## AT: Framework

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#### Any move to methodologically bracket out our discussion cannot be viewed as value neutral, it is the worst form of conservatism favoring the established order at the expense of the oppressed.

Meszaros, University of Sussex, Philosophy Professor Emeritus, 89

(Istvan, The Power of Ideology, p 232-234 GAL)

Nowhere is the myth of ideological neutrality – the self-proclaimed *Wertfreiheit* or value neutrality of so-called ‘rigorous social science’ – stronger than in the field of methodology. Indeed, we are often presented with the claim that the adoption of the advocated methodological framework would automatically exempt one from all controversy about values, since they are adequate method itself, thereby saving one from unnecessary complications and securing the desired objectivity and uncontestable outcome.

Claims and procedures of this kind are, of course, extremely problematical. For they circularly assume that their enthusiasm for the virtues of ‘methodological neutrality’ is bound to yield ‘value neutral’ solutions with regard to highly contested issues, without first examining the all-important question as to the conditions of possibility – or otherwise – of the postulated systematic neutrality at the plans of methodology itself. The unchallengeable validity of the recommended procedure is supposed to be self-evident on account of its purely methodological character.

In reality, of course, this approach to methodology is heavily loaded with a conservative ideological substance. Since, however, the plane of methodology (and ‘meta-theory’) is said to be in principle separated from that of the substantive issues, the methodological circle can be conveniently closed. Whereupon the mere insistence on the purely methodological character of the criteria laid down is supposed to establish the claim according to which the approach in question is neutral because everybody can adopt it as the common frame of reference of ‘rational discourse’.

Yet, curiously enough, the proposed methodological tenets are so defined that vast areas of vital social concern are *a priori* excluded from their rational discourse ‘metaphysical’, ‘ideological’, etc. The effect of circumscribing in this way the scope of the one and only admissible approach is that it automatically disqualifies in the name of methodology itself, all those who do not fit into the stipulated framework of discourse. As a result, the propounders of the ‘right method’ are spared the difficulties that go with acknowledging the real divisions and incompatibilities as they necessarily arise from the contending social interests at the roots of alternative approaches and the rival sets of values associated with them.

This is where we can see more clearly the social orientation implicit in the whole procedure. For – far from offering an adequate scope for critical enquiry – the advocated general adoption of the allegedly neutral methodological framework is equivalent, in fact, to consenting not even to raise the issues that really matter. Instead, the stipulated ‘common’ methodological procedure succeeds in transforming the enterprise of ‘rational discourse’ into the dubious practice of producing methodology for the sake of methodology: a tendency more pronounced in the twentieth century than ever before. This practice consists in sharpening the recommended methodological knife until nothing but the bare handle is left, at which point the new knife is adopted for the same purpose. For the ideal methodological knife is not meant for cutting, only for sharpening, thereby interposing itself between the critical intent and the real objects of criticism which it can obliterate for as long as the pseudo-critical activity of knife-sharpening for tits own sake continues to be pursued. And that happens to be precisely its inherent ideological purpose.

Naturally, to speak of a ‘common’ methodological framework in which one can resolve the problems of a society torn by irreconcilable social interests and pursuing antagonistic confrontations is delusory, at best, notwithstanding all talk about ‘ideal communication communities’. But to define the methodological tenets of all rational discourse by way of transubstantiating into ‘ideal types’ (or by putting into methodological ‘brackets’) the discussion of contending social values reveals the ideological colour as well as the extreme fallaciousness of the claimed rationality. For such treatment of the major areas of conflict, under a great variety of forms – from the Viennese version of ‘logical positivism’ to Wittgenstein’s famous ladder that must be ‘thrown away’ at the point of confronting the question of values, and from the advocacy of the Popperian principle of ‘little by little’ in the ‘emotivist’ theory of value – inevitably always favours the established order. And it does so by declaring the fundamental structural parameters of the given society ‘of of bounds’ to the potential contestants, in the authority of the ideally ‘common’ methodology.

However, even on a cursory inspection of the issues at stake it out to be fairly obvious that to consent not to question the fundamental structural framework of the established order is radically different according to whether one does so as the beneficiary of the order or from the standpoint of those who find themselves at the receiving end, exploited and oppressed by the overall determinations (and not just by some limited and more or less easily corrigible detail) of that order. Consequently, to establish the ‘common’ identity of the two, opposed sides of a structurally safeguarded hierarchical order – by means of the reduction of the people belong to the contending social forces into fictitious ‘rational interlocutors’, extracted from their divided real world and transplanted into a beneficially shared universe of ideal discourse – would be nothing sort of methodological miracle.

Contrary to the wishful thinking hypostatized as a timeless and socially unspecified rational community, the elementary condition of a truly rational discourse would be to acknowledge the legitimacy of contesting the given order of society in substantive terms. This would imply the articulation of the relevant problems not on the plane of self-referential articulation of the relevant problems not on the plane of self-referential theory and methodology, but as inherently practical issues whose conditions of solution point towards the necessity of radical structural changes. In other words, it would require the explicit rejection of all fiction of methodological and meta-theoretical neutrality. But, of course, this would be far too much to expect precisely because the society in which we live is a deeply divided society. This is why through the dichotomies of ‘fact and value’, ‘theory and practice’, ‘formal and substantive rationality’, etc. The conflict-transcending methodological miracle is constantly stipulated as the necessary regulative framework of the *ruling ideology.*

What makes this approach particularly difficult to challenge is that its value-commitments are *mediated* by methodological precepts to such a degree that it is virtually impossible to bring them into the focus of discussion without openly contesting the framework as a whole. For the conservative sets of values at the roots of such orientation remain several steps removed from the ostensible subject of dispute as defined in logico/methodological, formal/structural, and semantic/analytical terms. And who would suspect of ideological bias the impeccable – methodologically sanctioned – credentials of ‘procedural rules’, ‘models and ‘paradigms’?

Once, though, such rules and paradigms are adopted as the common frame of reference of what may or may not be allowed to considered the legitimate subject of debate, everything that enters into the accepted parameters is necessarily constrained not only by the scope of the overall framework, but simultaneously also by the inexplicit ideological assumptions upon the basis of which the methodological principles themselves were in the first place constitution. This why the allegedly ‘non-ideological’ ideologies which so successfully conceal and exercise their apologetic function in the guise of neutral methodology are doubly mystifying.

Twentieth-century currents of thought are dominated by approaches that tend to articulate the social interests and values of the ruling order through complicated – at times completely bewildering – mediations, on the methodological plane. Thus, more than ever before, the task of ideological demystification is inseparable from the investigation of the complex dialectical relationship between methods and values which no social theory or philosophy can escape.

## Politics/Elections

### 2AC

#### Politics/election is not inevitable, but instead a direct outcome of ablenormative social institutions & idea of politics – their framing of the DA links to our criticism

Orentlicher, Professor of Law at Indiana University, 96

(David, 31 Harv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rev. 49, Winter)

A more expansive interpretation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act would better realize the purposes of the principle of reasonable accommodations. The principle of reasonable accommodations recognizes two important truths. First, it recognizes that disability is not simply an intrinsic characteristic of a person but is the result of the interaction between a person's intrinsic qualities and the environment. [87](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n87#n87" \t "_self) Second, the principle recognizes that the environment is shaped not simply by natural, inevitable forces but also has been shaped to serve the interests of some segments of society at the expense of others. The socio-political environment cannot [\*67] always be justified by the operation of neutral or objective principles or by principles that are otherwise morally valid. [88](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n88#n88" \t "_self) Indeed, there is nothing "natural" or ineluctable about the fact that most aspects of socio-political organization respond primarily to the needs of persons without disabilities, [89](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n89#n89" \t "_self) just as there is nothing inevitable about the fact that the post office and many businesses cease operations on Sunday, the Christian Sabbath, rather than on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath, or Friday, the Moslem Sabbath. Social norms develop not because they are pre-ordained, but because they serve the needs of social groups that are dominant either in numbers or power. Often, social arrangements develop around a social norm of a person without disabilities because of inattention to the needs of persons with disabilities. In addition, in some cases, society purposefully creates its institutions for the convenience of persons without disabilities while aware of the hardship imposed on persons with disabilities. For example, it is commonly the case that mentally retarded persons are perceived to be physically unattractive. Yet, with a little assistance in grooming, many of these individuals can take on an "attractive" appearance. [90](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n90#n90" \t "_self) Some institutions for the mentally retarded have intentionally neglected the grooming of their wards to discourage them from entering into romantic or sexual relationships. [91](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n91#n91" \t "_self) The operators find that such relationships complicate their work; in addition, non-retarded persons are often unwilling to permit sexual or romantic activity by retarded persons. [92](http://web.lexis-nexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/universe/document?_m=a3a7411794111b450a59a6771e7e6f3e&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=693a1c845fd8026e0288884c326564c9" \l "n92#n92" \t "_self) In short, persons without disabilities may compromise the interests of persons with disabilities for their own convenience and psychological comfort. How a social norm develops, then, may depend much more on considerations of popularity or political power than upon alternative visions of distributive justice that often have greater moral weight. Because socio-political forces frequently exacerbate the impact of a disability without sufficient moral justification, anti-discrimination law requires [\*68] modifications of social policies to ameliorate the deleterious effects of socio-political forces on disability.

#### Political theory has systematically disempowers those coded as disabled – reject their model of decision-making

Handley, University East Anglia, Professor Political, Social and International Studies, 3

(Peter, “Focus on developing a disability approach to political analysis; ‘Theorizing disability: Beyond ‘Common Sense’”, Politics, Culture, Society; Democratic Theory, Social and Political Theory, Globalizing Worlds, and Introduction to Contemporary Politics, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9256.00186/full>)

Despite such events, I argue that political theory pays insufficient attention to disability, tending to subsume it – if it is considered – within wider debates, typically that of welfare. Consequently, disability is viewed as tangential to other current debates, such as those concerning social justice, equality and citizenship. I suggest that this is largely the result of the persistence of ‘common-sense’ ideas about disability amongst political theorists.3 In this sense political theory lags behind developments in the world of practical politics. Increasingly, disability is a ‘live’ political issue and disabled people now routinely engage in non-violent direct action and the lobbying of their elected representatives. They do so on the basis of ideas that pose fundamental challenges to ‘common-sense’ beliefs about disability. I begin by outlining these ‘common-sense’ ideas. Secondly, I outline the most influential critique of them in the shape of the so-called social model of disability. Finally, I review some criticisms of the social model itself before offering some thoughts on how theorising disability beyond ‘common sense’ poses deeper and more complex questions about what constitutes ‘normality’ in political theory.

## CPs

### 2AC

#### Their counterplan is simply an attempt to avoid engagement with ablenormativity and instead is a retreat to rational bureaucracy that enables mass violence against those coded as disabled

Hughes, Glasgow Caledonian University, School of Social Science, 2

(Bill, Bauman's Strangers, Disability & Society, Vol. 17 No. 5, p. 571-584, EBSCO)

Bureaucracy is ultra-rational, driven to embrace the abnormally normal. It makes cruelty and barbarism possible because it has no sense of suffering and should it be asked to provide a moral justification for its actions then it can always appeal to a banal utilitarian ethic like social Darwinism. The bureaucratic machine thrives on social distance and makes no direct or emotional contact with the flushed face of the doomed stranger. The totalitarian state violence that sponsored the genocide of Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, disabled people and other ‘undesirables’ was produced by unique cultural and historical conditions, but nonetheless, the holocaust must be understood as ‘an extraordinary example of the irrationality of modern rationality’ (Beilharz, 2000, p. 98). Modern culture—in Bauman’s view—is both heterophobic and morally indifferent, and as such will be well disposed to any means that proposes the extirpation of difference. Given this position, it is little wonder that in the 1990s, Bauman tries to inject moral sensibilities into cultural critique by drawing on Levinas’ (1981) argument that ethics is ‘first philosophy’ and that responsibility for the other is paramount to the extent that moral action precedes rational calculation. Modern history suggests that when the reverse is the case, disabled people will suffer at the hands of power. Mitchell & Snyder (2001, p. 213) argue that the ‘desired eradication’ of disability ‘is countered only with the ferocity of an ultimate recalcitrance to … violent “utopian” solutions.’