# Framework File – SDI

## Policy Debate Good

### 1NC – Shell

#### A. Interpretation --- the ballot’s sole purpose is to answer the resolutional question: Is the outcome of the enactment of a topical plan better than the status quo or a competitive policy option?

#### Definitional support ---

#### 1. “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School 4 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:"Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### 2. “United States Federal Government should” means the debate is solely about the outcome of a policy established by governmental means

Ericson 3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow *should* in the *should*-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase *free trade*, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the *affirmative side* in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### B. Violation --- they claim advantages that are independent of the plan

C. Reasons to prefer:

#### 1. Predictable limits --- the grammar of the resolution is based upon enacting a policy. They justify arbitrarily changing the question of the debate to an infinite number of potential frameworks, ensuring the Aff always wins. Grammar is the only predictable basis for determining meaning; it’s the foundation for how words interact. Ignoring it justifies changing the focus of the debate, mooting the resolution altogether.

#### 2. Ground --- advantages that aren’t linked to the outcome of the plan are impossible to negate. They can claim “critical” arguments outweigh disads linked to the plan or shift their advocacy to avoid impact-turns.

#### 3. Plan-focus --- critical frameworks change the role of the ballot from a yes / no question about the desirability of the plan to something else. This undermines the singular logical purpose of debate: the search for the best policy. Logical policymaking is the biggest educational impact --- any other learning is worthless because it can’t be applied to the real world.

#### D. Topicality is a voting issue for fairness and outweighs all other issues because without it, debate is impossible

Shively 00 (Ruth Lessl, Assistant Prof Political Science – Texas A&M U., Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p. 181-182)

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to-they must reject and limit-some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest-that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect-if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the *starting* condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators,and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

### 2NC – Limits

#### Changing the framework unlimits the topic --- anything other than plan focus opens the floodgates to a huge number of alternative styles. A *partial* list of arguments actually used in recent years includes the Aff using debate to perform via music or art, criticize the state or problem-solution thinking, claim that representations, ontology, methodology, or ethics come first, use their ‘worldview’ to ‘solve our disads’, present the plan as a metaphor, irony, or counterfactual, remain completely silent, or use the 1AC to examine identity, minority participation, or debate itself.

#### Worse, the potential list is literally infinite --- only our interpretation limits debate to promote politically relevant dialogue

Lutz 00 (Donald, Professor of Political Science – U Houston, Political Theory and Partisan Politics, p. 39-40)

Aristotle notes in the Politics that political theory simultaneously proceeds at three levels – discourse about the ideal, about the best possible in the real world, and about existing political systems. Put another way, comprehensive political theory must ask several different kinds of questions that are linked, yet distinguishable. In order to understand the interlocking set of questions that political theory can ask, imagine a continuum stretching from left to right. At the end, to the right is an ideal form of government, a perfectly wrought construct produced by the imagination. At the other end is the perfect dystopia, the most perfectly wretched system that the human imagination can produce. Stretching between these two extremes is an infinite set of possibilities, merging into one another, that describe the logical possibilities created by the characteristics defining the end points. For example, a political system defined primarily by equality would have a perfectly inegalitarian system described at the other end, and the possible states of being between them would vary primarily in the extent to which they embodied equality. An ideal defined primarily by liberty would create a different set of possibilities between the extremes. Of course, visions of the ideal often are inevitably more complex than these single-value examples indicate, but it is also true that in order to imagine an ideal state of affairs a kind of simplification is almost always required since normal states of affairs invariably present themselves to human consciousness as complicated, opaque, and to a significant extent indeterminate. A non-ironic reading of Plato’s republic leads one to conclude that the creation of these visions of the ideal characterizes political philosophy. This is not the case. Any person can generate a vision of the ideal. One job of political philosophy is to ask the question “Is this ideal worth pursuing?” Before the question can be pursued, however, the ideal state of affairs must be clarified, especially with respect to conceptual precision and the logical relationship between the propositions that describe the ideal. This pre-theoretical analysis raises the vision of the ideal from the mundane to a level where true philosophical analysis and the careful comparison with existing systems can proceed fruitfully. The process of pre-theoretical analysis, probably because it works on clarifying ideas that most capture the human imagination, too often looks to some like the entire enterprise of political philosophy. However, the value of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of the General Will, for example, lies not in its formal logical implications, nor in its compelling hold on the imagination, but on the power and clarity it lends to an analysis and comparison of the actual political systems. Among other things it allows him to show that anyone who wishes to pursue a state of affairs closer to that summer up in the concept of the General Will must successfully develop a civil religion. To the extent politicians believe theorists who tell them that pre-theoretical clarification of language describing an ideal is the essence and sum total of political philosophy, to that extent they will properly conclude that political philosophers have little to tell them, since politics is the realm of the possible not the realm of logical clarity. However, once the ideal is clarified, the political philosopher will begin to articulate and assess the reasons why we might want to pursue such an ideal. At this point, analysis leaves the realm of pure logic and enters the realm of the logic of human longing, aspiration, and anxiety. The analysis is now limited by the interior parameters of the human heart (more properly the human psyche) to which the theorist must appeal. Unlike the clarification stage where anything that is logical is possible, there are now define limits on where logical can take us. Appeals to self-destruction, less happiness rather than more, psychic isolation, enslavement, loss of identity, a preference for the lives of mollusks over that of humans, to name just a few ,possibilities, are doomed to failure. The theorist cannot appeal to such values if she or he is to attract an audience of politicians. Much political theory involves the careful, competitive analysis of what a given ideal state of affairs entails, and as Plato shows in his dialogues the discussion between the philosopher and the politician will quickly terminate if he or she cannot convincingly demonstrate the connection between the political ideal being developed and natural human passions. In this way, the politician can be educated by the possibilities that the political theorist can articulate, just as the political theorist can be educated by the relative success the normative analysis has in “setting the Hook” of interest among nonpolitical theorists. This realm of discourse, dominated by the logic of humanly worthwhile goals, requires that the theorist carefully observe the responses of others in order not to be seduced by what is merely logical as opposed to what is humanly rational. Moral discourse conditioned by the ideal, if it is to e successful, requires the political theorist to be fearless in pursuing normative logic, but it also requires the theorist to have enough humility to remember that, if a non-theorist cannot be led toward an idea, the fault may well lie in the theory, not in the moral vision of the non-theorist.

#### Alternative frameworks are potentially limitless

Mearsheimer 95 (John, Professor of Political Science – U Chicago, International Security, Winter)

Nevertheless, critical theorists readily acknowledge that realism has been the dominant interpretation of international politics for almost seven hundred years. “Realism is a name for a discourse of power and rule in modern global life.” Still, critical theory allows for change, and there is no reason, according to the theory anyway, why a communitarian discourse of peace and harmony cannot supplant the realist discourse of security competition and war. In fact, change is always possible with critical theory because it allows for an unlimited number of discourses, and it makes no judgment about the merit or staying power of any particular one. Also, critical theory makes no judgment about whether human beings are “hard-wired” to be good or bad, but instead treats people as infinitely changeable.

Potential critical arguments are limitless --- we’d be forced to defend all of history

Shors and Mancuso 93 (Mathew and Steve, U Michigan, “The Critique: Skreaming Without Raising Its Voice”, Debaters Research Guide, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/ShorsMancuso1993.htm)

Unfortunately, these uses of the Critique are not only inevitable when its rules are accepted, but they also make a mockery of any potential intellectual power of the Critique. Taken to its logical end, soon there will be *Critiques of business Confidence* and the like, when the overriding set of principles includes "the judge should never harm the confidence of businesses." Precisely because normative statements are always relative, no one set of principles is ever always defensible. What the Critique allows is that debaters find any philosopher or advocate in the history of humankind who writes "Rational thought is a myth" and therein lies a Critique.

### Limits Good – 2NC

#### Basic limits are necessary to effective resistance –-- they govern deliberative democracy and are essential to prevent violence and tyranny

Shively 00 (Ruth Lessl, Assistant Prof Political Science – Texas A&M U., Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p. 184)

The point here is that in arguing—and the point holds equally for other forms of contest—we assume that it is possible to educate or persuade one another. We assume that it is possible to come to more mutual understandings of an issue and that the participants in an argument are open to this possibility. Otherwise, there is no point to the exercise; we are simply talking at or past one another. At this point, the ambiguists might respond that, even if there are such rules of argument, they do not apply to the more subversive or radical activities they have in mind. Subversion is, after all, about questioning and undermining such seemingly “necessary” or universal rules of behavior. But, again, the response to the ambiguist must be that the practice of questioning and undermining rules, like all other social practices, needs a certain order. The subversive needs rules to protect subversion. And when we look more closely at the rules protective of subversion, we find that they are roughly the rules of argument discussed above. In fact, the rules of argument are roughly the rules of democracy or civility: the delineation of boundaries necessary to protect speech and action from violence, manipulation and other forms of tyranny. Earlier we asked how the ambiguists distinguish legitimate political behaviors, like contest or resistance, from illegitimate behaviors, like cruelty and subjugation. We find a more complete answer here. The former are legitimate because they have civil or rational persuasion as their end. That is, legitimate forms of contest and resistance seek to inform or convince others by appeal to reasons rather than by force or manipulation. The idea is implicit in democracy because democracy implies a basic respect for self-determination: a respect for people’s rights to direct their own lives as much as possible by their own choices, to work and carry on relationships as they see fit, to participate in community and politics according to decisions freely made by them rather than decisions forced on them, and so on. Thus, to say that rational persuasion is the end of political action is simply to acknowledge that, in democratic politics, this is the way we show respect for others’ capacities for self-direction. In public debate, our goal is to persuade others with ideas that they recognize as true rather than by trying to manipulate them or move them without their conscious, rational assent.

#### Limits key to effective discussion

Bauman 99 (Zygmunt, Emeritus Professor of Sociology – U Leeds and Warsaw, In Search of Politics, p. 4-5)

The art of politics, if it happens to be *democratic* politics, is about dismantling the limits to citizen’s freedom; but it is also about self-limitation: about making citizens free in order to enable them to set, individually and collectively, their own, individual and collective, limits. That second point has been all but lost. All limits are off-limits. Any attempt at self-limitation is taken to be the first step on the road leading straight to the gulag, as if there was nothing but the choice between the market’s and the government’s dictatorship over needs—as if there was no room for the citizenship in other form than the consumerist one. It is this form (and only this form) which financial and commodity markets would tolerate. And it is this form which is promoted and cultivated by the governments of the day. The sole grand narrative left in the field is that of (to quote Castoriadis again) the accumulation of junk and more junk. To that accumulation, there must be no limits (that is, all limits are seen as anathema and no limits would be tolerated). But it is that accumulation from which the self-limitation has to start, if it is to start at all. But the aversion to self-limitation, generalized conformity and the resulting insignificance of politics have their price—a steep price, as it happens. The price is paid in the currency in which the price of wrong politics is usually paid—that of human sufferings. The sufferings come in many shapes and colours, but they may be traced to the same root. And these sufferings have a self-perpetuating quality. They are the kind of sufferings which stem from the malfeasance of politics, but also the kind which are the paramount obstacle to its sanity. The most insister and painful of contemporary problems can be best collected under the rubric of *Unsicherheit*—the German term which blends together experiences which need three English terms—uncertainty, insecurity and unsafety—to be conveyed. The curious thing is that the nature of these troubles is itself a most powerful impediment to collective remedies: people feeling insecure, people wary of what the future might hold in store and fearing for their safety, are not truly free to take the risks which collective action demands. They lack the courage to dare and the time to imagine alternative ways of living together; and they are too preoccupied with tasks they cannot share to think of, let alone to devote their energy to, such tasks can be undertaken only in common.

### 2NC – Ground

#### Their framework is unfair because it undermines negative ground. Critical arguments inevitably cater to the Aff because they allow them to claim “critical” arguments outweigh disads linked to the plan or shift their advocacy to avoid impact-turns.

#### Only policy resolutions provide stable and productive ground --- alternative frameworks are impossible to debate

Lahman 36 (Carroll Pollack, Director of Men’s Forensics – Western State Teacher’s College, Debate Coaching: A Handbook for Teachers and Coaches, p. 74-5)

V. Formulating the Proposition 5 A “question” for debate is not enough. Obviously a contest debate cannot be held on the topic: “Mussolini,” for it may be attacked from any number of angles. A discussion is possible, but not a debate. Something must be declared concerning the policy on which two opposing positions are possible. An example is “Resolved, that Mussolini’s governmental principles should be condemned.” A. *Kinds of Propositions* “Propositions may be classified as (1) those of fact, (2) those dealing with proposals advocated as theoretically sound, and (3) those dealing with matters of practical policy.”6 (1) *Propositions of fact* are concerned with the question “Is this true?” Examples are: Resolved, that prohibition is unsound in principle. Resolved, that too many people attend college. Resolved, that a high protective tariff does the American farmed more harm than good. Partly as a result of the visits of British debaters to this country, this type of proposition is being more widely used than previously. (2) *Propositions advocated as theoretically sound* fall between proportions of fact and propositions of policy. They frequently have the weakness of trying to separate theory and practice. The following examples illustrate the type: Resolved, that a new political alignment on the basis of liberal and conservative parties would be desirable in the United States. Resolved, that a requirement of two years of Latin for every student in high school would be desirable. (3) Propositions of policy deal with the question: “Should this be done?” They are the most definite and concrete of the three types, and for that reason are most widely used. To illustrate: Resolved that a Federal Department of Education, headed by a cabinet member, should be established. Resolved, that interscholastic athletics should be abolished. Resolved, that \_\_\_\_should adopt the city manager form of government.

#### Policy topics are necessarily public --- this ensures the issues of controversy are not based on subjective private arguments that can’t be debated

Shively 97 (Ruth Lessl, Assistant Prof Political Science – Texas A&M U., Compromised Goods, p. 118)

I would answer that we can as long as we adhere to two basic rules of public debate. The first is that public debaters must base their arguments on public evidence. This is simply what it means to make a public, as opposed to a private, argument: to provide reasons or evidences that are comprehensible to one’s audience. Obviously, to make an argument based on internal or private experience is to make an argument that no one else can assess—it is to talk to oneself. Thus Neuhaus writers, “A public argument is transsubjective. It is not derived from sources of revelation or disposition that are essentially private and arbitrary.”11 It makes its case with reasons that are shared. Thus religious argument is safely undertaken in public discourse as long as it is presented “in terms that can make sense to anyone, including those who disagree and those who refuse to share the theological starting point.”12

### Ground Good

#### Two impacts ---

#### 1. Fairness ---- good predictable ground is necessary for the Neg to have a chance to compete. Without it, the debate is skewed against us from the beginning.

#### 2. Turns the case --- without predictable ground, debate becomes meaningless and produces a political strategy wedded to violence

Shively 00 (Ruth Lessl, Assistant Prof Political Science – Texas A&M U., Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p. 182)

The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert. But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest**.** It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implica­tions, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion. Yet difficulties remain. Foragreement is not simply the initial condition, but the continuing ground, for contest. If we are to success­fully communicate our disagreements, we cannot simply agree on basic terms and then proceed to debate without attention to further agree­ments. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements. Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.

### A2: Justifies Offensive Language

#### Multiple other checks –-- communal shunning, apologies, post round discussions or speaker points can all act as a deterrent –-- the ballot decides the question of the resolution, not individual ethics.

#### Offensive language is an extreme example that crosses “red lines” and can be rejected --- this doesn’t justify a non-policy framework

Frank 97 (David A., Assistant Prof and Director of Forensics – U Oregon, Argumentation & Advocacy, Spring, p. 195)

I believe the debate culture should establish well-developed “red lines**”** that place restrictions on the verbal behavior in the debate classroom. To be sure, any ethical attempt to refute, critique and deconstruct an opponent’s argument on the resolution should be encouraged. Yet attacks on the selfconcepts and self- esteem of others should not be tolerated and are inconsistent with the intent of academic debate. The existence of such “red lines” should not discourage vigorous debate, for there are many available arguments that deal with substantive issues on any resolution. Our task as a community of debate educators is to develop judging paradigms that integrate a commitment to the values of diversity and impartiality. The judge should represent and enforce communal and personal values that exist to promote the health of argument and the public sphere. At the same time, judges can remain impartial adjudicators of substantive arguments. While some will cluck about “political correctness” and “censorship,” the debate round is not a speaker’s corner or a talk show, it is a classroom. If it is a classroom, then some preconditions must exist if students are to learn. Among these preconditions should be a guarantee that a person’s race, gender, ethnicity, etc., will not be the target of abuse or harassment.

#### Double bind ---- either offensive language is a reason to reject the plan and there’s no link because these arguments can operate within our framework, or it is unrelated to the plan and can only be considered by breaking plan focus, which is illogical. Accepting this teaches a model of decision-making where good ideas are rejected for personal reasons --- this is the ultimate form of privileging personal purity over the collective good and should be rejected.

### A2: Representation Matter/1st

#### 1. While this may generally be true, it makes no sense in the context of debate. Policy proposals, like plans, are issued at the beginning of debates, not at the end. Representations usually influence policy outcomes, but in debate they are pre-decided. They have to show how they *already* influenced the plan --- which is exactly our framework argument.

#### 2. Rigged game --- don’t even evaluate this argument --- without predictability, there is no way for us and disprove their claim that “representations matter” in this instance. We have no evidence that “The Woolly Mammoth” is extinct --- but that doesn’t mean it isn’t true, just that the topic has nothing to do with this question.

#### 3. Representations don’t influence reality

Kocher 00 (Robert L, Author and Philosopher, http://freedom.orlingrabbe.com/lfetimes/reality\_sanity1.htm)

While it is not possible to establish many proofs in the verbal world, and it is simultaneously possible to make many uninhibited assertions or word equations in the verbal world, it should be considered that reality is more rigid and does not abide by the artificial flexibility and latitude of the verbal world. The world of words and the world of human experience are very imperfectly correlated. That is, saying something doesn't make it true. A verbal statement in the world of words doesn't mean it will occur as such in the world of consistent human experience I call reality. In the event verbal statements or assertions disagree with consistent human experience, what proof is there that the concoctions created in the world of words should take precedence or be assumed a greater truth than the world of human physical experience that I define as reality? In the event following a verbal assertion in the verbal world produces pain or catastrophe in the world of human physical reality or experience, which of the two can and should be changed? Is it wiser to live with the pain and catastrophe, or to change the arbitrary collection of words whose direction produced that pain and catastrophe? Which do you want to live with? What proven reason is there to assume that when doubtfulness that can be constructed in verbal equations conflicts with human physical experience, human physical experience should be considered doubtful? It becomes a matter of choice and pride in intellectual argument. My personal advice is that when verbal contortions lead to chronic confusion and difficulty, better you should stop the verbal contortions rather than continuing to expect the difficulty to change. Again, it's a matter of choice. Does the outcome of the philosophical question of whether reality or proof exists decide whether we should plant crops or wear clothes in cold weather to protect us from freezing? Har! Are you crazy? How many committed deconstructionist philosophers walk about naked in subzero temperatures or don't eat? Try creating and living in an alternative subjective reality where food is not needed and where you can sit naked on icebergs, and find out what happens. I emphatically encourage people to try it with the stipulation that they don't do it around me, that they don't force me to do it with them, or that they don't come to me complaining about the consequences and demanding to conscript me into paying for the cost of treating frostbite or other consequences. (sounds like there is a parallel to irresponsibility and socialism somewhere in here, doesn't it?). I encourage people to live subjective reality. I also ask them to go off far away from me to try it, where I won't be bothered by them or the consequences. For those who haven't guessed, this encouragement is a clever attempt to bait them into going off to some distant place where they will kill themselves off through the process of social Darwinism — because, let's face it, a society of deconstructionists and counterculturalists filled with people debating what, if any, reality exists would have the productive functionality of a field of diseased rutabagas and would never survive the first frost. The attempt to convince people to create and move to such a society never works, however, because they are not as committed or sincere as they claim to be. Consequently, they stay here to work for left wing causes and promote left wing political candidates where there are people who live productive reality who can be fed upon while they continue their arguments. They ain't going to practice what they profess, and they are smart enough not to leave the availability of people to victimize and steal from while they profess what they pretend to believe in.

#### 4. Prefer our evidence --- the best empirical research concludes Neg

Roskoski and Peabody 91 (Matthew and Joe, “A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language ‘Arguments,’” http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques)

Language Does Not Create Reality Language "arguments" assume the veracity of the Sapir- Whorf hypothesis. Usually, this is made explicit in a subpoint labeled something like "language creates reality." Often, this is implicitly argued as part of claims such as "they're responsible for their rhetoric" or "ought always to avoid X language." Additionally, even if a given language "argument" does not articulate this as a premise, the authors who write the evidence comprising the position will usually if not always assume the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Perhaps the most common example is the popular sexist language "argument" critiquing masculine generic references. Frequently debaters making this "argument" specifically state that language creates reality. The fact that their authors assume this is documented by Khosroshahi: The claim that masculine generic words help to perpetuate an androcentric world view assumes more or less explicitly the validity of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis according to which the structure of the language we speak affects the way we think. (Khosroshahi 506). We believe this example to be very typical of language "arguments." If the advocate of a language "argument" does not defend the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, then there can be no link between the debater's rhetoric and the impacts claimed. This being the case, we will claim that a refutation of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is a sufficient condition for the refutation of language "arguments". Certainly no logician would contest the claim that if the major premise of a syllogism is denied, then the syllogism is false. Before we begin to discuss the validity of the hypothesis, we ought first to note that there are two varieties of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. The strong version claims that language actually creates reality, while the weak version merely claims that language influences reality in some way (Grace). As Bloom has conceded, the strong version - "the claim that language or languages we learn determine the ways we think" is "clearly untenable" (Bloom 275). Further, the weak form of the hypothesis will likely fail the direct causal nexus test required to censor speech. The courts require a "close causal nexus between speech and harm before penalizing speech" (Smolla 205) and we believe debate critics should do the same. We dismiss the weak form of the hypothesis as inadequate to justify language "arguments" and will focus on the strong form. Initially, it is important to note that the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis does not intrinsically deserve presumption, although many authors assume its validity without empirical support. The reason it does not deserve presumption is that "on a priori grounds one can contest it by asking how, if we are unable to organize our thinking beyond the limits set by our native language, we could ever become aware of those limits" (Robins 101). Au explains that "because it has received so little convincing support, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has stimulated little research" (Au 1984 156). However, many critical scholars take the hypothesis for granted because it is a necessary but uninteresting precondition for the claims they really want to defend. Khosroshahi explains: However, the empirical tests of the hypothesis of linguistic relativity have yielded more equivocal results. But independently of its empirical status, Whorf's view is quite widely held. In fact, many social movements have attempted reforms of language and have thus taken Whorf's thesis for granted. (Khosroshahi 505). One reason for the hypothesis being taken for granted is that on first glance it seems intuitively valid to some. However, after research is conducted it becomes clear that this intuition is no longer true. Rosch notes that the hypothesis "not only does not appear to be empirically true in any major respect, but it no longer even seems profoundly and ineffably true" (Rosch 276). The implication for language "arguments" is clear: a debater must do more than simply read cards from feminist or critical scholars that say language creates reality. Instead, the debater must support this claim with empirical studies or other forms of scientifically valid research. Mere intuition is not enough, and it is our belief that valid empirical studies do not support the hypothesis. After assessing the studies up to and including 1989, Takano claimed that the hypothesis "has no empirical support" (Takano 142). Further, Miller & McNeill claim that "nearly all" of the studies performed on the Whorfian hypothesis "are best regarded as efforts to substantiate the weak version of the hypothesis" (Miller & McNeill 734). We additionally will offer four reasons the hypothesis is not valid. The first reason is that it is impossible to generate empirical validation for the hypothesis. Because the hypothesis is so metaphysical and because it relies so heavily on intuition it is difficult if not impossible to operationalize. Rosch asserts that "profound and ineffable truths are not, in that form, subject to scientific investigation" (Rosch 259). We concur for two reasons. The first is that the hypothesis is phrased as a philosophical first principle and hence would not have an objective referent. The second is there would be intrinsic problems in any such test. The independent variable would be the language used by the subject. The dependent variable would be the subject's subjective reality. The problem is that the dependent variable can only be measured through self- reporting, which - naturally - entails the use of language. Hence, it is impossible to separate the dependent and independent variables. In other words, we have no way of knowing if the effects on "reality" are actual or merely artifacts of the language being used as a measuring tool. The second reason that the hypothesis is flawed is that there are problems with the causal relationship it describes. Simply put, it is just as plausible (in fact infinitely more so) that reality shapes language. Again we echo the words of Dr. Rosch, who says: {C}ovariation does not determine the direction of causality. On the simplest level, cultures are very likely to have names for physical objects which exist in their culture and not to have names for objects outside of their experience. Where television sets exists, there are words to refer to them. However, it would be difficult to argue that the objects are caused by the words. The same reasoning probably holds in the case of institutions and other, more abstract, entities and their names. (Rosch 264). The color studies reported by Cole & Means tend to support this claim (Cole & Means 75). Even in the best case scenario for the Whorfians, one could only claim that there are causal operations working both ways - i.e. reality shapes language and language shapes reality. If that was found to be true, which at this point it still has not, the hypothesis would still be scientifically problematic because "we would have difficulty calculating the extent to which the language we use determines our thought" (Schultz 134). The third objection is that the hypothesis self- implodes. If language creates reality, then different cultures with different languages would have different realities. Were that the case, then meaningful cross- cultural communication would be difficult if not impossible. In Au's words: "it is never the case that something expressed in Zuni or Hopi or Latin cannot be expressed at all in English. Were it the case, Whorf could not have written his articles as he did entirely in English" (Au 156). The fourth and final objection is that the hypothesis cannot account for single words with multiple meanings. For example, as Takano notes, the word "bank" has multiple meanings (Takano 149). If language truly created reality then this would not be possible. Further, most if not all language "arguments" in debate are accompanied by the claim that intent is irrelevant because the actual rhetoric exists apart from the rhetor's intent. If this is so, then the Whorfian advocate cannot claim that the intent of the speaker distinguishes what reality the rhetoric creates. The prevalence of such multiple meanings in a debate context is demonstrated with every new topicality debate, where debaters spend entire rounds quibbling over multiple interpretations of a few words.1

#### 5. Not offense --- our framework doesn’t exclude discussing representations --- they can tie their arguments to the outcome of the plan, read it on the Neg, or use other forums to discuss these issues.

#### 6. Privileging representations locks in violence --- policy analysis is the best way to challenge power

Taft-Kaufman 95 (Jill, Professor of Speech – CMU, Southern Communication Journal, Vol. 60, Issue 3, Spring)

The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend. Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation" (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas, institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

### A2: Frameworks Institute

#### Frame theory is wrong --- beliefs aren’t so easily shaped

Oliver and Johnston 00 (Pamela E., U Wisconsin and Hank, SDSU, “What A Good Idea! Frames and Ideologies in Social Movement Research”, 2-29, http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~oliver/PROTESTS/ArticleCopies/Frames.2.29.00.pdf)

Frame theory is often credited with “bringing ideas back in” to the study of social movements, but frames are not the only useful ideational concepts. In particular, the older, more politicized concept of ideology needs to be used in its own right and not recast as a frame. Frame theory is rooted in linguistic studies of interaction, and points to the way shared assumptions and meanings shape the interpretation of any particular event. Ideology theory is rooted in politics and the study of politics, and points to coherent systems of ideas which provide theories of society coupled with value commitments and normative implications for promoting or resisting social change. Ideologies can function as frames, but there is more to ideology than framing. Frame theory offers a relatively shallow conception of the transmission of political ideas as marketing and resonating, while a recognition of the complexity and depth of ideology points to the social construction processes of thinking, reasoning, educating, and socializing. Social movements can only be understood by genuinely linking social psychological and political sociology concepts and traditions, not by trying to rename one group in the language of the other.

#### Prefer our evidence --- there’s no empirical basis for their theory

Benford 97 (Robert D., Professor of Sociology – U Nebraska-Lincoln, “An Insider’s Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective”, Sociological Inquiry, Vo. 67, No. 4)

In the last decade the framing perspective has gained increasing popularity among social movement researchers and theorists. Surprisingly, there has been no critical assessment of this growing body of literature. Though the perspective has made significant contributions to the movements literature, it suffers from several shortcomings. These include neglect of systematic empirical studies, descriptive bias, static tendencies, reification, reductionism, elite bias, and monolithic tendencies. In addition to a critique of extant movement framing literature, I offer several remedies and illustrate them with recent work, the articles by Francesca Polletta. John H. Evans, Sharon Erickson Nepstad, and ira Silver in this special section address several of the concerns raised in this critique and, in so doing, contribute to the integration of structural and cultural approaches to social movements.

### A2: Nayar

#### Zero alternative --- breaking down ‘global orders’ fails and results in cataclysmic violence

Balakrishnan 3 (Uma, Department of Government and Politics – St. John’s University, “Taking Charge of the Future”, International Studies Review, 5)

*Re-Framing the International* provides a perfect starting point for debates on the construction of the future. It raises a number of interesting questions that need to be explored. Is it possible to create a global community without losing the focus on the individual within this group? How does one balance the interests of larger actors like transnational corporations with those of the community so that we do not exchange one set of absolute rules (embodied in static sovereignty) for another? Where do we locate the norms that will underlie the new order, given the variety and seeming incoherence of demands from across the globe? In spite of the great sense of hope that underlies Re-Framing the International, the nagging question of how this can be accomplished without upheaval remains. Although the arguments for a peaceful transition are logical, the contributors are unable to show how power can be transcended. Given the current intransigence of the United States and the United Kingdom with respect to Iraq, it is difficult to envision the triumph of logic without the thrust provided by cataclysmic events like those that have characterized the past century.

#### Even Nayar concedes

Nayar 99 (Jayan, Critical Theorist, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599, Lexis)

And so, what might I contribute to the present collective exercise toward a futuristic imaging of human possibilities?I am unsure. It is only from my view of the "world," after all, that I can project my visions. These visions do not go so far as to visualize any "world" in its totality; they are uncertain even with regard to worlds closer to home, worlds requiring transformatory actions all the same. Instead of fulfilling this task of imagining future therefore I simply submit the following two "poems."

#### Local thinking sustains hegemonic ordering and exclusion --- their framework locks in parochialism

Hoffs 6 (Dianne and Peter, U Maine, Journal of Educational Administration, Vol. 44, No. 3)

There is no question that helping educational leadership students become self-analytical and reflect upon the areas where their own leadership and decisions can be improved is an important aspect of self and school improvement. If, however, an educational leadership program fails to push students to reflect beyond their individual actions and their current setting, it can actually reinforce their tendency both to think and act locally. This confines their actions to the norms of their local schools and communities, which can only result in the maintenance of the status quo. More problematic, local thinking can mask deep prejudice that exists to sustain a system that advantages the dominant culture. School leaders who hesitate to challenge local norms may perpetuate a system of schooling that marginalizes people who are considered different. As Counts reminds us, all education includes the imposition of ideas and values, but educators have an obligation to be clear about what assumptions shape their practice. A narrow focus on local concerns may involve “the clothing of one's own deepest prejudices in the garb of universal truth” ([Counts, 1932](http://www.emeraldinsight.com/Insight/ViewContentServlet?Filename=Published/EmeraldFullTextArticle/Articles/0740440304.html#b6), p. 180).There is an alternative. Educational leaders have to decide in big and small ways every day whether to let local or global contexts shape their actions. School leaders who go out of their way to welcome immigrant students, hire openly gay teachers, support a multi-cultural curriculum, honor a variety of religious holidays, and routinely examine school practices that might reinforce privilege (to list just a few examples), perhaps even in the face of local disapproval, contribute to the important task of creating an arena for expanding local and parochial weltanschauungen. Exemplary acts by school leaders speak even louder than exemplary words. They send messages about the inclusiveness of the schools' social and intellectual environments. They quite literally set up a level playing field for the arena of ideas and beliefs. This is an arena from which a new social order can emerge.

## Critique Debate Good

### Critique Debate Good - Shell

#### The traditional framework of policy debate assumes that discourse is a neutral medium through which thoughts are transmitted. This whitewashes the fact that discourses are produced such that they define what can and cannot be said through a violent process of control and exclusion

Roland Bleiker, “Forget IR Theory,” *Alternatives*; 1997

**The doorkeepers** of IR are those who, knowingly or unknowingly, **make sure that the discipline’s discursive boundaries remain intact. Discourses**, in a Foucaultian sense, **are subtle mechanisms that frame our thinking process. They determine the limits of what can be thought, talked, and written of in a normal and rational way. In every society the production of discourses is controlled, selected, organized, and diffused by certain procedures. They create systems of exclusion that elevate one group of discourses to a hegemonic status while condemning others to exile**. Although the boundaries of discourses change, at times gradually, at times abruptly, they maintain a certain unity across time, a unity that dominates and transgresses individual authors, texts, or social practices. **They explain**, to return to Nietzsche, **why “all things that live long are gradually so saturated with reason that their origin in unreason thereby becomes improbable.”28 Academic disciplines are powerful mechanisms to direct and control the production and diffusion of discourses. They establish the rules of intellectual exchange and define the methods, techniques, and instruments that are considered proper for the pursuit of knowledge. Within these margins, each discipline recognizes true and false propositions based on the standards of evaluation it established to assess them.29** <63-64>

#### Critique solves - Dissent at the epistemological and ontological level runs through the discursive cracks of hegemony to the heart of social change.

Bleiker, 00Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague,(Roland, Popular Dissent**,** Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

This chapter has mapped out some of the discursive terrains in which transversal dissent takes place. **Discourses are not invincible monolithic forces that subsume everything in reach. Despite their power to frame social practices, a discursively entrenched hegemonic order can be fragmented and thin at times. To excavate the possibilities for dissent that linger in these cracks, a shift of foci from epistemological to ontological issues is necessary.** Scrutinising the level of Being reveals how individuals can escape aspects of hegemony. Dasein, the existential awareness of Being, always already contains the potential to become something else than what it is. By shifting back and forth etween hyphenated identities, an individual can travel across various discursive fields of power and gain the critical insight necessary to escape at least some aspect of the prevailing order. **Transversal practices of dissent that issue from such mobile subjectivities operate at the level of dailiness. Through a range of seemingly mundane acts of resistance, people can gradually transform societal values and thus promote powerful processes of social change. Theses transformations are not limited to existing boundaries of sovereignty. The power of discursive practices is not circumscribed by some ultimate spatial delineation, and neither are the practices of dissent that interfere with them. At a time when the flow of capital and information is increasingly trans-territorial, the sphere of everyday life has become an integral aspect of global politics** — **one that deserves the attention of scholars who devote themselves to the analysis of international relations.** The remaining chapters seek to sustain this claim and, in doing so, articulate a viable and non-essentialist concept of human agency.

### A2: Predictability

#### Unpredictability is inevitable – embracing this fact, however, allows us to live meaningful lives.

Bleiker and Leet 6 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, and Martin, Senior Research Officer with the Brisbane Institute, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(3), p. 729-730)JM

Dramatic, sublime events can uproot entrenched habits, but so can a more mundane cultivation of wonder and curiosity. Friedrich Nietzsche pursued such a line of enquiry when reflecting upon what he called the ‘ after effects of knowledge’. He considered how **alternative ways** of life **open** **up through** a simple **awareness of the fallibility of knowledge**. **We endure** a series of non-dramatic **learning experiences as we emerge from** the illusions of **childhood**. **We are confronted with being uprooted from the safety of the house**. At first, **a plunge into despair is likely**, as one realises the contingent nature of the foundations on which we stand and the walls behind which we hide and shiver in fear: All **human life is sunk deep in untruth; the individual cannot pull it out of this well without growing** profoundly **annoyed** with his entire past, without finding his present motives (like honour) senseless, **and without opposing** scorn and **disdain to the passions that urge one on to the future and to the happiness in it**.43 The sense of **meaninglessness**, the anger at this situation, **represents a reaction against the habits of one’s upbringing** and culture. One no longer feels certain, **one no longer feels in control**. The sublime disruption of convention gives rise to the animosity of loss. The resentment may last a whole lifetime. Nietzsche insists, however, that **an alternative** reaction **is possible**. **A** completely different ‘**after effect of knowledge’ can emerge** over time **if we** are prepared to **free ourselves from** the **standards** we continue to apply, even if we do no longer believe in them. To be sure, **the: old motives of intense desire would still be strong at first**, due to old, inherited habit, **but they would gradually grow weaker** **under the influence of cleansing knowledge.** Finally one would live among men and with oneself as in nature, without praise, reproaches, overzealousness, delighting in many things as in a spectacle that one formerly had only to fear.44 The elements of fear and defensiveness are displaced by delight if and when we become aware of our own role in constructing the scene around us. The ‘**cleansing knowledge’** of which Nietzsche speaks **refers to exposing the entrenched habits of representation of which we were ignorant**. We realise, for example, that nature and culture are continuous rather than radically distinct. We may have expected culture to be chosen by us, to satisfy our needs, to be consistent and harmonious, in contrast to the strife, accident and instinct of nature. But **just as we can neither predict a thunderstorm striking nor prevent it, so we are unable ever to eliminate the chance of a terrorist striking in our midst**. **We can better reconcile ourselves to the unpredictability and ‘irrationality’ of politics** and culture **by overcoming** our childhood and idealistic **illusions**. The cultivation of the subliminal, then, can dilute our obsession with control by questioning the assumptions about nature and culture in which this obsession is embedded. **Without** this work of **cultivation**, **we are** far more **vulnerable** once hit by the after effects of knowledge. **We find ourselves** in a place we never expected to be, **overwhelmed** **by unexamined habits** of fear and loathing. But **if**, as Nietzsche suggests, **we experiment with the subliminal disruptions encountered in the process of ‘growing up’, we may become better prepared.** We may follow Bachelard’s lead and recognise that the house not only offers us a space to withdraw from the world when in fear, but also a shelter in which to daydream, to let our minds wander and explore subliminal possibilities. That, Bachelard believes, is indeed the chief benefit of the house: ‘it protects the dreamer’ .45

### A2: Limits

#### A focus on limits engenders violent practices by stopping productive discussions.

Bleiker and Leet 6 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, and Martin, Senior Research Officer with the Brisbane Institute, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(3), p. 733-734)JM

A subliminal orientation is attentive to what is bubbling along under the surface. It is mindful of how conscious attempts to understand conceal more than they reveal, and purposeful efforts of progressive change may engender more violence than they erase. For these reasons, Connolly emphasises that ‘ethical artistry’ has an element of naïveté and innocence. One is not quite sure what one is doing. Such naïveté need not lead us back to the idealism of the romantic period. ‘One should not be naïve about naïveté’, Simon Critchley would say.56 Rather, the challenge of change is an experiment. It is not locked up in a predetermined conception of where one is going. It involves tentatively exploring the limits of one’s being in the world, to see if different interpretations are possible, how those interpretations might impact upon the affects below the level of conscious thought, and vice versa. This approach entails drawing upon multiple levels of thinking and being, searching for changes in sensibilities that could give more weight to minor feelings or to arguments that were previously ignored.57 Wonder needs to be at the heart of such experiments, in contrast to the resentment of an intellect angry with its own limitations. The ingre d i e n t of wonder is necessary to disrupt and suspend the normal pre s s u res of returning to conscious habit and control. This exploration beyond the conscious implies the need for an ethos of theorising and acting that is quite diff e rent from the mode directed towards the cognitive justification of ideas and concepts. Stephen White talks about ‘circ u i t s of reflection, affect and arg umentation’.58 Ideas and principles provide an orientation to practice, the implications of that practice feed back into our affective outlook, and processes of argumentation introduce other ideas and affects. The shift, here, is from the ‘vertical’ search for foundations in ‘skyhooks’ above or ‘foundations’ below, to a ‘horizontal’ movement into the unknown.

#### We must incorporate alternative perspectives in order to stop violence.

Bleiker 1 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 30(3), p. 519)JM

Hope for a better world will, indeed, remain slim if we put all our efforts into searching for a mimetic understanding of the international. Issues of global war and Third World poverty are far too serious and urgent to be left to only one form of inquiry, especially if this mode of thought suppresses important faculties and fails to understand and engage the crucial problem of representation. We need to employ the full register of human perception and intelligence to understand the phenomena of world politics and to address the dilemmas that emanate from them. One of the key challenges, thus, consists of legitimising a greater variety of approaches and insights to world politics. Aesthetics is an important and necessary addition to our interpretative repertoire. It helps us understand why the emergence, meaning and significance of a political event can be appreciated only once we scrutinise the representational practices that have constituted the very nature of this event.

### Discourse First – Intelligibility

#### Discourse key: it is within discourse that the chaos of the world transubstantiates into experience. Serving as the dynamo of normalcy and judgment, discourse renders the world and the social intelligible.

Bleiker, 00Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague,(Roland, Popular Dissent**,** Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Power is not a stable and steady force, something that exists on its own. **There is no essence to power, for its exercise is dependent upon forms of knowledge that imbue certain actions with power**. This is to say that the manner in which we view and frame power also influences how it functions in practice. **'It is within discourse**,' Foucault claims**, 'that power and knowledge articulate each other.'** [31](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471199#31) **Discourses are subtle mechanisms that frame our thinking process. They determine the limits of what can be thought, talked and written in a normal and rational way.** In every **society the production of discourses is controlled, selected, organised and diffused by certain procedures. This process creates systems of exclusion in which one group of discourses is elevated to a hegemonic status while others are condemned to exile. Discourses give rise to social rules that decide which statements most people recognise as valid, as debatable or as undoubtedly false**. They guide the selection process that ascertains which propositions from previous periods or foreign cultures are retained, imported, valued, and which are forgotten or neglected. [32](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471199#32) Although these boundaries change, at times gradually, at times abruptly, they maintain a certain unity across time, a unity that dominates and transgresses individual authors, texts or social practices. Not everything is discourse, but everything is in discourse. Things exist independently of discourses, but we can only assess them through the lenses of discourse, through the practices of knowing, perceiving and sensing which we have acquired over time. Nietzsche: That mountain there! That cloud there! What is 'real' in that? Subtract the phantasm and every human contribution from it, my sober friends! If you can! If you can forget your descent, your past, your training — all of your humanity and animality. There is no 'reality' for us — not for you either, my sober friends… [33](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471199#33) Nietzsche's point, of course, is not that mountains and clouds do not exist as such. To claim such would be absurd. Mountains and clouds exist no matter what we think about them. And so do more tangible social practices. But they are not 'real' by some objective standard. Their appearance, meaning and significance is part of human experiences, part of a specific way of life. A Nietzschean position emphasises that discourses render social practices intelligible and rational — and by doing so mask the ways in which they have been constituted and framed. Systems of domination gradually become accepted as normal and silently penetrate every aspect of society. They cling to the most remote corners of our mind, for 'all things that live long are gradually so saturated with reason that their emergence out of unreason thereby becomes improbable'. [34](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471200#34) Discourses are more than just masking agents. They provide us with frameworks to view the world, and by doing so influence its course. Discourses express ways of life that actively shape social practices. But more is needed to demonstrate how the concept of discourse can be of use to illuminate transversal dissident practices. More is needed to outline a positive notion of human agency that is not based on stable foundations. This section has merely located the terrains that are to be explored. It is now up to the following chapters to introduce, step by step, the arguments and evidence necessary to develop and sustain a discursive understanding of transversal dissent and its ability to exert human agency.

### Discourse First – Policy Making

#### Policymaking cannot escape the nature of actions as preconstituted in language- the creation of a single acceptable description of actions is vital to preventing engagement or discussion of these acts, meaning that in a vacuum there is no way to evaluate policy without kritik.

Patton 97**,** professor of philosophy at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia (Paul, “The World Seen From Within: Deleuze and the Philosophy of Events”, Theory and Event 1:1, 1997)

 There is a parallel here with the views of Anscombe and others in the philosophy of action, according to which **actions** (a special class of events) **are always events under a description**. This is **because actions involve intentions and intentions presuppose some description of what it is that the agent intends to do**. On this view, **the bare occurrence** (or numerical identity) **of actions might be specifiable in purely physical terms, but their identity as actions of a particular kind involves reference to appropriate descriptions**. [4](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v001/1.1patton.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT4) **There is** thus **a necessary connection between the identity of the action and the manner in which it would be described by the agent**. Moreover**, to the degree that events involving non-human agencies such as corporate bodies, political movements and nation states are understood in terms of the model of rational action, this connection applies in the case of a broad range of social and political events**. Thus, while it may be true that by installing offensive missiles the Soviet authorities reinforced the defensive capabilities of Cuba, this might not be an appropriate description of their action. [5](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v001/1.1patton.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT5) The same action may have multiple (true) descriptions, but it is not always possible to substitute one description of an action for another in contexts that involve reference to the beliefs or intentions of agents.  This thesis about the dependence of actions upon descriptions implies **that the nature of such events is not exhausted by any particular description or set of descriptions.** Ian Hacking explores some surprising consequences of this thesis. One is the phenomena to which Nietzsche and Foucault drew attention, namely that **new forms of description of human behavior make possible new kinds of action. Only after the discursive characterization of behavior in terms of juvenile delinquency or split personality was established did it become possible for individuals to conceive of themselves and therefore to act as delinquents or splits. Not all discursive constructions of subjectivity open up new possibilities for action: some may serve to invalidate or remove possibilities for action**. Hacking cites the case of a bill brought before the British Parliament which sought to pardon retrospectively several hundred soldiers who were shot for desertion during the First World War, on the grounds that they would now be regarded as suffering from post-traumatic stress. [6](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v001/1.1patton.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22FOOT6) Such a redescription would pathologize the action of the deserters, retrospectively transforming their actions into symptoms. In other cases, the aim of retroactive redescription is to render reprehensible behavior that was formerly acceptable, as for example, when the European 'settlement' of Aboriginal land in the Australian colonies is redescribed as invasion.  The second surprising conclusion which Hacking draws from this account of the nature of actions is that **there is no simple fact of the matter which enables us to say whether such redescriptions are correct or incorrect. It follows that the nature of past actions is essentially indeterminate: one and the same event may be expressed in an open-ended series of statements**. In other words, generalizing the Anscombe thesis about actions points in the same direction as Deleuze's Stoic thesis about the relationship between events and the forms of their linguistic expression: **while the event proper or pure event is not reducible to the manner in which it appears or is incarnated in particular states of affairs, the nature of the incarnate or impure event is closely bound up with the forms of its expression**. Moreover, **since the manner in which a given occurrence is described or 'represented' within a given social context determines it as a particular kind of event, there is good reason for political actors to contest accepted descriptions.**

#### Discourses are intrinsic to political calculation- ignoring their importance is tantamount to saying that the president has no role in shaping policymaking.

Campbell et al, 07, David, Professor of Geography at the University of Durham**,** (Alison J. Williams, Post-Doctoral Research Associate in the International Boundaries Research Unit in the Department of Geography at Durham University; Luiza Bialasiewicz, Professor of Geography at Royal Halloway University, London; Stuart Elden, Professor of Geography at Durham; Alex Jeffrey, Professor of Geography, Politics & Sociology at the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne; Stephen Graham, Professor of Geography at Durham, “Performing security: The imaginary geographies of current US strategy”, Political Geography, Vol. 26, p. 406-407)

It is, finally, important to call attention to the difference between performativity and performance. **Performativity is a discursive mode through which ontological effects** (the idea of the autonomous subject or the notion of the pre-existing state) **are established. Performativity thereby challenges the notion of the naturally existing subject. But it does not eradicate the appearance of the subject or the idea of agency**. **Performance presumes a subject and occurs within the conditions of possibility brought into being by the infrastructure of performativity**. This is especially important when it comes to considering the role of named individuals in the development and furtherance of security policy. Although the citation of such names gives the appearance of wilful subjects exercising agency with volition, we argue in this paper, **despite calling attention to the performances of individuals or policies, that the continuities between groups of security officials and the arguments they propagate demonstrate the importance of performativity** (especially recitation and reiteration as constraints on those performances) **in the production of policy**. Methodologically this approach requires an alternative model of explanation, one best explicated by the argument of William Connolly (2005: 869) that classical models of explanation based on ‘‘efficient causality’’ – whereby ‘‘you first separate factors and then show how one is the basic cause, or they cause each other, or how they together reflect a more basic cause’’ – need to give way to the idea of ‘‘emergent causality’’. In this conception, **politics is understood as a resonant process in which diverse elements infiltrate into the others, metabolizing into a moving complex** – causation as resonance between elements that become fused together to a considerable degree. Here causality, as relations of dependence between separate factors, morphs into energized complexities of mutual imbrication and interinvolvement, in which heretofore unconnected or loosely associated elements fold, blend, emulsify, and dissolve into each other, forging a qualitative assemblage resistant to classical models of explanation (Connolly, 2005: 870. See also Connolly, 2004). In this context, **it is important to understand what an individually named subject signifies, and how we can understand the place of agency within performativity once pre-given subjectivity is contested**. In his account of the contemporary American political condition, William Connolly argues that, in contradistinction to any idea of a conspiratorial cabal exercising command, the US is run by a ‘‘theo-econopolitical [resonance] machine’’ in which the Republican party, evangelical Christians, elements of the electronic media and ‘‘cowboy capitalists’’ come together in emergent and resonant, rather than efficient, relationships (Connolly, 2005: 878). This means the **major public figures** like the President **and prominent media commentators** **need to be understood in particular ways.** As Connolly (2005: 877) argues: **It is pertinent to see how figures such as Bush and O’Reilly dramatize the resonance machine. But while doing so, it is critical to remember that they would merely be oddball characters unless they triggered, expressed and amplified a resonance machine larger than them. They are catalyzing agents and shimmering points in the machine**; their departure will weaken it only if it does not spawn new persona to replace them.

### Discourse K is key to Change

#### Language and politics is indistinct since language is the field under which all things, including politics, are constituted.

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But were these poetic dissident activities, as some fear, a mere play with words, intellectual games devoid of social significance? Not necessarily. **Language is always already politics. The links between words and what they signify may not be authentic, but they are constituted as real through the language in which they are embedded. And the ensuing forms of representation, partial and subjective as they are, become our social and political realities. Hence, to engage with language is to engage directly in social struggle.** In this sense, poetic dissent is as real and often as effective as the practices of international *Realpolitik*.

#### Discourse is better than policymaking, it creates the possibility for alternative modes of expression which policymaking automatically rules out.

Bleiker, 98asst. prof. of International Studies at Pusan National University (Roland, “Retracing and redrawing the boundaries of events: Postmodern interferences with international theory”, *Alternatives*, Oct-Dec 1998, Vol. 23, Issue 4)

"Inventions from the unknown," the poet Arthur Rimbaud says, "demand new forms."[37] New forms of speaking create preconditions for new forms of acting. **Opening up different ways of identifying events, of seeing and feeling reality, can occur only through language. It is a process saturated with obstacles and contradictions, obscurities and frustrations. It is never complete. It may not even happen. It certainly does not happen always.** Language has no outside. Only different insides. There is no easy language. There are only worn-out metaphors. (How to locate forms of writing and thinking that may turn into new forms of acting and living? **The point is to stretch language up to its limits: beyond the encrusted layers of silencing speech habits, but only as far as the roots still touch the ground. Disentangle knots of words, liberate from them laughter, shouts, gazes, variations, sensitivities, multiplicities. But do not disregard the manner in which a particular language is embedded in concrete social practices.** "Any war against a form of language," Michael Shapiro says, "must come from within.")[38] Contracting Contradictions Live the life of contradictions. The contradictions of life. Think through contradictions, not against them. Write about contradictions, not around them. Don't cut off the edges that bother you. They will never fit into your box, even without edges. (**Instead of continuously trying to fill the void left by the fallen God, postmodern thought no longer searches for alternative Archimedean foundations. The increasingly transversal events of contemporary world politics require more than ever that one accepts ambiguities and deals with the fragmented nature of life** in the late twentieth century. One must try to comprehend international relations by relying on various forms of insight and levels of analysis even if they are incommensurable and contradict each other's internal logic. **An event** like the fall of the Berlin Wall has multiple faces. It **is too complex to be viewed adequately through one set of lenses**. The masses of people that took to the streets in November 1989 were only one of many factors that contributed to the downfall of the existing regime. Other crucial influences include the evolution of the Sovietled alliance system, the existence of a second German state, economic decay, or the obsolescence of domestic systems of threats and privileges. **Each of these political sites offers possibilities for different readings of the event in question, readings that may contradict each other. Each provides a unique fragment of insight** into the fall of the Berlin Wall. **None of them can have the last word. Only in their incomplete and perhaps contradictory complementariness can these insights provide something that resembles an adequate understanding of what happened**.)

### Discourse K is key to Education

#### Social dynamics cannot be understood through the opposition of dominant and marginalized discourses: discursive analysis reveals that domination and marginalization are constantly shifting, and by their very discursive nature transgress the traditional categories of thought. Critique is key for thought to reach that discursive void around which oppression and resistance orbit.

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But **how are we to understand a void?** How are we to appreciate the dynamics that evolve within it, the ways in which it plays out the forces that linger on all of its multiple points of entry and exit? **The first step in this direction entails a departure from the deeply entrenched Western practice of viewing the world in dualistic terms. Much of modern thought has revolved around the juxtaposition of antagonistic bipolar opposites, such as rational/non-rational, good/ evil, just/unjust, chaos/order, domestic/international or, precisely, strong/weak. One side of the pairing is considered to be analytically and conceptually separate from the other.** The relationship between them generally expresses the superiority, dominance or desirability of one entity (such as strong/order) over the other (such as weak/chaos). The crucial spaces between them, the grey and indefinable voids, remain unexplored. Departing from this long tradition would, by contrast, emphasise the complementariness of opposites and the overlapping relationships between them. Since one side of the pairing (such as order) can only exist by virtue of its opposite (such as chaos), both form an inseparable and interdependent unit. [4](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471253#4)  **Non-dualistic conceptualising recognises that social dynamics cannot be understood by juxtaposing dominant and marginalised discourses, or local and global spheres. Discourses overlap, influence each other. They transgress boundaries. They are in a constant state of flux, and so are their multiple and cross-territorial relationships with political practice. A dominant discourse usually incorporates elements of discursive practices that are squeezed into the margins.** The influence of these exiled discourses, in turn, may increase to the point of their becoming dominant. The dividing lines between **discourses always changes and may be blurred** to the point that one needs to accept, as Foucault does, that multiple discursive elements interact at various strategic levels. [5](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471253#5) **What deserves our attention, then, is the discursive void, the space where these multiple and overlapping discourses clash, where silent and sometimes not so silent arguments are exchanged, where boundaries are drawn and redrawn.** The second step in appreciating how the discursive void influences transversal struggles requires a break with some aspects of Foucault's thought. **It may be the case that confrontations in the discursive void do not take place among equals, that, indeed, the only drama staged there is an endlessly repeated play of domination**. [6](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471254#6) But **resistance to these plays of domination is an equally constant theme**. Foucault, of course, would not necessarily disagree, for he argues that 'wherever there is power, there is resistance'. [7](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471254#7) He is simply less optimistic about the chances of precisely locating and directing these forms of resistance. He even goes as far as arguing that because the dynamic in the space between the strong and the weak takes place in an interstice, a 'non-place' where adversaries do not meet directly, no one is responsible for its outcome. [8](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471254#8) Such an interpretation can easily lead to a fatalistic interpretation that annihilates altogether the concept of human agency — an interpretation that is neither compelling nor necessarily compatible with most of Foucault's remaining arguments.

### A2: Shively

#### It is no longer a question of searching for Truth, but rather of accepting difference and facilitating dialog within that difference

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In the absence of authentic knowledge, the formulation of theoretical positions and practical action requires modesty. **Accepting difference and facilitating dialogue becomes more important than searching for the elusive Truth**. But **dialogue is a process**, an ideal, not an end point. **Often there is no common discursive ground, no language that can establish a link between the inside and the outside. The link has to be searched first**. But the celebration of difference is a process, an ideal, not an end point. A call for tolerance and inclusion cannot be void of power. **Every social order, even the ones that are based on the acceptance of difference, excludes what does not fit into their view of the world**. Every form of thinking, some international theorists recognize, expresses a will to power, a will that cannot but "privilege, oppress, and create in some manner."[54] There is no all-encompassing gaze. **Every process of revealing is at the same time a process of concealing. By opening up a particular perspective, no matter how insightful it is, one conceals everything that is invisible from this vantage point**. The **enframing** that occurs by such processes of revealing, Martin Heidegger argues, **runs the risk of making us forget that enframing is a claim, a disciplinary act that "banishes man into that kind of revealing that is an ordering**." And where this ordering holds sway, Heidegger continues, "it drives out every other possibility for revealing."[55] This is why **one must move back and forth between different, sometimes incommensurable forms of insights. Such an approach recognizes that the key to circumventing the ordering mechanisms of revealing is to think in circles**--not to rest too long at one point, but to pay at least as much attention to linkages between than to contents of mental resting places. **Inclusiveness does not lie in the search for a utopian, all-encompassing worldview, but in the acceptance of the will to power**--in the recognition that we need to evaluate and judge, but that no form of knowledge can serve as the ultimate arbiter for thought and action. As a critical practice, postmodernism must deal with its own will to power and to subvert that of others. This is not to avoid accountability, but to take on responsibility in the form of bringing modesty to a majority.

#### Truth seeking is bad – Truth to power is key

Mourard 1 (Roger, Wastenaw CC-College of educ, http://inkido.indiana.edu/research/onlinemanu/papers/focault.pdf)

**The political task is not to discover** the **truth** and thereby free humanity from domination or alienation. **Truth is a function of power/knowledge**. Rather, **the task is to conduct “a battle about the status of truth and the** economic and political **role that it plays**.” **Foucault’s approach is to challenge the existing social order** of the present by showing how it emerged from the will to dominate through the creation of a fictitious individual self and its equally manufactured objectification as an entity to be investigated scientifically.

### Framing Key – Frameworks Institute

#### Rhetoric matters --- the way the plan is framed determines its meaning

Frameworks Institute 5 (“The FrameWorks Perspective: Strategic Frame Analysis,” http://www.frameworksinstitute.org/strategicanalysis/perspective.shtml)

Strategic frame analysis is an approach to communications research and practice that pays attention to the public’s deeply held worldviews and widely held assumptions. This approach was developed at the FrameWorks Institute by a multi-disciplinary team of people capable of studying those assumptions and testing them to determine their impact on social policies. Recognizing that there is more than one way to tell a story, strategic frame analysis taps into decades of research on how people think and communicate. The result is an empirically-driven communications process that makes academic research understandable, interesting, and usable to help people solve social problems. This interdisciplinary work is made possible by the fact that the concept of framing is found in the literatures of numerous academic disciplines across the social, behavioral and cognitive sciences. Put simply, framing refers to the construct of a communication — its language, visuals and messengers — and the way it signals to the listener or observer how to interpret and classify new information. By framing, we mean how messages are encoded with meaning so that they can be efficiently interpreted in relationship to existing beliefs or ideas. Frames trigger meaning. The questions we ask, in applying the concept of frames to the arena of social policy, are as follows: How does the public think about a particular social or political issue? What is the public discourse on the issue? And how is this discourse influenced by the way media frames that issue? How do these public and private frames affect public choices? How can an issue be reframed to evoke a different way of thinking, one that illuminates a broader range of alternative policy choices? This approach is strategic in that it not only deconstructs the dominant frames of reference that drive reasoning on public issues, but it also identifies those alternative frames most likely to stimulate public reconsideration and enumerates their elements (reframing). We use the term reframe to mean changing “the context of the message exchange” so that different interpretations and probable outcomes become visible to the public (Dearing & Rogers, 1994: 98). Strategic frame analysis offers policy advocates a way to work systematically through the challenges that are likely to confront the introduction of new legislation or social policies, to anticipate attitudinal barriers to support, and to develop research-based strategies to overcome public misunderstanding. What Is Communications and Why Does It Matter? The domain of communications has not changed markedly since 1948 when Harold Lasswell formulated his famous equation: who says what to whom through what channel with what effect? But what many social policy practitioners have overlooked in their quests to formulate effective strategies for social change is that communications merits their attention because it is an inextricable part of the agenda-setting function in this country. Communications plays a vital role in determining which issues the public prioritizes for policy resolution, which issues will move from the private realm to the public, which issues will become pressure points for policymakers, and which issues will win or lose in the competition for scarce resources. No organization can approach such tasks as issue advocacy, constituency-building, or promoting best practices without taking into account the critical role that mass media has to play in shaping the way Americans think about social issues. As William Gamson and his colleagues at the Media Research and Action Project like to say, media is “an arena of contest in its own right, and part of a larger strategy of social change.” One source of our confusion over communications comes in not recognizing that each new push for public understanding and acceptance happens against a backdrop of long-term media coverage, of perceptions formed over time, of scripts we have learned since childhood to help us make sense of our world, and folk beliefs we use to interpret new information. As we go about making sense of our world, mass media serves an important function as the mediator of meaning — telling us what to think about (agenda-setting) and how to think about it (media effects) by organizing the information in such a way (framing) that it comes to us fully conflated with directives (cues) about who is responsible for the social problem in the first place and who gets to fix it (responsibility).

### Violence Impact – Nayar

#### Their framework ignores the violence inherent in our perspectives -- making violence inevitable

Nayar 99 (Jayan, Critical Theorist, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599, Lexis)

Rightly, we are concerned with the question of what can be done to alleviate the sufferings that prevail. But there are necessary prerequisites to answering the "what do we do?" question. We must first ask the intimately connected questions of "about what?" and "toward what end?" These questions, obviously, impinge on our vision and judgment. When we attempt to imagine transformations toward preferred human futures, we engage in the difficult task of judging the present. This is difficult not because we are oblivious to violence or that we are numb to the resulting suffering, but because, outrage with "events" of violence aside, processes of violence embroil and implicate our familiarities in ways that defy the simplicities of straightforward imputability. Despite our best efforts at categorizing violence into convenient compartments--into "disciplines" of study and analysis such as "development" and "security" (health, environment, population, being other examples of such compartmentalization)--the encroachments of order(ing) function at more pervasive levels. And without doubt, the perspectives of the observer, commentator, and actor become crucial determinants. It is necessary, I believe, to question this, "our," perspective, to reflect upon a perspective of violence which not only locates violence as a happening "out there" while we stand as detached observers and critics, but is also one in which we are ourselves implicated in the violence of ordered worlds where we stand very much as participants. For this purpose of a critique of critique, it is necessary to consider the "technologies" of ordering.