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\*\*Shells

2AC Framework Shell

A. Our interpretation is that the affirmative should be able to weigh the advantages of the plan against the kritik alternative, which must be enacted by the United States federal government.

B. Violation – they don’t let us weigh the aff and their aff is not enacted by the USfg

C. Vote Neg

1) Plan focus – our framework ensures a stable locus for links and the comparison of alternatives. Alternative frameworks which do not ensure that the plan is the starting-point of the debate make confusion and judge intervention inevitable.

2) Ground – there are an infinite number of unpredictable K frameworks, K links, and K impacts. Forcing the aff to debate in the neg framework moots the 1AC. Because the K could literally be about anything, their so-called framework destroys aff ground because we can never predict what we’ll have to compare our plan to. Even if there’s some ground for us to respond to their arg, it’s not good or predictable and losing the 1AC puts us at an inherent disadvantage.

3) Topic-specific education – only debates about the plan translate into education about the topic. There would be no reason to switch topics every year if not for plan-focus debate. K frameworks encourage ultra-generics like the ‘state bad’ K that are stale and uneducational.

Failure to engage the political process turns the affirmative into spectators who are powerless to produce real change.

Rorty 98 (prof of philosophy at Stanford, Richard, 1998, “achieving our country”, Pg. 7-9)JFS

Such people find pride in American citizenship impossi­ble, and vigorous participation in electoral politics pointless. They associate American patriotism with an endorsement of atrocities: the importation of African slaves, the slaughter of Native Americans, the rape of ancient forests, and the Viet­nam War. Many of them think of national pride as appropri­ate only for chauvinists: for the sort of American who re­joices that America can still orchestrate something like the Gulf War, can still bring deadly force to bear whenever and wherever it chooses. When young intellectuals watch John Wayne war movies after reading Heidegger, Foucault, Stephenson, or Silko, they often become convinced that they live in a violent, inhuman, corrupt country. They begin to think of themselves as a saving remnant-as the happy few who have the insight to see through nationalist rhetoric to the ghastly reality of contemporary America. But this insight does not move them to formulate a legislative program, to join a political movement, or to share in a national hope. The contrast between national hope and national self­-mockery and self-disgust becomes vivid when one compares novels like Snow Crash and Almanac of the Dead with socialist novels of the first half of the century-books like The Jungle, An American Tragedy, and The Grapes of Wrath. The latter were written in the belief that the tone of the Gettysburg Address was absolutely right, but that our country would have to transform itself in order to fulfill Lincoln's hopes. Transfor­mation would be needed because the rise of industrial capi­talism had made the individualist rhetoric of America's first century obsolete. The authors of these novels thought that this rhetoric should be replaced by one in which America is destined to become the first cooperative commonwealth, the first class­less society. This America would be one in which income and wealth are equitably distributed, and in which the govern­ment ensures equality of opportunity as well as individual liberty. This new, quasi-communitarian rhetoric was at the heart of the Progressive Movement and the New Deal. It set the tone for the American Left during the first six decades of the twentieth century. Walt Whitman and John Dewey, as we shall see, did a great deal to shape this rhetoric. The difference between early twentieth-century leftist in­tellectuals and the majority of their contemporary counter­parts is the difference between agents and spectators. In the early decades of this century, when an intellectual stepped back from his or her country's history and looked at it through skeptical eyes, the chances were that he or she was about to propose a new political initiative. Henry Adams was, of course, the great exception-the great abstainer from ·politics. But William James thought that Adams' diagnosis of the First Gilded Age as a symptom of irreversible moral and political decline was merely perverse. James's pragmatist theory of truth was in part a reaction against the sort of de­tached spectators hip which Adams affected. For James, disgust with American hypocrisy and self­-deception was pointless unless accompanied by an effort to give America reason to be proud of itself in the future. The kind of proto- Heideggerian cultural pessimism which Adams cultivated seemed, to James, decadent and cowardly. "Democracy," James wrote, "is a kind of religion, and we are bound not to admit its failure. Faiths and utopias are the no­blest exercise of human reason, and no one with a spark of reason in him will sit down fatalistically before the croaker's picture. "2

1NC Framework Shell

(IF THEY READ A PLAN TEXT)

A. Interpretation: The affirmative must present and defend the hypothetical implementation of [plan] by the United States federal government.

(IF THEY DON’T READ A PLAN TEXT)
A. Interpretation: The affirmative must present and defend the hypothetical implementation of a substantial reduction of military and/or police presence by the United States federal governmental in one or more of the following countries: Japan, South Korea, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Kuwait.

(BOTH)

“Resolved” proves the framework for the resolution is to enact a policy.

**Words and Phrases** **64** Permanent Edition

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

The USFG is the government in Washington D.C.

**Encarta** Online Encyclopedia **2k** <http://encarta.msn.com>

 “The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC”

B. Violation: [fill in why they don’t meet your interpretation].

C. This interpretation is best -

 A. If we win this argument, the affirmative is not topical because they do not defend the resolution, that’s a voting issue to preserve competitive equity and jurisdictional integrity

 B. Fairness – if the affirmative does not defend the resolution, there are an infinite number of non-falsifiable, unpredictable, totalizing, and personal claims they can make – it is impossible to be negative

 C. Switch-Side Debate is Best – spending every round talking about the failure of the IR system is unproductive – you cannot know if your argument is true unless you consider both sides of it – there is no reason why voting affirmative is key to anything – you can run your kritik when you are negative

 D. There is no risk of offense – you can read any argument you want as the negative, and even so, you can make an ethical justification for federal government action – make them show you why it is necessary for their criticism to be successful to not defend the resolution

 E. Topicality before advocacy - you can vote negative to endorse their project – there is no reason why voting affirmative is important, and your vote signifies that you do not believe that they are topical, not that you don’t believe in their project

1NC Framework Shell

This is a prior question that must be resolved first – it is a pre-condition for debate to occur

**Shively, 2k** (Assistant Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, Ruth Lessl, Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p. 181-2)JFS

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to-they must reject and limit-some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest-that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect-if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

1NC Framework Shell

Limits are key – their interpretation would allow \*limitless\* contexts for advocacy that only tangentially relate to the topic. The breadth of political theory magnifies the importance of limits on discourse

Lutz 2k (Donald S. Professor of Polisci at Houston, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 39-40)JFS

Aristotle notes in the Politics that political theory simultaneously proceeds at three levels—discourse about the ideal, about the best possible in the real world, and about existing political systems.4 Put another way, comprehensive political theory must ask several differ­ent kinds of questions that are linked, yet distinguishable. In order to understand the interlocking set of questions that political theory can ask, imagine a continuum stretching from left to right. At the end, to the right, is an ideal form of government, a perfectly wrought con­struct produced by the imagination. At the other end is the perfect dystopia, the most perfectly wretched system that the human imagi­nation can produce. Stretching between these two extremes is an infi­nite set of possibilities, merging into one another, that describe the logical possibilities created by the characteristics defining the end points. For example, a political system defined primarily by equality would have a perfectly inegalitarian system described at the other end, and the possible states of being between them would vary prima­rily in the extent to which they embodied equality. An ideal defined primarily by liberty would create a different set of possibilities be­tween the extremes. Of course, visions of the ideal often are inevitably more complex than these single-value examples indicate, but it is also true that in order to imagine an ideal state of affairs a kind of simpli­fication is almost always required since normal states of affairs invari­ably present themselves to human consciousness as complicated, opaque, and to a significant extent indeterminate. A non-ironic reading of Plato's Republic leads one to conclude that the creation of these visions of the ideal characterizes political philoso­phy. This is not the case. Any person can generate a vision of the ideal. One job of political philosophy is to ask the question "Is this ideal worth pursuing?" Before the question can be pursued, however, the ideal state of affairs must be clarified, especially with respect to con­ceptual precision and the logical relationship between the proposi­tions that describe the ideal. This pre-theoretical analysis raises the vision of the ideal from the mundane to a level where true philosophi­cal analysis, and the careful comparison with existing systems can proceed fruitfully. The process of pre-theoretical analysis, probably because it works on clarifying ideas that most capture the human imagination, too often looks to some like the entire enterprise of political philosophy.5 However, the value of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's concept of the General Will, for example, lies not in its formal logical implications, nor in its compelling hold on the imagination, but on the power and clarity it lends to an analysis and comparison of ac­tual political systems.

1NC Framework Shell

Abandoning politics cedes it to the elites – causes war, slavery, and authoritarianism

Boggs 2k (CAROL BOGGS, PF POLITICAL SCIENCE – SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 00, THE END OF POLITICS, 250-1)

But it is a very deceptive and misleading minimalism. While Oakeshott debunks political mechanisms and rational planning, as either useless or dangerous, the actually existing power structure-replete with its own centralized state apparatus, institutional hierarchies, conscious designs, and indeed, rational plans-remains fully intact, insulated from the minimalist critique. In other words, ideologies and plans are perfectly acceptable for elites who preside over established governing systems, but not for ordinary citizens or groups anxious to challenge the status quo. Such one-sided minimalism gives carte blanche to elites who naturally desire as much space to maneuver as possible. The flight from “abstract principles” rules out ethical attacks on injustices that may pervade the status quo (slavery or imperialist wars, for example) insofar as those injustices might be seen as too deeply embedded in the social and institutional matrix of the time to be the target of oppositional political action. If politics is reduced to nothing other than a process of everyday muddling-through, then people are condemned to accept the harsh realities of an exploitative and authoritarian system, with no choice but to yield to the dictates of “conventional wisdom”. Systematic attempts to ameliorate oppressive conditions would, in Oakeshott’s view, turn into a political nightmare. A belief that totalitarianism might results from extreme attempts to put society in order is one thing; to argue that all politicized efforts to change the world are necessary doomed either to impotence or totalitarianism requires a completely different (and indefensible) set of premises. Oakeshott’s minimalism poses yet another, but still related, range of problems: the shrinkage of politics hardly suggests that corporate colonization, social hierarchies, or centralized state and military institutions will magically disappear from people’s lives. Far from it: the public space vacated by ordinary citizens, well informed and ready to fight for their interests, simply gives elites more room to consolidate their own power and privilege. Beyond that, the fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian civil society, not too far removed from the excessive individualism, social Darwinism and urban violence of the American landscape could open the door to a modern Leviathan intent on restoring order and unity in the face of social disintegration. Viewed in this light, the contemporary drift towards antipolitics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more authoritarian and reactionary guise-or it could simply end up reinforcing the dominant state-corporate system. In either case, the state would probably become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.16 And either outcome would run counter to the facile antirationalism of Oakeshott’s Burkean muddling-through theories.

2NC Overview

3 key arguments in this debate

1. Switch-Side debate solves all of the affirmative’s offense – all of your reasons why your kritik is good can be ran while you are negative without a blatant violation of the resolution

2. Shively – this precedes all other questions – we cannot even debate until we know the conditions, subjects, and limits of this debate – you can’t evaluate the content of their claims until rules have been set up

3. Boggs – we are the only ones with an external impact – if we fail to engage politics, then elites fill the vacuum who push forth imperialist, oppressive agendas

Coverstone: Oasis key to Education

Debate must be isolated from the public sphere to effectively teach the skills that are critical to success in the public sphere

Alan **Coverstone**, BRILLIANT DEBATE THEORIST, **1995**, "An Inward Glance: A Response To Mitchell's Outward Activist Turn," DRG, URL: http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm

Mitchell's argument underestimates the nature of academic debate in three ways. **First, debate trains students in the very skills required for navigation in the public sphere of the information age**. In the past, political discourse was controlled by those elements who controlled access to information. While this basic reality will continue in the future, its essential features will change. No longer will mere possession of information determine control of political life. Information is widely available. For the first time in human history we face the prospect of an entirely new threat. The risk of an information overload is already shifting control of political discourse to superior information managers. It is no longer possible to control political discourse by limiting access to information. Instead, control belongs to those who are capable of identifying and delivering bits of information to a thirsty public. Mitchell calls this the "desertification of the public sphere."

**The public senses a deep desire for the ability to manage the information around them. Yet, they are unsure how to process and make sense of it all. In this environment, snake charmers and charlatans abound**. The popularity of the evening news wanes as more and more information becomes available. People realize that these half hour glimpses at the news do not even come close to covering all available information. They desperately want to select information for themselves. So they watch CNN until they fall asleep. Gavel to gavel coverage of political events assumes top spots on the Nielsen charts. Desperate to decide for themselves, the public of the twenty-first century drinks deeply from the well of information. When they are finished, they find they are no more able to decide. Those who make decisions are envied and glorified.

**Debate teaches individual decision-making for the information age. No other academic activity available today teaches people more about information gathering, assessment, selection, and delivery. Most importantly, debate teaches individuals how to make and defend their own decisions**. Debate is the only academic activity that moves at the speed of the information age. Time is required for individuals to achieve escape velocity. Academic debate holds tremendous value as a space for training.

Mitchell's reflections are necessarily more accurate in his own situation. Over a decade of debate has well positioned him to participate actively and directly in the political process. Yet the skills he has did not develop overnight. **Proper training requires time. While there is a tremendous variation in the amount of training required for effective navigation of the public sphere, the relative isolation of academic debate is one of its virtues**. Instead of turning students of debate immediately outward, we should be encouraging more **to enter the oasis. A thirsty public, drunk on the product of anyone who claims a decision, needs to drink from the pool of decision-making skills. Teaching these skills is our virtue.**

DEBATE MUST BE NONPOLITICAL TO EFFECTIVELY TEST IDEAS.

Alan **Coverstone**, BRILLIANT DEBATE THEORIST, **1995**, "An Inward Glance: A Response To Mitchell's Outward Activist Turn," DRG, URL: http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm

As we enter the twenty-first century, let us take pride in the unique activity in which we engage. Debaters, more than any other segment of American society, are capable of functioning effectively in the political world. Debaters acquire superior skills in information management and decision-making. Because our activity is non-political, students receive the space they need to test ideas, opinions, and beliefs. This testing process is put at risk by an outward activist turn. Yet, even more dangerous is the potential for new forms of domination within our academic oasis. We must be careful not to replace domination by media/government elites with domination with our community elite.

Mitchell's call for activism, as well as his examples of thriving participation should raise our awareness of both our responsibilities and opportunities. Individuals who have learned to make and defend their own political decisions will continue to move easily into political life. Let us do nothing to lessen that impact.

Let us encourage greater involvement in debate. Such involvement holds greater potential for reinvigoration of political discourse than direct mass activism. Let us not stoop to the level of modem political discourse, but elevate that discourse to our own level of deliberation

A/T: Mitchell

Mitchell changed his mind. Fiat-oriented debate is better than the activist model.

Gordon Mitchell, debate coach at Pittsburgh, Nov 09 2002, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200211/0136.html

Politically I have moved quite a bit since 1998, when I wrote that debate institutions should pay more attention to argumentative agency, i.e. cultivation of skills that facilitate translation of critical thinking, public speaking, and research acumen into concrete exemplars of democratic empowerment. Back then I was highly skeptical of the "laboratory model" of "preparatory pedagogy," where students were kept, by fiat, in the proverbial pedagogical bullpen. Now I respect much more the value of a protected space where young people can experiment politically by taking imaginary positions, driving the heuristic process by arguing against their convictions. In fact, the integrity of this space could be compromised by "activist turn" initiatives designed to bridge contest round advocacy with political activism. These days I have much more confidence in the importance and necessity of switch-side debating, and the heuristic value for debaters of arguing against their convictions. I think fashioning competitive debate contest rounds as isolated and politically protected safe spaces for communicative experimentation makes sense. However, I worry that a narrow diet of competitive contest round debating could starve students of opportunities to experience the rich political valence of their debating activities.

**DEBATE SHOULD BE ISOLATED--ATTEMPTS TO EXPAND INTO THE PUBLIC SPHERE, CAUSE ELITE COLONIZATION OF DEBATE, CRUSHING POLITICAL DISCOURSE.**

Alan **Coverstone**, BRILLIANT DEBATE THEORIST, **1995**, "An Inward Glance: A Response To Mitchell's Outward Activist Turn," DRG, URL: http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm

Second, Mitchell's argument underestimates the risks associated with an outward turn. Individuals trained in the art and practice of debate are, indeed, well suited to the task of entering the political world. At some unspecified point in one's training, the same motivation and focus that has consumed Mitchell will also consume most of us. At that point, political action becomes a proper endeavor. However, all of the members of the academic debate community will not reach that point together. A political outward turn threatens to corrupt the oasis in two ways. It makes our oasis a target, and it threatens to politicize the training process. As long as debate appears to be focused inwardly, political elites will not feel threatened. Yet one of Mitchell's primary concerns is recognition of our oasis in the political world. In this world we face well trained information managers. Sensing a threat from "debate," they will begin to infiltrate our space. Ready made information will increase and debaters will eat it up. Not yet able to truly discern the relative values of information, young debaters will eventually be influenced dramatically by the infiltration of political elites. Retaining our present anonymity in political life offers a better hope for reinvigorating political discourse. As perhaps the only truly non-partisan space in American political society, academic debate holds the last real possibility for training active political participants. Nowhere else are people allowed, let alone encouraged, to test all manner of political ideas. This is the process through which debaters learn what they believe and why they believe it. In many ways this natural evolution is made possible by the isolation of the debate community. An example should help illustrate this idea.

Like many young debaters, I learned a great deal about socialism early on. This was not crammed down my throat. Rather, I learned about the issue in the free flow of information that is debate. The intrigue of this, and other outmoded political arguments, was in its relative unfamiliarity. Reading socialist literature avidly, I was ready to take on the world. Yet I only had one side of the story. I was an easy mark for the present political powers. Nevertheless, I decided to fight City Hall. I had received a parking ticket which I felt was unfairly issued. Unable to convince the parking department to see it my way, I went straight to the top. I wrote the Mayor a letter. In this letter, I accused the city of exploitation of its citizens for the purpose of capital accumulation. I presented a strong Marxist critique of parking meters in my town. The mayor's reply was simple and straightforward. He called me a communist. He said I was being silly and should pay the ticket. I was completely embarrassed by the entire exchange. I thought I was ready to start the revolution. In reality, I wasn't even ready to speak to the Mayor. I did learn from the experience, but I did not learn what Gordon might have hoped. I learned to stop reading useless material and to keep my opinions to myself.

Do we really want to force students into that type of situation? I wrote the mayor on my own. Debaters will experiment with political activism on their own. This is all part of the natural impulse for activism which debate inspires. Yet, in the absence of such individual motivation, an outward turn threatens to short circuit the learning process. Debate should capitalize on its isolation. We can teach our students to examine all sides of an issue and reach individual conclusions before we force them into political exchanges. To prematurely turn debaters out threatens to undo the positive potential of involvement in debate.

A/T: Mitchell

DEBATE AS ACTIVISM FORCES A HOMOGENIZING AGENDA, CRUSHING POLITICAL DISCOURSE.

Alan **Coverstone**, BRILLIANT DEBATE THEORIST, **1995**, "An Inward Glance: A Response To Mitchell's Outward Activist Turn," DRG, URL: http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm

My third, and final reaction to Mitchell's proposal, targets his desire for mass action. The danger is that we will replace mass control of the media/government elite with a mass control of our own elite. The greatest virtue of academic debate is its ability to teach people that they can and must make their own decisions. An outward turn, organized along the lines of mass action, threatens to homogenize the individual members of the debate community. Such an outcome will, at best, politicize and fracture our community. At worst, it will coerce people to participate before making their own decisions.

Debate trains people to make decisions by investigating the subtle nuances of public policies. We are at our best when we teach students to tear apart the broad themes around which traditional political activity is organized. As a result, we experience a wide array of political views within academic debate. Even people who support the same proposals or candidates do so for different and inconsistent reasons. Only in academic debate will two supporters of political views argue vehemently against each other. As a group, this reality means that mass political action is doomed to fail. Debaters do not focus on the broad themes that enable mass unity. The only theme that unites debaters is the realization that we are all free to make our own decisions. Debaters learn to agree or disagree with opponents with respect. Yet unity around this theme is not easily translated into unity on a partisan political issue. Still worse, Mitchell's proposal undermines the one unifying principle.

Mitchell must be looking for more. He is looking for a community wide value set that discourages inaction. This means that an activist turn necessarily will compel political action from many who are not yet prepared. The greatest danger in this proposal is the likelihood that the control of the media/government elite will be replaced by control of our own debate elite.

Emphasizing mass action tends to discourage individual political action. Some will decide that they do not need to get involved, but this is by far the lesser of two evils. Most will decide that they must be involved whether or not they feel strongly committed to the issue. Mitchell places the cart before the horse. Rather than letting ideas and opinions drive action as they do now, he encourages an environment where action drives ideas for many people. Young debaters are particularly vulnerable. They are likely to join in political action out of a desire to "fit in." This cannot be what Mitchell desires. Political discourse is a dessert now because there are more people trying to "fit in" that there are people trying to break out.

Framework – A2: Spanos

Their Spanos evidence totalizes the educational impact of debate and decontextualizes the politics that occur in debates

Devyne 96 (John, NYU Ed School, Maximum Security: The Culture of Violence in Inner City Schools, p. 191)

I argue that Spanos epistemology should be challenged on two essential points. First, in reconceptializes ideal education along the lines of Paulo Freire, Spanos conflates the dialogic aspect of teaching with the totality of the student-teacher relationship. Teacher and student, we are told, should enter into a “reciprocal deconstructive learning process, one in which the oppositional teacher becomes a student and the interested student a teacher” (1993, 202), the teacher now experiencing what it feels like to be subjected to the disciplinary gaze. Such an educational philosophy has delusions of omnipotence: it wishes to extend its valid insights to encompass all aspects of teaching and learning, to become a totalizing vision. To accept the concept that not all knowledge is immediately generated through the dialogic relationship does not, however, equal an “oppressor ideology” or “the absolutizing of ignorance”. It simply represents a recognition that the student needs to be aware of what things or concepts mean for other people outside the context of the immediate dialogic relationship. In other words, while knowledge constructed through dialogue is to be valued as essential to the pedagogic process, it is also true that not all knowledge is or should be so conceptualized. Constructivism is splendid, but it has limits.

Framework – A2: Hicks & Green

Framework doesn’t cause U.S. exceptionalism – It solves it

Stannard 6 (Matt, U of Wyoming, <http://globaldebateblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/from-httpwww.html>.)

If it is indeed true that debate inevitably produces other-oriented deliberative discourse at the expense of students’ confidence in their first-order convictions, this would indeed be a trade-off worth criticizing. In all fairness, Hicks and Greene do not overclaim their critique, and they take care to acknowledge the important ethical and cognitive virtues of deliberative debating. When represented as anything other than a political-ethical concern, however, Hicks and Greene’s critique has several problems: First, as J.P. Lacy once pointed out, it seems a tremendous causal (or even rhetorical) stretch to go from “debating both sides of an issue creates civic responsibility essential to liberal democracy” to “this civic responsibility upholds the worst forms of American exceptionalism.” Second, Hicks and Greene do not make any comparison of the potentially bad power of debate to any alternative. Their implied alternative, however, is a form of forensic speech that privileges personal conviction. The idea that students should be able to preserve their personal convictions at all costs seems far more immediately tyrannical, far more immediately damaging to either liberal or participatory democracy, than the ritualized requirements that students occasionally take the opposite side of what they believe. Third, as I have suggested and will continue to suggest, while a debate project requiring participants to understand and often “speak for” opposing points of view may carry a great deal of liberal baggage, it is at its core a project more ethically deliberative than institutionally liberal. Where Hicks and Greene see debate producing “the liberal citizen-subject,” I see debate at least having the potential to produce “the deliberative human being.” The fact that some academic debaters are recruited by the CSIS and the CIA does not undermine this thesis. Absent healthy debate programs, these think-tanks and government agencies would still recruit what they saw as the best and brightest students. And absent a debate community that rewards anti-institutional political rhetoric as much as liberal rhetoric, those students would have little-to-no chance of being exposed to truly oppositional ideas.

The historical basis for their exceptionalism claims is backward

Harrigan 8 (Casey, M.A. Wake, <http://globaldebateblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/from-httpwww.html>.)

However, the arguments in “Lost Convictions” alone should not be read as a sweeping indictment of SSD for two reasons. First, Greene and Hicks make a specific and context-dependent claim about the Cold War that cannot be easily applied to contemporary discussion of the merits of SSD. 1954 was a time of McCarthyism and anti-Communist witch-hunts. It was quite possible then that one justification for debating both sides was a re-affirmation of liberalism against the communists. Now, in the midst of the “war on terrorism,” widespread restrictions on civil liberties, and President Bush’s mantra of “with us or against us,” it seems like the opposite is truer. Fidelity to the American cause is performed through the willing silence of its citizens. Dissent is quelled and the public is encouraged to view the world through the singular lens of “freedom” against the forces of terrorism. Debating both sides—and lacking immediate conviction—is a sign of weakness and waffling in the face of imminent threats to national security. Thus, in the contemporary context, to reject SSD and promote argument only through conviction is far more conducive to supporting American exceptionalism than debating multiple sides is as a liberal democratic justification.

Framework – A2: Hicks & Green

Experience proves that their exceptionalism argument is backward

English 7 (Eric, M.A. Pitt, <http://globaldebateblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/from-httpwww.html>.)JFS

It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions.12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. “I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.” As Katyal recounts, “the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.”14 The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as “with us or against us,” the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be [end page 224] apparent—the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a “weapon of mass destruction.”

AT: You Exclude Critiques

False – you can run them, you just need to tie your links and alternatives to specific policy actions – this creates a better model of education and a way of making criticism accessible to elites

Walt ’91  (Stephen, Professor – U Chicago, International Studies Quarterly, 35)

A second norm is relevance, a belief that even highly abstract lines of inquiry should be guided by the goal of solving real-world problems. Because the value of a given approach may not be apparent at the beginning-game theory is an obvious example-we cannot insist that a new approach be immediately applicable to a specific research puzzle. On the whole, however, the belief that scholarship in security affairs should be linked to real-world issues has prevented the field from degenerating into self-indulgent intellectualizing. And from the Golden Age to the present, security studies has probably had more real-world impact, for good or ill, than most areas of social science. Finally, the renaissance of security studies has been guided by a commitment to democratic discourse. Rather than confining discussion of security issues to an elite group of the best and brightest, scholars in the renaissance have generally welcomed a more fully informed debate. To paraphrase Clemenceau, issues of war and peace are too important to be left solely to insiders with a vested interest in the outcome. The growth of security studies within universities is one sign of broader participation, along with increased availability of information and more accessible publications for interested citizens. Although this view is by no means universal, the renaissance of security studies has been shaped by the belief that a well-informed debate is the best way to avoid the disasters that are likely when national policy is monopolized by a few self-interested parties.

And- their version of “critiques” is educationally devastating, it creates outcomes where teams can go an entire year, or even an entire college career without learning anything about the actual topics.  Our version forces them to do topic-specific research to apply their arguments to something relevant

This is offense – their framework wrecks education and you shouldn’t believe any of their arguments related to the alternative – it ignores empirical realities

Jentleson 2  (Bruce, Director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy and Professor of Public Policy and Political Science at Duke University, International Security 26.4 (2002) 169-183, projectmuse)

To be sure, political science and international relations have produced and continue to produce scholarly work that does bring important policy insights. Still it is hard to deny that contemporary political science and international relations as a discipline put limited value on policy relevance—too little, in my view, and the discipline suffers for it. 1 The problem is not just the gap between theory and policy but its chasmlike widening in recent years and the limited valuation of efforts, in Alexander George's phrase, at "bridging the gap." 2 The [End Page 169] events of September 11 drive home the need to bring policy relevance back in to the discipline, to seek greater praxis between theory and practice. This is not to say that scholars should take up the agendas of think tanks, journalists, activists, or fast fax operations. The academy's agenda is and should be principally a more scholarly one. But theory can be valued without policy relevance being so undervalued. Dichotomization along the lines of "we" do theory and "they" do policy consigns international relations scholars almost exclusively to an intradisciplinary dialogue and purpose, with conversations and knowledge building that while highly intellectual are excessively insular and disconnected from the empirical realities that are the discipline's raison d'être. This stunts the contributions that universities, one of society's most essential institutions, can make in dealing with the profound problems and challenges society faces. It also is counterproductive to the academy's own interests. Research and scholarship are bettered by pushing analysis and logic beyond just offering up a few paragraphs on implications for policy at the end of a forty-page article, as if a "ritualistic addendum." 3 Teaching is enhanced when students' interest in "real world" issues is engaged in ways that reinforce the argument that theory really is relevant, and CNN is not enough. There also are gains to be made for the scholarly community's standing as perceived by those outside the academic world, constituencies and colleagues whose opinions too often are self-servingly denigrated and defensively disregarded. It thus is both for the health of the discipline and to fulfill its broader societal responsibilities that greater praxis is to be pursued.

AT: Bad Policymakers

Policy debates are critical to education about government action, whether you like the state or not –- refusal to debate specific policies cedes the whole discussion to elites

Walt ’91  (Stephen, Professor – U Chicago, International Studies Quarterly, 35)

A second norm is relevance, a belief that even highly abstract lines of inquiry should be guided by the goal of solving real-world problems. Because the value of a given approach may not be apparent at the beginning-game theory is an obvious example-we cannot insist that a new approach be immediately applicable to a specific research puzzle. On the whole, however, the belief that scholarship in security affairs should be linked to real-world issues has prevented the field from degenerating into self-indulgent intellectualizing. And from the Golden Age to the present, security studies has probably had more real-world impact, for good or ill, than most areas of social science. Finally, the renaissance of security studies has been guided by a commitment to democratic discourse. Rather than confining discussion of security issues to an elite group of the best and brightest, scholars in the renaissance have generally welcomed a more fully informed debate. To paraphrase Clemenceau, issues of war and peace are too important to be left solely to insiders with a vested interest in the outcome. The growth of security studies within universities is one sign of broader participation, along with increased availability of information and more accessible publications for interested citizens. Although this view is by no means universal, the renaissance of security studies has been shaped by the belief that a well-informed debate is the best way to avoid the disasters that are likely when national policy is monopolized by a few self-interested parties.

Engagement with state policy is critical to influence the government and prevent war

Walt ’91 (Stephen, Professor – U Chicago, International Studies Quarterly, 35)

A recurring theme of this essay has been the twin dangers of separating the study of security affairs from the academic world or of shifting the focus of academic scholarship too far from real-world issues. The danger of war will be with us for some time to come, and states will continue to acquire military forces for a variety of purposes. Unless one believes that ignorance is preferable to expertise, the value of independent national security scholars should be apparent. Indeed, history suggests that countries that suppress debate on national security matters are more likely to blunder into disaster, because misguided policies cannot be evaluated and stopped in time. As in other areas of public policy, academic experts in security studies can help in several ways. In the short term, academics are well place to evaluate current programs, because they face less pressure to support official policy. The long-term effects of academic involvement may be even more significant: academic research can help states learn from past mistakes and can provide the theoretical innovations that produce better policy choices in the future. Furthermore, their role in training the new generation of experts gives academics an additional avenue of influence. Assuming they perform these tasks responsibly, academics will have a positive-albeit gradual-impact on how states deal with the problem of war in the future.

AT: You Create Spectators

1. There’s no impact to the spectator phenomenon–we are already isolated from politics, there’s only a chance that we can become engaged through debates over specific policy.  Only their framework becomes insular and irrelevant

2. Policy debate is good – it solves the spectator phenomenon and increases both critical and policy education

Joyner 99 (Christopher Professor of International Law in the Government Department at Georgetown University, Spring, [5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377]

Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense. A debate exercise is particularly suited to an examination of United States foreign policy, which in political science courses is usually studied from a theoretical, often heavily realpolitik perspective. In such courses, international legal considerations are usually given short shrift, if discussed at all. As a result, students may come to believe that international law plays no role in United States foreign policy-making. In fact, serious consideration is usually paid by government officials to international law in the formulation of United States policy, albeit sometimes ex post facto as a justification for policy, rather than as a bona fide prior constraint on consideration of policy options. In addition, lawyers are prominent advisers at many levels of the foreign-policy-making process. Students should appreciate the relevance of international law for past and current US actions, such as the invasion of Grenada or the refusal of the United States to sign the law of the sea treaty and landmines convention, as well as for  [\*387]  hypothetical (though subject to public discussion) United States policy options such as hunting down and arresting war criminals in Bosnia, withdrawing from the United Nations, or assassinating Saddam Hussein.

AT: K Precedes Fairness/Ground

This is a false choice - they can always win that the principles of their advocacy are good in the abstract—we can only debate the merits of their framework if they defend the specific consequences of political implementation

Ignatieff 4 (Michael, Lesser Evils, Carr professor of human rights at Harvard, p. 20-1)

As for moral perfectionism, this would be the doctrine that a liberal state should never have truck with dubious moral means and should spare its officials the hazard of having to decide between lesser and greater evils. A moral perfectionist position also holds that states can spare their officials this hazard simply by adhering to the universal moral standards set out in human rights conventions and the laws of war. There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is relatively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases. What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and moral distinctions between these are clear in the abstract, abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice. Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standards is that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another

A/T: Rules = Violence

Conventions of communication are not a matter of violent exclusion but rather the preconditions for consensus.

Mary Dietz, Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, 2000, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 123-4

Habermas's distinction between "pure" communicative action and strategic action raises many difficulties, not the least of which is its adherence to an idealized model of communication that, as Habermas himself acknowledges, does not fit a great deal of everyday social interaction (McCarthy 1991,132). Machiavelli's famous riposte to those thinkers who "have imagined republics and principalities which have never been seen or known to exist in reality" (Machiavelli 1950, 56) seems pertinent here, for the idealized model that Habermas imagines and the distinction that supports it appear boldly to deny the Machia­vellian insight that "how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his pres­ervation" (56). I will return to this point as it relates to politics later. For now, it is important to underscore that Habermas relies upon the communicative-strategic distinction to do at least two things: first, to show that on the level of linguistics, communicative action enjoys an "originary" priority over strategic and all other modes of linguistic usage, which are themselves "parasitic" (Rasmussen 1990, 38) or "de­rivative" (McCarthy 1991, 133) upon the former.12 Second, on the level of political theory, Habermas introduces the distinction in order to limit the exercise of threats and coercion (or strategic action) by enu­merating a formal-pragmatic system of discursive accountability (or communicative action) that is geared toward human agreement and mutuality. Despite its thoroughly modern accouterments, communica­tive action aims at something like the twentieth-century discourse-equivalent of the chivalric codes of the late Middle Ages; as a normative system it articulates the conventions of fair and honorable engage­ment between interlocutors. To be sure, Habermas's concept of com­municative action is neither as refined nor as situationally embedded as were the protocols that governed honorable combat across Euro­pean cultural and territorial boundaries and between Christian knights; but it is nonetheless a (cross-cultural) protocol for all that. The entire framework that Habermas establishes is an attempt to limit human violence by elaborating a code of communicative conduct that is de­signed to hold power in check by channeling it into persuasion, or the "unforced" force of the better argument (Habermas 1993b, 160).^

Policy Framework Good

Policy involvement is inevitable- we need to proactively engage in the language of policy making for movements to be effective

Makani 2k Themba-Nixon, Executive Director of The Praxis Project, Former California Staffer,  Colorlines. Oakland: Jul 31, 2000.Vol.3, Iss. 2; pg. 12

The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. Policy is for wonks, sell-out politicians, and ivory-tower eggheads. Organizing is what real, grassroots people do. Common as it may be, this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. Given who's usually present, most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, and the tried and true: cold, hard cash. Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at the smaller scale of local politics. At the local level, we have greater access to elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for reelection. For example, getting 400 people to show up at city hall in just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand, 400 people at the state house or the Congress would have a less significant impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually constituents, and the impact is even greater. Recent trends in government underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of measures devolving significant power to state and local government. Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water safety are among the areas where states and localities now have greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure. History has taught us that, for social services and civil rights in particular, the lack of clear federal standards and mechanisms for accountability lead to uneven enforcement and even discriminatory implementation of policies. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing progressive initiatives in this more localized environment. Greater local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement important social policies that were heretofore out of reach. To do so will require careful attention to the mechanics of local policymaking and a clear blueprint of what we stand for. Getting It in Writing Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.

Policy Framework Good

We have a responsibility as scholars to evaluate the policy debate- we shape decision making

Edkins and Zehfussi 5 (Review of International Studies (2005),31,p. 454-5)

What we are attempting in this article is an intervention that demonstrates how the illusion of the sovereign state in an insecure and anarchic international system is sustained and how it might be challenged. It seems to us that this has become important in the present circumstances. The focus on security and the dilemma of security versus freedom that is set out in debates immediately after September 11th presents an apparent choice as the focus for dissent, while concealing the extent to which thinking is thereby confined to a specific agenda. Our argument will be that this approach relies on a particular picture of the political world that has been reflected within the discipline of international relations, a picture of a world of sovereign states. We have a responsibility as scholars; we are not insulated from the policy world. What we discuss may not, and indeed does not, have a direct impact on what happens in the policy world, this is clear, but our writings and our teaching do have an input in terms of the creation and reproduction of pictures of the world that inform policy and set the contours of policy debates.21 Moreover, the discipline within which we are situated is one which depends itself on a particular view of the world – a view that sees the international as a realm of politics distinct from the domestic – the same view of the world as the one that underpins thinking on security and defence in the US administration.22 In this article then we develop an analysis of the ways in which thinking in terms of international relations and a system of states forecloses certain possibilities from the start, and how it might look to think about politics and the international differently.

Policymaking Framework Good – International Law

Our education arguments outweigh all of their critical nonsense – we must train future policymakers in rules and procedure to prevent human extinction – this concern comes prior to all attempts to change world order

Beres 3 (Louis Rene, Prof. of International Law at Purdue, Journal and Courier, June 5)

The truth is often disturbing. Our impressive American victories against terrorism and rogue states, although proper and indispensable, are inevitably limited. The words of the great Irish poet Yeats reveal, prophetically, where our entire planet is now clearly heading. Watching violence escalate and expand in parts of Europe and Russia, in Northern Ireland, in Africa, in Southwest Asia, in Latin America, and of course in the Middle East, we discover with certainty that "... the centre cannot hold/Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world/The blood-dimmed tide is loosed/and everywhere The Ceremony of innocence is drowned."   Our response, even after Operation Iraqi Freedom, lacks conviction. Still pretending that "things will get better," we Americans proceed diligently with our day-to-day affairs, content that, somehow, the worst can never really happen. Although it is true that we must go on with our normal lives, it is also true that "normal" has now become a quaint and delusionary state. We want to be sure that a "new" normal falls within the boundaries of human tolerance, but we can't nurture such a response without an informed appreciation of what is still possible.  For us, other rude awakenings are unavoidable, some of which could easily overshadow the horrors of Sept. 11. There can be little doubt that, within a few short years, expanding tribalism will produce several new genocides and proliferating nuclear weapons will generate one or more regional nuclear wars. Paralyzed by fear and restrained by impotence, various governments will try, desperately, to deflect our attention, but it will be a vain effort. Caught up in a vast chaos from which no real escape is possible, we will learn too late that there is no durable safety in arms, no ultimate rescue by authority, no genuine remedy in science or technology.  What shall we do? For a start, we must all begin to look carefully behind the news. Rejecting superficial analyses of day-to-day events in favor of penetrating assessments of world affairs, we must learn quickly to distinguish what is truly important from what is merely entertainment. With such learning, we Americans could prepare for growing worldwide anarchy not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet.  Nowhere is it written that we people of Earth are forever, that humankind must thwart the long-prevailing trend among all planetary life-forms (more than 99 percent) of ending in extinction. Aware of this, we may yet survive, at least for a while, but only if our collective suppression of purposeful fear is augmented by a complementary wisdom; that is, that our personal mortality is undeniable and that the harms done by one tribal state or terror group against "others" will never confer immortality. This is, admittedly, a difficult concept to understand, but the longer we humans are shielded from such difficult concepts the shorter will be our time remaining. We must also look closely at higher education in the United States, not from the shortsighted stance of improving test scores, but from the urgent perspective of confronting extraordinary threats to human survival. For the moment, some college students are exposed to an occasional course in what is fashionably described as "global awareness," but such exposure usually sidesteps the overriding issues: We now face a deteriorating world system that cannot be mended through sensitivity alone; our leaders are dangerously unprepared to deal with catastrophic deterioration; our schools are altogether incapable of transmitting the indispensable visions of planetary restructuring.  To institute productive student confrontations with survival imperatives, colleges and universities must soon take great risks, detaching themselves from a time-dishonored preoccupation with "facts" in favor of grappling with true life-or-death questions. In raising these questions, it will not be enough to send some students to study in Paris or Madrid or Amsterdam ("study abroad" is not what is meant by serious global awareness). Rather, all students must be made aware - as a primary objective of the curriculum - of where we are heading, as a species, and where our limited survival alternatives may yet be discovered.  There are, of course, many particular ways in which colleges and universities could operationalize real global awareness, but one way, long-neglected, would be best. I refer to the study of international law. For a country that celebrates the rule of law at all levels, and which explicitly makes international law part of the law of the United States - the "supreme law of the land" according to the Constitution and certain Supreme Court decisions - this should be easy enough to understand. Anarchy, after all, is the absence of law, and knowledge of international law is necessarily prior to adequate measures of world order reform.  Before international law can be taken seriously, and before "the blood-dimmed tide" can be halted, America's future leaders must at least have some informed acquaintance with pertinent rules and procedures. Otherwise we shall surely witness the birth of a fully ungovernable world order, an unheralded and sinister arrival in which only a shadowy legion of gravediggers would wield the forceps.

Fiat Good – Key to Education

Simulation of different roles through fiat encourages learning and empowerment

Innes and Booher ’99 (Judith, Director – Institute of Urban and Regional Development and Professor at UC Berkeley and David, Visiting Scholar at the Institute, Journal of the American Planning Association, Winter, Vol. 65, Iss. 1)

Our observation and practice of consensus building suggests that the analogy to role-playing games will help to illuminate the dynamic of effective consensus processes. Even when the dispute seems intractable, role playing in consensus building allows players to let go of actual or assumed constraints and to develop ideas for creating new conditions and possibilities. Drama and suspension of reality allows competing, even bitterly opposed interests to collaborate, and engages individual players emotionally over many months. Scenario building and storytelling can make collective sense of complexity, of predicting possibilities in an uncertain world, and can allow the playful imagination, which people normally suppress, to go to work. In the course of engaging in various roles, participants develop identities for themselves and others and become more effective participants, representing their stakeholders' interests more clearly. In many of their most productive moments, participants in consensus building engage not only in playing out scenarios, but also in a kind of collective, speculative tinkering, or bricolage, similar in principle to what game participants do. That is, they play with heterogeneous concepts, strategies, and actions with which various individuals in the group have experience, and try combining them until they create a new scenario that they collectively believe will work. This bricolage, discussed further below, is a type of reasoning and collective creativity fundamentally different from the more familiar types, argumentation and tradeoffs.[sup11] The latter modes of problem solving or dispute resolution typically allow zero sum allocation of resources among participants or finding the actions acceptable to everyone. Bricolage, however, produces, rather than a solution to a known problem, a new way of framing the situation and of developing unanticipated combinations of actions that are qualitatively different from the options on the table at the outset. The result of this collective tinkering with new scenarios is, most importantly, learning and change among the players, and growth in their sophistication about each other, about the issues, and about the futures they could seek. Both consensus building and roleplaying games center on learning, innovation, and change, in a process that is entertaining and-when conducted effectively-in some fundamental sense empowers individuals.

AT: Fiat is Utopian

Utopian policy proposals are valuable even if they are never enacted—they still put pressure on power to accede to demands and create a vision for social change

Streeten 99 (Paul, Development, v. 42 n.2 ingenta)

First, Utopian thinking can be useful as a framework for analysis. Just as physicists assume an atmospheric vacuum for some purposes, so policy analysts can assume a political vacuum from which they can start afresh. The physicists’ assumption plainly would not be useful for the design of parachutes, but can serve other purposes well. Similarly, when thinking of tomorrow’s problems, Utopianism is not helpful. But for long-term strategic purposes it is essential. Second, the Utopian vision gives a sense of direction, which can get lost in approaches that are preoccupied with the feasible. In a world that is regarded as the second-best of all feasible worlds, everything becomes a necessary constraint. All vision is lost. Third, excessive concern with the feasible tends to reinforce the status quo. In negotiations, it strengthens the hand of those opposed to any reform. Unless the case for change can be represented in the same detail as the case for no change, it tends to be lost. Fourth, it is sometimes the case that the conjuncture of circumstances changes quite suddenly and that the constellation of forces, unexpectedly, turns out to be favourable to even radical innovation. Unless we are prepared with a carefully worked out, detailed plan, that yesterday could have appeared utterly Utopian, the reformers will lose out by default. Only a few years ago nobody would have expected the end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, the break-up of Yugoslavia, the marketization of China, the end of apartheid in South Africa. And the handshake on the White House lawn between Mr Peres and Mr Arafat. Fifth, the Utopian reformers themselves can constitute a pressure group, countervailing the self interested pressures of the obstructionist groups. Ideas thought to be Utopian have become realistic at moments in history when large numbers of people support them, and those in power have to yield to their demands. The demand for ending slavery is a historical example. It is for these five reasons that Utopians should not be discouraged from formulating their proposals and from thinking the unthinkable, unencumbered by the inhibitions and obstacles of political constraints. They should elaborate them in the same detail that the defenders of the status quo devote to its elaboration and celebration. Utopianism and idealism will then turn out to be the most realistic vision. It is well known that there are three types of economists: those who can count and those who can’t. But being able to count up to two, I want to distinguish between two types of people. Let us call them, for want of a better name, the Pedants and the Utopians. The names are due to Peter Berger, who uses them in a different context. The Pedants or technicians are those who know all the details about the way things are and work, and they have acquired an emotional vested interest in keeping them this way. I have come across them in the British civil service, in the bureaucracy ofthe World Bank, and elsewhere. They are admirable people but they are conservative, and no good companions for reform. On the other hand, there are the Utopians, the idealists, the visionaries who dare think the unthinkable. They are also admirable, many of them young people. But they lack the attention to detail that the Pedants have. When the day of the revolution comes, they will have entered it on the wrong date in their diaries and fail to turn up, or, if they do turn up, they will be on the wrong side of the barricades. What we need is a marriage between the Pedants and the Utopians, between the technicians who pay attention to the details and the idealists who have the vision of a better future. There will be tensions in combining the two, but they will be creative tensions. We need Pedantic Utopian Pedants who will work out in considerable detail the ideal world and ways of getting to it, and promote the good cause with informed fantasy. Otherwise, when the opportunity arises, we shall miss it for lack of preparedness and lose out to the opponents of reform, to those who want to preserve the status quo.

Roleplaying Good

Role-playing good –

a. Devil’s advocate – debating both sides forces us to understand the arguments that our opponents make – this refines our strategies and improves advocacy – Malcolm X’s prison debates prove this

Branham 95 (Robert, Professor Rhetoric at Bates College, Argumentation and Advocacy, "`I Was Gone On Debating': Malcolm X's Prison Debates And Public Confrontations," Winter, vol. 31, no. 3, p.117)

As Malcolm X sought new outlets for his heightened political consciousness, he turned to the weekly formal debates sponsored by the inmate team. "My reading had my mind like steam under pressure," he recounted; "Some way, I had to start telling the white man about himself to his face. I decided to do this by putting my name down to debate" (1965b, p. 184). Malcolm X's prison debate experience allowed him to bring his newly acquired historical knowledge and critical ideology to bear on a wide variety of social issues. "Whichever side of the selected subject was assigned to me, I'd track down and study everything I could find on it," wrote Malcolm X. "I'd put myself in my opponent's place and decide how I'd try to win if I had the other side; and then I'd figure out a way to knock down those points" (1965b, p. 184). Preparation for each debate included four or five practice sessions.

b.  Role-playing is uniquely empowering --- this imagination is critical to understand how the government reaches decisions, how to hold it accountable and determine how we should act
Rawls 99 (John, Professor Emeritus – Harvard University, The Law of Peoples, p. 54-7)

Developing the Law of Peoples within a liberal conception of justice, we work out the ideals and principles of the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people. I distinguish between the public reason of liberal peoples and the public reason of the Society of Peoples. The first is the public reason of equal citizens of domestic society debating the constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice concerning their own government; the second is the public reason of free and equal liberal peoples debating their mutual relations as peoples. The Law of Peoples with its political concepts and principles, ideals and criteria, is the content of this latter public reason. Although these two public reasons do not have the same content, the role of public reason among free and equal peoples is analogous to its role in a constitutional democratic regime among free and equal citizens. Political liberalism proposes that, in a constitutional democratic regime, comprehensive doctrines of truth or of right are to be replaced in public reason by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens. Here note the parallel: public reason is invoked by members of the Society of Peoples, and its principles are addressed to peoples as peoples. They are not expressed in terms of comprehensive doctrines of truth or of right, which may hold sway in this or that society, but in terms that can be shared by different peoples. 6.2. Ideal of Public Reason. Distinct from the idea of public reason is the ideal of public reason. In domestic society this ideal is realized, or satisfied, whenever judges, legislators, chief executives, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the idea of public reason and explain to other citizens their reasons for supporting fundamental political questions in terms of the political conception of justice that they regard as the most reasonable. In this way they fulfill what I shall call their duty of civility to one another and to other citizens. Hence whether judges, legislators, and chief executives act from and follow public reason is continually shown in their speech and conduct. How is the ideal of public reason realized by citizens who are not government officials? In a representative government, citizens vote for representatives-chief executives, legislators, and the like-not for particular laws (except at a state or local level where they may vote di¬rectly on referenda questions, which are not usually fundamental ques¬tions). To answer this question, we say that, ideally, citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact.7l When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason, forms part of the political and social basis of liberal democracy and is vital for its enduring strength and vigor. Thus in domestic society citizens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason, while doing what they can to hold government officials to it. This duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. I emphasize that it is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech.

Roleplaying Good

And, their role-confusion arguments are stupid – debates don’t think that they are the president anymore than people who play axis and allies think that they’re Hitler – it’s a game and the argument that we would get confused about it relies on the belief that we are all amazingly stupid

\*\*\* Role-playing as public actors shatters apathy and political alienation, which is critical to check inequality and exploitation

Mitchell 2K (Gordon, Director of Debate and Professor of Communication – U. Pittsburgh, Argumentation & Advocacy, Vol. 36, No. 3, Winter)

When we assume the posture of the other in dramatic performance, we tap into who we are as persons, since our interpretation of others is deeply colored by our own senses of selfhood. By encouraging experimentation in identity construction, role-play "helps students discover divergent viewpoints and overcome stereotypes as they examine subjects from multiple perspectives..." (Moore, p. 190). Kincheloe points to the importance of this sort of reflexive critical awareness as an essential feature of educational practice in postmodern times. "Applying the notion of the postmodern analysis of the self, we come to see that hyperreality invites a heteroglossia of being," Kincheloe explains; "Drawing upon a multiplicity of voices, individuals live out a variety of possibilities, refusing to suppress particular voices. As men and women appropriate the various forms of expression, they are empowered to uncover new dimensions of existence that were previously hidden" (1993, p. 96). This process is particularly crucial in the public argument context, since a key guarantor of inequality and exploitation in contemporary society is the widespread and uncritical acceptance by citizens of politically inert self-identities. The problems of political alienation, apathy and withdrawal have received lavish treatment as perennial topics of scholarly analysis (see e.g. Fishkin 1997; Grossberg 1992; Hart 1998; Loeb 1994). Unfortunately, comparatively less energy has been devoted to the development of pedagogical strategies for countering this alarming political trend. However, some scholars have taken up the task of theorizing emancipatory and critical pedagogies, and argumentation scholars interested in expanding the learning potential of debate would do well to note their work (see e.g. Apple 1995, 1988, 1979; Britzman 1991; Giroux 1997, 1988, 1987; Greene 1978; McLaren 1993, 1989; Simon 1992; Weis and Fine 1993). In this area of educational scholarship, the curriculum theory of currere, a method of teaching pioneered by Pinar and Grumet (1976), speaks directly to many of the issues already discussed in this essay. As the Latin root of the word "curriculum," currere translates roughly as the investigation of public life (see Kincheloe 1993, p. 146). According to Pinar, "the method of currere is one way to work to liberate one from the web of political, cultural, and economic influences that are perhaps buried from conscious view but nonetheless comprise the living web that is a person's biographic situation" (Pinar 1994, p. 108). The objectives of role-play pedagogy resonate with the currere method. By opening discursive spaces for students to explore their identities as public actors, simulated public arguments provide occasions for students to survey and appraise submerged aspects of their political identities. Since many aspects of cultural and political life work currently to reinforce political passivity, critical argumentation pedagogies that highlight this component of students' self-identities carry significant emancipatory potential.

Roleplaying Good

Roleplaying is necessary to refuse our construction as passive client citizens—it’s a more effective form of politics

Kulynych 97  (Jessica, Winthrop University, Polity, Winter, p. 344-5)

Unfortunately, it is precisely these elements of citizen action that cannot be explained by a theory of communicative action.  It is here that a performative conception of political action implicitly informs Hager’s discussion.  From a performative perspective, the goal of action is not only to secure a realm for deliberative politics, but to disrupt and resist the norms and identities that structure such a realm and its participants.  While Habermas theorizes that political solutions will emerge from dialogue, a performative understanding of participation highlights the limits of dialogue and the creative and often uncontrollable effect of unpremeditated action on the very foundations of communication.  When we look at the success of citizen initiatives from a performative perspective, we look precisely at those moments of defiance and disruption that bring the invisible and unimaginable into view.  Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the policy debate and experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate within the energy commissions could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics.  The existence of a goal-oriented debate within a technically dominated arena defied the normalizing separation between expert policymakers and consuming citizens.  Citizens momentarily recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients.

AT: Resolved – Colon Means Individuals

1.  The colon doesn’t matter–even under their interpretation where individuals have to be “resolved,” the resolution still includes the federal government, meaning that individuals have to be “resolved” that the federal government should act

2.  Their “resolved” and colon arguments make no sense–the affirmative has to defend the proposition that the government should act

Parcher 1 (Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February, http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html)JFS

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constituent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision.  (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

The colon is meaningless – everything after it is what’s important

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing 2k ([http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm](http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank))

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

The colon just elaborates on what the debate community was resolved to debate:

Encarta World Dictionary 7 (<http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?refid=1861598666>)

co•lon (plural co•lons) noun Definition: 1. punctuation mark: the punctuation mark (:) used to divide distinct but related sentence components such as clauses in which the second elaborates on the first, or to introduce a list, quotation, or speech. A colon is sometimes used in U.S. business letters after the salutation. Colons are also used between numbers in statements of proportion or time and Biblical or literary references.

And, our interpretation is good–we have no evidence about the stance of individuals which hurts predictability and it also shifts the debate away from government policy–all the evidence we have read argues that these federal policy debates are good

And, our ground and education arguments outweigh this–even if their grammar claims are correct, grammar in debate is only important because it allows us to divide up arguments fairly and predictably–they might be grammatical, but they still destroy debate

AT: Words Lack Determinate Meaning

First, even if words mean different things to different people, we can still create some consensus on the issues we discuss–if i say “the dog is on fire” everyone understands what i mean.  Our shively evidence argues that some consensus is the prerequisite for debate This means you should vote for us–if words don’t mean anything, they haven’t made an argument, they can’t justify any given claim, and we automatically win

And, even if there is no absolute truth, consensus allows us to reach common understanding

Ferguson and Mansbausch 2 (Yale, Prof of IR at Rutgers, Richard, Prof of IR at Iowa State, International Relations and the “Third Debate,” ed. Jarvis)

Although there may be no such thing as “absolute truth” (Hollis, 1994:240-247; Fernandez-Armesto, 1997:chap.6), there is often a sufficient amount of intersubjective consensus to make for a useful conversation.  That conversation may not lead to proofs that satisfy the philosophical nit-pickers, but it can be educational and illuminating.  We gain a degree of apparently useful “understanding” about the things we need (or prefer) to “know.”

AT: Words Lack Determinate Meaning

Their argument creates an intellectual climate for holocaust denial – the effect of their critique is to blur the lines of history and mask atrocity

Hexham 99 (Irving, in Mission and the State, ed. Ulrich van der Hayden, 2000, <http://www.ucalgary.ca/~hexham/courses/Courses-2006/Rels-339/IRVING/Ulrich-revised.htm>)JFS

Deborah Lipstadt warns historians about the dangers of adopting fashionable theories like deconstruction without solidly grounding their work in an accurate representation of source materials [1994]. She makes a passionate plea for historical accuracy while demonstrating the real dangers that occur when people distort the facts. The techniques used by Holocaust deniers, who use history to propagate their views, are not isolated to rogue historians. The basic arguments used by the deniers are not as absurd as most decent people, who instinctively reject such claims, think. In fact, they are increasingly common in popular scholarship. As Lipstadt points out "It is important to understand that the deniers do not work in a vacuum." [Lipstadt 1984:17]. Rather, holocaust "denial can be traced to an intellectual climate that has made its mark in the scholarly world during the past two decades. The deniers are plying their trade at a time when history seems to be up for grabs and attacks on the Western rationalist tradition have become commonplace." [Lipstadt 1994:17]. She continues: "This tendency can be traced, at least in part, to intellectual currents that began in the late 1960's. Various scholars began to assert that texts had no fixed meaning. The reader's interpretation, not the author's intention, determined meaning." [Lipstadt 1984:18] The danger here is not that established scholars are likely to become converts to holocaust denial, although in places like France this is a clear possibility, rather it is the effect such techniques have on students. As Lipstadt observes: "The scholars who supported this deconstructionist approach were neither deniers themselves nor sympathetic to the deniers' attitudes; most had no trouble identifying Holocaust denial as disingenuous." But, "when students had to confront the issue. Far too many of them found it impossible to recognize Holocaust denial as a movement with no scholarly, intellectual, or rational validity" [Lipstadt 1984:18]. At the end of her work she warns again that some "historians are not crypto-deniers, but the results of their work are the same: the blurring of boundaries between fact and fiction and between persecuted and persecutor [Lipstadt 1994:215]. Further Lipstadt correctly observes that "If Holocaust denial has demonstrated anything, it is the fragility of memory, truth, reason, and history." She is right. As scholars it is our duty to defend history based upon the accurate and the objectivity of scholarship. No doubt some people will bristle at the suggestion that we ought to strive for objectivity. Such critics regard the discovery of bias as something totally new without realizing that the hermeneutics of suspicion existed long before Foucault or Deridda [Spencer 1874] History and the deconstruction of Afrikaner Ideology With Lipstad's warning in mind let us turn to the study of South Africa history. During the 1980's various writers used history to deconstruct the claims of Afrikaner Nationalism [Hexham 1981; du Toit and Giliomee 1983; du Toit 1983; Elphick and Giliomee 1988]. These works made an impact among Afrikaners because they exposed the inconsistencies of the historical claims used to legitimate the ideology of apartheid. This delegitimation was possible because these studies were based on the same historical sources as those used by Afrikaner Nationalists used to justify apartheid. By demonstrating that the sources themselves did not support Nationalist claims these authors struck a body blow at the intellectual edifice that maintained the self-confidence of Afrikaner Nationalist intellectuals. At the same time other authors, such as Charles Villa-Vicencio and James Cochran, joined the fray. But, these latter writers were not trained historians. Rather they were theologians who used history as a tool in the "as a basis for ecclesial renewal" and to "understand the character of the church in South Africa and identify its social function" [Villa-Vicenciio 1988:1]. Worthy as these goals were these theologians appropriated historical evidence rather like fundamentalist Christians use proof texts from the Bible to support their arguments. Thus the historical record was forced into preconceived neo-Marxist ideological frameworks for the purpose of undermining support for apartheid. The problem with this approach was that it often distorted and misrepresented the source documents [Cf. Hexham 1989; 1993]. At this point, it is necessary to add that whenever one talks about the "distortion" or “misrepresentation” of sources it is important to recognize that everyone makes the occasional mistake. It is also true that in many cases legitimate questions of interpretation may arise when various scholars see the significance of the same piece of evidence differently. Therefore, what I am objecting to is not the occasional mistake, questionable usage, or issues of genuine interpretation. Rather, it is the systematic use or misuse of source texts to support a grand theory without regard to the context and clear intent of the original sources. Such practices ignore historical methods for the purpose of promoting an ideology [Himmelfarb 1987; Elton 1967 and 1991] The problem, of course, is that once these techniques are generally accepted the choice of ideology can change. Today they are used to promote democracy and tolerance. Tomorrow they may be used to promote totalitarianism and racism.

\*\*\*Interpretation Debate\*\*\*

2NC Interpretation Extension

(IF THEY READ A PLAN TEXT)

Our interpretation is that the affirmative must defend the hypothetical world in which their plan is passed by the USfg – this is reasonable interp because all we ask is that the affirmative defend something they already advocate – and this argument is the most predictable given the wording of the resolution because –

A. Resolved means to enact by law

B. The USfg is the government in Washington, we are not the government, so the affirmative changes the actor of the resolution

(IF THEY DON’T)

Our interpretation is that the affirmative must defend the resolution – this is fair because the debate community agreed on a resolution and the affirmative needs to abide by that – they don’t enact a governmental policy – their failure to do so proves them non-topical because

A. Resolved means to enact by law

B. The USfg is the government in Washington, we are not the government, so the

affirmative changes the actor of the resolution

2NC AT: Counter-Interpretation

The affirmative claims that they are a form of politics –

1. This doesn’t mean they meet our interpretation – they still fail to defend a hypothetical implementation of the plan by the United States federal government

2. Their form of thinking is bad – regardless of whether “thinking is good”, a failure to engage in governmental reforms causes a takeover by imperialist elites

3. This interpretation is arbitrary and unlimiting – in their view, anything can count as politics, which justifies all counter interpretations, that is impacted by the 1NC Lutz evidence

4. Switch-Side debate solves this – all conceptions of politics can be run on the negative

\*\*\*Violation Debate\*\*\*

2NC Violation Extension

Extend our violation – the affirmative doesn’t defend a hypothetical implementation of the plan/resolution

2NC AT: We Meet – We Affirm the Rez as “X”

This does not meet our interpretation

1. You do not defend an implementation by the USfg – that is the vital internal link to all of our offense

2. This is the death of fairness – you can affirm the topic as a metaphor, doorknob, dance, rap, dream, or literally anything you want – Lutz impacts this

3. Our definitions of Resolved and the USfg prove that this argument is false – affirming the resolution is a governmental action – they do not do this

\*\*\*Topicality Debate\*\*\*

2NC Topicality Extension

Extend our topicality claim – they violate two words in the resolution

A. First is resolved – resolved means to enact by law – they don’t enact any governmental policy

B. Second is USfg – the actor of the affirmative is the debaters/judge, not the USfg, that justifies infinite amounts of actors who can do the plan – that jacks predictability

This is a priori –

A. Shively says it is a precursor to debate – we cannot debate without knowing what we are debating about

B. It is key to preserve competitive equity – failure to defend a plan allows the affirmative to forego defending disadvantages to the plan – that gives the affirmative an unfair competitive advantage

C. It is a jurisdictional issue – it is outside your power as a judge to vote for a non-topical plan

2NC AT: Topicality is Exclusionary

1. Exclusion is inevitable – Time constraints and the judge’s decision at the end of the debate means that certain forms of exclusion are inevitable in debate

2. Non-topical affirmatives are BAD for activism – Non-topical cases mean negatives can’t adequately prepare to refute the case, so our discussions of rhetoric are one-sided, meaning we can never learn about which strategies really are best for activism. Extend the 1NC shively evidence – their unwillingness to agree to any static rules to govern debate renders their resistance meaningless because it prevents the form of intellectual inquiry which is necessary to discerning strategies for true resistance AND their unwillingness to defend a stable course of governmental action denies them any focal point for social transformation.

3. Their kritik just proves a reason to vote negative – their criticism of the resolution should be OUR ground. This is key to predictability in debates while still allowing discussion of the issue

4. Kritiks of T aren’t a voting issue – instead, just evaluate it as an education-based reason to prefer their interpretation

5. Debating the merits of specific governmental policy provides an essential check on the hegemony of the bureaucratic state, prevents totalitarianism

Torgerson 99 (Douglas professor of poli sci, “The promise of Green Politics” p. 154-6)

One rationale for Arendt’s emphasis on the intrinsic value of politics is that this value has been so neglected by modernity that politics itself is threatened. Without a celebration of the intrinsic value of politics, neither functional nor constitutive political activity has any apparent rationale for continuing once its ends have been achieved. Functional politics might well be replaced by a technocratic management of advanced industrial society. A constitutive politics intent on social transformation might well be eclipsed by the coordinated direction of a cohesive social movement. In neither case would any need be left for what Arendt takes to be the essence of politics, there would be no need for debate. Green authoritarianism, following in the footsteps of Hobbes, has been all too ready to reduce politics to governance. Similarly, proponents of deep ecology, usually vague about politics, at least have been able to recognize totalitarian dangers in a position that disparages public opinion in favor of objective management? Any attempt to plot a comprehensive strategy for a cohesive green movement, moreover, ultimately has to adopt a no- nonsense posture while erecting clear standards by which to identify and excommunicate the enemy that is within. Green politics from its inception, however, has challenged the officialdom of advanced industrial society by invoking the cultural idiom of the carnivalesque. Although tempted by visions of tragic heroism, as we saw in chapter , green politics has also celebrated the irreverence of the comic, of a world turned upside down to crown the fool. In a context of political theater, instrumentalism is often attenuated, at least momentarily displaced by a joy of performance. The comic dimension of political action can also be more than episodic. The image of the Lilliputians tying up the giant suggests well the strength and flexibility of a decentered constitutive politics. In a functional context, green politics offers its own technology of foolish ness in response to the dysfunctions of industrialism, even to the point of exceeding the comfortable limits of a so-called responsible foolishness. Highlighting the comic, these tendencies within green politics begin to suggest an intrinsic value to politics. To the extent that this value is recognized, politics is inimical to authoritarianism and offers a poison pill to the totalitarian propensities of an industrialized mass society. To value political action for its own sake, in other words, at least has the significant extrinsic value of defending against the antipolitical inclinations of modernity. But what is the intrinsic value of politics? Arendt would locate this value in the virtuosity of political action, particularly as displayed in debate. Although political debate surely has extrinsic value, this does not exhaust its value. Debate is a language game that, to be played well, cannot simply be instrumentalized for the services it can render but must also be played for its own sake. Any game pressed into the service of external goals tends to lose its playful quality; it ceases to be fun. It was in reflecting on the social movements of the 1960s that Arendt proclaimed the discovery that political action was fun. It was fun even though it sprang from moral purposes and even though political debate also enhanced the rationality of opinion formation. Arendt’s affirmation of the apparently frivolous value of fun sharply contrasts with her earlier celebration of glory, even of public happiness. The affirmation nonetheless suggests a particular promise of politics, a promise especially contained in the comic dimension of green politics.

2NC AT: Language is Fluid

they claim language is fluid

1. Shively precedes this – if language is indeed fluid, we must both come to a prior agreement on its meeting before a fair debate can take place

2. We agree – our argument is not that all language has an objective meaning – we argue that language is subjective and that we should argue about which definitions are best for this context

\*\*\*Fairness Debate\*\*\*

2NC Fairness Extension

Extend our fairness claim – we are making a few distinct arguments here – if the aff doesn’t have to defend a policy action they can defend an action that is:

A. Non-falsifiable – they can run affirmatives that have no proof and means we cannot have arguments against them

B. Unpredicable – they can run something we have never heard of, the resolution sticks them to the scope of a pre-determined stasis for debate – impacted by Shively

C. Totalizing – the aff can say that rape is bad and we have no arguments against it

D. Personal Claims – they can tell a story, recount a dream, or any number of things that only have happened to them, and we cannot be ready for them

Fairness is impacted by the Shively evidence – establishment of fair limits and rules of the subject of debate are a precursor to debate

Turns the aff – their movement is more successful in a world of fairness because all people have equal opportunities to access its benefits

2NC AT: Nazis Wanted Fairness

This argument is absurd

1. I’m sure the Jews wanted fairness too…

2. We aren’t Nazis…

3. The Nazis did a lot of things, just because the Nazis wore pants and so did we doesn’t mean we are Nazis

2NC AT: Your Conception of Fairness is Bad

they say our conception of fairness is bad -

1. Shively precludes this argument – we agree to a conception of fairness prior to the round by selecting the resolution – this concept of fairness is agreed on as a point of stasis – it is not arbitrarily conceived of by us

2. Your conception of fairness is worse – it argues that people can do whatever they want and ignore rules – that justifies endless violence and the worst excesses of humans

2NC AT: Education Precedes Fairness

They say education precedes fairness –

1. We access a better internal to education –

A. Because fairness is key to clash, which means better education about both sides of any issue

B. Because learning about the implementation of the plan is key to understanding governmental procedure

C. Because resolutional education means we learn new things every year

2. Fairness precedes education

A. Education is inevitable, if we sit around and debate for an hour, we will learn something – it’s a question of balanced arguments

B. The best education is research – if we research for the topic and can’t use it because you run a kritik aff, then we don’t learn how to implement our information and analyze information

3. Education is inevitable – it’s a question of policy vs. kritikal education

2NC AT: Fairness is Arbitrary

They say fairness is arbitrary

1. Shively precludes this argument – we agree to a conception of fairness prior to the round by selecting the resolution – this concept of fairness is agreed on as a point of stasis – it is not arbitrarily conceived of by us

2. And, the affirmative is more arbitrary – they run arguments that are not even tangentially related to the resolution –

2NC AT: Fairness is Utopian

They say we can never have fair debates

1. This isn’t true – sticking to a prior point of stasis allows for predictable arguments that can be met with clash

2. Even if fairness if impossible, we should strive towards it – fairness is a question of degree, even if we are not 100% fair, being more fair is a good thing

\*\*\*Switch-Side Debate\*\*\*

2NC Switch-Side Extension

Three distinct arguments on the Switch Side debate

1. Spending both aff and neg rounds theorizing about the failure of the IR system is a waste – only considering both sides of an issue allows for true education about it

2. Voting affirmative is not key – you can vote negative to endorse their project – in fact, their focus on the ballot is flawed – they still focus on winning, which means their project is not truly revolutionary –

3. They can run their kritik when they are negative while still preserving fairness by being topical

No offense – even though debate might be flawed, switch-side checks all offense

Muir 93 (Department of Communications at George Mason, Star, “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 26(4), Gale Academic)JFS

Contemporary debate, even in the context of a vigorous defense, does have its drawbacks. It tends to overemphasize logic and tactics and to downplay personal feelings; it is by nature competitive, and therefore susceptible to competitive impulses and techniques (such as rapid speaking and a multiplicity of arguments); and it can desensitize debaters to real human problems and needs through continual labeling and discussion of abstract issues on paper. These problems, however, are more than matched by the conceptual flexibility, empathy, and familiarity with significant issues provided by switch-side debate. The values of tolerance and fairness, implicit in the metaphor of debate as game, are idealistic in nature. They have a much greater chance of success, however, in an activity that requires students to examine and understand both sides of an issue. In his description of debating societies, Robert Louis Stevenson questions the prevalence of unreasoned opinion, and summarizes the judgment furthered in this work: Now, as the rule stands, you are saddled with the side you disapprove, and so you are forced, by regard for your own fame, to argue out, to feel with, to elaborate completely, the case as it stands against yourself; and what a fund of wisdom do you not turn up in this idle digging of the vineyard! How many new difficulties take form before your eyes! how many superannuated arguments cripple finally into limbo, under the glance of your enforced eclecticism! . . . It is as a means of melting down this museum of premature petrifactions into living and impressionable soul that we insist on their utility.

2NC AT: Switch-Side Kills Advocacy

They say switch-side kills real advocacy

1. Switch side is key to true advocacy – before we make up our mind about what we believe in, we must consider both positions

2. Debate is not a forum for advocacy – speech times, judging, competition

2NC AT: Switch-Side Causes Relativism

They claim switch-side debating causes relativism –

1. Switch-side debate doesn't encourage relativism – it fosters tolerance without committing students to active moral irresponsibility

Muir 93 (Department of Communications at George Mason, Star, “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 26(4), Gale Academic)JFS

A final indictment of values clarification education is that it encourages relativism, Stewart, for example, sees value clarification as individualistic, personal, and situational.^' He also characterizes values clarification as possessing a hidden set of values (an "absolute relativism") that includes purposefulness, strong beliefs, and thoughtfulness, among others. This "hidden curriculum" of values clarification formulates responses to situations while decrying such pre-judgment. In obvious ways, switch-side debate illustrates the same dilemma: No one value is seen as correct and unassailable, yet certain values get placed above others as a matter of procedure. Both features need to be explicitly addressed since both reflect directly on debate as a tool of moral pedagogy. The first response to the charge of relativism is that switch-side debate respects the existence of divergent beliefs, but focuses attention on assessing the validity of opposing belief systems. Scriven argues that the "confusion of pluralism, of the proper tolerance for diversity of ideas, with relativism—the doctrine that there are no right and wrong answers in ethics or religion—is perhaps the most serious ideological barrier to the implementation of moral education today. "^ The process of ethical inquiry is central to such moral education, but the allowance of just any position is not. Here is where cognitive-development diverges from the formal aims of values clarification. Where clarification ostensibly allows any value position, cognitive-development progresses from individualism to social conformity to social contract theory to universal ethical principles. A pluralistic pedagogy does not imply that all views are acceptable: It is morally and pedagogically correct to teach about ethics, and the skills of moral analysis rather than doctrine, and to set out the arguments for and against tolerance and pluralism. All of this is undone if you also imply that all the various incompatible views about abortion or pornography or war are equally right, or likely to be right, or deserving of respect. Pluralism requires respecting the right to hold divergent beliefs; it implies neither tolerance of actions based on those beliefs nor respecting the content of the beliefs. The role of switch-side debate is especially important in the oral defense of arguments that foster tolerance without accruing the moral complications of acting on such beliefs. The forum is therefore unique in providing debaters with attitudes of tolerance without committing them to active moral irresponsibility. As Freeley notes, debaters are indeed exposed to a multivalued world, both within and between the sides of a given topic. Yet this exposure hardly commits them to such "mistaken" values. In this view, the divorce of the game from the "real world" can be seen as a means of gaining perspective without obligating students to validate their hypothetical value structure through immoral actions.

2. Relativism is good – it allows us to adapt and understand context – the affirmative tries to posit universal truths which are false – preemptive killing may be bad, but killing in self-defense might not, understanding these distinctions is key to morality

\*\*\*Shively Debate\*\*\*

2NC Shively Extension

Extend our Shively argument – The question of what we are debating about takes precedence over all other claims – we must establish what we are debating about before we do it

**This is a d-rule – impossible to be negative without prior agreement on the terms of the resolution**

**Shively** 2k (Ruth Lessl, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, *Political Theory and Partisan Politics* p. 182-3)

The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert. But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest. It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implications, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion.Yet difficulties remain. For and then proceed to debate without attention to further agreements. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements. Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.

**Our argument doesn’t preclude revolutionary conceptions of the resolution –grounding radical activism in the rules of political contest is the only truly subversive act**

**Shively** 2k (Ruth Lessl Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 180)

'Thus far, I have argued that if the ambiguists mean to be subversive about anything, they need to be conservative about some things. They need to be steadfast supporters of the structures of openness and democracy: willing to say "no" to certain forms of contest; willing to set up certain clear limitations about acceptable behavior. To this, finally, I would add that if the ambiguists mean to stretch the boundaries of behavior—if they want to be revolutionary and disruptive in their skepticism and iconoclasm—they need first to be firm believers in something. Which is to say, again, they need to set clear limits about what they will and will not support, what they do and do not believe to be best. As G. K. Chesterton observed, the true revolutionary has always willed something "definite and limited." For example, "The Jacobin could tell you not only the system he would rebel against, but (what was more important) the system he would not rebel against..." He "desired the freedoms of democracy." He "wished to have votes and not to have titles . . ." But "because the new rebel is a skeptic"—because he cannot bring himself to will something definite and limited— "he cannot be a revolutionary." For "the fact that he wants to doubt everything really gets in his way when he wants to denounce anything" (Chesterton 1959,41). Thus, the most radical skepticism ends in the most radical conservatism. In other words, a refusal to judge among ideas and activities is, in the end, an endorsement of the status quo. To embrace everything is to be unable to embrace a particular plan of action, for to embrace a particular plan of action is to reject all others, at least for that moment. Moreover, as observed in our discussion of openness, to embrace everything is to embrace self-contradiction: to hold to both one's purposes and to that which defeats one's purposes—to tolerance and intolerance, open-mindedness and close-mindedness, democracy and tyranny. In the same manner, then, the ambiguists' refusals to will something "definite and limited" undermines their revolutionary impulses. In their refusal to say what they will not celebrate and what they will not rebel against, they deny themselves (and everyone else in their political world) a particular plan or ground to work from. By refusing to deny incivility, they deny themselves a civil public space from which to speak. They cannot say "no" to the terrorist who would silence dissent. They cannot turn their backs on the bullying of the white supremacist. And, as such, in refusing to bar the tactics of the anti-democrat, they refuse to support the tactics of the democrat. In short, then, to be a true ambiguist, there must be some limit to what is ambiguous. To fully support political contest, one must fully support some uncontested rules and reasons. To generally reject the silencing or exclusion of others, one must sometimes silence or exclude those who reject civility and democracy.

\*\*\*Lutz Debate\*\*\*

2NC Lutz Extension

Extend the Lutz evidence – there are an infinite number of frameworks between degrees – there are two opposite extremes, and everything in between, the aff could pick any of these frameworks, jacking predictability – and Lutz says anyone can idealize about a perfect world, but our duty as debaters is to prescribe pragmatic policies that can actually have real change

\*\*\*Boggs Debate\*\*\*

2NC Boggs Extension

Extend the Boggs card – a failure to engage politics leaves a vacuum for elites to fill with racist, imperialist, warmongering policies – critiques of the state fail and lead to more authoritarianism

Exposing the flaws of the system does nothing – real change must start with the state

**Johnston 5** (Adrian, Dept of Philosophy, New Mexico University, International Journal of Zizek Studies, Vol. 1)JFS

However, the absence of this type of Lacan-underwritten argument in Žižek’s socio- political thought indicates something important. Following Lacan, Žižek describes instances of the tactic of “lying in the guise of truth” and points to late-capitalist cynicism as a key example of this (here, cynically knowing the truth that “the System” is a vacuous sham produces no real change in behavior, no decision to stop acting “as if” this big Other is something with genuine substantiality).149 Žižek proclaims that, “the starting point of the critique of ideology has to be full acknowledgement of the fact that it is easily possible to lie in the guise of truth.”150 Although the Lacanian blurring of the boundary between theoretical thinking and practical action might very well be completely true, accepting it as true inevitably risks strengthening a convenient alibi—the creation of this alibi has long been a fait accompli for which Lacan alone could hardly be held responsible—for the worst sort of intellectualized avoidance of praxis. Academics can convincingly reassure themselves that their inaccessible, abstract musings, the publications of which are perused only by their tiny self-enclosed circle of “ivory tower” colleagues, aren’t irrelevant obscurities made possible by tacit complicity with a certain socio-economic status quo, but, rather, radical political interventions that promise sweeping changes of the predominating situation. If working on signifiers is the same as working in the streets, then why dirty one’s hands bothering with the latter?

Debate empowers democratic decision-makers and preserves the process of democratic deliberation.

**Hill 8** (Sara, Afterschool Matters: Creative Programs That Connect Youth Development and Student Achievement, MEd from the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and her EdD from Peabody College, Vanderbilt University)JFS

Civic education, or what we are calling democracy skill-building experiences, can help to empower youth to become engaged learners, critical thinkers, and active citizens, as well as to be more academically prepared. At a time when the civic participation of young people is becoming less frequent, out-of-school time and youth development programs, such as an urban debate club, offers a possible model for using the out-of-school time hours to foster civic participation, democracy skill building, and learning. This chapter describes an urban youth debate league and how this type of program can be a part of the vision of a more informed and active youth citizenry. This chapter discusses these questions: What might “democracy in action” look like in out-of-school time and youth development programs, and how does it relate to learning? How does urban debate serves as an example of democracy skill building during the out-of-school time hours? What are the program and policy supports needed to support a civic engagement and democracy skill-building role for out-of-school time hours? The chapter concludes with information important for youth program providers, policy makers, and other individuals and organizations seeking to foster youth democracy development and participation during out-of-school time hours. There is consensus that to preserve a democracy requires the development of democratic citizens. How we think about the formation of democratic citizens depends on the specific conception of democracy we hold, whether it is a set of skills, level of participation, civic discourse, community mobilization, or exercise of certain rights and responsibilities (Galston, 2001). Educators and government leaders agree on the importance of democratic education because of society’s reliance on the people to make deliberate choices about the direction of their collective lives (Battistoni, 1985). Yet there is a range of terms used in the language to describe democratic development or civic engagement.

2NC AT: Debate 🡪 Social Movements

They say debate can be used for social movements –

1. This isn’t true – debate is a contest to see who can make better arguments – its competitive nature makes it non-receptive to movement

2. Debate is a bad place for movements – nobody pays attention to debates besides debaters – there will be less overall change in a debate movement

3. The aff is a pointless cultural criticism – they only affect the people in this room – vote neg to prevent debate from becoming an underground irrelevancy

Mann 95 (Paul, Pomona College, Dept. of English, Post-Modern Culture 5(3), http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/text-only/issue.595/mann.595)JFS

Apocalyptic cults and youth gangs, garage bands and wolfpacks, \*colleges\* and phalansteries, espionage network trading in vaporous facts and networks of home shoppers for illicit goods; monastic, penological, mutant-biomorphic, and anarcho-terrorist cells; renegade churches, dwarf communities, no-risk survivalist enclaves, unfunded quasi-scientific research units, paranoid think tanks, unregistered political parties, sub-employed workers councils, endo-exile colonies, glossolaliac fanclubs, acned anorexic primal hordes; zombie revenants, neo-fakirs, defrocked priests and detoxing prophets, psychedelic snake-oil shills, masseurs of undiagnosed symptoms, bitter excommunicants, faceless narcissists, ideological drag queens, mystical technophiles, sub-entrepreneurial dealers, derivative \*derivistes\*, tireless archivists of phantom conspiracies, alien abductees, dupe attendants, tardy primitives, vermin of abandoned factories, hermits, cranks, opportunists, users, connections, outriders, outpatients, wannabes, hackers, thieves, squatters, parasites, saboteurs; wings, wards, warehouses, arcades, hells, hives, dens, burrows, lofts, flocks, swarms, viruses, tribes, movements, groupuscules, cenacles, isms, and the endlessly multiplied hybridization of variant combinations of all these, and more... Why this stupid fascination with stupid undergrounds? What is it about these throwaway fanzines and unreadable rants, these neo-tattoos and recycled apocalypses, this mountainous accumulation of declassified factoids, these bloody smears, this incredible noise? Why wade through these piles of nano-shit? Why submit oneself to these hysterical purveyors, these hypertheories and walls of sound? Why insist on picking this particular species of nit? Why abject criticism, whose putative task was once to preserve the best that has been known and thought, by guilty association with so fatuous, banal, idiotic, untenable a class of cultural objects? Why not decline, not so politely, to participate in the tiny spectacle of aging intellectuals dressing in black to prowl festering galleries and clubs where, sometime before dawn, they will encounter the contemptuous gaze of their own children, and almost manage to elide that event when they finally produce their bilious reports, their chunks of cultural criticism? No excuse, no justification: all one can put forward is an unendurable habit of attention, a meager fascination, no more or less commanding than that hypnosis one enters in the face of television; a rut that has always led downward and in the end always found itself stuck on the surface; a kind of drivenness, if not a drive; a \*critique\*, if you can forgive such a word, that has never located any cultural object whose poverty failed to reflect its own; a rage to find some point at which criticism would come to an end, and that only intensified as that end-point receded and shrunk to the size of an ideal. [2] Then if one must persist in investigating these epi-epiphenomena, perhaps compelled by some critical fashion (no doubt already out of vogue), perhaps merely out of an interminable immaturity, why not refer the stupid underground back to all the old undergrounds, back to the most familiar histories? Why not cast it as nothing more than another and another and another stillborn incarnation of an avant-garde that wallows in but doesn't quite believe its own obituaries, and that one has already wasted years considering? Why not just settle for mapping it according to the old topography of center and margin, or some other arthritic dichotomy that, for all their alleged postness, the discourses we are about to breach always manage to drag along behind them? Why not simply accede to the mock-heroic rhetoric of cultural opposition (subversion, resistance, etc.) that, after a generation of deconstructions, we still don't have the strength to shake; or to the nouveau rhetoric of multiplicity (plurality, diversity, etc.), as if all one needed was to add a few more disparate topic headings to break the hold of a One that, in truth, one still manages to project in the very act of superceding it? Nothing will prevent us—indeed, nothing can save us--from ransoming ourselves again and again to the exhausted mastery of these arrangements; nothing will keep us from orienting ourselves toward every difference by means of the most tattered maps. But at the same time we must entertain--doubtless the right word--the sheer possibility that what we encounter here is not just one more margin or one more avant-garde, however impossible it will be to avoid all the orders and terms attendant upon those venerable and ruined cultural edifices. We must remain open to the possibility that this stupid underground poses all the old questions but a few more as well, that it might suggest another set of cultural arrangements, other topographies and other mappings, however unlikely that might be. In any case, whatever vicarious attractions the stupid underground offers the bored intellectual groping for a way to heat up his rhetoric, if not his thought, whatever else we might encounter here, it is important to insist that you will not find these maps laid out for your inspection, as if on an intellectual sale table, and rated for accuracy and charm. No claim is being staked here; no one is being championed, no one offered up on the critical auction block as the other of the month. There is nothing here to choose; all the choices have already been made. One can only hope, in what will surely prove an idle gesture, to complicate cultural space for a moment or two,

2NC Apolitical Theorizing Does Nothing

Apolitical theorizing exists only in the ivory tower and fails to persuade anyone or change anything

Lepgold and Nincic 1  (Joesph, associate professor of Government at Georgetown and Miroslav professor of Poly Sci at UC-Davis, Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance pg. 2-4)JFS

For many reasons, connections between scholarly ideas and policymakers’ thinking in international relations are less common today, and the gap may grow unless we rethink carefully our approach to policy relevance. Deep, often ritualized rivalry among theoretical schools makes it unlikely that fu- ture officials will leave their university training in this subject with a clear, well-formed worldview. Such intellectual competition, of course, could be stimulating and useful, especially if it led officials to question their basic causal assumptions or consider rival explanations of the cases they face. More commonly, officials seem to remember the repetitive, often strident theo- retical debates as unproductive and tiresome. Not only is much international relations scholarship tedious, in their view; it is often technically quite dif- ficult. Partly for this reason, much of it is so substantively arid that even many scholarly specialists avoid trying to penetrate it. From a practitioner’s perspective, it often seems as if university scholars are increasingly “with- drawing . . . behind a curtain of theory and models” that only insiders can penetrate. In addition, for many observers, the end of the cold war has made it harder to find models providing a compelling link between the international environment and manipulable policy instruments. One exception to this growing split between scholars of international relations and policymakers is the work on the inter-democratic peace, which we discuss in chapter 5. This work, as we will show, has deeply influenced many contemporary policymakers. But, for the most part, it remains the exception; the profes- sional gap between academics and practitioners has widened in recent years. Many scholars no longer try to reach beyond the Ivory Tower, and officials seem increasingly content to ignore it. According to much conventional wisdom, this situation is unsurprising. International relations scholars and practitioners have different professional priorities and reflect different cultures. Not only is it often assumed that good theory must sacrifice policy relevance; but also those seeking guidance in diagnosing policy situations and making policy choices, it is often thought, must look for help in places other than contemporary social science research. This book challenges much of the conventional wisdom on these issues. It argues that IR theorists and foreign policy practitioners have important needs in common as well as needs that are different. Social science theory seeks to identify and explain the significant regularities in human affairs. Because people’s ability to process information is limited, they must perceive the world selectively in order to operate effectively in it; constructing and using theories in a self-conscious way helps to inject some rigor into these processes.6 For these reasons, both theorists and practitioners seek a clear and powerful understanding of cause and effect about policy issues, in order to help them diagnose situations, define the range of possibilities they con- front, and evaluate the likely consequences of given courses of action. At the same time, a deep and continuing concern for the substance and stakes involved in real-world issues can help prevent theorists’ research agendas from becoming arid or trivial. This book therefore has two objectives: to elaborate and justify the reasoning that leads to these conclusions, and to illustrate how scholarship on international relations and foreign policy can be useful beyond the Ivory Tower.

2NC Apolitical Theorizing Does Nothing

Theorizing about epistemology, ontology, and methodology is useless – only policy discussions will have an impact outside of this debate

Lepgold and Nincic 1  (Joesph, associate professor of Government at Georgetown and Miroslav professor of Poly Sci at UC-Davis, Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance pg. 6-7)JFS

Unlike literature, pure mathematics, or formal logic, the study of inter- national relations may be valued largely for its practical implications and insights. SIR, like the major social-science disciplines, initially gained a firm foundation in academia on the assumption that it contributes to improved policy.9 It is part of what August Comte believed would constitute a new, “positive” science of society, one that would supersede the older tradition of metaphysical speculation about humanity and the social world. Progress toward this end has been incomplete as well as uneven across the social sciences. But, in virtually all of these fields, it has been driven by more than just curiosity as an end in itself. Tightening our grip on key social processes via improved understanding has always been a major incentive for new knowledge in the social sciences, especially in the study of international relations. This broad purpose covers a lot of specific ground. Policymakers want to know what range of effective choice they have, the likely international and domestic consequences of various policy decisions, and perhaps whether, in terms of more general interests and values, contemplated policy objectives are really desirable, should they be achievable. But the practical implications of international issues hardly end there. How wars start and end, the causes and implications of economic interdependence, and what leverage individ- ual states might have on trans-state problems greatly affects ordinary citizens’ physical safety, prosperity, and collective identity. Today, it is hard to think of any major public-policy issue that is not affected by a state’s or society’s relationships with other international actors. Because the United States looms so large within the international system, its citizens are sometimes unaware of the range and impact of international events and processes on their condition. It may take an experience such as the long gas lines in the 1970s or the foreign-inspired terrorist bombings in the 1990s to remind them how powerfully the outside world now impinges upon them. As Karl Deutsch observed, even the smallest states can no longer effectively isolate themselves, and even the largest ones face limits on their ability to change others’ behavior or values.11 In a broad sense, globalization means that events in many places will affect people’s investment opportu- nities, the value of their money, whether they feel that their values are safe or under attack, and perhaps whether they will be safe from attack by weap- ons of mass destruction or terrorism. These points can be illustrated by observing university undergraduates, who constitute one of the broadest categories of people who are potentially curious about IR. Unlike doctoral students, they care much less about po- litical science than about the substance of politics. What they seem to un- derstand is that the subject matter of SIR, regardless of the level of theoretical abstraction at which it is discussed, inherently has practical implications. One might argue that whatever our purpose in analyzing IR might be, we can have little confidence in our knowledge absent tightly developed theory and rigorous research. One might then infer that a concern with the practical implications of our knowledge is premature until the field of SIR is better developed on its own terms. But if one assumes that SIR inherently has significant real-world implications, one could also conclude that the balance in contemporary scholarship has veered too far from substance and too close to scholasticism. As in other fields driven by a concern with real-world developments, SIR research has been motivated by both internally- and externally-driven con- cerns. The former are conceptual, epistemological, and methodological mat- ters that scholars believe they need to confront to do their intellectual work: Which research programs are most apt to resolve the field’s core puzzles? What is the meaning of contested concepts? Which empirical evidence or methods are especially useful, convincing, or weak in this field? The latter consist of issues relevant to policy practitioners and citizens: How can people prepare to deal with an uncertain future? More specifically, how can they anticipate future international developments to which they might need to adapt, assess the likely consequences of measures to deal with that future, or at least think about such matters intelligently?12 While the best scholarly work tends to have important ramifications for both types of concerns, the academic emphasis has shifted too far toward work with little relevance out- side academia. This balance must be redressed if SIR is to resonate outside the Ivory Tower.

2NC Policy Debate Can Influence Policymakers

Theory can impact policymakers, but only if it focuses on practical policy issues

Lepgold and Nincic 1  (Joesph, associate professor of Government at Georgetown and Miroslav professor of Poly Sci at UC-Davis, Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance pg. 11-12)JFS

In some areas, foreign-policymakers have been deeply influenced by the theoretical literature in International Relations. Aside from the work the work on the interdemocratic peace discussed in chapter 5, and, to a lesser extent, some of the literature on international institutions examined in chap- ter 6, strategic studies has been most important in this respect. Such concepts as “escalation dominance” as well as the more general notion of the pris- oners’ dilemma were conceived by academics but have become part of the daily vocabulary of many practitioners. Work on deterrence, nuclear prolif- eration, arms control, and the use of coercive force has influenced a host of U.S. weapons-acquisition and force-management issues.24 At one time, such an impact on official thinking was not unusual. Concerns about effective public policy have traditionally been part of the academic study of politics; the American Political Science Association (APSA), for example, was founded in part to “bring political science to a position of authority as regards practical politics.”25 By moving professional scholars away from externally- driven issues, the professionalization of political science has molded the kind of work by which they earn professional prestige, making them less able or willing to communicate with policymakers. From the perspective of many officials, SIR scholars are comfortable on their side of the gap, free of any obligation to address practical issues.26 As a result, the public intellectuals who address current foreign policy issues now tend to have few or weak connections to universities, while the prominent scholars in this field tend to write almost exclusively for their own colleagues.

2NC Theory Trades Off With Politics

Theorizing is a direct trade-off with political action – that causes a resurgence of the genocidal atrocities of the 20th century

Wolin 4  (Richard, distinguished professor of intellectual history at Graduate Center, City University of New York, The Seduction of Unreason: the intellectual romance with fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism, pg. 8-9)JFS

The Seduction of Unreason is an exercise in intellectual genealogy. It seeks to shed light on the uncanny affinities between the Counter-Enlightenment and postmodernism. As such, it may also be read as an archaeology of postmodern theory. During the 1970s and 1980s a panoply of texts by Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze, and Lyotard were translated into English, provoking a far-reaching shift in American intellectual life. Many of these texts were inspired by Nietzsche’s anticivilizational animus: the conviction that our highest ideals of beauty, morality, and truth were intrinsically nihilistic. Such views found favor among a generation of academics disillusioned by the political failures of the 1960s. Understandably, in despondent times Nietzsche’s iconoclastic recommendation that one should “philosophize with a hammer”—that if something is falling, one should give it a final push—found a ready echo. Yet, too often, those who rushed to mount the Nietzschean bandwagon downplayed or ignored the illiberal implications of his positions. Moreover, in retrospect, it seems clear that this same generation, many of whose representatives were comfortably ensconced in university careers, had merely exchanged radical politics for textual politics: unmasking “binary oppositions” replaced an ethos of active political engagement. In the last analysis it seems that the seductions of “theory” helped redirect formerly robust political energies along the lines of acceptable academic career tracks. As commentators have often pointed out, during the 1980s, while Republicans were commandeering the nation’s political apparatus, partisans of “theory” were storming the ramparts of the Modern Language Association and the local English Department. Ironically, during the same period, the French paradigms that American academics were so busy assimilating were undergoing an eclipse across the Atlantic. In France they were perceived as expressions of an obsolete political temperament: gauchisme (“leftism”) or “French philosophy of the 1960s.”21 By the mid-1980s French intellectuals had passed through the acid bath of antitotalitarianism. Under the influence of Solzhenitsyn’s pathbreaking study of the Gulag as well as the timely, if slick, anticommunist polemics of the “New Philosophers” such as André Glucksmann and Bernard Henri-Lévy, who were appalled by the “killing fields” of Pol Pot’s Cambodia (the Khmer Rouge leader had been educated in Paris during the 1950s) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, French intellectuals began returning to the indigenous tradition of democratic republicanism—thereby leaving the 1960s leftists holding the bag of an outmoded philosophical anarchism. The tyrannical excesses of Third Worldism—China’s Cultural Revolution, Castro’s Cuba, Idi Amin’s Uganda, Mobutu’s Zaire, Duvalier’s Haiti—finally put paid to the delusion that the “wretched of the earth” were the bearers of a future socialist utopia. Suddenly, the nostrums of Western humanism, which the poststructuralists had emphatically denounced, seemed to merit a second look.

2NC Engaging Politics Solves Totalitarianism

A revitalized public sphere solves totalitarianism and includes all people

Lakeland, 93 (Paul, Fairfield Religious Studies Professor, “Preserving The Lifeworld, Restoring the Public Sphere, Renewing Higher Education” <http://www.crosscurrents.org/lakeland2>)JFS

How did we get from a democratic society in which the citizens--no matter how small a minority of the total community they constituted--truly felt they owned it, to one in which so many are alienated from the political process? One reason is that in the earlier years the expansion of citizenship and the subsequent increase in educational opportunities did not lead to the admission of these newly educated classes into the dialogue. Educational reform and improvement in the standard of living took place within European societies whose class, gender, and race-based social constraints underwent no serious change; a little learning did not a gentleman make. Another, more recent reason is that democratization was accompanied by capitalization, so that the passive consumption of culture and commodities with its attendant apolitical sociability was the path preferred by, or at least open to, the vast majority. In other words, there are just a lot more citizens; but many of these citizens are the victims of structural oppression, and all are lured by the blandishments of material ease. Again, to return to Habermas's forms of expression, all this amounts to the progressive colonization of the lifeworld by the system. If, in the past two hundred years, the public sphere has so completely failed to fulfill its promise as a market-place for the discourse of a free society, the project must be to restore it through the revival of true communicative action, that is, to persuade people to talk to one another with respect, to listen fairly, to argue cleanly, and to move towards consensus on norms for action. That way lies a democratic future. Any other way leads to one or another form of totalitarianism, including the totalitarianism of mass consumption culture whose victims are so easily persuaded to pursue its spurious salvation and ersatz heaven. However, the character of our modern world requires that steps taken to transform the public sphere respect and reflect the complexity of modern society. We are not just so many individuals sorted into different social classes. We are rather members of a number of sub-groups, perhaps defined by race, class, gender or religion, as well as members of the larger body politic. What will be needed is a confluence of these autonomous publics or distinct interest groups coming together in common concern for the preservation of democratic life. The public sphere will have to include many more voices than it did in the time of Samuel Johnson, and the consensus on social goods may seem even more elusive; but the dynamics of the process, so argues Habermas, will help ensure the preservation of a human society.

\*\*Consequentialism

Policymaking Requires Consequentialism

Even if their values are good, policymaking necessitates consequentialism

Brock, ‘87  [Dan W. Brock, Professor of Philosophy and Biomedical Ethics, and Director, Center for Biomedical Ethics at Brown University, Ethics, Vol. 97, No. 4, (Jul., 1987), pp. 786-791, JSTOR]JFS

When philosophers become more or less direct participants in the policy-making process and so are no longer academics just hoping that an occasional policymaker might read their scholarly journal articles, this scholarly virtue of the unconstrained search for the truth-all assumptions open to question and follow the arguments wherever they lead-comes under a variety of related pressures. What arises is an intellectual variant of the political problem of "dirty hands" that those who hold political power often face. I emphasize that I do not conceive of the problem as one of pure, untainted philosophers being corrupted by the dirty business of politics. My point is rather that the different goals of academic scholarship and public policy call in turn for different virtues and behavior in their practitioners. Philosophers who steadfastly maintain their academic ways in the public policy setting are not to be admired as islands of integrity in a sea of messy political compromise and corruption. Instead, I believe that if philosophers maintain the academic virtues there they will not only find themselves often ineffective but will as well often fail in their responsibilities and act wrongly. Why is this so? The central point of conflict is that the first concern of those responsible for public policy is, and ought to be, the consequences of their actions for public policy and the persons that those policies affect. This is not to say that they should not be concerned with the moral evaluation of those consequences-they should; nor that they must be moral consequentialists in the evaluation of the policy, and in turn human, consequences of their actions-whether some form of consequentialism is an adequate moral theory is another matter. But it is to say that persons who directly participate in the formation of public policy would be irresponsible if they did not focus their concern on how their actions will affect policy and how that policy will in turn affect people. The virtues of academic research and scholarship that consist in an unconstrained search for truth, whatever the consequences, reflect not only the different goals of scholarly work but also the fact that the effects of the scholarly endeavor on the public are less direct, and are mediated more by other institutions and events, than are those of the public policy process. It is in part the very impotence in terms of major, direct effects on people's lives of most academic scholarship that makes it morally acceptable not to worry much about the social consequences of that scholarship. When philosophers move into the policy domain, they must shift their primary commitment from knowledge and truth to the policy consequences of what they do. And if they are not prepared to do this, why did they enter the policy domain? What are they doing there?

Policymaking Requires Consequentialism

Even if deontology is right, states must act as consequentialists

Stelzig, ‘98 [Tim Stelzig, B.A. 1990, West Virginia University; M.A. 1995, University of Illinois at Chicago; J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Pennsylvania, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 901, March, 1998, L/N]JFS

This Comment seeks to dissipate the tension Blackstone broached when he stated that the "eternal boundaries" provided by our "indelible rights" sometimes must be "modified" or "narrowed" by the "local or occasional necessities of the state."(n269) Rights, as trumps against the world, ostensibly ought not to be things that may be cast aside. Yet, it is intuitively obvious that the state justifiably acts in ways impermissible for individuals as it collects taxes, punishes wrongdoers, and the like. Others have offered explanations for why coercive state action is morally justified. This Comment adds another. This Comment began by adopting deontology as a foundational theoretic assumption and briefly describing how deontology was to be understood herein. I then examined the characteristics of two leading theories of rights--Dworkin's theory of legal rights and Thomson's theory of moral rights. Although neither Dworkin nor Thomson is an absolutist with respect to rights, neither account explains why the state, but not individuals, may act in ways seemingly justifiable only on consequentialist grounds: that is, why the state may override the trumping effect of rights. In attempting to provide an answer to this question, I first noted that deontology does not exhaust moral discourse. The deontologist is forced to recognize that rights cannot capture everything of moral importance. I then provided several examples of distinctions recognized in the philosophical literature that delimit areas in which deontology does not apply, focusing in particular on the Trolley Problem and the distributive exemption from deontological norms that the Trolley Problem illustrates. The deontological exemption was examined fairly closely in order to enumerate the criteria that trigger the exemption and understand the principles that guide its application. By applying the distributive exemption to the state, I accomplished two things. First, I was able to provide a new justification for the existence of the coercive state, both when premised on the traditional assumptions of social contractarians, and when premised on a more realistic understanding of the modern state. Second, I was able to sketch the relationship between the constraints of rights and the demands of policy, justifying a state that provides for the general welfare without violating rights in a way objectionable to liberals. Libertarians have argued that such a state violates deontologicalnorms, that governmental intervention going beyond what is minimally necessary to preserve social order is not justified. Deontology does not require such a timid state and, moreover, finds desirable a state which promotes the general welfare to the fullest extent possible, even if in so doing it acts in ways deontologically objectionable for anyone other than one filling the government's unique role in society. More specifically, I argued that the government must consequentially justify its policy choices. The elegance of this particular rationale for the contours of permissible governmental action is that it remains a deontological justification at base. One of the worries of full-blown consequentialism is that it requires too much, that any putative right may be set aside if doing so would produce greater good. The justification offered here does not suffer that flaw. The distributive exemption does not permit that any one be sacrificed for the betterment of others; rather, it only permits a redistribution of inevitable harms, a diversion of an existing threatened harm to many such that it results in harm to fewer individuals.

Consequentialism Good – Lesser Evil

We must choose the lesser evil. Hard and fast rules about what is right must be made to limit further atrocities against civilization

**Issac 02** (Professor of political science at Indiana-Bloomington, PhD from Yale Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, p.)JFS

WHAT WOULD IT mean for the American left right now to take seriously the centrality of means in politics? First, it would mean taking seriously the specific means employed by the September 11 attackers--terrorism. There is a tendency in some quarters of the left to assimilate the death and destruction of September 11 to more ordinary (and still deplorable) injustices of the world system--the starvation of children in Africa, or the repression of peasants in Mexico, or the continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. But this assimilation is only possible by ignoring the specific modalities of September 11. It is true that in Mexico, Palestine, and elsewhere, too many innocent people suffer, and that is wrong. It may even be true that the experience of suffering is equally terrible in each case. But neither the Mexican nor the Israeli government has ever hijacked civilian airliners and deliberately flown them into crowded office buildings in the middle of cities where innocent civilians work and live, with the intention of killing thousands of people. Al-Qaeda did precisely this. That does not make the other injustices unimportant. It simply makes them different. It makes the September 11 hijackings distinctive, in their defining and malevolent purpose--to kill people and to create terror and havoc. This was not an ordinary injustice. It was an extraordinary injustice. The premise of terrorism is the sheer superfluousness of human life. This premise is inconsistent with civilized living anywhere. It threatens people of every race and class, every ethnicity and religion. Because it threatens everyone, and threatens values central to any decent conception of a good society, it must be fought. And it must be fought in a way commensurate with its malevolence. Ordinary injustice can be remedied. Terrorism can only be stopped. Second, it would mean frankly acknowledging something well understood, often too eagerly embraced, by the twentieth century Marxist left--that it is often politically necessary to employ morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends. A just or even a better society can only be realized in and through political practice; in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won't work. In such situations our choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is between the wrong that confronts us and the means--perhaps the dangerous means--we have to employ in order to oppose it. In such situations there is a danger that "realism" can become a rationale for the Machiavellian worship of power. But equally great is the danger of a righteousness that translates, in effect, into a refusal to act in the face of wrong. What is one to do? Proceed with caution. Avoid casting oneself as the incarnation of pure goodness locked in a Manichean struggle with evil. Be wary of violence. Look for alternative means when they are available, and support the development of such means when they are not. And never sacrifice democratic freedoms and open debate. Above all, ask the hard questions about the situation at hand, the means available, and the likely effectiveness of different strategies.

Consequentialism Good – Not Calculation

**No turns – consequentialism is more than pure calculation**

Ord 5 (Toby, Thesis Paper for Oxford in Philosophy, http://tinyurl.com/2c5456q)JFS

Consequentialism is often charged with being self-defeating, for if a person attempts to apply it, she may quite predictably produce worse outcomes than if she applied some other moral theory. Many consequentialists have replied that this criticism rests on a false assumption, confusing consequentialism’s criterion of the rightness of an act with its position on decision procedures. Consequentialism, on this view, does not dictate that we should be always calculating which of the available acts leads to the most good, but instead advises us to decide what to do in whichever manner it is that will lead to the best outcome. Whilst it is typically afforded only a small note in any text on consequentialism, this reply has deep implications for the practical application of consequentialism, perhaps entailing that a consequentialist should eschew calculation altogether.

**Consequentialism Good – Morals**

Consequentialism is not incompatible with morals – moralists do things based on whether they will have moral consequences

Frank 2 (Robert, Cornell University, “The Status of Moral Emotions in Consequentialist Moral Reasoning”, http://tinyurl.com/22truv3)JFS

The philosopher Bernard Williams describes an example in which a botanist wanders into a village in the jungle where ten innocent people are about to be shot. He is told that nine of them will be spared if he himself will shoot the tenth. What should the botanist do? Although most people would prefer to see only one innocent person die rather than ten, Williams argues that it would be wrong as a matter of principle for the botanist to shoot the innocent villager.2 And most people seem to agree. The force of the example is its appeal to a widely shared moral intuition. Yet some philosophers counter that it is the presumed validity of moral intuitions that such examples call into question (Singer, 2002). These consequentialists insist that whether an action is morally right depends only on its consequences. The right choice, they argue, is always the one that leads to the best overall consequences. I will argue that consequentialists make a persuasive case that moral intuitions are best ignored in at least some specific cases. But many consequentialists appear to take the stronger position that moral intuitions should play no role in moral choice. I will argue against that position on the grounds that should appeal to their way of thinking. As I will attempt to explain, ignoring moral intuitions would lead to undesirable consequences. My broader aim is to expand the consequentialist framework to take explicit account of moral sentiments.

Morality Bad – International Violence

Morality cannot address international violence – we must make sacrifices

**Issac 2** (Professor of political science at Indiana-Bloomington, PhD from Yale Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, p.)JFS

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

\*\*Utilitarianism

Utilitarianism Good – Public Sphere

Util can be used in the public sphere, and deontology in the private sphere

Goodin 95 (Robert E., Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy, Google Books)JFS

My concern in this book, true to the thrust of this introduction, is with utilitarianism as a public philosophy. My main concern is with the ways in which utilitarianism can be a good guide to public policies without necessarily being a good guide to private conduct. Nonetheless, in adducing many of its most important implication for public policy it is important to see at leas in broad outline how it would set about shaping private conduct. Utilitarians, and consequentialists more generally, are outcome-oriented. In sharp contrast to Ten Commandment-style deontological approaches, which specify certain actions to be done as a matter of duty, utilitarian theories assign people responsibility for producing certain results, leaving the individuals concerned broad discretion about how to achieve those results. The same basic difference in the two theories' approaches to assigning moral jobs reappears across all levels of moral agency, from private agency, from private individuals to collective (especially state) actors. The distinctively utilitarian approach, thus conceived, to international protection of the ozone layer is to assign states responsibility for producing certain effects, leaving them broad discretion in how they accomplish it (Chapter 18). The distinctively utilitarian approach, thus conceived, to the ethical defense of nationalism is couched in terms of delimiting state boundaries in such a way as to assign particular organization (Chapter 16). And, at a more domestic level of analysis, the distinctively utilitarian approach to the allocation of legal liabilities is to assign them to whomsoever can best discharge them (Chapters 5 through 7). The great advantage of utilitarianism as a guide to public conduct is that it avoids gratuitous sacrifices, it ensures we are able to ensure in the uncertain world of public policy-making that politics are sensitive to people's interests or desires or preferences. The great failing of more deontological theories, applied to those realism, is that they fixate upon duties done for the sake of duty rather than for the sake of any good that is done by doing one's duty. Perhaps it is permissible (perhaps it is even proper) for private individuals in the course of their personal affairs to fetishize duties done for their own sake. It would be a mistake for public officials to do likewise, not least because it is impossible. The fixation of motives makes absolutely no sense in the public realm, and might make precious little sense in the private one even, as Chapter 3 shows. The reason public action is required at all arises form the inability of uncoordinated individual action to achieve certain orally desirable ends. Individuals are rightly excused from pursuing those ends. The inability is real; the excuses, perfectly valid. But libertarians are right in their diagnosis, wrong in their prescription. That is the message of Chapter 2. The same thing that makes those excuses valid at the individual level the same thing that relives individuals of responsibility - makes it morally incumber upon individuals to organize themselves into collective units that are capable of acting where they as isolated individuals are not. When they organize themselves into these collective units, those collective deliberations inevitably take place under very different forms. Individuals are morally required to operate in that collective manner, in certain crucial respects. But they are practically circumscribed in how they can operate, in their collective mode. and those special constraints characterizing the public sphere of decision-making give rise to the special circumstances that make utilitarianism peculiarly apt for public policy-making, in ways set out more fully in Chapter 4. Government house utilitarianism thus understood is, I would argue, a uniquely defensible public philosophy.

Utilitarianism Good - Inevitable

Utilitarianism inevitable even in deontological frameworks

Green 2 (Assistant Professor Department of Psychology Harvard University Joshua, November 2002, 314) JFS

Some people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take priority over which. If that’s what we mean by 302 “balancing rights,” then we are wise to shun this sort of talk. Attempting to solve moral problems using a complex deontological algorithm is dogmatism at its most esoteric, but dogmatism all the same. However, it’s likely that when some people talk about “balancing competing rights and obligations” they are already thinking like consequentialists in spite of their use of deontological language. Once again, what deontological language does best is express the thoughts of people struck by strong, emotional moral intuitions: “It doesn’t matter that you can save five people by pushing him to his death. To do this would be a violation of his rights!”19 That is why angry protesters say things like, “Animals Have Rights, Too!” rather than, “Animal Testing: The Harms Outweigh the Benefits!” Once again, rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and absoluteness of the answer. But sometimes rights talk persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has faded. One thinks, for example, of the thousands of children whose lives are saved by drugs that were tested on animals and the “rights” of those children. One finds oneself balancing the “rights” on both sides by asking how many rabbit lives one is willing to sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so on, and at the end of the day one’s underlying thought is as thoroughly consequentialist as can be, despite the deontological gloss. And what’s wrong with that? Nothing, except for the fact that the deontological gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth that there really are “rights,” etc. Best to drop it. When deontological talk gets sophisticated, the thought it represents is either dogmatic in an esoteric sort of way or covertly consequentialist.

Utilitarianism Good – Moral

The advent of the nuclear age necessitates utilitarianism – absolutist ethics are self-contradictory

**Nye, 86** (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 18-19) JFS

The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case.34 Imagine that you are visiting a Central American country and you happen upon a village square where an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants lined up against a wall. When you ask the reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain's men last night. When you object to the killing of possibly innocent people, you are told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Just to prove the point that we all have dirty hands in such situations, the captain hands you a rifle and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other. Otherwise both die. He warns you not to try any tricks because his men have their guns trained on you. Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity by refusing to play his dirty game? The point of the story is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? Would it matter if there were twenty or 1,000 peasants to be saved? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons from a terrorists' nuclear device? At some point does not integrity become the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is more important than the lives of countless others? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences? Do absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a world of nuclear weapons? "Do what is right though the world should perish" was a difficult principle even when Kant expounded it in the eighteenth century, and there is some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then. Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.

**Utilitarianism Good – Must Assess All Risks**

The recent possibility of extinction requires assessment of all risks despite probability

Yudkowsky 8 (Full-time Research Fellow at the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence and Cofounder Eliezer, January 22nd 2008, “Circular Altruism”)JFS

Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios. More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, people tend to overestimate the probability that, e.g., seven events of 90% probability will all occur. Conversely, people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.) Dawes (1988) observes: 'In their summations lawyers avoid arguing from disjunctions ("either this or that or the other could have occurred, all of which would lead to the same conclusion") in favor of conjunctions. Rationally, of course, disjunctions are much more probable than are conjunctions.' The scenario of humanity going extinct in the next century is a disjunctive event. It could happen as a result of any of the existential risks discussed in this book - or some other cause which none of us fore saw. Yet for a futurist, disjunctions make for an awkward and unpoetic-sounding prophecy.

**Morality Bad – Survival Comes First**

Survival comes first – there is no point in preserving morality if we all die

**Nye, 86** (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 45-46)JFS

Is there any end that could justify a nuclear war that threatens the survival of the species? Is not all-out nuclear war just as self contradictory in the real world as pacifism is accused of being? Some people argue that "we are required to undergo gross injustice that will break many souls sooner than ourselves be the authors of mass murder."73 Still others say that "when a person makes survival the highest value, he has declared that there is nothing he will not betray. But for a civilization to sacrifice itself makes no sense since there are not survivors to give meaning to the sacrifical [sic] act. In that case, survival may be worth betrayal." Is it possible to avoid the "moral calamity of a policy like unilateral disarmament that forces us to choose between being dead or red (while increasing the chances of both)"?74 How one judges the issue of ends can be affected by how one poses the questions. If one asks "what is worth a billion lives (or the survival of the species)," it is natural to resist contemplating a positive answer. But suppose one asks, "is it possible to imagine any threat to our civilization and values that would justify raising the threat to a billion lives from one in ten thousand to one in a thousand for a specific period?" Then there are several plausible answers, including a democratic way of life and cherished freedoms that give meaning to life beyond mere survival. When we pursue several values simultaneously, we face the fact that they often conflict and that we face difficult tradeoffs. If we make one value absolute in priority, we are likely to get that value and little else. Survival is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of other values, but that does not make it sufficient. Logical priority does not make it an absolute value. Few people act as though survival were an absolute value in their personal lives, or they would never enter an automobile. We can give survival of the species a very high priority without giving it the paralyzing status of an absolute value. Some degree of risk is unavoidable if individuals or societies are to avoid paralysis and enhance the quality of life beyond mere survival. The degree of that risk is a justifiable topic of both prudential and moral reasoning.

AT: Calculation Bad

Your authors misunderstand utilitarianism – link turn – utilitarianism is against calculation

Chappell 5 (Richard, PhD in Philosophy from Princeton, Philosophy, Et Cetera, http://www.philosophyetc.net/2005/06/indirect-utilitarianism.html)JFS

Utilitarianism is a much maligned moral theory, in part because it's so easily abused. It's easy for people to misunderstand the theory, and use it, for example, to argue for totalitarianism. But of course utilitarianism properly understood recommends no such thing. In fact, it tends to support our common-sense moral intuitions. Strange as it may seem, utilitarianism recommends that we do not base our everyday moral decision-making on calculations of utility. Why is this? Well, utilitarianism says that we ought to do whatever would maximize utility. But attempting to reason in a utilitarian fashion tends to have disastrous consequences, and fails miserably to maximize utility. Therefore, we ought not to reason in a utilitarian manner. Instead, we should try to inculcate those dispositions and attitudes, and abide by those principles, that would tend to promote utility. That is, we should be honest, compassionate, loyal, trustworthy, averse to harming others, partial towards loved ones, and so forth. We should, in other words, be virtuous rather than scheming. J.L. Mackie (p.91) offers six utilitarian reasons for opposing "the direct use of utilitarian calculation as a practical working morality": 1. Shortage of time and energy will in general preclude such calculations. 2. Even if time and energy are available, the relevant information commonly is not. 3. An agent's judgment on particular issues is likely to be distorted by his own interests and special affections. 4. Even if he were intellectually able to determine the right choice, weakness of will would be likely to impair his putting of it into effect. 5. Even decisions that are right in themselves and actions based on them are liable to be misused as precedents, so that they will encourage and seem to legitimate wrong actions that are superficially similar to them. 6. And, human nature being what it is, a practical working morality must not be too demanding: it is worse than useless to set standards so high that there is no real chance that actions will even approximate to them.

\*\*Extinction

Extinction Outweighs – Laundry List

Extinction outweighs – no coping mechanisms, no experience, no trial-and-error, future generations

Bostrom 2 (Nick Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale.. www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.)

Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[[2]](%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn2)At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[[3]](%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn3)A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that mighthave been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn4)  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century. The special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following points: Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience – is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions. We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters.[[5]](%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn5) Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat. Reductions in existential risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk. If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits [15,16]. In view of its undeniable importance, it is surprising how little systematic work has been done in this area. Part of the explanation may be that many of the gravest risks stem (as we shall see) from anticipated future technologies that we have only recently begun to understand. Another part of the explanation may be the unavoidably interdisciplinary and speculative nature of the subject. And in part the neglect may also be attributable to an aversion against thinking seriously about a depressing topic. The point, however, is not to wallow in gloom and doom but simply to take a sober look at what could go wrong so we can create responsible strategies for improving our chances of survival. In order to do that, we need to know where to focus our efforts.

**Extinction Outweighs – Discussion Key**

**Discussing existential risks is key to prevent neglectful attitudes toward them**

Bostrom 2 (Nick Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale.. www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.)

Existential risks have a cluster of features that make it useful to identify them as a special category: the extreme magnitude of the harm that would come from an existential disaster; the futility of the trial-and-error approach; the lack of evolved biological and cultural coping methods; the fact that existential risk dilution is a global public good; the shared stakeholdership of all future generations; the international nature of many of the required countermeasures; the necessarily highly speculative and multidisciplinary nature of the topic; the subtle and diverse methodological problems involved in assessing the probability of existential risks; and the comparative neglect of the whole area. From our survey of the most important existential risks and their key attributes, we can extract tentative recommendations for ethics and policy: We need more research into existential risks – detailed studies of particular aspects of specific risks as well as more general investigations of associated ethical, methodological, security and policy issues. Public awareness should also be built up so that constructive political debate about possible countermeasures becomes possible. Now, it’s a commonplace that researchers always conclude that more research needs to be done in their field. But in this instance it is *really* true. There is more scholarly work on the life-habits of the dung fly than on existential risks. Since existential risk reduction is a global public good, there should ideally be an institutional framework such that the cost and responsibility for providing such goods could be shared fairly by all people. Even if the costs can’t be shared fairly, some system that leads to the provision of existential risk reduction in something approaching optimal amounts should be attempted. The necessity for international action goes beyond the desirability of cost-sharing, however. Many existential risks simply cannot be substantially reduced by actions that are internal to one or even most countries. For example, even if a majority of countries pass and enforce national laws against the creation of some specific destructive version of nanotechnology, will we really have gained safety if some less scrupulous countries decide to forge ahead regardless? And strategic bargaining could make it infeasible to bribe all the irresponsible parties into subscribing to a treaty, even if everybody would be better off if everybody subscribed [14,42].

**Extinction Outweighs - Policymaking**

**It is our duty to support policy that counters extinction**

Bostrom 2 (Nick Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale.. www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.)

Some of the lesser existential risks can be countered fairly cheaply. For example, there are organizations devoted to mapping potentially threatening near-Earth objects (e.g. NASA’s Near Earth Asteroid Tracking Program, and the Space Guard Foundation). These could be given additional funding. To reduce the probability of a “physics disaster”, a public watchdog could be appointed with authority to commission advance peer-review of potentially hazardous experiments. This is currently done on an ad hoc basis and often in a way that relies on the integrity of researchers who have a personal stake in the experiments going forth. The existential risks of naturally occurring or genetically engineered pandemics would be reduced by the same measures that would help prevent and contain more limited epidemics. Thus, efforts in counter-terrorism, civil defense, epidemiological monitoring and reporting, developing and stockpiling antidotes, rehearsing emergency quarantine procedures, etc. could be intensified. Even abstracting from existential risks, it would probably be cost-effective to increase the fraction of defense budgets devoted to such programs.[[23]](%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn23) Reducing the risk of a nuclear Armageddon, whether accidental or intentional, is a well-recognized priority. There is a vast literature on the related strategic and political issues to which I have nothing to add here. The longer-term dangers of nanotech proliferation or arms race between nanotechnic powers, as well as the whimper risk of “evolution into oblivion”, may necessitate, even more than nuclear weapons, the creation and implementation of a coordinated global strategy. Recognizing these existential risks suggests that it is advisable to gradually shift the focus of security policy from seeking national security through unilateral strength to creating an integrated international security system that can prevent arms races and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Which particular policies have the best chance of attaining this long-term goal is a question beyond the scope of this paper.

**Extinction Outweighs – Laundry List**

**Extinction outweighs all other threats – life is a prerequisite**

Ochs 2 [Richard Ochs, “BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY,” Free From Terror, [http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html,](http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html%2C) June 9th 2002 ]JFS

Against this tendency can be posed a rational alternative policy. To preclude possibilities of human extinction, "patriotism" needs to be redefined to make humanity’s survival primary and absolute. Even if we lose our cherished freedom, our sovereignty, our government or our Constitution, where there is life, there is hope. What good is anything else if humanity is extinguished? This concept should be promoted to the center of national debate. For example, for sake of argument, suppose the ancient Israelites developed defensive bioweapons of mass destruction when they were enslaved by Egypt. Then suppose these weapons were released by design or accident and wiped everybody out? As bad as slavery is, extinction is worse. Our generation, our century, our epoch needs to take the long view. We truly hold in our hands the precious gift of all future life. Empires may come and go, but who are the honored custodians of life on earth? Temporal politicians? Corporate competitors? Strategic brinksmen? Military gamers? Inflated egos dripping with testosterone? How can any sane person believe that national sovereignty is more important than survival of the species? Now that extinction is possible, our slogan should be "Where there is life, there is hope." No government, no economic system, no national pride, no religion, no political system can be placed above human survival. The egos of leaders must not blind us. The adrenaline and vengeance of a fight must not blind us. The game is over. If patriotism would extinguish humanity, then patriotism is the highest of all crimes. There are many people who believe it is their God-given right to do whatever is deemed necessary to secure their homeland, their religion and their birthright. Moslems, Jews, Hindus, ultra-patriots (and fundamentalist Christians who believe that Armageddon is God’s prophesy) all have access to the doomsday vials at Fort Detrick and other labs. Fort Detrick and Dugway employees are US citizens but may also have other loyalties. One or more of them might have sent the anthrax letters to the media and Congress last year. Are we willing to trust our security, NO -- trust human survival to people like this? Human frailty, duplicity, greed, zealotry, insanity, intolerance and ignorance, not to speak of ultra-patriotism, will always be with us. The mere existence of these doomsday weapons is a risk too great for rational people to tolerate. Unless guards do body crevice searches of lab employees every day, smuggling out a few grams will be a piece of cake. Basically, THERE CAN BE NO SECURITY. Humanity is at great risk as we speak. All biological weapons must be destroyed immediately. All genetic engineering of new diseases must be halted. All bioweapons labs must be dismantled. Fort Detrick and Dugway labs must be decommissioned and torn down. Those who continue this research are potential war criminals of the highest order. Secret bioweapons research must be outlawed.

**Extinction Outweighs – Suffering**

Extinction will be the greatest moment of suffering in history – abject fear of it is self-defeating – rational attempts to prevent it are best

Epstein and Zhao ‘9  (Richard J. and Y. Laboratory of Computational Oncology, Department of Medicine, University of Hong Kong, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine Volume 52, Number 1, Winter 2009, Muse)JFS

Human extinction is 100% certain—the only uncertainties are when and how. Like the men and women of Shakespeare’s As You Like It, our species is but one of many players making entrances and exits on the evolutionary stage. That we generally deny that such exits for our own species are possible is to be expected, given the brutish selection pressures on our biology. Death, which is merely a biological description of evolutionary selection, is fundamental to life as we know it. Similarly, death occurring at the level of a species—extinction—is as basic to biology as is the death of individual organisms or cells. Hence, to regard extinction as catastrophic—which implies that it may somehow never occur, provided that we are all well behaved—is not only specious, but self-defeating. Man is both blessed and cursed by the highest level of self-awareness of any life-form on Earth. This suggests that the process of human extinction is likely to be accompanied by more suffering than that associated with any previous species extinction event. Such suffering may only be eased by the getting of wis- dom: the same kind of wisdom that could, if applied sufficiently early, postpone extinction. But the tragedy of our species is that evolution does not select for such foresight. Man’s dreams of being an immortal species in an eternal paradise are unachievable not because of original sin—the doomsday scenario for which we choose to blame our “free will,” thereby perpetuating our creationist illusion of being at the center of the universe—but rather, in reductionist terms, because paradise is incompatible with evolution. More scientific effort in propounding this central truth of our species’ mortality, rather than seeking spiritual comfort in escapist fantasies, could pay dividends in minimizing the eventual cumulative burden of human suffering.

Extinction Outweighs - Ontology

Extinction precedes ontology – existence is a prerequisite for the self

Wapner 3 [Paul Wapner is associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, DISSENT / Winter 2003]JFS

All attempts to listen to nature are, indeed, social constructions, except one. Even the most radical postmodernist acknowledges the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence. As mentioned, postmodernists assume that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world, even if they argue about its different meanings. This substratum is essential for allowing entities to speak or express themselves. That which doesn't exist, doesn't speak. That which doesn't exist, manifests no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And everyone should be wary about those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including when environmentalists and students of global environmental politics do so). But we should not doubt the simple-minded notion that a prerequisite of expression is existence. That which doesn't exist can never express itself. And this in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

\*\*Pragmatism

Pragmatism 2AC – Rorty

Only pragmatic philosophy can evade the logical harms of the K and still take action against great atrocities – We’re not committed to their slippery slope link args

Rorty 2 (Richard, U Minn, http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm)JFS

The most powerful reason for thinking that no such culture is possible is that seeing all criteria as no more than temporary resting-places, constructed by a community to facilitate its inquiries, seems morally humiliating. **Suppose** that Socrates was wrong, that **we have not** once **seen the Truth**, and so will not, intuitively, recognise it when we see it again. This means that when the secret police come, **when the torturers violate the innocent, there is nothing to be said** to them of the form “**There is something within you which you are betraying.** Though you embody the practices of a totalitarian society which will endure forever, there is something beyond those practices which condemns you.” This thought is hard to live with, as is Sartre’s remark: Tomorrow, after my death, **certain people may decide to establish fascism**, and the others may be cowardly or miserable enough to let them get away with it. **At that moment, fascism will be the truth of man**, and so much the worse for us. In reality, **things will be as much as man has decided they are**. This hard saying brings out what ties Dewey and Foucault, James and Nietzsche, together- the sense that **there is nothing** deep down **inside us except what we have put there ourselves**, no criterion that we have not created in the course of creating a practice, no standard of rationality that is not an appeal to such a criterion, no rigorous argumentation that is not obedience to our own conventions. **A post-philosophical culture**, then, **would be one in which men and women felt** themselves **alone**, merely **finite, with no links to something Beyond.** On **the pragmatist’s** account, **position was** only a halfway stage in the development of such a culture-the **progress toward**, as Sartre puts it, **doing without God**. For positivism preserved a god in its notion of Science (and in its notion of “scientific philosophy”), the notion of a portion of culture where we touched something not ourselves, where we found Truth naked, relative to no description. **The culture of positivism** thus **produced** endless **swings** of the pendulum **between** the view that **“values are** merely ‘**relative’** (or ‘emotive,’ or ‘subjective’)” **and** the view that **bringing the “scientific method”** to bear on questions of political and moral choice **was the solution to all our problems. Pragmatism**, by contrast, **does not erect Science as an idol** to fill the place once held by God. **It views science as one genre** of literature-or, put the other way around, literature and the arts as inquiries, on the same footing as scientific inquiries. Thus **it sees ethics as neither more “relative”** or “subjective” than scientific theory, **nor as needing to be made “scientific.”** Physics is a way of trying to cope with various bits of the universe; ethics is a matter of trying to cope with other bits. Mathematics helps physics do its job; literature and the arts help ethics do its. Some of these inquiries come up with propositions, some with narratives, some with paintings. The question of what propositions to assert, which pictures to look at, what narratives to listen to and comment on and retell, are all questions about what will help us get what we want (or about what we should want). No. The question of whether **the pragmatist view of truth**-that it is t a profitable topic-**is** itself true is thus **a question about whether a post-Philosophical culture is a good thing** to try for. **It is not a question about what** the word **“true” means, nor** about **the requirements of** an adequate philosophy of **language**, nor about whether the world “exists independently of our minds,” **nor about** whether the intuitions of **our culture** are captured in the pragmatists’ slogans. **There is no way in which the issue between the pragmatist and his opponent can be** tightened up and **resolved** according to criteria agreed to by both sides. **This is one of those issues which puts everything up for grabs at once** -where there is no point in trying to find agreement about “the data” or about what would count as deciding the question. But **the messiness of the issue is not a reason for setting it aside.** The issue between religion and secularism was no less messy, but it was important that it got decided as it did.

Cede The Political 2AC – Ketels (1/2)

The critique’s methodology causes cynical withdrawal from action which ensures apathy toward atrocities

Ketels ‘96 [Violet. Prof of English @ Temple. “Havel to the Castle!” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol 548, No 1. Nov 1996]JFS

Intellectuals can choose their roles, but cannot not choose, nor can we evade the full weight of the consequences attendant on our choices. "It is always the intellectuals, however we may shrink from the chilling sound of that word ... who must bear the full weight of moral responsibility."55 Humanist intellectuals can aspire to be judged by more specifically ex-acting criteria: as those whose work is worthwhile because it has human uses; survives the test of reality; corresponds to history; represses rationalizing in favor of fact; challenges the veracity of rulers; refuses the safety of abstraction; recognizes words as forms of action, as likely to be lethal as to be liberating; scruples to heal the rupture between words and things, between things and ideas; re-mains incorruptibly opposed to the service of ideological ends pursued by unnecessary violence or inhumane means; and, finally, takes risks for the sake of true witness to events, to the truth even of unpopular ideas or to the lies in popular ones. Above all, intellectuals can resist the dreary relativism that neutralizes good and evil as if in defense of the theoretical pseudo-notion that distinguishing between them is not possible. The hour is too late, the situation too grave for such pettifoggery. Bearing witness is not enough, but it is something. At the dedication of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum inWashington, D.C., Elie Wiesel spoke. "We must bear witness," he said. "What have we learned? ... We are all responsible. We must do some-thing to stop the bloodshed in Yugoslavia." He told a story of a woman from the Carpathian Mountains who asked of the Warsaw Uprising, "Why don't they just wait quietly until after the war?" In one year she was packed into a cattle car with her whole family on the way to Auschwitz. "That woman was my mother," Wiesel said. Viclav Havel, the humanist intellectual from Bohemia, spoke too: of the Holocaust as a memory of democratic appeasement, live memory of indifference to the danger of Hitler's coming to power, of indifference to the Munich betrayal of Prague. "Our Jews went to concentration camps. . . . Later we lost our freedom." We have lost our metaphysical certainties, our sense of responsibility for what comes in the future. For we are all responsible, humanly responsible for what happens in the world. Do we have the right to interfere in internal conflict? Not just the right but the duty. Remember the Holocaust. To avoid war, we watched-silently and, so, complicitly, unleashing darker, deadlier demons. What should we have done about Yugoslavia? Something. Much earlier. We must vigilantly listen for the early warning signs of threats to freedoms and lives everywhere. We must keep the clamorous opposition to oppression and violence around the world incessant and loud. Cry out! Cry havoc! Call murderers murderers. Do not avoid violence when avoidance begets more violence. There are some things worth dying for. Do not legitimize the bloodletting in Bosnia or anywhere by negotiating with the criminals who plotted the carnage. Do not join the temporizers. Take stands publicly: in words; in universities and boardrooms; in other corridors of power; and at local polling places. Take stands prefer-ably in written words, which have a longer shelf life, are likelier to stimu-late debate, and may have a lasting effect on the consciousnesses of some among us.

Cede The Political 2AC – Ketels (2/2)

**Extinction**

Ketels ‘96 [Violet. Prof of English @ Temple. “Havel to the Castle!” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol 548, No 1. Nov 1996]JFS

Characteristically, Havel raises lo-cal experience to universal relevance. "If today's planetary civilization has any hope of survival," he begins, "that hope lies chiefly in what we understand as the human spirit." He continues: If we don't wish to destroy ourselves in national, religious or political discord; if we don't wish to find our world with twice its current population, half of it dying of hunger; if we don't wish to kill ourselves with ballistic missiles armed with atomic warheads or eliminate ourselves with bacteria specially cultivated for the purpose; if we don't wish to see some people go desperately hungry while others throw tons of wheat into the ocean; if we don't wish to suffocate in the global greenhouse we are heating up for ourselves or to be burned by radiation leaking through holes we have made in the ozone; if we don't wish to exhaust the nonrenewable, mineral resources of this planet, without which we cannot survive; if, in short, we don't wish any of this to happen, then we must-as humanity, as people, as conscious beings with spirit, mind and a sense of responsibility-somehow come to our senses. Somehow we must come together in "a kind of general mobilization of human consciousness, of the human mind and spirit, human responsibility, human reason." The Prague Spring was "the inevitable consequence of a long drama originally played out chiefly in the theatre of the spirit and the con-science of society," a process triggered and sustained "by individuals willing to live in truth even when things were at their worst." The process was hidden in "the invisible realm of social consciousness," conscience, and the subconscious. It was indirect, long-term, and hard to measure. So, too, its continuation that exploded into the Velvet Revolution, the magic moment when 800,000 citizens, jamming Wenceslas Square in Prague, jingled their house keys like church bells and changed from shouting 'Truth will prevail to chanting" Havel to the castle."

Cede The Political 2AC – Rorty (1/2)

This failure to engage the political process turns the affirmative into spectators who are powerless to produce real change.

Rorty 98 (prof of philosophy at Stanford, Richard, 1998, “achieving our country”, Pg. 7-9)JFS

Such people find pride in American citizenship impossi­ble, and vigorous participation in electoral politics pointless. They associate American patriotism with an endorsement of atrocities: the importation of African slaves, the slaughter of Native Americans, the rape of ancient forests, and the Viet­nam War. Many of them think of national pride as appropri­ate only for chauvinists: for the sort of American who re­joices that America can still orchestrate something like the Gulf War, can still bring deadly force to bear whenever and wherever it chooses. When young intellectuals watch John Wayne war movies after reading Heidegger, Foucault, Stephenson, or Silko, they often become convinced that they live in a violent, inhuman, corrupt country. They begin to think of themselves as a saving remnant-as the happy few who have the insight to see through nationalist rhetoric to the ghastly reality of contemporary America. But this insight does not move them to formulate a legislative program, to join a political movement, or to share in a national hope. The contrast between national hope and national self­-mockery and self-disgust becomes vivid when one compares novels like Snow Crash and Almanac of the Dead with socialist novels of the first half of the century-books like The Jungle, An American Tragedy, and The Grapes of Wrath. The latter were written in the belief that the tone of the Gettysburg Address was absolutely right, but that our country would have to transform itself in order to fulfill Lincoln's hopes. Transfor­mation would be needed because the rise of industrial capi­talism had made the individualist rhetoric of America's first century obsolete. The authors of these novels thought that this rhetoric should be replaced by one in which America is destined to become the first cooperative commonwealth, the first class­less society. This America would be one in which income and wealth are equitably distributed, and in which the govern­ment ensures equality of opportunity as well as individual liberty. This new, quasi-communitarian rhetoric was at the heart of the Progressive Movement and the New Deal. It set the tone for the American Left during the first six decades of the twentieth century. Walt Whitman and John Dewey, as we shall see, did a great deal to shape this rhetoric. The difference between early twentieth-century leftist in­tellectuals and the majority of their contemporary counter­parts is the difference between agents and spectators. In the early decades of this century, when an intellectual stepped back from his or her country's history and looked at it through skeptical eyes, the chances were that he or she was about to propose a new political initiative. Henry Adams was, of course, the great exception-the great abstainer from ·politics. But William James thought that Adams' diagnosis of the First Gilded Age as a symptom of irreversible moral and political decline was merely perverse. James's pragmatist theory of truth was in part a reaction against the sort of de­tached spectators hip which Adams affected. For James, disgust with American hypocrisy and self­-deception was pointless unless accompanied by an effort to give America reason to be proud of itself in the future. The kind of proto- Heideggerian cultural pessimism which Adams cultivated seemed, to James, decadent and cowardly. "Democracy," James wrote, "is a kind of religion, and we are bound not to admit its failure. Faiths and utopias are the no­blest exercise of human reason, and no one with a spark of reason in him will sit down fatalistically before the croaker's picture. "2

Cede The Political 2AC – Rorty (2/2)

Failure to engage in the political process will result in the takeover by the extreme right, leading to discrimination and war worldwide.

Rorty 98 (prof of philosophy at Stanford, Richard, 1998, “achieving our country” pg. 89-94)JFS

Many writers on socioeconomic policy have warned that the old industrialized democracies are heading into a Weimar-like period, one in which populist movements are likely to overturn constitutional governments. Edward Luttwak, for example, has suggested that fascism may be the American future. The point of his book The Endangered Ameri­can Dream is that members of labor unions, and unorganized unskilled workers, will sooner or later realize that their gov­ernment is not even trying to prevent wages from sinking or to prevent jobs from being exported. Around the same time, they will realize that suburban white-collar workers-them- selves desperately afraid of being downsized-are not going to let themselves be taxed to provide social benefits for any­one else. At that point, something will crack. The nonsuburban electorate will decide that the system has failed and start looking around for a strongman to vote for-someone willing to assure them that, once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats, tricky lawyers, overpaid bond salesmen, and postmodernist professors will no longer be calling the shots. A scenario like that of Sinclair Lewis’ novel It Can’t Happen Here may then be played out. For once such a strongman takes office, nobody can predict what will happen. In 1932, most of the predictions made about what would happen if Hindenburg named Hitler chancellor were wildly overoptimistic. One thing that is very likely to happen is that the gains made in the past forty years by black and brown Americans, and by homosexuals, will be wiped out. Jocular contempt for women will come back into fashion. The words "nigger" and "kike" will once again be heard in the workplace. All the sadism which the academic Left has tried to make unaccept­able to its students will come flooding back. All the resent­ment which badly educated Americans feel about having their manners dictated to them by college graduates will find an outlet. But such a renewal of sadism will not alter the effects of selfishness. For after my imagined strongman takes charge, he will quickly make his peace with the international super­rich, just as Hitler made his with the German industrialists. He will invoke the glorious memory of the Gulf War to pro­voke military adventures which will generate short-term prosperity. He will be a disaster for the country and the world. People will wonder why there was so little resistance to his evitable rise. Where, they will ask, was the American Left? Why was it only rightists like Buchanan who spoke to the workers about the consequences of globalization? Why could not the Left channel the mounting rage of the newly dispossessed? It is often said that we Americans, at the end of the twenti­eth century, no longer have a Left. Since nobody denies the existence of what I have called the cultural Left, this amounts to an admission that that Left is unable to engage in national politics. It is not the sort of Left which can be asked to deal with the consequences of globalization. To get the country to deal with those consequences, the present cultural Left would have to transform itself by opening relations with the residue of the old reformist Left, and in particular with the labor unions. It would have to talk much more about money, even at the cost of talking less about stigma. I have two suggestions about how to effect this transition. The first is that the Left should put a moratorium on theory. It should try to kick its philosophy habit. The second is that the Left should try to mobilize what remains of our pride in being Americans. It should ask the public to consider how the country of Lincoln and Whitman might be achieved. In support of my first suggestion, let me cite a passage from Dewey's Reconstruction in Philosophy in which he ex­presses his exasperation with the sort of sterile debate now going on under the rubric of "individualism versus commu­nitarianism." Dewey thought that all discussions which took this dichotomy seriously suffer from a common defect. They are all committed to the logic of general notions under which specific situa­tions are to be brought. What we want is light upon this or that group of individuals, this or that concrete human being, this or that special institution or social arrangement. For such a logic of inquiry, the tradition­ally accepted logic substitutes discussion of the mean­ing of concepts and their dialectical relationships with one another. Dewey was right to be exasperated by sociopolitical theory conducted at this level of abstraction. He was wrong when he went on to say that ascending to this level is typically a right­ist maneuver, one which supplies "the apparatus for intellec­tual justifications of the established order. "9 For such ascents are now more common on the Left than on the Right. The contemporary academic Left seems to think that the higher your level of abstraction, the more subversive of the estab­lished order you can be. The more sweeping and novel your conceptual apparatus, the more radical your critique. When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been "inadequately theorized," you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of lan­guage, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist ver­sion of economic determinism. Theorists of the Left think that dissolving political agents into plays of differential sub­jectivity, or political initiatives into pursuits of Lacan's im­possible object of desire, helps to subvert the established order. Such subversion, they say, is accomplished by "problematizing familiar concepts." Recent attempts to subvert social institutions by prob­lematizing concepts have produced a few very good books. They have also produced many thousands of books which represent scholastic philosophizing at its worst. The authors of these purportedly "subversive" books honestly believe that they are serving human liberty. But it is almost impossi­ble to clamber back down from their books to a level of ab­straction on which one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty, a candidate, or a political strategy. Even though what these authors "theorize" is often something very concrete and near at hand-a current TV show, a media celebrity, a re­cent scandal-they offer the most abstract and barren expla­nations imaginable. These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into polit­ical relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left re­treats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice pro­duces theoretical hallucinations. These result in an intellec­tual environment which is, as Mark Edmundson says in his book Nightmare on Main Street, Gothic. The cultural Left is haunted by ubiquitous specters, the most frightening of which is called "power." This is the name of what Edmund­son calls Foucault's "haunting agency, which is everywhere and nowhere, as evanescent and insistent as a resourceful spook."10

 \*\*Generic K Answers

A2: Exclude the State PIC

Making the State the center of analysis is bad – ruins the K

Constable, Professor at Berkeley, 1991

Marianne, Polity, Foucault & Walzer: Sovereignty, Strategy & the State, Winter 1991, <http://www.jstor.org.floyd.lib.umn.edu/stable/pdfplus/3235041.pdf>, accessed 7-9-09, AMG

Foucault's point is that the modern state is not the most useful focus, target, or model of power or of resistance today. To conceive of the modern state as a unified entity loses sight of the fact that today's governmental society and today's state, no less than the sovereign-state of political theorists, is not a unified whole. Perhaps, Foucault suggests, the State is no more than a composite reality and a mythical abstraction whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. Maybe what is really important for our modern times ... is not so much the State-domination of society, but the "governmentalisation" of the State.48

A2: K of Epistemology – No Alt

The alt is exactly like the link or the perm solves – Totalizing rejection of the aff premises is a right-wing fascistic tactic to control the terms of debate – Liberal reason defines progressive politics and solves best

Hicks 9 (Stephen PhD Phil, <http://www.stephenhicks.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/hicks-ep-ch4.pdf>)

What links the Right and the Left is a core set of themes: antiindividualism, the need for strong government, the view that religion is a state matter (whether to promote or suppress it), the view that education is a  process of socialization, ambivalence about science and technology, and strong themes of group conflict, violence, and war. Left and Right have often divided bitterly over which themes have priority and over how they should be applied. Yet for all of their differences, both the collectivist Left and the collectivist Right have consistently recognized a common enemy: liberal capitalism, with its individualism, its limited government, its separation of church and state, its fairly constant view that education is not primarily a matter of political socialization, and its persistent Whiggish optimism about prospects for peaceful trade and cooperation between members of all nations and groups. Rousseau, for example, is often seen as being a man of the Left, and he has influenced generations of Left thinkers. But he was also inspirational to Kant, Fichte, and Hegel—all men of the Right. Fichte in turn was used regularly as a model for Right thinkers— but he was also an inspiration for Left socialists such as Friedrich Ebert, president of the Weimar Republic after World War I. Hegel’s legacy, as is well known, took both a Right and a Left form. While the details are messy the broad point is clear: the collectivist Right and the collectivist Left are united in their major goals and in identifying their major opposition. None of these thinkers, for example, ever has a kind word for the politics of John Locke. In the twentieth century, the same trend continued. Scholars debated whether George Sorel is Left or Right; and that makes sense given that he inspired and admired both Lenin and Mussolini. And to give just one more example, Heidegger and the thinkers of the Frankfurt School have much more in common politically than either does with, say, John Stuart Mill. This in turn explains why thinkers from Herbert Marcuse to Alexandre Kojève to Maurice Merleau-Ponty all argued that Marx and Heidegger are compatible, but none ever dreamed of connecting either to Locke or Mill. The point will be that liberalism did not penetrate deeply into the main lines of political thinking in Germany. As was the case with metaphysics and epistemology, the most vigorous developments in social and political philosophy of the nineteenth and early twentieth century occurred in Germany, and German socio-political philosophy was dominated by Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. By the early twentieth century, accordingly, the dominant issues for most Continental political thinkers were not whether liberal capitalism was a viable option—but rather exactly when it would collapse—and whether Left or Right collectivism had the best claim to being the socialism of the future. The defeat of the collectivist Right in World War II then meant that the Left was on its own to carry the socialist mantle forward. Accordingly, when the Left ran into its own major disasters as the twentieth century progressed, understanding its fundamental commonality with the collectivist Right helps to explain why in its desperation the Left has often adopted ‚fascistic‛ tactics.

A2: Language PICs – Butler

Language is reversible – The introduction of injurious language simultaneously introduces the prospect of contestation – Their erasure avoids the prospect of contestation

Butler 97 (Judith, Excitable Speech, UC-Berkeley, p. 2)

One is not simply fixed by the name that one is called. In being called an injurious name, one is derogated and demeaned. But the name holds out another possibility as well: by being called a name, one is also, paradaoxically, given a certain possibility for social existence, initiated into a temporal life of language that exceeds the prior purposes that animate that call. Thus the injurious address may appear to fix or paralyze the one it hails, but it may also produce an unexpected and enabling response. If to be addressed is to be interpellated, then the offensive call runs the risk of inaugurating a subject in speech who comes to use language to counter the offensive call. When the address is injurious, it works its force upon the one in injures.

Their certainty about the effects of language belies the nature of human agency and the importance of context, making us powerless in the face of language – Extricating the language from the plan doesn’t make the words “go away” – Confrontation via the permutation solves best

Butler 97 (Judith, Excitable Speech, UC-Berkeley, p. 13)

Indeed, recent effort to establish the incontrovertibly wounding power of certain words seem to founder on the question of who does the interpreting of what such words mean and what they perform. The recent regulations governing lesbian and gay self-definition in the military of, indeed, the recent controversies over rap music suggest that no clear consensus is possible on the question of whether there is a clear link between the words that are uttered and their putative power to injure. To argue, on the one hand, that the offensive effects of such words is fully contextual, and that a shift of context can exacerbate or minimize that offensiveness, is still not to give an account of the power that such words are said to exercise. To claim, on the other hand, that some utterances are always offensive, regardless of context, that they carry their contexts with them in ways that are too difficult to shed, is still not to offer a way to understand how context is invoked and restaged at the moment of utterance.

This theory of agency is critical to true liberation – Their conception of liberty is in service to the state and systemic power – “Only policy formulations *truly* matter” is their arg

Butler 97 (Judith, Excitable Speech, UC-Berkeley, p. 15)

Those who seek to fix with certainty the link between certain speech acts and their injurious effects will surely lament the open temporality of the speech act. That no speech act has to perform injury as its effect means that no simple elaboration of speech acts will provide a standard by which the injuries of speech might be effectively adjudicated. Such a loosening of the link between act and injury, however, opens up the possibility for a counter-speech, a kind of talking back, that would be foreclosed by the tightening of that link. Thus, the gap that separates the speech act from its future effects has its auspicious implications: it begins a theory of linguistic agency that provides an alternative to the relenetless search for legal remedy. Te interval between instances of utterance not only makes the repetition and resignifcation of the utterance possible, but shows how words might, through time, become disjoined from their power to injure and recontextualized in more affirmative modes. I hope to make clear that by affirmative, I mean “opening up the possibility of agency” where agency is not the restoration of a sovereign autonomy in speech, a replication of conventional notions of mastery.

A2: Language PICs – Butler

Only we have a legitimate theory of human agency

Butler 97 (Judith, Excitable Speech, UC-Berkeley, p. 16)

Whereas some critics mistake the critique of sovereignty for the demolition of agency, I propose that agency begins where sovereignty wanes. The one who acts (who is not the same as the sovereign subject) acts precisely to the extent that he or she is constituted as an actor and, hence, operating within a linguistic field of enabling constraints from the outset.

A2: Language K’s -- Brown

They can’t solve the case--Censoring certain words transforms politics into a fight over language rather than the institutions that generate true violence. Only the perm solves.

Brown 1 [Wendy Brown, professor at UC-Berkeley, 2001 Politics Out of History, p. 35-36]JFS

 “Speech codes kill critique,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech. Although Gates was referring to what happens when hate speech regulations, and the debates about them, usurp the discursive space in which one might have offered a substantive *political* response to bigoted epithets, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institutions. But turning political questions into moralistic ones—as speech codes of any sort do—not only prohibits certain questions and mandates certain genuflections, it also expresses a profound hostility toward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legislative and enforced truth. And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert emancipatory aspirations into reactionary ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of rationality and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction. Here we greet a persistent political paradox: the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born. Thus Gates might have said, “Speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique.” And, we might add, contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conservative as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of historically specific social powers. But moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations of power. Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban (formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, the sources that generate racism, poverty, violence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed. We are lost as how to address those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorientation, rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Don’t mourn, moralize

A2: Language K’s – Hicks

Their language K’s imply a relativism about language that equates right and wrong with effectiveness, allowing their evidence to employ a bias that you should be skeptical toward

Hicks 9 (Stephen PhD Phil, <http://www.stephenhicks.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/hicks-ep-ch4.pdf>)

This explains the harsh nature of much postmodern rhetoric. The regular deployments of ad hominem, the setting up of straw men, and the regular attempts to silence opposing voices are all logical consequences of the postmodern epistemology of language. Stanley Fish, as noted in Chapter Four, calls all opponents of racial preferences bigots and lumps them in with the Ku Klux Klan. Andrea Dworkin calls all heterosexual males rapists6 and repeatedly labels ‚Amerika‛ a fascist state.7 With such rhetoric, truth or falsity is not the issue: what matters primarily is the language’s effectiveness. If we now add to the postmodern epistemology of language the far Left politics of the leading postmodernists and their firsthand awareness of the crises of socialist thought and practice, then the verbal weaponry has to become explosive.

A2: Language K’s – Roskoski

Punishing offensive language makes it worse—censorship only drives it underground where its effects are more acutely felt.

Matthew Roskoski and Joe Peabody, “A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language ‘Arguments,’” 1991, http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques, accessed 10/17/02

If language "arguments" become a dominant trend, debaters will not change their attitudes. Rather they will manifest their attitudes in non-debate contexts. Under these conditions, the debaters will not have the moderating effects of the critic or the other debaters. Simply put, sexism at home or at lunch is worse than sexism in a debate round because in the round there is a critic to provide negative though not punitive feedback. The publicization effects of censorship are well known. "Psychological studies reveal that whenever the government attempts to censor speech, the censored speech - for that very reason - becomes more appealing to many people" (Strossen 559). These studies would suggest that language which is critiqued by language "arguments" becomes more attractive simply because of the critique. Hence language "arguments" are counterproductive. Conclusion Rodney Smolla offered the following insightful assessment of the interaction between offensive language and language "arguments": The battle against {offensive speech} will be fought most effectively through persuasive and creative educational leadership rather than through punishment and coercion... The sense of a community of scholars, an island of reason and tolerance, is the pervasive ethos. But that ethos should be advanced with education, not coercion. It should be the dominant voice of the university within the marketplace of ideas; but it should not preempt that marketplace. (Smolla 224-225).1 We emphatically concur. It is our position that a debater who feels strongly enough about a given language "argument" ought to actualize that belief through interpersonal conversation rather than through a plea for censorship and coercion. Each debater in a given round has three minutes of cross-examination time during which he or she may engage the other team in a dialogue about the ramifications of the language the opposition has just used. Additionally even given the efficacy of Rich Edwards' efficient tabulation program, there will inevitably be long periods between rounds during which further dialogue can take place.

Punishing offensive language creates a backlash and drives it underground

Matthew Roskoski and Joe Peabody, A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language Arguments, 1991

Previously, we have argued that the language advocates have erroneously reversed the causal relationship between language and reality. We have defended the thesis that reality shapes language, rather than the obverse. Now we will also contend that to attempt to solve a problem by editing the language which is symptomatic of that problem will generally trade off with solving the reality which is the source of the problem. There are several reasons why this is true. The first, and most obvious, is that we may often be fooled into thinking that language "arguments" have generated real change. As Graddol and Swan observe, "when compared with larger social and ideological struggles, linguistic reform may seem quite a trivial concern," further noting "there is also the danger that effective change at this level is mistaken for real social change" (Graddol & Swan 195). The second reason is that the language we find objectionable can serve as a signal or an indicator of the corresponding objectionable reality. The third reason is that restricting language only limits the overt expressions of any objectionable reality, while leaving subtle and hence more dangerous expressions unregulated. Once we drive the objectionable idea underground it will be more difficult to identify, more difficult to root out, more difficult to counteract, and more likely to have its undesirable effect. The fourth reason is that objectionable speech can create a "backlash" effect that raises the consciousness of people exposed to the speech. Strossen observes that "ugly and abominable as these expressions are, they undoubtably have had the beneficial result of raising social consciousness about the underlying societal problem..." (560).

A2: K – Perm – Generic – A2: Contradictions Bad

Their binary link arguments contradict with their alternative – The perm solves best by refusing dichotomies

Hicks 9 (Stephen PhD Phil, <http://www.stephenhicks.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/hicks-ep-ch4.pdf>)

In postmodern discourse, truth is rejected explicitly and consistenly. On can be a rare phenomenon. Consider the following pairs of claims. the one hand, all truth is relative; on the other hand, postmodernism On the one hand, all cultures are tells it like it really is. equally deserving of respect; on the other, Western culture is Values are subjective—but sexism and uniquely destructive and bad. Technology is bad and destructive—and it is racism are really evil. unfair that some people have more technology than others. Tolerance is good and dominance is bad—but when postmodernists come to power, political correctness follows. There is a common pattern here: Subjectivism and relativism in one breath, dogmatic absolutism in the next. Postmodernists are well aware of the contradictions—especially since their opponents relish pointing them out at every opportunity. And of course a postmodernist can respond dismissingly by citing  Hegel—‚Those are merely Aristotelian logical contradictions‛—but it is one thing to say that and quite  another to sustain Hegelian contradictions psychologically.

A2: K – Perm – Generic – Coalitions

Total critique shatters coalition-building necessary to confront oppression – perm solves best

Sankaran Krishna, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii, 1993, Alternatives, v. 18

While this point is, perhaps, debatable, Der Derian’s further assertion, that a postmodern critique of the Gulf War mobilization would be somehow more effective, sounds less convincing. An alternative, late-modern tactic against total war was to war on totality itself, to delegitimize *all* sovereign truths based on class, nationalist, or internationalist metanarratives … better strategically to play with apt critiques of the powerful new forces unleashed by cyberwar than to hold positions with antiquated tactics and nostalgic unities. (AD: 177-178; emphasis in original) The dichotomous choice presented in this excerpt is straightforward: one either indulges in total critique, delegitimizing all sovereign truths, or one is committed to “nostalgic” essentialist unities that have become obsolete and have been the grounds for all our oppressions. In offering this dichotomous choice, Der Derian replicates a move made by Chaloupka in his equally dismissive critique of the more mainstream nuclear opposition, the Nuclear Freeze movement of the early 1980s, that, according to him, was operating along obsolete lines, emphasizing “facts” and “realities” while a “postmodern” President Reagan easily outflanked them through an illusory Star Wars program. (See KN: chapter 4) Chaloupka centers this difference between his own supposedly total critique of all sovereign truths (which he describes as nuclear criticism in an echo of literary criticism) and the more partial (and issue-based) criticism of what he calls “nuclear opposition” or “antinuclearists” at the very outset of his book. (KN: xvi) Once again, the unhappy choice forced upon the reader is to join Chaloupka in his total critique of all sovereign truths or be trapped in obsolete essentialisms. This leads to a disastrous politics, pitting groups that have the most in common (and need to unite on some basis to be effective) against each other. Both Chaloupka and Der Derian thus reserve their most trenchant critique for political groups that should, in any analysis, be regarded as the closest to them in terms of an oppositional politics and their desired futures. Instead of finding ways to live with these differences and to (if fleetingly) coalesce against the New Right, this fratricidal critique is politically suicidal. It obliterates the space for a political activism based on provisional and contingent coalitions, for uniting behind a common cause even as one recognizes that the coalition is comprised of groups that have very differing (and possibly unresolvable) views of reality. Moreover, it fails to consider the possibility that there may have been other, more compelling reasons for the “failure” of the Nuclear Freeze movement or anti-Gulf War movement. Like many a worthwhile cause in our times, they failed to garner sufficient support to influence state policy. The response to that need not be a totalizing critique that delegitimizes all narratives. The blackmail inherent in the choice offered by Der Derian and Chaloupka, between total critique and “ineffective” partial critique ought to be transparent. Among other things, it effectively militates against the construction of provisional or strategic essentialisms in our attempts to create space for an activist politics. In the next section, I focus more widely on the genre of critical international theory and its impact on such an activist politics.

Only a combination of micro and macro politics can solve oppression

Steven Best, Assoc. Prof Phil. And Human. U Texas and Douglas Kellner, Phil. Of Ed. Chair, 2001, “Postmodern Politics and the Battle for the Future,” Illuminations, www.uta.edu/huma/illuminations/kell28.htm

The emphasis on local struggles and micropower, cultural politics which redefine the political, and attempts to develop political forms relevant to the problems and developments of the contemporary age is extremely valuable, but there are also certain limitations to the dominant forms of postmodern politics. While an emphasis on micropolitics and local struggles can be a healthy substitute for excessively utopian and ambitious political projects, one should not lose sight that key sources of political power and oppression are precisely the big targets aimed at by modern theory, including capital, the state, imperialism, and patriarchy. Taking on such major targets involves coalitions and multi-front struggle, often requiring a politics of alliance and solidarity that cuts across group identifications to mobilize sufficient power to struggle against, say, the evils of capitalism or the state. Thus, while today we need the expansion of localized cultural practices, they attain their real significance only within the struggle for the transformation of society as a whole. Without this systemic emphasis, cultural and identity politics remain confined to the margins of society and are in danger of degenerating into narcissism, hedonism, aestheticism, or personal therapy, where they pose no danger and are immediately coopted by the culture industries. In such cases, the political is merely the personal, and the original intentions of the 1960s goal to broaden the political field are inverted and perverted. Just as economic and political demands have their referent in subjectivity in everyday life, so these cultural and existential issues find their ultimate meaning in the demand for a new society and mode of production. Yet we would insist that it is not a question of micro vs macropolitics, as if it were an either/or proposition, but rather both dimensions are important for the struggles of the present and future.[15] Likewise, we would argue that we need to combine the most affirmative and negative perspectives, embodying Marcuse's declaration that critical social theory should be both more negative and utopian in reference to the status quo.[16] There are certainly many things to be depressed about is in the negative and cynical postmodernism of a Baudrillard, yet without a positive political vision merely citing the negative might lead to apathy and depression that only benefits the existing order. For a dialectical politics, however, positive vision of what could be is articulated in conjunction with critical analysis of what is in a multioptic perspective that focuses on the forces of domination as well as possibilities of emancipation.

AT: Generic Alt

Prioritizing moral vision ahead of practical political change dooms the alternative and increases the risk of NW

Yost 7 (Naval Postgraduate School Associate Professor, Former DOD Official, Woodrow Wilson International Center Security Studies Fellow, John Hopkins Visiting Scholar, May 2007 David, “Analysing international nuclear order,” Int'l Affairs, 83.3, access 9/3)

The generally insufficient level of commitment to ‘a common moral obligation’ includes a low level of allegiance in key regions of the world to the non- proliferation and disarmament ideals championed by Walker. The most serious obstacles to the realization of his vision reside not, as he suggests, in the United States but in the rise of new power centres, particularly in Eurasia, and the emergence of violent and highly capable non-state actors. As Pierre Hassner observes, Probably the most important reason for the crisis of the nuclear order, and for my rather pessimistic assessment of its chances of being solved any time soon, is the sharp decline of the international political order on which the NPT was based. The two elements on which any such order has to rely—power and legitimacy—have been profoundly modified in a direction unfavourable to the West. Although Walker deprecates the idea of ‘muddling through’ and deplores the focus in US policy on ‘certain actors in the world whose possession of nuclear weapons or weapon-related technologies would be intolerable’, there is a certain practical logic in focusing on the cases and tasks immediately at hand while pursuing broader positive political changes. Aside from concentrating on the most dangerous specific proliferants, the most pressing priority—while maintaining a reliable posture for deterrence, dissuasion and defence—is reforming and strengthening the NPT-based nuclear non-proliferation regime as a whole; and that includes remedying (to the maximum extent possible) the significant deficiencies present in the treaty since its origin. Further proliferation would probably make the achievement of nuclear disarmament an even more remote prospect and might well increase the risk of nuclear war.

A2: Predictions Bad

Predictions are imperfect but inevitable and critical to preventing major war

Kagan & Kagan 2k (Donald & Frederick, American Enterprise, While America Sleeps, p. 5)

Predicting the future is a difficult and uncertain business, but for those who make international and military policy there is no escape from it. Any future course of action rests on assumptions about how events are likely to develop and how political and military leaders will try to shape and react to them. Simply to project the behavior of the past in a straight line into the future is a mistake, for history does not repeat itself with precision. A far worse mistake, however, is to project a future that is entirely different from the past, to assume that all previous human behavior has been made irrelevant by some developments or discoveries. It is tempting to construct a vision of the future that, however pleasing, is entirely unprecedented and most unlikely. Men have been making such optimistic projections since the eighteenth century, at least, predicting the end of war because of new conditions and always turning out to be devastatingly wrong. For all its shortcomings, past behavior remains the most reliable predictor of future behavior. History can enlighten critical elements of the debate over our national security policy by examining what once was as a way of conceiving what might be. The center of any argument against the need to maintain large armed forces and an active foreign policy as a way of preventing war is the refusal to admit that we could face a serious threat in a very short time. A corollary to that refusal is the assumption that warning signs will be seen well before the threat materializes.

Apocalyptic Imagery Good – Social Change

Apocalypse is the purest test of dialogue – we should be open to the transformative potential of vulnerability to apocalyptic imagery

Franke 9 (Associate Prof of Comparative lit at Vanderbilt William Poetry and Apocalypse Page 92-93)JFS

Apocalypse prima facie refuses and makes an end of dialogue: it thunders down invincibly from above. But for this very reason the greatest test of our dialogical capacity is whether we can dialogue with the corresponding attitude or must resort to exclusionary maneuvers and force. What is called for here is a capacity on the part of dialogue not to defend itself but to let itself happen in interaction with an attitude that is apparently intolerant of dialogue. Letting this possibility be, coming into contact with it, with the threat of dialogue itself, may seem to be courting disaster for dialogue. It is indeed a letting down of defenses. Can dialogue survive such a surrendering of itself in utter vulnerability to the enemy of dialogue? Or perhaps we should ask, can it rise up again, after this self-surrender, in new power for bringing together a scattered, defeated humanity to share in an open but commonly sought and unanimously beckoned Logos of mutual comprehension and communication? May this, after all, be the true and authentic “end” of dialogue provoked by apocalypse? For what it is worth, my apocalyptic counsel is that we must attempt an openness to dialogue even in this absolute vulnerability and risk. The world is certainly not a safe place, and it will surely continue not to be such, short of something … apocalyptic. Needed, ever again, is something on the order of an apocalypse, not just a new attitude or a new anything that we can ourselves simply produce. Philosophy itself, thought through to its own end, can hardly resist concluding that “only a god can save us” (Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten). But can not our attitude make a difference- perhaps make possible the advent of apocalypse beyond all our powers, even those of our own imaginations? I will wager an answer to this question only in the operative mood. May we bring a voice speaking up for mutual understanding onto the horizon of discourse in our time, a time marked by the terrifying sign of apocalyptic discourse. May we do this not by judging apocalyptic discourse, but by accepting that our condition as humans is as much to be judged as to judge and that all our relatively justified judgments are such to the extend that they offer themselves to be judged rather than standing on their own ground as absolute. In other words, may our discussions remain open to apocalypse, open to what we cannot represent or prescribe but can nevertheless undergo in a process of transformation that can be shared with others – and that may be genuinely dialogue.

Our encounter with the apocalypse is an aesthetic approach – this opens up space for imagining a new world

Franke 9 (Associate Prof of Comparative lit at Vanderbilt William Poetry and Apocalypse Page 40)JFS

Envisioning an end to the game of the present in all spheres of social and political life, with its embittered alignments and its entrenched impasses, as insidiously difficult as that may be for us to “do” (as Beckett’s Endgame so wittily insinuates), enables us to envisage, and so also to beginning to enact, new possibilities. And yet, apocalypse, as the advent of the end, is nothing that we can do, though we can be aware of and perhaps cooperate with its happening to us. Indeed, from a certain point of view, this is already what our tradition itself is all about. Apocalyptic, as the ultimate expression of transcendent, metaphysical vision in poetry, rather than being taken as an aberration, symptomatic of a pathology of Western civilization that could be cured, should be accepted as part of the whole and as standing for the possibility of renewal inherent within this tradition. From this type of imagination, new and different proposals unceasingly draw their inspiration. All representations and imaginings have their limits. Apocalypse thematizes this inherent destiny for every order of imagination to have its end and give place to a new, thitherto unimaginable order. Every imagination of the end in apocalyptic style is the occasion for new orientation toward the open space we call the future. This future, however, is not for us to name, in the end, since it is beholden to the Other. And this may mean – and has meant, in the terms forged by a certain tradition embracing Dante, Celan, and Stevens – being beholden to an apocalypse, to the revelation of the “eternity” that surpasses us utterly and unutterably.

Apocalyptic Imagery Good – Social Change

Apocalypse is the vision of change –the imagination of something entirely different

Franke 9 (Associate Prof of Comparative lit at Vanderbilt William Poetry and Apocalypse Page 91)JFS

“Apocalyptic” in the proper sense is a biblical or apocryphal literary genre that develops especially in the inter-testamental period, but it must also be understood as a mode of vision that views life as destined to convert into something utterly strange and different: it envisions our life as radically relational and as dependent ultimately on an absolute Other. This is the vision of the Bible and of the plethora of disparate cultural outlooks and religious ways of life it has spawned.102 Apocalyptic in this sense raises the issue of the ultimate groundlessness of all our own judgments through opening up beneath them the abyss of a judgment by which they are all to be judged: their partial perspective is then set to be measured against a whole vision and absolute standard and last judgment in order to avoid assuming the role of God and the prerogatives of revelation ourselves, thereby setting dialogue into a frame not itself open to dialogue and negotiation.

Apocalyptic Imagery – Alt Fails

Their alternative only recreates the violence they attempt to stop –the anti-apocalyptic position fails to transgress their link arguments

Franke 9 (Associate Prof of Comparative lit at Vanderbilt William Poetry and Apocalypse Page 4-5)JFS

There is a temptation, especially appealing to articulate, dialectically skillful academicians, perhaps particularly in the postmodern climate where “deconstruction” has become as much a common denominator as a radical challenge, to say that every party to the discussion must simply avoid assertions presuming to any final disclosure of truth, or, in other words, that we must all learn to avoid “apocalyptic” discourse.1 But the viability of precisely this solution seems to me to have been belied by discussions even in purely academic contexts, such as an interdisciplinary seminar among humanities scholars.2 for this solution draws the boundaries of acceptable discourse in a tendentious and exclusionary way: it in effect makes a rational, pragmatic, relativistic approach normative for all. And to that extend, so far from overcoming the arbitrary and dogmatic method of absolutistic religious belief, it risks becoming just one further manifestation and application of it, the imposition of one’s own apocalypse, however liberal, enlightened, and philosophical it may be, on others. Indeed, any drawing of boundaries by us – that is, by certain of us, however the claim to being representative may itself be drawn – cannot but be tendentious and exclusionary. That is why we have no right to shut out the final judgment from above of beyond us – though, of course, also not to appropriate this judgment in order to use it, in the name of God or truth of facts or the future, in our own biased way against others. The problem here is that the “anti-apocalyptic” position belongs to a system of oppositions with apocalypticist positions, and so can do no more than turn their violence in the opposite direction. The bracketing or banning of apocalyptic discourse, even when only by ostracizing it, does not solve the problem posed by this form of communication so difficult to accommodate alongside other in an open, neutral forum of debate. It shifts the imposition of an absolute from the level of the expressed, the propositions affirmed, to the unending, free, unjudged and unjudgeable status of conversation itself: anything may be said, but nothing must be said that would call into question this activity of unrestricted discourse and mark its limits against something that could perhaps reduce it to vanity and, in effect, end it. That would be a threat to the dialogue’s own unimpeachable power of self-validation. Higher powers, such as those revealed, at least purportedly, by apocalypse, must be leveled in the interest of this power of our own human Logos that we feel ourselves to be in command of, or that is, at any rate, relatively within our control. Of course, the “we” here depends on who is the most dialectically powerful, and its established not without struggle and conflict.

Rejection of the apocalyptic vision entrenches an apocalyptic theology which dictates absolute truth – censorship of aesthetics destroys dialogue

Franke 9 (Associate Prof of Comparative lit at Vanderbilt William Poetry and Apocalypse Page 83-84)JFS

Yet this rejection of apocalyptic vision itself involves a claim, and it is not without pretenses of its own. It wishes to draw the bounds of legitimate representations and to circumscribe what ought and ought not be brought to the table as lying within the compass of discussion. And to set the limits and establish the law for representation is in and of itself to assume a position beyond all representation. 97 There is perhaps an apocalyptic theology (or its negation and inversion) buried even here, a belief about what ultimately is true or, at any rate, about what makes a difference or really matters in the end. Rather than attempting to exorcise this residual haunting presence of truth, or at least of a pretended disclosure of what is decisive in the end, I submit that we should accept it as belonging to the very dialogical nature of our common pursuit. For to the extend that we gather to talk and exchange views with one another and argue over them, we are seeking some generally valid and communicable understanding. And yet the dialogue can have no pre-established framework that would not be biased – the work of some and the imposition on others. Any delimitation of a framework for dialogue, unless they have previously accepted the conditions that are not of their own making, does presuppose what in crucial respects is indistinguishable from an absolute “theological” type of authority, a sort of positively given “revelation”.

AT: Narrative

Narrative fails to subvert the dominant paradigm – They recreate absolutisms

Clawson 98 (Mark, J.D. – Stanford, 22 Legal Stud. Forum 353)

These subjective identities give certain individuals solid ground upon which they can build a progressive framework of thought. But the narrowly defined identities of contemporary progressivism limit the possibility that those outside the narrow group of interest will share the agenda. One might hope that progressives could be somewhat open-minded. But as Stanley Fish has observed, "to say that one's mind should be open sounds fine until you realize that it is equivalent to saying that one's mind should be empty of commitments, should be a purely formal device." n165 Assuming that a broad base of progressive factions can mold diverse individuals-with distinct notions of identity-into a cohesive whole is simply asking the framework of progressive thought to do something that, in the end, it cannot. Contemporary narratives of identity seek to resolve the questions of authority that plague progressivism, but they lack the power that religion once held. In an earlier era, progressives could unite behind an over-arching paradigm that commanded them to "do as they would be done by." n166 Since widely shared cultural assumptions fueled the progressive agenda of early decades, slavery was vanquished and monopolies were crushed. But increasingly subjective narratives of identity command obeisance only within narrow spheres, not translating easily into the realities of other social worlds. The interpretation of the world facilitated by these narrow identities-including a well-defined course of future action-is accessible only to those who share their cultural assumptions. This interpretation may, in fact, challenge the social worlds established by other progressives. In the end, it seems that progressive narratives, like Frye's romances, end where they began, but with a difference. n167 Questions of authority and feelings of dissonance remain in the larger progressivism, but those who gain new identities now live in temporary worlds of absolutes.

A2: Generic Biopower Links

No link – their link arguments presume governmentality and biopower remain linked – this relationship is fundamentally broken now

Fraser 3, Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Politics and Philosophy at the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science (The New School for Social Research) (Nancy, Constellations, Vol 10, No 2, p. 165-166)

The preceding account of fordist discipline assumes at least three empirical propositions that no longer hold true today. It assumes, first, that social regulation is organized nationally, that its object is a national population living in a national society under the auspices of a national state, which in turn manages a national economy. It assumes, second, that social regulation constitutes a nonmarketized counterpart to a regime of capital accumulation, that it is concentrated in the zone of “the social,” and that its characteristic institutions are the governmental and nongovernmental agencies that comprise the (national) social-welfare state. It assumes, finally, that regulation’s logic is subjectifying and individualizing, that in enlisting individuals as agents of self-regulation, it simultaneously fosters their autonomy and subjects them to control, or rather, it fosters their autonomy as a means to their control.

If these propositions held true in the era of fordism, their status is doubtful today. In the post-89 era of postfordist globalization, social interactions increasingly transcend the borders of states. As a result, the ordering of social relations is undergoing a major shift in scale, equivalent to denationalization and transnationalization. No longer exclusively a national matter, if indeed it ever was, social ordering now occurs simultaneously at several different levels. In the case of public health, for example, country-based agencies are increasingly expected to harmonize their policies with those at the transnational and international levels. The same is true for policing, banking regulation, labor standards, environmental regulation, and counterterrorism.9 Thus, although national ordering is not disappearing, it is in the process of being decentered as its regulatory mechanisms become articulated (sometimes cooperatively, sometimes competitively) with those at other levels. What is emerging, therefore, is a new type of regulatory structure, a multi-layered system of globalized governmentality whose full contours have yet to be determined.

At the same time, regulation is also undergoing a process of desocialization. In today’s hegemonic – neoliberal – variant of globalization, massive, unfettered, transnational flows of capital are derailing the Keynesian project of national economic steering. The tendency is to transform the fordist welfare state into a postfordist “competition state,” as countries scramble to cut taxes and eliminate “red tape” in hopes of keeping and attracting investment.10 The resulting “race to the bottom” fuels myriad projects of deregulation, as well as efforts to privatize social services, whether by shifting them onto the market or by devolving them onto the family (which means, in effect, onto women). Although the extent of such projects varies from country to country, the overall effect is a global tendency to destructure the zone of “the (national) social,” formerly the heartland of fordist discipline. Decreasingly socially concentrated, and increasingly marketized and familialized, postfordist processes of social ordering are less likely to converge on an identifiable zone. Rather, globalization is generating is a new landscape of social regulation, more privatized and dispersed than any envisioned by Foucault.

Finally, as fordist discipline wanes in the face of globalization, its orientation to self-regulation tends to dissipate too. As more of the work of socialization is marketized, fordism’s labor-intensive individualizing focus tends to drop out. In psychotherapy, for example, the time-intensive talk-oriented approaches favored under fordism are increasingly excluded from insurance coverage and replaced by instant-fix pharma-psychology. In addition, the enfeeblement of Keynesian state steering means more unemployment and less downward redistribution, hence increased inequality and social instability. The resulting vacuum is more likely to be filled by outright repression than by efforts to promote individual autonomy. In the US, accordingly, some observers posit the transformation of the social state into a “prison-industrial complex,” where incarceration of male minority youth becomes the favored policy on unemployment.11 The prisons in question, moreover, have little in common with the humanist panopticons described by Foucault. Their management often subcontracted to for-profit corporations, they are less laboratories of self-reflection than hotbeds of racialized and sexualized violence – of rape, exploitation, corruption, untreated HIV, murderous gangs, and murderous guards. If such prisons epitomize one aspect of postfordism, it is one that no longer works through individual self-governance. Here, rather, we encounter the return of repression, if not the return of the repressed.

In all these respects, postfordist globalization is a far cry from Foucauldian discipline: multi-layered as opposed to nationally bounded, dispersed and marketized as opposed to socially concentrated, increasingly repressive as opposed to self-regulating. With such divergences, it is tempting to conclude that the disciplinary society is simply dépassé. One might even be tempted to declare, following Jean Baudrillard, that we should all “oublier Foucault.”

Biopower Good – Democracy

Turn - Biopolitics are not totalitarian – it strengthens democracy and prevents the impacts they describe. And, the type of power present in democracy is wholly distinct from the type of power responsible for their impacts

Ross, Berkeley history professor, 2004

(Edward, “Central European History,” AD:7-8-9March, p. 35-36) PMK

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany. Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal staring night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate.

TURN – The Alt increases Biopower

Lifting biopolitical constraints *necessarily* creates new ones. The illusion that we can be free from biopower makes the impact worse.

Shapiro, Critical Theorist and UCLA graduate, 2007 (Steve, April 22, Foucault and Constraints on Individualism, http://www.gather.com/viewArticle.action?articleId=281474976965588) PMK

A prime example of this is during the 1970s when the Soviet Union and the United States were still in an arms race. In 1979, guerrilla opposition forces started to threaten the government of Afghanistan. The Soviets interfered trying to end the conflict, but instead, the conflict led to the Afghan War which lasted ten years, taking an enormous human and economic toll. Only after the Soviet withdrawal could the Afghan people take control of their government. The Soviets let the Afghan people take care of it themselves. It so happened to be that when the Soviets lifted their biopower, the Taliban seized control of the government and exerted far greater biopower than before. The truth is, however, that lifting a biopolitical constraint is an endless process. Foucault himself states the fact that it is impossible to be in a world without biopower, because as soon as a constraint has been lifted, another one sets into place. Foucault uses the historical example of the French revolution and how the French overthrew their government, a constraint that led to their suffering at the time, but then had to face a new governmental power. The power structures circulate if individualism is preserved, and that, Foucault explains, is the sole priority of a society: to ensure that it does circulate. As soon we try to infringe on a constraint and use power to limit it, we are stopping this cycle, only increasing biopower within the constraint itself.

TURN – The Alt increases Biopower

Attempting to break free from biopolitical control will only cause greater suffering

Shapiro, quals not listed, 2007

Steve, Gather, Foucault and Constraints on Individualism, 4-22-07 <http://www.gather.com/viewArticle.action?articleId=281474976965588>, Accessed 7-8-09, AMG

Think of the amount of suffering that binds us within small deviations of relative constraints. Any biopolitical means is already a constraint of individualism in itself, therefore any attempt other than the attempt of the individual to end that constraint is already deviating that biopolitical limitation the individual. Attempting to change a constraint will only lead to a greater biopolitical constraint over the individual. Any attempt to end the suffering of the individual will only lead to more suffering. Essentially, this action is the destruction of that constraint altogether, but a destruction of a constraint can be as devastating, if not more devastating, than the status quo itself. The constraint cannot be destroyed by any means, it can only be limited through use of power over the initiation of that constraint. What can seem like agonizing to one outside the constraint can be a simple form of life for another within it. Changing that form of life tremendously increases the power structures over the individuals within the constraint, further leading to power over that individual's mind. Interference can devastate the mind of the individual, making the lifting of the constraint even more difficult. In particular instances, it takes more exertion of power to deviate a system than to control it. “Breaking free” in essence, is the only possible change that can be enacted by the individual as a means of deviating the constraint. Examining the contextuality of the historical abstract can lead us to a possible non-biopolitical deviation of the status quo. Instead of attempting the impossible, destroying the constraint altogether, the individual can lift that constraint through the visualization of its context. Only when the individual discovers the source of his suffering can he truly be free from that constraint.

The act of resistance assures more biopower

Kelly, PhD Foucault author, 2009

Mark, eInternation Relations Michel Foucault’s Political Philosophy, 3-31-09, <http://www.e-ir.info/?p=618>, Accessed 7-9-09, AMG

Against the strategies of power is arrayed our resistance. This is a resistance that is today however badly undermined by the emergence of a form of power that seizes us in the core of our being, subjection, the investment by power of the formation of our subjectivity itself. Nevertheless, for Foucault, resistance is not merely a permanent possibility, but an inevitable corollary of power. Resistance is presupposed by power: to induce someone to do something implies that they otherwise would have done something else. This means that power can only occur where there is already an inclination that runs contrary to it. As Foucault puts it, ‘Resistance comes first’.[iii] Still, power is ubiquitous, as is resistance – animal activity inevitably implies the existence of both, as a matter of some animals trying to get others to conform to their will, and the inevitable excess of the will of the victim over that of the wielder of power.

TURN – Rejecting Biopower 🡪 Violence

We can use the tools of biopower to challenge its worst manifestations- rejecting these tools leads to horrid violence

**Deranty, Philosophy Prof. @ Macquarie University, 2004**

(Jean-Phillipe, *Borderlands* Vol. 3 # 1 “Agamben’s Challenge to normative theories…” p. online)

48. One can acknowledge the descriptive appeal of the biopower hypothesis without renouncing the antagonistic definition of politics. As Rancière remarks, Foucault’s late hypothesis is more about power than it is about politics (Rancière 2002). This is quite clear in the 1976 lectures (Society must be defended) where the term that is mostly used is that of "biopower". As Rancière suggests, when the "biopower" hypothesis is transformed into a "biopolitical" thesis, the very possibility of politics becomes problematic. There is a way of articulating modern disciplinary power and the imperative of politics that is not disjunctive. **The power that subjects and excludes socially can also empower politically simply because the exclusion is already a form of address which unwittingly provides implicit recognition. Power includes by excluding, but in a way that might be different from a ban**. This insight is precisely the one that Foucault was developing in his last writings, in his definition of freedom as "agonism" (Foucault 1983: 208-228): "Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free" (221). The hierarchical, exclusionary essence of social structures demands as a condition of its possibility an equivalent implicit recognition of all, even in the mode of exclusion. **It is on the basis of this recognition that politics can sometimes arise as the vindication of equality and the challenge to exclusion.** 49. This proposal rests on a logic that challenges Agamben’s reduction of the overcoming of the classical conceptualisation of potentiality and actuality to the single Heideggerian alternative. Instead of collapsing or dualistically separating potentiality and actuality, one would find in Hegel’s modal logic a way to articulate their negative, or reflexive, unity, in the notion of contingency. Contingency is precisely the potential as existing, a potential that exists yet does not exclude the possibility of its opposite (Hegel 1969: 541-554). Hegel can lead the way towards an ontology of contingency that recognises the place of contingency at the core of necessity, instead of opposing them. The fact that the impossible became real vindicates Hegel’s claim that **the impossible should not be opposed to the actual. Instead, the possible and the impossible are only reflected images of each other and, as actual, are both simply the contingent. Auschwitz should not be called absolute necessity** (Agamben 1999a: 148), **but absolute contingency. The absolute historical necessity of Auschwitz is not "the radical negation" of contingency, which, if true, would indeed necessitate a flight out of history to conjure up its threat. Its absolute necessity in fact harbours an indelible core of contingency, the locus where political intervention could have changed things, where politics can happen.** Zygmunt Bauman’s theory of modernity and his theory about the place and relevance of the Holocaust in modernity have given sociological and contemporary relevance to this alternative historical-political logic of contingency (Bauman 1989). 50. In the social and historical fields, politics is only the name of the contingency that strikes at the heart of systemic necessity. An ontology of contingency provides the model with which to think together both the possibility, and the possibility of the repetition of, catastrophe, as the one heritage of modernity, and the contingency of catastrophe as logically entailing the possibility of its opposite. **Modernity is ambiguous because it provides the normative resources to combat the apparent necessity of possible systemic catastrophes**. Politics is the name of the struggle drawing on those resources. 51. **This ontology enables us also to rethink the relationship of modern subjects to rights. Modern subjects are able to consider themselves autonomous subjects because legal recognition signals to them that they are recognised as full members of the community, endowed with the full capacity to judge. This account of rights in modernity is precious because it provides an adequate framework to understand real political struggles, as fights for rights**. We can see now how this account needs to be complemented by the notion of contingency that undermines the apparent necessity of the progress of modernity. Modern subjects know that their rights are granted only contingently, that the possibility of the impossible is always actual. This is why **rights should not be taken for granted. But this does not imply that they should be rejected as illusion, on the grounds that they were disclosed as contingent in the horrors of the 20th century. Instead, their contingency should be the reason for constant political vigilance.** 52. By questioning the rejection of modern rights, one is undoubtedly unfaithful to the letter of Benjamin. Yet, if one accepts that one of the great weaknesses of the Marxist philosophy of revolution was its inability to constructively engage with the question of rights and the State, then it might be the case that the **politics that define themselves as the articulation of demands born in the struggles against injustice are better able to bear witness to the "tradition of the oppressed" than their messianic counterparts.**

Alt Fails – Biopower General

Attempts to defy biopower fail

Parry, associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 2005 “SOCIETY MUST BE [REGULATED]”: BIOPOLITICS AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE IN GONZALES V. RAICH, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=854564) PMK

What, then, about individual rights-based resistance to biopolitics? For several reasons, I think rights-based objections fail almost completely.76 First, one must formulate the right at issue, and there is no general right not to have a regulatory state. Not all of the work of biopolitics turns on direct management of people in ways that restrict their liberty. The collection and publication of data on the economy or education, and much of the work of the Army Corps of Engineers or the National Institutes of Health, for example, trespasses on no individual liberty interests in any sense that would have a hope of legal recognition. With respect to those activities that more often implicate liberty interests—the activities of, say, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, or large parts of the Department of Health and Human Services—the most one could argue for, I think, is a “presumption that any restriction on the rightful exercise of liberty is unconstitutional unless and until the government convinces a hierarchy of judges that such restrictions are both necessary and proper.”77 One might even argue that this formulation is truest to the original understanding of the Constitution.78 The problem, of course, is that the courts have never read the Constitution to include such a broad rule—and they are unlikely ever to do so.

Although it is a signpost of modernity, the meaning of the Constitution nonetheless also reflects and changes in response to the forces of modernity that include the development of biopolitics. Without broad-based liberty claims, procedural and substantive due process provide the most obvious avenues for relief. One of the touchstones of procedural due process, however, is the balancing of individual interests against government interests and the interests of the process itself.79 Such claims do not prevent biopolitical regulation; rather they merely require it to work through channels in which individuals may be heard. The fact that, for example, a welfare recipient has the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner does not make the provision and administration of welfare benefits less biopolitical in any “meaningful” way. The person being heard, whatever the outcome of the hearing, has still been inspected, recorded, and placed within a rationally-defined category that is managed, perhaps perfectly appropriately, for the greater good.

Alt Fails – Biopower is too strong

Foucoult’s self-contradicions and vagueness makes the alt impossible to ever solve

Haber, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, 1994

(Honi Fern, “Beyond postmodern politics: Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault,” Routledge. JM)

This is analogous to the domination of phrase regimes talked about in Lyotard; because everything is formulated within the domain of a phrase and a phrase is both the "effect of power" and exclusionary of other powers, it is seen by Lyotard as a mark of terror. It is impossible then to locate within Lyotard the voice of resistance; it is as if his thesis of the terrorizing by "phrase regimes" forces him to conclude that to speak is already to be co-opted, and this is why the presentation of the unpresentable is totally mystified. **Foucault, on the other hand, at least claims to be able to both postulate the omnipresence and ubiquity of power, even as inscribed on our very bodies, and still allow for the possibility of resistance and oppositional transformation. The question, though, is how? How can he both universalize the domina­tion of subjectless power and still leave space for the empowerment of marginalized voices?** In fact he sometimes uses his refusal to speak for oppositional voices as a shield to hide behind; we cannot allow his refusal to speak for marginalized voices to excuse him from ad­dressing the difficult questions regarding resistance—made even more difficult, given the context of power in which resistances arise and are said to be products.This leads us then to consider more closely his notion of resistance. Granted, he need not provide a blueprint for the form oppositional struggles must or should take, still**, his thesis of the ubiquity of nor­malizing and disciplinary power, along with its implication for his theory of the subject as an effect and also the vehicle of such power, forces us to ask questions such as: How is resistance possible, where does it come from, why would it arise? How can we affect conscious choices for resistance or subvert those powers which both constitute and oppress it? Does Foucault's analysis of the ubiquity of power eliminate reference to a thinking/willing subject who might motivate resistances?**

In short, the thesis that "we cannot abandon our own order, even where we would attack it," **renders Foucault's theory of power prob­lematic for the possibility of resistance, and an evaluator of Foucault interested in the formation of oppositional struggles, and the voicing of marginalized voices, can both respect his refusal to shape those struggles while at the same time refusing to thereby be put off from demanding a more constructive (or even coherent) notion of resistance and transformation.**

Non-Unique: Foucault’s assertions of biopower vastly transcend the negative’s link

IPCE No Date (Analysis of The History of Sexuality, http://www.ipce.info/ipceweb/Library/history\_of\_sexuality.htm) PMK

**There was also an element of social control in this. A power relation was created between the preacher and the confessant, between the psychoanalyst and his patient. Power relations are to Foucault central to any analysis of society**, and this is especially true for sexuality. **Power relations are formed in all relations where differences exist. What Foucault means by power is not necessarily what is ordinarily meant by the word. It is something ubiquitous and cannot be thought of as dual, as creating a division between those dominating and those being dominated. Power in Foucault's meaning of the word is not an exclusively negative force. He claims that we have had a juridical view of power in our society; we tend to see it as something negative, oppressing, defining what is not to be done. Instead, power is the basis of Foucault's analysis of society. Common power relations** related to sexuality **are, in addition to the ones mentioned between the one who confesses and the one that receives the confession, those between teacher and pupil, between parent and child, and between doctor and patient. to bring biological objects and processes into political and economic calculation; discipline does so by addressing the animal body of individualized man whereas biopolitics does so by addressing the species body of the total population.**

Alt Fails – Biopower Inevitable

Modern biopolitics inevitable

Perry, Prof. Sociology at Vanderbilt University, ‘07

(Joshua, DePaul Journal of Health Care Law, “PARTIAL BIRTH BIOPOLITICS”, Spring 2007, CMM)

Ultimately, it is the use of this political power of regulation over the body politic that is cause for some concern. Surely, some instances of social benefit can be imagined. [n30](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.156391.2189871083&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1247109335756&returnToKey=20_T6928233401&parent=docview#n30) However, as contemporary issues of life and death trigger power dynamics between individuals, an administratively-bureaucratized state, and a conservative ideological movement which seeks to regulate the culture via legislation advancing its version of the common good, perhaps it is inevitable that biopower more often gives rise to a more objectionable brand of biopolitics. For instance, in the realm of reproductive rights one finds increasing attempts by the state to control mechanisms relating to the biological beginnings of life, even as individuals attempt to assert claims to autonomy and rights to self-determination. It is to this particular expression of biopolitics that our discussion now returns.

Biopower is inevitable, it is a circular system

Shapiro, quals not listed, 2007

Steve, Gather, Foucault and Constraints on Individualism, 4-22-07 <http://www.gather.com/viewArticle.action?articleId=281474976965588>, Accessed 7-8-09, AMG

A prime example of this is during the 1970s when the Soviet Union and the United States were still in an arms race. In 1979, guerrilla opposition forces started to threaten the government of Afghanistan. The Soviets interfered trying to end the conflict, but instead, the conflict led to the Afghan War which lasted ten years, taking an enormous human and economic toll. Only after the Soviet withdrawal could the Afghan people take control of their government. The Soviets let the Afghan people take care of it themselves. It so happened to be that when the Soviets lifted their biopower, the Taliban seized control of the government and exerted far greater biopower than before. The truth is, however, that lifting a biopolitical constraint is an endless process. Foucault himself states the fact that it is impossible to be in a world without biopower, because as soon as a constraint has been lifted, another one sets into place. Foucault uses the historical example of the French revolution and how the French overthrew their government, a constraint that led to their suffering at the time, but then had to face a new governmental power. The power structures circulate if individualism is preserved, and that, Foucault explains, is the sole priority of a society: to ensure that it does circulate. As soon we try to infringe on a constraint and use power to limit it, we are stopping this cycle, only increasing biopower within the constraint itself.

Alt Fails – Biopower Inevitable

Biopower has evolved in a nature more complex than Foucault ever fathomed. Complexity has become inevitability.

Dreyfus, PhD in Philosophy from Harvard University and Professor at U.C. Berkeley, 04

(Hubert, Being and Power: Heidegger and Foucault, http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/html/paper\_being.html) PMK

This raises an important question. When Foucault describes power as "coming from everywhere" is he describing power in general, i.e. the social clearing, or is he describing bio-power, which is uniquely discrete, continuous and bottom-up? This seeming problem is cleared up, I think, if we remember Heidegger's account of onto-theology. Like the understanding of being, power, always, in fact, "comes from everywhere," in that it is embodied in the background of everyday practices. But what these background practices have made possible up to recently is monarchical and state-juridical power, i.e. power administered from above. But now, Foucault tells us, things have changed: To conceive of power [in these terms] is to conceive of it in terms of a historical form that is characteristic of our societies: the juridical monarchy. Characteristic yet transitory. For while many of its forms have persisted to the present, it has gradually been penetrated by quite new mechanisms of power that are probably irreducible to the representation of law. Just as for Heidegger the technological understanding of being, by treating everything as resources, levels being to pure ordering, and so gets rid of all onto-theology --the idea that some entity is the ground of everything -- so bio-power reveals the irrelevance of questions of the legitimacy of the state as the source of power. Foucault says: At bottom, despite the differences in epochs and objectives, the representation of power has remained under the spell of monarchy. In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king. Hence the importance that the theory of power gives to the problem of right and violence, law and illegality, freedom and will, and especially the state and sovereignty. That is, just as total mobilization cannot be understood by positing subjects and objects, so normalization works directly through new sorts of invisible, continuous practices of control Foucault calls micro-practices. The everyday person to person power relations whose coordination produces the style of any regime of power are, indeed, everywhere. But in earlier regimes of power they are not micro-practices. Only disciplinary power works meticulously by ordering every detail. So, while for Foucault all forms of power are bottom up and the understanding of power as monarchical misses this important fact, nonetheless bio-power is bottom-up in a new and dangerously totalizing way, so that understanding power on the model of the power of the king (the equivalent of onto-theology) covers up an important change in how our practices are working.

Alt Fails – Biopower Inevitable

**The American political system will inevitably exert biopower.**

**Agamben, professor of philosophy at the College International de Philosophie in Paris, 2000.**

 [Means Without End: Notes on Politics, p. 113-115.] PMK

**While the state in decline lets its empty shell survive everywhere as a pure structure of sovereignty and dom­ination, society as a whole is instead irrevocably deliv­ered to the form of consumer society, that is, a society in which the sole goal of production is comfortable living**. The theorists of political sovereignty, such as Schmitt, see in all this the surest sign of the end of politics. And the planetary masses of consumers, in fact, do not seem to foreshadow any new figure of the polis (even when they do not simply relapse into the old ethnic and reli­gious ideals). However, the problem that the new politics is facing is precisely this: is it possible to have a political community that is ordered exclusively for the full en­joyment of wordly life? But, if we look closer, isn’t this precisely the goal of philosophy? And when modern po­litical thought was born with Marsilius of Padua, wasn’t it defined precisely by the recovery to political ends of the Averroist concepts of “sufficient life” and “well-liv­ing”? Once again Walter Benjamin, in the “Theologico­Political Fragment,” leaves no doubts regarding the fact that “The order of the profane should be erected on the idea of happiness.”’ The definition of the concept of “happy life” remains one of the essential tasks of the coming thought (and this should be achieved in such a way that this concept is not kept separate from ontol­ogy, because: “being: we have no experience of it other than living itself”). **The “happy life” on which political philoso­phy should be founded thus cannot be either the naked life that sovereignty posits as a presupposition so as to turn it into its own subject or the impenetrable extrane­ity of science and of modern biopolitics that everybody today tries in vain to sacralize. This “happy life” should be, rather, an absolutely profane “sufficient life” that has reached the perfection of its own power and of its own communicability—a life over which sovereignty and right no longer have any hold.**

Alt Fails – Biopower Inevitable

Biopower is inevitable, so it shouldn’t be resisted.

Nadesan, Author, 08

(Majia Holmer, *Google Books,* “Governmentality, Biopower, and Everyday Life,” 208, http://books.google.com/books?id=7ywbHl9DnkEC&pg=PA23&dq=prisons+biopower, accessed 7-8-9, SLR)

By the closing decades of the twentieth century, formalized and state-sponsored liberal technologies designed to produce self-governing subjects and to securitize the market were under attack for governing too much. The liberal capacity to “steer from the centre” was suspect, as was the liberal state’s success in producing self-governing subjects (Rose, 2000, p. 159). Neoliberal reforms sought to disperse liberal centers of government and to empower “market” mechanisms, thereby targeting the “excesses” of liberal government. In effect, neoliberal governmentalities extend liberal strategies of government or “action at a distance” (Latour, 1987, p. 219; Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 9) by further deterritorializing the operations of power, particularly through the extension of biopower and through circulating market networks. Foucault and other expanded on how the assemblages and technologies of biopower operate on populations through geographically diffuse technologies that render populations increasingly visible in particular ways using expert knowledge and interventions while simultaneously encouraging individuals’ self-regulation and “optimization” (Rose, 2007). In order to know and regulate the health of populations, biopower pursues greater knowledge about and regulatory mechanisms over, populations, which are themselves fragmented along increasingly nuanced lines of divisibility (see Deleuze, 1992). As shall be demonstrated, the degree of surveillance implicated in neoliberal governmentalities and the progressively demanding requirements for risk reduction and social and economic success have complex effects that often increase social control while encouraging self-regulation. In contrast, neoconservative governmentalities strive to reinvigorate older forms of state sovereignty in order to remoralize the population while securitizing global circuits.

**Biopower is inevitable, it is a circular system**

**Shapiro, 2007**

Steve, Gather, Foucault and Constraints on Individualism, 4-22-07 http://www.gather.com/viewArticle.action?articleId=281474976965588, Accessed 7-8-09, AMG

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Alt Fails – Biopower Too Complex

**Biopower has evolved in a nature more complex than Foucault ever fathomed**

Dreyfus, PhD in Philosophy from Harvard University and Professor at U.C. Berkeley, 04 (Hubert, Being and Power: Heidegger and Foucault, http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/html/paper\_being.html) PMK

This raises an important question. **When Foucault describes power as "coming from everywhere" is he describing power in general**, i.e. the social clearing, **or is he describing bio-power, which is uniquely discrete, continuous and bottom-up? This seeming problem is cleared up**, I think, if we remember Heidegger's account of onto-theology**. Like the understanding of being, power, always, in fact, "comes from everywhere," in that it is embodied in the background of everyday practices**. But what these background practices have made possible up to recently is monarchical and state-juridical power, i.e. power administered from above. But now, Foucault tells us, things have changed: To conceive of power [in these terms] is to conceive of it in terms of a historical form that is characteristic of our societies: the juridical monarchy. Characteristic yet transitory. For while many of its forms have persisted to the present, it has gradually been penetrated by quite new mechanisms of power that are probably irreducible to the representation of law. Just as for Heidegger the technological understanding of being, by treating everything as resources, levels being to pure ordering, and so gets rid of all onto-theology --the idea that some entity is the ground of everything -- so **bio-power reveals the irrelevance of questions of the legitimacy of the state as the source of power. Foucault says: At bottom, despite the differences in epochs and objectives, the representation of power has remained under the spell of monarchy**. In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king. Hence the importance that the theory of power gives to the problem of right and violence, law and illegality, freedom and will, and especially the state and sovereignty. That is, **just as total mobilization cannot be understood by positing subjects and objects, so normalization works directly through new sorts of invisible, continuous practices of control** Foucault calls micro-practices. **The everyday person to person power relations whose coordination produces the style of any regime of power are, indeed, everywhere**. But in earlier regimes of power they are not micro-practices. Only disciplinary power works meticulously by ordering every detail. So, while for Foucault all forms of power are bottom up and the understanding of power as monarchical misses this important fact, nonetheless **bio-power is bottom-up in a new and dangerously totalizing way, so that understanding power on the model of the power of the king** (the equivalent of onto-theology**) covers up an important change in how our practices are working.**

BIOPOWER ≠ IMPACT

Totalitarianism and Ethnic Racism caused the Holocaust, NOT biopolitics.

Dickinson 4 (Edward, Biopolitics, Facism, Democracy, Central European History v37 n1, Ass. Prof. Hist. at University of Cincinnati)

In an important programmatic statement of 1996 Geoff Eley celebrated the fact that Foucault’s ideas have “fundamentally directed attention away from institutionally centered conceptions of government and the state . . . and toward a dispersed and decentered notion of power and its ‘microphysics.’”48 The “broader, deeper, and less visible ideological consensus” on “technocratic reason and the ethical unboundedness of science” was the focus of his interest.49 But the “power-producing effects in Foucault’s ‘microphysical’ sense” (Eley) of the construction of social bureaucracies and social knowledge, of “an entire institutional apparatus and system of practice” ( Jean Quataert), simply do not explain Nazi policy.50 The destructive dynamic of Nazism was a product not so much of a particular modern set of ideas as of a particular modern political structure, one that could realize the disastrous potential of those ideas. What was critical was not the expansion of the instruments and disciplines of biopolitics, which occurred everywhere in Europe. Instead, it was the principles that guided how those instruments and disciplines were organized and used, and the external constraints on them. In National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of the völkisch state. In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been constrained by a rights-based strategy of social management. This is a point to which I will return shortly. For now, the point is that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state. A comparative framework can help us to clarify this point. Other states passed compulsory sterilization laws in the 1930s — indeed, individual states in the United States had already begun doing so in 1907. Yet they did not proceed to the next steps adopted by National Socialism — mass sterilization, mass “eugenic” abortion and murder of the “defective.” Individual . gures in, for example, the U.S. did make such suggestions. But neither the political structures of democratic states nor their legal and political principles permitted such policies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not horrible; but in a democratic political context they did not develop the dynamic of constant radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies. The radicalizing dynamic of the Nazi regime was determined, however, not only by its structure but also by its ideology. The attentive reader will have noticed a degree of conceptual slippage in many of the quotations used in the foregoing pages between ethnic racialism and eugenics, between “eugenic” murder and the Final Solution. This slippage between “racialism” and “racism” is not entirely justified. After the rigors of the Goldhagen debate, it takes some sangfroid to address the topic of anti-Semitism in Germany at all.But it appears from the current literature that there was no direct connection between anti- Semitism and eugenic ideas. Some German eugenicists were explicitly racist; some of those racist eugenicists were anti-Semites; but anti-Semitism was not an essential part of eugenic thought. As Peter Fritzsche — among many others — has pointed out, racism really is at the heart of the Nazi “discourse of segregation,” and the “fantastic vision” of all-out racial war that motivated the Nazis is not explained merely by the logic of enlightened rationalism, technocracy, and scientism.51 Eugenics did not “pave the way” for the murder of millions of Jews. Ethnic racism — and particularly anti-Semitism— did.

BIOPOWER ≠ IMPACT

The final solution was the byproduct of a unique understanding of the relationship between Jews and Germans. Biopolitics does NOT necessitate extermination of the Other.

Dickinson 4 (Edward, Biopolitics, Facism, Democracy, Central European History v37 n1, Ass. Prof. Hist. at University of Cincinnati)

And yet, it is clear that anti-Semitism and eugenics did not imply, presuppose, or necessitate each other. The Nazi variant of biopolitical modernity was in fact quite idiosyncratic. It is very difficult to assess the place of explicitly ethnic racist thinking in the development of eugenics; but despite a resurgence of interest in the differing “character” and fate of ethnic groups after about 1927, on the whole ethnic racism appears to have become gradually less interesting to eugenicists from the late imperial period forward. The Nazis shifted the balance quite suddenly and forcibly in favor of ethnic racial thought after 1933. It may be that the growing in uence of eugenics made National Socialist thinking more plausible for many people in the early 1930s; but it seems equally likely that the moderation of eugenics in the 1920s may have increased the appeal of the Social Democratic Party (as the strongest advocate, among the non-Nazi political parties, of eugenic policies) while actually discrediting the Nazis’ more dated ideas.53 In fact, it may be useful to consider not only what eugenic ideas and euthanasia policy contributed to the implementation of the Final Solution, but also how momentum toward the Final Solution shaped Nazi eugenics. The context for Nazi eugenic policies was shaped fundamentally by the Nazis’ sense that Germany was in a permanent racial war with “the Jews” (or communists and democrats, which in the Nazi worldview amounted to the same thing). The urgency of Nazi eugenic policy —the scope of forcible sterilization, the murder of tens of thousands of “defective” people— derived not just from the “normal” fear of degeneration typical of eugenics since its inception, but also from a quite extraordinary understanding of the immediacy of racial confrontation.

The holocaust was the result of a series of unique conditions, not the endpoint of all biopolitical regimes.

Ranibow and Rose 3 (Paul/Nikolas, Thoughts On The Concept of Biopower Today, The Molecular Science Institute, Professor of Anthropology at University of Chicago, Professor of Sociology at James Martin White)

Holocaust is undoubtedly one configuration that modern biopower can take. This, as we have already implied, was also Foucault’s view in 1976: racisms allows power to sub-divide a population into subspecies known as races, to fragment it, and to allow a relationship in which the death of the other, of the inferior race, can be seen as something that will make life in general healthier and purer: “racism justifies the deathfunction in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principle that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as ones is a member of a race or a population (2003: 258). The Nazi regime was, however, exceptional – “a paroxysmal development”: “We have, then, in Nazi society something that is really quite extraordinary: this is a society which has generalized biopower in an absolute sense, but which has also generalized the sovereign right to kill… to kill anyone, meaning not only other people but also its own people… a coincidence between a generalized biopower and a dictatorship that was at once absolute and retransmitted throughout the entire social body” (2003: 260). Schmitt argued, erroneously in our view, that the “state of exception” was the guarantee of modern constitutional power. But the articulation of biopower in the form it took under National Socialism was dependent upon a host of other historical, moral, political and technical conditions. Holocaust is neither exemplary of thanato-politics, nor is it in some way the hidden dark truth of biopower.

\*\*\*Kritiks Good\*\*\*

2AC – Debate Can Be Used For Movements

Debate is a place for the voice of the oppressed – this is the key arena for our movement

**Warner and Bruschke 3** (Ede, University of Loiusville, John, CSU Fullerton, “GONE ON DEBATING:” COMPETITIVE ACADEMIC DEBATE AS A TOOL OF EMPOWERMENT FOR URBAN AMERICA)JFS

These arguments are theoretical; they cannot speak as powerfully as the voices of those who have experienced both the oppression of an education system failing from the “unique synergy between lack of funding and anachronistic pedagogical practices.” Ed Lee, who now holds a Master’s degree and works for an Urban Debate League in San Francisco, recounts his experience as an urban debater: Educated in the public school system of inner-city Atlanta, my high school experience was tragically similar to the one depicted above. My savior, like many others**,** was the Atlanta Urban Debate League. It provided the opportunity to question the nefarious rites of passage (prison, drugs, and drinking) that seem to be uniquely debilitating to individuals in the poor urban communities. In enclaves of poverty, there is also an undercurrent of nihilism and negativity that eats away at the soul of the community. Adults are hopeless. Children follow their lead and become hopeless. The solution isto offer people a choice beyond minimum wage or prison. UrbanDebateLeagues provide that. Debating delivers a galaxy of alternatives and opportunity for those who are only offered hopelessness and were unnecessary elements of our culture that existed becaused they (predominantly) go unquestioned. Questioning the very nature of our existence is at the heart of the debate process. I am left wondering what would occur if debate became as compulsory in inner-city educational culture as football and basketball? Imagine graduating from high school each year millions of underprivileged teenagers with the ability to articulate their needs, the needs of others, and the ability to offer solutions. I am convinced that someone would be forced to listen. Urban debate Leagues offers a pedagogical tool that simultaneously opens the mind to alternatives and empowers students to take control of their lives. Half of the time, students are disseminating information and forming arguments about complexphilosophical andpolitical issues. In the other half, they answer the arguments of others. Self-reflexivity is an inherent part of the activity. Debating gives students the ability to articulate the partiality of all critical assessments. Contemporary educational techniques teach one side of the issue and universalize it as the only “truth.” Debate forces students to evaluate both sides, and determine their independent contextualized truth. Additionally, unlike the current pedagogy, debate allows everything to be questioned…The ability to question subjectivities presented as the objective truth makes debate uniquely empowering for individuals disenfranchised by the current system. It teaches students to interrogate their own institutionalized neglect and the systemic unhindered oppression of others. It is one of the few venues we are able to question authority. (pp. 95-6) Given the possibilities an urban debate program presents, it is worth examining the practical possibilities for a revitalization of urban debate. One thing is clear: Urban debate is under-utilized at present. Many urban debate programs died in the late sixties and early seventies as the result of massive budget cuts. As tax revenues diminished in educational coffers, debate programs, always treated as just one of the “extracurricular” activities, got lost in efforts to stop the institutional bleeding by “doing more with less.” While college debate is more vibrant, as early as 1975 major college debate organizations were acknowledging the lack of diversity in intercollegiate forensics. Little has changed over the past twenty-five years; minority participation remains exceptionally low at the two major national policy debate tournaments, the Cross Examination Debate Association championship and the National Debate Tournament (Hill, 1997; Stepp, 1997)

State-Centricity Bad – Agency

An analysis of policymaking that proceeds from the state cannot provide the resources to articulate a capacity for human agency.

Bleiker, 00 (Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague,(Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

While opening up the study of global politics to a variety of new domains, most efforts to rethink the international have not gone as far as they could have, or, indeed, should have gone. Here too, questions of conceptualisation and representation are of crucial importance. Campbell stresses that for all their efforts to understand a wide range of global phenomena, most approaches to international theory have displayed a remarkably persistent compulsion to anchor an under­ standing of the complexities of global life in a 'something-national' formulation — whether it is 'international', 'multinational', or 'transna­ tional'.[14](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471070#14)Representative for such forms of conceptualising is Mark Zacher's seemingly sensible claim that 'non-state actors such as multi­ national corporations and banks may increase in importance, but there are few signs that they are edging states from centre stage'.[15](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471070#15) Debates about the role of human agency display similar state-centric tendencies. There are disagreements on various fronts, but virtually all discussions on agency in international theory remain focused on conceptualising state behaviour. Alexander Wendt, who has been instrumental in bringing issues of agency to the study of international relations, has been equally influential in directing ensuing discussions on a state-centric path. He explicitly and repeatedly acknowledges 'a commitment to states as units of analysis' and constructs much of his theoretical work around an examination of states and the constraints within which they operate.[16](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471070#16) Here too, the logic behind adapting a state-centric form of representation rests on the assumption that 'as long as states are the dominant actors in international politics, it is appropriate to focus on the identity and agency of the state rather than, for example, a transnational social movement'.[17](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471070#17) Questions of agency in international theory should not and cannot be reduced to analyses of state behaviour. This book demonstrates how an instance of transversal dissent may influence global politics at least as much as, say, a diplomatic treatise or a foreign policy decision. At a time when processes of globalisation are unfolding and national boundaries are becoming increasingly porous, states can no longer be viewed as the only consequential actors in world affairs. Various scholars have thus begun to question the prevalent spatial modes of representation and the artificial separation of levels of analysis that issues from them. They suggest, as mentioned above, that global life is better understood as a series of transversal struggles that increasingly challenge what Richard Ashley called 'the paradigm of sovereign man.' Transversal struggles, Ashley emphasises, are not limited to established spheres of sovereignty. They are neither domestic nor international. They know no final boundaries between inside and out­ side.[18](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471071#18) And they have come to be increasingly recognised as central aspects of global politics. James Rosenau is among several scholars who now acknowledge that it is along the shifting frontiers of trans­ versal struggles, 'and not through the nation state system that people sort and play out the many contradictions at work in the global scene'.[19](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471071#19)

State-Centricity – Impact: Violence

While states still serve important functions in policymaking- focusiung exclusively on the state-centric approach to policymaking legitimates violent exclusion of alternative viewpoints.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague,(Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

To expand the scope of international theory and to bring transversal struggles into focus is not to declare the state obsolete. States remain central actors in international politics and they have to be recognised and theorised as such. In fact, my analysis will examine various ways in which states and the boundaries between them have mediated the formation, functioning and impact of dissent. However, my reading of dissent and agency makes the state neither its main focus nor its starting point. There are compelling reasons for such a strategy, and they go beyond a mere recognition that a state-centric approach to international theory engenders a form of representation that privileges the authority of the state and thus precludes an adequate understand­ing of the radical transformations that are currently unfolding in global life. Michael Shapiro is among an increasing number of theor­ists who convincingly portray the state not only as an institution, but also, and primarily, as a set of 'stories' — of which the state-centric approach to international theory is a perfect example. It is part of a legitimisation process that highlights, promotes and naturalises cer­tain political practices and the territorial context within which they take place. Taken together, these stories provide the state with a sense of identity, coherence and unity. They create boundaries between an inside and an outside, between a people and its others. Shapiro stresses that such state-stories also exclude, for they seek 'to repress or delegitimise other stories and the practices of identity and space they reflect.' And it is these processes of exclusion that impose a cer­tain political order and provide the state with a legitimate rationale for violent encounters.[22](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471072#22)

State-Centricity – Impact: Education

State-centricity makes critical understanding of the world impossible.

Shampa Biswas, Professor of Politics at Whitman College, December 2007, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1, p. 125-126

In making a case for the exilic orientation, it is the powerful hold of the nation-state upon intellectual thinking that Said most bemoans. 31 The nation-state of course has a particular pride of place in the study of global politics. The state-centricity of International Relations has not just circumscribed the ability of scholars to understand a vast ensemble of globally oriented movements, exchanges and practices not reducible to the state, but also inhibited a critical intellectual orientation to the world outside the national borders within which scholarship is produced. Said acknowledges the fact that all intellectual work occurs in a (national) context which imposes upon one’s intellect certain linguistic boundaries, particular (nationally framed) issues and, most invidiously, certain domestic political constraints and pressures, but he cautions against the dangers of such restrictions upon the intellectual imagination. 32 Comparing the development of IR in two different national contexts – the French and the German ones – Gerard Holden has argued that different intellectual influences, different historical resonances of different issues, different domestic exigencies shape the discipline in different contexts. 33 While this is to be expected to an extent, there is good reason to be cautious about how scholarly sympathies are expressed and circumscribed when the reach of one’s work (issues covered, people affected) so obviously extends beyond the national context. For scholars of the global, the (often unconscious) hold of the nation-state can be especially pernicious in the ways that it limits the scope and range of the intellectual imagination. Said argues that the hold of the nation is such that even intellectuals progressive on domestic issues become collaborators of empire when it comes to state actions abroad. 34 Specifically, he critiques nationalistically based systems of education and the tendency in much of political commentary to frame analysis in terms of ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ - particularly evident in coverage of the war on terrorism - which automatically sets up a series of (often hostile) oppositions to ‘others’. He points in this context to the rather common intellectual tendency to be alert to the abuses of others while remaining blind to those of one’s own. 35

State-Centricity – Impact: Agency

Agency can only be articulated in opposition to the restrictive structuralisms of the status quo—in other words, we can claim our agency only by rejecting the state-centric view of politics.

Bleiker, 00 Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague,(Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Questions of agency have been discussed extensively in international theory, mostly in the context of the so-called structure—agency debate. Although strongly wedded to a state-centric view, this debate nevertheless evokes a number of important conceptual issues that are relevant as well to an understanding of transversal dynamics. The roots of the structure—agency debate can be traced back to a feeling of discontent about how traditional approaches to international theory have dealt with issues of agency. Sketched in an overly broad manner, the point of departure looked as follows: At one end of the spectrum were neorealists, who explain state identity and behaviour through a series of structural restraints that are said to emanate from the anarchical nature of the international system. At the other end we find neoliberals, who accept the existence of anarchy but seek to understand the behaviour of states and other international actors in terms of their individual attributes and their ability to engage in cooperative bargaining. If pushed to their logical end-point, the two positions amount, respectively, to a structural determinism and an equally farfetched belief in the autonomy of rational actors. [24](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471074#24)

The structure—agency debate is located somewhere between these two poles. Neither structure nor agency receive analytical priority. Instead, the idea is to understand the interdependent and mutually constitutive relationship between them. The discussions that have evolved in the wake of this assumption are highly complex and cannot possibly be summarised here. [25](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471074#25) Some of the key premises, though, can be recognised by observing how the work of Anthony Giddens has shaped the structure—agency debate in international relations. Giddens speaks of the 'duality of structure,' of structural properties that are constraining as well as enabling. They are both 'the medium and outcome of the contingently accomplished activities of situated actors'. [26](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471075#26) Expressed in other words, neither agents nor structures have the final word. Human actions are always embedded in and constrained by the structural context within which they form and evolve. But structures are not immutable either. A human being, Giddens stresses, will 'know a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member'. [27](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471075#27) The actions that emerge from this awareness then shape the processes through which social systems are structurally maintained and reproduced.

State-Centricity – Impact: Identity

It is bad to focus on the state in IR- the state creates boundaries within its self and excludes and represses certain aspects in order to reflect a certain identity

Bleiker in 2000 (Roland, Senior Lecturer and Coordinator of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Queensland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics)

To expand the scope of international theory and to bring transversal struggles into focus is not to declare the state obsolete. States remain central actors in international politics and they have to be recognised and theorised as such. In fact, my analysis will examine various ways in which states and the boundaries between them have mediated the formation, functioning and impact of dissent. However, my reading of dissent and agency makes the state neither its main focus nor its starting point. There are compelling reasons for such a strategy, and they go beyond a mere recognition that a state-centric approach to international theory engenders a form of representation that privileges the authority of the state and thus precludes an adequate understanding of the radical transformations that are currently unfolding in global life. Michael Shapiro is among an increasing number of theorists who convincingly portray the state not only as an institution, but also, and primarily, as a set of 'stories' — of which the state-centric approach to international theory is a perfect example. It is part of a legitimisation process that highlights, promotes and naturalises certain political practices and the territorial context within which they take place. Taken together, these stories provide the state with a sense of identity, coherence and unity. They create boundaries between an inside and an outside, between a people and its others. Shapiro stresses that such state-stories also exclude, for they seek 'to repress or delegitimise other stories and the practices of identity and space they reflect.' And it is these processes of exclusion that impose a certain political order and provide the state with a legitimate rationale for violent encounters.

The state sustains collective identity through an increasing process of oppressive power struggles, culminating in violence

Connoly in 2k2(William, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science @ Johns Hopkins University, Identity/Difference, expanded edition)

 In several domains, the state no longer emerges as a consummate agent of efficacy, even though it expands as a pivotal agent of power.4 A crack in the very unity of "power" has opened up. We have entered a world in which state power is simultaneously magnified and increasingly disconnected from the ends that justify its magni- fication. As obstacles to its efficacy multiply, the state increasingly sustains collective identity through theatrical displays of punish- ment and revenge against those elements that threaten to signify its inefficacy. It launches dramatized crusades against the internal other (low-level criminals, drug users, disloyalists, racial minor- ities, and the underclass), the external other (foreign enemies and terrorists), and the interior other (those strains of abnormality, subversion, and perversity that may reside within anyone). The state becomes, first, the screen upon which much of the resentment against the adverse effects of the civilization of produc- tivity and private affluence is projected; second, the vehicle through which rhetorical reassurances about the glory and durability of that civilization are transmitted back to the populace; and third, the instrument of campaigns against those elements most disturbing to the collective identity. In the first instance, the welfare apparatus of the state is singled out for criticism and reformation. In the second, the presidency is organized into a medium of rhetorical diversion and reassurance. In the third, the state disciplinary-police-punitive apparatus is marshaled to constitute and stigmatize constituencies whose terms of existence might otherwise provide signs of defeat, injury, and sacrifice engendered by the civilization of productivity itself. <p206>

Reps Shape Policy

**Representations shape the way in which policies are formed**

Bleiker 3 (Roland, Poly Sci @ U of Queensland, Australian Journal of Politics and History: Volume 49, No. 3, 2003 pp. 430-445)

Such a critical engagement must start with re-interpreting the very events of 11 September. To do so is not necessarily easy, for the prevalent public discourse, repeated in a variety of forums, holds that this is a “time for realism, not abstract philosophising”.14 But events themselves do not have any meaning. Meaning emerges only with the process of representation. And realism is, of course, only one of many forms of political interpretation. It is no less abstract than others, except that we have become so used to its metaphors — from the balance of power to collateral damage — that we are no longer aware of their arbitrary and highly political nature. To declare realism realistic, and to depoliticise its metaphors, is to foreclose the option of understanding a phenomenon like terrorism. Dealing with interpretation, and by definition with abstraction, is thus inevitable if one is to look for innovative solutions that can break the cycle of violence. One of the crucial questions, often falsely dismissed as “insensitive and irrelevant”, is to ask why 11 September has come to be seen as a major event in global politics. But this question is not as absurd as it seems. Indeed, it is an important precondition for understanding the politics of representation that lies at the heart of terrorism and the fight against it.

Knowledge is Subjective

**Knowledge production is based on a violent subjectivity**

Chow 6 (Rey, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities and Professor of Modern Culture & Media Studies, Comparative Literature, and English, The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work, Duke University Press, pg. 40-41)

Often under the modest and apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the "scientific" and "objective" production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special "areas" became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic conception of the world as target.52 In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war—if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes53—is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to "know" the other cultures? Can "knowledge" that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare's accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign "self"/"eye"—the "I"—that is the United States, the other will have no choice but remain just that—a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as at the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber—such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter—will never receive the attention that is due to them. "Knowledge," however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences.54 This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has been, since its inception, haunted by "the absence of a definable object"-and by "the problem of the vanishing object."

Ontology First

The nuclear predicament can only be understood in terms of ontology – it’s a necessary prerequisite to any understanding of the current condition

Santoni 85 (Ronald, Prof of Philosphy @ Denison U, “Nuclear War Philosophical Perspectives, pp. 153-4)

In contrast, Zimmerman, who essentially restates the position of the German existentialist Martin Heidegger, argues that the origins of the arms race are deeper then psychological. Thus, the arms race is rooted in a radical misunderstanding of who we are as human beings, and is also a particularly dangerous symptom of “anthropocentric humanism” – an idolatrous modern humanism which, among other defects, both self-centeredly views the human being as the only being which possesses any intrinsic worth or value *and* understands human beings as things; e.g., as their “egos,” bodies, or “pesonae.” Adherents to two competing views of anthropocentric humanism, the two nuclear giants vie to secure the earth and all of its commodities. Each regards as a threat to its individual goals of power, security and domination of the Earth. Each prepares to annihilate the other for the sake of its won idolatrous, self-logical misunderstanding of both human and nonhuman being (the latter perceived as “raw material to be consumed by human kinds”). Our craving to consume things betrays insecurity and expresses the sense of ontological isolation we experience as a result of anthropocentric humanism’s subject-object dualism. Our distorted images and anxieties about “the enemy” stem in part from the arrogant view that *other* people, advocating a divergent ideology and a different form of humanism, must stand as obstacles to our controlling or appropriating the world. 6 Each sides preparations for nuclear wear epitomize the “dark side” of modern humanism – its distorted drive to domination the Earth at any cost to lie. So steeped are we in this eco-centered humanism that we remain anchored to it as we try to find our way beyond it. It accounts for our resort to psychological maneuvers which Fox discusses, not the other way round. Given this analysis, what is needed to liberate us from the spiral of the arms race is no less than a “paradigm shift” in our understanding of what it means to be a human being. We need a “more profound humanism” that both acknowledges the uniqueness of the human being (we are not things but the “awareness” or “opening” in which things manifest themselves) and recognizes that the “highest human possibility “ is not to dominate other beings but to serve them by letting them reveal themselves as they are. As Zimmerman and Heidegger put it, we must “let beings be” we must take the anxiety that reveals to us the facticitiy of our death, that returns us to the truth of who we are that summons us to relinquish old destructive patterns and open new creative ways. Only when we accept the creative disclosures of anxiety, “recollect what we have forgotten,” refuse to be controlled by fear, and being in terms of “open awareness” and love will eliminate the threat of the Other and the motive for the arms race. Although Zimmerman appear to agree with Fox concerning our need to admit to ourselves our anxiety and fear, and to see through our self-deceptive efforts to evade the possibility of our extinction, it is clear that for Zimmerman the cure to our contemporary malady demand first and foremost a correction on our ontology – in our understanding of and attitude toward being – rather then a correction of our psychology. Coming to understand who we are in relation to the rest of being is a prerequisite to understanding and overcoming the psychological aberrations that spawn, nourish and hold us hostage to the arms race. Trying to own up to fear and anxiety without succumbing to delusive defense mechanisms – in the matter that Fox prescribes – requires, for Zimmerman, addressing our self-understanding and approach to all beings: only then will language be able to “speak through us in a new way”; only then will we be more open to serve than to dominate. I agree with Zimmerman that the underlying causes of the arms race are deeper than psychological, that the psychological fears and distortions which heat the arms are an outcome of our idolatrous attitude to ourselves and our exploitative attitude to other beings. I believe that the problem of what constitutes a person represents the fundamental philosophical issue of the twentieth century, and that it is in our confusions about and failures to discern the distinguishing ontological features of a human being that we find the bases of vexing contemporary problems of violence and dehumanization. These problems reflect the way in which we violate the dignity, freedom and autonomy of human reality, in which we treat persons as things. The Zimmerman-Heidegger analysis serves to underscore my conviction that our present preoccupations with violence and preparations for nuclear “war” reveal a distorted existential perspective on all being, not just human being. We objectify human reality and are quite ready to devour the rest of Being for our human “ends” even if that process means the extinction of all life.2

Ontology First

The affirmatives attempt to secure our world leads to an endless spiral of violence – only prioritizing ontology can remedy violence

Zimmerman 85 (Michael, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Colorado, Nuclear War Philosophical Perspectives, pp. 135-36)

We live in an age of crisis. Crises threaten to destroy established states of affairs, but crises are also opportunities for creating something novel and beautiful. At first glance, it would appear that the nuclear arms race is the most pressing crisis facing us. Surely if this arms race ends like those before it, we will destroy much of humanity as well as many other forms of life that share the Earth with us. The nuclear arms race, however, as I shall argue in the following essay, may only be a symptom of a deeper crisis that has been developing for many centuries. This crisis has to do with how we understand ourselves as human beings. Today, human beings in the so-called developed countries regard humankind as the center of reality, the source of all meaning, and the only beings with intrinsic value. I shall use the term “anthropocentric humanism” to refer to this way of understanding who we are. The dark side of humanism is often ignored in favor of the positive dimensions of the humanism with which we are more familiar. The positive thrust of humanism includes its recognition of the importance of individual human freedom and its affirmation of the dignity of humankinds. The dark side of humanism involves an arrogant human-centeredness that reduces the nonhuman world to the status of a commodity whose only value lies in its usefulness for human purposes. According to the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, conceiving of ourselves as masters of all beings, we adopt a false sense of superiority that undermines our true humanity. In the following essay, which will make use of some of Heidegger’s thoughts about human existence in the nuclear age, I argue that this same drive to dominate the natural world is present in the armed struggle between nations. The current nuclear arms race can be interpreted as a conflict between two great representatives of anthropocentric humanism, the United States and the Soviet Union. Strangely, each nation is prepared to annihilate the other side in order to defend the principles of “true humanism”. Marxists and capitalist alike regard their life as the only legitimate fulfillment of the Enlightenment ideal of human progress and freedom. But to a large extent both superpowers are guided by anthropocentric humanism, whose highest aim is power and security, Hence, neither superpower can rest content until the other side is eliminated or at least neutralized. Paradoxically, the quest for total security leads to total insecurity, as we are finding out now that the nuclear arms race is moving to even more threatening levels. In my view, the dangers of nuclear war will not be eliminated, even though some arms controls might be successfully negotiated, until there occurs a basic shift in our understanding of what it means to be human. The positive side of humanism, which has some insight into what it means to be fully human, points in the right direction, but the dark of anthropocentric side predominates today. Let us consider for a moment Heidegger’s view that anthropocentric humanism is the underling disorder, of which the nuclear arms race is but a particularly dangerous symptom.

Predictability Bad

Unpredictability is inevitable – embracing this fact, however, allows us to live meaningful lives.

Bleiker and Leet 6 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, and Martin, Senior Research Officer with the Brisbane Institute, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(3), p. 729-730)JM

Dramatic, sublime events can uproot entrenched habits, but so can a more mundane cultivation of wonder and curiosity. Friedrich Nietzsche pursued such a line of enquiry when reflecting upon what he called the ‘ after effects of knowledge’. He considered how alternative ways of life open up through a simple awareness of the fallibility of knowledge. We endure a series of non-dramatic learning experiences as we emerge from the illusions of childhood. We are confronted with being uprooted from the safety of the house. At first, a plunge into despair is likely, as one realises the contingent nature of the foundations on which we stand and the walls behind which we hide and shiver in fear: All human life is sunk deep in untruth; the individual cannot pull it out of this well without growing profoundly annoyed with his entire past, without finding his present motives (like honour) senseless, and without opposing scorn and disdain to the passions that urge one on to the future and to the happiness in it.43 The sense of meaninglessness, the anger at this situation, represents a reaction against the habits of one’s upbringing and culture. One no longer feels certain, one no longer feels in control. The sublime disruption of convention gives rise to the animosity of loss. The resentment may last a whole lifetime. Nietzsche insists, however, that an alternative reaction is possible. A completely different ‘after effect of knowledge’ can emerge over time if we are prepared to free ourselves from the standards we continue to apply, even if we do no longer believe in them. To be sure, the: old motives of intense desire would still be strong at first, due to old, inherited habit, but they would gradually grow weaker under the influence of cleansing knowledge. Finally one would live among men and with oneself as in nature, without praise, reproaches, overzealousness, delighting in many things as in a spectacle that one formerly had only to fear.44 The elements of fear and defensiveness are displaced by delight if and when we become aware of our own role in constructing the scene around us. The ‘cleansing knowledge’ of which Nietzsche speaks refers to exposing the entrenched habits of representation of which we were ignorant. We realise, for example, that nature and culture are continuous rather than radically distinct. We may have expected culture to be chosen by us, to satisfy our needs, to be consistent and harmonious, in contrast to the strife, accident and instinct of nature. But just as we can neither predict a thunderstorm striking nor prevent it, so we are unable ever to eliminate the chance of a terrorist striking in our midst. We can better reconcile ourselves to the unpredictability and ‘irrationality’ of politics and culture by overcoming our childhood and idealistic illusions. The cultivation of the subliminal, then, can dilute our obsession with control by questioning the assumptions about nature and culture in which this obsession is embedded. Without this work of cultivation, we are far more vulnerable once hit by the after effects of knowledge. We find ourselves in a place we never expected to be, overwhelmed by unexamined habits of fear and loathing. But if, as Nietzsche suggests, we experiment with the subliminal disruptions encountered in the process of ‘growing up’, we may become better prepared. We may follow Bachelard’s lead and recognise that the house not only offers us a space to withdraw from the world when in fear, but also a shelter in which to daydream, to let our minds wander and explore subliminal possibilities. That, Bachelard believes, is indeed the chief benefit of the house: ‘it protects the dreamer’ .45

Limits Bad

A focus on limits engenders violent practices by stopping productive discussions.

Bleiker and Leet 6 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, and Martin, Senior Research Officer with the Brisbane Institute, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(3), p. 733-734)JM

A subliminal orientation is attentive to what is bubbling along under the surface. It is mindful of how conscious attempts to understand conceal more than they reveal, and purposeful efforts of progressive change may engender more violence than they erase. For these reasons, Connolly emphasises that ‘ethical artistry’ has an element of naïveté and innocence. One is not quite sure what one is doing. Such naïveté need not lead us back to the idealism of the romantic period. ‘One should not be naïve about naïveté’, Simon Critchley would say.56 Rather, the challenge of change is an experiment. It is not locked up in a predetermined conception of where one is going. It involves tentatively exploring the limits of one’s being in the world, to see if different interpretations are possible, how those interpretations might impact upon the affects below the level of conscious thought, and vice versa. This approach entails drawing upon multiple levels of thinking and being, searching for changes in sensibilities that could give more weight to minor feelings or to arguments that were previously ignored.57 Wonder needs to be at the heart of such experiments, in contrast to the resentment of an intellect angry with its own limitations. The ingre d i e n t of wonder is necessary to disrupt and suspend the normal pre s s u res of returning to conscious habit and control. This exploration beyond the conscious implies the need for an ethos of theorising and acting that is quite diff e rent from the mode directed towards the cognitive justification of ideas and concepts. Stephen White talks about ‘circ u i t s of reflection, affect and arg umentation’.58 Ideas and principles provide an orientation to practice, the implications of that practice feed back into our affective outlook, and processes of argumentation introduce other ideas and affects. The shift, here, is from the ‘vertical’ search for foundations in ‘skyhooks’ above or ‘foundations’ below, to a ‘horizontal’ movement into the unknown.

We must incorporate alternative perspectives in order to stop violence.

Bleiker 1 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 30(3), p. 519)JM

Hope for a better world will, indeed, remain slim if we put all our efforts into searching for a mimetic understanding of the international. Issues of global war and Third World poverty are far too serious and urgent to be left to only one form of inquiry, especially if this mode of thought suppresses important faculties and fails to understand and engage the crucial problem of representation. We need to employ the full register of human perception and intelligence to understand the phenomena of world politics and to address the dilemmas that emanate from them. One of the key challenges, thus, consists of legitimising a greater variety of approaches and insights to world politics. Aesthetics is an important and necessary addition to our interpretative repertoire. It helps us understand why the emergence, meaning and significance of a political event can be appreciated only once we scrutinise the representational practices that have constituted the very nature of this event.

Limits Bad

Limits exclude and are an innately subjective process -- Objectifying rules obliterates agency

Bleiker 3 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, *Contemporary Political Theory*, 2, p. 39-40)JM

Approaching the political - and by extension dilemmas of agency requires tolerance towards various forms of insight and levels of analysis, even if they contradict each other’s internal logic. Such differences often only appear as contradictions because we still strive for a universal standard of reference that is supposed to subsume all the various aspects of life under a single totalizing standpoint (Adorno, 1992, 17–18). Every process of revealing is at the same time a process of concealing. Even the most convincing position cannot provide a form of insight that does not at the same time conceal other perspectives. Revealing always occurs within a frame. Framing is a way of ordering, and ordering banishes all other forms of revealing. This is, grossly simplified, a position that resonates throughout much of Heidegger’s work (1954, 35). Taking this argument to heart is to recognize that one cannot rely on one form of revealing alone. An adequate understanding of human agency can be reached only by moving back and forth between various insights. The point, then, is not to end up with a grand synthesis, but to make most out of each specific form of revealing (for an exploration of this theme, via an analysis of Kant’s Critique of Judgement, see Deleuze, 1994).

Link – Exclusion

A procedural method of policymaking debate posits an ‘ideal speech’ which necessarily excludes other forms of discourse, making any definition of participation that is limited exclusively to regulated political discourse inevitably exclusionary, racist and sexist.

Kulynych, 97, Winthrop U Prof of Polysci (Jessica, “Performing Politics: Foucault, Habermas, and Postmodern Participation, Polity, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Winter, 1997), 315-346, accessed Jstor)

Certainly, one might suggest that the above cases are really just failures of speech, and, therefore, not a critique of ideal speech as it is formulated by Habermas. Indeed Seyla Benhabib reformulates Habermas's speech act perspective to make it sensitive to the above critique. She argues that feminists concerned with the discourse model of democracy have often confused the historically biased practices of deliberative assemblies with the normative ideal of rational deliberation.26 She suggests that feminists concerned with inequities and imbalances in communication can actually benefit from the Habermasian requirement that all positions and issues be made " 'public' in the sense of making [them] accessible to debate, reflection, action and moral-political transformation."27 The "radical proceduralism" of the discourse model makes it ideally suited to identify inequities in communication because it precludes our accepting unexamined and unjustified positions.28 Even such a sophisticated and sensitive approach to ideal speech as Benhabib's cannot cleanse communicative action of its exclusivity. It is not only that acquiring language is a process of mastering a symbolic heritage that is systematically gendered, but the entire attempt to set conditions for "ideal speech" is inevitably exclusive. The model of an ideal speech situation establishes a norm of rational interaction that is defined by the very types of interaction it excludes. The norm of rational debate favors critical argument and reasoned debate over other forms of communication.29 Defining ideal speech inevitably entails defining unacceptable speech. What has been defined as unacceptable in Habermas's formulation is any speech that is not intended to convey an idea. Speech evocative of identity, culture, or emotion has no necessary place in the ideal speech situation, and hence persons whose speech is richly colored with rhetoric, gesture, humor, spirit, or affectation could be defined as deviant or immature communicators. Therefore, a definition of citizenship based on participation in an ideal form of interaction can easily become a tool for the exclusion of deviant communicators from the category of citizens. This sort of normalization creates citizens as subjects of rational debate. Correlatively, as Fraser explains, because the communicative action approach is procedural it is particularly unsuited to address issues of speech content.30 Therefore, by definition, it misses the relationship between procedure and content that is at the core of feminist and deconstructive critiques of language. A procedural approach can require that we accommodate all utterances and that we not marginalize speaking subjects. It cannot require that we take seriously or be convinced by the statements of such interlocutors. In other words, a procedural approach does not address the cultural context that makes some statements convincing and others not.

A2: “You Lead to No Limits”

Their 'no limits' args are overstated -- openness is a leap of faith guided by ethics which prevents the abuse of conversational encounters

Bleiker and Leet 6 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, and Martin, Senior Research Officer with the Brisbane Institute, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(3), p. 737)JM

The most typical objection to such an open-ended approach to ethics is, of course, the accusation that it inevitably leads into a relativist void from whence it becomes impossible to separate good and evil: that only a categorical approach to ethics can save us in a time of moral need. But our most difficult ethical decisions must usually be taken precisely at a time when subliminal events have shaken the very foundations of our principles, at moments when the boundaries between good and evil need to be revisited and redrawn. Falling back into old intellectual habits, whether they are codified or not, will not give us any answers, at least not those we need to deal with the issues in an innovative, sensitive and fair way. Finding ethical solutions at such times of dearth requires a leap of faith into the unknown. Søre n K i e r k e g a a rd already knew that the results of such a leap can never be known, that the ensuing decisions are, by nature, terrible.63 No foundation can ever guarantee to save us from a fall. No pre - e s t a b l i s h e d principles can give us certainty that we are on the right path. Nothing, in short, can absolve us from the terrible burden of decision-making. But we are most likely to face the ensuing challenges successfully when equipped with an aesthetic and ethical sensibility that the conscious alone cannot provide. It is at such moments of need that the lessons learned from the sublime and the subliminal can become most useful – as long as we have discovered ways of embracing the sense of wonder and enchantment they engender.

A2: Limits Inevitable

Language has an infinite number of constructions – there are no limits

Warsi no date (jilliani, linguistics author, jilaniwarsi.tripod.com/language.pdf)JFS

Language provides opportunities to send the message that has never been sent before and to understand novel messages. It also suggests that number of sentences in language is limitless. Any speaker can construct a sentence that has never been constructed before. It is this feature of language that is referred to as productivity or creativity of language.

**Language has no limits – politics transcends to the personal level and becomes infinite**

Okadigbo 2 (Chuba, former African Senate President, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ChatAfriK/message/2824)JFS

Yes. Dialogue has no limits especially when the dialogue leads to a general, consensual agreement. The purpose of politics is the well-being of the masses; the common good is the object of politics. These calculations focus on the subject of power and politics. Where politics stops, government begins. Where government stops, politics begins. Now, I give you one example. Do you know, Mr. Editor, that there are already manipulations in the press to reduce the impeachment saga into a regional affair between North and South? By not being emotive but intellectual about it, I watch that argument with every discretion. Dialogue is of the essence right now. If you allow any emotive, temperamental or tribal argument in the calculus, we will lose the objective of state policy

**Dialogue is limitless and allows new possibilities for thought**

CII no date (The Co-Intelligence Institute non-profit research institute, http://www.co-intelligence.org/P-dialogue.html)JFS

The late quantum physicist David Bohm observed that both quantum mechanics and mystical traditions suggest that our beliefs shape the realities we evoke. He further postulated that thought is largely a collective phenomenon, made possible only through culture and communication. Human conversations arise out of and influence an ocean of cultural and transpersonal meanings in which we live our lives, and this process he called dialogue. Most conversations, of course, lack the fluid, deeply connected quality suggested by this oceanic metaphor. They are more like ping-pong games, with participants hitting their very solid ideas and well-defended positions back and forth. Such conversations are properly called discussions. "Discussion," Bohm noted, derives from the same root word as "percussion" and "concussion," a root that connotes striking, shaking and hitting. Dialogue, in contrast, involves joining our thinking and feeling into a shared pool of meaning which continually flows and evolves, carrying us all into new, deeper levels of understanding none of us could have foreseen. Through dialogue "a new kind of mind begins to come into being," observed Bohm, "based on the development of common meaning... People are no longer primarily in opposition, nor can they be said to be interacting, rather they are participating in this pool of common meaning, which is capable of constant development and change." Bohm's approach to dialogue involved participants working together to understand the assumptions underlying their individual and collective beliefs. Collective reflection on these assumptions could reveal blind spots and incoherences from which participants could then free themselves, leading to greater collective understanding and harmony. Bohm maintained that such collective learning increases our collective intelligence. (For links to sites, groups, and listservs working with Bohm's approach to dialogue, click here.) (For Bohm's introduction to group dialogue, click here.)

A2: “You Lead to Implicit Limits”

Dialogue is intersubjective

Kent et al 2 (Michael L. Kent, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Strategic Communication, Maureen Taylor, Ph.D., is Gaylord Family Chair of Strategic Communication, Sheila M. McAllister-Spooner, Ph.D., is Assistant Professor of Communication, Monmouth University, Research in dialogic theory and public relations)

Since dialogue is intersubjective, it necessitates interpretation and understanding by all parties involved. Dialogue necessitates that all participants are willing to exert themselves on the part of others in a dialogue to understand often- diverse positions. Commitment to interpretation also means that efforts are made to grasp the positions, beliefs, and values of others before their positions can be equitably evaluated (Gadamer, 1994; Ellul, 1985; Makay & Brown, 1972).

These intersubjective limits are better than imposed limits for self/other worth

Kent et al 2 (Michael L. Kent, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Strategic Communication, Maureen Taylor, Ph.D., is Gaylord Family Chair of Strategic Communication, Sheila M. McAllister-Spooner, Ph.D., is Assistant Professor of Communication, Monmouth University, Research in dialogic theory and public relations)

Genuine dialogue, involves more than just a commitment to a relationship. Dialogue occurs when individuals (and sometimes groups) agree to set aside their differences long enough to come to an understanding of the others’ positions. Dialogue is not equivalent to agreement. Rather, dialogue is more akin to intersubjectivity where both parties attempt to understand and appreciate the values and interests of the other. Dialogue is both Socratic and Kantian. Dialogue rests on an acknowledgement of the worth of the other as well as a willingness to “continue the conversation”—not for purposes of swaying the other with the strength of one’s erudition, but as a means of understanding the other and reaching mutually satisfying positions.

Open-ended dialogue solves colonizing tendencies of externally imposed limits

Hawkins and Muecke 3 (Gay and Stephen, Culture and Waste, p. 54, Google Books)

Monologue is the narcissistic conversation that the 'West has with itself key feature of which is that the other never gets to talk bark on its terms. Monologue is a practice of power, of course. since it involves silencing the people whose words and though. would require a break with self=absorption. Much of what passes for conversation is actually monologue because it is constructed around a self=other structure such that the "other. is the absence or reflection of self In contrast. dialogue is intersubjective It is an openended meeting of subjects. Emil Fackenheim articulates two main precepts for structuring the ground for ethical dialogue.' The first that dialogue begins where one is, and thus is always situated; the second is that dialogue is Open, and I thus that the outcome is not known in advance. Openness produces reflexivity, to that one's own round becomes destabilized. In open dialogue one holds one's self available to be surprised, to be challenged, and to be knocked out of narcissism. Dialogue breaks up monologue, it clears a round for meeting, generating a place where people cm speak on their own terms. It thus requires attentive listening and an open mind. Construed in this way, dialogue is a decolonizing practice leading toward unpredictable outcomes.

Guilar 6 (Joshua, School of Communication and Culture

In dialogic education, students, teachers, and content are related intersubjectively. Different disciplines have contributed to the understanding of such relations. One source for understanding the intersubjective nature of instruction is the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1982: 1960; Smith, 1993). Gadamer proposed a dialogical mode of knowing through shared conversation regarding the interpretation of texts. An educational community is intersubjective in nature when all parties relate to one another as having a sense of agency and a unique perspective. In such a community there is not a knowing subject (e.g., the teacher) and a known object (e.g., the student or the content of instruction). Rather, all three elements—the teacher, the student, and the content—relate in an intersubjective, interpretive community. In this community, roles such as teacher and student are still significant. However, the nature of the dialogic conversation changes power relations in contrast to conventional pedagogy. Particularly, the nature of the conversation is such that the students become agents in the hermeneutic community. Students’ roles change from being passive learners to becoming co-creators. In expressing his or her perspective, a student co-creates along with other students and the teacher a shared world in which difference is expressed and respected. Power is shared mutually in this co-created community.

A/T: Shively

It is no longer a question of searching for Truth, but rather of accepting difference and facilitating dialog. We cannot rely upon common terms for discussion as they so often freeze alternative thought and prevent real debate from occurring.

Bleiker, 98 asst. prof. of International Studies at Pusan National University (Roland, “Retracing and redrawing the boundaries of events: Postmodern interferences with international theory”, *Alternatives*, Oct-Dec 1998, Vol. 23, Issue 4)

In the absence of authentic knowledge, the formulation of theoretical positions and practical action requires modesty. Accepting difference and facilitating dialogue becomes more important than searching for the elusive Truth.

But dialogue is a process, an ideal, not an end point. Often there is no common discursive ground, no language that can establish a link between the inside and the outside. The link has to be searched first.

But the celebration of difference is a process, an ideal, not an end point. A call for tolerance and inclusion cannot be void of power. Every social order, even the ones that are based on the acceptance of difference, excludes what does not fit into their view of the world. Every form of thinking, some international theorists recognize, expresses a will to power, a will that cannot but "privilege, oppress, and create in some manner."[54] There is no all-encompassing gaze. Every process of revealing is at the same time a process of concealing. By opening up a particular perspective, no matter how insightful it is, one conceals everything that is invisible from this vantage point. The enframing that occurs by such processes of revealing, Martin Heidegger argues, runs the risk of making us forget that enframing is a claim, a disciplinary act that "banishes man into that kind of revealing that is an ordering." And where this ordering holds sway, Heidegger continues, "it drives out every other possibility for revealing."[55] This is why one must move back and forth between different, sometimes incommensurable forms of insights. Such an approach recognizes that the key to circumventing the ordering mechanisms of revealing is to think in circles--not to rest too long at one point, but to pay at least as much attention to linkages between than to contents of mental resting places.

Inclusiveness does not lie in the search for a utopian, all-encompassing worldview, but in the acceptance of the will to power--in the recognition that we need to evaluate and judge, but that no form of knowledge can serve as the ultimate arbiter for thought and action. As a critical practice, postmodernism must deal with its own will to power and to subvert that of others. This is not to avoid accountability, but to take on responsibility in the form of bringing modesty to a majority.

Policy Making Bad

Policy making framework makes a commodity of violence – ensures its continuance – and is unethical

Makau 96 (Josina., Ph.D. in Rhetoric at the University of California-Berkeley, Responsible Communication, Argumentation Instruction in the Face of Global Perils)

Weisel's critique of German education prior to world war II points to another danger of traditional argumentation instruction . Like the Nazi doctors, students in traditional argumentation courses are taught "how to reduce life and the mystery of life to abstraction." Weisel urges educators to teach students what the Nazi doctors never learned – that people are not abstractions. Weisel urges educators to learn from the Nazi experience the importance of humanizing their charges, of teaching students to view life as special, 'with its own secrets, its own treasures, its own sources of anguish and with some measure of triumph.' Trained as technocrats with powerful suasory skills but little understanding, students participating in traditional argumentation courses would have difficulty either grasping or appreciating the importance of Weisel's critique. Similarly, they would have difficulty grasping or appreciating Christian's framework for an ethic of technology an approach that requires above all, openness, trust and care. The notion of conviviality would be particularly alien to these trained technocrats. Traditionally trained debaters are also likely to fail to grasp the complexity of issues. Trained to view problems in black and white terms and conditioned to turn to "expertise" for solutions, students, and traditional courses become subject to ethical blindness. As Benhabib noted, 'Moral blindness implies not necessarily an evil or unprincipaled person, but one who can not see the moral texture of the situation confronting him or her.' These traditional debaters, deprived of true dialogic encounter , fail to develop 'the capacity to represent' to themselves the 'multiplicity of viewpoints, the variety of perspectives, the layers of meaning, etc. which constitute a situation'. They are thus inclined to lack 'the kind of sensitivity to particulars, which most agree is essential for good and perspicacious judgment.' Encouraging student to embrace the will to control and to gain mastery, to accept uncritically a sovereign view of power, and to maintain distance from their own and others 'situatedness,' the traditional argumentation course provides an unlikely site for nurturing guardians of our world's precious resources. It would appear, in fact, that the argumentation course foster precisely the 'aggressive and manipulative intellect bred by modern science and discharged into the administration of things' associated with most of the world's human made perils. And is therefore understandable that feminist and others critics would write so harshly of traditional argumentation of debate.

A2: “Policy-Only Focus Good”

Their limitation of politics to the state denies creativity which eliminates the things that makes life worth living and perverts politics.

Bleiker and Leet 6 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, and Martin, Senior Research Officer with the Brisbane Institute, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(3), p. 735-736)JM

Promoting aesthetic engagements with politics is not to replace social scientific enquiries or to suggest that art offers a solution to all problems. The point, rather, is that the key political challenges of our time, from terrorism to poverty, are far too complex not to employ the full register of human intelligence and creativity to deal with them. Aesthetic engagements with the sublime are central to this endeavour. But to remain valid, such engagements must go beyond a mere process of aestheticising the political. Establishing societal models based on beauty and harmony has led to dangerous political experiments. We need to acknowledge, along with George Kateb, that the aesthetic is a dominant force in human life. But we need to do so while recognising the potentially problematic practice of searching for stability amidst chaos and contingency through a resort to beauty as the ultimate value. In his view, such ‘unaware and unrationalized aestheticism’ is responsible for a great deal of immorality.60 In attempts to transform the ambivalent experience of the sublime into something unambiguously ‘beautiful’, moral limits are often ignored. In contrast to aesthetic ‘cravings’, then, the challenge is to cultivate an appreciation of sublimity in the everyday, and to use the aesthetic not to mask our fears of the uncertain, but to recognise them and search for ways of living comfortably with the contingent dimensions of life.

The conception of politics devolves to a form of absolute control that overlimits the realm of the political, making true representation impossible & violence inevitable.

Bleiker and Leet 6 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, and Martin, Senior Research Officer with the Brisbane Institute, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(3), p. 736)JM

An aesthetic engagement with the sublime inevitably contains an ethical component. But the ethics we find here is very different from the automatic and codified form of ethics that prevails in much of the theory and practice of international politics. This is so because prevailing approaches to scholarship and decision-making have stated a clear preference for the conscious in the fields of politics and ethics, to the point of imposing order in an attempt to repress ambivalence. The ethical significance of the aesthetic ensues from the effort to be mindful about the inherent violence of such forms of representation. It involves relaxing pressures always working to cut the world down to the size and shape of our fears, needs and desires. Morton Schoolman, for instance, argues that the aesthetic refers to a kind of openness and responsiveness that contrasts sharply with those tendencies in the modern world towards control and the repression of difference. He distinguishes ‘formal reason’ which ‘finds what is unknown and diff e rent from thought to be an obstacle to its emancipation from fear’, from an ‘aesthetic reason’ that is ‘unafraid of the unfathomable in which it finds the source of its receptivity to the diversity of diff e rent forms of life’.61 John Gray illustrates the practical dimensions of this position by reminding us that consciousness can actually be an obstacle, that the most accomplished pianist, for instance, is at his or her most skilful when playing with the least amount of self-awareness .62 Similarly, in the domain of ethics, the conscious self can be both the source of moral behaviour and an obstacle to it.

A2: “Policy-Only Focus Good”

Expanding what counts as politics is critical to solve environmental crisis.

Mallory 8 (Chaone, prof of environmental philosophy @ Villanova U, [http://www.environmentalphilosophy.org/ISEEIAEPpapers/2008/Mallory.pdf] AD: 7/9/10)JM

Although I think that Sandilands overstates the case somewhat—environmental movements, even those which utilize fairly conventional discourses and strategies, are always self-consciously calling for political action and thus understand themselves as political actors as such—nonetheless Sandilands points out something very significant. One of the most salient questions for environmentalists is not how to best exploit existing political avenues for the sake of making gains for the more-than-human world, not about how humans ought best “represent” the interests of nature in incorrigibly anthropocentric political arenas, but to question, and ultimately reconfigure what counts as politics itself; to revise, or rupture where necessary, traditional political categories and assumptions about who or what counts as a political subject and what counts as political action and speech, and challenge the instrumentalist view of politics in favor of a view that considers politics as a space where ecological subjectivities are formed, contested, destabilized, and re-formed. Ecofeminist political philosophy wonders how nature can have a voice in the polis. This leads to other sorts of philosophical tasks and questions, as Sandilands notes.

The kritik doesn’t preclude politics – it allows for an understanding of it that can solve problems more effectively.

Zalewski 2K (Marysia, Director, Centre for Gender Studies, *Feminism After Postmodernism*, p. 67-68)JM

A typical postmodern claim is that power is not something that is simply or only repressive. In keeping with a desire to dismantle dualistic thinking, postmodernists refuse to perceive power as fundamentally opposed to resistance, hence the intertwined phrase; power/resistance. Indeed, the idea that there is a monolithic power ‘out there’, whether that is patriarchy, racism or capitalism, can lead to a sense of fatalism and despair, which is hardly the best way to achieve emancipatory ends, postmoderns might argue. This links into the notion of productive power introduced earlier, which implies that the persistent battle over the meanings of things will inevitably foster new forms of resistance and new meanings emerge from this. The battles over the words 'queer' and 'nigger\* serve as good examples of this. The consistent postmodern emphasis on disputing meanings and displacing traditional ideas and values, inevitably leads to a questioning and dishevelling of modernist definitions and certainties about what counts as politics. This imposition of the authority of correct meaning is something that postmodernists are keen to expose. Postmodernists also resist the idea that their views of the subject and epistemology lead to an inability to be political or do politics. If we think of a specific postmodern method, deconstruct ion, we can understand it as something that questions the terms in which we understand the political, rather than an abandonment of the political. Surely, postmodernists argue, questioning what counts as politics is a political act? Rethinking what the political is can allow a whole range of differences of opinions to appear. Additionally, rather than concentrating on the 'why' of things, postmodernists prefer to focus on effects. So instead of asking. 'Why are women oppressed?', postmodernists are more likely to ask questions about the effects of particular practices. For example. 'What are the effects of beliefs about the "proper" roles for women such as those espoused by the Catholic Church?' Or in other (postmodern) words. "How do women gel said [or described] as "good wives" by the Catholic Church?' Questioning foundations, beliefs about who and what 'the subject is' and opening the notion of politics surely counts as taking feminist responsibility seriously?

A2: “Policymaking K to Solve”

Empirically, policymaking can't solve violence

Bleiker 1 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 30(3), p. 509-510)JM

Those who make the analysis of these political events their professional purview—the students of international relations (ir)—adhere to representational habits that have become equally objectified and problematic. Many of them are social scientists for whom knowledge about the ‘facts’ of the ‘real world’ emerges from the search for ‘valid inferences by the systematic use of well-established procedures of inquiry’.3 But relatively little practical knowledge has emerged from these efforts, even after successive generations of social scientists have refined their models and methods. Our insights into the international have not grown substantially, nor have our abilities to prevent deadly conflicts. From Kosovo to Afghanistan violence remains the modus operandi of world politics. Even proponents of scientific research lament that ‘students of international conflict are left wrestling with their data to eke out something they can label a finding’.4

Expanding what is considered political is crucial to solve global problems.

 Bleiker 1 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 30(3), p. 519)JM

To broaden our knowledge of the international does, however, require more than simply adding a few additional layers of interpretation. What is needed is a more fundamental reorientation of thought and action: a shift away from harmonious common sense imposed by a few dominant faculties towards a model of thought that enables productive flows across a variety of discordant faculties. For Deleuze, this difference amounts to a move from recognition to a direct political encounter, from approaches that affirm appearances without disturbing thought towards approaches that add to our understanding and, indeed, force us to think.44

Their framework constrains meaningful discussion – this allows violence to persist.

Bleiker 1 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 30(3), p. 524)JM

Being aware of the problematic dimensions of representation, aesthetic approaches view academic disciplines as powerful mechanisms that direct and control the production and diffusion of knowledge. Disciplines establish the rules of intellectual exchange and define the methods, techniques, and instruments that are considered proper for the pursuit of knowledge. While providing meaning, coherence and stability, these rules also delineate the limits of what can be thought, talked, and written of in a normal way. Innovative solutions to existing problems cannot be found if our efforts at understanding the international remain confined to a set of rigid and well-entrenched disciplinary rules.

A2: “We Lead to Policy Change”

Academics don’t influence policy

Barnett 6 (Michael What the Academy Can Teach by Academy and Policy, Vol. 28 (2) - Summer 2006 the Harold Stassen Prof of IR at the Humphrey Institute and Profof Poli Sci at the U of Minnesota http://hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=1553&p=1) TBC 7/9/10

Over the years I have had a recurring encounter at professional meetings: a cluster of academics, discussing the implications of their research, worry that the findings, if ripped out of context and misappropriated by government officials, could have unintended consequences. A debate follows about whether academics are responsible for how their research is used and, if so, how they can control its interpretation and appropriation. I have always been bemused by these exchanges—academics worry about the implementation of their ideas, without realizing that policymakers simply might not care what international relations scholars have to say, let alone listen to their opinions. At these moments I am reminded of a classic exchange in Casablanca between Peter Lorre and Humphrey Bogart. Lorre asks, “You despise me, don’t you, Rick?” Bogart replies, “I guess I would if I thought about you.” Although US government officials are not nearly as dismissive of academics and their ideas as Bogart was of Lorre, they certainly have a low threshold for academic research. Some of their dismissiveness is understandable. Policymakers need to act in complex situations defined by tremendous uncertainty and with some knowledge of the key participants before deciding what to do. Academic knowledge rarely meets this standard of “usability.” Yet the impatience of policymakers cannot be completely attributed to the kind of knowledge they desire. It also is a result of a general intolerance for theory and frustration with the ways in which academics collect and analyze information. This dismissal of scholarly knowledge and research can be dangerous in several ways, including a failure both to acknowledge important developments in world affairs that should affect policy and to recognize the positive effects of thinking like a scholar.

**Academics don’t influence policy – Methodology**

Barnett 6 (Michael What the Academy Can Teach by Academy and Policy, Vol. 28 (2) - Summer 2006 the Harold Stassen Prof of IR at the Humphrey Institute and Profof Poli Sci at the U of Minnesota http://hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=1553&p=1) TBC 7/9/10

Academics pay considerable attention to sources, data, methods, and research design. While there are places in the foreign policy bureaucracy that approximate this logic of inquiry, often what passes for research in government is not scientifically driven observation but rather arguments that conform to the political realities of the moment. Academics consider alternative hypotheses and appeal to evidence to show why their proposed argument is superior to existing explanations. Many policymakers do not. Academics privilege relatively long, exhaustive, footnote-crowded papers that methodically consider an issue from all angles. Policymakers, as they rise in status, become less likely to read anything longer than three pages. I learned the art of writing memos that did not exceed two pages, stripped complex processes down to their bare bones, and simplified issues to the point of being simple-minded and one-dimensional. The immediate victims of this makeover were nuance, complexity, and contingency. Academics tend toward probabilistic statements, while policymakers favor deterministic, “if-then” statements. Academics tend to favor conclusions that are provisional and invariably call for further study, while policymakers assert their findings with an air of confidence that suggests that no further debate is needed.

Academics don’t influence policy – Academics aren’t accessible

Barnett 6 (Michael What the Academy Can Teach by Academy and Policy, Vol. 28 (2) - Summer 2006 the Harold Stassen Prof of IR at the Humphrey Institute and Profof Poli Sci at the U of Minnesota http://hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=1553&p=1) TBC 7/9/10

The fast-paced policy world left little time to read academic research, though there were occasions when scholarly findings penetrated the thick walls of government. These successful “crossover” ideas shared certain attributes. They were easily digestible. If scholarly research is to have an impact, it must be presented in a “talking points” formula—relatively short, simplified, representations of the world. A good, if somewhat extreme, example is Foreign Policy magazine. It used to resemble Foreign Affairs with relatively lengthy, serious examinations of contemporary issues. Several years ago Foreign Policy switched to a new format with fewer articles and a preference for simplified statements (globalization is a myth) and highly provocative, sometimes inflammatory claims (Mexicans are taking over the United States) as well as many bright, multicolored graphics. There is, in essence, a preference for style over substance, for simplicity over complexity. A close friend of mine who works in the US Department of State tells me that he and his colleagues like the change in part because it is their version of People magazine.

AT: “Do it on the aff/neg”

"Do it on the neg" marginalizes our arg.

Bleiker 1 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 30(3), p. 523)JM

A second and related shortcoming of early postmodern contributions is their focus on criticising/deconstructing the shortcomings of dominant Realist and Liberal approaches to international political theory. While essential at a time when there was little space for alternative knowledge, this process of critique has nevertheless limited the potential of postmodern contributions. Discourses of power politics and their framing of political practice cannot overcome all existing theoretical and practical dilemmas. By articulating critique in relation to arguments advanced by orthodox approaches to ir, the impact of critical voices remains confined within the larger discursive boundaries that were established through the initial framing of these debates.

"Run it as an advantage” pigeon-holes our args.

Bleiker 1 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 30(3), p. 523)JM

My suggestion is, thus, to ‘forget IR theory’, to see beyond a narrowly defined academic discipline and to refuse tying future possibilities to established forms of life.57 Instead of seeking nostalgic comfort and security in the familiar interpretation of long gone epochs, even if they are characterised by violence and insecurity, conscious forgetting opens up possibilities for a dialogical understanding of our present and past. Rather than further entrenching current security dilemmas by engaging with the orthodox discourse that continuously gives meaning to them, forgetting tries to escape the vicious circle by which these social practices serve to legitimise and objectivise the very discourses that have given rise to them.

“Do it on the aff” compromises our arguments.

Herring 6 (Eric, Reader in International Politics at the University of Bristol, [http://mil.sagepub.com/content/35/1/105.full.pdf] AD: 7/9/10)JM

Insider activism (that is, intellectual and policy work within mainstream institutions) risks co-option and deradicalisation. For some, being an activist scholar necessarily involves being an anti-military, anti-state, anti-capitalist outsider opposing British-backed US foreign policy, but there is no consensus on this.21 The risks of co-option and deradicalisation needs to be considered in relation to context, strategy and tactics as well as theorised understandings of the underlying characteristics of those mainstream institutions. To insist on or assume pacifism, anarchism, socialism and opposition to all aspects of British and US foreign policy misses what may turn out to be the ambiguous, contingent, factionalised and therefore potentially progressive aspects of the military, the state, capitalism and the foreign policies of Britain and the United States.

A2: Elite Takeover

Elites control society – they influence all aspects of decision making.

Amsden, DiCaprio, and Robinson 9 (Alice, prof of Political Economics at MIT, Alisa, Research Fellow at UNU-WIDER, and James, prof of Government at Harvard U, August, [http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/newsletter/articles/en\_GB/05-08-2009/] AD: 7/9/10)JM

Elites also impact development outcomes through their control over decision-making processes that allocate political resources within a society. This introduces two additional channels through which their activities impact growth in the long run. The first is that elites have the resources to design and implement institutions that favour their interests. Such institutions may promote participation and information flow. Or they may simply cement the position of a particular group within the governance structure. Another feature of elite control over institutions is that they are able to influence how both elites and non-elites within a society perceive different issues. Elites control how issues are framed through their ability to distribute or withhold information, and their influence over and within the media. Even where there is a free media, it depends on elites for information, and can choose to present issues that reflect a particular bias. The extent to which these channels are used for social or personal welfare gain varies among societies. But the fact that these channels exist in every society highlights the fact that if elites can be induced to adopt developmental behaviour, it can have a disproportionately positive impact on growth and development.

Elite control now

Saeger 7 (Olivia, Haverford College. Dept. of Political Science, [http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace-xml/handle/10066/1035] AD: 7/9/10)JM

It is also important to realize that the space for civil society to thrive is created by political elites outside of the state. Essentially, political elites control the creation of civil society by allowing for civil society to function autonomously. Once it was determined that political elites were the vital factor in creating a successful democratic transition, two case studies were examined which allowed us insight into how political elites work and what they must do in order to succeed.

Democracy is a sham – current events prove

Wafawarova 7 (Reason, postgraduate student in International Relations at Macquarie U, March 6, [http://raceandhistory.com/selfnews/viewnews.cgi?newsid1173219724,4349,.shtml] AD: 7/9/10)JM

Neo-liberal democracy is the pretext upon which the Americans invaded Iraq and now they have a crisis on how they should be handling their defeat there. It is the pretext they used to be in Afghanistan and the same pretext they used to come up with the so-called Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act. It is the pretext they use to call their perceived enemies "axes of evil, dictators, despots, tyrants, extremists and rogue or failed states." Democracy as a model of governance will always be excellent but America's version of democracy is a sham. It is not designed for governance but for fomenting conflict between the middle class and the lower class of the developing countries.

Switch Sides Bad

Switch-side debate makes people disinterested in real belief and prepares a world of neocons

Spanos 4 (William, in Joe Millers’ Book Cross-ex pg. 467)JFS

Dear Joe Miller, Yes, the statement about the American debate circuit you refer to was made by me, though some years ago. I strongly believed then –and still do, even though a certain uneasiness about “objectivity” has crept into the “philosophy of debate” — that debate in both the high schools and colleges in this country is assumed to take place nowhere, even though the issues that are debated are profoundly historical, which means that positions are always represented from the perspective of power, and a matter of life and death. I find it grotesque that in the debate world, it doesn’t matter which position you take on an issue — say, the United States’ unilateral wars of preemption — as long as you “score points”. The world we live in is a world entirely dominated by an “exceptionalist” America which has perennially claimed that it has been chosen by God or History to fulfill his/its “errand in the wilderness.” That claim is powerful because American economic and military power lies behind it. And any alternative position in such a world is virtually powerless. Given this inexorable historical reality, to assume, as the protocols of debate do, that all positions are equal is to efface the imbalances of power that are the fundamental condition of history and to annul the Moral authority inhering in the position of the oppressed. This is why I have said that the appropriation of my interested work on education and empire to this transcendental debate world constitute a travesty of my intentions. My scholarship is not “disinterested.” It is militant and intended to ameliorate as much as possible the pain and suffering of those who have been oppressed by the “democratic” institutions that have power precisely by way of showing that their language if “truth,” far from being “disinterested” or “objective” as it is always claimed, is informed by the will to power over all manner of “others.” This is also why I told my interlocutor that he and those in the debate world who felt like him should call into question the traditional “objective” debate protocols and the instrumentalist language they privilege in favor of a concept of debate and of language in which life and death mattered. I am very much aware that the arrogant neocons who now saturate the government of the Bush administration — judges, pentagon planners, state department officials, etc. learned their “disinterested” argumentative skills in the high school and college debate societies and that, accordingly, they have become masters at disarming the just causes of the oppressed. This kind leadership will reproduce itself (along with the invisible oppression it perpetrates) as long as the training ground and the debate protocols from which it emerges remains in tact. A revolution in the debate world must occur. It must force that unworldly world down into the historical arena where positions make a difference. To invoke the late Edward Said, only such a revolution will be capable of “deterring democracy” (in Noam Chomsky’s ironic phrase), of instigating the secular critical consciousness that is, in my mind, the sine qua non for avoiding the immanent global disaster towards which the blind arrogance of Bush Administration and his neocon policy makers is leading.

Switch Sides Bad

Debating on both sides of an issue severs sincerity and ethics from public speaking; ethical speech becomes impossible, this causes moral relativism

Ronald Walter Green and Darrin Hicks in 5(Cultural Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 100-126, “Lost Convictions: Debating both sides and the ethical self-fashioning of liberal citizens”, January 2005)

LOST CONVICTIONS Debating both sides and the ethical self-fashioning of liberal citizens This paper takes as its point of departure the ethical problematization of debating both sides #/ having students argue both affirmative and negative on a debate resolution #/ in order to highlight the role of communication as a cultural technology of liberalism. It argues that debating both sides contributed to the cultural governance of cold war liberalism by separating speech from conviction to cultivate the value of debate as a method of democratic decision-making.The valorization of free and full expression as a pre-requisite for ‘decision by debate’ prepared the ground for dis-articulating debate from cold war liberalism and rearticulating it as a game of freedom that contributes to the moral education of liberal citizens. In so doing, debate becomes a global technology of liberalism creating exceptional subjects by circulating the communicative norms of deliberative democracy. Keywords conviction; free speech; cold war; debate; American exceptionalism; deliberative democracy In 1954, the US military academies, and a host of other colleges, refused to affirm the national debate resolution: ‘Resolved: The United States should diplomatically recognize the People’s Republic of China’. The problem of speaking in favour of the diplomatic recognition of ‘Red China’ came amidst an acute moment in the US containment strategy of domestic and international communism (Ross 1989). This, in turn, sparked a national controversy that included discussion in the New York Times (Burns 1954). Due to the growing prevalence of ‘switch-side debating’, a procedure that required teams to debate both sides of the resolution in consecutive debate rounds at intercollegiate debate tournaments, the controversy manifested itself as an ethical concern about the relationship between public speaking and the moral attributes of good citizenship. At the heart of the ‘debate about debate’ (Ehninger 1958) was the idea of conviction and how it should guide the moral economy of liberal citizenship. But why dredge up this event from the archive of communication education? First, since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been a vigorous trade in debate as a tool for democratic education, often with the hope of inculcating students with the norms necessary for deliberative democracy. For example, since 1994, the International Debate Education Association ‘has introduced debate to secondary schools and universities throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the Former Soviet Union, Central Asia and Haiti and continues to grow throughout the world’ (idebate.org 2004). The promotion and circulation of debate as a technique of democratic decision-making suggests a need to explore the history of its ethical problematization. As a cultural technology, the value of debate rests on its claim to cultivate the ethical attributes required for democratic citizenship. Therefore, those challenges to debate’s civic function require special consideration in order to assess the role of communication in the selffashioning of liberal citizens.1 In Foucauldian fashion, we are interested in the ethical problematization of debating both sides so that we might learn how this pedagogical technique organizes forms of democratic subjectification available in the present (Foucault 2001).The second reason to write about the debating both sides controversy is because it highlights how communication becomes an object, instrument and field of cultural governance. The emphasis on the linguistic dimension of communication tends to privilege a methodological and political commitment to read the circulation of power as an ideological phenomenon mediated by the  process of generating and controlling the meaning of contested values, identities, and symbols (Nelson & Gaonkar 1998, Rosteck 1999). As an alternative to this vision of a ‘communicational cultural studies’ (Grossberg 1997) this paper highlights the ‘technical dimension’ of speech, that is, itscirculation as an object and instrument for regulating the conduct of citizensubjects. 2 Therefore, we approach the debating both sides controversy in terms of what Michel Foucault (2001) calls a ‘history of thought’ #/ a ‘history of how people become anxious about this or that’ (p. 74). Moreover, to write a history of debate as a cultural technology reveals how power works productively by augmenting the human capacity for speech/communication. For us, an under-appreciated aspect of the productive power of cultural governance resides in the generation of subjects who come to understand themselves as speaking subjects willing to regulate and transform their communicative behaviours for the purpose of improving their political, economic, cultural and affective relationships.This paper argues that the strong liberal defence of debating both sides separates speech from conviction. Debating both sides does so by de-coupling the sincerity principle from the arguments presented by a debater. In place of the assumption that a debater believes in what he or she argues, debating both sides grooms one to appreciate the process of debate as a method of democratic decision-making. We argue the debating both sides controversy articulates debate to Cold War liberal discourses of ‘American exceptionalism’ by folding the norm of free and full expression onto the soul of the debater. In turn, a debater willing to debate both sides becomes a representative of the free world. Furthermore, we will demonstrate how debating both sides as a technique of moral development works alongside specific aesthetic modes of class subjectivity increasingly associated with the efforts of the knowledge class to legitimize the process of judgment. Debating both sides reveals how the globalization of liberalism is less about a set of universal norms and more about the circulation and uptake of cultural technologies. In the first part of this essay, we will offer a thick description of how the relationship between speech and conviction led to the ethical problematization of debating both sides. In the second part of the essay, we contextualize this history through an encounter with Cold War liberalism and the importance of debating both sides as a technology capable of generating a commitment to free speech. The third section of the paper will describe how debate re-invents itself as a game of freedom that instils the ethical attributes of deliberative democracy by re-coding debating both sides as necessary to the moral development of students.4 Debate and the problem of conviction In the United States, the 1920s and 1930s saw a veritable explosion in the popularity of intercollegiate debate. To accommodate the growing numbers of students wishing to debate and the rising costs of hosting and travelling to debates, the model of annual contests between rival schools gave way to triangular and

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Switch Sides Bad

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quadrilateral debating leagues and eventually to the debate tournament. Intercollegiate debating underwent major transformations during this period, many of them brought on by tournament competition.5 Perhaps the most significant #/ and certainly the most controversial #/ transformation resulting from tournament debating was the practice of having participants debate both sides of the proposition. Debating both sides, its proponents argued, had the pragmatic benefit of allowing more teams to participate in more debates and to make scheduling tournaments much more efficient. There was, as well, the pedagogical benefit of rewarding those students with the most refined skills in marshalling evidence and formulating arguments in support of their respective positions. By the 1950s, debating both sides had become so prevalent that the West Point National Debate Tournament, the largest and most prestigious tournament of the day, mandated it as a condition of participation.6 The growing professionalization of tournament debating carried out in extra-curricular competitive spaces increasingly relied on debating both sides.1 0 2 CULTURAL STUDIES As a tournament progresses, a student moves from one side of the resolution to the next, a switch in sides, demarcated by the next ‘round’ of debate. The technique of debating both sides increases the efficiency of debate to train students in critical thinking and argumentative advocacy by modifying the side of the resolution the debater advocates. Since each debate is a situated rhetorical event with changing interlocutors and different individual judges, each debate round allows a unique pedagogical opportunity to learn and evaluate behaviour. The relationship between debate as a competitive activity amenable to pedagogical intervention and debating both sides as a specific technique of debate pedagogy and tournament administration, however, did not appear naturally, but was the effect of intellectual struggle. While the opposition to debating both sides probably reaches back to the challenges against the ancient practice of dissoi logoi , we want to turn our attention to the unique cultural history of debate during the Cold War. In the midst of Joseph McCarthy’s impending censure by the US Senate, the US Military Academy, the US Naval Academy and, subsequently, all of the teacher colleges in the state of Nebraska refused to affirm the resolution #/ ‘Resolved: The United States should diplomatically recognize the People’s Republic of China’. Yet, switch-side debating remained the national standard, and, by the fall of 1955, the military academies and the teacher colleges of Nebraska were debating in favour of the next resolution. Richard Murphy (1957), however,was not content to let the controversy pass without comment. Murphy launched a series of criticisms that would sustain the debate about debate for the next ten years. Murphy held that debating both sides of the question was unethical because it divorced conviction from advocacy and that it was a dangerous practice because it threatened the integrity of public debate by divorcing it from a genuine search for truth. Murphy’s case against the ethics of debating both sides

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**rested on what he thought to be a simple and irrefutable rhetorical principle: A public utterance is a public commitment. In Murphy’s opinion, debate was best imagined as a species of public speaking akin to public advocacy on the affairs of the day. If debate is a form of public speaking, Murphy reasoned, and a public utterance entails a public commitment, then speakers have an ethical obligation to study the question, discuss it with others until they know their position, take a stand and then #/ and only then #/ engage in public advocacy in favour of their viewpoint.** Murphy had no doubt that intercollegiate debate was a form of public advocacy and was, hence, rhetorical, although this point would be severely attacked by proponents of switch-side debating. Modern debating, Murphy claimed, ‘is geared to the public platform and to rhetorical, rather than dialectical principles’ (p. 7). Intercollegiate debate was rhetorical, not dialectical, because its propositions were specific and timely rather than speculative and universal. Debaters evidenced their claims by appeals to authority and opinion rather than formal logic, and debaters appealed to an audience, even if that audience was a single person sitting in the back of a room at a relatively isolated debate tournament. As such, debate as a species of public argument should be held to the ethics of the platform. **We would surely hold in contempt any public actor who spoke with equal force, and without genuine conviction, for both sides of a public policy question. Why, asked Murphy, would we exempt students from the same ethical obligation?** Murphy’s master ethic #/ that a public utterance entails a public commitment #/ rested on a classical rhetorical theory that refuses the modern distinctions between cognitive claims of truth (referring to the objective world), normative claims of right (referring to the intersubjective world), and expressive claims of sincerity (referring to the subjective state of the speaker), although this distinction, and Murphy’s refusal to make it, would surface as a major point of contention in the 1960s for the proponents of debating both sides.7 Murphy is avoiding the idea that the words spoken by a debater can be divorced from what the speaker actually believes to be true, right, or good (expressive claims of sincerity). For Murphy, to stand and publicly proclaim that one affirmed the resolution entailed both a claim that the policy being advocated was indeed the best possible choice, given extant social conditions, and that one sincerely believed that her or his arguments were true and right. In other words, a judge should not make a distinction between the merits of the case presented and the sincerity of the advocates presenting it; rather, the reasons supporting a policy and the ethos of the speakers are mutually constitutive forms of proof. The interdependency of logos and ethos was not only a matter of rhetorical principle for Murphy but also a foundational premise of public reason in a democratic society. Although he never explicitly states why this is true, most likely because he assumed it to be self-evident, a charitable interpretation of Murphy’s position, certainly a more generous interpretation than his detractors were willing to give, would show that his axiom rests on the following argument: If public reason is to have any legitimate force, auditors must believe that advocates are arguing from conviction and not from greed, desire or naked self-interest. **If auditors believe that advocates are insincere, they will not afford legitimacy to their claims and will opt to settle disputes through force or some seemingly neutral modus vivendi such as voting or arbitration. Hence, sincerity is a necessary element of public reason and, therefore, a necessary condition of critical deliberation in a democratic society.** For Murphy, the assumption of sincerity is intimately articulated to the notion of ethical argumentation in a democratic political culture. If a speaker were to repudiate this assumption by advocating contradictory positions in a public forum, it would completely undermine her or his ethos and result in the loss of the means of identification with an audience. The real danger of undermining the assumption of sincerity was not that individual speakers would be rendered ineffective #/ although this certainly did make training students to debate both 1 0 4 CULTURAL STUDIES sides bad rhetorical pedagogy. **The ultimate danger of switch-side debating was that it would engender a distrust of public advocates. The public would come to see the debaters who would come to occupy public offices as ‘public liars’ more interested in politics as vocation than as a calling. Debate would be seen as a game of power rather than the method of democracy.** The nation’s leading debate coaches, taking Murphy’s condemnation as an accusation that they had failed in their ethical responsibility as educators, quickly and forcefully responded to his charges. They had four primary rejoinders to Murphy: that he had misunderstood the nature of tournament debate; that switch-side debating was a sound educational procedure; that intercollegiate debate should be held accountable to a different ethic than those of the platform; and that switch-side debating was necessary to the maintenance of intercollegiate debate. Proponents of switch-side debating, such as A. Craig Baird (1955), Nicholas Cripe (1957), and George Dell (1958) agreed that Murphy’s ethic applied ‘to argument in the pulpit, in the legislative halls, in the courtroom, and the marketplace’ (Cripe 1957, p. 209).. This ethic, that a public utterance entails a public commitment, should not, however, apply to the forms of advocacy performed in tournament debating. For the proponents of switch-side debating, there was a sharp distinction between school and public debate. School debate, in particular tournament debating, was not a species of public argument geared towards gaining the consent of an audience to the rightness of the speaker’s stand on a public issue, but, rather, a pedagogical tool designed to help students develop their critical thinking skills. Not only did tournament debating differ in purpose, but it also differed in method from public debate. Tournament debate was defined as a dialectical method of disputation, a method suitable for adjudication by an expert judge on technical criteria rather than by a public audience. Hence, the sincerity principle simply did not apply to intercollegiate debate. The description of debate as a dialectical method did not mean that the proponents of switch-side debating rejected the importance of conviction for public argument. They did, however, claim that sound conviction, as opposed to dogmatism, was a product of debate, not its prerequisite. Baird (1955), arguing that debate should be understood less as public advocacy and more as a dialectical method of inquiry, claimed that sound conviction was a product of a rigorous analysis of all aspects of a question and that this analysis was best conducted through a method which had students practice defending and rejecting the major arguments on both sides. Thus, debating both sides should be understood as an educational procedure designed to generate ‘sound’ convictions prior to public advocacy. Baird urged that the critics of switch-side debating should understand the practice as a pedagogical device and to judge it accordingly. ‘These student exercises’, he told debaters and their coaches, ‘are to be sharply distinguished from the later ‘practical life’ situations in which you are preachers, lawyers, business men and women, politicians and community LOST CONVICTIONS 1 0 5 leaders. Debate and discussion training is essentially training in reflective thinking, in the defence of different sides (‘role playing’ as some call it), and in the revelation of strength and weakness of each position’ (p. 6). It was Baird’s recognition that debating both sides was equivalent to role-playing that warranted re-thinking the fit between the speaker and the words spoken. Furthermore, if a debater did in fact appear to be shallow, insincere and prone to manipulate public opinion for her or his own ends, this was certainly not, argued Wayne Thompson (1944) and Nicholas Cripe, the fault of switch-side debating, but the ‘result of other causes #/ weakness in the character of the offender or a misunderstanding of the proper functioning of debate’ (Thompson 1944, p. 296). The proper way to deal with any ethical shortcomings in debaters, the proponents argued, was for the national forensics associations to develop a code of ethics that would stress the ethical responsibility of intercollegiate debaters (to present the best possible case according to facts as the debater understood them) and to forcefully condemn individual acts of malfeasance such as misconstruing evidence, falsifying sources, and misrepresenting their opponents’ positions. For Robert Newman (1963), the controversy over debating both sides was simple to resolve: as long as a good case could be made on each side of the resolution and individual debaters did not lie or cheat, there simply was no ethical dilemma and certainly no need for a disciplinary-based ethic to guide debate practice. Finally, debate coaches justified switch-side debate on the pragmatic grounds that it was a necessary component of tournament debating and that abandoning the practice would mean the end of intercollegiate debating. ‘In fact, if the proponents of ethical debate are correct’, Cripe warned, ‘and it is immoral for a team to debate both sides, then many schools would have to discontinue debate as we practice today’ (1957, p. 209). **Baird’s defence of debating both sides #/ in which he defined it as an educational procedure designed to generate sound conviction #/ was the most formidable of the defences of switch-side debating. However, it was defeated,according to Murphy (1957), once educators understood that there were many ways of teaching students to see**

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Switch Sides Bad

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**both sides of an issue.** **He or she could prepare briefs on both sides of the question, form roundtable discussions where students would play devil’s advocate to test the strength of each other’s positions, and even have informal practice rounds in a closed club setting where students debated both sides to test and strengthen their convictions. It was not the fact that students explored all sides of an issue that worried Murphy. Rather, Baird’s defence, and any defence that claimed debating both sides was ethical because it was a pedagogical tool, ignored ‘a basic rhetorical principle that the speaker should read and discuss, and inquire, and test his [sic ]position before he [sic ] takes the platform to present it’** (Murphy 1957, p. 5).

Turn: we cannot be educated by just anybody speaking on an issue; real education occurs when those who really care about an issue speak to us about it in earnest.

Ronald Walter Green and Darrin Hicks in 5 (Cultural Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 100-126, “Lost Convictions: Debating both sides and the ethical self-fashioning of liberal citizens”, January 2005)

**Because debate propositions are deliberately worded so good arguments can be made on both sides, there should never be a shortage of speakers on both sides of the issue, speakers who really believe in what they were arguing. The real benefit of hearing both sides of an issue, Murphy claimed, is that it encourages individuals to open their minds to other perspectives and to modify their beliefs if so warranted. Yet, alternative views will not be taken seriously, unless we ‘hear them from persons who actually believe them, who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them’**  (Murphy 1957, p. 4). Switch-side debating, Murphy argued, is not justified by the principles of free speech; rather, those principles support revoking the practice. For Day, in contrast, the re-coding of free speech as the ethical substance of debate, a substance that was internal to its procedures, allowed for an ethical re-description of debate as a deliberative technique. For instance, as Day argues, the ‘prime requisite which must be met if debate is to provide sound decisions is that it be thorough and complete, that all arguments and information relevant to a decision be known and understood’ (1966, p. 6). Day’s commitment to free speech is based on a radical reading of Mill: Freedom of expression entails more than lifting prior restraints on argumentation; it necessitates the construction of avenues of access for minority views within dominant media outlets and, if necessary, the restructuring of deliberative forums so minority views will not be rejected outright because they challenge hegemonic methods of interpretation. ‘Free speech is the necessary prerequisite of full debate’, Day argues, because ‘it guarantees that full debate can take place’ (p. 6). Yet, freedom of speech does 1 1 0 CULTURAL STUDIES not guarantee that full debate will take place. It is in this gap between opportunity and outcome that Day discovers the ethical demand for debating both sides: ‘A commitment to debate as the method of democratic decisionmaking demands an overriding ethical responsibility to promote the full confrontation of opposing opinions, arguments, and information relevant to decision. Without the confrontation of opposing ideas debate does not exist, and to the extent that that confrontation is incomplete so is debate incomplete’ (p. 6). To promote debate as a democratic mode of decision-making required full and free expression so as to maximize the confrontation of opposing ideas. Debating both sides emerged as a specific pedagogical technique to inculcate and encourage students to embrace the norm of full and free expression. Two practical obligations are entailed in the acceptance of this ethic: First, the forums for public deliberation must be fully inclusive; encouragement and incentive must be provided to those who hold unpopular views to express themselves. Second, and more important, ‘all must recognize and accept personal responsibility to present, when necessary, as forcefully as possible, opinions and arguments with which they may personally disagree’ (p. 7). Few are likely to challenge the first entailment, but the second provided Day with a radical redefinition of the ethics of conviction. Day argues that persuasively presenting a position that contradicts one’s personal conviction is the ‘highest ethical act in democratic debate’ (p. 7). Moreover, to argue forcefully for a position one abhors is the hallmark of democratic citizenship. To set aside one’s convictions and present the argument for the other side demonstrates that the citizen has forsaken her or his personal interests and particular vision of the good for the benefit of the commonweal. That is, the citizen recognizes the moral priority of democratic debate when she or he agrees to be bound by its results regardless of personal conviction. Debating both sides, then, is necessitated by the ethical obligations intrinsic to the technology of democratic debate. Both of Murphy’s charges that **debating both sides is unethical #/ that requiring students to debate both sides is a form of blackmail and that the separation of speech and conviction courts sophistry #/ are answered by this position.** On the one hand, if debating both sides of a question is an ethical duty, requiring students to do so as a condition of participation is not an immoral imposition but rather an ethical and pedagogical duty. On the other hand, given the political dangers that privileging personal conviction over democratic process courts, divorcing speech from conviction is a prerequisite to democratic legitimacy. In so doing, one’s convictions should be reassigned so as to promote a commitment to debate as the fundamental process of a democratic form of public deliberation. The practice of debating both sides does not warrant support simply because it is ethical; it does so because it is an effective pedagogical technique for inculcating the communicative ethics necessary for democratic citizenship. According to Day, ‘Debating both sides teaches students to discover, analyze, LOST CONVICTIONS 1 1 1 and test all the arguments, opinions, and evidence relevant to a decision. In addition, it provides an opportunity for students to substantiate for themselves the assumption that ‘‘truthful’’ positions may be taken on both sides of controversial questions’ (1966, p. 13).

Utilitarianism Bad – Genocide/War/Morals

Policy decisions directed at maintaining human survival through whatever means will encourage genocide, war, and the destruction of moral values

**Callahan 73** – Co-Founder and former director of The Hastings Institute, PhD in philosophy from Harvard University (Daniel, “The Tyranny of Survival”, p 91-93)

The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of Communist domination has for over two decades fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs. During World War II, native Japanese-Americans were herded, without due process of law, to detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944) in the general context that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise blatantly unjustifiable. The survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimations of Nazism. Under the banner of survival, the government of South Africa imposes a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has seen one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival: the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evoked as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B. F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. For Jacques Monod, in Chance and Necessity, survival requires that we overthrow almost every known religious, ethical and political system. In genetics, the survival of the gene pool has been put forward as sufficient grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from marrying and bearing children. Some have even suggested that we do the cause of survival no good by our misguided medical efforts to find means by which those suffering from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a normal life, and thus procreate even more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than to cite Paul Ehrlich, whose works have shown a high dedication to survival, and in its holy name a willingness to contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to surviving populations of nations which have not enacted population-control policies. For all these reasons it is possible to counterpoise over against the need for survival a "tyranny of survival." There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for sake of survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny survival as value is that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive single-mindedness that will stop at nothing. We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without the premise of a right to life—then how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in the process, destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival. To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic victories. Yet it would be the defeat of all defeats if, because human beings could not properly manage their need to survive, they succeeded in not doing so.

Utilitarianism Bad – Individuality

Utilitarianism disregards respect for the individual and perpetuates societal inequality by evaluating utility as a whole

**Freeman 94** (Avalon Professor in the Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D. Harvard University, J.D. University of North Carolina (Samuel, “Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the Priority of Right,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 313-349, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265463)

The inclusion of all sentient beings in the calculation of interests severely undermines the force of any claim that utilitarianism is an "egalitarian" doctrine, based in some notion of equal concern and respect for persons. But let us assume Kymlicka can restore his thesis by insisting that it concerns, not utilitarianism as a general moral doctrine, but as a more limited thesis about political morality. (Here I pass over the fact that none of the utilitarians he relies on to support his egalitarian interpretation construe the doctrine as purely political. The drift of modern utilitarian theory is just the other way: utilitarianism is not seen as a political doctrine, to be appealed to by legislators and citizens, but a nonpublic criterion of right that is indirectly applied [by whom is a separate issue] to assess the nonutilitarian public political conception of justice.) Still, let us assume it is as a doctrine of political morality that utilitarianism treats persons, and only persons, as equals. Even in this form it cannot be that maximizing utility is "not a goal" but a "by-product," "entirely derived from the prior requirement to treat people with equal consideration" (CPP, p. 31) Kymlicka says, "If utilitarianism is best seen as an egalitarian doctrine, then there is no independent commitment to the idea of maximizing welfare" (CPP, p. 35, emphases added). But how can this be? (i) What is there about the formal principle of equal consideration (or for that matter occupying a universal point of view) which would imply that we maximize the aggregate of individuals' welfare? Why not assume, for example, that equal consideration requires maximizing the division of welfare (strict equality, or however equal division is to be construed); or, at least maximize the multiple (which would result in more equitable distributions than the aggregate)? Or, why not suppose equal consideration requires equal proportionate satisfaction of each person's interests (by for example, determining our resources and then satisfying some set percentage of each person's desires) . Or finally we might rely on some Paretian principle: equal consideration means adopting measures making no one worse off. For reasons I shall soon discuss, each of these rules is a better explication of equal consideration of each person's interests than is the utilitarian aggregative method, which in effect collapses distinctions among persons. (2) Moreover, rather than construing individuals' "interests" as their actual (or rational) desires, and then putting them all on a par and measuring according to intensity, why not construe their interests lexically, in terms of a hierarchy of wants, where certain interests are, to use Scanlon's terms, more "urgent" than others, insofar as they are more basic needs? Equal consideration would then rule out satisfying less urgent interests of the majority of people until all means have been taken to satisfy everyone's more basic needs. (3) Finally, what is there about equal consideration, by itself, that requires maximizing anything? Why does it not require, as in David Gauthier's view, optimizing constraints on individual utility maximization? Or why does it not require sharing a distribution? The point is just that, to say we ought to give equal consideration to everyone's interests does not, by itself, imply much of anything about how we ought to proceed or what we ought to do. It is a purely formal principle, which requires certain added, independent assumptions, to yield any substantive conclusions. That (i) utilitarian procedures maximize is not a "by-product" of equal consideration. It stems from a particular conception of rationality that is explicitly incorporated into the procedure. That (2) individuals' interests are construed in terms of their (rational) desires or preferences, all of which are put on a par, stems from a conception of individual welfare or the human good: a person's good is defined subjectively, as what he wants or would want after due reflection. Finally (3), aggregation stems from the fact that, on the classical view, a single individual takes up everyone's desires as if they were his own, sympathetically identifies with them, and chooses to maximize his "individual" utility. Hare, for one, explicitly makes this move. Just as Rawls says of the classical view, Hare "extend[s] to society the principle of choice for one man, and then, to make this extension work, conflat[es] all persons into one through the imaginative acts of the impartial sympathetic spectator" (TJ, p. 27). If these are independent premises incorporated into the justification of utilitarianism and its decision procedure, then maximizing aggregate utility cannot be a "by-product" of a procedure that gives equal consideration to everyone's interests. Instead, it defines what that procedure is. If anything is a by-product here, it is the appeal to equal consideration. Utilitarians appeal to impartiality in order to extend a method of individual practical rationality so that it may be applied to society as a whole (cf. TJ, pp. 26-27). Impartiality, combined with sympathetic identification, allows a hypothetical observer to experience the desires of others as if they were his own, and compare alternative courses of action according to their conduciveness to a single maximand, made possible by equal consideration and sympathy. The significant fact is that, in this procedure, appeals to equal consideration have nothing to do with impartiality between persons. What is really being given equal consideration are desires or experiences of the same magnitude. That these are the desires or experiences of separate persons (or, for that matter, of some other sentient being) is simply an incidental fact that has no substantive effect on utilitarian calculations. This becomes apparent from the fact that we can more accurately describe the utilitarian principle in terms of giving, not equal consideration to each person's interests, but instead equal consideration to equally intense interests, no matter where they occur. Nothing is lost in this redescription, and a great deal of clarity is gained. It is in this sense that persons enter into utilitarian calculations only incidentally. Any mention of them can be dropped without loss of the crucial information one needs to learn how to apply utilitarian procedures. This indicates what is wrong with the common claim that utilitarians emphasize procedural equality and fairness among persons, not substantive equality and fairness in results. On the contrary, utilitarianism, rightly construed, emphasizes neither procedural nor substantive equality among persons. Desires and experiences, not persons, are the proper objects of equal concern in utilitarian procedures. Having in effect read persons out of the picture at the procedural end, before decisions on distributions even get underway, it is little wonder that utilitarianism can result in such substantive inequalities. What follows is that utilitarian appeals to democracy and the democratic value of equality are misleading. In no sense do utilitarians seek to give persons equal concern and respect.

Utilitarianism Bad – Morals

Owning oneself is a moral imperative – utilitarianism imposes interpersonal obligations to society, which destroys morality

**Freeman 94** (Avalon Professor in the Humanities at the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D. Harvard University, J.D. University of North Carolina (Samuel, “Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the Priority of Right,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 313-349, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265463)

Kymlicka distinguishes two interpretations of utilitarianism: teleological and egalitarian. According to Rawls's teleological interpretation, the "fundamental goal" (LCC, p. 33) of utilitarianism is not persons, but the goodness of states of affairs. Duty is defined by what best brings about these states of affairs. " [M] aximizing the good is primary, and we count individuals equally only because that maximizes value. Our primary duty isn't to treat people as equals, but to bring about valuable states of affairs" (LCC, p. 27). It is difficult to see, Kymlicka says, how this reading of utilitarianism can be viewed as a moral theory. Morality, in our everyday view at least, is a matter of interpersonal obligations-the obligations we owe to each other. But to whom do we owe the duty of maximizing utility? Surely not to the impersonal ideal spectator . . . for he doesn't exist. Nor to the maximally valuable state of affairs itself, for states of affairs don't have moral claims." (LCC, p. 28-29) Kymlicka says, "This form of utilitarianism does not merit serious consideration as a political morality" (LCC, p. 29). Suppose we see utilitarianism differently, as a theory whose "fundamental principle" is "to treat people as equals" (LCC, p. 29). On this egalitarian reading, utilitarianism is a procedure for aggregating individual interests and desires, a procedure for making social choices, specifying which trade-offs are acceptable. It's a moral theory which purports to treat people as equals, with equal concern and respect. It does so by counting everyone for one, and no one for more than one. (LCC, p. 25)

Utilitarianism Bad – Mass Death

Risks taken by the government to increase overall utility will severely compromise the individual which will result in fatality

**Schroeder 86** (Professor of Law at Duke (Christopher H., Prof of Law at Duke, “Rights Against Risks,”, April, Columbia Law Review, pp. 495-562, http://www.jstor.org/pss/1122636)

Equity has provided a limited answer to the question of acceptable risk. The traditional doctrine of injunctions against tortious behavior holds that courts may enjoin behavior that is virtually certain to harm an identifiable individual in the near future.'2 This body of law, however, focuses more on avoidance of harm to specific persons than on regulation of risk.'3 It is thus inapposite to the questions of modern technological risk, risk that is quite unlikely to injure any identifiable individual in the short-term, but that carries severe consequences that are certain to occur to someone in the medium to distant future. Consider the paradigm of the Acme Chemical Company: Acme Chemical Company is discovered to be storing chemical wastes on its land in such a way that seepage containing traces of those wastes are entering an underground water system that serves as the sole drinking water supply for a town several miles away. One of the chemicals has been classified as a carcinogen in laboratory experiments on mice. Although extrapolating from these results to predictions of human carcinogencity is somewhat controversial, federal agencies routinely do so. Under one of a number of plausible sets of assumptions, a concentration of ten parts per billion (ppb) in drinking water is estimated to increase a human's chance of contracting cancer by one in one hundred thousand if the human is assumed to consume a normal intake over the course of twenty years. Analyses show that the current concentration in the underground aquifer near Acme's plant is ten ppb. This case exhibits the typical features of risky actions associated with modern technology. The probability of risk to any individual is relatively small while its severity is substantial, perhaps fatal. Risk is being imposed on individuals who have not consented to it in any meaningful sense. Finally, risk is unintentional in the sense that imposing risk on others is not an objective of Acme's plan.'4 We may assume its executives in fact would be tremendously relieved if they could avoid the risk.

Utilitarianism Bad – Value to Life

Utilitarianism destroys value to life by forcing the individual to take risks on a cost-benefit basis in an effort to increase overall utility of an entity, while demoralizing the individual’s own system of values

**Schroeder 86** (Professor of Law at Duke (Christopher H., Prof of Law at Duke, “Rights Against Risks,”, April, Columbia Law Review, pp. 495-562, http://www.jstor.org/pss/1122636)

From the individual's point of view, the balancing of costs and benefits that utilitarianism endorses renders the status of any individual risk bearer profoundly insecure. A risk bearer cannot determine from the kind of risk being imposed on him whether it is impermissible or not. The identical risk may be justified if necessary to avoid a calamity and unjustified if the product of an act of profitless carelessness, but the nature and extent of the underlying benefits of the risky action are fre quently unknown to the risk bearer so that he cannot know whether or not he is being wronged. Furthermore, even when the gain that lies behind the risk is well-known, the status of a risk bearer is insecure because individuals can justifiably be inflicted with ever greater levels of risk in conjunction with increasing gains. Certainly, individual risk bearers may be entitled to more protection if the risky action exposes many others to the same risk, since the likelihood that technological risks will cause greater harm increases as more and more people experience that risk. This makes the risky action less likely to be justifiable. Once again, however, that insight seems scant comfort to an individual, for it reinforces the realization that, standing alone, he does not count for much. A strategy of weighing gains against risks thus renders the status of any specific risk victim substantially contingent upon the claims of others, both those who may share his victim status and those who stand to gain from the risky activity. The anxiety to preserve some fundamental place for the individual that cannot be overrun by larger social considerations underlies what H.L.A. Hart has aptly termed the "distinctively modern criticism of utilitarianism,"58 the criticism that, despite its famous slogan, "everyone [is] to count for one,"59 utilitarianism ultimately denies each individual a primary place in its system of values. Various versions of utilitarian ism evaluate actions by the consequences of those actions to maximize happiness, the net of pleasure over pain, or the satisfaction of desires.60 Whatever the specific formulation, the goal of maximizing some mea sure of utility obscures and diminishes the status of each individual. It reduces the individual to a conduit, a reference point that registers the appropriate "utiles," but does not count for anything independent of his monitoring function.61 It also produces moral requirements that can trample an individual, if necessary, to maximize utility, since once the net effects of a proposal on the maximand have been taken into account, the individual is expendable. Counting pleasure and pain equally across individuals is a laudable proposal, but counting only plea sure and pain permits the grossest inequities among individuals and the trampling of the few in furtherance of the utility of the many. In sum, utilitarianism makes the status of any individual radically contingent. The individual's status will be preserved only so long as that status con tributes to increasing total utility. Otherwise, the individual can be discarded.

A2: Pragmatism – Rorty Bad

Rorty is heavy on rhetoric, weak on reason – Be skeptical of their willy-nilly combinations and put a premium on our links

Davidson 7 (John, Princeton, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rorty/)JFS

One particularly contentious issue has arisen in connection with Rorty's appropriation of earlier philosophers; prominent readers of the classical American pragmatists have expressed deep reservations about Rorty's interpretation of Dewey and Peirce, in particular, and the pragmatist movement in general. Consequently, Rorty's entitlement to the label "pragmatist" has been challenged. For instance Susan Haack's strong claims on this score have received much attention, but there are many others. (See, for example, the discussions of Rorty in Thomas M. Alexander, 1987; Gary Brodsky, 1982; James Campbell, 1984; Abraham Edel, 1985; James Gouinlock, 1995; Lavine 1995; R.W: Sleeper, 1986; as well as the essays in Lenore Langdorf and Andrew R. Smith, 1995.) For Rorty, the key figure in the American pragmatist movement is John Dewey, to whom he attributes many of his own central doctrines. In particular, Rorty finds in Dewey an anticipation of his own view of philosophy as the hand-maiden of a humanist politics, of a non-ontological view of the virtues of inquiry, of a holistic conception of human intellectual life, and of an anti-essentialist, historicist conception of philosophical thought. To read Dewey his way, however, Rorty explicitly sets about separating the "good" from the "bad" Dewey. (See "Dewey's Metaphysics," CP, 72-89, and "Dewey between Hegel and Darwin", in Saatkamp, 1-15.) He is critical of what he takes to be Dewey's backsliding into metaphysics in Experience and Nature, and has no patience for the constructive attempt of Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. Rorty thus imposes a scheme of evaluation on Dewey's works which many scholars object to. Lavine, for instance, claims that "scientific method" is Dewey's central concept (Lavine 1995, 44). R.W. Sleeper holds that reform rather than elimination of metaphysics and epistemology is Dewey's aim (Sleeper 1986, 2, chapter 6). Rorty's least favourite pragmatist is Peirce, whom he regards as subject to both scheme-content dualism and to a degree of scientism. So it is not surprising that Haack, whose own pragmatism draws inspiration from Peirce, finds Rorty's recasting of pragmatism literally unworthy of the name. Rorty's key break with the pragmatists is a fundamental one; to Haack's mind, by situating himself in opposition to the epistemological orientation of modern philosophy, Rorty ends up dismissing the very project that gave direction to the works of the American pragmatists. While classical pragmatism is an attempt to understand and work out a novel legitimating framework for scientific inquiry, Haack maintains, Rorty's "pragmatism" (Haack consistently uses quotes) is simply an abandonment of the very attempt to learn more about the nature and adequacy conditions of inquiry. Instead of aiding us in our aspiration to govern ourselves through rational thought, Rorty weakens our intellectual resilience and leaves us even more vulnerable to rhetorical seduction. To Haack and her sympathisers, Rorty's pragmatism is dangerous, performing an end-run on reason, and therefore on philosophy.

A2: Pragmatism – Rorty Bad

Even the most defensible institutions are complicit in atrocities that only the K can consistently prevent – Pragmatism opens the door for genocide and nuclear war

Leiter 7 (Brian, Law@UTexas, http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/issues/archive/v74/74\_3/04.Leiter.pdf)JFS

Now Rorty does sometimes write as though, in terms of practical success, science and morals are on a par. He says, for example, “We have been equally successful in both morals and physics. To be sure, we have more difficulty convincing people of our moral views than of our scientific views, but this does not mean that the two differ in something called ‘epistemic status.’”18 Yet what could count as the evidence of “equal success” in morals and physics that Rorty has in mind? It can’t be that those who try to violate the laws of physics end up frustrated, maimed, or dead, while those who violate the moral law (however it is understood) suffer no predictable set of consequences at all. It can’t be that Nazi scientists and Manhattan Project scientists were interested in the same physics, but had rather different morals and politics. It can’t be that the academic community in physics is global, transcending culture and nationality, while most moral debate is parochial in the worst sense of that term, that is, tracking the interests and horizons of particular classes, cultural traditions, and experiences. Rorty objects, however, that “brute facts about the presence or absence of consensus—whether about planetary orbits or about sodomy—are to be explained sociologically rather than epistemologically.” For this to be persuasive, however, we would need to hear the details about how the actual sociological explanation goes, and Rorty, alas, never offers any. About the only explanatorily relevant psychosocial factor in the offing is that humans everywhere share an interest in predicting the future course of their experience, but that simply explains why the Scientific Norm works for human purposes, and why Nazis and social democrats share the same physics, but not the same morals. But that is a “sociological” explanation that simply underlines the fundamental difference between morals and science.

Morality “doesn’t work” – Thinking is prior to natural science, contrary to Rorty

Leiter 7 (Brian, Law@UTexas, http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/issues/archive/v74/74\_3/04.Leiter.pdf)

If I am right, then perhaps there is only one plausible pragmatic thesis that deserves notice in philosophy, and it is the one suggested by the powerful metaphor of Neurath’s boat. This thesis is, contra Rorty, very much an epistemological thesis, that is, a thesis about the justification of what we ought to believe. And it says that justification can not run all the way down, that it is grounded, unavoidably, in propositions (and practices) that we accept because they work, and not for any other reason. But nothing in human experience or history gives us any reason to think that the criterion of “what works” extends all the way up the chain of justification. For it turns out that from human experience and human history, the practices “that work” are practices whose criteria of belief and action have nothing to do with practical considerations. And when we take those practices seriously, natural science and morality seem to be very different indeed.

A2: Pragmatism – Rorty Bad

Rorty is tautological – How can we “prove” prag w/o an epistemological basis for favoring what “works? And how do we judge that? – It’s illogical at its base

Olsen 6 (Michael, UC-SD undergrad, Cal Undergrad Philo Review, http://www.cupr.org/VI2/VoicingIdeas-Olsen.pdf)

Richard Rorty argues in “Solidarity or objectivity?” that the course of philosophy since the time of Plato has concerned two opposing ways of thinking of one’s life: objectivity or solidarity. The first is defined as a pursuit of justification for knowledge independent of appearance, or “standing in relation to a nonhuman reality” (Rorty 1991, p. 21). Solidarity is, on the other hand sought among the relations of individuals in a community without the detachment of a “God’s eye view.” Rorty proposes that we accept solidarity, looking at “knowledge [and truth] as a compliment paid to the beliefs […] we think so well justified that, for the moment, further justification is not needed” (Rorty 1991, p. 24). Problematic to Rorty’s pragmatism is that it leaves us in a regress in attempt to justify our knowledge. Additionally, even if we accept his theory as coherent, coherence can be grounded in falsity and truth alike. At the heart of our desire for objectivity, is not to seek Truth for its own sake as Rorty contends (Rorty 1991, p. 21), but to seek truth for the very purpose of reasoned communal discourse. While we should always be willing to adjust our beliefs and grow, a view that Rorty espouses, his view of knowledge in fact hinders our ability to move forward.

A2: Pragmatism – Epistemology K

Their argument for pragmatism is circular – It presumes that there is a rationality to their epistemology

Leiter 7 (Brian, Law@UTexas, http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/issues/archive/v74/74\_3/04.Leiter.pdf)

We may see how Rorty’s “pragmatism,” as he calls it, goes wrong by recalling the most evocative metaphor in the pragmatist genre, “Neurath’s boat,” an image due to the logical positivist Otto Neurath but made famous in post-WWII philosophy by the American pragmatist Quine.16 Neurath (and Quine) analogized our epistemological situation to that of sailors at sea who must rebuild the boat in which they sail. Being afloat, they cannot abandon the ship and rebuild it from scratch, so they must choose to stand firm on certain planks of the ship while rebuilding others. They, of course, choose to “stand firm” on those planks that are the most sturdy and reliable—the ones that “work” the best—though there may come a point when the sailors will tear those up too and replace them with new ones. Our epistemological situation, on this Quinean pragmatic view, is the same. In figuring out what we ought to believe, we necessarily “stand firm” on certain epistemic “planks” in our best-going theory of the world, the one that, to date, has worked the best. To be sure, we cannot rule out that we may one day want to replace those planks too—just as our predecessors replaced planks like “the truth is what the Good Book says” and “Newtonian mechanics describes the laws governing all matter”—but that is just to renounce absolute certainty and accept fallibilism as fundamental to our epistemological situation.

Rorty is backward on epistemology – Fundamentally undermines prag

Leiter 7 (Brian, Law@UTexas, http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/issues/archive/v74/74\_3/04.Leiter.pdf)

Where the Neurath/Quine picture agrees with Rorty is that all our epistemic judgments are “parochial,” but only in the fairly trivial sense that it is conceptually (hence practically) impossible for us to climb out of our ship (our best-going theory of the world) and rebuild the whole edifice from scratch by reference to nonparochial (nonhistorical) standards of truth and warrant. (On Quine’s view, “there is no Archimedean point of cosmic exile from which to leverage our theory of the world.”17) We must necessarily rely on certain epistemic criteria—criteria for what we ought to believe—any time we ask about the justification of any other belief (including beliefs about epistemic criteria). That is just to say that we must stand firm on certain “planks” in the boat while rebuilding (or figuring out whether we ought to rebuild) any other planks. The only question, then, is which planks we ought to “stand firm” on because they work so well.