## Top Level

### Framework 1NC

#### A – Interpretation:

#### Topical affirmatives must affirm the resolution through instrumental defense of action by the United States Federal Government.

#### B – Definitions

#### Should denotes an expectation of enacting a plan

#### American Heritage Dictionary 2000 (Dictionary.com)

should. The will to do something or have something take place: I shall go out if I feel like it.

#### Federal government is the central government in Washington DC

**Encarta Online 2005,**

**http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia\_1741500781\_6/United\_States\_(Government).html#howtocite**

United States (Government), the combination of federal, state, and local laws, bodies, and agencies that is responsible for carrying out the operations of the United States. The federal government of the United States is centered in [Washington, D.C.](http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761576320/Washington_D_C.html)

#### Resolved implies a policy

**Louisiana House 3-8-2005,** <http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm>

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

#### C – Vote neg – We have five net benefits

#### First is Decisionmaking

#### The primary purpose of debate should be to improve our skills as decision-makers. We are all individual policy-makers who make choices every day that affect us and those around us. We have an obligation to the people affected by our decisions to use debate as a method for honing these critical thinking abilities.

#### Additionally, The best route to improving decision-making is through discussion about public policy

#### Mutually accessible information – There is a wide swath of literature on governmental policy topics – that ensures there will be informed, predictable, and in-depth debate over the aff’s decision. Individual policymaking is highly variable depending on the person and inaccessible to outsiders.

#### Harder decisions make better decisionmakers – The problems facing public policymakers are a magnitude greater than private decisions. We all know plans don’t actually happen, but practicing imagining the consequences of our decisions in the high-stakes games of public policymaking makes other decisionmaking easier.

#### Second is Predictability- The resolution proposes the question the negative is prepared to answer. Even if it is good to talk about their 1AC, they must prove we could have logically anticipated it. This question comes prior to the merits of the aff because it implicates our ability to debate.

#### And, predictability is the internal link to solving the aff – Debate has unique potential to change attitudes and grow critical thinking skills because it forces pre-round internal deliberation on a of a focused, common ground of debate

**Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf**

What happened in this particular case, as in any particular case, was in some respects peculiar unto itself. The problem of the Bloomfield Track had been well known and much discussed in the local community for a long time. Exaggerated claims and counter-claims had become entrenched, and unreflective public opinion polarized around them. In this circumstance, the effect of the information phase of deliberative processes was to brush away those highly polarized attitudes, dispel the myths and symbolic posturing on both sides that had come to dominate the debate, and liberate people to act upon their attitudes toward the protection of rainforest itself. The key point, from the perspective of ‘democratic deliberation within’, is that that happened in the earlier stages of deliberation – before the formal diNDIscussions (‘deliberations’, in the discursive sense) of the jury process ever began. The simple process of jurors seeing the site for themselves, focusing their minds on the issues and listening to what experts had to say did virtually all the work in changing jurors’ attitudes. Talking among themselves, as a jury, did very little of it. However, the same might happen in cases very different from this one. Suppose that instead of highly polarized symbolic attitudes, what we have at the outset is mass ignorance or mass apathy or non-attitudes. There again, people’s engaging with the issue – focusing on it, acquiring information about it, thinking hard about it – would be something that is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the deliberative process. And more to our point, it is something that is most likely to occur within individuals themselves or in informal interactions, well in advance of any formal, organized group discussion. There is much in the large literature on attitudes and the mechanisms by which they change to support that speculation.31 Consider, for example, the literature on ‘central’ versus ‘peripheral’ routes to the formation of attitudes. Before deliberation, individuals may not have given the issue much thought or bothered to engage in an extensive process of reflection.32 In such cases, positions may be arrived at via peripheral routes, taking cognitive shortcuts or arriving at ‘top of the head’ conclusions or even simply following the lead of others believed to hold similar attitudes or values (Lupia, 1994). These shorthand approaches involve the use of available cues such as ‘expertness’ or ‘attractiveness’ (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) – not deliberation in the internal-reflective sense we have described. Where peripheral shortcuts are employed, there may be inconsistencies in logic and the formation of positions, based on partial information or incomplete information processing. In contrast, ‘central’ routes to the development of attitudes involve the application of more deliberate effort to the matter at hand, in a way that is more akin to the internal-reflective deliberative ideal. Importantly for our thesis, there is nothing intrinsic to the ‘central’ route that requires group deliberation. Research in this area stresses instead the importance simply of ‘sufficient impetus’ for engaging in deliberation, such as when an individual is stimulated by personal involvement in the issue.33 The same is true of ‘on-line’ versus ‘memory-based’ processes of attitude change.34 The suggestion here is that we lead our ordinary lives largely on autopilot, doing routine things in routine ways without much thought or reflection. When we come across something ‘new’, we update our routines – our ‘running’ beliefs and pro cedures, attitudes and evaluations – accordingly. But having updated, we then drop the impetus for the update into deep-stored ‘memory’. A consequence of this procedure is that, when asked in the ordinary course of events ‘what we believe’ or ‘what attitude we take’ toward something, we easily retrieve what we think but we cannot so easily retrieve the reasons why. That more fully reasoned assessment – the sort of thing we have been calling internal-reflective deliberation – requires us to call up reasons from stored memory rather than just consulting our running on-line ‘summary judgments’. Crucially for our present discussion, once again, what prompts that shift from online to more deeply reflective deliberation is not necessarily interpersonal discussion. The impetus for fixing one’s attention on a topic, and retrieving reasons from stored memory, might come from any of a number sources: group discussion is only one. And again, even in the context of a group discussion, this shift from ‘online’ to ‘memory-based’ processing is likely to occur earlier rather than later in the process, often before the formal discussion ever begins. All this is simply to say that, on a great many models and in a great many different sorts of settings, it seems likely that **elements of the pre-discursive process are likely to prove crucial to the shaping and reshaping of people’s attitudes** in a citizens’ jury-style process. The initial processes of **focusing attention on a topic**, providing information about it and **inviting people to think hard** about it is likely to provide a strong impetus to internal-reflective deliberation, altering not just the information people have about the issue but also the way people process that information and hence (perhaps) what they think about the issue. What happens once people have shifted into this more internal-reflective mode is, obviously, an open question. Maybe people would then come to an easy consensus, as they did in their attitudes toward the Daintree rainforest.35 Or maybe people would come to divergent conclusions; and they then may (or may not) be open to argument and counter-argument, with talk actually changing minds. Our claim is not that group discussion will always matter as little as it did in our citizens’ jury.36 Our claim is instead merely that the earliest steps in the jury process – the sheer focusing of attention on the issue at hand and acquiring more information about it, and the internal-reflective deliberation that that prompts – will invariably matter more than deliberative democrats of a more discursive stripe would have us believe. However much or little difference formal group discussions might make, on any given occasion, the pre-discursive phases of the jury process will invariably have a considerable impact on changing the way jurors approach an issue. From Citizens’ Juries to Ordinary Mass Politics? In a citizens’ jury sort of setting, then, it seems that informal, pre-group deliberation – ‘deliberation within’ – will inevitably do much of the work that deliberative democrats ordinarily want to attribute to the more formal discursive processes. What are the preconditions for that happening? To what extent, in that sense, can findings about citizens’ juries be extended to other larger or less well-ordered deliberative settings? Even in citizens’ juries, deliberation will work only if people are attentive, open and willing to change their minds as appropriate. So, too, in mass politics. In citizens’ juries the need to participate (or **the anticipation of participating) in formally organized group discussions might be the ‘prompt’ that evokes those attributes**. But there might be many other possible ‘prompts’ that can be found in less formally structured mass-political settings. Here are a few ways citizens’ juries (and all cognate micro-deliberative processes)37 might be different from mass politics, and in which lessons drawn from that experience might not therefore carry over to ordinary politics: • A citizens’ jury concentrates people’s minds on a single issue. Ordinary politics involve many issues at once. • A citizens’ jury is often supplied a background briefing that has been agreed by all stakeholders (Smith and Wales, 2000, p. 58). In ordinary mass politics, there is rarely any equivalent common ground on which debates are conducted. • A citizens’ jury separates the process of acquiring information from that of discussing the issues. In ordinary mass politics, those processes are invariably intertwined. • A citizens’ jury is provided with a set of experts. They can be questioned, debated or discounted. But there is a strictly limited set of ‘competing experts’ on the same subject. In ordinary mass politics, claims and sources of expertise often seem virtually limitless, allowing for much greater ‘selective perception’. • Participating in something called a ‘citizens’ jury’ evokes certain very particular norms: norms concerning the ‘impartiality’ appropriate to jurors; norms concerning the ‘common good’ orientation appropriate to people in their capacity as citizens.38 There is a very different ethos at work in ordinary mass politics, which are typically driven by flagrantly partisan appeals to sectional interest (or utter disinterest and voter apathy). • In a citizens’ jury, **we think and listen in anticipation of the discussion phase, knowing that we soon will have to defend our views in a discursive setting where they will be probed intensively**.39 In ordinary mass-political settings, there is no such incentive for paying attention. It is perfectly true that citizens’ juries are ‘special’ in all those ways. But if being special in all those ways makes for a better – more ‘reflective’, more ‘deliberative’ – political process, then those are design features that we ought try to mimic as best we can in ordinary mass politics as well. There are various ways that that might be done. Briefing books might be prepared by sponsors of American presidential debates (the League of Women Voters, and such like) in consultation with the stakeholders involved. Agreed panels of experts might be questioned on prime-time television. Issues might be sequenced for debate and resolution, to avoid too much competition for people’s time and attention. Variations on the Ackerman and Fishkin (2002) proposal for a ‘deliberation day’ before every election might be generalized, with a day every few months being given over to small meetings in local schools to discuss public issues. All that is pretty visionary, perhaps. And (although it is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to explore them in depth) there are doubtless many other more-or-less visionary ways of introducing into real-world politics analogues of the elements that induce citizens’ jurors to practice ‘democratic deliberation within’, even before the jury discussion gets underway. Here, we have to content ourselves with identifying those features that need to be replicated in real-world politics in order to achieve that goal – and with the ‘possibility theorem’ that is established by the fact that (as sketched immediately above) there is at least one possible way of doing that for each of those key features.

#### Third is Limits – The aff interpretation explodes the number of potential affirmatives to anything that has a loose relationship to transportation, making it impossible for the negative to engage in crucial pre-deliberate research and provide robust in-debate clash

#### Fourth is Education

#### A focus on policy is necessary to learn the pragmatic details of powerful institutions – acting without this knowledge is doomed to fail in the face of policy professionalis who make the decisions that actually affect outcomes

**McClean, Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at Molloy College in New York, ‘1 (David E., “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope”, Conference of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy, http://www.americanphilosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/)**

Or we might take Foucault who, at best, has provided us with what may reasonably be described as a very long and eccentric footnote to Nietzsche (I have once been accused, by a Foucaltian true believer, of "gelding" Foucault with other similar remarks). Foucault, who has provided the Left of the late 1960s through the present with such notions as "governmentality," "Limit," "archeology," "discourse" "power" and "ethics," creating or redefining their meanings, has made it overabundantly clear that all of our moralities and practices are the successors of previous ones which derive from certain configurations of savoir and connaisance arising from or created by, respectively, the discourses of the various scientific schools. But I have not yet found in anything Foucault wrote or said how such observations may be translated into a political movement or hammered into a political document or theory (let alone public policies) that can be justified or founded on more than an arbitrary aesthetic experimentalism. In fact, Foucault would have shuddered if any one ever did, since he thought that anything as grand as a movement went far beyond what he thought appropriate. This leads me to mildly rehabilitate Habermas, for at least he has been useful in exposing Foucault's shortcomings in this regard, just as he has been useful in exposing the shortcomings of others enamored with the abstractions of various Marxian-Freudian social critiques. Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These **futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces theoretical hallucinations**"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) **This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."**

### A2: We Meet

#### You don’t meet

#### Any aff would be topical – Using the topic as a “jumping off point” for other discussions creates an infinite list of potential affs (queer theory, gender, security, language, etc.)

#### A stable advocacy is key – Without a plan, they can re-explain their relationship to transportation after the 1NC to avoid anything we criticize. The aff must unambiguously say something is good for the neg to have the ability to say it’s bad.

### A2: CI “Resolved”

#### Resolved

“Resolved” means “To change or convert by resolution or formal vote; -- used only reflexively; as, the house resolved itself into a committee of the whole,” **that’s** **American Heritage Dictionary 2k**

#### Resolved is express a legislative determination

**Words and Phrases ‘64** (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

## Standards

### Predictability 2NC

#### Predictability is good

#### Productive debates – We need to be prepared to discuss the aff to maximize debate’s potential to foster critical thinking. If we cannot predict the affirmative, debates become shallow and devoid of their educational potential

#### Intellectual growth – Half of debate’s value comes beforewe ever enter the room – the process of researching potential affirmatives forces us to re-consider personal beliefs and develop a thicker, more robust view of the world – That’s Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer

#### Without this pre-round consideration, debates have nowhere to begin- destroys the valuable process of thinking though another’s arguments

**Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer- Australian National University- 2003, When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy, POLITICAL STUDIES: 2003 VOL 51, 627–649, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.0032-3217.2003.00450.x/pdf**

Certainly, ‘consideration’ necessarily comes temporally prior to ‘discussion’. An internal process of weighing of reasons necessarily precedes any participation in a public discursive interchange. That, after all, is how we decide what position to take in the ensuing public discussion. Ideals of deliberative democracy may require that we go into public discussions with an ‘open mind’, in the sense of a willingness to change our opinions in the light of subsequent evidence and argument. But if everyone came to the process with a completely open mind, to the extent that no one was prepared to take any position to start with, the deliberations would have nowhere to begin. Internal-reflective processes are also involved in responding to the arguments and evidence presented by others in discussion. Much of the work in understanding what others are saying, whether in a formal meeting or an everyday conversation, inevitably occurs inside our own heads. We ‘get’ their jokes, catch their allusions, complete their ‘conversational implicatures’, fill in suppressed premises of their argument-sketches, and so on (Grice, 1975; Mansbridge, 1999). Empathetic extensions of that sort are crucial in enabling us to make sense of one another over the course of discussions, democratic or otherwise. So too, we argue, do **they loom large in the run-up to those discussions.** And so too might they do likewise, we suggest, even in the absence of any formal discussions. Imagining ourselves in the place of another for purposes of trying to understand what the other is saying is broadly of a cloth with imagining ourselves in the place of another for purposes of trying to understand what the other is or might be feeling or desiring (Goodin, 2000, 2003). The motivations might be different. But the process is broadly the same.10 As a modest step toward establishing those larger arguments, we here examine how deliberations actually proceeded in a citizens’ jury on an Australian environmental issue. There, just as our model of ‘democratic deliberation within’ hypothesizes, deliberation of the more internal-reflective sort did indeed precede – and did indeed do more to change people’s attitudes than – formal group deliberations of the more discursive sort.

### Limits 2NC

#### 1. Limits are good-

#### A. Fairness and ground- We can’t read disads and solvency arguments if they don’t defend the aff instrumentally. All we get is counter-warrant debates, which always favor the affirmative.

#### B. It’s the internal link to every other impact- A manageable and predictable set of affirmatives are key to third and fourth level debates that cultivate critical thinking skills- turns their acitivism/project/etc.

#### C. Prevents intellectual balkanization – If we could talk about anything, each team would retreat to the corner of academia that makes them feel most comfortable – a bounded area for debate challenges debates to expand their intellectual horizons without making the task seem unmanageable. If we were all having a party on a cliff, you would be much more likely to dance near the edge if there were a fence.

#### D. Limits are liberating - Limits are an inevitable aspect of human biology and society, so learning to work and be creative within these limits is essential. Debate offers another way to practice working within a necessarily limited human existence – that’s Ramaekers.

#### 2. Not all limits are created equal –

#### A. The limits our framework outlines are not the same as (whatever bad limits they talk about)

#### B. Limits are essential for equitable relations in society– They assume that limits are some infinite capacity to do whatever you want- this radical liberalism turns into the domination of the weak by the strong and is the same logic as Bush exceptionalism and Tea Partiers- freedom should be bounded by the limits of responsibility within a community

#### C. The taboo on anything that might be “limiting” creates paralysis –their criticism of makes the perfect the enemy of the good. The best we can do is fashion reasonable *middle ground* that fosters discussion

**John O. Beahrs- Department of Psychiatry, Oregon Health Sciences University- Dec., 1992, Paradoxical Effects in Political Systems, Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 755-769, jstor**

New taboos have emerged that reflect new societal myths along with the pervasive aversion to the acceptance of limits and boundaries. Any hint of favoring the promotion of death, discrimination, injustice, deprivation, or hardship currently carries the implication of unacceptable evil. This climate no doubt arose in part from a reaction to earlier social traumata, and reflects a degree of healthy awakening from earlier self-idealization. At the same time, **these taboos now impose a subtle tyranny of their own, which can foster bad outcomes by dampening the open discussion needed for effective problem-solving**. They are reviewed in turn, defining their tacit underlying assumptions and potentials for negative paradox of their own. One major taboo is death-tacitly assumed to be unacceptable and correctible, or whose prevention is of ultimate value compared to other values. The taboo against contrary data can take several forms. Extreme "pro-lifeism," by preventing therapeutic abortion, may devastate the quality of life. Failure to allow medical euthanasia or rational suicide may threaten life at other levels by diverting health care funds from areas where they could be better used. Phobic avoidance of preventable death (such as the death penalty for hard-core evildoers, risk to terrorists' hostages) may so limit our ability to deal with both crime and terrorism that these evils will also escalate and claim far more innocent victims than otherwise. The taboo against death often worsens its cruel impact. A second taboo is discrimination, which suppresses the fact that what distinguishes complex living systems from an undifferentiated cell is cooperative division of labor-an inherently discriminative process. Having arisen as a corrective to gross racial and sexual injustice, this taboo now fosters several types of paradoxical effect. The leveling process could lead toward a common standard of mediocrity, or alternatively, to the paradox of communism, which rather than a classless society creates a rigid dichotomy between a massive underprivileged sector and a tiny ruling elite (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989). Antidiscrimination statutes may hamstring employers, who fear that effective action against problem employees will bring civil liberties reprisals. Gone too far, this can demoralize the productive sector to the point of a lowered economic base, worsening the plight of the disadvantaged who always bear the brunt of hard times. Another taboo, injustice, discounts the fact that many aspects of life are inherently unfair, and that simple tragedies do occur for which nobody should be blamed. This fosters excessive litigation, which may create new injustice in several ways: (1) driving individuals out of high-risk professions like obstetrics, thus depriving their clientele of vital services; (2) driving up the cost of services to a level where they become less availablet o the disadvantaged;a nd (3) simply shifting the burden of unfairness to those who may be held accountable for matters not properly their responsibility. A fourth taboo, against deprivation, hardship, and even simple unpleasure, reflects the social aversion to limits in any form. This fosters paradoxical effects now manifest in personal ethics, mental health, and social service agencies. The ethic of "self-actualization," by undercutting the vital roles of commitment and fidelity, leads to dissolving the social cement provided by stable families, yielding far more despair and less actualization of human potential. In mental health practice, failure to set effective limits fosters regressive dependency and worsens many patients' disorders; conversely, enforcing higher patient responsibilities improves these disorders (Halleck, 1988; Beahrs, 1990c). Welfare recipients are plagued by many anti-incentives that make upward mobility difficult, while dependency on their benefactors threatens their basic autonomy, leading to demoralization and worsening their overall plight (Mead, 1986). All these taboos share a common form: striving to remold society into an ideal of what it "ought" to be. This task becomes self-defeating when important aspects of reality are ignored, which then come back to yield the unexpected effect. To try to change what can only be accepted or simply endured, as in struggling to "close the generation gap," creates a "**Utopia syndrome" in which the inevitable stresses of life are unnecessarily transformed into major problems** (Watzlawicke t al., 1974). If there is any single feature characteristic of today's contemporary domestic malaise, it is probably the extent to which Utopian thinking dominates current mythology. The apparent corrective is greater realism. Pitted against this reasoning, however, is that many correctible evils have been pushed aside by despots throughout history, with rationalizations frighteningly similar to the above arguments: that such evils are "facts of life" or inviolate "human nature" (Kohn, 1986). Earlier this century, not employing appropriate correctives first prolonged the economic tyranny of the great trusts, and later failed to prevent the global destruction of the Second World War. The traumatization of these earlier years along with increased awareness of our own potential for evil, probably fuels the current quest for Utopia. Thus, in essence, the current paradoxes mirror the earlier ones. This dilemma cannot be resolved without answering the question of "human nature," differentiating what is "realistic" from Utopian self-deceptions that almost inevitably yield paradoxical effects. This is the task of all the human sciences and their primary bridge to public policy (Wilson, 1978). Yet, burgeoning data from many levels has so far strikingly failed to establish relevance to the actual world of subtle forces and counterforces in which political leaders operate (Jervis, 1989). For the time being, it may be wise to conclude that human nature remains an ideological concept without proven substantive validity (Berry, 1986). At the same time, it is a concept of such pivotal importance to political psychology that new scientific data must be continually scrutinized toward its clarification.

**D. <whatever the aff, they would probably need some sort of limit on people/government/thought to achieve whatever they want to achieve---- give example>**

### Limits– A2: You Exclude Our Aff

#### Necessary trade-off – The goal of our interpretation is not to exclude your aff, but to create a common ground for debate that allows us to maximize its immense educational and intellectual potential – There will always be some “issue” we exclude, but this is a necessary evil in pursuit of a manageable framework for comprehensive and productive discussion.

#### Other opportunities – They can read their aff on the negative or discuss it in any other deliberative or education setting – Just because it doesn’t belong on this topic’s agenda does not mean it can never be discussed.

#### Dogmatism – the insistence that we always discuss \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ devolves debate into polemics and dogmatism – creates a violent and unproductive model of communication

**Foucault, ’84 (Michel, “Polemics, Politics and Problematizations” Interview by Paul Rabinow, http://foucault.info/foucault/interview.html)**

I like discussions, and when I am asked questions, I try to answer them. It’s true that I don’t like to get involved in polemics. If I open a book and see that the author is accusing an adversary of “infantile leftism” I shut it again right away. That’s not my way of doing things; I don’t belong to the world of people who do things that way. I insist on this difference as something essential: a whole morality is at stake, the one that concerns the search for truth and the relation to the other.

In the serious play of questions and answers, in the work of reciprocal elucidation, the rights of each person are in some sense immanent in the discussion. They depend only on the dialogue situation. The person asking the questions is merely exercising the right that has been given him: to remain unconvinced, to perceive a contradiction, to require more information, to emphasize different postulates, to point out faulty reasoning, and so on. As for the person answering the questions, he too exercises a right that does not go beyond the discussion itself; by the logic of his own discourse, he is tied to what he has said earlier, and by the acceptance of dialogue he is tied to the questioning of other. Questions and answers depend on a game—a game that is at once pleasant and difficult—in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of dialogue.

The polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a just undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in search for the truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is armful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat. For him, then the game consists not of recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak but of abolishing him as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue; and his final objective will be not to come as close as possible to a difficult truth but to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly upholding from the beginning. The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that his adversary is by definition denied.

Perhaps, someday, a long history will have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on discussion and an obstacle to the search for the truth. Very schematically, it seems to me that today we can recognize the presence in polemics of three models: the religious model, the judiciary model, and the political model. As in heresiology, polemics sets itself the task of determining the intangible point of dogma, the fundamental and necessary principle that the adversary has neglected, ignored or transgressed; and it denounces this negligence as a moral failing; at the root of the error, it finds passion, desire, interest, a whole series of weaknesses and inadmissible attachments that establish it as culpable. As in judiciary practice, polemics allows for no possibility of an equal discussion: it examines a case; it isn’t dealing with an interlocutor, it is processing a suspect; it collects the proofs of his guilt, designates the infraction he has committed, and pronounces the verdict and sentences him. In any case, what we have here is not on the order of a shared investigation; the polemicist tells the truth in the form of his judgment and by virtue of the authority he has conferred on himself. But it is the political model that is the most powerful today. Polemics defines alliances, recruits partisans, unites interests or opinions, represents a party; it establishes the other as an enemy, an upholder of opposed interests against which one must fight until the moment this enemy is defeated and either surrenders or disappears.

Of course, the reactivation, in polemics, of these political, judiciary, or religious practices is nothing more than theater. One gesticulates: anathemas, excommunications, condemnations, battles, victories, and defeats are no more than ways of speaking, after all. And yet, in the order of discourse, they are also ways of acting which are not without consequence. There are the sterilizing effects. Has anyone ever seen a new idea come out of a polemic? And how could it be otherwise, given that here the interlocutors are incited not to advance, not to take more and more risks in what they say, but to fall back continually on the rights that they claim, on their legitimacy, which they must defend, and on the affirmation of their innocence? There is something even more serious here: in this comedy, one mimics war, battles, annihilations, or unconditional surrenders, putting forward as much of one’s killer instinct as possible. But it is really dangerous to make anyone believe that he can gain access to the truth by such paths and thus to validate, even if in a merely symbolic form, the real political practices that could be warranted by it. Let us imagine, for a moment, that a magic wand is waved and one of the two adversaries in a polemic is given the ability to exercise all the power he likes over the other. One doesn’t even have to imagine it: one has only to look at what happened during the debate in the USSR over linguistics or genetics not long ago. Were these merely aberrant deviations from what was supposed to be the correct discussion? Not at all—they were the real consequences of a polemic attitude whose effects ordinarily remain suspended.

### Limits– A2: “Fairness” K

**<read limits good>**

**Their “fairness bad” arg doesn’t assume a game- you are asking for a fair appraisal of the round to**

#### Only formal, pre-agreed rules can ensure openness and equal access—throwing away limits doesn’t mean debate becomes more egalitarian; it means those with the most power dominate the discussion- turns the aff

**Mari Boor Tonn, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland, College Park, 2005**

**“Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430**

Second, democratic processes and public problem solving necessarily diverge from social conversations by articulating objectives at the outset; adhering to formal rules for participating in, managing, and achieving problem resolution; and documenting outcomes. Through the scrupulous recording of motions, discussions, amendments, and votes, the dynamics of such joint action are rendered visible, accessible, and retrievable, even to persons not party to the immediate deliberative process. "Democracies," Schudson writes, "put great store in the power of writing to secure, verify, and make public. Democracies require public memories."32 Thus, contrary to the framing of conversation and dialogue as egalitarian public problem-solving models, they, in truth, can reify pecking orders by licensing group members with social authority to set agendas, steer and dominate discussion, and—absent the polling and recording of votes—interpret the "will" of the group. Moreover, such informal processes can reward those who speak the loudest, the longest, are the most articulate, or even the most recalcitrant. Freeman's analysis of consciousness-raising groups is instructive: At any small group meeting anyone with a sharp eye and an acute ear can tell who is influencing whom. The members of the friendship group will relate more to each other than to other people. They listen more attentively, and interrupt less; they repeat each other's points and tend to give in amiably; they tend to ignore or grapple with the "outs" whose approval is not necessary for making a decision . . . They are nuances of interaction, not prewritten scripts. But they are discernible, and they do have their effect. Once one knows . . . whose approval is the stamp of acceptance, one knows who is running things.33 As a result, Freeman argues that purportedly "structureless" organizations are a "deceptive . . . smokescreen," given that "'structurelessness' does not prevent the formation of informal structures, but only formal ones . . . For everyone to have the opportunity to be involved . . . and to participate . . . the structure must be explicit, not implicit. The rules of decision-making must be open and available to everyone, and this can only happen if they are formalized."34 Schudson likewise argues that the inherently "threatening" nature of political deliberation demands procedures guaranteeing "equal access to the [End Page 411] floor, equal participation in setting the ground rules for discussion, and a set of ground rules designed to encourage pertinent speaking, attentive listening, appropriate simplifications, and widely apportioned speaking rights."35

### Limits - A2: Agency / Identity

#### Humans define their identity through the limits between self and other- their aversion to constraint causes psychological overload

**John O. Beahrs- Department of Psychiatry, Oregon Health Sciences University- Dec., 1992, Paradoxical Effects in Political Systems, Political Psychology, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Dec., 1992), pp. 755-769, jstor**

**The ideal of unlimited expansion is a myth, which excludes awareness of a most critical datum: that limits and boundaries are vital constituents of human health.** Constraints like ethics and the law limit freedom at one level but enhance it overall (Beahrs, 1977, 1986). Similarly, one can define who one is only by defining what one is not-the process of setting limits and boundaries. More than usually believed, this involves excluding options that may be as valid as those that are embraced, which thus requires strong personal choices in the absence of ultimate guidelines. Avoiding this difficult task leads to diffusion of both individual and collective identity . . . a problem widely noted in contemporary America. In the arena of actual living, the alternatives for identity-formation are usually narrowed by constraints that are "given." For individuals, these include constitutional and environmental contingencies largely beyond a growing child's control (Freud, 1966/1916). For societies, geographical features like Great Britain's insular status interact with preexisting traditions and pressures from neighboring groups. In the era when America's physical boundaries seemed endless, the choices available to specific individuals were usually kept within manageable bounds by such givens. As science and technology removed these constraints, one after another, both individuals and society were left with having to make choices in these new areas where we were ill-prepared. Diffusion of identity thus arises in part from uncertainty, which becomes more problematic as the explosion of available information and viable options undercuts the comparative simplicity on which identity formation thrives. In America, the traditional aversion to limits compounds the already difficult task of adapting to this novel source of stress. Resulting conditions of social mobility, moder communications, and cultural homogeonisation also work against social identity-formation( Bloom, 1990).

### Limits– Dogmatism I/L

#### Our framework forces debates on both sides of a social issue which stimulates critical thinking and helps students understand the complexities of policy dilemmas – this is critical to check dogmatism

**Keller, et. al, 01 – Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago**

**(Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)**

John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28).

The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.

#### Switch side debate breaks down us/them dichotomies and moderates extremism

**Mitchell Communications Pitt ‘7**

**(“Debate as a W.M.D., Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies”, Vol. 4 #2)**

But this outcome seems paradoxical. How can an activity that gives voice to extreme views moderate extremism? Speech professor Jeffrey Auer’s 1954 statement may hold the key: ‘‘A person, because he supports the recognition of Communist China, isn’t a communist, any more than because he supports the recognition of Communist China, he is a Chinaman.’’7 Just as walking a mile in unfamiliar shoes lends perspective, switch-side debating increases appreciation of contrary opinions as the debater ‘‘tries on’’ an unfamiliar idea rather than relying on simplification, reduction, or rejection. In fact, debating both sides encourages participants to dismantle absolutist ‘‘us versus them’’ dichotomies. This may explain why those invested in the stability of such polar categories find debate so threatening.

#### Switch side debate helps checks dogmatism and empowers students to form their own moral identity

**Muir, 93 – Department of Communications at George Mason**

**(Star A., “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate,” Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 26, No. 4. Gale Academic Onefile)**

Yes, there may be a dangerous sense of competitive pride that comes with successfully advocating a position against one's own views, and there are ex-debaters who excuse their deceptive practices by saying "I'm just doing my job." Ultimately, however, sound convictions are distinguishable from emphatic convictions by a consideration of all sides of a moral stance. Moral education is not a guaranteed formula for rectitude, but the central tendencies of switch-side debate are in line with convictions built on **empathic appreciation for alternative points of view** and a reasoned assessment of arguments both pro and con. Tolerance, as an alternative to dogmatism, is preferable, not because it invites a relativistic view of the world, but because in a framework of equal access to ideas and equal opportunities for expression, the truth that emerges is **more defensible and more justifiable**. Morality, an emerging focal point of controversy in late twentieth-century American culture, is fostered rather than hampered by empowering students to form their own moral identity.

### Limits– Shively

#### We can’t debate if we can’t anticipate the topic of discussion

**Ruth Lessl Shively, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, 2000** *Political Theory and Partisan Politics* **p. 181-2**

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to—they must reject and limit—some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational per­suasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest—that consen­sus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect—if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not com­municating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagree­ments. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an under­standing of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

### Devil’s Advocate Good

#### They have functionally decided to write their own resolution instead of affirming the one we already have- even if the resolution is wrong, having a devil’s advocate in deliberation is vitally important to critical thinking skills and avoiding groupthink

**Hugo Mercier and Hélène Landemore- 2011 (in press)**

**(Philosophy, Politics and Economics prof @ U of Penn, Poli Sci prof @ Yale), Reasoning is for arguing: Understanding the successes and failures of deliberation, Political Psychology, http://sites.google.com/site/hugomercier/publications**

Reasoning can function outside of its normal conditions when it is used purely internally. But it is not enough for reasoning to be done in public to achieve good results. And indeed the problems of individual reasoning highlighted above, such as polarization and overconfidence, can also be found in group reasoning (Janis, 1982; Stasser & Titus, 1985; Sunstein, 2002). Polarization and overconfidence happen because not all group discussion is deliberative. According to some definitions of deliberation, including the one used in this paper, reasoning has to be applied to the same thread of argument *from different opinions* for deliberation to occur. As a consequence, “If the participants are mostly like-minded or hold the same views before they enter into the discussion, they are not situated in the circumstances of deliberation.” (Thompson, 2008: 502). We will presently review evidence showing that the absence or the silencing of dissent is a quasi-necessary condition for polarization or overconfidence to occur in groups. Group polarization has received substantial empirical support. 11 So much support in fact that Sunstein has granted group polarization the status of law (Sunstein, 2002). There is however an important caveat: group polarization will mostly happen when people share an opinion to begin with. In defense of his claim, Sunstein reviews an impressive number of empirical studies showing that many groups tend to form more extreme opinions following discussion. The examples he uses, however, offer as convincing an illustration of group polarization than of the necessity of having group members that share similar beliefs at the outset for polarization to happen (e.g. Sunstein, 2002: 178). Likewise, in his review of the group polarization literature, Baron notes that “The crucial antecedent condition for group polarization to occur is the presence of a likeminded group; i.e. individuals who share a preference for one side of the issue.” (Baron, 2005). Accordingly, when groups do not share an opinion, they tend to depolarize. This has been shown in several experiments in the laboratory (e.g. Kogan & Wallach, 1966; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1978). Likewise, studies of deliberation about political or legal issues report that many groups do not polarize (Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Luskin, Fishkin, & Hahn, 2007; Luskin et al., 2002; Luskin, Iyengar, & Fishkin, 2004; Mendelberg & Karpowitz, 2000). On the contrary, some groups show a homogenization of their attitude (they depolarize) (Luskin et al., 2007; Luskin et al., 2002). The contrasting effect of discussions with a supportive versus dissenting audience is transparent in the results reported by Hansen ( 2003 reported by Fishkin & Luskin, 2005). Participants had been exposed to new information about a political issue. When they discussed it with their family and friends, they learned more facts supporting their initial position. On the other hand, during the deliberative weekend—and the exposition to other opinions that took place—they learned more of the facts supporting the view they disagreed with. The present theory, far from being contradicted by the observation that groups of likeminded people reasoning together tend to polarize, can in fact account straightforwardly for this observation. When people are engaged in a genuine deliberation, the confirmation bias present in each individual’s reasoning is checked, compensated by the confirmation bias of individuals who defend another opinion. **When no other opinion is present (or expressed, or listened to), people will be disinclined to use reasoning to critically examine the arguments put forward by other discussants**, since they share their opinion. Instead, they will use reasoning to strengthen these arguments or find other arguments supporting the same opinion. In most cases the reasons each individual has for holding the same opinion will be partially non-overlapping. Each participant will then be exposed to new reasons supporting the common opinion, reasons that she is unlikely to criticize. It is then only to be expected that group members should strengthen their support for the common opinion in light of these new arguments. In fact, groups of like-minded people should have little endogenous motivation to start reasoning together: what is the point of arguing with people we agree with**? In most cases, such groups are lead to argue because of some external constraint**. These constraints can be more or less artificial—a psychologist telling participants to deliberate or a judge asking a jury for a well supported verdict—but they have to be factored in the explanation of the phenomenon. 4. Conclusion: a situational approach to improving reasoning We have argued that reasoning should not be evaluated primarily, if at all, as a device that helps us generate knowledge and make better decisions through private reflection. Reasoning, in fact, does not do those things very well. Instead, we rely on the hypothesis that the function of reasoning is to find and evaluate arguments in deliberative contexts. This evolutionary hypothesis explains why, when reasoning is used in its normal conditions—in a deliberation—it can be expected to lead to better outcomes, consistently allowing deliberating groups to reach epistemically superior outcomes and improve their epistemic status. Moreover, seeing reasoning as an argumentative device also provides a straightforward account of the otherwise puzzling confirmation bias—the tendency to search for arguments that favor our opinion. The confirmation bias, in turn, generates most of the problems people face when they reason in abnormal conditions— when they are not deliberating. This will happen to people who reason alone while failing to entertain other opinions in a private deliberation and to groups in which one opinion is so dominant as to make all others opinions—if they are even present—unable to voice arguments. In both cases, the confirmation bias will go unchecked and create polarization and overconfidence. We believe that the argumentative theory offers a good explanation of the most salient facts about private and public reasoning. This explanation is meant to supplement, rather than replace, existing psychological theories by providing both an answer to the why-questions and a coherent integrative framework for many previously disparate findings. The present article was mostly aimed at comparing deliberative vs. non-deliberative situations, but the theory could also be used to make finer grained predictions within deliberative situations. It is important to stress that the theory used as the backbone for the article is a theory of reasoning. The theory can only make predictions about reasoning, and not about the various other psychological mechanisms that impact the outcome of group discussion. We did not aim at providing a general theory of group processes that could account for all the results in this domain. But it is our contention that the best way to reach this end is by investigating the relevant psychological mechanisms and their interaction. For these reasons, the present article should only be considered a first step towards more fined grained predictions of when and why deliberation is efficient. Turning now to the consequences of the present theory, we can note first that our emphasis on the efficiency of diverse groups sits well with another recent a priori account of group competence. According to Hong and Page’s Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem for example, under certain plausible conditions, a diverse sample of moderately competent individuals will outperform a group of the most competent individuals (Hong & Page, 2004). Specifically, what explains the superiority of some groups of average people over smaller groups of experts is the fact that cognitive diversity (roughly, the ability to interpret the world differently) can be more crucial to group competence than individual ability (Page, 2007). That argument has been carried over from groups of problem-solvers in business and practical matters to democratically deliberating groups in politics (e.g., Anderson, 2006; Author, 2007, In press). At the practical level, the present theory potentially has important implications. Given that individual reasoning works best when confronted to different opinions, the present theory supports the improvement of the presence or expression of dissenting opinions in deliberative settings. Evidently, many people, in the field of deliberative democracy or elsewhere, are also advocating such changes. While these common sense suggestions have been made in the past (e.g., Bohman,

 2007; Sunstein, 2003, 2006), the present theory provides additional arguments for them. It also explains why approaches focusing on individual rather than collective reasoning are not likely to be successful. Specifically tailored practical suggestions can also be made by using departures from the normal conditions of reasoning as diagnostic tools. Thus, different departures will entail different solutions. Accountability—having to defends one’s opinion in front of an audience—can be used to bring individual reasoners closer to a situation of private deliberation. The use of different aggregation mechanisms could help identify the risk of deliberation among like-minded people. For example, before a group launches a discussion, a preliminary vote or poll could establish the extent to which different opinions are represented. If this procedure shows that people agree on the issue at hand, then skipping the discussion may save the group some efforts and reduce the risk of polarization. Alternatively, a **devil’s advocate** could be introduced in the group to defend an alternative opinion (e.g. Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986).

## Answers

### A2: “Your Ground is X”

#### It’s not predictable ground

#### Focus on ideals devolves into limitless advocacy- emphasis on political effects avoids the black whole of theoretical idealism

**Donald S. Lutz, Professor of Polisci at Houston, 2000** *Political Theory and Partisan Politics* **p. 39-40**

Aristotle notes in the Politics that political theory simultaneously proceeds at three levels—discourse about the ideal, about the best possible in the real world, and about existing political systems.4 Put another way, comprehensive political theory must ask several differ­ent kinds of questions that are linked, yet distinguishable. In order to understand the interlocking set of questions that political theory can ask, imagine a continuum stretching from left to right. At the end, to the right, is an ideal form of government, a perfectly wrought con­struct produced by the imagination. At the other end is the perfect dystopia, the most perfectly wretched system that the human imagi­nation can produce. Stretching between these two extremes is an infi­nite set of possibilities, merging into one another, that describe the logical possibilities created by the characteristics defining the end points. For example, a political system defined primarily by equality would have a perfectly inegalitarian system described at the other end, and the possible states of being between them would vary prima­rily in the extent to which they embodied equality. An ideal defined primarily by liberty would create a different set of possibilities be­tween the extremes. Of course, visions of the ideal often are inevitably more complex than these single-value examples indicate, but it is also true that in order to imagine an ideal state of affairs a kind of simpli­fication is almost always required since normal states of affairs invari­ably present themselves to human consciousness as complicated, opaque, and to a significant extent indeterminate. t A non-ironic reading of Plato's Republic leads one to conclude that the creation of these visions of the ideal characterizes political philoso­phy. This is not the case. Any person can generate a vision of the ideal. One job of political philosophy is to ask the question "Is this ideal worth pursuing?" Before the question can be pursued, however, the ideal state of affairs must be clarified, especially with respect to con­ceptual precision and the logical relationship between the proposi­tions that describe the ideal. This pre-theoretical analysis raises the vision of the ideal from the mundane to a level where true philosophi­cal analysis, and the careful comparison with existing systems can proceed fruitfully. The process of pre-theoretical analysis, probably because it works on clarifying ideas that most capture the human imagination, too often looks to some like the entire enterprise of political philosophy.5 However, the value of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's concept of the General Will, for example, lies not in its formal logical implications, nor in its compelling hold on the imagination, but on the power and clarity it lends to an analysis and comparison of ac­tual political systems. Among other things it allows him to show that anyone who wishes to pursue a state of affairs closer to that summed up in the concept of the General Will must successfully develop a civil religion. To the extent politicians believe theorists who tell them that pre-theoretical clarification of language describing an ideal is the essence and sum total of political philosophy, to that extent they will properly conclude that political philosophers have little to tell them, since politics is the realm of the possible not the realm of logical clarity. However, once the ideal is clarified, the political philosopher will begin to **articulate and assess the reasons why we might want to pursue** such an ideal. At this point, analysis leaves the realm of pure logic and enters the realm of the logic of human longing, aspiration, and anxi­ety. The analysis is now limited by the interior parameters of the human heart (more properly the human psyche) to which the theorist must appeal. Unlike the clarification stage where anything that is logical is possible, there are now definite limits on where logic can take us. Appeals to self-destruction, less happiness rather than more, psychic isolation, enslavement, loss of identity, a preference for the lives of mollusks over that of humans, to name just a few possibilities, are doomed to failure. The theorist cannot appeal to such values if she or he is to attract an audience of politicians. Much political theory in­volves the careful, competitive analysis of what a given ideal state of affairs entails, and as Plato shows in his dialogues the discussion between the philosopher and the politician will quickly terminate if he or she cannot convincingly demonstrate the connection between the political ideal being developed and natural human passions. In this way, the politician can be educated by the possibilities that the politi­cal theorist can articulate, just as the political theorist can be educated by the relative success the normative analysis has in "setting the hook" of interest among nonpolitical theorists. This realm of discourse, domi­nated by the logic of humanly worthwhile goals, requires that the theorist carefully observe the responses of others in order not to be seduced by what is merely logical as opposed to what is humanly rational. Moral discourse conditioned by the ideal, if it is to be suc­cessful, requires the political theorist to be fearless in pursuing norma­tive logic, but it also requires the theorist to have enough humility to remember that, if a non-theorist cannot be led toward an ideal, the fault may well lie in the theory, not in the moral vision of the non-theorist.

### A2: Objectivity Bad

#### Objectivity is essential to avoiding propaganda and dogmatism – switch side debate allows us to de-center ourselves and produce better, more inclusive debate

**Haskell, Professor History Rice, 90**

**(Professor of History at Rice, “Objectivity is not neutrality: Rhetoric vs. practice in Peter Novick’s That noble dream,” History and Theory 29, no. 2: 129–157)**

I regard Nietzsche’s attack on asceticism as a cultural calamity, all the more regrettable because of his high seriousness and the brilliance of the assault. Had he directed his wrath merely against Victorian passionlessness there would be no room for complaint, but his ridicule of ascetic values and practices became reckless and indiscriminate, reaching far beyond the foibles of a generation to renunciation itself. Morality is what suffers most from the devaluation of ascetic practices, but such practices are also indispensable to the pursuit of truth. The very possibility of historical scholarship as an enterprise **distinct from propaganda** requires of its practitioners that vital minimum of ascetic self-discipline that enables a person to do such things as abandon wishful thinking, assimilate bad news, discard pleasing interpretations that cannot pass elementary tests of evidence and logic, and, most important of all, suspend or bracket one’s own perceptions long enough to **enter sympathetically into the alien and possibly repugnant perspectives of rival thinkers.** All of these mental acts—especially coming to grips with a rival’s perspective—require detachment, an undeniably ascetic capacity to achieve some distance from one’s own spontaneous perceptions and convictions, to imagine how the world appears in another’s eyes, **to experimentally adopt perspectives that do not come naturally**—in the last analysis, to develop, as Thomas Nagel would say**, a view of the world in which one’s own self stands not at the center, but appears merely as one object among many**. To be dissatisfied with the view of the world as it initially appears to us, and to struggle to formulate a superior, more inclusive, less self-centered alternative, is to strive for detachment and aim at objectivity. And to turn thus against one’s most natural self—to engage in “this uncanny, dreadfully joyous labor of a soul voluntarily at odds with itself”— is to commit that very sin against the will to power that Nietzsche so irresponsibly condemned. Detachment does not promise access to any transcendental realm and always remains, as Nagel says, “under the shadow” of skepticism. Although it is an ideal and holds out a standard higher than any of us routinely achieve, acceptable performance under its regulative influence does not require superhuman effort. It is that frail and limited but perfectly real power which, for example, permits conscientious scholars to referee one another’s work fairly, to acknowledge merit even in the writings of one’s critics, and successfully to “bend over backwards” when grading students so as not to penalize those holding antagonistic political convictions. We try to exercise this capacity every day; sometimes we succeed, sometimes we fail, and we assign praise and blame to ourselves and others accordingly. It is of course true that we sometimes delude ourselves, developing a pseudo-objective standpoint that functions mainly to obscure choice, shifting responsibility for what we want to do to a seemingly impersonal state of affairs. But to shrug off the capacity for detachment as entirely illusory—to claim that since none of the standpoints the self is capable of imagining are really that of “the other,” but are self produced (as is certainly the case), and to argue sthat all viewpoints therefore are indistinguishably contaminated by selfishness or group interest or the omnipresent Nietzschean will—is to turn a blind eye to distinctions that all of us routinely make and confidently act upon, and thereby to blur all that distinguishes villainy from decency, veracity from mendacity, in everyday affairs. Not to mince words, it is to defame the species. Fairness and honesty are qualities we can rightfully demand of human beings, and those qualities require a very substantial measure of self-overcoming—more than could exist if Nietzsche’s hyperbolic and indiscriminate war on asceticism were permitted to triumph. Objectivity is not something entirely distinct from detachment, fairness, and honesty, but the product of extending and elaborating these priceless and fundamentally ascetic virtues.

#### AT: Objectivity = Inaction

**Haskell, Professor History Rice, 90**

**(Professor of History at Rice, “Objectivity is not neutrality: Rhetoric vs. practice in Peter Novick’s That noble dream,” History and Theory 29, no. 2: 129–157)**

The possibility of distinguishing baby from bathwater is lost the moment we confuse objectivity with neutrality. And my most serious reservation about Novick’s uncommonly intelligent and wide-ranging history of the objectivity question—the most complete history of the American historical profession ever written for any purpose—is that he virtually equates objectivity with neutrality. Subtle and perceptive though his analysis is, much of his text reads like an expose. His aim is to show, often through passages selected from personal correspondence, that in spite of all their high-minded public rhetoric about the importance of “being objective,” historians have bristled with likes and dislikes and have often conceived of their work as a means of striking a blow for what they liked, be it reunification of North and South in the founding generation, or racial integration in a later one.13 All this is presented to the reader in a tone of bemused shock and wide-eyed dismay, as if by discovering connections between their scholarship and their likes and dislikes we were catching the mighty with their pants down. That tone is justifiable in a few sad and striking cases in which prominent historians’ dislikes turn out to have been ethnic and ugly. But on the whole, who will be either surprised or disappointed to discover that historians who praised objectivity and thought of themselves as objective had strong preferences about mobilization for World War I, isolationism, responsibility for the cold war, Vietnam, racial segregation and the like, and wrote books and articles meant in part to advance their side of these major public debates? These commitments betray a lack of objectivity only if we define objectivity as neutrality, and to do that would be to trivialize both the ideal and those who have striven to realize it. Novick generally construes active political commitment by historians who subscribe to the ideal of objectivity as evidence either of personal insincerity or, more often, the incoherence and emptiness of the ideal. I wonder. Perhaps Novick has defined objectivity too narrowly. Perhaps historians who advocated objectivity and worried, say, about the relativism of Charles Beard and Carl Becker meant neither to claim neutrality for themselves nor to impose it on others. Perhaps instead, by defending what they called “objectivity,” they meant, as I do, to sustain that minimal respect for self-overcoming, for detachment, honesty, and fairness, that makes intellectual community possible. Perhaps they were not naive to sense in snappy slogans like “everyman his own historian” not only the useful corrective to scientism that Novick appropriately sees there, but also the harbinger of a remissive cultural movement corrosive of all constraints upon the will, a movement which over the course of the twentieth century has in fact succeeded in putting on the defensive the very idea of obligation, whether moral (“You ethically ought to do x”) or epistemological (“You rationally/logically ought to believe y”).14 The upshot, as a new century looms, is that many wonder if “ought” statements capture anything important about human beings and the world they live in, or are merely grandiose masks for preferences that are ultimately personal and self-serving (“I want you to do x or believe y”).15 Some will see in this cultural shift a welcome retreat of authoritarianism, others a tragic breakdown of authority. Those who lament it as a breakdown will by no means be found only on the political right, for insofar as the left trades on ideas of moral obligation (for example, to the poor, to minorities), or distinguishes between policies that are well or ill-suited to the “realities” of our situation, it too has a vested interest in objectivity. Without entering into the debate here, we can simply observe that the stakes in this cultural contest are extremely high, and while the possibility of objective knowledge is a central point at issue, neutrality is not. Yet in Novick’s definition of objectivity, neutrality looms very large indeed. In two key definitional paragraphs near the beginning of his text, Novick spells out in abbreviated form the principal tenets of the ideal of objectivity to which he believes historians have subscribed with little change for the past hundred years.16 I place the second of the two sequential paragraphs first because it strains hardest to identify objectivity with neutrality. The objective historian’s role is that of a neutral, or disinterested, judge; it must never degenerate into that of an advocate or, even worse, propagandist. The historian’s conclusions are expected to display the standard judicial qualities of balance and evenhandedness. As with the judiciary, these qualities are guarded by the insulation of the historical profession from social pressures or political influence, and by the individual historian avoiding partisanship or bias—not having any investment in arriving at one conclusion rather than another. Objectivity is held to be at grave risk when history is written for utilitarian purposes. One corollary of all this is that historians, as historians, must purge themselves of external loyalties: the historian’s primary allegiance is to “the objective historical truth,” and to professional colleagues who share a commitment to cooperative, cumulative efforts to advance toward that goal. (2) Although there is much in this sketch that strikes me as accurate, on the whole I find it impossible to reconcile with my impression that most historians, certainly the abler and more influential ones, recognize full well that fine history can be and routinely is written by politically committed scholars. Most historians just do not assign to “neutrality” and “disinterestedness” the inflated value that Novick suggests. Most, I think, would be aghast at the thought that historians must “purge themselves of external loyalties” in order to do their job well. Seeing an analogy between the role of the judge and that of the historian does not imply any overestimation of the value of neutrality: judges, like historians, are expected to be open to rational persuasion, not to be indifferent about the great issues of their day or—bizarre thought—to abstain from judgment. What we demand of them is self-control, not self-immolation. Bias and conflict of interest do indeed arouse our suspicion, not only of judges and historians, but of whomever we depend upon to be fair. The demand is for detachment and fairness, not disengagement from life. Most historians would indeed say that the historian’s primary commitment is to the truth, and that when truth and “the cause,” however defined, come into conflict, the truth must prevail. But to say that is not to prohibit political advocacy; it is only to set intellectually responsible limits to it—limits without which advocates would discredit not only scholarship but their own cause. Who will trust a scholar-advocate who claims the privilege of lying or obscuring the truth for good causes?

### A2: Epistemology

#### Fixating on epistemological questions eliminates all productive potential – accepting truth claims, even if they are not perfect, is necessary for politically instrumental action

**Cloud, Professor of Communication Studies at Texas, 2006**

**December, Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies**

Of necessity, attention to the films here is curtailed in favor of my main purpose, namely to narrate the trajectory of contemporary theory through the narrative of the films, rather than to interpret the films through the lens of the theories.7 The films as metonym represent an uncanny and cogent compression of the arc of critical theory over the last several decades. As the Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky argued in his writings on literature and art, cultural works (including academic theories) are bound to the historical conditions of their production; we must attend to their collective influence not as the vanguard of social change but as ideologies that may legitimate and sustain existing social relations. Taken together, the films and contemporary critical cultural and communication theory alike emerge out of a historical moment of political and intellectual pessimism on the Left and express deep skepticism about the possibility of mobilizing people against real oppression. Both narratives, one in popular culture and one in the academy, risk perpetuating **an ideology of resignation to existing social relations disguised as critique and resistance**. The films offer two versions of the real. One is an experiential real, in which knowledge of the material base of oppression contra mystification generates critical insight and the capacity for action. The film also invokes a Lacanian Real, in which the psychic residue of the lack of wholeness in the Symbolic and the experience of trauma leave persons/subjects uneasy.9 In the first film, for example, Neo experiences vague unease with his daily life in the Matrix and begins to ‘‘hack’’ into the computerdriven system. While he remains in the symbolic world of the Matrix, he is incapable of fighting it in a systematic way, because his suspicions are quite literally groundless until he is unplugged from ideology. In contrast to a Lacanian perspective, this article defines reality as the site of lived experience, the place where the embodied experience of labor generates contradictions with regard to knowledge and consciousness.10 In capitalism, the division of society into classes and the divergent experiences of members of those classes are real. This definition of the real is standpoint-based, resting on fundamental and divergent interests in a particular society. Marxists are concerned with epistemology, questions of what is true and what is false. But **epistemological questions always beg the ontological: true or false to what or whom?** Although there is no permanent, essential, or universally experienced reality, the category of reality is **necessary to political judgment** even as it finds intelligibility, conscious meaning, and strategic import in discourse. As the Marxist theorist Georg Luka´cs explains, lived experience is the dialectical springboard for the production of oppositional truth and action.No matter how complex the process, dialectical materialism asks, quite simply, for a ‘‘reality test’’ of political discourses and ideologies from the standpoint of ordinary people. While film and theory alike proclaim the end of any such reality, this article advances an argument for a classical Marxist understanding of the rhetorically mediated relationship between reality and consciousness.14 Classical Marxism addresses the lacuna of agency in poststructuralist and post-Marxist theory in ways that avoid the pitfalls of relativism and anti-humanism. To the end of understanding this problem, the article first surveys theoretical conceptions of reality and agency in structuralist and poststructuralist theory alongside their representations in The Matrix , Matrix: Reloaded, and Matrix: Revolutions. While the first Matrix film begins to articulate a dialectical, interested, and solidaristic version of agency, this vision, as in contemporary theory, falls by the wayside as the heroes of the story conclude that there is no way out of the Matrix. The films engagingly represent critical theory’s retreat from notions of truth and reality as sources of agency, and, as Ellen Meiksins Wood and others have argued, from class-based theory and politics.15 The second major section of the essay explores the realist philosophy of classical Marxism, particularly the rhetorically rich concepts of real class interests (rather than identities) and solidarity among those who share real interests. These concepts provide bases for identification and conjoint action across identity differences, avoiding the traps of identity essentialism, anti-humanism, and naıve individualism. Interests and solidarity are the building blocks of a Marxist rhetoric and of a realpolitik of class utterly necessary to challenging the oppression and exploitation of capitalism today. This project has been devalued and dismissed in theories with antihumanist and nearly exclusively symbolic commitments that **give away the ground for political instrumentality.** Even rhetorical theory, originally the study of practical interventionist politics, has allowed agency to wither away in the shadow of structuralism and relativism.

#### Epistemological validity cannot be separated from the outcomes of decisions

**Hugo Mercier and Hélène Landemore- 2011 (in press)**

**(Philosophy, Politics and Economics prof @ U of Penn, Poli Sci prof @ Yale), Reasoning is for arguing: Understanding the successes and failures of deliberation, Political Psychology, http://sites.google.com/site/hugomercier/publications**

Since our goal is to explain why deliberation works sometimes well and sometimes poorly, it is necessary to set some standards of performance. Many criteria can be—and are—used as standards of good deliberation, from increased respect between the participants (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, Schneiderhan & Khan, 2008, Steenbergen, Bachtiger, Sporndli, & Steiner, 2003), to the reaching of consensus (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2006; Niemeyer & Dryzek, 2007), to increased coherence between beliefs (Gastil & Dillard, 1999) to substantive quality of the outcome. Here we will focus essentially on the latter type of standards, which can also be called epistemic standards. Epistemic standards allow us to judge whether a given deliberative process produces better or worse outcomes from a substantive rather than purely procedural point of view. Epistemic standards are routinely used unproblematically in psychology experiments, whether they measure the validity of logical arguments or the factual accuracy of answers to empirical questions. In political science, the question of what is an epistemically correct, right, or superior outcome often remains hidden behind the veil of the future, what Rawls called the “burdens of judgment,” or, more radically, is rendered inaccessible by the structure of much of politics as a situation of imperfect procedural justice. It is for example doubtful that we can ever answer with certainty the questions of, say, whether going to war in Iraq was the right political decision or whether the bailout of banks was the most appropriate answer to the impeding economic crisis of November 2008, yet **we are still aiming for such answers when we deliberate and reason about these issues**. Furthermore empirical proxys can be used as a way to judge whether or not the standard has been met: for example, GDP growth and unemployment level are commonly used to judge whether or not government policies— which result from deliberations at the institutional level—have produced the right outcome or not. The fact that we cannot know for sure whether the deliberative process yielded the right answer does not mean that we can evade the question of epistemic validity in politics (see Cohen, 1986; Estlund, 1998, 2007; Author, 2007; Martí, 2006; Raz, 1990; Talisse, 2009). Even though there are differences between logical and political problems, we think that the results observed in experiences involving questions of logic are meaningful and can be partially translated to political questions about, say, the usefulness of an economic stimulus or whether or not to raise the retirement age. In any case, all the reader needs to accept for our approach to make sense is that there are better and worse answers to political questions (for more on the question of the epistemic dimension of moral and political questions and the related position called moral or political cognitivism, see Estlund, 2007, Author, 2007 and Talisse, 2009). The argumentative theory can make predictions regarding deliberation bearing on any kind of questions that can be assumed to have a better or worse answer, whether from a factual, moral, or political point of view (see for instance, Author, submitted-b, for an extension to the moral domain).

### A2: Ontology K

#### Questions of ontology shut down pragmatic political action – we never move past ontological “priming” to practiced material struggle

**Barnett, Geography Prof at Open, 08**

**Political affects in public space: normative blind-spots in non-representational ontologies, Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, Volume 33, Issue 2**

Thrift’s spatial politics of affect and Connolly’s neuropolitics of media affects sits, therefore, in a much broader range of work that is concerned with affective aspects of political life. But the examples noted above all focus on the affective aspects of life without adopting a vocabulary of ontological layers, levels and priority. This is in contrast to the characteristic ontologisation of affect in human geography. The ontologisation of affect as a layer of preconscious ‘priming to act’ reduces embodied action simply to the dimension of being attuned to and coping with the world. **This elides the aspect of embodied knowing that involves the capacity to take part in ‘games of giving and asking for reasons’**. While the ontologisation of theory in human geography has been accompanied by claims to transform and reconfigure understandings of what counts as ‘the political’, this project has been articulated in a register which **eschews the conventions of justification**, that is, the giving and asking for reasons. This is particularly evident when it comes to accounting for why the contemporary deployment of affective energy in the public realm is bad for democracy. The contemporary deployment of anxious, obsessive and compulsive affect in the political realm is presented as having ‘deleterious consequences’ on the grounds that it works against democratic expression (Thrift 2007, 253); contributes to a style of democracy that is **consumed but not practised** (2007, 248); promotes forms of sporadic engagement that can be switched on and off (2007, 240); and generally leads to certain dispositions being placed beyond question. There is certainly a vision of democracy as a particular type of engaged ethical practice at work in these occasional judgements (2007, 14), but the precise normative force of this view is not justified in any detail. The eschewing of justification arises in part because the content of these ontologies, which emphasise various layers of knowing that kick-in prior to representation, is projected directly onto the form of exposition. **There is a particular type of authority put into play in this move**. The avowedly antiintentionalist materialism associated with contemporary cultural-theoretic ontologies of affect **closes down the conceptual space in which argument and disagreement can even get off the ground** (see Leys 2007). In contrast, and as outlined above, the argument pursued here follows an avowedly ‘nonrepresentationalist’ perspective according to which assertions of knowledge, including the types of knowledge asserted by ontologies of affect, always stand in need of reasons, precisely because they emerge as reasons for certain sorts of commitments and entitlements (Brandom 1996, 167). On this understanding ontological assertions act as justifications, and are subject to the demand for justification. If ‘placing things in the space of reasons’ (McDowell 1994, 5) in this sense is not acknowledged as one aspect of practice, then **recourse to the ontological register closes down the inconclusive conversations upon which democratic cultural politics depends** (Rorty 2006).

### A2: State Bad

#### 1- This isn’t offense- our framework does not force you to *support* the state- but voting affirmative ought to mean that the government *should* do the resolution

#### 2- If the state is bad, then we ought to learn about it- Extend our education impacts

#### 3- Even if its marginally bad to talk about the state, it’s much worse for the affirmative to get to pick their own resolution. Extend our limits impacts

#### 4- Role-playing is a form of defiant deliberative politics that reclaims agency

**Jessica Kulynych, Asst Professor of Political Science at Winthrop University, Polity, Winter, 1997, n2 p315(32)**

When we look at the success of citizen initiatives from a performative perspective, we look precisely at those moments of defiance and disruption that bring the invisible and unimaginable into view. Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the policy debate and experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate within the energy commissions could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics. The existence of a goal-oriented debate within a technically dominated arena defied the normalizing separation between expert policymakers and consuming citizens. Citizens momentarily recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients. The disruptive potential of the energy commissions continues to defy technical bureaucracy even while their decisions are non-binding. SHE CONTINUES… Consider, for example, a public hearing. When seen from a discursive legitimation perspective, deliberation and debate are about the sincere, controlled attempt to discern the best, most rational, least biased arguments that most precisely express an interlocutor’s ideas and interests. In practice, however, deliberation is a much less deliberative and much more performative activity. The literary aspects of debate – irony, satire, sarcasm, and wit – work precisely on the slippage between what is said and what is meant, or what can be said and what can be conceived. Strategies such as humor are not merely rational, but visceral and often uncontrollable, as is the laughter that is evoked from such strategies. Performative actions are not alternative ways of deliberating; rather they are agonistic expressions of what cannot be captured by deliberative rationality. As such, they resist the confines of that rationality and gesture toward places where words, arguments, and claims are not enough. Without an understanding of the performative aspects of political action, Hager cannot explain how citizens are able to introduce genuinely new and different “ways of perceiving and naming the world” into a realm where such epistemic standards are unimaginable. It is in the process of acting as citizens in a technical bureaucratic setting, where citizen action is by definition precluded, that alternative, epistemic standards of evaluation become possible. Only when scholars recognize the performative will they be able to grasp the intricacies of contemporary political actions and the possibilities for an actually diverse and participatory democracy.

#### Dogmatism – Our framework forces debates on both sides of a social issue which stimulates critical thinking and helps students understand the complexities of policy dilemmas – this is critical to check dogmatism

**Keller, et. al, 01 – Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago**

**(Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)**

John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28).

The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.

#### Dogmatism creates a violent and unproductive model of communication – justifies war

**Foucault, ’84 (Michel, “Polemics, Politics and Problematizations” Interview by Paul Rabinow, http://foucault.info/foucault/interview.html)**

I like discussions, and when I am asked questions, I try to answer them. It’s true that I don’t like to get involved in polemics. If I open a book and see that the author is accusing an adversary of “infantile leftism” I shut it again right away. That’s not my way of doing things; I don’t belong to the world of people who do things that way. I insist on this difference as something essential: a whole morality is at stake, the one that concerns the search for truth and the relation to the other.

In the serious play of questions and answers, in the work of reciprocal elucidation, the rights of each person are in some sense immanent in the discussion. They depend only on the dialogue situation. The person asking the questions is merely exercising the right that has been given him: to remain unconvinced, to perceive a contradiction, to require more information, to emphasize different postulates, to point out faulty reasoning, and so on. As for the person answering the questions, he too exercises a right that does not go beyond the discussion itself; by the logic of his own discourse, he is tied to what he has said earlier, and by the acceptance of dialogue he is tied to the questioning of other. Questions and answers depend on a game—a game that is at once pleasant and difficult—in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of dialogue.

The polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a just undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in search for the truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is armful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat. For him, then the game consists not of recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak but of abolishing him as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue; and his final objective will be not to come as close as possible to a difficult truth but to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly upholding from the beginning. The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that his adversary is by definition denied.

Perhaps, someday, a long history will have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on discussion and an obstacle to the search for the truth. Very schematically, it seems to me that today we can recognize the presence in polemics of three models: the religious model, the judiciary model, and the political model. As in heresiology, polemics sets itself the task of determining the intangible point of dogma, the fundamental and necessary principle that the adversary has neglected, ignored or transgressed; and it denounces this negligence as a moral failing; at the root of the error, it finds passion, desire, interest, a whole series of weaknesses and inadmissible attachments that establish it as culpable. As in judiciary practice, polemics allows for no possibility of an equal discussion: it examines a case; it isn’t dealing with an interlocutor, it is processing a suspect; it collects the proofs of his guilt, designates the infraction he has committed, and pronounces the verdict and sentences him. In any case, what we have here is not on the order of a shared investigation; the polemicist tells the truth in the form of his judgment and by virtue of the authority he has conferred on himself. But it is the political model that is the most powerful today. Polemics defines alliances, recruits partisans, unites interests or opinions, represents a party; it establishes the other as an enemy, an upholder of opposed interests against which one must fight until the moment this enemy is defeated and either surrenders or disappears.

Of course, the reactivation, in polemics, of these political, judiciary, or religious practices is nothing more than theater. One gesticulates: anathemas, excommunications, condemnations, battles, victories, and defeats are no more than ways of speaking, after all. And yet, in the order of discourse, they are also ways of acting which are not without consequence. There are the sterilizing effects. Has anyone ever seen a new idea come out of a polemic? And how could it be otherwise, given that here the interlocutors are incited not to advance, not to take more and more risks in what they say, but to fall back continually on the rights that they claim, on their legitimacy, which they must defend, and on the affirmation of their innocence? There is something even more serious here: in this comedy, one mimics war, battles, annihilations, or unconditional surrenders, putting forward as much of one’s killer instinct as possible. But it is really dangerous to make anyone believe that he can gain access to the truth by such paths and thus to validate, even if in a merely symbolic form, the real political practices that could be warranted by it. Let us imagine, for a moment, that a magic wand is waved and one of the two adversaries in a polemic is given the ability to exercise all the power he likes over the other. One doesn’t even have to imagine it: one has only to look at what happened during the debate in the USSR over linguistics or genetics not long ago. Were these merely aberrant deviations from what was supposed to be the correct discussion? Not at all—they were the real consequences of a polemic attitude whose effects ordinarily remain suspended.

#### Otherization – Switch side debate breaks down us/them dichotomies and moderates extremism

**Mitchell Communications Pitt ‘7**

**(“Debate as a W.M.D., Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies”, Vol. 4 #2)**

But this outcome seems paradoxical. How can an activity that gives voice to extreme views moderate extremism? Speech professor Jeffrey Auer’s 1954 statement may hold the key: ‘‘A person, because he supports the recognition of Communist China, isn’t a communist, any more than because he supports the recognition of Communist China, he is a Chinaman.’’7 Just as walking a mile in unfamiliar shoes lends perspective, switch-side debating increases appreciation of contrary opinions as the debater ‘‘tries on’’ an unfamiliar idea rather than relying on simplification, reduction, or rejection. In fact, debating both sides encourages participants to dismantle absolutist ‘‘us versus them’’ dichotomies. This may explain why those invested in the stability of such polar categories find debate so threatening.

### A2: Roleplaying Bad

#### Roleplaying is good:

#### Dogmatism – Our framework forces debates on both sides of a social issue which stimulates critical thinking and helps students understand the complexities of policy dilemmas – this is critical to check dogmatism

**Keller, et. al, 01 – Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago**

**(Thomas E., James K., and Tracly K., Asst. professor School of Social Service Administration U. of Chicago, professor of Social Work, and doctoral student School of Social Work, “Student debates in policy courses: promoting policy practice skills and knowledge through active learning,” Journal of Social Work Education, Spr/Summer 2001, EBSCOhost)**

John Dewey, the philosopher and educational reformer, suggested that the initial advance in the development of reflective thought occurs in the transition from holding fixed, static ideas to an attitude of doubt and questioning engendered by exposure to alternative views in social discourse (Baker, 1955, pp. 36-40). Doubt, confusion, and conflict resulting from discussion of diverse perspectives "force comparison, selection, and reformulation of ideas and meanings" (Baker, 1955, p. 45). Subsequent educational theorists have contended that learning requires openness to divergent ideas in combination with the ability to synthesize disparate views into a purposeful resolution (Kolb, 1984; Perry, 1970). On the one hand, clinging to the certainty of one's beliefs risks dogmatism, rigidity, and the inability to learn from new experiences. On the other hand, if one's opinion is altered by every new experience, the result is insecurity, paralysis, and the inability to take effective action. The educator's role is to help students develop the capacity to incorporate new and sometimes conflicting ideas and experiences into a coherent cognitive framework. Kolb suggests that, "if the education process begins by bringing out the learner's beliefs and theories, examining and testing them, and then integrating the new, more refined ideas in the person's belief systems, the learning process will be facilitated" (p. 28).

The authors believe that involving students in substantive debates challenges them to learn and grow in the fashion described by Dewey and Kolb. Participation in a debate stimulates clarification and critical evaluation of the evidence, logic, and values underlying one's own policy position. In addition, to debate effectively students must understand and accurately evaluate the opposing perspective. The ensuing tension between two distinct but legitimate views is designed to yield a reevaluation and reconstruction of knowledge and beliefs pertaining to the issue.

#### Dogmatism creates a violent and unproductive model of communication – justifies war

**Foucault, ’84 (Michel, “Polemics, Politics and Problematizations” Interview by Paul Rabinow, http://foucault.info/foucault/interview.html)**

I like discussions, and when I am asked questions, I try to answer them. It’s true that I don’t like to get involved in polemics. If I open a book and see that the author is accusing an adversary of “infantile leftism” I shut it again right away. That’s not my way of doing things; I don’t belong to the world of people who do things that way. I insist on this difference as something essential: a whole morality is at stake, the one that concerns the search for truth and the relation to the other.

In the serious play of questions and answers, in the work of reciprocal elucidation, the rights of each person are in some sense immanent in the discussion. They depend only on the dialogue situation. The person asking the questions is merely exercising the right that has been given him: to remain unconvinced, to perceive a contradiction, to require more information, to emphasize different postulates, to point out faulty reasoning, and so on. As for the person answering the questions, he too exercises a right that does not go beyond the discussion itself; by the logic of his own discourse, he is tied to what he has said earlier, and by the acceptance of dialogue he is tied to the questioning of other. Questions and answers depend on a game—a game that is at once pleasant and difficult—in which each of the two partners takes pains to use only the rights given him by the other and by the accepted form of dialogue.

The polemicist, on the other hand, proceeds encased in privileges that he possesses in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorizing him to wage war and making that struggle a just undertaking; the person he confronts is not a partner in search for the truth but an adversary, an enemy who is wrong, who is armful, and whose very existence constitutes a threat. For him, then the game consists not of recognizing this person as a subject having the right to speak but of abolishing him as interlocutor, from any possible dialogue; and his final objective will be not to come as close as possible to a difficult truth but to bring about the triumph of the just cause he has been manifestly upholding from the beginning. The polemicist relies on a legitimacy that his adversary is by definition denied.

Perhaps, someday, a long history will have to be written of polemics, polemics as a parasitic figure on discussion and an obstacle to the search for the truth. Very schematically, it seems to me that today we can recognize the presence in polemics of three models: the religious model, the judiciary model, and the political model. As in heresiology, polemics sets itself the task of determining the intangible point of dogma, the fundamental and necessary principle that the adversary has neglected, ignored or transgressed; and it denounces this negligence as a moral failing; at the root of the error, it finds passion, desire, interest, a whole series of weaknesses and inadmissible attachments that establish it as culpable. As in judiciary practice, polemics allows for no possibility of an equal discussion: it examines a case; it isn’t dealing with an interlocutor, it is processing a suspect; it collects the proofs of his guilt, designates the infraction he has committed, and pronounces the verdict and sentences him. In any case, what we have here is not on the order of a shared investigation; the polemicist tells the truth in the form of his judgment and by virtue of the authority he has conferred on himself. But it is the political model that is the most powerful today. Polemics defines alliances, recruits partisans, unites interests or opinions, represents a party; it establishes the other as an enemy, an upholder of opposed interests against which one must fight until the moment this enemy is defeated and either surrenders or disappears.

Of course, the reactivation, in polemics, of these political, judiciary, or religious practices is nothing more than theater. One gesticulates: anathemas, excommunications, condemnations, battles, victories, and defeats are no more than ways of speaking, after all. And yet, in the order of discourse, they are also ways of acting which are not without consequence. There are the sterilizing effects. Has anyone ever seen a new idea come out of a polemic? And how could it be otherwise, given that here the interlocutors are incited not to advance, not to take more and more risks in what they say, but to fall back continually on the rights that they claim, on their legitimacy, which they must defend, and on the affirmation of their innocence? There is something even more serious here: in this comedy, one mimics war, battles, annihilations, or unconditional surrenders, putting forward as much of one’s killer instinct as possible. But it is really dangerous to make anyone believe that he can gain access to the truth by such paths and thus to validate, even if in a merely symbolic form, the real political practices that could be warranted by it. Let us imagine, for a moment, that a magic wand is waved and one of the two adversaries in a polemic is given the ability to exercise all the power he likes over the other. One doesn’t even have to imagine it: one has only to look at what happened during the debate in the USSR over linguistics or genetics not long ago. Were these merely aberrant deviations from what was supposed to be the correct discussion? Not at all—they were the real consequences of a polemic attitude whose effects ordinarily remain suspended.

#### Otherization – Switch side debate breaks down us/them dichotomies and moderates extremism

**Mitchell Communications Pitt ‘7**

**(“Debate as a W.M.D., Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies”, Vol. 4 #2)**

But this outcome seems paradoxical. How can an activity that gives voice to extreme views moderate extremism? Speech professor Jeffrey Auer’s 1954 statement may hold the key: ‘‘A person, because he supports the recognition of Communist China, isn’t a communist, any more than because he supports the recognition of Communist China, he is a Chinaman.’’7 Just as walking a mile in unfamiliar shoes lends perspective, switch-side debating increases appreciation of contrary opinions as the debater ‘‘tries on’’ an unfamiliar idea rather than relying on simplification, reduction, or rejection. In fact, debating both sides encourages participants to dismantle absolutist ‘‘us versus them’’ dichotomies. This may explain why those invested in the stability of such polar categories find debate so threatening.

#### Agency – Role-playing is a form of defiant deliberative politics that reclaims agency

**Jessica Kulynych, Asst Professor of Political Science at Winthrop University, Polity, Winter, 1997, n2 p315(32)**

When we look at the success of citizen initiatives from a performative perspective, we look precisely at those moments of defiance and disruption that bring the invisible and unimaginable into view. Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the policy debate and experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate within the energy commissions could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics. The existence of a goal-oriented debate within a technically dominated arena defied the normalizing separation between expert policymakers and consuming citizens. Citizens momentarily recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients. The disruptive potential of the energy commissions continues to defy technical bureaucracy even while their decisions are non-binding. SHE CONTINUES… Consider, for example, a public hearing. When seen from a discursive legitimation perspective, deliberation and debate are about the sincere, controlled attempt to discern the best, most rational, least biased arguments that most precisely express an interlocutor’s ideas and interests. In practice, however, deliberation is a much less deliberative and much more performative activity. The literary aspects of debate – irony, satire, sarcasm, and wit – work precisely on the slippage between what is said and what is meant, or what can be said and what can be conceived. Strategies such as humor are not merely rational, but visceral and often uncontrollable, as is the laughter that is evoked from such strategies. Performative actions are not alternative ways of deliberating; rather they are agonistic expressions of what cannot be captured by deliberative rationality. As such, they resist the confines of that rationality and gesture toward places where words, arguments, and claims are not enough. Without an understanding of the performative aspects of political action, Hager cannot explain how citizens are able to introduce genuinely new and different “ways of perceiving and naming the world” into a realm where such epistemic standards are unimaginable. It is in the process of acting as citizens in a technical bureaucratic setting, where citizen action is by definition precluded, that alternative, epistemic standards of evaluation become possible. Only when scholars recognize the performative will they be able to grasp the intricacies of contemporary political actions and the possibilities for an actually diverse and participatory democracy.