# 1NC

#### First, freedom of mobility is a ruse.

#### Transportation infrastructure produces docile bodies who do not possess the potential for mobility but are compelled to never stop moving in order to perform quotidian functions. Frictionless movement becomes a death march of mobility.

Sager 2006 [Tore, Department of Civil and Transport Engineering, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, “Freedom as Mobility: Implications of the Distinction between Actual and Potential Travelling,” Mobilities, Vol. 1, No. 3]

Bauman (2000) emphasises that mobility and power are intertwined. Partly for this reason, mobility is not a good that tends to be equally distributed among people; rather, it tends to reflect power differences. According to Bauman, ‘people who move and act faster … are now the people who rule’ (2000, p.119). If this is so, it is not an unambiguous tendency, however. Albertsen and Diken (2001) note that whereas mobility is a matter of choice for some, for others it is a fate. Some people are constantly forced to move on and are denied the right to settle down in a suitable place. ‘Do we dare assume that their mobility, their border-crossing is liberating?’, Pritchard (2000, p.59) asks rhetorically. Compelled movement creates problems for an ideology that associates mobility with freedom. It would seem that these displaced people, always being passed on to another territory and another authority, are forced to be free in the sense of being mobile. However, this counterintuitive result is problematic only when mobility is defined as revealed transport. In this essay mobility is defined as potential transport, and it is stressed that freedom of movement implies the right not to move. It is thus clear that the potentiality aspect of mobility prevents an awkward problem concerning mobility’s relationship to freedom. The possibility that individuals might be forced to be free was discussed by JeanJaques Rousseau as part of his work on participative democracy. The aim here is to reformulate the dilemma in a mobility context. The collective decision-making body might provide mobility to the population, but in order to succeed the decisionmakers might have to organise society so as to ensure a high volume of transport (or person-kilometres). Private investment in transport infrastructure and vehicles will not be generated without anticipated demand. A break-even point for the established supply might require more travelling than most people are comfortable with. Focusing on freedom as mobility, one could say that the mobile population is in this case forced to be free. However, it seems to be a contradiction in terms that freedom can be forced on the citizens (Simhony, 1991). In general, this paradoxical situation might arise in a market society where freedom is associated with a high and diversified transport supply, which gives ample opportunities for choice. The problem is that high supply will not be offered in the market in the absence of high demand. Hence, the ability to enjoy the services of the producers is conditional on high willingness to pay among the consumers. They have to reveal their high demand. If they choose not to travel, they will lose the opportunity to travel. Actual transport is a prerequisite for mobility. Consumers do not escape the constraining have to if they want to enjoy the freedom of having the opportunity to. They have to make a lot of trips in order to be mobile – even in the sense of being potentially able to travel. In this lies the parallel to Rousseau’s forcedtobe-free dilemma. Because of the 1/n effect, the single individual is not likely to feel that the requirement for a sufficient overall volume of trips limits his or her freedom. Each individual relies on the others to do the travelling and feels no personal responsibility to pay for the supply that essentially provides mobility. The favourable view of freedom as mobility, freedom as potential transport, depends on the majority’s belief that they could actually travel far less and still maintain their existing level of mobility. However, if too many individuals were to enjoy merely the potentiality of transport, the system would break down. In many cases, planners counteract this breakdown, although not necessarily consciously. The more transport they plan for, the more society is designed in ways making people dependent on transport, and the less opportunity remains to enjoy mobility in the sense of potential transport. A threat to the idea of freedom as mobility comes from the behavioural principle of maximising a notion of utility made up entirely from the consumption of goods and services, as is standard procedure in economics. Freedom as mobility, as potential transport, has no explicit value in this maximisation process. The difference between potential and actually implemented transport is of no significance to human action with this idea of utility. The intrinsic ‘value’ of any potential travelling would be offset by the slightest increase of utility stemming from the commodity bundle that might be acquired on an extra trip. When everything is connected to everything else in physical space in a vast and seamless web, when ‘distance is dead’ and zero friction has brought cause and effect into an intimate embrace, nothing can be controlled unless everything is controlled. Then the prediction paradigm of planners (Sager, 2005) makes them enemies of freedom. Predictability comes at the expense of flexibility. To the degree that transport planners successfully control ever more variables that might possibly be obstacles to prediction, utility maximisation and transport in search of better bargains, freedom as mobility is lost.8 What from the perspective of transport planners appears as the fatal flaw in their art – their inability to eliminate friction, the Herculean task of turning physical space into an integrated and fine-woven structure of premium circulation networks – is instead the condition of freedom. Where the circulation systems become indeterminate, in the gaps between them, the high-friction interstices and transfer points, we might exercise the independent choice of keeping further movement as a potentiality. We can stop to think, exit the system if we so wish, and in this respect we are autonomous (compare Friedmann, 1979, p.38). In the quest for freedom, the main point is not necessarily to cross borders, but to exploit the ambiguity of the border zone. Crossing borders is often to move from one system, one solid structure, and one firmly cemented tangle of power relations to another. Escape means to exploit the possibilities, weaknesses, and uncoordinated control found in the gaps between the systems. Sometimes it is a question of rejecting the either/or, breaking with the regimentation of code/space-formatted premier circulation systems, and playfully exploring the scope for hybrid movement, using low-tech modes on part of the journey. Escape for some groups in some settings is as incredibly easy as walking out a door. For others, formal restrictions, deep-seated habits, or internalised conventions raise almost insurmountable barriers in matters of mobility (Gerzina, 2001). When transport becomes too easy, ‘excess travel’ proliferates (Handy et al., 2005), and the domain of potentiality is shrinking. Paradoxically, when distance is dead, so is freedom as mobility. The self-destructive capacity of omnipotence, Hegel’s vivid description of the lord destroying himself as master the moment he destroys the slave, is also recognised in this ambivalence (Bernstein, 1971, pp.26–27). Just when the planners seem to have succeeded completely, when control is gained over the last variable that could possibly interfere with movement, transport planning has demolished its own rationale of freedom as mobility. There is no longer any reason not to travel. Potential transport becomes an oxymoron, and no one rests in peace.

#### Second, transportation infrastructure individuates consumption through social diffusion, ramping up demand, locking in mobility for the affluent reproduces domination and exclusion from vital social functions. Technologies of efficiency police the population through the super-panopticon of perpetual surveillance.

Andrejevic 2003 [Mark, Fairfield University, “Monitored Mobility in the Era of Mass Customization,” Space and Culture, Vol. 6, No. 2]

Surely this dramatic increase reflected a feat of engineering—of highway building and automobile making, of designing and constructing the infrastructure for suburban sprawl and shopping malls—but it also represented a crucial spatial component of the dramatic increase in levels of consumption and production associated with 20thcentury consumer society. What Lefebvre (1991) described as the “productive consumption” of space associated with increased mobility helped to stimulate a productive spiral: suburbanization and its associated technologies of mobile and static privatization increased demand through spatial dispersion. Each household served as the repository for a private set of appliances that displaced or replaced forms of collective consumption: The automobile displaced the trolley, the radio the concert hall, the TV set the downtown movie theater, and so on. The demise of collective consumption increased demand for individual consumption thereby helping to absorb the goods produced by an increasingly rationalized and efficient industrial sector. Lefebvre provided one example of this spiral in his discussion of what Goodman called “asphalt’s magic circle”: Government taxes on gasoline are used to build an improved highway system, thereby subsidizing the use of automobiles and increasing the consumption of gasoline (and space) and in turn promoting the further production of automobiles (p. 374). As Lefebvre put it, This sequence of operations implies a productive consumption: the consumption of a space, and one that is doubly productive in that it produces both surplus value and another space. . . .What actually happens is that a vicious circle is set in train which for all its circularity is an invasive force serving dominant economic interests. (p. 374) The fact that Lefebvre refers to this spiral of production as a “strategy” suggests its association with techniques for the rationalization of production (and of the production of space). Indeed, the spatial differentiation associated with the rise of industrial capitalism offered the promise of individuation as a ruse of rationalization. Suburbanization offered an escape from urban congestion as surely as it served as a form of sorting, exclusion, and differentiation. Similarly, the interstate highway system mobilized the myth of the freedom of the road while simultaneously channeling movement through certain areas and around others. As Deleuze put it, “People can drive infinitely and ‘freely’ without being confined yet while still being perfectly controlled” (quoted in Allon, 2001, p. 20). From the very inception of mass society, the promise of differentiation, of freedom—in short, of an escape from its own stultifying homogeneity— has served as one of its guiding marketing strategies. (…continued on page 136…) It should be noted in advance that the consumption of space as a means of individuation is, in general, a form of consumption limited to affluent groups (as is the promise of individuation through the consumption of customized goods and services). As Morley (2000), quoting Massey, observed, the mobility of affluent classes is “quite different from the mobility of the international refugee or the unemployed migrant as a social experience” (p. 200)—not to mention the immobility of groups of people unable to relocate from regions of poverty, famine, and warfare. Echoing Foucault, it is tempting to observe that the bourgeoisie have endowed themselves with a “garrulous mobility”—one that permeates the ads for cell phones, cruise lines, and SUVs—and that just as there is a bourgeois form of monitored mobility, there are also class mobilities (subject to rather different forms of surveillance).Which is not to say that other groups are excluded from spatial monitoring but rather that much of this monitoring is devoted to the forms of sorting and exclusion described by Gandy (1993) and Lyon (1994). Indeed, the law enforcement correlative to consumer monitoring, especially in the newly terrorism-conscious United States, is what Marx (1988) has described as categorical suspicion:Monitoring is not limited to particular suspects but is universalized to figure out who the suspects might be. Of late, the spatial component of this type of monitoring has been developed as a technique to permit the automated recognition of criminal activity: Computers are programmed to recognize, in their monitoring of a particular space, interaction patterns associated with criminal activity and then to flag those interactions (Riordan, 1997). The intersection of spatio-temporal paths can be used as hieroglyphic representations of particular kinds of social interactions—hieroglyphs that reduce the need for human monitoring and thereby realize a superpanopticon that does not rely merely on the probability of being watched but on its certainty.

#### Third, the expert discourses that circulate around transportation produce the normative travelling body. The affirmative disciplines the citizen into an efficient consumer while excluding bodies not fit for transit. Mobility planning manages micro-practices in order to secure the economic function of the city.

Bonham 6 [Jennifer, The Editorial Board of the Sociological Review “Transport: disciplining the body that travels”]

The disciplining of the travelling body has been examined in detail elsewhere (Bonham, 2002), the main point to be made in this chapter is the historical specificity of that body. The normalizing discourses which have brought the efficient (or economical) traveller into effect have been so utterly effective because they have been produced, circulated, and elaborated by a multiplicity of experts working across a number of disciplines and agencies. The knowledges brought into effect by these experts not only coalesced with each other but also normalized the efficient traveller. This normalization was made complete when, in 1949, George Zipf announced that an underlying principle of all human behaviour was the desire to minimize human effort (Zipf, 1949: v). This naturalization of the ‘efficient body’, which underpins present day transport research, placed the modern body outside of the political domain and therefore beyond question. As the body was disciplined to move efficiently, knowledge began to proliferate on the journey and on how to secure its economic conduct. One hundred years of micro-investigations and interventions into the spaces, bodies, mechanisms, and conduct of travel are difficult to unravel. I would argue, however, that breaking motoring into its constituent parts is an important task for three reasons. First, because it disrupts the fusion – or the illusion of unity (car, body, space, conduct) – that transport experts (road and vehicle designers, road safety experts, transport planners and modellers) work in earnest to create. Second, each of these constituent parts is linked into broader socio-spatial relations that are marginalized or excluded as researchers – once again – prioritize the motorist and motoring as a site of investigation. Finally, it seems it is in these constituent parts that the apparent dominance of the motoring experience can be fractured and destabilized. The first part of this chapter focused upon the objectification of, and interventions into, the spaces and uses of the street from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. It was argued that these interventions reinforced each other to produce the street not just as a site of movement but as a site of efficient movement. The logic of the economic journey provided the basis for designating street space for a new order of mobility. The second part of the chapter focused upon the objectification of the travelling body and the human capacities necessary to fast, orderly movement. As these capacities were identified, norms were established and individual travellers could be positioned in relation to these norms. Those bodies that fell outside of the norm were excluded from particular travel practices such as driving. Nonetheless, all travellers were targeted to conduct themselves efficiently both at the micro level of their own bodies and in reference to the journeys made by others. The ordering of street uses and street spaces within discourses on urban planning and engineering coalesced with the ordering of travelling bodies within discourses on psychology and medicine to value the efficient body and secure the economical operation of the city. It was through the first half of the twentieth century that the street was entrenched as a site of economical travel and travellers disciplined to this ordering of movement. As this order was established, it became meaningful to produce knowledge about journeys and innovations in the travel survey made this practicable. The origin-destination survey enabled transport planners to identify the precise points in the urban environment between which people moved – the point-to-point journey, or ‘trip’, was no longer an abstraction. These surveys, in turn, enabled the elaboration of the journey in terms of the timing and duration of journeys, the routes along which people travelled and the mode of travel. Norms could then be established in relation to each of these ‘trip criteria’ (origin, destination, duration, route). Transport planners used these criteria to determine which modes of travel maximized choice and they intervened in the urban environment to secure the conditions necessary for these travellers (Bonham, 2002). The new field of transport enabled the elaboration of a range of mechanisms (safety programmes, regulatory devices such as traffic lights, street and vehicle designs) to structure the field of action of the ‘free’ urban traveller toward the efficient conduct of the journey. The ordering of urban movement established in the first part of the twentieth century was (and still is) fundamental to the field of urban transport and the present-day conduct of travel.

#### Fourth, the highway and the rail-line are the concentration camps of speed. Through the domination of time, transportation acts as the last fortification of the states ability to conduct war. The continued appropriation of space by technologies of speed makes the Earth into a battlefield.

Virilio, Curator of the Museum of the Accident, in ‘5 |Paul, Negative Horizon, Pg. 58-9|

Deterritorialization inaugurates the sublimation of domestic pacification,¶ the bringing about of great movements of colonists announces¶ the age of massive and accelerated migrations: beyond exocolonization,¶ an endocolonization, the acceleration of a distancing, the incessant¶ quotidian bustle and the absence of settlements beyond the city limits,¶ the gyrovague cycles of work and leisure and no longer the ostracism¶ of deportation. 'This mass of individuals visible in the smallest military¶ unit unites in a common voyage' that Clausewitz described long ago,¶ public transport generalizes it today: transport became civilization. Both¶ the long highway convoys of holidaymakers and the suburban trains¶ of the proletarian itineration define a political isobar, a new frontier,¶ literally a last front, that of movement and of its violence. Already the¶ German geographer Ratzel defined war as the promenade' of one's¶ frontier over the terrain of the adversary, the front being merely a¶ wandering frontier, its line being merely a military isobar. From this¶ point forth the front line will pass through the centre of towns, through¶ the heart of the countryside, and the common voyage of the task force¶ advances with the incessant movement of traffic. High-speed routes¶ are the next to last figure of the fortification, but a fortification that is¶ once again identified, as during the pastoral era, with time saved and¶ no longer with permanent obstacles. If the capacity for sudden onset¶ is indeed the essence of war, it is also that of the modern State. 'The¶ weapon of the Army Service Corps', the totality of supply networks¶ functions like a last place/non-place of political power putting the full¶ scope of the state apparatus into play. 'An army is always strong enough¶ when it can go and come, extend itself and draw itself back in, as it¶ wishes and when it wishes.' This phrase of the ancient Chinese strategist¶ Se Ma presents the pneumatic dimension of the transit camp, or¶ rather, of the unspeakable social migration, vectorial image of a combat¶ without battle but not without fear, that gives rise to an extermination¶ that extends throughout the world and spreads its victims across the¶ field of excess speed. At the beginning of the transportation revolution,¶ Field Marshal von Moltke wrote: 'We prefer the construction of the¶ railway to that of the fortification' - a phrase that could have been¶ interpreted as pacifist if the invasion of France in 1870 had not introduced¶ a cruel contradiction to the ideology of 'progress through the¶ increased speed of transports'. Whatever one may say, to vanquish is¶ always to advance, and to gain in speed [frenare de la vitesse] is always¶ to take power [preñare lepouvoir], since there is always a dromocrat to¶ declare, like Frederick II on the subject of the Austrians: 'Indolent in¶ their movements, slow in executing their projects, they regarded time as¶ their own.¶ Let us not forget, we are all Austrians, the slow [lent] and the violent¶ confront one another in this 'battle between classes of speed' that has¶ gone on since the innovation of that first logistical support of space that¶ was the woman of burden. Transports govern production, including the¶ production of destruction; since the problem of the transport is parallel¶ to that of munitions, the speed of action always depends upon the¶ state of the logistical system. After von Moltke, it was Luddendorf who¶ stated in 1918: 'The Allied victory is the victory of French trucks on¶ the German railway. It was no longer the victory of a people, a nation,¶ or even of a general, but rather the victory of a vector. The place of¶ war is no longer the frontier that bounds the territory, but that point¶ where the machine of transport moves. And with the beginning of the¶ Second World War, General Guderian, practitioner of the Blitzkrieg,¶ concluded: 'where we find the tanks, there is the front'. Thus he fulfils¶ Goebbels designs, who already in 1929 claimed: 'He who can conquer¶ the road, conquers also the State'. All is front from this point on, since¶ everything is mobilized at all times and in all terrains. Where we find¶ the travelling machine, there is the State, the country has disappeared¶ in the non-place of the State of emergency, territorial space vanishes,¶ only Time remains - but only the time that remains.¶ Now each vector administers the time of the passenger in expelling¶ him through the unleashing of the beyond, speed is the progress of¶ violence at the same time as its advantage; beyond the territorial body,¶ each speed constitutes a fleeting 'province of time' where the old role of¶ places disappears in the geographic annihilation of distances. The urban¶ motorway is not a pathway of transmission, but the concentration¶ camp of speed; segregation and incarceration stem far more from the¶ violence of displacement than from various police controls - a highway¶ colony, similar to the staircase of Mauthausen, that motorists extend by¶ the increased performance of their vehicles, by the tolls or tickets that¶ sanction excessive speeds far more than the excess of speed.¶ In reality, with the dromocratic revolution of transports, it is the¶ administration of Time that starts to take shape. The interest in¶ dominating time far more than territory already made its appearance¶ in the cult of the train schedule. Frederick of Prussia's desire for¶ conquest became that of every industrial state: it is no longer invasion¶ that forms the foundation of the law but its speed, pure speed. The direct¶ line [droite ligne] of the pathway of penetration indispensable to its¶ celerity symbolizes the extermination of public rights [droit public]:,¶ the emergency literally caused the traditional political structures to¶ implode. In contracting distances, it causes the forces of the marching¶ order to intervene in every sector of public life. Under the virtuous¶ pretexts of risks and dangers resulting from the acceleration of relations,¶ the project of a rigorous management of Time, following that of space,¶ tends to become that of a prevention of the moment....¶ In metamorphosing into an 'integral security', defence finally brings¶ about the perfection of the principle of fortification that Vauban¶ announced as follows: 'War must be immediately superimposable on¶ all habitable places in the world'.

#### Fifth, ensuring the health of the social body is the underside of the power to mobilize populations for war. Global extinction would not be possible without the unquestioned biopolitics of the 1AC.

Foucault, in ’76 [Michel, The History of Sexuality, pg. 136-137]

Since the classical age the West has undergone a very¶ profound transformation of these mechanisms of power.¶ "Deduction" has tended to be no longer the major form of¶ power but merely one element among others, working to¶ incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize¶ the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making¶ them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated¶ to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them.¶ There has been a parallel shift in the right of death, or at least¶ a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-administering¶ power and to define itself accordingly. This death that¶ was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as¶ simply the reverse of the right of the social body to ensure,¶ maintain, or develop its life. Yet wars were never as bloody¶ as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts¶ on their own populations. But this formidable power of death¶ -and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and¶ the cynicism with which it has so greatly expanded its limits¶ -now presents itself as the counterpart of a power that¶ exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer,¶ optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls¶ and comprehensive regulations. Wars are no longer waged in¶ the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are¶ waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations¶ are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in¶ the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital. It is¶ as managers of life and survival, of bodies \_and the race, that¶ so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars,¶ causing so many men to be killed. And through a turn that¶ closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them¶ to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision¶ that initiates them and the one that terminates them are in¶ fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival.¶ The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process:¶ the power to expose a whole population to death is the¶ underside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued¶ existence. The principle underlying the tactics of battle-¶ that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on¶ living-has become the principle that defines the strategy of¶ states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical¶ existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence¶ of a population. If genocide is indeed the dream of modern¶ powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient¶ right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at¶ the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale¶ phenomena of population.

#### Last, the alternative is a rejection of the affirmative’s dangerous biopolitics that justify the investment in transportation infrastructure.

#### And, our intervention into the aff’s regime of truth challenges the hegemony of modernity’s technological thought and drives for control. The alternative is a necessary first step to re-build the world brink-by-brick.

Edkins, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales at Aberystwyth, in ‘6 [Jenny December 2006, “The Local, the Global and the Troubling,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Vol. 9 No. 4, pg. 499-511]

Of course, 'this regime is not merely ideological or superstructural; it was a condition of the formation and development of capitalism' (Foucault 1980a: 133), which means that interventions that challenge the regime of truth constitute a challenge to the hegemony of the social and economic system with which it is bound up. It is in this context of a particular, scientific regime of truth and the role of the intellectual that I want to discuss the ways in which the academic search for 'causes' and 'solutions' to the Northern Ireland conflict operates, and how this mode of working can prohibit change. The role of the intellectual, as both Gramsci and Foucault have argued, can be central to change and contestation, but it can also be part of the structures that prohibit change and keep existing structures and problematisations in place. I suggest that the particular form of intellectual work that identifies 'problems' and then proposes 'solutions' is problematic. It ultimately reinforces or reproduces certain ways of thinking and conceals the way that identifying something as a problem in the first place is already to take a particular stance in relation to it. I argue that the alternative in the case of violence in particular is to engage in intellectual activity that brings to light struggles hidden in detailed historical records or localised knowledges - an activity that Foucault calls genealogy - and emphasises the necessity for a gradual remaking of the world, not through narrative accounts that regularise and normalise history in terms of cause and effect, but through a slow re-building, brick by brick***.***

# Virilio One Card 1NC

#### Horse, Women? {\*\*\*Tag this yourself\*\*\*}

Virilio, Curator of the Museum of the Accident, in ‘5 |Paul, Negative Horizon, Pg. 39-49|

Man is the passenger of woman, not only at the time of his birth, but¶ also during their sexual relations, hence the taboo against incest as a¶ vicious circle, or rather, voyage.2 Paraphrasing Samuel Buder, we could¶ say that the female is the means that the male found to reproduce¶ himself, that is to say, to come to the world. In this sense, woman is the¶ first means of transportation for the species, its very first vehicle, the¶ second would be the horse [monture^ with the enigma of the coupling¶ of dissimilar bodies fitted out for the migration, the common voyage.¶ Pack animals, saddled horses, or draught horses - the metabolic¶ vehicles present themselves as the exemplary products of a scorned¶ zoophilia, forgotten with the rejection of bestiality. At the origin of¶ domestication, woman preceded the raised and bred animal, the first¶ form of economy, even before slavery and husbandry. She begins this¶ movement that will lead to the pastoral societies, patriarchal societies¶ organized for war, beyond the primordial hunt. In feet, it is at the close¶ of these first acts of carnage that what is to come is first sketched out:¶ war. From the animal hunt for the purpose of immediate subsistence,¶ we pass on to the hunt for woman in passing on to the hunt for¶ man. But this hunt is already more than a slaughter, an execution;¶ it is a capture, the capture of female livestock. The waste of energy¶ ceases, as far as the female sex, once the males are again executed and¶ consumed. This is the case practically up to the agricultural stage that¶ will see the institutionalization of slavery, thanks to the taking of men¶ as prisoners.¶ It is useful to consider this transfer of violence for just as war arose¶ from conflicts between members of the same species and not from a¶ confrontation with animal kind, so also did its sophistication further¶ develop in connection with internecine struggles as opposed to conflicts¶ against outsiders.¶ Patriarchy arose with the capture of women and then established and¶ perfected itself through the husbandry of livestock. In this economy of¶ violence that signalled the pastoral stage, beauty preceded the beast, it is¶ the coexistence of this twofold livestock that favoured the establishment¶ of the dominant sex; but looking again at these metamorphoses of the¶ hunter, domestication is the fulfilment and perfecting of prédation.¶ Outright bloodshed and direct slaughter are contrary to the unlimited¶ use of violence, that is to say, its economy. From the confrontation¶ ending in the carnage of the first ages, we witness an evolution that¶ leads hunters to the point of gaining simple control of the movements of¶ certain selected species, then with the help of the dog, the first 'domesticated'¶ animal, we pass on to the shepherding of semi-wild herds and¶ finally to breeding. The domestication of the female stock has its place¶ in this process. Some time before the pack animal, woman served as a¶ beast of burden; like the herd, she worked in the fields, controlled and¶ supervised by men. During migrations, in the course of conflicts, she¶ carried the baggage. Well before the use of the domesticated donkey,¶ she was the sole 'means of transport'. In attending to transport, woman¶ allowed the burdened hunter to specialize in the homosexual duel, that¶ is, to become a hunter of men, a warrior.¶ The first freedom is the freedom of movement, the 'woman of¶ burden [feinme-de-charge] provided the man of the hunt with this,¶ but this freedom is not one of 'leisure', it is a potential for movement¶ that is identified with a potential for war, beyond the primitive hunt.¶ The first logistical support, the domesticated female establishes war in¶ taking over the hunter's maintenance for him; just as the territory will¶ be laid out by the invader for the best movement of his forces, so also¶ the woman captured and taken as a mate will immediately be changed¶ into a means of transport. Her back will be the model for later means of¶ portage, all auto-mobility will stem from this infrastructure, from this¶ pleasing conquered croup; all the desires of conquest and penetration¶ are found here in this domestic vehicle. This woman-of-burden who¶ will continue this portage from gestation and early infancy gives the¶ warrior time, sometimes a good time, but above all free time.¶ On this level, the heterosexual group will be more formidable in¶ the homicidal fight than the homosexual, and the purely logistical¶ dimension of the weaker sex will be essential to the emergence of the¶ patriarchal order. On this side of reproduction and sexual customs,¶ bisexuality asserts itself as a veritable 'mode of subsistence'. For the¶ nomad, survival was identified with the pursuit of prey; with pasturage,¶ the pursuit of the enemy. The group finds its subsistence in its faculties¶ of adaptation to movement, its 'fortification is only 'time gained' over¶ prey, over the adversary, it is not yet the 'obstacle' of the sedentary¶ agrarian, but the course and its means: 'pack-woman',4 the mare,¶ anticipating later conveyances. In offering him free time, along with her¶ back, woman became the 'future of man',5 his destiny and destination.¶ Thanks to this first stock, the hunter-breeder comes to possess what¶ in military terms we call 'a good payload capacity' thus allowing him¶ to prolong conflicts and therefore to succeed, since he was no longer¶ obliged to procure food on site.¶ Conflicts, limited up till then by the limited mobility of groups,¶ could henceforth be extended because woman brought to the warrior¶ his projectile weapons and served as supply. With the breeding of¶ the horse, war will last even longer and extend over a greater area,¶ simply because the horse's capacity and speed is superior to the human¶ metabolic vehicle.¶ Let's take the example of the Maya: in the Yucatan, the wars that¶ preceded the arrival of the Spanish were always of short duration, for on¶ that continent the women were still the only transport vectors— On¶ the other hand, with the conquest by a trifling company of mounted¶ invaders, we witness a debacle without precedent that is no better¶ explained by metallic weapons than by the spiritual disposition of the¶ native people. It is the differential in time, the speed of the conquerors¶ that enabled the extermination of a civilization by a few dozen¶ horsemen. The introduction of the horse on the American continent is¶ the probable cause of the extinction of a people and a culture that faced¶ their conquerors together in the same place, but in a different unity of¶ time, the Spanish possessed this 'dromocratic' superiority that always¶ compensates for any inferiority in numbers.¶ In sum, with the origin of the first expansion of combat, woman¶ was the first 'transportation revolution'. She allowed the hunter to¶ specialize in the obscenity of the narcissistic and homosexual duel, far¶ more formidable than the contest with wild animals because it requires¶ constant changes in tactics, as well as strategies. By her domestication,¶ the weaker sex allowed the invention of an enemy beyond prey; later,¶ this extension of the assault was pursued with pack animals, the¶ invention of the mount, the cavalry, the use of chariots and the sorts¶ of infrastructural constraints specific to Mesopotamia, the invention¶ of roads, in anticipation of the railway ... but this is another history,¶ that of the specifically technological revolution in transportation as¶ opposed to the metabolic vectors. We saw in the nineteenth century¶ how man came down from his horse to mount the train, and this in¶ the same era when he discovers himself curiously descended from an¶ ape-like anthropoid ... I would here like to make an inverse move and¶ attempt a guess at how man mounted his horse [monté sur la monture]¶ in descending from the arms, from the back of woman.¶ To leave is also to leave behind; to leave the dock, the port, to prepare¶ to launch out, but also to lose one's sense of calm, to be swept up in the¶ violence of speed, this unsuspected violence produced by the vehicle, this¶ celerity that tears us away so abruptly from the places travelled through¶ and in which we abandon ourselves in shared transport.¶ Each departure is a distancing [ecartement] that deprives us of¶ contact, of direct experience; each instance of vehicular mediation is¶ nothing other than a drawing and quartering [écartèlemenfì, a torture of¶ the locomotive body, a sensory privation of the passenger. Borne along,¶ walled in by the violence of movement, we merely attain acceleration,¶ that is to say, the loss of the immediate. Speed, by its violence, becomes¶ a destiny at the same time as being a destination. We go nowhere,¶ we have contented ourselves solely widi leaving and abandoning the¶ vivacious and vivid [vif] to the advantage of the void [vide] of speed.¶ The term 'mount' [monter] shows [montre] this clearly: we mount¶ horses, we 'mount'6 automobiles, we climb up [élevons] to be carried off¶ [être enlevés], stolen away by the prosthesis that extends our mobility;¶ this abduction is at the heart of accelerated travel, travellers taken up by¶ the violence of speed are 'displaced persons', [«personnes déplacée/»}¶ literally deportees— However, this modern transmigration seems to¶ have been overlooked; the acceleration of movement [deplacemenf] has¶ been assimilated to a progression, to progress, as a curious blind alley in¶ the history of movement— The mount would seem, therefore, indispensable¶ to the assumption of the passenger, this rider levitated above¶ the ground, hostage to the celerity of his course, deprived of his own¶ motility. Eliminating the fatigue of its passenger's locomotive limbs,¶ the horse, the mount, in its saddle, resembles a seat that moves, a piece¶ of furniture, a hippomobile that is not satisfied merely in assisting the¶ body in the requirements of parking, of rest, like a chair, but also in¶ moving from one place to another.¶ The invention of the mount would be in some measure a military tactic¶ of the locomotive body: just as we exercise our limbs standing in place¶ in order to alleviate extended sedentary immobility, so also, in the¶ mobility of the saddled animal, we spare ourselves from the discomfort¶ of pedestrian travel by manipulating the speed of movement. Sliding¶ bit by bit, drifting stage by stage, from the slightest shifts to the most¶ far-reaching, we play this game of hide and seek with our body which¶ we call: assistance, comfort, support, well-being ... in order to feel our¶ animal body less we are constantly on the move (motility), so as to forget¶ the expanse of the territorial body, we travel rapidly, violently.¶ This constant search for an ideal weightlessness is at the heart of the¶ problems of domination. The epiphany of the horse, celebrated in the¶ Middle Ages, illustrates this particularly well: in equestrian heroism,¶ the horse is the bearer of death at the same time as being the protector¶ of life, but 'wasn't it only the protector because it was the bearer?' as¶ Fernand Benoit asks.9 This theme recurs again in the bearer of Christ,¶ St Christopher, patron saint of motorists. The celerity of the warhorse¶ protects the rider from his pursuers but also from his own weakness,¶ the mount protects its passenger from the weakness of his own constitution,¶ but only by disqualifying it, explaining why the horse and the bird10¶ would be portents of death at the same time as being portents of power¶ and domination: it is necessary first for the passenger to join corporally¶ with the divine celerity of the warhorse, to lose his soul in an immediate¶ metempsychosis in order to accede to domination. He who is 'mounted'¶ dominates those on the ground, he dominates them by the height of his¶ mount, but also by the mobile force of his horse with ks tack on. His¶ adversaries will no longer escape him, they are driven before him in the¶ hunt and widely dispersed, the martial role of the horse is to disperse the¶ fleeing enemy in order to exterminate it, the charge of the cavalry breaks¶ through the mass of infantry like an explosive charge tears open the¶ mass of walls and ramparts.¶ The differential in speed and violence between the infantry, those¶ who fight on foot, and the cavalry, those who fight on horseback,¶ leads to the disqualification of the former (just as the pack animal had¶ disqualified the 'pack-woman'), only to be followed in turn by the even¶ greater differential between technological means of transport and all¶ types of metabolic vectors.¶ The violence of speed is only an extermination; mounted, raised¶ up by his speed, the passenger is nothing but a dead man who rides11¶ both elevated [elevé] and carried off [enleve], the mounted rider no¶ longer really belongs, instead, he belongs quite entirely to the violence¶ of the warhorse and, just as the expression 'to take [enlever] a position'¶ means in military terms to take it by crossing over it, the phrase 'spur¶ on [enlever12} to the gallop' signifies that the rider is leaving the earth,¶ losing his footing in an accelerated errantry.¶ Speed resembles senescence, and death, this death that brushes up¶ against the evil that carries him off and bears him away from his people;¶ to mount the horse or ride in the automobile is to prepare to die to¶ the moment of the departure, and thus, to be reborn in the moment¶ of arrival (to die a bit...). Speed is identified with a premature aging,¶ the more the movement [mouvement13] accelerates, the more quickly¶ time passes and the more the surroundings are stripped of their significance;¶ 'displacement' [Replacement14] becomes a kind of cruel joke:¶ it is said 'The shortest trips15 are the best!' Like one who has passed¶ away, the passenger is no longer of this world, and if the freedom of¶ movement (habeas corpus] would seem to be one of the first freedoms,¶ the liberation of speed, the freedom of speed, seems to be the fulfilment¶ of all freedoms.16 In fact, the course arises in history as the sublimation¶ of the hunt, speed perpetuates the hunt and mobilization of forces,¶ extermination. The dromocratic hierarchy of speed [vitesse] renews¶ nobility: vitesse oblige\ The society of the course, society of the hunt,¶ the dromocracy is merely a clandestine organization of a social and¶ political hunt where speed extends the advantage of violence, a society¶ where the affluent class conceals the class of speed. The last 'economy¶ of violence', where the transmigration of species goes beyond portage,¶ in the 'transportation revolution' where riding, a metempsychosis of¶ origins, is illustrated by the myth of the centaur17 but also by the myth¶ of the motorist.¶ The progress of speed is nothing other than the unleashing of¶ violence; we saw that breeding and training were economic forms of¶ violence, or, if you like, the means to sustain violence, indeed render it¶ unlimited. The conservation of metabolic energy was not therefore an¶ end but an orientation of violence: the means to prolonging it in time\*,¶ the technological motor resulted in the long-standing pursuit of the¶ perpetuum mobile, and with it the release of this violence. Two questions¶ present themselves:¶ How did we ever guess at the vehicle within the animal? The motor¶ in their limbs?¶ How did the primate come to have this desire to couple with the¶ mount? What sort of seduction is at work here?¶ This desire for a foreign body following as it does the desire for the¶ different body oíheterosexuality seems to me a major event on a number¶ of points, comparable to the invention of fire, but an innovation that¶ has been lost in the obscurity that surrounds animality.¶ From the zoophobia that signals the earliest hunts and that ended in¶ the slaughter for immediate alimentary needs, we come to this zoophilia¶ of the training of the animal for transport¶ How is it that we get beyond the necessities of mere subsistence?¶ How did we guess at the motor beyond the reserve of meat on the hoof?¶ The means of locomotion on this side of alimentation?¶ What sort of economy, what sort of subsistence is at issue in the¶ costly upkeep of a large animal for the course?¶ Domestication seems to be a quasi functional end of predation:¶ bloodshed was a waste of violence, the enclosing of semi-wild animals,¶ and above all the breeding which followed, brought forth an initial¶ type of economy. Domestication is a form of conservation of energy¶ necessary for subsistence. With the training of the mount, this¶ underwent a transformation: the economy of violence is no longer¶ that of the hunter in the breeder but that of the hunted animal. With¶ the mount, kinetic energy was preserved, the speed of the horse as¶ opposed to that of proteins. From a direct subsistence economy to an¶ indirect one, we proceed on to an economy of survival, the animal of¶ locomotion was now useful almost only for combat, his passenger will¶ be only a parasite, the body of the race animal was nothing other than¶ a first speed factory, a motor, the standard for the modern measure of¶ horsepower.¶ Whereas the hunter aimed at stopping the movement of the wild¶ animal by a systematic slaughter, with domestication, the breeder¶ is satisfied with conserving it, finally, thanks to training; the rider is¶ linked up with the movement, in orienting it and in prompting its¶ acceleration. From the desire for death to the desire for incorporation,¶ it seems we witness a phenomenon of the metempsychosis of the living,¶ the couple at odds from their origins henceforth form only one body,¶ as in a marriage. It is the erotic desire for this prosthesis that sets it off¶ in the beginning.¶ But in this instant, the race becomes a higher form than the hunt,¶ the eruption of the beyond, of a beyond of physical bodies, territorial¶ and animal, an image of delirium and possession that will, in medieval¶ belief, become the 'diabolical hunt' where the horse takes on an apocalyptic¶ dimension, where the four riders symbolize the end of time and¶ the extermination of history.¶ After having signalled the suppression of distances by the speed of the¶ course, the eruption of the beyond signals the annihilation of time. The¶ speed of the warhorse symbolizes the terror of the end, but it must also¶ be carefully noted that fear and speed are in fact linked: in the animal¶ world, speed is the fruit of terror, the consequence of danger. In fact,¶ the reduction of distances by the acceleration of movement is the effect¶ of the instinct for self preservation. Speed being simply the production of¶ fear, it is flight and not the attack that prompts the violent distancing,¶ the sudden burst of speed. The constant acquisition of greater and¶ greater speed is only therefore the curb to increasing anxiety; in this¶ sense 'the transportation revolution', in producing in the nineteenth¶ century the factory of speed, industrializes terror: the motor manufactures¶ fear. The speed of movement18 is only the sophistication of flight¶ and not the attack, as the fascist philosophy of the thirties claimed ('All¶ grandeur is in the attack' in other words, in the eruption of the beyond¶ of bodies and in particular the territorial body). Unfortunately for the¶ 'futurists' this war manoeuvre is never anything but a flight forward, a¶ prevention of the end and not a projection forward!¶ If distance is place, it is also the body. To sweep down upon [fonare],¶ to strike precipitously, is at once: to be swept up into \fondre], to¶ dissolve into ... we find here the vehicular function of the warhorse to¶ disperse (skedasis19), to drive the enemy astray [¿carter], but also, to be¶ carried astray oneself [¿¿carter], taken beyond the familiar horizon.¶ 'Fear is cruel', says a Nordic maxim, 'it never kills, but it impairs¶ life.' The sublimation of the hunt in the course also makes it impossible¶ merely to abide—¶ Let us return to the invention of the vector. Very early, the hunter¶ must have been struck by the swiftness of animal movement and¶ fascinated by the instant reflexes of game. Conversely, pursued by wild¶ animals or enemies, the hunter must have perceived a real change in¶ the acceleration of his performance. In the terror, the power, and in¶ his forces multiplied by fear, he must have perceived a formidable¶ 'weapon. The aptitude for accelerated movement appeared to him as¶ the aptitude for survival, before the invention of tools designed for¶ killing, movement was for the fighting body what range would later be¶ for the power of projectile weapons: a question of critical distance, a¶ problem of retreat and not solely of penetration.¶ It is meanwhile significant to note that the extended range of sidearms¶ resulted from the development of the cavalry. If tools extend the body¶ of man and extend it to a great distance, thanks to the projectile; it is¶ the invention of the mount and the vehicle which will attain its greatest¶ extension, the mount will be the warriors first 'projector, his first¶ weapons system. 'At the beginning of the second millennium before¶ our era, the copper poniard in use in the Aegean region, will give birth¶ to the dagger, the longer weapon that spread through all of central¶ Europe. The dagger was very valuable for the soldier on foot, but for¶ the cavalry an even more imposing weapon was needed. It is therefore¶ with the cavalry of the last period of the bronze age that the dagger gave¶ rise to the sword', states General Fuller, and continues: 'The increase in¶ the numbers of cavalry armed with lances and swords will bring about¶ the suppression of the sledge and battleaxe of those who lived in the¶ steppes.' In fact, for this last category it was a question of tools more¶ than weapons. It was extension that will make of the hunting knife¶ a specialized weapon, and of the sword, a 'lance' ... from a series of¶ polyvalent prostheses we progress on to the 'weapon' that, according to¶ Sun Tsé, Ís only an 'ill-omened tool', an obscene prosthesis, literally!...¶ and this in order to offset the speed and the elevation of the mount. . ..¶ We saw previously that before the domestication and breeding of¶ the war horse, woman had contributed to the protraction of combat¶ beyond the duel; with the horse this protraction extends not only to¶ war and its duration, but also to the entirety of its means: weapons,¶ logistics, infrastructure, etc.¶ Extension and protraction come to be identified with protection and¶ defence, the protracted wars' of agrarian societies, which have survived¶ right into contemporary times, are sketched out in this transfer from¶ woman to the horse, then to the chariot and the road; as the military¶ space develops, the cavalry, as a parasite of the mount, gives way to¶ wheeled vehicles, while harnessing replaces the mounted coupling and¶ requires the construction of roads, that is to say the void, the clearing¶ out and straightening of the path. First 'military glacis', the road is only¶ a linear clearing offered to the 'divine celerity' of the war chariot, earth¶ scorched by vehicles, the surface scoured, the Mesopotamian road is¶ defined independently from the land it passes through, a geometric¶ abstraction; uniformity, unidirectionality, speed [la vitesse] provokes the¶ void [le vide] and the void [le vide], speed [le vite]—¶ After the pack animal, the draught animal, comes this line that¶ stretches out and extends beyond the bends of the road, this straight¶ route that predetermines the displacement by inducing the violence of¶ movement, this infrastructure, the 'static vehicle' that is nothing other¶ than a memorial to the celerity of fear. The steel that stretches out in¶ front in the sword, in the lance, in the knife as in the rail, is like the¶ road, that disappears over the horizon in a movement of shock and¶ distancing, signalling one violence, one terror.¶ In Mesopotamia, possession of the earth is always linked to the¶ techniques of the 'war of the course'; the monarch distributed the¶ territory to an elite of movement, those who move quickly possess the earth.¶ On the other hand, the charioteers had important administrative roles,¶ their teams allowing for a global surveillance in support of the central¶ power. In Rome, we find again the stallion-standard20 [cheval-etalon] in¶ the aristocracy of breeders and then, with the Roman equestrian order¶ and the octroi by the State of the 'public horse', we note that this elite of¶ speed is in fact economico-militaristic. Among the knights of the equite¶ romani, we find prefects, tribunes, but also 'military tradesmen. As¶ Nicolet notes: 'This second very influential aristocracy, who play a very¶ important financial and political role in the publica and the tribunals,¶ never lose the character that their military origins confer upon them.'21¶ The 'knight-banker' administers the movable and transportable assets.¶ His affluence results from transfers and from their celerity. The profit¶ of war results from the portable character of assets, without the transfer¶ of spoils war would be futile; economically if there was nothing to be¶ won, it would no longer be profitable.¶ To sum up, from the 'hunter-breeders' up to the 'ocean-pirates'¶ passing through the horsemen and charioteers, the elite of movement¶ represents a misunderstood and underestimated order without which¶ accumulation would not have been possible. The accumulation of¶ energy and of speed in the vectors of transport (horse-drawn or¶ seagoing) is indispensable for the capitalization of goods and riches, the¶ occult character of this dromocratic 'society of the course' reveals the¶ strategic dimension of the vectorial politics carried down through the¶ ages.¶ Desire for a metallic body — the passenger enclosed in the cabin of¶ the automobile repeats the primary coupling. As if the materialist West,¶ with the revolution of transports, installed its metempsychosis in the¶ present moment of bodies; without awaiting the transmigrations of¶ birth or death, the industry of movement accelerates, transfers, from¶ here to there, from one to the other, we 'cast off' [«appareillons»22],¶ enclosed in the differential of speeds, walled in by the energy of the¶ travelling, we are less human than we are station.23¶ Site of ejection and no longer election,24 territory becomes the¶ margin [lisière] of an incessant cabotage: disembarkation, embarkation,¶ break of load, technical rhythms build us up and break us down relentlessly.¶ The excess of speed is a driving school, it trains our reflexes, our¶ responses, as the fascist Marinetti once wrote:¶ Our heart is not in the least weary!¶ For it feeds on fire, hate, and speed.

## Links

### TI = biopolitics

#### \_\_\_ Transportation infrastructure is part of a larger apparatus of police power

Nadesan, Professor Social & Behavioral Sciences, ASU, in ‘8 [Majia Holmer, “Governmentality, Biopower, and Everyday Life”, pg. 18]

Foucault (1980a) claimed that the concept of population as a distinct¶ object of inquiry and administration emerged in the eighteenth century in¶ relation to the apparatuses of police:¶ The great eighteenth-century demographic upswing in Western Europe,¶ the necessity for coordinating and integrating it into the apparatus of¶ production and the urgency of controlling it with finer and more adequate¶ power mechanisms caused 'population,' with its numerical variables¶ of spaces and chronology, longevity and health, to emerge not only¶ as a problem but as an object of surveillance, analysis, intervention,¶ modification, etc. The project of a technology begins to be sketched:¶ demographic estimates, the calculation of the pyramid of ages, different¶ life expectations and Levels of mortality, studies of the reciprocal relations¶ of growth of wealth and growth of population .... (p. 171)¶ Police power addressed problems of order and security and was exercised¶ through detailed regulations by authorities attempting to redress specific,¶ concrete circumstances (Valverde, 2003). Public health and transportation¶ were historically important problem arises for police power.

#### \_\_\_\_ Transportation infrastructure is a just a way for the state to securitize the transactions of the market through normalizing the social body.

Nadesan, Professor Social & Behavioral Sciences, ASU, in ‘8 [Majia Holmer, “Governmentality, Biopower, and Everyday Life”, pg. 51]

From Foucault's perspective, liberalism birthed the idea of the autonomous¶ market as a critique of state sovereignty. Foucault (1997c) remarked in "The¶ Birth of Biopolitics" that the "market as a reality and political economy as¶ a theory played an important role in the liberal critique," although " liberalism¶ is neither the consequence nor the development of these" (p. 76).¶ For Foucault, the market played "the role of a ' test'" for excessive governmentality¶ (p. 76). He observed that the market's relevance as test stemmed¶ from the " basic incompatibility between the optimal development of its¶ economic process and a maximization of governmental procedures" (p.¶ 76). Thus, the liberal critique of excessive government settled on the market¶ freeing " reflection on economic practices from the hegemony of the ' reason¶ of the state'" (p. 76).¶ By focusing on the market, the liberal philosophers hoped to dislocate¶ the mercantile formulation of the sovereign as the seat of power and economic¶ administration, freeing the circulation of goods and control from¶ the sovereign reins of power. Accordingly, seventeenth-century merchants¶ and financers heeded the call of individuals such as Sir Dudley North, who¶ advocated " Peace, Industry and Freedom that bring Trade and Wealth and¶ nothing else" (cited in Davies, 1952, p. 284). These aspirations would be¶ fully articulated in eighteenth-century political economy, which articulated¶ rights within a semantic context of individual ownership. The emerging¶ philosophy of liberalism critiqued sovereign authority over market transactions¶ but, simultaneously, called upon the state to securitize those transactions¶ through legal and transportation infrastructures. The state was also¶ called upon to police the poor, to govern those who were viewed as ungovernable¶ or as requiring government (Dean, 1990; Driver, 1993).

### TI = governmentality

#### \_\_\_\_ Mobility and governmentality are inseparable - the construction of transportation infrastructure is simultaneously the construction of the ideal American subject.

Conley 2010 (Donovan, Ph.D., University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana, “Grid and Swerve,” Critical Studies in Media Communication, Vol. 27, No. 1, http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcsm20.)

The federal government’s presence in the development of the West emerged through scattered, low-level thrusts of state exertion: through the military that accompanied surveyor and settlement parties; through trading and/or forced removal of Native Indians; through economic policies and infrastructural projects; through Congressional Statutes and Supreme Court decisions; and, most profoundly, through the distribution and regulation of public lands. The West thus became a political lever, the terrain through which the American nation-state became ‘‘governmentalized’’ (Foucault, 1991, p. 103). No longer a vast ‘‘empty’’ region, the western territory quickly became a striated space of nationalistic determination. To merely traverse this space was to announce oneself as a national subject. Increasingly through the thirties and forties, territorial mobility carried with it the imprimatur of the state. To move about was therefore to navigate one’s relation to the grid of governance that was conquering space in the name of the nation. The clearest expression of this fact remains the geo-political grid of roads, canals, and public lands that were patched together in the antebellum period under the shiny label ‘‘Internal Improvements.’’ These ‘‘Internal Improvements’’ established a grid of mobility as the ground of the nation-state. Together the ‘‘communications’’ network and the land grid consolidated, distributed, administered and mapped the spatiomaterial activities of the antebellum populace. This grand feat of national ‘‘improvement’’ thus became, in turn, a space of state-sponsored mobility. To borrow an observation from de Certeau, ‘‘the geometrical space of urbanists and architects seems to have the status of the ‘proper meaning’ constructed by grammarians and linguists in order to have a normal and normative level to which they can compare the drifting of ‘figurative’ language’’ (1988, p. 100). Let us add to urbanists and architects the normalizing role of civil engineers and surveyors, territorial legislatures and courts, administrative offices and military outposts (Lawson & Seidman, 2004). What must be appended to this observation, however, is the fact that such grids of normativity do not exert themselves as such in actually-existing social space. De Certeau thus adds, ‘‘In reality, this faceless ‘proper’ meaning . . . cannot be found in current use, whether verbal or pedestrian; it is merely the fiction produced by a use that is also particular, the metalinguistic use of science that distinguishes itself by that very distinction’’ (1988, p. 100). The grid as such, in other words, is an imperfect realization of the dream of social perfection; or, more to the point, a fractured expression of the dream of seamlessness\*what Fisher calls ‘‘damaged social space’’ (1988, p. 75). In its imperfection, nevertheless, the grid shaped the terrain of national mobility, funneling the movements of bodies, goods and (before the telegraph) information through social space. It thus became a defacto grid of governance, a terrain of designed mobility. The ways of navigating this terrain in turn articulate the possible ways of traversing the political ground of the state itself. It is here that we turn to Margaret Fuller’s aleatory style of western travel.

### TI = Speed

#### \_\_\_\_ The success of transportation infrastructure depends on speed and efficiency because they are constituents of the modern war machine. The Aff’s emphasis on speed enables military violence.

Virilio and Lotringer 83 (Paul and Sylver, Paul Virilio philosopher, Sylvère Lotringer, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus of French literature and philosophy at Columbia University., Pure War, pg. 44-45).

And only that. This brings me back to some ancient but clear-cut examples. We have two sides of the regulation of speed and wealth. Up until the nineteenth century, society was-founded on the brake. Means of furthering speed were very scant. You had ships, but sailing ships evolved very little between Antiquity and Napoleon's time; the horse even less; and of course there were carrier pigeons. The ·only machine to use speed with and sophistication was the optical telegraph, then the electronic telegraph. In general, up until the nineteenth century, there was no production of speed. They could produce brakes by means of ramparts, the law, rules, interdictions, etc. They could break using all kinds of obstacles. (It's not by chance that ancient society was one of the successive obstacles on the level of people, of morals, of terrotial defmition-whether it was the city walls, taxes, the fortified systems of the Nation-State: all of them were-so many Brakes) suddenly, there's the great revolution that others have called the Industrial Revolution or the Transportation revolution I call it a dromocratic revolution because what was invented was not only, as has been said, the possibility of multiplying similar objects (which to my' mind is a completely limited vision), but especially a means of fabricating speed with the steam engine. then the combustion engine. And so they can pass from age of brakes to the age of the accelerator. In other words power will be invested in acceleration itself. We know that the army has always been the place where pure speed is used, whether in the cavalry-the best horses, of course, were army horses artillery, etc. Still today, the army uses the most prominent speeds-whether it be in missiles or planes. Take the examples of uproar around the American SST. It wasn't built because Americans were very worried at the idea of building a civilian supersonic jet that would go faster than military jets. It's very clear that the hierarchy of speed is ,equivalent to the hierarchy of wealth The two are coupled. And there; indeed, the state of emergency the age of intensiveness; is linked to the primacy of speed not only on the scale of a more or less effective calvary or naval weapon.

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### Airplane

#### \_\_\_\_ Airplane transportation collapses space time between destinations. Distance is undermined by a flattening of time, which produces anxieties that hold the potential for war and violence.

Virilio and Lotringer 83 (Paul and Sylver, Paul Virilio philosopher, Sylvère Lotringer, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus of French literature and philosophy at Columbia University., Pure War, pg. 44-45).

We generally distinguish three types of distance. Space distance is the day of walking or the kilometer to simplify then time-distance., the kilometer/hour; and finally speed-distance, which is the mach. Movement, is no longer indexed according to metrics but to the speed of sound. Thirty years ago, for example it took 24 hours to go from Paris to New York. Now it takes three and a half. By the end of this century, with the hydrogen jet, it will take only half an hour. But at the same time it still takes over three and a half hours to go from Paris to Corsica. So there is a deregulation of distance which causes time-distances to replace space-distances. Geography is replaced by chronology. The mach-meter of the Concorde replaces the kilometer. There’s something very important in that. We have begun to inhibit time. For a long time the city existed where it was. Paris was in Paris and Rome was in Rome. There was a territorial and geographical inertia. Now there’s an inertia in time, a polar inertia in the sense that the pole is simultaneously an absolute place (for the metaphor), absolute inertia which is geographically locatable and also an absolute inertia in the planets movement. Were heading toward a situation in which every city will be the same place – in the time. There will be a kind of coexistence and probably not a very peaceful one, between these cities which have kept their distance in space but will be telescoped in time. When we can go to the antipodes in a second or a minute, what will remain of the city? What will remain of us? The difference of sedentariness in geographical space will continue but real life will be led in a polar inertia.

#### \_\_\_\_ Airplane transportation collapses space time between destinations. Distance is undermined by a flattening of time, which produces anxieties that hold the potential for war and violence.

Virilio and Lotringer 83 (Paul and Sylver, Paul Virilio philosopher, Sylvère Lotringer, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus of French literature and philosophy at Columbia University., Pure War, pg. 44-45).

We generally distinguish three types of distance. Space distance is the day of walking or the kilometer to simplify then time-distance., the kilometer/hour; and finally speed-distance, which is the mach. Movement, is no longer indexed according to metrics but to the speed of sound. Thirty years ago, for example it took 24 hours to go from Paris to New York. Now it takes three and a half. By the end of this century, with the hydrogen jet, it will take only half an hour. But at the same time it still takes over three and a half hours to go from Paris to Corsica. So there is a deregulation of distance which causes time-distances to replace space-distances. Geography is replaced by chronology. The mach-meter of the Concorde replaces the kilometer. There’s something very important in that. We have begun to inhibit time. For a long time the city existed where it was. Paris was in Paris and Rome was in Rome. There was a territorial and geographical inertia. Now there’s an inertia in time, a polar inertia in the sense that the pole is simultaneously an absolute place (for the metaphor), absolute inertia which is geographically locatable and also an absolute inertia in the planets movement. Were heading toward a situation in which every city will be the same place – in the time. There will be a kind of coexistence and probably not a very peaceful one, between these cities which have kept their distance in space but will be telescoped in time. When we can go to the antipodes in a second or a minute, what will remain of the city? What will remain of us? The difference of sedentariness in geographical space will continue but real life will be led in a polar inertia.

### Automobilty

#### \_\_\_\_ The automobile is a full assault on space that control how and where we move and in what time controlling the structures of life. The car is a tool of destruction and full control that obliterates the earth.

Bratton 2k6 (Benjamin H., Lecturer @ the Southern California School or Architecture at UCLA, “ “Logistics of Habitable Circulation,” Introduction to 2006 Edition of Speed and Politics, pg. 15-16)

**Dromocracy depends on technologies that in their employ- ment, straddle the pre-political and the hyperpolitical, working on the bodies of the masses as a practical material that can be strate- gically designed and deployed**. If the city is a collective prostheses of its inhabitants**, other technologies are for a more** individual, **specific purpose, for example the** car*.* "**The transportation capacity created by the mass production of automobiles became a social assault on space"** that would undo centripetal urban concentration exploding it into the congested network ofthe open highway (50). "No more riots, no need for much repression; to empty the streets, it's enough to promise everyone the highway: this is the aim of [the Nazi party's] Volkswagen plebiscite" (49**). Dromocracy extends to this new platform: "Speed limits...we are talking about acts of government, in other words of the political control of the highway, aiming precisely at limiting the extraordinary power of assault that the motorization of the masses creates**" (51). Earlier in the century, **the concentration of industrial technology into individual motor- ized locomotion had already revolutionized the battlefield in the figure of the** tank; **that "automotive fort"** (78). **These offered their commanders a new calculus of speed and movement.** As **if sailing across a smooth surface, the tank "extends war over an earth that disappears, crushed under the infinity of possible trajectories" (**79). Virilio suggests **these "battleships of earth"** (79) **should not be called "all-terrain," but** "sans-terrain" **in their obliteration of territorial impediment** (78). Later with the Jeep (and more grotesquely the Hummer) **the personal fortress would allow for the (largely preten- tious) presumption of this power to the performance of the daily commute**.6 But vehicular prostheticization is not only automotive. Others are assimilated as surgical prosthetics, others as fashion. The long marches of soldiers across fields plowed by battle during World War I presented the· problem of damaged feet, and gave rise to the practical science of Orthopedics, and the redesign of the pedestrian soldier's locomotive technology: his *shoes.* This accomplishment is amplified and embellished in the cultural imaginary for which the sports shoe becomes a vehicle of personal ambulatory and logistical excellence ("Just do it").

### Cars/Highways

#### \_\_\_\_ Automobility is historically bound into governmentality and systems of surveillance.

Dodge and Kitchin 2007 (Martin, Geography, School of Environment and Development, University of Manchester, and Rob, NIRSA, National University of Ireland, “The automaticmanagement of drivers and drivingspaces,” Geoforum, Vol. 38, No. 2]

As Foucault has documented, particularly his genealogies (1976, 1978), modern life is infused with the apparatus and systems of governmentality that seek to order and regulate the behaviour of individuals by producing a particular form of rationality designed to ensure good government through a more efficient and rationalized legal and social field (McNay, 1994). These systems hold power because they instill a regime of self-disciplining and conformity through the threat of discipline for noncompliance with social norms and rules. The systems intervene in all aspects of daily life and are supported by technologies designed to monitor and evaluate behaviour, and that this surveillance is potentially ever-present. Such technologies include censuses, health records, school attendance, criminal records, tax records, registration of births, deaths, marriages, and more recently CCTV footage, mobile phone records, and as we document various systems surrounding automobilities and its infrastructures. As many commentators have noted with respect to governmentality and automobilities, the long held myth of ‘freedom of the road’ has never been a reality, with driving being subject to various forms of state regulation that have sought to selfdiscipline drivers through the threat of direct disciplining (official warnings from traffic police, fines, disqualification, confiscation of vehicles, imprisonment, and so on). The first cars required a person to run in front of the vehicle waving a red flag to warn unsuspecting pedestrians. Not long after roads became managed in order to make them more serviceable and navigable for drivers. This included the introduction of road grading schemes and then consistent number identification, the application of standard road markings and signage, and the introduction of traffic lights and speed limits to regulate flow. These regulations became fixed in material-legal form as the Highway Code, introduced in Britain in the 1930s and now common in most countries (Featherstone, 2004). Highway codes were complemented by the formalised testing and licensing of drivers by the state. In Britain this became a legal requirement with the passing of the 1903 Motor Car Act (Higgs, 2001). In the same Act, the registration of vehicles was introduced that mandated the visual display of a license plate that uniquely identified each vehicle and enabled the police to trace the owner’s address details in local registries. Later in the twentieth century, drivers were required to insure vehicles they owned, limit their consumption of alcohol, wear seat belts and not use a handheld phone when driving2 and automobiles became subject to a raft of other forms of regulation including pollution orders, safety and fuel efficiency standards, and regular road worthiness testing, and marked with globally unique VIN codes3. As this short list demonstrates, with the transition from novel sight to ubiquity, drivers and vehicles have been increasingly drawn into the orbit of governmentality through successive layers of monitoring, identification, and regulation by the state.

### Governmentality Link

#### \_\_\_\_ Biopower culminates in a form of governance called governmentality. This utilizes tactics such as pastoral power to normalize practices of the self, stretching beyond institutions.

Holmes and Gastaldo ’02 [Dave, assistant professor in the school of nursing at the university of ottawa, denise, assistant professor in the faculty of nursing at the university of toronto, journal of advanced nursing 38(6), june 2002, pages 559-560]

Governing life to govern society: the concept of governmentality From his later work on disciplinary power (Foucault [1975] 1995) and, subsequently, on bio-power (Foucault 1990), Foucault further developed his analysis of power, and defined his concept of 'governmentality'. Foucault's writings on biopower, or power over life, situated biological life as a political event and explored the global character of power in economic, social and historical terms (Gastaldo 1997, Moss¶ 1998). Through his historical research on sexuality, and while articulating the concept of bio-power, Foucault (1990) progressively manifested an interest in government (Hindess 1996). Exploring both the local and the general levels involved in the exercise of power, Foucault expanded the notion of governance and explained more successfully how power functions (Moss 1998). Governmentality, a term Foucault (1979) coined, describes the general mechanisms of society's governance and does not refer specifically to the term, government , as commonly used. As Gordon (1991) explained: Government as an activity could concern the relation between self and self, private interpersonal relations involving some form of control or guidance, relations within social institutions and communities and, finally, relations concerned with the exercise of political sovereignty. (pp. 2-3) According to McNay (1994), Foucault¶ considered governmentality as a complex system of power relations that binds sovereignty-discipline-government in a tripartite manner. Governing involves these three forms of power. This conception allows us to appreciate¶ how Foucault integrated the states of domination (sovereignty), disciplinary power (discipline) and the government of others and self (government). Governmentality involves domination and disciplinary techniques, as well as self-governing ethics (Deflem 1998). In his own terms, Foucault defined governmentality as: The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security. (1979,p. 20) In short, government means to conduct others and oneself, and governmentality is about how to govern. 'The concept of government implies all those tactics, strategies, techniques, programmes, dreams and aspirations of those authorities that shape beliefs and the conduct of population' (Nettleton 1991, p. 99). Hence, government is an activity that aims to shape, mould or affect the conduct of an individual or a group, that is, to conduct the conducts of people (Gordon 1991). According to Foucault, this governmentalization of the state relies on a specific security apparatus that links all together in a very specific complex of procedures and techniques: diplomatic-military techniques, the police, and pastoral power, such as the care of others. Diplomatic-military techniques, the first dimension of the security apparatus, allows the state to protect itself against external threats and to preserve its territorial integrity through diplomatic representations, a permanent armed force, and established war policies (Gros 1996). In addition, to protect itself against internal threats, the state is endowed with a police force. Finally, pastoral power achieves care of others through various therapeutic regimes while ultimately helping to shape the self so that it fits within an appropriate, 'normalized' way of living (Dean 1999). The normalized way of living refers to a conformity to a set of social rules and ways of conceiving oneself and others. The power of normalization imposes homogeneity by setting standards and ideals for human beings (Rose 1998). Governing is as much about practices of government as it is about practices of the self because the concept of governmentality deals with those practices that try to shape, mould, mobilize and work through the choices, desires, aspirations and needs of individuals and populations (Rose & Miller 1992). Governmentality connects the question of government and politics to the self (Dean 1999). In our discussion, we will explore how nursing is a constitutive element of governmentality by looking at power over life as the governance of populations and individuals (Gastaldo 1997, Gastaldo & Holmes 1999).

### Disciplinary Power Link

#### \_\_\_\_ The plan just increases the smooth functioning of disciplinary power, making people more docile and useful through the acceptance fo their burden to police themselves

Foucault, chair in the history of systems of thought at the college de france, 1975 [michel, discipline & punish: the birth of the prison, p. 218-221]

The formation of the disciplinary society is connected with a number of broad historical processes -- economic, juridico- political and, lastly, scientific -- of which it forms part.¶ 1. Generally speaking, it might be said that the disciplines are techniques for assuring the ordering of human multiplicities. It is true that there is nothing exceptional or even characteristic in this: every system of power is presented with the same problem. But the peculiarity of the disciplines is that they try to define in relation to the multiplicities a tactics of power that fulfils three criteria: firstly, to obtain the exercise of power at the lowest possible cost (economically, by the low expenditure it involves; politically, by its discretion, its low exteriorization, its relative invisibility, the little resistance it arouses); secondly, to bring the effects of this social power to their maximum intensity and to extend them as far as possible, without either failure or interval; thirdly, to link this `economic' growth of power with the output of the apparatuses (educational, military, industrial or medical) within which it is exercised; in short, to increase both the docility and the utility of all the elements of the system. This triple objective of the disciplines corresponds to a well-known historical conjuncture. One aspect of this conjuncture was the large demographic thrust of the eighteenth century; an increase in the floating population (one of the primary objects of discipline is to fix; it is an anti-nomadic technique); a change of quantitative scale in the groups to be supervised or manipulated (from the beginning of the seventeenth century to the eve of the French Revolution, the school population had been increasing rapidly, as had no doubt the hospital population; by the end of the eighteenth century, the peace-time army exceeded 200,000 men). The other aspect of the conjuncture was the growth in the apparatus of production, which was becoming more and more extended and complex; it was also becoming more costly and its profitability had to be increased. The development of the disciplinary methods corresponded to these two processes, or rather, no doubt, to the new need to adjust their correlation. Neither the residual forms of feudal power nor the structures of the administrative monarchy, nor the local mechanisms of supervision, nor the unstable, tangled mass they all formed together could carry out this role: they were hindered from doing so by the irregular and inadequate extension of their network, by their often conflicting functioning, but above all by the `costly' nature of the power that was exercised in them. It was costly in several senses: because directly it cost a great deal to the Treasury; because the system of corrupt offices and farmed-out taxes weighed indirectly, but very heavily, on the population; because the resistance it encountered forced it into a cycle of perpetual reinforcement; because it proceeded essentially by levying (levying on money or products by royal, seigniorial, ecclesiastical taxation; levying on men or time by corvées of press-ganging, by locking up or banishing vagabonds). The development of the disciplines marks the appearance of elementary techniques belonging to a quite different economy: mechanisms of power which, instead of proceeding by deduction, are integrated into the productive efficiency of the apparatuses from within, into the growth of this efficiency and into the use of what it produces. For the old principle of `levying-violence', which governed the economy of power, the disciplines substitute the principle of `mildness-production-profit'. These are the techniques that make it possible to adjust the multiplicity of men and the multiplication of the apparatuses of production (and this means not only `production' in the strict sense, but also the production of knowledge and skills in the school, the production of health in the hospitals, the production of destructive force in the army).¶ In this task of adjustment, discipline had to solve a number of problems for which the old economy of power was not sufficiently equipped. It could reduce the inefficiency of mass phenomena: reduce what, in a multiplicity, makes it much less manageable than a unity; reduce what is opposed to the use of each of its elements and of their sum; reduce everything that may counter the advantages of number. That is why discipline fixes; it arrests or regulates movements; it clears up confusion; it dissipates compact groupings of individuals wandering about the country in unpredictable ways; it establishes calculated distributions. It must also master all the forces that are formed from the very constitution of an organized multiplicity; it must neutralize the effects of counter-power that spring from them and which form a resistance to the power that wishes to dominate it: agitations, revolts, spontaneous organizations, coalitions -- anything that may establish horizontal conjunctions.¶ Hence the fact that the disciplines use procedures of partitioning and verticality, that they introduce, between the different elements at the same level, as solid separations as possible, that they define compact hierarchical networks, in short, that they oppose to the intrinsic, adverse force of multiplicity the technique of the continuous, individualizing pyramid. They must also increase the particular utility of each element of the multiplicity, but by means that are the most rapid and the least costly, that is to say, by using the multiplicity itself as an instrument of this growth. Hence, in order to extract from bodies the maximum time and force, the use of those overall methods known as time-tables, collective training, exercises, total and detailed surveillance. Furthermore, the disciplines must increase the effect of utility proper to the multiplicities, so that each is made more useful than the simple sum of its elements: it is in order to increase the utilizable effects of the multiple that the disciplines define tactics of distribution, reciprocal adjustment of bodies, gestures and rhythms, differentiation of capacities, reciprocal coordination in relation to apparatuses or tasks. Lastly, the disciplines have to bring into play the power relations, not above but inside the very texture of the multiplicity, as discreetly as possible, as well articulated on the other functions of these multiplicities and also in the least expensive way possible: to this correspond anonymous instruments of power, coextensive with the multiplicity that they regiment, such as hierarchical surveillance, continuous registration, perpetual assessment and classification. In short, to substitute for a power that is manifested through the brilliance of those who exercise it, a power that insidiously objectifies those on whom it is applied; to form a body of knowledge about these individuals, rather than to deploy the ostentatious signs of sovereignty. In a word, the disciplines are the ensemble of minute technical inventions that made it possible to increase the useful size of multiplicities by decreasing the inconveniences of the power which, in order to make them useful, must control them. A multiplicity, whether in a workshop or a nation, an army or a school, reaches the threshold of a discipline when the relation of the one to the other becomes favourable.¶ If the economic take-off of the West began with the techniques that made possible the accumulation of capital, it might perhaps be said that the methods for administering the accumulation of men [p. 221] made possible a political take-off in relation to the traditional, ritual, costly, violent forms of power, which soon fell into disuse and were superseded by a subtle, calculated technology of subjection. In fact, the two processes¶ -- the accumulation of men and the accumulation of capital -- cannot be separated; it would not have been possible to solve the problem of the accumulation of men without the growth of an apparatus of production capable of both sustaining them and using them; conversely, the techniques that made the cumulative multiplicity of men useful accelerated the accumulation of capital. At a¶ less general level, the technological mutations of the apparatus of production, the division of labour and the elaboration of the disciplinary techniques sustained an ensemble of very close relations (cf. Marx, Capital, vol. 1,¶ chapter XIII and the very interesting analysis in Guerry and Deleule). Each makes the other possible and necessary; each provides a model for the other. The disciplinary pyramid constituted the small cell of power within which the separation, coordination and supervision of tasks was imposed and made efficient; and analytical partitioning of time, gestures and bodily forces constituted an operational schema that could easily be transferred from the groups to be subjected to the mechanisms of production; the massive projection of military methods onto industrial organization was an example of this modelling of the division of labour following the model laid down by the schemata of power. But, on the other hand, the technical analysis of the process of production, its `mechanical' breaking-down, were projected onto the labour force whose task it was to implement it: the constitution of those disciplinary machines in which the individual forces that they bring together are composed into a whole and therefore increased is the effect of this projection. Let us say that discipline is the unitary technique by which the body is reduced as a `political' force at the least cost and maximized as a useful force. The growth of a capitalist economy gave rise to the specific modality of disciplinary power, whose general formulas, techniques of submitting forces and bodies, in short, `political anatomy', could be operated in the most diverse political regimes, apparatuses or institutions.

### Highways

#### \_\_\_\_ The creation of infrastructure is essential the automobile’s use as the speed machine.

Virilio, Curator of the Museum of the Accident, in ‘5 |Paul, Negative Horizon, Pg. 150-151|

The automobile vehicle is not a 'machine' like others since it is both a¶ stationary machine and a vehicular machine. Stationary: the motor on¶ its test rig, or its chassis; vehicular: the drive system, wheels, or tracks,¶ that take the vehicle over various surfaces, tracks, roads, highways; the¶ pairing of the driving wheels and the road engages the production of¶ the effects of speed, artifacts specific to each vehicle as it races along in¶ contact with the ground or in its immediate proximity. The automobile¶ machine is not, therefore, a simple means of transmission, 'a speed¶ machine', it is more the means of transmission of speed as such. The¶ habit of identifying speed with the movement of transportation has¶ misled us regarding the nature of the 'movement of movement'. As a¶ quantity, speed possesses both a magnitude, the number of kilometres¶ covered per hour, and a direction; but it is also, therefore, a vector, and,¶ just as the automobile industry produces the vector-vehicle, so also¶ does it manufacture and produce vector-speed. As we remember from¶ physics: 'Every movement can be resolved into one single proposition:¶ force and change in velocity are vectors that have the same direction'.¶ Thus, the automobile vehicle (car, boat, plane) is composed of two¶ vectors: both the mobile force-vector as well as the speed-vector of¶ movement, which is a consequence and direct product of the first, but¶ also of the ambient milieu and the particular element (earth, water, air)¶ of travel.¶ The drive of the automobile vehicle and its acceleration (positive¶ or negative) are thus both effects of the surface and atmospheric¶ conditions, or, if one prefers, of the type of resistance to progress.¶ The functional and instrumental nature of the surfaces of contact of¶ the infrastructure (roads and highways) as well as the forms of least¶ resistance of the vector-vehicle contribute to making the speed-vector¶ the essential characteristic of automobile movement, or, even more¶ precisely, one of its dimensions. In effect, speed only becomes one of the¶ 'dimensions' of movement in so far as it can be conceived of as constant¶ through the course of the time and conserved through the course of the¶ movement. Meanwhile, this constant magnitude, secured in the past¶ (with difficulty) by the extreme rectification of the line of the surface¶ for wheeled vehicles and thanks to the profile of vehicles, is maintained¶ today by the electronic artifice of the on-board computer, a true speed¶ programmer.¶ After the innovation, a long time ago, of the Greek and Roman¶ public road networks - and there is a half century of experience with¶ the highway infrastructure also contributing to affirm this - that is,¶ after the spatial and geographical innovation of the unidirectionality¶ and unidimensionality of the vectorial pairing, innovation now lies¶ in the 'management of time and movement', thanks to the electronic¶ control of the speeds of the course.¶ By this means, the vehicular complex composed of the 'small¶ dynamic vehicle' (auto, motorcycle) and the 'great static vehicle'¶ (road, bridge, tunnel) produces negative or positive acceleration like¶ a new dimension of the world, or rather, like a constant renewal of¶ its dimensions. Ceaselessly reprogrammed by technological advancements¶ in the control of vectors, this renewal is not only perceptible in¶ the shortening of distances of time, but also in the system of appearances,¶ in the vision of passengers. 'A speed machine' and not solely 'a¶ transport machine', the production of the vector-vehicle gives rise to¶ the projection of a sort of illumination, the pairing of motor-wheels¶ engages the pairing of car-road; between the departure and arrival,¶ the country and its landscapes unwind like a drive belt. This artifact,¶ disregarded like an optical illusion, is nevertheless no more illusory¶ than the shrinking of the distance of the time of the course. One might¶ just as well consider this rapprochement in time as a mobile illusion,¶ since the geographic distance separating the point of departure from¶ the destination, the distance in space, does not vary any more than the¶ landscapes move in the dromoscopic vision of passengers travelling at¶ speed—

### High Speed Rail

#### \_\_\_\_ High Speed rail projects delink us from local communities and convert us into soldier-citizens to fulfill the state’s desires.

Virilio ’01 [cultural theorist and urbanist] Virilio Live pg. 75 edited by John Armitage

It's important to return to the city. To return to the city is to return to politics or to the political people. It’s not by chance that in Greek the city is called the *‘polis’.* The city was created in a relationship to territorial space. It is a territorial phenomenon, a phenomenon of territorial concentration. Old villages are spread over a territory which is not a territory but a field, in all senses of the term. There is creation, from the old villages, through what has been called kinesis, of an urban territorial unit - the Greek city-state, to take a well-known reference. Since politics and the city were born together, they were born through a right: the creation of a territory or of an estate by right, being established, the right of autochthonism. There are rights because there is territory. There are rights and therefore duties - he who has land has war, as the people of Verde said. He who has rights in an urban territory has the duty to defend it. The citizen is also a soldier-citizen. I feel this situation survives up to the present; we are experiencing the end of that world. Through the ups and downs of the state, the city-state, the more or less communal state, and finally, the nation-state, we have experienced the development of politics linked to the territory; always down-to-earth. In spite of railroads and telephones, we experienced a relationship to the soil and a relationship to a still coherent right. There was still a connection to territorial identity, even in the phenomenon of nationalistic amplification. Today, as we saw earlier with the end of time-space and the coming of speed-space, the political man and the city are becoming problematic. When you talk about the rights of man on the world scale, they pose a problem which is not yet resolved, for a state of rights is not connected with a state of place, to a clearly determined locality. We clearly see the weaknesses of the rights of Man. It makes for lots of meetings, but not for much in the way of facts. Just take a look at Eastern European countries or Latin America. It seems to me that speed- space which produces new technologies will bring about a loss, a derealization of the city. The megalopolises now being talked of (Cak cutta, or Mexico with 30 million inhabitants) are no longer cities, they; are phenomena which go beyond the city and translate the decline of the city as a territorial localization, and also as a place of an assumed Mere. I’m very pessimistic. I feel we’ entering into a society without rights, a ‘non-rights’ society, because we’re entering a society of the non-place, and because the political man was connected to the discrimination of a place. The loss of a place is, alas, generally the loss of rights. Here, we have a big problem: the political man must be reinvented - a political man connected to speed-space. There, everything remains to be done, nothing’s been accomplished. I’d even say the question hasn’t been considered. The problem of the automatic responder we were talking about earlier, the legal action which Clifford Johnson is taking against the US Congress, is in my opinion the trial of the century. The problem of rights there is the right of the powerful man, the last man, he who decides. Now, he too will no longer have the right, if he delegates his right to an automatic machine. We truly have here a political question and an urban question, because at present the cities are undone by technology, undone by television, defeated by automobility (the highspeed trains, the Concorde). The phenomena of identification and independence are posed in a completely new way. When it takes 3 hours to go to New York, and 36 to New Caledonia, you are closer to American identification than to Caledonian or French identification. Before proximity, there was territorial continuity. We were close because we were in the same space. Today we are close in the speed-space of the Concorde, of the high-speed train, of telecommunications. Therefore, we don’t feel conjoined to people, the compatriots of the same people - the Basques or the Corsicans. We no longer have the time to go to Bastia, because practically, we are closer to New York, because you can’t go by Concorde to Bastia, We have here a phenomenon of distortion of the territorial community that explains the phenomenon of demands of independence. Before, we were together in the same place, and could claim an identity. Today, we are together elsewhere, via high-speed train, or via TV. There is a power of another nature which creates distortions. We are no longer in space, but in speed-space. Because of speed-space there are fellow countrymen participating in the same nonplace who feel close, whereas one’s own countrymen in Corsica or New Caledonia are in reality so far away in speed-space, so beyond 36 hours or 10 hours, that they are strangers and therefore desire their autonomy. There’s a logic there, and it’s a logic which poses problems.

### Port/Bridge/Waterway

#### \_\_\_\_ The invention of speed necessitated the bridge, the port, and the waterway – they are a fortification of the population.

Virilio, Curator of the Museum of the Accident, in ‘5 |Paul, Negative Horizon, Pg. 50-51|

¶ In providing for an elevated traversing of the greatest expanses, the¶ animals body becomes a body-bridge, a mobile bridge, whereas the¶ body of woman was only a precarious body-footbridge, the horses body¶ becomes the symbol of the hipparch and beyond him of the monarchy,¶ the leader who harnesses and directs these animal energies. Well before¶ the invention of the arch among sedentary cultures, the body of the¶ mount sketches out the construction of the bridge that spans the¶ distance of the moat, the gap of the river; the symbolic function of the¶ horse that disperses (skedasi?\*) the enemy doubles with the function¶ of exchange, the mount becomes an 'elevated crossroads', literally, an¶ interchange [échangeur], as the cabalistic tradition would call it later¶ on— To finish, these points [points], these bridges [ponts], produce¶ the port [porfì, this site where the animal lays down its load will mineralize¶ into the architectonic of the portal [porte], veritable port of¶ earth' of caravan transience, a gearbox [botte de vitesses] where the value¶ of movement is exchanged for the octroi of a taxation on invasion¶ trades; a value that repeats, in the economy this time, the power of the¶ transshipment of the cavalry, this 'charge of rupture'27 that will trigger¶ the progressive development of the urban ramparts erected against the¶ assault of waves of animals like the quay against the ocean. In fact,¶ the slanted postern that allows the connecting route to pass through is¶ similar to the entrance to the fortified port, between the defence towers of¶ the urban enclosure and those of the port citadel, a similar 'liquidation is¶ at work, in the example of the 'portal', it is a question of the turbulence¶ of the dry flux of passengers that must be controlled by the design of¶ the surroundings; in the case of the 'port', it is a question of the flow¶ that 'ports' the vessels. The defence is thus double since it is necessary¶ to protect oneself not only from the water and tidal movements by the¶ erection of the quay, but also from naval manoeuvres. In the continental¶ city, the entrance is merely a 'dry port' where the defences control access¶ based in the immediate outlying area where the topography has been¶ levelled off, worn down, to facilitate control of various movements. The¶ port with its customs control, allowing for the engagement and disengagement¶ of internal and external movements, is the most important¶ thing for the art of Western fortification and will be taken up later by¶ the railway stations and airports.

### Rail

#### **\_\_\_\_ Railways enable a panoptic mode of authoritarianism through the imposition of timetables and the increased alignment of the center and periphery**

Symes 2011 (Colin, Faculty of Human Sciences, Macquarie University, “Time and Motion: Chronometry and the Railway Timetables of New South Wales, 1855-1906,” Kronoscope Vol. 11, No. 1-2]

According to Actor Network theory (ANT), tools, machines, and technologies form ensembles of organic and non-organic entities, hybrids of human beings and machines. Included in these ensembles are semiotic tools, which have the capacity to symbolically underwrite, record, ‘memorise,’ transport, and articulate their operations (Graham 1998). As Bruno Latour wistfully observes, it is hard to know whether we are in charge of our machines, or they us. Trains are a case in point. They were, and remain, complex ensembles of mechanical, social, and textual ‘actors.’ Back stage, hidden from passengers, myriad spatial and temporal calculations must be undertaken if train ensembles are to perform to their optimum, stick to their schedules and not, as it were, go ‘off the rails.’ Train crews need to be rostered (itself an exercise in time management) and rolling stock must be marshalled for them to crew. Whatever else it is, time is a phenomenon of inscription, of semiotics, of textual adjuncts that in the case of timetables ‘direct’ and make possible railway journeys (Latour 1997). It is signs (including natural ones) that illustrate the passage of time, framing its quantitative and qualitative ‘feel.’ Railways overflow with such signs, albeit, figurative, enumerating ones. The imperatives of railway time (as opposed to other forms of timing) are that it is rational and calculating, efficient and economical. Railways form complex networks of human and machine actors conveying passengers and freight—‘ticket items’ in more senses than one. Without them, railway systems would atrophy. Further, analysis of the ticket items (information tokens standing in lieu of passengers and freight) permits railway efficiency to be monitored and checked. The timetable is the railway’s information management system, providing a basis for rationalising and scheduling passengers and freight, preventing time wastage and overcrowding, in short, avoiding poor distributions of ticket items across the system. As a chronographic, the timetable represents time and motion as enumerated information, enabling travel futures to be seen and itineraries to be planned and scoped. In the absence of timetables, planning journeys ahead of time and identifying trains to catch would be difficult. As such, a timetable constitutes an interface document, one that links human actors with machines, in this case trains with their passengers, their drivers, guards, porters and so on. In doing so, the timetable choreographs (sets in train) a range of complementary actions among the network’s actors, those concerned with a train’s departure and arrival, with running on time. Being clockwise entails being on time and not wasting time; and to be counter-clockwise is to be, so to speak, ill trained. Arguably, the horology engendered by falling into line with timetables extended beyond the railway state, to the education state and to the factory state. Of particular salience was that ‘distance’ could be ‘governed’ as never before, and that the periphery could be brought into alignment with the centre—Simmel’s “mutual relations” (1997, 177). In effect, the timetable is a “powerful system of governmentality that normatively locates trains, people and activities at specific places and moments” (Urry 2007, 98). Remote locations can be brought within the sphere of influence of individuals to an unprecedented degree. Actions can be projected through time and space, ‘here’ thereby influencing ‘there,’ ‘now’ ‘later.’ The railway’s contribution to the renovated horology was that it synchronised actions across space, adding the factor of motion to spatial and temporal accounting. Hence, distances are now expressed temporally—in how long it takes to reach a destination, not how far it is. Timetables made it possible to direct actions across space, to control the movement of unseen members of the community, at some designated time in the future. Trains could be met, appointments kept, and freight collected. They also exacted an influence on passengers’ in-train performances, such that they knew when they should prepare to alight, so as not to overshoot their destinations. They also ensured that punctuality, pace Simmel (1997, 177), was not confined to the city. If hazard, inefficiency, and confusion were to be avoided, all parts of the railway state had to fall into line with its timetables. Thus the onus on us knowing the time and being on time was spread throughout the state. In Australia’s case, it entailed that city time was eventually exported to the bush. Timetables were originally called “schemes of departure” (Simmons 1995, 183). There were three distinctive features of the time they ‘fixated.’ First, it was on the move, was mobile not stationary. Second, it included topographic information. Third, it took a ‘tabular’ form and was organised axially. Instead of being ‘dialled,’ as on a clock, railway time was horizontally and vertically distributed in columns and rows, was framed in cells as a series of stops. All stops were ordered as they were in actual space (A before B, C after B, and so on).

### Telecommunications Link

#### \_\_\_\_ Telecommunications enable a new form of global war and violence.

Virilio ’01 [cultural theorist and urbanist] Virilio Live pg. 82 edited by John Armitage

First of all, one can no longer speak of space or time without speaking of speed. Philosophically, but above all physically, to speak of a space is instantly to speak of the relationship of time to this space. Thus to speak of time is to refer to the time of displacement and the time of perception. Clearly, in war, which for centuries has essentially amounted to wars of movement, wars of displacement (based on assaults, attacks), one must start implementing greater, more decisive speeds in military confrontations. This tendency is of course evident in assault techniques (cavalry, tanks), but it becomes even more manifest in telecommunication techniques, that is, techniques of perception and information. In this sense, a war is always a reorganization of space. A new war reorganizes the space of society by its means of assault and by its means of information. This was clear in the Gulf War in an exemplary and, in my view, definitive way because it concerned an extremely limited local wax that could only be won so quickly because it was controlled on a global scale.The technologies of real time that still weren’t perfected with the invention of the telegraph and the telephone since a delay remained;(due to the coding and transmission of the message), have attained their maximum scale. It is now possible for us to act, to teleact, in real time and not only to gather information and perceive by satellite. As I have often said, we can distinguish between three decisive actions, each tied to a certain period: tele-audition (telephone, radio), television in differed time, and finally tele-action, that is, the possibility of tele-acting instantaneously regardless of the distance. I stand rather alone in insisting that speed is clearly the determining factor. In my capacity as social analyst, I do not wish to deliver monologues but to partake in a dialogue. For the past twenty-five years, my work has nevertheless been solitaiy. To say that speed is a determining factor in society requires proof, an effort that is starting to exhaust me. Thus, in my view the Gulf War was a kind of confirmation of what I announced seven years previously in War and Cinema.

### City Planning

#### \_\_\_\_ The desire to map out the city and land in a method of planning is based in the historical notion of militarization that maps out the environment based on a violent military order that attempts to secure total control.

Bratton 2k6 (Benjamin H., Lecturer @ the Southern California School or Architecture at UCLA, “Logistics of Habitable Circulation,” Introduction to 2006 Edition of Speed and Politics, pg. 11-12)

"**History progresses at the speed of its weapons systems;" that is, at the speed of the competitive capacities to envision, draw, map, curtail, mobilize, contour, stabilize and police the polis** (90). At least since Vitruvius defined the rules of architecture based on his own military engineering experience, **it is understood that the design of space is already a strategic weapon of fortification.** But **architectural media are only one such means and the evolution of their deployments is interrelated and serpentine**. Marquis de Vauban, **Louis XIV's chief military engineer of fortifications (and of their breaching), made to his king the unusual recommendation that in order to secure a less permeable border with France's neighbors he should voluntarily cede contested land deemed "indefensible."** The plan realized Richelieu's earlier image to France as "le pre carre,"or the "squared field," and in **fact this same phrase was later used to describe Vauban's parallel lines of fortifi- cations up and down the now consolidated national enclosure.** In 1782, Charles de Fourcroy's *tableau poliometrique* appeared. This "first known flowchart" is a diagram of the relative sizes of European metropoles, and in it, as geographer Gilles Palsky notes, "**We see the passage to abstract, to fictitious features. By these proportional triangles, [de Fourcroy] constructs an image that does not return or relate to [the] original existence.**"5 De Fourcroy's semiotic innovation was this **figural territorialization, the drawing of the comparative scale of cities as relative, primary geometric forms**. **This "map" does not correspond to any direct representation of the geographic juxtaposition of the cities, but rather graphs their relative quantitative difference in the population. This inscription produces another** virtual **space with which to order the natural territory of the polis as a projected image of an enclosed, admin- istrative totality**. For Virilio, **this also signals the production of logistical space as a Modern administrative horizon. "This means the universe is redis- tributed by the military engineers, the earth 'communicating' like a single glacis, as the infrastructure of future battlefield," not one limited by given terrestrial geography** (85). With the French Army of Engineers being, assigned the task in 1790 of "**expand[ing] the logistical glacis over the whole territory," this era marked the birth of Modern administration-by-calculation, an on-going project in which all of the vicissitudes of land and its inhabitants are con-tinuously charted, symbolized, and manipulated**. Virilio locates its emergence in the history of military geography, especially naval techniques. "**Total war is omnipresent; it is first waged on the sea because the naval glacis naturally presents no permanent obstacle to vehicular movement of planetary dimensions," and the mobility of smooth maritime space would return to organize land in its logistical image (73). Governance by speed (by states or otherwise) is** logistics, **and logistics, like the oceanic vectors from which it is born, is omnidirectional.**

### Freedom of Movement

#### \_\_\_\_ Freedom of movement is belied by the disciplining of the body through networks that discipline the body of the traveler to increase efficiency.

Bonham 6 [Jennifer, The Editorial Board of the Sociological Review “Transport: disciplining the body that travels” [KC]

Over the past century, the place of the automobile in the city has been challenged on a number of grounds, most notably those of citizens’ rights, public safety, social justice and urban aesthetics. The most recent challenge to the automobile centred on the environmental impacts of different ‘modal choices’, in particular, the differential environmental effects of bus, bicycle, or automobile travel. This debate quickly reached a stalemate. While environmentalists drew on a variety of statistics to support the case for improvements in public transport services and cycling facilities, advocates of the automobile used other statistics to demonstrate that, given the right roads, traffic flows, speed limits, engines and fuels, cars could be environmentally-friendly ‘green machines’. More than a decade on, the use of automobiles in Australian cities, indeed in many cities, continues unabated. The persistent increase in automobile usage is often explained by reference to technological progress, increases in personal wealth and the considered choices of free individuals (eg, Adams, 1980; Donovan, 1996). Alternatively, it has been explained in terms of the power of particular fractions of capital and the shaping of individual choices by capitalist interests and liberal ideologies of self-interest (eg, Franks, 1986; Hodge, 1990). The former explanation operates to naturalize contemporary practices of mobility while the latter tends to position motorists as victims of automotive companies and their technologies (Bonham, 2002: 19–24). This chapter locates the proliferation of automobile usage within a broader study of how urban populations have been incited to think about and conduct their journeys. The approach I have taken draws on the insights of Michel Foucault’s genealogical studies (Foucault, 1977; 1978) as it examines the micro techniques by which bodies have been disciplined to the use of ‘public’ space and the practice of travel. Discipline, to paraphrase Foucault, ‘. . . centres on the body as a machine, optimizing its capabilities, increasing its usefulness and docility, integrating it into systems of efficient and economic controls’ (Foucault, 1978: 139). The body of the traveller – motorist, pedestrian, child – is not a ‘natural’ body but a body worked upon through relations of power and knowledge to conduct the journey in particular ways. It is argued in this chapter that disciplining the travelling body has been essential to the government of urban mobility. Bodies have been disciplined to and subsequently governed through two interrelated ways of thinking about mobility. First, changes in travel technologies have been linked, both positively and negatively to freedom, as individuals are able physically to remove themselves from their daily routines, everyday responsibilities and immediate social networks (Kern, 1982: 111–4; Creswell, 1997). The second way of thinking about travel is that of transport: movement from one point to another in order to participate in the activities at the ‘trip destination’ (Schumer, 1955; Hensher, 1976; Allan *et al.*, 1996). This innovation, more significant than the train, tram or automobile, has made it possible to objectify travel practices and create knowledge about the efficient completion of the journey. The production of transport knowledge has involved separating out, classifying, and ordering travel practices in relation to their efficiency. This ordering of travel establishes a hierarchy which not only values some travel practices (rapid, direct, uninterrupted) and some travellers (fast, orderly, singlepurpose) over others but also enables their prioritization in public space. All trips, not just those to sites of production, consumption, and exchange, can be made economically. The journey to a friend’s house, the beach, or the doctor (so called ‘social’ journeys) can be made with greater or lesser economy. As transport experts (from engineers and transport modellers to sociologists, environmentalists, and feminists) deploy the logic of the economical journey they are fundamentally implicated in the ordering of urban travel and the consequent prioritization of some travellers – specifically motorists – over others. The conceptualization of urban travel as transport has rendered urban movement calculable while at the same time ameliorating the dangers of too much freedom to move. Travel has been made manageable as it has been anchored between an origin and destination. ‘Freedom of movement’ has been re-conceptualized through traffic and transport discourses into ‘freedom to access destinations’. Thinking about urban travel in terms of transport has made it possible to govern the movement of urban populations, to maximize choice and to secure the economical operation of the urban environment. The motor vehicle is centred in transport discourse as maximizing travel choice while the motorist’s field of action can be structured toward the efficient conduct of the journey.

### Knowledge

#### \_\_\_\_ The knowledge of the 1AC isn’t neutral – its used as a discursive form of power used to monitor, identify, and discipline

Yates & Hiles 10 [Scott and Dave; DeMontfort University “Towards a “Critical Ontology of Ourselves”? Foucault, Subjectivity, and Discourse Analysis” Theory and Psychology Vol. 20 (1): 52-75 [KC]

Foucault termed his new approach “genealogy”: a “meticulous and patiently documentary” analysis (Foucault, 1971/1987a), which introduced a central concern for practices and institutions to the historical study of discourse. We will not expand upon the methodological assumptions and imperatives of this approach, as they have been quite thoroughly covered by Hook (2005a). Foucault (1980), initially at least, still sought to preserve a place for archaeology, arguing that archaeology could provide an “analysis of local discursivities” (p. 85) alongside genealogy, which traces the emergence, formation, and rejection of systems of knowledge, and their links to social practices and institutions. A key aspect of genealogy is the interrogation of the ways in which systems of knowledge that take human beings as their object are linked to forms of social apparatus (dispositifs), comprising a “heterogeneous ensemble ... of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions” (Foucault, 1980, p. 194). This illustrates Foucault’s emerging notion that systems of knowledge are inherently connected with power. This “power–knowledge” nexus constitutes what is attended to, what is desirable to be done, how people and objects are to be understood, related to, and acted upon. Thus, for example, the knowledge that is gathered of human behaviour can be understood in terms of a norm or an ideal of desirability. This makes possible power relations which centre on monitoring and assessing a population, and identifying, disciplining, and correcting deviant individuals within it. Similarly, a power whose aim is to normalize or discipline produces and utilizes systems of knowledge which are useful in attaining this objective. There is a constant, reciprocal articulation “of power on knowledge and of knowledge on power” (Foucault, 1989, p. 51). Power produces more than knowledge and systems of social apparatus, however. It also “produces the very form of the subject” (Foucault, 1989, p. 158). The individual is not a pre-given phenomenological subject, an “elementary nucleus” (Foucault, 1980) onto which power fastens, or some form of original sovereign will standing opposite its antithesis of a power that constrains and limits it (Foucault, 1984/1988). It is, instead, “one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals” (Foucault, 1980, p. 98). The individual subject does not stand face-to-face with power; it is already one of its effects in terms of the identities to which it is tied and by which it understands itself, the positions from which it acts with respect to itself and others (Foucault, 1982). Power “brings into play relations between individuals ... [it] designates relationships” (p. 217).

### Peace

#### \_\_\_\_ The transpolitical nation state operates through a disappearance and loss of identification. The Aff preoccupation with guaranteeing peace turns warriors into police and exterminates all potential threats. Subjects become the living dead, forced into positions of zombification.

Virilio, Curator of the Museum of the Accident, in ‘5 |Paul, Negative Horizon, Pg. 165-6|

If in the past the first political act consisted in making the form of the city apparent at the same time as the figure of citizenship, and this was the underlying meaning of the rites of foundation and the rites of autochthony in the ancient civic space,1 it seems that we are now witnessing the premises of a fundamental reversal: it is no longer a question of forming 'autochthonous' (i.e., native) citizens along with foreigners coming from whatever sort of synechism, as was the case in the Athenian city, but rather a process leading to the disappearance of citizenship by transforming the residents into 'foreigners within, a new sort of untouchable, in the transpoliticai and anational state where the living are nothing more than 'living dead' in permanent deferment. The ceremony of the 'folly of May' thus echoed the ancient rites, since it sought to make the disappeared of Argentina reappear, by maintaining the political presence of the absent through the presence of their wives in the Plaza de Mayo in Buenos Aires. If the Agora or the Forum circumscribed a scene for the liturgy, for the acts of the people, the Plaza de Mayo serves only to delimit a screen for the projection of a shadow theatre where the real actors have effectively disappeared. Thus the daily murals of a nation condemned to silence are logically superceded by the procession of a population devoted to absence. So if the yellow star singled out the Jews from the anonymous crowd \foule], the white scarf worn by the women [filies2] in the Plaza de Mayo evokes the defiance of the work of mourning, the negation of widowhood. The sign of membership is superceded by the signalling of the disappeared, the declaration of absence. The inversion thus appears to be radical: if the political State prescribed a right of citizenship or a national identity, conversely, the transpoliticai State implies a loss of identification, the progressive discrediting of all the rights of citizenship. 'When are the disappeared? The slogan of wives and mothers from the Plaza de Mayo signals an innovation, the invention of a new economy of distancing where prisons and detention camps would themselves be on the way to disappearance. .. . The last form of the 'Nation, extermination will thus have exterminated the camp, that is, the fundamentally political principle of its limitation. Extending to the full range of the living, the transpoliticai State would, as the strategies of political war feared, bring about a complete discharge3 where the invisible police of a generalized inquisition supercede the visible polis of a population with rights. As the West German Chancellor recently declared, ' The supreme value is no longer the Nation, it is peace. This phrase translates perfecdy what lies beyond the political, the civic discharge. Peace tends to replace the Nation, the state of total peace supercedes the national State, and from this the concept of 'security' surpasses the principle of 'defence', specifically linked with the geographically limited State. Since the public will to power consists less in assuring the continued existence of a Nation by the defence or extension of its boundaries than in sustaining peace, the politically declared reality of the 'enemy' now disappears, making way for the indeterminacy of constantly redefined threats. So, in describing America as a new sort of nation that was neither imperialist nor sought to expand its territory, Richard Nixon represented the United States has seeking simply to present a 'way of life' for other nations to study and adopt. We now see that, in this way of life, pacification replaces nationalism, the final citizen becoming less active than passive; the enemy of the constitution is henceforth less an 'internal enemy' of the national State than a 'threat' to the civil peace, a danger for the constitution of internal pacification. In this sort of class struggle, in which the opposition is almost exclusively that between the 'military' and the 'civil', and where the warrior is transformed into the police, we may surmise that extermination as a superior farm of the State of pacification will exterminate death, that is, the delimitation of this transpolitical life by the menacing threat of imminent disappearance, the innovation of a subject who is 'living-dead' [mort-vivanfì, no longer akin to the Spartan Helot or the Roman slave, but a kind of'zombie' inhabiting the limbs of a devalued public life.

### Policy

#### \_\_\_\_ Policy initiatives are a type of governmentality as they are constantly reforming themselves to shape and reform reality.

MILLER AND ROSE, 2008, Professor of Management Accounting at the London School of Economics and Political Science & Martin White Professor of Sociology at the London School of Economics and Political Science and Director of the BIOS Center [Peter & Nikolas, Governing the Present, p. 28-29]

Of course, these dimensions can be studied, and have been studied, without drawing upon the notion of government. But the approach suggested by these writings of Michel Foucault has two further features that we consider important. Policy studies tend to be concerned with evaluating policies, uncovering the factors that led to their success in achieving their objectives or, more usually, deciphering the simplifications, misunderstandings, miscalculations and strategic errors that led to their failure (e.g. Williams et al. 1986). We, on the other hand, are not concerned with evaluations of this type, with making judgements as to whether and why this or that policy succeeded or failed, or with devising remedies for alleged deficiences (cf. Thompson 1987). Rather, we are struck by the fact that this very form of thinking is a characteristic of ‘governmentality’: policies always appear to be surrounded by more or less systematized attempts to adjudicate on their vices or virtues, and are confronted with other policies promising to achieve the same ends by improved means, or advocating something completely different. Evaluation, that is to say, is something internal to the phenomena we wish to investigate. For us, this imperative to evaluate needs to be viewed as itself a key component of the forms of political thought under discussion: how authorities and administrators make judgements, the conclusions that they draw from them, the rectifications they propose and the impetus that ‘failure’ provides for the propagation of new programmes of government. ‘Evaluation’ of policy, in a whole variety of forms, is thus integral to what we term the programmatic character of governmentality. Governmentality is programmatic not simply in that one can see the proliferation of more or less explicit programmes for reforming reality— government reports, white papers, green papers, papers from business, trade unions, financiers, political parties, charities and academics proposing this or that scheme for dealing with this or that problem. It is also programmatic in that it is characterized by an eternal optimism that a domain or a society could be administered better or more effectively, that reality is, in some way or other, programmable (cf. Gordon 1987; MacIntyre 1981; Miller and O’Leary 1989b; Rose and Miller 1988). Hence the ‘failure’ of one policy or set of policies is always linked to attempts to devise or propose programmes that would work better, that would deliver economic growth, productivity, low inflation, full employment or the like. Whilst the identification of failure is thus a central element in governmentality, an analysis of governmentality is not itself a tool for social programmers. To analyse what one might term ‘the will to govern’ is not to enthusiastically participate in it.

#### \_\_\_\_ Policy and government technologies and programmes are counterproductive as they are implemented along lines of subjectivity according to the specific motives of the individual.

MILLER AND ROSE, 2008, Professor of Management Accounting at the London School of Economics and Political Science & Martin White Professor of Sociology at the London School of Economics and Political Science and Director of the BIOS Center [ Peter & Nikolas, Governing the Present: Administering Economic, Social, and Political Life, p. 35]

Such networks are, of course, not the simple aggregate of rationally planned technologies for shaping decisions and conduct in calculated ways (Thompson 1982). ‘Governmentality’ is embodied in innumerable deliberate attempts to invent, promote, install and operate mechanisms of rule that will shape the investment decisions of managers or the child care decisions of parents in accordance with programmatic aspirations. But such attempts are rarely implanted unscathed, and are seldom adjudged to have achieved what they set out to do. Whilst ‘governmentality’ is eternally optimistic, ‘government’ is a congenitally failing operation. The world of programmes is heterogeneous and rivalrous, and the solutions for one programme tend to be the problems for another. ‘Reality’ always escapes the theories that inform programmes and the ambitions that underpin them; it is too unruly to be captured by any perfect knowledge. Technologies produce unexpected problems, are utilized for their own ends by those who are supposed to merely operate them, are hampered by underfunding, professional rivalries, and the impossibility of producing the technical conditions that would make them work—reliable statistics, efficient communication systems, clear lines of command, properly designed buildings, well framed regulations or whatever. Unplanned outcomes emerge from the intersection of one technology with another, or from the unexpected consequences of putting a technique to work. Contrariwise, techniques invented for one purpose may find their governmental role for another, and the unplanned conjunction of techniques and conditions arising from very different aspirations may allow something to work without or despite its explicit rationale. The ‘will to govern’ needs to be understood less in terms of its success than in terms of the difficulties of operationalizing it.>>>

### Safety

#### \_\_\_\_ The government-endorsed discourse of “safety” is essential to biopower in the US; the aff’s plan attempts to improve conditions for the poor in the name of their safety, but their propogation of the discourse of safety further increases government power

Packer, 2003 [Jeremy, Assistant Professor of Communications at Penn State, Foucault, Cultural Studies, and Governmentality, p. 151-153]

Biopower as it operates in the United States is dependent upon the safety discourse. This is the political/social arm of biopower in which populations are taken as a whole, invested with productive possibilities and normalized according to new knowledges that create systems of assessment and diagnosis. What is unique about biopolitics is that it depends first, upon the production of knowledge to validate the normative standards by which populations can be measured and second, upon policy initiatives that are mandated to bring the population up to snuff In the scenario of disciplined mobility the real question is, what specific knowledge is deployed in order to legitimate the normative practices of mobility, and furthermore, how has this knowledge been transferred into everyday practices and self-reflection?¶ Biopolitics attempts to control and produce mobilizations of particular populations, such as motorcycle gangs or youth. At times the safety discourse itself accounts for the very creation of these populations. Actuarial practices depend upon the production of very specific categories, while insurance com­panies over the past seventy years have continuously been guilty of using scare campaigns that depend upon just such stereotypes, which serve not only to validate their actuarial tactics, but also actively to disenfranchise some popu­lations from mobility altogether. More generally, the very same populations historically denied social mobility often have their mobility curtailed through safety campaigns. Women were considered a problematic addition to the driving environment in the early 1950s due to their supposed inability to deal with the technical demands of the automobile. After insurance companies reformulated the normative driver using women drivers of middle age as their actuarial yardstick, campaigns were aimed more specifically at women's supposed desire for a safer driving environment in order to reorient the mobile environment. During the Depression when itinerant laborers used it as a means of mobility and later when larger numbers of youth began hitchhiking this form of mobility was increasingly surveyed, regulated, and outlawed. “Driving While Black” is another example of the fairly repressive ways in which the mobility of minority populations are regulated. In particular, police profiling sanctions and initiates this form of surveillance. Safety campaigns of this sort limit and redirect these populations mobility, because their mobile activities are said to be dangerous, although this does not raise the question of whether their very mobility itself is dangerous to social-political orders.¶ A potentially more insidious outcome of the proliferation of the safety discourse is that it has increasingly served as a free-floating legitimator. The claim that some activity, product, or form of conduct is unsafe automatically legitimates public concern, media worthiness, litigation, and governmental involvement. The space for public debate about nearly any topic is limited not by what is the just, the good, or the democratic, but rather by what is safe. As I have shown, what is safe remains an abstraction, but it is treated as though it were not only an automatic good, but something definable, measurable, and controllable. Goodness, justice, and democracy are also abstractions, but ones which have a long history of intellectual debate. I am not trying to assert that these other abstractions should be the end point or absolute grounds for every policy decision or public discussion. However, the safety discourse, due in large part to its appearance of objectivity, colonizes discussions concerning how to manage things properly and reduces all other.

### Security

#### \_\_\_\_ The appeals to images of nuclear violence are a statist tool used to produce insecurity and spur consumption.

Virilio 77 (Paul, Speed and Politics, pg. 139-140)

In fact, **the government's deliberately terroristic manipulation of the need for security is the perfect answer to all the new ques- tions now being put to democracies by nuclear strategy-the new isolationism of the nuclear State that, in the U.S., for example, is totally revamping political strategy.** **They are trying to recreate** Union **through a new unanimity of need, just as the mass media phantasmatically created a need for cars, refrigerators... We will see the creation of a common feeling of insecurity that will lead to a new kind of consumption, the consumption of protection; this latter will progressively come to the fore and become** the tar- get of the whole merchandising system. This is essentially what Raymond Aron recently said, when he accused liberal society of having been too optimistic for too long! **The indivisible promo- tion of the need for security already composes a new composite portrait of the citizen-no longer the one who enriches the nation by consuming, but the one who invests first and foremost in security, manages his own protection as best he can, and finally pays more to consume less**. All this is less contradictory than it seems. **Capitalist society has always tightly linked politics with freedom from fear, social security with consumption and comfort. But as we saw, the other side of this obligatory movement is assistance; since the war of movement, the infirmity of unable bodies has taken on a social consistency through the demands ·of the military worker.** **If the Treaty of Versailles is concerned with assistance, it's because the inevitability of national Defense requires it, and henceforth imposes a plan of social action on the States as part of their general defense.** As Gilbert Mury notes, the first true social workers were not neutral because they came from places like Colonel de la Roque's "French Social Party." It's a good thing to remember: the promoters of the new "Social Security'' in Great Britain (Sir Beveridge, for example, in 1942) had made it an objective of total war. Furthermore, **it was to encounter similar groups of fascist or Petainist inspiration on the European continent, such as the National Aid movement. It is interesting to note the enrollment in these movements of certain members of the fascist denunciation forces (who were formerly occupied with civilian surveillance and repression), their integration into the new personnel of social aid, as we take advantage of the experience of common-law prisoners today. This is because the activities of these technicians of standardization are inseparable from the hegemonic aims of the State administration.**

### Security

#### \_\_\_\_ System invulnerablity necessitates a disciplinary order that prioritizes national security over life itself. The resulting paranoia turns every citizen into a potential terrorist and justifies a state of perpetual surveillance an violence

Packer 2006 (Jeremy, Associate Professor of Communication North Carolina State University, “Becoming Bombs: Mobilizing Mobility in the War of Terror,” Cultural Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4-5., http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rcus20.)

One of the problematic elements of such attacks for an RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) guided military, under biopolitical formations of Empire, is that the suicide bomber, as Hardt and Negri (2004), p. 54) explain, makes apparent ‘the ontological limit of biopower in its most tragic and revolting form’. Where RMA military strategy works to minimize its own military casualties in acknowledgement of the productive capacity of life, the suicide bomber inverts this notion to acknowledge and exploit the destructive (resistant) capacity of life. As a problematic of governance, the suicide bomber exposes the limits of disciplinarity as a means for governing at a distance. If all can be bombs, may be bombs, governing at a distance can not depend upon mere processes of disciplinarity and panopticism as means for internalizing the gaze and creating docile citizens. In a biopolitical order the pastoral relation of state and subject makes life the end-goal of and motor for creating a productive population/state. When life is not equally invested as a desired ends by state and citizen alike, life is no longer only that which must be groomed and cared for, but rather it becomes a constant and immanent threat which needs diffusing or extinguishing.4 The governance of mobility then needs to be understood in terms of this new problematic, mobility as immanent threat. Over the past 80 years transportation was imagined as an arena fraught with danger to the citizen subject. The question was, how can we keep them from endangering themselves as well as others? The problem posed by transportation technologies and their attendant citizen subjects was not their mobility per se, but rather whether it would create a problem in ensuring safe travel. In the new state of war, the subject isn’t a becoming accident, but a becoming bomb. The accident is something through which a set of internalized modes of safe conduct and safe technologies can be activated and initiated in order to save mobile subjects from themselves as well as prevent breakdowns in the technological order. Under the regime of Homeland Security, it is not the safety of citizens that is of primary concern, but rather the stability of Empire’s social order most generally, and more specifically the security of the state form. It is a war in which the state form fears all that may become problematic, become bomb. So the new mode of problematization treats all mobilities as potential bombs. Citizen’s become bombs, not simply by choice or through cell propaganda and training, but by Homeland Security itself. It treats all as potential bombs, thereby governing us as if each and all may become bombs. Effectively, we are all therefore becoming bombs whether we would ever choose to be or not. In the biopolitical regime, mobile safety is a key technology of governance; it is a means of hedging against the cultural and economic damage posed by unsafe practices at the level of the social and the individual. The relationship between the state and citizen under a rubric of safety could be described as a sort of paternalism, or what Foucault (1978) has described as pastoralism. In this conception, each paternal subject of the state, the ‘safe citizen’, is looked after as an individual subject worthy of care and protection and as an integral part of the population as a whole. Subject and population are imagined as mutually constitutive. The safe driver is not just the product of the safe road system, but also its producer. Thus individual and social safety are inseparable. The goals of the one are imagined to create the outcome for others. Safe individuals create safe societies. Health, or the maintenance and creation of the productive capacity of the body biopower, provides a good example. The general health of the society, the ‘public health’, depends upon the relative health of the individuals of which it is comprised. Healthier individuals for instance, minimize the spread of communicable disease and decrease the overall strain placed on the health care system, which allows for the better allocation of medical resources, which leads to healthier individuals, and so on. Traffic safety has been similarly imagined and in fact is in some governmental quarters treated as a public health issue. In order to create a safe driving environment, each individual’s driving behavior is targeted for alteration both for their own benefit and the benefit of other drivers. Thus, a safe driving environment depends upon safe individual drivers, while the safer the environment as a whole, the safer each individual. Two coalescing changes in the political formulation of citizen to state are altering this formulation for the governance of automobility. The first will be characterized as a shift from the ‘safety society’ to the ‘security society’. The second alteration, has been gaining force since the 1960s when technological solutions to traffic safety were beginning to be imagined as more effective than driving behavior modification.5 Increasingly, the technological solutions work through communications, command, and control networks (C3) with the military leading the way of their development. Under these changes, rather than being treated as one to be protected from an exterior force and one’s self, the citizen is now treated as an always potential threat, a becoming bomb. And the imagined means for diffusing such bombs are C3 technologies. In the security society, the constitutive is replaced by the combative. Mobile conduct is not treated as constitutively productive (i.e. creating safer roads), but rather as potentially destructive (creating a threat to the social order and the nation). The individual problematized in the safety discourse can side with the goals of safety, but not necessarily have to identify with the state or nation. The problematized individual of security is asked to primarily identify with the nation, but is treated by the nation as that which is its very threat. This severe disjuncture creates and depends upon a constantly imagined threat, an almost paranoid schizophrenia of self-to-nation relationship. Am I the enemy of the state (as surely I am treated before getting on a plane) or am I a friend of the state (helping the state in its surveillance practices of keeping constantly vigilant on the look-out for potential terrorists as with the TIPS program)? No longer is the constitutive nature that of self and society, but rather self and nation. I am part of the nation in-so-far-as I see (particular?) others as threats to the nation. Through an internalization of the state logic of other as becoming bomb, I accept my schizophrenia. I, in fact, am asked by the state to help enact the logic of threat in my everyday life through a selfactualization of surveillance and ever-readiness. I am asked to do so during and via my mobility. Extended mobility becomes not only a more malleable threat as bomb, but the potential extension of the self-state surveillance network. In this war of all against all, our mobility is imagined as a problem and solution.

### State

#### \_\_\_\_ The use of the state for logistical planning furthere the dromological machine driven towards pure speed and domestication of bodies.

Bratton 2k6 (Benjamin H., Lecturer @ the Southern California School or Architecture at UCLA, “ “Logistics of Habitable Circulation,” Introduction to 2006 Edition of Speed and Politics, pg. 14-15)

Where does Virilio locate the historical agency of dromology (speed) and *dromocracy* (politics)? How does one become the other? **The recurring actor in Virilio's history is the** State, **if only because it is also the legal signatory of modern war.** But his is hardly a traditional political theory. "In fact there is no 'industrial revolution' but only a 'dromocratic revolution;' **there is not democracy, only dromocracy; there is not strategy, only dromology"** (69). **States employ dromological techniques to exercise power, but as for Foucault, state apparatuses are functions, artifacts even, of dromocratic machinations that exceed their constitutions and incorporation**s. For Virilio (in concert with Deleuze and Guattari) such **state governments are profiled as a sort of "machinic species" of collective formation**. Echoing Heidegger, he writes **that "dromo- cratic intelligence is not exercised against a more or less determined military adversary, but as a permanent assault on the world, and through it, on human nature"** (86). Likewise, the mobilization of economic production is characterized less in terms of maximizing surplus labor value than according to the distribu- tion of metabolic intensification in the service of an historically comprehensive acceleration.¶ **Dromocracy establishes and reproduces standardized forms of assembly and disassembly for the systematic integration of human energy into specific infrastructures.** "Factory work must not escape the dictatorship of movement. It reproduces the enclosure on the spot, in the obligatory and absurd kinetic cycle ... condensed machine of the logistical glacis" (101). **This is the design of cor- poreal discipline in the pursuit of the image of spee**d [not the image of truth as Foucault might prioritize it] **in which "the class struggle is replaced by the struggle of the technological bodies of the armies according to their dynamic efficiency:** logistic*s"* (72). **Indeed the exercise of political authority in and through the dimensions of the body-in-motion appears for Virilio in its most extreme and comic form in those performances of collective sin- gularization that are Marxist state stadium pageants**. Their choreographies of motor functions move according to the parry line, now a literal grid. **The numb aesthetic of "miming the joys at being liberated" and through this, "the simplicity of a power that comes down to the constraint and housebreaking of bodies," is repeated upside down in the camps where the misbeliever's body absorbs the cultivation of the law** (55). Virilio writes, "His dissi- dence is a *postural* crime" (56). Even today, as **this script of fleshly discipline has largely been exported from the commanding GS metropoles to its satellites, another softer intercourse emerges between the individual and his logistical destiny, transposed into other symbolic and informational economies.**¶

### Speed/Virillio

#### \_\_\_\_ Increased speed of transportation **insulates the wealthy in a protective cocoon while denying illegitimated populations the right to travel. The affirmative does not prevent violence, but relocates it to the margins of society.**

Martin 2011 (Craig, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway University of London, “Desperate passage: violent mobilities and the politics of discomfort,” Journal of Transport Geography, Vol. 19]

The seeming starkness of this argument may emanate from the comfort of corporeal mobility that privileged forms of passengering provide: we are not privy to the roots of violence in our elite, cosmopolitan mobilities, in part due to the spectacularised power of subjective violence over systemic violence. The inherent violence of speed is screened out; its lineage black-boxed in both the ubiquity of transnational mobility itself, but more tellingly by the almost suspended experience of the legitimated passenger.8 Instead of corporeal mobility being an experience of the body thrown through space, the protection of the body by transit vehicles (train, automobile, plane, etc.) cushions the sheer physicality of corporeal movement. According to Virilio legitimated passengers are provided with forms of comfort that protect them from the visibility and physical tumult of acceleration (Virilio, 2006a, p. 54). This ‘politics of comfort’, values ‘‘the corporeal ‘packaging’ of the passenger’’ (Virilio, 2006a, p. 54–55). Such comforting may be said to issue from the sedentary past of the pre-Modern era, a past that is situated in the comfort of the furnished body, a form of cushioning that is then extended to the acceleration of Modernity in order to protect the passenger ‘‘from the assault of the velocity of vectors’’ (Virilio, 2006a, p. 54). Although this does not simply fold the sedentary onto the non-sedentary, of central importance to Virilio’s conception of comfort is his conflation of the French words meuble (furniture) and immeuble (shelter) (Virilio, 2006a, p. 55), whereby the protective cushioning of the padded armchair both separates and shelters the body from the harshness and discomfort of hardness, and later speed.9 In effect his image of a ‘‘mummified’’ body in motion (Virilio, 2006a, p. 55) locates the legitimated passenger within a realm of ‘suspended animation’, suggesting the encapsulation of the legitimated passenger in a hermetic, protected space. The passivity of the legitimated passenger is also present in Schivelbusch’s (1978) seminal work on the spatio-temporality of the railroad where he discusses the role of the in-between space of the railway journey, arguing that the pre-railroad journey was one which enabled the passenger to ‘savour’ the joys of relatively sedentary speeds (Schivebusch, 1978, p. 34). By contrast, and in a tone which might be said to resonate with Virilio’s rather more dramatic position, Schivelbusch references Ruskin’s description of the train traveller as a ‘‘human parcel’’ (Schivelbusch, 1978, p. 35), packaged in their sealed environment, and, as he adds, ‘‘untouched by the space traversed’’ (1978:35). Admittedly, such reasoning does not afford enough significance to the profoundly rich texture of the journey (see Bissell, 2007), including the social relations encompassed by such spaces. It does however emphasise the connection between privileged modes of passengering and the separation from the harsh realities of the accelerated violence of Modernity’s speed culture. The significance of separation becomes even more evident when one considers the work of de Cauter on capsularisation. Echoing Virilio’s work, he notes how the increasing acceleration of the hyper mobilised world necessitates in-built protection for the human body. The role of capsules, he argues, is central to the protective cocooning of the body at these increasing speeds, but also to the constitution of networked mobilities more generally (de Cauter, 2004, p. 96). Added to this the effective separation that the capsule appears to facilitate is characteristic ofZˇ izˇek’s description of a supposed ‘non-violent zero-level’, i.e., the protection provided masks the actual systemic violence of speed. Historically this capsular logic has led to the creation of various sociotechnical systems which have facilitated the increased speed and dominance of communication, trade, but most profoundly for my position, corporeal and non-corporeal mobilities in the form of railway carriages, the motorcar, the airplane etc. Without such protection the increasing speed of Modernity would not have been possible, for as de Cauter emphasises, ‘‘the more physical and informational speed increases, the more man (sic) will need capsules’’, thus identifying the relationship between the increased speeds of Modernity and the required ‘‘protection against shock’’ (de Cauter, 2004, p. 95). There is, then, a significant link between Virilio’s position and de Cauter’s: in order to protect the mobile body from the extremes of increasing speed the capsules provide evermore sophisticated forms of protection, be it passenger airbags, noise reduction technology or advanced braking systems. This is a defining condition of contemporary capsularisation and legitimated, cosmopolitan mobilities alike. For in older forms of capsularised society the human body was directly linked to the vehicle (animals, bicycles, skis, roller skates (de Cauter, 2004, p. 95)), whereas with the increasing speed of more recent forms of capsularised society the body remains comparatively suspended—in particular the physical demands of mobility become transferred onto the capsule itself, leaving the passenger inside—akin to Schivelbusch’s ‘human parcel’— protected from the subjective violence of the actual body in movement. As becomes apparent the luxury of comfort and protection is only available to those licensed to separate their bodies through capsularisation from accelerated Modernity’s legacy of shock and systemic violence. The question of separation is not solely demonstrated in relation to the affective tumult of the speeding body, it is also ascribable to the politics of separation. De Cauter suggests that the capsularised ethos is one of inclusion and exclusion, notably in relation to struggles over the meaning of public space (gated communities for example), but also, I would add, with accelerated mobilities. Like the border, the capsule as both a protective cushion for legitimated peoples, and an exclusionary divide barring illegitimated peoples, is symptomatic of the desire in those locked-out to be included in the capsularised network, thus attesting to the earlier argument outlined by Kumin (2000) concerning the immanent bond between securitisation practices and the increasing use of human smuggling syndicates by illegitimated peoples in order to circumvent such modes of barring. Further to this, for Campbell the question of capsularisation serves to ‘‘transgress conventional understandings of inside/outside and isolated/connected’’ (Campbell, 2005, p. 951), as it expands the concept of security toward a more networked approach. It highlights the shifting sites of securitisation, where the exclusionary logic of the border extends to the mobile formations of the capsule. The networked nature of the capsule not only provides the expressions of separation, but also that of connection. Such attempts to connect with the capsularised network of transnational mobilities can take many forms, and as illustrated by the various tactics of infiltration the modes of securing inclusion are often parasitic—clinging onto the underside of lorries or secretion in shipping containers. The desperation of undocumented immigrants and the politics of people smuggling expose the innate violence of speed for those peoples disqualified from travelling via legitimated means. They are locked out of the packaged mobilities of comfort, often resorting instead to the use of unpackaged forms of discomfort by travelling in inappropriate vehicles. Crucially the desperate passenger is not afforded the comforts of corporeal capsularisation that Virilio and de Cauter speak of. Instead, the cushioning of the privileged passenger that screens out the violence of speed is replaced by a politics of discomfort, most tellingly via the passage in vehicles unintended for human mobility. This distinction between comfort and discomfort is in one sense reliant upon a binary reversal as it provides a valuable illustration of the differences in physical affect inflicted upon the bodies of the legitimated traveller and desperate passenger. For example, Mohammed, an Arab Iraqi, describes a tortuous journey from Iraq to Athens (cited in Courau, 2003, p. 379). The journey, arranged by smugglers, is made up of various modes of transport, including a minibus where Mohammed and his fellow passengers have to lie under the seats. However, the most arduous part of his journey to Athens comes with the group spending some 25 h kneeling in the back of a lorry.10 Discomfort in this instance is clearly a form of physical distress and thus close to the outline of subjective violence, the body in this case fixed in position for an extended period of time. This stands in contrast to Virilio’s argument that comfort breeds docility, the passive body immured in a state of dependency on packaged comfort (Virilio, 2006a, p. 55–56). Whilst the submissive body of Virilio’s cosmopolitan traveller may be inert in its comforted torpor, the fixity of the desperate passenger is of a different register—Mohammed’s account describes the need to remain still in order to avoid discovery at security checkpoints (Courau, 2003, p. 379). Added to this, if we return to the issue of subjective and objective violence discussed in the previous section, the binary relationship is extended. The comfort described by Virilio is a concealment of the systemic violence of accelerative society, whereas the unpackaged environments of commodity mobility serve to underscore this in the most brutal forms of subjective violence on the desperate passenger. The physical and psychological tumult, the subjective violence felt by the desperate passenger is a result of the use of vehicles unintended for human transportation, hence, in part, the exposure of systemic violence. Given the effective barring from cushioned forms of mobility it becomes necessary, then, for the undocumented to literally harness the violence of speed through the use of alternative mobility formations, in many cases those designed for commodity distribution. Following Virilio’s and de Cauter’s work it could be stated that the transferral of physical mobility onto the capsule/ vehicle is overturned in the practices of desperate passage: instead of the comforts of separation there is a reattachment of the body onto capsules not designed for corporeal mobility. Again, this serves to highlight how the comforts of legitimated passage simply disguise the systemic nature of violent mobilities. The physical affect of the body moving at high speed is exposed when such comforts are not present, the systemic violence of mobility imposed on the body of the desperate passenger, the body at one again with the vehicular object at its most rudimentary.

## Internal Links

### Infrastructure = War

#### \_\_\_\_ The creation of infrastructure and systems of transport pave the way for complete militarization.

Virilio 77 (Paul, Speed and Politics, pg. 85)

Practical war divides the Assault into two phases, **the first of which is the creation of the original infrastructure of future battlefields. This infrastructure consists of new railroads and stations, telephone installations, enlargement of roads and tracks, the parallel lines of departure, evacuation routes, shelters, etc. The countryside, the earth**¶ **is henceforth given over, definitively consecrated to war by the cosmopolitan mass of workers, ·an army of laborers speaking every language, the Babel of logistics**.1 Both the arsenal and the war per- sonnel already take on a kind of peaceful, or rather political, air; they return to highway surveillance. **Already we find the beginnings of what will become deterrence: reduction of power in favor of a better trajectory, life traded for survival**. In 1924, the military monk Teilhard de Chardin writes in Mon univers: "We still need mightier and mightier cannons, bigger and bigger battleships, to materialize our aggression on the world.

### TI = Surveillance

#### \_\_\_\_ Whereas mobility once operated on a local level, regulated by the disciplinary power of the aristocracy, the twentieth century saw a vast increase in transportation which required a new mode of control. Under the rule of the nation-state, speed shifted from a novelty to a moral necessity, and the resulting problematization of the body in motion has persisted to the present day in the form of total surveillance over movement.

Cresswell 2012 (Tim, Department of Geography Royal Holloway, University of London, “Constellations of Mobility,” www.dtesis.univr.it/documenti/Avviso/all/all181066.pdf.)

A feudal sense of movement was characterized by carefully controlled physical movement where the monopoly on the definition of legitimate movement rested with those at the top of a carefully controlled great chain of being. The vast majority of people had their movement controlled by the lords and the aristocracy. For the most part mobility was regulated at the local level. Yet still mobile subject positions existed outside of this chain of command ñ the minstrel, the vagabond, the pilgrim. Within this Constallation of Mobility we can identify particular practices of mobility, meanings for mobility and patterns of movement. In addition there are characteristic spaces of mobility and modes of control and regulation (Groebner, 2007). This was the era of frankpledge and of branding. As feudalism began to break down a larger class of mobile masterless men arose who threatened to undo the local control of mobility. New subjects, new knowledges, representations and discourses and new practices of mobility combined. The almshouse, the prison and the workcamp became spaces of regulation for mobility. By the Nineteenth Century in Europe the definition and control of legitimate movement had passed to the nation-state, the passport was on the horizon, national borders were fixed and enforced (Torpey, 2000). New forms of transport allowed movement over previously unthinkable scales in short periods of time. Narratives of mobility-as-liberty and mobility-as-progress accompanied notions of circulatory movement as healthy and moral (Sennett, 1994). By the Twentieth Century mobility was right at the heart of what it is to be modern. Modern man, and increasingly modern woman, were mobile. New spaces of mobility from the boulevard to the railway station (the spaces of Benjamin’s Arcades Project (Benjamin, 1999)) became iconic for modernity. New subject positions such as tourist, citizen, globe-trotter and hobo came into being. So what of now? We too have our sense of movement. Railways stations have been replaced by the airport - the site from which much cultural theory is written (Hetherington, 2002). Our mobility is increasingly regulated and legitimized by authorities beyond the nation-state. The United Nations, international logistics organizations, transnational corporations, and post-national bodies such as the European Union create new stories for mobility, new spaces for mobility and new kinds of subject identities. European citizens, global terrorists, the kinetic elite. Biometrics are beginning to supplement and then replace the passport as keys to our mobile identities. Broadly speaking, then, the scale of regulation for mobility has moved in the past 500 years or so from the local to the global. While mobility of the poor was always a problem for those high up it was a more local problem in feudal Europe where wandering vagabonds were regulated by the local parish through a system known as frankpledge (Dodgshon, 1987). By the eighteenth century mobility was beginning to become a national responsibility, Passports were just around the corner and poor people moved over greater distances and more frequently. By the end of the nineteenth century the nation state had a monopoly on the means of legitimate movement and national borders, for the first time became key points of friction in the movement of people (Torpey, 2000). By World War Two passports had become commonplace and nations were cooperating in identifying and regulating moving bodies. In each case it was indeed bodies that proved to be the key element even as the scale of mobility expanded and speeded up. While feudal vagabonds had their bodies branded like cattle, later travellers had to provide a photograph and personal details including “distinguishing marks” for the new passes and passports that were being developed (Groebner, 2007). Now we are in a new phase of mobility regulation where the means of legitimate movement is increasingly in the hands of corporations and trans-national institutions. The United Nations and the European Union, for instance, have defined what counts and what does not account as appropriate movement. The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative is seeking to regulate movement between the United States, Canada, Mexico and the Carribbean in ever more sophisticated ways (Gilbert, 2007; Sparke, 2006). Increasingly national interests are combined with so called pervasive commerce as innovative forms of identification based on a hybrid of biometrics and mobile technology are developed (Fuller, 2004). One of the latest developments in mobile identification technology is the Rfid (Radio Frequency Identification) chip. These chips have been attached to objects of commerce since the 1980s. The Rfid chip contains a transponder that can emit a very low power signal that is readable by devices that are looking for them. The chip can include a large amount of data about the thing it is attached to. Rfid chip have the advantage over barcodes of being readable on the move, through paint, and other things that might obscure it, and at a distance. It is, in other words, designed for tracking on the move. Unlike a barcode it does not have to be stationary to be scanned. And Rfid technology is being used on people. As with most kinds of contemporary mobility regulation the testing ground seems to be airports. In Manchester airport a trial has just been conducted in which 50,000 passengers were tracked through the terminal using Rfid tags attached to boarding passes. The airport authorities have requested that this be implemented permanently. Washington State together with the Department of Homeland Security has recently conducted a trail involving Rfid tags on state driving-licenses allowing the users to travel between the states participating in the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative. These tags can include much more information than is normally found on a driver’slicense and can, of course, be tracked remotely. It is experiments such as these that have led some to predict the development of a global network of RFID receivers placed in key mobility nodes such as airports, seaports, highways, distribution centers, and warehouses, all of which are constantly reading, processing, and evaluating people’s behaviors and purchases. Information gathering and regulation such as this is starkly different from the mobility constellations of earlier periods. Regulation of mobility, to use Paul Virilio’s term, is increasingly dromological. Dromology is the regulation of differing capacities to move. It concerns the power to stop and put into motion, to incarcerate and accelerate objects and people (Virilio, 2006). Virilio and others argue that previous architectural understandings of space-time regulation are increasingly redundant in the face of a new informational and computational landscape in which the mobility of people and things is tightly integrated with an infrastructure of software that is able to provide a motive force or increase friction at the touch of a button (Thrift and French, 2002; Dodge and Kitchin, 2004), The model for this new mode of regulation is logistics. The spaces from which this mobility is produced are frequently the spatial arrangement of the database and spreadsheet.

#### \_\_\_\_ The aff necessitates a surveillance of mobility that disciples the subject into a docile body and a tool of complete biopolitical control.

Bennett and Regan (Colin J., Department of Political Science, University of Victoria, and Priscilla M., Department of Public & International Affairs, George Mason University, “Editorial: Surveillance and Mobilities.,” Surveillance & Society. Vol 1., No. 4)

As all surveillance analysts have taken note, over the course of the 20th century surveillance systems have become more ubiquitous to include ‘monitoring everyday life’ (Lyon, 2001). Workplaces, stores, schools, hospitals are all physical spaces where monitoring occurs. The online world has not been immune to this everyday surveillance as cookies, web-bugs and other technologies capture information on mouse-droppings and click-stream data. One of the most damaging results of the monitoring of everyday life is the further blurring of the boundaries between public and private, between personal and social borders. The surveillance of mobilities defies the contextualization of life: the workplace, store and home are no longer separate places in which one is surveilled but instead each becomes a point on the flow of surveillance. And each of these points is connected to the others, providing a more completely textured rendition of one’s everyday life. With the surveillance of mobilities there is potentially no ‘hiding’. There is no room to anonymously walk down a street, drive through a neighborhood, or talk on the phone. All these movements and flows are subject to scrutiny, captured, stored, manipulated, and subsequently used for purportedly benevolent or underhandedly sinister purposes. The objects we use (cars, phones, computers, electricity) in turn become tools for surveillance. Actions, conversations, movements are all caught. Movement is not a means of evading surveillance but has become the subject of surveillance. What will be the consequences of the lack of possibility for unmonitored movement? Might we all just stop? Will we become frozen in catatonic poses as we realize there is no place to hide? These questions are interestingly addressed in Fotel and Thomsen’s analysis of the surveillance of children where there is now “adult orchestration of their mobility” (539), in Curry’s examination of systems to identify the treacherous traveler, and in Sweeny’s devil1.0. The history of surveillance systems would indicate that the most likely consequence of the surveillance of mobilities will be yet more rationalization and control (Giddens, 1985; Beniger, 1986). Gary Marx offers a redefinition of surveillance to take into account the fact that surveillance is no longer focused on suspected persons but is “also applied to contexts (geographical places and spaces, particular time periods, networks, systems and categories of persons) (2002: 10). Such surveillance is more intensive and extensive allowing for finer gradations of what is considered appropriate or deviant. As Peter Adey points out in his article in this issue “particular movements are inscribed with meanings of what is an allowed movement and what is considered suspicious and deviant” (508). And this may lead to more places, such as airports airplanes, being considered ‘off-limits’ for people exhibiting these movements. As with other forms of surveillance, the surveillance of mobilities may result in more selfmonitoring as there is an increased awareness that one is under constant, continual and continuous scrutiny. Even if the surveillance is designed not to control but to care and secure, the awareness that one is under scrutiny, or that one might potentially be under scrutiny, can change behaviors in unintended ways. The potential for this having negative unintended consequences is perhaps most apparent in the education setting and with the monitoring of children’s movements. At the same time, and as is true with other surveillance systems, there may be increased temptations to, as well as opportunities for, gaming or confronting the surveillance. As Sweeny notes with the Surveillance Camera Players: I consciously acknowledge the presence of the camera, altering my behavior accordingly: nervously gawking at the camera, hiding my face, or flipping the bird. Through this performance, I temporarily deflect the gaze of the camera through my embodied practices. (530) And as surveillance systems collect more information, this leads to more detailed categorization of individuals and then to judgments based on those categorizations, leaving the concept of a unique individual in the dustbin of history. But as Curry suggests, the use of information based on the surveillance of mobilities will lead to collection of ever more information because the judgments that can be made based on place (who belongs in a jetliner, who belongs in this educational space, who drives their car along this highway) are more straightforward than those based on movements. Such information may not necessarily be ‘identifiable’. Extrapolations of behavior can be made by knowing the types of people who engage in certain behaviors in certain places at certain times. Our discourses, and our regulatory responses, are still dependent upon outmoded distinctions between what is and is not ‘personal data’, as Green and Smith demonstrate. Nevertheless, the surveillance of mobilities requires more detailed data mining to construct narratives of a person’s activity, “What is he really doing? Is he a mentally deranged person, desperate to escape his troubles by escaping the country? Is he a criminal…Is he a Cuban émigré, now homesick? Or is he simply a somewhat frazzled businessman?” (485) But surveillance of mobilities assumes that more information and more finely tuned categorization of that information can answer such questions. As Arvidsson points out: The extraction of surplus value in information capitalism entails the transformation of ‘productive life’ into ‘dead values’, like brands or ‘content’. This is the main function of the ubiquitous surveillance of the panoptic sort. But this ‘branding of life’ also tends to lead to its automation. Branded life is programmed life (468).

#### \_\_\_\_ Transportation systems are a tool of total surveillance by bringing everything within instant reach. This produces us as docile bodies before the panopticism of the state.

Sager 2006 (Tore, Department of Civil and Transport Engineering, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, “Freedom as Mobility: Implications of the Distinction between Actual and Potential Travelling,” Mobilities, Vol. 1, No. 3,]

Mobile subjects have to be disciplined in order to ensure safe and efficient transport and circulation systems. Disciplining is a broader notion than surveillance: it requires a technology of power ‘that reappears with regularity across the social plane, reasserting itself in various sectors, creating a grid of possibilities not primarily aimed to limit actions, but to speed up and standardize specific actions’ (Packer, 2003, p.144). Although limiting action may not be the main purpose, disciplining affects even the potentiality aspect of mobility. For instance, women may be disciplined to stay at home even if transport alternatives are available. Packer (2003, p.140) argues that mobile subjects must be highly disciplined, as they are not always within the immediate scope of state interaction and might, in certain conditions, do harm to the state. This section analyses surveillance as a set of disciplining technologies. Mobility and freedom characterise states or situations, while transport and liberation require action. Given an imperfect vantage point (lack of freedom), freedom depends on liberation, and mobility will not be established without transport. Once the mobile state is established, the potentiality aspect of mobility can be seen as ex ante in relation to transport. That is, the possibility of transport exists first, then one decides whether the transport will actually be employed. Transport also has ex post characteristics in that it leaves tracks – electronically or as physical marks. In contrast with the ex ante attribute that is associated with freedom, the ex post tracks are associated with control. Potentiality opens doors for alternative actions, while tracks attest to the choice of one alternative and the foreclosure of the rest. Tracks betray the particular actions actually chosen and undertaken. The effects of tracks on freedom as mobility are discussed later. Surveillance systems help answer the questions of who is where, at what point in time, and what they are doing. Some systems are designed to sort people’s activities and characteristics for marketing or profiling purposes. They capture information about people’s demographic characteristics, preferences, communications, consumer transactions, and movements in order to more effectively manipulate them to buy products or behave in prescribed ways (Clarke, 2000, 2003). Compare Molz’s (2006, p.380) mentioning of ‘cookies’ that record how users surf the Internet, which websites they visit, and which links they use. With the surveillance of movement between workplace, store, home, and so forth, there is potentially no hiding. ‘There is no room to anonymously walk down a street, drive through a neighborhood, or talk on the phone … The objects we use (cars, phones, computers, electricity) … become tools for surveillance. Actions, conversations, movements are all caught. Movement is not a means of evading surveillance but has become the subject of surveillance’ (Bennett & Regan, 2004, p.453). Road tolling systems, cellphone locators, and traffic control monitors keep track of movement, and data from these can – within legal limits – be integrated with other kinds of information such as closed circuit television (CCTV) or data recording economic transactions. Molz (2006, p.379) concludes that ‘[t]he more we move and communicate, the more we are tracked and recorded’. Tracks can be used for surveillance and violation of privacy (Sager, 1998). In combination with accessibility and hypermobility (Sager, 2005), tracks provide perfect conditions for surveillance. When all places are accessible and within almost instant reach, anybody can be on the spot anytime. It is especially threatening when friction between private and public spheres is reduced. Clearly, the relationship between freedom and the defeat of friction is ambiguous. New opportunities for the individual and new possibilities of control are simultaneously provided for. This is a reminder that aspects of freedom may contradict each other; in this case, freedom as a large choice set that implies transport and freedom as lack of external control. Typically, surveillance is intense at the hubs, terminals, and transfer points where the potential for freedom is highest (Adey, 2004; Mu ller & Boos, 2004). Airports are symbols of mobility but also filters that sort travellers at coded gates. Tracks in combination with insignificant friction lead society towards electronic panopticism (Lyon, 1993).10 Again, it is the mobility of the watchers, and not their actual following of the tracks, which is the foundation of the efficient surveillance system. Behaviour is regulated through the travellers’ knowledge that they might be watched by anybody with an interest in doing so, as transport and accessibility to any place are so easily and momentarily obtainable. For example, some believe that ‘You’ll never walk alone’ has a double meaning in Liverpool because of the extensive use of CCTV in the central city streets (Coleman & Sim, 2000).

## Impacts

### 2NC Virilio Impact

#### \_\_\_\_ Increasing speed pushes us toward the integral accident of the destruction of the world – resisting a particular war is the wrong approach. Only resisting he complex of war itself can stop the accident form occuring

Virilio in ‘1 |Paul, Virilio Live pg. 28|

Here, one must state that the book might also have been titled *Pure War* (Virilio and Lotringer, 1997 [1983]) since that is the heading of the Introduction.14 That was the time when we were living with the unadulterated balance of terror. What I mean is that one cannot understand the concept of pure war outside of the atomic bomb, the weapon of the apocalypse. At that time, and this has been somewhat forgotten, we were living with the potentiality of a pure war, which, nevertheless, failed to materialize. What is pure war? It is a war of a single utterance: Fear! Fear! Fear! Nuclear deterrence can be conceived of as pure war for the simple reason that nuclear war never took place. However, such deterrence did spawn a technoscientific explosion, inclusive of the Internet, and other satellite technologies. And so one saw that the history of warfare, of siege war, of the war of movement, of total war, of world war, all somehow merged into pure war. That is, into a blockade, into nuclear deterrence. What had been reached was the dimension of ' the integral accident, the moment of the total destruction of the world. And there it stopped. Thus, at that stage, the whole concept of resistance to war became a new phenomenon. It was no longer about resisting an invader, German or other, but about resisting the military-scientific and industrial complex. Take my generation: during the Second World War you had resistance, combat against the Germans who invaded France. During the 1960s and 1970s there was resistance, among others by me, not against an invader, but against the military-industrial complex, that is against the invention of ever crazier sorts of weapons, like the neutron bomb, and ‘Doomsday machines’, something that we saw, for instance, in Stanley Kubrick’s film *Dr Strangelove.* Thus resistance to pure war is of another nature than resistance to an oppressor, to an invader. It is resistance against science: that is extraordinary, unheard of!

#### \_\_\_\_ Transporation infrastructure is a convoy of colonialism. It transforms the population into an always mobilized force for a perpetual war.

Virilio, Curator of the Museum of the Accident, in ‘5 |Paul, Negative Horizon, Pg. 56-7|

Imperceptibly, the route [la vote] reproduces the convoy [le convoi\, the¶ alignment of troops; in marching order, the unwinding band channels¶ us together in a column for the sequencing [défilé] of accelerated travel¶ [voyage]. This aligned disposition of bodies in movement repeats that of¶ the body of the trained animal: man entrained [dresse] is a man trained¶ [redresse], in rows by two, by three; the multi-lane motorway inscribes¶ the procession of convoys in the crossing of conquered landscapes.¶ Victory of the sequencing [victoire de defilement or victory parade¶ [défilé de victoire], the high-speed route institutes the invasion as the¶ colonial division of lands institutes the occupation ... the route installs¶ its first line, its front in the conquest of time; here as elsewhere, to¶ vanquish is to advance, and the allotment of territory in the interminable¶ band of the route of penetration is nothing but a dynamic form¶ of colonization, the route straightened for acceleration is nothing other¶ than a 'deportation camp, the punishment of modern asylums arises¶ from the linear and continuous character of the movement and not¶ simply from incarceration. The route that gives rise to the column of¶ vehicles also prompts the colonization of passengers; whether deportees¶ of work or deportees of leisure makes no difference! The transit camp¶ of a final war where the domestication and normalization of motorists¶ is continuously perfected.¶ Site of ejection and no longer of election where the alternating¶ transmigration renews the classical territorial transplantation, it does¶ indeed seem as if transfer must be indispensable to the State. The State¶ apparatus is in fact simply an apparatus of displacement [Replacement36],¶ its stability appears to be assured by a series of temporary gyroscopic¶ processes of delocalization and relocalization. Let's look again for a¶ moment at the Peruvian world: despite its inferior mobility due to the¶ absence of the horse, it relied upon the distances between outposts to¶ maintain state power; however, these distances would prove fatal with¶ the arrival of the European equestrian forces: 'In the Incan Empire¶ borders and subjugated provinces were defended by garrisons, strategic¶ points were guarded by fortresses, pacification was effected by moving¶ people from one point to another, the conquered tribal colonies were¶ installed in secured areas and colonies of the dominant race were¶ established in the subjugated provinces'.37 We note that 'pacification'¶ is accomplished here, as elsewhere, through a complete distancing¶ between the vanquishers and the vanquished, and a similar practice¶ is at work among the Guarani Reducciones. Transport is at the heart¶ of the State apparatus just as it is at the heart of war, while these logistical¶ necessities are to be traced back to their beginnings assured by¶ the woman of burden. Nevertheless, these displacements are still only¶ displacements in space, transplantations from one place to another and¶ not yet transmigrations in the time of acceleration, the weak and irregular¶ performance of vectors is up to this point incapable of prompting¶ a dromocratic revolution of the State, beyond the walled city, the¶ limits of the town or region. The distancing occurs through territorial¶ conquest, it does not yet occur through the conquest of time. If¶ invasion contributes to the institution of public law, its speed is not yet¶ the Law of the world, the State is as yet only the state of siege of citadels,¶ and not yet the state of emergency of vectors. Delocalization is effected¶ through colonies of populations until it comes to be realized in the¶ perpetual movement of columns of vehicles, and this will last until the¶ nineteenth century, when the rail will contribute less to consolidating¶ the colonial conquest than to preparing this historical transformation¶ that today takes the illusory title of 'decolonization. The 'liberation of¶ colonies' brought about by the passage from the era of moving people¶ from place to place to that of outright migrations is in fact only the¶ most evident sign of deterritorialization; it announces the future of an¶ anational 'state of emergency' beyond the old state of siege on the city,¶ where the capitalization of speed attains to such a degree that the old¶ geopolitics tends to become a simple chronopolitics, a true war of time,¶ beyond that of space and territories.

### Accident🡪Extinction

#### \_\_\_\_ The State’s obsession with speed and efficiency produces monumental accidents that threaten our survival.

Virilio 05 (Paul, Paul Virilio (b. 1932 in Paris) philosopher. Information Bomb pg. 36-37)

'The war years do not seem like real years .... They were¶ a nightmare in which reality stopped,' wrote Agatha¶ Christie not so very long ago. 1¶ Today, one feels it no longer takes a war to kill the reality of the world. Crashes, derailments, explosions, destruction, pollution, the greenhouse effect, acid rain ... Minamata, Chernobyl, Seveso, etc. In those days of deterrence we eventually got¶ used, after a fashion, to our new nightmare and, thanks¶ among other things to live TV, the long death throes of the¶ planet assumed the familiar guise of one series of scoops¶ among others. Thus, having reached a high degree of’ scientific stupor, we simply contented ourselves with ticking off the events, with enumerating the unfortunate victims of our scientific reverses, our technical and industrial mistakes, But we had seen nothing yet, and where the de-realization of the physical world was concerned, we were soon going to pass on to the next stage. Up till then we had in fact stubbornly refused to concern ourselves with the unparalleled scope of the more perverse harm and more personal troubles caused, not by the spectacular failures of¶ our technical innovations, but by their very performances, their record-breaking feats - the tremendous technological victories won in this critical period in the fields of communications and representation. It has been claimed that psychoanalysis does not resolve¶ problems, but merely displaces them . . . We might say the¶ same of technical and industrial progress.¶ Even as our famous 'Gutenberg galaxy' was claiming to¶ put reading within everyone's grasp, the reader will note¶ that, at the same time, it mass-produced populations of¶ detif-mutes.¶ Industrial typography, by spreading the habit of solitary¶ - and hence silent - reading, was gradually to deprive¶ the peoples of that use of speech and hearing which had¶ previously been involved in the (public, polyphonic) reading¶ aloud made necessary by the relative scarcity of¶ manuscripts.¶ Thus printing forced a degree of impoverishment upon¶ language, which lost not only its sodal relief (primordial¶ eloquence), but also its spatial relief (its emphases, its¶ prosody). This was a popular poetics which was not long in¶ withering away, then dying, literally for want of breath,¶ before lapsing into academicism and the unambiguous language¶ of all propaganda, of all advertising.

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#### \_\_\_\_ War is the laboratory of the future where states experiment with new ideological coordinates. As such, accidents and massive destruction are necessary consequences of state sponsored speed.

Virilio ’01 [cultural theorist and urbanist] Virilio Live pg. 72 edited by John Armitage

Yes, insofar as war has always been the laboratory of the future. Because of the necessity to survive, and to face the possibility of sudden death, be it in ancient or new societies, war has always been the laboratory of techniques, of mores. I really believe this, and we must not forget it. War has also been the laboratory of speed. When Sun Tzu, the old Chinese strategist of several centuries ago, said that ‘promptitude is the essence of war’, he said it at the time of the cavalry. Now it is obvious that this saying is still true: witness the debate over euromissiles in Europe just a year ago. So, war is in fact the laboratory of modernity, of all modernities. And it is in this sense that it has been a subject of permanent study for me. It is also because I myself have experienced it. I lived through a war in my childhood, and it affected me deeply. Thus, war is not merely an amoral phenomenon, it is an experimental phenomenon inasmuch as it reverses productivity relations. War produces accidents. It produces an unheard-of accident, which is ,upsetting the traditional idea of war. Substance is necessary and accident is contingent and relative! That is the traditional story of the return to the accident. In war time the opposite is true. Here accident is necessary and substance relative and contingent. What are war machines? They are machines in reverse - they produce accidents, disappearances, deaths, breakdowns. I think war in this sense conveys something which at present we are experiencing in peacetime; the accident has now become something ordinary.

### Biopower = Racism

#### \_\_\_\_ The emergence of biopolitics was co-constitutive with racism. The K accesses their impacts better.

Radovanović 12 [Olivera, University of Masaryk, Department of Sociology PhD “Society as a Garden: Justification and Operationalization of Foucaldian “Right to Kill” in the Contemporary World” (http://is.muni.cz/th/236868/fss\_m/Ma\_Thesis\_Olivera\_Radovanovic.pdf) KC]

What this means is that, instead of war being the continuation of politics by different means, Clausewitz’s aphorism should be inverted: it is rather the politics that is the continuation of war by different means. There is always a war beneath peace, Foucault argues (Ibid.: 51), because the state is now allied with its population against the threat constituted as everything that differentiates from the biological norms postulated in that society. (Reid 2008a: 36) Reid argues that “an era of biopolitical wars ensues in which populations are constituted via their orientation around racialised norms, enemies are distinguished by their racial differentiation from the norm and wars are waged in which populations are mobilized in defense of racial norms against rival populations defined by a perception of racial abnormality.” (2008a: 34) It is crucial to note here that “race” itself is not pinned to a stable biological skincolour-like meaning. (Foucault 2003a: 77) Originally, the concept of race was simply the matter of two peoples who do not share the same language or religion, but are related by a history of violence and wars. The social body is therefore constituted of single-race which is according to certain virtues split into a super-race and a sub-race. (Ibid.: 60, 61). The modern state occupied this original discourse of “race war” and inverted it to its own ends. It becomes a discourse of battle between the race that is entitled to establish the norm and those, who deviate from that norm, who present the threat to the biological heritage. (Reid 2008a: 30) The (racialised) norm therefore represents the way of life in all its multiplicity desired in a concrete society, whereas the object which departs that setting automatically threatens to damage the biology, i.e. the existence of that way of life. “Society must be defended” therefore means that, in addition to self- activism to develop its vitality and maintain “normality”, the state is obligated to defend its society against the portion of those who diverge from the standard. And here we find the appearance of state racism which will, according to the logic from the previous quote, turn society against itself, against its own elements and its own products. We speak here about the internal racism of social normalization. (Foucault 2003a: 62) A shift from law to norm occurs, as well as a shift from races in the plural to race in the singular and the idea of racial struggle into the one of race purity. (Ibid.: 81) In that respect, Foucault sees racism as “primarily a way of introducing break into the domain of life that is under power’s control, the break between what must live and what must die. […] It is a way of separating out the groups that exist within a population.” (Ibid.: 254, 255) Putting the life of species as the target object of security practices of state power allows selecting any form of life perceived to grow degenerative effects within the field of population. (Reid 2008a: 37) Dillon even suggests that the concept of race directly contributes to the triangulation of biopolitics with its “necropolitics”, which “helps strip biopolitics of any assumed innocence in respect of its project of making life live.” (2008: 170) This “necropolitics” or war against “enemies” is not necessarily a confrontation in a military way, but also a form of quiet extermination, carried out by ongoing installation of regulatory techniques. However, war in its real (military) sense of words for causes as such is not excluded either. (Reid 2008a: 37, 38) Foucault in sum suggests that social body has been involved in the struggle on regular historical bases. The expectation that things could have changed once the lifeprone biopower replaced the death-prone prince proved groundless. Wars and bloodshed have actually never vanished - they sustained, but only changed the rhetoric of their causes. Once it was the fight on behalf of sovereign life and territory, now it is population’s life and vitality that are at stake.

### Cities

#### \_\_\_\_ Speed saturates immediacy, which cause destruction to urban landscapes.

Virilio and Lotringer 83 (Paul and Sylver, Paul Virilio philosopher, Sylvère Lotringer, Ph.D. Professor Emeritus of French literature and philosophy at Columbia University., Pure War, pg. 44-45).

The technological race has caused the city to disappear. --The city was the means of mapping out a political space that existed in a given political duration. Now speed-ubiquitous instantaneousness-dissolves the city, or rather displaces it. And displaces it, I would say, in time. We have entered another kind of capital which corresponds to another kind of population. We no longer populate stationeries (cities as great parking lots and populations), we populate the time spent changing place, travel time. What we are noticing on the level of urban planning has already been noticed on the level of specific neighborhoods, and individuals, even of being at the mercy of phone calls. There is a kind of destruction caused by saturating immediacy, which is linked to speed. So it seems to me that the danger of nuclear power should be seen less in the perspective of the destruction of populations than of the destruction of societal temporality.

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### Colonization

#### \_\_\_\_ The technology of speed gives way to total war and colonization.

Virilio ’01 [cultural theorist and urbanist] Virilio Live pg. 37 edited by John Armitage

Well, as a child of the Second World War, a ‘war baby’, you may say that the war was my university. I learned to know the world through the fear brought about by war. So for me the archetypal war was the Second World War, which lasted from 1939 to 1945. This war produced both Auschwitz and Hiroshima-in fact I keep a stone from Hiroshima on my desk. The war model is a method of total control over a territory and a population, to bring a whole region or continent into subjection, through radio, telephone, and a combination of both of these was already every much there during the Second World War. Hence my work is about defining total war as a conflict model, in all realms, not only in realm of the military, but also in the realm of the social, and in what I would call ‘colonization.’ Colonization is already a model of total war. To quote Michelet, the nineteenth-century French historian: ‘Without a powerful navy, there are no colonies.’ It is the power of technology which makes colonial power followed. Thus it is clear that my writings on the war model are linked to the history of colonial empires, that is to the times of colonial imperialism and ideological totalitarianism.

### Democracy

#### \_\_\_\_ New technologies and forms of transportation replace the tyranny of the dictator with the tyranny of time. This destroys democracy and public engagement with lived reality.

Virilio ’01 [cultural theorist and urbanist] Virilio Live pg. 92 edited by John Armitage

Until now societies have only used relative speeds: the horse, the ship, the train, or the automobile, the airplane. From now on, they will make use of the absolute speed of electromagnetic waves. There is thus the risk that the fall of feudalism will in the future be succeeded by the fall of democracy. The question is whether we can actually democratize ubiquitousness and instantaneity, which in fact are the prerogatives of providence, in other words, absolute autocracy. Today the tyranny of a dictator is being replaced by the tyranny of real time, which means that it is no longer possible to democratically share the time it takes to make decisions. But let’s go back in time, to the origin of the Greek city-state. Athenian democracy is also a dromocracy, a hierarchy of speed and not just of wealth. In ‘The constitution of the Athenians a text dating from c. 430 B.C., it says that in Athens the people and the poor matter more than the noble and the wealthy, which is fair in that it is in fact the people who make the ships sail and who thus give the city-state its power. In contrast to Sparta, this is a maritime democracy, the power of Athens being primarily supported by ships and less so by infantry. Athens is, then, democratic, but also dromocratic, since those who make the ships sail are the ones who control the city. As opposed to traditional autocratic regimes, the sharing of power in Athens goes hand in hand with the physical power of displacement - which was never the case for antique knighthood, in particular *equites romani.* Likewise, in Venice both the spoils and speed were shared. Thus, the considerable political and cultural power attained by these two great historical cities literally stems from the propulsive capacity of a population completely involved in the great accelerating movement of history. Athens and Venice are both cities where civil rights are linked to the population’s capacity for propulsion, while in land-based societies, where the cavalry predominates instead of the ship, it is the nobility that is dominant. And cavalry implies knighthood and feudalism, or the rejection of democracy. It is very surprising to see that of two vehicles, one animal and the other technical, one brings about democracy and the other forbids it. There are no democratic knights in the history of our societies. But what exactly is democracy? Democracy is sharing. The sharing of what? It is not the sharing of money, it is the sharing of the decisionfrom the beginning: we have the right to share the decision. But in contemporary societies decisions are made within incredibly short time limits. Once again, the revolution in the means of transportation and transmission brings about a speed in decision-making beyond democratic control. So today the question of democracy is not that it is threatened by some tyrant, but by the tyranny of technique. Allow me to exemplify this: the crash on Wall Street. What exactly is the automation of the quotations on Wall Street? The installation of an automatic quotation system that functions without human assistance and in real time poses the problem of decisions no longer being shared, since it is the machine that decides. This is an example taken from the stock market, but it is an example that indicates that a democracy in real time is almost impossible. Is democracy at all possible, that is, the control and sharing of a decision, when the time in which to make the decision is so short that there is no longer time for reflection? This is the big question today. In former societies and up until today, the possibility of sharing decisions existed because the societies were based on relative speeds. But as soon as societies start being based on the speed of light, what decision will remain to be shared if time can no longer be shared? Allow me to present another example. In the beginning there were supreme commanders. In democratic societies, there were captains, generals, and so forth, each with his own responsibility in war time. Little by little, as the time available for decision-making became shorter, the general staff was invented. And then with the atomic bomb, who is it that decides? Gorbachev and Bush are the final decision-makers in the end. Tomorrow these two men won’t even be necessary, as the response will be automated, given by computer. This analysis demonstrates the degree to which using absolute speed instead of relative speeds threatens the very essence of democracy.

### Fascism

#### \_\_\_\_ The state is driven by militarist need for speed –this is the basis for Fascism.

Peter L Kantor 06 M.S. – Science and Technology Studies – 1997 BA Psychology 92 2005 Curr Magazine Reviewer

Paul Virilio asks the question: If the world is run by the engine of capitalism, then why is it that it continuing acceleration has not stopped at the limit of the realization of capital? His answer is that it is because what drives our technocratic society is not capitalism but militarism, the dromological state, the state of movement.¶ From this perspective, revolution is the first form of mass transit and the city is a "human dwelling place penetrated by channels of rapid communication" [p.5]. In this world, the engineer is the high priest, his current role a thinly veiled version of the original militaristic meaning of the term. The engineer overlays geometries of circulation onto nature and seeks to structure human geography for the optimum of control. Technology has freed us from the bounds of immobility and bound us instead by a dictatorship of movement. In this dromological imperative, the vehicle is far more important than the message it delivers.¶ This process, in its modern form, he describes as a combination of the ideal of the medieval fortified city with the ideal of Reason. Reason has moved the seat of power from the human soul to the process of Reason and has thereby transformed all bodies to technical bodies, subjected to the force of reason. This is, in his opinion, the very basis of Fascism, which is "one of the most accomplished cultural, political and social revolutions of the dromocratic West" [p.117], and therefore not likely to go away.

### Genocide

#### Biopower enables a form of totalitarianism whereby narratives of purity are used to sacrifice members of the population. Death is rationalized as a resource and systematic executions are justified.

Los 2004 (Maria, Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa, “The Technologies of Total Domination,” Surveillance & Society, Vol. 2, No. 1.)

Foucault’s concept of bio-power (or pastoral power) refers to the administration of conditions and processes of life. It concerns those mechanisms of power and knowledge production that focus on life itself, by problematizing it, investing in it, shaping it, enhancing, maximizing, and so forth (Foucault, 1979b). Various areas of human life, such as those constructed as hygiene, sex, diet and reproduction, fall within the domain of bio-politics. Its dark side lies in its potential for disallowing or disqualifying life within the context of care or population enhancement. This may range from programs of sterilization of mentally ill to decisions about rational use of scarce medical resources to regulation concerning discontinuation of life support or euthanasia. Development of bio-power and bio-politics has been intertwined with the advancement of human sciences, such as medicine and psychology. Human sciences tend to construct society through a focus on individual human beings, who have unique needs and are neither expandable nor inter-changeable. In contrast, scientific totalitarianism relies on a concept of society derived from organic or technical sciences where the parts have no meaning other than being inane components of the whole. The whole has no obligations towards its parts, while the parts have to fulfil their humble roles for the machine or a body to work. Unlike liberal ideology, totalitarianism does not confer any rights (even the right to life) on individuals just because they were born human. Mass movements, which aim at saving humanity, the race or the people, cannot afford to be slowed down by weak or obstructive elements. Hitler made this principle very clear in his 1944 speech to a group of officer cadets: Nature is always teaching us…that she is governed by the principle of selection: that victory is to the strong and that the weak must go to the wall. She teaches us that what may seem cruel to us…is nevertheless often essential if a higher way of life is to be attained. Nature…knows nothing of the notion of humanitarianism which signifies that the weak must at all costs be surrounded and preserved even at the expense of the strong (quoted in Krausnick, 1970:29). Lenin, who saw morality as subordinated to the objective interests of the class struggle of the proletariat, announced in an essay published in 1918 a program of “purging the Russian land of all kinds of harmful insects” (quoted in Solzhenitsyn, 1974:27). This started a frantic hunt for “parasites” that outlasted him for many decades (see Los, 1988: 89-98). Stalin explained brutal purges within his own Party by likening it to a living organism: “Like every organism, it undergoes a process of metabolism: the old and outworn moves out; the new and growing lives and develops” (quoted in Amis, 2002:167). Chairman Mao spoke against allowing “political dust and germs to dirty our clean faces or eat into our healthy organisms,” and he likened the Party to a surgeon who saves the patient by removing his appendix (Mao Tse Tung, 1976: 265, 262). The rituals of mass blood-letting over which these leaders presided were part of grand schemes of social prophylaxis and purification, necessary for production of a better form of life. Purging of the social body did not have to aim precisely at diseased elements, being instead performed as a cleansing ritual, whereby society expels a set amount of matter to revitalize itself. When Stalin liquidated numerous categories of enemies of the people, the victims were often chosen according to the pre-set quota. For instance, in the campaign against kulaks, each village had to name families to be purged even if there were no rich peasant families residing in the area, and in the 1927 campaign against “industrial wreckers,” each factory was obliged to single out some engineers as saboteurs (Solzhenitsyn, 1974:43). Similarly, during the Chinese land reform campaign in the 1950s, at least one million landlords were executed based on certain quota for each district (Taylor, 1993:4). There is, however, a tension between organic and inorganic representations of the society. This is well explained by Lefort: [T]he two images do not fully merge; the image of the body is altered when it comes into contact with that of the machine. The latter contradicts the logic of identification; the communist ‘us’ is itself dissolved… making the social appear at the boundaries of the inorganic… Once the old organic constitution disappears, the death instinct is unleashed into the closed, uniform, imaginary space of totalitarianism (1986: 301, 306). The type of knowledge that appears to thrive under a totalitarian regime is a knowledge that rationalizes death as a resource, facilitates formation of the self-less objects and suppresses alternative knowledges. Both Nazi and Stalinist regimes developed complex technologies of killing as a form of population management. They involved intricate mechanisms of selection, regulation, division of labour, economization, ritualization, de-individualization and normalization. These were rituals of imprinting complicity in general population, designed to foster moral anaesthesia and re-definition of human beings as nothing more than transitory clusters of recyclable matter, disposable parts of the machine, or a pest. The process of turning people into “human material” and its macabre relationship to human sciences is well described in a memoir by Dr Nyiszli, a Jewish prisoner of Auschwitz, who saved his life by becoming Dr. Mendele’s assistant: When the convoys arrived, soldiers scouted the ranks lined up before the box cars, hunting for twins and dwarfs… Dr. Mendele wanted to solve the problem of the multiplication of the race by studying the human material – or rather, the twin material (Nyiszli, 1973: 52, 80). The process of killing – carried out largely by prisoner kommandos – was permeated by medical symbols and knowledge. The deadly gas was delivered by Red Cross cars and introduced into the gas chamber by the Deputy Health Officer (p.48). Then a new phase of the exploitation and utilization of Jewish bodies took place… Hair was also a precious material, due to the fact that it expands and contracts uniformly, no matter what the humidity of the air. Human hair was often used in delayed action bombs, where its particular qualities made it highly useful for detonating purposes. So they shaved the dead. …[T]he dead were next sent to the “tooth-pulling” kommando… All members of the kommando were fine stomatologists and dental surgeons (50; emphasis added). In the Gulag, severe Russian climate made possible a symbolic use of the bodies through their continuous, frozen display in the camps and surrounding areas. Solzhenitsyn and other survivors of the Soviet Gulag described how Soviet camp authorities coped with the body-disposal tasks in wintertime when the ground was frozen. “[E]very morning the orderlies hauled the corpses to the gatehouse, stacking them there” (Solzhenitsyn, 1976:112). “The corpses were left unburied. In May they used to decompose – and at that point the “goners” who had survived until then were summoned to cover them up” (115). The climate was also employed in the task of killing, whereby many hungry, exhausted prisoners simply froze to death or were placed in locked death carriages for failing to fulfil their work quota and simply left in them for a day to freeze. The bodies were then tossed out and left in the open (114). Totalitarian practices render the distinction between life and death increasingly blurred, thus necessitating development of new technologies for surveillance and administration of populations of the “living dead.” Concentration camps, politically induced famine, pseudoscientific experiments, psychiatric punishment - these are all examples of this peculiar condition, in which people are not dead but no longer live. The aim is to annihilate the uniqueness of the human person (Arendt, 1958: 453). Society of Pavlov’s dogs, who can be conditioned on the most basic, biological level, represents both a triumph and a defeat of the totalitarian disciplinary regime. When human disciplines serve to erase the line between life and death, their familiar human subject is turned into an incomprehensible dehumanized body, whose domination is no longer ideologically meaningful.

### Invisible/Structural Violence

#### **\_\_\_\_ Transportation networks function through the perpetual sacrifice of human agency to technology – this produces an ongoing invisible violence.**

Martin 2011 (Craig, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway University of London, “Desperate passage: violent mobilities and the politics of discomfort,” Journal of Transport Geography, Vol. 19]

It is clear that the body of the legitimated passenger is dependent on the networks of mobility, there is a transference of effort from the human body to the accelerative technologies that facilitate movement. To an extent the parasitic harnessing of motive energy begins with the conscious tethering of non-human force for the purpose of increased corporeal acceleration. Virilio suggests that the control of movement is premised not only on the ability to move individuals or commodities, but critically at the root of this power is the mobilisation of political and military force through the domination of time and space (Virilio, 2006a, p. 40). This is perhaps most evident in the perceived capacity to marshal armies and munitions i.e., through military logistics (see Tomlinson, 2007, p. 56–64; Van Creveld, 1978). Logistics as the art of strategy is capable of delivering the potential of attack through spatio-temporal control. For if the enemy believes that the opposing side has the means to effectively move bodies and objects at will without being seen to do so, then they also have the means to attack wherever and whenever they have desire to do so: ‘‘Thus, it is above all a new idea of violence that no longer comes from direct confrontation and bloodshed, but rather from the unequal properties of bodies, evaluation of the number of movements allowed them in a chosen element, permanent verification of their dynamic efficiency’’ (Virilio, 2006b, p. 62). From his identification of a new form of violence Virilio situates violence at the core of the means to implement movement. Of course, such a forthright claim has to be unpacked, particularly as it implies the union between mobility and the logistics of violence. Violence can be a form of gestural affect, that of civil unrest, crime, mass-murder or terror (see Balibar, 2009). It is identified with a wilful assault on the physical or political body. However Abel (2007, p. 2) maintains that the issue of violence operates at the level of individual violation as well as that of the less immediately verifiable: including language; capitalism; and security—all are forms of violation which demonstrate the multiplicity of violence. Similarly Benjamin situates the question of violence not only with the individual but also with the state, noting how the ‘‘law sees violence in the hands of individuals as a danger undermining the legal system’’ (Benjamin, 1999, p. 280), whereas in the hands of the state violence is concerned with justified legal ends. Although there is not the opportunity to pursue the depth of Benjamin’s argument it is important to stress how the critique of violence put forward by him highlights the legal fortifications constructed in order to sanction specific forms of violence in the name of violence as legal right. Structural in tone, this posits the deeper and more complex concept of violence as a form of indiscernible instrumentalisation of the individual subject. Indeed, perhaps one way of approaching the discussion of violence and speed is through the question of visibility and invisibility—with the immediately verifiable effects of individual violence, be they physical injury or damage, but equally the imperceptible mechanisms which produce the more visible manifestations.Zˇ izˇek’s work in this area has described the most visible articulation of violence as subjective: those modes of overt, identifiable aggression (Zˇ izˇek, 2008, p. 2). One could add to Zˇ izˇek’s position that the subjective expressions of violence are similarly the most mediated, in that they are often spectacularised in their representations (see Jay, 2003, p. 2). However, in terms of the indiscernible production of instrumental modes of control Zˇ iz ˇek also proffers a valuable elaboration of this by identifying an objective background that is said to precede the subjective forms (also see Balibar, 2009, p. 22). Objective violence is defined by two categories: symbolic and systemic. ForZˇ izˇek symbolic violence is most readily seen through language and other representational forms, whereas systemic violence accounts for ‘‘the often catastrophic consequences of the smooth functioning of our economic and political systems’’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2008, p. 2). To be sure, the imperceptibility of systemic violence is perhaps the dominant one, for it does not project the discernible representations of the symbolic, rather it appears to be the very constitution of the normative functioning of sovereign power. Systemic violence then is a form of domination whereby the structures of political and economic systems are enacted in order to posit the symbolic or subjective forms as the visible expressions of violence. However, in structural terms it is clear that the exclusion of specific groups (based on class, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, etc.) from access to the mechanisms of social formations, but also from corporeal mobility and the potential of acceleration, represents a further form of violence, albeit less immediately perceptible. This can be developed a little further by refocusing the relationship between the subjective and objective in terms of the non-violent. Subjective forms of violence are measured against a ‘norm’, which is deemed to be non-violence. In this sense the eruption of violence is seen as a moment of abnormality in comparison with the typical functioning of non-violence. However,Zˇ izˇek insists that such a ‘‘non-violent zero-level’’ (Zˇizˇek, 2008, p. 2) masks the operation of the objective forms of violence—i.e., the norm is not nonviolence, but rather the imperceptible functioning of the economy and politics as objective violence. The visibility of subjective violence camouflages the substrata of systemic violence. He contends: ‘‘objective violence is invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as subjectively violent’’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2008:2). Systemic forms of violence, then, imply the deep-seated roots of violence as constitutive of all capitalist forms of economic and political life. Moreover, the systemic operates through invisible modes that structure the operation of such forms. As the ‘base’ of violence one might suggest that the systemic acts as an infrastructure of violence, a claim which aligns with Virilio’s argument concerning the militaristic function of all logistical formations: they structure the very mechanisms of domination described by Zizek. Further to this we can begin to recognise Virilio’s assertion that violence is not solely expressed through direct attack—it is also the organisation of violence.7 The organisational power of logistics is indeed emblematic of systemic domination, and of the practical realisation of spatio-temporal control and order. Arendt discusses such a proposal in relation to the implementation of subjective violence, whereby the ability to employ violence through technological means is a profoundly important facet of its manifestation (Arendt, 1970, p. 4). Such modes of implementation are clearly demonstrated through the various arsenals of weaponry, military transport technologies, but fundamentally through logistical organisation of armament and personnel movements. In similar terms, Thrift develops his discussion of logistical power by noting how such mechanisms ‘‘are founded on the systematic delivery of violence’’ (Thrift, 2008, p. 199 my emphasis). Although his argument is ultimately focussed on ‘softer’ modes of violence in the urban realm Thrift’s suggestion is clear: the ability to structure violence, or to mobilise the technology of violence, is an inherent formula of violence. The mobilisation of violence is a form of violence in its own right. Three terms emerge from this: structure, organisation, and implementation. All posit the mobilisation of subjective, visible forms of violence through the often-invisible systemic infrastructure of logistical power. Given this it is vital to engage with how mobilisation and implementation occurs. Identified earlier in relation to Serres’ development of parasite theory, the nexus of corporeal acceleration—via increasing speed—can be read as a form of violence through the exploitation of motive energy. The domestication of animals through the harnessing of the motive power of the mount, up to the technologies of remote drone aircraft (Helmore, 2009): all attest to the exploitation of speed for military as well as commercial gain. In historical terms Virilio describes a form of ‘zoophilia’—what might be thought of as an appreciation of the potential for acceleration beyond the limitations of the human body and the harnessing of other motive forces, such as the saddled animal (Virilio, 2006a, p. 39). The technology of speed is premised specifically on the relationship between the body of the passenger and the harnessing of the power of the motive vehicle—an entwining of body and animal, and later machine. By encasing the body within the power of the animal/non-animal machine there is a transferral of dominance from animal to human through the harnessing power of control. Here Virilio is highlighting the relationship between optimum efficiency, speed and the control of movement for political, military and commercial purposes. It is part of an extended network where breeding, agriculture and technology enact forms of control and utilisation for the purpose of accelerated movement. Speed itself is an extension of these earlier forms of violence as harnessing power. In this scenario there is a twofold form of distribution: violence distributes speed through systemic structuring, and the infrastructure of speed distributes violence beyond its origins, or as Virilio suggests ‘‘the steel that stretches out in front in the sword, in the lance, in the knife as in the rail, is like the road, that disappears over the horizon in a movement of shock and distancing, signalling one violence, one terror’’ (Virilio, 2006a, p. 48). The road is as powerful as the shaft of the sword.

### Statism/Inequality

#### \_\_\_\_ Speed and velocity are equivalent to money and power—Acceleration is a political phenomenon that brings nations to dominance

 Virilio ’01 [cultural theorist and urbanist] Virilio Live pg. 26 edited by John Armitage

Dromology originates from the Greek word, *dromos.* Hence, dromology is the science of the ride, the journey, the drive, the way. To me, this means that speed and riches are totally linked concepts. A history of the world is not only about the political economy that is, wealth, money, capital, but also about the political economy of speed. If time is money, as they say, then speed is power. You see it with the velocity of the predators, of the cavalry, of railways, of maritime power. But it is also possible to see it with the velocity of dispatching information. So all my work has been about attempting to trace the dromocratic dimension of societies from ancient Greek society right up to our present-day societies. This work is of course about unrelenting acceleration, but it is mostly about the fact that all so pyramidal in nature: the higher speeds belong to the upper reaches of society, the slower to the bottom. The wealth pyramid is the replica of the velocity pyramid. Examples are easy to find: it was true in ancient societies, through maritime power and cavalry, and through of dispatching messages, and it holds true in our modern soceities, through the transport revolution, and through the current revolution in data transport and information processing. Thus my work is stating that it is of paramount importance to analyze acceleration as a major political phenomenon, a phenomenon without which no understanding of history, especially history-that-is-in-the-making, since the eighteenth century is possible .

### Value to Life

#### \_\_\_\_ The hierarchies comprised of status quo power relations create estrangement that dehumanize – this destroys value to life

Radovanović 12 [Olivera, University of Masaryk, Department of Sociology supervised by Csaba Szaló, PhD “Society as a Garden: Justification and Operationalization of Foucaldian “Right to Kill” in the Contemporary World” (http://is.muni.cz/th/236868/fss\_m/Ma\_Thesis\_Olivera\_Radovanovic.pdf)]

Bureaucrats are, Bauman argues in this respect, defined not so much by the qualities and possessions of their character but by the function they ought to perform for the recipients of the services. That may have a “profound and far-reaching” psychological impact on them (1989: 99), since what only matters is the particular role the specialists play in the chain of numerous others specialists. As far as the success of his own part of the operation is concerned, as function-performers, as units in a totality much larger than any one of them, the personality of their actions, together with individual responsibility, (1989: 100) “is all but wiped out” (1991: 50): “Would workers in the chemical plants that produced napalm accept responsibility for burned babies […][and be] even aware that others might reasonably think that he was responsible?” (Bauman 1989: 100) What such “practical and mental distance” from the final result indicates is that rarely do the bureaucratic functionaries and experts have full knowledge of the consequences of their commands and even less frequently do they see their decisions through to their logical end. (Bauman 1989: 99, Bauman 1991: 50) In replacing moral responsibility for the technical, the bureaucratic ethos of “well-done job” is therefore inconceivable. Within the hierarchy in which each person is accountable to the direct superior, he or she is “naturally interested in his opinion and his approval of the work.” (Ibid.) Therefore, in terms of nonlinear division, possibilities for ethnical significance “disappear […] or are considerably weakened”; technical responsibility wins over unconditionally and unassailably and “the bureaucrat’s own act becomes an end in itself” (Ibid.: 101), since the priority in this process are the details of the work than the outcome of the activity. (Alvarez 1997: 145) Cut of moral worries, the act can be judged “soberly” and performed as suggested by the best available know-how and pay-off estimations. (Ibid.) Therefore, in terms of nonlinear division, possibilities for ethnical significance. Another equally important effect of bureaucratic action is dehumanization of objects of its operation, that is, “the possibility to express these objects in purely technical, ethically neutral terms.” (Bauman 1989: 102) “It is difficult”, Bauman says, “to perceive and remember the humans behind all such technical terms” – soldier shooting targets, “which fall when they are hit” or employees of great companies expectant to destroy competition; they are cut off their distinctiveness. (Ibid: 103, original emphasis) Efficient dehumanization is achieved with the cancellation of subjects’ moral demands, followed by the bureaucratic ethical indifference and censure of resistance. (Ibid.) In sum, "[f]rom a purely technical point of view,” Weber argues, “a bureaucracy is capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency, and is in this sense formally the most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, in stability, in the stringency of its discipline, and in its reliability. It thus makes possible a particularly high degree of calculability of results for the heads of the organization and for those acting in relation to it. It is finally superior both in intensive efficiency and in the scope of its operations and is formally capable of application to all kinds of administrative tasks.” (1978: 224, my emphasis) Flexible to “all kinds of administrative tasks” (Ibid.), bureaucracy, among other spheres of life, successfully inserted itself into the military and warfare circles. With its rigid hierarchy, established routines and uniform and centralized procedures, armies proved to be “the very textbook models of bureaucratic structure.” (Adams 2000) A more detailed explication of this occurrence expects you in the following chapter.

#### \_\_\_\_ The impact of a state sponsored infrastructure of speed is existential imprisonment. The resulting inertia destroys the value to life.

Virilio ’01 [cultural theorist and urbanist] Virilio Live pg. 31 edited by John Armitage

That is quite simple. When what is being put to work are relative speeds, no intertia obtains, but acceleration or deceleration. We are then in the realm of mobility and emancipation. But when absloloute speed, that is the speed of light, is put to work, then one hits a wall, a barrier, which is the barrier of light. Let me remind you that there exist three recognized barriers: the sound barrier, which was passed in 1947 by Chuck Jager, the barrier of heat, which was crossed in the 1960’s with rockets, at what is called ‘escape velocity’ and, finally, the speed of light, which is the effectuation of the ‘live’ in almost all realms of human activity. That is the possibility to transfer over distance sight, sound, smell and tactile feeling. Only gustation, taste, seems to be left out of it. From that movement onwards, it is no longer necessary to make any journey: one has already arrived. The consequence of staying at the same place is a sort of Foulcauldian imprisonment, but this new type of imprisonment is the ultimate form because it means that the world has been reduced to nothing. The world is reduced, both in terms of surface and extension, to nothing and this results in a kind of incarceration, in a stasis, which means that it is no longer necessary to towards the world, to journey, to stand up, to depart, to go to things. Everything is already there. This is again, an effect of relativity. Why? Because the earth is so small. In the cosmos, absolute speed amounts to little, but at that scale, it is earth which amounts to nothing. This is the meaning of intertia. There is a definite relationship between inertia and absolute speed which is baded on the stasis which results from absolute speed. Absolute stasis leads potentially to absolute stasis. The world, then remains ‘a home’ already there given. I repeat: this is a possibility, a potentiality, but here we are back to what I said before: when people are in a situation of possible inertia, they are already inert.

### Totalitarianism

#### \_\_\_\_ Speed, state power and efficiency converge to produce a form of totalitarianism that exceeds the violence of all of its previous forms. Globalitarianism sediments total state control throughout the globe and guarantees unmatched violence.

Virilio ’01 [cultural theorist and urbanist] Virilio Live pg. 29 edited by John Armitage

Globalitarianism! This is what transcends totalitarianism. Let’s take an example, and excuse the neologism, but I cannot find another word. Totalitarianism covered my life, through the Second World War and through the period of nuclear deterrence, so you may say through Nazism first and then Stalinism. Totalitarianism was thus a central issue at that time. But now, through the single market, through globalization, through the convergence of time towards a single time, a world time, a time which comes to dominate local time, and the stuff of history, what emerges - through cyberspace, through the big telecommunications conglomerates, is a new totalitarianism, a totalitarianism of totalitarianism, and that is what I call globalitarianism. It is the totalitarianism of all totalities. Globalization, in this sense, is a truly important event. But, when people say to me, ‘We’ll become world citizens!’, I reply, ‘Forget it’. I was a world citizen long before globalization. After the war, I met Gary Davis, I went to meetings which took place in the Pere Lachaise neighbourhood of Paris. I was 16-17-18 at that time. I was half Italian, I felt a world citizen. But when people say that Bill Gates, cyberspace and VR are the stuff of world citizenship, I say, no way! Globalitarianism is social cybernetics. And that’s something infinitely dangerous, more dangerous even, perhaps, than the Nazi or communist brands of totalitarianism. It is difficult to explain globalitarianism but it is simple enough in itself. Totalitarianisms were singular and localized. Occupied Europe, for example, was one, the Soviet empire another, or China. That’s clear. The rest of the world was not under totalitarianism. Now, with the advent of globalization, it is everywhere that one can be under control and surveillance. The world market is globalitarian. It is on purpose that I use the doublet total/totalitarian, and globalitarian. I consider this phenomenon a grave menace. It is manifest that Time Warner and the large conglomerates like Westinghoi MCIWorldCom and all the other gigantic companies are not the equivalent of Hitler or Stalin. Yet, bad things are possible ...

### War

#### \_\_\_\_ The concept of war is based off of the states ability to securitize against “potential” threats – this slaughter becomes inevitable in a world where the state is driven by eliminating “the other”

Radovanović 12 [Olivera, University of Masaryk, Department of Sociology PhD “Society as a Garden: Justification and Operationalization of Foucaldian “Right to Kill” in the Contemporary World” (http://is.muni.cz/th/236868/fss\_m/Ma\_Thesis\_Olivera\_Radovanovic.pdf)]

That brings us to conclusion that “securitization” actually potentially makes the totality of people insecure by simultaneously developing the category of risk, danger and death. It excludes in the name of protection and always discriminates within society. (Bigo 2008: 105) What logically follows is that wars are now declared on behalf of existence of the whole population, the slaughters are committed in the name of life necessity, against insecurity; “massacres have become vital.” (Foucault 1990: 137) Power to expose a portion of population to death is now based on need to guarantee one’s continued existence. (Ibid.) The participation of populations in war is therefore reconceived not as the product of a right of seizure, but as a positive, life-affirming act. (Reid 2008b: 76) The death of the other does no longer guarantee one’s safety; the death of the other as a representative of a bad and/or inferior race is something that will make one’s life healthier and purer. In Society Must Be Defended, Foucault summarizes it in this way: “The more inferior species die out, the more abnormal individuals are eliminated, the fewer degenerates there will be in the species as a whole, and the more I – as species rather than individual – can live, the stronger I will be, the more vigorous I will be. I will be able to proliferate.” (Pp. 255). The enemies are not particularly of political sort; they are perceived as the threat to the population’s existence and way of life. The killing in the biopower system is therefore justified, if it will contribute to elimination of the biological danger and to the improvement of the species or race. Once the state is driven in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify its [state’s] murderous function; the racism becomes precondition for exercising right to kill (understood in a broader sense, not only murder as such: exposing someone to death, increasing the risk of death of some people, rejection, exclusion and the like). (Ibid.: 256) War is therefore about two things – not simply to destroy a political opponent, but to destroy the enemy race, to diminish the life threat that those people represent to us. Dillon puts it this way: “The war for life which biopolitics wages on behalf of its understanding of life, and in relentless pursuit of appropriate power relations to enact that understanding, is translated into biopolitical peace through an obsession with security. Biopolitically it is “life” which has to be secured against life. Peace is written as war biopolitically through discourses of security. To make life live it has to be secured. Securing life is a continuous war against whatever threatens life. Life is thus a permanent security problem for biopolitics” (2008: 168) In addition, war will be seen more than improving one’s race by eliminating the enemy one – it will mean the regeneration of one’s one race, in sense “[a]s more and more of our number die, the race to which we belong will become all the purer.” (Foucault 2003a: 257) On the level of “spontaneous, or at any rate spontaneous and regulated play of desire” which will “allow the production of an interest, of something favourable for the population” (Foucault 2007: 79), racism justifies the death-function by conviction that the death of others makes one biologically stronger. (Foucault 2003a: 257)

#### \_\_\_\_ Speed enables the state to conduct war and exact destruction on its victims. Speed enables state on state violence and renders populations as victims.

Virilio ’01 [cultural theorist and urbanist] Virilio Live pg. 75 edited by John Armitage

Indeed, now they are talking of a trans-horizonal weapon - the term is a technical one. But I believe that war has never been linked to the horizon. It always was, even when geographical, a war of time. Its territory was always temporal. When Sun Tzu said, ‘Promptitude is the essence of war', he meant war is not simply a problem of hills, valleys and mountain passes which have to be defended, it’s a problem of time; hence, the invention of the cavalry. Cavalry was its strike force, the strike force of that time. Afterwards, it was the artillery which replaced this strike force. Every war is a war of time, and I think there have been profound changes, changes which brought about the invention of new weapons and which today are reaching a limit. ‘Star Wars’ is also a war of time, but it is no longer the time of decision. If you take the history of decision in war, war was first delegated to commanders, great captains of the Middle Ages, then afterwards, with the invention of headquarters, the decision was concentrated in individuals - the ministers of war, chiefs of staff, who concealed the decision. There was a phenomenon of concentration - the dispersal, the diaspora, of decision disappeared. Then, with the Second World War, there was the creation of the general headquarters, a headquarters of armies and groups of armies, whose great strategist was Eisenhower. Here again you had a phenonemon of retention of power over a chief of general headquarters who made the decisions concerning a half a continent or half a hemisphere. With nuclear weapons, this retention of the time of war, of the time of decision, became even more concentrated in one lone individual, the head of state. Presidentialism in France is connected with nuclear power, the strike force. Presidentialism in the US is similar, even if its origin is not exactly the same. Nuclear weapons demanded there be just one decision-maker. This, moreover, is one of the major handicaps to the creation of Europe: if we want a nuclear Europe, there will be no Europe, because we’ll never manage to agree on a President.In fact, this moment is in the process of disappearing too. The supreme decision-makers, Francois Mitterand, Reagan, Gorbachev himself, are in the process of disappearing. Why? Because now with ‘Star Wars’, transhorizon and transcontinental weapons, the decisiontime to fire will drop to a few milliseconds. With laser weapons that work at the speed of light, 300,000 kilometres per second, there’s no question of saying, ‘Mr President, it seems that some rockets have taken off on the other side of the Atlantic’. No, they would already be there before you could say so. So now the formidable idea is taking hold m the US and the USSR, around the ‘Star Wars’ debate, of the automatic responder, meaning the idea of a war-declaration machine. Why? Because man’s time is no longer the time of the speed of light. Manpolitical solution through Marxism or capitalism; the military solution through dissuasion. All the solutions were there. Now we’ve seen the results and are experiencing the drama of these solutions, so I believe our generation must again find the questions, and that’s not easy.

### WMD

#### \_\_\_\_ The Affirmative’s promotion of speed and efficiency will result in massive accidents and the creation of weapons of mass destruction.

 Virilio in ‘1 |Paul, Virilio Live pg. 97|

But doesn’t the emergence of global information networks also mean that we have reached, in all possible senses, the frontier velocity of electromagnetic waves? By this I mean that we have not only achieved the escape velocity that enables us to shoot satellites and people into orbit but also that we have hit the wall of acceleration. This means that world history, which has constantly accelerated from the age of the cavalry to the age of the railway, and from the age of the telephone to the age of radio and television, is now hitting the wall that stands at the limit of acceleration. The question is what happens to a society that stands at the limit point of acceleration? In past societies, for example, progress was predicated on the nature and development of their acceleration. Acceleration was not only related to speeds of memory and calculus, but also of action. Today, though, one can no longer speak only of ‘tele-vision.’ One must also speak of ‘tele-action’. To be ‘interactive’ means to be here, but to act somewhere else at the same time. And yet, I doubt whether the questions I am concerned with are being raised at all today. How many people, for instance, realise that a global historical accident has been triggered as consequence of this situation? For every time a new type of velocity is invented a new type of specific accident occurs. I’m always stating that when the railway was invented, derailment was invented too. Ships, like the *Titanic,* sink on a given day at a given place. However, since the invention of ‘real time5, we have created the accident of accidents, to speak with Epicurus. That means that historical time itself triggers the accident, as it reaches the frontier of the speed of light. My impression is that what is being bandied about as the progress of communication is in fact merely a step backward, an unbelievable archaism. To reduce the world to one unique time, to one unique situation, because it has exhausted the possibility to devise new systems of acceleration, is an accident without precedent, a historical accident the like of which has never occurred before. Indeed, this is what Einstein called, very judiciously, ‘the second bomb5. The first bomb was the atomic bomb, the second one is the information bomb, that is, the bomb that throws us into ‘real time5.1 believe that what people say about the performance of computing also applies to the faculty of looking at the world to the faculty of shaping the world, of steering it, but also of living in it.

## Alternatives

### Kritik / Exposure Alt

#### \_\_\_\_ Critique itself is an effective alternative—since power can only operate through structures of knowledge, exposing the foundations of systems of control disrupts them

Li , 2007, professor of anthropology and senior cananda research chair in political economy and culture in Asia-Pacific at the Univ of Toronto. [ Tania Murray, The Will to Improve, pp. 22-26]

Critique, writes Nikolas Rose, has the potential to "reshape and expand the terms of political debate, enabling different questions to be asked, enlarging spaces of legitimate contestation, modifying the relations of the different participants to the truths in the name of which they govern or are governed."72 The critic I picture,' from Rose's account, is the academic whose primary medium for learning about and changing the world is text. In contrast, the critic conjured by Gramsci is an activist, interested both in studying and in helping to produce conjunctures at which social groups come to see themselves as collectivities, develop critical insight, and mobilize to confront their adversaries. There are also the "prickly subjects" I mentioned earlier—the targets of improvement schemes, who occupy an important place in my account.¶ A follower of Marx, Gramsci considered the fundamental groups driving social transformation to be classes differentiated by their access to the means of production. Yet he understood that the actual social groups engaged in situated struggles are far more diverse, reflections of their fragmentary experiences, attachments, and embedded cultural ideas. Thus for him, the question of how a collective, critical practice emerges could not be answered with reference to abstract concepts such as capital and labor. It had to be addressed concretely, taking into account the multiple positions that people occupy, and the diverse powers they encountern Building on Gramsci's worlc, Stuart Hall proposes an understanding of identity as the product of articulation. Rather than view identity as the fixed ground from which insights and actions follow, he argues that new interests, new positionings of self and others, and new meanings emerge contingently in the course of struggle. Thus a Gramscian approach yields an understanding of the practice of politics and the critical insights on which it depends as specific, situated, and embodied. An example may help to illustrate the kind of analysis this approach enables¶ In 2001, Freddy, a young man from Lake Lindu in Centra Sulawesi, recounted to me how he had "learned to practice politics" (belajar berpolitik). What this meant, for him, was learning to figure out for himself what was wrong and right in the world, and how to carry that assessment forward to bring about change. His epiphany occurred a few years earlier, when an NGO based in the provincial capital Palu began helping the people of his village organize to contest the construction of a hydroelectric dam that would flood their land and forcibly evict them. Home from Java, where he had worked and studied for some years, he was sent by the village Headman to observe the activities of this NGO, and report back on what kinds of trouble they were fomenting. So he started to attend their meetings, listening from the back, and came to the gradual realization that much of what they said about the importance of livelihoods, conservation, and the legitimacy of customary land rights made perfect sense. In contrast, the more he listened to officials promoting the dam as a step toward "development" in the province as well as a better future for the villagers, the less credible he found them.¶ The campaign against the dam occurred under the New Order regime, when individuals who had critical insights shared them frequently in the form of cynical jokes and asides but did not articulate them in public forums or engage in collective action. NGOS such as the ones assisting Freddy's village were threatened by the authorities and accused of being communist. But seeing the dedication of the NGO'S young staff, and absorbing some of their intellectual energy, he became convinced that learning to practice politics was a positive step. He described his feeling as one of awakening from a long and lazy sleep. He began to look with new eyes at the people around him in his village and in the State apparatus who were too afraid to engage in political debate. When I met him in zocii, after the fall of Suharto, he felt the possibilities for practicing politics had opened up, but people were slow to grasp them. They had to unlearn habits of quiescence cultivated through three decades of New Order doublethink and doubletalk and start to think of politics positively, as an entitlement.¶ Throughout the struggle for independence and especially in the period 1945 to 1965, until the army-led coup that ushered in the massacre of half a million people labeled communists, many Indonesians had been active in conducting politics and vigorous in debating the shape of the nation. There were mass mobilizations of workers, peasants, women, youth, regional, and religious communities, all engaged in struggles over the distribution of resources and the recognition of differences (cultural, historical, regional, religious) that supplied points of distinction and alliance. But Sukarno, the first president, retreated into the paternalism of "Guided Democracy," paving the way for his successor, Suharto, to declare politics an unhelpful distraction to the work of development. Politics became a dirty word. The goal of Suharto's regime was to secure a stable state of nonpolitics in which nothing "untoward" or "excessive" would happen—the condition of eerie stillness memorably described in John Pemberton's ethnography about Java.74¶ In the hostile conditions of the New Order, reclaiming politics and giving it a positive inflection was no mean feat. To understand how it was achieved by a young man in a highland village in Sulawesi, we must examine both the process through which his political positioning emerged and the particular shape it took. Together with his covillagers, Freddy came to see himself as a member of an indigenous group defending its territory against the state—an identity he did not carry with him when he left the village to pursue his studies years before. That identity emerged when a set of ideas to which he was exposed by the NGOS supporting his village helped him to make sense of his situation, locate allies and opponents, and organize.” Identities, as Stuart Hall argues, "are subject to the continuous 'play' of history, culture and power." They are "unstable points of identification or suture . . . Not an essence but a positioning."76¶ In this book, I explore the positionings that enable people to practice a critical politics. I also explore positionings formed through the will to improve: the position of trustee, and the position of deficient subject whose conduct is to be conducted. Gramsci did not examine the position of trustee, which stands in an awkward relation to that of the "organic intellectual" whose job is to help subalterns to understand their oppression and mobilize to challenge it. Yet the work of the intellectual and the trustee are not entirely distinct. As I will show, Indonesian activists engaged in a critical politics find numerous deficiencies in the population they aim to support. Their support becomes technical, a matter of instructing people in the proper practice of politics. They too are programmers. They share in the will to improve, and more specifically, the will to empower. Their vision of improvement involves people actively claiming the rights and taking on the duties of democratic citizenship.77¶ The value of a Gramscian approach, for my purposes, is the focus on how and why particular, situated subjects mobilize to contest their oppression. This was not a question elaborated by Foucault. Conversely, Foucault has the edge on explicit theorization of how power shapes the conditions in which lives are lived. Although Gramscians turn to the concept of hegemony for this purpose, Gramsci's formulations were notoriously enigmatic and fragmented. In her critical review of the use of Gramsci by anthropologists, Kate Crehan argues that the term hegemony for Gramsci "simply names the problem—that of how the power relations underpinning various forms of inequality are produced and reproduced."78 He used it not to describe a fixed condition, but rather as a way of talking about "how power is lived in particular times and places," always, he thought, an amalgam of coercion ¶ and consent.”¶ Foucault shared the concern to examine how power is lived but approached it differently. Gramsci understood consent to be linked to consciousness. Foucault understood subjects to be formed by practices of which they might be unaware, and to which their consent is neither given nor withheld. Further, Foucault highlighted the ways in which power enables as much as it constrains or coerces. It works through practices that are, for the most part, mundane and routine. Thus the binary that is compatible with a Gramscian analytic—people either consent to the exercise of power or they resist it—was not useful to Foucault.80 I do not find it necessary to choose between Gramsci and Foucault on this point. Some practices render power visible; they trigger conscious reactions adequately described in terms such as resistance, accommodation, or consent. Other modes of power are more diffuse, as are peoples' responses to them. John Allen put this point eloquently when he observed that power "often makes its presence felt through a variety of modes playing across one another. The erosion of choice, the closure of possibilities, the manipulation of outcomes, the threat of force, the assent of authority or the inviting gestures of a seductive presence, and the combinations thereof."81¶ Powers that are multiple cannot be totalizing and seamless. For me this is a crucial observation. "The multiplicity of ¶power, the many ways that practices position people, the various modes "playing across one another" produce gaps and contradictions. Subjects formed in these matrices—subjects like Freddy—encounter **inconsistencies that provide grist for critical insights**. Further, **powers once experienced as diffuse**, **or indeed not experienced as powers at all, can become the subject of a critical consciousness**. Indeed, **exposing how power works, unsettling truths so that they could be scrutinized and contested was** as **central** to the political agenda of Foucault as it was for Gramsci.82 Foucault did not elaborate on how such insights might become collective, although the connection is easily made. To the extent that practices of government form groups rather than isolated individuals, critical insight is potentially shared. One of the inadvertent effects of programs of improvement—the dam at Lake Lindu, for example—is to produce social groups capable of identifying common interests and mobilizing to change their situation.83 Such collectivities have their own internal class, ethnic, and gender fractures. Their encounter with attempts to improve them forms the basis of their political ideas and actions. Scholars working in a Foucauldian mode have often observed the "strategic reversibility" of power relations, as diagnoses of deficiencies imposed from above become "repossessed" as demands from below, backed by a sense of entitlement.84 Bringing insights from Foucault and Gramsci together enables me to extend this observation, and to put the point more starkly: improvement programs may inadvertently stimulate a political challenge The way they do this, moreover, is situated and contingent Floods and diseases, topography, the variable fertility of the soil, prices on world markets, the location of a road—any of these may stimulate critical analysis by tincturing expert schemes and exposing their flaws.

#### \_\_\_\_ Forms of resistance are immensely viable in the areas of discourse and social understandings.

McCormack, Department of Sociology at Wellesley College, ’04 [Karen, “Resisting the Welfare Mother”, Critical Sociology 30(2), Spring 2004, Pages 374-375]

Possibilities for Resistance A society is thus composed of certain foregrounded practices organizing its normative institutions and of innumerable other practices that remain ‘minor,’ always there but not organizing discourse and preserving the beginnings or remains of different (institutional, scientific) hypotheses for that society or for others. (de Certeau 1984:48) The remains of different hypotheses can be heard in the meanings attributed to welfare by many of the recipients, whose understandings of the administration of social services to the poor contain within them a challenge to the universality of the dominant construction. To a certain extent, strategies that accommodate the dominant discourse, that reinforce the common sense understanding of welfare receipt, also resist by challenging the application of such an understanding to themselves. All of the women that I interviewed rejected some part of the welfare mother discourse. For some women, this was an active process of separating themselves from the putative welfare mother while discursively reinforcing her existence, while for others resistance took the form of direct discursive challenge to the underlying assumptions about poverty and value that bolster the ideology. Scott (1985, 1990) uses the phrases “everyday forms of resistance” and “hidden transcripts” to describe those discursive practices that resist dominant constructions. Everyday forms of resistance are those mundane practices that occur as recipients participate in their daily lives, challenging in an unorganized and often invisible way the meanings that render them powerless objects. None of the women interviewed belonged to any type of welfare rights organizations, and while they may have discussed their rights with lawyers at legal aid offices or their teachers at various educational sites, they weren’t involved in any organized effort to change the policies or meanings of welfare. The types of resistance in which they were engaged were all a part of their everyday lives. As one recipient put it, they are ‘just livin’ life.’ Engagement with the dominant discourse may in fact make possible these “reverse” discursive forms. Foucault (1990:101-102) writes that: There is not, on the one side, a discourse of power, and opposite it, another discourse that runs counter to it. Discourses are tactical elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations; there can be different and even contradictory discourses within the same strategy. . . By recognizing the category of the welfare recipient or welfare mother, by naming poverty and deservingness, these women are also able to construct their response and, sometimes, their resistance to these categories. The forms of their resistance are not arbitrary but are patterned clearly by the level of stigma and surveillance that they experience.

#### \_\_\_ Dominant discourses and social understandings influence not only the typical understanding of transport but also the recipients’ understanding of themselves. However, the fluidity and superficiality of discourses leaves perfect room for resistance against power.

McCormack, Department of Sociology at Wellesley College, 2004 [Karen, “Resisting the Welfare Mother”, Critical Sociology 30(2), Spring 2004, Pages 357-360]

The three people quoted above, one a former President of the United States, the second a caseworker at the Department of Social Services, and the last a woman receiving welfare represent surprisingly consistent understandings of welfare. Each of these quotes suggests an understanding of welfare recipients as manipulative and undeserving, as a particular type of person, one who is less honest, less hardworking than the rest of us. While these three individuals do not share a singular, consistent understanding of welfare, these quotes display some commonality that exists despite their different social locations, revealing a “common sense” understanding of welfare that had solidified by the mid-1990s. In this paper, I explore the complex and contradictory operations of this welfare discourse for women receiving public assistance. Foucault (1978:101) rightly turns our attention to the complexity of discourse as a powerful, material force, when he writes that: We must make allowances for the complex and unstable processes whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling-block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it. 3 In the quotes above, we see the reinforcement and transmission of power, but in the words of women receiving assistance, alongside the transmission of power we can glimpse its resistance. The discursive practices surrounding welfare and its recipients are part of “the moral economy,” 4 a particular understanding of the relationship between morality and wealth. Simply stated, the moral economy of wealth involves the discursive production and circulation of symbolic representations of wealth that serve to invest the behavior of the wealthy with a certain moral identity . . . through the moral economy of wealth, financial wealth is transformed into moral worth, and socalled redundant or excess resources are accounted for as signs of the bountiful surplus moral value and virtue of the wealthy. (Herman 1999:7) The Protestant ethic of hard work and ascetic living, coupled with the widely accepted achievement ideology (of a fair and just meritocracy), celebrate the achievements of the wealthy while deriding the shiftlessness of the poor (cf. Weber 1930, MacLeod 1997). This specifically American equation of morality and wealth provides for little acknowledgement of structural determinants of opportunity and economic well being, relying instead upon explanations for economic success or failure located clearly with the efforts and abilities of the individual. Programs to aid the poor in the U.S. have historically accepted the values of this moral economy by attempting to separate the deserving poor from the undeserving. The content of these categories has changed over time, though the assumption remains that poverty represents a failing of the individual except in unusual circumstance (which have varied historically from disability, death of a spouse, etc.). With large numbers of women with children moving into the workforce in the 1980s, the decline of married-couple households, and the increasing number of African American women receiving assistance (following the Civil Rights Movement), poor single mothers joined the “undeserving” category in what can only be understood as a backlash against feminist and civil rights gains (cf. Quadagno 1996; Sidel 1996; Fraser and Gordon 1994). Within this moral economy, particular discursive practices frame the welfare mother as undeserving, lazy, dependent, irresponsible, oversexed; she came to be seen as responsible for her own fate and marked as an outsider. That this image represents the real character of poor women receiving assistance becomes taken for granted, apparently needing no substantive evidence. Ronald Reagan was instrumental in constructing the image of the Welfare Queen, the penultimate abuser of a system designed to help the poor. The welfare queen lied and cheated to take money from the state while she lived well, drove expensive cars, and owned a nice home. While the welfare queen in Reagan’s speech quoted above was shown to be a fabrication, 5 the image of the welfare queen lived on, long past Reagan’s presidency. The flip side of the welfare queen in this moral economy is the wealthy entrepreneur and philanthropist. Herman proposes that the “. . .moral economy provides these men with the basic discursive categories, linguistic repertoires, and vocabularies of motive with which they give rhetorical shape to their self-identity.” The moral economy, particularly the specific dominant discourse about welfare constructs these categories for women receiving assistance as well. The particular discursive practices surrounding welfare are stigmatizing to women receiving assistance. That is, they mark these women as less deserving, more dangerous, less human than the “rest of us.” That women receiving welfare payments echo the judgments made against them (in particular ways to be discussed below) speaks to the power of discourse. Governmental assistance does not provide enough money for families to get by, nor does the minimum wage provide enough to support families. Edin and Lein (1997) have demonstrated the relative costs of work vis-à-vis public assistance for poor women with children, showing clearly that neither provides enough and that low-wage work leaves women worse off than welfare. Women on welfare understand this reality; they see the shortage of jobs, the impossibility of survival on a low-wage job while attempting to pay for rent and childcare. And yet even they often echo the sentiments about the lazy, manipulative welfare mother. By naming welfare mothers as others – ¶dependent, immoral, and irresponsible – the dominant discourse allows for little positive identification as persons receiving assistance. Previous examinations of stigma among welfare recipients suggest that negative effects of the moralizing discourse are pervasive. Kingfisher (1996:33) writes that the experience of stigma was so pervasive among her sample that “all recipients who participated in [her] study were aware of the stigma associated with being on welfare and felt compelled to address it in one way or another.” Yet what I found in interviewing women receiving welfare was not a monolithic “welfare discourse” or “welfare stigma,” a clear field within which women lived, but rather a more varied materialization of these dominant practices that was dependent upon the communities in which they lived. For women residing in mixed-class communities, interacting with the working poor, working and middle classes, Kingfisher’s assessment rang true. These women were palpably aware of the dominant imagery and took steps to distance themselves from the putative welfare mother. On the other hand, women living in the inner city, surrounded by other poor people, appeared to be partially immune from the pernicious associations with the welfare mother. While they were not wholly unaware of the dominant practices, they were also operating upon a different field, one in which poverty and welfare receipt were understood quite differently. The meanings of welfare produced by the recipients themselves can run counter to the dominant construction. Dodson’s (1999:189) exploration of the lives of poor women and girls suggests that many alternative strategies exist in the margins, that women construct a range of responses to dominant constructions, ways that they “*. . .*tried to make sense of their place in the world and to hold on to themselves.”

### Micropolitical Resistance Alt

#### \_\_\_\_ Micropolitical challenges can disrupt the whole system of domination—macropolitical structures must be constantly reproduced at the finest grains of the social body

Kulynych, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Winthrop University, 1997 [Jessica J., “Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation,” Polity (30.2), p, 37]

Participation as resistance compels us to expand the category of political participation. Whereas traditional studies of participation delimit political participation from other "social" activities, once participation is defined as resistance this distinction is no longer tenable. Bonnie Honig suggests that performative action isan event, an agonistic disruption of the ordinary sequence of things, a site of resistance of the irresistible, a challenge to the normalizing rules that seek to constitute, govern, and control various behaviors. And, [thus,] we might be in a position to identify sites of political action in a much broader array of constations, ranging from the self-evident truths of God, nature, technology and capital to those of identity, of gender, race and ethnicity. We might then be in a position to act-in the private realm."¶ A performative concept of participation as resistance explodes the distinction between public and private, between the political and the apolitical. As Foucault explains, what was formerly considered apolitical, or social rather than political, is revealed as the foundation of technologies of state control. Contests over identity and everyday social life are not merely additions to the realm of the political, but actually create the very character of those things traditionally considered political. The state itself is "superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology and so forth."72 **Thus it is contestations at the micro-level, over the intricacies of everyday life, that provide the raw material for global domination, and the key to disrupting global strategies of domination**. Therefore, the location of political participation extends way beyond the formal apparatus of government, or the formal organization of the workplace, to the intimacy of daily actions and iterations.¶ A performative understanding of political participation demands recognition of a broader array of actors and actions as well. Performative participation is manifest in any activity that resists the technological and bureaucratic construction of privatized client-citizens, or reveals the contingency of contemporary identities. Political action, understood in this sense, does not have to be intentional, rational, and planned; it may be accidental, impulsive, and spontaneous. It is the disruptive potential, the surprising effect, rather than the intent of an action that determines its status as participation. Consequently, studies of participation must concern themselves not just with those activities we intentionally take part in and easily recognize as political participation, but also with those accidental, unplanned, and often unrecognized instances of political participation. If resistance is a matter of bringing back into view things that have become self-evident, then we must be prepared to recognize that consciousness of the contingency of norms and identities is an achievement that happens through action and not prior to action. Performative participation is manifest in any action, conscious or unconscious, spontaneous or organized, that resists the normalizing, regularizing, and subjectifying confines of contemporary disciplinary regimes.¶ Such a concept of political participation allows us to see action where it was previously invisible. So where Gaventa, in his famous study of Appalachian miners, sees quiescence in "anger [that is] poignantly expressed about the loss of homeplace, the contamination of streams, the drain of wealth, or the destruction from the strip mining all around ... [but is only] individually expressed and shows little apparent translation into organized protest or collective action,"" a concept of performative resistance sees tactics and strategies that resist not only the global strategies of economic domination, but also the construction of apathetic, quiescent citizens. When power is such that it can create quiescence, then the definition of political participation must include those forms of political action that disrupt and counter quiescence. A concept of political participation that recognizes participation in sporadically expressed grievances, and an "adherence to traditional values" by citizens faced with the "penetration of dominant social values," is capable of seeing not only how power precludes action but also how power relationships are "not altogether successful in shaping universal acquiescence." "

### Freedom Alt

#### \_\_\_\_ Voting negative is an affirmation of freedom—You should use your ballot as a signal of individual revolt, not for abstract collective decisionmaking. This form of freedom is a priori and is neccesary to create widespread resistance to domination

Prozorov, 2007, Collegium Research Fellow, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, [Sergei, Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty, p . 9-12]

Moreover, it is precisely the divorce of freedom from the discourse of the perfect order that renders freedom a political concept par excellence. Our focus on political freedom in this book is the very opposite of a reduction of freedom to the circumscribed domain of politics, be it defined in terms of the state, community, ideology or institutions. On the contrary, what renders freedom political is its a priori antagonistic nature with regard to every positive form of order. Never content with its confinement to the private realm, freedom always engages with order in its totality, transcending its internal demarcation of the public and the private. If we approach 'the political' as a name for the problem of constitution of order in the absence of first principles (i.e. as a constitutive act of power that has no ground beyond itself), then freedom serves as a counterpart, or in Derridean terms, a supplement of the political, insofar as it consists in the de constructive engagement with order that disrupts the hold of its foundational principles on the lives of the subjects governed by it. Moreover, as we shall discuss in detail in Part 2, such practices of freedom are intricately linked to the elementary act of the foundation of order, being nothing more than a subversive repetition, by individuals captured within a political order, of the sovereign act of the foundation of the latter. In terms of this parallel, political freedom refers to the problem of the constitution of the subject in the absence of any first principles that would govern this constitution. Simply put, political freedom consists in the confrontation with any circumscribed domain of politics in the name for the potentialities of existence that are curtailed by it. By the same token, we might speak of artistic freedom in terms of confrontation with the regime of 'what counts for art' or of sexual freedom as confronting the existing conventions regulating sexual behaviour. In this sense, when divorced from the normative question of the perfect order, freedom becomes political by contesting whatever counts for politics in any given situation. It would thus be entirely wrong to suggest that freedom is anti-political- on the contrary, what practices of freedom do is liberate the political from its confinement within sedimented and stratified forms of order that are in a strict sense made possible by a fundamental depoliticisation (see Ranciere 2001; Prozorov 2005). ¶ If freedom is political in this sense, then it must logically precede any positive order of politics, which invites the question of its ontological status in relation to this positivity. This book will deal with this question extensively in an attempt to elaborate a Foucauldian ontology of freedom that posits freedom as both anterior and exterior to any form of positive order, functioning as its singularly paradoxical 'slippery foundation' that simultaneously makes possible both its establishment and its transgression. The task of this book is to liberate a concrete experience of freedom from the weight of abductive governmental projects through an engagement with Foucault's philosophy that asserts, pace innumerable critics, that Foucault's critical project unfolds on the basis of a certain ontology of freedom and is therefore affirmative (though in an idiosyncratic way) rather than purely negative or even nihilist (Fraser 1995; Walzer 1986). ¶ Moreover, reconceptualising freedom as an ontological condition of human being rather than as an attribute of social order will introduce into a discourse on freedom a certain kind of universalism that is absent in both ideological and multiculturalist accounts, for which freedom is only meaningful as an internal attribute of a certain particularistic order. To speak of universalism in relation to Foucault's thought is certainly controversial, given the prevalent reading of Foucault as a radical pluralist in both synchronic and diachronic aspects, emphasising the irreducible particularism of all forms of power, knowledge and ethics. However, the universalism we shall affirm is a necessary consequence ofthinking freedom onto logically as a potentiality for being otherwise that is inherent in and available to all human beings. This element of universality should be distinguished from any distinction between individualism and communitarianism. Countless critics have charged Foucault with opting for a hyperbolically individualistic mode of practicing freedom that aesthetises one's own existence (Wolin 1994; Habermas 1985). While these charges have been convincingly dismissed by pointing both to textual evidence and Foucault's own political and social commitments (Bennett 1996; Simons 1995), the answer to the question of whether a Foucauldian freedom is a solely individual experience or lends itself to collective action requires the displacement of the very opposition between the collective and the individual. ¶ It is certainly true that no collective 'project' could ever be inferred from a Foucauldian ontological affirmation of freedom, both because it opposes the reduction of existence to a normative project and because it must logically presuppose taking exception from any such project as the very substance offreedom. At the same time, Foucault's standpoint recalls Albert Camus's understanding of revolt as an individual affirmation of common existence: 'I revolt, therefore we are' (Camus 2006, part 1). For Camus, the act of revolt actualises the universal solidarity of human beings by manifesting, beyond the limits that it transgresses, the infinite possibilities of freedom that do not depend on one's particular identities, attributes or circumstances. In his discussion of the Iranian revolution of 1979, Foucault appears to echo Camus in asserting that revolt, although always arising out of particular circumstances of subjection or oppression, affirms nothing particular but rather the possibility available to us all: 'It is through revolt that subjectivity (not that of great men but of whomever) introduces itself into history and gives it the breath of life.' (Foucault cited in Bernauer 1990, 180) As a potentiality, freedom is not only available to all without any possibility for discrimination, but it is also available to all equally: in asserting one's freedom one is always already wholly free, irrespectively of the positive degree of autonomy that one thereby achieves. In such a sense, a practice of freedom functions as an affirmation of human universality and is therefore unthinkable in terms of a narcissistic individualism. ¶ This is not to say that freedom cannot be abused by its deployment against the freedom of the other. Indeed, the possibility of abuse or perversion is inherent in the very notion of freedom as radically heterogeneous to any form of normative prescription. To be worthy of the name, freedom must necessarily presuppose the permanent risk of its own abrogation or, in Derrida's terms, of a 'radical evil' that would destroy freedom from within: '[w]ithout the possibility of radical evil, of perjury, and of absolute crime, there is no responsibility, no freedom, no decision.' (Derrida 1996,219) We must therefore accept the infinite risk of freedom: if freedom is not to be viewed as an epiphenomenon of a particular order, we must presuppose the ever-present possibility of its abuse. 'Freedom is freedom for both good and evil.' (Agamben 1999, 183) Thus, a discourse on freedom must refuse the conventional blackmail gesture, whereby an act that most of us would consider outright evil is demonstrated to be manifestly free so that a moralising critic could ceaselessly pontificate about the inappropriateness of 'that sort of freedom'. This blackmail is ironically less widespread in the domain of empirical politics than in political theory: the formal freedoms of contemporary liberal-democratic societies surely allow for infinite abuse that can never be adequately insured against other than through the \_ installation of a dystopian police state. Yet, none of this appears to disqualify these actually existing freedoms on the grounds of the absence of adequate insurance against abuse - a charge regularly levelled against Foucault (Rorty 1992; Walzer 1986; Wolin 1994). Freedom in the sense of potentiality for being otherwise is an ontological condition of possibility of practices, whose effects are entirely contingent and may well consist in abrogating their own conditions of possibility in e.g. the assumption of 'voluntary servitude' or the negation of the freedom of the Other. However, taking this risk of infinite abuse is essential to any concept of freedom worthy of name, since the only alternative would be a restrictive specification of freedom in positive terms that would return us to the normative discourse on the perfect order. The abuse of freedom cannot be insured against precisely because of its universality that proscribes any endowment of freedom with rational or moral foundations and positive identitarian predicates. 'In the end, there is no explanation for the man who revolts. His action is necessarily a tearing that breaks the thread of history and its long chains of reasons.' (Foucault cited in Bernauer 1990, 175)

#### \_\_\_\_ Freedom only exists in an immanent relation to life—the only way to produce freedom against domination is in constant self-constitution

Prozorov, 2007, Collegium Research Fellow, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, [Sergei, Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty, p34-35]

Yet, what is it that refuses, resists and twists loose, if not the anterior subject whom, according to Foucault's critics, Foucault must presuppose to make his discourse on freedom meaningful? It is crucial to emphasise that to posit the subject of resistance is not to endow it with any pre-political authentic identity. According to Nikolas Rose, resistance is rather located in the gap between one's actual existence and the positivity of identity that specifies it in discourse: 'human being - like all else - exceeds all attempts to think it.' (Rose 1 996b, 35----Q) Similarly, in Paul Patton's argument (1995, 359), Foucault needs only a minimal or, in our terms, austere ontology of human being as a 'material to which techniques [of subjectification] are applied and which resists [this application]'. The ontological precondition of freedom is not an anterior subjectivity but a sheer capacity to act, be acted upon and resist force. As we shall argue in detail below, a Foucauldian subject resists solely as a living being. 'It is not a question of advocating such resistance, of praising autonomy or blaming domination as respective exemplars of a good and evil for all, but simply of understanding why such resistance does occur. Foucault does not think that resistance to forms of domination requires justification. To the extent that it occurs, such resistance follows from the nature of particular human beings. It is an effect of human freedom.' (Patton 1998, 73. See also Patton 2000; Connolly 1998; Oksala 2005) The vitalist overtones of this understanding of freedom have been elaborated in Gilles Deleuze's reconstruction of Foucault's concept ofbiopower: ¶ Life becomes resistance to power when power takes life as its object. [ ... ] When power becomes biopower, resistance becomes the power of life, a vital power that cannot be contained within the paths of a particular diagram. Is not the force that comes from outside a certain idea of Life, a certain vitalism, in which Foucault's thought culminates? Is not life the capacity to resist force? [ ... ] There is no telling what man might achieve 'as a living being', as a set offorces that resist. (Deleuze 1988,92-3) ¶ Although this notion of life as an ontological precondition of freedom appears to betray a residual naturalism in Foucault's otherwise strongly anti-essentialist approach, it is necessary to note the nuances in this conception of freedom. While Foucault (1990a, 157) has occasionally affirmed the apparently natural 'bodies and pleasures' as the locus of 'genuine' practices of freedom in opposition to the discourse of sexual liberation, it would be erroneous to conclude that this affirmation reintroduces the principle of originary authenticity with regard to some prediscursive primal matter (cf. Horowitz 1995; Oksala 2005, chapter 5). The subject of resistance for Foucault is not an anterior vital force that resists but that which emerges in the act of resistance to diagrammatic enfolding. Freedom therefore does not consist in letting the primal forces of life be but in their confrontation with that which threatens to enclose them within a discursive domain of positivity. Resistance is therefore not protective but rather constitutive of freedom as 'something one has and does not have, something one wants, something one conquers' (Nietzsche 1977, 271). For this reason, freedom can never be a foundation of any social order, since it exists and manifests itself solely in acts of resistance to the 'self-constituting practices' that this order prescribes and can never be 'a state-of-being within a society that would accord with our moral nature, noumenal or social-historical' (Rajchman 1994a, 193). Yet, on the other hand, freedom can never exist apart from the social order, since it is only activated in the practice of resistance to and the transgression of the identity constituted by the diagram. We may therefore sum up the third response to the question of freedom in Foucault's work as the advancement of the notion of concrete freedom, which involves the diagram without being reducible to its operations and is extra-diagrammatic not because it precedes the diagram but because it confronts it. To paraphrase Foucault, we may term this attitude to freedom 'unhappy positivism', a sense of disappointment in and dissatisfaction with any positive diagrammatic constitution of freedom that animates permanent resistance to governmental modes j of subjectification.

### Local Knowledge Alt

#### \_\_\_\_ Only the alternative, in challenging the most obvious fringes of power exertion, can overcome the oppression of the state apparatus

Foucault, professor at the college of france, 1980 [Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings, pg. 96-99]

The problem for me is how to avoid this question, central to the theme of right, regarding sovereignty and the obedience of individual subjects in order that I may substitute the problem of domination and subjugation for that of sovereignty and obedience. Given that this was to be the general line of my analysis, there were a certain number of methodological precautions that seemed requisite to its pursuit. In the very first place, it seemed important to accept that the analysis in question should not concern itself with the regulated and legitimate forms of power in their central locations, with the general mechanisms through which they operate, and the continual effects of these. On the contrary, it should be concerned with power at its extremities, in its ultimate destinations, with those points where it becomes capillary, that is, in its more regional and local forms and institutions. Its paramount concern, in fact, should be with the point where power surmounts the rules of right which organise and delimit it and extends itself beyond them, invests itself in institutions, becomes embodied in techniques, and equips itself with instruments and eventually even violent means of material intervention. To give an example: rather than try to discover where and how the right of punishment is founded on sovereignty, how it is presented in the theory of monarchical right or in that of democratic right, I have tried to see in what ways punishment and the power of punishment are effectively embodied in a certain number of local, regional, material institutions, which are concerned with torture or imprisonment, and to place these in the climate- at once institutional and physical, regulated and violent - of the effective apparatuses of punishment. In other words, one should try to locate power at the extreme points of its exercise, where it is always less legal in character. A second methodological precaution urged that the analysis should not concern itself with power at the level of conscious intention or decision; that it should not attempt to consider power from its internal point of view and that it should refrain from posing the labyrinthine and unanswerable question: 'Who then has power and what has he in mind? What is the aim of someone who possesses power?' Instead, it is a case of studying power at the point where its intention, if it has one, is completely invested in its real and effective practices. What is needed is a study of power in its external visage, at the point where it is in direct and immediate relationship with that which we can provisionally call its object, its target, its field of application, there- that is to say-where it installs itself and produces its real effects. Let us not, therefore, ask why certain people want to dominate, what they seek, what is their overall strategy. Let us ask, instead, how things work at the level of on-going subjugation, at the' level of those continuous and uninterrupted processes which subject our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours etc. In other words, rather than ask ourselves how the sovereign appears to us in his lofty isolation, we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts etc. We should try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution of subjects. This would be the exact opposite of Hobbes' project in Leviathan, and of that, I believe, of all jurists for whom the problem is the distillation of a single will-or rather, the constitution of a unitary, singular body animated by the spirit of sovereignty- from the particular wills of a multiplicity of individuals. Think of the scheme of Leviathan: insofar as he is a fabricated man, Leviathan is no other than the amalgamation of a certain number of separate in- dividualities, who find themselves reunited by the complex of elements that go to compose the State; but at the heart of the State, or rather, at its head, there exists something which constitutes it as such, and this is sovereignty, which Hobbes says is precisely the spirit of Leviathan. Well, rather than worry about the problem of the central spirit, I believe that we must attempt to study the myriad of bodies which are constituted as peripheral subjects as a result of the effects of power.

#### \_\_\_\_ Thought is crucial to political reform; the thought induced by the alternative would spark massive political change

Bratich, 2003 [Jack, Assistant Professor of Communications at University of New Hampshire, Foucault, Cultural Studies, and Governmentality, p. 68]

This conception of thought has very practical, concrete effects for political action, since “as soon as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and quite possible” (Foucault, 1988b, p. 155). Or, as Rose (1999) puts it, “showing the role of thought in holding [contingent arrangements] together . . . also show[s] that thought has a part to play in contesting them” (p. 59). More than just being a condition for change, thought is also imperative to prevent a return or doubling of the institutions and practices targeted for transformation. Without "the work of thought upon itself ... whatever the project of reform, we know that it will be swamped, digested by modes of behavior and institutions that will always be the same" (Foucault, 1988b, p. 156).

#### \_\_\_\_ Only a bottom up analysis of power relations at the most infinitesimal level has the ability to truly change the cycle of poverty and exclusion; the criticism of the alternative redirects the flow of power away from the bourgeoisie and disrupt the circulation of state knowledge

Foucault, professor at the college of france, 1980 [Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings, pg. 96-99]

A third methodological precaution relates to the fact that power is not to be taken to be a phenomenon of one individual's consolidated and homogeneous domination over others, or that of one group or class over others. What, by contrast, should always be kept in mind is that power, if we do not take too distant a view of it, is not that which makes the difference between those who exclusively possess and retain it, and those who do not have it and submit to it. Power must by analysed as something which circulates, or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localised here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organisation. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always also the elements of its articulation. In other words, individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application. The individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, is not the vis-a-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects. The individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle. There is a fourth methodological precaution that follows from this: when I say that power establishes a network through which it freely circulates, this is true only up to a certain point. In much the same fashion we could say that therefore we all have a fascism in our heads, or, more profoundly, that we all have a power in our bodies. But I do not believe that one should conclude from that that power is the best distributed thing in the world, although in some sense that is indeed so. We are not dealing with a sort of democratic or anarchic distribution of power through bodies. That is to say, it seems to me-and this then would be the fourth methodological precaution- that **the important thing is not to attempt some kind of deduction of power starting from its centre and aimed at the discovery of the extent to which it permeates into the base,** of the degree to which it reproduces itself down to and including the most molecular elements of society. **One must rather conduct an ascending analysis of power,** starting, that is, from its infinitesimal mechanisms, which each have their own history, their own trajectory, their own techniques and tactics, and then see how these mechanisms of power have been- and continue to be- invested, colonised, utilised, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended etc., by ever more general mechanisms and by forms of global domination. It is not that this global domination extends itself right to the base in a plurality of repercussions: I believe that the manner in which the phenomena, the techniques and the procedures of power enter into play at the most basic levels must be analysed, that the way in which these procedures are displaced, extended and altered must certainly be demonstrated; but above all what must be shown is the manner in which they are invested and annexed by more global phenomena and the subtle fashion in which more general powers or economic interests are able to engage with these technologies that are at once both relatively autonomous of power and act as its infinitesimal elements. In order to make this clearer, one might cite the example of madness. The descending type of analysis, the one of which I believe one ought to be wary, will say that the bourgeoisie has, since the sixteenth or seventeenth century, been the dominant class; from this premise, it will then set 98 Power/Knowledge Two Lectures 99 out to deduce the internment of the insane. One can always make this deduction, it is always easily done and that is precisely what I would hold against it. It is in fact a simple matter to show that since lunatics are precisely those persons who are useless to industrial production, one is obliged to dispense with them. One could argue similarly in regard to infantile sexuality - and several thinkers, including Wilhelm Reich have indeed sought to do so up to a certain point. Given the domination of the bourgeois class, how can one understand the repression of infantile sexuality? Well, very simply- given that the human body had become essentially a force of production from the time of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, all the forms of its expenditure which did not lend themselves to the constitution of the productive forces- and were therefore exposed as redundant- were banned, excluded and repressed. These kinds of deduction are always possible. They are simultaneously correct and false. Above all they are too glib, because one can always do exactly the opposite and show, precisely by appeal to the principle of the dominance of the bourgeois class, that the forms of control of infantile sexuality could in no way have been predicted. On the contrary, it is equally plausible to suggest that what was needed was sexual training, the encouragement of a sexual precociousness, ¶ given that what was fundamentally at stake was the constitution of a labour force whose optimal state, as we well know, at least at the beginning of the nineteenth century, was to be infinite: the greater the labour force, the better able would the system of capitalist production have been to fulfil and improve its functions. I believe that anything can be deduced from the general phenomenon of the domination of the bourgeois class. What needs to be done is something quite different. **One needs to investigate historically, and beginning from the lowest level, how mechanisms of power have been able to function**. In regard to the confinement of the insane, for example, or the repression and interdiction of sexuality, we need to see the manner in which, at the effective level of the family, of the immediate environment, of the cells and most basic units of society, these phenomena ofrepression or exclusion possessed their instruments and their logic, in response to a certain number of needs. We need to identify the agents responsible for them, their real agents (those which constituted the immediate social entourage, the family, parents, doctors etc.), and not be content to lump them under the formula of a generalised bourgeoisie. We need to see how these mechanisms of power, at a given moment, in a precise conjuncture and by means of a certain number of transformations, have begun to become economically advantageous and politically useful. I think that in this way one could easily manage to demonstrate that what the bourgeoisie needed, or that in which its system discovered its real interests, was not the exclusion of the mad or the surveillance and prohibition of infantile masturbation (for, to repeat, such a system can perfectly well tolerate quite opposite practices), but rather, the techniques and procedures themselves of such an exclusion. It is the mechanisms of that exclusion that are necessary, the apparatuses of surveillance, the medicalisation of sexuality, of madness, of delinquency, all the micro-mechanisms of power, that came, from a certain moment in time, to represent the interests of the bourgeoisie. Or even better, we could say that to the extent to which this view of the bourgeoisie and of its interests appears to lack content, at least in regard to the problems with which we are here concerned, it reflects the fact that it was not the bourgeoisie itself which thought that madness had to be excluded or infantile sexuality repressed. What in fact happened instead was that the mechanisms of the exclusion of madness, and of the surveillance of infantile sexuality, began from a particular point in time, and for reasons which need to be studied, to reveal their political usefulness and to lend themselves to economic profit, and that as a natural consequence, all of a sudden, they came to be colonised and maintained by global mechanisms and the entire State system. It is only if we grasp these techniques of power and demonstrate the economic advantages or political utility that derives from them in a given context for specific reasons, that we can understand how these mechanisms come to be effectively incorporated into the social whole. To put this somewhat differently: the bourgeoisie has never had any use for the insane; but the procedures it has 100 Power/Knowledge Two Lectures 101 employed to exclude them have revealed and realized from the nineteenth century onwards, and again on the basis of certain transformations - a political advantage, on occasion even a certain economic utility, which have consolidated the system and contributed to its overall functioning. The bourgeoisie is interested in power, not in madness, in the system of control of infantile sexuality, not in that phenomenon itself. The bourgeoisie could not care less about delinquents, about their punishment and rehabilitation, which economically have little importance, but it is concerned about the complex of mechanisms with which delinquency is controlled, pursued, punished and reformed etc. As for our fifth methodological precaution: it is quite possible that the major mechanisms of power have been accompanied by ideological productions. There has, for example, probably been an ideology of education, an ideology of the monarchy, an ideology of parliamentary democracy etc.; but basically I do not believe that what has taken place can be said to be ideological. It is both much more and much less than ideology. It is the production of effective instruments for the formation and accumulation of knowledge- methods of observation, techniques of registration, procedures for investigation and research, apparatuses of control. All this means that power, when it is exercised through these subtle mechanisms, cannot but evolve, organise and put into circulation a knowledge, or rather apparatuses of knowledge, which are not ideological constructs. By way of summarising these five methodological precautions, I would say that we should direct our researches on the nature of power not towards the juridical edifice of sovereignty, the State apparatuses and the ideologies which accompany them, but towards domination and the material operators of power, towards forms of subjection and the inflections and utilisations of their localised systems, and towards strategic apparatuses. We must eschew the model of Leviathan in the study of power. **We must escape from the limited field of juridical sovereignty and State institutions, and instead base our analysis of power on the study of the techniques and tactics of domination.**

### Resistance Alt

#### \_\_\_\_ Resistance must attempt to subvert and contest all instance of control—even political failures based on the alternative will produce change in the end

Clifford, 2001, Michael, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Mississippi State University, pg. 140 – 141, Political Genealogy after Foucault, 2001

What can be done against the disciplinary mechanisms and power rela­tions which subject us? Is there any recourse besides juridical, rights-based appeals to sovereignty?50 Foucault offers us no easy, formulaic answers. Resistance has to be specific and appropriate to the situation it opposes. It may require calculated retreats, compromises, temporary submissions. The most basic form of resistance would be a simple refusal: "To say no is the minimum form of resistance."51 Such resistance can have a significant impact on the powers that be. Moreover, it can open up other possibilities for strategic resistance. Resistance can also take the form of "confrontation strategies," which can take shape as direct challenges, and can be more or ess violent. Even when such confrontations are ineffective, they can make it possible to identify strengths and weaknesses in a given power relation, which can be used strategically in future attacks. Another possible form of resistance would be various "subversion strategies," which operate by using the dictates of a given power relationship against itself, but without outright opposition. Even the appeal to rights can be effective in suspend­ing or even upsetting relations of power, provided that such an appeal is recognized as a strategy, that it is raised in response to a specific practice, and that it does not end up perpetuating or reinforcing a particular disci­plinary coercion, or of setting up a new one in its place.52 Whatever its form, any strategy of resistance will have as its aim, ultimately, to refuse a certain form of subjection which limits the possibilities of what we can be as free human beings: "The political, ethical, social, and philosophical problem of our day is not to liberate the individual from the state and from the state's institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization which is linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through a refusal of the kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries."53 Promoting new forms of subjectivity requires resisting entrenched rela­tions of power. This does not mean we can ever be completely free of power relations. On the contrary, the best we can do is to replace one power relation with another. The best we can hope for is a power relation with fewer constraints and more open possibilities for free activity, for expressions of human subjectivity.54

#### \_\_\_\_ Resistance is immanent to relations of power—critique should refuse consent

Simons, Critical Theory and Cultural Studies at the University of Nottingham, 1995 [Jon, Foucault and the Political, p.37-38]

Resistance is possible when power pushes towards its limits. Power relations should always be analysed in terms of adversarial struggle and confrontational strategies. There must always be points of insubordination at which it is possible not to escape power per se, but to escape the particular strategy of power relation that directs one's conduct.-Each adversarial relation is potentially reversible (1982a: 225-6). The term that best characterizes Foucault's concept of adversarial, strategic, potentially reversible power relations is 'agonism' (222). The word suggests a contest involving strategy, reaction and even taunting, as in a wrestling match." Agonism may be as serious as political domination or as light as child's play. It permeates all the different types of relationships (economic, familial, communicative and sexual) within which power relations are immanent (1978b: 94). There is, however, one sense in which resistance becomes absolute for Foucault. All regimes structures of power reach their limit when people give 'preference to the risk of death over the certainty of having to obey', which is 'that moment when life will no longer barter itself, when the powers can no longer do anything, and when, before the gallows and the machine guns, men revolt' . No power can continue to rule over people who refuse to be intimidated by death (1981e: 5). Foucault discusses here the Iranian revolution about which he was accused of being unduly enthusiastic, but he refers to the Warsaw ghetto revolt as involving the same degree of intensity and defiance. When a regime becomes merely destructive, it ceases to govern (1982a: 220). An act of suicide would demonstrate the limits of a power relation (1988p: 12). Certainly in the context of bio-power, 'death is power's limit, the moment that escapes it' (1978b: 138). Foucault is too enthusiastic about revolt that demands the ultimate sacrifice." His admiration for the spiritual, revolutionary experience as a way of life suggests a mode of living that transcends the limits of normal life. Yet he is simultaneously aware that such existence is sustained by a momentary light that will soon die out (1988f: 218-9). Absolute transgression is a lightning flash, not daylight. Less dramatic but more continuous acts of resistance may be more significant affirmations of agonistic liberty (Thiele, 1990: 922-3). Another objection is that if bio-power has made this the century of genocide, how will the willingness to die limit the oppressive power of regimes that do not wish to govern whole populations but to murder them? Death and sacrifice may indicate the limits of power but they are not its insurmountable impasses. As in Tian An Men Square, sometimes when governments order the tanks to crush the bodies in their path the soldiers obey. Foucault's enthusiasm for revolt that costs lives is unbearably light because while life may be lived as resistance, death cannot be lived. It is a transgression that escapes all limits. With these qualifications in mind, Foucault's argument that revolt as refusal to obey demonstrates the limits to power remains valid. To some extent, all political power is conditional upon the cooperation and obedience of its subjects, who always have the potential to withdraw their consent and thus defeat tyrannies (Sharp, 1985: 151 ). Foucault argues that such revolt stands in the way of 'absolute absolutism' and anchors all forms of liberty (l981e: 5). It is not the existence of universal rules and doctrines of natural rights that limit power, but practices of liberty (5, 8). 'Liberty is a practice ... [I]t is never assured by the institutions and laws that are intended to guarantee [it]' (1984g: 245). Liberty should not be considered as a secure state of liberation unbreached by excesses of power, but as the practices that effectively limit power (1988p: 2-3). It is not the philosophical critique of power that limits its excesses, but practical critique in the form of resistance.

### Genealogy First

#### \_\_\_\_ We must engage in the role of a critic – by engaging in a problematization of the way that power relations work can we either give or take legitimacy from hierarchal structures that control populations

Radovanović 12 [Olivera, University of Masaryk, Department of Sociology supervised by Csaba Szaló, PhD “Society as a Garden: Justification and Operationalization of Foucaldian “Right to Kill” in the Contemporary World” (http://is.muni.cz/th/236868/fss\_m/Ma\_Thesis\_Olivera\_Radovanovic.pdf)]

In order to uncover and understand power’s capability to produce discourses of truth that have such a powerful effect in our society, Foucault argues that we need to engage ourselves in looking into the “how” of power. (2003a: 24) In order to comprehend its hidden nature, it is necessary to start with an ascending study of its micro mechanisms which have a history of their own. In other words, Foucault thinks that “we have to analyze the way in which the phenomena, techniques, and procedures of power come into play at the lowest levels; we have to show, obviously, how these procedures are displaced, extended, and modified, and above all, how they are invested or annexed phenomena […].” (Ibid.: 30, 31) One of the foundational conclusions of such inquiry should be that the power mechanisms, at a given moment and subject to a number of transformations, came to be economically profitable and politically useful. (Ibid.: 33) No matter what mission declared, state is what must inevitably exist at the end. What the intervention of raison d’État must arrive at is the state’s integrity, its completion, consolidation, and its reestablishment if it has been compromised. (Foucault 2007: 241) If we prove this, Foucault says, then we could understand how this and other practices eventually integrated themselves into the political system. (2003a: 33) In order to discover the “real” truth about the power relations, one has to go beyond the imposition of power of knowledge, by de-centring and “de-subjecting oneself.” (Reid 2008a: 31) Following this logic, Foucault intended to discover whether the power relations are basically relationships of confrontation, a struggle to death, or a war. Can we find traces of permanent war beneath the peace, wealth, state and its laws? Consequently, he poses the question when did war first emerge as a means of driving political force and when did it become a map for analyzing social relations. “How, when and why it was first noticed or imagined that what is going on beneath and in power relations is a war? When, how and why did someone come up with the idea that it is a sort of uninterrupted battle that shapes peace, and that the civil order – its basis, its essence, its essential mechanisms – is basically an order of battle? Who came up with the idea that the civil order is an order of battle?” (2003a: 47) One should therefore problematize the universality that is used to seal the truth and project the knowledge that is in interest of the state because, once war becomes an inseparable condition of knowledge, we inevitably “become the soldiers of the truth in endless and serial fields of political struggle.” (Reid 2008a: 32) Foucault for that reason turned to exploring a “historico-political discourse”, which is “a new discourse, a strange discourse” and substantially “a discourse of war, which was understood to be a permanent social relationship, the ineradicable basis of all relations and institutions of power” having its history from the civil wars led in the sixteenth century. (Foucault 2003a: 49). By exploring this discourse Foucault concluded that “war is uninterrupted frame of history”, which “is going beneath order and peace, the war that undermines our society and divides it in a binary mode”, that is actually a race war. (Ibid.: 59, 60).

### Walking

#### \_\_\_\_ The alternative is go for a walk. A single footstep is all that it takes to unravel the endless regulations of abstract space and establish room for diverse mobilities

Topinka 2012 [Robert J., Department of Communication Studies, Northwestern University, “Resisting the Fixity of Suburban Space: The Walker as Rhetorician,” Rhetoric Society Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 1]

This embarkation could begin with something as simple as a footstep. While Certeau does not attempt to lay out a plan for revolution, he does theorize the rhetorical resistance inherent in walking. He describes the ‘‘triple enunciative’’ function of walking. First, like the speaker making use of words, walking appropriates topographical systems; secondly, it acts out the practice of space; and finally it implies relations among positions, just as to speak is to imply the existence of the other (Certeau 97–98). In this conception, walking becomes a subtle manipulation of systems of order. Each step is a selection that has repercussions in everyday life, because to take a step is to practice space. In Wal-Mart’s extended system of order, the walker practices space by rewriting the curves and loops of frontage roads into a more direct path. The walker inserts new conjunctions, new passages in space, thus critiquing the extension of Iowa Street and simultaneously extending the space for agency within it. Certeau’s enunciative understanding of walking is appealing in no small part because of the agency it builds into everyday practice. Certeau describes the formal structure of this agency using the rhetorical tropes of synecdoche, or substituting part for the whole, and asyndeton, or omitting a conjunction. In the practice of space, Certeau tells us, synecdoche ‘‘expands a spatial element’’ by creating a ‘‘more’’ out of a fragment (101). Conversely, asyndeton creates a ‘‘less’’ by opening ‘‘gaps in the spatial continuum’’ (101). These movements occur in walking as storefronts, for example, become representative of a neighborhood (synecdoche) or as the walker steps on certain parts of the concrete and not others (asyndeton), unlike the car whose wheels never leave the pavement. Thus, through synecdoche and asyndeton, the steps of the walker constantly reshape space. These movements are tactical in nature, because they operate within the dominant space of the city grid, making use of available moments. For Certeau, these tactics do not permanently change the grid; they reshape it invisibly, but this reshaping remains in the practice. It leaves no traceable residue. Yet the walker also alters the time of space: Iowa Street seeks to regulate the timing of all movements within it, but walkers do not move according to this regulation. The walker practices asyndeton by stepping here and not there, but this practice also entails polysyndeton, or the addition of conjunctions. To ignore given conjunctions by, say, jaywalking, is also to create additional conjunctions: the walker passes here and not there, simultaneously omitting a conjunction and creating a new one. Because so much space on Iowa Street is unusable, at least for car drivers, the walker’s ability to locate usable space alters the rhythm of the space and reinvents how it is used. Such an alteration is a strike at the heart of Iowa Street, which relies on extension in support of efficient consumption—routes that lead inexorably to destinations. Abstract spaces, Lefebvre reminds us, react negatively to time. By creating rigid, fixed structures, abstract spaces seek to harness time, like the stoplight counting down to red. But walkers do not need stop lights. A street of walkers renders stop lights utterly useless, destroying their ability to harness time and feeding the seeds of differential rhetorical space. Walking becomes a particularly potent weapon in spaces designed to exclude the walker. To begin his chapter on walking, Certeau describes seeing Manhattan from the 110th floor of the World Trade Center. This view reveals the city’s grid, but it does not reveal the rhetorical space available to Manhattan’s walkers. New Yorkers, of course, walk everywhere. Almost no one walks on Iowa Street. Instead, the ‘‘free’’ market rules, and walkers stop practicing space to enter their cars, where, for safety’s sake, they must submit completely to Iowa Street’s system of order. To be sure, a walker cannot travel nearly as quickly as a car. But a car needs a fixed space to operate successfully: cars cannot turn without a turn lane, or reverse direction without stopping, or travel on uneven terrain. The walker does all of these things. Indeed, the walker marks out space and time with every step. Thus the walker turns Iowa Street’s dominant trope of extension by inventing new spaces for movement and denaturalizing the distance Iowa Street builds in to its order. Thus we can add another trope to Certeau’s rhetoric of walking: paromologia. The car can have speed; the walker has space and time. Moreover, the walker carries revolutionary critique in each step. Iowa Street’s logic works so long as it can suppress difference. So long as users agree to drive, Iowa Street’s order enjoys complete domination. But the walker turns Wal-Mart’s mini-city into self-parody. To be sure, walking when one has no other option does not necessarily entail resistance, but walking in space built for cars does reveal new ways of using that space. On Iowa Street, purposeful walking is thus a form of resistance that cedes fixity in favor of agency. Walkers create difference in every step, nurturing the seeds of difference that abstract spaces must suppress to sustain themselves. Indeed, the differences that tactics create challenge the fundamental logic of these spaces, which, as Lefebvre argues, must suppress all difference in order to exist. Abstract space, much like the capitalist market, must extend itself in order to sustain itself. The market is a juggernaut. Of course, self-perpetuating logic must also self-justify; thus the market mythologizes itself as it erects its massive stage for the production and consumption of commodities. The Iowa Streets of the United States have become pillars of this stage. Within this space, consumption fuels itself by suppressing time and extending spatial distance, forcing consumers off of their feet and into their cars, where they are subject to an extensive system of regulation and separated from one another. Iowa Street thus extends its logic and pre-empts collective action. But there is hope amidst this domination. Walking has resistance built into it. Planners present users with a coordinated space, but when those users are walkers, the varied and unpredictable actions of the user reverberate in that space. Like the guitar player manipulating strings, walkers manipulate rhetorical space. Abstract spaces that rely on a complete domination of time and a total suppression of difference also render walking revolutionary. Iowa Street cannot adapt itself to change—it feeds only on its own homogeneity. It cannot sustain difference on a mass scale. The walker on Iowa Street rewrites a rhetorical space that figures in important ways in our everyday lives. It may seem that this argument overlooks the simple fact that people would rather drive down Iowa Street than walk. While this may be true in some cases, there are walkers in these rhetorical spaces. On the Iowa Street in Lawrence, Kansas, they are already participating in critique. As I mentioned above, the sidewalk on Iowa Street makes a habit of disappearing and reappearing unexpectedly. But walkers do not give up and turn around when this happens. Instead, they continue on, creating a new order with each step. The walkers write their own path. Unlike Iowa Street, which is rigidly linear and homogenous, the walker’s path meanders, and unique footsteps are visible on it. By deploying rhetorical tropes in a material rather than symbolic space, walking opens a space for rhetorical invention in the everyday life of consumers, revealing the beginnings of a process that has the potential to create lasting difference on Iowa Street. Walking, in other words, unlocks the fixity in the suburban version of Cintron’s ‘‘gates locked’’ stance. As Lefebvre demonstrates, abstract spaces— spaces of power and domination—attempt to present themselves as eternal, aligning themselves with the mythology of the ‘‘free’’ market, the logic of teleological progress, and rhetorical fixity. This logic, though, reveals its own lie. For this lie to become legible, it only takes the walker to locate the point at which this so-called progress exhausts itself. The walker, by writing a new, differential space with each step, brings this point of exhaustion ever closer, turning a fixed space into a rhetorical space.

### Solvency - Automobility

#### \_\_\_\_ ALT - A consciousness shift regarding automobility allows us to create new possibilities for a sustainable future.

Goodwin 2010 (Katherine J., doctoral student at American University's School of International Service, managing editor for the Journal of International Relations and Development, “Reconstructing Automobility: The Making and Breaking of Modern Transportation,” Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 10, No. 4]

For anyone concerned with reducing carbon emissions or sustainably managing the Earth's resources, automobility represents a massive—and an increasingly global—problem. It is easy to find ways in which the links among gasoline, cars, mobility, and human flourishing are reinforced, naturalized, and effectively dominate our current understanding of mobility. Indeed, it is all too clear that the policies, symbols, and landscapes of automobility structure the choices available to us when choosing how (and whether) to move from place to place. Yet whenever one scratches the surface of that structure, one finds agency: people taking action, informed by the past but oriented towards the future as they make sense of the contingencies of the present.65 One finds instances of (and opportunities for) human ingenuity, investigation, and re-imagination. One finds that, with each instance, automobility is reconstituted slightly differently. When one views automobility in this way—as continually rebuilt through human actions—it no longer seems a great hulking locked-in system. Instead, it is fertile ground for multifaceted change. Each link presents a different challenge and requires a different strategy of change. Delinking gasoline from cars is largely a technological problem, one that is likely to be solved most effectively by innovations within industries, and national or global price signals. This is the link for the technological optimists and market liberals among us, and there are certainly promising signs on this front. Automobile manufacturers in China and Japan are investing heavily in battery technology. Companies in Brazil are expanding and refining the use of sugarcane ethanol in flex-fuel cars. Removing gasoline from the equation is clearly possible; the challenge is to find ways to foster technological innovation and to encourage the growth of markets for alternatives. Delinking cars from mobility presents a somewhat wider problem. It is likely to take more time, requiring changes in the landscape rather than in cars. It lies in the hands of a wider range of actors, involving national and local governments, urban planners, developers, and civil society organizations. Several cities and regions provide examples. Curitiba, Brazil, has a well-established bus rapid transit system, while Japanese cities are linked by a network of high-speed trains. Melbourne, Australia has successfully pedestrianized large areas of its downtown. Bike-sharing programs have proven successful in Paris, Montreal, [End Page 75] and Washington DC (among others). Collaboration occurs across borders as well: the World Carfree Network, to offer one example, connects civil society groups with the goal of reducing dependence on automobiles and organizes seminars and youth exchanges. Deconstructing the link between cars and mobility is the work of the New Urbanists among us; its challenge is to build the knowledge and to create the capacities necessary to make cities fully multimodal. Finally, delinking mobility from human flourishing presents the most fundamental challenge, as it raises the question of what characterizes a meaningful life. Does greater mobility make us happier? Wiser? Does it make us free? These are questions that every human, as a thinking cultural being, can pose. The link between mobility and human flourishing may be the most difficult to uncouple, as it requires us to change our values rather than our cities or our fuels. Yet it is also the most accessible. We all shape cultural understandings together, through all kinds of channels, all the time. With this in mind, one may conclude that automobility can be transformed through many kinds of actions. Transforming automobility can come through creating opportunities for people to profit from electric transit or through revalorizing life on a local scale. It can come through investigating the consequences of our own lifestyles or through reimagining the landscapes that allow us to take those consequences for granted. The history of automobility is more fluid, eclectic, and marked by human creativity than it might at first seem. Perhaps the future of mobility will be, as well.

### AT: No Alternative

#### \_\_\_\_ Their cries of no alt only show their fixedness to the flawed ways of the status quo.

Prozorov, 2007, Collegium Research Fellow, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, [Sergei, Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty, p41]

At the same time, Foucault's 'austere ontology' permits us to understand why the transgression of limits does not consist in the leap out ofthe diagram into the outside, which, of course, is a space impossible to inhabit (cf. Foucault 1987, 1997). There is nothing on the outside that could be valorised and presented as an 'alternative' to diagrammatic positivities. The very language of 'alternatives' that countless critics sought to impose on Foucault is diagrammatised from the outset by the subsumption of the brute alterity of the outside under distinct positive forms, so that a discourse on freedom is confined to the discussion of relative benefits of different diagrams. In contrast, the practices of concrete freedom have nothing to do with the desire for 'another diagram', but are rather entirely contained in passage to the exterior limit of the diagram in question: 'transgression has its entire space in the line that it crosses. ' (Foucault 1977a, 34)

#### \_\_\_\_Their no alternative argument is another link—the question of alternatives to biopolitics is a rigged game that ensures the smooth functioning of domination by reducing the political to the biopolitical production of new modalities of power

Prozorov, 2007, Collegium Research Fellow, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, [Sergei, Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty, p 147-150]

Conclusion ¶ Why Want Freedom? ¶ We have concluded the second part of this book with an outline of **an anti-biopolitical strategy of the counterproductive 'refusal of care'** that runs against the dominant tendencies in contemporary critical thought. While today's critical discourse in political and international relations theory is constituted by a diverse critique of sovereignty of both the state and the subject, we have reaffirmed sovereignty as, in a strict sense, another name for freedom, its rigorous ontopolitical counterpart. Whereas the critique of the 'demonic project' of modernity tends to focus on its disavowed sovereign foundation, we have suggested that freedom is rather jeopardised by the immanent rationalities of biopolitical rule, resistance to which must necessarily traverse the stage of the reaffirmation of the sovereignty of bare life. Finally, we have highlighted the radical heterogeneity of concrete freedom to any form of immanentism, which, intentionally or unwittingly, betrays the experience of freedom through its subsumption under a positive form of political order, which would itself be 'free', so that the freedom of its subjects would become redundant. In contrast, we have defined freedom as a necessarily transgressive experience, a rupture of the transcendence of the undecidable decision within the immanence of the diagram, which simultaneously effects a rupture in the subject itself between its diagrammatic identity and its meto-homonym of irreducibly potential being that can never be subsumed under any diagram. It is precisely that which cannot be subsumed that, to recall Schmitt, is sovereign, and it is resistance to such subsumption that constitutes the subject as a being that is always beside itself. ¶ Nonetheless, when concretised as a mode of political practice, the ethos of sovereign freedom does not posit a teleology of our empowerment as sovereigns in the positive sense, but rather invokes the possibility of the weakening of all power as the outcome of our ceaseless resistance to the diagrammatic abduction of our existence. The state of exhausted destitution that awaits us when we twist loose from the diagram is certainly a **poor contender in a rhetorical competition with the eschatological visions of triumphant emancipation** that have successfully tempted humanity throughout modernity and continue to do so, as we are invited to transcend modernity, albeit in a typically modern fashion. Moreover, this exhausted fulfilment of our sovereign power is unlikely ever to be complete or final, hence the struggle for freedom will always be a complex strategic game of advances and retreats, states of capture and moments of liberation. The Foucauldian politics of freedom is thus entirely in accordance with Foucault's own description of himself as an 'active pessimist', clearly aware that 'everything is dangerous' but nonetheless devoted to deciding, every day, on 'which is the main danger' (Foucault 1984b, 343). Yet, why should a pessimist be active? Why do we still resist, if our experience, including the experience of reading Foucault, teaches us that promises of a 'better tomorrow' at best disappoint and at worst deceive, that **projects of emancipation may always lead to more effective enslavement** and that no perfect order can ever be built on our desire for freedom? The question we must address in the conclusion to this book is: why wantfreedom? ¶ In answering this question we may undertake another 'transvaluation' of contemporary critical discourse. On the basis of our previous discussion we may claim that the desire for freedom is determined not by the orientation towards a 'brighter future', but by the experiences of the past. This thesis differentiates our account from the so-called 'messianic' turn in continental philosophy, primarily associated with the later work of Jacques Derrida (1992b, 1995, 1996. See also Badiou 2003; Agamben 2004). In this approach, the concept of the messianic is divorced both from the concrete figure of the messiah and from the theological tradition in general. This 'messianism without messianism' (Derrida 2005, 86-92) only seeks to retain in the messianic tradition the experience of a pure event that ruptures the existing order of being, radically reshaping one's conditions of existence. More specifically, in Derrida's influential work on the 'democracy to come' (1994, 1996, 2005), the messianic dimension refers to the temporal structure of democracy as a promise that is indefinitely deferred and, by virtue of its very semantic structure, may never be actually fulfilled: a democracy to come will never be actually present at any determinate moment in the future. 'The 'to-come' not only points to the promise but suggests that democracy will never exist, in the sense of present existence, not because it will be deferred but because it will always remain aporetic in its Structure.' (Derrida 2005, 86) Although Derrida takes particular care to differentiate this notion from a Kantian or a Habermasian 'regulative idea' and insists that despite its 'promissory'structure 'democracy to come' must guide our actions in the 'here and now', he nonetheless affirms this ideal as an orientation towards the future: 'the to of the 'to come' wavers between imperative injunction (call or performative) and the patient perhaps of messianicity (nonperformative exposure to what comes, to what can always not come or has already come' (ibid., 91). Whether 'democracy to come' is something we must venture to establish or patiently wait for, it is nonetheless something that is structurally, i.e. necessarily, impossible at present. ¶ In contrast to Derrida, Foucault's ontology of freedom contains no messianic expectation, as freedom is and has always been present as the condition of possibility of any form of order. No diagram could ever be established in any other manner than by a free sovereign decision. Moreover, no diagram need ever have been established, were its subjects not sovereign to themselves prior to its establishment. The diagram is entirely dependent on the freedom of its subjects, which it abducts and orders in accordance with its positive rationalities. The experience of freedom is therefore entirely independent of the future and is always instantly available in the here and now as a transgression of the limits of our own diagrammatic identities. Even when the diagram appears fully closed unto self-immanence and alI possibilities of freedom seem to be foreclosed, the very genealogy of this diagram permits us to hear, behind its claims to truth and morality, 'the distant roar of battle' (Foucault 1977b: 308) that made it possible. Freedom is therefore not 'always to come' but rather 'always has been'. We must pay attention to the grammatical structure of the present perfect tense, which indicates the inclusive character of predication: the action, described by the present perfect, started in the past and continues in the present. This grammatical structure corresponds exactly to our ontology of freedom in its affirmation of both the antecedence of the freedom of human beings to any order of government and its continuing existence even under the worst forms of oppression. Thus, in a strict sense, we should speak not of our desire for freedom, whose advent lies in the future, but of the desire of our freedom to escape its captivity in the deficit of existence. It is by virtue of our always already having been free in the ontological sense that we resist and it is this ontological freedom that finds its ontic manifestation in every concrete act of resistance. The singularity of Foucault's thought consists not in the eschatological promise of future liberation but in its demonstration of the infinite range of possibilities of freedom in the here and now. ¶ In this sense, the Foucauldian position is heterogeneous to Derrida's messianism but accords with what may be called a 'post-messianic' philosophy of Agamben (see Ojakangas 2005b; MilIs 2004). Whereas Derrida conceives of the messianic as always 'to come', present in our present only as a deferred promise or injunction, for Agamben the messianic moment has already arrived or, more precisely, there is no need to wait for its arrival since its experience is entirely available to us in Our present existence. While Derrida's messianism does not seek to dismantle the existing diagrams but rather to highlight their undecidability and the presence of the messianic promise within them, Agamben's approach seeks to dispense with the existing structure of the political order as such in a self-consciously apocalyptic prophecy of a profane 'happy life' beyond the reach of power. ¶ As we have remarked above, Agamben's key difference from Foucault is the eschatological pathos, wholly alien to the latter philosopher. Nonetheless, both of these approaches emphasise the universal availability of the experience of freedom in the here and now and thereby dismantle the messianic horizon of expectation. Our freedom is neither the task of the bright future nor even the instrument for bringing it about. For both Foucault and Agamben, the experience of freedom must rather involve a certain liberation from the future, insofar as any determinate image of the future, any telos of political practice, functions as an instrument of our subjection in the present. Instead, the experience of freedom is available to us alI in our present existence as an ever-present potentiality of our present to be otherwise than it is. At the same time, ontic practices of freedom remain rare, their availability all too frequently obscured by the diagram's claims to truth and morality, necessity and self-evidence, and most insidiously, to liberation. Thus, Foucault's claim that we are ontologically much freer than we feel entails that ontically we have not been as free as we might have been. The desire of our freedom is therefore animated by our realisation of the full extent of our subjection in the past that has made us what we are in the present.¶ We have started this book with describing Foucault's thought on freedom as an exemplar of free thought, an experience of thought that itself liberates us from our identity. We may now conclude that this experience of flight can hardly be conceived as a blissful state of contentment. The ecstatic exodus of thought from the confinement of our historical ontologies ultimately finds freedom at the exterior limit of every diagram as the excess of human being over any attempt to reduce it to a positivity, an identity or a project. This experience of the universal availability of freedom leads to a sobering realisation of the full extent of our unfreedom in the past. Moreover, given that freedom can never be granted by any diagram but can only be reclaimed from it, we begin to recognise that all too often we only have ourselves to blame for our unfreedom. Indeed, **many of the practices we have previously engaged in under the assumption that there was 'no alternative' only succeeded in governing us because of the absence of our resistance to them**. Being freer than one felt before, the ecstatic experience of Foucault's thought, does not open to us a horizon of 'bright future' but, rather less eminently, reveals to us the full extent of our voluntary servitude in the past. The practice of concrete freedom in the present is therefore driven by the failures to be free in the past - the subjection and suffering incurred as necessary and self-evident, the possibilities foregone due to the claims for their impossibility, the attachment to diagrammatic artefacts that promised us access to our authentic identity. The experience of free thought leaves us with scars that we did not know we ever had, the scars left by the wounds that we never perceived as wounding. These scars mark our prior deficit of existence, making us painfully perceive that we 'could have been otherwise', were our potentiality not abducted by the diagram and reduced to the actuality of our positive identity. If, as Zizek (2004b) correctly claims, 'liberation hurts', this is not merely because liberation necessarily presupposes a violent confrontation, but rather because the very moment of liberation leaves us with a bitter regret about all that' could have been'.

### AT: State Key/Structural Change Key

#### \_\_\_\_ Their claims that we need to make some structural change miss the point – our alternative is powerful particularly because it avoids the traps of government and thus can transcend it all

Prozorov, 2007, Collegium Research Fellow, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, [Sergei, Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty, p27-28]

Secondly, what is demanded of Foucault is a set of universal and normative rather than particular and aesthetic) criteria, in terms of which the question of 'better' codes and disciplines could be posed. As Nancy Fraser (1995, 147) claims, 'what Foucault needs, and needs desperately, are normative criteria for distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable forms of power' (and consequently of resistance) to avoid slipping into the nihilist 'wholesale rejection of modernity'. As Foucault is taken to reject 'humanism', he is required to offer 'some alternative, posthumanist ethical paradigm capable of identifying objectionable features of a fully realised autonomous society' (Fraser 1994b, 185). In short, the only form a discourse on freedom can take is that of a paradigmatic positivity, an alternative to the present disciplinary and confessional society, and thus located on the same ontological plane. In this aspect of criticism, Foucault's critics resort to the discourse of the 'perfect order' that we have introduced above: Foucault's discourse on freedom is held to be incoherent or outright unintelligible, insofar as it resists the identification of freedom with a certain form of social order. What is at stake is not merely Foucault's lack of enthusiasm about the 'liberal state', which could always be ignored as a purely political divergence, but, far more seriously, the absence of 'positive evaluation' of any form of state as a necessary container for practices of freedom. ¶ If Foucault's discourse were merely a reflection of his commitment to some positive alternative to liberalism (e.g. socialism or conservatism), the debate between Foucault and his critics might have at least unfolded on the same level of normative political philosophy and, however interminable and fruitless, would have a comforting familiarity as belonging to the century-old tradition of social criticism. Instead, Foucault's intervention in the discourse of political philosophy is so disconcerting precisely because, rather than provide a new perspective on the already-existing field of inquiry, it sought to reshape this field itself, by thoroughly reorienting political thought in a number of ways: from the problematic of transcendent sovereignty to the analysis of immanent power relations, from the critique of 'repression' to the study of productivity of power, and, most importantly for our study, from the grand thematic of 'liberation' to the analysis of concrete practices of freedom. All these reorientations are, however, effaced in the demand of Foucault's critics to return to the prior conventions of the discourse on freedom in order to be admitted into this field \_ a disciplinary action, if there ever was one. In other words, the order of the discourse on freedom established by Foucault's liberal critics offers a highly limited choice of two enunciative modalities: a 'positive evaluation' of what is basically a liberal modality of freedom (with its assumptions of subjective anteriority and interiority) or the elaboration of a positive alternative to 'liberal humanism' (which of course, could then be dismissed as normatively unacceptable).

## Framework

### Disinterested Debate Bad

#### And, their framework ignores the way a disinterested debate space serves the ideological agenda of imperialism and oppression. We must create a revolution in debate to fight destruction of the planet.

Spanos, professor SUNY Binghampton, in ‘4

[William V., “Email to Joe Miller,” posted on Cross-x.com, November 18, 2004. Spanos was emailed to confirm whether or not an e-mail published on eDebate was in fact written by him. This was his response]

Dear Joe MIller, Yes, the statement about the American debate circuit you refer to was made by me, though some years ago. I strongly believed then –and still do, even though a certain uneasiness about “objectivity” has crept into the “philosophy of debate” — that debate in both the high schools and colleges in this country is assumed to take place nowhere, even though the issues that are debated are profoundly historical, which means that positions are always represented from the perspective of power, and a matter of life and death. I find it grotesque that in the debate world, it doesn’t matter which position you take on an issue — say, the United States’ unilateral wars of preemption — as long as you “score points”. The world we live in is a world entirely dominated by an “exceptionalist” America which has perennially claimed that it has been chosen by God or History to fulfill his/its “errand in the wilderness.” That claim is powerful because American economic and military power lies behind it. And any alternative position in such a world is virtually powerless. Given this inexorable historical reality, to assume, as the protocols of debate do, that all positions are equal is to efface the imbalances of power that are the fundamental condition of history and to annul the Moral authority inhering in the position of the oppressed. This is why I have said that the appropriation of my interested work on education and empire to this transcendental debate world constitute a travesty of my intentions. My scholarship is not “disinterested.” It is militant and intended to ameliorate as much as possible the pain and suffering of those who have been oppressed by the “democratic” institutions that have power precisely by way of showing that their language if “truth,” far from being “disinterested” or “objective” as it is always claimed, is informed by the will to power over all manner of “others.”This is also why I told my interlocutor that he and those in the debate world who felt like him should call into question the traditional “objective” debate protocols and the instrumentalist language they privilege in favor of a concept of debate and of language in which life and death mattered. I am very much aware that the arrogant neocons who now saturate the government of the Bush administration — judges, pentagon planners, state department officials, etc. learned their “disinterested” argumentative skills in the high school and college debate societies and that, accordingly, they have become masters at disarming the just causes of the oppressed. This kind leadership will reproduce itself (along with the invisible oppression it perpetrates) as long as the training ground and the debate protocols from which it emerges remains in tact. A revolution in the debate world must occur. It must force that unworldly world down into the historical arena where positions make a difference. To invoke the late Edward Said, only such a revolution will be capable of “deterring democracy” (in Noam Chomsky’s ironic phrase), of instigating the secular critical consciousness that is, in my mind, the sine qua non for avoiding the immanent global disaster towards which the blind arrogance of Bush Administration and his neocon policy makers is leading.

### Their Framework bad – Domination

#### \_\_\_\_ The decision-making paradigm inherent in the traditional forms of political engagement engages in an unconscious exercise of power over the self which regulates discourse and produces for itself legitimate methods for engagement which rarely result in change.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, “Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, Polity, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

While separately both Habermas and Foucault challenge the traditional understanding of participation, their combined insights further and irrevocably extend that challenge. Theoretical focus on the distinctions between Habermas and Foucault has all too often obscured important parallels between these two theorists. Specifically, the Habermas-Foucault debate has underemphasized the extent to which Habermas also describes a disciplinary society. In his descriptions of bureaucracy, technocracy, and system colonization, Habermas is also describing a world where power is productive and dispersed and where political action is constrained and normalized. Habermas, like Foucault, describes a type of power that cannot be adequately characterized in terms of the intentions of those who possess it. Colonization is not the result of conscious intention, but is rather the unintended consequence of a multitude of small adjustments. The gender and racial subtexts infusing the system are not the results of conscious intention, but rather of implicit gender and racial norms and expectations infecting the economy and the state. Bureaucratic power is not a power that is possessed by any individual or agency, but exists in the exercise of decisionmaking. As Iris Young points out, we must "analyze the exercise of power [in contemporary societies] as the effect of often liberal and humane practices of education, bureaucratic administration, production and distribution of consumer goods, medicine and so on."' The very practices that Habermas chronicles are exemplary of a power that has no definitive subject. As Young explains, "the conscious actions of many individuals daily contribute to maintaining and reproducing oppression, but those people are simply doing their jobs or living their lives, and do not understand themselves as agents of oppression."8 Colonization and bureaucratization also fit the pattern of a power that is not primarily repressive but productive. Disciplinary technologies are, as Sawicki describes, not... repressive mechanisms ... [that] operate primarily through violence ... or seizure ... but rather [they operate] by producing new objects and subjects of knowledge, by inciting and channeling desires, generating and focusing individual and group energies, and establishing bodily norms and techniques for observing, monitoring and controlling bodily movements, processes, and capacities.9 The very practices of administration, distribution, and decisionmaking on which Habermas focuses his attention can and must be analyzed as productive disciplinary practices. Although these practices can clearly be repressive, their most insidious effects are productive. Rather than simply holding people back, bureaucratization breaks up, categorizes, and systemizes projects and people. It creates new categories of knowledge and expertise. Bureaucratization and colonization also create new subjects as the objects of bureaucratic expertise. The social welfare client and the consumer citizen are the creation of bureaucratic power, not merely its target. The extension of lifeworld gender norms into the system creates the possibility for sexual harassment, job segregation, parental leave, and consensual corporate decisionmaking. Created as a part of these subjectivities are new gestures and norms of bodily behavior, such as the embarrassed shuffling of food stamps at the grocery checkout and the demeaning sexual reference at the office copier. Bodily movements are monitored and regularized by means of political opinion polls, welfare lists, sexual harassment protocols, flex-time work schedules, and so forth. Modern disciplinary power, as described by Foucault and implied by Habermas, does not merely prevent us from developing, but creates us differently as the effect of its functioning. These disciplinary techniques not only control us, but also enable us to be more efficient and more productive, and often more powerful. Focusing on the disciplinary elements of the Habermasian critique opens the door for exploring the postmodern character of Habermasian politics. Because Habermas does describe a disciplinary world, his prescription for contemporary democracy (discursive politics) ought to be sensitive to, and appropriate for, a disciplinary world. Foucault's sensitivity to the workings of disciplinary power is central to the articulation of a plausible, postmodern version of discursive politics. In the following discussion I will argue for a performative redefinition of participation that will reinvigorate the micro-politics demanded by Foucault, as well as provide a more nuanced version of the discursive politics demanded by Habermas.

### Policy Not Key

#### \_\_\_\_ Policy choices are not what shapes the forces of domination, but our mode of thought.

Burke, Senior Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at UNSW, Sydney, in ‘7 |Anthony, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason”, Back to Theory & Event, 10.2|

What I take from Heid\egger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.

## AT Answers

### AT Permutation

#### \_\_\_\_ Perm fails – the alternative can only exist outside of the social

Prozorov, 2007, Collegium Research Fellow, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, [Sergei, Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty, p32-34]

Concrete Freedom: The Resistance of a Living Being The third response to the question of a Foucauldian freedom, drawing primarily on Foucault's writings on art, transgression and 'aesthetics of existence', attempts precisely this task of dissociating freedom from the positivity of the diagram. Such authors as Gilles Deleuze (1988), James Bernauer (1990), Jon Simons (1995), John Rajchman (1985), Paul Patton (1995) and Thomas Dumm (1996) argue not merely for the possibility of a Foucauldian discourse on freedom, but for the centrality of freedom to Foucault's historical ontology. Rajchman distinguishes between two notions of freedom at work in Foucault's discourse. Foucault's nominalist histories of e.g. madness, medicine or sexuality disentangle the processes of formation of what Rajchman refers to as 'nominal' freedoms that in our terminology are discursively constituted, positive properties of a diagrammatically specified identity. According to Rajchman, exposing the constituted character of such freedoms serves to enhance one's 'real freedom', which is understood as a practice rather than a final state, a practice that consists in one's 'revolt' against the instituted identity. For every instituted conception of freedom we apply a nominalist reversal and attempt to determine the larger practice within which it figures; that practice is then what involves our 'real' freedom, something asocial, which cannot be instituted or guaranteed. Thus our real freedom does not consist either in our telling true stories and finding our place within some tradition or ethical code, in completely determining our actions in accordance with universal principles or in accepting our limitations in authentic self-relation. [ ... ] Our real freedom is found in dissolving or changing the polities that embody our nature, and as such it is asocial or anarchical. No society or polity could be based on it, since it lies precisely in the possibility of constant change. Our real freedom is thus political, though it is never finalisable, legislatable or rooted in our nature. (Rajchman 1985, 122-23) In this approach, a 'real' freedom or, in Foucault's own (and arguably less contentious) expression, 'concrete freedom' (Foucault 1988b, 36) is characterised by the following features. Firstly, and recalling Rorty's idea of a 'private' quest for autonomy, this freedom is 'asocial' and 'anarchical', irreducible to any social order but rather implicated in every project of its transformation. It is thus clear why it is impossible to satisfy the demand of Foucault's critics for a positive alternative to a liberal diagram of freedom. Whatever such alternative could be conjured, 'real' freedom would still relate to the project of its transgression rather than be fully actualised within its utopian diagram. Nonetheless, pace Rorty, this notion of freedom is explicitly political in the sense employed by philosophers as diverse as Carl Schmitt (1976) and Jacques Ranciere (1995), since it consists in the moment of radical openness and contestation and has the force of a constitutive decision that takes exception from the positivity of the diagram. Freedom is therefore an active practice of resistance rather than a retreat into the governmentally sanctioned private space. In Foucault's fortunate formulation, freedom is an 'art [rather than a state] of not being governed quite so much' (Foucault in Chambers 2001, 116): Liberty is a practice. The liberty of men is never assured by the institutions and laws that are intended to serve it. This is why almost all of these laws and institutions are quite capable of being turned around. Not because they are ambiguous, but simply because 'liberty'is what must be exercised. The guarantee of freedom is freedom. (Foucault in Gordon 1991,47. Emphasis added.) One will know that freedom is alive not when the interests emerging in a society are allowed to express themselves, be represented and be pursued, not even when dissent and heresy are allowed to manifest themselves, but when contestation, unruliness, intractability are not yet abolished. (Pizzomo 1992,207) Incapable of being firmly established or guaranteed by any institutional structure of the political order, concrete freedom consists in a momentary act rather than a permanent state of affairs: 'It is occasion, spark, challenge. It is risk, it is not guaranteed, backed-up or assured: it always remains without an end.' (Rajchman 1985, 123) Concrete freedom is thus simultaneously political and extra-diagrammatic. Insofar as we understand the political as the constitutive outside of the social order rather than as a functionally differentiated subsystem within it (see Schmitt 1976; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Lefort 1988; Ranciere 1995), we may suggest that concrete freedom is political without being social. In other words, it targets the totality of the diagram, in which human existence is reduced to a positive social project, contesting not the already sedimented features of this project but rather the very process of this sedimentation, whereby the acts of power, implicated in the formation of any diagram, are effaced by their reinscription as instruments of liberation. In short, the affirmation of concrete freedom is driven by the abduction of human existence, necessarily presupposed in any establishment of a 'nominally' free social order. Secondly, this notion of freedom is entirely divorced from any assumption of originary authenticity and the correlate projects of self-discovery or self-actualisation that are central to the epistemic regime of liberal government. As a number of studies have demonstrated, liberal governmental rationality synthesises the mobilisation of human desire for freedom with the specification of its content, so that one is incited to discover and liberate one's 'inner self' through following an externally devised model of e.g. an 'active citizen', an 'enterprising employee' or a 'caring mother' (see Rose 1990; Marinetto 2003; Triantafillou and Nielsen 2001; Rankin 2001). The concept of concrete freedom targets not merely these models of freedom, but the very desire for self-discovery that they respond to. In Foucault's phrase (1982, 216), 'the target nowadays is not to discover what we are but to refuse what we are.' Insofar as subjective interiority is always an effect of governmental practices of subjectification, freedom must consist in the resistance to 'the administrative inquisition which determines who one is' (Bernauer 1994,258), 'a refusal to contract into an identity, a continual twisting loose from the historical forms of life by which 1 [one] is always already shaped' (Caputo 1993, 255).

### AT Permutation—Depoliticization/Containment

#### \_\_\_\_ The permutation is a strategy of technical containment—it reduces political contestation to a conflict of implementations and a question of expertise—vote negative to keep the front of struggle open

Li , 2007, professor of anthropology and senior cananda research chair in political economy and culture in Asia-Pacific at the University of Toronto [ Tania Murray, The Will to Improve, pp. 10-12]

Although rendering contentious issues technical is a routine practice for experts, I insist that this operation should be seen as a project, not a secure accomplishment. Questions that experts exclude, misrecognize, or attempt to contain do not go away. On this point I diverge from scholars who emphasize the capacity of expert schemes to absorb critique, their effective achievement of depoliticization. Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, among others, argue that expert knowledge takes "what is essentially a political problem, removing it from the realm of political discourse, and recasting it in the neutral language of science." They find expertise closed, self-referencing and secure once a "technical matrix" has been established. Resistance, or failure to achieve a program's stated aims, comes to be "construed as further proof of the need to reinforce and extend the power of the experts." Thus "what we get is not a true conflict of interpretations about the ultimate worth or meaning of efficiency, productivity, or normalization, but rather what might be called a **conflict of implementations**."24 Similarly, Timothy Mitchell describes discursive practices that translate issues of poverty, landlessness, and hunger into problems of public health to be solved by technical interventions in social relations and hygiene. In his account, experts rule: much of the time, they succeed in disguising their failures and continue to devise new programs with their authority unchallenged.25 Ferguson offers the qualified observation that development "may also very effectively squash political challenges to the system" by its insistent reposing of political questions in technical term.26 Nikolas Rose stresses the "switch points" where critical scrutiny of governmental programs is absorbed back into the realm of expertise, and "an opening turns into a closure."27 Closure, as these scholars have shown, is indeed a feature of expert discourses. Such discourses are devoid of reference to questions they cannot address, or that might cast doubt upon the completeness of their diagnoses or the feasibility of their solutions. In particular, as Ferguson and Mitchell stress, they exclude what I call political-economic questions—questions about control over the means of production, and the structures of law and force that support systemic inequalities. I am fascinated by the question of how these questions are screened out in the constitution of improvement as a technical domain, and I examine this operation in detail in several chapters of this book. Yet I am equally interested in the "switch" in the opposite direction: in the conditions under which expert discourse is punctured by a challenge it cannot contain; moments when the targets of expert schemes reveal, in word or deed, their own critical analysis of the problems that confront them. I make a conjuncture of this kind the focus of my analysis in chapters 4 and 5. From the perspective proposed by Foucault, openings and closures are intimately linked. He describes the interface between the will to govern and what he calls a strategy of struggle as one of "permanent provocation."28 He writes: For a relationship of confrontation, from the moment it is not a struggle to the death, the fixing of a power relationship becomes a target—at one time its fulfillment and its suspension. And in return the strategy of struggle also constitutes a frontier for the relationship of power, the line at which, instead of manipulating and inducing actions in a calculated manner, one must be content with reacting to them after the event. In effect, between a relationship of power and a strategy of struggle there is a reciprocal appeal, a perpetual linking and a perpetual reversa1.29 As I see it, the unsettled meaning of the terms politics and the political hinge on this element of linking and reversa1.30 Is politics the name for a relation of power, or a practice of contestation? At what point does one slide into the other? In order to pin down the relation of "perpetual reversal" that Foucault describes in rather abstract terms and to make it the subject of empirical investigation, I have settled on a terminology that distinguishes between what I call the practice of government, in which a concept of improvement becomes technical as it is attached to calculated programs for its realization," and what I call the practice of politics—the expression, in word or deed, of a critical challenge. **Challenge often starts out as refusal of the way things are. It opens up a front of struggle**. This front may or may not be closed as newly identified problems are rendered technical and calculations applied. Government, from this perspective, is a response to the practice of politics that shapes, challenges, and provokes it. The practice of politics stands at the limit of the calculated attempt to direct conduct. It is not the only limit, however. In the next section, I examine the limit presented by force.

### AT Our Demand Framework Solves—Not Implemented

#### \_\_\_\_ Governmental policies are formed on pragmatics, not on the ethical appeal against the problem—their good intentions get drowned out

Duyvendak & Uitermark, 2005 [Jan Willem, Justus, Professor of Sociology at University of Amsterdam, Ph.D. degree at the Amsterdam School of Social Sciences, Policy, People, and the New Professional, May 2005, p.64-66]

Histroical resreach (Duyvendak & Rijkschroeff 2004; Fermin 1997; Prins 2000 [2004]; Rijkschroeff, Duyvendak & Pels 2004) has demonstrated that over the last decades, much of the policy making has been driven by pragmatic conditions rather than principles. Moreover, one and the same policy instrument seems to have been applied over time for different reasons, either pragmatic or principle related. (Luceo & Kobben '992)' To put it another way, policy does not have a one-to-one relationship with ideals; it is based on a variety of mo-tives and justifications as well as principles, and cannot be reduced sim¬ply to the implementation of an ideal. An idea that commonly crops up in the public and political debates is that the ideal of a multicultural so¬ciety permeates all phases of policymaking, including the results, but the literature reveals serious doubts about whether there is a direct relationship between ideas and the actual results of policies (Lipsky 1980; Wil¬son 1989; Pressman & Wildavsky 1984). In many studies on multiculturalism, the 'black box' of public admin-istration and how policies are executed remains closed. People assume that there is a close link between the policy pursued and what professionals do in practice. In the Netherlands, policies were multicultural in the sense that they recognised the right of ethnic self-organisation, and due to the religiously 'pillarised' past there was a legal framework that provided rights to minorities (and to other citizens) to follow their own cultural and religious identities. Whether this indeed led to a lot of multicultural practices is an entirely different question - one we want to answer in this chapter on professional practices. Due to space considerations, however, we cannot investigate the complex relationship between ideals, policies, and practices in detail. What we can do is shed some light on how recent shifts in public debates and the political climate have affected professional practices by briefly discussing two cases. I The first concerns the Neighbourhood Alliance, an organisation that shares many of the criticisms that are now often made against multiculturalism. We show that this organisation attempts to translate an ideological critique of multiculturalism into a concrete program. At the same time, we see that there are powerful forces at play on a local level that make it difficult to effectively implement this program. The second case concerns recent reforms of Rotterdam's local right-wing government in which the party of the late Pim Fortuyn is quite hegemonic. This government's mission was to create and implement policies that departed radically from those of the left-wing governments that had ruled Rotterdam for decades. In this case too, we find that the translation of an anti-multicultural ideal into policy practice is not straightforward. Both cases highlight that there are many obstacles that frustrate the translation of ideals into policy and the implementation of policies into practice. These obstacles play their part even when the ideals themselves are hegemonic in the public debate. The notion that ideals and policies on the one hand and professional practices on the other are closely linked is also a fundamental assumption in the debate on (de) professionalization: new neo-liberal policies are blamed for limiting the maneuvering space of professionals.

#### \_\_\_\_ Debates don’t translate into government implementation—The government has its own agenda and does not ct in the people’s interests which leads to discontempt in the public sphere

Duyvendak & Uitermark, 2005 [Jan Willem, Justus, Professor of Sociology at University of Amsterdam, Ph.D. degree at the Amsterdam School of Social Sciences, Policy, People, and the New Professional, May 2005, p.73]

The most important observation is simply that there is a world of difference between the national debate and the reality of policymaking ill neighbourhoods. The concerns of local actors are not necessarily the same as those expressed in the public sphere. While commentators who participate in the national debate may be concerned about Dutch norms and values or the (lack of) compatibility between Islamic and Western civilisations, most organisations ill disadvantaged neighbourhoods sim¬ply want to reach their target groups in order to develop and maintain policy interventions. As a consequence, they sometimes end up acting against the very beliefs that are promoted in the public sphere. This is most apparent with the issue of political and admirlistrative organisation along ethnic lines. In the Dutch case, such a constellation is normally not defended on ideological grounds ('each ethnic group should have a seat at the table!') but on pragmatic grounds ('we can only reach immi¬grants through immigrant organisations'). In a sense, then, examining the exceptional position of the Neighbourhood Alliance helps us under¬stand that most of the time ideology does not fmd its way into profes¬sional practice. When an organisation like the Neighbourhood Alliance explicitly scrutinises professional practices from an ideological viewpoint, it becomes apparent that almost all professional practices fall short of addressing public concerns (as manifested by the public Sphere). Interestingly, this is also the case for the Neighbourhood Alli-ance itself on the basis of the research we have carried out so far, we conclude that only under very specific conditions (high involvement of hea~quarters with the panel, high level of professional support, co-operative attitude of other local stakeholders) does its program actually translate somewhat into practice.

### AT They Want It/Link: Need

#### \_\_\_\_ Claims of objectively being to decide what a person needs also is the right to control them

Batsleer and Humphris 2000 (Janet and Beth, Senior lecturer at Manchester Metropolitan University, Princible lecturer at Manchester Metropolitan University, Welfare, Exclusion, and agency pgs 15-16)

The concept of 'voice' and 'agency' involves far more than is usually considered in relation to welfare as 'good ¶ practice' in promoting participation and user involvement in the management of services. It is 'important for welfare professionals to consider how best to engage Powerful perspectives emerging in organized form from groups not so far defined the nature of 'good practice'. Power has exercised in welfare practice by claims to knowledge which are true. generalizable, universal. Many of these scientific claims to knowledge have been incorporated - via medicine and psychology in particular - into welfare discourse. In this context, the claim to knowl­edge about others is a claim to power in relation to them, for good or ill. The power lies in part in the capacity to define, analyse and name -even bring into being - human populations, and to establish, through these claims to knowledge, systems of control of those populations.

### AT We Limit Government Power

#### \_\_\_\_ Government relies on partial moderation to maintain power. reform is not success for your demand it is a form of adaptation on behalf of the government

Foucault, Professor at The Collège De France, 1978 [Michel, The Birth Of Biopolitics, p. 19-20]

I WOULD LIKE TO refine a little the theses or hypotheses that I put forward last week with regard to what I think is a new art of government that began to be formulated, reflected upon, and outlined around the middle of the eighteenth century. I think an essential characteristic of this new art of government is the organization of numerous and complex internal mechanisms whose function—and this is what distinguishes them from raison d'Etat—is not so much to ensure the growth of the state's forces, wealth, and strength, to ensure its unlimited growth, as to limit the exercise of government power internallyThis art of government is certainly new in its mechanisms, its effects, and its principle. But it is so only up to a point, because we should not imagine that this art of government is the suppression, obliteration, abolition, or, if you prefer, the Aufhebung of the raison d'Etat I tried to talk about last week. In fact, we should not forget that this new art of government, or this art of the least possible government, this art of governing between a maximum and a minimum, and rather minimum than maximum, should be seen as a sort of intensification or internal refinement of raison d'Etat; it is a principle for maintaining it, developing it more fully, and perfecting it. It is not something other than raison d'Etat, an element external to and in contradiction with raison d'Etat, but rather its point of inflection in the curve of its development. If you like, to use a not very satisfactory expression, I would say that it -is the reason of the least state within and as organizing principle of raison d'Etat itself, or again: it is the reason of least government as the principle organizing raison d'Etat itself. There is someone, unfortunately I've not been able to find his name in my papers, but when I do I will tell you, but certainly from the end of the eighteenth century, who spoke about "frugal government."' Well, I think that actually at this moment we are entering what could be called the epoch of frugal government, which is, of course, not without a number of paradoxes, since during this period of frugal government, which was inaugurated in the eighteenth century and is no doubt still not behind us, we see both the intensive and extensive development of governmental practice, along with the negative effects, with the resistances and revolts which we know are directed precisely against the invasive intrusions of a government which nevertheless claims to be and is supposed to be frugal. Let's say--and this will be why we can say that we are living in the age of frugal government—that this extensive and intensive development of a government that is nevertheless supposed to be frugal has been constantly accompanied, outside and within government, by the question of the too much and the too little. Stretching things and giving a caricature of them, I would say that whatever the extension and intensive development of government there may be in fact, the question of frugality has been at the very heart of the reflection which has revolved around government.\* The question of frugality has, if not replaced, at least overtaken and to an extent forced back and somewhat marginalized a different question which preoccupied political reflection in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and even up to the start of the eighteenth century, which was the problem of the constitution. Certainly, all the questions concerning monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy do not disappear. But just as they were the fundamental questions, I was going to say the royal questions, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, so starting from the end of the eighteenth century, throughout the nineteenth century, and obviously more than ever today, the fundamental problem is not the constitution of states, but without a doubt the question of the frugality of government. [The] question of the frugality of government is indeed the question of liberalism**.** I -would now like to take-up two or three of the points I mentioned last week in order to clarify and refine them.

### AT Letter of the Law—Fails

#### \_\_\_\_ The continual reliance on the utopian promise of the law has failed for decades and decades—this reliance serves not to create change, but to channel our impulses toward hope—the dominating spirit of the law overwhelms the letter

Bell, Visiting Professor of Law at NYU, 2004 [Derrick, Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of Education and the Unfulfilled Hopes for Racial Reform, p. 185-189]

Racial Equality: A Goal Too Vulnerable¶ An understandable but, in retrospect, serious misjudgment was our over-reliance on court orders to achieve racial equality. In our school desegregation campaigns, equality would be realized when schools were no longer identifiable by race. This equality by "definitional fiat" limitation is circumscribed, as Brandon Lofton, a student in my constitutional law class points out, because we designated the U.S. government as maker and guarantor of the promise of equality." Lofton cites the speeches of Martin Luther King, Jr., and other black leaders who insisted that the government must honor its commitment to racial equality.¶ By so doing, Lofton argues, "the civil rights leadership limited its conception of African-American identity and freedom to the American legal and social context." This tactic helped the movement dismantle segregation at the point when the blatant "Jim Crow" system threatened the nation's policymakers' designs for world leadership after World War II. Thus when, with persistent pleading from the State and Justice Departments, the Supreme Court proclaimed that separate facilities were now to be inherently unequal, as Michael Seidman noted:¶ the demand for equality had been satisfied and blacks no longer had just cause for complaint. The mere existence of Brown thus served [to] legitimate current arrangements. True, many blacks remained poor and disempowered. But their status was no longer a result of the denial of equality. Instead, it marked a personal failure to take advantage of one's definitionally equal status.14¶ Equality by proclamation not only failed to truly reflect the complexity of racial subordination, it also vested the government and the courts with the ultimate moral authority to define African-American freedom. When the Brown decision was followed by civil rights laws, mostly motivated by black activism that highlighted the continuing racism that undermined our Cold War battles with the Soviet Union, policymakers and much of white society easily reached the premature conclusion that America was now fair and neutral. With implementation of the moderate civil rights laws, the trumpets of "reverse discrimination" began sounding the alarm. In quick response, the government and the courts began giving priority to the rights of "innocent whites" caught in the remedial web of civil rights laws that, to be effective, had to recognize and correct the priorities of race that some whites had deemed vested and permanent.¶ Soon the cacophony settled into a virtual orchestra playing a melody that in this century resembles the song that begins: "The party's over." I am not sure what that policy-activated orchestra was playing in the nineteenth century when the nation abandoned Reconstruction policies. In both eras, though, there is the readiness to mute any sound of the racial remedies earlier and solemnly promised to blacks in order to maintain stability and solidarity among whites whose own social and economic status varies widely.¶ Today, black people and many Hispanics are trapped in a racial time warp. We are buffeted by the painful blows of continuing bias as the law upon which we relied for remedies is reinterpreted with unsupported assurances that the disadvantages we suffer must be caused by our deficiencies because, we are told without even a trace of irony, racism is a thing of the past. The hypocrisy so apparent in the claims of a color-blind society illustrate the harsh and disconcerting truth about racial progress. **We prefer to ignore or rationalize rather than confront these truths because they disrupt our long-settled expectations of eventual racial equality.**¶ Given the setbacks in civil rights suffered in recent decades, and the decline in the relative well-being of so many people of color, civil rights adherents need to reconsider our racial goals. We need to examine what it was about our reliance on racial remedies that may have **prevented us from recognizing** that these legal rights could do little more than bring about the cessation of one form of discriminatory conduct that soon appeared in a more subtle though no less discriminatory form. I hope that this examination leads us to redefine goals of racial equality and opportunity to which blacks have adhered for more than a century.¶ Stanford professor Robert Gordon explained the need for this redefinition. Interpreting the writings of the Critical Race Theory adherents, he referred to the writings of Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and his notions of "hegemony." Gordon explained that:¶ the most effective kind of domination takes place when both the dominant and dominated classes believe that the existing order, with perhaps some marginal changes, is satisfactory, or at least represents the most that ¶ anyone could expect, because things pretty much have to be the way they are.15 Views of this kind afflict the working classes who, though recognizing they are ill-treated and poorly paid, toil on in silence, concluding that nothing can be done and "making waves" about their condition will only make things worse.¶ We civil rights professionals are not immune to the hegemonic syndrome. Even as we fight through the courts to improve conditions, our actions represent a major denial of reality about the nation's history and how and when it addresses even the most severe racial inequities. Thus, as Gordon asserts, we civil rights lawyers are a **key cog in "legitimating" class society by providing it an opportunity** fromtime to time **to appear "approximately just."** While the law functions as a tool of the dominating class, it must function so as to induce both the dominant and dominated classes to accept the hierarchy. It accomplishes this result by appearing to be universal and operating with a degree of independence **by making "it possible for other classes to use the system against itself . . . and force it to make good on its utopian promises.**" In so acting, Gordon maintains, the law can serve as an agent for positive gains by disadvantaged groups.¶ **But there is a catch.** The very process of realizing a gain sought through the courts ultimately serves to deepen the legitimacy of the system. Gordon and other critical legal scholars are correct in asserting that the effort to gain rights and even the discussion of rights serve to co-opt and legitimize the very concept of rights and equality, leaving them empty of dependable substance.¶ Professor Kimberle Crenshaw saw the dilemma a dozen years ago, but concluded that as long as race consciousness thrives, blacks will have to rely on rights rhetoric to protect their interests.16 There are, though, limited options to those deemed the Other in making specific demands for inclusion and equality. Doing so in the quest for racial justice, though, means that "winning and losing have been part of the same experience."¶ Crenshaw recognized race and racism as playing key roles in the maintenance of hegemony, adding: "until whites recognize the hegemonic function of racism and turn their efforts toward neutralizing it, African-American people must develop pragmatic political strategies—self-conscious ideological struggle—to minimize the costs of liberal reform while maximizing its utility." Given racism's critical role in providing an outlet for white frustrations caused by economic exploitation and political manipulation, one wonders whether American society could survive as we know it if large numbers of whites ever realized what racism costs them and decided to do something about it.¶ The obsession with white dominance renders that much-needed recognition unlikely. Can it be that at some unacknowledged level racial equality advocates know we are **living an impossible dream?** **And as a shield against that awful truth, can it be that we hold tightly to our belief in eventual racial justice and the litigation and legislation we hope will give meaning to that belief?** **Remaining faithful to the racial-equality creed enables us to drown out the contrary manifestations of racial domination that flourish despite our best efforts.**¶ Long ago, in a major denial of reality, the racial-equality commitment had to survive the undeniable fact that the Constitution's framers initially opted to protect property, which included enslaved Africans. That commitment had to overlook the political motivations for the Civil War amendments, self-interest motivations almost guaranteeing that when political needs changed, the protection provided the former slaves would not be enforced. In conformity with past practice, protection of black rights is now **predictably episodic.** For these reasons, both the historic pattern and its contemporary manifestations require review and replacement of racial-equality ideology with specific programs leading to tangible goals.¶ Racism translates into a societal vulnerability of black people, whose exploitation few politicians—including those at the presidential level—seem able to resist. And why not? The unwillingness to remedy even the most serious racial injustices, if those remedies will appear detrimental to the expectations of whites, is now settled. The effectiveness of "racial bonding" by whites requires that blacks must seek a new and more realistic goal for our civil rights activism. African Americans need a rationale based on what we can gain for ourselves rather than on what we can obtain from courts or other government entities.

### AT Capitalism = Freedom

#### \_\_\_\_ The market privileges the natural operating of the market over the freedom of individuals, and even smooth functioning of the economy cannot exist without limits and regulations

Foucault, Professor at The Collège De France, 1978 [Michel, The Birth Of Biopolitics, p. 19-20]

Why speak of liberalism, and why speak of a liberal art of government, when it is quite dear that the things I have referred to and the features I have tried to indicate basically point to a much more general phenomenon than the pure and simple economic doctrine, or the pure and simple political doctrine, or the pure and simple economic-political choice of liberalism in the strict sense? If we take things up a bit further back, if we take them up at their origin, you can see that what characterizes this new art of government I have spoken about would be much more a naturalism than liberalism, inasmuch as the freedom that the physiocrats and Adam Smith -talk about is much more the spontaneity, the internal and intrinsic mechanics of economic processes than a juridical freedom of the individual recognized as such. Even in Kant, who is much more a jurist than- an economist, you have seen that perpetual peace is not guaranteed by law, but by nature. In actual fact, it is something like a governmental naturalism which emerges in the middle of the eighteenth century And yet I think we can speak of liberalism. I could also tell you—but 'I will come back to this2°—that this naturalism, which I think is fundamental or at any rate original in this art of government, appears very dearly in the physiocratic conception of enlightened despotism. I will come back to this at greater length, but, in a few words, what conclusions do the physiocrats draw from their discovery of the existence of spontaneous mechanisms of the economy which must be respected by every government if it does not want to induce effects counter to or even the opposite of its objectives? Is it that people must be given the freedom to act as they wish? Is it that governments must recognize the essential, basic natural rights of individuals? Is it that government must be as little authoritarian as possible? It is none of these things. What the physiocrats deduce from their discovery is that the government must know these mechanisms in their innermost and complex nature. Once it knows these mechanisms, it must, of course, undertake to respect them. But this does not mean that it provide itself with a juridical framework respecting individual freedoms rand the basic rights of individuals. It means, simply, that it arm its politics with a precise, continuous, dear and distinct knowledge of what is taking place in society, in the market, and in the economic circuits, so that the limitation of its power is not given by respect for the freedom of individuals, but simply by the evidence of economic analysis which it knows has to be respected.21 It is limited by evidence, not by the freedom of individuals. So, what we see appearing in the middle of the eighteenth century really is a naturalism much more than a liberalism. Nevertheless, I think we can employ the word liberalism inasmuch as freedom really is at the heart of this practice or of the problems it 'confronts. Actually, I think we should be dear that when we speak of liberalism with regard to this new art of government, this does not mean\* that we are passing from an authoritarian government in the seventeenth century and at the start of the eighteenth century to a government which becomes more tolerant, more lax, and more flexible. I do not want to say that this is not the case, but neither do I want to say that it is. It does not seem to me that a proposition like that has much historical or political meaning. I did not want to say that there was a quantitative increase of freedom between the start of the eighteenth century and, let's say, the nineteenth century. I have not said this for two reqcons. One is factual and the other is a reason of method and principle. The factual reason first of all. What sense is there in saying, or simply wondering, if an administrative monarchy like that of France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with all its big, heavy, unwieldy, and inflexible machinery, with its statutory privileges which had to be recognized, with the arbitrariness of decisions left to different people, and with all the shortcomings of its instruments, allowed more or less freedom thana regime which is liberal, let's say, but which takes on the task of continuously and effectively taking charge of individuals and their well-being, health, and work, their way of being, behaving, and even dying, etcetera? So, comparing the quantity of freedom between one system and another does not in fact have much sense. And we do not see what type of demonstration, what type of gauge or measure we could apply. This leads us to the second reason, which seems to me to be more fundamental. This is that we should not think of freedom as a universal which is gradually realized over time, or which undergoes quantitative variations, greater or lesser drastic reductions, or more or less important periods of eclipse. It is not a universal which is particularized in time and geography. Freedom is not a white surface with more or less numerous black spaces here and there and from time to time. Freedom is never anything other—but this is already a great deal—than an actual relation between governors and governed, a relation in which the measure of the "too little\* existing freedom is given by the "even more"t freedom demanded. So when I say "liberal"\* I am not pointing to a form of governmentality which- would leave more white spaces of freedom. I mean something else. If I employ the world "liberal," it is first of all because this governmental practice in the process of establishing itself is not satisfied with respecting this or that freedom, with guaranteeing this or that freedom. More profoundly, it .is a consumer of freedom. It is a consumer of freedom inasmuch as it can only function insofar as a number of freedoms actually exist: freedom of the market, freedom to buy and sell, the free exercise of property rights, freedom of discussion, possible freedom of expression, and so on. The new governmental reason needs freedom therefore, the new art of government consumes freedom. It consumes freedom, which means that it must produce it. **I**t must produce it, it must organize it. The new art of government therefore appears as the management of freedom, not in the sense of the imperative: "be free," with the immediate contradiction that this imperative may contain The formula of liberalism is not "be free." Liberalism formulates simply the following: I am going to produce what you need to be free. I am going to see to it that you are free to be free. And so, if this liberalism is not so much the imperative of freedom as the management and organization of the conditions in which one can be free, it is clear that at the heart of this liberal practice is an always different and mobile problematic relationship between the production of freedom and that which in the production of freedom risks limiting and destroying it. Liberalism as I understand it, the liberalism we can describe as the art of government formed in the eighteenth century, entails at its heart a productive/ destructive relationship [with] freedom [ Liberalism must produce freedom, but this very act entails the establishinent of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats, etcetera. Clearly, we have examples of this. There must be free trade**,** of course, but how can we practice free trade in fact if we do not control and limit a number of things, and if we do not organize a series of preventive measures to avoid the effects of one-country's hegemony over others, which would be precisely the limitation and restriction of free trade? All the European countries and the United States encounter this paradox from the start of the nineteenth century when, convinced by the economists of the end of the eighteenth century, those in power who want to establish the order of commercial freedom come up against British hegemony. American governments, for example, who used this problem of free trade as a reason for revolt against England, established protectionist tariffs from the start of the nineteenth century in order to save a free trade that would be compromised by English hegemony. Similarly, there must be freedom of the internal market, of course, but again, for there to be a market there must be buyers as well as sellers. Consequently, if necessary, the market must be supported and buyers created by mechanisms of assistance. For freedom of the internal market to exist, the effects of monopolies must be prevented, and so anti-monopoly legislation is needed. There must be a free labor market, but again there must be a large enough number of sufficiently competent, qualified, and politically disarmed workers to prevent them exerting pressure on the labor market. We have then the conditions for the creation for a formidable body of legislation and an incredible range of governmental interventions to guarantee production of the freedom needed in order to govern.

### AT Repression—Power = Productive

#### \_\_\_\_ Power is not located in institutions, but rather is linked to the noramlization of social practices. Only a proper analysis of power’s true effects can formulate modes of resistance.

Holmes and Gastaldo ’02 [Dave, Assistant Professor in the School of Nursing at the University of Ottawa, Denise, Assistant Professor in the Faculty of Nursing at the University of Toronto, Journal of Advanced Nursing 38(6), June 2002, Pages 558-559]

[Before governmentality: the issue of power](http://web.ebscohost.com.lib-ezproxy.tamu.edu:2048/ehost/detail?vid=5&hid=103&sid=84bcbd19-3101-4d6c-84b9-74e34f73e4c2%40sessionmgr104&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#toc)  Power is a well-studied concept that has been examined from various theoretical perspectives. Well known works from Lukes (1974), Marx (1946), Weber (1986), and Arendt (1995) were particularly useful for understanding recent and current socio-political issues. Michel Foucault, the late French philosopher, offered an original way to look at power that differed from many theories which address power as it deals with the state, the legitimacy of power, the notion of ideology, and questions regarding the possession and source of power (Dean 1999). Foucault maintained that we must look at power not only as a repressive exercise (a dimension which of course exists); we must also concentrate upon its constructive aspects. For Foucault, power 'seems to include everything from overt forms of coercion and manipulation to the subtle exercise of authority and influence' (Weberman 1995, p. 193). This understanding of power is innovative because power has been conceived of traditionally as only a negative and repressive force. Power has been linked to prohibition, punishment, and imposition of laws, but Foucault also explored the notion of constructive (or productive) power, arguing that there are ways to exercise power that generate little conflict or frustration; power relations that are more difficult to resist (Weberman 1995). In summary, we distance ourselves from the traditional 'jurico-discursive' point of view (McHoul & Grace 1993, Weberman 1995), which tends to state that: Power takes the form of openly articulated (hence discursive) prohibition, coercion, threats and punishment (hence juridical) and has the effect of restricting the activities of the ruled by preventing them from doing what they want to do (Weberman 1995, p. 191). According to Foucault, we must overcome this obsession with repressive and sovereign power if we want to offer a more comprehensive understanding of how power is exercised in society. We must investigate, through research, how power produces subjectivities. Foucault observed that the construction of self (subjectivity) is linked to established forms of knowledge and institutionalized practices. Self is not an essence; it is created by the influence of multiple forms of power. Foucault also emphasized the idea of studying power where it produces effects, locally and often in subtle forms. For Foucault, power is to be seen as: The multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the process which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses them, as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain of system... power is not an institution, and not a structure, neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society (1990,pp. 92-93). Power does not function only on the basis of law, but also through techniques related to discipline and normalization (Foucault 1980a). Nor is power based on violence, but on control and productive exercises in ways that surpass the state and its institutions (Foucault 1994a). Moreover, power relations are not one-sided, and any particular group does not hold power. In fact, power is fluid and circulates among and through bodies (McHoul & Grace 1993). Power is employed and exercised through a net-like organization; it is not the property of someone or a group. Power acts upon individuals as they, in turn, act upon others. Therefore, power is relational. Foucault insisted that 'power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere' (Foucault 1990, p. 93).

### AT Truth

#### \_\_\_\_ Truth does not exist in a vaccuum—it can only be produced in and through power relations

Foucault, Professor at The Collège De France, 1978 [Michel, The Birth Of Biopolitics, p. 19-20]

The question here is the same as the question I addressed with regard to madness, disease, delinquency, and sexuality. In all of these cases, it was not a question of showing how these objects were for a long time hidden before finally being discovered, nor of showing how all these objects are only wicked illusions or ideological products to be dispelled in the [light]\* of reason finally having reached its zenith**.** It was a matter of showing by what conjunctions a whole set of practices—from the moment they become coordinated with a regime of truth—was able to make what does not exist (madness, disease, delinquency, sexuality, etcetera), nonetheless become something, something however that continues not to exist. That is to say, what I would like to show is not how an error—when I say that which does not exist becomes something, this does not mean showing how it was possible for an error to be constructed—or how an illusion could be born, but how a particular regime of truth,- and therefore not an error, makes something that does not exist able to become something**.** It is not an illusion since it is precisely a set of practices, real practices, which established it and thus imperiously marks it out in reality**.** The point of all these investigations concerning madness, disease, delinquency, sexuality, and what I am talking about now, is to show how **t**he coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth form an apparatus (dispositif) of knowledge-power that effectively marks out in reality that which does not exist and legitimately submits it to the division **between true and false.** In the things I am presently concerned with, the moment when that which does not exist is inscribed in reality, and when that which does not exist comes under a legitimate regime of the true and false, marks the birth of this dissymmetrical bipolarity of politics and the economy. Politics and the economy are not things that exist, or errors, or illusions, or ideologies. They are things that do not exist and yet which are inscribed in reality and fall under a regime of truth dividing the true and the false.

### AT Agamben

#### \_\_\_\_ Agamben’s theories are ultimately incorrect—None are abandoned, only specifically incorporated into biopower

Prozorov, 2007, Collegium Research Fellow, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, [Sergei, Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty, p7]

While Agamben's sovereign seems to appear on the scene only to retreat from it, leaving its subjects in the perpetual apprehension of his presence-in-his-absence, Foucault's imagery of power relations presents to us a myriad of agencies of power, busily (re)forming their objects so that nothing in principle should remain untouched by the mechanisms of power. Quarantine operations during epidemics, the compilation of dossiers on delinquents, campaigns against children's masturbation, etc. - Foucault's writings create an impression of an endless vertigo of governmental activity of doctors, teachers, wardens, judges, social workers that might make one wish for Agamben's abandonment. The objects of a Foucauldian power are never abandoned but rather permanently abducted by myriad governmental agencies, simultaneously confined in the restricted domains of power and rendered productive in accordance with their rationalities. This form of power that Foucault has famously termed 'biopolitics' does not oscillate between killing and abandoning to a permanently insecure life; instead, in a formula that we find no less disconcerting, it makes live (cf. Foucault 1990a, 138). The crucial point here is that, contrary to some overly enthusiastic readings (Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004), biopolitical power does not foster, augment, extend and nurture 'life-as-such' (which, in its very 'as­suchness' should be able to do perfectly well without biopower) but only the forms of life that are in accordance with its specific rationality. Biopower makes one live the existence it has first captured and confined. In this manner, human existence is recast as a project, endowed with identity, subjected to authority and granted a teleological destination. As we shall discuss in detail below, Foucault's key insight is that while in this state of abduction individuals can be viewed and view themselves as free in the positive sense, this very positive freedom also functions as a subtle form of constraint, which forcefully prevents the actualisation of other pathways of freedom.

### AT Rorty

#### \_\_\_\_ Rorty doesn’t apply – liberal societies are just as bad in the ontological sense, and that focus prevents us from genuinely liberating ourselves.

Prozorov, 2007, Collegium Research Fellow, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, [Sergei, Foucault, Freedom and Sovereignty, p29-30]

The crucial contribution of the governmentality problematic is the rejection of the view of 'liberal society' proposed by Rorty: numerous empirical studies of liberal government demonstrate precisely that a 'liberal society' (or, more concretely and correctly, a liberal diagram) does 'invent' and 'create' and, furthermore, that it creates particular kinds of subjective identity and prescribes particular 'practices of freedom'. In a crude summation, 'the [liberal] state is constituted by a promise: 'We will assist you to practice your freedom as long as you practice it our way.' (Dean 1998, 217) Contemporary analyses of neoliberal governmentality are particularly illuminating in their analysis of the linkage that this diagram establishes between freedom and the governmentally constructed pedagogical routines that specify the practice of freedom by providing authoritative templates for its 'proper' exercise: individuals are thereby 'bound into the language and evaluations of expertise at the very moment that they are assured oftheir freedom and autonomy' (Rose 1990,203. See also Cruikshank 1999; Marinetto 2003; Brigg 2001). This governmental activity of, in Ian Hacking's (2002) term, 'making up people' disturbs Rorty's version ofthe public/private distinction, in which the constitution of a plurality of idiosyncratic forms of subjectivity is relegated to the realm of individual existence, whose sanctity is guaranteed by the non-interfering state (cf. Weintraub 1997; Burchell 1991; Hindess 1996b). Instead, governmentality studies demonstrate the ways in which the 'private' quest for autonomy is increasingly mobilised by government for the achievement of its goals, whereby freedom paradoxically becomes a duty: 'The self is to be a subjective being, it is to aspire to autonomy, it is to strive for personal fulfilment in its earthly life, it is to interpret its reality and destiny as a matter of individual responsibility, it is to find meaning in existence by shaping its life through acts of choice.' (Rose 1996b, 151) The very desire for and enjoyment of freedom thus paradoxically become a governmental injunction. Slavoj Zizek (2006, 310) has phrased this injunction in terms of an ironic reversal of the Kantian ethical imperative: 'You must because you can!' Recast as a governmental 'grant' rather than a natural limit to government, the subject's freedom becomes an obligation, and, furthermore, an obligation to be enjoyed as a personal project of self-actualisation rather than simply a duty to be fulfilled. Moreover, the epistemic presupposition of a deeper, fundamental identity to be actualised in self-expression turns the practice of freedom into a hard labour of anxious self-scrutiny. One of titles of self-help manuals, cited by Nikolas Rose (1990, 242) in his brilliant study of the liberal government of subjectivity, urges the subject 'to be that self which one truly is'. It is at the moment of the presupposition of the existence of a 'true self' that is contrasted with one's 'empirical self' that the injunction to freedom becomes equivalent to the subjection to external expertise. The illumination of the possibility of 'mobilisation of freedom' for the purposes of government is the central contribution of the problematic of governmentality that allows a discourse on freedom to transcend the facile dualism between repression and emancipation.

### AT Habermas

#### \_\_\_\_ Habermas' idea of contestation does not understand relations of power

Owen 99. Director of the Center for Post-Analytic Philosophy, U of Southampton (David Owen), Foucault Contra Habermas: Orientation and Enlightenment. Sage Publications, 1999. pg. 30

<<<The general claim to be advanced now is this: genealogy exemplifies orientation in thinking in which thinking is oriented to an immanent id and this orientation in thinking is articulated in terms of the process, becoming otherwise than we are through the agonic use of reason.section will reverse the ordering of the previous section in order to dr. out clearly both the difference between the conceptions of enlightenine which characterise critique and genealogy, and the form of, and relatiO ship to, orientation in thinking exhibited by genealogy. It is appropriate to begin by simply illustrating the claim that genealogy resists the hegemony of critique's conception of enlightenment andit does so by articulating a distinct conception of enlightenment. Wri, EL5 in response to Habermas' description of his work as anti-Enlightenme Foucault makes the following remarks: I think that the Enlightenment as a set of political, economic, social, insti tional, and cultural events on which we still depend in large part, constitutes privileged domain for analysis. I also think that as an enterprise for linking progress of truth and the history of liberty in a bond of direct relation, formulated a philosophical question that remains for us to consider. I think finally, as I have tried to show with reference to Kant's text ['An answer to the question: "what is enlightenment?" 'I, that it defined a certain manner o philosophizing. But that does not mean that one has to be 'for' or 'against' the Enlightenment. It even means that one has to refuse everything that might present itse in the form of a simplistic and authoritarian alternative: you either accept th Enlightenment and remain within the tradition of its rationalism (this i considered a positive term by some and used by others, on the contrary, as reproach); or else you criticize the Enlightenment and then try to escape fro its principles of rationality (which may be seen once again as good or bad) And we do not break free of this blackmail by introducing 'dialectical' nuances while seeking to determine what good and bad elements there may have bee in the Enlightenment. (1984a: 42-3)>>> cault, 1979d: 794; cf. 1988a).

### AT Mobility Good

#### \_\_\_\_ Mobility only provides freedom for the wealthy - transportation necessarily increases our reliance upon exploitative and ecologically harmful cycles of production

Goodwin 2010 [Katherine J., doctoral student at American University's School of International Service in Washington DC, managing editor for the Journal of International Relations and Development, “Reconstructing Automobility: The Making and Breaking of Modern Transportation,” Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 10, No. 4]

Modern sensibilities are saturated with the belief that the desire for greater mobility is inherent in human nature. Readers of this article very likely feel that their lives have been enriched by their ability to travel to new places and to visit faraway friends. They may grimace at the thought of living and working their entire lives within walking distance of where they were born. They certainly may appreciate the ability to buy imported strawberries in winter. To those who can afford it, mobility brings its own very particular and undeniable joys. Yet, as this section will begin by discussing, there are fundamental contradictions contained in the concept that extensive mobility is necessary to human flourishing, particularly with regard to the conflation of mobility with freedom. The section will go on to argue that the mobility-flourishing link has its origins in modern industry, not in human nature. It will conclude by suggesting that there is a growing recognition that increasing the movement of people and goods may not be the way to secure collective well-being. Many municipal groups—and as a result, national governments—are beginning to articulate a new vision of community life that emphasizes proximity rather than mobility. In doing so, they reconstitute the link between mobility and human flourishing as an ambiguous one at best. To a great extent, the commonly understood link between mobility and [End Page 70] human flourishing is due to mobility being interpreted as freedom. Although mobility as freedom may seem feasible at a superficial level, this association begins to break down if, following Thomas Princen, we approach mobility as a myth. Princen sees mobility as a myth "not in the sense of being fictional or wrong, but in the sense of being central to a belief system, one that sees human well-being in terms of ever-increasing movement and personal choice."51 Drawing on Roland Barthes' foundational work Mythologies, one can view the mobility-as-freedom myth as a kind of cultural and cognitive sleight of hand. For Barthes, a myth is "constituted by the loss of the historical quality of things: in it, things lose the memory that they once were made."52 In the same way that one cannot simultaneously look at and through a window pane, one can only see mobility as freedom if one loses focus on its historical production. In other words, one can only conceive of mobility as freedom by "losing the memory" that mobility must be made. Paterson rightly argues that "the condition of possibility of 'autonomous mobility' through the car is in fact extensive state planning"53—and he could easily have added the successful functioning and corresponding power of the auto and energy industries. Roads, fuel, functioning vehicles—these are prerequisites of automotive freedom. Yet in no sense is the material reality of roads, fuel, and vehicles free—it is neither gratis (without cost) nor libre (autonomous). There are material, financial, ecological, and opportunity costs involved, though these may not be reflected in the price of every-day driving. Moreover, any kind of mobility beyond using one's own two feet engenders dependence upon systems of production, distribution, regulation and research. The use of even a simple mode of transportation such as a bicycle implies being in a relationship of at least interdependence with (if not outright dependence on) the slew of engineers, investors, manufacturers, and distributors who make that mode of transportation available. The conditions of possibility of mobility have little to do with autonomy. On a more abstract level, conceiving of mobility as freedom posits a relationship between freedom and space. This seems to make sense at first glance: the farther one can go, the more freedom one enjoys. Yet upon further consideration, this association becomes problematic. Is there a correlation between distance traveled and freedom enjoyed? Am I somehow freer when I fly to Australia than when I take the train to Boston? It is as if one posited a relationship between the freedom of speech and the number of words one uses. Do I more fully enjoy my freedom to speak when I write a two-volume tome than when I hold up a sign in the street? The thought seems faintly ridiculous. One can certainly make a case for mobility as a negative right, positing that no state can legitimately limit the movements of individuals (with certain exceptions, such as convicted criminals). This is "freedom of movement" as articulated [End Page 71] in Article 13 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state." Freedom of movement, in this sense, is very likely essential to human flourishing. Yet there is a difference between freedom of movement and freedom as movement. With freedom of movement, one is free to move or not. With freedom as movement, one is only free while in motion. It is the latter which may be cause for concern. Viewing freedom as movement prompts one to treat mobility as a positive right. In this view, if states are obligated to recognize the rights of its citizens, then states are obligated to provide citizens with the means to move.54 If one can only be free when one can move as far and as frequently as one wishes, then the state must ensure its citizens' freedoms by funding roads and airports, ensuring as much mobility as possible. This becomes somewhat paradoxical for the citizen: one's freedom is brought into being by the state through material processes which are neither gratis nor libre.

### AT Pinker/Modernity Not Violent

#### \_\_\_\_ State power elevates violence to horrific new levels through rational justifications. These genocidal possibilities that must be challenged.

Radovanović 12 [Olivera, University of Masaryk, Department of Sociology supervised by Csaba Szaló, PhD “Society as a Garden: Justification and Operationalization of Foucaldian “Right to Kill” in the Contemporary World”http://is.muni.cz/th/236868/fss\_m/Ma\_Thesis\_Olivera\_Radovanovic.pdf]

It is the fact that the massive manslaughter was the means for reaching the goals and expressing animosity towards the other groups during the entire history of mankind. Anyone with any historical knowledge is aware that mass murder and deadly expulsions of people are ancient. (Chirot and McCauley 2006: 18) Are then contemporary warring conducts any different from the earlier ones? Do the theses about modern wars as special sorts that scholars have ever made in fact represent the attempt to “invent hot water” or the avaricious intention to barbarize the civilized society we are? Mann argues that blaming our “primitive” predecessors for leaving us with heritage of carnage “offers us psychological comfort” to see the contemporary murderers “far removed from we civilized moderns.” (2005: 18) Those “primitives”, Mann continues, would have to include groups from all the continents, “as culturally close to use, as 19th century Americans and Australians and 20th century Germans.” (Ibid.) Many scholars also believe that there is the difference, and a very profound one; the fading boundaries separating national and international concerns ensures that the consequences of war are felt more acutely than in earlier conflicts; the thoroughness and scope of bloody events in 20th century went far beyond anything in the past and have been the product of modernity itself. (Chirot and McCauley 2006: 18, Spence 2005: 290 291) Bauman offers the following explanation on this issue. He claims that “modern holocaust” is in comparison to the medieval one unique in double sense. “[I]t is modern. And it stands unique against the quantidianity of modern society” (1989: 94) because it brings together ordinary modern factors which are, in normal conditions, separated: 1)racism; 2) “practical policy” of a dominant centralized state; 3) state emergency as “an extraordinary wartime condition” and 4) non-interference, that is passive acceptance of state practices by the population as a whole. (Ibid.) Independently, these factors are rather usual and ordinary; when combined, they prove their devastating force. In other words, genocidal actions are likely to occur with, “thus far, uncommon and rare” encounter of “two common and abundant inventions of modern times.” (Ibid.: 106) It is, first of all, bureaucracy that is “intrinsically capable of genocidal action” (Ibid.), but to engage in such performance, it needs to meet with another modern device: “a bold design of better, more reasonable and rational social order, […] a racially uniform, or classless society.” (Ibid.) Above all, it requires the capacity to bring such designs into existence and the decidedness to make them efficient. Shocking it may sound, but modern (mass) killing, therefore, rendered neither irrational or in any sense crazy and uncontrolled outburst of passions, and hardly ever a purposeless and irrational act. It is rather a result of rational social engineering tending to achieve the ambivalence-free homogeneity that social reality failed to produce by its own. (Bauman 1991: 39, Chirot & McCauley 2006: 7) Alvarez borrowed Aredent’s term and defined genocidal action as a type of “legal crime”, since it is typically planned, authorized and implemented by duly constituted authorities acting on behalf of a legitimate government. (1997: 141) The truth is that possibility of genocide has been always imminent, but in modern times, state control apparatus assigned it several new values. State-controlled resources can be crucial for economic advancement and physical survivor, and more importantly, if everyone is supposed to be a member of the nation that supports and legitimizes this state, then any cultural group which state control cannot handle is should feel threatened with extinction. (Chirot & McCauley 2006: 50)

### AT Power Inevitable/No Resistance

#### \_\_\_\_ The fluidity of power always makes resistance possible.

Yates & Hiles 10 [Scott and Dave; DeMontfort University “Towards a “Critical Ontology of Ourselves”? Foucault, Subjectivity, and Discourse Analysis” Theory and Psychology Vol. 20 (1): 52-75]

Dreyfus (2004) also argues that in the lecture What is an Author? Foucault took another step in elaborating the agency and potential creative powers of subjects through the concept of “founders of discursivity” (such as Freud and Marx) who are able to open up “a new disclosive space” and “a new style of discourse.” In his discussions of power, Foucault’s work contains clearer indications of the importance of freedom and agency. He stated that, although there was no position of pure autonomy or freedom at the margins of power or any potential society free of power relations, one is nevertheless not completely “trapped” (Foucault, 1980). Discourses connected to power are “tactically polyvalent” (Foucault, 1976/1981), and can be appropriated strategically in resistance to power. Power relations always contain the possibilities of resistance. Power, for Foucault (1982), is distinguished from forms of domination such as slavery in which there are no grounds for “reciprocal incitation and struggle.” Rather, power is conceived as acting upon the actions of others, of aiming to guide and structure their “possible field of actions” (p. 221). Power is “exercised over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free” (p. 221). Subjects in power relations are “faced with a field of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, sev-eral reactions ... may be realized” (p. 221). At the same time, however, it must be acknowledged that power relations are often “fixed in such as way that they are perpetually asymmetrical” (Foucault, 1984/1997a, p. 292), and there is only “extremely limited” margin for action, freedom, or resistance. However, much of the emphasis in Foucault’s analyses was on ways that people are constituted as subjects by forces beyond their control, and this often seems to leave little room for conceptualizing the potential for agency or resistance in his work (McNay, 1994). This leads to possible readings that see Foucault as a “prophet of entrapment” (Simons, 1995) who promotes a nega- tive conceptualization of power (McNay, 1994) and the “hyper-determination” (Dean, 1994) of the subject, and who is unable to account for the agency and action of subjects that he discussed alongside his analyses of power.

### AT Speed Inevitable

#### \_\_\_\_ Speed is not a natural result of human progress but a product of the capitalist need for efficiency

Goodwin 2010 (Katherine J., doctoral student at American University's School of International Service in Washington DC, managing editor for the Journal of International Relations and Development, “Reconstructing Automobility: The Making and Breaking of Modern Transportation,” Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 10, No. 4]

Contradictions of freedom and mobility aside, there is a second important point to make regarding the link between mobility and human flourishing. While humans have always been mobile creatures, the contemporary assumption that extensive movement is a necessary part of social well-being has fairly recent origins. The convergence in the nineteenth century of modern capitalist industry, the development of the railroad and telegraph, and the institutionalization of time by factories and states significantly changed the sense of space and time in which people lived.55 Two significant transformations concern us here. The first is the emergence of the daily commute between home and work or school, whereby routinized intraurban movement became habitual.56 The second is tourism. Before the nineteenth century, "the idea occurred to no one to go off to the seaside … Except for a few English aristocrats (considered perfectly eccentric), one did not travel for pleasure. One took to the road for business, for the service of the king, or to join—if one was a lady—one's husband."57 In the era of railroads and leisure time, however, touring other cities became feasible and desirable. These two transformations—commuting to work and travelling for pleasure—led to another new phenomenon: "the increasing experience of landscape from a moving rather than stationary vantage-point" and an "increasing sense of the body as an anonymized parcel of flesh which is shunted from place to place."58 At the most intimate scale, mobility became a daily embodied experience, eventually to be taken for granted as a natural part of human life. On a larger scale, Nigel Thrift points to the shifting symbolism of the era, where circulation became a prevalent metaphor and was understood to be "causally connected to progress" in the way that the circulation of blood is causally [End Page 72] connected to life.59 This perceived connection to progress was heightened and intensified by the modern capitalist impetus towards accessing markets. Fundamental to capitalism is the idea that "the ability of workers and machines and financial capital to find their best employment is essential to well-functioning markets, to efficient markets … a productive society is a mobile society."60 Beginning in the nineteenth century, urban planners with the light of progress in their eyes "produced elaborate plans to improve roadways, build canals, improve river navigation and so on, in order to improve the 'circulation' of goods and people."61 The state became invested in mobility on an unprecedented scale. The association of mobility with human flourishing—particularly with its components of travel, commuting, and access to distant markets—can thus be seen as a uniquely modern phenomenon. Yet highly mobile social relations may not necessarily produce the fullest and best expression of human contentment. There are other ways to organize interactions, other ways to acquire understanding, other ways to live.

#### \_\_\_\_ Biopower is not inevitable, by realizing the existing power structures we have the power to transform it into something more productive.

Chambon 1999 (Adrienne, director of Ph. D program at U Toronto, Ph. D in Social Work from U Chicago, Columbia University Press New York , Reading Foucault for Social Work, “Foucault’s Approach,” p. 67-8)

More fundamentally, Foucault spoke to the transformative potential of his work. Transformative work shows that the present is not natural and need not be taken as inevitable or absolute. Change can come from the realization of the precarious nature of established ways and by inviting the development of alternatives. This holds true for the client and for the worker and is of particular relevance to the academic social worker, researcher, and educator. We come close here to the definition of the role of the intellectual, as well as its limits: "The work of the intellectual ... is fruitful in a certain way to describe that-which-is by making it appear as something that might not be, or that might not be as it is" (Foucault 1983:206). Foucault concluded: These [forms of rationality] reside on a base of human practice and human history; and that since these things have been made, they can be unmade, as long as we know how it was that they were made.... Any description must always be made in accordance with these kinds of virtual fracture which open up the space of freedom understood as a space of concrete freedom, i.e., of possible transformation. (206) Because power is productive, it is up to us to produce new forms, after seeing through that which is all too familiar, and to realize that those new forms will generate new possibilities as well as new constraints>

### AT Mobility Good

#### \_\_\_\_ Their conflation of mobility and freedom assumes a privileged subject. For the desperate passenger, travel is nut a luxury, but a necessity.

Martin 2011 [Craig, Department of Geography, Royal Holloway University of London, “Desperate passage: violent mobilities and the politics of discomfort,” Journal of Transport Geography, Vol. 19]

The common thread that links the various desperate passengers is the lack of legal right they have to their own mobility (and thus identity, according to Urry, 2000, p. 49) through dint of circumstance. This highlights perhaps the most critical factor in the debates on the mobilities of various individuals: the choice of when to move, the ability to do so, and the specific mobility networks that are utilised. Choice, as the supposed freedom of liberal capitalism, suggests the affordance of the right to move at will. Cresswell (2006, p. 256) notes how Bauman’s work on the vagabond and the tourist exemplifies the divergences in the ability to move.3 For although Bauman may argue that ‘‘nowadays we are all on the move’’ (Bauman, 1998, p. 77), there are clear qualitative differences. The cosmopolitan mobilities of legitimated individuals mask the struggles to move for reasons of political turmoil or natural catastrophe. Thus articulating the asymmetrical networks of mobility, where one group are provided with the means to travel without impediment and in circumstances that provide necessary forms of comfort; the other impeded in every movement they attempt to make, and as I maintain in this paper, the comforts afforded legitimated passengers are absent.4 Bauman (1995, p. 95) accentuates the value of push and pull factors as measures of mobility, most tellingly again in regard to the vagabond and the tourist.5 The tourist speaks of impatience, informed by the ‘pull’ of novelty and the experiences offered by the far-off. They appear to move on purpose, with the comfort of knowing that they can return to the safety of home when they so choose. Their mobility is cushioned by a proliferation of safe, ‘‘well marked escape routes’’ (Bauman, 1995, p. 96) that furnish the tourist with a form of protective cocoon, both physically and emotionally. There is, to use Cresswell’s phrase, a ‘‘voluntarism’’ of sorts (Cresswell, 2006, p. 256). However, the question of the freedom to move emphasises an altogether different situation for the desperate passenger. For the desperate passenger the issue of purpose becomes a decisive one—theirs is a desperate need to escape, or more critically an ‘in-voluntarism’ in relation to human trafficking. The routes of escape or forced transit for the desperate passenger are markedly different to those offered to the tourist. Often these are not routes designed for corporeal mobility but instead are intended for alternate forms, including commodity flows. Such routes lie outside of the normative codings of corporeal mobility altogether and are fraught with intense danger, including death (Chrisafis, 2009, p. 12). As we saw with the introductory example (BBC News, 2009a) the desperate passenger has to rely on multifarious tactics to illicitly cross borders through the infiltration of various transport networks. These include stowing away on cargo ships (Carrell, 2008; IMO, 2009); the underside of lorries (Chrisafis, 2009, p. 12; Kenyon, 2009); the wheel wells of aircraft (New York Times, 1993, p. 33); inappropriate small-scale sailing vessels (BBC News, 2009b); or railway freight trains (Scarpellino, 2007, p. 330). The final instance concerns the movement of undocumented migrants travelling from Mexico to the USA, a relatively short journey in comparison to the often lengthy, chaotic and traumatic journeys through Europe of Afghan or African migrants for example. In one case a 15 year-old Afghan boy journeyed for over one year to reach the UK, travelling through Iran, Turkey, Greece and Italy, then finally through France by train. As Chrisafis suggests, the last part of the Afghan’s journey— crossing the English Channel—proved equally as troublesome as the rest, with five attempts in one week to stowaway on the underside of lorries, only to be apprehended by security patrols (Chrisafis, 2009, p. 12). Similarly there have been numerous media reports of stowaways onboard intercontinental aircraft, with the most precarious mode being the use of aircraft wheel wells. In 1993 the New York Times reported the story of a 13 year old Columbian child who was found alive after tumbling out of the wheel well of a cargo plane at Miami airport (New York Times, 1993, p. 33). The report speaks of the child being covered in frost after the 1000-mile journey, with only the fact that the wheel well was pressurised enabling his survival

### AT Affect of the Train/Survivors\*\*

#### \_\_\_\_ New forms of transportation produce an affective ruse of comfort that obviates the economy of violence that undergirds high speed transportation

Virilio, Curator of the Museum of the Accident, in ‘5 |Paul, Negative Horizon, Pg. 54-6|

Meanwhile, with regard to this transition, it should be noted that¶ the rail revolution came to us from a maritime power that perfected the¶ 'sport of the transport' to such a point that it became an entire politics.¶ It is from Britannic insularity that this demand came to us, new for¶ the Continent, of comfort in travelling. This Anglo-Saxon ideology of¶ 'well- being' is encountered in both the bourgeois furnishings [mobilier]¶ of the eighteenth century and in what was first maritime mobility35 and¶ then rail mobility, the comforted body of the traveller comes to complement¶ the assisted body, the sedentary. It was the Scot MacAdam who, in 1815,¶ invented the smooth road surface for high-speed transportation. And¶ these furnishings that simulate in apartments the cabins of sea-going¶ vessels come from the same horizon. The marine element and its restful¶ swaying motion became a norm of Anglo-Saxon comfort. The adage¶ of oriental metempsychosis 'every body deserves misericord" is taken up¶ by the gentry before the rest of the West. Moreover, the manufacture¶ of speed technologies contributed to the disqualification of metabolic¶ means of speed: the locomotive body of the privileged man deserves the¶ misericord of assistance, he whose prestige was in the past determined by¶ his animal mount, its musculature, will henceforth be protected from¶ the assault of the velocity of vectors. It will be necessary to make the¶ road smooth and cushion the cabin of the vehicle and the seats. An¶ entire politics of comfort develops in this epoch. With the violent accelaeration [emballenen^ of the motorized machine, it will be necessary¶ to promote the value of the corporeal 'packaging' [I'emballage] of the¶ passenger, of this traveller squeezed into his upholstered mantle, in the¶ arms of his armchair, an image of a body mummified that moves and¶ that the British practice of 'sports' will attempt to revive, yes, to resuscitate¶ once it has arrived safe and sound— Whether it is a question¶ of furniture [meublé] or shelter [immeuble], comfort fools us, it leads¶ us into error in our experience of our own bodies. Comfort is nothing¶ more than a subtle trap into which we fall with all our weight, the¶ addiction to the comfort of artificial assistance is comparable to that of¶ a narcotic, it deprives us of the physical realities of an actual body like¶ those of the places traversed. With the high speeds that are only one¶ of the outcomes of comfort, we are fooled by the duration of the trip.¶ Doped by the cushion, by the depth of the seats, duped by the celerity¶ of the course, the addiction to comfort leads us to lose our sense of¶ touch, the muscular contact with materials and volumes giving way¶ instead to a series of caresses, light strokes, and fleeting slidings.¶ The effect of the surface of things, the touch of surfaces, is definitively¶ evaded by the improvement of 'well being' thanks to the interposition¶ of mediating elements destined to cause us to lose complete contact¶ with primary materials.¶ Enveloped, hidden beneath a cover that conceals solid reality, a bit¶ like the way accelerated automobility veils the image of landscapes¶ traversed, the padding of seats or the lining of clothes destroys all sense¶ of localization, every possibility of getting one's bearings.¶ In sum, comfort is nothing other than a collection of ruses that¶ aim to erase these infinitesimal inconveniences which are, however,¶ themselves the proof of the existence of weight, scale, and a natural¶ motility.¶ Meanwhile in order to outsmart the adversary - but also to¶ circumvent our own fatigue - we have ceaselessly sought to perfect this¶ vehicle that bears us along while we rest our lower limbs. If the seat¶ relieves our legs from bearing our mass, the car or horse does even more¶ to relieve the fatigue of the road, but this economy of exhaustion masks¶ the economy of violence; the subterfuges of assistance cleverly conceal¶ the fact that the comfort of the assisted body is nothing other than a¶ sophisticated domestication, the progressive immobilization of physical¶ framing of their domicile [encadrement de l'immeuble], illustrating the¶ 'democratic' illusion of the social and spatial integration, the illusion¶ of a concentration-camp system that is finally nothing more than the¶ vehicular system of the transhumance of an effectively dromocratic¶ society.

### AT Owen/theory Doesn’t Matter

#### \_\_\_\_ Philosophical perspective is vital to how we orient our politics and engage in International Relations – the rise of post-positivisim proves

Kurki, Aberystwyth University, UK, in ‘11

[Milja, “The Limitations of the Critical Edge: Reflections on Critical and Philosophical IR Scholarship Today”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 40(1) 129–146]

Philosophical reflection is about gaining understanding of how knowledge is generated and structured and what its relationship is to its producer, their social context and society at large. It is about understanding the role and structure of scientific or social knowledge: how it is constructed; what objects exist in its purview; and why and how we do (or do not) come to know our objects in specific ways. This might seem a rather abstract interest; and indeed, for many, ‘meta-theoretical’ or ‘philosophy of science’ research remains a rather abstract theoretical sub-field narrowly engaged in detailed debates on epistemology, causation or prediction. Philosophically informed IR research can, however, be much more than this. Indeed, for many of its promulgators, philosophical research has arguably been a very politically and socially important, as well as potentially influential, field of study. While most philosophically inclined analysts acknowledge that meta-theory is not everything in IR, most argue it is of crucial significance in the discipline.8 This is because it shapes in crucial ways how we come to understand the world, evaluate claims about it and, indeed, interact with it. Depending on whether we are a positivist or a post-structuralist, we seek different kinds of data, ask different kinds of questions and come to engage with actors differently in ‘international politics’ (which is also conceived of in different ways).9 To use Patrick Jackson’s language: philosophical wagers matter.10 Philosophical research is not only of significance in IR scholarship, of course. It is worth remembering that some of the most well-known philosophers of science had at the heart of their inquiries questions of values and politics. Thus, Popper and Kuhn, for example, were socially and politically driven philosophers of science; and sought through their philosophical frameworks to influence the interaction of scientific practice and societal power structures.11 The same stands for logical positivists in the social sciences. Biersteker describes this well: European and American scholars embraced logical positivist, scientific behavioralism in the post-war era in part as a reaction against fascism, militarism, and communism. They were reacting against totalizing ideologies and sought a less overtly politicized philosophical basis for their research. Their liberalism stressed toleration for everything except totalizing ideologies, and their logical positivist scientific approaches provided what they viewed as a less politicized methodology for the conduct of social research.12 Murphy’s detailed study of the rise of behaviouralist peace studies confirms the same; the rise, in a specific context, of a specific type of meta-theoretical argumentation, which is deployed to a social and, in fact, ‘political’ effect in order to criticise recent social dynamics and to change the world in a preferable direction.13 There is, even when it is sidestepped by scientists or philosophers themselves (as in the case of behaviouralists), a ‘politics’ to the philosophy of science, in the sense that meta-theoretical concerns are tied up with concrete social and political debates and struggles and specific normative and political visions of both science and society, even if in indirect ways.14 their concrete research and resultant policy proposals. Indeed, in a famous line, Steve Smith called his epistemological work the most political of his career.16

# Aff Answers

### Don’t Reject Speed

#### \_\_\_\_ Our world is in transition – Speed should not be rejected but be accelerated until we enter a new epoch

Virilio in ‘1 |Paul, Virilio Live pg. 113|

As I see it, we’ve passed from the extended time of centuries and from the chronology of history to a time that will continue to grow ever more intensive: infinitely tiny partitions of time contain the equivalent of what used to be contained in the infinite greatness of historical time. The entirety of our history is now being written at the speed of light, which is to say in nanoseconds, picoseconds and femtoseconds whereas the organization of time was previously based on hours and minutes. We no longer live even in a world of seconds; we live in a world of infinitely tiny units of time. And this passage from an extensive to an intensive time will have considerable impact on all the various aspects of the conditions of our society: it leads to a radical reorganization both of our social mores and of our image of the world. This is the source of the feeling that we’re faced with an epoch in many ways comparable to the Renaissance: it’s an epoch in which the real world and our image of the world no longer coincide. The world has already experienced epochs of transition, and I believe that we’re in the midst of another one.

### Aff – Stopping movement is Toto

#### **\_\_\_\_ Controlling movement is soviet style oppression – the Aff is better than the alt**

Los 2004 (Maria, Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa, “The Technologies of Total Domination,” Surveillance & Society, Vol. 2, No. 1.)

Human sciences were deeply engaged in dehumanization of the population as a whole as they were both applied to this end and stimulated by new needs and new data generated through these practices. From propaganda and brain washing to elaboration of new types of mental disease to reproductive regulation programs, the key role of human sciences in producing totalitarian power is evident. Their individualizing potential is blocked, when they are made subservient to a total “scientific ideology.” As a result, the historical totalitarian states often relied on quite archaic modes of population management, based on spatializing, observing and immobilizing (terms used by Foucault to describe Bentham’s architectural Panopticon, 1980: 160). There is a striking resemblance between the Soviet comprehensive regulation and restriction of population movement (to avoid contamination and spread of dangerous ideas) and Foucault’s description of the plague control regulations at the end of the seventeenth century: [A] strict spatial partitioning: the closing of the town and its outlying districts, a prohibition to leave the town on pain of death, the killing of all stray animals; the division of the town into distinct quarters, each governed by an intendant. Each street is placed under the authority of a syndic, who keeps it under surveillance… If it is absolutely necessary to leave the house, it will be done… avoiding any meeting (1979: 195). Such Soviet policies as prohibition to leave the country, internal passports, restricted residence permits, work permits linked to residence permits, closed cities, the use of penalty of banishment, duty to work and collective housing, exemplify the utilization of this, rather rudimentary Panoptical arrangement. It relies on “discipline as a blockade” and is generally associated with “the enclosed institutions, established at the edges of society, turned inwards towards negative functions: arresting evil, breaking communications, suspending time” (Foucault, 1979a: 209). The emulation of this type of institutional discipline in the general population management subordinates all other forms of bio-politics to the same negative logic. The emergence of the collective and the brigade as key organizing principles of totalitarian, surveillance-oriented bio-politics illustrates this tendency. In his Gulag Archipelago, Solzhenitsyn shows the evolution of the Soviet camps, established in 1918. In the following excerpt, he comments on the early, experimental stage of their development: Not often is it possible to arrange such mass labor projects as in the gravel pit near Yaroslavl; there hundreds of prisoners are clumped together in a small area visible to the naked eyes of the supervisors, and hardly has any one of them stopped moving than he is immediately conspicuous. These are ideal conditions. … How, then, is it to be managed in other cases? Much thought was applied. And the brigade was invented (1976:142). The brigade represents a modified Panopticon principle. The brigadier is a prisoner who takes on the role of a temporary overseer and executioner, while sharing the doomed destiny of his or her fellow prisoners: “Slave driving the prisoners with club and ration, the brigadier has to cope with the brigade in the absence of the higher-ups…” (Solzhenitsyn, 1976: 143). “[I]f the logging brigade failed to fulfil the day’s norm …, the brigadier went into the punishment block too. And if you don’t want to go to the punishment block, then drive your brigade members to their death. Bow down to the stronger!” (145). A survivor of the Auschwitz concentration camp, sociologist Anna Pawelczynska describes a Nazi version of the brigade system: Authority over the work crews as a whole was exercised by a prisoner – the Lagerkapo – and a large staff of subordinate Kapos with their own staffs of underlings responsible for the individual work crews. This group of functionaries was responsible for the organization of work and its results, the dividing up and formation of work crews, escorting the crews to the work site, supervising the performance of work, accompanying back to the camp those who survived the day and seeing that those who did not survive … were also delivered back to the camp. In practice the forming of work crews often meant beating the prisoners and driving them like cattle (1979: 47). According to the official Bolshevik language, the brigade was introduced to provide its members with “psychological enrichment” and “heightened sense of dignity” (Solzhenitsyn, 1976: 143). The same cryptic code applied to the “collective labour” introduced in the society at large, where brigade system became the primary form of organization of labour and enforcement of work discipline. Far from being limited to the economic sphere, the collective became an organizing principle throughout the society. It was a strategy of absorption of the private by the public in order to enable generalized surveillance and disciplinary re-education of the society. Developed by Anton Makarenko and other Soviet specialists in education and psychology, the collective mechanism was based on mutual surveillance, collective correction (admonition) and self revelation (Kharkhordin, 1999). Work, family and neighbourhood collectives discussed everyday problems and personal lives of members, applied to them norms of socialist ideology and enforced current work and family related policies. They were regulated by the state and formed “the substance of official public life in Soviet Russia” (Zdravomyslova and Voronkov, 2002: 66). The collective housing policy initiated in Soviet cities in the early 1920s further reinforced the pervasiveness of social surveillance and atomization through collectivization. It targeted spaces hitherto considered private. Individual families were no longer allowed to be sole occupants of their apartments, but were instead forced to share them with other families. Parental influence was undermined by child rearing policies that taught young children to become “dependent on the collective for guidance and direction, … learn from it to exercise self discipline, and … subordinate [their] interests to those of the collective” (Finckenauer, 1995: 4). While Nazi policies did not have the methodical collectivist orientation of the Stalin’s policies, they too aimed to weaken parents’ role in upbringing of children, despite the official pro-family rhetoric. To achieve this, they relied on the Hitler Youth organization, a network of boarding schools for racially pure children (“with a strong flavor of army cadet college”) and the Adolf Hitler school for the future elite, where “[s]tep by step, mothers and fathers were banished from the lives of their children and familial loyalty was transferred to the teacher, to the school and to the Fürer” (LeBor and Boyes, 2001: 53). To provide a new framework to people’s lives and eradicate religious influence, both the Nazis and the Soviets introduced “a new calendar, new occasions of tribal celebration and new cults” (117). There were new holidays, anniversaries related to the new regime or its Leader, new marriage and funeral ceremonies as well as elaborate initiation ceremonies for the young. (“Ten-year-olds were formally induced into Nazi youth organizations, fourteen-year-olds publicly ‘confirmed’ their commitment to the Hitler Youth,” 118). The collectivist management of life is consistent with the overall political technology of totalitarianism, which is predicated on the dissolution of the self and civil society. It aims at abolishing both continuity and choice in social relations, replacing them with artificial, non-optional social environment for atomized, mutually controlling individuals.

### Virilio – Right Reappropriation

#### And, the right will re-appropriate the K

#### First, Virilio’s emphasis on speed ignores the brutal reality of the war itself – this allows the pentagon to sell the new “clean” wars to the public unwittingly reinforcing American militarism

Krishna, Dept. Poli Sci @ Hawaii, in ’93 [Snakaran, Alternatives 18, 399]

By emphasizing the technology and speed in the Gulf War, endlessly analyzing the representation of the war itself, without a simultaneous exposition of the “ground realities,” postmodernist analyses wind up, unwittingly, echoing the Pentagon and the White House in their claims that this was a “clean” war with smart bombs that take out only defense installations with minimal collateral damage.” One needs to reflesh the Gulf War dead through our postmortems instead of merely echoing, with virilio and others, the “disappearance” of territory or the modern warrior with the new technologies; or the intertext connecting the war and television; or the displacement of the spectacle. Second, the emphasis on speed with which the annihilation proceeded once the war began tends to obfuscate the long build-up to the conflict and US complicity in Iraqi foreign and defense policy in prior times. Third, as the details provided above show, if there was anything to highlight about the war, it was not so much its manner of representation as the incredible levels of annihilation that have been perfected. To summarize: I am not suggesting that postmodern analysts of the war are in agreement with the Pentagon’s claims regarding a “clean” war; I am suggesting that their preoccupation with representation, sign systems, and with the signifier over the signified, leaves one with little sense of the annihilation visited upon the people and land of Iraq. And, as the Vietnam War proved and Schwartzkopf well realized, without that physicalist sense of violence war can be more effectively sold to a jingoistic public.

#### And, slowing things down plays into the hands of fundamentalisms of all stripes. The K would make the tea party’s nostalgic politics more effective.\*\*

Connolly, Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, in ‘2

[William, Neuropolitics, pg. 180]

Today, ironically, the most virulent attempts to slow things down now take the form of national and religious fundamentalisms that deploy media sound bites and military campaigns of ethnic cleansing to return to a slow, centered world. Indeed, the ambiguity of speed finds its most salient manifestation in the paradoxical contest taking place in our souls, our states, and our interstate actions between the pluralization of public cultures and their fundamentalization. Fundamentalism is the shape the desire for a slow, centered world takes when its temporal conditions of possibility are absent. The drives to pluralize and to fundamentalize culture form, therefore, two contending responses to late-modern acceleration. Each propensity intensifies under the same temporal conditions. And that struggle goes on within us as well as between us. As that contest proceeds it also becomes clear why democratic pluralists must embrace the positive potentialities of speed while working to attenuate its most dangerous effects. We explored these issues in chapter 6 primarily within the compass of the territorial state. We turn now to that dimension of citizen politics that reaches across states.

#### And, we can’t go back to an age before technology—pursuing high-speed rail as a shared resource through an embrace of pluralism harnesses the revolutionary power of speed to democratic ends. Opening ourselves up to the dynamism of speed is crucial to overcome virulent nationalism, social violence, and the drumbeat of war. ¶

Connolly 2 (William E. Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, “Neuropolitics Thinking, Culture, Speed” Theory Out of Bounds, Volume 23, University of Minnesota Press, P140-2)

Arendt fears that the late-modern acceleration of pace accentuates a dangerous nostalgia to return to the “quiet of the past,” a quiet placed in quotes because our contemporary memory of it is unavoidably inflected differently than it would have been experienced during the fugitive present when the horizon of the future was open. For the future is never what it used to be, and neither is the past. This nostalgia for a comforting image of the past expresses anxiety about the security of immortality, existential meaning, moral boundaries, explanatory confidence, and narrative closure. All these are called into question by the acceleration of pace. Arendt herself is deeply ambivalent about the condition she diagnoses. I concur in that ambivalence enough to say that without the pull of the past the horizon of the future would explode into an abyss. With it, the fundamental issues are, first, how to engage the rift and, second, how to respond thoughtfully to the acceleration of pace without falling into either a dangerous insistence upon slowing the world down to a snail’s pace or a crude celebration of high velocity per se. The challenge for those who embrace the rift is how to reconfigure the balance between past and future in a world whirling faster than heretofore. And how to respond with agonistic respect to those who do not embrace the idea of a rift in a context where neither this cosmology nor those ranged against it is soon likely to receive a definitive demonstration. The intellectual challenge is how to come to terms productively with the ambiguous relations among time, pace, freedom, plurality, and democracy. None of us may really be prepared to meet this challenge. But time is short. You might say that as the asymmetries between different zones of time widen it becomes easier to discern the rift, which, as Nietzsche, Deleuze, Prigogine, Arendt, and I contend, is constitutive of time itself. But, again, that very suspicion may tempt many into a dangerous, reactive response: into a series of familiar political movements to slow time down to conceal the rift. Such reactive drives are not too likely to grab hold effectively of the processes of capitalist invention, finance, investment, labor migration, geographic expansion, and intraterritorial colonization, even though these are preeminent forces propelling the acceleration of pace. For these processes flow through and across states in ways that make it difficult for any territorially organized entity to govern them effectively. The collapse of the Soviet Union is probably bound up in part with that state’s inability either to avoid these processes or to absorb them into its political economy without transforming it. So now resentment against the acceleration of pace becomes projected upon religious and nationalist drives to identify a series of vulnerable constituencies as paradigmatic enemies of territorial culture, traditional morality, unified politics, and Christian civilization. The atheist, the postmodernist, the gay, the prostitute, the Democracy and Time 146,7 Jew, the media, the nomadic Indian, and the Gypsy have all been defined as paradigmatic agents of restlessness, nomadism, superficial fashion, immorality, and danger by defenders of close integration among political territory, religious unity, and moral monism. Such definitions displace upon vulnerable constituencies anxiety about the pace of life and the rift in time. The underlying enemy is speed and uncertainty, but it is difficult to grab hold of the capitalist systems in which these processes are set. The hopeful thing is how many contemporary Christians, in the name of Christian love, join others in resisting and transcending these ugly equations. When Wolin’s presentation of the acceleration of pace in several zones of life is juxtaposed to my portrayal of the rift in time, a different picture of the contemporary condition emerges. Uneven pace across zones helps to reveal more poignantly what has always been in operation, a rift between past and future that helps to constitute the essence of time and to enter into the constitution of politics itself. It now becomes possible to come to terms with this condition in a more affirmative way. I do not think, again, that the reading of time I endorse has been proved defin- itively, nor is either it or the interpretations it contends against apt to be. But this interpretation does pose powerful challenges to those who implicitly treat one of the alternative conceptions of time as if it were undeniable. To embrace the rift is to challenge demands in contemporary social science for consummate explanation, cul- tural theory for smooth narrative, moral philosophy for thick, stable universals, and popular culture for the sufficiency of common sense. Even as efforts to slow the world down fail, they do untold harm to many constituencies striving to respond in new ways to injuries imposed upon them and new possibilities opened up before them. Perhaps the best way to proceed is to strive to modulate the fastest and most dangerous military and corporate processes while intervening politically within accelerated processes of communication, travel, population flows, and cultural intersection to support a more generous ethos of pluralism. Such a double orientation does not scrap the advantages of territorial democracy, but it does support democratic movements that extend beyond the parameters of the territorial state as well as operate within it. The challenge is how to support the positive connections among democracy, uneven zones of tempo, and the rift in time without legitimating a pace of life so fast that the promise of democracy becomes translated into fascist becoming machines.

And,

Connolly 2 (William E. Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, “Neuropolitics Thinking, Culture, Speed” Theory Out of Bounds, Volume 23, University of Minnesota Press, P178-9)

Sheldon wolin seeks to save local democracy by slowing down time. Paul Virilio lifts the issue of speed into the ether of global politics itself. It would be difficult to overstate the importance of Virilio to exploration of the effects of speed upon the late-modern condition. Everybody who engages the issue is indebted to him, even when they disagree with him profoundly. When speed accelerates, Virilio says, space is compressed. And everything else changes too: the ability to deliberate before going to war; the priority of civilian control over the military; the integrity of the territorial politics of place; the capacity to think with concepts in relation to images; the ability to escape the eye of surveillance; and so on and on. Not only does Virilio chart the multiple effects of speed, he develops an arresting vocabulary to fix these effects in our minds: the war machine, the unspecified enemy, the nonplace of speed, the negation of space, the perpetual state of emergency, the miniaturization of action, the disappearance of the present, and the integral accident. These pithy formulations encapsulate in their brevity the compression of time they represent, giving us a double dose of the phenomenon Virilio warns against. And the danger is great. Little doubt about that. If you treat the war machine as the paradigm of speed, as Virilio does, it seems that sometime during the 1960s the ability to deliberate democratically about military action was jeopardized by the imperative to automatize split-second responses to preemptive strikes a minute or less away from their targets. My concern, nonetheless, is that Virilio allows the military paradigm to overwhelm all other modalities and experiences of speed. *Virilio remains transfixed by a model of politics insufficiently attuned to the positive role of speed in intrastate democracy and cross-state cosmopolitanism*. He underplays the positive role speed can play in ventilating dogmatic identities in the domains of religion, sensuality, ethnicity, gender, and nationality. And he remains so sunk in the memory of the territorial nation as the place of democratic deliberation that he too quickly dismisses the productive possibilities (I do not say probabilities) of cosmopolitanism in the late-modern time. Let’s listen to some moves in Virilio’s presentation of the correspondences between speed, temporality, territory, democratic deliberation, nation- hood, and belonging. The speed of the political decision depends on the sophistication of the vectors: how to transport the bomb? how fast? The bomb is political . . . not because of an explosion that should never happen, but because it is the ultimate form of political surveillance. Social conflicts arise from rivalries between those who occupy and preserve an eco-system as the place that specifies them as a family or group, and that therefore deserves every sacrifice, including sudden death. For “if to be is to inhabit,’ not to inhabit is no longer to exist. Sudden death is preferable to the slow death . . . of the man deprived of a specific place and thus of his identity. Contraction in time, the disappearance of the territorial space, after that of the fortified city and armor, leads to a situation in which the notions of “before” and “after” designate only the future and the past in a form of war that causes the “present” to disappear in the instantaneousness of decision. “Unlike cinema,” Hitchcock said, “with television there is no time for suspense, you can only have surprise.” This is . . . the paradoxical logic of the videoframe which privileges the accident, the surprise, over the durable substance of the message. In the first instance, it [war] involves the elimination of the appearance of the facts, the continuation of what Kipling meant when he said: “Truth is the first casualty of war.” Here again it is less a matter of introducing some maneuver . . . than with the obliteration of the very principle of truth. Moral relativism has always been offensive, from time immemorial. The more speed increases the faster freedom decreases.1 But what if, as I began to argue in the last chapter, the compression of distance through speed has some of the effects Virilio records while it also supports the possibility of democratic pluralization within states and the periodic emergence of citizen cosmopolitanism across states speaking affirmatively to issues of ecology, peace, indigenous minorities, the legitimation of new identities and rights, and the better protection of old rights? Then acceleration would carry positive possibilities as well as dangers. And a single-minded attack on its dangers would forfeit access to its positive possibilities. Let me, then, summarize my contentions: • The contemporary accentuation of tempo in interterritorial communications, entertainment, tourism, trade, and population migration exposes more constituencies more actively to the comparative particularity and contestability of faiths and identities they may heretofore have taken to be universal or incontestable. • The accentuated pace in the experiences of accident, innovation, and surprise, listed by Virilio only as a destructive effect of speed, can also function over time to disrupt closed models of nature, truth, and morality into which people so readily become encapsulated, doing so in ways that support revisions in the classical paradigms of science and more active appreciation of positive possibilities in the politics of becoming by which new identities and rights are engendered. • Virilio’s identification of the territorial nation as repository of democratic unity and of slow pace as the temporal condition of national deliberation deprecates pursuit of a more expansive ethos of multidimensional pluralism that speaks to diversities, both submerged and visible, already extant on most politically organized territories. Speed is dangerous. A military culture organized around missiles accentuates danger and compresses the time in which to respond to it. At a certain point of acceleration speed in other domains also jeopardizes freedom and shortens the time in which to engage ecological issues. But, as already suggested in the last chapter, the crawl of slow time contains significant injuries, dangers, and repressive tendencies too. Speed is therefore profoundly ambiguous. *The positive possibilities* in this ambiguity *are lost to those who experience its effects* only *through nostalgia for a fictive time when a slow pace*, the centered nation, the security of eternal truth, the experience of nature as purposive organism or set of timeless laws, and the solidity of thick moral universals governed experience of the world and *enabled democratic deliberation.* Today, ironically, the most virulent attempts to slow things down now take the form of national and religious fundamentalisms that deploy media sound bites and military campaigns of ethnic cleansing to return to a slow, centered world. Indeed, the ambiguity of speed finds its most salient manifestation in the paradoxical contest taking place in our souls, our states, and our interstate actions between the pluralization of public cultures and their fundamentalization. Fundamentalism is the shape the desire for a slow, centered world takes when its temporal conditions of possibility are absent. The drives to pluralize and to fundamentalize culture form, therefore, two contending responses to late-modern acceleration. Each propensity intensifies under the same temporal conditions. And that struggle goes on within us as well as between us. As that contest proceeds it also becomes clear why democratic pluralists must embrace the positive potentialities of speed while working to attenuate its most dangerous effects. We explored these issues in chapter 6 primarily within the compass of the territorial state. We turn now to that dimension of citizen politics that reaches across states.

### Modernity Good – Violence Decreasing

#### \_\_\_\_ The kritik is revisionist history. Modernity has universally decreased violence by 90%.

Pinker, Psychology Prof. at Harvard, in ‘7 [Steven, “A History of Violence,” http://www.edge.org/3rd\_culture/pinker07/pinker07\_index.html]

At one time, these facts were widely appreciated. They were the source of notions like progress, civilization, and man's rise from savagery and barbarism. Recently, however, those ideas have come to sound corny, even dangerous. They seem to demonize people in other times and places, license colonial conquest and other foreign adventures, and conceal the crimes of our own societies. The doctrine of the noble savage—the idea that humans are peaceable by nature and corrupted by modern institutions—pops up frequently in the writing of public intellectuals like José Ortega y Gasset ("War is not an instinct but an invention"), Stephen Jay Gould ("Homo sapiens is not an evil or destructive species"), and Ashley Montagu ("Biological studies lend support to the ethic of universal brotherhood"). But, now that social scientists have started to count bodies in different historical periods, they have discovered that the romantic theory gets it backward: Far from causing us to become more violent, something in modernity and its cultural institutions has made us nobler. To be sure, any attempt to document changes in violence must be soaked in uncertainty. In much of the world, the distant past was a tree falling in the forest with no one to hear it, and, even for events in the historical record, statistics are spotty until recent periods. Long-term trends can be discerned only by smoothing out zigzags and spikes of horrific bloodletting. And the choice to focus on relative rather than absolute numbers brings up the moral imponderable of whether it is worse for 50 percent of a population of 100 to be killed or 1 percent in a population of one billion. Yet, despite these caveats, a picture is taking shape. The decline of violence is a fractal phenomenon, visible at the scale of millennia, centuries, decades, and years. It applies over several orders of magnitude of violence, from genocide to war to rioting to homicide to the treatment of children and animals. And it appears to be a worldwide trend, though not a homogeneous one. The leading edge has been in Western societies, especially England and Holland, and there seems to have been a tipping point at the onset of the Age of Reason in the early seventeenth century. At the widest-angle view, one can see a whopping difference across the millennia that separate us from our pre-state ancestors. Contra leftist anthropologists who celebrate the noble savage, quantitative body-counts—such as the proportion of prehistoric skeletons with axemarks and embedded arrowheads or the proportion of men in a contemporary foraging tribe who die at the hands of other men—suggest that pre-state societies were far more violent than our own. It is true that raids and battles killed a tiny percentage of the numbers that die in modern warfare. But, in tribal violence, the clashes are more frequent, the percentage of men in the population who fight is greater, and the rates of death per battle are higher. According to anthropologists like Lawrence Keeley, Stephen LeBlanc, Phillip Walker, and Bruce Knauft, these factors combine to yield population-wide rates of death in tribal warfare that dwarf those of modern times. If the wars of the twentieth century had killed the same proportion of the population that die in the wars of a typical tribal society, there would have been two billion deaths, not 100 million. Political correctness from the other end of the ideological spectrum has also distorted many people's conception of violence in early civilizations—namely, those featured in the Bible. This supposed source of moral values contains many celebrations of genocide, in which the Hebrews, egged on by God, slaughter every last resident of an invaded city. The Bible also prescribes death by stoning as the penalty for a long list of nonviolent infractions, including idolatry, blasphemy, homosexuality, adultery, disrespecting one's parents, and picking up sticks on the Sabbath. The Hebrews, of course, were no more murderous than other tribes; one also finds frequent boasts of torture and genocide in the early histories of the Hindus, Christians, Muslims, and Chinese. At the century scale, it is hard to find quantitative studies of deaths in warfare spanning medieval and modern times. Several historians have suggested that there has been an increase in the number of recorded wars across the centuries to the present, but, as political scientist James Payne has noted, this may show only that "the Associated Press is a more comprehensive source of information about battles around the world than were sixteenth-century monks." Social histories of the West provide evidence of numerous barbaric practices that became obsolete in the last five centuries, such as slavery, amputation, blinding, branding, flaying, disembowelment, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, and so on. Meanwhile, for another kind of violence—homicide—the data are abundant and striking. The criminologist Manuel Eisner has assembled hundreds of homicide estimates from Western European localities that kept records at some point between 1200 and the mid-1990s. In every country he analyzed, murder rates declined steeply—for example, from 24 homicides per 100,000 Englishmen in the fourteenth century to 0.6 per 100,000 by the early 1960s. On the scale of decades, comprehensive data again paint a shockingly happy picture: Global violence has fallen steadily since the middle of the twentieth century. According to the Human Security Brief 2006, the number of battle deaths in interstate wars has declined from more than 65,000 per year in the 1950s to less than 2,000 per year in this decade. In Western Europe and the Americas, the second half of the century saw a steep decline in the number of wars, military coups, and deadly ethnic riots. Zooming in by a further power of ten exposes yet another reduction. After the cold war, every part of the world saw a steep drop-off in state-based conflicts, and those that do occur are more likely to end in negotiated settlements rather than being fought to the bitter end. Meanwhile, according to political scientist Barbara Harff, between 1989 and 2005 the number of campaigns of mass killing of civilians decreased by 90 percent.

### Biopolitics Good – Dickinson

#### \_\_\_\_ Biopolitics good—It leads to freedom and resistance to the most oppresive parts of the system through resistance from below

Dickinson, University of Cincinnati, March 2004 [Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, p.41-44]

In any case, the focus on the activities and ambitions of the social engineers in the literature on biopolitical modernity has begun to reach the point of diminishing returns. In the current literature, it seems that biopolitics is almost always acting on (or attempting to act on) people; it is almost never something they do. This kind of model is not very realistic. This is not how societies work. The example of the attempt to create a eugenic counseling system in Prussia should be instructive in this respect. Here public health and eugenics experts— technocrats— tried to impart their sense of eugenic crisis and their optimism about the possibility of creating a better “race” to the public; and they successfully mobilized the resources of the state in support of their vision. And yet, what emerged quite quickly from this effort was in fact a system of public contraceptive advice — or family planning. It is not so easy to impose technocratic ambitions on the public, particularly in a democratic state; and “on the ground,” at the level of interactions with actual persons and social groups, public policy often takes on a life of its own, at least partially independent of the fantasies of technocrats.¶ This is of course a point that Foucault makes with particular clarity. The power of discourse is not the power of manipulative elites, which control it and impose it from above. Manipulative elites always face resistance, often effective, resistance. More important, the power of discourse lies precisely in its ability to set the terms for such struggles, to define what they are about, as much as what their outcomes are. As Foucault put it, power— including the power to manage life —“comes from everywhere.”105 Biomedical knowledge was not the property only of technocrats, and it could be used to achieve ends that had little to do with their social-engineering schemes.106 Modern biopolitics is a multifaceted world of discourse and practice elaborated and put into practice at multiple levels throughout modern societies. And of course it is often no less economistic—no less based on calculations of cost and benefit —at the level of the individual or family than it is in the technocrats’ visions of national efficiency.¶ In fact, the literature of the past twenty years has made it abundantly clear that a great deal of “official” biopolitical discourse generated by academics and civil servants was essentially reactive. A vast amount of discussion among eugenics, population policy, and welfare experts focused on the concrete “problem” of the demographic transition of the early twentieth century. It was the use of reproductive knowledge and reproductive technology by millions of Europeans to limit their fertility — the Geburtenrückgang or decline of births, in German parlance — that was the center of concern. While much of the historical literature stresses the role of science in shaping technocratic ambition, of course actually a large proportion of the technocrats’ discourse was concerned with orchestrating a return to more “natural” and less technologically-enabled reproductive patterns. The problem, particularly for the more influential moderate and pronatalist branch of eugenics, was not only how to apply modern science to humanity, but more importantly how to get humanity to stop applying modern science to itself.¶ Atina Grossmann, in her history of the organized mass popular movement for fertility control in Germany in the 1920s, has given us a good example of what this shift in perspective can reveal. Grossmann stresses the technocratic ambition and relatively conservative intent of many medical sex reformers, the power of the “motherhood-eugenics consensus” to shape and limit acceptable definitions of women’s social and sexual roles and aspirations in this period, and the prevalence of the rhetoric of “social health, medicalization, cost effectiveness, and national welfare.” And yet, in the final analysis she describes a powerful reform movement that helped to spread contraceptives and contraceptive knowledge widely among the German population. Popular groups were “increasingly insistent that the working class also had a right to the benefits of scientific progress” (in the form of contraceptive technologies); and while most of the medical establishment opposed the widespread use of contraceptives, the popular movement garnered critical support from radical socialists within the med-ical profession. As Grossmann remarks, “the German case is instructive precisely because it illustrates the fallacies of setting up rigid categories of ‘popular’ and ‘professional.’”107¶ In short: is the microphysics of modern power/knowledge always the microphysics of oppression, exploitation, and manipulation? Are technocratic elites always in charge of the imperatives of discourse — or do discourses have their own logic, which ¶ technocrats can define, escape or direct no more (or less) than can anyone else? Discourse may or may not be a locomotive, driving down a pre-determined track and dictating individual decisions and fates by its own internal logic; but even if it is, the technocrats aren’t driving it, and in fact their schemes may get field of state activity was often the product of technocratic “readings” of biopolitical discourse. But it was only one small part of a much broader process by which a large proportion of the German population came to define their needs and aspirations in new ways. We need not exaggerate the degrees of freedom that process generated to be able to appreciate that in some cases, to some extent, and sometimes willy-nilly, discourse and policy were actually a response to that broader process of redefinition — in short, to “demand-side” pressures.¶ Uncoupling “technocracy” from “discourse” is not yet enough, however. We should also be alive to the ways in which new social practices, institutions, and knowledge generated new choices — a limited range of them, constrained by all kinds of discursive and social frameworks, but nonetheless historically new and significant. Modern biopolitics did create, in a real sense, not only new constraints but also new degrees of freedom— new levers that increased people’s power to move their own worlds, to shape their own lives. Our understanding of modern biopolitics will be more realistic and more fruitful if we reconceptualize its development as a complex process in which the implications of those new choices were negotiated out in the social and discursive context. Again, in the early twentieth century many more conservative biopolitical “experts” devoted much of their energy precisely to trying— without any discernable success— to control those new degrees of freedom. For most social liberals and Social Democrats, however, those new choices were a potential source of greater social efficiency and social dynamism. State policy reflected the constant negotiation and tension between these perspectives.¶ Nor should we stop at a reexamination of knowledge and technology. It might make sense, too, to reexamine the process of institution-building, the elaboration of the practices and institutions of biopolitics. No doubt the creation of public and private social welfare institutions created instruments for the study, manipulation, or control of individuals and groups. But it also generated opportunities for self-organization and participation by social groups of all kinds. Grossmann’s birth control movement was but one instance of the explosive growth of the universe of associational life in the field of biopolitics, which itself was only one small part of a much broader development: the self-creation of a new, urban industrial social order, the creation of a self-government of society through myriad nongovernmental organizations. In these organizations, citizens were acting to shape their own lives in ways that were often fundamentally important as part of lived experience — of the “life world.” Of course there was nothing inherently democratic about these organizations or their social functions — many were authoritarian in structure, many cultivated a tendentially elitist culture of expertise, and some pursued exclusionary and discriminatory agendas. Nevertheless, they institutionalized pluralism, solicited participation, enforced public debate, and effectively sabotaged simple authoritarian government. Again, National Socialist totalitarianism was in part a response precisely to the failure of political, social, and cultural elites to contain and control this proliferation of voices, interests, and influence groups.108

#### \_\_\_\_ Biopolitics is good—only seeing it as bad A) ignores the massive decrease in structural violence it has caused and B) views power unidirectionally in contradiction with their own critique

Dickinson, University of Cincinnati, March 2004 [Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, p. 36-39

This understanding of the democratic and totalitarian potentials of biopolitics at the level of the state needs to be underpinned by a reassessment of how biopolitical discourse operates in society at large, at the “prepolitical” level. I would like to try to offer here the beginnings of a reconceptualization of biopolitical modernity, one that focuses less on the machinations of technocrats and experts, and more on the different ways that biopolitical thinking circulated within German society more broadly.¶ It is striking, then, that the new model of German modernity is even more relentlessly negative than the old Sonderweg model. In that older model, premodern elites were constantly triumphing over the democratic opposition. But at least there was an opposition; and in the long run, time was on the side of that opposition, which in fact embodied the historical movement of modern- ization. In the new model, there is virtually a biopolitical consensus.92 And that consensus is almost always fundamentally a nasty, oppressive thing, one that partakes in crucial ways of the essential quality of National Socialism. Everywhere biopolitics is intrusive, technocratic, top-down, constraining, limiting. Biopolitics is almost never conceived of— or at least discussed in any detail— as creating possibilities for people, as expanding the range of their choices, as empowering them, or indeed as doing anything positive for them at all.¶ Of course, at the most simple-minded level, it seems to me that an assessment of the potentials of modernity that ignores the ways in which biopolitics has made life tangibly better is somehow deeply flawed. To give just one example, infant mortality in Germany in 1900 was just over 20 percent; or, in other words, one in five children died before reaching the age of one year. By 1913, it was 15 percent; and by 1929 (when average real purchasing power was not significantly higher than in 1913) it was only 9.7 percent.93 The expansion of infant health programs— an enormously ambitious, bureaucratic, medicalizing, and sometimes intrusive, social engineering project— had a great deal to do with that change. It would be bizarre to write a history of biopolitical modernity that ruled out an appreciation for how absolutely wonderful and astonishing this achievement— and any number of others like it — really was. There was a reason for the “Machbarkeitswahn” of the early twentieth century: many marvelous things were in fact becoming machbar. In that sense, it is not really accurate to call it a “Wahn” (delusion, craziness) at all; nor is it accurate to focus only on the “inevitable” frustration of “delusions” of power. Even in the late 1920s, many social engineers could and did look with great satisfaction on the changes they genuinely had the power to accomplish.¶ Concretely, moreover, I am not convinced that power operated in only one direction — from the top down— in social work. Might we not ask whether people actually demanded welfare services, and whether and how social workers and the state struggled to respond to those demands? David Crew and Greg Eghigian, for example, have given us detailed studies of the micropolitics of welfare in the Weimar period in which it becomes clear that conflicts between welfare administrators and their “clients” were sparked not only by heavyhanded intervention, but also by refusal to help.94 What is more, the specific nature of social programs matters a great deal, and we must distinguish between the different dynamics (and histories) of different programs. The removal of children from their families for placement in foster families or reformatories was bitterly hated and stubbornly resisted by working-class families; but mothers brought their children to infant health clinics voluntarily and in numbers, and after 1945 they brought their older children to counseling clinics, as well. In this instance, historians of the German welfare state might profit from the “demand side” models of welfare development that are sometimes more explicitly explored in some of the international literature.95¶ In fact, even where social workers really were attempting to limit or subvert the autonomy and power of parents, I ¶am not sure that their actions can be characterized only and exclusively as part of a microphysics of oppression. Progressive child welfare advocates in Germany, particularly in the National Center for Child Welfare, waged a campaign in the 1920s to persuade German parents and educators to stop beating children with such ferocity, regularity, and nonchalance. They did so because they feared the unintended physical and psychological effects of beatings, and implicitly because they believed physical violence could compromise the development of the kind of autonomous, selfreliant subjectivity on which a modern state had to rely in its citizenry.96 Or, to give another common example from the period, children removed from their families after being subjected by parents or other relatives to repeated episodes of violence or rape were being manipulated by biopolitical technocrats, and were often abused in new ways in institutions or foster families; but they were also being liberated. Sometimes some forms of the exercise of power in society are in some ways emancipatory; and that is historically significant.¶ Further, of course we must ask whether it is really true that social workers’ and social agencies’ attempts to manipulate people worked. My own impression is that social policy makers grew increasingly aware, between the 1870s and the 1960s, that their own ends could not be achieved unless they won the cooperation of the targets of policy. And to do that, they had to offer people things that they wanted and needed. Policies that incited resistance were — sometimes with glacial slowness, after stubborn and embittered struggles—de-emphasized or even abandoned. Should we really see the history of social welfare policy as a more or less static (because the same thing is always happening) history of the imposition of manipulative policies on populations? I believe a more complex model of the evolution of social policy as a system of social interaction, involving conflicting and converging demands, constant negotiation, struggle, and— above all— mutual learning would be more appropriate. This is a point Abram de Swaan and others have made at some length; but it does not appear to have been built into our theory of modernity very systematically, least of all in German history.97

#### \_\_\_\_ Biopolitics is not the problem in and of itself, it’s biopolitics deployed in totalitariains socities which is bad—Our strengthening of democratic structures prevents, not causes, their impact

Dickinson, University of Cincinnati, March 2004 [Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, p. 18-19]

In an important programmatic statement of 1996 Geoff Eley celebrated the fact that Foucault’s ideas have “fundamentally directed attention away from institutionally centered conceptions of government and the state . . . and toward a dispersed and decentered notion of power and its ‘microphysics.’”48 The “broader, deeper, and less visible ideological consensus” on “technocratic reason and the ethical unboundedness of science” was the focus of his interest.49 But the “power-producing effects in Foucault’s ‘microphysical’ sense” (Eley) of the construction of social bureaucracies and social knowledge, of “an entire institutional apparatus and system of practice” ( Jean Quataert), simply do not explain Nazi policy.50 The destructive dynamic of Nazism was a product not so much of a particular modern set of ideas as of a particular modern political structure, one that could realize the disastrous potential of those ideas. What was critical was not the expansion of the instruments and disciplines of biopolitics, which occurred everywhere in Europe. Instead, it was the principles that guided how those instruments and disciplines were organized and used, and the external constraints on them. In National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of the völkisch state. In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been constrained by a rights-based strategy of social management. This is a point to which I will return shortly. For now, the point is that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state.

A comparative framework can help us to clarify this point. Other states passed compulsory sterilization laws in the 1930s — indeed, individual states in the United States had already begun doing so in 1907. Yet they did not proceed to the next steps adopted by National Socialism — mass sterilization, mass “eugenic” abortion and murder of the “defective.” Individual figures in, for example, the U.S. did make such suggestions. But neither the political structures of democratic states nor their legal and political principles permitted such policies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not horrible; but in a democratic political context they did not develop the dynamic of constant radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies.

#### \_\_\_\_ Their critique of biopolitics has a pessimistic view of modernity, totalizing a diverse historical epoch and ignoring the good manifestations of biopolitical governance—Nazism is the exception, not the rule

Dickinson, University of Cincinnati, March 2004 [Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, p.21-23]

This issue is important, I believe, in part because the project of ferreting out the contribution of biopolitical discourses to the construction of National Socialism so dominates the literature, creating a sense of impending disaster that I believe has all too strongly shaped the questions we, as historians, are asking about the history of modern biopolitics. I want to give two examples that I believe reveal the way this focus constrains our collective historical imagination. I do so not in order to point out that my colleagues are “wrong,” but to suggest how powerfully our imaginations and our questions are shaped by the specter and spectacle of National Socialism. In a brilliant review article published in 1996, Peter Fritzsche posed the question “Did Weimar Fail?” Fritzsche gave voice to a healthy skepticism regarding the tendency in the literature to imply that the history of social welfare programs is only part of the prehistory of National Socialism. The “darker vision of modernism” presented by Detlev Peukert, he suggested, “is compelling but not wholly persuasive.” The “spirit of science” itself, he argued, does not introduce “quite so automatically a ‘discourse of segregation’ without the application of racist politics”; and he asked “to what extent are reformist practices invariably collusions in disciplinary regimes?” And yet, Fritzsche’s reflections are haunted by almost unrelieved foreboding, which merely accurately reflects the tone of the literature he was reviewing. He suggested that “the central theme of this scholarship . . . is the regimentation and discipline of citizens in often dangerously imaginative ways”; it “establishes significant continuities between the Weimar era and the Third Reich”; the history of the republic reveals the “dark shadows of modernity.”58 Indeed, the conceptual framework Fritzsche set up seems to take totalitarianism, war, and mass murder as the end-point of “continuity.” Taking up a question asked by Gerald Feldman, Fritzsche suggested that the Weimar Republic was neither a gamble nor an experiment, but rather a laboratory of modernity. From this perspective, Fritzsche asserts, perhaps Weimar should be regarded as “less a failure than a series of bold experiments that do not come to an end with the year 1933.” The failure of political democracy “is not the same as the destruction of the laboratory.” Thus, the “coming of the Third Reich was not so much a verification of Weimar’s singular failure as the validation of its dangerous potential.”59 Fritzsche’s was a wonderful metaphor for Weimar Germany, a period of enormous creativity and experimentation in any number of fields; and it is surely also a fruitful way to conceive of the relationship between Weimar and Nazi Germany. And yet— again, as Fritzsche’s more skeptical comments pointed out — the laboratory didn’t simply stay open; the experimenters didn’t simply keep experimenting; not all the experiments simply kept running under new management.60 Particular kinds of experiments were not permitted in the Third Reich: those founded on the idea of the toleration of difference; those that defined difference as a psychological, political, or cultural fact to be understood and managed, rather than as a form of deviance or subversion to be repressed or eliminated; those founded on the idea of integration through selfdirected participation (as opposed to integration through orchestrated and obedient participation); and those that aimed at achieving a stable pluralism. There were many such experiments under way in the Weimar period; given the extent to which the political fabric of the Weimar Republic was rent by ideological differences, they were often of particular importance and urgency. Many of those experiments appeared to be failing by the end of the 1920s; and that in itself was a critically important reason for the appeal of the ideas championed by the Nazis. The totalitarian and biological conception of national unity was in part a response to the apparent failure of a democratic and pluralist model of social and political integration. And yet, many of those very same experiments were revived, with enormous success, after 1949. Examples from my own field of research might include the development of a profession of social work that claimed to be a value-neutral foundation for cooperation between social workers of radically differing ideological orientation; the development of a psychoanalytic, rather than psychiatric, interpretation of “deviance” (neurosis replaces inherited brain defects); and the use of corporatist structures of governance within the welfare bureaucracy. These mechanisms did not work perfectly. But they were a continuation of “experiments” undertaken in the Weimar period and shut down in 1933; and they did contribute to the stabilization of a pluralist democracy. That was not a historically trivial or selfevident achievement, either in Germany or elsewhere. It required time, ingenuity, and a large-scale convergence of long-term historical forces. We should be alive to its importance as a feature of modernity. As Fritzsche’s review makes clear, then, much of the recent literature seems to imply that National Socialism was a product of the “success” of a modernity that ends in 1945; but it could just as easily be seen as a temporary “failure” of modernity, the “success” of which would only come in the 1950s and 1960s. As Paul Betts recently remarked, we should not present the postwar period as a “redemptive tale of modernism triumphant” and cast Nazism as merely a “regressive interlude.” But neither should we dismiss the fact that such a narrative would be, so to speak, half true— that the democratic welfare state is no less a product of modernity than is totalitarianism.

#### \_\_\_\_ Their critique of biopolitics only focuses on the dark side of modernity. This one sided picture masks the achievements of biopolitical modernity, which is the large scale absence of mass murder not its cause

Dickinson, University of Cincinnati, March 2004 [Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, p. 23-25]

A second example is Geoff Eley’s masterful synthetic introduction to a collection of essays published in 1996 under the title Society, Culture, and the State in Germany, 1870–1930. Eley set forth two research agendas derived from his review of recent hypotheses regarding the origins and nature of Nazism. One was to discover what allowed so many people to identify with the Nazis. The second was that we explore the ways in which welfare policy contributed to Nazism, by examining “the production of new values, new mores, new social practices, new ideas about the good and efficient society.” Eley suggested that we examine “strategies of policing and constructions of criminality, notions of the normal and the deviant, the production and regulation of sexuality, the . . . understanding of the socially valued individual . . . the coalescence of racialized thinking . . .”62 So far so good; but why stop there? Why not examine the expanding hold of the language of rights on the political imagination, or the disintegration of traditional authority under the impact of the explosive expansion of the public sphere? Why not pursue a clearer understanding of ideas about the nature of citizenship in the modern state; about the potentials of a participatory social and political order; about human needs and human rights to have those needs met; about the liberation of the individual (including her sexual liberation, her liberation from ignorance and sickness, her liberation from social and economic powerlessness); about the physical and psychological dangers created by the existing social order and how to reduce them, the traumas it inflicted and how to heal them? In short, why not examine how the construction of “the social” — the ideas and practices of the modern biopolitical interventionist complex — contributed to the development of a democratic politics and humane social policies between 1918 and 1930, and again after 1945? Like Fritzsche’s essay, Eley’s accurately reflected the tone of most of those it introduced. In the body of the volume, Elizabeth Domansky, for example, pointed out that biopolitics “did not ‘automatically’ or ‘naturally’ lead to the rise of National Socialism,” but rather “provided . . . the political Right in Weimar with the opportunity to capitalize on a discursive strategy that could successfully compete with liberal and socialist strategies.”63 This is correct; but the language of biopolitics was demonstrably one on which liberals, socialists, and advocates of a democratic welfare state could also capitalize, and did. Or again, Jean Quataert remarked—quite rightly, I believe — that “the most progressive achievements of the Weimar welfare state were completely embedded” in biopolitical discourse. She also commented that Nazi policy was “continuous with what passed as the ruling knowledge of the time” and was a product of “an extreme form of technocratic reason” and “early twentieth-century modernity’s dark side.” The implication seems to be that “progressive” welfare policy was fundamentally “dark”; but it seems more accurate to conclude that biopolitics had a variety of potentials.64 Again, the point here is not that any of the interpretations offered in these pieces are wrong; instead, it is that we are, collectively, so focused on unmasking the negative potentials and realities of modernity that we have constructed a true, but very one-sided picture. The pathos of this picture is undeniable, particularly for a generation of historians raised on the Manichean myth— forged in the crucible of World War II and the Cold War— of the democratic welfare state. And as a rhetorical gesture, this analysis works magnificently — we explode the narcissistic self-admiration of democratic modernity by revealing the dark, manipulative, murderous potential that lurks within, thus arriving at a healthy, mature sort of melancholy. But this gesture too often precludes asking what else biopolitics was doing, besides manipulating people, reducing them to pawns in the plans of technocrats, and paving the way for massacre. In 1989 Detlev Peukert argued that any adequate picture of modernity must include both its “achievements” and its “pathologies”— social reform as well as “Machbarkeitswahn,” the “growth of rational relations between people” as well as the “swelling instrumental goal-rationality,” the “liberation of artistic and scientific creativity” as well as the “loss of substance and absence of limits [Haltlosigkeit].”65 Yet he himself wrote nothing like such a “balanced” history, focusing exclusively on Nazism and on the negative half of each of these binaries; and that focus has remained characteristic of the literature as a whole. What I want to suggest here is that the function of the rhetorical or explanatory framework surrounding our conception of modernity seems to be in danger of being inverted. The investigation of the history of modern biopolitics has enabled new understandings of National Socialism; now we need to take care that our understanding of National Socialism does not thwart a realistic assessment of modern biopolitics. Much of the literature leaves one with the sense that a modern world in which mass murder is not happening is just that: a place where something is not —yet— happening. Normalization is not yet giving way to exclusion, scientific study and classification of populations is not yet giving way to concentration camps and extermination campaigns. Mass murder, in short, is the historical problem; the absence of mass murder is not a problem, it does not need to be investigated or explained.

#### \_\_\_\_ Fascism is not the inevitable flip-side of biopolitical modernity, but a break with the progressive and inclusive natuer of biopolitics

Dickinson, University of Cincinnati, March 2004 [Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, p. 25-28]

I would like to return, then, to the question: in what ways did modern biopolitics contribute to the building of a democratic political order in Germany? What else, besides National Socialist racial policy, did the discourse of biopolitics make possible? For what else was the biopolitical discourse of the turn of the century a “condition of possibility”? What other choices did it create, besides the ones the Nazis made? Taken together, the more recent literature on the development of welfare programs in Germany now allows us to reach some definite conclusions. Welfare policy has been a key field of inquiry for those elaborating the new vision of German modernity as biopolitical nightmare. In fact, Detlev Peukert formulated his own highly influential version of that account in the context of a study of a particular branch of child welfare policy. In his Grenzen der Sozialdisziplinierung (The Limits of Social Discipline), child welfare appeared as a cautionary tale regarding the “inner, structural pathologies of social assistance,” and more generally about the “pathogenesis of modernity.” Using correctional education in reformatories as a case study, he argued that the project of social policy was essentially a form of “inner colonialism,” a bourgeois attempt to impose a set of alien norms and values from without and “above”; indeed, it was guided by a “totalitarian claim to validity” for bourgeois social and behavioral norms.66 Like colonialism and totalitarianism, it was characterized from the beginning by a “tendency toward dehumanization,” because there was no room in bourgeois reformers’ “utopias of order” for those who would or could not conform. The ideal of “education for all” expanded the “life-chances of individuals from the lower classes, opened the way for them to culture and prosperity. But at the same time, it meant also an even more determined declaration of war [Kampfansage] against those who . . . would not allow themselves to be educated.” For “the ‘ineducable’ beyond the pedagogical province, no right to life remained.” The idea of the “implementation of a final solution to the problem of the asocial [people]” was a “further conclusion” (Folgerung) implicit in the project of universal socialization.67 At the end of Peukert’s book stood the National Socialist drive to pass a Law on Community Aliens, which would have put the “antisocial” completely at the mercy of the police, and the creation in 1940 of two special “youth concentration camps” for ineducable delinquents. Again, Peukert was very aware that he was writing the history of only one kind of modernity, and that the most destructive potentials of modern social engineering discourse were only to be realized in a very specific historical context. The “Final Solution” was, as he remarked, “one among other possible outcomes of the crisis of modern civilization,” and one possible only in the context of the concatenation of economic, social, and political disasters through which Germany passed in the two decades before 1933. The fact that Nazism was “one of the pathological developmental forms of modernity does not imply that barbarism is the inevitable logical outcome of modernization,” which also created “opportunities for human emancipation.” And yet, again, the history that Peukert actually wrote was the history of disaster— a disaster that, frequently, does seem at least highly likely. The “fatal racist dynamic in the human and social sciences,” which consists in their assignment of greater or lesser value to human characteristics, does “inevitably become fixated on the utopian dream of the gradual elimination of death,” which is “unfailingly” frustrated by lived reality. In periods of fiscal crisis the frustration of these “fantasies of omnipotence” generates a concern with “identifying, segregating, and disposing of” those judged less valuable.68 In the most detailed exposition of his analysis, Grenzen der Sozialdisziplinierung, Peukert argues that, given the “totalitarian claim to validity” of bourgeois norms, only the two “strategies of pedagogical normalization or eugenic exclusion” were open to middle-class social reformers; when the one failed only the other remained. Yet the failure of pedagogical normalization was preprogrammed into the collision between middle-class “utopias of order” and the “life-worlds” of the working class, which were rendered disorderly by the logic of industrial capitalism.69 Again, in Peukert’s model it seems to me that it is really only a matter of time and circumstance before the fundamentally and necessarily murderous potential of modernity is unleashed. A number of major studies in the 1990s, in contrast, emphasized the importance of the break in the development of social policy in 1933. These works consolidated the consensus regarding the importance of the economic and political crisis of the early 1930s and the destruction of democracy and the rule of law. Beyond that, however, they also suggest that the conceptual foundations of Nazi social, medical, and racial policy were actually quite distinct from those of Weimar policy — despite the fact that they were recognizably part of the broader discourse of modern biopolitics. They point out, too, that there was an important institutional caesura in welfare policy between 1933 and 1939. In the third volume of their history of poor relief in Germany (1992), for example, Florian Tennstedt and Christoph Sachsse concluded not only that the destruction of democratic elements in the welfare system by the Nazis had reversed the developments of the Weimar period, but also that the triumph of racist principles in Nazi welfare policy “points to a completely new understanding of social policy.” While there had been exclusionary tendencies in welfare policy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the development of social policy over time had actually been “characterized by a dynamic of inclusion.” Nazi policy,which aimed at “the hardening of racial inequalities,” thus “sought a radical break with a central and secular developmental tendency of modernity.”70 Hans-Uwe Otto and Heinz Sünker concurred in a volume published in the same year: the National Socialist instrumentalization of welfare was driven by a “radicalization of critiques of the welfare state already familiar in the Weimar period” and constituted an “abandonment of the . . . generally social-integrative function” of social policy.71 Stefan Schnurr argued that the Nazi “welfare” system broke with earlier social policy in that it was guided explicitly by a “social-biological explanation of social problems” and by “openly exterminatory intent”; “interest in this form of radical, goal-rational translation of social-biological and eugenic ideologies into social policy, guided by naked cost-benefit calculations, is not to be found in the leading contemporary conceptualizations of social work.”72 In a definitive study of Weimar child welfare policy published in 1996, Markus Gräser held that the shift toward eugenic and biologistic models and toward exclusion of the “inferior” in the later 1920s and in the depression “completely contradicted the inclusionary tendency of welfare policy.”73 Finally, Young-sun Hong’s magisterial study of Weimar social policy, published in 1998, delivered a pithy summary statement: “The Nazi project for the racial reconstruction of society,” she held, “implied a fundamental redefinition of the meaning of welfare which stripped the concept of all liberal-Christian connotations” derived from the founding traditions of social policy; “continuities at the level of technique were themselves refunctioned as they were subordinated to an antithetical system of substantive ends.”74

#### \_\_\_\_ Biopolitics is not totalitairan, in fact it is good—It has empirically lead to the strenethening of liberal democracy which has on-balance prevented the violence they describe and been used against oppressive strutures

Dickinson, University of Cincinnati, March 2004 [Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, p.35-36

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90¶ Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering.¶ This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.

#### \_\_\_\_ Biopolitics is good—It’s key to promote democracy and check totalitarianism

Dickinson, University of Cincinnati, March 2004 [Edward Ross, “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, p. 39-40]

All of these questions, however, still address primarily the activities of technocrats and social managers. We are still asking how bad social engineering is. In fact, this entire discourse seems to be shaped by the fundamental suspicion that trying actively to create a better society is always and necessarily a bad thing — an undemocratic, manipulative, oppressive thing.98 This assumption is rooted in a particular understanding of the micropolitics of expertise and professionalism. It is frequently argued that modern forms of technical knowledge and licensing create relations of dominance and subordination between experts and their “clients.” Thus Paul Weindling, for example, asserted that, “Professionalism, reinforced by official powers, meant that welfare defined new spheres for the exercising of coercion . . . The new technocracy of professions and welfare administrators might be seen as erecting antidemocratic and coercive social structures by extending the welfare state.” Michael Schwartz, similarly, observed in 1992 that “even in the democratic variant of science there was a tendency to technocratic elitism” and the “scientistic objectification of humanity.”99 And Detlev Peukert reminded us that “rationalization as a strategy of experts inherently contained [barg systematisch] the danger of the technocratic arrogance of experts, the overwhelming of those affected by the catalog of norms for rational living derived from the expert knowledge of the professions, but not from the experience of those affected.”100 Even more sinister, again, is the tendency of these same experts to exclude, stigmatize, and pathologize those they are not able to “normalize.” Zygmunt Bauman has presented the same case with a particular clarity, concluding that since modernity is “about” order, and order always implies its opposite, chaos, “intolerance is . . . the natural inclination of modern practice. Construction of order sets the limits to incorporation and admission. It calls for the denial of rights, and of the grounds, of everything that cannot be assimilated— for the de-legitimation of the other.”101¶ At its simplest, this view of the politics of expertise and professionalization is certainly plausible. Historically speaking, however, the further conjecture that this “micropolitical” dynamic creates authoritarian, totalitarian, or homicidal potentials at the level of the state does not seem very tenable. Historically, it appears that the greatest advocates of political democracy —in Germany leftliberals and Social Democrats —have been also the greatest advocates of every kind of biopolitical social engineering, from public health and welfare programs through social insurance to city planning and, yes, even eugenics.102 The state they built has intervened in social relations to an (until recently) ever-growing degree; professionalization has run ever more rampant in Western societies; the production of scientistic and technocratic expert knowledge has proceeded at an ever more frenetic pace. And yet, from the perspective of the first years of the millennium, the second half of the twentieth century appears to be the great age of democracy in precisely those societies where these processes have been most in evidence. What is more, the interventionist state has steadily expanded both the rights and the resources of virtually every citizen — including those who were stigmatized and persecuted as biologically defective under National Socialism. Perhaps these processes have created an ever more restrictive “iron cage” of rationality in European societies. But if so, it seems clear that there is no necessary correlation between rationalization and authoritarian politics; the opposite seems in fact to be at least equally true.

### Alt=Co-Optation

#### \_\_\_\_ Oppositions to freedom fail, they are co-opted by government

Barry, Osborne & Rose. 1996. [Andrew, lecturer @ Dept. of Scoiology University of London, Thomas, lecturer dept. of sociology university of brostol, nikolas, prof. of sociology @ university of london. Foucault and Political Reason. pg.2]

But if political reason itself is mutating, analysis of politics lags some way behind. It has proved difficult and painful for much political theory and political sociology to abandon the oppositions that have sufficed for so long: State and civil society, economy and family, public and private coercion and freedom. Yet contemporary movements in politics show Just how clumsy and inept such oppositions are: each, in different ways, demands a form of government that combines action by political and non-politlcal authorities, communities and individuals. Andthe relations of force of power, of subordination of liberation and "responsiblization" of collective allegiance and individual choice that are brought into being in these new configurations are difficult to visualize let alone to evaluate, in the language of orthodoxy. Indeed in a very real sense, it is liberalism itself that is at stake in these new forms of political reason – the peculiar sense in which, for liberalism, freedom was simultaneously the antonym, the limit and the objective of government and the ways in which these relations of liberty and authority were thought through and enacted in western societes over the subsequent 150 years.

### Apocalypse Turn

#### \_\_\_\_ Foucault is not a negative argument but an ethos for approaching problems. He explicitly rejects the apocalypticism of your kritik impact as counterproductive crisis rhetoric

Barry, Osborne & Rose. 1996 [Andrew, lecturer @ Dept. of Scoiology University of London, Thomas, lecturer dept. of sociology university of brostol, nikolas, prof. of sociology @ university of london. Foucault and Political Reason. pg. 4-52]

Foucault might be said to approach the question of the present with. a particular ethos but not with any substantive or *a priori* understanding its status. His concern is not to identify some current, perhaps definitive, "crisis" in the present. Foucault makes no reference to concepts. such as post-fordism, postmodernity, "McDonaldization"or late capitalism that have often been used to characterize a certain kind of break With the past. Nor is he concerned simply with a blanket denunciation of the present. No political programmatics follow automatically from his work in this field. Foucault once argued in an interview, that one of the "most destructive habits of modern thought ... IS that the moment of the present is considered in history as the break, the climax, the fulfilment, the return ofI youth, etc." - confessing that he had himself found himself at ~e~ ~wn into the orbit of such a temptation (Foucault 1989c: 251). But if It IS the case that, for example, the closing pages of Madness and Civilization adopt an unquestionably apocalyptic tone in their pronouncements on the present, and that Foucault himself was to regret the adoption of such apocalyptic tones, in a sense, the conception of the present does retain a certain stability across his work. Above all, one' might say, Foucault was concerned to introduce an "untimely" attitude in our relation towards the present. Untimely in the Nietzschean sense: acting counter to our time, introducing a new sense of the fragility of our time, and thus acting on our time for the benefit, one hopes, of a time to come (Nietzsche 1983: 60, c£ Rose 1993b: 1, Bell 1994-: 155).

### Permutation—Politics

#### \_\_\_\_ We can problematize and write the critical histories of the present without giving up on politics and emancipation

Barry, Osborne & Rose. 1996. [Andrew, lecturer @ Dept. of Scoiology University of London, Thomas, lecturer dept. of sociology university of brostol, nikolas, prof. of sociology @ university of london. Foucault and Political Reason. pg.6-7]

Although these theories of the present" address themselves to our political reason, then, this is not in the sense that any specific political prescriptions or proscriptions flow. This does not condemn historians of the present themselves in any way to be without politics or "beyond politics". For there is certainly an ethos of engagement tied to this way of conceiving of the present, one that may itself be historical but should not be despised for that. In his essay on Kant and the Enlightenment, Foucault insists that if modernity connotes anything it is not a period or a mode of experience but an "ethos", a way of orientating oneself to history. Kant's distinction was hardly to have inaugurated this modernity itself, so much as to have posed the question of the present as an issue. Here we find some hints as to Foucault's own understanding of the necessary ethos of the intellectual in the present. FOllqiult highlights Kant's "pragmatisanthropology':, so cli£ferent from the medium of the three Critiques, w .ch opened up a space for Enlightenment not as certainty but as a \_ kind of permanent questioning of thep resent, indeed a "commitment to \_ uncertainty" (Gordon 1986: 74). As Colin Gordon emphasizes, for Foucault this commitment entailed a novel version of critique itself not so much to establish the limits of thought, but to locate the possible place for transgression ~ibid.: 75). This understanding of the present does not take the anti-Enlightenment stance of other grand genealogies of the present moment. Gordon cites the work of Cassirer, Hayek, Adorno and Horkheimer as instances of genealogical thought linked to a "semiology of catastrophe". But as Foucault himself notes, one "does not [have] to be 'for' or 'against' the Enlightenment" (Foucault 1986: 43). Rather, the style of Foucault's histories of the present owes something to the classical orientation of Tocqueville or Weber, where "the analysis addresses the hazards and necessities of a system, not the unrecognized invasions of an alien, pathological mutation" (ibid.: 78, see also Owen 1994).

### Biopower Inevitable

#### \_\_\_\_ Biopower is inevitable

Wright, 2008 (Nathan, Fellow at the Centre for Global Political Economy, “Camp as Paradigm: Bio-Politics and State Racism in Foucault and Agamben”, http://ccjournal.cgu.edu/past\_issues/nathan\_wright.html)

Perhaps the one failure of Foucault’s that, unresolved, rings as most ominous is his failure to further examine the problem of bio-political state racism that he first raises in his lecture series, Society Must Be Defended. At the end of the last lecture, Foucault suggests that bio-power is here to stay as a fixture of modernity. Perhaps given its focus on the preservation of the population of the nation it which it is practiced, bio-power itself is something that Foucault accepts as here to stay. Yet his analysis of bio-politics and bio-power leads inevitably to state-sanctioned racism, be the government democratic, socialist, or fascist. As a result, he ends the lecture series with the question, “How can one both make a bio-power function and exercise the rights of war, the rights of murder and the function of death, without becoming racist? That was the problem, and that, I think, is still the problem.” It was a problem to which he never returned. However, in the space opened by Foucault’s failure to solve the problem of state racism and to “elaborate a unitary theory of power” (Agamben 1998, 5) steps Agamben in an attempt to complete an analysis of Foucauldian bio-politics and to, while not solve the problem of state racism, at least give direction for further inquiry and hope of a politics that escapes the problem of this racism.

### Work In the system

#### \_\_\_\_ Working within the system is the only way to effectively dismantle biopolitics. This solves better than the alternative alone, acting purely locally absent government cannot solve.

Wittman 2006 (John is an assistant professor at UTPA “Biopower and Pedagogy: Local Spaces and Institutional Technologies”, <http://compositionforum.com/issue/15/wittmanbiopower.php>)

One critical component to the success of biopolitics is that different and sometimes competing institutions, whether they be ideological or material, operate together as a system of coercion rather than force. This is not so much a means of mind control as it is a systematic reorganization of governing technologies. These technologies do not impose regulatory principles as much as governing institutions (re)constitute new social relations that (re)create how to live. Unless this process of biopower is interrupted, people can become so entrenched in institutional logics that those logics and the institutions that support them become invisible. In other words, the threat of biopower is the increasing retreat of analytical thought to cliché forms of thinking. Disrupting the technology of biopolitics is a difficult task, but not an impossible one. Foucault suggests in acting within institutional boundaries “it is quite possible . . . to get to know how it works and to work within it . . . and . . . to carry out in that specific area work that may properly be called intellectual” (“On Power” 107). This includes learning how one is imbedded in a system to gain some perspective on how to act just beyond it. To struggle within real, material everyday circumstances is what Foucault calls the task of the “specific” intellectual, which he opposes to the “universal” intellectual. The specific intellectual must be able to suspend “as far as possible the system of values to which one refers when testing and assessing” (107). The task of the specific individual is to respond to local contingent sites of struggle in the context of the global. It is not to critique specific notions of right and wrong but to uncover how we are produced institutionally. This defrosting of institutional thought gets at the heart of Foucault. Foucault’s work often focused on the notion that human beings can defend against some forms of power. Like James E. Porter and others suggest in their own critique of institutional logic, “Though institutions are certainly powerful, they are not monoliths; they are rhetorically constructed human designs (whose power is reinforced by buildings, laws, traditions, and knowledge making processes) and so are changeable” (611). [{5}](http://compositionforum.com/issue/15/wittmanbiopower.php) However, in a short discussion of resistance to biopolitical production, Foucault comments that in doing so “the main objective of these struggles is to attack not so much such-or-such institution of power, or group, or elite, or class but, rather, a technique, a form of power” (Subject 331). As an educator, the importance of biopolitics in education is that the regulation of the social accounts partially for a lack of analytical critique many writing teachers claim to be central in their curriculum. Mas’ud Zavarzadeh makes this point in “The Pedagogy of Totality.” Focusing his criticism on Michael Bérubé’s Ignorance Is a Luxury We Cannot Afford, in his discussion of peoples’ reactions to 9/11 Zavarzadeh suggests that pedagogically “empathy” has been substituted for the “analytical” and that what teachers seek instead of the analytical is “moral clarity.” Producing morally tolerable students (right thinking individuals) has become a staple in transformative pedagogy. [{6}](http://compositionforum.com/issue/15/wittmanbiopower.php) This is not to suggest that critical stances in education have not had positive repercussions, but I do think we need to regard them only as initial steps in beginning to understand ourselves as teachers and writers. Pedagogies that are derived from transformative projects are often treated as conclusionary rather than preparatory. Zavarzadeh argues that the “pedagogy of tears is grounded in the notion that social change takes place through a ‘change of heart’: an altering of the affective consciousness of the individual who can help, through philanthropy and faith-based charity, to create a compassionate culture” (40). Transformative pedagogy is largely based on assumptions of tolerance.

### Rejection Fails

#### \_\_\_\_ Pure rejection of dominant system recreates the system instantly, Working within the system to fight oppression is key

Johnson PhD in 2004 (Carol, PhD in philosophy, foucault, rogerian argument, and feminist standpoint theory: intersecting discourses concerning welfare reform during the 1990s, pp.23)

Charles Taylor’s examination of Foucault found his rejection of the institutional apparatuses that influence how people perceive and define themselves and the world problematic. According to Taylor, Foucault’s theoretical approach was incomplete because any form of resistance to the subversively dominating systems that do the controlling is by definition created by the very system it rejects, and is therefore invalid. Further, for Taylor, Foucault’s approach left no place for resistance to develop untainted by all that it refused. Though Taylor found that Foucault’s research provided “valuable historical insights,” he critiqued Foucault’s refusal to acknowledge how the system has progressively created opportunities for individuals to collectively take action against oppression (81-2). Taylor discusses Foucault’s theoretical connection to Nietzsche and credits Foucault for requiring his readers to examine how Western ideologies participate in the construction of subject/object identities. But, in the end, Taylor questions whether one really wants to arbitrarily reject the self-reflective epistemology inherent in the Western (Augustinian) tradition (99).

### Biopower can be Productive

#### \_\_\_\_ The use of power is not negative- We must stop the rejection of power and embrace its possibilities.

Merquior 1985 (J.G., PhD in sociology from London School of Economics and former professor of political science at the University of Brasilia. “Foucault”: Foucault’s ‘cratology’: his theory of power, pages 108-110)

On the very last page of Discipline and Punish Foucault stresses that 'the power of normalization' is not exercised by the prison alone, but also by our social mechanisms to procure health, knowledge and comfort. Consequently, adds he, 'the fabrication of the disciplinary individual' does not rest only on institutions of repression, rejection and marginalization. The carceral transcends the goal. The study of the prison, therefore, was bound to unfold into an anatomy of social power at large -as well as, inevitably, a reconsideration of our very concept of power. No wonder so many of Foucault's texts and interviews since the mid-seventies expatiate upon the problem of modern forms of domination. By searching for theology of the modern subject, Foucault was automatically defining an angle where knowledge is enmeshed with power. Thus his pursuit of the modern subject through forms of knowledge as well as practices and discourses had to concentrate on what he calls power-knowledge (pouvoir-savoir), a Nietzschean perspective where all will to truth is already a will-to-power. And the more he delved into spheres of practical knowledge on the subject, the more he found technologies of the self waiting for analysis. At the end of the day, as Colin Gordon notes, Foucault developed a concept of power' as able to take the form of a subjectification as well as of an objectification'. I the self as a tool of power, a product of domination, rather than as an instrument of personal freedom -this became Foucault’s main theme after Discipline and Punish. As already indicated, all this problematic presupposed a recasting of the concept of power. Put in a nutshell, it required a theory of productive power. The theory of discursive practices in The Archaeology of Knowledge and L'Ordre du discours remained tied up with too negative a view of power, stressing coercion, prohibition and exclusion. Since Discipline and Punish Foucault changed the focus. Now he warned: 'we must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it "excludes", it "represses", it "censors", it "abstracts", it "masks", it "conceals". In fact, power produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of .truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.'