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\*\*\*GOTTA HAVE A PLAN

# PLAN GOOD 1NC

**Gotta have a plan—failure to have a concrete option we can debate against guarantees that oppression continues and efforts for change backfire**

**STEVE 2007** (Anonymous member of Black Block and Active Transformation who lives in East Lansing, MI, Date Last Mod. Feb 8, http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/global/a16dcdiscussion.htm)

What follows is not an attempt to discredit our efforts. It was a powerful and inspiring couple of days. I feel it is important to always analyze our actions and be self-critical, and try to move forward, advancing our movement. The State has used Seattle as an excuse to beef up police forces all over the country. In many ways Seattle caught us off-guard, and we will pay the price for it if we don't become better organized. The main weakness of the Black Block in DC was that clear goals were not elaborated in a strategic way and tactical leadership was not developed to coordinate our actions. By leadership I don't mean any sort of authority, but some coordination beside the call of the mob. We were being led around DC by any and everybody. All someone would do is make a call loud enough, and the Black Block would be in motion. We were often lead around by Direct Action Network (DAN - organizers of the civil disobedience) tactical people, for lack of our own. We were therefore used to assist in their strategy, which was doomed from the get go, because we had none of our own. The DAN strategy was the same as it was in Seattle, which the DC police learned how to police. Our only chance at disrupting the IMF/WB meetings was with drawing the police out of their security perimeter, therefore weakening it and allowing civil disobedience people to break through the barriers. This needs to be kept in mind as we approach the party conventions this summer. Philadelphia is especially ripe for this new strategy, since the convention is not happening in the business center. Demonstrations should be planned all over the city to draw police all over the place. On Monday the event culminated in the ultimate anti-climax, an arranged civil disobedience. The civil disobedience folks arranged with police to allow a few people to protest for a couple minutes closer to where the meetings were happening, where they would then be arrested. The CD strategy needed arrests. Our movement should try to avoid this kind of stuff as often as possible. While this is pretty critical of the DAN/CD strategy, it is so in hindsight. This is the same strategy that succeeded in shutting down the WTO ministerial in Seattle. And, while we didn't shut down the IMF/WB meetings, we did shut down 90 blocks of the American government on tax day - so we should be empowered by their fear of us! The root of the lack of strategy problem is a general problem within the North American anarchist movement. We get caught up in tactical thinking without establishing clear goals. We need to elaborate how our actions today fit into a plan that leads to the destruction of the state and capitalism, white supremacy and patriarchy. Moving away from strictly tactical thinking toward political goals and long term strategy needs to be a priority for the anarchist movement. No longer can we justify a moralistic approach to the latest outrage - running around like chickens with their heads cut off. We need to prioritize developing the political unity of our affinity groups and collectives, as well as developing regional federations and starting the process of developing the political principles that they will be based around (which will be easier if we have made some headway in our local groups). The NorthEastern Federation of Anarchist Communists (NEFAC) is a good example of doing this. They have prioritized developing the political principles they are federated around. The strategies that we develop in our collectives and networks will never be blueprints set in stone. They will be documents in motion, constantly being challenged and adapted. But without a specific elaboration of what we are working toward and how we plan to get there, we will always end up making bad decisions. If we just assume everyone is on the same page, we will find out otherwise really quick when shit gets critical. Developing regional anarchist federations and networks is a great step for our movement. We should start getting these things going all over the continent. We should also prioritize developing these across national borders, which NEFAC has also done with northeastern Canada. Some of the errors of Love and Rage were that it tried to cover too much space too soon, and that it was based too much on individual membership, instead of collective membership. We need to keep these in mind as we start to develop these projects. One of the benefits of Love and Rage was that it provided a forum among a lot of people to have a lot of political discussion and try to develop strategy in a collective way. This, along with mutual aid and security, could be the priorities of the regional anarchist federations. These regional federations could also form the basis for tactical leadership at demonstrations. Let me first give one example why we need tactical teams at large demos. In DC the Black Block amorphously made the decision to try to drive a dumpster through one of the police lines. The people in front with the dumpster ended up getting abandoned by the other half of the Black Block who were persuaded by the voice of the moment to move elsewhere. The people up front were in a critical confrontation with police when they were abandoned. This could be avoided if the Black Block had a decision making system that slowed down decision making long enough for the block to stay together. With this in mind we must remember that the chaotic, decentralized nature of our organization is what makes us hard to police. We must maximize the benefits of decentralized leadership, without establishing permanent leaders and targets. Here is a proposal to consider for developing tactical teams for demos. Delegates from each collective in the regional federation where the action is happening would form the tactical team. Delegates from other regional federations could also be a part of the tactical team. Communications between the tactical team and collectives, affinity groups, runners, etc. could be established via radio. The delegates would be recallable by their collectives if problems arose, and as long as clear goals are elaborated ahead of time with broader participation, the tactical team should be able to make informed decisions. An effort should be made to rotate delegates so that everyone develops the ability. People with less experience should be given the chance to represent their collectives in less critical situations, where they can become more comfortable with it. The reality is that liberal politics will not lead to an end to economic exploitation, racism, and sexism. Anarchism offers a truly radical alternative. Only a radical critique that links the oppressive nature of global capitalism to the police state at home has a chance of diversifying the movement against global capitalism. In order for the most oppressed people here to get involved the movement must offer the possibility of changing their lives for the better. A vision of what "winning" would look like must be elaborated if people are going to take the risk with tremendous social upheaval, which is what we are calling for. We cannot afford to give the old anarchist excuse that "the people will decide after the revolution" how this or that will work. We must have plans and ideas for things as diverse as transportation, schooling, crime prevention, and criminal justice. People don't want to hear simple solutions to complex questions, that only enforces people's opinions of us as naive. We need practical examples of what we are fighting for. People can respond to examples better than unusual theory. While we understand that we will not determine the shape of things to come, when the system critically fails someone needs to be there with anti-authoritarian suggestions for how to run all sorts of things. If we are not prepared for that we can assume others will be prepared to build up the state or a new state.

# PLAN GOOD 1NC

**Vote Negative:**

**First, the Aff should lose—lack of a concrete plan makes any positive change impossible either in debate or the world at large and only empowers reactionary forces—they undermine the purpose of debate which is to teach us good decision-making skills that we can use in any context**

**Second, this is not a framework argument—whether debate is about policy, activism, or identity, plans are necessary for practical reasons—this is a solvency turn, not a normative rule or a theory argument**

**Third, it undermines clash—it’s impossible to engage their ideas if we don’t know what they are—that clash is critical to develop strategies and test ideas which eventually result in social change**

**BRANHAM 1995** (Robert, Professor of Rhetoric at Bates College, Argumentation and Advocacy, Winter)

In the years following his release from prison, Malcolm X honed his speaking skills through sidewalk preaching and his ministry in New York Temple No. 7 and other mosques. He gained national attention in the late 1950s through a series of public confrontations with Black clergy, civil rights leaders and the press. After complaining about the lack of coverage of the NOI in the Amsterdam News, he was given his own column in which he blasted Christian ministers as "chicken-eaters" who served "the slaveowners' church." When a delegation of prominent New York ministers protested, editor James Hicks offered them equal space in a column that would run beside Malcolm X's - a debate in print. "By the third week," Hicks recalls, "it was apparent that, by having a target, Malcolm was even more devastating. Malcolm murdered the man" (Goldman, 1973, p. 61). Hicks' rhetorical assessment was an astute one. Malcolm X was at his best when able to use the ideas of another as a foil for his own, which shone most brightly in the light generated by confrontation.

# PLAN GOOD 2NC

**Every political strategy must have a concrete platform for advocacy—our argument has nothing to do with framework or theory because we don’t say that the Aff should be forced to do this for traditional debate reasons—failure to have a plan just means that the Aff will get coopted by other groups also fighting for change who have more definite ideas, which splinters efforts to fight oppression while well-organized reactionaries will fill the void—this turns the case and means that attempts to change things will just dissipate our energies and leave us vulnerable—our 1NC Steve evidence gives the historical example of the Black Block WTO protesters who simply ended up as fodder for the police**

**And, their strategy allows vague shifting which conceals weaknesses and results in manipulation that turns their impact**

**GALLES 2009** (Gary, Professor of Economics at Pepperdine, “Vagueness as a Political Strategy,” March 2, http://blog.mises.org/archives/author/gary\_galles/)

The problem with such vagueness is that any informed public policy decision has to be based on specific proposals. Absent concrete details, which is where the devil lurks, no one--including those proposing a "reform"--can judge how it would fare or falter in the real world. So when the President wants approval for a proposal which offers too few details for evaluation, we must ask why. Like private sector salesmen, politicians strive to present their wares as attractively as possible. Unlike them, however, a politician's product line consists of claimed consequences of proposals not yet enacted. Further, politicians are unconstrained by truth in advertising laws, which would require that claims be more than misleading half-truths; they have fewer competitors keeping them honest; and they face "customers"--voters-- far more ignorant about the merchandise involved than those spending their own money. These differences from the private sector explain why politicians' "sales pitches" for their proposals are so vague. However, if vague proposals are the best politicians can offer, they are inadequate. If rhetoric is unmatched by specifics, there is no reason to believe a policy change will be an improvement, because no reliable way exists to determine whether it will actually accomplish what is promised. Only the details will determine the actual incentives facing the decision-makers involved, which is the only way to forecast the results, including the myriad of unintended consequences from unnoticed aspects. We must remember that, however laudable, goals and promises and claims of cost-effectiveness that are inconsistent with the incentives created will go unmet. It may be that President Obama knows too little of his "solution" to provide specific plans. If so, he knows too little to deliver on his promises. Achieving intended goals then necessarily depends on blind faith that Obama and a panoply of bureaucrats, legislators, overseers and commissions will somehow adequately grasp the entire situation, know precisely what to do about it, and do it right (and that the result will not be too painful, however serious the problem)--a prospect that, due to the painful lessons of history, attracts few real believers. Alternatively, President Obama may know the details of what he intends, but is not providing them to the public. But if it is necessary to conceal a plan's details to put the best possible public face on it, those details must be adverse. If they made a more persuasive sales pitch, a politician would not hide actual details. They would be trumpeted at every opportunity, proving to a skeptical public he really had the answers, since concealing rather than revealing pays only when better informed citizens would be more inclined to reject a plan. Claiming adherence to elevated principles, but keeping detailed proposals from sight, also has a strategic advantage. It defuses critics. Absent details, any criticism can be parried by saying "that was not in our proposal" or "we have no plans to do that" or other rhetorical devices. It also allows a candidate to incorporate alternatives proposed as part of his evolving reform, as if it was his idea all along. The new administration has already put vague proposals on prominent display. However, adequate analysis cannot rest upon such flimsy foundations. That requires the nuts and bolts so glaringly absent. In the private sector, people don't spend their own money on such vague promises of unseen products. It is foolhardy to act any differently when political salesmen withhold specifics, because political incentives guarantee that people would object to what is kept hidden. So while vagueness may be good political strategy, it virtually ensures bad policy, if Americans' welfare is the criterion.

# PLAN GOOD 2NC

**Debate over the details of nuclear policy is critical to prevent state manipulation—failure to advance concrete policy options allows the elite to manipulate fear and turns the case**

**NOLAN 1989** (Janne, Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution and has worked as a national security specialist in both the Senate and Executive Branch, Guardians of the Arsenal, 282-284)

To many, the idea that nuclear war planning is subject to bureaucratic politics, institutional rivalries, and the petty ambitions of individuals competing for influence is so appalling that the refuse to acknowledge the “legitimacy” of such dynamics. Even discussing the political dimension of nuclear policy somehow trivializes the subject, and so it is discounted. Better to spend time refining moral exhortations or improving the exactitude of new quantitative models for force balances than to stoop so low. For many antinuclear activists, in particular, discussing ways to make nuclear strategy more coherent is totally off the mark. It begs the real question about nuclear weapons: their fundamental illegitimacy as instruments of war or diplomacy. It is politically and morally bankrupt to talk about making strategy more coherent, they argue, when the real imperative is to get rid of these weapons altogether. “Reform” is just rearranging the deck chairs in the war-fighting bureaucracy that is leading the world in its inexorable march to Armageddon. The illegitimacy of nuclear weapons is without doubt the source of the most enduring political problems in American security. Few politicians are ever willing to state publicly that they believe that nuclear weapons preserve peace or that a war-fighting strategy is the cornerstone of credible nuclear deterrence. These positions are accepted privately by many, of course, and discussed openly among the cognoscenti. To many who argue for radical revisions in nuclear forces, the main problem is the fundamentally antidemocratic manner in which nuclear policy is undertaken. It is only because it has been hidden from the public view that the current character of nuclear strategy has survived. Almost everyone interviewed for this book was asked about this key assumption. Should nuclear doctrine be a subject for a national referendum? Should the American public exert influence in our war-fighting posture? To a man (they were all males), the advocates of strategic defenses said yes. As Martin Anderson put it, “Absolutely. If you have the right strategy, the people will support you.” Gregory Fossedal, a former *Wall Street Journal* editorial-page writer and now a media fellow at the Hoover Institution, echoed these words: “Reagan, Martin Anderson, and I are populists. We’re governed by the people, not by the Harvard faculty or the Brookings Institution. You change elite opinion through popular opinion.” An unacknowledged political alliance exists between the Right and the Left on this issue. Nuclear war plans, they both argue, would not stand up to political scrutiny. Though they could not be more divided in their goals, the two schools agree that the public needs to be informed about the Faustian bargain that the architects of flexible response have provided as the basis for American security. But ask most officials with responsibilities for nuclear forces the same question, and you will draw laser glares. Those who are working on the actual implementation of war plans blanch at the thought of public or congressional intrusion into the private realm of strategy. After examining the experience of four decades of policies about nuclear weapons, one is struck by the tremendous role that secrecy has played in holding the system together. Even the most modest efforts to be “candid” about real policy, like James Schlesinger’s, proved disastrous. The public genuinely believes that nuclear weapons are illegitimate and does not want to be reminded of their existence. As we have seen, the public’s concern about nuclear weapons can be readily turned to fear. And this kind of public sentiment helped spawn the industry of nuclear deceit, of which the SDI is simply the most recent example. Calls to public activism with unspecific objectives may thus not be the best approach. Frightened Americans looking for solace are a great constituency for clever political strategists. There is no question that current nuclear strategy cannot sustain the glare of public attention. The whole concept of limited nuclear war has no political constituency. But, as Frank Miller is fond of saying, flexible response is the worst alternative–except for all the others. Not even the military, trained to be inured to the consequences of its dire responsibility can “support” nuclear doctrine. General Dougherty has said, I consider raw, deliberate population attacks immoral as well as unlawful, and I know of no US nuclear planning force that has as its targeting objectives cities, civilian populations, noncombatants, civilian objects, schools, or hospitals *that have no relation to the objective of preventing nuclear aggression from succeeding*. As proof, one has merely to look at the US nuclear inventory, which is clearly unsuited for optimum use in city destruction or mass noncombatant kill. A commander planning deliberate attacks on cities...would have a major moral problem on his hands with his command and combat crews.

# A2: YOU’RE TRYING TO MAKE US DO STUFF

**First, this doesn’t link—our argument is that attempts to change without a stable, concrete plan will be coopted by reactionaries or manipulated by other groups for their own ends—this turns the case because we will jump from one project to the next with no clear focus while those opposed to the Aff will just circle the wagons and crush positive change**

**Second, this argument is not based on rules—we don’t say it’s cheating not to have a plan, we just say it’s a bad political strategy—we can agree that theory shouldn’t be used to exclude the aff and still say that their project is counterproductive**

**And, concrete strategies are good—debate requires that we compare one option to another one with a basic understanding of what we are choosing between—the Aff should have to defend the method of action or they will only educate us in losing political strategies**

# A2: STILL CLEAR WHAT WE DO

**First, it doesn’t matter—even if you can figure out basically what the Aff does, concrete, stable details are important—groups that share similar goals but don’t define them carefully will manipulate each other and get pulled into broader campaigns that lead them away from their original purpose—our steve evidence gives the empirical example of Black Block WTO protesters who were forced to turn from one group to another and ultimately couldn’t accomplish anything**

**Second, our 2NC Galles evidence answers this—any hint of vagueness makes potential allies suspicious and creates inflated desires for social change—this means people won’t support the aff and ultimately reject what they see as deception**

**Third, figuring it out is not enough—even if you are pretty sure what the Aff does, you can’t be certain—their strategy allows constant shifting and the point is that other people must have a solid grasp on the means and the ends or else they will misunderstand, distort the project, or fail to unite against organized opposition—the Aff is like a Rorschach test where everyone sees what they want to see but will end up fighting over details when they figure out that their visions are not identical**

# A2: TEXT BAD (DECONSTRUCTION)

**First, this whole debate denies their argument—all the arguments they make are formed in the same indeterminate language—the only difference is that they don’t have a concrete proposal for advocacy that the debate can revolve around**

**Even if there is no absolute truth, we can create provisional consensus and common understanding**

**FERGUSON AND MANSBACH 2002** (Yale, Prof of IR at Rutgers, Richard, Prof of IR at Iowa State, *International Relations and the “Third Debate,”* ed. Jarvis)

Although there may be no such thing as “absolute truth” (Hollis, 1994:240-247; Fernandez-Armesto, 1997:chap.6), there is often a sufficient amount of intersubjective consensus to make for a useful conversation. That conversation may not lead to proofs that satisfy the philosophical nit-pickers, but it can be educational and illuminating. We gain a degree of apparently useful “understanding” about the things we need (or prefer) to “know.”

**Their argument creates an intellectual climate for Holocaust denial–the effect of their critique is to blur the lines of history and mask atrocity**

**HEXHAM 1999** (Irving, in *Mission and the State*, ed. Ulrich van der Hayden, 2000, http://www.ucalgary.ca/~hexham/courses/Courses-2006/Rels-339/IRVING/Ulrich-revised.htm)

Deborah Lipstadt warns historians about the dangers of adopting fashionable theories like deconstruction without solidly grounding their work in an accurate representation of source materials [1994]. She makes a passionate plea for historical accuracy while demonstrating the real dangers that occur when people distort the facts. The techniques used by Holocaust deniers, who use history to propagate their views, are not isolated to rogue historians. The basic arguments used by the deniers are not as absurd as most decent people, who instinctively reject such claims, think. In fact, they are increasingly common in popular scholarship. As Lipstadt points out "It is important to understand that the deniers do not work in a vacuum." [Lipstadt 1984:17]. Rather, holocaust "denial can be traced to an intellectual climate that has made its mark in the scholarly world during the past two decades. The deniers are plying their trade at a time when history seems to be up for grabs and attacks on the Western rationalist tradition have become commonplace." [Lipstadt 1994:17]. She continues: "This tendency can be traced, at least in part, to intellectual currents that began in the late 1960's. Various scholars began to assert that texts had no fixed meaning. The reader's interpretation, not the author's intention, determined meaning." [Lipstadt 1984:18] The danger here is not that established scholars are likely to become converts to holocaust denial, although in places like France this is a clear possibility, rather it is the effect such techniques have on students. As Lipstadt observes: "The scholars who supported this deconstructionist approach were neither deniers themselves nor sympathetic to the deniers' attitudes; most had no trouble identifying Holocaust denial as disingenuous." But, "when students had to confront the issue. Far too many of them found it impossible to recognize Holocaust denial as a movement with no scholarly, intellectual, or rational validity" [Lipstadt 1984:18]. At the end of her work she warns again that some "historians are not crypto-deniers, but the results of their work are the same: the blurring of boundaries between fact and fiction and between persecuted and persecutor [Lipstadt 1994:215]. Further Lipstadt correctly observes that "If Holocaust denial has demonstrated anything, it is the fragility of memory, truth, reason, and history." She is right. As scholars it is our duty to defend history based upon the accurate and the objectivity of scholarship. No doubt some people will bristle at the suggestion that we ought to strive for objectivity. Such critics regard the discovery of bias as something totally new without realizing that the hermeneutics of suspicion existed long before Foucault or Deridda [Spencer 1874] History and the deconstruction of Afrikaner Ideology With Lipstad's warning in mind let us turn to the study of South Africa history. During the 1980's various writers used history to deconstruct the claims of Afrikaner Nationalism [Hexham 1981; du Toit and Giliomee 1983; du Toit 1983; Elphick and Giliomee 1988]. These works made an impact among Afrikaners because they exposed the inconsistencies of the historical claims used to legitimate the ideology of apartheid. This delegitimation was possible because these studies were based on the same historical sources as those used by Afrikaner Nationalists used to justify apartheid. By demonstrating that the sources themselves did not support Nationalist claims these authors struck a body blow at the intellectual edifice that maintained the self-confidence of Afrikaner Nationalist intellectuals. At the same time other authors, such as Charles Villa-Vicencio and James Cochran, joined the fray. But, these latter writers were not trained historians. Rather they were theologians who used history as a tool in the "as a basis for ecclesial renewal" and to "understand the character of the church in South Africa and identify its social function" [Villa-Vicenciio 1988:1]. Worthy as these goals were these theologians appropriated historical evidence rather like fundamentalist Christians use proof texts from the Bible to support their arguments. Thus the historical record was forced into preconceived neo-Marxist ideological frameworks for the purpose of undermining support for apartheid. The problem with this approach was that it often distorted and misrepresented the source documents [Cf. Hexham 1989; 1993]. At this point, it is necessary to add that whenever one talks about the "distortion" or “misrepresentation” of sources it is important to recognize that everyone makes the occasional mistake. It is also true that in many cases legitimate questions of interpretation may arise when various scholars see the significance of the same piece of evidence differently. Therefore, what I am objecting to is not the occasional mistake, questionable usage, or issues of genuine interpretation. Rather, it is the systematic use or misuse of source texts to support a grand theory without regard to the context and clear intent of the original sources. Such practices ignore historical methods for the purpose of promoting an ideology [Himmelfarb 1987; Elton 1967 and 1991] The problem, of course, is that once these techniques are generally accepted the choice of ideology can change. Today they are used to promote democracy and tolerance. Tomorrow they may be used to promote totalitarianism and racism.

# A2: PLANS ALLOW BAD C/PS

**First, this is the wrong solution—saying “bad C/PS means we shouldn’t have plans” is the equivalent of saying “the KFC Double Down is bad for you so we should never eat food”—if a specific counterplan is bad the Aff can beat it by going for theory**

**And, lack of a plan is worse—**

**A) Our 1NC impact is that it turns the case and creates bad political strategy—this outweighs their theory arguments—that’s our Steve evidence**

**B) Lack of a plan means no ground for the negative at all, which is a much larger link to their impact—this is especially bad because the 2AR is the last speech and they can always subtly reinterpret their advocacy**

**[[[this means they can’t make any “theory bad” arguments—they are the first ones to impose a rules-based limit on what debate should include—our argument is only about effective political strategy—theirs is now about what is fair and how we should enforce rules]]]**

# A2: NAZIS HAD PLANS

**Nazis did have plans—but so did the Allies, the Jewish Resistance, the Polish Underground, Malcolm X, Ceasar Chavez, The Black Panthers, and the worker’s rights movement—our 1NC Steve evidence is about plans in the context of anarchist resistance to the state—their analogy is terrible**

\*\*\*NO PERFORMANCE

# MUST BE WORDS 1NC

**Our interpretation is that arguments must be verbal, capable of refutation, and with both a claim and a warrant—pictures, images, and physical performances do not meet this**

**FLEMING 1996** (David, some kind of comm dude, Argumentation and Advocacy, Summer)

Others, however, have resisted the idea of non-linguistic argumentation. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), for example, maintain that the theory of argument should concern itself only with "the discursive means of obtaining the adherence of minds" (emphasis in original, p. 8). An action "designed to obtain adherence falls outside [italics added] the range of argumentation," they write, "to the degree that the use of language is lacking in its support or interpretation" (p. 8). Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Kruiger (1984) also consider argumentation to be necessarily verbal: Argumentation requires the use of language. A person engaged in argumentation makes an assertion or statement, assumes or doubts something, denies something, and so on. For the performance of all these activities he [or she] must utter words and sentences (whether spoken or written). Besides these verbal means he can, of course-just as in any other verbal activity-employ non-verbal means (e.g., facial expression and gestures). To the extent that these fulfill an argumentative function, they can always be explicitized verbally. However, non-verbal means of communication can never completely replace verbal ones: argumentation without the use of language is impossible. This means that a person engaged in argumentation has deliberately opted for the use of verbal means. He clearly prefers to use words rather than non-verbal means of communication; he [or she] speaks, rather than resorting to blows or other forms of violence. Here we have another excellent reason for calling argumentation a pre-eminently verbal activity. The arguer uses words to lend force to his [or her] words. (p. 3) For Kneupper (1978), non-verbal signs may be used in argument, but they don't function as arguments unless linguistically translated. And Balthrop (1980,p. 185) claims that argument is "inherently discursive and linguistic." The notion that non-discursive or artistic forms can be arguments, he writes, "would preclude argument from fulfilling" its reason-giving or justificatory function (p. 188). Finally, Toulmin, Rieke and Janik (1979,p. 137) write that "reasoning could not exist in the absence of language. Both claims and all the considerations used to support them must be expressed by some kind of a linguistic symbol system."[2] Let's try out a fairly conventional definition and see how pictures stack up. An argument is an intentional human act in which support is offered on behalf of a debatable belief. It is characterized first and foremost by reasonableness. Now, to say that an act or object is "reasonable" is, first, to assert that reasons can be adduced in order to make that act or object acceptable to some audience (what is acceptable is, of course, local and indeterminate, but the act of adducing reasons to make something acceptable is, I believe, cross-situational). An argument, in other words, involves a two-part relation, one part (evidence, data, proof, support, reason, etc.) supporting the other (position, claim, assertion, conclusion, thesis, point, argument, proposition, etc.). Second, to say that something is "reasonable" is to assert that it admits of improvement, is corrigible, refutable, accountable; it is an act or object which can be interrogated, criticized, and elaborated by others (and even invites interrogation, criticism, and elaboration). An argument exists, that is, in a specifiable context of debate, controversy, opposition, or doubt; its position is thus necessarily contestable. Now, whatever else a picture can do, it cannot satisfy these two criteria. First, it lacks the requisite internal differentiation; it is impossible to reliably distinguish in a picture what is position, and what is evidence for that position. The distinction at the heart of argument, the difference between that which asserts and that which supports, is thus collapsed. Second, a picture cannot with reliability be refuted, opposed, or negated. It can be countered but only by introducing words into the situation; the picture itself makes no claim which can be contested, doubted, or otherwise improved upon by others. If I oppose the "position" you articulate in a picture, you can simply deny that your picture ever articulated that, or any other, position. The picture is only refutable if first translated into language-in which case we have left the realm of pictures altogether. Now, we can ignore these problems and call pictures "arguments" anyway. But to do so would, I believe, deprive the term of its significance. Because if a picture can (self-sufficiently) be an "argument," then what do we call the linguistic act of asserting and supporting debatable claims? To say that a picture can be an argument is to leave individuals with the impression that they have argued for something when they have merely placed it in someone else's field of vision. Further, to claim that a picture can be an argument is to make it less likely that analysts will attend to the rhetorical functions that pictures can and do serve.

**Edited for gendered language**

**There are impacts in our Fleming evidence—**

**First, the interpretation that arguments can be non-verbal allows violence—only limiting arguments to words precludes the use of force**

**Second, it crushes debate—images are impossible to refute and they can alter the supposed meaning to avoid our arguments—it collapses deliberation and debate**

**Third, it link turns any reason why images and performance can be good—treating them as arguments collapses the distinctions that allow them to be studied in their own right**

# MUST BE WORDS 2NC

**Only verbal persuasion is good for debate—visual evidence like pictures, film, or performances does not meet this criteria. every argument must have two parts—a claim and a warrant—expressed in words, which can be refuted. visual evidence does not have this sequence and is impossible to refute since it relies on individual interpretation. even if it’s just one part of an argument, it is still bad since it flattens this sequence and makes rational argument impossible. there are several impacts in our Fleming evidence—**

**Violence—our framework is the only one that requires reason instead of physical violence—broadening the notion of argument and denying the primacy of verbal persuasion causes violence**

**Turns their aff—conflating arguments with visual imagery collapses the distinctions between them—this not only ruins argument but also distorts the things that are valuable about imagery—this link turns any offense for their interpretation**

**Switch-side debate—visual presentations are not evidence, they are representations, even if interpretation is added to them—you can’t negate a picture since it exists as material fact, but without context other than words—the only way is to use more images, which collapses debate**

**More evdence that they destroy switch-side debate and rational deliberation**

**FLEMING 1996** (David, some kind of comm dude, Argumentation and Advocacy, Summer)

What O'Keefe (1977) calls "argument[1]" (a reason-giving speech act), then, is fully understandable only in the context of "argument[2]" (a social interaction characterized by disagreement). We provide reasons for our beliefs, Toulmin (1958,p. 97, pp. 214-216) wrote, because other people can always demand them from us. Similarly, Kuhn (1991,pp. 12-13) proposes that we consider "rhetorical argument" (an assertion with accompanying justification) as interiorized "dialogic argument" (the juxtaposition of opposing assertions). Habermas (1981/ 1984) also posits a close relation between reason-giving and social opposition. People advance reasons, Habermas says, in order to gain intersubjective recognition for "criticizable validity claims" (p. 17). The "rationality of an expression," then, is a function of "its being susceptible of criticism" (p. 9) To our earlier principle that an argument always contains two parts, claim and support, we can now add the related principle that an argument always occurs in a context of (implicit or explicit) disagreement, doubt, and opposition. Pictures seem to have difficulty satisfying the first requirement; can they satisfy the second? Our definition of a picture as a representation meant to "look like" the visible world turns out to have some bearing on this question. Because if the picture is perceived to be closer to the material world than language, then it may be less negatable as a communicative entity. Why? Because negation is a linguistic function, foreign to the concrete and analogic world of the non-verbal. As Burke (1966,p. 419) put it, "the negative is a peculiarly linguistic resource."[6] It is only with language, he writes, and particularly through the linguistic act of proscription, that the nonverbal is imbued with negative force. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969,p. 155) also restrict negation to discourse, although they are more explicit about its social origins. From this perspective, the pictorial has no negative. "Art," says Langer (1942,p. 214), "gives form to something that is simply there." Worth (1981,p. 173) is also clear on this point. The "ability of words to deal with what is not," he writes, "is one of the central functions of language"; the picture is incapable of this function[7] We can use language to indicate what a picture is not, but there is no pictorial way of doing this. An example may help here. A photograph in a college brochure showing a smiling student walking down a sidewalk on a sunny day can be an effective device for promoting the school to high school students and their parents. When they arrive on campus as freshmen, however, many of those students will discover that there aren't many sunny days in that part of the world (what's worse, there aren't many smiling people either). The picture is not necessarily deceptive; unless faked, it is a recording of an actual-albeit posed-event. What the picture cannot do, in other words, is provide viewers with access to its opposite, cannot by picturing a smiling student on a sunny day suggest non-sunny days and non-smiling students. We can't look at a picture and produce its pictorial opposite without first translating it into a negatable linguistic assertion. To pictorially "oppose" the picture, we would have to treat the original as somehow equivalent to or captioned by the relevant language which our new picture refutes. With words, on the other hand, there is always the possibility of negation; as Peirce (1991,p. 189) wrote, an "assertion always implies a denial of something else." When you say "It's hot out here," the statement is actually or potentially the opening volley for an infinite range of subsequent and easily-imagined or -produced opposing statements: "no, it's not, .... I think it's cold," etc.[8] Because language is, from this point of view, so distinct from the existential complex which it is apparently "about," any assertion pretending to "be" reality is-by its very difference from that reality-open to doubt, question, elaboration, criticism, testing, disagreement, endorsement, etc.[9] With pictures, however, what is shown just is. A picture, because it seems to have a closer material relationship with the represented world, is therefore less available for opposition than language. It resists opposition, improvement, and debate as much as it resists assertion. The point here is not that language is more responsible than pictures; only that it is difficult to access reliably with a picture any message other than the one being pictured. To doubt, question, or criticize that message, we would need to introduce language into the situation, an operation that can be especially difficult (and risky) if the initial message is not linguistically explicit. Now it is true that we can construct a visual sign reliably translated as a verbal proscription; but this, Worth (1981,p. 173) claims, is simply a linguistic use of a visual form (e.g., a drawing of a cigarette superimposed by a red diagonal line is merely a visual substitute for the verbal utterance "No smoking").

**The impact is extinction**

**STANNARD 2006** (Matt, Department of Communication and Journalism, University of Wyoming, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18, http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html)

The complexity and interdependence of human society, combined with the control of political decisionmaking—and political conversation itself—in the hands of fewer and fewer technological "experts," the gradual exhaustion of material resources and the organized circumvention of newer and more innovative resource development, places humanity, and perhaps all life on earth, in a precarious position. Where we need creativity and openness, we find rigid and closed non-solutions. Where we need masses of people to make concerned investments in their future, we find (understandable) alienation and even open hostility to political processes. The dominant classes manipulate ontology to their advantage: When humanity seeks meaning, the powerful offer up metaphysical hierarchies; when concerned masses come close to exposing the structural roots of systemic oppression, the powerful switch gears and promote localized, relativistic micronarratives that discourage different groups from finding common, perhaps "universal" interests. Apocalyptic scenarios are themselves rhetorical tools, but that doesn’t mean they are bereft of material justification. The "flash-boom" of apocalyptic rhetoric isn’t out of the question, but it is also no less threatening merely as a metaphor for the slow death of humanity (and all living beings) through environmental degradation, the irradiation of the planet, or the descent into political and ethical barbarism. Indeed, these slow, deliberate scenarios ring more true than the flashpoint of quick Armageddon, but in the end the "fire or ice" question is moot, because the answers to those looming threats are still the same: The complexities of threats to our collective well-being require unifying perspectives based on diverse viewpoints, in the same way that the survival of ecosystems is dependent upon biological diversity. In Habermas’s language, we must fight the colonization of the lifeworld in order to survive at all, let alone to survive in a life with meaning. While certainly not the only way, the willingness to facilitate organized democratic deliberation, including encouraging participants to articulate views with which they may personally disagree, is one way to resist this colonization.

**And, we have an independent impact—mixing aesthetic concerns with political argument encourages mass murder—totalitarian violence will remain unchecked**

**TEACHOUT 2003** (Terry, Commentary music critic and the drama critic of the Wall Street Journal, Commentary, September 2003, proquest)

Hitler, in short, was a deranged idealist, a painter who sought power over others in order to make his romantic dreams real, then grew ever more bloodthirsty when the human beings who were his flesh-and-blood medium resisted his transforming touch. He was not the first such murderous artist. As Irving Babbitt wrote of the similarly mad idealists who had unleashed their own reign of terror on France: Robespierre and Saint-Just were ready to eliminate violendy whole social strata that seemed to them to be made up of parasites and conspirators, in order that they might adjust this actual France to the Sparta of their dreams; so that the Terror was far more than is commonly realized a bucolic episode. It lends color to the assertion that has been made that the last stage of sentimentalism is homicidal mania. To READ Hitler and the Power of Aesthetics is to reflect not only on power but on the various ways in which artists through the ages have responded to power, and more specifically to the politicians and political ideas of their time. In Nazi Germany, this response, as Frederic Spotts reminds us, was overwhelmingly positive. The list of distinguished non-Jewish artists who left the country after Hitler came to power is brief to the point of invisibility when placed next to the rogues' gallery of those who stayed behind, in many cases not merely accepting the inevitability of Nazi rule but actively collaborating with the regime. The composers Carl Orff and Richard Strauss, the conductors Wilhelm Furtwangler and Herbert von Karajan, the Nobel Prize-winning author Gerhart Hauptmann, the filmmaker Leni Riefenstahl, the actor Emil Jannings, the stage designer Caspar Neher-all these and many more were perfectly prepared to make their peace with Nazism. What drove these men and women? No doubt, in some cases, the motive was the crudest sort of self-interest. For not only did Hitler subsidize the arts, he subsidized individual artists as well, in many cases lavishly. And even those who were not the direct objects of his personal largesse benefited from his open-handed arts policy, which included exemption from military service, as well as from the fact that the emigration and slaughter of prominent Jewish artists left more room at the top of the heap. In addition, many German artists were true Nazi believers; ironically, their number included a few, like the twelve-tone composer Anton Webern and the Expressionist painter Emil Nolde, whose modernist art was anathema to the Nazis. Others, whatever their reservations about specific policies, shared Hitler's loathing for modernism and endorsed his vision of Germany as the savior of the West. The relationship of these artists to the Nazi regime remains relevant to mis day. Though artists vary widely in their political awareness-from total indifference on the one hand to passionate involvement on the other-many, perhaps most, find it hard to resist the blandishments of politicians who appear to take an informed interest, however specious, in the arts. Shelley's famous assertion that "poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world" can also be read as a rueful admission that the world deigns at any given moment to acknowledge only a handful of serious artists. The rest are regarded with comparative indifference, especially in market-based democracies where no natural mechanism exists to introduce the "masses" to high art. Some artists accept their comparatively lowly status, finding sufficient reward in the practice of their calling. But others are enraged by it, particularly those romantics who long to remake the world so as to bring it into closer accord with their private visions. Such artists are irresistibly drawn to men of power, and are sometimes willing to pervert their art in the name of politics. Hitler, both a romantic and an artist manque, understood this temptation and made the most of it. The historian Paul Johnson understands it as well, and has it in mind when he writes: "Art, no less than politics, carries with it a whiff of sulphur, the stench of the charnel-house." It is tempting to try to excuse this as mere foolishness. As Hitler himself once remarked, "Artists are simple-hearted souls. Today they sign this, tomorrow that; they don't even look to see what it is, so long as it seems to them well-meaning." But as he knew-better, perhaps, than any other politician of the 20th century-ideas have consequences, and the artist who succumbs to the temptation to dabble in ill-digested political ideas, be he a Nazi, a Communist, or a pacifist, is as morally responsible for their ultimate consequences as any other human being. In the end, beauty excuses nothing, least of all mass murder.

# A2: SEQUENCE INTERPRETATION BAD

**Extend our Fleming evidence—sequence is critical to allow arguments to be refuted—this is key to switch-side negation which upholds deliberative democracy and prevents extinction—that’s our Fleming and Stannard evidence in the overview**

**And, argument must have a sequence of claim and warrant—visual presentation destroys this sequence—our interpretation is more ethical because sequential argument requires one to suspend judgement until evidence is presented**

**FLEMING 1996** (David, some kind of comm dude, Argumentation and Advocacy, Summer)

Now, why can't a picture satisfy this demand, that is, be structured so that claim-like and support-like entities can be identified? The answer appears to have something to do with the fact that a picture typically functions as a simultaneous whole rather than a sequence of bits. It lacks, in other words, the internal linear arrangement that characterizes verbal discourse. Argument requires a structure in which conceptually-distinct ideas can be sequentially linked (thus, "X, therefore Y," "X because of Y," etc.). Hintikka and Bachman (1991,p. 8), for example, define argument as a "line of reasoning," while Andrews, Costello and Clark (1993) characterize it as a sequence or chain. Langer's (1942) distinction between presentational and discursive symbols rests on this same notion of linearity (see pp. 63-83). For Postman (1985,p. 26), the sequentiality of verbal arguments has an almost ethical quality to it; in arguing, each participant must delay his or her verdict until the other's turn is finished. Without syntactic arrangement, then, the visual can present or express ideas but cannot state them, an act which requires a more restricted structure. For Langer (1942,p. 75), visual forms are capable of combination, but not discursive combination. That is, the relation of constituents in a picture is grasped in one act of vision, "given all at once to the intelligent eye" (p. 77), and allowing simultaneous presentation of a direct, continuous articulation of reality. Although some claim a vocabulary and syntax for visual communication (Bowman, 1968, p. 8), it is more typically asserted that the visual lacks both lexicon and syntax. For Gombrich (1982,p. 138), this means that the visual, while "supreme" at arousal, is altogether incapable of statement. Goodman (1976,1978) concurs: the non-verbal can exemplify, but it cannot denote.

# A2: CAN BE PART OF AN ARGUMENT

**This does not avoid any of our arguments—even using visual evidence as a part of an argument still links to our claims about the impossibility of negation and the fascism that results from aesthetic considerations in politics. our 1nc fleming evidence also says this erodes the limits on violence in public argument by permitting non-verbal persuasion**

**And, visual presentations cannot even be parts of an argument—they deny linear connections and can resist verbal interpretation**

**FLEMING 1996** (David, some kind of comm dude, Argumentation and Advocacy, Summer)

By itself, then, a picture lacks sequential syntax and is therefore unable to array ideas in the two-part conceptual structure of argumentation. But couldn't a picture still function as one part of an argument? That is, couldn't it function as claim or evidence even if, as a non-discursive entity, it cannot do both? This is, in fact, how some scholars have interpreted the argumentative function of the picture. According to Jamieson (1988,p. 240), if rhetoric is statement and proof, then visual rhetoric is statement alone. In the age of television, she writes, argument has been replaced by assertion; there is no narration, no definition, no counter-argument, no evidence. Concerning a different kind of visual, and acting as friend rather than enemy, Buchanan (1989,p. 108) proposes what he calls an "assertoric rhetoric" for material artifacts, a form of discourse presumably devoid of reason-giving but rich in positionality. But there are problems with this notion. If the visual can play an "assertoric" role in argument, what kinds of things can it assert? How does it go about making assertions? How do we know when and if our interpretation of a picture's assertion is the same as someone else's? And how do we adduce and evaluate evidence for assertions if we can't with any reliability know exactly what is being asserted? The difficulty of answering these questions has led some scholars to claim that, because of their inherent richness, concreteness, and ineffability, visual artifacts actually resist assertion. According to Becker (1986,p. 275), pictures are too subtle to act as assertions. Given a photograph without linguistic accompaniment, it is nearly impossible to say what its topic is. And even if we know the topic, Becker argues, we still don't know the statement. The picture itself can be seen to assert, or be evidence for, multiple statements regarding multiple topics (again, the non-discursiveness of pictures makes these functions problematically collapsible). For Moran (1989,p. 101), this is, in fact, the great power of the picture: it "can be used to get a point across without incurring the risks and responsibilities of asserting that point or it." Fox (1994b, p. 70) agrees: the image is "the ultimate tool" of nuance, intimation, hint, and suggestion. It is for this reason, he writes, that imagemakers focus on values, attitudes, feelings, and effects, caring little about logic, proof, and argument (p. 77). Similarly, for Postman (1985), the photograph is limited to concrete representation: As an "objective" slice of space-time, the photograph testifies that someone was there or something happened. Its testimony is powerful but it offers no opinions-no "should-have-beens" or "might-have-beens." Photography is preeminently a world of fact, not of dispute about facts or of conclusions to be drawn from them .... When applied to a photograph, the question, Is it true? means only, Is this a reproduction of a real slice of space-time? If the answer is "Yes," there are no grounds for argument, for it makes no sense to disagree with an unfaked photograph. The photograph itself makes no arguable propositions, makes no extended and unambiguous commentary. (pp. 72-73) In the world of the photograph, Postman writes, there is no beginning, middle, and end: "there is only a present and it need not be part of any story that can be told" (p. 74). The ideational limitation that Postman identifies here has been described by Sontag (1990) as a kind of narrative failure. Gerbner (1994) and Hayakawa (in Fox, 1994a) have also commented on the picture's inability to represent a temporal succession of ideas (cf. Lessing, 1962). For Berger (1972,p. 26), this means that a picture, independent of a sequential array of signs, is incapable of functioning as an argument. When a painting is reproduced in a film, and thus unfolds in time, it becomes part of the film-maker's argument. But outside of such use, a painting has its own authority and can potentially reverse or qualify any (verbal) conclusion reached about it. According to Berger and Mohr (1982,p. 120), it is an event's development over time which allows its meaning to be perceived. A photograph arrests this movement, and its meaning, therefore, is ambiguous.

# A2: WE DON’T KILL SWITCH-SIDE

**Even if switch-side debate is theoretically possible in their framework, it’s not effective—**

**A) Our Fleming evidence says that pictures can’t be negated just by words, which forces us to use other images—this can’t succeed because visual images demand different interpretations from different people so refutation is impossible—they can always say “that’s not what we mean” and there’s no more debate**

**B) Visual evidence destroys argument—images cannot have the two-step process of claim and warrant which allows us to attack ethical judgments**

**C) Finally, there’s no context—images are removed from social context because they display one frozen segment of time—this makes it impossible to debate their social surroundings**

**And, more evidence—visual evidence undercuts switch-side debate—they make any negation impossible**

**FLEMING 1996** (David, some kind of comm dude, Argumentation and Advocacy, Summer)

Because, then, it partakes so powerfully of material reality, the picture lacks the distance both from "reality" and historical context which allow us to reliably negate it. Postman (1985,p. 73) writes that the photograph, for example, is "not refutable"; and Berger and Mohr (1982,p. 92) write that it is "irrefutable as evidence."[10] On this line of thought, refutability becomes a criterion of rationality. Sontag (1990,p. 23) writes, for example, that "all possibility of understanding is rooted in the ability to say no," in "not accepting the world as it looks" to the camera. Is it for this reason that the visual has often met with such suspicion and hostility? Explaining his newspaper's refusal to print editorial cartoons, an editor of the New York Times argued that "A good strong cartoon is very likely to distort an editorial position that can be made more clearly, more fairly, and more accurately through the use of words" (as cited in Medhurst & DeSousa, 1981, p. 229). Gerbner (1994) claims that to resolve conflicts we must entertain a variety of perspectives, yet dramatic imagery tends to inhibit the complexity of thought and preempt alternative points of view. Fox (1994b), meanwhile, writes that the emotional intensity of visuals limits the number of rational options we weigh in thinking through problems (p. 77). And Hayakawa (in Fox, 1994a) has said that it is easier for people to have an uncritical confidence in images than in words (p. 184). The only way to "negate" an image, Hay-akawa says, is to compare it with others and put it in a context (p. 188). Williams' (1987) analysis of the 1940 Nazi documentary The Wandering Jew is relevant to this point. The images in the film, he writes, are condensed (i.e., partial, synecdochic) versions of a formal ideology, achieving with their very compression the simplicity, ambiguity, and emotional intensity which can protect the argument against deconstruction. They are also present (i.e., concrete, metonymic), material instantiations whose very materiality-their apparent closeness to actual life-makes them hard to refute. Williams argues that the "condensation of abstract ideology into' representative form," combined with the "self-articulate vividness" of its images, makes The Wandering Jew seem "unimpeachable, if not 'incorruptible'" (p. 299). The film's "presence"-its sensory realism-imbues it with an "un-negated concreteness or totalization" (p. 300). As a "present" argument, Williams says, it "is what it is (undeconstructed; unhindered by negation)" (p. 303). He continues: Arguments which are visually, and perhaps more generally sensorily, present are less susceptible to the deconstructive turn in linguistic representation: as sensations, they simply are. (p. 303) According to Williams, the Nazis represented their ideology in "picture units" whenever possible, knowing that rational argumentation could be better superceded in that way than through language (p. 305). Interestingly, the two characteristics of ideological argument that Williams points to-its compact and concrete qualities-would suggest that, according to the theory I have been advancing, the film isn't really an argument at all. That is, it lacks the requisite two-part structure of claim and support, and it is un-negatable. The Wandering Jew is dangerous, in other words, not so much because it argues a pernicious point, but because it communicates that point by avoiding argument altogether.

# A2: PICTURES = ARGUMENTS

**Pictures are not arguments—extend our interpretation—arguments must be spoken or written language in two parts—claim and warrant—which are capable of refutation. Pictures do not meet this standard, which is our Fleming evidence.**

**And, visual imagery is not argument—treating it as such either destroys the notion of argument or alters the visual so it is no longer useful**

**FLEMING 1996** (David, some kind of comm dude, Argumentation and Advocacy, Summer)

To sum up, argument is reasoning towards a debatable conclusion. It is a human act conducted in two parts (claim and support) and with awareness of two sides (the claim allows for and even invites opposition). By this definition, something which cannot be broken down into claim and support, and whose claim is not reliably contestable, is not an argument, whatever else it may be and however else it may participate in argument. It would seem, then, that a picture can be considered an "argument" only by stretching the meaning of that word beyond recognition. Its lack of internal differentiation between claim and support precludes it from serving as a self-sufficient argument. And its non-refutability precludes it from acting as an argumentative claim without language because it is unable to assert a contestable position. To be refutable, the picture would have to be translated into a linguistic statement, in which case either the visual is irrelevant (since now duplicated by language), or the verbal is such a reduction of the visual as to be an entirely new thought altogether. This last possibility, in which the non-argumentative artifact is translated into one, appears to be what Fisher and Filloy (1982) mean when they claim that fictional and dramatic works are "arguments." When they translate The Great Gatsby, what they end up with is clearly argumentative; but it is no longer The Great Gatsby.

# A2: ARGUMENT DEFINITION BAD

**First, all the impact arguments in the overview are reasons why our interpretation is good—we have link turns to their net benefits but we also have three independent advantages to ours—switch-side debate with an impact of extinction, fascism, with an impact of mass murder, and violence in the real world of debate which is in our 1NC Fleming evidence**

**Our definition of argument is not rigged against the visual—this only serves to show the valuable distinction between picture and argument**

**FLEMING 1996** (David, some kind of comm dude, Argumentation and Advocacy, Summer)

Now, it might be said that I define argument in such a way that it has a built-in bias towards linguistic forms. But that is precisely my point, that traditional conceptions of argument reflect an inherent connection to a particular kind of speech act, and to dissociate the term from that act would strip the concept of its most important qualities. While it may be true that form is often subordinate to use, it is also true that form can determine use to a degree. A stick may indeed "be" a spoon if it is used as one, but some things can be used as spoons only by completely distorting what we mean by "spoon." Argument, that is, may not be as flexible a concept as some have hoped. My approach here might also strike some as overly normative: it deals with what an argument should be but doesn't help us understand the range of arguments actually encountered in the world. But definitions of argument cannot avoid normative thinking.[12] Defining "argument" is not, in this regard, like defining "question." The criterion we use to demarcate argument from non-argument (for example, "reasonableness") is typically a criterion that has inescapable cultural value. For me, an argument is an intentional act structured in claim and support components and situated in a specifiable social dispute. This is normative in the sense that that kind of act often has cultural value; but something could be an argument by this criterion and still be "bad." My purpose in this paper has not been to disparage the pictorial. I am not arguing here that pictures are rhetorically uninteresting or irrelevant. Pictures exert enormous influence in our culture, and they deserve increased attention from scholars whose primary interests are verbal. I have rehearsed here a conventional theory of argument in the interest of highlighting features of that theory that might be obscured or lost if the concept is watered down.[13] If what we mean by "argument" is the act of advancing reasonable positions in contexts of doubt and difference, then a picture cannot, independent of language, be an argument.

# A2: POLITICS WITHOUT AESTHETICS BAD

**First, politics based on verbal argument alone are good—that’s our Fleming evidence and all the net benefits in the overview—we have the only historical examples, which are the third reich and the french revolutionary terror—both of these were driven by aesthetic intepretations of politics**

**And, art is not just manipulated by fascists but is central to the project—reliance on aesthetic concerns can justify mass murder**

**YOUNG 2003** (James E. Young is professor and chair of Judaic & Near Eastern studies at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, “The Terrible Beauty of Nazi Aesthetics,” Forward, April 25, http://www.forward.com/articles/8694/)

Hitler was both a product of his time’s aesthetic temper (as retrograde as his tastes may have been) and possibly the greatest producer of political design and choreography who ever lived. We cannot separate his deeds, his policies and his Nazi ideology from his aesthetic temper. Our reflex may be to protect the aesthetic realm from the ugliness and barbarism committed in its name. But without recognizing the central role aesthetics actually played in the Nazis’ murderous regime, we ignore the basic historical fact at the heart of Spotts’s book: Art, beauty and aesthetics were not benign byproducts of the Nazi Reich, but part and parcel of its malevolent logic. Beauty and terror, aesthetics and power, may not only be paired after the historical fact but might now be regarded as historical forces that also drive events as they actually unfold.

# A2: AESTHETICS INEVITABLE

**First, even if some aesthetic sense in debate is inevitable, that does not mean it shouldn’t be minimized—corruption in government is inevitable, but this doesn’t mean we have to support the Iraq war—we should minimize the importance of aesthetics for persuasion and do everything we can to limit decisions to verbal reason**

**And, our interpretation solves this—arguments composed of sequential claims and warrants allow ethical deliberation—visual imagery does not**

**FLEMING 1996** (David, some kind of comm dude, Argumentation and Advocacy, Summer)

Now, why can't a picture satisfy this demand, that is, be structured so that claim-like and support-like entities can be identified? The answer appears to have something to do with the fact that a picture typically functions as a simultaneous whole rather than a sequence of bits. It lacks, in other words, the internal linear arrangement that characterizes verbal discourse. Argument requires a structure in which conceptually-distinct ideas can be sequentially linked (thus, "X, therefore Y," "X because of Y," etc.). Hintikka and Bachman (1991,p. 8), for example, define argument as a "line of reasoning," while Andrews, Costello and Clark (1993) characterize it as a sequence or chain. Langer's (1942) distinction between presentational and discursive symbols rests on this same notion of linearity (see pp. 63-83). For Postman (1985,p. 26), the sequentiality of verbal arguments has an almost ethical quality to it; in arguing, each participant must delay his or her verdict until the other's turn is finished. Without syntactic arrangement, then, the visual can present or express ideas but cannot state them, an act which requires a more restricted structure. For Langer (1942,p. 75), visual forms are capable of combination, but not discursive combination. That is, the relation of constituents in a picture is grasped in one act of vision, "given all at once to the intelligent eye" (p. 77), and allowing simultaneous presentation of a direct, continuous articulation of reality. Although some claim a vocabulary and syntax for visual communication (Bowman, 1968, p. 8), it is more typically asserted that the visual lacks both lexicon and syntax. For Gombrich (1982,p. 138), this means that the visual, while "supreme" at arousal, is altogether incapable of statement. Goodman (1976,1978) concurs: the non-verbal can exemplify, but it cannot denote.

# A2: AESTHETICS GOOD

**Our interpretation solves this—we can get the benefits of aesthetically pleasing debate without actually basing our decisions on aesthetics—our argument is just that visual displays are not evidence and should not be used for decisions**

**And, we link turn all of this—using visual imagery as apart of an argument blurs the distinctions between them and destroys the advantages of aesthetics—that’s our 1NC Fleming evidence**

# A2: MORE ACCESSIBLE

**This is backwards—verbal arguments can be both heard and seen because they can be spoken or written—visual performances can only be seen, which means they are not accessible to people who are blind or have poor vision**

**Second, extend our Fleming evidence about negation—visual imagery requires everyone to form their own opinions and allows the team using visual evidence to alter their claims—this makes debate over a common topic impossible because the aff can always alter their argument to undermine debate—this is the worst kind of exclusion**

# A2: RULES BAD

**No link—this argument is not based on rules—we don’t say it’s cheating to use visual imagery, we just say it’s a bad political strategy—we can agree that theory shouldn’t be used to exclude the Aff and still say that their project is counterproductive**

**Second, our arguments are not based on rules—our Fleming evidence makes a normative statement about what argument should be and then defends it—this claim links equally to the aff because they attempt to define argument too—they just do it in a different way**

# A2: NOT A REASON TO VOTE NEG

**First, the only remedy is to vote negative—we’ve read disadvantages to their performance like fascism, violence, and extinction—they collapse debate and that means you should vote Negative because if we prove their methodology is bad, we have disproved the Aff—how we represent our arguments is important—we just criticized their method of making arguments**

**Second, they should not be allowed to sever their use of visual imagery—this is exactly what our Fleming evidence criticizes because the aff is allowed to shift the meaning of images or drop them altogether to destroy our ability to negate them—this has nothing to do with theory—you should vote negative because their attempt at severance has proven the link to our argument**

\*\*\*MILITARY EDUCATION

# MILITARY EDUCATION 2AC

**The Neg must defend a concrete policy that’s an opportunity cost to the plan**

**A) Fairness—there are an infinite number of frameworks that the Aff can’t predict which rigs the game for the negative**

**MEARSHEIMER 1995** (John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, International Security, Winter 94/95)

Nevertheless, critical theorists readily acknowledge that realism has been the dominant interpretation of international politics for almost seven hundred years. “Realism is a name for a discourse of power and rule in modern global life.” Still, critical theory allows for change, and there is no reason, according to the theory anyway, why a communitarian discourse of peace and harmony cannot supplant the realist discourse of security competition and war. In fact, change is always possible with critical theory because it allows for an unlimited number of discourses, and it makes no judgment about the merit or staying power of any particular one. Also, critical theory makes no judgement about whether human beings are “hard-wired” to be good or bad, but instead treats people as infinitely changeable. The key to how they think and behave is the particular “software program” that individuals carry around in their heads, and those can be changed. In essence, critical theorists hope to replace the widely used realist software package with new software that emphasizes communitarian norms. Once that switch has been made, states will cooperate with each other and world politics will be more peaceful.

**B) Policy implications are necessary to test theory—a legitimate alternative must describe the consequences of implementing specific change because rhetorical criticism can make the world worse—the impact is education and it turns the case**

**FEAVER 2001** (Peter, Asst. Prof of Political Science at Duke University, Twenty-First Century Weapons Proliferation, p 178)

At the same time, virtually all good theory has implications for policy. Indeed, if no conceivable extension of the theory leads to insights that would aid those working in the ‘real world’, what can be ‘good’ about good theory? Ignoring the policy implications of theory is often a sign of intellectual laziness on the part of the theorist. It is hard work to learn about the policy world and to make the connections from theory to policy. Often, the skill sets do not transfer easily from one domain to another, so a formidable theorist can show embarrassing naivete when it comes to the policy domain he or she putatively studies. Often, when the policy implications are considered, flaws in the theory (or at least in the presentation of the theory) are uncovered. Thus, focusing attention on policy implications should lead to better theorizing. The gap between theory and policy is more rhetoric than reality. But rhetoric can create a reality–or at least create an undesirable kind of reality–where policy makers make policy though ignorant of the problems that good theory would expose, while theorists spin arcana without a view to producing something that matters. It is therefore incumbent on those of us who study proliferation–a topic that raises interesting and important questions for both policy and theory–to bring the communities together. Happily, the best work in the proliferation field already does so.

**C) War—Ignore their generic evidence—detailed military education prevents extinction**

**Education about military issues is necessary to prevent war extinction**

**HANSON 2007** (Victor Davis Hanson, Professor of Classics at CSU Fullerton, “Why Study War?” City Journal, Summer)

It’s no surprise that civilian Americans tend to lack a basic understanding of military matters. Even when I was a graduate student, 30-some years ago, military history—understood broadly as the investigation of why one side wins and another loses a war, and encompassing reflections on magisterial or foolish generalship, technological stagnation or breakthrough, and the roles of discipline, bravery, national will, and culture in determining a conflict’s outcome and its consequences—had already become unfashionable on campus. Today, universities are even less receptive to the subject. This state of affairs is profoundly troubling, for democratic citizenship requires knowledge of war—and now, in the age of weapons of mass annihilation, more than ever. I came to the study of warfare in an odd way, at the age of 24. Without ever taking a class in military history, I naively began writing about war for a Stanford classics dissertation that explored the effects of agricultural devastation in ancient Greece, especially the Spartan ravaging of the Athenian countryside during the Peloponnesian War. The topic fascinated me. Was the strategy effective? Why assume that ancient armies with primitive tools could easily burn or cut trees, vines, and grain on thousands of acres of enemy farms, when on my family farm in Selma, California, it took me almost an hour to fell a mature fruit tree with a sharp modern ax? Yet even if the invaders couldn’t starve civilian populations, was the destruction still harmful psychologically? Did it goad proud agrarians to come out and fight? And what did the practice tell us about the values of the Greeks—and of the generals who persisted in an operation that seemingly brought no tangible results? I posed these questions to my prospective thesis advisor, adding all sorts of further justifications. The topic was central to understanding the Peloponnesian War, I noted. The research would be interdisciplinary—a big plus in the modern university—drawing not just on ancient military histories but also on archaeology, classical drama, epigraphy, and poetry. I could bring a personal dimension to the research, too, having grown up around veterans of both world wars who talked constantly about battle. And from my experience on the farm, I wanted to add practical details about growing trees and vines in a Mediterranean climate. Yet my advisor was skeptical. Agrarian wars, indeed wars of any kind, weren’t popular in classics Ph.D. programs, even though farming and fighting were the ancient Greeks’ two most common pursuits, the sources of anecdote, allusion, and metaphor in almost every Greek philosophical, historical, and literary text. Few classicists seemed to care any more that most notable Greek writers, thinkers, and statesmen—from Aeschylus to Pericles to Xenophon—had served in the phalanx or on a trireme at sea. Dozens of nineteenth-century dissertations and monographs on ancient warfare—on the organization of the Spartan army, the birth of Greek tactics, the strategic thinking of Greek generals, and much more—went largely unread. Nor was the discipline of military history, once central to a liberal education, in vogue on campuses in the seventies. It was as if the university had forgotten that history itself had begun with Herodotus and Thucydides as the story of armed conflicts. What lay behind this academic lack of interest? The most obvious explanation: this was the immediate post-Vietnam era. The public perception in the Carter years was that America had lost a war that for moral and practical reasons it should never have fought—a catastrophe, for many in the universities, that it must never repeat. The necessary corrective wasn’t to learn how such wars started, went forward, and were lost. Better to ignore anything that had to do with such odious business in the first place. The nuclear pessimism of the cold war, which followed the horror of two world wars, also dampened academic interest. The postwar obscenity of Mutually Assured Destruction had lent an apocalyptic veneer to contemporary war: as President Kennedy warned, “Mankind must put an end to war, or war will put an end to mankind.” Conflict had become something so destructive, in this view, that it no longer had any relation to the battles of the past. It seemed absurd to worry about a new tank or a novel doctrine of counterinsurgency when the press of a button, unleashing nuclear Armageddon, would render all military thinking superfluous. Further, the sixties had ushered in a utopian view of society antithetical to serious thinking about war. Government, the military, business, religion, and the family had conspired, the new Rousseauians believed, to warp the naturally peace-loving individual. Conformity and coercion smothered our innately pacifist selves. To assert that wars broke out because bad men, in fear or in pride, sought material advantage or status, or because good men had done too little to stop them, was now seen as antithetical to an enlightened understanding of human nature. “What difference does it make,” in the words of the much-quoted Mahatma Gandhi, “to the dead, the orphans, and the homeless whether the mad destruction is wrought under the name of totalitarianism or the holy name of liberty and democracy?” The academic neglect of war is even more acute today. Military history as a discipline has atrophied, with very few professorships, journal articles, or degree programs. In 2004, Edward Coffman, a retired military history professor who taught at the University of Wisconsin, reviewed the faculties of the top 25 history departments, as ranked by U.S. News and World Report. He found that of over 1,000 professors, only 21 identified war as a specialty. When war does show up on university syllabi, it’s often about the race, class, and gender of combatants and wartime civilians. So a class on the Civil War will focus on the Underground Railroad and Reconstruction, not on Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. One on World War II might emphasize Japanese internment, Rosie the Riveter, and the horror of Hiroshima, not Guadalcanal and Midway. A survey of the Vietnam War will devote lots of time to the inequities of the draft, media coverage, and the antiwar movement at home, and scant the air and artillery barrages at Khe Sanh. Those who want to study war in the traditional way face intense academic suspicion, as Margaret Atwood’s poem “The Loneliness of the Military Historian” suggests: Confess: it’s my profession that alarms you. This is why few people ask me to dinner, though Lord knows I don’t go out of my way to be scary. Historians of war must derive perverse pleasure, their critics suspect, from reading about carnage and suffering. Why not figure out instead how to outlaw war forever, as if it were not a tragic, nearly inevitable aspect of human existence? Hence the recent surge of “peace studies” (see “The Peace Racket”). The university’s aversion to the study of war certainly doesn’t reflect public lack of interest in the subject. Students love old-fashioned war classes on those rare occasions when they’re offered, usually as courses that professors sneak in when the choice of what to teach is left up to them. I taught a number of such classes at California State University, Stanford, and elsewhere. They’d invariably wind up overenrolled, with hordes of students lingering after office hours to offer opinions on the battles of Marathon and Lepanto. Popular culture, too, displays extraordinary enthusiasm for all things military. There’s a new Military History Channel, and Hollywood churns out a steady supply of blockbuster war movies, from Saving Private Ryan to 300. The post–Ken Burns explosion of interest in the Civil War continues. Historical reenactment societies stage history’s great battles, from the Roman legions’ to the Wehrmacht’s. Barnes and Noble and Borders bookstores boast well-stocked military history sections, with scores of new titles every month. A plethora of websites obsess over strategy and tactics. Hit video games grow ever more realistic in their reconstructions of battles. The public may feel drawn to military history because it wants to learn about honor and sacrifice, or because of interest in technology—the muzzle velocity of a Tiger Tank’s 88mm cannon, for instance—or because of a pathological need to experience violence, if only vicariously. The importance—and challenge—of the academic study of war is to elevate that popular enthusiasm into a more capacious and serious understanding, one that seeks answers to such questions as: Why do wars break out? How do they end? Why do the winners win and the losers lose? How best to avoid wars or contain their worst effects? A wartime public illiterate about the conflicts of the past can easily find itself paralyzed in the acrimony of the present. Without standards of historical comparison, it will prove ill equipped to make informed judgments. Neither our politicians nor most of our citizens seem to recall the incompetence and terrible decisions that, in December 1777, December 1941, and November 1950, led to massive American casualties and, for a time, public despair. So it’s no surprise that today so many seem to think that the violence in Iraq is unprecedented in our history. Roughly 3,000 combat dead in Iraq in some four years of fighting is, of course, a terrible thing. And it has provoked national outrage to the point of considering withdrawal and defeat, as we still bicker over up-armored Humvees and proper troop levels. But a previous generation considered Okinawa a stunning American victory, and prepared to follow it with an invasion of the Japanese mainland itself—despite losing, in a little over two months, four times as many Americans as we have lost in Iraq, casualties of faulty intelligence, poor generalship, and suicidal head-on assaults against fortified positions. It’s not that military history offers cookie-cutter comparisons with the past. Germany’s World War I victory over Russia in under three years and her failure to take France in four apparently misled Hitler into thinking that he could overrun the Soviets in three or four weeks—after all, he had brought down historically tougher France in just six. Similarly, the conquest of the Taliban in eight weeks in 2001, followed by the establishment of constitutional government within a year in Kabul, did not mean that the similarly easy removal of Saddam Hussein in three weeks in 2003 would ensure a working Iraqi democracy within six months. The differences between the countries—cultural, political, geographical, and economic—were too great. Instead, knowledge of past wars establishes wide parameters of what to expect from new ones. Themes, emotions, and rhetoric remain constant over the centuries, and thus generally predictable. Athens’s disastrous expedition in 415 BC against Sicily, the largest democracy in the Greek world, may not prefigure our war in Iraq. But the story of the Sicilian calamity does instruct us on how consensual societies can clamor for war—yet soon become disheartened and predicate their support on the perceived pulse of the battlefield. Military history teaches us, contrary to popular belief these days, that wars aren’t necessarily the most costly of human calamities. The first Gulf War took few lives in getting Saddam out of Kuwait; doing nothing in Rwanda allowed savage gangs and militias to murder hundreds of thousands with impunity. Hitler, Mao, Pol Pot, and Stalin killed far more off the battlefield than on it. The 1918 Spanish flu epidemic brought down more people than World War I did. And more Americans—over 3.2 million—lost their lives driving over the last 90 years than died in combat in this nation’s 231-year history. Perhaps what bothers us about wars, though, isn’t just their horrific lethality but also that people choose to wage them—which makes them seem avoidable, unlike a flu virus or a car wreck, and their tolls unduly grievous. Yet military history also reminds us that war sometimes has an eerie utility: as British strategist Basil H. Liddell Hart put it, “War is always a matter of doing evil in the hope that good may come of it.” Wars—or threats of wars—put an end to chattel slavery, Nazism, fascism, Japanese militarism, and Soviet Communism. Military history is as often the story of appeasement as of warmongering. The destructive military careers of Alexander the Great, Caesar, Napoleon, and Hitler would all have ended early had any of their numerous enemies united when the odds favored them. Western air power stopped Slobodan Milošević’s reign of terror at little cost to NATO forces—but only after a near-decade of inaction and dialogue had made possible the slaughter of tens of thousands. Affluent Western societies have often proved reluctant to use force to prevent greater future violence. “War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things,” observed the British philosopher John Stuart Mill. “The decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks that nothing is worth war is much worse.” Indeed, by ignoring history, the modern age is free to interpret war as a failure of communication, of diplomacy, of talking—as if aggressors don’t know exactly what they’re doing. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, frustrated by the Bush administration’s intransigence in the War on Terror, flew to Syria, hoping to persuade President Assad to stop funding terror in the Middle East. She assumed that Assad’s belligerence resulted from our aloofness and arrogance rather than from his dictatorship’s interest in destroying democracy in Lebanon and Iraq, before such contagious freedom might in fact destroy him. For a therapeutically inclined generation raised on Oprah and Dr. Phil—and not on the letters of William Tecumseh Sherman and William Shirer’s Berlin Diary—problems between states, like those in our personal lives, should be argued about by equally civilized and peaceful rivals, and so solved without resorting to violence. Yet it’s hard to find many wars that result from miscommunication. Far more often they break out because of malevolent intent and the absence of deterrence. Margaret Atwood also wrote in her poem: “Wars happen because the ones who start them / think they can win.” Hitler did; so did Mussolini and Tojo—and their assumptions were logical, given the relative disarmament of the Western democracies at the time. Bin Laden attacked on September 11 not because there was a dearth of American diplomats willing to dialogue with him in the Hindu Kush. Instead, he recognized that a series of Islamic terrorist assaults against U.S. interests over two decades had met with no meaningful reprisals, and concluded that decadent Westerners would never fight, whatever the provocation—or that, if we did, we would withdraw as we had from Mogadishu. In the twenty-first century, it’s easier than ever to succumb to technological determinism, the idea that science, new weaponry, and globalization have altered the very rules of war. But military history teaches us that our ability to strike a single individual from 30,000 feet up with a GPS bomb or a jihadist’s efforts to have his propaganda beamed to millions in real time do not necessarily transform the conditions that determine who wins and who loses wars. True, instant communications may compress decision making, and generals must be skilled at news conferences that can now influence the views of millions worldwide. Yet these are really just new wrinkles on the old face of war. The improvised explosive device versus the up-armored Humvee is simply an updated take on the catapult versus the stone wall or the harquebus versus the mailed knight. The long history of war suggests no static primacy of the defensive or the offensive, or of one sort of weapon over the other, but just temporary advantages gained by particular strategies and technologies that go unanswered for a time by less adept adversaries. So it’s highly doubtful, the study of war tells us, that a new weapon will emerge from the Pentagon or anywhere else that will change the very nature of armed conflict—unless some sort of genetic engineering so alters man’s brain chemistry that he begins to act in unprecedented ways. We fought the 1991 Gulf War with dazzling, computer-enhanced weaponry. But lost in the technological pizzazz was the basic wisdom that we need to fight wars with political objectives in mind and that, to conclude them decisively, we must defeat and even humiliate our enemies, so that they agree to abandon their prewar behavior. For some reason, no American general or diplomat seemed to understand that crucial point 16 years ago, with the result that, on the cessation of hostilities, Saddam Hussein’s supposedly defeated generals used their gunships to butcher Kurds and Shiites while Americans looked on. And because we never achieved the war’s proper aim—ensuring that Iraq would not use its petro-wealth to destroy the peace of the region—we have had to fight a second war of no-fly zones, and then a third war to remove Saddam, and now a fourth war, of counterinsurgency, to protect the fledgling Iraqi democracy. Military history reminds us of important anomalies and paradoxes. When Sparta invaded Attica in the first spring of the Peloponnesian war, Thucydides recounts, it expected the Athenians to surrender after a few short seasons of ravaging. They didn’t—but a plague that broke out unexpectedly did more damage than thousands of Spartan ravagers did. Twenty-seven years later, a maritime Athens lost the war at sea to Sparta, an insular land power that started the conflict with scarcely a navy. The 2003 removal of Saddam refuted doom-and-gloom critics who predicted thousands of deaths and millions of refugees, just as the subsequent messy four-year reconstruction hasn’t evolved as anticipated into a quiet, stable democracy—to say the least. The size of armies doesn’t guarantee battlefield success: the victors at Salamis, Issos, Mexico City, and Lepanto were all outnumbered. War’s most savage moments—the Allied summer offensive of 1918, the Russian siege of Berlin in the spring of 1945, the Battle of the Bulge, Hiroshima—often unfold right before hostilities cease. And democratic leaders during war—think of Winston Churchill, Harry Truman, and Richard Nixon—often leave office either disgraced or unpopular. It would be reassuring to think that the righteousness of a cause, or the bravery of an army, or the nobility of a sacrifice ensures public support for war. But military history shows that far more often the perception of winning is what matters. Citizens turn abruptly on any leaders deemed culpable for losing. “Public sentiment is everything,” wrote Abraham Lincoln. “With public sentiment nothing can fail. Without it nothing can succeed. He who molds opinion is greater than he who enacts laws.” Lincoln knew that lesson well. Gettysburg and Vicksburg were brilliant Union victories that by summer 1863 had restored Lincoln’s previously shaky credibility. But a year later, after the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Petersburg, and Cold Harbor battles—Cold Harbor claimed 7,000 Union lives in 20 minutes—the public reviled him. Neither Lincoln nor his policies had changed, but the Confederate ability to kill large numbers of Union soldiers had. Ultimately, public opinion follows the ups and downs—including the perception of the ups and downs—of the battlefield, since victory excites the most ardent pacifist and defeat silences the most zealous zealot. After the defeat of France, the losses to Bomber Command, the U-boat rampage, and the fall of Greece, Singapore, and Dunkirk, Churchill took the blame for a war as seemingly lost as, a little later, it seemed won by the brilliant prime minister after victories in North Africa, Sicily, and Normandy. When the successful military action against Saddam Hussein ended in April 2003, over 70 percent of the American people backed it, with politicians and pundits alike elbowing each other aside to take credit for their prescient support. Four years of insurgency later, Americans oppose a now-orphaned war by the same margin. General George S. Patton may have been uncouth, but he wasn’t wrong when he bellowed, “Americans love a winner and will not tolerate a loser.” The American public turned on the Iraq War not because of Cindy Sheehan or Michael Moore but because it felt that the battlefield news had turned uniformly bad and that the price in American lives and treasure for ensuring Iraqi reform was too dear. Finally, military history has the moral purpose of educating us about past sacrifices that have secured our present freedom and security. If we know nothing of Shiloh, Belleau Wood, Tarawa, and Chosun, the crosses in our military cemeteries are just pleasant white stones on lush green lawns. They no longer serve as reminders that thousands endured pain and hardship for our right to listen to what we wish on our iPods and to shop at Wal-Mart in safety—or that they expected future generations, links in this great chain of obligation, to do the same for those not yet born. The United States was born through war, reunited by war, and saved from destruction by war. No future generation, however comfortable and affluent, should escape that terrible knowledge. What, then, can we do to restore the study of war to its proper place in the life of the American mind? The challenge isn’t just to reform the graduate schools or the professoriate, though that would help. On a deeper level, we need to reexamine the larger forces that have devalued the very idea of military history—of war itself. We must abandon the naive faith that with enough money, education, or good intentions we can change the nature of mankind so that conflict, as if by fiat, becomes a thing of the past. In the end, the study of war reminds us that we will never be gods. We will always just be men, it tells us. Some men will always prefer war to peace; and other men, we who have learned from the past, have a moral obligation to stop them.

**D) Fairness is a voting issue because it’s the foundation of debate and improves the quality of argument**

# MILITARY EDUCATION 1AR

**Extend our Hansen evidence—public education about the details of military operations is critical to engage the military and rein in those who would push towards war—the impact is extinction.**

**And, their critique does not access the same education—detailed discussions of military operations are necessary, not just relationships between war and other issues**

**Kagan 2006** (Fred, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “Why Military History Matters,” June, http://www.aei.org/outlook/24600)

To the extent that universities offer courses on military history, moreover, they are more likely to be “war and society” courses than studies of operational military history. The difference is extremely important. “War and society,” also sometimes called “new military history” (although it is by now decades old), normally studies everything about war except for war itself: how soldiers are recruited or conscripted, how they feel about war, how they and others write about it, how war affects society, politics and economics, gender and war, and so on. These studies are worthy and valid, and their conclusions can be very important. They are not a substitute, however, for the serious study of war itself. Like any major area of human endeavor, the study of war has its own language and set of concepts. The minutiae of the military language--unit sizes and nomenclature, acronyms and abbreviations, typologies of military activity--are obscure enough to confuse casual observers. Thus throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom, correspondents embedded with military units sometimes misidentified those units because they did not understand the abstruse system of nomenclature the military uses. They can be excused for the error: probably few people outside the military could explain the hierarchical relationship of brigades, regiments, battalions, squadrons, troops, and companies.[4] The deeper and more important concepts are even less accessible. Words commonly used in daily speech, such as “strategy,” “operations,” and “tactics,” have technical meanings in the military lexicon different from their ordinary usage. The “Battle of Stalingrad,” for example, was really an operational-level undertaking (the Soviets, in fact, called it “Operation Uranus”). “Operation Iraqi Freedom” took place at the strategic level, whereas “Operation Anaconda” (conducted as part of “Operation Enduring Freedom,” the strategic-level attack on the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan) was a tactical mission. It normally takes West Point cadets the better part of a semester devoted to the study of the military art to understand this language. Recent fascination with the idea of change and new approaches in warfare have larded military-speak with even more opaque phrases: “effects-based operations,” “network-centric warfare,” “system-of-systems,” “revolution in military affairs,” and so on. Military experts both civilian and uniformed toss such phrases around with abandon, but they convey little to the uninitiated. Yet the U.S. government is now spending billions of dollars on “system-of-systems” systems in order to use “network-centric warfare” concepts to implement “effects-based operations.” The voter and taxpayer can make no sound judgment about the choices of the nation’s leaders without understanding these concepts and the historical context from which they emerge. That context can only emerge from the study of war itself in the form of operational military history, military theory, and the study of contemporary operations. Studies of “war and society” will not suffice here.[5]

**Only debates about the details of military operations solve our education arguments—this is critical to functioning democracy that reigns in military excess and media exposure isn’t enough**

**Kagan 2006** (Fred, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “Why Military History Matters,” June, http://www.aei.org/outlook/24600)

Attentive readers might well wonder how it could be said that Americans pay inadequate attention to military history, given the vast market for books, movies, and television shows about the Civil War, Vietnam, World War II and the Greatest Generation, and, now, the Persian Gulf wars. The media that supply this market generally fall into yet another category of military history: “face of battle” studies. Movies such as Saving Private Ryan in this generation (or Apocalypse Now in the generation now controlling America’s universities) exemplify this category. Their theme, stated openly or implicitly, is that war can only be understood by seeing it through the eyes of the common soldier, with all the fear, confusion, violence, and gore that supposedly dominate his (or her) viewpoint. War is about killing, pain, and fear, and attempts to portray it otherwise, some have argued, are not merely wrong, but even immoral. Such images of war subtly (sometimes grossly) distort the view of war even of the common soldier.[6] They are extremely unhelpful as tools to educate the electorate about military matters. War is not simply killing, death, and fear. It is the purposeful use of force to achieve political goals. Anyone who thinks that this statement is hairsplitting has not spoken with America’s soldiers and Marines, who make it clear with virtually every statement that they understand the political consequences of their every decision and action. The exceptions invariably prove the rule: those who mistreated prisoners at Abu Ghraib received no defense or support from their comrades-in-arms; the predominant reaction in the army was disgust at their actions and resentment at the damage they had done to the mission. If such presentations of war distort the actual experience of it even at the lowest ranks, they are almost invariably vague about the higher goals the operations they describe are supposed to achieve, the concepts that generated those goals, the interaction with the enemy (who usually appears as a black box, sometimes sympathetic, sometimes antipathetic, frequently without any real meaning at all), and the real reasons behind anything that is actually happening. They have helped convince many that war is a senseless undertaking--as, indeed, it is when shorn of any of the real motivations and complexities that actually shape it. The current conflict is not without its skillful chroniclers. Sean Naylor (Not a Good Day To Die) and F. J. “Bing” West (No True Glory) have written superb works that place the day-to-day activities of soldiers and Marines into their larger contexts. Even these excellent studies are not enough by themselves to serve as adequate instruction in the military art, however. Because they are contemporary histories, they cannot provide the larger context or significance of the events they describe since the outcome of the struggle is not yet known. For similar reasons, even these authors’ courageous efforts to understand the enemy’s viewpoint and actions can only be incomplete when the conflict is still underway. From the standpoint of helping Americans understand war in enough complexity to make informed decisions at the polls or of giving future civilian leaders the tools they will need to shape and control their military, there is simply no substitute for solid education. It should not be necessary to make this argument. After all, no one would be willing to turn control of the Federal Reserve over to people who had simply watched movies about business and read a few accounts of business leaders and prominent corporations. Congressmen are frequently former businessmen or lawyers--people whom the electorate trusts to know the main subjects their leaders will have to address. This might be an argument for preferring veterans for elected and appointed positions, but the establishment of all-volunteer armed forces in the 1970s has severely contracted the pool of such potential candidates. Nor is it entirely clear that a brief tour as a conscripted eighteen-year-old private actually prepares someone to rule on issues of grand strategy decades later. Since it is neither possible nor desirable to insist that political leaders be selected from among the military’s senior officers, it becomes a fundamental civic duty of colleges and universities to offer serious military history courses to their students. Winning this battle will not be easy. Many within the academic community imagine that anyone who studies war must also approve of war--as though oncologists must naturally approve of cancer or virologists of AIDS. Even among those who are more receptive to the study of military history, trends within academia as a whole lead many to prefer “war and society” studies to operational military history. Recent decades have seen a significant increase in sociological approaches to history--studying groups of people rather than individuals, especially those thought to be historically understudied, like women and minorities. Operational military history necessarily involves a focus on individual “dead white men” whom many in the historical profession find distasteful, even apart from their feelings about the study of war.

# A2: MILITARY EDUCATION BAD/WE K THE MILITARY

**Extend our Hansen evidence—militarism will always be inevitable for some people and only detailed military knowledge can create an informed public to rein them in**

**And, our second Kagan card answers this—studying war doesn’t mean we support it any more than oncologists support cancer.**

**Studying military operations is important for everyone—it’s not a matter of supporting or opposing war**

**Kagan 2006** (Fred, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “Why Military History Matters,” June, http://www.aei.org/outlook/24600)

There are many reasons for the relatively poor position of the field of military history today. It is not important to assign blame or even to study the causes of the problem closely. What matters is to recognize that fixing the problem is an urgent national security priority and should be important to those interested in the welfare of the nation on both sides of the aisle. Those--like President Bush--who believe that military operations play a critical role in the current struggle should easily see the importance of this study. Those--like many of his opponents--who would prefer a reduced role for the military, should also support the study and teaching of war as the best way to prepare a future generation of leaders to be able to exercise civilian control of the military. This problem should not be a partisan issue or even an ideological one. Solving it is simply an essential precondition to maintaining a healthy democratic process in a time of danger and conflict.

# A2: CRITIQUE SOLVES MIL EDU

**Our Kagan evidence answers this—operational studies of war are critical, not the relationships between war and other topics—this is a reason why debates over the plan’s implementation and strategy matter but their critique doesn’t solve this.**

**And, operational study is critical to solve all of their arguments—you can’t critique war if you don’t know what’s actually happening and what alternatives are available.**

# STRATEGY DEBATE GOOD--DEMOCRACY

**Detailed knowledge of military strategy is critical for American democracy—failure to learn operational details allows the military to control politics and kill civilians**

**Kagan 2006** (Fred, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “Why Military History Matters,” June, http://www.aei.org/outlook/24600)

Far from being simply an academic study, military history powerfully shapes the way decision-makers and the American public think about the war in which we are engaged. It is both unfortunate and dangerous, therefore, that so little serious operational military history is being written and taught in the United States today. \* In a cabinet meeting to plan the 2001 attack on Afghanistan, advisers argued against using American ground forces because of the nationalistic uprisings that resulted from the British invasions in the 19th century and the Soviet invasion of 1979. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice argued that U.S. forces should take Kabul since the Soviets had never done so.[1] \* Defending his vision of military transformation in the wake of that war, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld cited the German experience in World War II, which showed, he argued, that a partially transformed military could revolutionize warfare.[2] \* American military officers discussing options in Iraq today continually cite the experiences of T. E. Lawrence, especially his declaration that one must teach Arabs what to do, rather than do it for them.[3] In these and many other cases, military history or, rather, a fairly simplistic and distorted understanding of it, has had profound practical consequences for American policy. The citizens of a democracy must have a basic understanding of the issues confronting their state in order to choose their leaders wisely. Those leaders must have a much more sophisticated understanding in order to choose and execute their policies well. This fact is nowhere more important than in the realm of warfare, in which the lives of soldiers and civilians--friendly, enemy, and neutral alike--hang on almost every decision. Civilian control of the military, moreover, rests on the ability of civilian leaders and the electorate to understand the military issues before them. It is easy for military officers to rely on tortuous, acronym-laden PowerPoint presentations to obscure matters if their civilian masters do not speak their language. It is also easy for anyone with a vision and the ability to mine history for pseudo-examples thereby to persuade those who might know better, if only they were armed with a better understanding of the past. It is becoming commonplace to argue that the United States cannot succeed in the long war against terrorism without developing a cadre of people who speak the languages and understand the cultures. It is even more important to develop leaders and voters who understand war. The examples offered above highlight this problem. All were historical factoids taken out of their context and thereby distorted to “prove” points that they do not, in fact, support. The Afghans bitterly resisted both the British and the Soviet invasions because of their overtly imperialistic nature. In the first case, Afghan leaders had been resisting British encroachments for decades. In the second, the Soviets invaded to support a deeply hated government (which already faced a massive insurgency), whose leader the Soviets immediately executed and replaced with their own puppet--who continued to pursue policies rejected by the overwhelming majority of the population. Popular resistance to such invasions was in no way surprising. It had nothing whatsoever to do with the way the Afghans received American troops, however, who removed a broadly unpopular government (facing an insurgency of its own), sought to “impose” democracy, and were therefore greeted largely as liberators. This distorted history powerfully and wrongly shaped American policy in Afghanistan. Rumsfeld’s praise for the Wehrmacht’s partial transformation was also misplaced. It is true that the Wehrmacht crushed Poland and France in 1939 and 1940 with only a handful of panzer divisions. The rest of the army was little different from World War I infantry (apart from the important addition of a powerful Luftwaffe that had not existed in the First World War). But the same partially transformed Wehrmacht then failed utterly in its 1941 invasion of Russia, and the incompleteness of the transformation played a vital role in that failure. Put bluntly, it is much harder to walk from the Polish frontier to Moscow than from the Belgian border to Calais, and the Germans could not make a go of it, despite their vaunted panzers. Selecting the first part of this history and discarding the rest provides a comforting anecdote, but actually undermines the overall argument. The words of T. E. Lawrence bouncing around CENTCOM today are also largely inappropriate to the situation. Lawrence, after all, was engaged in fomenting rebellion, not suppressing one, and the difference in aim leads to a major difference in method. For one thing, time is generally on the side of the revolutionaries, who can normally afford to wait until they have mastered the necessary skills before engaging their enemies. Time works against a sitting government under attack, however, since every explosion and every death undermines that government’s legitimacy. Some tasks, such as the establishment of security, really cannot be put off until the government has learned how to accomplish them itself--at least, not without seriously endangering the establishment of a stable government at all. These problems were much less intense for Lawrence and his Arabian insurgents (who also benefited from the military destruction of the empire they were attacking by outside forces--something else that makes the task of the insurgent much easier). The abuse of military history is thus no purely academic problem, although the solution must be academic in the first instance. There is, unfortunately, little ground for imagining that future generations will find leaders who understand military history better than those currently in power. The study of military history in America’s colleges and universities today is seriously curtailed and itself distorted, and there has been far too little national attention paid to this problem to date.

**Democratic institutions demand debate on the military**

**Fiala 2004** (Andrew Fiala is assistant professor of philosophy and humanistic studies at the University of Wisconsin-Green Bay. He is the author of The Philosopher's Voice: Philosophy, Politics, and Language in the 19th Century. Citizenship, Epistemology, and the Just War Theory, Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 7.2 (2004) 100-117, LEQ)

In this paper, I will argue that ordinary citizens of democracies should be strongly committed to pacifism in practice. The argument is based on the principles of the just war tradition and a political analysis of the division of labor in society. The idea that pacifist conclusions can be drawn from just war thinking has come under fire lately from just war theorists who reject the idea that the very principles of the just war tradition could lead to pacifism. The just war tradition is committed to the idea of producing justice through a moral use of appropriately limited violent means. I have no doubt that occasionally some violence is necessary in the real world. The problem I focus on here is whether ordinary citizens are able to judge whether military force is justifiable. I argue that most of us are not in a position to make this judgment. From this I conclude that we should err on the side of peace. This conclusion may sound like the naïve view of a cloistered college professor, who does not understand the complexities of military power. Such an ad hominem objection to the idea of "just war pacifism" has been made recently by Keith Pavlischek—a Gulf War veteran [End Page 100] and a colonel in the Marine Reserves. Pavlischek argues that the just war tradition focuses on providing a normative ground for statecraft, providing guidance for military leaders, and offering guidance for individuals as they decide whether to support the use of force. He concludes that judgment about the justice of war "rests with those who have the competence to render such judgments. Put bluntly, the judgment resides with those who know what they are talking about. In almost every instance, that does not include bishops, theologians, and professors."1 Pavlischek is undoubtedly right about the fact that it is ultimately up to our military and civilian leaders to decide whether a given war is just because they have access to the necessary information and expertise to make the judgment. However, this still leaves the rest of us with the problem of deciding whether to support the judgments made by our leaders. Pavlischek recognizes this: "For most Americans . . . the just war tradition illuminates the responsibilities of citizens in a self-governing democracy under God."2 However, he does not recognize the complexity of this claim. The division of labor in society includes a division of responsibility for judgment. Moreover, democratic institutions allow—indeed, demand—debate and disagreement among and between the parts of society. The responsibility of a citizen in a self-governing democracy is not simply to acquiesce in light of the expertise of our leaders. Rather, our duty is to question and demand proof, especially in light of actions that have momentous moral implications, such as the question of whether to support the use of military force.

# ACCOUNTABILITY INTERNAL LINK

Our discussions are vital to maintain civilian control of the military

Kohn ’97 (Richard H. Kohn, Professor of history and chairman of the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. An expanded version of this essay appears as "The Forgotten Fundamentals of Civilian Control of the Military in Democratic Government," Working Paper 11 in the Project on Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, and will be published in a volume of essays on civilian control in small democracies sponsored by the Arias Center for Peace and Reconciliation, San José, Costa Rica., “How Democracies Control the Military”, Project Muse, 1997, LEQ)

If civilian control is a process, and its measure is the relative influence of the military over policy, then civilians and military personnel have to work together day after day, week after week, year after year**.** Competent, effective, and courageous civilian officials are indispensable to civilian control: men and women who understand the military ethos, treat those who wear the uniform with courtesy, contest them when necessary, and protect their professionalism when others in the political arena attempt to gain partisan advantage by using or abusing the military leadership. Senior officers fear being stuck with the blame for policies or operations that fail not because of military mistakes, but because of decisions by politicians. Some degree o**f** [End Page 152] confidence must be built up on both sides; that, too, is highly situational, and rests in the hands of individual officials and officers when they begin their working relationships. Military leaders need direct access to the highest authority in the land; they need to be respected and their counsel must be sought. Civilian leaders, whatever their background, must come to know enough about military affairs to gain sympathy for the military's professional needs, obligations, requirements, and perspectives. But they must be tough enough to oppose military judgments when necessary and make their authority felt in spite of the political risk. They will need the backing of the voters. Civilian control must be accepted as axiomatic by the military, the political leadership, and the populace. Military subordination to civilian authority must be supported actively and vocally by the organs of opinion: the media, the universities, political parties, commercial and professional associations, and others. Without a vigilant press and a widespread public understanding of the nature and importance of civilian control, it can appear to be functioning properly but in actuality be quite weak.

# ACCOUNTABILITY GOOD

**Active public discussion holds the military and government together**

**Kohn 97**, Richard, PhD, Professor of History and Peace, War, and Defense, “How Democracies Control the Military”, Journal of Democracy, Volume 8, Number 4, October 1997, pp. 140-153, Project MUSE

A second foundation for civilian control lies in the operating mechanisms of government--the methods by which civilian authority rules military forces. If they are to function as an expression of the whole society's will, their subordination must be to the entire governmental structure, not simply to the incumbent president or prime minister. Divided control does contain dangers. The military can become adept at boosting its own influence by playing civilian authorities against one another. But separation of authority reduces the possibility that the executive could use the army to overturn the constitution or coerce the legislature. Accountability to **the legislature implies accountability to the people, forcing public discussion and scrutiny of defense policy, budgets, and cases of military mistakes** or malfeasance. Active parliamentary oversight makes military affairs more transparent, and should actually strengthen national defense by reinforcing military identification with the people and popular identification with the military. The judiciary plays a supporting but indispensable role, holding members of the military personally accountable to law.

**Civil-military relations are a constant struggle—popular understanding of military affairs is necessary to maintain civilian control**

**Kohn ’97** (Richard H. Kohn, Professor of history and chairman of the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. An expanded version of this essay appears as "The Forgotten Fundamentals of Civilian Control of the Military in Democratic Government," Working Paper 11 in the Project on Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, and will be published in a volume of essays on civilian control in small democracies sponsored by the Arias Center for Peace and Reconciliation, San José, Costa Rica., “How Democracies Control the Military”, Project Muse, 1997, LEQ)

Sometimes, where civilian control is weak or nonexistent, military influence laps over into other areas of public policy and social life. Even in mature democracies that have long practiced civilian control, the balance between military and civilian varies with time and place, with the personalities involved, with the personal or political ambitions of senior military officers and leading politicians, and with the circumstances that give the military prestige and weight in public opinion. Even in those democracies with rich traditions of unbroken civilian dominance, war and security can (and have) become so important in national life and so central to the definition of the state that the military, particularly during or after a crisis or war, can use its expertise or [End Page 143] public standing to limit civilian influence in military affairs. But even beyond such circumstances, civilian control depends frequently on the individuals involved: how each side views its role and function; the public respect or popularity possessed by a particular politician or political institution or military officer or armed force; the bureaucratic or political skill of the various officials. If civilian control of the military is a process defined by the relative influence of civilian and military officials, then the central issue confronting scholars and policy makers today is how to judge the extent to which civilian control exists, how well it functions, and whether it is sufficient for democratic governance. Ultimately, civilian control rests upon a set of ideas, institutions, and behaviors that has developed over time in democratic societies. Together, these practices check the likelihood that the military will interfere in political life; they form a system that provides civilian officials with both the authority and the machinery to exercise supremacy in military affairs. Civilian control contains inherent tensions and still suffers periodic strains and lapses, but the system can be introduced and made to function in almost any country where democracy begins to take root.

# CIVILIAN CONTROL IMPACT

**Military dominance destroys democracy and reduces citizenship to national security—turns their impacts**

**Kohn ’97** (Richard H. Kohn, Professor of history and chairman of the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. An expanded version of this essay appears as "The Forgotten Fundamentals of Civilian Control of the Military in Democratic Government," Working Paper 11 in the Project on Post-Cold War Civil-Military Relations, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, and will be published in a volume of essays on civilian control in small democracies sponsored by the Arias Center for Peace and Reconciliation, San José, Costa Rica., “How Democracies Control the Military”, Project Muse, 1997, LEQ)

Among the oldest problems of human governance has been that of securing the subordination of military forces to political authority. In the twentieth century alone, civilian control of the military has been a concern of democracies like the United States and France, of communist tyrannies such as the Soviet Union and China, of fascist dictatorships in Germany and Italy, and since 1945, of many smaller states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Whether--and how--a society controls those who possess the ultimate power of physical coercion, and ensures their loyalty both to the particular government in power and to the regime in general, is basic to democratic governance. Civilian control has special significance today. Throughout the postcommunist world, societies are struggling to build democratic institutions. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has declared civilian control a prerequisite for membership. In encouraging democratization, the United States and other Western powers use civilian control as a measure of progress toward democracy. While democracy is spreading in South and Central America, and in Europe, Asia, and Africa, there exists no set of standards by which to evaluate whether civilian control exists, how well it functions, and what the prognosis is for its continued success. Control by civilians presents two challenges. For mature democracies, [End Page 140] where civilian control has historically been strong and military establishments have focused on external defense, the test is whether civilians can exercise supremacy in military policy and decision making--that is, frame the alternatives and define the discussion, as well as make the final choice. When the military enjoys great prestige, possesses advanced bureaucratic skills, believes that its ability to fulfill its mission may be at risk, or comes to doubt the civilian leadership, civilians can face great obstacles in exercising their authority. Fledgling democracies, with scant experience in combining popular government and civilian control, face a tougher challenge. They must ensure that the military will not attempt a coup d'état, or otherwise defy civilian authority. In many former autocracies, the military has concentrated on internal order or been deeply involved in politics, sometimes preying on society rather than protecting it. There the chief requirement is to establish a tradition of civilian control, to make the military establishment politically neutral, and to prevent or preclude any possibility of military intervention in political life. The task will still remain to establish civilian control over national security policy and decision making. But in the new democracies, civilian efforts to gain supremacy over military affairs risk provoking military defiance, or, if public opinion does not support the civilians, perhaps even military intervention. What are the common characteristics or experiences that have, historically, fostered civilian control under democracy? While this essay is based mostly on Western and particularly Anglo-American experience, the analysis applies to any society that practices, or is making the transition to practicing, government based upon the sovereignty and will of the people. For democracy, civilian control--that is, control of the military by civilian officials elected by the people--is fundamental. Civilian control allows a nation to base its values, institutions, and practices on the popular will rather than on the choices of military leaders, whose outlook by definition focuses on the need for internal order and external security. The military is, by necessity, among the least democratic institutions in human experience; martial customs and procedures clash by nature with individual freedom and civil liberty, the highest values in democratic societies. Because their basic purpose is to wage armed conflict, military institutions are designed for violence and coercion, and over the centuries have developed the organizational structure, operating procedures, and individual values needed to succeed in war. Authority in the military emphasizes hierarchy so that individuals and units act according to the intentions of commanders, and can succeed under the very worst of physical circumstances and mental stresses. While many of the military's professional values--courage, honesty, [End Page 141] sacrifice, integrity, loyalty, service--are among the most respected in human experience, the norms and processes intrinsic to military institutions diverge so far from the premises of democratic society that the relationship is inherently adversarial and sometimes unstable. Military behaviors are functional imperatives. If society were to be governed by the personal ideals or institutional perspectives of the military, developed over centuries to support service to the state and sacrifice in war, then each individual citizen (and the national purpose) would become subservient to national security--to the exclusion, or at least the devaluation, of other needs and concerns. The point of civilian control is to make security subordinate to the larger purposes of a nation, rather than the other way around. The purpose of the military is to defend society, not to define it. While a country may have civilian control of the military without democracy, it cannot have democracy without civilian control.

# INFORMATION PROCESSING IMPACT—MILITARY

**Media images are biased and overwhelming—learning to process information about military deployment is vital to a working democracy**

**Viola 2006** (James, Lt. Col., US Army, “what is the proper role of public opinion in the decision to use

Military force as an element of national power,” http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2967/ksil525.pdf)

According to Lippman, the media, at their best, gives us representations, pictures of an outside world we do not directly see or experience. Ideally, radio, television, print, and most recently the internet, will provide its followers with quality, unbiased information by reporting researched facts so the public can utilize it to make decisions and form opinions. One must remember that someone or some group is behind the release of this information that may have their own agendas. Most people claim that they get their news from the television rather than the newspaper. Although recent evidence shows people over report their reliance on television as their main source of news.28 Watching television or listening to the radio news is a more passive form of attention. While newspaper reading takes more concentration and the reader comprehends at their own pace which increases retention and comprehension. By taking advantage of all media outlets on a regular basis you can be well informed and capable of making educated decisions on political issues. The mass media not only can influence people on specific issues but they have the ability to influence what issues the public deems as important. In its most basic form, the evidence shows that for the most major public issues, most of the public begins to pay attention after they have been reported in newspaper and television.29 Bernard Cohen, political scientist, stated, " The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about."30 How much the public is interested in events and issues is for the most part proportional to how much news coverage the issues get.31 Once an event finds itself a top issue in the media, it also becomes an issue discussed among citizens. The media lends itself to communication among its readers and through public consideration and discourse, opinions are shaped and voiced. It is also commonplace for organized interest groups - including corporations and government agencies and other elites - to try to influence the press and by that the public agenda.32 Even though we rely on the media to report impartially, or at least to sift through the mounds of information and report credible material, the stories still come form sources with their own motives. For instance, a politician may call the press to inform them of detrimental information he discovered about his opponent. Is this news, yes, but the information was told for specific purposes, to benefit his own popular standing by making his opponent look bad. There is an overload of information on a daily basis that we are bombarded with from the media. It is impossible to take on all the issues at the same time and give them all equal attention. We, as a nation, choose to take time with the issues that have a direct impact on our lives. Why is it that during the Somalia deployment not every American could regurgitate particulars about this issue? It received plenty of news and media coverage to warrant public attention. It was a national military involvement but not high on every American's priority list. The United States' involvement in Somalia did not affect every American the same. Those who had loved ones deployed had more vested in the Somalia operation and paid closer attention to the details and daily activity. Although public opinion is a vital part of democracy and foreign policy, does not mean that just because every American does not possess detailed knowledge on all political issues that public opinion is any less important.

# PUBLIC OPINION IMPACT—WAR

**Public opinion has a direct influence on military deployments for good or for ill—failure to encourage good education about military operations results in endless war**

**Viola 2006** (James, Lt. Col., US Army, “what is the proper role of public opinion in the decision to use

Military force as an element of national power,” http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/papers/pmt/exhibits/2967/ksil525.pdf)

In this regard, neither Bush’s decision to launch Operation Restore Hope nor Clinton's decision to withdraw troops was decided in a vacuum. In each of these cases, public opinion had become increasingly critical and disenchanted with established policies over several months.47 Although domestic discontent formed the back drop of policy and in some sense restrained the range of choices available to Bush and Clinton, both White House decisions nonetheless demonstrated the importance of presidential politics in understanding the final policy choice.48 It is hard to see how the United States' foreign policy could avoid having a humanitarian edge. If the president did not put it there, American voters, watching the ghastly events on CNN, soon would.49 Although it took the American government months to get involved in the humanitarian efforts in Somalia, it only took four days to withdraw due to public outpouring. As mentioned previously, 70% of those polled believed that sending troops was even "worth the possible loss of American lives." Yet, as soon as lives were lost, the American people were outraged and Clinton made his decisions based on public emotions. That is what makes the Somalia precedent so worrisome as we look at what is happening with the handling of Iraq today. If the United States abandons its own security interests as the standard by which to decide whether to use military force, there is virtually no limit to the possible arenas in which American lives my be sacrificed. Washington will have foreign policy determined by emotions. Where and when we intervene will be determined by television images of suffering or the lobbying skills of foreign political factions, not the relevance of the stakes to the security of the American republic.50 The debate over these issues as you can see, is not a new one. It continues to take place generally along two axes: one concerns the distinction between practical considerations, the other concerns the realist-liberal dimension. Representative democracy is built upon the notion that public opinion underpins public policy. The reality of this remains an empirically open question and the real role of public opinion in the formulation of foreign, security and defense policy can be, and often has been, questioned. While most students of foreign policy agree that the willingness and ability of democratic governments to involve their military in international conflicts will indeed be affected in some way by public opinion, the implications of this have always been controversial. From a normative perspective, the role public opinion ought to play in the formulation of foreign policy can therefore also be questioned, sometimes challenging the ideals of representative democracy. Although the sensitivity to political response fully corresponds to democratic ideals, it has often been questioned, for instance, whether it would be wise for governments to pay more attention to the opinion and demands of the population when it comes to foreign and security policy decisions. Public opinion has only played a minor role in considerations of national security policy research. Yet politicians clearly seem to respect, fear and try to manipulate public opinion. Academics and politicians alike seem to feel that the role of public opinion in security matters is of relatively minor importance, but the pragmatic politicians are much more concerned with the general mood of the issue or hot button. In an indirect manner, this mood does seem to influence policy decisions, even though our government was designed for inefficiencies to prevent rapid change based on emotions.

\*\*\*ROLE PLAYING

# ROLE PLAYING 1NC (K aff)

**Debate should be an academic exercise where the Affirmative plays the role of the federal government and the Negative negates this plan in any way they choose. This creates a competitive space to imagine new ideas and translate them into practical suggestions—playing devil’s advocate challenges the status quo and results in emancipatory change**

**ANDREWS 2006** (Peter, Consulting Faculty Member at the IBM Executive Business Institute in Palisades, New York, Executive Technology Report, August, www-935.ibm.com/services/us/bcs/pdf/g510-6313-etr-unlearn-to-innovate.pdf)

High stakes innovation requires abandoning conventional wisdom, even actively unlearning things we “know” are true. As science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke said, “The only way of discovering the limits of the possible is to venture a little way past them into the impossible.” 1 Venturing into the impossible carries many risks: discouragement, failure, loss of reputation and even ridicule. The trials of innovators – those who had the courage to be disruptive – are the stuff of legends. But their contributions have changed our world. Not everyone aspires to innovations that are high impact. Small but profitable innovations are welcome and essential contributors to the growth and well-being of corporations and societies. But, even if your goal is modest, a look at unlearning can be of value since taking even a few steps at unlearning can lead to fresh ideas. In an article, William Starbuck of New York University said, “learning often cannot occur until after there has been unlearning. Unlearning is a process that shows people they should no longer rely on their current beliefs and methods.” But, how do we unlearn? Five steps seem to be essential. We need to: 1) Create space for thinking 2) Play with ideas 3) Dare to believe that the impossible ideas might be true 4) Adapt the ideas to useful contexts 5) Take action, despite objections of experts and authorities. Create space for thinking A classic Far Side cartoon shows a student raising his hand, asking to be excused because his brain is full. In these days of information overload, most of us have the same problem. We have been exposed to huge numbers of ideas, often at a rate that makes analysis and selection difficult. How do we put these aside? One technique is to list what we “know” about a subject. Then challenge each one. What happens if you exaggerate the statement? What are the drawbacks? Does it become absurd? What does the world look like if the opposite is true? Conventional wisdom at many levels – from the humors theory of disease to the inevitability of slavery, to the spoke and hub design of airlines – has been successfully challenged. The unthinkable has become thinkable, and then the world has changed. The purpose of questioning is both to clear away clutter and create doubt. Starbuck focuses on this and suggests that we stop thinking of things – theories, products and processes – as finished. He says we should “start from the premises that current beliefs and methods are ‘not good enough’ or ‘merely experimental’.” 3 This is an emancipating concept, but there is still work to do. What can be put into the empty space that was created? This is where popular tricks for generating ideas can be valuable. Play with ideas The classic technique for idea generation is a freewheeling, nonjudgmental brainstorming session. And, bringing in people with different knowledge and perspectives can help push the limits. To push even further, the process can be made competitive, using Red Team approaches (Red Teams assume the role of the outsider to challenge assumptions, look for unexpected alternatives and find the vulnerabilities of a new idea or approach).

**This interpretation is good—**

**First, switch-side debate—only our interpretation guarantees that we take positions that we don’t agree with to facilitate debate on both sides. This promotes deliberation that’s key to prevent extinction**

**STANNARD 2006** (Matt, Department of Communication and Journalism, University of Wyoming, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18, http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html)

The complexity and interdependence of human society, combined with the control of political decisionmaking—and political conversation itself—in the hands of fewer and fewer technological "experts," the gradual exhaustion of material resources and the organized circumvention of newer and more innovative resource development, places humanity, and perhaps all life on earth, in a precarious position. Where we need creativity and openness, we find rigid and closed non-solutions. Where we need masses of people to make concerned investments in their future, we find (understandable) alienation and even open hostility to political processes. The dominant classes manipulate ontology to their advantage: When humanity seeks meaning, the powerful offer up metaphysical hierarchies; when concerned masses come close to exposing the structural roots of systemic oppression, the powerful switch gears and promote localized, relativistic micronarratives that discourage different groups from finding common, perhaps "universal" interests. Apocalyptic scenarios are themselves rhetorical tools, but that doesn’t mean they are bereft of material justification. The "flash-boom" of apocalyptic rhetoric isn’t out of the question, but it is also no less threatening merely as a metaphor for the slow death of humanity (and all living beings) through environmental degradation, the irradiation of the planet, or the descent into political and ethical barbarism. Indeed, these slow, deliberate scenarios ring more true than the flashpoint of quick Armageddon, but in the end the "fire or ice" question is moot, because the answers to those looming threats are still the same: The complexities of threats to our collective well-being require unifying perspectives based on diverse viewpoints, in the same way that the survival of ecosystems is dependent upon biological diversity. In Habermas’s language, we must fight the colonization of the lifeworld in order to survive at all, let alone to survive in a life with meaning. While certainly not the only way, the willingness to facilitate organized democratic deliberation, including encouraging participants to articulate views with which they may personally disagree, is one way to resist this colonization.

**Second, policy relevance—Role playing is the best way to promote critical policy analysis and well-informed students**

**SCHAAP 2005** (Andrew, University of Melbourne, Politics, Vol 25 Iss 1, February)

Learning political theory is largely about acquiring a vocabulary that enables one to reflect more critically and precisely about the terms on which human beings (do and should) co-operate for and compete over public goods, symbolic and material. As such, political theory is necessarily abstract and general. But, competency in political theory requires an ability to move from the general to the particular and back again, not simply by applying general principles to particular events and experiences but by reflecting on and rearticulating concepts in the light of the particular. Role play is an effective technique for teaching political theory because it requires that students employ political concepts in a particular context so that learning takes place as students try out new vocabularies together with their peers and a lifelong learner in the subject: their teacher.

**Third, democracy—only debates about the details of military operations solve our education arguments—this is critical to functioning democracy that reigns in military excess**

**Kagan 2006** (Fred, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, “Why Military History Matters,” June, http://www.aei.org/outlook/24600)

Attentive readers might well wonder how it could be said that Americans pay inadequate attention to military history, given the vast market for books, movies, and television shows about the Civil War, Vietnam, World War II and the Greatest Generation, and, now, the Persian Gulf wars. The media that supply this market generally fall into yet another category of military history: “face of battle” studies. Movies such as Saving Private Ryan in this generation (or Apocalypse Now in the generation now controlling America’s universities) exemplify this category. Their theme, stated openly or implicitly, is that war can only be understood by seeing it through the eyes of the common soldier, with all the fear, confusion, violence, and gore that supposedly dominate his (or her) viewpoint. War is about killing, pain, and fear, and attempts to portray it otherwise, some have argued, are not merely wrong, but even immoral. Such images of war subtly (sometimes grossly) distort the view of war even of the common soldier.[6] They are extremely unhelpful as tools to educate the electorate about military matters. War is not simply killing, death, and fear. It is the purposeful use of force to achieve political goals. Anyone who thinks that this statement is hairsplitting has not spoken with America’s soldiers and Marines, who make it clear with virtually every statement that they understand the political consequences of their every decision and action. The exceptions invariably prove the rule: those who mistreated prisoners at Abu Ghraib received no defense or support from their comrades-in-arms; the predominant reaction in the army was disgust at their actions and resentment at the damage they had done to the mission. If such presentations of war distort the actual experience of it even at the lowest ranks, they are almost invariably vague about the higher goals the operations they describe are supposed to achieve, the concepts that generated those goals, the interaction with the enemy (who usually appears as a black box, sometimes sympathetic, sometimes antipathetic, frequently without any real meaning at all), and the real reasons behind anything that is actually happening. They have helped convince many that war is a senseless undertaking--as, indeed, it is when shorn of any of the real motivations and complexities that actually shape it. The current conflict is not without its skillful chroniclers. Sean Naylor (Not a Good Day To Die) and F. J. “Bing” West (No True Glory) have written superb works that place the day-to-day activities of soldiers and Marines into their larger contexts. Even these excellent studies are not enough by themselves to serve as adequate instruction in the military art, however. Because they are contemporary histories, they cannot provide the larger context or significance of the events they describe since the outcome of the struggle is not yet known. For similar reasons, even these authors’ courageous efforts to understand the enemy’s viewpoint and actions can only be incomplete when the conflict is still underway. From the standpoint of helping Americans understand war in enough complexity to make informed decisions at the polls or of giving future civilian leaders the tools they will need to shape and control their military, there is simply no substitute for solid education. It should not be necessary to make this argument. After all, no one would be willing to turn control of the Federal Reserve over to people who had simply watched movies about business and read a few accounts of business leaders and prominent corporations. Congressmen are frequently former businessmen or lawyers--people whom the electorate trusts to know the main subjects their leaders will have to address. This might be an argument for preferring veterans for elected and appointed positions, but the establishment of all-volunteer armed forces in the 1970s has severely contracted the pool of such potential candidates. Nor is it entirely clear that a brief tour as a conscripted eighteen-year-old private actually prepares someone to rule on issues of grand strategy decades later. Since it is neither possible nor desirable to insist that political leaders be selected from among the military’s senior officers, it becomes a fundamental civic duty of colleges and universities to offer serious military history courses to their students. Winning this battle will not be easy. Many within the academic community imagine that anyone who studies war must also approve of war--as though oncologists must naturally approve of cancer or virologists of AIDS. Even among those who are more receptive to the study of military history, trends within academia as a whole lead many to prefer “war and society” studies to operational military history. Recent decades have seen a significant increase in sociological approaches to history--studying groups of people rather than individuals, especially those thought to be historically understudied, like women and minorities. Operational military history necessarily involves a focus on individual “dead white men” whom many in the historical profession find distasteful, even apart from their feelings about the study of war.

**Fourth, it turns the Aff—failure to play Devil’s advocate undermines persuasion and there’s no offense because it doesn’t cause role confusion**

**LUCKHARDT and BECHTEL 1994** (C. Grant and William, How to do Things with Logic, p 179)

This diagram indicates that first the arguers present their argument(s) for the conclusion in which they believe, here represented as A. Then the arguers formulate the best argument(s) possible for the exact opposite conclusion. If they argue in the first demonstration that, say, the best diagnosis for a patient is cholera, then as a second argumentative step the arguers will present the case for the best diagnosis not being cholera. As a third step, this strategy requires that the arguers then critique this second demonstration as well as possible. If that critique is successful, then the original demonstration stands, and the conclusion that follows is the original one, A. Why, you might wonder, would anyone ever want to engage in what may appear to be logical gymnastics? The answer is that this strategy is useful in two ways. As a method for discovering the truth of a matter, it is often extremely helpful in warding off the intellectual malady called “tunnel vision.” This is the tendency we all have to stick to our first view of a matter, failing to recognize contrary evidence as it comes in, and thus failing to revise our view to be consistent with it. In extreme cases of tunnel vision contrary evidence to one’s original view may even be noticed but be treated as confirming the original view. Requiring medical students who believe the patient has cholera to present the best case against this diagnosis will often cause them to rethink the case they had originally made. The conclusion in the end may still be the same as the original diagnosis—cholera—but now it will be a conclusion that has taken other options seriously. The devil’s advocate strategy has much to recommend in terms of its persuasiveness. Having demonstrated to your audience that you are aware of a case to be made against A, but that that case must fail, you will be perceived as having been extremely open-minded in your considerations. And you *will* have been open-minded, provided that you do not hedge in your demonstration of –A. You are not being a true devil’s advocate if your demonstration of –A is so weak that it is easily criticized in the third step. It is very tempting to hedge your demonstration of –A in this way, but also dangerous, for it invites your audience to point out that there is a better case against A than the one you have presented.

# ROLE PLAYING 2NC

**Debate should be an academic competition where the Affirmative plays the role of the federal government. This role playing is the best way to foster clash in debate and allow us to critically examine state policy. We are not Michigan State, and this is not a theory argument—we don’t establish “rules” for debate, we just make a normative statement about why our interpretation is better—we have three net benefits in the 1NC—**

**First, switch-side debate—requiring one team to play the federal government guarantees that we debate against positions that we believe and produces good clash—our Stannard evidence says this is critical to check elite domination and provide solutions to planetary extinction**

**Second, policy education—roleplaying teaches us the vocabulary of political science—that’s our Schaap evidence—that’s necessary to translate general ideas into concrete reforms that reach beyond the debate community—our Kagan evidence says this reins in the military and prevents violence**

**Third, we turn the Aff—our Luckhardt and Bechtel evidence says that the failure to play Devil’s advocate will undermine our credibility and prevent our ideas from being taken seriously—it turns role confusion because role playing allows us to correct flaws in our own thought and understand our own positions in more depth**

# ROLE PLAYING GOOD/A2: COOPTION

**Arguing against the government perspective is critical—it’s key to refining our positions and building bridges with insiders**

**GITLIN 2003** (Todd, Professor of Journalism and Sociology at Colombia and Former President of Students for a Democratic Society, Letters to a Young Activist, 96)

Insider and outsider impulses sometimes coexist and war in the same breast. Some outsiders are former insiders—Daniel Ellsberg, for example, the career Pentagon official who, in 1971, released the Pentagon Papers on Vietnam to the *Washington Post* and *New York Times*, risking a long jail sentence and reprisals by President Nixon’s operatives. Ellsberg proceeded to cross the line, devoting himself for decades to civil disobedience against American nuclear policy. Outsiders may in turn become insiders. Tom Hayden, for example, principle author of SDS’s *Port Huron Statement,* sought and held state office in California and became a powerful voice in education and environmental policy there for a quarter of a century—much longer than he spent as a student and community organizer and planner of demonstrations. Don’t accuse ex-outsiders of selling out, a charge that is not only smug, drenched as it is in moral superiority, but self-defeating, since it forswears influence and regresses to the Manichaean presumption that all will be better when *all* your outsiders displace *all* the other side’s insiders—a dubious proposition trailing Leninist fumes—or when no more insiders exist (a hallucination). Rather than hallucinate or plot coups, it behooves outsiders to contact insiders, argue with them, learn something from them, challenge them and resist the all-or-nothing temptation to demonize them. Equally it behooves insiders to listen to outsiders, not just to cool them out. Any real reformer greets you and your friends as useful allies.

# ROLE PLAYING SOLVES EXCLUSION

**Role-playing solves exclusion—it’s ideal for people with limited knowledge of the subject**

**SCHAAP 2005** (Andrew, University of Melbourne, Politics, Vol 25 Iss 1, February)

#2 Concern and respect for students and student learning: Using the role play encouraged students to express ideas in terms of the concepts associated with the particular ideology they were asked to engage with. A particular advantage of the role play was that it enabled students to learn from each other; students with different levels of competence in political theory benefited from the questions and explanations that they gave to each other. Moreover, the teacher naturally assumes a generous disposition in this situation as students ask for advice, help, clarification, etc. throughout the session. # 3 Appropriate assessment and feedback: The role play provided immediate opportunities to provide students with feedback on their ideas. Like Levy, I tended not to correct misinformation. However, I did reward students by pointing out when a particularly good point was being made. I also recorded the meeting so that students could listen to the discussion later and I posted the various draft declarations of human rights on the subject website. # 4 Clear goals and intellectual challenge: When devising the role play I was forced to articulate the learning outcomes I hoped to achieve more clearly than I had done when preparing regular lectures. This may have been related to the high-risk nature of this teaching method and my worry that students would not take it seriously if they could not see the point of it. A particular advantage of this teaching method is that it posed an intellectual challenge to students, regardless of their level of competence in the subject.

# ROLE PLAYING GOOD—EDUCATION

**Role playing overcomes polarization and teaches students political jargon necessary to form critical opinions**

**SCHAAP 2005** (Andrew, University of Melbourne, Politics, Vol 25 Iss 1, February)

While every subject has its jargon, the object of study in political theory is the jargon itself. Perhaps because of its abstract nature, political theory often polarises politics students: it either alienates or inspires them. Role playing offers one valuable technique to overcome this divide by demonstrating in practice why we cannot do without theories of politics. By participating in this role play, students experienced at first hand how arguments made from within five traditions of political philosophy come into conflict in relation to the issue of human rights. Even self-avowed pragmatists have their own theories – only they are implicitly assumed rather than explicitly articulated. In role playing the pragmatists' self-deception is exposed: they are forced to declare their (imagined) hands and hold their (assigned) theories open to scrutiny. Once drawn into the game, in this way, they are on their way to becoming political theorists.

**Role playing is the most effective means of understanding conflicting roles of government actors**

**GONZALES 2008** (Angelo, Ph.D. Candidate, Travers Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley, “Teaching American Political Institutions Using Role Playing Simulations,” Feb 22, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/2/4/5/6/3/pages245631/p245631-1.php)

The observation that organizational actors can play multiple roles in political institutions is important from a pedagogical standpoint, because these roles provide the basis upon which teachers can design effective role-playing simulations. First, roles provide the essential structure for simulations, in conjunction with one’s learning objectives. If one’s goal is to teach students about the importance of parties in Congress, then one’s simulation should include important roles for party leaders. To that end, a House floor debate or a Rules Committee deliberation might make the most sense, but a Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources hearing on western water might not be as effective. Second, with adequate preparation time, roles help ensure that students are not just acting on their personal beliefs and preconceptions. In preparing for a role, students are forced to look at the individual whose part they are playing from different perspectives, considering the ways in which their multiple positions within the organization might conflict with each other. And even in situations where students haven’t prepared well, there are numerous opportunities in interacting with other simulation actors for students to learn about the ways in which multiple roles can come into play in a particular institution. Finally, roles can liberate shy students to take a more active role in simulations than they might otherwise do in more traditional class settings. I’ll never forget one particularly shy student who came out of her shell when asked to play a lawyer in a Supreme Court simulation I designed. Something about the act of playing a particular role helped her shed her fears of speaking in class, and from that day forward, she no longer had any qualms about participating actively in discussions. In sum, when designed properly, role-playing simulations can be an effective pedagogical technique for teaching students about the dynamic interaction between political actors and the internal rules and processes of political institutions. The role-playing aspect forces students to get into the heads of political actors and to consider why these actors make the decisions they do, given the structure of institutional incentives and constraints in which they operate. The simulation aspect forces students to engage in an actual decision-making process and to consider why the process works or fails to work as it does. Short of actually working in a political institution, role-playing simulations provide the best means by which students can learn about the complex inner workings of these organizations that are so central to the American political system.

**Role playing is critical to understand how government works and how it fails—traditional education is less effective**

**GONZALES 2008** (Angelo, Ph.D. Candidate, Travers Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley, “Teaching American Political Institutions Using Role Playing Simulations,” Feb 22, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/2/4/5/6/3/pages245631/p245631-1.php)

Political institutions are central to many courses on American politics and government. From the institutions of government – represented by legislatures, executive agencies, and courts at all levels – to the intermediary institutions that structure citizens’ interactions with their government (e.g., parties and interest groups), a thorough knowledge of political institutions is necessary to truly grasp the inner workings of the American political system. Unfortunately, it can be difficult for students to learn about the dynamic nature of these institutions from the pages of a textbook. For example, it is important to know the textbook description of Congress as a bicameral institution, with representatives elected every two years and senators every six years, but such information does little to explain how these constitutional differences between the House and Senate can create incentives for members to act in different ways. Congress is a complex institution with numerous rules governing the consideration of business and multiple incentives structuring the behavior of members. The best way to truly understand the effects of these rules and incentives, I argue, is to get inside the heads of the members themselves, and the most effective way to do so pedagogically is through the use of role-playing simulations. Congress is not the only political institution with interesting internal dynamics that can be taught using simulations. Political parties are continually struggling to manage the diverse interests of their internal coalitions, while staking out policy positions that will give them an electoral advantage in the next election. Interest groups comprise nearly every conceivable interest, exhibit widely varying degrees of political sophistication, and interact with many different aspects of the political system (e.g., lobbying bureaucratic agencies during the rule-making process, testifying before committees, lobbying individual members of Congress, and engaging in electioneering to influence the results of elections). The bureaucracy and the courts, though underappreciated, are essential actors in the policy process from start to finish. The Executive Office of the President walks a fine line between serving the individual interests of the President and respecting the statutory mandates of Congress. And the President (and most governors) wear several institutional hats that are often in conflict with one another (e.g., head of state, party leader, and chief policy maker). Understanding the ways in which these institutions manage all of their internal conflicts is critical for understanding why the American political system works (or fails to work) as it does. In this paper, I argue that role-playing simulations are an essential technique in any professor's repertoire for teaching American political institutions. I also discuss two case studies from my own teaching experience: (1) a congressional committee hearing designed to simulate the role of interest groups in the policy process, and (2) a Senate floor debate designed to simulate the interplay between Senate rules and the major interests that structure senators’ behaviors (i.e., committees, parties, and re-election). In both of these exercises, I argue that students came away with a better understanding of the complex and dynamic nature of each institution than had they simply been asked to memorize the textbook. Finally, I present results from a brief survey my former students to solicit their thoughts about the effectiveness of these simulations.

**Switch side policy debates are good for critical thinking and education**

**KELLER, WHITTAKER, AND BURKE, 2001** [Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, "Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning," Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer, EBSCOhost]

The purposes of this article were to examine the potential of student debates for fostering the development of policy practice knowledge and skills, to demonstrate that debates can be effectively incorporated as an in-class assignment in a policy course, and to report findings on the educational value and level of student satisfaction with debates. Based on a review of the literature, the authors' experience conducting debates in a course, and the subsequent evaluation of those debates, the authors believe the development of policy practice skills and the acquisition of substantive knowledge can be advanced through structured student debates in policy-oriented courses. The authors think debates on important policy questions have numerous benefits: prompting students to deal with values and assumptions, encouraging them to investigate and analyze competing alternatives, compelling them to advocate a particular position, and motivating them to articulate a point of view in a persuasive manner. We think engaging in these analytic and persuasive activities promotes greater knowledge by stimulating active participation in the learning process.

# SWITCH-SIDE GOOD

**Switch-side debate reigns in extremism and challenges violent “Us-Them” dichotomies**

**Mitchell 2007** (Gordon, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, “Debate as a Weapon of Mass Destruction,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, June)

Within this context, the Speech Association of America (precursor to today’s National Communication Association) invited thousands of college students to debate the relative merits of an American diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China in 1954. Anxiety spread about the ability of students to engage the topic safely; every team would be asked to defend both sides of this resolution, a common tournament procedure known as ‘‘switch-sides’’ debate. Some argued that the practice would indoctrinate America’s youth, while giving aid and comfort to the enemy. ‘‘For even a small segment of American college students to rise at this time to the defense of this Communist Government would be sweet music to the ears of Moscow and Peiping,’’ wrote debate instructor Charles R. Koch, as he pulled his own team from competition in protest.1 Given the switch-side norm of academic debate and the highly controversial nature of the resolution, ‘‘the US Military Academy, the US Naval Academy and, subsequently, all of the teacher colleges in the state of Nebraska refused to affirm the resolution.’’2 A predominant military concern was that, ‘‘a pro-recognition stand by men wearing the country’s uniforms would lead to misunderstanding on the part of our friends abroad and to distortion by our enemies.’’3 Karl Wallace, then president of the scholarly organization that now sponsors this journal, was pressured heavily to change the China topic.4 His firm and principled resistance is documented in an official statement emphasizing that ‘‘inherent in the controversy’’ over the 1954 debate resolution ‘‘is an alarming distrust of the processes essential to a free society.’’5 The fierce controversy even drew in journalist Edward R. Murrow, who backed Wallace’s position in an edition of the See it Now television program seen by millions. Some complained that ‘‘discussions of this topic were channeled to bring out criticism’’ of McCarthy himself.6 The timing of the red-baiting senator’s political implosion, which followed shortly after the Wallace and Murrow statements, suggests that the great 1954 ‘‘debate about debate’’ indeed may have helped rein in McCarthyism run amok. But this outcome seems paradoxical. How can an activity that gives voice to extreme views moderate extremism? Speech professor Jeffrey Auer’s 1954 statement may hold the key: ‘‘A person, because he supports the recognition of Communist China, isn’t a communist, any more than because he supports the recognition of Communist China, he is a Chinaman.’’7 Just as walking a mile in unfamiliar shoes lends perspective, switch-side debating increases appreciation of contrary opinions as the debater ‘‘tries on’’ an unfamiliar idea rather than relying on simplification, reduction, or rejection. In fact, debating both sides encourages participants to dismantle absolutist ‘‘us versus them’’ dichotomies. This may explain why those invested in the stability of such polar categories find debate so threatening.

**Failure to engage the opposite side creates an echo chamber that cuts off any possibility for change**

**GITLIN 2003** (Todd, Professor of Journalism and Sociology at Colombia and Former President of Students for a Democratic Society, Letters to a Young Activist, 120-121)

Green rectitude is one case of a larger pitfall: self-enclosure. When you belong to a small minority—as I did in the sixties—on the one hand, it’s a comfort to share your life with fellow believers: to read the same articles, get the same references, wince at the same insults, pass around the same jokes. Very much on the other hand, disbelievers are a drag. Why bother talking to them when there’s so much they don’t *get*? When you live in an echo chamber where your cheers boom and cheerleading substitutes for thought, you enclose yourself in a sect, though you may call it a movement. The world of the saved substitutes for the world as it is, full of the unsaved. So I appeal to you: Persevere, but don’t bury yourself in an army of the right-minded. Beware the perilous rapture of shrinking your world to the tribe of the saved, the cheerleading good guys who brandish the same slogans, curse the same enemies, thrill to the same saints, whether their names are Che, Fidel, Ho, Malcolm, Huey, Noam, whomever.

**Switch-side debate is critical to make real change—arguments will only be accepted if we engage their opposites and prove them wrong**

**GITLIN 2003** (Todd, Professor of Journalism and Sociology at Colombia and Former President of Students for a Democratic Society, Letters to a Young Activist, 159-160)

Whoever exacted vengeance for that young woman’s audacity was stomping on democratic ideals, failing to understand that questioning is precisely what authority *needs*. Only in an autocracy is doubt a breach of decorum. The ruler is absolute and infallible—end of discussion. In a democracy, however, authority needs to be convincing. It cannot be convincing, cannot care for the public good, unless pressed to defend itself. This is what John Stuart Mill meant in *On Liberty* when he wrote that even if one and only one person dissented, the dissent should be heard, for two reasons. First, the dissenter might always be right. Second, the authority of the majority opinion—even if close to unanimous—is heightened by having to confront its contraries. In the light of free competition, arguments only improve. So the expression of rival views is necessary for practical as well as principled reasons.

**We should play Devil’s advocate—failure to present an alternative, worst-case look at their ideas only silences dissent, makes them hard to implement, and allows flaws to slip through**

**CHANDRA 2008** (Sarvajeet, Managing Partner in Master Sun Consulting, MBA in Marketing Communications from MICA, Ahmedabad. He is a mechanical engineer from MS University, “Role of Strategy Execution Team - Be a Devil's Advocate, Bad News Messenger,” Dec 17, http://ezinearticles.com/?Role-of-Strategy-Execution-Team---Be-a-Devils-Advocate,-Bad-News-Messenger&id=1797944)

Become a Devil's Advocate to a Specific Strategy and look at the What Will Go Wrong We are all over-confident and over-optimistic beings. While that has spurred us on as a civilization, this over-confidence gets translated into strategic choices or strategic plans that we make. Most of us tend to believe in the veracity of our ideas, tenacity of our plans and our destiny to win (regardless of market condition and competitive activity) It is the job of the execution team therefore to assume the role of a Devil's advocate. It is the job of the execution team to do so, since they have to drive the execution. They have to question the unrealistically precise estimates of time, resources and targets. They have to imagine a worst case scenario (most strategists do not come up with very gloomy worst case scenarios). Someone has to be given the role of challenging the false consensus or group-think that may have cause the dissenters to stay quiet. The execution team has to confront and ensure that worst case scenarios is put on the table. This will help the strategy become more 'implementable', give the strategic plan more flexibility and force the strategists to become more realistic. However for this to happen the management must encourage the culture of challenge and recognize the role of the strategy execution team as a ' Devil's Advocate'

**Switch side debate increases education and checks dogmatism- turns their impact**

**Galloway ‘7** (Ryan Galloway, Samford Debate Coach, Professor of Communication Studies at Samford, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007, LEQ)

Willingness to argue against what one beliefs helps the advocate understand the strengths and weaknesses of their own position. It opens the potential for a new synthesis of material that is superior to the first (Dybvig & Iverson, 2000). Serving as a devil’s advocate encourages an appreciation for middle ground and nuance (Dell, 1958). Failure to see both sides can lead to high levels of ego involvement and dogmatism (Hicks & Greene, 2000). Survey data confirms these conclusions. Star Muir found that debaters become more tolerant after learning to debate both sides of an issue (Muir, 1993).

# A2: ROLE CONFUSION

**First, no link—our interpretation is explicit about the need to play the federal government, but this doesn’t mean we are the federal government—playing the game Axis and Allies doesn’t make you a Nazi; actors who play Nero don’t actually want to burn Rome; and this argument is downright insulting—this is based on the assumption that people are so stupid that explicitly playing a part will confuse them into believing it—all historical evidence disproves this**

**Second, the argument solves itself—just being aware of role confusion should be enough to stop it—if their argument is that we will believe the other side is actually correct, this only begs the question of whether change is a good idea at all**

**Third, extend our 1NC Luckhardt and Bechtel evidence—role playing can strenghthen our original beliefs after we reveal minor flaws—this is the opposite of role confusion**

**And, the advantages of role playing outweigh risk of role confusion**

**ANDREWS 2006** (Peter, Consulting Faculty Member at the IBM Executive Business Institute in Palisades, New York, Executive Technology Report, August, www-935.ibm.com/services/us/bcs/pdf/g510-6313-etr-unlearn-to-innovate.pdf)

Dare to believe that the impossible ideas might be true How does your list of new ideas help with unlearning? It provides alternative views to directly challenge your set beliefs and frameworks. It provides the grains of sand that are the beginnings for pearls of wisdom. But only if you are willing to suspend disbelief. The natural tendency is to sift your ideas based on the ones that have clear, apparent value, that “make the most sense.” Often these ideas prove themselves right away. But none of these is likely to help with unlearning or to lead to truly disruptive innovations. Instead of categorizing and prioritizing your long (20 or more) list of ideas, give the ones that are the most intriguing and the most improbable a chance. See if you can talk yourself into them. If you do this well, you can use your arguments as a wedge to crack open your patterns of thought and action. If you can put together a line of reasoning that can convince others, you’ll be forced to reconsider and reformulate your own views. There is a danger to this. For the sake of argument (literally), Mark Twain built a case for Bacon’s being the author of Shakespeare’s plays. He started out believing the opposite and ended up convincing himself. But ultimately, you need to find a way to trust an alternate reality, at least for awhile. If you don’t take crazy ideas seriously, you can’t give them a fair chance and make them your own.

**Malcolm X proves that evidence-intensive switch side debate improves social activism**

**BRANHAM 1995** (Robert, Professor of Rhetoric at Bates College, Argumentation and Advocacy, Winter)

Norfolk had a fine library of several thousand volumes and prisoners were able to check out books of their choice. Malcolm X became a voracious and critical reader, discovering "new evidence to document the Muslim teachings" in books ranging from accounts of the slave trade to Milton's Paradise Lost (X, 1965b, pp. 185-186). Malcolm X's "prison education, including Elijah Muhammad," writes Baraka, "gives him the form with which overtly to combine consciousness with his actual life" (p. 26). As Malcolm X sought new outlets for his heightened political consciousness, he turned to the weekly formal debates sponsored by the inmate team. "My reading had my mind like steam under pressure," he recounted; "Some way, I had to start telling the white man about himself to his face. I decided to do this by putting my name down to debate" (1965b, p. 184). Malcolm X's prison debate experience allowed him to bring his newly acquired historical knowledge and critical ideology to bear on a wide variety of social issues. "Whichever side of the selected subject was assigned to me, I'd track down and study everything I could find on it," wrote Malcolm X. "I'd put myself in my opponent's place and decide how I'd try to win if I had the other side; and then I'd figure out a way to knock down those points" (1965b, p. 184). Preparation for each debate included four or five practice sessions. Debaters conducted individual research and also worked collaboratively in research teams (Bender, 1993). Visiting debaters "could not understand how we had the material to debate with them," recalls Malcolm Jarvis, Malcolm X's debate partner at Norfolk. "They were at the mercy of people with M.A.s and Ph.D.s to teach them," he explains.

**And, role playing solves the impact—it reforms the state and allows us to challenge bad policy**

**DONOVAN AND LARKIN 2006** (Claire and Phil, Australian National University, Politics, Vol 26:1)

We do not suggest that political science should merely fall into line with the government instrumentalism that we have identified, becoming a ‘slave social science’ (see Donovan, 2005). But, we maintain that political scientists should be able to engage with practical politics on their own terms and should be able to provide research output that is of value to practitioners. It is because of its focus on understanding, explanation, conceptualisation and classification that political science has the potential to contribute more to practical politics, and more successfully. As Brian Barry notes, ‘Granting (for the sake of argument) that [students of politics] have some methods that enable us to improve on the deliverances of untutored common sense or political journalism, what good do they do? The answer to that question is: not much. But if we change the question and ask what good they could do, I believe that it is possible to justify a more positive answer’ (Barry, 2004, p. 22). A clear understanding of how institutions and individuals interact or how different institutions interact with each other can provide clear and useful insights that practitioners can successfully use, making – or perhaps remaking – a political science that ‘directs research efforts to good questions and enables incremental improvements to be made’ (ibid., 19). In this sense, political science already has the raw material to make this contribution, but it chooses not to utilise it in this way: no doubt, in part, because academics are motivated to present their findings to other academics and not the practitioners within the institutions they study.

**And, switch-side debate makes all future proposals better**

**MATTHEWS and METCALFE 2007** (David B. Matthews Defence Systems Analysis Division Defence Science and Technology Organisation and Mike Metcalfe School of Management University of South Australia, “On the Implementation of ‘Concept-Led’ and ‘Participative’ Planning in the Development of the Defence Logistics Transformation Plan,” Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Australian Department of Defense Land Operations Division, September, http://dspace.dsto.defence.gov.au/dspace/bitstream/1947/9000/1/DSTO-TR-2022%20PR.pdf)

The concept-led approach developed by the authors has been embedded within a modified action learning cycle reminiscent of Popper’s (1969; 1972) hypothetico-deductivist model of inquiry. Accordingly, following the development of conjectures (in our case, action statements) inquiry should be characterised by ‘ingenious and severe attempts to refute them’ (Popper, 1969). It is only through surviving such attempted refutations that action statements gain credibility. Unfortunately, within the context of organisational planning, it is rarely feasible to ‘test’ an action statement empirically (in the sense of implementing the action and observing its results). Not only is direct experimentation with organisations a risky (and potentially ethically fraught) affair, but any implementation of proposals would irreversibly change the organisation. Accordingly, testing is usually conducted along one of two lines, similar to those discussed in Chapter 4. These are by simulation, modelling and analysis within a modelcentric approach or by red-teaming, debate and argumentation within a discursive approach. Unsurprisingly, the authors recommend a general discursive framework for the testing of action statements. Such an approach is reminiscent of a judicial inquiry (as opposed to an empirical test). Action statements are tested through interrogation by those who have proposed alternative statements developed from different foundational ‘concepts’ (akin to cross-examination). The benefits of a discursive approach include avoiding certain epistemic fallacies associated with over reliance on models and enabling participants to engage in a learning process via the attempted refutation of confederate action statements. In particular, participation in learning processes of this sort inevitably aids participants in the refinement of action statements in subsequent iterations of the action learning cycle. Simulation, modelling and analysis may be provided as tools to support this learning process. However, as opposed to the model-centric approach, within the discursive approach such techniques are not seen as definitive. Rather, they represent simply another perspective on the possible implications of particular actions. The above approach takes its cues from Churchman’s (1979) argument for systematically seeking different ‘rationalities’ for testing the pre-suppositions in our own thinking as well as Ackoff’s (1979a,b) call for replacing the problem-solving orientation of Operations Research with one that focusses on planning and system design. In the words of Ulrich (1994): ‘What the systems designer [planner] needs beyond even new analytical techniques is a dialectic framework that would enable him to enter into a discourse with these other rationalities and to learn to understand them as what they are: mirrors of his own failure to live up to the systems idea.’ That is, what the planner ultimately needs is a discursive framework for testing his/her action statements against those developed from different role-specific concerns, foundational presuppositions and/or concepts, whether through red-teaming, structured argumentative processes or group decision and negotiation processes. The overall aim is to develop a more critical understanding of the possible implications of action statements by uncovering potentially deleterious effects that would have remained hidden by the uncritical implementation of plans founded on a single perspective. Accordingly, the whole process should be an exercise in applied dialectics.

**Switch-side debate is good–it forces evaluation of arguments on both sides and improves advocacy skills for defending one’s own position—confusion only produces better results**

**KELLER, WHITTAKER, AND BURKE, 2001** (Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, "Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning," Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer, EBSCOhost)

These policy practice skills reflect the hallmarks of critical thinking (see Brookfield, 1987; Gambrill, 1997). The central activities of critical thinking are identifying and challenging underlying assumptions, exploring alternative ways of thinking and acting, and arriving at commitments after a period of questioning, analysis, and reflection (Brookfield, 1987). Significant parallels exist with the policy-making process--identifying the values underlying policy choices, recognizing and evaluating multiple alternatives, and taking a position and advocating for its adoption. Developing policy practice skills seems to share much in common with developing capacities for critical thinking. R.W. Paul (as cited in Gambrill, 1997) states that critical thinkers acknowledge the imperative to argue from opposing points of view and to seek to identify weakness and limitations in one's own position. Critical thinkers are aware that there are many legitimate points of view, each of which (when thought through) may yield some level of insight. (p. 126) John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28). The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.

# A2: WE SOLVE EDUCATION

**Extend our 1NC Schaap evidence—role playing is the best possible way to learn the vocabulary of politics—whatever education they provide is useless unless we can implement it**

**And, our education is better quality—**

**A) Topic specific—even if we both provide education, our schaap evidence is an impact for why the content of our education is better—it’s critical to challenge nuclear policy**

**B) Deep versus shallow—even if other approaches provide education, role playing provides the best education—switch-side debate fosters deep-holistic learning**

**SCHAAP 2005** (Andrew, University of Melbourne, Politics, Vol 25 Iss 1, February)

According to an influential theory of teaching in higher education, people tend to approach learning either in a 'deep-holistic' or 'surface-atomistic' way (Ramsden, 1992, pp. 43ff.). Students who adopt a deep-holistic approach to learning seek to discover the meaning of an idea, text or concept by relating new information to previous experience and the broader context within which it is encountered. By contrast, students who adopt a surface-atomistic approach tend to simply reproduce information, accumulating particular facts or details without discovering and constructing relations between them. Ramsden (1992, pp. 53ff.) reports on research that shows that deep-holistic approaches to learning are related to higher-quality outcomes and greater enjoyment while surface-atomistic approaches are dissatisfying and associated with poorer grades. Ramsden (1992, pp. 96–102) identifies six key principles of teaching in higher education to promote a deep-holistic approach to learning. Effective teaching requires: engaging student interest; demonstrating concern and respect for students and student learning; providing appropriate feedback and assessment so that students can monitor their own learning; presenting students with clear goals and an intellectual challenge; giving students independence and control over their own learning; and modifying one's own teaching practice in response to student learning outcomes. In sum, effective teaching encourages students to relate to the subject material in a purposeful way. Teaching methods that promote deep-holistic approaches to learning 'involve students in actively finding knowledge, interpreting results, and testing hypotheses against reality (often in a spirit of co-operation as well as individual effort) as a route to understanding and the secure retention of factual knowledge' (Ramsden, 1992, p. 152). According to Ramsden there is no best teaching method. Nevertheless, some methods naturally encourage a deep-holistic approach to learning better than others. The traditional university lecture tends to be modelled on an implicit theory of teaching as transmitting information to students rather than one of making learning possible. While lectures can be engaging, stimulating and can involve students as active learners, this is often difficult to achieve and more often they encourage surface-atomistic approaches to learning: students struggle to remember various isolated details and the lecturer appears as a remote authority rather than participating in a community of learning with his or her students. Consequently, Ramsden (1992, p. 167) insists that the best way to improve the effectiveness of teaching in higher education is to make lecturing 'less like a lecture (passive, rigid, routine knowledge transmission) and more like an active communication between teacher and students'. In contrast to lecturing, role playing naturally tends to promote a deep-holistic approach to learning because it requires students to interact and collaborate in order to complete an assigned task. The context of the role play requires students to adopt different perspectives and think reflexively about the information they represent to the group. Some benefits of role playing identified by historian James Levy (1997, pp. 14–18) are that it: helps overcome students' inhibitions to contribute because they feel that they do not know enough; stimulates student discussion and debate outside of the classroom; provides many teachable moments by revealing gaps in students' understanding that the instructor can address; encourages students to grapple with sophisticated issues that they might otherwise have failed to appreciate; and often challenges the teacher's own views.

**Effectiveness—education provided by switch-side debate makes future proposals more effective—because the lasting purpose of debate is to make us better decision-makers, this outweighs their arguments**

**MATTHEWS and METCALFE 2007** (David B. Matthews Defence Systems Analysis Division Defence Science and Technology Organisation and Mike Metcalfe School of Management University of South Australia, “On the Implementation of ‘Concept-Led’ and ‘Participative’ Planning in the Development of the Defence Logistics Transformation Plan,” Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Australian Department of Defense Land Operations Division, September, http://dspace.dsto.defence.gov.au/dspace/bitstream/1947/9000/1/DSTO-TR-2022%20PR.pdf)

The concept-led approach developed by the authors has been embedded within a modified action learning cycle reminiscent of Popper’s (1969; 1972) hypothetico-deductivist model of inquiry. Accordingly, following the development of conjectures (in our case, action statements) inquiry should be characterised by ‘ingenious and severe attempts to refute them’ (Popper, 1969). It is only through surviving such attempted refutations that action statements gain credibility. Unfortunately, within the context of organisational planning, it is rarely feasible to ‘test’ an action statement empirically (in the sense of implementing the action and observing its results). Not only is direct experimentation with organisations a risky (and potentially ethically fraught) affair, but any implementation of proposals would irreversibly change the organisation. Accordingly, testing is usually conducted along one of two lines, similar to those discussed in Chapter 4. These are by simulation, modelling and analysis within a modelcentric approach or by red-teaming, debate and argumentation within a discursive approach. Unsurprisingly, the authors recommend a general discursive framework for the testing of action statements. Such an approach is reminiscent of a judicial inquiry (as opposed to an empirical test). Action statements are tested through interrogation by those who have proposed alternative statements developed from different foundational ‘concepts’ (akin to cross-examination). The benefits of a discursive approach include avoiding certain epistemic fallacies associated with over reliance on models and enabling participants to engage in a learning process via the attempted refutation of confederate action statements. In particular, participation in learning processes of this sort inevitably aids participants in the refinement of action statements in subsequent iterations of the action learning cycle. Simulation, modelling and analysis may be provided as tools to support this learning process. However, as opposed to the model-centric approach, within the discursive approach such techniques are not seen as definitive. Rather, they represent simply another perspective on the possible implications of particular actions. The above approach takes its cues from Churchman’s (1979) argument for systematically seeking different ‘rationalities’ for testing the pre-suppositions in our own thinking as well as Ackoff’s (1979a,b) call for replacing the problem-solving orientation of Operations Research with one that focusses on planning and system design. In the words of Ulrich (1994): ‘What the systems designer [planner] needs beyond even new analytical techniques is a dialectic framework that would enable him to enter into a discourse with these other rationalities and to learn to understand them as what they are: mirrors of his own failure to live up to the systems idea.’ That is, what the planner ultimately needs is a discursive framework for testing his/her action statements against those developed from different role-specific concerns, foundational presuppositions and/or concepts, whether through red-teaming, structured argumentative processes or group decision and negotiation processes. The overall aim is to develop a more critical understanding of the possible implications of action statements by uncovering potentially deleterious effects that would have remained hidden by the uncritical implementation of plans founded on a single perspective. Accordingly, the whole process should be an exercise in applied dialectics.

**And, access—role playing reaches the most students with different learning styles**

**GONZALES 2008** (Angelo, Ph.D. Candidate, Travers Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley, “Teaching American Political Institutions Using Role Playing Simulations,” Feb 22, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/2/4/5/6/3/pages245631/p245631-1.php)

Role-playing simulations, in particular, are an excellent teaching technique from both a pedagogical and a substantive political science perspective. On the pedagogical side, role- playing simulations are a great way to reach students with all types of learning styles. The very nature of role-playing engages the strengths of tactile-kinesthetic learners, and, when designed correctly, such simulations can reach both auditory and visual learners, as well. Additionally, as other researchers have demonstrated, role-playing simulations can actually enhance students’ understanding and retention of course material, especially when designed around a well-defined and limited set of learning objectives (Baranowski 2006; Frederking 2005; Lay and Smarick 2006). From a political science (American politics) perspective, role-playing simulations provide a useful way for students to learn about both the process of the American political system and the dynamics of American political institutions (Baranowski 2006; Ciliotta-Rubery and Levy 2000; Endersby and Webber 1995; Lay and Smarick 2006; Smith and Boyer 1996). As Smith and Boyer (1996, 690) argue, ―Simulations have the power to recreate complex, dynamic political processes in the classroom, allowing students to examine the motivations, behavioral constraints, resources and interactions among institutional actors.

# A2: CRITICAL EDUCATION OUTWEIGHS

**First, there’s no link—the aff can justify the plan any way that they want to, and can read critical arguments on the negative—nothing is excluded by our interpretation**

**Second, we solve this better—**

**A) Extend our Schaap and Kagan evidence—role playing provides the best tools to criticize state nuclear policy—their framework doesn’t teach the details of state policy and language—the impact is democracy and military violence**

**B) Topic specific—we encourage the Negative to develop specific critiques and require the Aff to have a critical defense tied to the plan—this requires much less generic research than their interpretation—this mix of particular and general is good which is our 1NC Schaap evidence—here’s more**

**BETTS 1997** (Richard, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, and he is Director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, World Politics, 50.1)

Two academic pathologies should raise the stock of policy studies. One is that the professional premium on theorizing tends to proliferate theories, promote constant revision of theories, and encourage production of second-rate theories over first-rate applications. Albert Hirschman, with impeccable credentials as a theorist, long ago indicted "the tendency toward compulsive and mindless theorizing." 48 One sure sign of intellectual degeneration in a field is when the logical relationship between generalization and specification is inverted, theories threaten to outnumber their applications, and the shelf life of theoretical work turns out to be hardly longer than that of policy analysis. Some social scientists are untroubled that professional incentives encourage such imbalance, because never having had to meet a payroll in the policy world, they overestimate the ease with which an effective application can be derived from a theoretical insight. Every intellectual would rather be an Einstein than an engineer, but useful knowledge is not advanced if the academy generates a horde of would-be Einsteins but few competent engineers. Strategists are not just engineers, but they consider empiricism and application no less important than the theoretical part of their work. The other pathology is when theorization becomes a closed system, with no connection through which insights can be applied to the outside world--when theorists communicate effectively with no one but each other. When this happens, a theory may remain beautiful but it loses the claim to utility. It is the widespread perception in the outside world that theorization is a closed system that makes "academic" a pejorative adjective in normal parlance. A system can be closed in two senses: lack of feedback from policy application, or lack of interest in testing theories against evidence. Both problems are addressed in typical strategic studies research programs that proceed from policy issues, to theoretical formulation, to empirical testing, to policy application. Intellectuals who spend much time in Washington sometimes worry that much theoretical work in contemporary political science reflects both pathologies and has not proved much less ephemeral or more useful than good applications of old theory. Unless academics themselves [End Page 31] become involved on the periphery of policy-making, the only way that their work can have effect outside the closed system in universities is if practitioners read it. Few high-level staff in the U.S. government read anything more academic than Foreign Affairs, and high-level policymakers seldom have time to read any unofficial material but op-ed pieces. One academic journal that is read occasionally in Washington is International Security, because it melds policy analysis and theory. This is one reason it has had a circulation 50 to 80 percent higher than its IPE counterpart International Organization and that academics in other fields sometimes denigrate its academic quality. Some academics may value the aesthetic qualities of theory as much as the utilitarian. Strategists can get as excited as anyone over the elegance of an idea, but see elegance without empirical confirmation and applicability as no more science than art. As Brodie suggested, any criterion for strategy but a utilitarian one is a contradiction in terms: "The question that matters in strategy is: Will the idea work? . . . . Strategy is a field where truth is sought in the pursuit of viable solutions." 49

# A2: HICKS AND GREENE

**First, there’s no link—Hicks and Greene are former policy debaters who used their experience to publish academic work—the fact that this happened at all is proof that switch-side debate does not automatically produce neoliberal subjects**

**Second, our impact outweighs—there’s no impact to neoliberalism in their evidence, but our Stannard evidence says switch-side debate breaks elite domination and solves extinction, and our Schaap, Kagan, Luckhardt and Bechtel cards are all case turns**

**And, Hicks and Greene are wrong—switch-side debate is good and any alternative links worse to their criticism of debate**

**STANNARD 2006** (Matt, Department of Communication and Journalism, University of Wyoming, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18, http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html)

If it is indeed true that debate inevitably produces other-oriented deliberative discourse at the expense of students' confidence in their first-order convictions, this would indeed be a trade-off worth criticizing. In all fairness, Hicks and Greene do not overclaim their critique, and they take care to acknowledge the important ethical and cognitive virtues of deliberative debating. When represented as anything other than a political-ethical concern, however, Hicks and Greene's critique has several problems: First, as my colleague J.P. Lacy recently pointed out, it seems a tremendous causal (or even rhetorical) stretch to go from "debating both sides of an issue creates civic responsibility essential to liberal democracy" to "this civic responsibility upholds the worst forms of American exceptionalism." Second, Hicks and Greene do not make any comparison of the potentially bad power of debate to any alternative. Their implied alternative, however, is a form of forensic speech that privileges personal conviction. The idea that students should be able to preserve their personal convictions at all costs seems far more immediately tyrannical, far more immediately damaging to either liberal or participatory democracy, than the ritualized requirements that students occasionally take the opposite side of what they believe. Third, as I have suggested and will continue to suggest, while a debate project requiring participants to understand and often "speak for" opposing points of view may carry a great deal of liberal baggage, it is at its core a project more ethically deliberative than institutionally liberal. Where Hicks and Greene see debate producing "the liberal citizen-subject," I see debate at least having the potential to produce "the deliberative human being." The fact that some academic debaters are recruited by the CSIS and the CIA does not undermine this thesis. Absent healthy debate programs, these think-tanks and government agencies would still recruit what they saw as the best and brightest students. And absent a debate community that rewards anti-institutional political rhetoric as much as liberal rhetoric, those students would have little-to-no chance of being exposed to truly oppositional ideas. Moreover, if we allow ourselves to believe that it is "culturally imperialist" to help other peoples build institutions of debate and deliberation, we not only ignore living political struggles that occur in every culture, but we fall victim to a dangerous ethnocentrism in holding that "they do not value deliberation like we do." If the argument is that our participation in fostering debate communities abroad greases the wheels of globalization, the correct response, in debate terminology, is that such globalization is non-unique, inevitable, and there is only a risk that collaborating across cultures in public debate and deliberation will foster resistance to domination—just as debate accomplishes wherever it goes. Indeed, Andy Wallace, in a recent article, suggests that Islamic fundamentalism is a byproduct of the colonization of the lifeworld of the Middle East; if this is true, then one solution would be to foster cross-cultural deliberation among people on both sides of the cultural divide willing to question their own preconceptions of the social good. Hicks and Greene might be correct insofar as elites in various cultures can either forbid or reappropriate deliberation, but for those outside of that institutional power, democratic discussion would have a positively subversive effect.

**Hicks and Greene are wrong—activism by former debaters proves that switch-side debate is good**

**Mitchell 2007** (Gordon, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, “Debate as a Weapon of Mass Destruction,” Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, Vol. 4, No. 2, June)

Second, while the pedagogical benefits of switch-side debating for participants are compelling,10 some worry that the technique may perversely and unwittingly serve the ends of an aggressively militaristic foreign policy. In the context of the 1954 controversy, Ronald Walter Greene and Darrin Hicks suggest that the articulation of the debate community as a zone of dissent against McCarthyist tendencies developed into a larger and somewhat uncritical affirmation of switch-side debate as a ‘‘technology’’ of liberal participatory democracy. This technology is part and parcel of the post-McCarthy ethical citizen, prepared to discuss issues from multiple viewpoints. The problem for Greene and Hicks is that this notion of citizenship becomes tied to a normative conception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. They write, ‘‘The production and management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time.’’11 Here, Greene and Hicks argue that this new conception of liberal governance, which epitomizes the ethical citizen as an individual trained in the switch-side technique, serves as a normative tool for judging other polities and justifying forcible regime change. One need look only to the Bush administration’s framing of war as an instrument of democracy promotion to grasp how the switch-side technique can be appropriated as a justification for violence. It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff ’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions. 12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. ‘‘I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.’’ As Katyal recounts, ‘‘the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.’’14 The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as ‘‘with us or against us,’’ the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be apparent\*the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a ‘‘weapon of mass destruction.’’

**And, the risk that debate will be coopted is only a reason to be careful—debate is still good and the only way to fight domination is to retain common ground**

**STANNARD 2006** (Matt, Department of Communication and Journalism, University of Wyoming, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18, http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html)

We can read such criticisms in two ways. The first way is as a warning: That we ought to remain cautious of how academic debate will be represented and deployed outside of the academy, in the ruthless political realm, by those who use it to dodge truthful assertions, by underrepresented groups, of instances of material injustice. In this sense, the fear is one of a "legalistic" evasion of substantive injustice by those privileging procedure over substance, a trained style over the primordial truth of marginalized groups. I prefer that interpretation to the second one: That the switch-side, research-driven "game" of debate is politically bankrupt and should give way to several simultaneous zones of speech activism, where speakers can and should only fight for their own beliefs. As Gordon Mitchell of the University of Pittsburgh has pointed out, such balkanized speech will break down into several enclaves of speaking, each with its own political criteria for entry. In such a collection of impassable and unpermeable communities, those power relations, those material power entities, that evade political speech will remain unaccountable, will be given a "free pass" by the speech community, who will be so wrapped up in their own micropolitics, or so busy preaching to themselves and their choirs, that they will never understand or confront the rhetorical tropes used to mobilize both resources and true believers in the service of continued material domination. Habermas’s defense of the unfinished Enlightenment is my defense of academic debate: Don’t throw the baby out with the bathwater. Instead, seek to expand this method of deliberation to those who will use it to liberate themselves, confront power, and create ethical, nonviolent patterns of problem resolution. If capitalism corrupts debate, well, then I say we save debate.

# A2: POLICY EDUCATION BAD

**First, we solve this—any reason why policy education is bad is more likely to be true of shallow, simple education that comes from high school civics classes or basic exposure to propaganda on the news—if the government is actually bad, in-depth education can only be good because it should expose these flaws**

**And, their framework is suicidal–it cedes the opportunity to influence state policy and gives power to the elite**

**WALT 1991** (Stephen, Professor at the University of Chicago, *International Studies Quarterly* 35)

A third reason for decline was the Vietnam War. Not only did the debacle in Indochina cast doubt on some of the early work in the field (such as the techniques of “systems analysis” and the application of bargaining theory to international conflict), it also made the study of security affairs unfashionable in many universities. The latter effect was both ironic and unfortunate, because the debate on the war was first and foremost a debate about basic security issues. Was the “domino theory” accurate? Was U.S. credibility really at stake? Would using military force in Indochina in fact make the U.S. more secure? By neglecting the serious study of security affairs, opponents of the war could not effectively challenge the official rationales for U.S. involvement. The persistent belief that opponents of war should not study national security is like trying to find a cure for cancer by refusing to study medicine while allowing research on the disease to be conducted solely by tobacco companies.

**Debating state policy allows us to shape institutions and resist domination**

**STANNARD 2006** (Matt, Department of Communication and Journalism, University of Wyoming, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18, http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html)

If Habermas is right, and I obviously believe he is, then academics cannot afford to be insulated from the lives of ordinary working people, but must instead co-participate in some kind of empowerment for all, perhaps by facilitating schools, and I would suggest debate programs, as safe deliberation zones, which can in turn inform liberatory politics. Above all, a commitment to deliberative democracy means removing the stigma from disagreement and confrontation, and teaching all participants to be co-creators not only of the substance of debate, but the rulemaking of the conversational process itself. This debating can take place both inside and outside of schools. A commitment to deliberative democracy means a commitment to privileging the process of deliberation over other processes in shaping political life. In other words, inclusive rather than restrictive voting rights, more candidates on TV and not less, more resources committed to education not fewer, erring on the side of freedom of speech rather than restrictions, and above all, an emphasis on and respect for the conversational process itself as an active, inclusive, organic field of political truth-building. A democratization, in other words, of the building of collective truth. Sometimes this means conducting deliberative polls or favoring the referendum process. Other times it means making the political process more transparent, such as favoring open-door meetings and the like. Now, many people make pretty good arguments as to the imperfections of these policies. The referendum process can be co-opted, bought out; sometimes even openness is antithetical to transparency, since cynical politicians can take advantage of openness for their own publicity, and sometimes people need to deliberate in private. But the great thing about deliberation as a commitment is that these criticisms can become part of the overall process of deliberative democracy. In a world where interested parties have the opportunity to speak and debate in good faith, we can criticize the referendum process, or explain why we can’t always have open meetings. We can debate the rules themselves, in other words, debate the process itself. All of this suggests that, if deliberative ethics are an antidote to both authoritarianism and self-centeredness, we need more: More debate teams, more public discussion, more patient deliberation, more argument, more discourse, and more nurturing and promotion of the material entities that sustain them.

**And, policy education is necessary to prevent war and violence**

**BERES 2003** (Louis Rene, Prof. of International Law at Purdue, Journal and Courier, June 5)

The truth is often disturbing. Our impressive American victories against terrorism and rogue states, although proper and indispensable, are inevitably limited. The words of the great Irish poet Yeats reveal, prophetically, where our entire planet is now clearly heading. Watching violence escalate and expand in parts of Europe and Russia, in Northern Ireland, in Africa, in Southwest Asia, in Latin America, and of course in the Middle East, we discover with certainty that "... the centre cannot hold/Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world/The blood-dimmed tide is loosed/and everywhere The Ceremony of innocence is drowned." Our response, even after Operation Iraqi Freedom, lacks conviction. Still pretending that "things will get better," we Americans proceed diligently with our day-to-day affairs, content that, somehow, the worst can never really happen. Although it is true that we must go on with our normal lives, it is also true that "normal" has now become a quaint and delusionary state. We want to be sure that a "new" normal falls within the boundaries of human tolerance, but we can't nurture such a response without an informed appreciation of what is still possible. For us, other rude awakenings are unavoidable, some of which could easily overshadow the horrors of Sept. 11. There can be little doubt that, within a few short years, expanding tribalism will produce several new genocides and proliferating nuclear weapons will generate one or more regional nuclear wars. Paralyzed by fear and restrained by impotence, various governments will try, desperately, to deflect our attention, but it will be a vain effort. Caught up in a vast chaos from which no real escape is possible, we will learn too late that there is no durable safety in arms, no ultimate rescue by authority, no genuine remedy in science or technology. What shall we do? For a start, we must all begin to look carefully behind the news. Rejecting superficial analyses of day-to-day events in favor of penetrating assessments of world affairs, we must learn quickly to distinguish what is truly important from what is merely entertainment. With such learning, we Americans could prepare for growing worldwide anarchy not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet. Nowhere is it written that we people of Earth are forever, that humankind must thwart the long-prevailing trend among all planetary life-forms (more than 99 percent) of ending in extinction. Aware of this, we may yet survive, at least for a while, but only if our collective suppression of purposeful fear is augmented by a complementary wisdom; that is, that our personal mortality is undeniable and that the harms done by one tribal state or terror group against "others" will never confer immortality. This is, admittedly, a difficult concept to understand, but the longer we humans are shielded from such difficult concepts the shorter will be our time remaining. We must also look closely at higher education in the United States, not from the shortsighted stance of improving test scores, but from the urgent perspective of confronting extraordinary threats to human survival. For the moment, some college students are exposed to an occasional course in what is fashionably described as "global awareness," but such exposure usually sidesteps the overriding issues: We now face a deteriorating world system that cannot be mended through sensitivity alone; our leaders are dangerously unprepared to deal with catastrophic deterioration; our schools are altogether incapable of transmitting the indispensable visions of planetary restructuring. To institute productive student confrontations with survival imperatives, colleges and universities must soon take great risks, detaching themselves from a time-dishonored preoccupation with "facts" in favor of grappling with true life-or-death questions. In raising these questions, it will not be enough to send some students to study in Paris or Madrid or Amsterdam ("study abroad" is not what is meant by serious global awareness). Rather, all students must be made aware - as a primary objective of the curriculum - of where we are heading, as a species, and where our limited survival alternatives may yet be discovered. There are, of course, many particular ways in which colleges and universities could operationalize real global awareness, but one way, long-neglected, would be best. I refer to the study of international law. For a country that celebrates the rule of law at all levels, and which explicitly makes international law part of the law of the United States - the "supreme law of the land" according to the Constitution and certain Supreme Court decisions - this should be easy enough to understand. Anarchy, after all, is the absence of law, and knowledge of international law is necessarily prior to adequate measures of world order reform. Before international law can be taken seriously, and before "the blood-dimmed tide" can be halted, America's future leaders must at least have some informed acquaintance with pertinent rules and procedures. Otherwise we shall surely witness the birth of a fully ungovernable world order, an unheralded and sinister arrival in which only a shadowy legion of gravediggers would wield the forceps.

# A2: ARGUING AGAINST CONVICTION BAD

All of our role playing arguments answer this—arguing against conviction is good because it forces you to justify your own beliefs in the face of alternatives.

**And, switch-side debate doesn’t require this**

**Galloway 2007** (Ryan Galloway, Samford Debate Coach, Professor of Communication Studies at Samford, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007, LEQ)

However, this does not mean that debaters are victims. The sophistication of modern argument and the range of strategic choices available to modern debaters allow them to choose positions that are consistent with their belief structures. The rise of plan-inclusive counterplans, kritiks, and other strategies allow negative teams to largely align themselves with agreeable affirmative cases while distinguishing away narrow slivers of arguments that allow debaters to rarely argue completely against their convictions. While some contend that this undermines the value of switch-side debate (Ellis, 2008b; Shanahan, 2004), in fact, the notion that debaters employ nuanced answers to debate topics illustrates the complexity of modern debate resolutions.

Debate is not public speaking- we aren’t meant to convince the opponents but illustrate who won- debate is a private event not public whether they want it to be or not

Galloway 2007 (Ryan Galloway, Samford Debate Coach, Professor of Communication Studies at Samford, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007, LEQ, LEQ)

The argument that debaters should not argue in favor of ideas that they do not believe treats debate as with a normal public speaking event. This controversy was discussed thoroughly in various speech journals throughout the 1950s and 1960s, with most authors coming to the conclusion that debate is a unique public speaking event, where participants and observers disassociate the debater from their role. Richard Murphy lays out the case that students should not be forced to say something they do not believe, a concept quite similar to modern-day advocates of the notion that affirmatives should not have to defend the topic (1957; 1963). Murphy contends, “The argument against debating both sides is very simple and consistent. Debate…is a form of public speaking. A public statement is a public commitment” (1957, p. 2). Murphy believed students should discuss and research an issue until they understood their position on the issue and then take the stand and defend only that side of the proposition. Murphy’s fear was that students risk becoming a “weather vane,” having “character only when the wind is not blowing” (1963, p. 246). In contrast, Nicholas Cripe distinguished between speaking and debating (1957, p. 210). Cripe contended that, unlike a public speaker, a debater is “not trying to convince the judges, or his opponents” of the argument but merely to illustrate that their team has done the superior debating (p. 211). Debating in this sense exists with an obligation to give each position its best defense, in much the way an attorney does for a client. Here, the process of defending a position for the purposes of debate is distinct from their advocacy for a cause in a larger sense. As such, they are like Socrates in the Phaedrus, speaking with their heads covered so as not to anger the gods (Murphy 1957, p. 3). Additionally, debate is unlike public speaking since it happens almost always in a private setting. There are several distinctions. First, very few people watch individual contest rounds. The vast majority of such rounds take place with five people in the room—the four debaters, and the lone judge. Even elimination rounds with the largest audiences have no more than approximately one hundred observers, almost all of whom are debaters. Rarely do people outside the community watch debates. Also, debate has developed a set of norms and procedures quite unlike public speaking. While some indict these norms (Warner 2003),the rapid rate of speed and heavy reliance on evidence distinguishes debate from public speaking. Our activity is more like the closed debating society that Murphy admits can be judged by “pedagogical, rather than ethical, standards”(1957, p. 7).

# A2: NIHILISM

**They confuse the cart with the horse- conviction flows from discussion not prior to it**

**Galloway 2007** (Ryan Galloway, Samford Debate Coach, Professor of Communication Studies at Samford, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007, LEQ)

Those who worry that competitive academic debate will cause debaters to lose their convictions, as Greene and Hicks do in their 2005 article, confuse the cart with the horse. Conviction is not a priori to discussion, it flows from it.A. Craig Baird argued, “Sound conviction depends upon a thorough understanding of the controversial problem under consideration (1955, p. 5). Debate encourages rigorous training and scrutiny of arguments before debaters declare themselves an advocate for a given cause. Debate creates an ethical obligation to interrogate ideas from a neutral position so that they may be freely chosen subsequently.

# A2: YOU ENDORSE THE STATE

**This is totally wrong—role playing the state does not endorse it any more than the cast of Hogan’s Heroes are actually nazis because they played them on TV—their argument assumes that everyone in debate is a complete idiot who cannot tell the difference between a game and reality—the mere fact that they pointed this out should be enough warning to prevent us from doing it**

**And, we have topic-specific evidence about why debating state policy is good—that’s our Schaap and Kagan evidence—here’s more—we can rein in the worst excess of the state and prevent violence**

**WALT 1991** (Stephen, Professor at the University of Chicago, *International Studies Quarterly* 35)

A second norm is relevance, a belief that even highly abstract lines of inquiry should be guided by the goal of solving real-world problems. Because the value of a given approach may not be apparent at the beginning–game theory is an obvious example–we cannot insist that a new approach be immediately applicable to a specific research puzzle. On the whole, however, the belief that scholarship in security affairs should be linked to real-world issues has prevented the field from degenerating into self-indulgent intellectualizing. And from the Golden Age to the present, security studies has probably had more real-world impact, for good or ill, than most areas of social science. Finally, the renaissance of security studies has been guided by a commitment to democratic discourse. Rather than confining discussion of security issues to an elite group of the best and brightest, scholars in the renaissance have generally welcomed a more fully informed debate. To paraphrase Clemenceau, issues of war and peace are too important to be left solely to insiders with a vested interest in the outcome. The growth of security studies within universities is one sign of broader participation, along with increased availability of information and more accessible publications for interested citizens. Although this view is by no means universal, the renaissance of security studies has been shaped by the belief that a well-informed debate is the best way to avoid the disasters that are likely when national policy is monopolized by a few self-interested parties.

**Action through the state doesn’t uphold it, but the claim that we should never debate state politics makes change impossible and essentializes the state**

**KRAUSE AND WILLIAMS 1997** (Keith and Michael, Critical Security Studies, p. xvi)

First, to stand too far outside prevailing discourses is almost certain to result in continued disciplinary exclusion. Second, to move toward alternative conceptions of security and security studies, one must necessarily reopen the question subsumed under the modern conception of sovereignty and the scope of the political. To do this, one must take seriously the prevailing claims about the nature of security. Many of the chapters in this volume thus retain a concern with the centrality of the state as a locus not only of obligation but of effective political action. In the realm of organized violence states also remain the preeminent actors. The task of a critical approach is not to deny the centrality of the state in this realm but, rather, to understand more fully its structures, dynamics, and possibilities for reorientation. From a critical perspective, state action is flexible and capable of reorientation, and analyzing state policy need not therefore be tantamount to embracing the statist assumptions of orthodox conceptions. To exclude a focus on state action from a critical perspective on the grounds that it plays inevitably within the rules of existing conceptions simply reverses the error of essentializing the state. Moreover, it loses the possibility of influencing what remains the most structurally capable actor in contemporary world politics.

**Finally, they don’t get rid of the state—it will exist either way so there’s only a chance that more detailed analysis will help reform it—here’s more evidence in the context of debate**

**STANNARD 2006** (Matt, Department of Communication and Journalism, University of Wyoming, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18, http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html)

If it is indeed true that debate inevitably produces other-oriented deliberative discourse at the expense of students' confidence in their first-order convictions, this would indeed be a trade-off worth criticizing. In all fairness, Hicks and Greene do not overclaim their critique, and they take care to acknowledge the important ethical and cognitive virtues of deliberative debating. When represented as anything other than a political-ethical concern, however, Hicks and Greene's critique has several problems: First, as my colleague J.P. Lacy recently pointed out, it seems a tremendous causal (or even rhetorical) stretch to go from "debating both sides of an issue creates civic responsibility essential to liberal democracy" to "this civic responsibility upholds the worst forms of American exceptionalism." Second, Hicks and Greene do not make any comparison of the potentially bad power of debate to any alternative. Their implied alternative, however, is a form of forensic speech that privileges personal conviction. The idea that students should be able to preserve their personal convictions at all costs seems far more immediately tyrannical, far more immediately damaging to either liberal or participatory democracy, than the ritualized requirements that students occasionally take the opposite side of what they believe. Third, as I have suggested and will continue to suggest, while a debate project requiring participants to understand and often "speak for" opposing points of view may carry a great deal of liberal baggage, it is at its core a project more ethically deliberative than institutionally liberal. Where Hicks and Greene see debate producing "the liberal citizen-subject," I see debate at least having the potential to produce "the deliberative human being." The fact that some academic debaters are recruited by the CSIS and the CIA does not undermine this thesis. Absent healthy debate programs, these think-tanks and government agencies would still recruit what they saw as the best and brightest students. And absent a debate community that rewards anti-institutional political rhetoric as much as liberal rhetoric, those students would have little-to-no chance of being exposed to truly oppositional ideas. Moreover, if we allow ourselves to believe that it is "culturally imperialist" to help other peoples build institutions of debate and deliberation, we not only ignore living political struggles that occur in every culture, but we fall victim to a dangerous ethnocentrism in holding that "they do not value deliberation like we do." If the argument is that our participation in fostering debate communities abroad greases the wheels of globalization, the correct response, in debate terminology, is that such globalization is non-unique, inevitable, and there is only a risk that collaborating across cultures in public debate and deliberation will foster resistance to domination—just as debate accomplishes wherever it goes. Indeed, Andy Wallace, in a recent article, suggests that Islamic fundamentalism is a byproduct of the colonization of the lifeworld of the Middle East; if this is true, then one solution would be to foster cross-cultural deliberation among people on both sides of the cultural divide willing to question their own preconceptions of the social good. Hicks and Greene might be correct insofar as elites in various cultures can either forbid or reappropriate deliberation, but for those outside of that institutional power, democratic discussion would have a positively subversive effect.

# A2: WON’T BE POLICY MAKERS

**First, even if we never become policy makers, good understanding of government is important—as academics our theories about the state will be better, other people in debate might become policy makers, and role playing will make us better decision makers in general**

**Second, we have the most specific evidence—our Kagan evidence is specific to military policy and says that public deliberation is critical—our Schaap evidence says role playing is the only way to do this**

**And, the fact that we may not become policymakers makes this education more important, not less**

**KELLER, WHITTAKER, AND BURKE, 2001** (Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, "Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning," Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer, EBSCOhost)

Experiential learning, in the form of the practicum placement, is a key element in social work education. However, few social work students enroll in political or policy oriented practica. In a survey of 161 CSWE-accredited programs (131 BSW, 30 MSW), Wolk and colleagues (1996) found that less than half offered practica in government relations (BSW=20%, MSW=47%) and even fewer had placements in policy advocacy/development (BSW=15%, MSW=33%). Moreover, programs typically reported only one or two students participating in these types of placements, with the largest representation at a single school being 9 out of 250 MSW students (Wolk et al., 1996). Because few students receive policy-related field education, introducing students to policy relevant skills and experiences via active learning exercises in the classroom assumes greater importance. Bonwell and Eison (1991) describe the general characteristics of active learning in the classroom: \* Students are involved in more than listening. \* Less emphasis is placed on transmitting information and more on developing students' skills. \* Students are involved in higher-order thinking (analysis, synthesis, evaluation). \* Students are engaged in activities. \* Greater emphasis is placed on students' exploration of their own attitudes and values. (p. 2) Experiential learning in the classroom may involve case studies, role plays, debates, simulations, or other activities that allow students to make connections among theory, knowledge, and experience (Lewis & Williams, 1994). These active learning strategies encourage students to think on their feet, to question their own values and responses to situations, and to consider new ways of thinking in contexts which they may experience more intensely and, consequently, may remember longer (Meyers & Jones, 1993).

**Policy debate might not change the world, but critical debate definitely won’t–only theory with direct policy applications has any chance of influencing the state**

**DONOVAN AND LARKIN 2006** (Claire and Phil, Australian National University, Politics, Vol 26:1)

It would be naïve to assume that a political science which uses the knowledge and insights derived from the systematic and detailed study of political institutions and phenomena, or even concepts, will be simply picked up by those involved in the political process. Policymakers, politicians, unions, NGOs and the rest of the actors involved in practical politics have objectives to pursue, and political science is useful to them only where it helps them to clarify those objectives or to realise them. In many instances, ‘politicians would not be helped by advice from political scientists any more than fish would be able to swim better if they got advice from ichthyologists’ (Barry, 2004, p. 24); clearly, even at best, only a proportion of ‘useful’ political science will be taken up and there are numerous ‘filters’ that might see potentially workable ideas ignored (see Stone, Maxwell and Keating, 2001). And practical matters such as the differences in the time frames to which academics and those involved in practical politics work will clearly persist. But, the concern of the discipline must be less with ensuring the impact of individual pieces of work, or the work of particular individuals, and more with ensuring that there is a ‘critical mass’ of ‘usable’ political science to which practitioners can turn. This is still not a guarantee that it will be picked up by political practitioners, but producing research without this aim in mind is a guarantee that this will not happen.

# A2: SPECTATORSHIP

**First, we solve this—our Kagan evidence says that informed public debates are critical to understand military strategy and rein in violence—our Schaap evidence says that only role playing can do this—even if they win that we encourage spectatorship, only we actually provide the tools to make engagement effective**

**And, we solve the spectator phenomenon**

**JOYNER 1999** Christopher C. Joyner is a Professor of International Law in the Government Department at Georgetown University, Spring, 1999 [5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377]

Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. 8 The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense. A debate exercise is particularly suited to an examination of United States foreign policy, which in political science courses is usually studied from a theoretical, often heavily realpolitik perspective. In such courses, international legal considerations are usually given short shrift, if discussed at all. As a result, students may come to believe that international law plays no role in United States foreign policy-making. In fact, serious consideration is usually paid by government officials to international law in the formulation of United States policy, albeit sometimes ex post facto as a justification for policy, rather than as a bona fide prior constraint on consideration of policy options. In addition, lawyers are prominent advisers at many levels of the foreign-policy-making process. Students should appreciate the relevance of international law for past and current US actions, such as the invasion of Grenada or the refusal of the United States to sign the law of the sea treaty and landmines convention, as well as for [\*387] hypothetical (though subject to public discussion) United States policy options such as hunting down and arresting war criminals in Bosnia, withdrawing from the United Nations, or assassinating Saddam Hussein.

**And, our Stannard evidence answers this—switch-side debate creates deliberative democracy and encourages effective social activism—here’s more evidence that itsolves democracy and peace**

**RAWLS 1999** (John Rawls, professor at Harvard, The Law of Peoples, p. 56-57)

How is the ideal of public reason realized by citizens who are not government officials? In a representative govemment, citizens vote for representatives-chief executives, legislators, and the like—not for particular laws (except at a state or local level where they may vote directly on referenda questions, which are not usually fundamental questions). To answer this question, we say that, ideally, citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact. When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason, forms part of the political and social basis of liberal democracy and is vital for its enduring strength and vigor. Thus in domestic society citizens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason, while doing what they can to hold government officials to it. This duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. I emphasize that it is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech. Similarly, the ideal of the public reason of free and equal peoples is realized, or satisfied, whenever chief executives and legislators, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the principles of the Law of Peoples and explain to other peoples their reasons for pursuing or revising a people's foreign policy and affairs of state that involve other societies. As for private citizens, we say, as before, that ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were executives and legislators and ask themselves what foreign policy supported by what considerations they would think it most reasonable to advance. Once again, when firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal executives and legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate the public reason of free and equal peoples, is part of the political and social basis of peace and understanding among peoples.

# A2: THE CASE IS A TURN

**First, we don’t preclude their arguments—they can make them on the negative or even read them as advantages—we only require a link to the plan—we turn this argument because we require more intricate research and a higher standard for arguments**

**Second, we turn the case in three ways—**

**A) Our 1NC Andrews evidence says role playing is critical to improve our advocacy and expose weaknesses**

**B) Our Nolan evidence says informed public debate is the only way to challenge elite domination of nuclear policy—the alternative is elite manipulation of fear which makes problems worse—our Schaap evidence says only role playing solves this**

**C) Our Luckhardt and Bechtel evidence says that role playing is critical to build support for our ideas—failure to do this causes suspicion and rejection**

**Their arguments can be included in our framework, but debate over government policy is still critical–theoretical critique debates with no policy relevance distance the academy from government and hinder education**

**JENTLESON 2002** (Bruce, Director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy and Professor of Public Policy and Political Science at Duke University, International Security 26.4)

So, a Washington foreign policy colleague asked, which of your models and theories should I turn to now? What do you academics have to say about September 11? You are supposed to be the scholars and students of international affairs—Why did it happen? What should be done? Notwithstanding the surly tone, the questions are not unfair. They do not pertain just to political scientists and international relations scholars; they can be asked of others as well. It falls to each discipline to address these questions as they most pertain to its role. To be sure, political science and international relations have produced and continue to produce scholarly work that does bring important policy insights. Still it is hard to deny that contemporary political science and international relations as a discipline put limited value on policy relevance—too little, in my view, and the discipline suffers for it. 1 The problem is not just the gap between theory and policy but its chasmlike widening in recent years and the limited valuation of efforts, in Alexander George's phrase, at "bridging the gap." 2 The [End Page 169] events of September 11 drive home the need to bring policy relevance back in to the discipline, to seek greater praxis between theory and practice. This is not to say that scholars should take up the agendas of think tanks, journalists, activists, or fast fax operations. The academy's agenda is and should be principally a more scholarly one. But theory can be valued without policy relevance being so undervalued. Dichotomization along the lines of "we" do theory and "they" do policy consigns international relations scholars almost exclusively to an intradisciplinary dialogue and purpose, with conversations and knowledge building that while highly intellectual are excessively insular and disconnected from the empirical realities that are the discipline's raison d'être. This stunts the contributions that universities, one of society's most essential institutions, can make in dealing with the profound problems and challenges society faces. It also is counterproductive to the academy's own interests. Research and scholarship are bettered by pushing analysis and logic beyond just offering up a few paragraphs on implications for policy at the end of a forty-page article, as if a "ritualistic addendum." 3 Teaching is enhanced when students' interest in "real world" issues is engaged in ways that reinforce the argument that theory really is relevant, and CNN is not enough. There also are gains to be made for the scholarly community's standing as perceived by those outside the academic world, constituencies and colleagues whose opinions too often are self-servingly denigrated and defensively disregarded. It thus is both for the health of the discipline and to fulfill its broader societal responsibilities that greater praxis is to be pursued.

# A2: AMERICA BAD/SPANOS

**First, this is not a reason role playing is bad—even if the United States does evil things, we should still learn how the system works so we can oppose it—our Kagan, Schaap, and Stannard evidence proves that we can alter the government by learning its vocabulary, and our Schaap evidence says only role playing can teach this**

**Second, we have a separate impact—our Andrews, Luckhardt, and Bechtel evidence says role playing is good because it teaches us better advocacy—this spills over beyond the particular Aff in this debate and improves decision making that has nothing to do with policy debate**

**And, even if the American government is bad, role playing doesn’t associate us with it—we can examine courses of action without endorsing the agent, the same way that historians do when they write counterfactuals about Germany in World War Two or actors do when they play a part**

**Criticizing the U.S. government only isolates the left—brutal American history is a reason to engage the state, not reject it**

**GITLIN 2005** (Todd, professor of journalism and sociology at Columbia University, The Intellectuals and Patriotism, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/git01/)

From the late New Left point of view, then, patriotism meant obscuring the whole grisly truth of the United States. It couldn’t help spilling over into what Orwell thought was the harsh, dan- gerous, and distinct phenomenon of nationalism, with its aggres-sive edge and its implication of superiority. Scrub up patriotism as you will, and nationalism, as Schaar put it, remained “patrio- tism’s bloody brother.” Was Orwell’s distinction not, in the end, a distinction without a difference? Didn’t his patriotism, while refusing aggressiveness, still insist that the nation he affirmed was “the best in the world”? What if there was more than one feature of the American way of life that you did not believe to be “the best in the world”—the national bravado, the overreach of the marketplace. Patriotism might well be the door through which you marched with the rest of the conformists to the beat of the national anthem. Facing these realities, all the left could do was criticize empire and, on the positive side, unearth and cultivate righteous tradi-tions. The much-mocked “political correctness” of the next aca- demic generations was a consolation prize. We might have lost politics but we won a lot of the textbooks. The tragedy of the left is that, having achieved an unprece-dented victory in helping stop an appalling war, it then proceeded to commit suicide. The left helped force the United States out of Vietnam, where the country had no constructive work to do—ei- ther for Vietnam or for itself—but did so at the cost of discon-necting itself from the nation. Most U.S. intellectuals substituted the pleasures of condemnation for the pursuit of improvement. The orthodoxy was that “the system” precluded reform—never mind that the antiwar movement had already demonstrated that reform was possible. Human rights, feminism, environmental- ism—these worldwide initiatives, American in their inception, flowing not from the American Establishment but from our own American movements, were noises off, not center stage. They were outsider tastes, the stuff of protest, not national features, the real stuff. Thus when, in the nineties, the Clinton administra-tion finally mobilized armed force in behalf of Bosnia and then Kosovo against Milosevic’s genocidal Serbia, the hard left only could smell imperial motives, maintaining that democratic, anti-genocidal intentions added up to a paper-thin mask. In short, if the United States seemed fundamentally trapped in militarist imperialism, its opposition was trapped in the mir-ror-image opposite. By the seventies the outsider stance had be-come second nature. Even those who had entered the sixties in diapers came to maturity thinking patriotism a threat or a bad joke. But anti-Americanism was, and remains, a mood and a metaphysics more than a politics. It cannot help but see practical politics as an illusion, entangled as it is and must be with a sys-tem fatally flawed by original sin. Viewing the ongoing politics of the Americans as contemptibly shallow and compromised, the demonological attitude naturally rules out patriotic attachment to those very Americans. Marooned (often self-marooned) on university campuses, exiled in left-wing media and other cultural outposts—all told, an archipelago of bitterness—what sealed it- self off in the postsixties decades was what Richard Rorty has called “a spectatorial, disgusted, mocking Left rather than a Left which dreams of achieving our country.”

# A2: THEORY ARGUMENTS (roleplaying shell)

**Theory arguments are not responsive—we don’t think the Aff is cheating, we just have substantive reasons why their framework is bad. Even if they win these theory arguments, they still lose—our impacts are extinction and several case turns, which outweighs any theory argument**

# A2: RULES BAD (roleplaying shell)

**We don’t link to “rules bad”-type arguments—we don’t create “rules” for debate, we just say that the Aff would be more effective if they role played, and have impact turns to the way they read their Aff—our argument is more like a critique than a traditional theory argument**

**And, even if they win a link, rules are good for role playing**

**ANDREWS 2005** (Peter, Consulting Faculty Member at the IBM Executive Business Institute in Palisades, New York, Executive Technology Report, July, www-935.ibm.com/services/us/imc/pdf/gt510-6190-red-teams.pdf)

Disaster can force you to imagine the unimaginable. Unfortunately, the price is high, which is why Red Teams have come into vogue. While some Red Teams are merely review panels, the more ambitious ones are all about challenging assumptions, finding vulnerabilities and actively finding unconventional means to get a jump on mainstream (or Blue) planning teams. One key element is assuming an adversarial posture, taking the perspective of the enemy or competitor. The U.S. military has been using Red Teams to test their planning for over 30 years (and longer, by other names). They have received new attention as a critical tool for fighting terrorism, but for businesses, they can help provide competitive advantage, especially as a means to expand exploration of innovations. The key benefits of a Red Team are: • Identifying significant vulnerabilities • Discovering new uses for innovations • Challenging taboos and assumptions • Providing a minority report on a new concept or idea • Revealing the consequences of different perspectives; in particular, the perspectives of those with different goals and risk profiles. Red Teams can work at different levels – strategic, operational and tactical. They can goad a Blue Team to be more creative. They can help to anticipate and explain “irrational” actions and choices by adversaries. In addition, they can help to identify, train and tap talent for the organization, talent that is vital in a fast-changing environment. The success of a Red Team depends on its composition, its support from management, its relationship with the Blue Team, the goals, the available information and the rules of the game: Composition – Putting together an effective Red Team is as much an art as a science. There is a need to include experts, but there also must be room for people who ask naïve questions. Red Team members need to be able to inhabit the roles of adversaries and risk delivering bad news, but they also must stay on good terms with all parties. They need to understand the mindset and cultures of both their own organizations and the real-world adversaries. They need to be capable of detailed critical analysis, but they also need to be imaginative and iconoclastic. Most of all, they need to have the capability to communicate surprising concepts in clear, compelling language. Management support – The Red Team must have the authority and standing to get a fair hearing for its ideas and concepts. For most organizations, this means someone high up in management, but generally not the direct manager of the Blue Team. In addition to enabling a fair hearing, the management must also provide material support, proper staffing and access to information/experts. And, they must provide continuity and stability or the Red Team may find itself blocked and ignored. Relationship with Blue Team – The Red Team must have the trust of the Blue Team. Without trust, the Blue Team will hide key data and be reluctant to incorporate the views and insights of the Red Team. At the same time, the Red Team must not be co-opted by the Blue Team. It must maintain a level of independence and a willingness to make unpopular statements. Goals – Ultimately, the required deliverables of the Red Team must be defined and there must be some measures of success. This does not mean that the Red Team cannot cross boundaries and provide more than was agreed to, but there must be a level of accountability. The Red Team needs to know what is promised and deliver on those promises. Available information – There are times when the information the Red Team has available is restricted. It makes good sense that a Blue Team, creating a computer security system, would not need to reveal every aspect to a Red Team that is assuming the roles of black hat hackers (those people who would attempt to compromise system security without authorization). On the other hand, providing the Red Team with an open book on innovation plans makes sense. In fact, regularly meeting with and working with the Blue Team can benefit both teams, especially if a healthy competition develops. A sure sign that things are working well is if the Blue Team begins to incorporate and anticipate Red Team approaches as it pursues its own work. Rules of the game – Given the competitive nature of the teams, the rules of engagement must be clear with regard to information, judgment of success, what comprises proof and when/how opinions and insights are offered. In addition, the consequences – especially with regard to rewards and career advancement – must be stated up front. Creative Red Teams will look at a variety of aspects that affect success in the real world – culture, technologies, needs, rewards, laws, market research, risk factors and available resources. Their biggest payoffs will probably come from identifying assumptions and digging into the roles of adversaries. Unexamined assumptions are usually the biggest culprits in narrowing investigation and leading to tunnel vision: things that could never happen, logical chains that can’t be circumvented, values, taboos, false definitions and rules, to name a few. By researching the adversaries – perhaps including people who are not even on the radar screen – motivations, connections, different contexts, different values and risk factors can be explored in new ways. In fact, the best Red Teams are able to inhabit the roles of adversaries in ways that approach good acting.

# A2: PERM DO BOTH (roleplaying shell)

**They can’t permute—our argument is a framework about how the Affirmative should present their advocacy—just saying “do both” doesn’t solve the link because the aff still doesn’t have a defense of how the plan should be implemented by the federal government**

**And, there’s no alternative to permute—our only alternative is a vision of debate, not an actual, concrete policy—the permutation doesn’t meet the standard of the alternative—only a different 1AC could do that**

# A2: SOCIAL LOCATION

**First, our interpretation solves this—the Aff can make arguments from their own social location, they just have to be justifications for government action—also, they can make arguments on the opposite side when they’re negative—they have to win both that there is no defense of government action from their social location, and that every debate should always be about their own social location**

**Second, role playing is compatible with this—even if we make arguments from our own social location, that doesn’t mean we should never try to understand anyone else’s perspective—understanding how other entities we interact with make decisions is important for our own social location**

**And, debates about social location are impossible to resolve—if we can’t make arguments that transcend these social boundaries then there’s no common ground for debate and you can’t compare competing claims**

**And, privileging identity crushes debate and results in authoritarianism**

**STANNARD 2006** (Matt, Department of Communication and Journalism, University of Wyoming, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18, http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html)

But the Academy is not only under attack from "outsiders," and not merely because the post-September 11 world has given the nod to sterile and commodified forms of patriotic communication and safe, symbolic dissent. Both inside and outside college life, the value of discussion is increasingly under attack, under sabotage, sometimes unintentionally, sometimes violently, and the attackers are often not recognizable as such. We cower away from religious fanatics because we know they refuse to entertain the possibility of their incorrectness, but we fail to see our own failure to embrace the possibilities of our own incorrectness. We label other points of view "ideological" from vantage points we assume to be free of ideology, or we excuse our narrow-mindedness by telling ourselves that "ideology is inevitable." Part of this weakening of our commitment to open debate is our recent, seemingly liberating embrace of personal conviction over public deliberation, the self-comfort of personal narrative over the clumsy, awkward, and fallible attempt to forge consensus across the lines of identity and politics. The fetishization of personal conviction is no less threatening to the public forum than violent authoritarianism—both seek to render disagreement impossible, close off deliberation, and take us closer towards eventual, unnatural silence.

**And, all topics involve personal connections—claiming that a topic represents one group more than another disenfranchizes people in minority groups who care about policy issues**

**FUGATE 1997** (Amy, Director of Forensics at Johnson County Community College, Argumentation and Advocacy, Spring)

One area that seems problematic is the argument that debate resolutions do not focus on real people but rather abstract ideas and hypothetical examples (Bartanen, 1995). While my experience has been with NDT topics, I cannot think of one topic which did not deal with "real people". In fact, some years the topics seem eerily real! In one debate round last year, the affirmative argued in favor of increased United States assistance to the Palestinians. The negative argued that if the United States gave more assistance to the Palestinians it would cause the Israeli right wing to revolt with an impact of potential assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister. While the disadvantage was "hypothetical," it mirrored the real world when two weeks later, Rabin was assassinated. I would argue that topics which deal with the environment, the legal system, foreign assistance, military commitments, media, politics, United States relations with other countries, the different branches of our government, and so on are part of what makes academic debate "academic." I have even greater concern with deciding certain topic areas are more relevant to one gender or ethnic group than to another. There are several of my colleagues who would find it very difficult to be told that as women they aren't concerned with "masculine" issues such as nuclear disarmament.

**We have historical evidence—Malcolm X’s prison debates prove that role playing enhances social activism**

**BRANHAM 1995** (Robert, Professor of Rhetoric at Bates College, Argumentation and Advocacy, Winter)

Malcolm X later recalled of these early television appearances that "In the prison days, I had learned tricks to upset my opponents, to catch them where they didn't expect to be caught" and now was determined to supplement these with new skills tailored to "arguing on the air" (1965b, p. 244). In order to prepare himself for his public confrontations, Malcolm X continued the practice from his prison debates of pretending to be his opponent, so that he might anticipate the strongest possible arguments of his adversary. He reviewed tapes of prior speeches to identify successful and unsuccessful lines of argument. He carefully rehearsed his arguments, sometimes while driving his car (Perry, p. 179). He developed stock and highly effective responses to standard arguments that his opponents were likely to make. "One has the feeling," wrote Kenneth Clark in 1963, "that Minister Malcolm has anticipated every question anti is prepared with the appropriate answer, an answer which is consistent with the general position" of the NOI (p. 17). This commitment to systematic anticipation, strategic planning and briefing gave Malcolm X a decided advantage over most opponents (Branham, 1991, p. 97).

**Finally, debate is self-correcting—even if it is exclusionary, it trains people in the tools to change the process and fight domination**

**STANNARD 2006** (Matt, Department of Communication and Journalism, University of Wyoming, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18, http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html)

Some of the most articulate criticisms of competitive, switch-side academic debate come from the debate community itself. These criticisms have lately centered on things like the specialized and esoteric practices of debate, the under-representation of minorities in the activity, and the way in which debate practices feed, rather than fight, structures of domination. In other words, internal criticism of academic debate is very much like internal criticisms of the Academy in general: We’re too specialized, we’re too white, and we’re exploited by hegemonic institutions. All of these criticisms are true, and yet, paradoxically, it is our experience in debate, along with our experience in the critical thinking of university education, that teaches us how to articulate these arguments. The deliberative process is self-reflective and at least has the potential to be self-correcting.

# A2: WE EVENTUALLY CAUSE ACTION

**First, this isn’t good enough—our argument is about the benefit of roleplaying for challenging state hegemony over nuclear policy and elite domination of world-ending decisions—even if the Aff results in state action eventually, they don’t solve any of our arguments because they don’t actually take the perspective of the state**

**Critical theory must be tied to specific political institutions—it’s their obligation to link their arguments to policy**

**McCLEAN 2001** (David, New School University, “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm)

One might argue with me that these other intellectuals are not looking to be taken seriously in the construction of solutions to specific socio-political problems. They are, after all, philosophers engaged in something called philosophizing. They are, after all, just trying to be good culture critics. Of course, that isn't quite true, for they often write with specific reference to social issues and social justice in mind, even when they are fluttering about in the ether of high theory (Lukács, for example, was a government officer, albeit a minister of culture, which to me says a lot), and social justice is not a Platonic form but parses into the specific quotidian acts of institutions and individuals. Social justice is but the genus heading which may be described better with reference to its species iterations- the various conditions of cruelty and sadism which we wittingly or unwittingly permit. If we wanted to, we could reconcile the grand general theories of these thinkers to specific bureaucracies or social problems and so try to increase their relevance. We could construct an account which acts as a bridge to relevant policy considerations. But such attempts, usually performed in the reams of secondary literature generated by their devotees, usually make things even more bizarre. In any event, I don't think we owe them that amount of effort. After all, if they wanted to be relevant they could have said so by writing in such a way that made it clear that relevance was a high priority. For Marxians in general, everything tends to get reduced to class. For Lukács everything tends to get reduced to "reification." But society and its social ills are far too intricate to gloss in these ways, and the engines that drive competing interests are much more easily explained with reference to animal drives and fears than by Absolute Spirit. That is to say, they are not easily explained at all.

**The argument that criticism precedes action only dooms their project to irrelevance**

**McCLEAN 2001** (David, New School University, “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm)

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action."

# A2: CAN ROLE PLAY AS ACTIVISTS

**This doesn’t solve any of our impacts—our Schaap evidence is about learning political vocabulary by role playing government agencies—the impact is our Kagan evidence—this is critical to challenge status quo military policies—our Anderson, Luckhardt, and Bechtel evidence link turns their arguments because state role playing is key to activism, not the other way around**

**And, state policy is the only way to make criticism socially relevant—their framework condemns social activism to useless complaining that leaves power in the hands of the same elites**

**McCLEAN 2001** (David, New School University, “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm)

Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

# A2: COMPETITION BAD

**The Aff links to their own arguments—they are attempting to win, and if they aren’t, you should vote negative on presumption since they have failed to justify a vote**

**And, competition in debate is good—it encourages education, strong community, and increases quality of work**

**GILLESPIE AND GORDON 2006** (William and Elizabeth, Kennesaw State University, “Competition, Role-Playing, and Political Science Education,” Sep 1, http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/1/5/1/0/0/pages151007/p151007-1.php)

But, for the most part, coaches report that the competitive element enhances learning in several ways. First, many coaches perceive that competition motivates their students to put in the time and do their best work. Some indicate that no other means of motivation is as effective. Engaging in competition allows students to measure their progress. It also provides a goal, raises the stakes of the activity, and provides more rewards. Second, as one coach said, “the activity faithfully recreates many of the dynamics of the adversarial model, and my students report learning a lot.” For the goal of substantive learning about how American law functions, especially in litigation, competition is an essential element. Mock trial allows students to experience some of the processes, constraints, and emotions associated with competition in a courtroom. Third, the stress of competition itself helps students gain flexibility and adaptability. Many coaches mention the ability to “think on one’s feet” as a skill that students acquire in the fluid environment of a mock trial competition. “Competition enhances the learning experience. The students seem to absorb lessons more quickly and thoroughly under fire,” writes one coach. Another writes: “They also learn to adjust and adapt quickly to the different evaluators. That is something they don't get from their regular classes.” Fourth, some coaches explain that competing against other schools allows their students to learn by seeing different approaches to the same case. Representative comments along these lines include: “Students get to see what other teams do and learn from those experiences.” “[Competition] exposes the students to different techniques and approaches that the other teams use.” Fifth, many coaches explain that the competition enhances camaraderie and teamwork among their students. One coach explains that competition “gives a sense of duty to fulfill an obligation to their fellow teammates.” “Students learn teamwork in an interactive and dynamic setting,” reports another.

**Competition is good—it creates excellence and strenghtens communities—it’s the only way to keep participation high**

**LEWIS 1992** (Martin, Professor of Geography at George Washington University and recovered radical environmentalist, Green Delusions, pp 176-177)

But as anyone who has ever played sports knows full well, competition usually *creates* strong social bonds. Camaraderie not only links team members, but it can even develop between opposing contingents. Such bonding between competitors is most clearly evident in nonteam sports; people generally play tennis or racquetball with their closest friends, not their most bitter enemies. Noncompetitive sports, on the other hand, not only fail to bring out peak performances, but they seldom prove satisfying. When I was an undergraduate at the University of California at Santa Cruz, where Marxist, primitivist, and anarchist philosophies prevailed, many students declared that they would no longer play games such as racquetball in competitive manner. Instead they would merely bat the ball around for a while, and in so doing spare the egos of the less-skilled players. In short time, however, most of these caring persons ceased playing altogether.

# A2: EXCLUSION

**Exclusion is inevitable—the structure of the Aff does it too**

**Galloway 2007** (Ryan Galloway, Samford Debate Coach, Professor of Communication Studies at Samford, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007, LEQ)

While affirmative teams often accuse the negative of using a juridical rule to exclude them, the affirmative also relies upon an unstated rule to exclude the negative response. This unstated but understood rule is that the negative speech act must serve to negate the affirmative act. Thus, affirmative teams often exclude an entire range of negative arguments, including arguments designed to challenge the hegemony, domination, and oppression inherent in topical approaches to the resolution. Becoming more than just a ritualistic tag-line of “fairness, education, time skew, voting issue,” fairness exists in the implicit right to be heard in a meaningful way. Ground is just that—a ground to stand on, a ground to speak from, a ground by which to meaningfully contribute to an ongoing conversation.

\*\*\*POLICY GOOD/GENERAL TOOLBOX

# POLICY GOOD—DEMOCRACY

**Informed public debates over security issues are crucial to challenge the cult of secrecy and maintain democracy**

**WALT 1991** (Stephen, Professor at the University of Chicago, International Studies Quarterly 35)

Efforts to shield government policy from outside evaluation pose a grave threat to scholarship in the field. No doubt some government officials would like to deny ordinary citizens the opportunity to scrutinize their conduct; as a central part of that evaluative process, the scholarly profession should resist this effort wholeheartedly. The danger goes beyond the interests of any particular subfield; restricting information threatens the public debate that is central to democracy and essential to sound policy. Events as diverse as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Iran/contra affair, and the troubled development of the B-2 bomber remind us that excessive secrecy allows ill-conceived programs to survive uncorrected. Instead of limiting the study of security issues to a select group of official "experts," therefore, open debate on national security matters must be preserved. Such a debate requires that scholars retain access to a reliable and complete data base.

**Debates over public issues are vital to democracy**

**Levasseur and Carlin ‘1** (David G. Levasseur is Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at West Chester University in West Chester, Pennsylvania. Diana B. Carlin is Professor of Communication Studies and Dean of the Graduate School and International Programs at the University of Kansas, “Egocentric Argument and the Public Sphere: Citizen Deliberations on Public Policy and Policymakers”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs 4.3 (2001) 407-43, Muse, 2001, LEQ)

Democracies are built on discourse. As Harold Lasswell expressed several decades ago, "Democracy depends on talk, [and] the methods of talk need to aid in the discovery of sound public policy." 1 Because talk matters, contemporary scholarship has lavished great attention upon civic discourse. The majority of this attention has focused upon diagnosing and rejuvenating the ailing public sphere. While this sphere is defined somewhat differently by individual scholars, in a broad sense this sphere involves "citizens deliberating about common affairs, as distinct from personal or private concerns." 2 Within the expansive literature on the ailing public sphere, theoretical writings far outnumber empirical ones. However, the public sphere is not only a "normative" construct, but it is also a dialogic process subject to "empirical" examination. 3 Gerard A. Hauser has advocated taking an "empirical attitude" to the study of this discursive realm, and he argues that such an empirical "framework draws its inferences about publics, public spheres, and public opinions from actual social practices of discourse." 4 Focusing upon the empirical nature of the public sphere promises to yield valuable insights; just as an ailing patient is best diagnosed by an actual examination, assessing and improving the health of the public sphere is best accomplished through an actual examination of the discourse within this communicative space. [End Page 407] Such empirical examinations should pay particular attention to ordinary citizens' deliberative discourse. After all, democracy is built upon the discursive acts of ordinary people in ordinary conversation. 5 Yet scholars have paid little attention to such ordinary citizens, who, Alexis de Tocqueville observed, "reign over the American political world as God rules over the universe." 6 Consequently, our knowledge of the public sphere would benefit from a shift in focus: shifting our attention from the discourse of elites to the discourse of the larger citizenry. 7

**Debates must be over issues of common interest, not questions of individual concern or identity**

**Levasseur and Carlin ‘1** (David G. Levasseur is Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at West Chester University in West Chester, Pennsylvania. Diana B. Carlin is Professor of Communication Studies and Dean of the Graduate School and International Programs at the University of Kansas, “Egocentric Argument and the Public Sphere: Citizen Deliberations on Public Policy and Policymakers”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs 4.3 (2001) 407-43, Muse, 2001, LEQ)

Argument is a key discursive form within the public sphere. 22 Citizens within our discussion groups argued as they formed a communicative space to discuss political issues. Within this space, their arguments fell into distinct patterns, and these patterns ran counter to concepts of a healthy public sphere as described by most scholars. These patterns shared one commonality: they all contained a core element of egocentrism--the view that individuals should focus on their own interests and experiences. One group participant in Illinois ably described this egocentrism in his portrait of the debate viewing process: M1: I think part of the attraction to debates is sitting and watching the candidates try to make the issues relevant to you as a viewer. I think part of it is sitting there and saying, what they're talking about, how does that affect me? If you say, "Well, health care, doesn't affect me, I'm 22," then you're not going to get anything out of the debates. But if you sit there and watch and say, "Health care, now how does that affect me?" It's more the sense of this is something that's important. Otherwise, they wouldn't be talking about it, so how can it be made relevant to me? I think that's probably why I found that everything they talked about affected me in a certain way, because I was looking for it. In this case, the viewer watched the debate with a focus on the self--looking for connections between the self and public policy. Such a viewer was likely to generate political arguments with an egocentric foundation. Such egocentrism has a long history in the United States. In nineteenth-century America, Tocqueville observed a self-interested individualism that he labeled as "egoism." He warned that a neglect of associated life could lead to a disintegration of democracy. 23 The egocentrism that Tocqueville feared has, over time, become [End Page 410] entrenched within the U. S. ideological traditions of individualism and liberalism. 24 This entrenched American ideology portrays "individuals as autonomous rational agents who seek to pursue their own life plans, their own interests, without interference from other agents." 25 This ideology is the "public philosophy of contemporary American politics" and "most of our debates proceed within its terms." 26 An ego-centered ideology creates difficulties for the public sphere because a public sphere, by its very nature, should compel citizens to arrive at collective outcomes. In fact, the normative conceptions of the public sphere and deliberative democracy generally contend that citizens' arguments must further the common good rather than individual self-interest. For example, Jürgen Habermas's model of the bourgeois public sphere rests upon the notion that discourse will focus on the common good rather than private interests. John Dryzek argues that discourse in the public sphere should "restrain [the] pursuit of self-interest." John Rawls contends that in an ideal deliberative democracy arguments would be grounded in a "conception of the common good," and Zarefsky defines the public sphere as a discursive space where citizens focus on "the best interest of the larger community." 27 While others have alluded to egocentrism in the United States, they have not shown how this egocentrism is embodied within specific argument forms in the public sphere. In our discussion groups, this egocentrism emerged within three specific patterns of argument: (1) citizens framed arguments in terms of self-interest; (2) citizens grounded public policy evaluation in personal experience; and (3) citizens engaged in cynical public policy evaluation.

# CONCRETE CHANGE GOOD

**Their aversion to concrete political change creates a climate of skepticism where power replaces truth—the result is fascism**

**LEWIS 1992** (Martin, Professor of Geography at George Washington University and recovered radical environmentalist, Green Delusions, pp 247-248)A majority of those born between 1960 and 1980 seem to tend toward cynicism, and we can thus hardly expect them to be converted en masse to radical doctrines of social and environmental salvation by a few committed thinkers. It is actually possible that a radical education may make them even more cynical than they already are. While their professors may find the extreme relativism of subversive postmodernism bracingly liberating, many of today’s students may embrace only the new creed’s rejection of the past. Stripped of leftist social concerns, radical postmodernism’s contempt for established social and political philosophy—indeed, its contempt for liberalism—may well lead to right-wing totalitarianism. When cynical, right-leaning students are taught that democracy is a sham and that all meaning derives from power, they are being schooled in fascism, regardless of their instructors’ intentions. According to sociologist Jeffrey Goldfarb (1991), cynicism is the hallmark—and main defect—of the current age. He persuasively argues that cynicism's roots lie in failed left- and right-wing ideologies—systems of thought that deductively connect "a simple rationalized absolute truth ... to a totalized set of political actions and policies" (1991:82). Although most eco-radicals are anything but cynical when they imagine a "green future," they do take a cynical turn when contemplating the present political order. The dual cynical-ideological mode represents nothing less than the death of liberalism and of reform. Its dangers are eloquently spelled out by Goldfarb (1991:9): "When one thinks ideologically and acts ideologically, opponents become enemies to be vanquished, political compromise becomes a kind of immorality, and constitutional refinements become inconvenient niceties.

# NUCLEAR DEBATES GOOD

**Debate over the details of nuclear policy is critical to prevent state manipulation—failure to advance concrete policy options allows the elite to manipulate fear and turns the case**

**NOLAN 1989** (Janne, Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution and has worked as a national security specialist in both the Senate and Executive Branch, Guardians of the Arsenal, 282-284)

To many, the idea that nuclear war planning is subject to bureaucratic politics, institutional rivalries, and the petty ambitions of individuals competing for influence is so appalling that the refuse to acknowledge the “legitimacy” of such dynamics. Even discussing the political dimension of nuclear policy somehow trivializes the subject, and so it is discounted. Better to spend time refining moral exhortations or improving the exactitude of new quantitative models for force balances than to stoop so low. For many antinuclear activists, in particular, discussing ways to make nuclear strategy more coherent is totally off the mark. It begs the real question about nuclear weapons: their fundamental illegitimacy as instruments of war or diplomacy. It is politically and morally bankrupt to talk about making strategy more coherent, they argue, when the real imperative is to get rid of these weapons altogether. “Reform” is just rearranging the deck chairs in the war-fighting bureaucracy that is leading the world in its inexorable march to Armageddon. The illegitimacy of nuclear weapons is without doubt the source of the most enduring political problems in American security. Few politicians are ever willing to state publicly that they believe that nuclear weapons preserve peace or that a war-fighting strategy is the cornerstone of credible nuclear deterrence. These positions are accepted privately by many, of course, and discussed openly among the cognoscenti. To many who argue for radical revisions in nuclear forces, the main problem is the fundamentally antidemocratic manner in which nuclear policy is undertaken. It is only because it has been hidden from the public view that the current character of nuclear strategy has survived. Almost everyone interviewed for this book was asked about this key assumption. Should nuclear doctrine be a subject for a national referendum? Should the American public exert influence in our war-fighting posture? To a man (they were all males), the advocates of strategic defenses said yes. As Martin Anderson put it, “Absolutely. If you have the right strategy, the people will support you.” Gregory Fossedal, a former *Wall Street Journal* editorial-page writer and now a media fellow at the Hoover Institution, echoed these words: “Reagan, Martin Anderson, and I are populists. We’re governed by the people, not by the Harvard faculty or the Brookings Institution. You change elite opinion through popular opinion.” An unacknowledged political alliance exists between the Right and the Left on this issue. Nuclear war plans, they both argue, would not stand up to political scrutiny. Though they could not be more divided in their goals, the two schools agree that the public needs to be informed about the Faustian bargain that the architects of flexible response have provided as the basis for American security. But ask most officials with responsibilities for nuclear forces the same question, and you will draw laser glares. Those who are working on the actual implementation of war plans blanch at the thought of public or congressional intrusion into the private realm of strategy. After examining the experience of four decades of policies about nuclear weapons, one is struck by the tremendous role that secrecy has played in holding the system together. Even the most modest efforts to be “candid” about real policy, like James Schlesinger’s, proved disastrous. The public genuinely believes that nuclear weapons are illegitimate and does not want to be reminded of their existence. As we have seen, the public’s concern about nuclear weapons can be readily turned to fear. And this kind of public sentiment helped spawn the industry of nuclear deceit, of which the SDI is simply the most recent example. Calls to public activism with unspecific objectives may thus not be the best approach. Frightened Americans looking for solace are a great constituency for clever political strategists. There is no question that current nuclear strategy cannot sustain the glare of public attention. The whole concept of limited nuclear war has no political constituency. But, as Frank Miller is fond of saying, flexible response is the worst alternative–except for all the others. Not even the military, trained to be inured to the consequences of its dire responsibility can “support” nuclear doctrine. General Dougherty has said, I consider raw, deliberate population attacks immoral as well as unlawful, and I know of no US nuclear planning force that has as its targeting objectives cities, civilian populations, noncombatants, civilian objects, schools, or hospitals *that have no relation to the objective of preventing nuclear aggression from succeeding*. As proof, one has merely to look at the US nuclear inventory, which is clearly unsuited for optimum use in city destruction or mass noncombatant kill. A commander planning deliberate attacks on cities...would have a major moral problem on his hands with his command and combat crews.

**Informed public debate is key to responsible nuclear policy**

**NOLAN 1989** (Janne, Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution and has worked as a national security specialist in both the Senate and Executive Branch, Guardians of the Arsenal, 285)

The key to any successful and responsible public strategy is an informed constituency that is not very vulnerable to political diversion. If the effort to change current nuclear doctrine relies on exhortation rather than on analysis, or seeks to discredit the entire defense establishment as part of its exorcism, it will fail again. The response to ill-conceived campaigns of this kind has always been to circle the wagons. And the establishment is still far more capable of thwarting unwelcome ventures than activists are capable of bringing down the walls of Jericho.

# COMMON GROUND GOOD

**Debates should revolve around common ground—focus on individual perspectives just means that activism is ignored**

**Levasseur and Carlin ‘1** (David G. Levasseur is Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at West Chester University in West Chester, Pennsylvania. Diana B. Carlin is Professor of Communication Studies and Dean of the Graduate School and International Programs at the University of Kansas, “Egocentric Argument and the Public Sphere: Citizen Deliberations on Public Policy and Policymakers”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs 4.3 (2001) 407-43, Muse, 2001, LEQ)

Citizens in our discussion groups frequently framed arguments in terms of their own individual self-interest. For instance, one group participant in Nashville, Tennessee, remarked, "One of my concerns that really has not been brought up here and very little there is military spending. Being retired military and going to school on military benefits, that's a big concern." 28 Similarly, a citizen in North Dakota defined herself as a "single parent" and went on to argue: "I think they really need to address what they can do to help the single parents get through a month on their budget or get through so they can put their kids through college." A group member in San Francisco advocated more governmental attention to Planned Parenthood because "Planned Parenthood is another one, these social programs that I need. I go to that; I need that." All of these arguments are grounded in the egocentric warrant that if a policy affects the individual, then this policy demands political attention. According to some scholars, such arguments should not take place in the public sphere because the "public" nature of this sphere imposes certain rhetorical constraints upon citizens. Habermas's conception of the public sphere includes the belief that "there are certain arguments that simply cannot be stated publicly. In a [End Page 411] political debate it is pragmatically impossible to argue that a given solution should be chosen just because it is good for oneself." 29 Expressing similar sentiments, Hauser argues that within the public sphere participants must "forge links" with others or they run the risk of having their views "reduced to the status of a special interest." 30 In other words, since rhetoric involves finding common ground, the public sphere should constrain citizens' ability to offer arguments warranted exclusively upon individual self-interest. Nevertheless, participants in the study frequently grounded policy arguments explicitly in terms of their own self-interest, and groups did not censure such arguments. Discussion group members certainly could have recognized communal constraints and discussed public policy in more communal terms. In fact, a few communal arguments did find their way into the group discussions. For instance, a citizen in San Francisco chastised the government for "cutting funds to the national parks; they're cutting down forests that we need to breathe. There are so many different things, and none of those things are being discussed, which they really need to be discussed, because they're affecting everyone in the world, not just people in America. They're affecting everyone." In this case, the participant advocated a policy that benefits "everyone" rather than a policy that simply benefits herself. Since group facilitators simply prompted participants with general questions about the debates (for example, Were there any issues of interest that were not discussed during the debate?), there is no reason why group members could not respond in broader communal terms as the woman from San Francisco did with her comments on the environment. Nevertheless, such communal discourse was exceptionally rare in the groups, while arguments grounded in self-interest were overwhelmingly abundant. Pamela Johnston Conover, Stephen T. Leonard, and Donald D. Searing, in their limited focus group study of citizenship, found that individuals have great difficulty discussing the "common good." 31 Robert N. Bellah et al. similarly concluded from their citizen interviews that "the concept of common good" is becoming "ever harder to specify in a world where individuals mainly" seek "their own private good." 32 Paralleling these findings, citizens in our nationwide citizen groups were far more likely to evaluate policy positions using an egocentric standard than a common-good standard.

# IMPLEMENTATION KEY

**Theory without policy implications is just intellectual laziness which has no effect on the real world–policy education is necessary for good theory**

**FEAVER 2001** (Peter, Asst. Prof of Political Science at Duke University, Twenty-First Century Weapons Proliferation, p 178)

At the same time, virtually all good theory has implications for policy. Indeed, if no conceivable extension of the theory leads to insights that would aid those working in the ‘real world’, what can be ‘good’ about good theory? Ignoring the policy implications of theory is often a sign of intellectual laziness on the part of the theorist. It is hard work to learn about the policy world and to make the connections from theory to policy. Often, the skill sets do not transfer easily from one domain to another, so a formidable theorist can show embarrassing naivete when it comes to the policy domain he or she putatively studies. Often, when the policy implications are considered, flaws in the theory (or at least in the presentation of the theory) are uncovered. Thus, focusing attention on policy implications should lead to better theorizing. The gap between theory and policy is more rhetoric than reality. But rhetoric can create a reality–or at least create an undesirable kind of reality–where policy makers make policy though ignorant of the problems that good theory would expose, while theorists spin arcana without a view to producing something that matters. It is therefore incumbent on those of us who study proliferation–a topic that raises interesting and important questions for both policy and theory–to bring the communities together. Happily, the best work in the proliferation field already does so.

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# WAR IMPACT

**We have an external impact–engagement with state policy is critical to influence the government and prevent war**

**WALT 1991** (Stephen, Professor at the University of Chicago, *International Studies Quarterly* 35)

A recurring theme of this essay has been the twin dangers of separating the study of security affairs from the academic world or of shifting the focus of academic scholarship too far from real-world issues. The danger of war will be with us for some time to come, and states will continue to acquire military forces for a variety of purposes. Unless one believes that ignorance is preferable to expertise, the value of independent national security scholars should be apparent. Indeed, history suggests that countries that suppress debate on national security matters are more likely to blunder into disaster, because misguided policies cannot be evaluated and stopped in time. As in other areas of public policy, academic experts in security studies can help in several ways. In th short term, academics are well place to evaluate current programs, because they face less pressure to support official policy. The long-term effects of academic involvement may be even more significant: academic research can help states learn from past mistakes and can provide the theoretical innovations that produce better policy choices in the future. Furthermore, their role in training the new generation of experts gives academics an additional avenue of influence. Assuming they perform these tasks responsibly, academics will have a positive–albeit gradual–impact on how states deal with the problem of war in the future.

**Debate over concrete and specific policy option is crucial to prevent elite monopolization of state policy–policy debate restrains the excesses of the state and prevents miscalculation**

**WALT 1991** (Stephen, Professor at the University of Chicago, *International Studies Quarterly* 35)

A second norm is relevance, a belief that even highly abstract lines of inquiry should be guided by the goal of solving real-world problems. Because the value of a given approach may not be apparent at the beginning–game theory is an obvious example–we cannot insist that a new approach be immediately applicable to a specific research puzzle. On the whole, however, the belief that scholarship in security affairs should be linked to real-world issues has prevented the field from degenerating into self-indulgent intellectualizing. And from the Golden Age to the present, security studies has probably had more real-world impact, for good or ill, than most areas of social science. Finally, the renaissance of security studies has been guided by a commitment to democratic discourse. Rather than confining discussion of security issues to an elite group of the best and brightest, scholars in the renaissance have generally welcomed a more fully informed debate. To paraphrase Clemenceau, issues of war and peace are too important to be left solely to insiders with a vested interest in the outcome. The growth of security studies within universities is one sign of broader participation, along with increased availability of information and more accessible publications for interested citizens. Although this view is by no means universal, the renaissance of security studies has been shaped by the belief that a well-informed debate is the best way to avoid the disasters that are likely when national policy is monopolized by a few self-interested parties.

# TURNS K

**Engaging policy is critical—failure to spark debates in the middle ground reduce the quality of our arguments by producing insular dogma**

**McCLEAN 2001** (David, New School University, “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” http://www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm)

Our new president, possessing no towering intellect, talks of a people who share a continent, but are not a nation. He is right, of course. We are only beginning to learn to put tribal loyalties aside and to let ourselves take seriously other more salutary possibilities, though we delude ourselves into believing that we have made great progress. Perhaps so-called "compassionate conservatism," though a gimmick to win a political contest, will bear a small harvest of unintended and positive consequences, although I remain dubious about this if the task of thinking through what it might actually mean remains the chore of George W. Bush. But if the not-too-Neanderthal-Right is finally willing to meet the not-too-wacky-Left at a place of dialogue somewhere in the "middle," then that is good news, provided the Left does not miss the opportunity to rendevous. Yet, there is a problem here. Both the Cultural Left and the Cultural Right tend to be self-righteous purists. The best chance, then, is for the emergence of Rorty's new Political Left, in conjunction with a new Political Right. The new Political Left would be in the better position of the two to frame the discourse since it probably has the better intellectual hardware (it tends to be more open-minded and less dogmatic) to make a true dialogue work. They, unlike their Cultural Left peers, might find it more useful to be a little less inimical and a little more sympathetic to what the other side might, in good faith, believe is at stake. They might leave behind some of the baggage of the Cultural Left's endless ruminations (Dewey's philosophical cud chewing) about commodity fetishization, or whether the Subject has really died, or where crack babies fit into neo-capitalist hegemonies, and join the political fray by parsing and exposing the more basic idiotic claims and dogmas of witless politicians and dangerous ideologues, while at the same time finding common ground, a larger "We" perspective that includes Ronald Reagan and Angela Davis under the same tent rather than as inhabitants of separate worlds. The operative spirit should be that of fraternal disagreement, rather than self-righteous cold shoulders. Yet I am not at all convinced that anything I have described is about to happen, though this essay is written to help force the issue, if only a little bit. I am convinced that the modern Cultural Left is far from ready to actually run the risks that come with being taken seriously and held accountable for actual policy-relevant prescriptions. Why should it? It is a hell of a lot more fun and a lot more safe pondering the intricacies of high theory, patching together the world a priori (which means without any real consideration of those officers and bureaucrats I mentioned who are actually on the front lines of policy formation and regulation). However the risk in this apriorism is that both the conclusions and the criticisms will miss the mark, regardless of how great the minds that are engaged. Intellectual rigor and complexity do not make silly ideas politically salient, or less pernicious, to paraphrase Rorty. This is not to say that air-headed jingoism and conservative rants about republican virtue aren't equally silly and pernicious. But it seems to me that the new public philosopher of the Political Left will want to pick better yardsticks with which to measure herself. Is it really possible to philosophize by holding Foucault in one hand and the Code of Federal Regulation or the Congressional Record in the other? Given that whatever it has meant to be a philosopher has been under siege at various levels, I see no reason why referring to the way things are actually done in the actual world (I mean really done, not done as we might imagine) as we think through issues of public morality and social issues of justice shouldn't be considered a viable alternative to the way philosophy has proceeded in the past. Instead of replacing epistemology with hermeneutics or God knows what else as the foundation of philosophical practice, we should move social philosophers in the direction of becoming more like social and cultural auditors rather than further in the direction of mere culture critics. We might be able to recast philosophers who take-up questions of social justice in a serious way as the ones in society able to traverse not only disciplines but the distances between the towers of the academy and the bastions of bureaucracies seeking to honestly and sometimes dishonestly assess both their failings and achievements. This we can do with a special advantage over economists, social scientists and policy specialists who are apt to take the narrow view of most issues. We do have examples of such persons. John Dewey and Karl Popper come to mind as but two examples, but in neither case was there enough grasp of the actual workings of social institutions that I believe will be called for in order to properly minister to a nation in need of helpful philosophical insights in policy formation. Or it may just be that the real work will be performed by philosophically grounded and socially engaged practitioners rather than academics. People like George Soros come to mind here.

**Critical arguments are fine, but they must guide concrete policy options–this is necessary to retain the relevance of political science and address real-world crises**

**JENTLESON 2002** (Bruce, Director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy and Professor of Public Policy and Political Science at Duke University, International Security 26.4)

In the contemporary era, when debate rages not only over the foreign policy "answers" but even more fundamentally over what the defining "questions" [End Page 180] are, dominant disciplinary norms and practices are widening the theory-policy gap, and leaving the university-based scholarly world increasingly isolated. Moreover, whereas thirty or forty years ago academics were the main if not sole cohort of experts on international affairs outside of government and international institutions, today's world is a more competitive marketplace of ideas and expertise. The think tank world has grown and deepened—there are more of them dealing with a broader range of issues, and often doing so in ways that contribute significantly to literature building as well as policy debate. Many of the leading area and country specialists are now journalists who have done their own empirical work of intensive coverage of world trouble spots, and are also sufficiently grounded in relevant academic literature to use and contribute to it. It is both in the discipline's self-interest and part of its societal responsibility to link its scholarly mission more to the challenges that face the world. This was true before September 11; it is even truer since then. Policy relevance needs to be brought back in to international relations and to political science more generally. This is not an argument against theory. It is an argument for theory but with shifts in relative emphasis to foster greater policy relevance. 31 Theory can have three important policy utilities. One is its diagnostic value. Policymakers need to be able to assess the nature of the problem they face, the trend they are observing, and the incipient warning signs they may be sensing. Often the problem is less a dearth than a glut of information and the need to discern patterns, establish salience, and trace causal connections. What can otherwise be a seemingly overwhelming amount of information and detail can be organized, prioritized, and filtered through the framework that theory provides. Second, theory can have prescriptive value in contributing to the "conceptualization of strategies." Such analysis, while abstract and not itself in operational form, "identifies the critical variables of a strategy and the general logic associated with [its] successful use." Theory thus "is not in itself a strategy," but it is a valuable "starting point for constructing a strategy." 32 It must be combined with other types of knowledge, especially specific understanding of the particular situation and actor at hand. Its value often is in providing the framework for putting a particular situation and strategy in the type of broader context that can facilitate the design and implementation of effective strategies. [End Page 181] Third, theory can help with lesson drawing. It is bad enough for a policy to fail; but if the wrong lessons are drawn, that failure can have an additive and even a multiplier effect. Similarly, the benefits of a policy success can be countered by lessons poorly drawn and leading to some future misapplication of what worked the first time. Theory deepens understanding of patterns of causality within any particular case by penetrating beyond the situational and particularistic to identify independent variables of a more fundamental nature. It also helps broaden what can be learned from any particular subject or case. Bringing policy relevance back in thus does not mean driving theory out. International Organization,World Politics,International Security, and the American Political Science Review should continue to have distinct missions from Foreign Affairs,Foreign Policy, and the like. But that distinction should be in terms of how policy problems are approached, not whether attention is paid to them. Greater pride of place needs to be given to research questions defined in policy terms. What drives terrorism? Which strategies can be most effective in deterring it, defeating it, containing it? How better to link force and diplomacy? What about prevention, and questions raised about reducing and countering the political, social, and economic dynamics that foster and feed terrorism? Beyond just general arguments about unilateralism and multilateralism, what strategies and structures can best achieve the goals of peace, security, stability, and justice? These are all September 11 questions—comparable delineations could be drawn for those other areas of the international agenda that were there on September 10 and have not gone away. The demand for policy- relevant research is huge; it is the supply that is lagging.

# ISOLATION INTERNAL LINK

**We have an obligation as intellectuals to engage the policy results of theory–their framework is just a mask for isolation and distaste for real politics**

**JENTLESON 2002** (Bruce, Director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy and Professor of Public Policy and Political Science at Duke University, International Security 26.4)

Greater engagement with and experience in the policy world is to be encouraged at all stages of a career. There are many opportunities—and there can be more—to help broaden perspectives, build relationships and test and sharpen arguments and beliefs in constructive ways. The same is true for engaging as a public intellectual in the ways and on the terms discussed earlier. Ultimately it is about an ethic, about what is valued, about how professional success and personal fulfillment are defined. I am again reminded of a statement by Vaclav Havel, this playwright turned political dissident turned leader of his country's liberation from communism and move toward democratization, in his 1990 speech to a joint session of the U.S. Congress: "I am not thefirst, nor will I be the last, intellectual to do this. On the contrary, my feeling isthat there will be more and more of them all the time. If the hope of theworld lies in human consciousness, then it is obvious that intellectuals cannot go on forever avoiding their share of responsibility for the world and hiding their distaste for politics under an alleged need to be independent. It iseasy tohave independence in your program and then leave others to carry that program out. If everyone thought that way, pretty soon no one would be independent." 33 None of us is likely to have the role or responsibilities that Havel has. But we too are intellectuals who must think deeply about what our roles are to be, amid the extraordinary times in which we live.

# POLICY KEY TO THEORY

**Both theory and policy are important–engagement with policy action is necessary for theories to be relevant**

**MEARSHEIMER 2006** (John, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, *International Security*, vol 20 no 2)

In the 25 years since I received my PhD, the Political Science profession in the United States has gone to great lengths to distance itself from the real world. Any scholar who is seriously interested in engaging with the policy world or speaking to a wide public audience is viewed with suspicion, if not hostility, by his or her colleagues. Heaven forbid that one should appear on television or write an op-ed for a major newspaper. Political scientists have developed a self-enclosed world where they talk mainly to each other and their students, and dismiss those who have any inclination to be a public intellectual. In effect, the profession is engaged in selfmarginalization. This has been less true of IR scholars than other political scientists, especially those who study American politics. But even students of IR are now succumbing in large numbers to the cult of irrelevance. I think that this is a travesty. For the purpose of developing sound theories, which is the essence of our enterprise, we need to be deeply engaged with the real world, and to be constantly thinking about how well our theories explain what is happening in the world around us. Many well-educated Americans seem to believe that there is a clear separation between theory and policy. Those immersed in the policy world tend to think that academics do theory and they do policy, while academics tend to think that they do theory and people in Washington do policy. And never do the two meet. This strikes me as a fundamentally flawed way of thinking about how academics and policymakers approach the world around them. None of us could make sense of the world without the theories we have in our head, and we develop and refine those theories by constantly observing what is going on around us. This way of doing business applies to policymakers as well as academics. Madeleine Albright and Donald Rumsfeld think about American foreign policy in terms of particular theories, and their theories are virtually the same ones employed by academics when they think about US policy. Albright, for example, frequently talks about international politics in terms of the three liberal theories that are at the centre of academic discourse: democratic peace theory, institutionalism and economic interdependence. Rumsfeld sometimes sounds like a hard-core realist when he speaks about world politics. Academics, on the other hand, have no choice but to pay attention to events in the policy world, at least if they are interested in developing powerful theories. After all, the best academic work has real-world relevance. In short, I think that theory and policy go together for both academics and policymakers.

# DEBATE IMPACT: SOCIAL CHANGE

**Malcolm X proves that debate provides training in persuasion—this is critical to social change**

**BRANHAM 1995** (Robert, Professor of Rhetoric at Bates College, Argumentation and Advocacy, Winter)

Malcolm X spoke to predominantly white audiences and debated white opponents throughout his prison experience and often during his later public career. These encounters in part evidenced what Gambino has termed his "absolute faith in and reliance on the power of communication" to convince even whites of the truth of his position (p. 17). "The truth is so strong and clear," wrote X in a letter in 1954, "that not even the white man himself will deny it once he knows what we know" (Gambino, p. 17). But his expressed desire to "confront the white man" in debate was perhaps not so much designed to convert his adversaries as it was to assert himself and his sense of self-worth, to apply his learning, and, as in his later public appearances, to appeal to the large audience of fellow African American prisoners. "By defeating the white man in debate," writes Wolfenstein, "he was proving, to himself and to other black prisoners, the superiority of his position" (1981, p. 228). To the "concentric" audience of his fellow inmates, such encounters established his leadership and demonstrated the truth and strength of his beliefs (Branham and Pearce, 1987, p. 245). According to Malcolm Jarvis, interviewed in Orlando Bagwell's 1994 documentary, Malcolm X: Make It Plain, it was when Malcolm X began debating that his "name and three started spreading amongst the prison population and that's when the population started to grow at the debating classes. Most of the fellows used to come over out of curiosity, just to hear him speak." Malcolm X began proselytizing for the Nation of Islam while at Norfolk (Gambino, p. 14), and his fame as a debater there helped gain the attention and respect that were prerequisites for successful recruitment. By the time Bender arrived at Norfolk in 1950 or 1951, the prison's Muslim population had separated themselves from the debate team and other prison organizations. After refusing to take a required typhoid innoculation, Malcolm X was transferred to Charlestown Prison on 23 March 1950 (Perry, p. 132). Malcolm X had spent less than two years in Norfolk, yet during his time there he had undergone enormous spiritual, political and intellectual transformation. Malcolm X's prison debating experience represented a crucial transition in his practice as a Muslim and in the development of a public style through which he could bring his thoughts before a larger audience. Through his prison proselytizing and the "polemical confrontations" of his debates, writes Wolfenstein, "Malcolm became fully engaged in a Muslim practice grounded in racial self-identification and mediated through self-productive aggressivity" (p. 229). He had acquired proficiency in techniques of verbal confrontation and a confidence in the possibilities of moral suasion that would inform his speaking activities for the remainder of his life. "It was right there in prison," Malcolm X recalls in his autobiography, "that I made up my mind to devote the rest of my life to telling the white man about himself - or die" (pp. 184-185).

# DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IMPACT

**Deliberative democracy is critical to solve massive violence and maintain understanding of others that directly improves our lived experience**

**STANNARD 2006** (Matt, Department of Communication and Journalism, University of Wyoming, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18, http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html)

From another side, there is distrust of the term "truth," the assumption that it’s going to sound problematic no matter whether it has a big T or a little t. The collectivism of "democratized truth" threatens to assert a universality that has been out of fashion among the academic left for some time. After all, Lyotard, Baudrillard, and South Park have all taught us that there are a bunch of little stories, not one Grand Narrative—let alone one which asserts Grand Truth. But both the academic right, with its stuffy, ontological authoritarianism, and the academic left, obsessed with identity politics and microdiscursive revolutions, are barking up the wrong tree where communicative ethics are concerned. This democratic system of thought, which I’ve come to discuss with you today, is grounded not in grand systems or deconstructive criticism, although both extremes are welcome to make their case in a democratic forum. Discursive democracy is, instead, grounded in the most primary of ethical concerns for the people around us. As such, it demands a listening that is wholly unfamiliar to the ideological battles taking place inside of academia, as well as among talking media heads, Clear Channel Communications, Congress, or campus demonstrations full of pie-throwing and shout-downs. What Habermas and others have in mind is a kind of communication where each affected person becomes a participant and co-creator of conclusions relevant to their lives; a communicative version of Marx’s dictum: from each according to ability, to each according to need. Discursive democracy is both a way of thinking about problems—intellectual and otherwise—and a political rallying-cry that promises to turn ideological blinders into conversational openings. It’s a method of rhetorical and communication analysis, but also a tool for immediate social analysis with the potential to involve people from all walks of life. I will ultimately conclude that deliberative ethics are a tool of social survival, a check against what Habermas calls the "colonization of the life-world," a condition we may already be in, that risks both small and big apocalypses with every passing day. But on the brighter side, I’ll also say a good deal about communication and ethics, and about how knowing a few basic things about communication has the potential to make us not only faithfully good communicators, but also to make us enjoy the existence of other people. After all, we owe them our very lives.

# DEBATE GOOD

**Debate is good—the only alternative to rational discussion is the absolute imposition of power**

**STANNARD 2006** (Matt, Department of Communication and Journalism, University of Wyoming, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18, http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html)

Where Levinas and his family were victims of Nazism, Habermas was pulled into the Hitler Youth. Both thinkers emerged from the nightmare of Nazism deeply concerned about justification: Levinas with the ethical failure of metaphysics, Habermas with the absolute necessity of communicative rationality. If it sounds like these two concerns are in tension with one another, that’s understandable, because we have been taught to see absolutism and relativism as opposites. For Habermas, however, absolutism and relativism are two sides of the same coin: Both represent a failure to live up to the norm of communicative rationality. In the case of absolutism, communication is cut off in favor of authoritative pronouncements. In the case of relativism, rationality is abandoned, the proverbial baby thrown out with the bathwater. The Nazis were absolutists, but this absolutism rested on an abandonment of rational processes. In a world where we cannot arrive at truth through rational consensus, we are left with the will to power as the only possible determinant.

**Debate is good for education and critical thinking**

**KELLER, WHITTAKER, AND BURKE, 2001**

[Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, "Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning," Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer, EBSCOhost]

Since its origins in classical times, academic debate has been recognized as one of the best methods of learning and applying the attributes of critical thinking (Freeley, 1996). Recent empirical studies of students participating in competitive interschool forensics societies illustrate the link between debating and proficiency in critical thinking. Colbert (1987) found that students involved in intercollegiate debating for one year showed a larger pretest to posttest gain on a critical thinking test than a nondebating control group. Likewise, Shinn (1995) discovered that, after statistically controlling for intelligence, high school students who engaged in two years of competitive debating exhibited higher levels of critical thinking than a comparison group of nondebaters.

**Debate is a dialogue is key to check back dogmatism and allows real-world activism**

**Galloway 2007** (Ryan Galloway, Samford Debate Coach, Professor of Communication Studies at Samford, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007, LEQ)

Such tolerance is predictable since debate is firmly grounded in respect for the other through the creation of a fair dialogue. Ironically, opponents of a debate as dialogue risk falling prey to dogmatism and the requisite failure to respect potential middle grounds. Perceiving the world through the lens of contingency and probability can be beneficial to real-world activism when its goal is creating consensus out of competing interests. The anti-oppression messages of critical teams would benefit from a thorough investigation of such claims, and not merely an untested axiological assumption.

# NDT GOOD

**NDT-style debate is the best method for education**

**HYNES 1996** (Thomas, Professor of Communication Interim Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences Member, NDT Board of Trustees University of Louisville, Argumentation and Advocacy, Winter)

First, NDT debate encourages research and hard work. Debaters have always been among the first students to utilize the new engines of information technology in preparing for argument. Whereas rusty syllabi and slowly changing university courses often have a certain must quality about them, NDT debaters have always been on the frontiers of researching theoretical and policy arguments. Further, NDT training enables students to amass, evaluate, and synthesize large quantities of information. The drive to research will remain an integral part of the NDT. While it may be the case that research activity will always be in part controversial because of the potential barriers such work represents to part-time students and programs with limited resources, it cannot be denied that preparation and research provide a first rate discipline for those who make the commitment. Second, the NDT encourages excellence through competition. The tournament itself, as a culminating experience for a debate season, encourages students to prepare for an ultimate test of skill against equally prepared competitors. So, in contest, students learn to handle the challenges accompanying winning and losing. Classroom experiences, which involve sometimes tepid lectures and lengthy seminars, do not substitute for the intensity of an intellectual experience that invites a students best effort. The NDT serves as an exemplar of the best learning community that American colleges and universities have to offer.

# DECONSTRUCTION BAD

**Deconstruction is coopted by the right wing to support racism and totalitarianism–theory should be rejected in favor of objective empirical fact**

**HEXHAM 1999** (Irving, in *Mission and the State*, ed. Ulrich van der Hayden, 2000, http://www.ucalgary.ca/~hexham/courses/Courses-2006/Rels-339/IRVING/Ulrich-revised.htm)

Only in the 1980's did a growing number of radical Whites seriously begin to view missions and missionaries as agents of capitalist oppression. When they did, they too used arguments that are almost identical to those used by Afrikaner Nationalists. We need to ask hard questions about the adoption of this type of interpretation and its implications for scholarship. But, that would take another paper. All that can be done now is to note that a similar change has taken place in the interpretation, or reinterpretation, of the works of men like Michael Foucault, to whom writers like the Comaroffs' are heavily indebted. This reinterpretation involves the co-option of Foucault, and other writers like Antonio Gramsci, by neo-fascists in Europe [Golsan 1998:224-232, 244-258]. What this suggests is not that scholars like the Comaroffs are fascists. They are not. Rather it demonstrates the instability of theory. Relying on theory and theoretical frameworks without a solid grounding in accurate factual evidence is a two edged sword. Theory can be used and misused by many groups to promote diametrically opposed causes. Only empirical data and a careful sifting of sources will protect the reader against such misuse. This is the task facing us as serious historians. Only when we command the source material can we construct theories that are not open to endless interpretations and misuse by political extremists. Deborah Lipstadt rightly warns against the misuse of historical sources, clever theories, and a lack of moral vision. To ignore her warning is folly indeed. We may disagree with the religious vision of missionaries and their solutions to the human suffering they observed. But, we are not free to distort their words or trivialize the importance of the moral issues they raise. To do so is an act of intellectual violence that rapes the missionary record in the service of a new intellectual imperialism that in the end may turn out to promote the revival of fascism.

# POLICY GOOD: ENVIRONMENT

**Focus on state policy is key to environmental action**

**DEHGAN 2007** Alex, PhD., Afghanistan Country Director For The World Conservation Society, degrees in both evolutionary biology and law, Interview on Mongabay.com, August 7, http://news.mongabay.com/2007/0807-interview-dehgan.html)

Dehgan: Conservation solutions involve more than just science, but also being able to translate science into the policy arena. Scientists that fail to make their research relevant through in the policy process are effectively failing their obligations to society which funds their research and salaries. Most scientists, including many involved in conservation, are disinterested in the policy process, or fail to understand its differing needs. Watching scientists testify before Congress makes me believe that most scientists, even those interested in affecting policy, cannot connect with policymakers, and most policymakers fail to understand the scientific data and the method that generates it. I wanted to address this gap between science and policy by looking to train in both areas and obtained a law degree and a doctorate in evolutionary biology. My scientific training provided me with a framework for asking questions and evaluating data. My legal studies and policy work help me translate knowledge into action. Mongabay: More generally, what advice can you give students wanting to pursue a career in conservation? Are there specific degrees they should consider or is conservation so multi-faceted today that one could approach from a number of different disciplines? Dehgan: Conservation involves many different disciplines, and multiple pathways to involvement. There is no single path, but I would recommend the following advice to a young conservationist entering the field: Think Multidisciplinary. It is not enough to understand a single field, or a single species, but a conservation biologist must also understand how to translate that information, and how different fields may impact the implementation of your understanding. Rely on Data. Conservation has to be based on data, rather than rhetoric. Scientific data provides a foundation for the policy options that need to be taken. Without such data, we have no basis for advocating one policy option (conservation for instance) over another (deforestation). This applies whether you are working on biology or economics. We must start with the data, and if it isn’t there, we must collect it. This in part is why I appreciate the Wildlife Conservation Society so much, as they start from this point. Be Relevant. We have to make our results available, whether we study charismatic species like lemurs or cheetah, or invertebrates, to make others understand why pursuing a particular question is so important, and why societal funding for science must continue. Be Novel and Take Risks. Focus on those species or test ideas that are not part of the current fad. Like many other fields, conservation biology suffers badly from fads and trends that are more of an exercise in theoretical futility rather than tying the theory to the biology of the species that matter. Novel ideas encourage creative independent thought, and they allow for the field to advance, rather than stagnate. It is important to also take a risk, particularly when starting out, since this will distinguish you from the rest of the crowd, and allow you to demonstrate independence. Be Policy Savvy. Scientists have to understand how to translate science into policy. That doesn't mean advocacy, but making sure that the data is supporting the correct policy options. It also calls for an understanding of the differences between the fields.

# RULES GOOD

**Predictable rules are good—debating within a set of traditional limits allows us to focus on the topics and our common interests—membership in any debate organization is a choice, so we should maximize our discussion of the topic, not the rules**

**McDONALD 1996** (Kelly, some comm person, Argumentation and Advocacy, Fall)

As long held practices, traditions become entrenched by ritual and re-enactment. Debate societies sponsor tournaments and create guidelines which, almost by definition, become institutionalized. This habituation of forms of communion is liberating to the extent predictability eliminates uncertainty or unwillingness to participate. Habits, as James reminds us, are helpful in that they free us from conscious attention to particular matters and allow us to concentrate on other factors. As members of debate and forensics organizations we must make the best of the liberation which our tradition affords. Membership in a particular organization is an issue of choice. Presumably the program to which one is affiliated represents their interests. Greater knowledge of our interests and the interests represented by diverse forensic communities is a first step to realignment of those solidarities. The import of our interests and subsequent decisions is underscored by Anthony Gidden's when he argued, None the less actors have interests by virtue of their membership of particular groups, communities, classes, etc. This is why it is so important not to treat wants and interests as equivalent concepts: interests may imply potential courses of action, in contingent social and material circumstances. (1979, p. 189)

**Rules and switch side debate are necessary—the process of debate itself prevents them from becoming authoritarian**

**STANNARD 2006** (Matt, Department of Communication and Journalism, University of Wyoming, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18, http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html)

It is important to remember that Habermas is resisting both absolutism and relativism. He does not propose a communicative free-for-all. Rules are important, but it is equally important that the rules be co-created by the participants and not serve to preserve already-existing hierarchies. Methodology, science, and rationality are all important, but they must belong to the people rather than being imposed as a matter of metaphysical necessity from above. Norms, and truth itself, must be created from the ground up. In a dialogue with John Rawls, he writes: Under the pragmatic presuppositions of an inclusive and noncoercive rational discourse among free and equal participants, everyone is required to take the perspective of everyone else, and thus project herself into the understandings of self and world of all others; from this interlocking of perspectives there emerges an ideally extended we-perspective from which all can test in common whether they wish to make a controversial norm the basis of their shared practice; and this should include mutual criticism of the appropriateness of the languages in terms of which situations and needs are interpreted. In the course of successfully taken abstractions, the core of generalizable interests can then emerge step by step.

**Rules and structure are necessary for good debate–they are critical for education and ground and this also turns their solvency claims**

**SHIVELY 2000** Ruth, professor of political science at Texas A&M University, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, ed: Portis, p. 181-182)

In the same manner, then, the ambiguists' refusals to will some­thing "definite and limited" undermines their revolutionary impulses. In their refusal to say what they will not celebrate and what they will not rebel against, they deny themselves (and everyone else in their political world) a particular plan or ground to work from. By refusing to deny incivility, they deny themselves a civil public space from which to speak. They cannot say "no" to the terrorist who would silence dissent. They cannot turn their backs on the bullying of the white supremacist. And, as such, in refusing to bar the tactics of the anti­democrat, they refuse to support the tactics of the democrat. In short, then, to be a true ambiguist, there must be some limit to what is ambiguous. To fully support political contest, one must fully support some uncontested rules and reasons. To generally reject the silencing or exclusion of others, one must sometimes silence or exclude those who reject civility and democracy. SAYING "YES" TO PERSUASION The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to-they must reject and limit-some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest--that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect--if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

# CLASH GOOD

**Clash is good—it’s the only way to refine arguments and improve their quality**

**Galloway 2007** (Ryan Galloway, Samford Debate Coach, Professor of Communication Studies at Samford, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007)

In addition to the basic equity norm, dismissing the idea that debaters defend the affirmative side of the topic encourages advocates to falsely value affirmative speech acts in the absence of a negative response. There may be several detrimental consequences that go unrealized in a debate where the affirmative case and plan are not topical. Without ground, debaters may fall prey to a siren’s call, a belief that certain critical ideals and concepts are axiological, existing beyond doubt without scrutiny. Bakhtin contends that in dialogical exchanges “the greater the number and weight” of counter-words, the deeper and more substantial our understanding will be (Bakhtin, 1990). The matching of the word to the counter-word should be embraced by proponents of critical activism in the activity, because these dialogical exchanges allow for improvements and modifications in critical arguments. Muir argues that “debate puts students into greater contact with the real world by forcing them to read a great deal of information” (1993, p. 285). He continues, “[t]he constant consumption of material…is significantly constitutive. The information grounds the issues under discussion, and the process shapes the relationship of the citizen to the public arena” (p. 285). Through the process of comprehensive understanding, debate serves both as a laboratory and a constitutive arena. Ideas find and lose adherents. Ideas that were once considered beneficial are modified, changed, researched again, and sometimes discarded altogether. A central argument for open deliberation is that it encourages a superior consensus to situations where one side is silenced. Christopher Peters contends, “The theory holds that antithesis ultimately produces a better consensus, that the clash of differing, even opposing interests and ideas in the process of decision making…creates decisions that are better for having been subjected to this trial by fire” (1997, p. 336). The combination of a competitive format and the necessity to take points of view that one does not already agree with combines to create a unique educational experience for all participants. Those that eschew the value of such experience by an axiological position short-circuit the benefits of the educational exchange for themselves, their opponents, as well as the judges and observers of such debates.

**Malcolm x proves clash is good—it’s key to express oppositional ideas**

**BRANHAM 1995** (Robert, Professor of Rhetoric at Bates College, Argumentation and Advocacy, Winter)

In the years following his release from prison, Malcolm X honed his speaking skills through sidewalk preaching and his ministry in New York Temple No. 7 and other mosques. He gained national attention in the late 1950s through a series of public confrontations with Black clergy, civil rights leaders and the press. After complaining about the lack of coverage of the NOI in the Amsterdam News, he was given his own column in which he blasted Christian ministers as "chicken-eaters" who served "the slaveowners' church." When a delegation of prominent New York ministers protested, editor James Hicks offered them equal space in a column that would run beside Malcolm X's - a debate in print. "By the third week," Hicks recalls, "it was apparent that, by having a target, Malcolm was even more devastating. Malcolm murdered the man" (Goldman, 1973, p. 61). Hicks' rhetorical assessment was an astute one. Malcolm X was at his best when able to use the ideas of another as a foil for his own, which shone most brightly in the light generated by confrontation.

# FAIRNESS GOOD

**Fairness is a prerequisite for their Aff—some restrictions are necessary for it to gain influence in debate**

**Galloway 2007** (Ryan Galloway, Samford Debate Coach, Professor of Communication Studies at Samford, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007, LEQ)

Conceived as a dialogue, the affirmative speech act anticipates the negative response. A failure to adequately encourage, or anticipate a response deprives the negative speech act and the emergent dialogue of the capacity for a complete inquiry. Such violations short circuit the dialogue and undermine the potential for an emerging dialogue to gain significance (either within the debate community or as translated to forums outside of the activity). Here, the dialogical model performs as a fairness model, contending that the affirmative speech act, be it policy oriented, critical, or performative in nature, must adhere to normative restrictions to achieve its maximum competitive and ontological potential.

**Fairness is the foundation of respect and dignity**

Galloway 2007 (Ryan Galloway, Samford Debate Coach, Professor of Communication Studies at Samford, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007, LEQ)

When one side takes more than its share, competitive equity suffers. However**,** it also undermines the respect due to the other involved in the dialogue. When one side excludes the other, it fundamentally denies the personhood of the other participant(Ehninger, 1970, p. 110).A pedagogy of debate as dialogue takes this respect as a fundamental component. A desire to be fair is a fundamental condition of a dialogue that takes the form of a demand for equality of voice**.** Far from being a banal request for links to a disadvantage,fairness is a demand for respect, a demand to be heard, a demand that a voice backed by literally months upon months of preparation, research, and critical thinking not be silenced.

**Discussions are only productive if they’re fair—the Aff excludes Neg arguments**

**Galloway 2007** (Ryan Galloway, Samford Debate Coach, Professor of Communication Studies at Samford, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007, LEQ)

Affirmative cases that suspend basic fairness norms operate to exclude particular negative strategies. Unprepared, one side comes to the argumentative table unable to meaningfully participate in a dialogue. They are unable to “understand what ‘went on…’” and are left to the whims of time and power (Farrell, 1985, p. 114). Hugh Duncan furthers this line of reasoning: Opponents not only tolerate but honor and respect each other because in doing so they enhance their own chances of thinking better and reaching sound decisions. Opposition is necessary because it sharpens thought in action. We assume that argument, discussion, and talk, among free an informed people who subordinate themselves to rules of discussion, are the best ways to decisions of any kind, because it is only through such discussion that we reach agreement which binds us to a common cause…If we are to be equal…relationships among equals must find expression in many formal and informal institutions (Duncan, 1993, p. 196-197). Debate compensates for the exigencies of the world by offering a framework that maintains equality for the sake of the conversation (Farrell, 1985, p. 114).

**Fairness is necessary for debate to have value**

**Galloway 2007** (Ryan Galloway, Samford Debate Coach, Professor of Communication Studies at Samford, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007, LEQ)

A second reason to reject the topic has to do with its exclusivity. Many teams argue that because topicality and other fairness constraints prevent particular speech acts, debaters are denied a meaningful voice in the debate process. Advocates argue that because the negative excludes a particular affirmative performance that they have also precluded the affirmative team. The problem with this line of reasoning is that it views exclusion as a unitary act of definitional power. However, a dialogical perspective allows us to see power flowing both ways. A large range of affirmative cases necessitates fewer negative strategies that are relevant to the range of such cases. If the affirmative can present any case it desires, the benefits of the research, preparation, and in-depth thinking that go into the creation of negative strategies are diminished, if not eviscerated entirely. The affirmative case is obliged to invite a negative response. In addition, even when the negative strategy is not entirely excluded, any strategy that diminishes argumentative depth and quality diminishes the quality of in-round dialogue. An affirmative speech act that flagrantly violates debate fairness norms and claims that the benefits of the affirmative act supersede the need for such guidelines has the potential of excluding a meaningful negative response, and undermines the pedagogical benefits of the in-round dialogue. The “germ of a response” (Bakhtin, 1990) is stunted.

# STABILITY GOOD

**Stable referent is necessary to maintain the value of debate and improve arguments**

**Galloway 2007** (Ryan Galloway, Samford Debate Coach, Professor of Communication Studies at Samford, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007, LEQ)

Conversely, in a dialogical exchange, debaters come to realize the positions other than their own have value, and that reasonable minds can disagree on controversial issues. This respect encourages debaters to modify and adapt their own positions on critical issues without the threat of being labeled a hypocrite. The conceptualization of debate as a dialogue allows challenges to take place from a wide variety of perspectives. By offering a stable referent the affirmative must uphold, the negative can choose to engage the affirmative on the widest possible array of “counterwords,” enhancing the pedagogical process produced by debate.

# TOPICALITY GOOD

**The resolution is MOST fair and equitable starting point**

**Galloway 2007** (Ryan Galloway, Samford Debate Coach, Professor of Communication Studies at Samford, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007, LEQ)

First, teams have equal access to the resolution. The problem with relying upon prior disclosure, case lists, and word of mouth is that access is often tied to opportunity and resources. While it is true that there has been a phenomenal upsurge in the availability of case list access through technology, it is still the case that the resolution provides the most equal and fair access for all teams concerned. Each school in the community knows the wording of the resolution, even if they are not aware of the modifications made to any particular case. The notion that the negative team can rely upon the benevolence of the affirmative to provide strategic options radically tilts the argumentative table in favor of the affirmative. Providing the resolution as a baseline test operates as a demand for the negative’s approach to the topic to be heard. Instead of leaving the affirmative in complete control of what approaches to the topic the negative is allowed to argue, debate as a dialogue uses the resolution as a centerpiece of a demand to be heard.

**The resolution provides the most in-depth discussions because everyone is prepared**

**Galloway 2007** (Ryan Galloway, Samford Debate Coach, Professor of Communication Studies at Samford, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007, LEQ)

Second, teams spend the entire year preparing approaches for and against the resolution. The best debates often come from in-depth clash over a core area of the topic. It is not uncommon for debaters to spend between forty and sixty hours a week on debate, carefully refining their approaches to the topic.

**Thinking the topic is oppressive puts the cart before the horse and prevents debate- our interpretation solves**

**Galloway 2007** (Ryan Galloway, Samford Debate Coach, Professor of Communication Studies at Samford, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007, LEQ)

Thus, the unique distinctions between debate and public speaking allow debaters the opportunity to learn about a wide range of issues from multiple perspectives. This allows debaters to formulate their own opinions about controversial subjects through an in-depth process of research and testing of ideas. Putting the cart before the horse by assuming that one knows that the resolution is oppressive and cannot be meaningfully affirmed denies debaters the ability to craft a nuanced answer to the question posed by the resolution.

**The resolution is good—allows a broad range of balanced arguments**

**Galloway ‘7** (Ryan Galloway, Samford Debate Coach, Professor of Communication Studies at Samford, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007, LEQ)

Finally, there has been a concerted community effort to ensure that the resolution provides subjects of controversy that are controversial, balanced, and anticipate a nuanced approach. Ross Smith notes, “Affirmative teams try to find what they think might be a slam dunk case, but in crafting resolutions the idea is to find a controversial area with ground for both sides” (2000). The resolution is the result of a painstaking process; it is thoroughly discussed, debated, and ultimately submitted to the debate community for a vote. It is framed, ultimately, as an issue about which reasonable minds could differ. Reliance upon alternative systems, such as germaneness, lists of ground provided by the other side in the debate, or the fact that a team has run a case in the past, betrays the central point of having a dialogue about the resolution and undermines the consensus upon which the whole enterprise depends. And while there are obviously some valid complaints about individual topics, as a whole, resolutions allow for a wide range of approaches to issues of the day. It is striking on the 2008- 2009 resolution that conservative groups like the Heritage Foundation and the CATO Institute as well as Oxfam and the Sierra Club oppose agricultural subsidies, if for very different reasons. Teams could easily find evidence that subsidies go down a rat-hole, are counter-productive to free market economics, as well as arguing that subsidies entrench racism both domestically and globally, and prevent an ethic of care toward the global environment. Those that argue that the topic does not access issues relevant to a wide variety of special interests and minority groups may simply be asking for too much. Establishing the resolution as the bright line standard for evaluation of equity at the argumentative table allows all sides to the controversy access to formulating their approach to both sides of the topic question.

# PREDICTABILITY GOOD

**Predictability is critical to good debate—two-sided preparation is necessary**

Galloway 2007 (Ryan Galloway, Samford Debate Coach, Professor of Communication Studies at Samford, Contemporary Argumentation and Debate, Vol. 28, 2007, LEQ)

A common rejoinder is that debaters should think on their feet, and be prepared to debate against unusual affirmative cases and plans. While thinking on one’s feet is certainly valuable, allowing one side to think on their feet with the benefit of research, prior preparation, coaching, and thinking through arguments in advance, while depriving the other side of all such benefits hardly seems like a strategy that will result in a productive dialogue.Thinking on one’s feet is always framed by one’s past thoughts, arguments, and research base. Instead,debates are best when both sides have the opportunity to think ahead to the range of choices that the affirmative team can provide to the resolution. While there may always be someground for the negativeto respond to the affirmative team,that ground should stem from the resolution in order to maximize the benefits of the dialogical exchange which competitive debate allows.

# DECISIONMAKING GOOD

**Decision-making is good – key to education and critical thinking**

**KEARSLY 2001**, Greg, PhD in educational psychology, April 23 2001, “Decision-making”, http://tip.psychology.org/decision.html

From a practical point-of-view, **one of the most important human skills is decision-making** (judgement and choice). Both at a personal level, and in the context of organizations, decision-making skill strongly affects the quality of life and success. It is not surprising that the topic has received considerable study and is the subject of many different theoretical frameworks (e.g., Hammond, McClelland & Mumpower, 1980; Kaplan & Schwartz, 1975). **Decision-making skill is fundamental to management education** ( see Bazerman, 1986; Huber, 1980). A major focus of research on decision-making is the frequent departure from purely rational choices (e.g., Dawes, 1988; Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982). Indeed, Simon (1976) has made the case that "satisficing" (i.e., making a choice that is good enough) is the most common decision strategy. On the other hand, social psychologists look at decision-making as a matter of conflict resolution and avoidance behaviors due to situational factors (e.g., Janis & Mann, 1977). Rappoport & Summers (1973) discuss the role of probability and the limits to processing capacity in human judgement. Most theories accept the idea that decision-making consists of a number of steps or stages such as: recognition, formulation, generation of alternatives, information search, selection, and action. Furthermore, it is well recognized that routine cognitive processes such as memory, reasoning, and concept formation play a primary role in decision-making. The study of attitudes, creativity, and problem-solving is closely associated with decision-making. In addition, decision-making behavior is affected (usually adversely) by anxiety and stress.

# EVIDENCE GOOD

**Analysis and use of evidence from experts is good – prerequisite to change assumptions and sharpen analysis**

**Mills 2003**, Gary, Major in the United States Air Force, August 2003, “The Role of Rhetorical Theory in Military Intelligence Analysis”, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/au/mills.pdf , p. 5-6, MZ

As an integral part of the military’s new information age, you need to be aware of alternative sources available to enhance your communication and analytical skills. Recently retitled as intelligence operators, intelligence personnel must apply every available tool in order to support worldwide warfighter operations. As highlighted by the CIA Directorate of Intelligence, your **effective use of “outside experts** will yield useful information and insight, along with constructive **challenges to [your] working assumptions**, that can only **sharpen [your] analysis.”**1 In this study, Foucault’s discourse theories serve as the primary rhetorical workshop. As a result, there is a need to define the wide and essential scope of rhetorical theory, including a brief look at its history. The word rhetoric brings to mind many different meanings: “The practice of oratory [discourse or speech]; the study of strategies of effective oratory; the use of language, written or spoken [or electronic], to inform or persuade; the study of the persuasive effects of language; the study of the relation between language and knowledge; the classification and use of tropes and figures; and, of course, the use of empty promises and half-truths as a form of propaganda.”2 Intelligence officers interface with most of these overlapping meanings.3 You even study many influences and forms of propaganda. However, most importantly, you must understand that “rhetoric is an action” and that it affects communication and analytical perspectives.4 “In one sense, rhetoric is an action human beings perform, and in a second sense, it is a perspective humans take. As an action, rhetoric involves humans’ use of symbols for the purpose of communicating with one another. As a perspective humans take, rhetoric involves focusing on symbolic [and analytic] processes.”5 With some luck, this study will effectively communicate the strength of rhetoric’s influence on intelligence— ultimately changing and shaping your perspective on analysis.

**Evidence-based policymaking is key to effective policies and government**

**Sanderson 2002,** Ian, Policy Research Institute at Leeds Metropolitan University, Public Administration, Vol. 80 No. 1, “Evaluation, Policy Learning and Evidence-Based Policy Making”, http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/118910496/abstract?CRETRY=1&SRETRY=0

The increasing emphasis on the need for evidence-based policy indicates the continuing influence of the ‘modernist’ faith in progress informed by reason. Although the rationalist assumptions of evidence-based policy making have been subject to severe challenge from constructivist and post-modernist perspectives, it is argued that **the attempt to ground policy making in more reliable knowledge of ‘what works’ retains its relevance and importance.** Indeed, its importance is enhanced by the need for effective governance of complex social systems and it is argued that **‘reflexive social learning’** informed by policy and programme evaluation **constitutes an increasingly important basis for ‘interactive governance’.** The expanded use of piloting of new policies and programmes by the current UK Government is considered to provide limited scope for evaluation to derive reliable evidence of whether policies work. There is a need for greater clarity about the role of evaluation in situations where piloting essentially constitutes ‘prototyping’. **More emphasis should be placed on developing a sound evidence base for policy through longterm impact evaluations of policies** and programmes. It is argued from a realist position that such evaluation should be theory-based and focused on explaining and understanding how policies achieve their effects using ‘multi-method’ approaches.

**Evidence is key to a well-informed public and it’s a prerequisite to changing government**

**Smith et al 2000**, Peter Smith is a Professor of Economics at the University of York, Dr. Philip Davies is the Director of Social Sciences at Oxford, and Dr. Sandra Nutley is a senior lecturer in Public Sector Management at University of St. Andrews, “Introducing evidence-based policy and practice in public services”, PDF, p. 83

This is the first chapter in an edited collection and spends considerable time describing the organization of the book and the content of each of the sixteen chapters. However, it does recount why evidence based policy has come to the fore in recent years (pp.1-2):

• Governments have become increasingly receptive to certain types of evidence;

• The election of the British Labor Government in 1997 on the basis of its philosophy of “what matters is what works”;

• Increasing public and political skepticism toward governments and professionals;

• **The growth of an increasingly well educated and well informed public**;

• Greater availability of information;

• Growth in size and capabilities of research community;

• Increasing emphasis on productivity and international competitiveness;

• Increasing scrutiny and accountability in government.

# VAGUENESS IMPACT

**Their framework produces worse policy—vague shifting conceals weaknesses and results in manipulation that turns their impact**

**GALLES 2009** (Gary, Professor of Economics at Pepperdine, “Vagueness as a Political Strategy,” March 2, http://blog.mises.org/archives/author/gary\_galles/)

The problem with such vagueness is that any informed public policy decision has to be based on specific proposals. Absent concrete details, which is where the devil lurks, no one--including those proposing a "reform"--can judge how it would fare or falter in the real world. So when the President wants approval for a proposal which offers too few details for evaluation, we must ask why. Like private sector salesmen, politicians strive to present their wares as attractively as possible. Unlike them, however, a politician's product line consists of claimed consequences of proposals not yet enacted. Further, politicians are unconstrained by truth in advertising laws, which would require that claims be more than misleading half-truths; they have fewer competitors keeping them honest; and they face "customers"--voters-- far more ignorant about the merchandise involved than those spending their own money. These differences from the private sector explain why politicians' "sales pitches" for their proposals are so vague. However, if vague proposals are the best politicians can offer, they are inadequate. If rhetoric is unmatched by specifics, there is no reason to believe a policy change will be an improvement, because no reliable way exists to determine whether it will actually accomplish what is promised. Only the details will determine the actual incentives facing the decision-makers involved, which is the only way to forecast the results, including the myriad of unintended consequences from unnoticed aspects. We must remember that, however laudable, goals and promises and claims of cost-effectiveness that are inconsistent with the incentives created will go unmet. It may be that President Obama knows too little of his "solution" to provide specific plans. If so, he knows too little to deliver on his promises. Achieving intended goals then necessarily depends on blind faith that Obama and a panoply of bureaucrats, legislators, overseers and commissions will somehow adequately grasp the entire situation, know precisely what to do about it, and do it right (and that the result will not be too painful, however serious the problem)--a prospect that, due to the painful lessons of history, attracts few real believers. Alternatively, President Obama may know the details of what he intends, but is not providing them to the public. But if it is necessary to conceal a plan's details to put the best possible public face on it, those details must be adverse. If they made a more persuasive sales pitch, a politician would not hide actual details. They would be trumpeted at every opportunity, proving to a skeptical public he really had the answers, since concealing rather than revealing pays only when better informed citizens would be more inclined to reject a plan. Claiming adherence to elevated principles, but keeping detailed proposals from sight, also has a strategic advantage. It defuses critics. Absent details, any criticism can be parried by saying "that was not in our proposal" or "we have no plans to do that" or other rhetorical devices. It also allows a candidate to incorporate alternatives proposed as part of his evolving reform, as if it was his idea all along. The new administration has already put vague proposals on prominent display. However, adequate analysis cannot rest upon such flimsy foundations. That requires the nuts and bolts so glaringly absent. In the private sector, people don't spend their own money on such vague promises of unseen products. It is foolhardy to act any differently when political salesmen withhold specifics, because political incentives guarantee that people would object to what is kept hidden. So while vagueness may be good political strategy, it virtually ensures bad policy, if Americans' welfare is the criterion.

# A2: GENDER K OF DEBATE

**Even if debate has produced negative gender relations, it should not be abandoned—refusal to accept reform causes the same absolutist positions they critique**

**PALCZEWSKI 1996** (Catherine Helen Palczewski is an Associate Professor in the Department of Communication Studies and the Women's Studies Program at the University of Northern Iowa, Argumentation and Advocacy, Spring)

As Fulkerson points out, many of the initial feminist critiques of argument engage in some of the negative aspects of argument that the feminist critiques highlight: absolute positions are taken where authors reject too much of an alternative perspective. It seems that many of the early feminist critiques of argumentation have rejected the process out of hand (i.e. Ayim; Foss and Griffin; Gearhart; Moulton). I think such an approach throws out the baby with the bathwater (even though the scum in the bathwater did, indeed, come off the baby). Instead, this special issue points out that we need to open up studies of argumentation so that they address not only adversarial processes (which, in some instances, are indispensable) but also consensual processes (which, in other instances, are indispensable). In the spirit of cooperative argumentation espoused by Josina Makau, may the discussion continue, so that we all, women and men, masculine and feminine, may engage in systems of thought that enable us to break out of calcified forms of thinking.

# A2: DEBATE MASCULINE

**Debate is not inherently masculine—different perspectives simply allow people to read different arguments still linked by the topic**

**FUGATE 1997** (Amy, Director of Forensics at Johnson County Community College, Argumentation and Advocacy, Spring)

There is no dispute that women have been socialized to be caring, nurturing, sensitive, warm, and intuitive thinkers. However, while this may cause them to experience dissonance, I fail to see why these characteristics would prevent them from engaging in academic debate. Instead, our different socialization can allow us to bring the different perspectives into the debate activity. On the affirmative side, they can select case areas which focus debates on issues which would fall within their socialization. On the negative, there are arguments which should be argued as abstract (feminism, ethnocentrism, kritiks) yet would allow men and women to provide debate from a caring, sensitive, intuitive perspective. There is no question in my mind, that both my male and female students have been made more aware of gender and cultures through arguments such as these.

# A2: DEBATING GOVERNMENT BAD

**Debating state policy allows us to shape institutions and resist domination**

**STANNARD 2006** (Matt, Department of Communication and Journalism, University of Wyoming, Spring 2006 Faculty Senate Speaker Series Speech, April 18, http://theunderview.blogspot.com/2006/04/deliberation-democracy-and-debate.html)

If Habermas is right, and I obviously believe he is, then academics cannot afford to be insulated from the lives of ordinary working people, but must instead co-participate in some kind of empowerment for all, perhaps by facilitating schools, and I would suggest debate programs, as safe deliberation zones, which can in turn inform liberatory politics. Above all, a commitment to deliberative democracy means removing the stigma from disagreement and confrontation, and teaching all participants to be co-creators not only of the substance of debate, but the rulemaking of the conversational process itself. This debating can take place both inside and outside of schools. A commitment to deliberative democracy means a commitment to privileging the process of deliberation over other processes in shaping political life. In other words, inclusive rather than restrictive voting rights, more candidates on TV and not less, more resources committed to education not fewer, erring on the side of freedom of speech rather than restrictions, and above all, an emphasis on and respect for the conversational process itself as an active, inclusive, organic field of political truth-building. A democratization, in other words, of the building of collective truth. Sometimes this means conducting deliberative polls or favoring the referendum process. Other times it means making the political process more transparent, such as favoring open-door meetings and the like. Now, many people make pretty good arguments as to the imperfections of these policies. The referendum process can be co-opted, bought out; sometimes even openness is antithetical to transparency, since cynical politicians can take advantage of openness for their own publicity, and sometimes people need to deliberate in private. But the great thing about deliberation as a commitment is that these criticisms can become part of the overall process of deliberative democracy. In a world where interested parties have the opportunity to speak and debate in good faith, we can criticize the referendum process, or explain why we can’t always have open meetings. We can debate the rules themselves, in other words, debate the process itself. All of this suggests that, if deliberative ethics are an antidote to both authoritarianism and self-centeredness, we need more: More debate teams, more public discussion, more patient deliberation, more argument, more discourse, and more nurturing and promotion of the material entities that sustain them.

# a2: narratives

**Turn- personal narratives prevent effective debate and discussion and destroy the public sphere by creating a sense of expertise- multiple studies prove**

**Levasseur and Carlin ‘1** (David G. Levasseur is Assistant Professor of Communication Studies at West Chester University in West Chester, Pennsylvania. Diana B. Carlin is Professor of Communication Studies and Dean of the Graduate School and International Programs at the University of Kansas, “Egocentric Argument and the Public Sphere: Citizen Deliberations on Public Policy and Policymakers”, Rhetoric & Public Affairs 4.3 (2001) 407-43, Muse, 2001, LEQ)

While the personal narratives from participants in the study certainly seemed to spark enthusiasm, such engagement came at a significant cost. As with other forms of egocentric argument, narratives that focus on the self are largely unable to steer the conversation towards more transcendent communal outcomes. A group discussion in Ohio reveals this characteristic of personal narratives. In this particular discussion, participants actively debated the issue of whether government should support labor unions: M1: I don't think the unions are going to be wiped out, first of all. And I'm not a proponent of unions. I'm basically anti-union, okay? . . . However, by the same token, unions have got to work the same way in being fair to companies, and I've seen situations where unions, because of some of the things they did, were a disgrace. Perry Power Plant--I know people who were told to go hide--I have nothing to do--go hide. That's WRONG! Okay, I've seen situations where a person, because he's in the union and he has this job classification, then he can't do anything else and he's sitting there for six and a half of his eight hours because he's only needed to do these two things, but he's got to be there because nobody else can do it because the unions state that you've got to have a person to do this and a person to do this and so on. M2: Well, that's his trade though. What do you do? M1: I'm an accountant but I do a lot of other things other than just accounting things. M2: Well, what if somebody came in and tried to take your job--take your livelihood? Something you've trained for, you're second, third generation of this particular . . . M1: Yeah, but I can't be allowed to sit around for six and a half hours out of the eight hours when I could be doing something else but I can't do it because . . . M2: No, that's not my point. [End Page 414] M1: Well, that's my point! If I could do something productive to help the company to help me to help the workers the other six and a half hours, but I'm not allowed to do that because that's not my job classification. Then I'm qualified, I can do it, but I'm not allowed. . . . M2: What about prevailing wage with unions? M1: What do you mean? M2: Well, usually non-union companies are--they gauge their pay scale to union companies with prevailing wage. So if one day, if the prevailing wage with union companies--if it falls and it's gone, then what do you think will happen to the rest of the wages? When the union prevailing wage is wiped out? In this discussion, participants actively debated the issue of whether government should support labor unions; however, they reached no mutual conclusions on the value of labor unions. Divergent opinions were shared, but no attempt at consensus building regarding the role of unions in the economy occurred. Consensus was difficult because when one focuses on self-experience, it is difficult to transcend those experiences. While the conversation raised a number of points on behalf of unions, the anti-union storyteller continued to return to his story. Habermas argues that the public sphere should constitute a discursive space where individuals "transcend the provinciality of their spatiotemporal contexts"--a space where citizens engage in "context transcending validity claims." 39 When citizens ground public policy discussions in personal narratives, they generally fail to transcend the limitations of their personal lives and move to a broader social outlook. It is also interesting to note that in this exchange about unions the personal narrative goes unchallenged. Rhetorical theorists have long recognized that narratives are susceptible to the charge of ungeneralizable evidence. For instance, Richard Whatley observed that one must take care in constructing arguments from examples, because examples are perceived as "exceptions to a general rule" and "will not prove the probability of the conclusion." 40 While such a perception may prove fatal in debates between experts in the technical sphere, they do not seem to have much impact in the deliberative practices of ordinary citizens. In the foregoing exchange, one participant recounted his personal experiences with union workers at the Perry Power Plant. He told the story of union workers who spent endless hours in idleness or in hiding. While one could certainly challenge the generalizability of such a story, the other group members did not offer such challenges. Instead, a pro-union participant shifted the ground of the debate to the alternative issue of "prevailing wage," where the discussion died. Perhaps such personal narratives are difficult to challenge because they establish expertise. Recent scholarly outcry suggests that experts have usurped the public [End Page 415] sphere. 41 Such lamentations are grounded in the fear that technical expertise undermines citizen deliberation by devaluing citizens' views. While this incursion by technical expertise did find its way into the group discussions (citizens citing outside "expert" sources), personally grounded expertise, such as the credibility established in the following exchange from a group in California, appeared far more often: M1: I think they should really look into the military spending. That is just amazing. I was in the military, and it's just a waste. People just rot in the military. It's just amazing how much unnecessary money is used in the military, and how many people that shouldn't have jobs are in the military. M2: That's the Republican job program. M3: I think you can say that about any government organization. In this exchange, a participant recounted his personal experience in the military. With the simple statement, "I was in the military," he established expertise in this realm of public affairs. Just as technical expertise quells discussion, personal expertise has similar effects. In this case, the assertion that "people rot in the military" went unchallenged, and the discussion of military spending quickly came to an end. Such personal credibility may also be less assailable than technical expertise because of its deeply personal nature. Arguments grounded in technical expertise can be challenged for their failure to satisfy certain argumentation standards within a specialized argument field. For instance, a social scientist's findings could be challenged based on a flaw in experimental design. Such a challenge takes issue with the findings; it does not fundamentally take issue with the individual. On the other hand, a challenge to one's lived experience is easily perceived as a challenge to one's life or to one's character. Such challenges can only suggest that one is disingenuous in his or her storytelling or that one's lived experience falls outside the norm. Such challenges seem out of place in a culture grounded in a liberal political tradition that suggests that one should not judge others. 42

# A2: RESOLVED/COLON

**Their “Resolved” and colon arguments make no sense–the Affirmative has to defend the proposition that the government should act**

**PARCHER 2001** (Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html)

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committtee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

# A2: IYENGAR “IRAQ DEBATE BAD”

**Iyengar’s argument is not relevant—she concludes that public debate could be beneficial**

**IYENGAR 2010** (Radha, assistant professor of economics at LSE and a research associate in CEP’s labour markets and productivity and innovation programmes, “Violence in Iraq: the impact of public debate during wartime,” CentrePiece Winter 2009/10, http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/cp307.pdf)

Before considering recommendations for policy based on these findings, it is important to note that the results do not represent a full analysis of the costs and benefits of an open public debate about military strategy. My study does not address the issue of whether criticism of war strategies brings sufficient extra benefits to society to make such costs acceptable. Extensive empirical research suggests that open debate, independent scrutiny of official policy and transparency improves the quality of decisions in democracies relative to closed political systems and may at times be necessary to force changes in war strategy (Kaufman, 2004; Snyder, 1991). Public criticism and policy reviews may therefore be beneficial overall if the resulting improvements in strategy produce a real reduction in attacks and fatalities.

http://books.google.com/books?id=iDm8QqjilKYC&dq=%22Myths+of+Empire:+Domestic+Politics+and+International+Ambition%22&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=en&ei=pjlBTJmnLcWlnQeZ9LnLDw&sa=X&oi=book\_result&ct=result&resnum=4&ved=0CC4Q6AEwAw#v=onepage&q&f=false