# 1ncs

### Biopolitical Hadouken

#### **Fiat is Illusory: The affirmative’s utopian description of a transportation future is connected to very real subjugation of those left outside their fantasmic infrastructure**

Foucault 86 (Michel, Legend and famous French philosopher, Of Other Spaces, Diacritics Vol.16, No.1, Spring 1986, Trans. Jay Miskowiec) LA

Bachelard's monumental work and the descriptions of phenomenologists have taught us that we do not live in a homogeneous and empty space, but on the contrary in a space thoroughly imbued with quantities and perhaps thoroughly fantasmatic as well. The space of our primary perception, the space of our dreams and that of our passions hold within themselves qualities that seem intrinsic: there is a light, ethereal, transparent space, or again a dark, rough, encumbered space; a space from above, of summits, or on the contrary a space from below, of mud; or again a space that can be flowing like sparkling water, or a space that is fixed, congealed, like stone or crystal. Yet these analyses, while fundamental for reflection in our time, primarily concern internal space. I should like to speak now of exter- nal space. The space in which we live, which draws us out of ourselves, in which the erosion of our lives, our time and our history occurs, the space that claws and knaws at us, is also, in itself, a heterogeneous space. In other words, we do not live in a kind of void, inside of which we could place individuals and things. We do not live inside a void that could be colored with diverse shades of light, we live inside a set of relations that delineates sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable on one another. Of course one might attempt to describe these different sites by looking for the set of relations by which a given site can be defined. For example, describing the set of relations that define the sites of transportation, streets, trains (a train is an extraordinary bundle of rela-tions because it is something through which one goes, it is also something by means of which one can go from one point to another, and then it is also something that goes by). One could describe, via the cluster of relations that allows them to be defined, the sites of tem- porary relaxation - cafes, cinemas, beaches. Likewise one could describe, via its network of relations, the closed or semi-closed sites of rest- the house, the bedroom, the bed, etcetera. But among all these sites, I am interested in certain ones that have the curious property of being in relation with all the other sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect. These spaces, as it were, which are linked with all the others, which however contradict all the other sites, are of two main types. First there are the utopias. Utopias are sites with no real place. They are sites that have a general relation of direct or inverted analogy with the real space of Society. They present society itself in a perfected form, or else society turned upside down, but in any case these utopias are fundamentally unreal spaces. There are also, probably in every culture, in every civilization, real places- places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of society-which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and in- verted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality. Because these places are absolutely different from all the sites that they reflect and speak about, I shall call them, by way of contrast to utopias, heterotopias. I believe that between utopias and these quite other sites, these heterotopias, there might be a sort of mixed, joint experience, which would be the mirror. The mirror is, after all, a utopia, since it is a placeless place. In the mirror, I see myself there where I am not, in an unreal, vir- tual space that opens up behind the surface; I am over there, there where I am not, a sort of shadow that gives my own visibility to myself, that enables me to see myself there where I am absent: such is the utopia of the mirror. But it is also a heterotopia in so far as the mirror does exist in reality, where it exerts a sort of counteraction on the position that I occupy. From the standpoint of the mirror I discover my absence from the place where I am since I see myself over there. Startingfrom this gaze that is, as it were, directed toward me, from the ground of this virtual space that is on the other side of the glass, I come back toward myself; I begin again to direct my eyes toward myself and to reconstitute myself there where I am. The mirror functions as a heterotopia in this respect: it makes this place that I occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point which is over there. As for the heterotopias as such, how can they be described, what meaning do they have? We might imagine a sort of systematic description- I do not say a science because the term is too galvanized now-that would, in a given society, take as its object the study, analysis, description, and "reading" (as some like to say nowadays) of these different spaces, of these other places. As a sort of simultaneously mythic and real contestation of the space in which we live, this description could be called heterotopology. Its first principle is that there is probably not a single culture in the world that fails to constitute heterotopias. That is a con- stant of every human group. But the heterotopias obviously take quite varied forms, and perhaps no one absolutely universal form of heterotopia would be found. We can however classify them in two main categories. In the so-called primitive societies, there is a certain form of heterotopia that I would call crisis heterotopias, i.e., there are privileged or sacred or forbidden places, reserved for individuals who are, in relation to society and to the human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis: adolescents, menstruating women, pregnant women, the elderly, etc. In our society, these crisis heterotopias are persistently disappearing, though a few remnants can still be found. For example, the boarding school, in its nineteenth-century form, or military service for young men, have certainly played such a role, as the first manifestations of sexual virility were in fact supposed to take place "elsewhere" than at home. For girls, there was, until the middle of the twentieth century, a tradition called the "honeymoon trip" which was an ancestral theme. The young woman's deflowering could take place "nowhere” and, at the moment of its occurrence the train or honeymoon hotel was indeed the place of this nowhere, this heterotopia without geographical markers. But these heterotopias of crisis are disappearing today and are being replaced, I believe, by what we might call heterotopias of deviation: those in which individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed. Cases of this are rest homes and psychiatric hospitals, and of course prisons; and one should perhaps add retirement homes that are, as it were, on the borderline between the heterotopia of crisis and the heterotopia of deviation since, after all, old age is a crisis, but is also a deviation since, in our society where leisure is the rule, idleness is a sort of deviation.

#### Extinction

Bernauer, Boston College professor of philosophy, 1990

(James, “Michael Foucault’s Force of Flight: Toward an Ethics of Thought,” pp. 141-142)

This capacity of power to conceal itself cannot cloak the tragedy of the implications contained in Foucault's examination of its functioning. While liberals have fought to extend rights and Marxists have denounced the injustices of capitalism, a political technology, acting in the interests of a better administration of life, has produced a politics that places man's "existence as a living being in question." The very period that proclaimed pride in having overthrown the tyranny of monarchy, that engaged in an endless clamor for reform, that is confident in the virtues of its humanistic faith -- this period's politics created a landscape dominated by history's bloodiest wars. **What comparison is possible between a sovereign's authority to take a life and a power that, in the interest of protecting a society's quality of life, can plan, as well as develop the means for its implementation, a policy of mutually assured destruction? Such a policy is neither an aberration of the fundamental principles of modern politics nor an abandonment of our age's humanism in favor of a more primitive right to kill**; it is but the other side of a power that is "situated and exercised at the level of life, the species the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population. **The bio-political project of administering and optimizing life closes its circle with the production of the Bomb. "The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of a power to guarantee and individuals continued existence.** " The solace that might have been expected from being able to gaze at scaffolds empty of the victims of a tyrant's vengeance has been stolen form us by the noose that has tightened around each of our own necks.

#### This is a gateway issue that comes before weighing the aff: we have indicted the affirmative at the level of its knowledge production. The judge should prioritize in-round impacts: practices taken for granted here can serve the real interests of repression and subjugation, the issues raised in this critique should be considered with more political expediency than those raised by the affirmative

May 11 (Todd, Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Clemson, “A New Neo-Pragmatism: From James and Dewey to Foucault,” 2011, Foucault Studies, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/view/3205/3399, Pg. 60-62, JS)

I believe we can answer this question in the affirmative. The claim is not that all prac-tices have the same level of depth or influence when it comes to relations of power and know-ledge. If that were the case, then it would have been just as expedient for Foucault to study baseball as psychotherapeutic practice. Rather, the idea is that, to one extent or another, power and knowledge, and particularly their relationship, arises within practices. So in the case of baseball one might find it operating, at least at the margins—indeed it is not difficult to imagine such a case. Think, for instance, of a baseball player who is about to give a public speech being told that he is ‚on deck.‛ The implication here is that the person is about to en-gage in a competitive activity whose goal is to win something, whether that be audience’s respect, other speaking engagements, or something else. Inasmuch as this person understands himself through the game of baseball, transferring the image of being on deck to other activities promotes a competitive self-understanding, which generates beliefs and actions en-gaged with the world in a competitive mode. It might be pointed out here that not only baseball players, but other people as well are subject to the locution of being on deck. This is true. It is also true that people who are not in psychotherapy are subject to influences from that practice. Practices do not exist in isolation. They are intertwined and pervade our culture and society in different ways and to different extents. Moreover, an individual’s immersion in different practices can cause cross-fertiliza-tion of the power/knowledge effects of those practices within his or her beliefs, actions, and engagements. What Foucault offers in focusing on the level of practices as his unit of histo-rical and genealogical inquiry is not a specialized or narrow analytic, but instead a way of understanding ourselves and how we got to be who we are through the most common and pervasive ways in which we engage with the world. The addition I have made to Foucault’s own claim about practices is that it is in the practices that the power/knowledge relationships May: A New Neo-Pragmatism 61 are to be found. Even this is not an addition so much as a clarification that allows us to see more straightforwardly the relationship between his work and pragmatism. Having made this clarification, though, we must ask about that relationship. What is the implication of all this for pragmatism? It lies in introducing a complexity that appears to have escaped James and, to a lesser extent, Dewey, for whom the success of a practice lay in its ability to help us navigate the world. If Foucault’s genealogical approach is helpful, the con-cept of success must itself be investigated rather than being a sort of ‚unexplained ex-plainer.‛17 Successful navigation of the world seems to be a matter of accomplishing one’s goals better or more efficiently or more meaningfully. This being said, we might ask, what are the self-understandings tied up with particular senses of success? If, for instance, we are pro-duced to one extent or another to be psychological beings with personalities of the type that psychotherapy promotes, then success will be defined in psychotherapeutic terms. This, in turn, has its own political effects, effects Foucault has traced in Discipline and Punish and the first volume of the History of Sexuality. These effects are not always ones we would, on reflec-tion, seek to ratify. Some of them, for example the making-docile of human bodies, are, in Foucault’s term, intolerable. We cannot, then, take the notion of success or the idea of navi-gating the world more successfully at face value. We must see it as the name of a problem to be investigated rather than a solution to be attained. This, it seems to me, is a point that would deepen pragmatism without violating any of its central commitments. It would, instead, offer a historical dimension to pragmatist thought. Success in navigating the world is not a given. Rather, one is successful within parti-cular parameters, and those parameters have political inflections. It is not only that the para-meters provide territorial borders within which one can have more or less success in one’s navigation. The problem is deeper: what counts as success as well as what is encouraged or discouraged (or even prohibited) in the name of that success are political matters. They are matters of whom we have been shaped to be and what our understanding and self-under-standing consists in. We might, from another angle, locate the difference between Foucault and the prag-matists and neo-pragmatists this way. For the latter, pragmatism is a matter of what is prac-tical; while for Foucault, pragmatism is a matter of taking our practices as the unit of analysis. What gives Foucault’s work its force, and what makes it relevant for pragmatism, is that it is through our practices what is considered practical arises for us. We cannot take the practical, or successful within it, as a given. That is the lesson of his genealogies. Foucault’s work does not, of course, replace classical pragmatism or neo-pragmatism. Pragmatism’s emphasis on the bond between belief and action and between them and the world remain relevant for us. Even its notion of successful navigation of the world, suitably complicated by political analysis, has much to say. If what I have argued here is right, rather than seeing Foucault’s work as a replacement of pragmatism, we ought to see it in a line that extends from James and Dewey through Rorty to Foucault (even if the chronology of the latter two must at moments be reversed). Pragmatism has offered us a powerful philosophical per-spective on the intertwining of our selves and our world, no doubt as powerful as the best of 17 I am grateful to Colin Koopman for suggesting this helpful term. Foucault Studies, No. 11, pp. 54-62. 62 the phenomenological tradition. Seeing Foucault’s work engaged with that tradition does not permit us to surpass it, but instead to add a dimension to its already rich tradition.

### Biopolitical Tatsumaki Senpuu Kyaku

#### Transportation Infrastructure is biopolitical— The 1ac is a technology that reinforces docile biopolitical subjectivity-- Foucauldian understandings of power are an essential precondition to critical thinking on the topic

Bonham and Cox 10 (Jennifer and Peter, U of Adelaide and U of Chester, The Disruptive Traveller? A Foucauldian Analysis of Cycleways, 6/2010, http://adelaide.academia.edu/JenniferBonham/Papers/372359/The\_Disruptive\_Traveller\_A\_Foucauldian\_Analysis\_of\_Cycleways) LA

BRINGING FOUCAULT INTO TRANSPORT In contrast to the broader transport literature, we do not theorise the individual as a natural, pre-social being simply choosing one mode of travel over others. Drawing on Michel Foucault, we are interested in the techniques through which people in contemporary societies come to think of themselves as individuals and regulate themselves towards, alter or resist the subjectivities (or subject positions - e.g. as cyclists, pedestrians, motorists) available to them (Foucault 1982). We take the view that the production of knowledge about human beings - which has proliferated since the eighteenth century- and the operation of power which enables that knowledge is central to our capacity to think of ourselves first as individuals (Digeser 1992) and then as particular types of subjects (Foucault 1977, 1978). In this sense, those who produce and utilise transport knowledge participate both in shaping how people can think about their journeys and in structuring the field of action of individual travellers. It is impossible to review the key elements of Foucault's work in this article, instead we offer a brief introduction accompanied by an example of how Foucault's work can be utilised in transport. Readers unfamiliar with Foucault are directed to McHoul and Grace (1995) for a concise introduction and Bacchi (2009) on applying Foucault to policy analysis. Foucault offers an understanding of power as productive, as producing particular types of being and knowledge (Bacchi 2009:37-8). He identifies different types of power (Hindess 1996:96-136) and, although governmental and bio power are important to transport, our paper focuses on discipline as it foregrounds the role of 'spatialising' practices2 in processes of objectification and subjectification (the formation of subjects). Disciplinary power, fundamental to the selfregulation that characterises modern societies (Foucault 1991:101 ), has enabled the production of knowledge about the capabilities and capacities of human beings that, in turn, facilitates innovations in the exercise of power (Foucault 1977:224). It is through the operation of power at a micro-scale, the sorting and physical separation of the human mass - constituting difference through the discursive mechanisms (records keeping, data collection) involved in separating, scrutinising and monitoring bodies -that knowledge of singular bodies has been produced (Foucault 1977:191-2). From the moment we are born-separated from our mothers, gendered male or female, weighed, measured, named, allocated the special space of a cot and monitored at regular intervals - we are subjected to and made subjects through myriad practices involving the operation of power and the production of knowledge. The procedures of inscription which bring individuals into effect and objectivise bodies in specific ways- as healthy or ill, learned or illiterate, political or passive, law abiding or deviant, mobile or stationary simultaneously enable the aggregation of those singular histories into knowledge of populations where norms, the limits to normal, and deviations from the norm are constituted (Foucault 1977, 1982). An important point here is that these are not necessary ways of knowing individuals. Rather, conditions at different moments enable objectification of bodies in new ways. With this knowledge, individuals are worked upon through systems of punishment and reward to regulate themselves according to the norm while those found wanting- disruptive, abnormal -might be removed altogether. Travel is but one domain in which bodies have been objectivised and subjectivised3; separated, scrutinised and worked upon and, in the case of cycleways, removed altogether. Through the late nineteenth but especially the twentieth century it became thinkable, practicable and meaningful to study urban movement. Until recently, the meaning of that movement has been asserted and widely accepted as 'transport' -the journey from a to b specifically to accomplish some activity or task at point b (Bonham 2000). Over time, the journey, or trip, has come to appear as 'selfevident', as mechanisms for the study of journeys origin destination studies, household travel surveys, vehicle counts- excise particular practices from the mass of daily activities and bring them under scrutiny. Objectifying travel as 'transport' establishes the journey as a by-product of its end points - derived demand - and provides the imperative for trips to be accomplished as quickly, or as economically, as possible (BonhamandFerretti 1999). 'Derived demand' functions as a 'statement' (Foucault 1976: 102-17) within the field of transport, a statement that both disciplines those who would study travel, and discounts, if not excludes, the many other possibilities of our journeys. Drawing on Foucault's (1980:119) understanding of power as productive, the objectification of travel as transport is productive in that it has enabled the development of a vast body of knowledge and brought new subjects into effect- the pedestrian, cyclist, motorist, passenger. These subjects have been facilitated through the operation of power at a micro-scale involving practices of differentiation and separation of users of public space, identifying those who are stationary and those who move (Bonham 2002; Frello 2008), and subsequently scrutinising, sorting, categorising and disciplining those who move according to the conduct of their journey (Bonham 2006). A number of practices, particular ways of moving, particular types of observations, pauses, conversations- have been separated out, excluded as NOT-transport and marginalised in the space of the street. Other practices - keeping to course, attuning hearing, sight and reflexes to the operation of vehicles-have been worked upon in disciplining the mobile body (Bonham 2006; Paterson 2007). In cities across the world, the contemporary division and regulation of the public space of the street (and road) has been guided by a transport rationalisation of urban travel (Bonham 2000). Streets have been divided lengthwise and travellers allocated space according to the speed and order with which they travel (Bonham 2000). The mobile body has been incited to move at speed to ensure the efficient operation of the city. However, in the early twentieth century, widespread concern over motor vehicle related deaths and injuries underpinned debate over prioritising speed or safety. The debate was resolved (but never quite fixed) infavour of speed, with 'vulnerable' road users giving way to the fast (Bonham 2002). The slow and disorderly pedestrians, horses and carts-were removed to the margins, checked by the fast and orderly, or excluded altogether. Overall efficiency, measured in time, could only be assured if each traveller agreed to be orderly- hence all those road safety techniques and programs that train bodies in 'correct movement' (Bonham 2006). The public space of the street, often identified in political discourse as a site available to all citizens, effectively becomes an economic space where the subject of transport discourse, conducting the economical journey, gains primacy. Subjugating oneself within the discourse on transport becoming the efficient or economical traveller, which in the twentieth century has meant taking up the subject position of the motorist- is rewarded with priority in the use of public space. These individual rewards invoke wider social rewards through the increase in the reproduction of capital through the facilitation of movement (Cox 2010). Indeed, an entire literature on globalisation has employed this metaphor of increased flows in speed, volume and depth to describe globalisation of capitalism from the end of the twentieth century (Boran and Cox 2007). Transport discourses are thus woven into discourses on the nature of public good and of socio-economically responsible behaviour, reinforcing the linkage between travel behaviours and 'responsible citizens'. The knowledge produced about individual travellers is not only enabled by the exercise of power but also facilitates the further exercise of power. Power-knowledge relations operate at a micro-scale subjectivising singular bodies while, at a macro-scale, the subjectivities constituted within different disciplines (e.g. economics, demography) are deployed in the government of populations (Foucault1981, 1982,1991 ). Further, the aggregation of data about singular bodies not only allows the calculation of norms (and deviations from those norms) but in liberal societies, where citizens are constituted as free and incited to exercise freedom of choice (Huxley 2008), this knowledge is central to government as populations are guided rather than directed toward particular ends (Rose 1990; Gordon 1991; Rose and Miller 1992). In terms of transport, knowledge produced about individual travellers and singular journeys is combined into knowledge of urban populations and used to guide the choices of the population toward economical movement and the economical operation of the city. This process values speed and prioritises the reduction of travel time ahead of the impacts on health, environment and social exclusion that accompany increases in speed and travel energy consumption (Lohanand Wickham 1998; Whitelegg 1993, 1997).

#### **<<<SPECIFIC LINK PLACEHOLDER>>>**

#### This “way of life” promoted by the affirmative reinforces a neoliberal rationality that is entirely devoid of ethics, collective awareness, and capacity for resistance. The subject for the affirmative is a docile body engineered for consumption. Even if “something must be done,” the type of actions the aff thinking would lead to would be selfish and unethical

Hamann 9 (Trent H., St. John’s U, Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and Ethics, Foucault Studies No6 Feb 2009) LA

Within the apparatus (dispositif)11 of neoliberalism every individual is considered to be “equally unequal”, as Foucault put it. Exploitation, domination, and every other form of social inequality is rendered invisible as social phenomena to the extent that each individual’s social condition is judged as nothing other than the effect of his or her own choices and investments. As Wendy Brown has pointed out, Homo economi- cus is constructed, not as a citizen who obeys rules, pursues common goods, and ad- dresses problems it shares with others, but as a rational and calculating entrepreneur who is not only capable of, but also responsible for caring for him or herself.12 Brown points out that this has the effect of “depoliticizing social and economic powers” as well as reducing “political citizenship to an unprecedented degree of passivity and political complacency.” She writes: The model neoliberal citizen is one who strategizes for her- or himself among various social, political, and economic options, not one who strives with others to alter or organize these options. A fully realized neoliberal citizenry would be the opposite of public-minded; indeed, it would barely exist as a public. The body politic ceases to be a body but is rather a group of individual entrepreneurs and consumers . . . (E, 43). Within this practically Hobbesian (anti-)social landscape the ”responsibility” of in- dividuals constitutes a form of market morality13 understood as the maximization of economy through the autonomous rational deliberation of costs and benefits fol- lowed by freely chosen practices. Neoliberal subjects are constituted as thoroughly responsible for themselves and themselves alone because they are subjectified as thoroughly autonomous and free. An individual’s failure to engage in the requisite processes of subjectivation, or what neoliberalism refers to as a “mismanaged life” (E, 42), is consequently due to the moral failure of that individual. Neoliberal ratio- nality allows for the avoidance of any kind of collective, structural, or governmental responsibility for such a life even as examples of it have been on the rise for a num- ber of decades. Instead, impoverished populations, when recognized at all, are often treated as ”opportunities” for investment.14

#### The affirmative takes the object of the population, the management of its mobility, and the care for its life for granted. Assumptions about the “everyone” of the population are the basis for humanity’s worst wars and necessitate wholesale slaughter in the name of the whole.

Foucault 72 (Michael, Professor of the History of Systems of Thought College De France, The Foucault Reader, pg. 258) LD

Since the classical age, **the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power**. "Deduction" has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, **working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them**. There has been a parallel ·shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-administering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right , of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life . **Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations** . But **this formidable power of death-and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has greatly expanded its limits-now presents itself a s the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting to precise controls and comprehensive regulations . Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be de fended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone**; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: **massacres have become vital** . **It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed**. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates the􀓻 are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. **The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence**. The principle underlying the tactics of battle-that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living-has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. **If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.**

#### Extinction

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The space in which we live, which draws us out of ourselves, in which the erosion of our lives, our time and our history occurs, the space that claws and knaws at us, is also, in itself, a heterogeneous space. In other words, we do not live in a kind of void, inside of which we could place individuals and things. We do not live inside a void that could be colored with diverse shades of light, we live inside a set of relations that delineates sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable on one another. Of course one might attempt to describe these different sites by looking for the set of relations by which a given site can be defined. For example, describing the set of relations that define the sites of transportation, streets, trains (a train is an extraordinary bundle of rela-tions because it is something through which one goes, it is also something by means of which one can go from one point to another, and then it is also something that goes by). One could describe, via the cluster of relations that allows them to be defined, the sites of tem- porary relaxation - cafes, cinemas, beaches. Likewise one could describe, via its network of relations, the closed or semi-closed sites of rest- the house, the bedroom, the bed, etcetera. But among all these sites, I am interested in certain ones that have the curious property of being in relation with all the other sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect. These spaces, as it were, which are linked with all the others, which however contradict all the other sites, are of two main types. First there are the utopias. Utopias are sites with no real place. They are sites that have a general relation of direct or inverted analogy with the real space of Society. They present society itself in a perfected form, or else society turned upside down, but in any case these utopias are fundamentally unreal spaces. There are also, probably in every culture, in every civilization, real places- places that do exist and that are formed in the very founding of society-which are something like counter-sites, a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously represented, contested, and in- verted. Places of this kind are outside of all places, even though it may be possible to indicate their location in reality. Because these places are absolutely different from all the sites that they reflect and speak about, I shall call them, by way of contrast to utopias, heterotopias. I believe that between utopias and these quite other sites, these heterotopias, there might be a sort of mixed, joint experience, which would be the mirror. The mirror is, after all, a utopia, since it is a placeless place. In the mirror, I see myself there where I am not, in an unreal, vir- tual space that opens up behind the surface; I am over there, there where I am not, a sort of shadow that gives my own visibility to myself, that enables me to see myself there where I am absent: such is the utopia of the mirror. But it is also a heterotopia in so far as the mirror does exist in reality, where it exerts a sort of counteraction on the position that I occupy. From the standpoint of the mirror I discover my absence from the place where I am since I see myself over there. Startingfrom this gaze that is, as it were, directed toward me, from the ground of this virtual space that is on the other side of the glass, I come back toward myself; I begin again to direct my eyes toward myself and to reconstitute myself there where I am. The mirror functions as a heterotopia in this respect: it makes this place that I occupy at the moment when I look at myself in the glass at once absolutely real, connected with all the space that surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point which is over there. As for the heterotopias as such, how can they be described, what meaning do they have? We might imagine a sort of systematic description- I do not say a science because the term is too galvanized now-that would, in a given society, take as its object the study, analysis, description, and "reading" (as some like to say nowadays) of these different spaces, of these other places. As a sort of simultaneously mythic and real contestation of the space in which we live, this description could be called heterotopology. Its first principle is that there is probably not a single culture in the world that fails to constitute heterotopias. That is a con- stant of every human group. But the heterotopias obviously take quite varied forms, and perhaps no one absolutely universal form of heterotopia would be found. We can however classify them in two main categories. In the so-called primitive societies, there is a certain form of heterotopia that I would call crisis heterotopias, i.e., there are privileged or sacred or forbidden places, reserved for individuals who are, in relation to society and to the human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis: adolescents, menstruating women, pregnant women, the elderly, etc. In our society, these crisis heterotopias are persistently disappearing, though a few remnants can still be found. For example, the boarding school, in its nineteenth-century form, or military service for young men, have certainly played such a role, as the first manifestations of sexual virility were in fact supposed to take place "elsewhere" than at home. For girls, there was, until the middle of the twentieth century, a tradition called the "honeymoon trip" which was an ancestral theme. The young woman's deflowering could take place "nowhere” and, at the moment of its occurrence the train or honeymoon hotel was indeed the place of this nowhere, this heterotopia without geographical markers. But these heterotopias of crisis are disappearing today and are being replaced, I believe, by what we might call heterotopias of deviation: those in which individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed. Cases of this are rest homes and psychiatric hospitals, and of course prisons; and one should perhaps add retirement homes that are, as it were, on the borderline between the heterotopia of crisis and the heterotopia of deviation since, after all, old age is a crisis, but is also a deviation since, in our society where leisure is the rule, idleness is a sort of deviation.

#### This is a gateway issue that comes before weighing the aff: we have indicted the affirmative at the level of its knowledge production. The judge should prioritize in-round impacts: practices taken for granted here can serve the real interests of repression and subjugation, the issues raised in this critique should be considered with more political expediency than those raised by the affirmative

May 11(Todd, Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Clemson, “A New Neo-Pragmatism: From James and Dewey to Foucault,” 2011, Foucault Studies, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/view/3205/3399, Pg. 60-62, JS)

I believe we can answer this question in the affirmative. The claim is not that all prac-tices have the same level of depth or influence when it comes to relations of power and know-ledge. If that were the case, then it would have been just as expedient for Foucault to study baseball as psychotherapeutic practice. Rather, the idea is that, to one extent or another, power and knowledge, and particularly their relationship, arises within practices. So in the case of baseball one might find it operating, at least at the margins—indeed it is not difficult to imagine such a case. Think, for instance, of a baseball player who is about to give a public speech being told that he is ‚on deck.‛ The implication here is that the person is about to en-gage in a competitive activity whose goal is to win something, whether that be audience’s respect, other speaking engagements, or something else. Inasmuch as this person understands himself through the game of baseball, transferring the image of being on deck to other activities promotes a competitive self-understanding, which generates beliefs and actions en-gaged with the world in a competitive mode. It might be pointed out here that not only baseball players, but other people as well are subject to the locution of being on deck. This is true. It is also true that people who are not in psychotherapy are subject to influences from that practice. Practices do not exist in isolation. They are intertwined and pervade our culture and society in different ways and to different extents. Moreover, an individual’s immersion in different practices can cause cross-fertiliza-tion of the power/knowledge effects of those practices within his or her beliefs, actions, and engagements. What Foucault offers in focusing on the level of practices as his unit of histo-rical and genealogical inquiry is not a specialized or narrow analytic, but instead a way of understanding ourselves and how we got to be who we are through the most common and pervasive ways in which we engage with the world. The addition I have made to Foucault’s own claim about practices is that it is in the practices that the power/knowledge relationships May: A New Neo-Pragmatism 61 are to be found. Even this is not an addition so much as a clarification that allows us to see more straightforwardly the relationship between his work and pragmatism. Having made this clarification, though, we must ask about that relationship. What is the implication of all this for pragmatism? It lies in introducing a complexity that appears to have escaped James and, to a lesser extent, Dewey, for whom the success of a practice lay in its ability to help us navigate the world. If Foucault’s genealogical approach is helpful, the con-cept of success must itself be investigated rather than being a sort of ‚unexplained ex-plainer.‛17 Successful navigation of the world seems to be a matter of accomplishing one’s goals better or more efficiently or more meaningfully. This being said, we might ask, what are the self-understandings tied up with particular senses of success? If, for instance, we are pro-duced to one extent or another to be psychological beings with personalities of the type that psychotherapy promotes, then success will be defined in psychotherapeutic terms. This, in turn, has its own political effects, effects Foucault has traced in Discipline and Punish and the first volume of the History of Sexuality. These effects are not always ones we would, on reflec-tion, seek to ratify. Some of them, for example the making-docile of human bodies, are, in Foucault’s term, intolerable. We cannot, then, take the notion of success or the idea of navi-gating the world more successfully at face value. We must see it as the name of a problem to be investigated rather than a solution to be attained. This, it seems to me, is a point that would deepen pragmatism without violating any of its central commitments. It would, instead, offer a historical dimension to pragmatist thought. Success in navigating the world is not a given. Rather, one is successful within parti-cular parameters, and those parameters have political inflections. It is not only that the para-meters provide territorial borders within which one can have more or less success in one’s navigation. The problem is deeper: what counts as success as well as what is encouraged or discouraged (or even prohibited) in the name of that success are political matters. They are matters of whom we have been shaped to be and what our understanding and self-under-standing consists in. We might, from another angle, locate the difference between Foucault and the prag-matists and neo-pragmatists this way. For the latter, pragmatism is a matter of what is prac-tical; while for Foucault, pragmatism is a matter of taking our practices as the unit of analysis. What gives Foucault’s work its force, and what makes it relevant for pragmatism, is that it is through our practices what is considered practical arises for us. We cannot take the practical, or successful within it, as a given. That is the lesson of his genealogies. Foucault’s work does not, of course, replace classical pragmatism or neo-pragmatism. Pragmatism’s emphasis on the bond between belief and action and between them and the world remain relevant for us. Even its notion of successful navigation of the world, suitably complicated by political analysis, has much to say. If what I have argued here is right, rather than seeing Foucault’s work as a replacement of pragmatism, we ought to see it in a line that extends from James and Dewey through Rorty to Foucault (even if the chronology of the latter two must at moments be reversed). Pragmatism has offered us a powerful philosophical per-spective on the intertwining of our selves and our world, no doubt as powerful as the best of 17 I am grateful to Colin Koopman for suggesting this helpful term. Foucault Studies, No. 11, pp. 54-62. 62 the phenomenological tradition. Seeing Foucault’s work engaged with that tradition does not permit us to surpass it, but instead to add a dimension to its already rich tradition.

#### We do not attempt to “solve” biopower with a sweeping alternative, we simply provide a reason to reject the aff, our criticism of the aff is important as a practice in and of itself, this space ought not be subject to the assumptions of the aff, the role of the intellectual is to problematize unquestioned regimes of truth

Hamann 9 (Trent H., St. John’s U, Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and Ethics, Foucault Studies No6 Feb 2009) LA

Foucault explicitly identified critique, not as a transcendental form of judgment that would subsume particulars under a general rule, but as a specifically modern ”atti- tude” that can be traced historically as the constant companion of pastoral power and governmentality. As Judith Butler points out in her article “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue”,39 critique is an attitude, distinct from judgment, pre- cisely because it expresses a skeptical or questioning approach to the rules and ra- tionalities that serve as the basis for judgment within a particular form of gover- nance. From its earliest formations, Foucault tells us, the art of government has al- ways relied upon certain relations to truth: truth as dogma, truth as an individualiz- ing knowledge of individuals, and truth as a reflective technique comprising general rules, particular knowledge, precepts, methods of examination, confessions, inter- views, etc. And while critique has at times played a role within the art of government itself, as we’ve seen in the case of both liberalism and neoliberalism, it has also made possible what Foucault calls “the art of not being governed, or better, the art of not being governed like that and at that cost” (WC, 45). Critique is neither a form of ab- stract theoretical judgment nor a matter of outright rejection or condemnation of specific forms of governance. Rather it is a practical and agonistic engagement, re- engagement, or disengagement with the rationalities and practices that have led one to become a certain kind of subject. In his essay “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault suggests that this modern attitude is a voluntary choice made by certain people, a way of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of be- longing and presents itself as a task.40 Its task amounts to a “historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, [and] saying” (WE, 125). But how can we distinguish the kinds of resistance Foucault was interested in from the endless calls to ”do your own thing” or ”be all you can be” that stream forth in every direction from political campaigns to commercial advertising? How is it, to return to the last of the three concerns raised above, that Foucault does not simply lend technical sup- port to neoliberal forms of subjectivation? On the one hand, we can distinguish criti- cal acts of resistance and ethical self-fashioning from what Foucault called ”the Cali- fornian cult of the self” (OGE, 245), that is, the fascination with techniques designed to assist in discovering one’s ”true” or ”authentic” self, or the merely ”cosmetic” forms of rebellion served up for daily consumption and enjoyment. On the other hand we might also be careful not to dismiss forms of self-fashioning as ”merely” aesthetic. As Timothy O’Leary points out in his book Foucault and the Art of Ethics, Foucault’s notion of an aesthetics of existence countered the modern conception of art as a singular realm that is necessarily autonomous from the social, political, and ethical realms, at least as it pertained to his question of why it is that a lamp or a house can be a work of art, but not a life. O’Leary writes: Foucault is less interested in the critical power of art, than in the ‘artistic’ or ‘plas- tic’ power of critique. For Foucault, not only do no special advantages accrue from the autonomy of the aesthetic, but this autonomy unnecessarily restricts our possibilities for self-constitution. Hence, not only is Foucault aware of the specif- ic nature of aesthetics after Kant, he is obviously hostile to it.41

# Links

## Topic Links

### Transportation Top-Level

#### Transportation systems are intimately connected to the production of specific forms of life.

Jasanoff 6’ (Sheila Jasanoff, *Osiris* , Vol. 21, No. 1, Global Power Knowledge: Science and [Technology](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/507145) in International Affairs (2006), pp. 273-292)

GM crops are developed in the laboratory, usually in science‐rich Western nations, tested in the field, and transported thence for commercial propagation in both naturally and socially variable environments. Monsanto, in this respect, is like the Kew Gardens of the nineteenth century: a metropolitan “center of calculation”64 from which standardized products flow out to take root in the world’s economic and political peripheries. Key to sustaining this mode of production is the assumption that socioecologies are as standard as the crops grown within them—put differently, that social and ecological circumstances at the periphery are not so radically different from those at the metropolitan center as to defeat the project of global technology transfer. Yet accidents occurring even within the boundaries of single nation‐states show that transfers from the laboratory to the field can bring unpleasant surprises. For example, in one costly U.S. episode, ProdiGene, a GM corn variety containing an insulin precursor, trypsin,65 was planted in an unmarked field in rural Iowa. The manufacturer agreed with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, which approved the field trials, that the field would be quarantined the following year so as to remove any volunteer plants.66 In fact, the fields were not properly isolated and an undetermined quantity of the GM crop was harvested along with about 500,000 bushels of soybeans during the following season. Similar failures resulting from unforeseen couplings of technology, environment, and human behavior are all the more probable when transfers occur across disparate cultures of farming and of hazard control. Expanding on this point, **it has become clear that complex technological systems are forms of life, uniting human and nonhuman components in a common purposive framework, as much as they are targeted attempts to improve upon aspects of human life by physical or biological means**. Thus, transportation systems do not only move people about from place to place. They remake social structures and self‐understandings. **A** **car culture, for example, gives rise to different visions, and valuations, of time, distance, autonomy, community, environmental quality, and the cost of life than a culture dependent chiefly on bicycles or public transportation does.** Similarly, industrial agriculture is organized and managed on different principles from small family farms; **the two systems of production rest on different economic, social, and technological infrastructures, and their impacts on human solidarity and on the environment are correspondingly divergent.** **Conventional risk assessment methods take little or no account of the social and ethical ramifications of technological systems, including the threats they pose to long‐settled patterns of living.**

#### Transit projects lie within the regime of the heterotopia by which social deviants are excluded from society

Foucault 86 (Michel, Legend and famous French philosopher, Of Other Spaces, Diacritics Vol.16, No.1, Spring 1986, Trans. Jay Miskowiec) LA

Bachelard's monumental work and the descriptions of phenomenologists have taught us that we do not live in a homogeneous and empty space, but on the contrary in a space thoroughly imbued with quantities and perhaps thoroughly fantasmatic as well. The space of our primary perception, the space of our dreams and that of our passions hold within themselves qualities that seem intrinsic: there is a light, ethereal, transparent space, or again a dark, rough, encumbered space; a space from above, of summits, or on the contrary a space from below, of mud; or again a space that can be flowing like sparkling water, or a space that is fixed, congealed, like stone or crystal. Yet these analyses, while fundamental for reflection in our time, primarily concern internal space. I should like to speak now of exter- nal space. The space in which we live, which draws us out of ourselves, in which the erosion of our lives, our time and our history occurs, the space that claws and knaws at us, is also, in itself, a heterogeneous space. In other words, we do not live in a kind of void, inside of which we could place individuals and things. We do not live inside a void that could be colored with diverse shades of light, we live inside a set of relations that delineates sites which are irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable on one another. Of course one might attempt to describe these different sites by looking for the set of relations by which a given site can be defined. For example, describing the set of relations that define the sites of transportation, streets, trains (a train is an extraordinary bundle of rela-tions because it is something through which one goes, it is also something by means of which one can go from one point to another, and then it is also something that goes by). One could describe, via the cluster of relations that allows them to be defined, the sites of tem- porary relaxation - cafes, cinemas, beaches. Likewise one could describe, via its network of relations, the closed or semi-closed sites of rest- the house, the bedroom, the bed, etcetera. But among all these sites, I am interested in certain ones that have the curious property of being in relation with all the other sites, but in such a way as to suspect, neutralize, or invert the set of relations that they happen to designate, mirror, or reflect. These spaces, as it were, which are linked with all the others, which however contradict all the other sites, are of two main types. First there are the utopias. Utopias are sites with no real place. They are sites that have a general relation of direct or inverted analogy with the real space of Society. 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The mirror is, after all, a utopia, since it is a placeless place. In the mirror, I see myself there where I am not, in an unreal, vir- tual space that opens up behind the surface; I am over there, there where I am not, a sort of shadow that gives my own visibility to myself, that enables me to see myself there where I am absent: such is the utopia of the mirror. But it is also a heterotopia in so far as the mirror does exist in reality, where it exerts a sort of counteraction on the position that I occupy. From the standpoint of the mirror I discover my absence from the place where I am since I see myself over there. Startingfrom this gaze that is, as it were, directed toward me, from the ground of this virtual space that is on the other side of the glass, I come back toward myself; I begin again to direct my eyes toward myself and to reconstitute myself there where I am. 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For girls, there was, until the middle of the twentieth century, a tradition called the "honeymoon trip" which was an ancestral theme. The young woman's deflowering could take place "nowhere” and, at the moment of its occurrence the train or honeymoon hotel was indeed the place of this nowhere, this heterotopia without geographical markers. But these heterotopias of crisis are disappearing today and are being replaced, I believe, by what we might call heterotopias of deviation: those in which individuals whose behavior is deviant in relation to the required mean or norm are placed. Cases of this are rest homes and psychiatric hospitals, and of course prisons; and one should perhaps add retirement homes that are, as it were, on the borderline between the heterotopia of crisis and the heterotopia of deviation since, after all, old age is a crisis, but is also a deviation since, in our society where leisure is the rule, idleness is a sort of deviation.

#### Mobility is defined by power relations

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[Samantha Z. Herr, 2012, Lexington, Kentucky “BIOPOLITICS OF BIKE-COMMUTING: BIKE LANES, SAFETY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE,” uknowledge.uky.edu/geography\_etds/2/ pg. 6 accessed 7-7-12]

Transport cycling is embedded in ongoing social relations in the city established beyond the immediate purview of the bike. As mobilities and geography scholars suggest, the everyday ways in which we travel the city are intricately woven into the fabric of historically constituted and re-constituted power dynamics in the city (Blomley 1994; Blomley 2007a: Blomley 2007b; Cresswell 2010; Henderson 2009; Jenson 2009; Mitchell 2005; Shaw and Hesse 2010). On a meta-mobilities level, “Mobility is a resource to which not everyone has an equal relationship” (Hannam et al. 2006:3). More circumstantially, for example, Henderson (2009) looks at how parking debates in San Fransisco are “not just about parking, [but]…about how the city should be configured and organized, and for whom” (2009:71).“Different forms of mobility, such as movement by car or movement by foot [or bike], need different built environments to be functional, and are only privileged when political power promotes one over the other” (Henderson 2009:71). In other words, “[m]obility…contains social relations” (Henderson 2009:74). Thus, it is important to ask: Who moves furthest? Who moves fastest? Who moves most often?... How is mobility discursively constituted? What narratives have been constructed about mobility? How are mobilities represented?...Finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, there is a politics of mobile practice. How is mobility embodied? How comfortable is it? Is it forced or free (Cressell 2010:21)?

### Transportation – Biopower Proper

#### Transit is distributed along the lines of a privileged center with access to far-ranging mobilities and a disorganized, marginalized periphery.

Read 9 (Stephen, Delft University, Another Form: From the ‘Informational’ to the ‘Infrastructural’ City, http://repository.tudelft.nl/view/ir/uuid%3A9124271d-6373-4541-a5cd-54ba3e3373f4/) LA

How do we characterise the form of the contempo- rary city? Towns and cities used to be delimited by walls and centred on cathedrals or citadels or plazas. They were a sort of meta-architecture, centring the power of a ruler or church, or sheltering a market or a public place with its politics of exchange, appear- ance or talk.1 They commanded a region of smaller towns or a rural extension that filled the space to the next town or city.2 The legibilities of citadels, spires and boundaries still inform more recent images of a world of compact cities with CBDs neatly bordered by belts of neighbourhoods interspersed with indus- try and surrounded by open space. In this image that still sits so powerfully in our expectations, urban systems consist of hierarchies of villages, towns and cities, each with dominion over successively larger territories. This comforting image is shattered today however as new movement and communications infrastructures cut through neatly spaced territo- ries, undermining hierarchical orders and bringing incompatible urban elements into incongruous rela- tions with one another. Today, communications and social and economic organisation shift into cyber- space in a logic of hypertext as people break free from the constraints of place, to work and make community in networks across regional and even global dimensions. The internal orderings of cities seem to have become irrelevant, and the city has responded apparently by scattering. The rural peace is shattered as urban people spread into the countryside, to be followed by the rest of the city including its most central components. A new amor- phous city of fragments has invaded everywhere, creating sprawls of low intensity urbanisation served by ribbons of traffic-clogged infrastructure. Without having explicitly intended to do so, we seem to have created a new regional urbanism without commu- nity, public space or centrality, without places in the way we are used to understanding them. This loss of place has been signalled for a long time: Melvin Webber proposed already in the 1960s that we were beginning to conduct our lives in ‘non-place urban realms’ engaging in ‘communities without propinquity’ over different ranges by means of new travel and communications opportunities.3 He proposed however that our loss of places was not simply a loss of order or a failure of planning, but something positively brought into being as we made new forms of communication, social organisation and exchange possible. Marc Auge pointed to the downside, and bemoaned the loss of an organic social life in a supermodernity that has separated itself from the rest of the world in a self-contained space of long-distance connectivity.4 These twin themes have remained with us: of on the one hand the integration of new placeless forms of society by technological means, and on the other of the conse- quent fragmentation of social worlds as previously organic societies are divided by being included in or excluded from the new mobile, globally integrated world. Much commentary today understands a new social order emerging in a more virtual, less real, space and sphere.5 This space is high-tech, with high-tech networks and media and mobile personal devices facilitating new virtual forms of social and economic life free from the gross reality of life at street level. This new space allows some to inhabit not so much a global village as ‘a global network of individual cottages’.6 It understands a world divided between an ‘organised core of professionals and managers and a disorganised periphery’ occupy- ing respectively ‘the nodal segments of the space of globally interconnected flows and the fragmented and powerless locales of social communities’.7

#### Transportation infrastructure exerts normalizing forces on populations which influence our sense of self-understanding as well as our material possibilities for acting.

Read 9 (Stephen, Delft University, Another Form: From the ‘Informational’ to the ‘Infrastructural’ City, http://repository.tudelft.nl/view/ir/uuid%3A9124271d-6373-4541-a5cd-54ba3e3373f4/) LA

When new city areas were designed, the circula- tion pattern and public access to the centre were designed along with them. The public transpor- tation system became an essential strategy for realising the municipal vision of a modern city.45 An urban territorial unit became established as the city was concretely realised and ‘clearly identi- fied in different spheres of social action and social consciousness’.46 The result could be seen as a material institutionalisation of a commonly known functional and perceptual structure within which people would communicate, interact and coordinate their activities. It is not simply the plan of the city that was realised around public transportation; all the components of the modern city were realised at the same time. This distributed complex of components were ordered in relation to one another in an ongoing work of organ- isation and maintenance, and maintained in their order for the sense they made by being in place. The agency of this maintenance was not so much an organic society as a civic tidiness. This meant municipal minders: politicians and planners, but also gangs of street sweepers and rubbish remov- ers. It had as much to do however with the fact that shops and houses and the other physical compo- nents of the modern city need to appear where we expect them, that we walk and cycle and take the tram, for the most part, in appropriate places, and that street signs and tram-stops and traffic-lights are where they are supposed to be. We establish in the infrastructure, a material semiotics of things in place which we maintain and do things in, as if these ways of doing things were perfectly normal - which of course they are. The construction of a place is in a very funda- mental way about the realisation and objectification of the thing and its components. It is also about the synthesis of a network of situations which are commensurable and connect with each other. In the simple case I am highlighting it means that a trans- port means and its associated schedules, routes, stops, and relations with local facilities, enable one to act in the network. There is a technological rationality about this that is inescapable. But this rationality is not universal: it is of the particular tech- nical network, its objects and practices, and it ends where they end. The question of how power is distributed in a city built around a technical armature designed for public access is interesting and more complex than it would appear at first sight. Firstly the normality built into the infrastructure is not innocent and the public regulation of behaviour at Foucault’s bio- power level would require an analysis in its own terms. But, as interesting in the context of city building and design is the way orientations appear in the fabric. These appear in gradients in intensi- ties of activity and types of activity that reflect our commonsense understandings of centrality and are tied to the logic of the technological paradigm. But they are also reflected in the distributions of ethnic minorities, property values, or a general sense of place-value. Some of this looks historical (the direc- tion to the centre is the reverse of the direction of spread of the fabric), but a closer look at the activity patterns suggests also that value and centrality is formed in the overlap and articulation of one infra- structure with other infrastructures. The harbour of pre-20th century Amsterdam was an interface and articulation between a global infrastructure of ports and another one of canals transporting and distrib- uting goods within the city. The same place in the mid-20th century is an interface and articulation between a late 20th-century regional infrastructure of exurban centres and suburbs built around road and rail systems, and an early 20th century urban infrastructure of residential neighbourhoods and public transportation. The regional infrastructure supports a network of business, industry, commerce, residential areas and the practices of goods transport, commuting, shopping and leisure that go with them. All this overlaps in the historic centre with a transform- ing modern urban infrastructure. Today the largest infrastructure project in Amsterdam, the Noord-Zuid metro line is intended to strategically accelerate the transformation of the modern city of Amsterdam to a post-modern, post-industrial, urban node integrated into a metropolitan region. It draws the interface between modern and post-modern infrastructures through the modern fabric, opening new areas in the city itself for metropolitan scaled functions. It also creates new gradients and power differentials in the fabric which may condemn marginal areas to an even deeper marginality. The public opposition to this plan by many of the city’s residents reflects the way it is seen to undermine, and even disman- tle, an earlier realised ideal. [fig.1]

#### Discussions of contemporary transportation infrastructure investment occur against the backdrop of the global networking of urban centers and the deepening marginalization of the periphery of the City.

Read 9 (Stephen, Delft University, Another Form: From the ‘Informational’ to the ‘Infrastructural’ City, http://repository.tudelft.nl/view/ir/uuid%3A9124271d-6373-4541-a5cd-54ba3e3373f4/) LA

At the beginning of the 21st century it is no longer the tram system or a municipal city which is dominating discussion about the form of Amsterdam, but the motor car, European rail links, the airport, tourism, and regional polycentricity. Regimes of movement and place-identity today, for a large proportion of the urban population, are tied not to inner-city neigh- bourhoods and places but to networks of places beyond the bounds of the modern city. For some this means that the order cities once had is lost and that the city is exploding formlessly into the periph- ery. Here, in a sprawl of disparate and unrelated elements, we are condemned to live in a ‘state of suspension’47 between a disconnected local and the fluidity of networks. The view I am sketching here allows us to see the order in all this: regional and national rail and road systems are the thin technical networks towards which thick infrastructures of regional objects, subjects and practices are oriented. For Reyner Banham, writing more than 30 years ago of Los Angeles, ‘[t]he freeway system in its totality is now a single comprehensible place, a coherent state of mind, a complete way of life’.48 Business, commerce and industry exist today in production, supply, and customer networks as part of this infrastructure, and urban people and functions have relocated here. While the process of the making of the metro- politan city has not been as politically explicit or publicly visible a matter as was the making of the modern city, we nevertheless see a specific tech- nological rationality in it as transportation planning and highway engineering have worked to systema- tise it and give it form. Luki Budiarto is tracing the evolution of the highway network since 1955 and showing how it has been designed for performance around new standards of traffic speed and capacity. He has shown how a regional space and scale has been constructed in that time, establishing a space distinct from that of the modern city.49 But the objects and practices that gather to this new infrastructure don’t exist on their own. Many of the metropolitan places metropolitan people travel to are strongly articulated with other already established infrastructures, and the metropolitan infrastructure, as it has grown, has always been backwardly compatible with historical infrastruc- tures. I have already mentioned the backward compatibility of new practices with older ones, but there are important spatial senses in which backward compatibility works as infrastructures articulate with other infrastructures. Infrastructures are articulated with one another so that, for example, the centre of a modern city may be at the same time a centre in a network of regional centres, and this overlap may be generative and place forming. Backward compatibility means also that as the process extends, we will tend only to see places already made and already named. In the network topology I am describing, we no longer do things on a Cartesian surface but in networks of places from inside of which all we can see and all we have to work with are the places in the network. The impera- tive of backward compatibility works also at a level of connection with invisible networks like water, energy and waste removal, not to mention access roads and sites for building. So the growth of a new infrastructure like that of the metropolitan city is always and necessarily constrained by backward compatibilities with what was built before. Medieval, mercantile, industrial and municipal networks all contribute to the way van der Woud’s ‘empty land’ has been transformed in a process that combines new, usually bigger infrastructures with already real places that articu- late and direct not only real developments but also our virtual knowledge of them. The place of Amster- dam’s centre is not bounded therefore, but sits as a hinge at the articulation of infrastructures separated by an order of scale - as city infrastructures meet regional ones. I don’t propose a finished picture here of the metropolitan city, rather a sketch of a framework for understanding it as fundamentally relational and historical - and above all ordered. Using a frame- work that supports neither the centre-periphery form nor the bifurcation of urban space into physi- cal and technological components, it becomes possible to propose a different way of looking at the development of the periphery. The idea of sprawl and of a disordered fragmented periphery follows from the idea that interurban development can be conceived as a disaggregation of the material of the city outwards from the centre and into a theo- retically limitless extension. The ‘dust cloud’50 of peripheral growth into the ‘horizontal city’,51 and the terrains vagues52 that are their result, are ideas which represent this way of thinking in an at least residual form. Richard Ingersoll refers to Bergson however to warn us that disorder may be just an order we don’t yet recognise.53 In a view which sees metropolitan growth and form as part of the devel- opment of new infrastructures, stabilising new sets of objects, subjects and practices as wholes, sprawl becomes an ordered phenomenon oriented to a particular network. This view becomes even more plausible today as we look at the extraordinary developments along the freeway network over the last years in the Netherlands. Driving on the intercity freeway today becomes ever less an intercity experience and ever more an urban one. This may be not a result of bad policies or planning, but rather an inexorable product of contemporary technologies and ways of living.54 [fig. 2]

### Transportation – Subjectivization

#### Biopower subjectivizes modern mobile subjects--the “passenger” becomes just a “prisoner of the passage” through modern transportation

Adey et. al. 12 ["Profiling the passenger: mobilities, identities, embodiments."  Cultural Geographies 19.2 (2012); pp. 169-193. Accessed: 7/6/12] JDO

Passenger (noun and verb). Passage (verb and noun). Pass (verb and noun). Passenger, like the related words pass and passage, is of middle English origin, derived from the Old French word passager, and the verb pass can ultimately be traced through Old French to the Latin word passus.30 In the 15th and 16th centuries a passenger could be a person or thing that enabled passage – for example, a ford-keeper, a ferry-man, or a ferry itself – as well as a traveller ‘who passes by or through a place’.31 In its predominant, contemporary usage passenger refers to ‘a person in or on a conveyance other than its driver, pilot or crew’, and as the New English Dictionary stated in 1904, before the widespread use of the private motor car, passengering was generally associated with ‘public conveyance[s] entered by fare or contract’.32 As new transport technologies have emerged and been improved over successive centuries, so the experiences of the passenger have frequently become associated with increasing levels of comfort and speed, as well as changing relations and engagements between the passenger and the passage or paysage (landscape). The railway brought a speed, smoothness and regular rhythm (a pre-continuous-rail clickety-clack) to Britain, which, despite improvements in turnpikes and coaching technologies, was unknown to earlier travellers, and German critic Wolfgang Schivelbusch described how this led to the emergence of a new, relatively detached, fleeting mode of perception or way of seeing that was ‘panoramic’, as the landscape appeared to lose its depth and become fractured into ‘evanescent’ glimpsed scenes.33 John Ruskin famously complained that ‘all travelling becomes dull in exact proportion to its rapidity’, as the railway passenger’s sensibility is shattered, they detach themselves from the landscape, and are transformed from a ‘traveller into a living parcel’.34 Ruskin’s parcellized, transported passenger becomes a ‘prisoner of the passage’, unable to appreciate the evanescent landscape, and forced to turn his or her attention to a book, newspaper or the companionship of fellow passengers. Artists, satirists and social commentators made much of these new socialities of passengering and the geographies of the railway compartment,35 but it was not long before commentators began to actively engage with the new visualities and sensibilities afforded by train travel, and subsequently the very different visualities and embodied engagements associated with car travel, photography, the cinema, air travel, and the virtual mobilities afforded by digital media and internet use.36 The alienated, isolated, disempowered and detached passenger has been caricatured as the archetypal modern monadic ‘subject’ in the contemporary and future western world. In the writings of Paul Virilio, the modern passenger-traveller is ever-increasingly experiencing the passage through the medium of the ‘screen’, sealed off from physical landscapes and enfolded into their vehicle.37 Likewise, for Marc Augé, the increasing mobility of supermodernity and the resulting proliferation of ubiquitous non-places such as motorways and airports has led to the triumph of ‘the eternal passenger, always viewing locales as one passing through them’, exposed to ‘the alienating, individualizing, contractual’ nature of these spaces.38 In one sense, ‘we’ may understand what thinkers such as Augé, Virilio and Baudrillard are getting at, but such caricatures easily overlook the situated embodied practices of passengering and driving in particular vehicles through particular landscapes.39 Take, for example, people’s experiences of driving and passengering in motor cars. For more than 100 years, commentators have remarked on the similarities between the visualities of motor travel and the visualities afforded by the cinema screen,40 with an array of scholars and writers, for example, describing how ‘the sights, sounds, tastes, temperatures and smells of the city and countryside are reduced to the two-dimensional view through the car windscreen’.41 And yet, many specific accounts of driving, whether in the 1890s or 1990s, stress the multi-sensory and kinaesthetic, as well as visual, dimensions of driving and passengering. For many motorists – from pioneering automobilists in open-topped vehicles with non-standardized controls in the late 1890s, to contemporary off-road drivers and motorists in countries with relatively few paved roads – motoring was and is a bumpy, draughty and noisy experience. What’s more, the visual practices associated with motoring are highly specific, requiring extensive periods of engagement and observation, yet also effecting a ‘distracted attention’, or a semi-automatized ‘ontology of everyday distraction’, characterized by ‘a partial loss of touch with the here-and-now’.42 As the design and architecture critic Reyner Banham remarked of car travel in 1972: The observer plunges continuously ahead into a perspective that is potentially dangerous and demands his active attention (nor is the passenger passive: watch his feet and hands, listen to his comments and warnings).43

#### Mobility has become naturalized and effectively dominates our understanding of the autmobility structures and the choices available to us.

[Goodwin](http://muse.jhu.edu/results?section1=author&search1=Katherine%20J.%20Goodwin) 10 (Katherine J, doctoral student at American University's School of International Service in Washington DC “ Reconstructing Automobility: The Making and Breaking of Modern Transportation [Global Environmental Politics](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics) [Volume 10”, Number 4, November 2010](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/global_environmental_politics/toc/gep.10.4.html) pp. 60-78 | <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/gep/summary/v010/10.4.goodwin.html>

To a great extent, the commonly understood link between mobility and 70 • Reconstructing Automobility: The Making and Breaking of Modern Transportation 49. Vanderbilt 2008, 193–197. 50. Vanderbilt 2008, 199. human ºourishing is due to mobility being interpreted as freedom. Although mobility as freedom may seem feasible at a superªcial level, this association begins to break down if, following Thomas Princen, we approach mobility as a myth. Princen sees mobility as a myth “not in the sense of being ªctional or wrong, but in the sense of being central to a belief system, one that sees human well-being in terms of ever-increasing movement and personal choice.”51 Drawing on Roland Barthes’ foundational work *Mythologies,* one can view the mobility-as-freedom myth as a kind of cultural and cognitive sleight of hand. For Barthes, a myth is “constituted by the loss of the historical quality of things: in it, things lose the memory that they once were made.”52 In the same way that one cannot simultaneously look *at* and *through* a window pane, one can only see mobility as freedom if one loses focus on its historical production. In other words, one can only conceive of mobility as freedom by “losing the memory” that mobility must be *made.* Paterson rightly argues that “the condition of possibility of ‘autonomous mobility’ through the car is in fact extensive state planning”53—and he could easily have added the successful functioning and corresponding power of the auto and energy industries. Roads, fuel, functioning vehicles—these are prerequisites of automotive freedom. Yet in no sense is the material reality of roads, fuel, and vehicles free—it is neither *gratis* (without cost) nor *libre* (autonomous). There are material, ªnancial, ecological, and opportunity costs involved, though these may not be reºected in the price of everyday driving. Moreover, any kind of mobility beyond using one’s own two feet engenders dependence upon systems of production, distribution, regulation and research. The use of even a simple mode of transportation such as a bicycle implies being in a relationship of at least interdependence with (if not outright dependence on) the slew of engineers, investors, manufacturers, and distributors who make that mode of transportation available. The conditions of possibility of mobility have little to do with autonomy. On a more abstract level, conceiving of mobility as freedom posits a relationship between freedom and space. This seems to make sense at ªrst glance: the farther one can go, the more freedom one enjoys. Yet upon further consideration, this association becomes problematic. Is there a correlation between distance traveled and freedom enjoyed? Am I somehow freer when I ºy to Australia than when I take the train to Boston? It is as if one posited a relationship between the freedom of speech and the number of words one uses. Do I more fully enjoy my freedom to speak when I write a two-volume tome than when I hold up a sign in the street? The thought seems faintly ridiculous. One can certainly make a case for mobility as a negative right, positing that no state can legitimately limit the movements of individuals (with certain exceptions, such as convicted criminals). This is “freedom of movement” as articulated in Article 13 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights: “Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.” Freedom of movement, in this sense, is very likely essential to human ºourishing. Yet there is a difference between freedom *of* movement and freedom *as* movement. With freedom *of* movement, one is free to move or not. With freedom *as* movement, one is only free while in motion. It is the latter which may be cause for concern. Viewing freedom as movement prompts one to treat mobility as a positive right. In this view, if states are obligated to recognize the rights of its citizens, then states are obligated to provide citizens with the means to move.54 If one can only be free when one can move as far and as frequently as one wishes, then the state must ensure its citizens’ freedoms by funding roads and airports, ensuring as much mobility as possible. This becomes somewhat paradoxical for the citizen: one’s freedom is brought into being by the state through material processes which are neither *gratis* nor *libre.* Contradictions of freedom and mobility aside, there is a second important point to make regarding the link between mobility and human ºourishing. While humans have always been mobile creatures, the contemporary assumption that extensive movement is a necessary part of social well-being has fairly recent origins. The convergence in the nineteenth century of modern capitalist industry, the development of the railroad and telegraph, and the institutionalization of time by factories and states signiªcantly changed the sense of space and time in which people lived.55 Two signiªcant transformations concern us here. The first is the emergence of the daily commute between home and work or school, whereby routinized intraurban movement became habitual

### Infrastructure Top-Level

#### Infrastructure is a vital part of biopower: it influences the relations between subjects and defines the possibilities for their powers of self-expression

Read 9 (Stephen, Delft University, Another Form: From the ‘Informational’ to the ‘Infrastructural’ City, http://repository.tudelft.nl/view/ir/uuid%3A9124271d-6373-4541-a5cd-54ba3e3373f4/) LA

Infrastructures, as I will use the word here, are tech- nical networks arranging and especially distributing things and practices that have and draw their signifi- cance in relation to one another. But infrastructures are more than handy resources held in convenient relations with other things, because the things they contain are not predefined but become defined and come to make the sense they do in relation to whole arrangements of subjects, objects and practices that work together to construct larger entities - like the neighbourhood or the modern city or the metropoli- tan city or the globe for that matter. Infrastructures are also arrangements constructed and realised in specific historical times and conditions and to the social-organisational and technological state of the art of their times and places. They establish practi- cal and of-their-times ways of knowing and doing things between and in the presence of other things. In this way I want to foreground the role of techno- logical materiality in the production of urban things while conceiving subjectivity as a form of practical engagement with that materiality. I will look at the way infrastructures of contex- tual entities and practices are established and will cover a few examples, starting with a new virtual global informational network and practice, and then moving on to the less topical but just as significant real historical example of the modern city. The metropolitan post-modern city will be by then rather simple to describe. I will suggest that in a relational perspective all our infrastructures, and the subjects, objects and practices that attach to them, are both real in that they do something and virtual in that they are synthetic and potential, requiring active engagement before they manifest themselves. I am interested here in exploring how this point of view might change the way we look at and think about the urban periphery and the contemporary diffuse city. While a different way of seeing things may not solve problems we see emerging with new urban forms, a conceptualisation that finds order in the phenomenon we are looking at may offer at least some clarity about what it is we are dealing with. By in a sense virtualising urban materiality I will suggest that we may be able to reunify an urban space bifurcated between the virtual and the real and make places and flows commensurable. I will also suggest that in making real and virtual (low and high-tech) networks commensurable we can start to move beyond categorical dualisms like real and virtual or mind and material and as designers and planners begin dealing with the city directly in terms of the material technological paradigms of infra- structures. We live not in a bifurcated space but in a ‘dappled world’14 of our own making and replete with boundaries and cross-paradigm articulations. In the view I will outline our post-modern city is in principle no more or less ordered and coherent than any of the others, but what I will suggest is that in order to tackle problems of change and transition we need conceptualisations which enable us to see the boundaries and articulations clearly.

### Infrastructure – Biopower Proper

#### Infrastructure normalizes populations by regulating and defining individuals’ powers relative to their means of living.

Read 9 (Stephen, Delft University, Another Form: From the ‘Informational’ to the ‘Infrastructural’ City, http://repository.tudelft.nl/view/ir/uuid%3A9124271d-6373-4541-a5cd-54ba3e3373f4/) LA

Modern Amsterdam After 1850 a creeping technology-driven revolution took place in the Netherlands as land and water conditions were brought under increasingly central- ised and bureaucratised control. Improvements in drainage and movement infrastructures saw large areas of an ‘empty land’39 become inhabited. The infrastructures laid down then were to determine the shape of the contemporary landscape.40 But in and between cities over continental and global ranges, infrastructures had been implicated in this determination for much longer. Pre-20th century Amsterdam was dominated by its harbour and inter- nally structured around goods movement through a ring of canals oriented on the harbour.41 These canals centred an infrastructure with its associated knowledges, practices and objects, a material urban culture of merchant’s houses, warehouses, quays, porters and barges, as well as other facilities and activities like markets and industry that depended on and oriented themselves towards the canals. But the harbour was not just a part of Amsterdam, it was also part of an infrastructure of trade and colonial exploitation that connected to other ports in Europe and the East and West Indies. It was through the harbour that significant contact with the outside world was made. The harbour was also where most of the activity was - at the interface and articulation between the intra-city infrastructure of canals and water transport and an inter-city system of trade and exploitation. In the second half of the 19th century a belated industrialisation brought renewed economic vigour and Amsterdam began to expand. New industrial, harbour and housing areas began being built beyond the walls that had contained the city since the 17th century. The city changed suddenly from being a declin- ing trading port into a small but dense and growing industrial city. A city within walls and oriented on its harbour began reorienting as it expanded on the land side. A number of significant street grid adjustments were made as the street pattern was adapted to new patterns of use and movement.42 The wall itself was demolished to build new housing and factories as well as take traffic around the edge of the centre. Around the turn of the century the municipality began taking more control of develop- ments. This time also coincided with the municipal take-over of the tram, gas, water, electricity and telephone services and the beginnings of a different kind of modern social contract between citizen and government.43 The public take-over of the already rather well- developed tram system in 1900 put in place an important component of the project of city building of the post-first world war years. This project saw the completion of much of the Berlage Plan Zuid in time for the Olympics in 1928, and created a modern, social-democratic city in the place of the faded trading port Amsterdam had been just 60 years earlier. Infrastructure projects were concrete means to the realisation of the modern city: the logic of infrastructure was not just of accessibility but involved a project of the re-formation of the city. Van der Woud stresses a normality and ‘common interest’ as part of a structure of governance. This normality is instilled in people in modern technologi- cal and organisational conditions which along with their technological underpinnings become part of a collective field of perception, feeling and action.44

#### The state and the neo-liberal elite use building infrastructure as a biopolitical and imperial construct

Jasanoff 6’ (Sheila Jasanoff, Osiris , Vol. 21, No. 1, Global Power Knowledge Science and [Technology](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/507145) in International Affairs (2006), pp. 273-292)

**Empires, no less than nation‐states, engender and depend on feelings of belonging. Devices for producing imperial imagined communities have included, besides the grand, polarizing, ideological discourses of the cold war, mundane practices such as performing national celebrations,**[**68**](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/507145#fn69)**teaching a common language, training administrative and judicial élites,** and building infrastructures for commerce and communication. **Science and technology, we have seen, have long served as agents of imperial governmentality, helping to produce the mission consciousness and the associated forms of knowledge and skill that serve as instruments for extending power. Modern biotechnology, similarly, provides a discourse of development that continues colonial traditions, although the agents, recipients, and specific mechanisms of the development project have been partially reconfigured in modern times.** The discovery of Africa as a site for biotechnological development, through the propagation of crops such as golden rice, offers perhaps the clearest illustration. In the rhetoric of development specialists, and the scientific and industrial institutions that serve them, **Africa is represented through tropes of crisis and charity that render the continent’s condition as dire and the offers of scientific and technological solutions as salvationary**.[69](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/507145#fn70) In one instructive example, Gordon Conway, former president of the Rockefeller Foundation, and a colleague wrote an article in the prestigious journal Science on biotechnology’s capacity to help Africans. Though presented as scientific, the article merged the empiricist register of science with a narrative register that was little short of missionary. At the center of the discussion was a fictional African housewife, “Mrs. Namurunda,” who the authors said was not a real person but “a composite of situations existing in Africa.”[70](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/507145#fn71) The story begins with Mrs. Namurunda, a farmer and single mother, eking out a hard‐scrabble existence on fields infested with every form of insect blight, under adverse conditions of drought and soil degradation. It ends with scientific biotechnology solving her problems, enabling her to turn a profit and secure a brighter, better educated, more enlightened future for her children. **This script follows Foucault’s delineation of biopower with uncanny precision.** An entire continent becomes a medicalized body, requiring urgent therapeutic intervention, both as a collective and for its individual members. The fictional person of Mrs. Namurunda, unveiled in the pages of one of the world’s leading scientific journals, becomes a symbol for Africa’s “composite” ailments. Advanced societies’ power to develop and deliver the requisite treatments offers them the right, indeed the obligation, to engage in a new mission civilisatrice—built on a biomedical ethic of cure rather than, as in earlier times, a religious model of grace. But, this time, **eschewing the forceful, state‐led constellations of power that undergirded colonial rule, the neoliberal state works through a lightly regulated global industry and a largely self‐regulating scientific community.Their expansion into new territories carries the promise of better jobs and higher incomes back in the home country, thereby allowing the economically more powerful state to justify itself where votes are counted, in its own national community of citizens. The sick and incapacitated recipient, however, has little or no say in either the diagnosis or the treatment of the alleged pathology.**

### Infrastructure – Subjectivization/Exclusion

#### All connecting technological paradigms veil exclusions of those not privileged to reach its terminals

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When we say that real-time technologies eliminate place, they may quite literally do this - but always in some technical network and in some place. Techni- cal networks become the thin alignments delivering thick infrastructures to a select group who have access to them. The synthetic situation traders in London and Zurich share is literally placeless but when the server in Zurich goes down the technician has no difficulty finding it. The design of the technical system may construct a specific space and time but it does this not in some transcendent realm but in the actual sites networked by that technology, which also means that the situations are available only to those who have the credentials to get access to the terminals. This is a matter of a very spatial politics. All this serves to highlight both the extraordinar- ily synthetic nature of this context for global action, as well as the power differentials such synthetic arrangements may generate. The technological paradigm itself is no universal. It is delivered in specific sites and the project from here on becomes to understand how society and economics have depended upon a sited materiality and technicity which has often gone unnoticed, or treated as if it were a constraint to more abstract processes rather than being itself the locus of social and economic process and the site of its very specific realisation. The materiality and technicity of all this specifies very real anchor points for objects and infrastruc- tures (even if these sometimes happen to be mobile devices) and definite and real interfaces between the different infrastructures financial traders act in, because they are not in the placeless space of global financial trading all the time, and the new paradigm has to be backwardly compatible with the old. The process of financial trading needs to be supported on the one hand by a precisely engineered infra- structure to make action possible or even coherent, and on the other it requires precisely engineered backward compatibilities with other infrastructures. Today it may be possible to act towards some placeless place that presents itself as ‘global’, but this is an artefact designed into a technology which needs to be somewhere. Understanding knowledge in less disembodied ways, we might be able to ask whether other technological systems, like Roman roads, the Hanseatic League or the Thurn and Taxis postal system are not themselves also virtual and informational and something through which we act? The sorts of technologies that supported continen- tal and even global networks historically were viable then as means to reliable action over sometimes vast distances. The old technologies, objects and practices had to factor in time delays but we do the same thing today when we set out on a journey to a place we know the technology we are using will get us to. Could it be that the distinction between real and virtual is spurious when we are looking at the world through a network or relational lens? And is the world today as formless or simply bifurcated as the informational view would have us believe? It appears that financial traders act in a ‘thick’ infra- structure which situates the objects, practices and knowledges they deal in. We have certainly synthe- sised thick infrastructures and situated objects and practices and codes of practical knowledge in them before. The medieval trading route was the high- tech global technology of its day, synthesising the situations from which people could act globally and connecting those towards which they could act. They contained all the apparatus and organisational factors to facilitate action, for those who had the correct access credentials. We could imagine the ports of mercantile trading as the equipped worksta- tions of their day, with the bankers, agents, insiders’ gossip, shipyards, warehouses, quays and jetties, and the skilled people to service all of these. The trading routes and ship departure schedules made doing something at a distance possible and reliable and not just a shot in the dark. Places in this view are equipped terminals main- taining synthetic situations technologically. They maintain commensurability between their respective knowledges and equipments in order to maintain the functionality of the system. They come in networks and in packs, and we act from place to other places across networks which maintain compatibilities and equivalent possibilities for action. Action is therefore a joint achievement of the actor and the synthetic situation. The places towards which one could not act are simply not part of the particular technologi- cal paradigm, so that the system is both connected and bounded by the technics.

#### Infrastructure investment is an expression of biopower because it regulates physical space and individual freedom.

Heyman 8’ (Department of Sociology and Anthropology, The University of Texas at El Paso, Theorizing Cross-Border Mobility: Surveillance, Josiah Heyman, Security and Identity 2008 p. 318-319)

First, it is necessary to provide some explanation of what these categories entail, beginning with the rights category. In the first section of this article, we review the work of Torpey and others on the historical relationships between the nation-state and individual freedom of movement. In its broadest outlines, this scholarship **depicts an increasing tendency of the modern nation-state to enclose juridical as well as physical space via infrastructural-institutional moves to define subjectivity and restrict freedom of movement** (Torpey, 2000: 11). **One feature of this trend of enclosure was the employment of the passport as means of identification.** Toward the end of the twentieth century, while **cross-border mobility remained available to many individuals, loci of inspection became more ubiquitous, so that the movement of individuals, while still permitted, was tracked and inspected at various points beyond and in addition to the physical nation-state border**. This story provides a background for discussing differential mobilities as a problem of rights: the rights of persons to traverse borders have become unequal within the legal frameworks of the host nations. States confer rights by constitution or statute that individuals then may seek to enforce against those states. As Cresswell puts it, law “is a site of inscription for moving people at many levels” (2006: 736). While there is no recognized right, strictly speaking, for a noncitizen to cross a national border and enter the host country, there are procedural rights related to the event of border-crossing applicable to citizens and non-citizens alike: the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, the right to a hearing prior to confinement at the site of inspection (or confinement elsewhere), the right to equal treatment vis-à-vis other persons. And because courts announce rules that govern mobility disputes, “law is one very important site when mobilities are produced.” Crucially, Cresswell reminds us that **“rights” to mobility, like other rights, come with a “pretence of universality” that masks the particularity of their exercise by differently positioned social actors**. (2006: 740). **Thus we remain skeptical of liberalism’s universal rights discourse while recognizing that courts do in fact direct mobility in important ways.**

### Automobility Top-Level

#### The affirmative’s creation of automobility places an apparatus of control over those who refuse or even engage the system—makes domination inevitable

Packer, North Carolina State Associate Communications Professor, 10(Jeremy, “Automobility and apparatuses: commentary on Cotten Seiler’s Republic of Drivers,” History and Technology: An International Journal Volume 26, Issue 4, 2010, JSTOR, Date Accessed: 7/7, JS)

Seiler’s account may help clarify such a conjecture as he carefully accounted for the two historical moments that provide explanation of the automobility apparatus’s emergence. Most fundamentally for Seiler, automobility is an apparatus comprised of ‘commodities, bodies of knowledge, laws, techniques, institutions, environments, nodes of capital, sensibilities, and modes of perception.’ 9 He asks what sort of apparatus was created that could account for the vast proliferation of the automobile and the reorganization of the USA into a ‘republic of drivers’ governed in part through the use of the automobile? He pinpoints two key periods of emergence. First, from the turn of the twentieth century to 1929 the number of registered automobiles grew from 8000 to 29.3 million. 10 Second, following the Second World War the USA embarked on what was the largest public works project ever, the Interstate Highway System. This was accompanied by a significant increase in automobile use, particularly for women and African Americans. Seiler argues that during both periods driving functioned to iron‐out the ideological inconsistencies in the uniquely American contradiction between individual freedom and societal normalization or what, as Seiler points out, the sociologist David Riesman famously described in The Lonely Crowd 11 saw as the ‘groupism’ of being ‘other‐directed’ versus being ‘inner‐directed.’ For Seiler, the primary question to answer for each period was how the hegemonic struggle over ideological composition of this subjectivity played out. In the first period the struggle was manifest in the seeming loss of autonomy that resulted from Fordism and Taylorism. Here Seiler investigated ‘the ways in which the trauma of Taylorization necessitated the ideological production of a new, compensatory subjectivity characterized by self‐determination.’ 12 In the post‐war period the political economic struggle was not to be found in factories per se, rather it took place between (cold) warring empires. The creation of the Interstate Highway System was not only a massive public works project that solidified the growth of suburbs and the triumph of the automobile over the train and other forms of mass‐transit. It also performed an ideological feat. ‘(T)he limited access highway that communicated freedom as it limited the possibility of deviation provided a spatial metaphor for the narrowed political culture of the cold war.’ 13 Seiler makes clear that his thesis differs from those who depend upon a conception of the automobile as a commodity whose fetishistic value masks the exploitative nature of the work they must perform to garner the wages necessary to buy into a consumer culture. Rather, he sees driving, not owning, an automobile as that which performs the ideological work of producing the experience and belief that one is free. Seiler sums up the historical sweep of his narrative by concluding that ‘the apparatus of mobility that surrounds us and within which we conduct our daily lives deters us from imagining and especially undertaking other forms of association. This is an ideological accomplishment that some applaud and others condemn (italics in the original).’ 14 Seiler clearly condemns ‘the republic of drivers’ that is built upon a social and political vision that is perfectly modeled by the false freedom and individualism entailed in driving. It is a republic that lacks empathy, community, and, ultimately, a clear vision of democracy. 15 Seiler’s narrative is a powerful one. It deftly weaves together a discursive formation comprised of contemporaneous social theory and primary documentation of public speeches, safety manuals, highway plans, periodicals, industry statements and advertisments, as well as popular culture resources. It does so in order to situate what forces were in play that reconnected the social, cultural, economic, and political composition of the USA in accordance with automobility. Throughout Republic of Drivers two prominent strains of Seiler’s intellectual heritage stand together uneasily; his clearly stated Foucauldianism and his more subtle Marxism. I say uneasily not because of differing political assumptions or prescriptions, but rather in terms of how we might approach the role of ideology and the relative causal power of economic forces as part of and in their relation to technology. Numerous scholars have noted problems associated with bringing together Foucault and Marxism. 16 In particular these problems often revolved around questions of discourse, ideology, and the role they played in struggles over hegemony. Michelle Barrett summarized Foucault’s discontent with ideological critique as resulting from three misconceptions: ‘(1) it is implicated, as the other side of the coin, in unacceptable truth claims, (2) it often rests on a humanist understanding of the individual subject and (3) it is enmeshed in the unsatisfactory and determinist base‐superstructure model within Marxism.’ 17 This led Tony Bennett 18 to disqualify the language of ideology and the focus upon Gramscian explanations of hegemony that had come to dominate Cultural Studies by the late 1980s. Instead Bennett called for an emphasis upon Foucauldian governmentality that understood culture not as the realm of ideology production in the Marxist sense, but rather as a tool for governance. This work led in no small part to the growth of work in Cultural Studies in the area of governmentality. In The Republic of Drivers we find an alternative vision of the relationship between an apparatus, ideology, and capital. In the very paragraph in which Seiler first describes Foucault’s model of the apparatus he ends by stating that ‘as I will argue below, automobility emerged during and as a strategic response to the crises precipitated by the transition from proprietary to corporate capitalism in the United States.’ 19 This paragraph animates the difficult tension in Seiler’s account. Did automobility arise ‘in the last instance’ because of changes in the nature and structure of capitalism or did the automobility apparatus come into being as ‘the multifaceted, coordinating network of power’ that ‘bridges the ground between the more textual “discourse” and the materiality of practice.’ 20 Or could it have been both? As Foucault says the apparatus always ‘has as its major function at a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function (Foucault as cited by in Seiler).’ 21 Can the ‘urgent need’ be changes in capitalism or does that amount to the very sort economic of reductionism of which Foucault was so critical?

#### Car culture relies on biopolitical infrastructure, and using cars puts subjectivizing pressures on individuals to conform to norms about automobility

Lipshutz 09 (Ronnie, Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz, 8-27-09, Institute of European Studies, "The Governmentalization of “Lifestyle” and the Biopolitics of Carbon," p. 13-14, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/472341ct, accessed 7-7-12, CNM)

I use the term “automobility” here to refer to the dispotif or assemblage that is the automotive “system.”40 This dispotif includes not just the car itself but also the material infrastructure (highways, gas stations, parking lots, streets, pipelines), the production system (mining and manufacture of raw materials, shipping, parts production, assembly plants, tire plants, gasoline refining), auto-related labor, tourism, advertising, the arrangement of cities and suburbs, patterns of mass transit within and without major urban areas, and individual’s and people’s subjectivities and mentalities regarding both car and system. In the United States, those who lack cars find their mobility highly constrained and getting around expensive and time-consuming. Life is much easier if one possesses an automobile. Possession also constructs and reinforces “normality,” as do the existence and use of other elements of automobility. The result is that practices associated with that dispotif are, for the most part, assumed, unquestioned and regarded positively, while proposals to reduce or eliminate it are regarded as heretical, marginal and unfeasible. When the assemblage imposes externalities on society, these are either treated as a problem of individual agency (e.g., auto safety) or matters to be addressed instrumentally (by technological and economic fixes). The assemblage, as a whole, is not subject to transformation or conversion in any way that reduces its expanse. Indeed, notwithstanding a host of externalities arising from the automotive dispotif, the consumer of automobility comes under social pressure to sustain and support it through a variety of biopolitical inducements and practices focused on status, freedom, economic necessity, health and safety, and the mobile imaginary. Advertising, in particular, operates on the consumer’s subjectivity, as do a number of other social mentalities. Consider pickup truck advertising as a typical example. During the height of the automobile boom in the United States, advertising of pickup trucks was ubiquitous on television, quite clearly targeted toward a male demographic in the 25-60 age range. Commercials offered repeated imaginaries of vehicles engaged in “manly” activities, such as driving through mud or up rugged trails, pulling other trucks, carrying hay, herding cattle, etc. The “moving power” and capacity of these trucks were also emphasized as, presumably, a point of concern to men, who have “chores” that involve moving heavy or unwieldy things.

### **Automobility – Subjectivization**

#### Hyperautomobility Shapes Society Putting People in an Inescapable Situation

Freund, Peter March 2007

Freund, Peter. Sociology Department, Montclair State University, Montclair, New Jersey, USA "Hyperautomobility, the Social Organization of Space, and Health." Mobilities 2.1 (March 2007): pp. 37-38)

Contemporary societies, at least the United States, have been in recent decades promoting a new level of individualized and intensified daily transport – a hyperautomobility (see Martin, 1999). This hyperautomobility features more solo driving in personal vehicles, more trips and greater trip distances. It is associated with a social organization of settlement space characterized by geographically expansive sprawl. The communities of these settlements feature low-density, fragmented sites (i.e. single-family housing, shopping malls, and corporate campuses) that favour automobile travel over other transport modes. This fragmentation may inhibit the neighbouring aspect of community life that is based on proximity. For example, roadways may not feature sidewalks (or pavements in the United Kingdom), which encourage walking and socializing. In addition to its impacts on community life, hyperautomobility has become associated with new social and public health problems. The social problem has to do with social exclusion. While mass motorization has led to greater mobility for many, it has created new accessibility problems for those who do not drive (i.e. the disabled, the very young and the very old). Additionally, there is a differential social ecology of exposure to the risk factors associated with mass motorization. Groups lower in the stratification system are exposed to higher risks from both vehicular emissions and accidents. Finally, the growing public health problem of overweight and obesity is based in part on the loss of physical activity associated with hyperautomobility.

#### Trucks are associated with masculinity

Lipshutz 09 (Ronnie, Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz, 8-27-09, Institute of European Studies, "The Governmentalization of “Lifestyle” and the Biopolitics of Carbon," p. 15, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/472341ct, accessed 7-7-12, CNM)

Note, too, how such advertising offers “freedom” even as it induces forms of biopolitical self-regulation. The driver of a pickup can go anywhere he wishes, through mud and meadow, up hill and down dale, and even through city streets. Because trucks tend to be bigger and higher than cars, the driver can also assert himself on the road and avoid being intimidated by others’ road rage and unsafe practices. And driving a truck helps to reinforce that sense of masculinity associated with being “on the move” and dominating over others. At the same time, however, being a pickup-driving man also imposes constraints on behaviour. One becomes subject to various regulatory regimes, including traffic law, credit and banking systems, energy supply, repair shops, and gender roles and rules. One is free to drive anywhere, so long as one can pay for the loan, insurance, fuel and repairs, the truck does not break down, and there are no fences or other obstacles in the way. And to the extent that the driver fully internalizes the beliefs and practices conveyed by the advertisement and its associated discourse, he self- regulates his own “freedom.” Indeed, there is not a lot of difference between the old trope of “brainwashing,” the mass social engineering that is so feared in liberal societies and biopolitical regulation of consumer behaviour through various governmental mechanisms.

### Port Security

#### Regulatory surveillance of transportation infrastructure is biopolitical, racist and excludes poor and less developed populations

Bell 5 (Colleen Bell; Doctoral Candidate, Department of Political Science, York University; “Biopolitical Strategies of Security: Considerations on Canada’s New National Security Policy”; March 2005; <http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/publish/documents/WP34-Bell.pdf>; Kristof)

A variety of **new and expanded regulatory surveillance mechanisms have been expended on** the more traditional “key” **areas of transportation**, borders, and international security. What is most interesting about **these surveillance enhancements** is not only an intensified focus on detecting threats through totalizing surveillance mechanisms, but the **reliance on monitoring** biological substances and **biological characteristics of the population, as opposed to ‘political’ issues, to secure the state. For transportation security**, airport screening of goods and people, undercover operations, inspections of transportation workers and **enhanced detection technologies** for land, air and sea **are mandated. New investments in trace detection systems, gamma-ray systems, ion mobility spectrometers as well as “permit effective and unobtrusive screening of containers for explosive, chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological devices.”** are set out in the policy.93 Similarly, **detection strategies are key to border security enhancement along with and new funds for “LiveScan” digital fingerprinting**,94 **an ‘RCMP Real Time Identification project’ that enables the electronic recording of fingerprints for instant verification, and biometrically enabled smart chips that use facial recognition technologies “to interrupt the flow of high-risk travelers” have** also **been mandated**.95 Ten new countries were added to the list of those with visa requirements and improvements were made to the screening of VISA applicants abroad. The ‘Smart Borders’ strategy with the US “to enhance the security of the flow of goods and people and the transportation system, and to strengthen intelligence and law enforcement co-operation” will continue to be developed.96 The policy notes that Canada will also work with international partners and other G8 countries to internationalize Smart Borders programs, in addition to the development of the expanded ‘Next Generation Smart Borders Agenda’ to include cyber-security, food safety, public health, marine and transport security.”97 Passenger screening while people are in the process of booking flight reservations destined for Canada is also under consideration.98 Finally, International Security measures include the continuation of support for ‘counter-terrorism’ projects and capacity building in ‘failed’ and ‘failing’ states through funds from the International Assistance Envelope,99 which have tended to focus on health issues that, if excessively neglected, are considered to contribute to international crime. Tellingly, it is noted that the confluence between the security interests and international policy goals of Canada can be seen by how its democratic and pluralist characteristics provide the means through with ‘failed and failing’ states can be assisted “in the struggle against terrorism.”100 This **commitment to international security points to the ways in which poor and less developed countries are positioned as a threat to global security and consequently require monitoring and intervention**. It is significant to note the similarity between the detection strategies and mechanisms in both traditional and non-traditional sets of key security arenas, and highlights the extent to which the classificatory power of surveillance is applied at the level of the population. **As groups and individuals are constantly “riskprofiled” very little is left outside the purview of security**. According to Lyon, this can be seen by how the commercial sphere sorts people into consumer categories, and the social dangerousness of people is rated by policing and intelligence systems.101 **Biopolitical strategies of surveillance are not principally oriented to the past** (to reform deviance), **but to the future as a mechanism of control concerned with producing the conditions through which members of a population are subjected to continual and expansive risk profiling as a strategy to render the population, and consequently the state, safe and healthy**. It is **this link between biopolitics** **as a** productive **method of governing populations through security** apparatuses that **provides a decisive turn for surveillance to be constituted as a ‘**libratory’ **mechanism of societies characterized by the prevalence of ‘risk**.’

### Maritime Transportation

#### Maritime trade circulation is an attempt to preserve the security of liberal life

Lobo-Guerrero 08 (Luis Lobo-Guerrero is Lecturer in International Relations at Keele University. September 2008, International Political Sociology, "‘Pirates’, stewards, and the securitisation of global circulation," p. 3, http://www.biopolitica.cl/docs/Lobo\_Pirates\_securitisation\_global\_circulation.pdf, accessed 7-7-12, CNM)

In this way, the article is a contribution to the theorisation of a global biopolitics of security (c.f. Dillon 2007, Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, Lobo- Guerrero 2007a, Masters and Dauphinee 2007, c.f. Reid 2007). It seeks to advance knowledge on the ways in which maritime insurance as a technology of risk management, governs global maritime circulation. In so doing it argues that the global risk management of maritime circulation escapes the state/legitimate-violence complex that traditional approaches to the discipline of International Relations have dealt with (c.f. Ashley 1987, Campbell and Dillon 1993, Edkins 1999). Global circulation is presented here as a condition of possibility for the promotion and protection of a liberal way of life that depends greatly on its capacity to globalise trade. Trade implies moving goods, services, and people from place to place and 77% of the total world trade measured in terms of volume is seaborne (MIU 2007). Because of the mobility that defines maritime trade and the shifting conditions under which global shipping operates, the provision of security for global maritime circulation through insurance has seen the development of a complex and highly- adaptive security apparatus. Its objective has been to secure the global circulation of maritime trade by developing a mechanism to facilitate the financial protection of ships travelling the world. Practices involved in marine underwriting, actuarial research, claims adjustment, and an active stewardship role performed by the global maritime insurance industry constitute such apparatus of security.

#### The meaningfulness of oceans to the individual is made via biopolitical indexes

Lobo-Guerrero 08 (Luis Lobo-Guerrero is Lecturer in International Relations at Keele University. September 2008, International Political Sociology, "‘Pirates’, stewards, and the securitisation of global circulation," p. 24-25, http://www.biopolitica.cl/docs/Lobo\_Pirates\_securitisation\_global\_circulation.pdf, accessed 7-7-12, CNM)

Philip Steinberg, in The Social Construction of the Ocean provided a ground- breaking analysis of different constructions of ocean-space. He argued ‘that each period of capitalism, besides having a particular spatiality on land, has had a complementary –if often contrapuntal- spatiality at sea, with specific interest groups during each period promoting specific constructions of ocean-space’ (Steinberg 2001: 6). What he elaborated as the construction of ocean space is understood in this essay as problematisations of ocean space. The difference is not only semantic but epistemological. Whereas a problematisation seeks to make ‘facile gestures difficult’, a construction focuses on the actor/social-agency relationship and aims at explaining phenomena as the result of intended actions. If the output of the latter is an object, the outcome of the former is a problem-space. A problem space is here seen as the result of challenging the integrity of the social and the individual. The subject of forms of life is already a power/knowledge construct. Steinberg argued that throughout the industrial capitalist era, ‘the ocean was idealised as the antithesis of land-space’ (Steinberg 2001: 113). Based on classical and neo-classical doctrines of the period it was believed that ‘nations should seek power not by controlling trade but by wisely investing the resources for which they possessed a comparative advantage’ (Steinberg 2001: 113). If nations could trade freely amongst themselves wealth and happiness would follow (Steinberg 2001: 113). Ocean-space was then idealised ‘as an empty transportation surface, beyond the space of social relations, and projection of power in the deep sea was perceived as legitimate only when applied toward the end of destroying obstacles to free navigation’ (Steinberg 2001: 113). ‘The sea was constructed, like money or markets, as without social ‘roots’ –beyond society, politics, or other ‘artificial’ social constructs that could interfere with the ‘natural’ free flow of capital’ (Steinberg 2001: 114).

#### Oceans are viewed as a place solely for transportation and mobility, which allows for adaptive forms of security

Lobo-Guerrero 08 (Luis Lobo-Guerrero is Lecturer in International Relations at Keele University. September 2008, International Political Sociology, "‘Pirates’, stewards, and the securitisation of global circulation," p. 25-27, http://www.biopolitica.cl/docs/Lobo\_Pirates\_securitisation\_global\_circulation.pdf, accessed 7-7-12, CNM)

As argued by him, this makes it difficult to accept ‘the great void idealisation of transportation/communication space as an asocial, formless surface traversed by goods and information, generated in the static places of ‘society’’(Steinberg 2001: 201). However, his thesis is that postmodern capitalism, ‘for all its outward differences from industrial capitalism, maintains a spatiality on land and on sea not unlike that of the industrial era’ (Steinberg 2001: 162). ‘Places are important as locations for fixed investments. Movement of goods (and money and information) between these places is important as well. To a greater degree than ever before, the speed of this movement also is critical’ (Steinberg 2001: 162). What radically changes, however, is the degree of intensification in the identification of special spaces of stewardship, spaces suitable for ‘systemic regulation but to be insulated from state appropriation and territorial enclosure’ (Steinberg 2001: 163). However, this article would like to argue that a change within this process is as well the emergence of stewardship roles from non-state to non-international organisation actors such as the JWC. Marine stewardship is not a new security practice. In its contemporary form it is an application of the Roman understanding of the concept. As described by Steinberg, the Romans constructed the Mediterranean as a space within their sphere of influence, but they never deigned actually to claim it as the territory of the state. Indeed, they emphasised this distinction by governing the sea according to jus gentium (common law, or the law of the peoples) as opposed to Roman civil law, which applied only in the land-space of the empire (Steinberg 2001: 65). In effect, Rome constructed the Mediterranean as a ‘force-field’, a place-less surface that belonged to no one but upon which powerful states could intervene so as to steward its resources for the national interest. Since the sea primarily was used as a surface for the movement of troops and goods, interventions in this space centred on ridding the space of pirates and other oppositional forces that could impede the flow of goods and people (Steinberg 2001: 66). The role of the JWC, as described in the cases provided in the first part of the article, is to perform a novel form of stewardship which securitises ocean-space as a circulation resource, a resource that enables the connectivity of various nodes within a highly complex networked capitalist economy. Building on Steinberg’s insightful work, the suggestion of this article is that this is clearly not a construction of ocean- space. It is a biopolitical problematisation of spaces of circulation as a necessary condition for the liberal way of life. Such problematisation provides the possibility for intervening in the promotion and protection of a liberal form of life. The stewardship performed by the JWC is a site of interrogation for students of global politics. It adds towards Steinberg’s interpretation of contemporary stewardship under conditions of incessant circulation. In fact, the real conditions are more accurately described as exacerbated circulation which demand the provision of active and highly adaptive forms of security. Whereas Steinberg’s postmodern marine stewardship concerns relate mainly to natural resources (c.f. Steinberg 2001: 176- 180), the role of the JWC illustrates an active role of stewardship in the securitisation of global circulation through the problematisation of ocean-space as a circulation resource. The intricacies of this role and of the form of security it performs, however, exceed the aim of this article and will be the material for a later publication.

### Inland Transport

#### Both river transport and railways are examples of how the state manages its population

Divall 5 (Divall, Colin; Professor of Railway Studies and Head of the Institute of Railway Studies and Transport History @ University of York; "Cultures of Transport" Journal of Transport History 26.1 (March 2005): pp. 99-111.) Kristof

Similarly, studies of **navigation on the River Trent** in the UK, **enabled** by statute **in 1783, show how legal conceptions of highway were used to negotiate between** the **interests of land and trade**, fixed property and transport. The **Trent was a** particularly **volatile river, regularly changing its course along** several **stretches**. Given this topographical fact, **landowners objected to proposals to construct a towpath, which they saw as a potentially uncontrollable intrusion** upon their property. In order to satisfy all parties, the result was a proposal to regulate the course of the river whilst simultaneously ordering and regularizing the physical and social topography - 13 of the riparian environment. Thus **the plans claimed The Country would be freed from** Depredations of several hundred **dissolute fellows who are now loitering near the River** without any settled Residence, and **who might be useful to the community in other employments**. And if proper Gates were made between the Inclosures contiguous to the River the Trespass on the Lands would be greatly diminished.48 The proposals also reassured landowners that Provision be inserted in the Act for making satisfaction to the owners and occupiers of the adjacent lands for all trespass and damage to be done by the execution of any of the Powers of the Act, except by the Passage over such land for the hauling and navigating boats, the damage by which would be greatly diminished instead of increased.49 Here **transport technology and the hydrological techniques of river regulation intersected with** the **interests of agricultural improvement** within the context of theories of free-trade economics. Thus **the proposal linked moral, social and natural orders in the landscape by using ideas familiar to many** in the late-18th century. **Regulation of the channel would order the landscape by removing the** twin **threats of a** volatile **river and** vagrant **labour**. **In the process it would entrench the rights of private property at the same time that it liberated the river in the cause of trade and enterprise**.50 In a more contemporary context, Bishop, for instance, examines proposals for the (now-completed) Alice Springs to Darwin **railway, linking** Australia‘s **southern coast with the northern**. Bishop is particularly concerned with the idea of **the** ‗**corridor‘ as a tool of practical planning and a means of marshalling the hopes and aspirations of national identities**.51 He argues that **the rail project was implicated in a continuing resignification of** various **technologies**. **The corridor was** therefore **a site of difference, struggle and reconciliation, between European, Aboriginal and Asian conceptions of nation**. **It was a** highly contentious, paradoxical **gathering**, one **that embraces** both t**he macro level of regional and federal politics**, as well as the micro level of local concerns and individual experiences. **The rail corridor brings into** sharp **relief not just a struggle** between various **notions of place but their coexistence**, ‗**a series of** differing ―**social architectures‖ of dwelling that manage**, more or less **to coexist in what is imperiously composed** by one **of** them as Australian **national space**‘.52 - 14 - Although originating in very different historical and geographical contexts, these brief **examples show how transport systems have practical and symbolic consequences** at the spatial level well **beyond the immediacies of the technologies** themselves. **They gather and distribute** heterogeneous **materials in ways which are** highly **politicized in terms of** both **formal and cultural politics**. **The resulting relationships between technological formations and the conduct of everyday life are mutually constitutive**, whether couched in terms of European integration, 18th- century agricultural improvement or Australian national identity.

### Inland Waterways

#### Inland waterways are historically planned to order populations around them

Divall 5 (Divall, Colin; Professor of Railway Studies and Head of the Institute of Railway Studies and Transport History @ University of York; "Cultures of Transport" Journal of Transport History 26.1 (March 2005): pp. 99-111.) Kristof

Similarly, studies of **navigation on the River Trent** in the UK, **enabled** by statute **in 1783, show how legal conceptions of highway were used to negotiate between** the **interests of land and trade**, fixed property and transport. The **Trent was a** particularly **volatile river, regularly changing its course along** several **stretches**. Given this topographical fact, **landowners objected to proposals to construct a towpath, which they saw as a potentially uncontrollable intrusion** upon their property. In order to satisfy all parties, the result was a proposal to regulate the course of the river whilst simultaneously ordering and regularizing the physical and social topography - 13 of the riparian environment. Thus **the plans claimed The Country would be freed from** Depredations of several hundred **dissolute fellows who are now loitering near the River** without any settled Residence, and **who might be useful to the community in other employments**. And if proper Gates were made between the Inclosures contiguous to the River the Trespass on the Lands would be greatly diminished.48 The proposals also reassured landowners that Provision be inserted in the Act for making satisfaction to the owners and occupiers of the adjacent lands for all trespass and damage to be done by the execution of any of the Powers of the Act, except by the Passage over such land for the hauling and navigating boats, the damage by which would be greatly diminished instead of increased.49 Here **transport technology and the hydrological techniques of river regulation intersected with** the **interests of agricultural improvement** within the context of theories of free-trade economics. Thus **the proposal linked moral, social and natural orders in the landscape by using ideas familiar to many** in the late-18th century. **Regulation of the channel would order the landscape by removing the** twin **threats of a** volatile **river and** vagrant **labour**. **In the process it would entrench the rights of private property at the same time that it liberated the river in the cause of trade and enterprise**.50

### Railways

#### Railway linking occurs against the backdrop of biopolitical imperatives of trade and cultural formation

Divall 5 (Divall, Colin; Professor of Railway Studies and Head of the Institute of Railway Studies and Transport History @ University of York; "Cultures of Transport" Journal of Transport History 26.1 (March 2005): pp. 99-111.) Kristof

In a more contemporary context, Bishop, for instance, examines proposals for the (now-completed) Alice Springs to Darwin **railway, linking** Australia‘s **southern coast with the northern**. Bishop is particularly concerned with the idea of **the** ‗**corridor‘ as a tool of practical planning and a means of marshalling the hopes and aspirations of national identities**.51 He argues that **the rail project was implicated in a continuing resignification of** various **technologies**. **The corridor was** therefore **a site of difference, struggle and reconciliation, between European, Aboriginal and Asian conceptions of nation**. **It was a** highly contentious, paradoxical **gathering**, one **that embraces** both t**he macro level of regional and federal politics**, as well as the micro level of local concerns and individual experiences. **The rail corridor brings into** sharp **relief not just a struggle** between various **notions of place but their coexistence**, ‗**a series of** differing ―**social architectures‖ of dwelling that manage**, more or less **to coexist in what is imperiously composed** by one **of** them as Australian **national space**‘.52 - 14 - Although originating in very different historical and geographical contexts, these brief **examples show how transport systems have practical and symbolic consequences** at the spatial level well **beyond the immediacies of the technologies** themselves. **They gather and distribute** heterogeneous **materials in ways which are** highly **politicized in terms of** both **formal and cultural politics**. **The resulting relationships between technological formations and the conduct of everyday life are mutually constitutive**, whether couched in terms of European integration, 18th- century agricultural improvement or Australian national identity.

### Critical Infrastructure Top-Level

#### The securing of infrastructure legitimizes the extension of biopolitics over individuals

Lundborg and Vaugn-Williams 11 (Tom—Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Nick—University of Warwick) LA

While much of the existing literature on CIs and resilience planning has been of an explicitly policy-oriented nature, two notable exceptions are Lentzos and Rose (2009), and Dillon and Reid (2009). What distinguishes these contributions from other work is their critical insistence on questioning the political significance of CIs and resilience planning. Both locate this questioning within a biopolitical horizon inspired by the work of Michel Foucault. Lentzos and Rose (2009) seek to address the issue of how the political rationalities of advanced liberal democracies have become replaced by new technologies animated by the telos of security. In other words, they take as their starting point a curiosity about the nature of the contemporary relationship between governance in the West and security: a curiosity that Foucault had already begun to develop in his series of lectures at the Colle`ge de France published recently as Society Must Be Defended (2004). Lentzos and Rose cite Foucault’s animat- ing distinction between centripetal disciplinary mechanisms on the one hand and centrifugal biopolitical apparatuses on the other. The former isolates and closes off space in order to regulate bodies within that given area; the latter, by contrast, works with movements in ever-wider circuits in order to manage complex realities. In recent years, a number of authors have worked with and developed Foucault’s insights about how security can be made compatible with circulation in this way (Amoore 2006; Bigo 2007; Kavalski 2009; Salter 2006). As such, it is unnecessary to rehearse these relatively well-known arguments here, except to stress, as Lentzos and Rose do, that what is valued in liberal democratic societies is precisely the abil- ity to keep people, services, and goods constantly on the move. The necessity to maintain these centrifugal forces therefore takes the analysis of security practices beyond simple (disciplinary) notions of prevention, ‘‘big-brother’’ style surveil- lance, and barricades. Instead, biopolitical apparatuses of security are shown to work with complexity, embrace and identify patterns in flows, and govern through the management of these dynamics. It is within this context that Lentzos and Rose situate what they call a ‘‘logic of resilience,’’ understood as ‘‘a systematic, widespread, organizational, structural and personal strengthening of subjective and material arrangements so as to be better able to anticipate and tolerate disturbances in complex worlds without collapse’’ (Lentzos and Rose 2009:243). On this view, therefore, resilience encompasses technologies of security that recoil from shocks to (and within) the ‘‘system of systems’’ they constitute, in order to ensure a return to ‘‘normal’’ conditions of circulation as quickly as possible. While also working within the Foucauldian-inspired biopolitical paradigm, Dillon and Reid (2009) examine more specifically the role of resilient CIs in securing what they call the ‘‘liberal way of rule.’’ Before exploring their treat- ment of CIs, it is first necessary to introduce aspects of their broader argument about the relationship between liberalism and war. Dillon and Reid begin their book by characterizing liberalism as a ‘‘systemic regime of... power relations,’’ which, although committed to peace-making, is never- theless marked by an equal commitment to war, continuous state of emergency, and constant preparedness for conflict (Dillon and Reid 2009:7). From this perspective, war and society are mutually constitutive and the liberal way of rule can be under- stood as: ‘‘a war-making machine whose continuous processes of war preparation prior to the conduct of any hostilities profoundly, and pervasively, shape the liberal way of life’’ (Dillon and Reid 2009:9). As such, the liberalism–war complex acts as a grid for the production of knowledge, preoccupations, and political subjectivities. Taking their lead from Foucault’s later work, Dillon and Reid argue that the basic referent object of liberal rule is life itself. From this perspective, the liberal way of rule⁄war is inherently biopolitical: ‘‘its referent object is biological being and its governmental practices are themselves, in turn, governed by the proper- ties of species existence’’ (Dillon and Reid 2009:20). They stress, however, that the properties of species existence are not givens, but rather subject to changes in power ⁄ knowledge. Over the last 20 years, the Revolution in Military Affairs, accompanied by developments in the life sciences, has changed the way that life is viewed and understood. The move to ‘‘informationalize’’ life has led to the reduction in what it means to be a living being to a code, and as a result: ‘‘the very boundaries which long distinguished living from not living, animate from inanimate and the biological from the non-biological have been newly construed and problematized...’’ (Dillon and Reid 2009:22). The corollary of this account is that the informationalization of life has, in turn, changed the way in which war is waged by liberal rule: The development of the life sciences in general, and of complexity science in particular, comprising new knowledge about the complex emergent adaptive processes and properties of open living systems, has transformed the ways in which liberal regimes have come to understand that very nature of war, and of the relation of war to complex adaptive evolutionary models of rule and order. (Dillon and Reid 2009:111) The military is as interested now... in life-creating and life-adaptive processes as it is in killing, because, like the liberal way of rule and war more generally, it locates the nature of the threat in the very becoming-dangerous of the vital signs of life itself. (Dillon and Reid 2009:125) In other words, development in the life sciences has been embraced by liberal regimes, which, in turn, has affected the way that they view and fight wars. The move in life sciences away from Newtonian physics to complexity has enabled new biopolitical technologies of governance. Complexity science stresses the ‘‘anteriority of radical relationality,’’ the ‘‘dynamic and mobile nature of existence’’ and the ‘‘contingencies of bodies-in-formation’’ (Dillon and Reid 2009:72). Liberal biopolitical rule takes these problematizations of life as a start- ing point for securing its own existence. Thus, in a development of Foucault’s account of biopolitics as ‘‘making live and letting die,’’ Dillon and Reid argue that liberalism only promotes the kind of life that is productive for its own enter- prise in light of new power⁄knowledge relations. A liberal biopolitical problematization of life entails security practices that can ‘‘pre-empt the emergence of life forms in the life process that may prove toxic to life’’ (Dillon and Reid 2009:87). For these reasons, as set out in the lengthy quotation above, the perceived nature of threats has changed along with the emergence of alternative problematizations of life. Threats are no longer viewed as straightforwardly actual, but what Dillon and Reid refer to as ‘‘virtual’’: ‘‘the very continuous and contingent emergency of emergence of life as being-infor- mation; becoming-dangerous’’ (Dillon and Reid 2009:44). To put it differently, the threat with which liberal biopolitics is obsessed is the potentiality of some life to become dangerous and therefore detrimental to what living should involve. It is in this context that Dillon and Reid uncover a paradox of liberalism: the fact that according to its own logic it needs to kill in order to make life live. Dillon and Reid deal with both aspects of this biopolitical⁄necropolitical logic. Their discussion of the liberal way of war explores the various ways in which killing takes place, the aporia accompanying universal justifications of it, and the lethal criteria by which politics is reduced to mere ‘‘animal husbandry’’ (Dillon and Reid 2009:104). What is more pertinent for our purposes, however, is the equally significant account they offer of attempts by liberal rule to make life live: If the vocation of biopolitics is to make life live, it must pursue that vocation these days by making live life the emergency of its emergence ever more fully and ever more resiliently; detailing, clarifying, amplifying and otherwise drawing out the entailments of the emergency in the effort to make life live it even more animatedly in both virtual and actual terms. (Dillon and Reid 2009:89) It is in this context that we can return more explicitly to the role of resilient CIs because it is precisely these material apparatuses through which liberal rule secures the way of life it needs to reproduce its vision of ‘‘correct living’’ and also, therefore, the authorization of its own authority. Dillon and Reid pick up on Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz’s famous aphorism—‘‘politics is the extension of war by other means’’—to argue that the liberal peace is extended throughout society via CIs. They claim it is no coincidence that since 9⁄11 CIs have become reified as referent objects of securitization. Strategically and symbolically, CIs perform vital roles in securing the liberal way of rule and its vision of what ‘‘quality of life’’ must mean: ...the defence of critical infrastructure is not about the mundane protection of human beings from the risk of violent death at the hands of other human beings, but about a more profound defence of the combined physical and technological infrastructures which liberal regimes have come to understand as necessary for their vitality and security in recent years. (Dillon and Reid 2009:130) On this basis, Dillon and Reid extend the biopolitical diagnosis of resilience offered by Lentzos and Rose. Not only is resilience about the design and man- agement of the ‘‘system of systems’’ in such a way as to enable a smooth and expeditious return to ‘‘normal’’ conditions. More importantly, resilient CIs are also necessary for the optimalization of virtual (that is pre-emptive) tactics against the becoming-dangerous of bodies-in-formation: tactics upon which the edifice of liberal rule ultimately rests. Moreover, Dillon and Reid shrewdly observe that the perception of ‘‘terrorist threats’’ in Western societies enables liberal regimes to further develop and entrench CIs, in turn extending and intensifying biopolitical control over life.

#### Critical Infrastructure is mediated by biopolitical drives for securitization

Lundborg and Vaugn-Williams 11 (Tom—Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Nick—University of Warwick) LA

Alongside investment in CIs has emerged the concept of ‘‘resilience’’ around which current security planning, design, policy, rhetoric, and practice increas- ingly revolves. Here resilient CIs are commonly understood in terms of systems that demonstrate the ‘‘ability... to withstand and recover from adversity’’ (Sir Michael Pitt, quoted in Cabinet Office 2010:7). In this context, metaphors of ‘‘recoiling,’’ ‘‘bouncing back,’’ and ‘‘returning to normal’’ abound.3 The inter-disciplinary study of CIs and resilience planning is developing rapidly. What this literature tends to focus upon, however, is the effectiveness of systems in place and prospects for better policy prescription. Thus, for example, a 2007 special issue dealt with the efficiency of international disaster management planning (Laporte 2007), the potential effects of social breakdown following the collapse of CIs (Boin and McConnell 2007), new design principles to better pro- tect the management of CIs (Schulman and Roe 2007), and prospects for future European strategy (Fritzon, Ljungkvist, Boin, and Rhinard 2007). Elsewhere, Coaffee (2006) has charted the emergence of the concept of resil- ience from an urban planning perspective: first as a metaphor for how ecological systems cope with stress induced by external factors; and later in its application to disaster management, economic recovery, and the embedding of emergency preparedness into the built environment of the city. Other work has considered the conceptual history of resilience (Handmer and Dovers 1996), the relation between resilience and risk (Schoon 2006), and legal dimensions of infrastruc- ture (Likosky 2006). What has so far received less attention, however, is the broader political signifi- cance of the reorientation of Western security relations around CIs and resil- ience planning: How do sovereign attempts to secure CIs enable certain forms of governance? How do these attempts interact with and produce the populations they seek to govern? How do CIs and resilience planning reveal assumptions about contemporary political life in the West?4 In this article we tackle these questions in light of recent developments in the field of International Political Sociology (IPS). Reflecting ongoing efforts in IPS to re-theorize practices of (in)securitization, the first section considers what is at stake in the move to focus on material apparatuses, rather than states or individ- ual ‘‘speech-actors,’’ as referent objects in the field of global security relations. Drawing chiefly on the work of Jane Bennett, we advance an approach that recovers what we call the ‘‘political force of materiality’’ after the so-called linguistic turn in social and political theory. The second section outlines in further detail key developments in CI and resilience planning with especial focus on the paradigmatic US case. Here we draw extensively on ‘‘The National Plan for Research and Development in Support of Critical Infrastructure Protection’’ published by the DHS in 2004 to illustrate the centrality of CIs in the United States’s vision of homeland security.5 We deploy a vital materialist perspective influenced by Bennett to analyze the ways in which the objects of CIs do not form part of an inert backdrop for prac- tices of (in)securitization, but are themselves active in the management of flows in order to attempt to ensure ‘‘resilient’’ outcomes. The third section then seeks to address the broader political stakes of the Western obsession with resilient CIs by drawing on recent biopolitical analyses of the ‘‘logic of resilience’’ offered by Lentzos and Rose (2009) and ‘‘infrastruc- tures of liberal living’’ by Dillon and Reid (2009). While to some extent agreeing with the critical purchase of these perspectives, however, we ultimately argue that it is necessary to go further in recognizing that CIs are not closed, totalizing, and inevitably ‘‘successful’’ biopolitical apparatuses. Instead, we want to argue that they must be seen for what they are: open, vulnerable, and often absurd sys- tems that continually falter and backfire, and are often undermined according to their own logics. Finally, in the fourth section we consider how it might be possible to think about CIs and resilience planning in terms of open systems that do not always work the way they were meant to. To do so, we invoke Gilles Deleuze and Fe ́lix Guattari’s theorization of ‘‘molar’’ and ‘‘molecular’’ orders of composition in order to develop a new register—‘‘molecular security’’—for analyzing the fluctu- ating boundaries, uncertain identities, and material life produced by resilient CIs. Using illustrative examples set in the context of US counter-terrorism prac- tices, we ultimately argue from a molecular security approach that life always exceeds biopolitical attempts at controlling and capturing ‘‘it.’’

### Critical Infrastructure – Threats

#### Critical infrastructure protection decides on the nature of threat according to biopolitical understandings of the health of a nation and dangerous life.

Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams 10 (Lundborg is a research fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Sweden, Nick Vaughan-Williams is the Associate Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick, September 07 2010, "There’s More to Life than Biopolitics: Critical Infrastructure, Resilience Planning, and Molecular Security," stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/SGIR\_2010\_Lundborg\_VaughanWilliamsdoc.pdf CM)

A liberal biopolitical problematisation of life entails security practices that can ‘preempt the emergence of life forms in the life process that may prove toxic to life’ (Dillon and Reid 2009: 87). For these reasons, as set out in the lengthy quotation above, the perceived nature of threats has changed along with the emergence of alternative problematisations of life. Threats are no longer viewed as straightforwardly actual, but what Dillon and Reid refer to as ‘virtual’: ‘the very continuous and contingent emergency of emergent life as being- information; becoming-dangerous’ (Dillon and Reid 2009: 44). To put it differently, the threat with which liberal biopolitics is obsessed is the potentiality of some life to become dangerous and therefore detrimental to what living should involve. It is in this context that Dillon and Reid uncover a paradox of liberalism: the fact that according to its own logic it needs to kill in order to make life live. Dillon and Reid deal with both aspects of this biopolitical/necropolitical logic. Their discussion of the liberal way of war explores the various ways in which killing takes place, the aporia accompanying universal justifications of it, and the lethal criteria by which politics is reduced to mere ‘animal husbandry’ (Dillon and Reid 2009: 104). What is more pertinent to the purposes of the present paper, however, is the equally significant account they offer of attempts by liberal rule to make life live: If the vocation of biopolitics is to make life live, it must pursue that vocation these days by making life live the emergency of its emergence ever more fully and ever more resiliently, detailing, clarifying, amplifying and otherwise drawing out the entailments of the emergency in the effort to make life live even more animatedly in both virtual and actual terms (Dillon and Reid 2009: 89). It is in this context that we return more explicitly to the role of resilient CIs because it is precisely these material apparatuses through which liberal rule secures the way of life it needs to reproduce its vision of ‘correct living’ and also, therefore, the authorisation of its own authority. Dillon and Reid pick up on Foucault’s inversion of Clausewitz’s famous aphorism—‘politics is the extension of war by other means’—to argue that the liberal peace is extended throughout society via CIs. They claim it is no coincidence that since 9/11 CIs have become reified as referent objects of securitization. Strategically and symbolically, CIs perform vital roles in securing the liberal way of rule and its vision of what ‘quality of life’ must mean: [...] the defence of critical infrastructure is not about the mundane protection of human beings from the risk of violent death at the hands of other human beings, but about a more profound defence of the combined physical and technological infrastructures which liberal regimes have come to understand as necessary for their vitality and security in recent years (Dillon and Reid 2009: 130). On this basis, Dillon and Reid extend the biopolitical diagnosis of resilience offered by Lentzos and Rose. Not only is resilience about the design and management of the ‘system of systems’ in such a way as to enable a smooth and expeditious return to ‘normal’ conditions. More importantly, resilient CIs are also necessary for the optimalisation of virtual (i.e. pre- emptive) tactics against the becoming-dangerous of bodies in-formation: tactics upon which the edifice of liberal rule ultimately rests. Moreover, Dillon and Reid shrewdly observe that the perception of ‘terrorist threat’ in Western societies enables liberal regimes to further develop and entrench CIs, in turn extending and intensifying biopolitical control over life.

#### Defense of critical infrastructure from terrorism draws biopolitical distinctions between what infrastructures are “critical” to the nation and from whom they are threatened.

Aradau 10 (Dr. Claudia Aradau, Senior Lecturer in International Relatoins, King's College London, 2010, "Security that matters: critical infrastructure and objects of protection," oro.open.ac.uk/26408/1/Aradau\_security\_materiality\_SD.pdf CM)

‘The potential for catastrophic terrorist attacks that affect critical infrastructures is increasing’ (European Commission 2007). Thus describes the threat of terrorism a European Commission Communication on Critical Infrastructure Protection in the fight against terrorism. Critical infrastructures have emerged as an increasingly important priority in counter-terrorism activities after 9/11 in Europe. The European Commission lists the protection of infrastructures alongside the protection of borders and that of citizens. Unlike the protection of citizens, critical infrastructure is mainly concerned with physical and cyber-based systems; things and their material connectivities have become instrumental in the understanding of what it means to secure societies against terrorist attacks and other risks and hazards. Although critical infrastructure is generally considered a new coinage that goes back to US developments in the mid-90s, post-9/11 there have been innumerable documents on the vulnerabilities and protection of critical infrastructure from international organizations, governments, and research institutions. These largely concur in the definition of critical infrastructure as predominantly about the role of things in society, their functioning as well as their resilience. Material objects appear to support the provision of services, societal cohesion and the reproduction of national identity. Questions of critical infrastructure protection have given prominence to the role of things – from computers to transport and energy infrastructure to the daily TV set so that security scholars acknowledge that ‘the (core) rationality of CIP is associated with physical objects’ (Dunn Cavelty and Kristensen 2008: 11). However, the importance of materiality in discussions of critical infrastructure protection has largely remained within the remit of managerial responses. These ask for the invention of modalities of protection to safeguard pre-existing things and their functionalities. In critical analyses of the protection of critical infrastructure, materiality is supplanted by social, cultural and political discourses and practices. Even when its materiality is acknowledged, critical infrastructure protection is nonetheless ultimately about social and political action and human life (see for example Lipschutz 2008). Or it appears to be subsumed under the semiotics of the virtual, thus displacing both the material of physical infrastructure and that of virtual infrastructure (Der Derian and Finkelstein 2008). As the main purpose of CIP is to ensure that critical operations can continue without ‘undue interruption and that crucial, sensitive data are protected’ (GAO), security experts have focused on the measures and technologies deployed to ensure the robustness and resilience of critical infrastructure. These initiatives to protect infrastructure from catastrophic breakdowns obliterate a series of other practices and their constitutive role in the functioning or disruption of critical infrastructures. Mark Salter has argued, for example, that thinking of airports as a series of technical, managerial, bureaucratic and regulatory problems left out questions of market, the state and society (Salter 2008: 22). How is materiality to be understood between these two poles: one of technical positivity and the other of social practices of governance? Critical infrastructure is not just the result of a complex assemblage of social practices and values (Burgess 2007) – although this is not to say that social and cultural practices do not play a crucial role – but it emerges as an object whose materiality has both enabling and constraining effects on what can be said and done to secure it. The protection of critical infrastructure enacts particular distinctions between infrastructure and society, ‘hard’ things and ‘soft’ relations, human and non-human, matter and meaning. In this materialization of what is to be made secure, infrastructure plays an agential role, both constraining and enabling of particular configurations.

### Bikes Top-Level

#### Bike culture occurs against the backdrop of the biopolitical management of road safety and automobility

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[Samantha Z. Herr, 2012, Lexington, Kentucky “BIOPOLITICS OF BIKE-COMMUTING: BIKE LANES, SAFETY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE,” uknowledge.uky.edu/geography\_etds/2/ pg. 1-3 accessed 7-7-12]

Since the car boom of the 1950s, transport cycling in the US has been particularly stigmatized as childish and negatively associated with poverty and/or deviancy (Aldred 2010; Blickstein and Hanson 2001; Carlsson 2010; Furness 2005a; Furness 2005b; Horton 2006; Horton 2007; Horton, Rosen and Cox 2007; Skinner and Rosen 2007). As a response to dominant car-culture, environmental activists in the 1970s deployed bikecommuting advocacy, but this was largely seen as a counterculture threat to the status quo (Furness 2005b; Horton 2006). Thus, bike-commuting has generally disappeared as a potential means of transport for all but those who are too young or cannot afford a car (exemplified in such statistics as less than 1% of Americans commute by bike (McCarthy 2011; Pucher and Buehler 2009) … that is, until now. In cities across the U.S., biking is being touted as an energy-efficient, low carbon footprint, healthy, community-building form of transport, a sustainable solution to perceived urban ills. As city governments have become increasingly motivated to make their cities more sustainable, transport cycling has become integral in these plans. Boston is one such city enthusiastic about bicycle transportation. After appearing three times on Bicycling Magazine’s ‘The Worst’ list, the last of which was in 2006, the City of Boston changed its tune. In 2007, Boston Mayor, Tom Menino, launched a multipronged strategy to encourage bicycle transportation and make it a more viable option in the city. Since then, bike lanes and racks have been installed, a bike map project has been completed, and various city-wide bike-commuting events have taken place (City of Boston 2011). In 2011, Boston launched one of the first bike sharing programs in the U.S. (City of Boston 2011). Recent enthusiasm and efforts for cycling transport integration by Boston residents and the City made Boston an interesting case for my research. For this geographical investigation, the departure point has become the bike lane, an emerging feature in U.S. urban landscapes. Bike lanes are key infrastructure and symbols of the present ‘bikeways’ and ‘complete streets’ strategies for transport cycling integration. Since the mid-2000s, cities around the U.S. have been restructuring their streets to include bike lanes in unprecedented proportions. While increasingly a feature of the U.S. urban landscape, bike lanes are vehemently contested and ambiguous spaces. For example, Ben Adler, writer for The Nation, reports that in 2010, ‘Colorado’s Republican gubernatorial nominee attacked his Democratic opponent for building bike lanes, warning that they “could threaten our personal freedoms” and “convert Denver into a United Nations community"’ (2011:22). Adler also cites cases in New York City, one in which the city was sued for painting a bike lane that removed street parking in a wealthy area, and another in which a Hasidic Jewish community contested a lane in their neighborhood, believing that women on bicycles were dressed immodestly (2011:23-24). How did bike lanes come to be on the street in the first place, and what does it mean for them to be there? These are the questions of my first chapter.Because bike lanes are such ambiguous and contested spaces, it is interesting to ask, “what is at stake?” What is the thrust of bike lane enthusiasm? Through my second chapter, I come to understand that bike lanes are embedded in a process of re-imagining urban life toward more inclusivity and humanistic ideals of public space.1 I investigate the complex discourse of safety that works through discussions about bike lanes in transport literature, planning paradigms, bike advocacy, and for everyday bike commuters. What begins as a concern of the physical body leads to ideals of legitimacy and inclusivity, of which the bike lane has become a key symbol and act of these imaginings. The logic of bike lane safety becomes one that employs a right-based notion of social justice in which legitimacy, and ultimately safety, is garnered through becoming intelligible, or visible, as cycling subjects.

### Bikes – Bodily Safety

#### Bike lanes reorder biopolitical space around old-fashioned notions of bodily safety

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[Samantha Z. Herr, 2012, Lexington, Kentucky “BIOPOLITICS OF BIKE-COMMUTING: BIKE LANES, SAFETY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE,” uknowledge.uky.edu/geography\_etds/2/ pg. 75-78 accessed 7-7-12]

The potential for bodily harm intersects with the potential of a new urban ideal. Bike lanes work on perceptions of safety, not by changing perceptions of bodily protection, but by changing perceptions of the city space. Consider again the perspective stated by a bicycle commuter, “I like bike lanes not because I think that they're actually safer, but because they remind the cars that we are supposed to be there” (interview transcript 7-2-10). In the last chapter, I used this sentiment to illustrate how bike commuters understand bike lanes as mechanisms that increase their visibility and legitimacy as cyclists on the road. This assumed—or at least hoped for—legitimacy is understood by bikeways proponents as an important component in the creation of a more equitable and inclusive urban milieu. Bike lanes are used to produce a more inviting and accessible atmosphere for a wider diversity of cyclists with the aim of increasing the overall population of cyclists in the city. It is believed by some that “[t]he few cities that do provide good infrastructure for cyclists are the safest for cyclists, pedestrians and cars” (Koglin 2011: 225)…Planning for cyclists’ means creating more equal urban spaces where all road users can use the space…” (Koglin 2011:226, my emphasis). In other words, the participant above can be understood to “likes bike lanes,” not because she feels that her body is more protected, but because the idea of cycling in a more inclusive urban space changes her perception of the likelihood of a harmful event to take place. In this way, bike lanes intervene into the urban milieu. The milieu is a body with a multitude of moving parts in which an intervention in one area affects the whole. It is “[t]he space in which a series of uncertain elements unfold” (Foucault 2007:20). The milieu is a constantly shifting event-space composed of natural and artificial givens, such as watersheds, streets, and people (2007:20-21). “[T]he milieu appears as a field of intervention in which…one tries to affect, precisely, the population. … (2007:21). Possible events are managed with the ultimate goal of maximizing benefit for the greatest number. Future events and consequences to the population are managed through the interplay of remote factors (2007:72). “What one tries to reach through the milieu is precisely the conjunction of a series of events produced by…individuals, populations, and groups, and quasi natural events which occur around them” (2007:21, my emphasis). In other words, an intervention into the milieu is a holistic method. It is less like a surgeon, and more like a naturopathic doctor. Like an herbal concoction, an intervention into the milieu works at the intersection of elements to affect the collective body. Bike lanes, or more broadly road infrastructure, or even the urban physical environment, are remote factors that work in the milieu and on the population. Bike lanes re-purpose street space and instigate conversation and contention around how street space is purposed. Bike lanes are symbols of transport cycling. They are an attempt to preemptively create ‘safe space,’ whether this safety is experienced or not. This sense does not correspond to individual bodies, but to the body of the milieu. It depends on a notion of ‘the population,’ ‘the collective,’ ‘the public.’ Whether it is safety or something else that is actually experienced by cyclists, bike lanes change the shape of the urban environment, and this change reverberates throughout the milieu, creating shifts in how the urban environment is used, viewed, felt, experienced, and imagined. Boston starts to look more like a European cycling utopia. These changing arrangements of elements in the milieu produce sensations, affects. Cyclists’ experiences actually become more ambivalent. In this way, irrespective of the physicality of what they actually (do not) protect against, bike lanes, as physical components of the urban landscape, play on cyclists’ perceptions of risk and fear. They produce sensations about safety, even growing senses of safety, however preemptive, contradictory, or incomplete they might be. Bike lanes provoke sensations of a space between a present reality and a future potential. This potential is a safer street and city. Bike lanes are investments in this potential safety—or what we can call ‘security.’ Security deals neither in legality nor actuality (Simon 2010), but in potentiality. Security is based on managing the space between what is and what could be. It is a particular technique of power that works on managing potential future events (Foucault 2007:20). Foucault calls this the “the problem of… [a]n indefinite series of mobile elements” (2007:20). “[S]ecurity…tries to work within reality, by getting the components of reality to work in relation to each other, thanks to and through a series of analyses and specific arrangements” (2007:47). Apparatuses and technologies of security “open into a future that is not exactly controllable, not precisely measured or measurable” (2007:20), to maximize positive elements, and minimize what is risky (2007:19) for the population (2007:11, 19, 108, 122). In other words, security is a strategy of predicting and responding to what might happen; it is preemptive. And in that it attempts to minimize risk and maximize benefit for the population—to preserve life and curb death27—security can be seen as a preemptive safety. Bike lanes are mechanisms of security in this Foucauldian sense. The bikeways strategy for cycling safety is preemptive. Bike lanes are engaged in the present as insurance for the safe circulation and flow of bodies in the future—a future that hopefully looks like a street in Germany, Switzerland, or Denmark. Feelings of safety in the present respond to the perception of future legitimacy, to the very experience of this process in-motion (of becoming legitimate), and to a ‘safety imaginary’ that hinges on the presence of such legitimacy. This perceived legitimacy qua visibility brought by bike lanes (see the last chapter) is itself a product of a technology of security. Bike lanes as mechanisms of this technique of power, help build ‘the public’ (Foucault 2007:75), notions of freedom and livability, and ideals of inclusion and social justice. They do this, not through claiming spaces of representation like Mitchell (2002) would assert—claims which capture and create artificial stasis—but through managing circulation, managing a “multiplicity in movement” (Foucault 2007:125), managing “freedom” (2007:48-49, my emphasis). Within this framework of security, this freedom is not restricted by law and gained through rights claims, but is rather facilitated and produced through the management of freely moving bodies. Bike lanes attempt to be positively productive. They work to facilitate what people want to do and what they will want to do in the future. In this way, bike lanes participate in an apparatus that “think[s] before all else of men’s freedom, of what they want to do, of what they have an interest in doing, and of what they think about doing” (Foucault 2007:49). It is an apparatus that simultaneously creates and responds to ‘the wills of people’ and a notion of ‘public good.’ It is in this way that bike lanes work towards ‘street for all.’

### Bikes – Subjectivization

#### Bike paths aim to normalize power relations by facilitating the flow through interaction of difference

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[Samantha Z. Herr, 2012, Lexington, Kentucky “BIOPOLITICS OF BIKE-COMMUTING: BIKE LANES, SAFETY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE,” uknowledge.uky.edu/geography\_etds/2/ pg. 81-83 accessed 7-7-12]

Power relations that play into fear play out in material realities, such as the locations of where income or racial minorities live in relation to infrastructurally impoverished streets, access to types of modal methods stratified by gender, class, and other axis of difference, and whose bodies are more likely to suffer injury or death. Along with her findings on fear, for example, Loukaitou-Sideris (2006) also finds that ethnic minorities disproportionately walk as a mode of transport, and are disproportionately represented in pedestrian injury and fatalities statistics. “[R]isks are not the same for all individuals, all ages, or in every condition, place or milieu. There are therefore differential risks that reveal, as it were, zones of higher risk and, on the other hand, zones of lower risk. This means that one can thus identify what is dangerous” (Foucault 2007:63). Fear is conditioned by subjectivity, but so too is risk. Cycling safety is a mashup of subject positionality, perception, probability, potentiality, and embodied reality. The discourse of inclusivity intervenes at this conjunction. Inclusivity discourse, which is a technology of security, renders cycling safety into a problem of fear and risk, and responds to this rendering through attempting to manage potentialities by affecting probabilities. Inclusivity discourse does this through the negotiation of difference and normalcy. The bikeways discourse of inclusivity that advocates for the inclusion of cycling as an option for travel on city streets and for the inclusion of many different kinds of cyclists, is a project of creating a new norm that maintains multiplicity. As Miller, for example, states, “If cycling is to become mainstream, ordinary, ubiquitous, then we have to find ways to include every potential rider… it requires serious (dare I say ‘affirmative’) engagement with the reality and needs of the under-represented populations” ((blogpost 1/25/11). This is a call to recognize and maintain difference. It is not about trying to get everyone to move the same way, but about providing a space in which different people can move differently within a normal range. Consider again this response from a bike commuter in our conversation about her experiences of bike lanes: Visibility [from bike lanes] has made those of us who are not the crazy eighteentotwenty-four-year-old-boy on their fixed bike darting in and out of traffic being stupid, more comfortable and therefore more visible. And that's important because… they're not the kind [of cyclists] who are going to make drivers think cyclists should be here and that's important to me... (interview transcript 7-2-10). Read straightforwardly, this quote is about visibility and legitimacy. Read sideways, however, this quote is about flows of difference. It is important to this research participant for a person who is not a “crazy eighteen-to-twenty-four-year-old-boy” to be able to cycle on the street as well. From this perspective, it is movement that is of primary concern. In considering her movements through the city, this research participant both distinguishes her movements, and needs that impact her movements, as different from that of a “crazy eighteen-to-twenty-four-year-old-boy on their fixed bike,” and yet the same in that she still needs to be able to move through the city by bicycle. “The norm is an interplay of differential normalities” (Foucault 2007:63). Difference is preserved at the same time as it is subsumed. The norm is created through there being differences that interact in the urban milieu. As the cyclist’s quote above indicates, bike lanes help facilitate these interactions. Bike lanes are mechanisms of inclusivity discourse. Inclusivity, as a technology that gathers differences, helps produce the “plotting of the normal” (Foucault 2007:63). Importantly, inclusivity discourse understood in this light is not about counting bodies, what can be seen, what looks normal, or establishing legitimacy. Rather, it is about what can be expected or predicted, the establishment of a ‘normal’ range of experience. In other words, inclusivity in the Foucauldian sense of security is not about the intelligibility of bodies, but about facilitating their flow through the interaction of differences.

#### Contemporary commitments to biking attempt to shape the mobile subject into the model citizen

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[Samantha Z. Herr, 2012, Lexington, Kentucky “BIOPOLITICS OF BIKE-COMMUTING: BIKE LANES, SAFETY, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE,” uknowledge.uky.edu/geography\_etds/2/ pg. 18-19 accessed 7-7-12]

Whether tackling questions of cyclist identity (Aldred 2010; Blickstein and Hanson 2001; Fincham 2007; Furness 2005a; Furness 2005b; Horton 2006; Horton 2007; Horton, Rosen and Cox 2007; McCarthy 2011; Skinner and Rosen 2007),9 the embodied experience of bike commuting (Cupples and Ridley 2008; Jones 2005; Spinney 2009, 2010), the political mobilization of the bicycle in social movements (Batterbury 2003; Blickstein 2010; Blickstein and Hanson 2001; Carlsson 2002, 2010; Furness 2005a, 2005b, 2010; Horton 2006), or the emerging ‘green cycling’ discourse (Aldred 2010; Cupples and Ridley 2008; Jones 2005), social scholarship unites in its ponderings over the recent re-emergence of bicycling in automobile-dependent nations. Sustainability discourse is turning once perceived deviant cyclists into desirables; yet, despite the growing popularity of transport cycling promotion to create more healthy, inviting, sustainable cities, cyclists don’t find themselves transformed so much as stuck between competing discourses. On the one hand, transport cycling is becoming the behavior of the ‘responsible, good citizen’ (Aldred 2010; Cupples and Ridley 2008; Jones 2005), but on the other, cyclists rarely experience this positive status while riding on the road (Horton 2007; Horton et. al. 2007; Jones 2005; McCarthy 2011; Skinner and Rosen 2007). Of the first, for example, Cupples and Ridely (2008) show how transport cycling in New Zealand is seen to be the “right” thing to do. Through a discourse analysis of transport cycling promotion, they argue that, “One possible dominant reading of such strategies is that in the interests of greater well-being for ourselves, we are expected to put aside any economic, social, physical, or cultural differences and get on our bikes” (Cupples and Ridley 2008:257). “The bicycle, unlike the car, is seen as helping to promote a safe and pleasant local environment” (Aldred 2010:36). On the other hand, accounts from transport cyclists demonstrate that they experience their bodies disclosed, working and at risk; they experience marginalization, outsider-ness, and near accident or death encounters; and they experience exhilaration, the toning of muscles, sweating, heavy-breathing, pleasure and fun (Horton 2007; Horton et. al. 2007; Jones 2005; McCarthy 2011; Skinner and Rosen 2007).

### Airport Security Top-Level

#### The growing securitization of airports expands biopolitical control of populations

Martin 10 (Lauren L, U of Kentucky @ Lexington, Bombs, Bodies, and Biopolitics: Securitizing the Subject at the Airport Security Checkpoint, Social & Cultural Geography, Vol.11 No.1, http://oulu.academia.edu/LaurenMartin/Papers/1437718/Bombs\_bodies\_and\_biopolitics\_securitizing\_the\_subject\_at\_the\_airport\_security\_checkpoint) LA

Long before the attacks of 11 September 2001, the digitalization of identity data, linking of databases, and molecularization of surveillance (such as the collection of iris scans and ﬁngerprints) changed the spatiality of surveillance, and these technologies have become more entrenched in state security practices in recent years(Dillon2002).For critical security studies scholars, the collection of biometric data, the tracking of transaction data, and newly linked state intelligence and crime databases mark a change in the spatiality of  immigration and border enforcement, producing a border that is ‘everywhere and nowhere’ and imbricated with everyday life (Amoore 2006; Amoore and de Goede 2008; Coleman 2007; Martin and Simon 2008). Airports are particularly salient sites in this regard, because they operate both as ports of entry to the USA and as rather mundane workplaces for business travelers and airport employees (Parks 2007). While airports are often represented as abstractions, ‘spaces of ﬂows,’ and ‘non-places’ of global capitalism, airports are places , located in speciﬁc cultural and political economies (Adey 2004a, 2004b). In addition to carrying speciﬁc historical geographies and cultures of aerospace, airports serve as experimental sites for merging the regulation of mobility, promotion of consumerism, and surveillance (Adey 2006, 2008; Fuller and Harley 2004; Salter 2007). From ticket purchase to air trafﬁc control to the cockpit, the spatial practices of air travel are produced in and through code, so much so that Dodge and Kitchin (2004) argue that airports are ‘code/spaces.’ The airport represents, therefore, a site in which ‘ﬂows’ of information and capital are facilitated against a background of condensed and highly regulated surveillance practices. The airport epitomizes, in short, how the problems of mobility and state power, capital and security, geo-politics and geoeconomics congeal as a problem of security, addressed through combined surveillance and disciplinary practices (see Salter 2008). Beyond the airport, surveillance is increasingly ‘designed in’—and immanent to—the spaces of everyday life, diffusing and thereby  re-ordering the disciplinary mechanisms that form docile subjects. Hearkening to Deleuze (1988), Rose (1999) argues that power relations institutionalized in prisons, workhouses, and schools now work as a ‘diagram of power,’ a topological relationship between discursive objects embedded throughout social and state institutions. For example, closed circuit television (CCTV) records movement through public space (Koskela 2000; Fyfe and Banister 1996, 1998) and credit histories track consumption patterns, often without the knowledge of the citizen/consumer (Amoore and de Goede 2008). In this context, the making of political subjects is not what it used to be. Guided by concerns for the life of  statistical populations, subject formation operates less through prescription and prohibition and more through an assemblage of  techniques that ﬁne-tune subjects for the living of life. In this ‘control society,’ human beings are ‘not subjects with a unique personality that is the expression of some inner ﬁxed quality’ butare ‘plugged into multiple orbits, identiﬁed by unique codes, identiﬁcation numbers, proﬁles of preferences, security ratings and so forth’ (Rose 1999: 234). The ‘elements, capacities, and potentialities’ that deﬁne the subject of control are continually calculated and calibrated through multi-sited digital surveillance techniques, what Haggerty and Ericson call a ‘surveillant assemblage’ (Rose 1999: 234; Haggerty and Ericson 2000). Further, the digitalization of identity and the molecularization of biology have changed what it is to be living  , and have therefore decentered language and labor as constitutive of political subjectivity (Braun 2007; Dillon 2008; Rose 2006). In the context of state security regimes, deterritorializing the surveillance of populations marks, as Dillon argues, a deeper shift in the political ontology of state security (Dillon 2002, 2007, 2008; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009). Oriented towards the contingent, complex system, state security practices seek to manage non-linear ﬂows, segregating the threatening from the proﬁtable, and are not concerned with the making of proper political or ideological subjects. Rather, it is an abstracted, disaggregated species-being that has become both the potentially threatening subject and the object of intervention for securitized biopolitics (Dillon and Lobo-Guerra 2009; Adey 2009). Thus, the diffusion of surveillance and ballooning purview of security have reconﬁgured the spatiality of borders, citizenship, and state power, dramatically reconﬁguring the project of contemporary politics. From the perspective of regulating bomb jokes, however, could it be that the persistence of bluntly disciplinary mechanisms reveals a deep ambiguity about the ‘securitized subject,’  precisely because the ‘new’ subject of security is contingent, continually changing, and possibly becoming dangerous? Theories of performativity have sought to recast idealized liberal and disciplinary subjects as processes of subjectiﬁcation, partial, overdetermined, and under continual transformation (e.g., Butler 1990,1997; Laclau and Mouffe1985). Understanding security practices in terms of performative subjectiﬁcation casts a different light on two related conceptualizations of security and risk: (1) security practice as the spatialization of the biopolitics of exception (Amoore 2006, 2009; Amoore and de Goede 2008); and (2) risk as the operative logic of a post-anthropomorphic biopolitics, which renders travelers sub- or non-human through the management of contingency rather than money, labor, or identity (Adey 2009; Dillon 2007, 2008). Both of these conceptualizations extend Foucault’s concepts of biopower and biopolitics to understand how security practices reconﬁgure relations of power. Focused on the ways in which biopolitical governance has come to focus on risk analysis and preemption, these studies emphasize the importance of circulation, contingency, and connectivity to the power/knowledge assemblages that undergird security. As a consequence, both of these perspectives under estimate the degree to which the formation of subjects remains critical to the performance of security. Instead, as Foucault argues in his lectures on governmentality, government, discipline, and sovereignty are braided together , rather than episodically sequential modalities of power (Foucault 2007). As such, the formation of a subject is the constitutive moment of power—and power the constitutive outside of the subject—not a byproduct of speciﬁcally disciplinary orders (Butler 1997). It is true that subjects are no longer produced in the same way, but it is precisely their overdetermination that makes subjects contingent (see Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Is it possible that apparatuses of  security have not replaced disciplinary regimes, but have instead incorporated disciplinary apparatuses in response to the deep ambiguity about what an individual may do, when s/he is an identity in ﬂux? If  ‘the securitized subject’ is a contingent one, how might efforts to momentarily stabilize the subject be reconﬁgured and re-embedded at speciﬁc sites? And given that the concept of a coherent liberal subject has long been problematized by numerous social theorists, how might we revise our accounts of security from the perspective of theories of contingent and complex subjects? Drawing on Butler’s (1997) theorization of subjectiﬁcation as a function of   power (not conﬁned to liberal governance), I explore airport security from the perspective of  subject formation, and consider the governance of contingency as a project still under construction.

#### Airport Screening and profiling is inherently biopolitical.

Adey 09 [Peter, "Facing Airport Security: Affect, Biopolitics, And The Preemptive Securitisation Of The Mobile Body."Environment & Planning D: Society & Space 27.2 (2009): pgs. 274-295. Accessed 7/7/12] JDO

Much of the work in this area has developed as a critique of a developing vogue within airport and wider border security which uses the body, or information about the body, in order to identify one person from the next. The anxiety over who or what may be passing through the nation's borders means that uncertainty--a key object of biopolitical governing--is addressed by identification and by making known (Daase and Kessler, 2007; Ek, 2006; O'Malley, 2004). The so-called data-double [for a critical examination of this concept see Bennett (2006)] refers to the notion that our physical bodies and personal identities are repeated digitally by a data-double cruising in some sort of mirror world (Pascoe, 2001). Specific data about one's body are being used to distinguish one person from the next by matching up the corporeal body presented at a border checkpoint with the digital data of that body stored on a database or a credit card [for how these data-doubles enable the augmentation of the `real' passenger, see Fuller and Harley (2004)]. Although, to put it more precisely, it is not bodies per se which are being captured, but parts of bodies--dividuals according to Deleuze, a body ``partial, fragmented and incomplete'' (Walters, 2006, page 192; see also Introna and Wood, 2005). For many writers, Foucault's (2003; 2007) texts on the biopolitical help us interpret how these sorts of techniques enact a managerial, and not necessarily disciplinary, enrollment of a molar--a group of people addressed as a population and made known. Bodies, and knowledge of bodies, are abstracted into data which may be sifted, tabulated, and searched. In these studies, the body functions as one's passport (Van der Ploeg, 1999). The body must then show up, be present, ready, corporeal, to be read as various thresholds are surpassed (Agamben, 1998). From fingerprint and iris recognition technologies to the simple photograph imprinted on one's passport, identities have been proved by presenting a part of one's body at the airport/border (Salter, 2004; Torpey, 2000). The unity of the body is undone by focusing in on pieces of it. These pieces stand for the whole, for the whole of an identity. For instance, pattern recognition filters use finger prints. Palm recognition and now iris recognition technologies are deployed in many instances of facilitating airport priority passengers and frequent flyers who are pre-enrolled. In airports the Privium frequent flyer programme at Schiphol, Netherlands, as well as CANSPASS, and `trusted traveller' are cases in point of the elite use of these systems wherein trusted and frequent flyers have opted in (Adey, 2004; Cresswell, 2006a; Muller, 2007; Salter, 2004). Another major shift in airport and border security has been the introduction of the infamous profile. Originating from the realms of consumer marketing, and later perfected by Israeli Airline El Al, passenger profiling has taken many forms and guises (Elmer, 2004). Imaginations in the media which do not need rehearsing here have highlighted the problems faced by one who `flies while Arab'. Essentially, profiling addresses a future. For Mike Curry, a profile constructs ``a narrative within which the customer does something that she has not previously done, and by establishing the plausibility of that narrative'' (2004, page 488). Profiling projects forwards into the future in order to use that future to produce an outcome such as security. As Colleen Bell puts it, the ``biopolitical preoccupation with security sends it into `hyperbolic' mode, whereby subjects are accounted for on the basis of behavioural potentialities, rather than on the basis of how they have actually acted'' (2006, page 160). (3) Foucault (2007), of course, positions mobility alongside uncertainty with his understanding of `circulation'. Highly criticized systems such as the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS and CAPPS II) developed by the Transport Security Administration (TSA) created profiles of potential behavioural and personal indicators--a model of what someone likely to commit terrorist activity would act like and be like (Bennett, 2006; Lyon, 2007). Systems such as CAPPS were concerned with the ``actions--and especially the future actions--of individual members of a group''. As Curry goes on, ``To fit a profile meant to be predisposed to act in a certain way in certain situations'' (2004, page 489). Such systems, it has been shown, rely on quite large amounts of information, creating sorts of data trails or biographies and histories. By placing people into a specific category or a `risk pool', one may then use this profile to predict--using known data to theorise the unknown.

### Airport Security Magnifier

#### Airport security key: it is the primary way in which modern, affluent subjects engage with biopower

Adey 09 [Peter, "Facing Airport Security: Affect, Biopolitics, And The Preemptive Securitisation Of The Mobile Body."Environment & Planning D: Society & Space 27.2 (2009): pgs. 274-295. Accessed 7/7/12] JDO

It is easy to argue that these sorts of anxieties, fears, and experiences are being ignored by academics [although for a counter point see Salter (2007a)]. Though it is less the case for airline, airport, and security professionals who have long worked to previsualise and imagine the passenger's needs and wants in order that their behaviour might be predicted and therein anticipated. Such an attention has arisen in part so that the consumerist political economy of the airport terminal can be managed at a profit as passengers' `felt experiences' are made both measurable and quantifiable (Adey, 2008; Lisle, 2003; Salter, 2008). In other new developments, airport security is becoming more and more responsive to how security is experienced. Consider how these concerns are attended to by the TSA. Their spokesperson Kip Hawley explains, ``We recognize that the checkpoint is an interruption in the way of boarding a flight and often can be a source of frustration for travelers. TSA is moving to an approach where we spread out and calm down the security process. This should decrease stress at checkpoints, improve security, and improve the passenger experience. We're working with our airport and airline partners to establish a more calm security environment'' (2007a). 278 P Adey Here, we see an amazing shift in the intended consequences of security--in the ``moving toward a calmer, more nimble process'' as Hawley (2007a) describes it. To sum up, examined according to frames of the biopolitical, the regulation of airport mobilities may be characterized as a movement from the `pan-opticon' to the `ban-opticon' in the sense that such controls are not necessarily disciplinary but are addressed through the other pole of Foucault's apparatus. The power based on abandonment refers, in contrast, to a model of disengagement; ``it is a `banopticon' in the sense that it seeks proactive control and risk management rather than normalization'' (Bigo, 2002, page 82; 2006; Muller, 2004). As Louise Amoore puts it, this is ``an extension of biopower such that the body, in effect, becomes the carrier of the border as it is inscribed with multiple encoded boundaries of access'' (2006, pages 347 ^ 348). Both practices of biometrics and profiling employ a schema of technologies and procedures of recognition and calculation in order to deal with an uncertain future (Crampton and Elden, 2006). Both are based upon or have the effect of discriminating one person from the next. As Mick Dillon and Luis Lobo-Guerrero put it, ``The general problematic with which these biopolitical security techniques of population became preoccupied was ... the problem of differentiating good circulation from bad circulation'' (2008, pages 279 ^ 280). But the idea of biometrics and profiling is that they are also preemptive. Profiling enables the prediction of eventualities in order to prevent them, whereby biometrics sort out some identities from others in order to cancel out specific identities likely to present risks and therefore future eventualities. As Amoore writes, ``What Van Munster (2004, page 142) has called a `discourse on eventualities' has allowed the war on terror to be fought preemptively'' (Amoore, 2006, page 340).

### Pirates

#### The construction of the piracy security threat is based on the preservation of the international security apparatus

Lobo-Guerrero 08 (Luis Lobo-Guerrero is Lecturer in International Relations at Keele University. September 2008, International Political Sociology, "‘Pirates’, stewards, and the securitisation of global circulation," p. 15-16, http://www.biopolitica.cl/docs/Lobo\_Pirates\_securitisation\_global\_circulation.pdf, accessed 7-7-12, CNM)

The problem surrounding piracy that supported the listing of the Malacca Strait was related to three issues.3 First, the conceptualisation of piracy. Second, the measurement of piracy as a risk factor. And third, the potential interconnectedness of piracy with other forms of international crime and terrorism (c.f. Murphy 2007). It is argued in this section that the problematisation of criminality in the Malacca Strait waters as piracy was not politically neutral. It was the result of encompassing the situation through a wider security apparatus operationalised through global maritime insurance. In fact, such a problematisation of regional maritime crime as piracy operated as the condition of possibility for a technology of global insurance to affect the security environment of the region.

#### Problematization of pirates is securitizing

Lobo-Guerrero 08 (Luis Lobo-Guerrero is Lecturer in International Relations at Keele University. September 2008, International Political Sociology, "‘Pirates’, stewards, and the securitisation of global circulation," p. 19-20, http://www.biopolitica.cl/docs/Lobo\_Pirates\_securitisation\_global\_circulation.pdf, accessed 7-7-12, CNM)

A second element in the problematisation of maritime crime as piracy was an active process of securitisation; in this particular case, the profiling of piracy through political discourse.5 The narrative of the problem was heavily circumscribed within the rhetoric of the War on Terror (c.f. Engels 2007). Later on it was further securitised as ‘maritime terrorism’ (c.f. Greenberg et al. 2006). In October 2003, the defence minister of Singapore warned that terrorists might turn ‘supertankers, LPG [liquid petroleum gas], LNG [liquid natural gas], or chemical carriers into floating bombs’ (Ward and Hacket 2004: 1). Another Singaporean minister spoke about the ‘almost military precision’ of the attacks (Ward and Hacket 2004:1). As always, such securitisations are not politically neutral. Statements by high level Singaporean officials, as will be evident later on, responded to an alignment of the city-state’s security with the American interest in patrolling the area. The third element in the problematisation of the issue and its further securitisation within the context of the wider War on Terror was related to technical authorisation. In 2005, a report prepared by Aegis for the JWC stated that there was a potential close link between piracy in the Malacca region and terrorist activities. It argued that the modus operandi and weaponry employed resembled those by used by Islamist organisations in the area. ‘Pirates in the Strait are now largely indistinguishable from terrorists in terms of tactics employed, as well as their potential to cause significant damage to shipping’ (Jakarta-Post 2005, accessed: 29 November 2007). It explicitly identified the Strait as a potential target for the Jemaah Islamiah as having shown interest in the traffic of the Strait. The report concluded that sinking or damaging vessels in this sea-lane will seriously disrupt global maritime trade with significant economic and political consequences for the global economy (Jakarta-Post 2005).

### City

#### The Camp is the Urban

Bülent Diken, 2004

(Bülent Diken, Proffesor of Social and Cultural Theory at the Department of Sociology, Lancaster University “From Refugee Camps to Gated Communities: Biopolitics and the End of the City” Citizenship Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, March, 2004, 83-106 p. 101-102)

In what sense, then, does the camp signal the ‘end’ of the city? The first answer to this question is that the city has never existed as a whole; it has always been held together by the exception. The idea of an ‘ordered; city is this fundamentally nostalgic, the very symptom of which is the camp. The fantasy created thus is: if the hole (the camp) did not exist, the city would have been a whole. The camp is the ‘contingent’ space that hinders the urban order that would have been if, that is, the camp did not exist. What this fantasy hides of course that the camp is a ‘necessary’ effect of existing power relations. And precisely as such the camp participates actively, in the construction of the contemporary urban reality. Paradoxically, thus, the camp is what holds the city together: thanks to it, one can fantasize a non-antagonistic city! Thus a radical position against the idea of the camp as an anomaly is indeed to say that the camp does not exist: the city is always already antagonistic: it is an antagonistic. This is not the whole story, though there is a sense in which the camp definitely signals the ‘end’ of the city, and this brings us back to the question of post-politics, to the difficulty of politicization today in the classical Greek sense, that is as the metaphorical universalization of particular demands with the aim of restructuring the social space (Žižek, 1999, p.35). In as much as politics is the ability to debate and the capability to change the frame of the political debate and struggle on the basis of conflict, the camp means that power can escape the agora, that there is an essential link between increasing mobility and the ‘splintering’ city. The world of the contemporary camp(ing) is a world, in which power goes nomadic. Post-panoptic power is able to ‘travel light’, finds engagement neither necessary nor desirable, and speed is fast becoming the paramount factor of stratification and domination (Bauman, 2000, pp. 150-1). If ‘hit and run’ is the logic that makes people obey today, to be in the right camp means to be in a position to run at short notice. Political conflicts requires time and engagement, that is, dialogue; yet nomadic power can bypass the agora. Disengagement is no longer the outer limit of power relations, and uncertainty does not lead to conflict; they have both become effective strategies of power. Conflict requires relation; yet, one side of the mutual (panoptic) relation opted out (p. 188). Power moves to the ‘space of flows’; politics, the agore, remains incessantly local (Castells, 1996). In short, speed is “beyond politics’ (Lotringer and Virilio, 1997, p.86).

### Internet

#### Internet infrastructure is a part of the biopolitical restructuring of social space

Read 9 (Stephen, Delft University, Another Form: From the ‘Informational’ to the ‘Infrastructural’ City, http://repository.tudelft.nl/view/ir/uuid%3A9124271d-6373-4541-a5cd-54ba3e3373f4/) LA

According to a well-known informational view of the social-organisational form of our world, urban space has shifted away from being a social text,15 in a serial sequential time, to being a hypertext of simultaneous, technologically enabled, social- organisational linkages. Manuel Castells has claimed that the new microelectronic communica- tion media constitute a radically new ‘technological paradigm’, and that the new ‘informational city’ is a product of this new technology and the organisa- tional structures it enables.16 The power of networks today has become such, according to this view, that it is possible for the first time to coordinate and facilitate networked, decentralised organisation and action and maintain synchrony in networks.17 This new society is of a communicative order that emphasises the individual and his or her relations with widely distributed people in sparsely connected ‘network communities’ of family, friends, workmates and business contacts. Each person constructs his or her own community to orders relevant to that indi- vidual, and the internet becomes the pre-eminent infrastructure for a ‘networked individualism’.18 We begin to conduct large parts of our lives in a perva- sive connectivity of diverse network systems, and in a culture of ‘real virtuality’.19 Castells claims that this translates as a transformation of the material conditions of our lives, through the institution of a ‘space of flows’ and ‘timeless time’. The space of flows refers to the technological and organisa- tional possibility of effective social practices without geographical contiguity; timeless time refers to the use of new technologies ‘in a relentless effort to annihilate time’.20 But is this vision of a free-forming networked indi- vidualism weightlessly inhabiting a global space too simple? What kinds of people and things are involved in his vision? Castells has a Weberian conception of power as a violence someone does to someone else, defining power as ‘the action of humans on other humans to impose their will on others, by the use, potential or actual, of symbolic or physical violence’.21 He sees power as being played out today less through physical and more and more through symbolic violence - through media and communications - and he sees the subject emerg- ing in this struggle, which is a struggle in his terms literally for minds.22 Communications technologies and media are the most important parts of our lives today because ‘they build our imaginary’.23 While acknowledging that the power of global media today is unprecedented and may be radically and violently transformative of power relations, I want to note that Castells’s conception of the subject and his or her constitution is importantly different to more embod- ied versions of the constitution of subjectivity, and some of this is precisely in the emphasis on minds. Although he notes Foucault’s emphasis on the bodily microphysics of power, Castells stays with his macrophysics of networks of globally connected minds and globally diffusing ideas. Foucault argued how, in relations of power, human subjects are moved to behave in certain ways without being forced: ‘The exercise of power consists in guiding the possibility of conduct and putting in order the possible outcome. Basically power is less a confron- tation between two adversaries or the linking of one to the other than a question of government’.24 He taught us that we are shaped in situations that shape our conduct: being a crew member on a ship or a member of a household fundamentally affects the ways we are and what we do. We are all subject to an invisible governance of rationalised schemes, institutionalised programmes, techniques and material apparatus that shape conduct to particu- lar ends.25 These technical-organisational ‘devices’ diffuse more slowly than ideas, are integral with, and often only make sense in the context of, the practices they support and enable, and are not at all easily thrown off or replaced. With Foucault we shift the locus of subjectivity and action from the agent to the agent-environment relationship. What acts is not simply the agent with his or her stock of ideas, but the agent integrated with the technical and organisational systems that enable the action and make it coherent. What we end up dealing with is not pure ideas or information but dense networks of diverse but interrelated people and material embodying practical knowledges and supporting practices embedded in place.

### Poverty Advantages

#### Transportation infrastructure is created in a way that segregates the poor

Matiasek 04 (Edward, political theory and methodology at Illinois State University, "\"Fasten Your Safety Belts Kids! Security: from the Local to the International." http://pol.illinoisstate.edu/downloads/icsps\_papers/2004/matiasek13.pdf, accessed 7-7-12, CNM)

It is quite apparent that there is an implicit geopolitical force that underlies the location of low income housing. The zones are chosen by an appointed town official who has underwent training in “social engineering.” The locations of R3A zones have been placed as to ensure low income housing is feasible in a few areas. One can readily see this by marking the public transit routes that flow throughout the town. The necessity of transportation is a vital factor on mobility to employment opportunities and other necessities for poor people. The R3A zones that are not accessible to public transportation are not practical choices for low income providers to locate. On the same coin, the majority of off campus student housing is located under the R3B zones, and are thus not utilizable by low income housing providers. The rest of the town is segregated from low income housing,17 by single family districts which constitute the majority of the population’s wealthy. This is the primary way in which people who need low income housing to survive are forced into their own location, marked off by boundaries which serve as walls to the surrounding communities.

### “Freedom”

#### The perceived “freedom” offered by automobility is a lie: automobility takes an active role in the shaping and geographical stretching of lives by encapsulating people in their vehicles

Urry 4 (John, professor of Sociology at Lancaster, editor of the International Library of Sociology, “The ‘System’ of Automobility’, 2004, Theory Culture Society 21:25, 7/6/12, BR)

Automobility has irreversibly set in train new socialities, of commuting, family life, community, leisure, the pleasures of movement and so on. 2 The growth in automobility has principally involved new movement and not the replacement of public transport by the car (Adams, 1999; Vigar, 2002: 12). David Begg of the UK Centre for Integrated Transport deﬁnitively notes that: ‘Most car journeys were never made by public transport. The car’s ﬂexibility has encouraged additional journeys to be made’ (quoted in Stradling, 2002). These new mobilities result from how the car is immensely ﬂexible and wholly coercive. Automobility is a source of freedom, the ‘freedom of the road’. Its ﬂexibility enables the car-driver to travel at any time in any direction along the complex road systems of western societies that link together most houses, workplaces and leisure sites (and are publicly paid for). Cars extend where people can go to and hence what they are literally able to do. Much ‘social life’ could not be undertaken without the ﬂexibilities of the car and its 24hour availability. It is possible to leave late by car, to miss connections, to travel in a relatively time-less fashion. But this ﬂexibility is necessitated by automobility. The ‘structure of auto space’ (Freund, 1993; Kunstler, 1994) forces people to orchestrate in complex and heterogeneous ways their mobilities and socialities across very signiﬁcant distances. The urban environment has ‘unbundled’ territorialities of home, work, business and leisure that historically were closely integrated, and fragmented social practices in shared public spaces (SceneSusTech, 1998). Automobility divides workplaces from homes, producing lengthy commutes into and across the city. It splits homes and business districts, undermining local retail outlets to which one might have walked or cycled, eroding town-centres, non-car pathways and public spaces. It separates homes and leisure sites often only available by motorized transport. Members of families are split up since they live in distant places involving complex travel to meet up even intermittently. People inhabit congestion, jams, temporal uncertainties and health-threatening city environments, as a consequence of being encapsulated in a domestic, cocooned, moving capsule.

## Generic Links

### Economic Managerialism

#### The aff is not benign-while liberalism maintains the rhetoric of distance between subject and government, it merely transforms the boundaries of biopolitical regulation. The economic desire of individuals becomes the object of governance. The fusion of domestic and international economic management facilitates violence on a global scale.

Burke in 2005(Anthony, Senior Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Beyond Security)

This in turn enabled new modes of government which linked discipline with population, individualising with totalising power: a power which, seemingly without coercion, could produce individuals as subjects of their own desire while integrating them into a much broader system of regu­lation. Elsewhere Bentham contrasted 'the doleful motive of punishment' with the 'gentle motive of reward', the apparatus of law with 'the gentle liberty of choice'; labour, he said, is 'so easy and so light when animated by hope'.5° This `uncoerced', economic form of liberal individualism generated what Foucault has called 'the subject of interest', and introduced a contra­diction into governmental reason: while it made individuals more accessible to power, it also distanced them from it, forming a rhetoric in which, as Bentham said, security also guarantees 'political liberty' against 'the injus­tice of the members of the government'. This introduced, said Foucault, a 'dissonance of rationalities' between the juridical form of government implied by sovereignty and the more diffuse and accidental reconciliation of individual and societal interests in liberalism. Subjects were to be subservient to the exercise of sovereign power, but were also assumed to be free and autonomous economic actors. Liberalism as an art of govern­ment began, he argued, when it could formulate the 'incompatibility between the non-totalisable multiplicity which characterises subjects of interest, and the totalising unity of the juridical sovereign'.51 This generated a political problem: to discover a form of government that, while recognising that no sovereignty can fully comprehend the totality of the economy, or regulate every act that may have an economic effect, must still seek to do so. It was at the appearance of this problem that Foucault sited the junction of security, discipline and population – a mix of rationalities that might more fully grasp this uncertain political space. Thus, he argued: 'liberty is registered not only as a right of indi­viduals legitimately to oppose . . . the sovereign, but also now as an indispensable element of governmental rationality itself.'52 This engen­dered a drive for flexibility, mobility and vigilance – as Bentham declared, `Economy has . . . many enemies' and hence Security 'requires in the legislator, vigilance continually sustained, and power always in action, to defend it against his constantly reviving crowd of adversaries'.53 In short, the new, open space of liberalism had engendered a prophetic paranoia: the theme of a new productivity of political power which simultaneously reaches into the heart of the citizen and multiplies its own spatial reach. It seems no accident that both Bentham and Smith wrote at the height of the European imperialisms, a time in which the discursive imagination of the twentieth century – global trade, geopolitics, Clausewitzian war, and technological progress – was slowly but inexorably born. In describing this productivity Foucault emphasised the simultaneous individualisation and totalisation of governmental power: discipline and desire addressed to individuals, bio-power addressed to populations, in a perpetual feedback and productive combination – a power producing the very life it sought to order and utilise.54 To these, however, we must add geopolitics as the form of power which combined these rationalities with the vast lusts of modern imperialism.55 By the mid-twentieth century geopolitics had become the practice of security par excellence: a spatial­ising rationality of power which sought the control of territories and populations (as both economic resources and strategic possessions) within a perpetually dangerous and contested arena, through the interdependent production of domestic and transnational political space. Not withstanding the fascist imperialisms of the 1930s, we could thus characterise geopolitics as a liberal philosophy of global intervention, which links increasingly global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations across the whole of government. The domestic and international become fused spaces through a series of interlinked processes: of domestic and foreign economic policy, transnational business and trade, or the raising of armies with images of fear and otherness which simultaneously secure and rigidify domestic identities. As global influence becomes conceivable, the inter-relation of political economy, nationalism and the Other become central to security as a vector and rationality of power <p43-44>

### Economic Securitization

#### Economic security discourse attempts to violently re-order the world

Neocleous ’08 [Mark, Professor of Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University (UK), 2008 (“Critique of Security,” Pg. 101-102]

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’. Despite the fact that ‘economic security’ would never be formally defined beyond ‘economic order’ or economic well-being’, the significant conceptual consistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasize economic and thus ‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and ‘social equality’. Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bourgeoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. “The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the glove. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere… It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them… to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.” In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about it part under the guise of security. The whole world became a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of fifteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capital-accumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, economic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also ‘secured’ everywhere.

### Economic Competitiveness

#### The discourse of competitiveness is used to legitimatize policy actions through threat construction

Bristow, School of City and Regional Planning at Cardiff University, 05

(Gillian Bristow, Professor at the School of City and Regional Planning, Cardiff University, “Everyone’s a ‘winner’: problematising the discourse of regional competitiveness”, page 289-291, 4-13-05, http://joeg.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/5/3/285)

The evolutionary, ‘survival of the fittest’ basis of the regional competitiveness discourse clearly resonates with this evaluative culture. The discourse of competitiveness strongly appeals to the stratum of policy makers and analysts who can use it to justify what they are doing and/or to find out how well they are doing it relative to their ‘rivals’. This helps explain the interest in trying to measure regional competitiveness and the development of composite indices and league tables. It also helps explain why particular elements of the discourse have assumed particular significance—output indicators of firm performance are much easier to compare and rank on a single axis than are indicators relating to institutional behaviour, for example. This in turn points to a central paradox in measures of regional competitiveness. The key ingredients of firm competitiveness and regional prosperity are increasingly perceived as lying with assets such as knowledge and information which are, by definition, intangible or at least difficult to measure with any degree of accuracy. The obsession with performance measurement and the tendency to reduce complex variables to one, easily digestible number brings a ‘kind of blindness’ with it as to what is really important (Boyle, 2001, 60)—in this case, how to improve regional prosperity. Thus while a composite index number of regional competitiveness will attract widespread attention in the media and amongst policymakers and development agencies, the difficulty presented by such a measure is in knowing what exactly needs to be targeted for appropriate remedial action. All of this suggests that regional competitiveness is more than simply the linguistic expression of powerful exogenous interests. It has also become rhetoric. In other words, regional competitiveness is deployed in a strategic and persuasive way, often in conjunction with other discourses (notably globalisation) to legitimate specific policy initiatives and courses of action. The rhetoric of regional competitiveness serves a useful political purpose in that it is easier to justify change or the adoption of a particular course of policy action by reference to some external threat that makes change seem inevitable. It is much easier for example, for politicians to argue for the removal of supply-side rigidities and flexible hire-and-fire workplace rules by suggesting that there is no alternative and that jobs would be lost anyway if productivity improvement was not achieved. Thus, ‘the language of external competitiveness. . .provides a rosy glow of shared endeavour and shared enemies which can unite captains of industry and representatives of the shop floor in the same big tent’ (Turner, 2001, 40). In this sense it is a discourse which provides some shared sense of meaning and a means of legitimising neo-liberalism rather than a material focus on the actual improvement of economic welfare.

### Neoliberalism

#### **The relationship of the state to the market occurs in a biopolitical context**

Lazzarato 6 (Maurizio, Italian sociologist and philosopher researching areas such as labour ontology, biopolitics, immaterial labour and cognitive capitalism, “Biopolitics/Bioeconomics: A Politics of Multiplicity”, July 2006, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/0401-LAZZARATO-GB-2.pdf>, 7/10/12, BR)

Foucault makes relative the spontaneous “ontological” power of the enterprise, the market and labour and the constitutive force of “majoritarian” subjects (entrepreneurs and workers). Instead of making the sources of the production of wealth (and of the production of the real) in a mirroring fashion as Marxists and political economy have done, he shows how they are rather the results of the action of a group of dispositifs that activate, solicit and invest “society”. Enterprises, the market and labour are not spontaneous powers, but rather constitute what liberal government must make possible and real. The market, for instance, is an economic and social general regulator, yet it is not a natural mechanism found at the foundation of society, as Marxists and classical liberals had thought. On the contrary, the mechanisms of the market (prices, laws of demand and supply) are fragile. Favourable conditions must be continuously created for these fragile mechanisms to function. Governmentality assumes the market is the limit of state intervention : this is not in order to neutralise its interventions, but rather to requalify them. The relation between the State and the market is clarified by the theory and practice of German Ordo-liberals. In fact, liberal interventions can be as numerous as Keynesian ones (The freedom of the market needs an active and extremely vigilant politics), but their aims and objects are different. The goal of these interventions is the very possibility of the market. The objective is to make competition, the action of prices and the calculation of supply and demand possible. As the Ordo liberals say, intervention not on the market, but for the market. There is no need to intervene in the market since the measure of interventions is the principle of intelligibility, the place of veridiction. What needs intervention then ? According to the German liberals action must not be taken on what is directly economic, but on the conditions that make market economy possible. The government must intervene on society itself in its web and thickness. The “politics of society”, as they call it, has to take charge and account for social processes, and within them make room for the market mechanism. In order for the market to be possible, the general framework must be acted upon : demography, techniques, property rights, social and cultural conditions, education, juridical regulations etc. The economic theory of liberals manages to conceive of a politics of life (Vitalpolitik) in order to allow the market to exist : “A politics of life is not essentially oriented, as traditional social politics, towards the augmentation of wages and the reduction of labour time ; rather, it becomes aware of the life situation of the totality of workers, its real, concrete situation, from morning to evening to morning”. It looks like the “Third Way” of Tony Blair is more inspired by this continental liberalism than American neo-liberalism.

#### Capital investments are biopolitical

Lazzarato 6 (Maurizio, Italian sociologist and philosopher researching areas such as labour ontology, biopolitics, immaterial labour and cognitive capitalism, “Biopolitics/Bioeconomics: A Politics of Multiplicity”, July 2006, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/0401-LAZZARATO-GB-2.pdf>, 7/10/12, BR)

What does it mean, to form and better capital ? To make and manage investments in school education, in health, mobility, affects and relations of all sorts (marriage for instance). In reality we are not seeing the worker through the classical lenses of the term (Marx), since the problem is to manage one’s life time rather than one’s labour time. And that starts from birth, since these future performances also depend on the quantity of affect that is given to the worker by relatives, capitalised by income for him or her and in “psychic income” for the relatives. In order to turn a worker into an entrepreneur and an investor, one needs to “step to the exterior of labour”. Cultural, social, educative policies define the “wide and moving” framework within which choosing individuals evolve. And choices, decisions, conducts and behaviours are events and series of events that must be precisely regulated by the dispositifs of security. There is a shift from the analysis of structure to the analysis of the individual, from the analysis of economic processes to an analysis of subjectivity, its choices and the conditions of production of its life. Which system of rationality should this activity of choice obey to ? To the laws of the market, the model of supply and demand, the model of costs/investment that are generalised to the social body in its totality, to turn them into “a model of social relations, a model of existence itself, a relation of the individual to him/herself, to time, surroundings, the future, groups, the family”, which means that “economics is the study of the manner in which rare resources are allocated to alternative aims”.

### Neoliberalism – Stimulus Internal

#### The alarm bells they sound to justify Keynesian stimulus is underwritten by a logic of coercive governmental domination over the citizenry

Gudis, Cal-Riverside Associate History Professor, 10 (Catherine, “Driving consumption,” History and Technology: An International Journal Volume 26, Issue 4, 2010, JSTOR, Date Accessed: 7/7, JS)

McGovern looks at a different range of actors from the 1890s to 1940s, unpacking the rhetoric of ‘professionals who studied and addressed buyers and made civic language and ideas a centerpiece of common discourse about consumers.’ He believes ‘the links they forged between money and voting, spending and democracy, acquisition and national culture, contributed to the political formation of individual subjects as citizens, though not without significant social consequences.’ 10 Cohen carries this argument through the postwar years, first by outlining the ways that consumption was urged in the Depression and New Deal for both the ‘greater good,’ to save capitalist America, and to ensure individual rights. 11 In the postwar period, ‘consuming in pursuit of private gains’ was heralded for the ‘ameliorative effects of aggregate purchasing power,’ and aided through governmental policy (GI Bill, FHA, belief in Keynesian economics). 12 In the end, a nation of purchaser‐consumers came to believe that self‐interest and self‐gratification were the fundamental state‐sponsored rights of citizenship, trumping civics and social conscience. Seiler builds on many of these ideas: the car, he explains, was ‘facilitator of the blithely masterful new subjectivity of the consumer‐citizen,’ 13 the driver promoted and became a beneficiary of the same government policies characterizing the consumers’ republic (especially interstates), and the driver‐citizen, like the consumer, was seen as irrational and impulsive. 14 We can see how driving becomes interchangeable with consuming in Republic of Drivers: both entail market transactions; generate affect; make it seem we have choice, autonomy, and self determination; allow us and people usually subjected to prejudicial treatment – especially in the age of standardization – to potentially ‘pass as the blank liberal subject’; and establish a ‘sovereign self’ to divert attention from the social self of corporate capitalism. 15 The liberal‐capitalist hegemony that is bolstered by driving is given human flesh by the actors and agents in Glickman’s, McGovern’s, and Cohen’s accounts: advertisers, bankers, civil rights activists, consumers and consumerists (those seeking to represent the interests of consumers), developers, economists, ‘market‐based radicals,’ politicians and public officials, veterans, and others. Consumption of course shot through the entire enterprise of automobility. They were inseparable, just as the market’s infiltration into all corners of the exterior environment and interior life was characterized by mobility. However, the benefits of being on the road went beyond the sensation of freedom or the recuperation of a flailing sovereign self. That sensation was just the payoff for, well, paying. Drivers paid for the right to be on the road, and kept on paying the more they traveled. This was not lost on those with a vested interest in getting and keeping consumers on the road and who actively sought the attention and cash dollars of motorists. The more consumers drive, the more they consume, advertisers were fond of noting starting in the 1920s. 16 So while the open road became depicted as a place to enact freedom, democracy, and individuality (and in the process redefined and invigorated the older liberal rhetoric) a broad cast of other characters saw automobility as a source of profit. General automobile use and tourism represented perhaps billions of dollars worth of business in the 1920s – a total hard to estimate given the range of interconnected economic transactions. 17 Both national strength and prosperity could be gauged accordingly, as automobility not only represented but, as pundits promised, could create wealth and promote higher standards of living (the work of driver–consumer–citizens). Even in the years of deepest depression, the automobile remained a priority for many, including the unemployed. ‘People give up everything in the world but their car,’ Robert and Helen Lynd reported in their community studies of Middletown. Even though the experiences of the black auto‐tourists were ‘lessons’ in ‘Jim Crowism,’ as Lillian Rhoades wrote in a 1933 article, ‘One of the Groups Middletown Left Out,’ they too hastened to buy cars. Dust Bowl refugees, African American southern farm tenants, and urban families with hardly enough to cover basic emergencies did the same. 18 For two years of the Depression (1932 and 1933), gasoline consumption and miles driven by Americans steadily grew, along with mass auto tourism. 19 Perhaps this gave some traction to the publicity campaigns waged, for instance, by the National Association of Manufacturers as they worked to recast the majoritarian democracy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s four freedoms as an American Dream on four wheels, a dream of automobile consumption (and the other elements of mobile privatization it brought) so powerful that it itself was nearly capable of lifting the nation from the Depression – with, of course, the agents of not just ‘private’ enterprise but what business now declared to be ‘free’ enterprise as the fuel and the guarantor of America’s continued liberties. 20 This predominantly economic vision of the mobile American Way – ensured by individual freedom rather than majoritarian democracy – would dominate the discourse of advertising, automobility, and even liberalism itself for decades. America was commonly depicted in the popular press by the 1920s as a ‘nation on wheels’ and its inhabitants a ‘restless’ population pulsing to the beat of a ‘new American tempo’ 21 of youth, energy, and action – an identity bolstered further by advertisers who used these notions to justify rapid fashion change, obsolescence, expenditures for marketing campaigns, and the use of goods as object lessons in modernity, all with the purpose of urging fast‐paced mass consumption. By 1910, the most common product advertised was the car (it would remain that way on billboards through the 1950s) and within 10 more years the most common motif employed to sell all kinds of products was mobility. 22 As Roland Marchand and others have shown, advertisers persistently associated the products they publicized with class ascension, modernity, and progress. 23 Pleasure and consumption rather than work and production dominated advertising scenes that were no longer aimed to teach the utilitarian or objective value of the goods for sale. Associative, subjective values were depicted instead to sell intangible benefits, the clear referent of the advertisements now unmoored, replaced by ambiguity and diffused states of feeling. 24 Visual tropes and an array of metaphors of mobility abounded to sell, not merely sovereignty over self, but self‐realization. The discourse of advertising thus fashioned subjects whose mobility was enacted through consumption and for whom consumption represented all sorts of mobility – geographic, social, economic, physical, even spiritual.

### Neoliberalism - Innovation

#### Innovation incentives are always framed biopolitically

Lazzarato 6 (Maurizio, Italian sociologist and philosopher researching areas such as labour ontology, biopolitics, immaterial labour and cognitive capitalism, “Biopolitics/Bioeconomics: A Politics of Multiplicity”, July 2006, <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/0401-LAZZARATO-GB-2.pdf>, 7/10/12, BR)

Contrary to the opinion of Polany and the Regulation School, the regulation of the market is not a corrective to its disordered development ; it is its institution. Why this reversing of such a standpoint ? Because what needs to be taken into account is something relatively neglected by economics : the problem of innovation. If there is innovation, if something is created anew, when new forms of productivity are discovered, “this is nothing other than the result of a whole of investments that have been made at the level of man himself”. A politics of growth cannot simply point to the problem of material investment, of physical capital on the one hand, and of the number of workers multiplied by the hours of labour on the other. What needs to be changed is the level of content of human capital and to act on this “capital” a whole series of dispositifs are needed, to mobilise, solicit, incite and invest “life”.

### Neoliberalism Bad Affs

#### Biopower causes a neoliberal ordering of society

Hamann 9 (Trent H., St. John’s U, Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and Ethics, Foucault Studies No6 Feb 2009) LA

In his 1978-79 course lectures, Foucault analyzed liberalism as a historical form of biopolitical governmentality, that is, as a form of political rationality concerned with the government of populations and the conduct of individual conduct in accord with “the internal rule of maximum economy” (BB, 318). His genealogical analysis of libe- ralism led him to examine the West German Ordo-liberalism of the period from 1942 to 1962 and the American neoliberalism of the Chicago School, which developed lat- er on. Foucault noted that both forms of neoliberalism were conceived from the very beginning as interventionist and critical responses to specific forms of governmen- tality. For the West Germans, who were faced with the daunting task of building a new state from scratch it constituted a critique of the excessive state power of Naz- ism and for the Americans it was a reaction to the overextended New Deal welfare state and its interference in market mechanisms. In this regard both schools were linked from the start to classical liberalism insofar as they were forms of “critical go- vernmental reason,” or political rationality that theorized government as immanent- ly self-limiting by virtue of its primary responsibility for supporting the economy. Whereas the pre-modern state had utilized the economy to serve its own ends, the emergence of political economy within the liberal reason of state reversed the tradi- tional relationship between government and economy (BB, 12-3). What fascinated Foucault about the American neoliberals in particular, and distinguished them from the West German Ordo-liberals, was their unprecedented expansion of the economic enterprise form to the entire social realm. The Americans sought “to extend the ra- tionality of the market, the schemes of analysis it offers and the decision-making cri- teria it suggests, to domains which are not exclusively or not primarily economic: the family and the birth rate, for example, or delinquency and penal policy” (BB, 323). Government is also reconceived as an enterprise to be organized, operated, and sys- tematically critiqued according to an “economic positivism” (BB, 247). Within the reason of state of American neoliberalism, the role of government is defined by its obligations to foster competition through the installation of market-based mechan- isms for constraining and conditioning the actions of individuals, institutions, and the population as a whole. In fact, the government’s ability to operate under the cost-benefit rule of maximum economy while simultaneously “hard selling” this “way of doing things” becomes its one and only criterion of legitimacy (BB, 318). Another significant feature of neoliberalism is its explicit acknowledgment of the fact that neither the market nor economic competition between individuals is a natural reality with self-evident or intrinsic laws. Rather, the rationality of neolibe- ralism consists of values and principles that must be actively instituted, maintained, reassessed and, if need be, reinserted at all levels of society (BB, 120). While neoli- beral governmentality seeks to minimize state power as much as possible, it also re- cognizes that the market can only be kept viable through active governmental and legal support. Likewise, it explicitly acknowledges that competition between indi- viduals can only be fostered through social mechanisms that are exclusively en- coded, ordered and reassessed by market values. The point here is that within the rationality of neoliberal governmentality8 it is clear that Homo economicus or “eco- nomic man” is not a natural being with predictable forms of conduct and ways of behaving, but is instead a form of subjectivity that must be brought into being and maintained through social mechanisms of subjectification. As I will illustrate below, ”economic man” is a subject that must be produced by way of forms of knowledge and relations of power aimed at encouraging and reinforcing individual practices of subjectivation.

### Security

#### Every invocation of geopolitical security is also biopolitical-security becomes both a precondition for and regulator of the life of populations.

Dillon 2008(Michael, badass lecturer @ Lancaster, and Luis Lobo Guerrero, *biopolitics of security in the 21st century*, Paper Accepted for Publication in the Review of International Studies, January 2008, Online paper archive for the SGIR Turin Conference 2007)

It is nonetheless difficult, however, to sustain the privileging of the micro over the macro which Foucault ordinarily champions in his various analytics of power, because the problematisation of security provides such a powerful point of intersection between geopolitical and biopolitical security analysis. With discourses of security, the micropolitical regularly becomes the macro-political; when minor infringements of codes of normalisation, to do especially these days with religious dress codes for example, become incitements to political and nationalistic fervour, and when macro-political calls to nation cash-out into the detailed inscription of everyday conduct. This point was noted by Colin Gordon, for example when he referred to security as a ‘specific principle of political method and practice’ which joins the governing of the social body to ‘proper conduct’ of the individual, to the governing of oneself. Foucault also referred to it as the process of internal colonisation.28 There is thus no geopolitics that does not imply a correlate biopolitics, and no biopolitics without its corresponding geopolitics. Giorgio Agamben states this point succinctly: “It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power.”29

#### The politic of security is biopolitics

Dillon & Reid 1’ (Global Liberal Governance: Biopolitics, Security and War, Michael Dillon and Julian Reid, p.51-52)

**The history of security is not the pursuit of a universal value by pre-formed subjects, individual or collective**. 43 Given the foundational significance of security to all established formulations of politics, throughout the political tradition of the West, **the history of security is a history of the changing problematisation of what it is to be a political subject and to be politically subject. Thus it is always deeply implicated in the ways in which the task of government itself is problematised and political order conceived**. 44 Although the security problematic is ordinarily examined in terms of state sovereignty, **it has in fact always been a biopolitical as much as a geopolitical problematic.** 45 **Thus conceived security analysis takes the form of the genealogy of dynasties of power relations and the critical analysis of the discursive conditions of emergence of contemporary security regimes.** Furthermore, the changing problematisations of security have always been comprised of complex terrains of practices involving deeply embedded discourses of danger said to be foundational to individual welfare, social formation and political order. **Said to be foundational to life, individual welfare, social formation and political order, these problematisations of danger, together with their allied discourses of fear are, however, the very means by which specific programmes of life, individual, welfare, social formation and political order are introduced, circulated, reproduced and enacted.** **The project of securitising**, to steal but refashion a term coined elsewhere, is concerned with making life accessible to different social technologies: where technology refers broadly to complex techniques and relations of power established in the course of conceiving government as the administration and ordering of life rather than the politics of free peoples. Thus understood, technology **is the process by which life is rendered into some kind of determinate material, raw life, in need of being secured from the threats and fears to which discourses of danger say it is prey.**

#### Biopolitics and security cannot be separated from one another-any decision meant to secure life of population is a biopolitical one

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The first is a collection of related questions, initially posed by Foucault, when in effect he asked: What happens to the political rationalities and technologies of power, to the problematisation of security and to the character of security technologies when - taking species life as its referent object - power comes to strategise human being politically as species being? The paper goes on to explain how, according to Foucault, biopolitics first evolved around ‘population’ as its empirical referent object of power. Given Foucault’s emphasis on ‘empiricities, any engagement of Foucault’s biopolitics has therefore to address the category of the empirical referent of ‘population’, as well as the more generic referent object of biopower which is ‘life’, and to ask what has happened to population as well as to ‘life’ in the interim between Foucault’s initial interrogation of the biopolitical economy of biopower and the biopolitics of the 21st century. This paper does precisely that.4 It explains how the biopolitics of biopower is necessarily also allied with freedom and what kind of ‘freedom’ is understood to be at work in it. In explaining precisely what Foucault understands, in addition, by ‘security’, and how this understanding of security differs from traditional geopolitical accounts of security derived from ontologies and anthropologies of political subjectivity, the paper also clarifies why Foucault concludes that biopolitics simply is a “dispositif de sécurité”. Strictly speaking, therefore, there is no biopolitics which is not simultaneously also a security apparatus. There is no biopolitics of this, or a biopolitics of that. When one says biopolitics one says security; albeit in a certain way.

#### The biopolitics of the zones of liberal peace in the affluent spaces of the West is intimately connected to the global biosecurity of imperialism.

Braun 7’ (Biopolitics and the molecularization of life, Bruce Braun, Cultural Geographies 2007 p. 23-25)

**If security is a political discourse that justifies new forms of sovereign power by placing the actions of the state ‘outside’ politics, then biosecurity risks doing much the same, justifying a continuous state of emergency at the level of political life by reference to a continuous state of emergence at the level of molecular life.** We might conclude, then, that **biosecurity names much more than a set of political technologies whose purpose is to govern the disorder of biological life; it increasingly names a global project that seeks to achieve certain biomolecular futures by pre-empting others**, and does so in part by reconfiguring in other places relations between people, and between people and their animals. **Biosecurity weds biopolitics with geopolitics**. We are perhaps now in a position to bring the two halves of this paper together. In what ways can it be said of the molecularization of life that it has made our biological existence a political concern in new ways? For Nikolas Rose, **the molecularization of life has brought us to a new moment in the history of biopolitics, one in which bodies are understood in terms of their ‘genetic inheritance’, the management of risk is individualized, and the make-up of our bodies, and not just their conduct, has become the subject of technologies of self. In this ethopolitical regime biopolitics is understood in terms of governmentality, and politics takes as its concern the recognition of genetic conditions and the mobilizing of resources in their name.** But this is not the only way in which the molecularization of life has been apprehended. **If we attend to the global biopolitics of biosecurity the government of the ‘global biological’ we find a quite different relation between the biological and the political. On the one hand, the ‘genetic inheritance’ of the ‘somatic’ self comes to be replaced by ‘precarious’ bodies inhabiting ‘virtual’ biologies. On the other hand, forms of pastoral power recede while new forms of sovereign power appear. But how are we to understand the relation between the two?** At the very least, **we must see Rose’s ethopolitics as something more particular and less universal, as perhaps a form of biopolitics within globalization that is specific to the zone of ‘liberal peace’ in the affluent spaces of the West.** But more important, we must ask whether the conditions of possibility for ethopolitics for secure bodies that are open to ‘improvement’ include the extension of sovereign power elsewhere in the name of biological security. For not only does the global South lie outside the technoscientific and cultural networks that compose the ethopolitical for Rose, but arguably **biological existence there is increasingly subject to projects that seek to pre-empt risk through new forms of sovereign power. We are faced with the troubling thought that in the molecular age, what appears to us in terms of an ethics of ‘care of self’, and as a pressing problem of democracy, may appear to others as yet another expression of empire.**

### Environmental Managerialism

#### The attempt to remedy an environmental crisis locks the affirmative into the logic of environmental governmentality. This super-empowered statist ecology is the root of biopolitical control through its attempt to regulate the existence of individuals for the preservation of the population

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(Timothy, “The (Un)Wise (Ab)Use of Nature: Environmentalism as Globalized Consumerism? http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/tims/Tim528.htm)

In conclusion, Foucault is correct about the network of governmentality arrangements in the modern state. State power is not "an entity which was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very existence," because its power/knowledge has indeed evolved "as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns."116 Producing discourses of ecological living, articulating designs of sustainable development, and propagating definitions of environmental literary for contemporary individuals simply adds new twists to the "very specific patterns" by which the state formation constitutes "a modern matrix of individualization."117 The emergent regime of ecologized bio-powers, in turn, operates through ethical systems of identity as much as it does in the policy machinations of governmental bureaux within any discretely bordered territory. Ecology merely echoes the effects from "one of the great innovations in the techniques of power in the eighteenth century," namely, "the emergence of 'population' as an economic and political problem."118 Once demography emerges as a science of statist administration, it is statistical attitudes can diffuse into the numerical surveillance of Nature, or Earth and its nonhuman inhabitants, as well as the study of culture, or society and its human members, giving us ecographies written by the Worldwatchers steering effects exerted from their astropanopticons through every technoscientific space.119 Government, and now, most importantly, superpowered statist ecology, preoccupies itself with "the conduct of conduct," particularly in consumerism's "buying of buying" or "purchasing of purchasing." Habitus is habitat, as any good product semanticist or psychodemographer knows all too well. The ethical concerns of family, community and nation previously might have guided how conduct was to be conducted; yet, at this juncture, "the environment" serves increasingly as the most decisive ground for normalizing each individual's behavior.

#### Environmental management occurs against the backdrop of biopolitical understandings of nature which reduce everything to units of usefulness.

Smith 8 [Mick Smith, Queen's University, 2008 Michigan State University Press, Journal for the Study of Radicalism 2.1 (2008) 1-25 “Suspended Animation: Radical Ecology, Sovereign Powers, and Saving the (Natural) World,” Project Muse]

The idea of saving the (natural) world has about it an air of ridiculous naivety. Indeed it openly invites ridicule. First, it seems unrealistically grandiose in the scope of its ambition. How could one hope to save a whole world or to keep all of nature safe? Second, it appears too close to the patronizing and dangerous religiosity of those who want to save "America" or our souls for Jesus and free-enterprise (a somewhat strange combination), whether or not we want to be so saved. Does the natural world really want or need saving, and for whom? Third, it is all too readily compared, and all too rarely contrasted, with the kind of mindless fundamentalisms that, with proselytizing fervor, posit single, simple, but mutually contradictory ends for humankind. After all, aren't there many world-views, and correspondingly many understandings of what saving the natural world might entail? And of course, there are. And yet it might still be suggested that, deep down, radical ecologists strive to save what they can of the natural world, that this is their fundamental ethical and political concern. What is more, this ethical and political concern separates radical ecologists, those who would go to the root of that which threatens the world, from the purveyors of environmental expediency, from the "shallow" (to use Arne Naess's term) environmentalists who formulate all concerns for the natural world within the globally dominant language of resource economics [End Page 1] and management. It expresses the difference between those who regard the natural world as a "realm of ends" (to adopt a Kantian idiom) and those who account it merely a "storehouse of means" of value only because of its potential usefulness toward humanly determined ends. On this latter view the world is worth saving only in the sense that one might prudently save money for a rainy day, only as natural capital that earns us interest, rather than as that which is deserving of our interest, our concerns. Radical ecologists, then, argue that a distinction between ends and means, in the sense of ethics and instrumentality, is no less important with regard to the natural than to the social world. Saving the natural world is an end in itself. But, what kind of an end can it be? In what sense can we speak of a natural world of ends, and how might this be related to concerns about an ecological crisis, that is to say, the potential ending of the (natural) world? In any event, doesn't the rejection of "resourcism" just conﬁrm that radical ecology is, as sceptics suppose, a ridiculous form of fundamentalism naively refusing to engage in realpolitik? There are, I'd suggest, no simple answers to such questions, although just admitting this already begins to distinguish radical ecology from any single-minded fundamentalism. As an initial step, though, we might begin by distinguishing a realpolitik that provides a systematically applied excuse to compromise one's ethics from a "politics for the real (natural) world," understood as an applied art of seeking, where possible, ethical compromises, that is, a worldly phronesis, an ethically inspired political wisdom. Of course, speaking the language of resource economics may, on occasion, persuade sovereign powers to grant this or that aspect of the natural world a temporary stay of execution. But, as Neil Evernden**[1](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_for_the_study_of_radicalism/v002/2.1smith.html" \l "FOOT1)** argues, it also, wittingly or unwittingly, accepts the original terms on which nature's death warrant has already been signed. It concedes everything to an understanding of the world as no more than what Heidegger (1993) refers to as a "standing reserve" of lifeless, that is, de-animated and nonautonomous, "matter" systematically ordered according to a technological enframing (Gestell).**[2](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_for_the_study_of_radicalism/v002/2.1smith.html" \l "FOOT2)** The forests and their myriad inhabitants are thus conceptually reduced to so many board feet of timber, the once roaring rivers to so many kilowatt hours of hydroelectricity. From more radical perspectives, and at the risk of seeming ungrateful for small mercies, we might regard even those patches of the world momentarily set aside from more corrosive forms of technologically mediated commodiﬁcation as beings left in a state of suspended animation, as hanging dearly onto bare life above the gallows-drop of global capitalism. The fate of the world's whales is only one case in point—though "fate" is not [End Page 2] the right word here, since their salvation or extinction is, for the moment at least, in human hands and not an issue predetermined by irresistible (super)natural forces. We should bear in mind then that, like realpolitik, fate too provides a rubric that falsely naturalizes worldly apathy. Both terms imply that ethico-political action is irretrievably subservient to sovereign powers, powers envisaged as progress or the invisible hand of the market, which we must accept since they cannot be resisted. But neither term has a place in a politics for the real (natural) world precisely because, at least from the perspective of radical ecology, this naturalization is indeed false. Nature is not the source of the short-term, calculating, self-interested individualism that constitutes the (a)social world envisaged by contemporary advocates of realpolitik, nor should it be made subject to it. Nor is nature a synonym for, or ruled by, fate's decree; it is not governed by powers that impose a predetermined order on the world's unfolding. The radical ecologist doesn't want to save whales from realpolitik only to make them subject to some other predetermined fate (as those who reject all interference in natural processes might do), nor do they want to preserve them in timeless aspic in a museum or a dolphinarium. To save the whales is to free them from all claims of human sovereignty, to release them into the ﬂows of evolutionary time, of natural history, just as they release themselves into the ﬂows of the world's oceans. This saving is an ethico-political action. A politics for the real (natural) world must then recognize that the technological enframing of the world, its ordering as standing reserve, its being conceived as merely an instrumental means to human ends is not fated either. Heidegger warns against "the talk we hear more frequently, to the effect that technology is the fate of our age, where 'fate' means the inevitableness of an unalterable course."**[3](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_for_the_study_of_radicalism/v002/2.1smith.html" \l "FOOT3)** Nevertheless, although not irresistible, this enframing is, in fact, the "supreme danger" from which a politics of natural reality must strive to save us all—whales, humans, indeed the whole world. For, at this very moment, when humanity "postures as lord of the earth,"**[4](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_for_the_study_of_radicalism/v002/2.1smith.html" \l "FOOT4)** it too risks being reduced to standing reserve, to a material resource open to manipulation and transformation.

#### The affirmative’s embrace of the police state to ensure environmental management is the ultimate example of biopolitical control- the existence of all creatures is now wagered upon our political strategies

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(Timothy, “The (Un)Wise (Ab)Use of Nature: Environmentalism as Globalized Consumerism? http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/tims/Tim528.htm)

Environments are spaces under police supervision, expert management, risk avoidance, or technocratic control. By bringing environmentalistic agendas into the heart of corporate and government policy, one finds the ultimate meaning of a police state fulfilled. If police, as they bound and observed space, were empowered to watch over religion, morals, health, supplies, roads, town buildings, public safety, liberal arts, trade, factories, labor supplies, and the poor, then why not add ecology--or the totality of all interactions between organisms and their surroundings--to the police zones of the state? The conduct of any person's environmental conduct becomes the initial limit on other's ecological enjoyments, so too does the conduct of the social body's conduct necessitate that the state always be an effective "environmental protection agency." The ecological domain is the ultimate domain of unifying together all of the most critical forms of life that states must now produce, protect, and police in eliciting bio-power: it is the center of their enviro-discipline, eco-knowledge, geo-power.120 Few sites in the system of objects unify these forces as thoroughly as the purchase of objects from the system of purchases. Mobilizing biological power, then, accelerates exponentially after 1970 along with global fast capitalism. Ecology becomes one more formalized disciplinary mode of paying systematic "attention to the processes of life....to invest life through and through"121 in order to transform all living things into biological populations to develop transnational commerce. The tremendous explosion of global economic prosperity, albeit in highly skewed spatial distributions, after the 1973/1974 energy crises would not have been possible without ecology to guide "the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes."122 An anantamo-politics for all of Earth's plants and animals now emerges out of ecology as strategic plans for terraformative management through which environmentalizing resource managerialists acquire "the methods of power capable of optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern."123 To move another step past Foucault's vision of human biopower, these adjustments in the resourcing of Nature as environmentalized plants and animals to that of transnational capital are helpful to check chaotic systems of unsustainable growth. In becoming an essential subassembly for transnational economic development, ecological discourses of power/knowledge rationalize conjoining "the growth of human groups to the expansion of productive forces and the differential allocation of profit" inasmuch as population ecology, environmental science, and range management are now, in part, "the exercise of bio-power in its many forms and modes of application."124 Indeed, a postmodern condition perhaps is reached when the life of all species are wagered in each one of humanity's market-centered economic and political strategies. Ecology, which did emerge out of the traditional life sciences, now circulates within "the space for movement thus conquered, and broadening and organizing that space, methods of power and knowledge" as green disciplinary interventions, because the state has "assumed responsibility for the life processes and undertook to control and modify them."125 In the end, terraforming tendencies suggest that we cannot adequately understand the mobilization of geo-economic and geo-political discourses in present-day regimes, like the United States of America, without seeing how many of their tactics and institutions assume "environmentalized" modes of operation as part and parcel of ordinary practices of governance. Strategic Environmental Initiatives, despite Vice-President Gore's protests, already are standard operating procedures. To preserve the political economy of high-technology production, many offices of the American state and all transnational firms must function as "environmental protection agencies" inasmuch as they fuse a green geo-politics of national security with a grey geo-economics of continual growth to sustain existing industrial ecologies of mass consumption with a wise use of Nature exercised through private property rights. Habitus is habitat, but habitat now also defines or directs habitus. Conservationist ethics, resource managerialism, and green rhetorics, then, congeal as an unusually cohesive power/knowledge formation, whose (un)wise (ab)usefulness becomes an integral element of this fascinating new regime's order of social normalization.

### Environmental Managerialism – GHG Regulations

#### GHG emission regulations are biopolitical and take consumption as the focal point of life

Lipshutz 09 (Ronnie, Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz, 8-27-09, Institute of European Studies, "The Governmentalization of “Lifestyle” and the Biopolitics of Carbon," p. 9-11, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/472341ct, accessed 7-7-12, CNM)

Although consumption appears to be a well-understood concept, its content and practice are not as evident as they might seem. Clearly, we consume in order to live but beyond this consumption has as much to do with societal reproduction, and the production of identities and subjectivities, as it does with the assimilation of food, water and other things necessary to life. In this sense, we do better to think in terms of modes of consumption and their associated practices, differentiating among those involving basic needs, societal reproduction and identity creation. I borrow the notion of “modes” from Marxism29 in order to contrast the different means and ends of consumption and consumerism and how the practices associated with each have been shaped by social regulation and, indeed, social engineering. While the parallel is not quite accurate— differing modes of consumption do not correspond to “stages” of development in some teleological sense—it does help to distinguish material from symbolic means and ends (even though the material and symbolic are not wholly distinct). It also points to the ways in which everyday practices related to consumption constitute both “lifestyle” and represent a primary source of greenhouse gas emissions. In particular, it is consumption for identity creation that is most important to the high rates of economic growth associated with carbonization, and it is a mode particularly subject to the governmentalization through the market. The basic mode of consumption has to do with life itself. Clearly, there are certain things that humans must consume to survive; we might even say that human societies exist only as a result of collective efforts to ensure group and individual survival through adequate levels of consumption.30 While these basic necessities are implicated in climate change, especially through agriculture, they are not, for the most part, engines of capitalist growth and accumulation or accoutrements to particular forms of status and signification. This does not mean, of course, that all consumption of food and water involves survival—think here of meals at French restaurants or “designer water,” consumption of which is representational or signifying. I will, therefore, put aside consideration of the basic mode of consumption. 31

#### The regulation of carbon emissions relies on a new regime of self-policing which ushers in new formations of biopolitics.

Lipshutz 09 (Ronnie, Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz, 8-27-09, Institute of European Studies, "The Governmentalization of “Lifestyle” and the Biopolitics of Carbon," p. 2-3, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/472341ct, accessed 7-7-12, CNM)

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has proposed that, if the very worst impacts of global warming are to be avoided, rich and rapidly-industrializing societies need to reduce their aggregate greenhouse gas emissions by as much as 80% by the end of the 21st century.9 The favored approaches to emission control attempt to raise the cost of burning carbon, through direct carbon taxes or the so-called cap and trade system. Both will rely heavily on self-regulating markets for effect. That is, although there are likely to be surveillance and monitoring systems to quantify greenhouse gas emissions by various producers, a good-deal of self-reporting will be involved.10 Such a combination of prices and practices in pursuit of a “common good” and “self interest” is highly vulnerable to violation, corruption and collapse (as seen, for example, in the behaviors on Wall Street and the subprime mortgage bubble). In other words, successful control of carbon emissions will depend on individual and collective internalization of a new regime of consumption and new forms of governmentality and biopolitics. Given long-standing conflicts among countries and within them, as well as the complexities associated with internalizing the cost of carbon in consumer goods, there is good reason to wonder when this program will actually go into operation and if it has any chance of succeeding. What, then, is to be done? Inasmuch as carbon is imbricated in all facets of human life—people being carbon-based, with long reliance on the breaking of carbon bonds to provide biological energy as well as warmth for survival—successful control of global carbon emissions will depend on changes in both individual behavior and social practices, that is, lifestyle.11 Michel Foucault called forms of management that attempted to regulate behaviors “governmentality” in order to denote the ways in which administrative apparatuses of modern society operate on populations through “biopolitics.” His particular insight, as we shall see, is that changes in behaviors and practices are no longer effected through discipline, punishment and sovereign power but, rather, via rules, rule, desire and self-regulation. The governmentalization of lifestyle thus becomes linked to the shaping of desire and morality so that people want to do what they believe is good for them according to a biopolitical logic. It is in this context that lifestyles are already being reshaped in preparation for a low-carbon future.

#### The view of carbon consumption as a threat creates every person as a threat to global survival

Lipshutz 09 (Ronnie, Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz, 8-27-09, Institute of European Studies, "The Governmentalization of “Lifestyle” and the Biopolitics of Carbon," p. 8-9, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/472341ct, accessed 7-7-12, CNM)

The biopolitics of carbon consequently rests on such processes, through the governmentalization of the everyday practices of the world’s population and the associated biopolitics. 25 Such practices are, after all, the major source of greenhouse gases and the primary cause of global climate change.26 Excessive carbonization of the Earth’s atmosphere poses a number of threats to the security, well-being and “lifestyle” of that population taken as a whole, albeit not as a single undifferentiated one. It is, therefore, necessary to acquire knowledge about (i) the causes and sources of the threat, which arise from that “lifestyle”; (ii) to regulate those “lifestyle” practices that generate the carbon; and (iii) to acquire the technical and social knowledge necessary to modify those practices and reduce carbon emissions.27 There is something a bit chilling about such a biopolitics: everyone and everything comes to be seen either as a stock or flow of carbon, and a potential threat to global survival. If one is a stock, it is to be maintained at a constant or reduced level; if one is a flow, it is to be regulated. Babies might become very expensive as carbon sources.28

#### The shift from carbon consumption requires a new normality to make significant changes

Lipshutz 09 (Ronnie, Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz, 8-27-09, Institute of European Studies, "The Governmentalization of “Lifestyle” and the Biopolitics of Carbon," p. 20, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/472341ct, accessed 7-7-12, CNM)

The line of argument presented here points to two insights: First, significant changes in the practices of carbon consumers will be necessary if the emission reductions proposed by the IPCC are to be achieved. Second, such changes cannot rely merely on appeals to either economic self-interest or moral principles. In the former instance, although technological innovations and financial (dis)incentives can alter behaviors, a new “normality” will be required to internalize more significantly-changed subjectivities and practices. In the latter instance, individual calculations of self-interest have been seen to change according to circumstance and opportunity even as moral behavior is an individual choice and not binding on the individual.52 To return to the story of smoking, both self-interest (one’s health and income) and morality (others’ health) are factors in an individual’s decision to smoke or not. In a broader sense, however, it is through governmentality and biopolitics, expressed via social pressures and norms, that practices and the status and identity linked to them can be transformed on a large scale. For the most part, people do not want to be regarded as “abnormal” or “marginal” and will change their behaviors as new forms of belief and practice become normative and normalized.

### Poverty Advantages

#### Attempting to narrate for the poor establishes an us vs. them dichotomy that oversimplifies political and economic context and reinforces stereotypes

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(Sanford F. Schram, professor of social theory and policy at Bryn Mawr College, 1995, words of welfare: The Poverty of Social Science and the Social Science of Poverty, pg. 46-49 “According to Michel…in the face of grinding poverty.”)

According to Michel Foucault, most social statistics operate as the science of the state, aggregating social practices into reified populations, whose mean and range serve to define, rather than reflect, norms and margins.27 Statistical work most often is used then to identify repetitions that can be used to suggest ways for regulating individuated behavior to conform to such norms. Yet ethnography also risks replicating the myth of individua- tion that underlies social statistics. Glazer was hoping for a more up-close and personal representation that would allow him to capture the "culture of poverty."" The researcher, like the tourist or the fieldworker in an exotic land, would get to know the "alien other" so as to see how they were and were not like "us." Yet the "us/them" divide implicit in such a formulation reencodes the opportunity to read "the poor" as the negative referent they have been historically, especially for liberal, individualist, capitalist moder- nity, with its insistence on achieving through the market the identity of a self-sufficient autonomous self. Reading the poor in this way revisits the opportunity to say good things about "us" by contrast with "them!' Ethnog- raphy of the poor, in Glazer's hands, would risk becoming a reassuring tale of how the "not poor" are to be understood." Patricia Cough's critique of ethnography underscores how it glosses over its own animating impulses to make sense of the viewing subject by inter- preting the viewed object.° Ethnography's realism backgrounds the psy- choanalytic subtext that helps construct the narrative used to depict those who are viewed. Ethnography's narrative subtext can be read to be about the ethnographer's attempt to break with tradition, authority, established knowledge, or ascendant empirical understandings by showing how his or her ethnography makes an authoritative, original, genuinely new contribu- tion. This "oedipal" struggle invites the reader to identify with the narra- tive's subtextual insistence to make empirical claims that suggest that theviewed object can be best understood in coherent terms as an "other" from the particularviewpoint of the viewing subject. It is for this reason that realist narrativity can be said to function ideologically. Realist narrativity is ideological for making invisible the relays it produces between the terms it opposes. Especially important are the relays it produces between those oppositions upon which bourgeois individualism depends, such as self and society, nature and environment, sexuality and economy, private and public .... If, then, it is to be concluded that ethnography is informed with an oedipal logic of realist narrativity, developed through the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, it is because ethnography treats the subject's struggle for self-knowledge as a struggle to obtain factual representations ofempirical knowledge." The riddle of how knowledge is constructed is not solved by trying to make the false choice between allegedly factually objective statistics and authentically pure experience. Interrogating perspective must be matched by accounting for position, and both must appreciate the political impli-cations of how discourse narrates what is represented .12 If ethnography reenacts the psychoanalytic subtext of realist narratives, including other forms of empirical science, it also must address the positional issue of who gets to do ethnography on whom. In particular, to choose just one case of particu- lar relevance for studying welfare, what is at work when white, male, mid- dle-class social scientists are trying through ethnography to make sense of poor women of color? Ethnography as VoyeurismGlazer was right that ethnographic work would follow in his wake; how- ever, he hardly could predict that this genre would gain as much popularity as it has. In just the past few years, there have been numerous works using ethnographic depictions of the poor, including, to name just a few, Leslie Dunbar's The Common Interest, Susan Sheehan's Life for Me Ain't Been No Crystal Stair, John Schwarz and Thomas Volgy's The Forgotten Americans, Mark Rank's Living on the Edge, Mitchell Duneier's Slim's Table, Nicholas Lemann's The Promised Land, Alex Kotlowitz's There Are No Children Here, and William Julius Wilson's work on inner-city African American poor fam- ilies in Chicago." The last three of these in particular highlight the limita- tions of such work. Nicholas Lernann, born and raised in New Orleans, offers a book that moves back and forth between policy machinations in Washington, D.C., and the changing fortunes of black families moving from Clarksdale, Mis- sissippi, to Chicago, Illinois. Revised after earlier articles received criticism, the book jettisons an explicit "culture of poverty" argument.-14 Instead, by tracing migration from Clarksdale to Chicago and back, Lemann makes a more understated argument (about two-thirds of the way through the text) nd implies that the legacy of the sharecropping system broke the AfricanAmerican family and set it on the road to ruin.35 This cultural explanation is almost smothered by rich narratives of the families he studied. Their lives are hard, Only some of those who return South seem to get a reprieve. How this narrative underwrites the sharecropping thesis anymore than the bad statistical work of previous studies is left unexplained. Racism, eco- nomic dislocation, and political marginalization are mentioned, but the narrative continues to suggest that sharecropping and migration from the rural South to the urban North were critical factors in making poor, inner- city African American neighborhoods unlivable. Instead, Lemann remains intent on telling a tale of migration about southern sharecroppers, all the while backgrounding his own southern roots, which may very wen drive his insistence to tell a tale of how the South shaped the lives of those who left and those who returned.36 Alex Kotlowitz's ethnography of two young boys, Lafayette and Pharoah Rivers, from the Henry Homer Homes in Chicago is a withering tale of childhood hardship in one of the poorest neighborhoods in the United States. Kotlowitz stresses the psychic cost of growing up amid consistent violence, crime, drug abuse and drug trafficking, clashes with the police, and grinding poverty. In a moving narrative, Kotlowitz's preoccupation with the physical violence of the immediate neighborhood de- mphasizes the structural violence the broader society has inflicted on such neighbor- hoods. Racism, economic dislocation, and even bureaucratic insensitivity are mentioned, but the violent nature of community life is the story line. Kotlowitz cares for the boys he studied; he continues to visit them and pays for their private schooling. In the book's preface, Kotlowitz notes that the children's mother, LaJoe, had a hope, which Kotlowitz shared, that a "book about the children would make us all hear, that it would make us all stop and listen."37 His work therefore represents an attempt to overcome the silences that surround the deterioration of poor inner-city neighbor- hoods. Yet Kotlowitz's uncontextualized and close reading of the psychic costs of growing up in a violent neighborhood allows his work to be ap- propriated by white readers to tell other stories. They are free to use it for self-rationalizations that reinforce stereotypical notions about poor inner- city African Americans. Kotlowitz's narrative tells white audiences what they are already predisposed to hear-depravity persists in the inner city."' The white outside observer chronicles the inside of the alien black culturewith- out suggesting how the outside is implicated in constructing the inside. bell hooks provides an important point about the need of even the pro- gressive, antiracist white documentarian to identity himself and the posi- tion he adopts: "As critical intervention it allows for the recognition that progressive white people who are anti-racist might be able to understand the way in which their cultural practice reiriscribes white supremacy with- out promoting paralyzing guilt or denial . William Julius Wilson's most recentwork builds on his earlier The Truly Disadvantaged.40 This time, Wilson uses survey data and in-depth ethno-graphic studies of amilies in Chicago to make the case that racism and eco- nomic dislocation have contributed to the persistence of inner-city poverty. Yet a culture of resignation and resistance among some poor persons, par- ticularly some young African American males, preventsthem from mak- ing the most of the few opportunities that are available." The connection between the story and the conclusion is not obvious. The telling of the tale is taken by itself as justifying the conclusion. The lure of ethnography is the power of its narrative. To narrate lives is the privilege to say what they mean. Narrative becomes self-legitimating, especially through retelling. Wilson's often-repeated narrative is about how the loss of middle-class role models has allowed many poor inner-city African American youths to forgo com- mitting themselves to the world of work and achievement. Yet it is surely possible to tell other stories about these same individuals- stories that stress even the persistence of role models in the face of grinding poverty.'

#### The discourse of poverty, dependency, and work reinforces norms about correct conduct in society and otherizes the poor

Schram, prof social theory and policy @ Bryn Mawr College, 95

(Sanford F. Schram, professor of social theory and policy at Bryn Mawr College, 1995, words of welfare: The Poverty of Social Science and the Social Science of Poverty, pg. 128-130 “The contemporary discourse…as exemplified by the Family Support Act of 1988”)

The contemporary discourse on welfare is very much a discourse of depen- dency. The poor and the welfare dependent have served historically as con- venient, useful, and instructive mirror images for encoding the distinctions that set the standards for acceptable individual conduct in society." Desig- nating welfare taking as deviant, even criminalizing welfare dependency, has served the purposes of social control by negative example.29 The standards for a self-sufficient, autonomous individual in society are encoded and defined in terms of what the welfare dependent, as the "other," is not. In recent years, the "feminization of poverty" and the growing identifica- tion of public assistance as programs for minorities have intensified the idea of the welfare dependent as the "other:' The contemporary discourse on dependency suggests that the rich and poor really are different; where rich people may need tax incentives to be productive, poor people need welfare disincentives to encourage them to work. As the distinctions solid- ify, it is easier to argue that opposites have to be treated differently-re- wards for some and punishments for others-in order to get the same result." This contemporary discourse of dependency is in no small part preoc- cupied with the issues of self-sufficiency, work, productivity; and related designations of self-worth.31 Although these concerns have historically been present in welfare narratives," they take on a heightened sense of urgency in an era in which the nature of work and its place in our lives has been subject to change and uncertainty. What is at issue is the ability of work to serve as a regulating norm for the social order. The concern about work is heightened when it takes on more abstract, intangible, and even ephemeral qualities as we move from an industrial to a postindustrial economy." This is reinforced by an era in which the public space of wage earning is no longer reserved exclusively for men and the private space of home is no longer the only place for women, for the idea that work at home should be valued on par with wage labor further destabilizes our understanding of what consti- tutes work. in addition, questions about work are bound to increase in a time of growing concern about productivity and competitiveness, particu- larly of the manufacturing sector in the U.S. economy. At the same time, anxiety about work increases as restructuring of the industrial economy results in fewer manual jobs that pay a "family wage:' Finally, the concern about work is heightened also by the growth of the welfare state itself and the increasing numbers of people who derive their means of support pri- marily from the state rather than from employment .Although the availability of jobs, the level of wages, and people's stan- dard of living generally are to a great extent contingent upon the actions of the state, the contemporary discourse reinforces the distinction between the independent and the dependent in terms of those who have jobs (or receive public benefits in some way tied to their previous employment) and those who do not. In this context, it becomes ever more apparent that the welfare dependent are deficient because they do not have "work." The contemporary welfare narrative becomes one that highlights this deficiency and proposes work programs as the cure for the ills of the poor, as exem- plified by the Family Support Act of 1988.

### Democracy

#### Democracy doesn’t prevent totalitarianism—citizenship is founded on the primacy of bare life which collapses into a zone of indistinction

Agamben 98 [Giorgio, prof of philosophy at university of Verona, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, pg. 121-123]

The contiguity between mass democracy and totalitarian states, nevertheless, does not have the form of a sudden transformation (as Lewith, here following in Schmitt’s footsteps, seems to maintain); before impetuously coming to light in our century the river of biopolitics that gave homo sacer his life runs its course in a hidden but continuous fashion. It is almost as if, starting from a certain point, every decisive political event were double-sided: the spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts with central powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of individuals’ lives within the state order, thus offering a new and more dreadful foundation for the very sovereign power from which they wanted to liberate themselves. “The ‘right’ to life,” writes Foucault, explaining the importance assumed by sex as a political issue, “to one’s body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs and, beyond all the oppressions or ‘alienation,’ the ‘right’ to rediscover what one is and all that one can be, this ‘right’—which the classical juridical system was utterly incapable of comprehending—was the political response to all these new procedures of power” (La volontt’, p. 191). The fact is that one and the same affirmation of bare life leads, in bourgeois democracy, to a primacy of the private over the public and of individual liberties over collective obligations and yet becomes, in totalitarian states, the decisive political criterion and the exemplary realm of sovereign decisions. And only because biological life and its needs had become the politically decisive fact is it possible to understand the otherwise incomprehensible rapidity with which twentieth-century parliamentary democracies were able to turn into totalitarian states and with which this century’s totalitarian states were able to be converted, almost without interruption, into parliamentary democracies. In both cases, these transformations were produced in a context in which for quite some time politics had already turned into biopolitics, and in which the only real question to be decided was which form of organization would be best suited to the task of assuring the care, control, and use of bare life. Once their fundamental referent becomes bare life, traditional political distinctions (such as those between Right and Left, liberal­ism and totalitarianism, private and public) lose their clarity and intelligibility and enter into a zone of indistinction. The ex-communist ruling classes’ unexpected fall into the most extreme racism (as in the Serbian program of “ethnic cleansing”) and the rebirth of new forms of fascism in Europe also have their roots here. Along with the emergence of biopolitics, we can observe a displacement and gradual expansion beyond the limits of the decision on bare life, in the state of exception, in which sovereignty consisted. If there is a line in every modern state marking the point at which the decision on life becomes a decision on death, and biopolitics can turn into thanatopolitics, this line no longer appears today as a stable border dividing two clearly distinct zones. This line is now in motion and gradually moving into areas other than that of political life, areas in which the sovereign is entering into an ever more intimate symbiosis not only with the jurist but also with the doctor, the scientist, the expert, and the priest. In the pages that follow, we shall try to show that certain events that are fundamental for the political history of modernity (such as the declaration of rights), as well as others that seem instead to represent an incomprehensible intrusion of biologico-scientific principles into the political order (such as National Socialist eugenics and its elimina­tion of “life that is unworthy of being lived,” or the contemporary debate on the normative determination of death criteria), acquire their true sense only if they are brought back to the common biopolitical (or thanatopolitical) context to which they belong. From this perspective, the camp—as the pure, absolute, and im­passable biopolitical space (insofar as it is founded solely on the state of exception)—will appear as the hidden paradigm of the political space of modernity whose metamorphoses and disguises we will have to learn to recognize.

#### **A democratic society is yet biopolitical: democracy renders each subject individually identical to each other citizen.**

Prozorov 7 (Sergei, Research Fellow at the Danish Institute of International Studies, Academy of Finland Research Fellow at the Department of Political and Economic Studies at the University of Helsinki, “The Unrequited Love of Power: Biopolitical Investment and the Refusal of Care”, Feb 2007, Foucault Studies, 7/10/12, BR)

In a simplified contrast, the subject as a citizen is conceived as, first and foremost, a political being, part of a political unity, and his existence depends entirely on the nature of that unity. Thus, in a paradigmatic structure of absolute monarchy the subject’s existence is exhausted in his capacity to be killed by the sovereign, whose power consists precisely in the right of decision of making die or letting live. In a democratised version of sovereignty as popular sovereignty, the political existence of the citizen is endowed with a greater density, which consists in his participation in the bios of the community as a free subject of (self‐)government. At the same time, even in democratic regimes of sovereignty (or perhaps particularly there), the subject remains present as a part of a total unity of the ‘people’ (community, civil society) and present as identical to other citizens, an assumption that is essential to sustaining the ideal of democratic equality.3 The singularity of the subject as an individual is entirely external to the discourse of the ‘city‐citizen game’. This game is rather constituted by a division between the political existence of the subject as a participant in the ‘good life’ of the community and his ‘biological existence’ as part of the human species, which is of no concern to this community. In other words, the immanence of the life of the population is contrasted with the transcendent unity of the people as a collective sovereign. The entire problematic of division and distinction, central to the political thought of Western modernity, emerges within the context of the city‐citizen game: the public vs. the private, state vs. society, the political vs. the social, etc.4

### Marxism

#### Global capitalism is impossible without biopower

Pickett ‘5 (Associate professor of Political Science at Chaldron State College, On the Use and Abuse of Foucault For Politics, pp. 18-19)

Throughout the seventeenth century, according to Foucault, this new art of government was frustrated in its operations. Ruinous wars, rebellions, famines, urban uprisings, and the cumbersome aspects of mercantilism all contributed to this initial disruption. Still, we see in this period the rise of statistical studies which would form the basis for demographics and support large-scale public health projects.40 It is in the eighteenth century that the various tactics and techniques which formed the basis for bio-power began to expand rapidly. This further served as the basis for two phenomena: a rising population and the development of capitalism. Yet these in turn, especially the latter, helped intensify the growth of bio-power. The new statistical studies which were made at this time revealed that population and its various elements, such as longevity, birth rates, and such, had their own cycles and progressions. Since the strength of the government rests upon the population it governs, it is necessary (under the new political rationality) to administer the population itself. Pro-natal policies, the control of migrations, and other governmental policies become possible. With the support of the new human sciences and statistical studies, a new range of techniques and sites of intervention into the citizenry are opened up 41 Even though bio-power was still early in its development, it was advanced enough to serve as the basis (in conjunction with the disciplines) for the rise of capitalism: "[Capitalism] would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic processes."42 It is only upon the basis of the application of bio-power at all levels of the social body, and in various institutions, that it is possible to adjust human life to the needs of capital. A regulated, docile workforce, which is healthy and reproductive, is essential to in-creasing economic productivity. Bio-power is nothing less than "methods of power capable of optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life in general."43 Yet capitalism, in turn, was able to serve as a support for the intensification and further diffusion of bio-power. The conjunction sof bio-power and capitalism in the eighteenth century marked a turning point in human history, according to Foucault. Life itself was to be administered and controlled. Methods of power and knowledge took hold of man's biological existence, made it an object of study, and subjected it to continually increasing levels of intervention. It is on this basis that medicine assumed its heightened importance in the eighteenth century and was eventually consolidated in the nineteenth.44 A number of specific tactics supported this extension of bio-power. The family itself was medicalized, especially the parent-child relation. The traditional kinship relation was invested with a new, and highly precise, set of rules concerning the correct care for children. The space the family lives in must be sanitary and well-ventilated, for example.

### Identity Politics

#### **Biopolitics is a politics of otherness. Operating within this mindset does nothing but exclude and destroy the Body and human identity.**

Fassin, Professor at the University of Paris North, 01(Didier, “The Biopolitics of Otherness: Undocumented Foreigners and Racial Discrimination in French Public Debate”, *Anthropology Today,* Volume: 17(1), p. 7, CPG)

According to Agnes Heller (1996), biopolitics is ‘intimately linked to the question of identity politics’. I have tried to show that it also implies necessarily a politics of otherness. Based on the recognition of ‘difference of bodies’ which have race, sex, ethnicity and genes as their foundation, biopolitics, as she interprets it, is ‘ultimately defending the Body itself, its nature, integrity and health”. By renouncing ‘membership in a common political body’, biopolitics thus exemplifies a retreat from, and even a negation of ‘politics’ in the Arendtian sense of the recognition of human diversity from a universal perspective. However, examination of French immigration politics in the 1990s allows for a less pessimistic and more nuanced reading. The contemporary biopolitics of otherness in France rests on one major foundation: the recognition of the body as the ultimate site of political legitimacy. But this recognition takes two parallel paths. On the one hand, the suffering body manifests itself as the ultimate (but not unique) resource, supplanting all other social justifications for immigrants to be granted legal status and residing in a basic right to keep oneself alive as long as possible. This is a minimalist vision, but one which tends toward a universal horizon. On the other hand, the racialized body extends from the foreigner to the national and introduces internal frontiers founded on physical difference. This is a discriminatory concept, which creates hierarchies between people. In the first case, the reduction in political asylum is a corollary of the rise in the humanitarian rationale: the recognition of the suffering body imposes a legitimate order defining citizenship on purely physiopathological grounds. In the second, threats to human diversity lead to a response by civil society and the state, reminding us of shared political values: the recognition of the racialized body as principle of an illegitimate order allows for a measure of return to politics through the denunciation of this principle by the victims and their supporters. This is to say, despite common perceptions, biopolitics does not proceed by one logic. It demonstrates a tension, inscribed in the body, between the supreme universality of life (which allows a *sans-papiers* with AIDs to be recognized by the state in the name of his/her pathology) and the exaltation of difference, for which biology offers an apparently insurmountable formation (allowing each person to perceive a natural source of inequality in the physical characteristics of others). If we can recognize, in an unusual form, the eternal anthropological theme of the unity and diversity of the human condition, the questions raised here certainly call for a renewed commitment from social scientists to the critique of the contemporary foundations of politics.

### Free Will

#### The attempt to create a “free” individual who can make independent choices about their body fails to recognize the role that power plays in the construction of autonomy and prevents action.

Bevir Prof. of Poli Sci at UC Berkeley. 99 ( Mark “Foucault and Critique: Deploying Agency Against Autonomy” KNP)

Foucault's analysis of the social construction of the subject might seem merely to recapitulate a concept already familiar to us as socialisation. Actually, however, his critique of the subject cuts deeper than this. **Foucault argues that power is ubiquitous so a subject can come into being only as a construct of a regime of power/knowledge. No society, culture, or practice possibly could be free of power. No individual possibly could constitute himself as an autonomous agent free from all regimes of power. This is why, to return to our starting point, Foucault rejected the concept of the "sovereign, founding subject"** for one of "the subject" as "constituted through **Even when individuals appear to live in accord with commitments they have accepted for themselves, they really are only examining and regulating their lives in accord with a regime of power.** Foucault's view of the subject, therefore, precludes an idea often seen as the core of liberalism, the Enlightenment Project, or modernity; it precludes the idea of the individual coming before, or standing outside of, society. Indeed, Foucault argues that **our view of the subject as an autonomous agent derives from our having so internalised the technique of confession that we see it falsely as a way of unlocking our inner selves rather than rightly as a way of defining ourselves in accord with a social formation**. He says: "the obligation to confess is now relayed through so many different points, is so deeply ingrained in us, that we no longer perceive it as the effect of a power that constrains us; on the contrary, it seems to us that truth, lodged in our most secret nature, demands only to surface."' According to Foucault, **the individual subject is not an autonomous agent, but rather a social construct.** To consider the validity of his view of the subject, I want to distinguish autonomy from agency.1° Autonomous subjects would be able, at least in principle, to have experiences, to reason, to adopt beliefs, and to act, outside all social contexts. They could avoid the influence of any norms and techniques prescribed by a regime of power/knowledge. This concept of the autonomous subject resembles the idea of a "sovereign, founding subject" that **Foucault vehemently rejects: autonomous subjects, at least in principle, could found and rule themselves uninfluenced by others**. Agents, in contrast, exist only in specific social contexts, but these contexts never determine how they try to construct themselves. Although agents necessarily exist within regimes of power/knowledge, these regimes do not determine the experiences they can have, the ways they can exercise their reason, the beliefs they can adopt, or the actions they can attempt to perform. Agents are creative beings; it is just that their creativity occurs in a given social context that influences it.

# Impacts

### Classic

#### The dark underside of biopower is the mobilization of whole populations for the purpose of wholesale slaughter

Foucault 72 (Michael, Professor of the History of Systems of Thought College De France, The Foucault Reader, pg. 258) LD

Since the classical age, **the West has undergone a very profound transformation of these mechanisms of power**. "Deduction" has tended to be no longer the major form of power but merely one element among others, **working to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them**. There has been a parallel ·shift in the right of death, or at least a tendency to align itself with the exigencies of a life-administering power and to define itself accordingly. This death that was based on the right of the sovereign is now manifested as simply the reverse of the right , of the social body to ensure, maintain, or develop its life . **Yet wars were never as bloody as they have been since the nineteenth century, and all things being equal, never before did regimes visit such holocausts on their own populations** . But **this formidable power of death-and this is perhaps what accounts for part of its force and the cynicism with which it has greatly expanded its limits-now presents itself a s the counterpart of a power that exerts a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting to precise controls and comprehensive regulations . Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be de fended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone**; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity: **massacres have become vital** . **It is as managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so many men to be killed**. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused them to tend increasingly toward all-out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that terminates the􀓻 are in fact increasingly informed by the naked question of survival. **The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence**. The principle underlying the tactics of battle-that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living-has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population. **If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.**

### War/Violence

#### Liberal biopolitical governance risks unending war against all threats to the species—that apocalyptic violence will inevitably turn against the species itself.

Dillon and Reid ‘9(Michael, professor of Politics at the University of Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations at Kings College and Professor of International Relations at the University of Lapland, “The Liberal Way of War: Killing to Make Life Live, pg 30-33, JS)

One way of expressing the core problematic that we pursue in this book is, therefore, in the form of a question posed back to Paine on account of that definitive claim. What happens to the liberal way of rule and its allied way of war when liberalism goes global in pursuit of the task of emancipating the species from war, by taking the biohuman as its referent object of both rule and war? What happens to war, we ask, when a new form of governmental regime emerges which attempts to make war in defence and promotion of the entire species as opposed to using war in service of the supposedly limited interests of sovereigns? For the liberal project of the removal of species life from the domain of human enmity never in practice **entailed an end to war**, **or to the persistence of threats requiring war.** Paine makes this clear in his original formulation. Under liberal regimes, Paine observes, war will still be defined by relations between the human and its enemies. The enemies of the human will simply no longer be ‘**its species’** (Paine 1995: 595). What that meant, in practice, was that the liberal way of rule had to decide what elements and what expressions of human life best served the promotion of the species. Those that did not were precisely those that most threatened it; those upon which it was called to wage war. Deciding on what elements and expression of the human both serve and threaten is the definitive operation by which liberalism constitutes its referent object of war and rule: that of the biohuman. Whatever resists the constitution of the biohuman is hostile and dangerous to it, **even if it arises within the species itself.** Indeed, as we shall show, since life is now widely defined in terms of continuous emergence and becoming, it is a continuous becoming-dangerous to itself. The locus of threat and danger under the liberal way of rule and war progressively moves into the very morphogenic composition and re-composability of living systems and of living material. **The greatest source of threat to life becomes life.** It is very important to emphasize that this discourse of danger is precisely not that which commonly arises in the political anthropologies of human cupidity of early modern political theory going back classically, for example, to Hobbes and Locke, which was nonetheless still formulated in a context still circumscribed by the infinity of divine providence, however obscure this was becoming, and however much this obscurity helped fuel the crisis of their times. The analytics of finitude, rather than the analytics of redemption, circumscribe late modern discourses of governance and danger now, instead. Biology, one might therefore also say, itself arose as a science of finitude; of the play of species life and death outwith the play of human life and redemption. The same might very well be said for modern ‘political science.’ Biology does not, of course, recognize cupidity. Cupidity arises in a different, anthro-political, order of things. These days, especially, biology recognizes only the dynamics of complex adaptive evolutionary emergence and change of living systems, whose very laws of formation it increasingly understands in informational terms. These, additionally, empower it to re-compose living material according to design rather than nature in order to rectify the infelicities of nature, or, indeed, pre-empt its expression by positively creating new nature, rather than merely negating existing nature. Pre-emption here is not negative, it is positive. It is not precaution, so much as creative production. The discourse of danger being elaborated through the liberal way of rule and war, in the age of life as information, is therefore related to the possibility that complex adaptive emergence and change can go acerbic. The possibility of catastrophe lies, immanently, in the very dynamics of the life process itself. Neither is this a discourse of danger which revolves around traditional othering practices alone, however pervasive and persistent these politically toxic devises remain. This is a discourse of danger which hyperbolicizes fear in relation to the radically contingent outcomes upon which the very liveliness of life itself is now said to depend. Biohumanity—itself an expression of the attempt to give concrete form to finitude politically—is therefore both threat and promise. The corollary is therefore also clear: enemies of the species **must be cast out from the species** as such. ‘Just war’ in the cause of humanity here—a constant liberal trope (Douzinas 2003)—takes a novel turn when the humanity at issue is biohumanity. For just war has constantly to be waged for biohumanity against the continuous becoming-dangerous of life itself; and less in the form of the Machiavellian or Hobbesian Homo lupus than in the form of continuously emergent being, something which also prompts the thought that Foucault’s analytics of finitude might itself have to be revised to take account of the infinity of becoming which now also characterizes the contemporary ontology of the life sciences. Since the object is to preserve and promote the biohuman, **any such war to end war becomes war without end;** thus turning Walzer’s arguments concerning the justification of liberal war inside out (Walzer 2000: 329-335). The project of removing war from the life of the species becomes a lethal and, in principle, continuous and **unending process**. In a way, as a matter of its biopolitical logic, there is little particularly startling about this claim. Immanent in the biopoliticization of liberal rule, **it is only a matter of where, when and how it finds expression.** As the very composition and dynamics of species life become the locus of the threat to species life, so the properties of species life offer themselves in the form of a new king of promise: war may be removed from the species should those properties be attended to differently. Consider, for example, Kant’s ‘Idea for a Universal History’: if he lives among others of his own species, man is an animal who needs a master… he requires a master to break his self-will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free. But where is he to find such a master? Nowhere else but in the human species. (Kant 2005; emphasis added) ‘Nowhere else but in the human species.’ Here Kant, too, discloses the circumscription of his reflections by the analytics of finitude. Put simply, liberalism’s strategic calculus of necessary killing has, then, to be furnished by the laws and dynamics, the exigencies and contingencies, derived from the properties of the biohuman itself. **Making life live becomes the criterion against which the liberal way of rule and war must seek to say how much killing is enough**. In a massive, quite literally **terrifying, paradox**, however, since the biohuman **is the threat**, it cannot, itself, adjudicate how much self-immolation would be enough to secure itself against itself without destroying itself. However much the terror of the liberal way of rule and war currently revolves around the ‘figure’ of Al-Qaeda, the very dispositive of terror which increasingly circumscribes the life of the biohuman at the beginning of the twenty-first century is the fear induced by its very own account of life. No specific manner or form is proper, then, to the biohuman other than this: its being continuously at work instrumentally reassigning itself in order, it is said, to survive, but in fact to secure itself against its own vital processes. Within the compass of this biopolitical imaginary of species existence, the biohuman becomes the living being to whom all manner of self-securing work must be assigned. The task thus posed through the liberal way of rule and war by its referent object of rule and war—the biohuman—is no longer that, classically, of assigning the human its proper nature with a view to respecting it. The proper nature of the biohuman has become the infinite re-assignability of the very pluripotency itself. This is the strategic goal of the liberal way of war because it has become the strategic goal of the liberal way of rule. From the analytics of finitude, politically, has thus arisen an infinity of securitization and fear.

#### Biopolitics takes responsibility for optimizing the life of whole populations. Any amount of violence, even nuclear genocide, becomes justified.

Dean ‘1(Mitchell, Professor of Sociology at Macquarie University, “Demonic Societies: Liberalism, biopolitics, and sovereignty.” Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State, ed. Hanson and Stepputat, p. 55-58)

Consider again the contrastive terms in which it is possible to view biopolitics and sovereignty. The final chapter in the first volume of the History of Sexuality that contrasts sovereignty and biopolitics is titled "Right of Death and Power over Life." The initial terms of the contrast between the two registers of government is thus between one that could employ power to put subjects to death, even if this right to kill was conditioned by the defense of the sovereign, and one that was concerned with the fostering of life. Nevertheless, each part of the contrast can be further broken down. The right of death can also be understood as "the right to take life or let live"; the power over life as the power "to foster life or disallow it." Sovereign power is a power that distinguishes between political life (bios) and mere existence or bare life (zoe). Bare life is included in the constitution of sovereign power by Its very exclusion from political life. In contrast, biopolitics might be thought to include zoe in bios: stripped down mere existence becomes a matter of political reality. Thus, the contrast between biopolitics and sovereignty is not one of a power of life versus a power of death but concerns the way the different forms of power treat matters of life and death and entail different conceptions of life. Thus, biopolitics reinscribes the earlier right of death and power over life and places it within a new and different form that attempts to include what had earlier been sacred and taboo, **bare life, in political existence.** It is no longer so much the right of the sovereign to put to death his enemies but to disqualify the life—the mere existence—of those who are a threat to the life of the population, to disallow those deemed "unworthy of life," those whose bare life is not worth living. This allows us, first, to consider what might be thought of as the dark side of biopolitics (Foucault 1979a: 136—37). In Foucault's account, biopolitics does not put an end to the practice of war: it provides it with new and more sophisticated killing machines. These machines allow killing itself to be reposed at the level of entire populations. Wars become genocidal in the twentieth century. The same state that takes on the duty to enhance the life of the population also exercises the power of death over whole populations. **Atomic weapons are the key weapons of this process of the power to put whole populations to death.** We might also consider here the aptly named biological and chemical weapons that seek an extermination of populations by visiting plagues upon them or polluting the biosphere in which they live to the point at which bare life is no longer sustainable. Nor does the birth of biopolitics put an end to the killing of one's own populations. Rather, **it intensifies that killing**—whether by an "**ethnic cleansing**" that visits holocausts upon whole groups or by the mass slaughters of classes and groups conducted in the name of the Utopia to be achieved. There is a certain restraint in sovereign power. The right of death is only occasionally exercised as the right to kill and then often in a ritual fashion that suggests a relation to the sacred. More often, sovereign power is manifest in the refraining from the right to kill. The biopolitical imperative knows no such restraint. Power is exercised at the level of populations and hence wars will be waged at that level, on behalf of everyone and their lives. This point brings us to the heart of Foucault's provocative thesis about biopolitics: that there is an intimate connection between the exercise of a life-administering power and the commission of genocide: "If genocide is indeed the dream of modern powers, this is not because of a recent return of the ancient right to kill: it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population" (1979a: 137). Foucault completes this same passage with an expression that deserves more notice: "**massacres become vital**." There is thus a kind of perverse homogeneity between the power over life and the power to take life characteristic of biopower. The emergence of a biopolitical racism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries can be approached as a trajectory in which this homogeneity always threatened to tip over into a dreadful necessity. This racism can be approached as a fundamental mechanism of power that is inscribed in the biopolitical domain (Stoler 1995: 84—85). For Foucault, the primary function of this form of racism is to establish a division between those who must live and those who must die, and to distinguish the superior from the inferior, the fit from the unfit. The notion and techniques of population had given rise, at the end of the nineteenth century, to a new linkage among population, the internal organization of states, and the competition between states. Darwinism, as an imperial social and political program, would plot the ranking of individuals, populations, and nations along the common gradient of fitness and thus measure eflicienqp6 However, the series "population, evolution, and race" is not simply a way of thinking about the superiority of the "white races" or of justifying colonialism, but also of thinking about how to treat the degenerates and the abnormals in one's own population and prevent the further degeneration of the race. The second and most important function for Foucault of this biopolitical racism in the nineteenth century is that "it establishes a positive relation between the right to kill and the assurance of life" (Stoler 1995: 84). The life of the population, its vigor, its health, its capacities to survive, becomes necessarily linked to the elimination of internal and external threats. This power to disallow life is perhaps best encapsulated in the injunctions of the eugenic project: identify those who are degenerate, abnormal, feeble\*minded, or of an inferior race and subject them to forced sterilization: encourage those who are superior, fit, and intelligent to propagate. Identify those whose life is but mere existence and disqualify their propagation: encourage those who can partake of a sovereign existence and of moral and political life. But this last example does not necessarily establish a positive justification for the right to kill, only the right to disallow life. If we are to begin to understand the type of racism engaged in by Nazism, however, we need to take into account another kind of denouement between the biopolitical management of population and the exercise of sovereignty. This version of sovereignty is no longer the transformed and democratized form founded on the liberty of the juridical subject, as it is for liberalism, but a sovereignty that takes up and transforms a further element of sovereignty, its "symbolics of blood" (Foucault 1979a: 148). For Foucault, sovereignty is grounded in blood—as a reality and as a symbol—just as one might say that sexuality becomes the key field on which biopolitical management of populations is articulated. When power is exercised through repression and deduction, through a law over which hangs the sword, when it is exercised on the scaffold by the torturer and the executioner, and when relations between households and families were forged through alliance, "blood was a reality with a symbolic function." By contrast, for biopolitics with its themes of health, vigor, fitness, vitality, progeny, survival, and race, "power spoke of sexuality and to sexuality" (Foucault 1979a: 147). For Foucault (1979a: 149—50), the novelty of National Socialism was the way it articulated "the oneiric exaltation of blood," of fatherland, and of the triumph of the race in an immensely cynical and naive fashion, with the paroxysms of a disciplinary and biopolitical power concerned with the detailed administration of the life of the population and the regulation of sexuality, family, marriage, and education.'Nazism generalized biopower without the limit-critique posed by the juridical subject of right, but it could not do away with sovereignty. Instead, it established a set of permanent interventions into the conduct of the individual within the population and articulated this with the "mythical concern for blood and the triumph of the race." Thus, the shepherd-flock game and the city-citizen game are transmuted into the eugenic ordering of biological existence (of mere living and subsistence) and articulated on the themes of the purity of blood and the myth of the fatherland. In such an articulation of these elements of sovereign and biopolitical forms of power, the relation between the administration of life and the right to kill entire populations is no longer simply one of a dreadful homogeneity. It has become a necessary relation. The administration of life **comes to require a bloodbath**. It is not simply that power, and therefore war, will be exercised at the level of an entire population. It is that the act of disqualifying the right to life of other races becomes necessary for the fostering of the life of the race. Moreover, the elimination of other races is only one face of the purification of one's own race (Foucault 1997b: 231). The other part is to expose the latter to a universal and absolute danger, to expose it to the risk of death and total destruction. For Foucault, with the Nazi state we have an "absolutely racist state, an absolutely murderous state and an absolutely suicidal state" (232), all of which are superimposed and converge on the Final Solution. With the Final Solution, the state tries to eliminate, through the Jews, all the other races, for whom the Jews were the symbol and the manifestation. This includes, in one of Hitler's last acts, the order to destroy the bases of bare life for the German people itself "Final Solution for other races, the absolute suicide of the German race" is inscribed, according to Foucault. in the functioning of the modern state (232).

#### The protection of life through government is part of a biopolitical apparatus that seeks to control subjectivity-the power to protect is inevitably intertwined with the power to kill

Grayson in 2007 (Kyle, Lecturer in International Politics, School of Geography Politics and Sociology @ Newcastle University, Human Security as power/knowledge: the biopolitics of a definitional debate, Online paper archive for the SGIR Turin Conference 2007

http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Grayson-graysonsgir.pdf)

Biopolitics is necessarily an intricate concept because it demands a fundamental rethinking of highly complex social, political, and economic networks that are generally considered to be unproblematic, if not a-political (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero forthcoming). At its most simple, biopolitics is about the identification, classification, and management of populations in order to ensure that the dimensions of life that are said to define them are amenable to specific forms of governance, systems of belief, and cultural propensities, or what one might want to call ‘ways of life’ (Johnson 2002). The biopolitical project is therefore primarily concerned with (governing) the ‘contingent or “aleatory” features that are displayed by populations’ in order to mitigate risks and control threats that may arise from these features (Dillon 2007a, 41). As a ‘dispositif de sécurité’, biopolitics ‘regulates, strategizes, and seeks to manipulate the circulation of species life’(Dillon 2007, 9; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero forthcoming). Therefore, circulatory phenomena ranging from cholera to computer viruses can become subject to the biopolitical gaze. The identification, classification, and management of populations and their characteristics are localised within the practices of governmentality. According to Foucault, governmentality gains ascendancy in the eighteenth century in western Europe as the ultimate objective of government slowly began to transform from primarily viewing its means and ends as the (geopolitical) aggrandizement of the state into a concurrent imperative to deploy newly developed sciences to master population as an instrument (Foucault 2003b: 244). The end goal was to govern in an effective manner by seizing new advantages in populations that had to that point remained latent and by mitigating any risks and/or uncertainties that might become manifest and disrupt the dominant ‘ways of life’. Governmentality therefore required that a whole novel series of security apparatuses and complexes of knowledge—particularly the statistical sciences—be utilised to improve the welfare, living conditions, health, wealth, and longevity of population. Biopolitics thereby became a means to rationalize the problems presented to governmental practice by the phenomena characteristics of living human beings constituted as a population and an ends that practices of governmentality sought to achieve, that is to provide of a compelling rationalization of the phenomena characteristics of populations (Rabinow and Rose 2003: xxix). Biopolitics identified specific phenomena that not just should, but more importantly could, be managed by the state (e.g., communicable disease, moral degeneracy) while fuelling the creation of specific ‘scientific’ classifications such as the homosexual, the criminal-addict, or the immigrant as sub-sets of the general population that needed to be directly managed. The aim was to reduce the prevalence and potential impacts of what were represented as their associated phenomena. There was—and continues to be—a governmental fascination with what are framed as deviations from the norms of acceptable ways of life and finding means to prevent these from occurring, or correcting them once they have become manifest. Thus, biopolitics provided an answer to the question of ‘why must one govern’ with the triumph of economic and political liberalism in Western societies (Foucault 2003a: 204). The core of the answer was to promote the ‘right ways’ of living. Within this re-configuring of the ethos of government, one can see ‘in the rationality of biopolitics, [that] the new object is life and its regulation of its mechanisms’ (Rabinow and Rose 2003: xxix). This required that substandard—though potentially redeemable—ways of life be disciplined, punished, shaped, and transformed (Dillon 2007). In other circumstances, biopolitical rationalizations required that life deemed unworthy of life be left to die, or even be exterminated through the apparatuses of the state (Agamben 1998). Whatever its forms (i.e., to foster life worth living or to let die) biopolitics is increasingly identified as the fundamental drive in the practices of contemporary global politics, marking a significant shift in the conceptualisation and practices of security, development, political economy, and law (Reid 2004, Dillon 1995; Dillon and Reid 2001, Duffield 2001; Dauphinee and Masters 2007).

### Value to Life

#### This is the root cause of all violence: deciding on what life is worthy of being lived, protected, or included replicates economies of valuation which justify violence.

Dillon 1999 [Michael, “Another Justice,” *Political Theory* 27:2]

Philosophy's task, for Levinas, is to avoid conflating ethics and politics. The opposition of politics and ethics opens his first major work, Totality and Infinity, and underscores its entire reading. This raises the difficult question of whether or not the political can be rethought against Levinas with Levinas. Nor is this simply a matter of asking whether or not politics can be ethical. It embraces the question of whether or not there can be such a thing as an ethic of the political. Herein, then, lies an important challenge to political thought. It arises as much for the ontopolitical interpretation as it does for the under- standing of the source and character of political life that flows from the return of the ontological. For Levinas the ethical comes first and ethics is first phi- losophy. But that leaves the political unregenerated, as Levinas's own defer- ral to a Hobbesian politics, as well as his very limited political interventions, indicate.32 In this essay I understand the challenge instead to be the necessity of thinking the co-presence of the ethical and the political. Precisely not the subsumption of the ethical by the political as Levinas charges, then, but the belonging together of the two which poses, in addition, the question of the civil composure required of a political life. Otherness is born(e) within the self as an integral part of itself and in such a way that it always remains an inherent stranger to itself.33 It derives from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular hermeneutical manifestation; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by this absence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject lack the very foundations in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, however, mean that the dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ulti- mately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.34 They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure."36 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being. The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encoun- ter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality.37 What this also means is that the human is not decided. It is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in a position of having to decide without having already been fully determined and without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision. In the realm of undecidability, decision is precisely not the mechanical application of a rule or norm. Nor is it surrender to the necessity of contin- gency and circumstance. Neither is it something taken blindly, without reflection and the mobilisation of what can be known. On the contrary, know- ing is necessary and, indeed, integral to 'decision'. But it does not exhaust 'decision', and cannot do so if there is to be said to be such a thing as a 'dec- ision'. We do not need deconstruction, of course, to tell us this. The manage- ment science of decision has long since known something like it through the early reflections of, for example, Herbert Simon and Geoffrey Vickers.38 But only deconstruction gives us it to think, and only deconstructively sensible philosophy thinks it through. To think decision through is to think it as het- erogeneous to the field of knowing and possible knowing within which it is always located.39 And only deconstruction thinks it through to the intimate relation between 'decision' and the assumption of responsibility, which effect egress into a future that has not yet been-could not as yet have been-known: The instant of decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to this accumu- lation of knowledge. Otherwise there is no responsibility. In this sense only must the per- son taking the decision not know everything.40 Ultimately one cannot know everything because one is advancing into a future which simply cannot be anticipated, and into which one cannot see.

#### Biopower eliminates all value to life

Agamben 98 (Giorgio, U of Verona, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, p.139-40) LA

It is not our intention here to take a position on the difficult ethical problem of euthanasia, which still today, in certain coun­tries, occupies a substantial position in medical debates and pro­vokes disagreement. Nor are we concerned with the radicaliry with which Binding declares himself in favor of the general admissibility of euthanasia. More interesting for our inquiry is the fact that the sovereignty of the living man over his own life has its immediate counterpart in the determination of a threshold beyond which life ceases to have any juridical value and can, therefore, be killed without the commission of a homicide. The new juridical category of “life devoid of value” (or “life unworthy of being lived”) corre­sponds exactly—even if in an apparently different direction—to the bare life of homo sacer and can easily be extended beyond the limits imagined by Binding. It is as if every valorization and every “politicization” of life (which, after all, is implicit in the sovereignty of the individual over his own existence) necessarily implies a new decision concerning the threshold beyond which life ceases to be politically relevant, becomes only “sacred life,” and can as such be eliminated without punishment. Every society sets this limit; every society—even the most modern—decides who its “sacred men” will be. It is even pos­sible that this limit, on which the politicization and the exceprio of natural life in the juridical order of the state depends, has done nothing but extend itself in the history of the West and has now— in the new biopolitical horizon of states with national sovereignty—moved inside every human life and every citizen. Bare life is no longer confined to a particular place or a definite category. It now dwells in the biological body of every living being.

#### Biopower renders life calculable, and allows for the government to have total control over all aspects of life, devaluing it.

Inda, 2002 (Johnathan Xavier, Department of Chicano Studies at University of California “Biopower, Reproduction, and the Migrant Woman’s Body”, 100-101)

“For a long time ,” Foucault notes, “one of the characteristic privileges of sovereign power was the right to decide life and death” (History: 135). For instance, If an external enemy sought to overthrow him, the sovereign could justly wage war, requiring his subjects to fight in defense of the state. So, without directly proffering their death, the sovereign was sanctioned to risk their life. In this case, he exercised “an indirect power over them of life and death” (135). However, if someone hazarded to rebel against him and violate his laws, the sovereign could exert a direct power over the transgressor’s life, such that, as penalty, the latter could be put to death. The right to life and death, then, was somewhat dissymmetrical, falling on the side of death: “The sovereign exercised his right to life only by exercising his right to kill, or by refraining from killing; he evidenced his power over life only through the death he was capable of requiring.. The right which was formulated as the ‘power of life and death’ was in reality the right to take life or let live” (136). As such, this type of power, Foucault observes, was wielded mainly as a mechanism of deduction, making it “essentially a right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself” (136). That is, power was fundamentally a right of appropriation—the appropriation of a portion of the wealth, labor, services, and blood of the sovereign’s subjects---one that culminated in the right to seize hold of life in order to subdue it. The power of appropriation or of deduction, Foucault suggests, is no longer the principal form of power in the West. Since the classical age, the mechanisms of power here have undergone a radical transformation. Power now works “to incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it”; it is “a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them, rather than one dedicated to impeding them, making them submit, or destroying them” (History: 136). Thus, in contrast to a power organized around the sovereign, modern “power would no longer be dealing simply with legal subjects over whom the ultimate dominion was death, but with living beings, and the mastery if would be able to exercise over them would be applied at the level of life itself; it was the taking charge of life, more that the threat of death, that gave power its access even to the body” (142-143). In short, political power has assigned itself the duty of managing life. It is now over life that power establishes its hold and on which it seeks to have a positive influence. This power over life, which Foucault calls biopower, is most apparent in the emergence of “population” as an economic and political problem in the eighteenth century. This “population” is not simply a collection of individual citizens. We are not dealing , as Foucault notes, with subjects, or even with a “people,” but with a composite body “with its specific phenomena and its peculiar variables: birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of health, frequency of illness, patterns of diet and habitation” (History: 25). The “population,” in other words, has its own form of order, its own energy, traits, and dispositions. The management of this “population,” principally of its health, Foucault suggests, has become the primary commitement as well as the main source of legitimacy of modern forms of government: it’s the body of society which becomes the new principle [of political organizations] in the nineteenth century. It is this social body which needs to be protected, in a quasi-medical sense. In place of the rituals that served to restore the corporeal integrity of the monarch, remedies and therapeutic devices are employed such as the segregation of the sick, the monitoring of contagions, the exclusion of delinquents. (“Body/Power”: 55) The concern of government, then, is to produce a healthy and productive citizenry. Its commitment is to the protection and enhancement of the health of particular bodies in order to foster the health of the composite body of the population. This means, according to Foucault, that “biological existence” has now come to be “reflected in political existence” (history: 142). As such, biopower ultimately designates “what brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations” (143), its main overall concern being the life of the population, that is, of the species body—the body that functions as the foothold of biological processes pertaining to birth, death, health, and longevity. Simply put, the species body and the individual as a simple living being have become what are at stake in a state’s political tactics, marking the politicization of life, turning politics into biopolitics and the state into a biopolitical state.

#### Biopower eliminates the value to life

Babcock 11 (David John, Brown University, BIOPOWER, PROFESSIONAL SUBJECTIVITY, AND ANGLOPHONE POSTCOLONIAL LITERARY STUDIES: ISHIGURO, COETZEE, ONDAATJE, http://repository.library.brown.edu:8080/fedora/objects/bdr:11224/datastreams/PDF/content) LA

The definition that Foucault himself gives for this ―life‖ that must be fostered and protected is open-ended: life for biopower is ―understood as the basic needs, man‘s concrete essence, the realization of his potential, a plenitude of the possible.15 Biopower makes ―life an impersonal, abstract ―plenitude‖ that is attached to no one in particular. Foucault writes about biopower not in terms of ―subjects but of ―forces. Biopower works to ―incite, reinforce, control, monitor, optimize, and organize the forces under it: a power bent on generating forces, making them grow, and ordering them‖ (HS 136). To ―disallow‖ these forces would be to rob them of their momentum, or to contain their energy without disrupting future productivity. Many zones of state-driven violence or deprivation are abandoned to a postcolonial outside that enters political discourse only as an abstract figure for ―human suffering.‖ What gets lost in such a figuration is the way in which these conflicts are brought about by scarcities and divisions intrinsic to the biopolitical economy itself, to the way it manages the movement of commodities and capital. In fact, these localized atrocities are tightly interwoven with the legacies of colonialism and the international division of labor. Absolute violence still exists today, but it no longer takes the form of genocide directly overseen by the totalitarian state; instead, it takes the form of zones whose violence is not recognized by the global biopolitical order as its own. The challenge is to uncover our hidden complicity in this violence. As long as these artificial disavowals exist at the level of global discourse, the only way to disrupt them may be to look to the way these conflicts manifest themselves symptomatically at the micro-political level, in the interactions between individual subjects. Among its conclusions, Foucault‘s account of power maintains that every subject is fundamentally complicit in its exercise. An apparent gap in his analysis, however, is to what degree the subject should be held responsible for that complicity. One reason for this ethical gap may lie in the nature of biopower itself. The subjects and juridical formations fostered by biopower inevitably lead to a withering of individual responsibility even as it renders complicity universal. One example of this is the subject of liberal humanism. According to Foucault, the subject of liberal humanism emerges precisely to make intelligible the relationship between individuals and the biopolitical technologies of state rule that emerged in the eighteenth century. This subject is known by the rights it claims: ―the right‘ to life, to one‘s body, to health, to happiness, to the satisfaction of needs, and beyond all the oppressions or s,‘ the right‘ to rediscover what one is and all that one can be, this right‘...was the political response to all these new procedures of power which did not derive, either, from the traditional right of sovereignty‖ (HS 145). Foucault understands the rights of the liberal humanist subject as direct outgrowths of the biopolitical form of power, which the modern nation-state was charged with protecting.

### Value to Life (Neoliberalism-Specific)

#### Neoliberalism’s reliance on biopower destroys value to life and causes social inequality

Hamann 9 (Trent H., St. John’s U, Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and Ethics, Foucault Studies No6 Feb 2009) LA

Within the apparatus (dispositif)11 of neoliberalism every individual is considered to be “equally unequal”, as Foucault put it. Exploitation, domination, and every other form of social inequality is rendered invisible as social phenomena to the extent that each individual’s social condition is judged as nothing other than the effect of his or her own choices and investments. As Wendy Brown has pointed out, Homo economi- cus is constructed, not as a citizen who obeys rules, pursues common goods, and ad- dresses problems it shares with others, but as a rational and calculating entrepreneur who is not only capable of, but also responsible for caring for him or herself.12 Brown points out that this has the effect of “depoliticizing social and economic powers” as well as reducing “political citizenship to an unprecedented degree of passivity and political complacency.” She writes: The model neoliberal citizen is one who strategizes for her- or himself among various social, political, and economic options, not one who strives with others to alter or organize these options. A fully realized neoliberal citizenry would be the opposite of public-minded; indeed, it would barely exist as a public. The body politic ceases to be a body but is rather a group of individual entrepreneurs and consumers . . . (E, 43). Within this practically Hobbesian (anti-)social landscape the ”responsibility” of in- dividuals constitutes a form of market morality13 understood as the maximization of economy through the autonomous rational deliberation of costs and benefits fol- lowed by freely chosen practices. Neoliberal subjects are constituted as thoroughly responsible for themselves and themselves alone because they are subjectified as thoroughly autonomous and free. An individual’s failure to engage in the requisite processes of subjectivation, or what neoliberalism refers to as a “mismanaged life” (E, 42), is consequently due to the moral failure of that individual. Neoliberal ratio- nality allows for the avoidance of any kind of collective, structural, or governmental responsibility for such a life even as examples of it have been on the rise for a num- ber of decades. Instead, impoverished populations, when recognized at all, are often treated as ”opportunities” for investment.14

### Subjectification

#### Governmentalization constructs and constrains the individual dimensions of life.

Lipshutz 09 (Ronnie, Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz, 8-27-09, Institute of European Studies, "The Governmentalization of “Lifestyle” and the Biopolitics of Carbon," p .8, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/472341ct, accessed 7-7-12, CNM)

The example of smoking also suggests that deeply-embedded and widely- accepted social practices related to lifestyle can, and do, change over time, albeit not via the much-vaunted market and its concern with prices and internalization. Although we tend to regard lifestyles as a matter of “freedom of choice,”23 they are, in fact, heavily- regulated in terms of what we are permitted to do, what we are encouraged to consume, and what happens if we “violate” the rules and regulations that constrain our “freedom.” The governmentalization of lifestyle thus becomes a set of internalized norms and practices through which individual members of specified populations shape themselves so as to comport with their statistical placement in specific categories of consumers. Data on these practices can be collected to generate statistical norms about group “preferences” that, in turn, can be applied to further shape and stimulate the biopolitics of consumers. All of this serves the imperative of economic growth and accumulation, although it would be inaccurate to say that there is strong intentionality present in this process.24 A further point here is that the processes, practices and effects of governmentality serve as much to create those populations as they do to keep them contained within normative limits.

### Inequality

#### The way mobility is politicized is problematic because it magnifies social inequality

Jensen 11 (Jensen, Anne; Department of Policy Analysis, National Environmental Research Institute, Aarhus University, Denmark; "Mobility, Space, and Power: On the Multiplicities of Seeing Mobility" Mobilities 6.2 (May 2011): pp. 251-277; Kristof)

**With the inclusion of social mobility** and mobility capital, **the notion of motility** thus **deals with questions of social inequality**. The **social inequality embedded in uneven distribution of mobility is** also **a theme** emphasised by Urry, **with strong connections to power**: ‘[w]e might say that unforced “**movement” is power**, that is, **to be able to move (or to be able to** voluntarily **stay still**) **is** for individuals and groups **a major source of advantage** and conceptually independent of economic and cultural advantage’ (Urry, 2007, pp. 51–52). Social inequality is also a theme in the first editorial of the journal Mobilities (Hannam et al., 2006). Kevin Hannam, Mimi Sheller and John Urry emphasise how **particular mobilities induce social differentiation**. They raise questions of social inequality through showing how **social inequality is** (also) **produced by abilities to master mobility systems and access to different modes of mobility**. **This social inequality is** greatly **amplified by the** social **networks and goods that the masterful use of such mobilities enables**. In pursuit of this, Jonas Larsen, John Urry and Kay Axhausen advocate for ‘network capital’ to be considered in mobility studies, thus merging the ability to move with a notion of power and stressing a strong link to social inequality (Larsen et al., 2007). Cresswell presents a very clear example of how access to movement in times of crisis also connects to a politics of mobility. **In a case study of the way Hurricane Katrina was dealt with by the city authorities in New Orleans**, he demonstrates how **the politics of mobility**, i.e. **deciding whom to move and when,** how and where, **had severe, at times fatal, costs for the under-privileged population** of New Orleans**, while the wealthier citizens were able to escape the disaster** (Cresswell, 2008). Furthermore, Katharina Manderschied presents a way to combine perspectives of mobilities and space in the study of social inequalities. Drawing on a relational approach to space and social inequality, she shows how **mobilities are immanent to spatial means of creating, maintaining and deepening** social stratification, or social **inequalities** (Manderscheid, 2009). There are thus multiple ways of approaching the unequal distribution of mobility and subsequent opportunities for going to work, upholding family ties, using leisure activities, etc. The **politics of mobility** moreover **includes aspects which articulate mobility as related to freedom-based ‘rights’** and innately concerned with socio-spatial contexts, co-forming public presence (Sheller, 2004b, p. 42; Sheller, 2008; see also Cresswell 2006). To approach mobility from these perspectives also indicates a democratic dimension, evident in Sheller (2004b, 2008) and Cresswell (2006, p. 147). Such perspectives further lead to considerations over rights to mobility, including questions of mobility for whom, at what cost (individually and for others) and with which obligations attached (Sheller, 2008). Cresswell here adds another critical layer when he repeatedly stresses how mobility for some is based on and assumes the immobility of others (Cresswell, 2006, p. 249). Additionally, the politics of mobility have been addressed in investigations of how mobility and logics of mobility appear in political rationalities, ideas, representations and images (see e.g. Jensen & Richardson, 2004; Cresswell, 2006; Jensen, 2006; Jensen & Richardson, 2007).

#### When the affirmative talks about transportation, they exclude from the discussion the underprivileged who have no access to such transportation, this magnifies existing inequalities and racism

Giroux 6(Giroux, Henry A; holds the Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department; "Reading Hurricane Katrina: Race, Class, and the Biopolitics of Disposability" College Literature 33.3 [Peer Reviewed Journal] (2006):175-176; Kristof)

The Bush administration was not simply unprepared for Hurricane Katrina as it denied that the federal government alone had the resources to address catastrophic events; it actually felt no responsibility for the lives of poor blacks and others marginalized by poverty and relegated to the outskirts of society. Increasingly, **the role of the state seems to be about engendering the financial rewards and privileges of only some members of society, while the welfare of those marginalized by race and class is now viewed with** criminal **contempt**. The **coupling of the market state with the racial state** under George W. Bush **means that policies are aggressively pursued to dismantle the welfare state, eliminate affirmative action, model urban public schools after prisons, aggressively pursue anti-immigrant policies, and incarcerate with impunity Arabs, Muslims, and poor youth of color**. The central commitment of the new hyper-neoliberalism is now organized around the best way to remove or make invisible those individuals and groups who are either seen as a drain or stand in the way of market freedoms, free trade, consumerism, and the neoconservative dream of an American empire. This is what I call **the new biopolitics of disposability: the poor, especially people of color, not only have to fend for themselves in the face of life's tragedies but are also supposed to do it without being seen by the dominant society**. Excommunicated from the sphere of human concern, **they have been rendered invisible, utterly disposable**, and heir to that army of socially homeless that allegedly no longer existed in color-blind America. How else to explain the cruel jokes and insults either implied or made explicit by Bush and his ideological allies in the aftermath of such massive [End Page 175] destruction and suffering? **When** **it became obvious** in the week **following Katrina that thousands of the elderly, poor, and sick could not get out of New Orleans because they had no cars or money to take** a taxi or **any** other **form of transportation**, or were sick and infirmed, **the third-highest-ranking politician** in Washington, Rick Santorum, **stated in an interview "that people who did not heed evacuation warnings in the future may need to be penalized**" (Hamill 2005). For Santorum, **those who were trapped in the flood because of** poverty, sickness, and **lack of transportation had become an unwelcome reminder of** the state of **poverty and racism** in the United States, **and for that they should be punished**. Their crime, it seems, was that a natural disaster made a social and politically embarrassing disaster visible to the world, and they just happened to be its victims. Commenting on facilities that had been set up for the poor in the Houston Astrodome in Texas, Bush's mother and the wife of former President George H.W. Bush said in a National Public Radio interview, "So many of the people here, you know, were underprivileged anyway, so this is working very well for them" ("Barbara Bush" 2005). Other right-wing ideologues seeking to deflect criticism from the obscene incompetence and indifference of the Bush administration used a barely concealed racism to frame the events of Katrina. For example, Neil Boortz, a syndicated host on WFTL-AM in Florida stated that "**a huge percentage" of those forced to leave New Orleans were "parasites, like ticks on a dog. They are coming to a community near you**" (Norman 2005). On the September 13 broadcast of The Radio Factor, **Fox News** host Bill O'Reilly **overtly indulged** his own **racism before millions of** his **viewers in claiming that poor black people in New Orleans were basically drug addicts who failed to evacuate the city because they would not have access to their fix** (2005).

#### Mobility re-entrenches existing power relations – the powerful people keep powerless people immobile further reducing their power over their lives

Jensen 11 (Jensen, Anne; Department of Policy Analysis, National Environmental Research Institute, Aarhus University, Denmark; "Mobility, Space, and Power: On the Multiplicities of Seeing Mobility" Mobilities 6.2 (May 2011): pp. 251-277; Kristof)

Noting that ‘**as people, capital, and things move** **they** form and **reform space** itself’ (Sheller & Urry, 2006, p. 216), Sheller and Urry emphasise how **the** diverse **power effects of mobility relate strongly to space**. Here, space is included in the analysis of mobility in a mutually constitutive manner. Another take on the relation between mobility and space is to place both in a relationship ridden with tension, as e.g. when a sedentarism that is intimately tied to place and community is opposed to a nomadism that establishes mobility as a progressive force (Cresswell, 2006). To others, **mobility and space are linked in a productive sense that builds on a relational conception of power** (Jensen & Richardson, 2007) where for example Ole B. Jensen and Tim Richardson demonstrate a key role for mobility in the ‘making of European space’. Their analyses of the emergence of a European planning field show how the very relational and socially constructed character of (transnational) space makes this a site for power struggles and political tensions (Jensen & Richardson, 2004). Building on these insights, this article tracks such workings of power in the making of spatialised mobility. Investigating the Powers of How to See Above, I have outlined different ways in the **mobility** literature to consider aspects relating to power and space. These **have very real and re-enforcing impacts of power and spatialities that deny and delimit particular social groups from welfare and social goods through** e.g. **limiting access to mobility**. This article tracks additional workings of power in the study of mobility which have no less real effects. **Its basic Foucauldian conception of power sees power as a productive, enabling** and local **force in the social** rather than something that denies and can be possessed. **Power as a non-subjective force** works in networks and numerous ways and may be approached as a diverse and moving field of relations of forces which **when exercised constitute ‘mode[s] of action upon the actions of others**’ (Foucault, 1982, p. 221; see also 1978, 1979). Within this relational thinking, **space denotes a dynamic** and immanent **dimension of the social which is heterogeneous and continually produced in multiple points and relations** (Amin & Thrift, 2002; Massey, 2005). This implies a continued ‘openness and … condition of always being made’ (Massey, 2005, p. 39), and we may thus see space as something inherent to the ways mobility works in modernity; mobility is always spatialised (Cresswell, 2006). In the remainder of the article, two workings of power are scrutinised in relation to mobility and urban space. At first, the article discusses **a governmentality perspective in relation to mobility and space**, which **includes logics and practices of mobility and of ordering urban spaces**. Then, the article turns to examine emotions, sensory experiences and ambiences as additional ways power works and which are immanent to particular urban spaces and modes of mobility

### Genocide

#### Biopolitics necessitates genocidal slaughters of entire groups of people in the name of the survival of humanity writ-large

Rey Chow, Professor of the Humanities at Brown, 2002, The Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit of Capitalism, p. 9-10

Let me attempt to reformulate Foucault’s argument in a somewhat different manner. When life becomes the overarching imperative, his ar­gument implies, all social relations become subordinate to the discursive network that has been generated to keep it going, so much so that even a negative, discriminatory fact such as racism is legitimated in the name of the living. Rather than straightforwardly assuming the form of a cal­lous willingness to kill, therefore, racist genocide partakes of the organ­ization, calculation, control, and surveillance characteristic of power—in other words, of all the “civil” or “civilized” procedures that are in place primarily to ensure the continuance of life. Killing off certain groups of people en masse is now transformed (by the process of epistemic ab­straction) into a productive, generative activity undertaken for the life of the entire human species. Massacres are, literally, vital events.6 If Foucault thereby shows how murder (a negative act) can be legiti­mated by a valorization of life (a positive idea), his logic may, I think, also be turned around to demonstrate that the valorization of life itself, by the necessity of practice, can give rise to processes of discrimination, hatred, and, in some extreme cases, extermination. In other words, if the notion of legitimation shows how murder can, indeed, make sense as part of a positive idea, the reversal of Foucault’s logic shows that the ma­terial process of enforcing a positive idea inevitably derails it into some­thing destructive and unjust. It is, of course, always possible to explain this derailment economically: since an infinite valorization of life cannot possibly be sustained on the basis of finite resources, various forms of disciplinary and regulatory controls must be introduced in order to han­dle population increases, thereby resulting in a hierarchical situation in which resources are assigned to the privileged few rather than distributed equally among all, etc. Yet this type of explanation—which sees unequal economic distribution as the primary source of social injustice—does not seem adequate to account for the persistence of racism, especially in places where there is actually sufficient wealth, where the democratiza­tion of resources seems to some degree to have been achieved. How, in other words, is one to account for an environment in which one may be allowed to stay alive, may be told that all is equal, may be given access to many things, only then to realize that an insidious pattern of discrim­ination continues systematically to reduce one to a marginal position vis-à-vis mainstream society? Such an environment, which is characterized by a schism between the positively proclaimed values of life, on the one hand, and an affective dis-ease felt by those who sense they are nonethe­less the targets of discrimination, on the other, cannot be addressed pure­ly on economic grounds. The schism in question is not simply a matter of lies versus truths, or false ideology versus lived reality. It is rather, if we follow Foucault’s thinking, symptomatic of the generative function­ing of biopower itself. To illustrate this, some examples may be useful.

#### Biopolitics legitimizes racism and genocide

Milchman and Rosenberg 5 (Alan and Alan, Both @ Queens College, Review Essay: Michel Foucault: Crises and Problemizations, The Review of Politics vol67 no2, JSTOR) LA

"Society Must Be Defended "culminates in Foucault's chilling ac count of a tendency immanent to bio-politics, a tendency to what he has elsewhere designated as "thanato-politics," and its basis in what he here terms state racism. The question that Foucault raises in his final lecture in this course, is how can mass murder and ex termination become instantiated in a regime of biopower: If it is true that the power of sovereignty is increasingly on the retreat and that disciplinary or regulatory disciplinary power is on the advance, how will the power to kill and the function ofmurder operate in this technology of power, which takes life as both its object and its objective? ....How, under these conditions, is it possible for a political power to kill, to call for deaths, to demand deaths, to give the order to kill... ?Given that this power's objective is essentially tomake live, how can it let die? How can the power of death, the function of death, be exercised in a political sytem centered upon biopower? (p.254) For Foucault, it is here that racism, which, indeed, has a long history, intervenes, and now becomes inscribed in the basic mechanisms of the modern state. According to Foucault: …broadly speaking, racism justifies the death0function in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principle that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is amember of a race or a population, insofar as one is an element in a unitary living plurality.... The specificity of modern racism... is not bound up with mentalities, ideologies, or the lies of power. It isbound up with the techniques of power, with the technology of power. We are dealing with amechanism that allows biopower towork. So racism is bound up with the workings of a state that is obliged to use race, the elimination of races and the purification of the race, to exercise its sovereign power. The juxtaposition of—or the way biopower functions through? the old sovereign power of life and death implies the workings, the introduction and activation of racism. And it is, I think, here that we find the actual roots of racism (p. 258). State racism, then emerges, when in a regime of biopower, internal or external threats lead the state to engage in mass death: "Once the State functions in the biopower mode, racism alone can justify the murderous function of the State" (p. 256). But, according to Foucault, what is it that constitutes a group within the population as a "race?" Race is a "way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is under power's control: the break between what must live and what must die" (p. 254). The basis for such a break in the biological continuum can be ethnic or religious; it can be founded on sexual orientation, on deviance from a society's norms, on mental or physical illness, or on criminality. Any such "cut" in the continuity of the species can constitute a race in Foucauldian terms, so long as the "identity" in question is meataphysically defined, attributed to the very being of the individual or group. Moreover, the constitution of race entails "... the hierarchy of races, the fact that certain races are described as good and that others, in contrast, are described as inferior: all this is away of fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls.... It is, in short, away of establishing a biological-type caesura within a population that appears in the biological domain" (p. 255). And on the bases of such a caesura, the exclusion or elimination of the inferior race can be undertaken, purportedly in the interests of the life and health of the superior race, those who are normal. Race, for Foucault, is linked to the "dividing practices" through which a population can be regulated and controlled in a bio-political regime. The Foucauldian notion of race is a novel one, permitting us to see the numerous ways in which such dividing practices are instantiated in the modern world, as so many manifestations of a racialization of politics, even where there is no necessary genetic basis for the invidious distinctions that it entails. Foucault's analysis of state racism focuses on the Nazi and Stalinist regimes. Nazism is seen as the "paroxysmal" development of the technologies and mechanisms of biopower, while Stalinism has perfected what Foucault terms a "social-racism," inwhich the state exercises its right to kill or eliminate "class" enemies, the abnor mal, and "criminal" elements, no less metaphysically defined than the Jews or "Gypsies" that were the target of the Nazis. Foucault's linkage of state racism and the perpetuation of mass murder to ten dencies immanent to biopower, makes it clear that, for him, regimes such as Nazism and Stalinism are not atavistic reversions to the premodern past, but historically specific manifestations of tenden cies that are also found throughout the modern, democratic, West. Indeed, in their essay "Situating the Lectures," the editors of "Society Must Be Defended," Alessandro Fontana and Mauro Bertani, point out, "That there would appear to be a very strange kinship between 'liberal societies' and totalitarian states, or between the normal and the pathological, and sooner or later itmust be investigated" (p. 276). It seems to us, that Foucault's meditation on biopower and "thanato-politics," provides a basis for just such an investigation.7 Foucault's focus on the state racism of regimes such as Nazism or Stalinism, now past, should not mislead us into think ing that his vision of a "thanato-politics" was not a prospective one. Foucault lectured 15 years before the genocide in Rwanda and the Moreover, bloody ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. But these outbreaks of murderous state violence and racism, the examples of which have continued multiply, confirm the danger that Foucault saw ensconced within to the dispositif of bio-politics.8

#### The modern state is monstrous – the consequences of its biopolicy is evident in Nazism and Stalinism

Prozorov 7 (Sergei, Research Fellow at the Danish Institute of International Studies, Academy of Finland Research Fellow at the Department of Political and Economic Studies at the University of Helsinki, “The Unrequited Love of Power: Biopolitical Investment and the Refusal of Care”, Feb 2007, Foucault Studies, 7/10/12, BR)

Thus, the regimes of sovereignty and biopower are entirely distinct in their paradigmatic structure, which of course has never prevented their admixture in actual practices of the modern state, which Foucault has famously labelled a ‘demonic project’.11 On the ontological level, what is demonic about this project is its uncanny coupling of absolutely incommensurable elements: the negative and the positive, the transcendent and the immanent, scarcity and plenitude, etc.12 On the ontic level, the demonic nature of the modern state is owing to the confluence of the murderous power of the sovereign’s sword and the productive, vitalist power of biopolitics. The modern state is a monstrous unison of the executioner and the physician. The diabolic consequences of this confluence are illustrated by the two totalitarian projects of the twentieth century, German Nazism and Soviet Stalinism, which both combined sovereign and biopolitical imperatives in a radicalised manner. In the Foucauldian reading, Nazism is approached as the simultaneous universalisation of both sovereign and biopolitical imperatives on the basis of the primacy of the former. The positive and productive biopolitical imperative of maximising the life of the population reinscribed in terms of race became subsumed under the sovereign right of killing, effecting, in Foucault’s words, “an absolutely racist state, an absolutely murderous state and an absolutely suicidal state”.13 In this alignment of sovereignty and biopolitics, the cultivation of the life capacities of the race meant not only the right of the indiscriminate murder of those not belonging to it, but also, since the sovereign power of death was absolutised, the right to “expose its own race to the absolute and universal threat of death”,14 evidenced by Hitler’s Demolition Order in Spring 1945, which sought to destroy the living conditions of the German people.

### Eugenics

#### Biopolitics leads to Eugenics

Braun 7’ (Biopolitics and the molecularization of life, Bruce Braun, Cultural Geographies 2007 p. 10)

Translated into the language of biopolitics, Rose argues that it is i**ncreasingly our corporeality ‘life itself**’ and not just our conduct which **has become subject to what Foucault called ‘technologies of self**’. Ethopolitics, then, is the name Rose gives to this new ethical-political relation to our bodies, which are now defined in terms of open-ended futures. **But there is more to Rose’s account than merely a shift in the target of political rationalities from the behaviour of bodies to their actual make-up; for Rose, ethopolitics also relates to crucial changes in the relation between the individual and the state.** Rose develops this point in response to critics of biotechnology, for whom **the molecularization of life is inescapably haunted by eugenics. With our newfound capacity to diagnose genetic conditions in embryos, for instance, we can now make choices about whether to continue a pregnancy, or to accept an embryo for implantation in IVF therapies, based upon the knowledge of future risks.** For a number of critics this has raised the unsettling possibility of political rationalities directed toward eliminating ‘taints or weaknesses’ in populations, based on some bodies being calculated to have less biological worth than others. **This discomfort should come as little surprise; as we are all too aware from events in the twentieth century, biopolitics, defined as the care of life, can just as readily invest in the life of the collective body through purging ‘defective’ bodies as through improving, training or selecting ‘healthy’ ones.** 17 It is partly in response to these anxieties that Rose spells out his account of a historical shift from a biopolitics of populations to an ethopolitics characterized by the individual management of the ‘somatic’ self. While he readily agrees that political rationalities are still organized around risks to health, he claims that the nature of these political rationalities has changed in such a way that eugenics is no longer the threat it once was. **Biopolitical practices in the past, he argues, were directed toward improving the national stock, and took two forms which contained the potential for eugenics: hygienics, which was concerned with maximizing the health and productive powers of the national body in the present; and the regulation of reproduction, which was concerned with improving the national stock by eliminating risks to its wellbeing in the future**. **These were matters of concern for state policy, as well as for individuals who understood their biological lives (and the lives of their children) in terms of an ethical responsibility to the national body, thus blurring the boundaries between coercive and voluntary eugenics**

#### Modern biopolitics make possible a new, “liberal,” eugenic aimed at disciplining individuals through making everyone responsible for their own health.

Braun 7’ (Biopolitics and the molecularization of life, Bruce Braun, Cultural Geographies 2007 p. 11)

Hence, **when it comes to national health, the state seeks to ‘enable’ or ‘facilitate’ the health of individuals, rather than govern bodies in any direct way. The difference between ‘old’ eugenics and what some have today labelled ‘liberal’ eugenics, then, can be seen as the difference between state-led programmes that in the past sought to produce a particular population with particular traits and capabilities, and the ethical decisions of individuals in the present, who are exercising ‘choice’ in reproductive matters**. Although forms of pastoral power clearly shape these reproductive choices, the state remains neutral. For Rose, this is a crucial difference, and symptomatic of a larger shift, whereby health is increasingly a matter of individual rather than state responsibility and citizens are asked to take responsibility for securing their own wellbeing, through such things as purchasing private health insurance, being informed citizens, actively investigating health conditions, joining with others in support groups, contributing to lobby groups and seeking genetic counselling. **It is here, at the intersection of the molecularization of life with the individualization of risk, that Rose locates ethopolitics as the dominant biopolitical regime of the present. Within such a biopolitical order, he argues, individuals are presented with new ways of rendering their bodies to themselves in thought and language, making judgements about them, and ultimately acting upon them, whether these decisions are based on DNA samples from amniotic fluid, in the case of reproductive health, or susceptibility to Alzheimer’s, due to the presence or absence of particular genes. Thus, the individual who ‘takes responsibility for her health’ is at the same time the individual who thinks her body through its ‘genetic inheritance’, an inheritance to be managed wisely or potentially improved.** This government of the genetic self is thus decidedly not about following general programmes, aimed at the population at large, but about understanding and making wise choices about the risks that are peculiar to one’s self. Risk becomes ‘individualized’; the individual becomes ‘intrinsically somatic’; and ethical practices ‘increasingly take the body as a key site for work on the self’ 19 . **Within the social sciences and humanities this formulation of the biopolitical present predominates, as is evident in a great deal of work on the social and cultural aspects of biomedicine and biotechnology. From anthropologists and sociologists, for example, we learn that the molecularization of life and the individualization of risk have given rise to new forms of identity and sociality around disease and risk.** 20 Individuals are said to increasingly recognize the ‘self’ as the bearer of this or that genetic risk, around which daily routines and future plans must be prudently organized. Likewise, researchers have begun to attend to the myriad of ways that our genetic lives are lived, and ethical decisions about ‘life itself’ are made, within complex networks of activists, scientists, doctors, politicians and corporate interests that are clustered around particular ‘risks’. 21 In many of these accounts the Internet looms large, providing novel possibilities for the sharing of biomedical knowledge and life experience among lay advocates, scientists and clinicians, and for forging translocal communities around particular genetic identities.

### Exclusion

#### Consumption culture ensures the exclusion of people who don’t practice the “freedom” of consumption

Lipshutz 09 (Ronnie, Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz, 8-27-09, Institute of European Studies, "The Governmentalization of “Lifestyle” and the Biopolitics of Carbon," p. 17-18, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/472341ct, accessed 7-7-12, CNM)

To be sure, the process of identity construction is highly-individualized and the various “pieces” that comprise an individual identity can contribute to very idiosyncratic ones that barely resemble one another (hence, defying biopolitics).47 At the same time, however, the imaginaries associated with lifestyle are highly structured in terms of specific cultural logics, since this is the grammar that makes them intelligible to consumers who pursue their dreams and visions. There is, of course, greater space for variation but identities shaped through consumption are not without boundaries or constraints, as noted above. In other words, consumers do not practice in a realm of “freedom” or “free choice,” as is so often claimed. S/he must have money and permission to consume, the desired object or practice must be available for alienation in the market, and the item or practice must not threaten the self, others or society as a whole. These do not seem to be onerous limits, given the wide range of goods and opportunities supplied to those who are able to participate in regimes of consumption.48 At the same time, lifestyle is being regulated through norms, culture, credit, surveillance and other biopolitical tools.

#### Heterotopias are exclusionary

Foucault 86 (Michel, Legend and famous French philosopher, Of Other Spaces, Diacritics Vol.16, No.1, Spring 1986, Trans. Jay Miskowiec, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0300-7162%28198621%2916%3A1%3C22%3AOOS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F) LA

The last trait of heterotopias is that they have a function in relation to all the space that remains. This function unfolds between two extreme poles. Either their role is to create a space of illusion that exposes every real space, all the sites inside of which human life is parti- tioned, as still more illusory (perhaps that is the role that was played by those famous brothels of which we are now deprived). Or else, on the contrary, their role is to create a space that is other, another real space, as perfect, as meticulous, as well arranged as ours is messy, ill constructed, and jumbled. This latter type would be the heterotopia, not of illu- sion, but of compensation, and I wonder if certain colonies have not functioned somewhat in this manner. In certain cases, they have played, on the level of the general organization of terrestrial space, the role of heterotopias. I am thinking, for example, of the first wave of col- onization in the seventeenth century, of the Puritan societies that the English had founded in America and that were absolutely perfect other places. I am also thinking of those extraor- dinary Jesuit colonies that were founded in South America: marvelous, absolutely regulated colonies in which human perfection was effectively achieved. The Jesuits of Paraguay established colonies in which existence was regulated at every turn. The village was laid out according to a rigorous plan around a rectangular place at the foot of which was the church; on one side, there was the school; on the other, the cemetery; and then, in front of the church, an avenue set out that another crossed at right angles; each family had its little cabin along these two axes and thus the sign of Christ was exactly reproduced. Christianity marked the space and geography of the American world with its fundamental sign. The daily life of individuals was regulated, not by the whistle, but by the bell. Everyone was awakened at the same time, everyone began work at the same time; meals were at noon and five o'clock; then came bedtime, and at midnight came what was called the marital wake-up, that is, at the chime of the churchbell, each person carried out herlhis duty.

### Extinction

#### The expression of humanist biopower will destroy the planet

Bernauer, Boston College professor of philosophy, 1990

(James, “Michael Foucault’s Force of Flight: Toward an Ethics of Thought,” pp. 141-142)

This capacity of power to conceal itself cannot cloak the tragedy of the implications contained in Foucault's examination of its functioning. While liberals have fought to extend rights and Marxists have denounced the injustices of capitalism, a political technology, acting in the interests of a better administration of life, has produced a politics that places man's "existence as a living being in question." The very period that proclaimed pride in having overthrown the tyranny of monarchy, that engaged in an endless clamor for reform, that is confident in the virtues of its humanistic faith -- this period's politics created a landscape dominated by history's bloodiest wars. **What comparison is possible between a sovereign's authority to take a life and a power that, in the interest of protecting a society's quality of life, can plan, as well as develop the means for its implementation, a policy of mutually assured destruction? Such a policy is neither an aberration of the fundamental principles of modern politics nor an abandonment of our age's humanism in favor of a more primitive right to kill**; it is but the other side of a power that is "situated and exercised at the level of life, the species the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population. **The bio-political project of administering and optimizing life closes its circle with the production of the Bomb. "The atomic situation is now at the end point of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of a power to guarantee and individuals continued existence.** " The solace that might have been expected from being able to gaze at scaffolds empty of the victims of a tyrant's vengeance has been stolen form us by the noose that has tightened around each of our own necks.

### Environment Solvency Takeout

#### The affirmatives defense of environmental protections renders nature into capital in the process of trying to regulate (but not eliminate the process of consumption). They legitimate the expansion of capitalist development while attempting to remove the small excesses.

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(Timothy, “The (Un)Wise (Ab)Use of Nature: Environmentalism as Globalized Consumerism? http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/tims/Tim528.htm)

All of these environmentalizing initiatives reveal different aspects of Nature's infrastructuralization in the disorganized and incomplete transnational campaigns of environmentalized capital's terraforming programs. The actions of the Worldwatch Institute, the Nature Conservancy, or the World Wildlife Fund, or the Sierra Club are frameworks within which a new habitus with its own environmentalized social relations of production and consumption can come alive by guarding habitat as the supremely perfect site of habitus. As Baudrillard observes, "the great signified, the great referent Nature is dead, replaced by environment, which simultaneously designates and designs its death and the restoration of nature as simulation model....we enter a social environment of synthesis in which a total abstract communication and an immanent manipulation no longer leave any point exterior to the system."115 Rendering wildlife, air, water, habitat, or Nature into complex new systems of rare goods in the name of environmental protection, and then regulating the social consumption of them through ecological activism shows how mainstream environmentalists are serving as agents of social control or factors in political economy to reintegrate the intractable equations of (un)wise (ab)use along consummational rather than consumptive lines. Putting earth first only establishes ecological capital as the ultimate basis of life. Infrastructuralizing Nature renders everything on Earth, or "humanity's home," into capital--land, labor, animals, plants, air, water, genes, ecosystems. And, mainstream environmentalism often becomes a very special kind of "home eco nomics" to manage humanity's indoors and outdoors household accounts. Household consumption is always home consumption, because human economics rests upon terrestrial ecologics. Here the roots of ecology and economics intertwine through "sustainable development," revealing its truest double significance: sustainably managing the planet is the same thing as reproducing terrestrial stocks of infrastructorialized green capital. Whether or not environmentalists prevent the unwise abuse or promote wise use of natural resources is immaterial; everything they do optimizes the sign value of green goods and serves to reproduce global capital as environmentalized sites, stocks or spaces--an outcome that every Worldwatch Institute State of the World report or Club Sierra ecotour easily confirms. Likewise, the scarcity measures of Nature Conservancy or World Wildlife Fund scare campaigns show how everything now has a price, including wildlife preservation or ecological degradation, which global markets will mark and meet in their (un)wise (ab)use of environmentalized resources. Newer ecological discourses about total cost accounting, lifecycle management, or environmental justice may simply articulate more refined efforts to sustainably develop these bigger global processes of universal capitalization by accepting small correctives against particular capitalist interests. Admitting that poor people have been treated unjustly in siting decisions for environmental bads lets rich people redistribute these ecological costs across more sites so that they might benefit from the material and symbolic goods created by being just so environmental. Environmental justice movements perhaps are not so much about attaining environmental justice as they are about moving injustices more freely around in the environment, assuring the birth of new consumerisms for increased efficiency at risk management and broader participation ecological degradation in our terraformed Nature.

### Pleasure and Punishment

#### Transportation is Both a Pleasure and a Punishment

Freund, Peter March 2007

Freund, Peter. Sociology Department, Montclair State University, Montclair, New Jersey, USA "Hyperautomobility, the Social Organization of Space, and Health." Mobilities 2.1 (March 2007): pp. 42)

So, looked at from the point of view of individual connectivity within the framework of settlement sprawl, the car is functional; indeed, it is necessary. However, necessity is not in itself a virtue, much less a pleasure. While driving a car can be a pleasurable activity for many people, it is usually so in the context of being a voluntary act, such as taking a traditional Sunday excursion into the countryside. When driving becomes a routine necessity and is done on highly congested roadways, it can lose much of its appeal. From the perspective of the community and the society, hyperautomobility carries no pleasurable or functionally necessary connotations. Quite the contrary, looked at from the point of view of social justice, of community vitality, of public health, and of environmental integrity, it can be seen as dysfunctional.

### Imperialism (Automobility)

#### Transportation creates a social structure reliant on car culture and oil.

**Campbell 2005** “The Biopolitics of Security: Oil, Empire, and the Sports Utility Vehicle “ <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/american_quarterly/v057/57.3campbell.html> American Quarterly 57.3 (2005) (not done cite)

The concept of automobility—or that of the “auto social formation” or “car culture”—calls attention to the hybrid assemblage or machinic complex that the apparently autonomous entities of car and driver compose.88 In the “automobilized time-space” of contemporary society we can observe a networked, sociotechnical infrastructure that is in process, an infrastructure in which there is “the ceaseless and mobile interplay between many different scales, from the body to the globe.”89 Automobility thus is one dimension of empire, in the sense proposed by Hardt and Negri. The relationship between the auto and the urban has always been at its strongest in the United States. The beautification of cities through the construction of avenues, malls, and parkways in the early twentieth century coincided with and furthered the rise of the automobile.90 While the development of technology was obviously important, a transformation in American urban culture—wherein streets came to be viewed as traffic ways rather than recreational social spaces—was fundamental to the creation of the auto social formation. 91 Most obvious in the urban planning of Robert Moses, whose bridges, expressways, and parkways transformed New York City and its environs, these infrastructural developments came to be the leitmotif of modernity.92 National highway systems became the centerpieces of utopian plans—as in General Motors’ “Futurama” in the 1939 World’s Fair in New York—and were realized in the cold war years as a consequence of the Interstate Highways and Defense Act of 1956.93 Although constructed as a means to achieve the unification of social life, the web of traffic routes that permeate urban space have in practice furthered the fragmentation of the urban and its peri-urban and suburban spaces, creating in the process new borderlands (which in turn require new capsules of security).94 The distanciation of life elements (home from work, family from friends, haves from have nots) that are part of this urban fissure in turn promotes further reliance on automobility as people seek to overcome, traverse, or bypass these divisions. Importantly, this partitioning of the urban world has been codified in and encouraged by planning legislation. Embodying a functionalist view of the city as an organized machine, American urban planners from the 1920s on relied on a system of zoning controls that separated uses and imposed homogenous criteria on specified areas. Hostile to mixed usage or hybrid formations, these uniform zoning codes (known as Euclidean zoning after a 1926 Supreme Court decision in favor of the village of Euclid) have produced urban sprawl and the elongation of travel routes.95 In the ab**966 | American Quarterly** sence of public transport systems, these urban forms have further increased reliance on the car. For residents of the border zones known as “edge cities,” there is little choice but to rely on private transport for mobility. Contemporary urban life is both sustained by oil in the form of the car and requires increasing oil consumption through the use of the car urban life promotes. Citizens are thus coerced into a limited flexibility, creating a situation that is “a wonderful testament to the ability of a sociomaterial structure to serve its own reproduction.”96 Not that this is exclusive to America. The United States remains the archetypical case of the auto social formation, with more automobiles than registered drivers, and a per capita fuel consumption rate that is ten times the rate of Japan’s and twenty times as much as European city dwellers.97 Nonetheless, the social forces behind automobility are global, and societies other than the United States (China, for example) are witnessing profound growth in private vehicle usage. SUVs are growing in popularity—while equally attracting opprobrium—in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the UK, and other EU states.98 As the icon of automobility, the SUV is imperial.

#### The SUV is the bio political vehicle of the empire, creating social boundaries that materialize into the American notion of personal and national security.

**Campbell 2005** “The Biopolitics of Security: Oil, Empire, and the Sports Utility Vehicle “ <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/american_quarterly/v057/57.3campbell.html> American Quarterly 57.3 (2005) (not done cite)

The SUV is a vehicle of singular importance. It is a node in a series of networks that range from the body to the globe, which, when combined, establish the conditions of possibility for U.S. strategic policy and demonstrate that geopolitics needs to be understood in the context of biopolitics. In the story outlined here, it is the central role of mobility in American society that grants oil its social value. This article has outlined the key moments of connectivity in those networks that have given rise to the American auto social formation—the way the transport sector dominates petroleum use; the importance of passenger vehicles as the major consumers of oil in the transport sector; how light trucks have come to be the auto manufacturers’ dominant product, overtaking the car as the choice for the majority of families, who find themselves with little choice other than the private vehicle as they move through the domains of their lives. All this—the auto social formation of automobility— has resulted in a situation in which energy efficiency declines and dependence on oil from unstable regions increases as Americans drive further in less economical vehicles. Pivotal in this account is the role played by various laws and regulations—including fuel economy standards, exemptions for light trucks, tax rebates, trade tariffs, international environmental agreements, and zoning codes—in enabling and supporting automobility. Indeed, the story is tragic **The Biopolitics of Security | 967** insofar as the regulatory regime designed to increase energy efficiency and reduce oil dependence (the CAFE standards) has in fact created inefficiency and given rise to a class of vehicles (SUVs) that undermine the overall objective. Those vehicles are the embodiment of a new articulation of citizenship that effaces its social and global connectivity, but SUVs are unquestionably implicated in (if not solely responsible for) the United States’ rejection of the Kyoto Protocols and its initiation of an illegal international conflict. The SUV’s importance goes well beyond these instrumentalized concerns, because a renewed emphasis on the material requires an extended engagement with the immaterial. As such, the SUV is the icon of automobility in contemporary America, invested with codes drawn from the militarized frontier culture of post-Vietnam America and manifesting the strategic game animating social and cultural networks in contemporary liberal society. The SUV is the vehicle of empire, when empire is understood as the deterritorialized apparatus of rule that is global in scope but national and local in its effects. The SUV is a materialization of America’s global security attitude, functioning as a gargantuan capsule of excess consumption in an uncertain world. With its military genealogy and its claim to provide personal security through the externalization of danger, the SUV is itself a boundary-producing political performance inscribing new geopolitical borderlands at home and abroad through social relations of security, threat, and war. The SUV draws the understanding of security as sizeable enclosure into daily life, folds the foreign into the domestic, and links the inside to the outside, thereby simultaneously transgressing bounded domains while enacting the performative rebordering of American identity. Because of the SUV’s cultural power and pivotal place in the constitution of contemporary America, challenging its encoded performances is a difficult proposition. Instrumentally, rectification could begin with changes in the regulatory regime to increase economy standards (perhaps via efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, as the state of California proposes) and a political recognition that energy conservation is itself “the first and cheapest rapid deployment energy resource.”99 But bringing about change involves something more incisive than fine-tuning public policy. As this article makes clear, a biopolitical understanding of automobility is necessary, because we are dealing with dispositions and practices that exceed the structured sites of social institutions. Transformation therefore requires so much more than the individualization of responsibility proposed in the advertisements encouraged by the Detroit Project. Can the politics of desire be remodeled to make the SUV an “unpatriotic relic”?100 Only if America’s security attitude can resist the **968 | American Quarterly** reinscription of the homeland at war and begin to work with the networks of the biopolitical that exceed yet effect the borders of our communities.

### A/T: Ojakangas

#### Care for “all living” raises the issue of a life threatened making external massacres vital

Dillon ’ 5 (Professor at Lancaster, May, Response to Ojakangas: “Cared to Death: The Biopoliticised Time of Your Life,” Foucault Studies, No. 2, pp. 37-46, Date Accessed: 7/12, JS)

The key point of dispute with Ojakangas concerns the self-immolating logic of biopolitics. “Not bare life that is exposed to an unconditional threat of death,” he says in the introduction to his paper, “but the care of ‘all living’ is the foundation of biopower.” (emphasis in the original). Ojakangas says: “Foucault’s biopower has nothing to do with that [Agamben] kind of bare life.” I agree. Foucault’s biopolitics concerns an historically biologised life whose biologisation continues to mutate as the life sciences themselves offer changing interpretations and technical determinations of life. This biologised life of biopolitics nonetheless also raises the stake for Foucault of a life that is not a biologised life. So it does for Agamben, but differently and in a different way.24 For Foucault, the biologised life of biopolitics also raises the issue of a life threatened in supremely violent and novel ways. So it does for Agamben, but again differently and for the same complex of reasons. 25In contesting Agamben in the ways that he does, Ojakangas marks an important difference, then, between Foucault and Agamben. That done, perhaps the difference needs however to be both marked differently and interrogated differently. I have argued that there is a certain betrayal in the way Agamben reworks Foucault. There is however much more going on in this ‘betrayal’ than misconstruction and misinterpretation. There is a value in it. Exploring that value requires another ethic of reading in addition to that of the exegesis required to mark it out. For Agamben’s loathing of biopolitics is I think more ‘true’ to the burgeoning suspicion and fear that progressively marked Foucault’s reflections on it than Ojakangas’ account can give credit for, since he concentrates on providing the exegetical audit required to mark it out rather than evaluate it. In posing an intrinsic and unique threat to life through the very ways in which it promotes, protects and invests life, ‘care for all living’ threatens life in its own distinctive ways. Massacres have become vital. The threshold of modernity is reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own (bio) political strategies. Biopolitics must and does recuperate the death function. It does teach us how to punish and who to kill.26 Power over life must adjudicate punishment and death as it distributes live across terrains of value that the life sciences constantly revise in the cause of life’s very promotion. It has to. That is also why we now have a biopolitics gone geopolitically global in humanitarian wars of intervention and martial doctrines of virtuous war.27 Here, also, is the reason why the modernising developmental politics of biopolitics go racist: “So you can understand the importance – I almost said the vital importance – of racism to such an exercise of power.”28 In racism, Foucault insists: “We are dealing with a mechanism that allows biopower to work.”29 But: “The specificity of modern racism, or what gives it its specificity, is not bound up with mentalities, ideologies or the lies of power. It is bound up with the techniques of power, with the technology of power.”30

# Framing

## Topic Critique First

### Transportation Key (1NC Topic Link)

#### Transportation Infrastructure represents a biopolitical technology—Foucauldian understandings of power are key

Bonham and Cox 10 (Jennifer and Peter, U of Adelaide and U of Chester, The Disruptive Traveller? A Foucauldian Analysis of Cycleways, 6/2010, http://adelaide.academia.edu/JenniferBonham/Papers/372359/The\_Disruptive\_Traveller\_A\_Foucauldian\_Analysis\_of\_Cycleways) LA

BRINGING FOUCAULT INTO TRANSPORT In contrast to the broader transport literature, we do not theorise the individual as a natural, pre-social being simply choosing one mode of travel over others. Drawing on Michel Foucault, we are interested in the techniques through which people in contemporary societies come to think of themselves as individuals and regulate themselves towards, alter or resist the subjectivities (or subject positions - e.g. as cyclists, pedestrians, motorists) available to them (Foucault 1982). We take the view that the production of knowledge about human beings - which has proliferated since the eighteenth century- and the operation of power which enables that knowledge is central to our capacity to think of ourselves first as individuals (Digeser 1992) and then as particular types of subjects (Foucault 1977, 1978). In this sense, those who produce and utilise transport knowledge participate both in shaping how people can think about their journeys and in structuring the field of action of individual travellers. It is impossible to review the key elements of Foucault's work in this article, instead we offer a brief introduction accompanied by an example of how Foucault's work can be utilised in transport. Readers unfamiliar with Foucault are directed to McHoul and Grace (1995) for a concise introduction and Bacchi (2009) on applying Foucault to policy analysis. Foucault offers an understanding of power as productive, as producing particular types of being and knowledge (Bacchi 2009:37-8). He identifies different types of power (Hindess 1996:96-136) and, although governmental and bio power are important to transport, our paper focuses on discipline as it foregrounds the role of 'spatialising' practices2 in processes of objectification and subjectification (the formation of subjects). Disciplinary power, fundamental to the selfregulation that characterises modern societies (Foucault 1991:101 ), has enabled the production of knowledge about the capabilities and capacities of human beings that, in turn, facilitates innovations in the exercise of power (Foucault 1977:224). It is through the operation of power at a micro-scale, the sorting and physical separation of the human mass - constituting difference through the discursive mechanisms (records keeping, data collection) involved in separating, scrutinising and monitoring bodies -that knowledge of singular bodies has been produced (Foucault 1977:191-2). From the moment we are born-separated from our mothers, gendered male or female, weighed, measured, named, allocated the special space of a cot and monitored at regular intervals - we are subjected to and made subjects through myriad practices involving the operation of power and the production of knowledge. The procedures of inscription which bring individuals into effect and objectivise bodies in specific ways- as healthy or ill, learned or illiterate, political or passive, law abiding or deviant, mobile or stationary simultaneously enable the aggregation of those singular histories into knowledge of populations where norms, the limits to normal, and deviations from the norm are constituted (Foucault 1977, 1982). An important point here is that these are not necessary ways of knowing individuals. Rather, conditions at different moments enable objectification of bodies in new ways. With this knowledge, individuals are worked upon through systems of punishment and reward to regulate themselves according to the norm while those found wanting- disruptive, abnormal -might be removed altogether. Travel is but one domain in which bodies have been objectivised and subjectivised3; separated, scrutinised and worked upon and, in the case of cycleways, removed altogether. Through the late nineteenth but especially the twentieth century it became thinkable, practicable and meaningful to study urban movement. Until recently, the meaning of that movement has been asserted and widely accepted as 'transport' -the journey from a to b specifically to accomplish some activity or task at point b (Bonham 2000). Over time, the journey, or trip, has come to appear as 'selfevident', as mechanisms for the study of journeys origin destination studies, household travel surveys, vehicle counts- excise particular practices from the mass of daily activities and bring them under scrutiny. Objectifying travel as 'transport' establishes the journey as a by-product of its end points - derived demand - and provides the imperative for trips to be accomplished as quickly, or as economically, as possible (BonhamandFerretti 1999). 'Derived demand' functions as a 'statement' (Foucault 1976: 102-17) within the field of transport, a statement that both disciplines those who would study travel, and discounts, if not excludes, the many other possibilities of our journeys. Drawing on Foucault's (1980:119) understanding of power as productive, the objectification of travel as transport is productive in that it has enabled the development of a vast body of knowledge and brought new subjects into effect- the pedestrian, cyclist, motorist, passenger. These subjects have been facilitated through the operation of power at a micro-scale involving practices of differentiation and separation of users of public space, identifying those who are stationary and those who move (Bonham 2002; Frello 2008), and subsequently scrutinising, sorting, categorising and disciplining those who move according to the conduct of their journey (Bonham 2006). A number of practices, particular ways of moving, particular types of observations, pauses, conversations- have been separated out, excluded as NOT-transport and marginalised in the space of the street. Other practices - keeping to course, attuning hearing, sight and reflexes to the operation of vehicles-have been worked upon in disciplining the mobile body (Bonham 2006; Paterson 2007). In cities across the world, the contemporary division and regulation of the public space of the street (and road) has been guided by a transport rationalisation of urban travel (Bonham 2000). Streets have been divided lengthwise and travellers allocated space according to the speed and order with which they travel (Bonham 2000). The mobile body has been incited to move at speed to ensure the efficient operation of the city. However, in the early twentieth century, widespread concern over motor vehicle related deaths and injuries underpinned debate over prioritising speed or safety. The debate was resolved (but never quite fixed) infavour of speed, with 'vulnerable' road users giving way to the fast (Bonham 2002). The slow and disorderly pedestrians, horses and carts-were removed to the margins, checked by the fast and orderly, or excluded altogether. Overall efficiency, measured in time, could only be assured if each traveller agreed to be orderly- hence all those road safety techniques and programs that train bodies in 'correct movement' (Bonham 2006). The public space of the street, often identified in political discourse as a site available to all citizens, effectively becomes an economic space where the subject of transport discourse, conducting the economical journey, gains primacy. Subjugating oneself within the discourse on transport becoming the efficient or economical traveller, which in the twentieth century has meant taking up the subject position of the motorist- is rewarded with priority in the use of public space. These individual rewards invoke wider social rewards through the increase in the reproduction of capital through the facilitation of movement (Cox 2010). Indeed, an entire literature on globalisation has employed this metaphor of increased flows in speed, volume and depth to describe globalisation of capitalism from the end of the twentieth century (Boran and Cox 2007). Transport discourses are thus woven into discourses on the nature of public good and of socio-economically responsible behaviour, reinforcing the linkage between travel behaviours and 'responsible citizens'. The knowledge produced about individual travellers is not only enabled by the exercise of power but also facilitates the further exercise of power. Power-knowledge relations operate at a micro-scale subjectivising singular bodies while, at a macro-scale, the subjectivities constituted within different disciplines (e.g. economics, demography) are deployed in the government of populations (Foucault1981, 1982,1991 ). Further, the aggregation of data about singular bodies not only allows the calculation of norms (and deviations from those norms) but in liberal societies, where citizens are constituted as free and incited to exercise freedom of choice (Huxley 2008), this knowledge is central to government as populations are guided rather than directed toward particular ends (Rose 1990; Gordon 1991; Rose and Miller 1992). In terms of transport, knowledge produced about individual travellers and singular journeys is combined into knowledge of urban populations and used to guide the choices of the population toward economical movement and the economical operation of the city. This process values speed and prioritises the reduction of travel time ahead of the impacts on health, environment and social exclusion that accompany increases in speed and travel energy consumption (Lohanand Wickham 1998; Whitelegg 1993, 1997).

### Topic Critique Key

#### Critically investigating infrastructural spaces is key to political engagement

Read 9 (Stephen, Delft University, Another Form: From the ‘Informational’ to the ‘Infrastructural’ City, http://repository.tudelft.nl/view/ir/uuid%3A9124271d-6373-4541-a5cd-54ba3e3373f4/) LA

Peter Hall identified the Randstad in the 1960s as a multi-centred urban form emerging in the European context,55 soon after Jean Gottmann identified a process of sprawling intercity growth emerging on the north-eastern seaboard of the United States.56 Almost 50 years later we are still trying to understand this phenomenon, and to find adequate conceptualisations of its modes of growth and transformation. I have argued that the real and virtual networks of today do not simply distribute already constituted knowledge, things, people and practices. These come to be and are organised and given form in relational complexes in which they all become context for one another. These relational complexes are not constraints to larger spatial or societal processes, instead they are the socio-tech- nical systems in which social objects, subjects and practices are realised in the first place. I have called these complexes infrastructures, and described how they are discrete and bounded, heavy and durable, articulated with one another, and that changes have to transmit through the complex, redefining other things on the way. The urban territory has been manufactured in infrastructures and networks of connected places and in historical time. Orders of scale have been established in the technical systems themselves. They are part of no ideal or universal scheme: the scales of urban networks are material-technolog- ical, specific and situated, and correspond with the objects and places - cities, neighbourhoods, houses, regions, even nations and globes - those networks realise. Infrastructures are material and technical constructions which are costly and require purpose- ful design and installation, adjustment, upgrading and continual maintenance. Much of this work entails the mundane maintenance of keeping things in their normal or proper arrangements with other things so that they may be what they are and in place. Each of these arrangements embodies differ- ent material cultures, rationalities, and spacetimes specific to their networks. We may create placeless spaces and timeless times in particular infrastruc- tures but have to be in place and on time in order to experience them. Mobile devices and wireless technologies change things, but we still have to be somewhere when we use them and forgetting this can lead us very quickly to methodological problems of spaces generating specious universalities and without concrete means of support. Contemporary orders have developed by new infrastructures being superimposed over old, trans- forming what came before while being constrained by what was there. Our urban world consists of multiple real socio-technical infrastructures which link up equipped places in which we act and which make such actions both possible and reliable across distance. Many spaces for action are secured in other spaces and access to them restricted to the particular people accredited to carry out those actions. There are other technical networks that are more overtly urban though and which distrib- ute urban elements like harbours, airports, railway stations, bus and tram stops, parking garages, regional shopping centres, business and industrial clusters and historical centres, facilitating a system- atised access to places in networks and to the ways of life and of doing things they support. There are a number of more general conclusions that lead from this proposal. The first and most subtle is that all spatial relations require the interven- tion of something else to frame the relation. The fact that a shop and another shop are related requires the intervention of a shopper or a street to make the relation. In this sense no relations are pure; all are relations with the participation of an actor or an active infrastructure to whom or to which that rela- tion refers and means something. Things don’t just have relations of their own accord and there is no natural spatial order of cities as central place theory and other branches of spatial economics57 would have us believe. Rather, human beings intervene in the world, making networks to put things in order and hold whole stabilised arrangements of subjects, objects and practices in place. Perhaps the strangest conclusion we have to draw though is that all these infrastructures, whether built around virtual financial trading systems, or real tram systems, are as real and as virtual as each other. Bruno Latour suggests that something is real if it is connected and does something. The shape of the market on a trader’s screens and the tram stop in Amsterdam have exactly the same reality factor. But a tram stop also depends on being where it is and connected to what it is connected to to be a tram stop. Somewhere else it will be an incongru- ous construction of glass and steel, or scrap metal, or a feature in children’s games. And if we imagine a sea captain coming into a Hanse trading port in the thirteenth century, the fact that he makes a port of a rather low-tech collection of houses, trades, quays, merchants and porters, is at one level a result of a customary and ongoing use and maintenance of this port in relation to other ports. The port is not simply a labour of the sea captain’s imagination but it retains a virtuality that may change the object. The same port is also a place of unexpected dangers and no-go areas to a woman, a minefield of canine territoriality to a dog, and an adventure play- ground to a young boy. Infrastructures may stabilise objects, subjects and practices but all events that take place in them need to be activated by specific human perceptions and intentions. I have argued that the technological paradigm of Castells is far more divided and differentiated than he would seem to allow, with multiple techno- logical paradigms all generating limited spaces and specialised possibilities for action. We need to think through the question of the respective powers of the global and the local: are we subject to a macro- physical architecture of technological networks delivering power from above, or are we able to enrol technologies of all types to maintain, invent and reinvent microphysical architectures of enabling places offering multiple ways of being and living? I have outlined a material and relational view of the city that finds our ability to do things in our immer- sion in spaces we ourselves construct precisely so that we can act in that way. The foundation of urban form is, I have claimed, in these purposefully and strategically constructed spaces, each of which embodies particular knowledges, frames particular objects and subjects and facilitates particular ways of doing things. Much of the power and efficacy of these networks lies in the detail, and talk of a perva- sive connectivity is going to gloss and elide detailed factors crucial to the exact outcome of our strategic space-making. We need to think the way techno- logical paradigms are differentiated and articulated and use this knowledge to deliver a ‘dappled world’ of varying niches or inhabitable places from the very large to the very small. By ensuring we don’t live in a world of smooth pervasive power we can make diverse and creative places for action and inhabita- tion possible.

### Automobility Key (Extinction)

#### The global reach of automobility will result in extinction

Seiler, Dickinson College American Studies Professor, 10 (Cotten, “Author Response: The end of automobility,” History and Technology: An International Journal Volume 26, Issue 4, 2010, JSTOR, Date Accessed: 7/7, JS)

Mobility itself, as Catherine Gudis notes in her essay, holds a venerable place in US political–economic thought; its denotation of freedom and progress aided the expansion of automobility across the nation. As I have argued in Republic of Drivers, to those who took to the driver’s seat – first, elite whites, and later, working‐class whites, and later still and never fully without contestation, people of color – automobility offered landscapes for the performative representation of autonomy and material abundance. This performance served to shore up the yeoman/artisan selfhood so crucial to the legitimacy of the American political economy in the early twentieth century, after that (always somewhat specious) selfhood had been desiccated by proletarianization and Taylorization. Radically transformative of the landscape and most patterns of everyday life, automobility’s function was nevertheless conservative and hegemonic. Coupled with and complementary to the mass consumption that oriented twentieth century political economy, the affect‐generating practice of driving did important ideological work: it helped to justify to a great many twentieth century Americans why the basic structure of things should not change (even, as Gudis reminds us, during the stark and volatile years of the Great Depression).

Given the prominence of automobility as a signal element of modernity, it comes as little surprise that in recent decades it has also begun to be established in developing juggernauts such as India and China. To this nascence American and European commentators generally have three modes of response: (1) approval, as automobility is supposed to carry salutary Western and liberal values; (2) condescension, as these nations deviate from the American norm of automobility; and (3) anxiety. The first response indulges in political fantasy at its most beamish – especially in regard to China – by positing driving and car ownership as significant practices fostering liberalization. The second fits well with a long tradition of US and Western deprecation of Chinese and Indian efforts to achieve a creditable modernity. The third response is appropriate, if a little self‐serving. Even given future decreases in the USA’s current greenhouse gas output and rapacious apetite for petroleum, China’s and India’s adoption of anything approaching the American model will surely speed automobility’s (if not the planet’s) demise.

### Automobility Key (Education)

#### Analysis of automobility key

Seiler, Dickinson College American Studies Professor, 10 (Cotten, “Author Response: The end of automobility,” History and Technology: An International Journal Volume 26, Issue 4, 2010, JSTOR, Date Accessed: 7/7, JS)

It is important to note that these works engage not in a critique but in a rearguard defense of automobility. The most egregious of them, even as they acknowledge problems of congestion and pollution, reject the notion that the current level of automobility is unsustainable; instead, they recount a tale of American automobility (characterized usually as a birthright and always as a self‐evident ‘freedom’) betrayed by feckless bureaucratic authorities and anti‐market regulators. One can generally detect such a thesis from titles that recruit the reader with ‘and what we can do about it,’ as in Ted Balaker and Sam Staley’s The Road More Traveled: Why the Congestion Crisis Matters More Than You Think, and What We Can Do About It, and Randal O’Toole’s Gridlock: Why We’re Stuck in Traffic and What to Do About It. The aggrieved, populist tenor of this subgenre is not new; rather, it has been a staple of progressives’ critique of automobility, harking back to pedestrians’ movements of the 1920s as well as the Freeway Revolts. 6 What is noteworthy is the deployment of this collective populism to spur societal rededication to automobility over alternate forms of transport. These works span a continuum from Sperling and Gordon’s prescriptions of ‘driving toward sustainability’ to the one‐note libertarianism of O’Toole and others. Overall, they illustrate that because the coming attenuation of our mobility is figured, at least in the US context, as individual and national diminution; because our automobility is habitual and compulsory; and because we believe that technology will deliver a painless fix, most of us can not or will not envisage a world ‘after the car’ (which is the title of a very different type of book published in 2009 by the sociologists Dennis Kingsley and John Urry). 7 More to the point, the renovation of automobility these works prescribe is tantamount to the preservation of the specific form of life automobility helped to configure over the past century. 8 It is that form of life which is the ultimate focus of what I consider a more provocative set of recent investigations of automobility, most of which have come out of the disciplines of sociology, literature, and history, as well as the interdisciplinary fields of cultural studies, women’s and gender studies, communications, and American studies. The essays of Gudis, Flonneau, and Packer, which analyze Republic of Drivers so carefully and thoughtfully, suggest to me that we may be at least loosely united not merely as a temporal cohort but as laborers in a shared enterprise. Common to our work is a certain indifference to automobility as it has been documented in most historical, journalistic, and technical accounts – that is, as a technological phenomenon first and foremost, albeit one with social, spatial, political, environmental, and economic effects. This is to say that we tend to approach automobility as an immensely rich text – a story, to paraphrase the anthropologist Clifford Geertz, that a culture tells itself about itself. By interpreting this text we develop new, and hopefully more useful, descriptions of the political and economic structures and historical moments in which automobility has been conceived, desired, valorized, and problematized. Not surprisingly, then, this approach engages the dispositions, rationalities, and practices that are prior and/or external to automobility, but which inform it and whose power are often redoubled by it: individualism, for example, or consumption, selfhood, race, nationalism, gender, capitalism, safety, liberalism, freedom (and their inevitable intersections). As Flonneau describes the method, ‘discourse, rhetoric, and the creation of conceptual categories are crucial sites for analysis.’ The goal is to disinter and examine cultural foundations that have generally been taken for granted or obfuscated, as when automobility is attributed to some essential ‘human nature,’ ‘national character,’ or ‘technological imperative.’ When this mode of inquiry engages the institutions and figures that dominate most automotive history, such as the automobile industry and its innovators and leaders, the technological development of the car and the roadway (and with these the exemplary objects of automobility such as the Model T and the US Interstate Highway System), it mines them for the discourses crystallized there, perhaps at the expense of recounting their chronological narratives in the more straightforward manner of historians of technology (e.g. James Flink, John Rae, and Clay McShane) on whom we nonetheless rely. Gudis, quoting Stuart Hall on popular culture, captures this perhaps mercenary attitude as she concludes her essay: beyond what automobility can tell us about national (and increasingly global) values, priorities, structures, institutions, and configurations of power, we really do not give a damn about it (p. 376). 9

#### We must recognize the origins and casaulities created by automobile culture

Packer, North Carolina State Associate Communications Professor, 10(Jeremy, “Automobility and apparatuses: commentary on Cotten Seiler’s Republic of Drivers,” History and Technology: An International Journal Volume 26, Issue 4, 2010, JSTOR, Date Accessed: 7/7, JS)

I previously asked ‘Are technologies central to the workings of apparatuses?’ Rather than provide an ontological answer, I would prefer to take an epistemological detour that reorients the question. Foucault once suggested rather late in his life that each of his works could be understood as attempts to understand four major types of technologies in ‘both their specific nature and their constant interaction.’ 32 He characterizes these as: (1) technologies of production; (2) technologies of sign systems; (3) technologies of power; and (4) technologies of the self. He says each of these is a ‘matrix of practical reason.’ They ‘hardly ever function separately’ and each ‘is associated with a certain type of domination,’ ‘… implies certain modes of training and modification of individuals.’ 33 Foucault uses Marx’s Capital as an example that shows how techniques of production require modified conduct, exert domination, and obviously manipulate things anew. In an interview from about the same period, Foucault reflected upon technology as a historiographic object of analysis. He suggested a focus on tekhne, ‘a practical rationality governed by a conscious goal,’ not ‘technology’ understood too narrowly in his view as ‘hard technology, the technology of wood, of fire, of electricity.’ He further suggested that ‘government is also a function of technology: the government of individuals, the government of souls, the government of the self by the self, the government of families, the government of children, and so on.’ 34 Thus the historical study of a specific ‘hard’ technology would always entail situating it within the practical rationalities by which it comes to be governed and through which it governs specific practices and peoples. From such a vantage, the concern is not so much causality and origins, but rather the processes by which matrices interweave to form apparatuses.

## Biopolitics First

### Biopolitics Key General

#### Ontological commitments about the nature of life predetermine the epistemological and ethical dimensions of politics.

Lipshutz 09 (Ronnie, Professor of Politics at the University of California, Santa Cruz, 8-27-09, Institute of European Studies, "The Governmentalization of “Lifestyle” and the Biopolitics of Carbon," p. 5-6, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/472341ct, accessed 7-7-12, CNM)

What we see here is an example of governmentality and biopolitics. I argue that the narrative illustrates the transformation of lifestyle through the gradual socialization of various publics into a biopolitics of smoking. According to Mitchell Dean, biopolitics “is concerned with matters of life and death, with birth and propagation, with health and illness, both physical and mental, and with the processes that sustain or retard the optimisation of the life of a population.” He writes that Bio-politics must then also concern the social, cultural, environmental, economic and geographic conditions under which humans live, procreate, become ill, maintain health or become healthy, and die. From this perspective bio-politics is concerned with the family, with housing, living and working conditions, with what we call ‘lifestyle’, with public health issues, patterns of migration, levels of economic growth and the standards of living. It is concerned with the bio-sphere in which humans dwell. 15 “Population” refers here not to a discrete group of people living within a specified territory but, rather, a statistical assemblage of individuals who share, in certain terms, a range or set of characteristics and practices. Individuals comport themselves according to the standards of “normality” of their specific population group or “lifestyle,” which are framed in terms of particular types of behavior. The “right disposition” of things is then maintained through the standardization of populations groups within certain defined parameters, the self-regulation of their own behavior through conformity to these parameters, and the disciplining function of social pressures, civil behaviors, surveillance and law, all of which constrain tendencies to stray outside of those parameters. Taken together, individuals’ practices take place within a “zone of normality” that also serves to constitute “identity.” Applying this notion to smoking, biopolitics is linked to an ethic regarding injury to the self and others, articulated through a “will to the self’s wellness” and an injunction against harming others. Parallel with the rise of neo-liberalism, the rise of “responsibilization,” and a decline in the discourse of public health, individuals were increasingly commanded to ensure their “wellness” through changes in health-related practices. Health became an ethical obligation to others rather than an individual attribute.16

### Biopolitics Key (Topic Education)

#### Modern conceptualizations of transportation replace individuals with a single communal identity

Divall 5 (Divall, Colin; Professor of Railway Studies and Head of the Institute of Railway Studies and Transport History; "Cultures of Transport" Journal of Transport History 26.1 (March 2005): pp. 99-111.) Kristof

The **cultural turn has propelled issues of travel and physical mobility to the centre of** lively debates in **a number of key areas of social and historical inquiry**: imperialism, post-colonialism, migration, the formation of scientific and technological knowledge, **the** clinical and **social definition of** the modern body, to name but a few. **Terms such as** ‗**travel**‘, ‗**mobility**‘, ‗**displacement**‘, ‗diaspora‘, ‗frontier‘, ‗transience‘, ‗**dislocation**‘, ‗fluidity‘ and ‗permeability‘ **have become central to thinking about** the nature of **subjectivity** **and** hence **the formation of identity**, **both personal and social**.2 In particular, **social theorists** have **highlighted the ways that transport**, along with communications, has **helped** to reduce the power of traditional places to **define** personal and **communal identity**. Instead, **new identities are created through networks** spreading across geographically and socially extended spaces. At one extreme John Urry proposes that **unparalleled levels of mobility** have **contributed to a** contemporary ‗post-societal‘ **world** of extreme individualization **in which nation-states and their civil societies are replaced by global** ‗**networks** and flows‘.3

#### The biopolitics of mobility are key to understanding the topic and our national situatedness.

Divall 5 (Divall, Colin; Professor of Railway Studies and Head of the Institute of Railway Studies and Transport History @ University of York; "Cultures of Transport" Journal of Transport History 26.1 (March 2005): pp. 99-111.) Kristof

**When movement is understood as** a purposeful, meaningful – and thus **cultural** – act, **we are required to address both** the **material circumstances and political consequences of transport systems**. One of the most thoughtful and conceptually sophisticated examples of this kind is Jörg Beckmann‘s article on the way that the automobile orders our everyday lives.16 Beckmann reflects on the familiar contradiction that as **automobilization** ‗**creates independence and liberates its subject from** spatiotemporal **constraints, it** also **formulates new dependencies‘ by embedding car users** (and non-users) **in another** equally **structured way of life**.17 Taken as a whole, the **customs, habits and values of automobilization are a** practical **resource for the ordering of everyday life; they are a cultural regime**. Fully understanding the contradictions of this regime therefore requires a fresh examination and re-appraisal of the many ways in which historically automobile technology became indispensable in modern society, incorporating the cultural dimension in a more integrated fashion than was common until recently. We might ask, for example – as a few historians have already done – **how and why so many of the costs of auto-use have been externalized and made illegible in everyday discourse, with** profound **impacts on the social and ecological systems of** rural and urban **landscapes, disenfranchising** in particular **the elderly, the young and the poor**.18 And **how** else, for instance, **do we explain the central role that security of oil supplies has played in US foreign policy without recognizing the place of the automobile as a symbol of American democracy**? Or **how do we understand the** cultural im**portance of suburbs, shopping malls, and edge-city office development to everyday life in the developed world without recognizing** the physical constraints of nineteenth-century urban development and the ‗efficiency gains‘ later brought about **by personalized transport**?19

#### Due to its place at the center of life, transportation is a mode for the production of socialities and identities

Cresswell 11 (Tim, PhD in Human Geography, "Mobilities I: Catching Up." Progress in Human Geography 35.4 (August 2011): pp. 550-558, 7/6/12, BR)

This turn has been prefigured for a while by a number of theorists across disciplines who have argued for a kind of thinking that takes mobility as the central fact of modern or postmodern life. A significant thrust of these arguments has been to question the perceived prioritization of more rooted and bounded notions of place as the locus of identity. Important precursors include Clifford’s work in anthropology where he asks his colleagues to move from an abiding fascination with the deep analysis of particular, and usually remote, places to an engagement with the ‘routes’ that connect sites. We might also consider Auge´’s philosophical musings on the potentials for an anthropology of ‘non-places’, such as airport and motorways, marked by constant transition and temporality, and Castells’ outline of a network society where he suggests that a ‘space of places’ is being superimposed by and, in some senses, surpassed by a ‘space of flows’. These are tempered somewhat by the feminist analysis of Kaplan who asks necessary questions about the gendering of metaphors of travel in social and cultural theory but nonetheless lays the groundwork for a feminist embrace of mobility studies (Auge´, 1995; Castells, 1996; Clifford, 1997; Kaplan, 1996). The ‘turn’ became more pronounced with the arrival of key works in sociology that argued for the centrality of mobilities in a complicated, globalized world marked by time-space compression, a variable politics of mobility and the (arguable) withering away of established notions of ‘societies’ and ‘nations’ (Kaufmann, 2002; Urry, 2000). Urry’s two monographs on the importance of mobility have been particularly important here as he has advocated a ‘sociology beyond societies’ that focuses on how sociality and identity are produced through networks of people, ideas and things moving rather than the inhabitation of a shared space such as a region or nation state. All of these works ask fundamental questions about ontology and epistemology, urging us not to start from a point of view that takes certain kinds of fixity and boundedness for granted and instead starts with the fact of mobility.

### Biopolitics Key (Policy Education)

#### Their brand of education habituates hegemonic disciplines

Nickel 09 (Patricia Mooney Nickel is a Lecturer in the School of Social and Cultural Studies at Victoria University of Wellington. Theory & Event Volume 12 Issue 4, 2009, "Public Intellectuality: Academies of Exhibition and the New Disciplinary Secession," http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory\_and\_event/v012/12.4.nickel.html, accessed 7-10-12, CNM)

There is nothing inherently wrong with relevance when it intends liberation over discipline and humanity over economy. However, public intellectuality challenges the boundaries of "networks of research" established by "the discipline as disciplinary normalization,"45 prompting academic disciplines to engage in the re-institutionalization of the secession activity of their members, and even to assert the legitimacy of their discipline over that of others. Sociologist Michael Burawoy goes so far as to blame the emphasis on political science and economics over sociology for no less than tyranny and despotism: "We have to maintain the integrity of sociology's critical standpoint, namely civil society, in the face of challenges from economists and political scientists who are largely responsible for ideologies justifying the collusion of market tyranny and state despotism."46 Burawoy is engaged in what Jacques Rancière described as disciplinary thought, noting that "[t]here is no assured boundary separating the territory of sociology from that of philosophy or that of historians from literature."47 As Michel Foucault48 notes in The Order of Things, classifications of knowledge such as Burawoy's are not only laughable, they are also seriously aimed at protecting their contents from contagion: sociology from the contagion of political science and economics, legitimate knowledge from the contagion of illegitimate knowledge. It is important to recognize that academic secessions via academies, such as public sociology via the American Sociological Association and its Task Force on the Institutionalization of Public Sociology,49 function to resuscitate the discipline itself (or perhaps the individual careers of the instigators themselves) and further cement disciplinary boundaries through the establishment of supposedly superior disciplinary relevance to the public of one discipline over another.

#### Must change our conception of education to include the notion that the force of education is not truth but power

Suspitsyna 12 (Tatiana Suspitsyna is an Assistant Professor in the School of Educational Policy and Leadership at The Ohio State University. Journal of Higher Education, Volume 83 Number 1, January/February 2012, "Higher Education for Economic Advancement and Engaged Citizenship: An Analysis of U.S. Department of Education Discourse," http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal\_of\_higher\_education/v083/83.1.suspitsyna.html, accessed 7-10-12, CNM)

A Foucaultian conceptualization of democracy as a continuously changing practice possibly offers a more fruitful framework for thinking about the role of higher education when preparing for citizenship. Foucault's views on democracy evolved over time in the dialogue with and more often, as reaction against Habermas's work (Flyvbjerg, 1998; Love, 1989). Foucault (1995) is concerned about the disciplining effects of liberal democracy as a regime of truth that the subjects learn to accept and obey. From that perspective, a public consensus is a product of domination of some discourses and rationalities over others, rather than an exercise in individual free will. Instead of searching for a definitive solution as the deliberative model would have it, Foucault (1984) proposes asking questions to elucidate the relations between knowledge and power. The questioning, or problematization of "what is given to us as necessary to think and do," is an interrogation of the existing truths embedded in the dominant political doctrine (Burchell, 1993, p. 279). Thus, the goal of democratic action is to contest continuously not the government, but the truths and rationality upon which the government relies for its techniques and strategies of governing the population (Curtis, 2002, p. 525). The contestation at the center of that democratic action describes local micro struggles that individuals pursue as practice of freedom (Flyvbjerg, 1998). These struggles reflect individuals' different and conflicting interests and values. Such an understanding of democracy is agonistic, i.e., based on the acceptance of conflict and confrontation as a legitimate part of politics. Agonistic democratic practice does not have an essence that is universal for all; instead, it acknowledges and affirms the existence of multiple essences and multiple identities that make up the society (Mouffe, 1999). It does not suppress informal styles of argumentation, either. On the contrary, the agonistic model recognizes passions that rise from the conflict and difference and harnesses them for democratic purposes (Mouffe, 1999, pp. 755-756). Institutions of higher education pride themselves on the diversity of their intellectual traditions, organizational forms and histories, curricula, students, faculty, and staff. Without claiming inclusiveness, the agonistic model respects the conflicting values and positions that diversity brings. The agonistic emphasis on questioning and contestation is congruent with the scientific ethos of universities. The Foucaultian conceptualization of agency as performance rather than essence opens possibilities for resistance, exploration, and experimentation with new subjectivities (Kulynych, 1997) and promises new visions of citizenship. Without a foundation in economic rationality, citizenship can be re-imagined outside the neoliberal doctrine as a new technique of the self, a new way of [End Page 66] relating to civil society and economy. Preparing students for agonistic citizenship requires teaching them how to draw on their identities to tirelessly scrutinize, doubt, and challenge the naturalness and inevitability of dominant discourses and their consequences. Agonistic citizenship therefore appears to be the most viable model of engaged citizenship that can counterweigh the neoliberal discourse on higher education.

#### Governmentality affects educational institutions; critique is key to understand the way our ways of learning are implicated in biopolitics

Suspitsyna 12 (Tatiana Suspitsyna is an Assistant Professor in the School of Educational Policy and Leadership at The Ohio State University. Journal of Higher Education, Volume 83 Number 1, January/February 2012, "Higher Education for Economic Advancement and Engaged Citizenship: An Analysis of U.S. Department of Education Discourse," http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal\_of\_higher\_education/v083/83.1.suspitsyna.html, accessed 7-10-12, CNM)

Foucault (1990, 1995) observes that institutions of power such as the state, the penal system, and the legislature routinely rely on the sciences and experts to examine, measure, explain, and predict populations in order to create knowledge that would make their practice more efficient. These techniques of managing populations and the political rationality behind them are part of what constitutes the art of governing. Another aspect of government consists of individual subjects' freely regulating their own conduct according to the norms endorsed and propagated by the political sovereignty. This self-conduct, or in Foucault's parlance, techniques of the self, together with the techniques of managing populations and the rationality exercised by political sovereignty, constitutes what Foucault (1991) calls "govenmentality." In other words, governmentality is governmental rationality where government is understood as an activity, an art of regulating the conduct of autonomous individuals for the good of society (Foucault, 1991). Neoliberalism changes the formula of governmentality: the power to predict and regulate people's behavior shifts from the social sciences to budget disciplines and accountancy; nongovernmental organizations take over some functions of the state (Rose, 1996); and the expert authority becomes subject to checks and audits (Rose, 1993). The citizen subject of the neoliberal government is a hybrid of two traditions: it owes its flexibility to the postmodern embrace of diversity and difference and at the same time carries some characteristics of humanism, namely, its emphasis on rationality, autonomy, freedom, and [End Page 52] choice (Davies et al., 2006). Unlike its humanist predecessor, however, the neoliberal subject redefines the fundamental concepts of freedom, choice, autonomy, and rationality in market terms. In the neoliberal discourse, freedom of choice is an exercise in economic rationality that the subject must possess in order to select best value goods and services at the optimal price (Bansel, 2007). Autonomy is understood as heightened individualism aimed at survival and success in the economy; the survival and success of the subject are themselves linked to larger discourses of national economic competitiveness (Davies et al., 2006; Davies & Bansel, 2005). Rationality is redefined as achieving economic success through education or through the cultivation and application of entrepreneurial qualities (Nairn & Higgins, 2007). In short, freedom is achieved through choice in consumption, rationality is a way to acquire labor market power, and autonomy is a prerequisite of competitiveness. As a site of discursive practices, i.e., practices of production and dissemination of discourses, higher education is deeply implicated in the dominant neoliberal doctrine. That the dominant vision of higher education is neoliberal has already been established by other scholars (cf., Ayers, 2005; Giroux, 2002). What I wish to add to their analyses is an understanding of how the neoliberal discourse subverts the social functions of universities that are aimed at social justice and redefines individual agency in terms of economic rationality. The goal of my endeavor is to implicate the current meanings of higher education in the relations of power and to lay the groundwork for a discussion of models of engaged citizenship.

### Biopolitics Key (Situated Learning)

#### The aff’s framing is biopolitical – by asking us to conform to their standards they don’t see us as individuals & instead construct our identities for us. This just links harder to our kritik

Contu & Willmott 3

(Alessia, Series editor of the Critical Management Study Series, Palgrave Macmillan, and board member of the International Journal of Zizek Studies; Hugh, Member of RAE 2008 Business and Management Panel Editorial and board member of Academy of Management Review, Organization Studies, Journal of Management Studies; “Re-Embedding Situatedness: The Importance of Power Relations in Learning Theory”, May - Jun., 2003, Organization Science, 7/12/12,BR)

The promise of situated learning theory is to focus attention directly upon learning as a pervasive, embod- ied activity involving the acquisition, maintenance, and transformation of knowledge through processes of social interaction. In common with researchers who study organizations as cultures, analyses of situated learning "focus less on cognition and what goes on in individ- ual heads, and more on what goes on in the practices of groups" (Weick and Westley 1999, p. 442, empha- sis added). Learning is conceived to occur as individuals become members of the "communities" in which they are acculturated as they participate actively in the dif- fusion, reproduction, and transformation of knowledge- in-practice about agents, activities, and artifacts. "To know," it is argued, "is to be capable of participat- ing with the requisite competence in the complex web of relationships among people and activities" (Gherardi et al. 1998, p. 274; see also Boland and Tenkasi 1995, Fox 2000).3 Within "communities of practice," it is not the acquisition of skill or knowledge with a universal currency (e.g., textbook knowledge) that identifies the "competent" member. Rather, it is a demonstrated abil- ity to "read" the local context and act in ways that are recognized and valued by other members of the immedi- ate community of practice, that is all-important. In this respect, and this is a central point in Lave and Wenger's monograph, learning is not adequately understood as the transmission/acquisition of information or skill but inter alia "involves the construction of identities" (Lave and Wenger 1991, p. 53)

#### Only by being critical of the aff’s framing can we understand how the way we learn in this round has a profound effect on social structures involving relations of power – this is key to education

Contu & Willmott 3

(Alessia, Series editor of the Critical Management Study Series, Palgrave Macmillan, and board member of the International Journal of Zizek Studies; Hugh, Member of RAE 2008 Business and Management Panel Editorial and board member of Academy of Management Review, Organization Studies, Journal of Management Studies; “Re-Embedding Situatedness: The Importance of Power Relations in Learning Theory”, May - Jun., 2003, Organization Science, 7/12/12,BR)

It is our hope that these reflections upon situated learning theory, together with our reinterpretation of Orr's (1990, 1996) findings, demonstrate the relevance of recognizing and developing the radical dimension of Lave and Wenger's (1991) thinking, and then incorpo- rating its insights into analyses of learning in organiza- tions. We hope that our critique of their work and its dissemination will stimulate others to rise to the analyti- cal challenge, posed initially by the viewpoint advanced in Situated Learning, of showing more precisely and persuasively how learning, as a situated practice, is "a complex notion, implicated in social structures involv- ing relations of power" (Lave and Wenger 1991, p. 36). Our conviction is that the analytic potential of a situated understanding of learning will be fulfilled only when studies of learning in organizations more fully appreciate and demonstrate how learning processes are inextricably implicated in the social reproduction of wider institu- tional structure.

## Critique First

### Critique Key

#### Full commitment to critique is key to overcoming the totalizing nature of modern political rationality

Bronner 9 (Stephen Eric, Rutgers University, Constructing a Critical Political Theory, New Politics Vol:XII-3 Whole # 47, http://newpol.org/node/95) LA

All of this required a new mode of theorizing for a new period of international counterrevolution. Perhaps the formulation that the proletariat constituted the “subject-object” of history, as Lukacs had claimed, was becoming increasingly suspect. But the subject was still seen as capable of transforming social reality. The injunction was clear. The Frankfurt School would confront any sort of “materialism” that did not highlight issues dealing with agency, subjectivity, and the domination of nature — implicitly including the mainstream versions of Marxism, along with any form of “metaphysics” that sundered speculative thinking from the constraints of capitalist society. “Traditional theory,” in short, would become juxtaposed to “critical theory.”12 From the beginning, however, the enemy was less metaphysics than positivism or the scientific kinds of materialist thinking that reflected “reification.” It is with the overwhelming embrace of this concept that the third political “moment” in the history of critical theory emerges. The stage needs to be set. The era of the councils had ended with the Spanish Civil War. The Soviet Union had effectively become the partner of Nazi Germany in 1939 and, even once they became enemies in 1941, the totalitarian traits they shared in common were impossible to ignore. Liberalism had, for its part, proven incapable of preventing the emergence of fascism in Europe and, even in the United States, it had apparently morphed into forms of managing mass society at the expense of the individual. It now seemed not merely that the liberal political heritage of the bourgeoisie might contain the sources of reaction, but that the triumph of instrumental reason had blurred the difference between communism, fascism, and democracy. A historical situation had thus arisen in which, as Theodor Adorno later put the matter in Minima Moralia (1951), “the whole is false.” Each of these systems was predicated on treating working people as costs of production; each had integrated its political opposition; each had its culture industry and — albeit in different and often complex ways — each was intent upon securing conformity on the part of its citizens. It was now necessary to question modernity tout court and its attendant notion of progress. The Enlightenment, once considered the source of liberty and tolerance, had seemingly been betrayed or, better, had betrayed itself. Its commitment to scientific rationality and what Kant termed “pure reason” — once directed against the Church and all forces of superstition and provincial prejudice — had ultimately turned against everything that sought to temper the march of technological progress. DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT(1947), the classic work by Horkheimer and Adorno, suggested that everything associated with “practical reason” and emotional experience, conscience, and subjectivity, was being subverted by the demands of instrumental rationality. Enlightenment had engendered what was “totalitarian” and the “totally administered society” had sprung from the liberal political project. Its much- vaunted “individual” was now nothing more than a conscienceless robot seething with rage against the most pitiable and the weakest members of society. Enlightenment, modernity, and a unique form of scientific rationality had taken reification to its ultimate extreme: the subject had become a number tattooed on the arm of an anonymous inmate at Auschwitz. Utopia had, at least in its traditional formulations, been conquered. Political transformation had come up short. Freedom now rested on highlighting the tension between the totally administered system and the individual subject bent on preserving his or her subjectivity. In this vein, the “totality” required confrontation from a “constellation” of fragments or aphorisms constructed to enhance the repressed experience of subjectivity.14 Modernity rather than any particular system or state formation became the enemy and the purpose of the dialectical reason was now to create a “non-identity” between subject and object.15 Dialectic of Enlightenment left no room for a politically organized transformation of society in terms of traditional liberal and socialist values. It instead insisted on a philosophical and cultural emphasis upon negativity. Happiness would ultimately go the way of all flesh.16 The result was an inverted utopianism intent upon providing an ongoing critique of the given order in the name of an epiphany or a philosophical burst, akin in the aesthetic realm to the experience of fireworks — that for Theodor Adorno served as the paradigm of the encounter with art — and, in theological terms, to what Horkheimer termed the “longing for the totally other.” Philosophical negativity, aesthetic experience, and theological longing fused in a resuscitated metaphysic. Only in its opposition to reification, in its explosion of all claims to a positive and determinate critique of society, would it become possible to provide hope for the hopeless.

We must reframe the way debates occur in order to produce more effective policy. Debates have become classifications of good and bad, affirm a complexity of skepticism.

Zalloua 8 – (Assistant Professor of French at Whitman College (Zahi, "The Future of an Ethics of Difference After Hardt and Negri’s Empire" Muse)

With his concept of altermondialisation (or “alterglobalization,” the French word for globalization being derived from “world” [monde], a term that evokes the globe’s inhabitants more so than its geography), Derrida similarly foregrounds the continued need to think globalization in terms of alterity and its preservation—the need to think globalization otherwise (altermondialisation) than its current manifestation as a homogenizing capitalism that domesticates difference. In a brief essay entitled “Une Europe de l’espoir [A Europe of Hope],” Derrida challenges the terms of the debate imposed by a hegemonic and arrogant American power, who frames global struggle as a battle of good and evil. To this model Derrida opposes an engaged Europe, a “Europe that is more social and less mercantile” (2004, 3) and that realizes the promises of the Enlightenment.20 Here, the term Europe does not refer to—or rather, is not limited to—a geographical space with fixed boundaries, but rather a critical ethos based on the ideals of democracy, human rights, and freedom of thought21: It is once again a question of the Enlightenment, that is, of access to Reason in a certain public space, though this time in conditions that technoscience and economic or telemedia globalization have thoroughly transformed: in time and as space, in rhythms and proportions. If intellectuals, writers, scholars, professors, artists, and journalists do not, before all else, stand up together against [the violence of intolerance], their abdication will be at once irresponsible and suicidal. (2003, 125) Like Glissant’s archipelagoes, which serve as a productive model for rhizomatic thought, Derrida’s Europe becomes a trope for a deconstructive mode of reading, “an example of what a politics, a reflection, and an ethics might be, the inheritors of a past Enlightenment that bear an Enlightenment to come, a Europe capable of non-binary forms of discernment” (2004, 3). To read like a “European” (a subject position open to all—to Americans, for example, who draw their hope from the civil rights movement) is to contest what passes for moral clarity today. Against post-9/11 doxa and its resurrected rhetoric of good and evil, Derrida calls for a productive skepticism—a skepticism that does not entail paralysis and nihilism in the face of our “powerlessness to comprehend, recognize, cognize, identify, name, describe, foresee” (2003, 94), but vigilance and self-critique, a more rigorous mode of analysis, one that resists the lure of moral absolutes and bears witness to the specificity and complexity of sociopolitical reality. Just as Foucault had before him defiantly refused the “blackmail of the Enlightenment” (the notion that one is either “for” it or “against” it [1984, 42]), Derrida’s valorization of a European Enlightenment, on one hand, may have surprised if not shocked some of his readers, especially those for whom “the father of deconstruction” is a nihilist, obscurantist, textual idealist, or more generally, an enemy of Reason. On the other hand, this “turn” to the Enlightenment does not really represent a deviation in Derrida’s philosophical path. It is quite consistent with his demystifying critique of the yearning for purity, absolute (that is, ahistorical) meanings or transcendental signifieds (ousia, eidos, consciousness, etc.). For Derrida, this critique takes place first and foremost at the level of language. As Iain Chambers puts it, “If what involves an exploration of language itself” (32).22 As such, Derrida recognizes that his genealogical investigations—his denaturalization of key normative concepts (nature, culture, democracy, etc.)—never constitute a transgression in the pure sense of the term, as a stepping outside of metaphysics: There is not a transgression, if one understands by that a pure and simple landing into a beyond metaphysics, at a point which would be, let us not forget, first of all a point of language or writing. Now, even in aggressions or transgressions, we are consorting with a code to which metaphysics is tied irreducibly, such that every transgressive gesture reencloses us—precisely by giving us a hold on the closure of metaphysics—within this closure. (1981, 12) Nevertheless, despite (or because of) the impossibility of transcending the “closure of metaphysics,” Derrida tirelessly works to forestall what post-Marxists Laclau and Mouffe call the desire for an “ultimate fixity of meaning” (112), rethinking creatively and critically (under erasure) the inherited concepts of metaphysics within that very tradition: “‘a mutation will have to take place’ in our entire way of thinking about justice, democracy, sovereignty, globalization, military power, the relations of nation-states, the politics of friendship and enmity in order to address terrorism with any hope of an effective cure” (Derrida 2003, 106; emphasis added). While calling for an “effective cure”—that is, for a critique that will have a positive impact on the world—Derrida is careful to frame his observation in tentative terms as a “hope,” cognizant that he is not proposing a blueprint for rational political action. Along these lines, Derrida’s appeal to the Enlightenment, then, is not to be understood as a wholesale acceptance of its Reason, but as a tactical use of its tools in an effort to reframe the terms of current debates (about globalization, democracy, cosmopolitanism, hospitality, hybridity, difference, etc.), to prepare if not provide an urgent opening, “to see the present as holding some ability to become-other” (Nealon 2006, 79).

### Critique Before Policymaking (Serial Policy Failure)

#### The affirmative’s refusal to engage the underlying problematization behind their assumptions dooms their project to serial policy failure.

Dillon and Reid 2000[Michael, professor of political science at Lancaster and Julian, lecturer on international relations and professor of political science at King’s College in London; 2000, Alternatives, Volume 25, Issue 1: Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency]

As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and**, as Foucault noted, in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled**, selected, organised and redistributed **by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality**.[ [34](http://referenc.lib.binghamton.edu:2078/ehost/detail?vid=5&hid=8&sid=09f7f8d8-2503-4404-ae30-e907bb7cd760%40sessionmgr2#bib34)] More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these **epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention** of policy science and the continuous resolutions **of policymakers.** Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations**.** Here, too, we may also discover what might be **called "epistemic entrepreneurs**." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated**, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized.** All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable**. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy**, for science and for policy science**, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors** while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations.Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. **Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances** over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. **What they do not have is precisely the control that they want.** Yet **serial policy failure**--the fate and the fuel of all policy--**compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis** that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ [35](http://referenc.lib.binghamton.edu:2078/ehost/detail?vid=5&hid=8&sid=09f7f8d8-2503-4404-ae30-e907bb7cd760%40sessionmgr2#bib35)] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. **Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate**. As a particular kind of intervention into life, **global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure.** Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.

### Critique Before Policymaking (Depoliticization)

#### The affirmative is a-political because they are only a re-arrangement of the technical virtuoso of modern calculative managerialism; critique makes a new relationship to the political possible which spurs new kinds of actions.

Grayson 2007 [“Human Security as Power/Knowledge: The Biopolitics of a Definitional Debate,” at SGIR Turin Conference, <http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Grayson-graysonsgir.pdf>]

While the argument thus far has been critical of the biopolitics of human security, it does bear noting that the myriad forms of human misery and suffering to which human security ostensibly wishes to respond do demand forms of action and engagement. However, responses should not be conceptualised from positions that deny the power-relations that make them possible; to do so is the very epitome of irresponsibility. Conversely, to completely disengage from practical action will accomplish very little to reduce levels of suffering. Inaction, a political stasis of paralysis in which we should refuse to act in order to disconnect from the biopolitical matrix can also be unacceptable. The invocation of a binary distinction to guide resistance does nothing to address the power-relations constitutive of the current political situation; letting die is, after all, a form of biopolitical management. Rather, the key ethical problematique to which biopolitics cogently speaks is that the question is not necessarily one of action or inaction, but rather how to remain cognizant of how forms of action and/or inaction advocated by human security definitions produce and maintain a system of global governmentality aimed at maximizing economies of biopower? It is this ethical problematique which finds a resonance in William Connolly’s investigation of the politics of suffering and the responsibility to (re)act. He argues that the most difficult cases require not an ethics of help for the helpless but a political ethos of critical engagement between interdependent, contending constituencies implicated in asymmetrical structures of power. Indeed, some ways of acting upon obligations to the deserving poor or victims of natural disaster provide moral cover for the refusal to cultivate an ethics of engagement with constituencies in more ambiguous, disturbing, competitive positions. (Connolly 1999, 129) What this speaks to is the disciplinary power of ‘clear’ policy prescriptions engendered by the human security debate to foreclose the possibility of assistance in instances where to do so makes us feel uncomfortable or threatens what is perceived as the correct way of living. Thus, Connolly’s argument provides a new purchase on how it becomes possible ignore suffering or even institutionalise it as a part of broader biopolitical strategy. Moreover, it is also essential to keep cognizant of how the inherently subjective forms of interpretation within the human security debate are presented as being beyond their own subjectivity. Rather, under the cloak of cosmological realism, they are presented as objective methods of ascertaining truth, a truth that may be universal or particular—depending on the definition being advanced—yet always unmediated. However, as David Campbell (2005) has argued, positions which appeal to realisms are themselves ‘onto-political’. Thus, the broad, narrow, and via media accounts of human security that vie for exalted status of the best understanding of the concept contain ‘fundamental presumptions that establish the possibilities within which…[an] assessment of actuality is presented (Campbell 2005, 128). It is the certainty that can be achieved in avoiding onto-political consideration that becomes so attractive within the human security debate. Avoiding onto-politics makes it possible for a definition to prove its worth through a careful analysis of facts backed by the legitimizing function of its method. The goal is of course to produce clear policy prescriptions which are taken on board by the policy community. Within this formulation of (bio)politics, there is no need to reconsider, no need to agonize over decisions, no need to be held accountable for the power-knowledge that is produced, and no need to question the regime of truth that legitimizes them; ‘facts’ simply cannot be denied. Tragically, the absolute absence of critical thinking demanded by the abdication of onto-political reflection produces the conditions within which gross irresponsibility and unaccountability can flourish. Unless we reject the imperative of producing decidable decisions, Campbell notes via Derrida that we become the co-authors of an emaciated spectrum of policy possibility that is devoid of ethics, the political, and responsibility; the replacement is ‘a program, a technology, and its irresponsible application’ (Campbell 2005, 132). Therefore, the fiction that a decision can be sufficient, that a decision can definitively resolve the potentially irresolvable while remaining outside of onto-politics, is the most significant political act that is both constitutive of, and produced by, the biopolitical rationalities at the heart of the human security debate (Campbell 2005, 131). For human security to represent a marked transformation in how security is conceptualised and a sign of progress in the field of security studies, the discursive formation that sets its limits and the incitement to discourse which shapes its debates must acknowledge that ‘no decision is sufficient, so we will have to make many and…see a constant oscillation and mobility between different positions’ (Campbell 2005, 131). The imposition of modes of being and becoming in the form of biopolitical rationalities that are pervasive within the human security discourse— including both ‘human’ and ‘security’— must be subject to critique (Connolly 1999). Given the conceptual, professional, and cultural obstacles faced by security analysts in extricating themselves from these modes of thinking, the call is not a simple one.

### Critique Before Policymaking

#### Critical theory must reject political exigency—this permits superior policy

Brown 5 (Wendy, UC Berkeley, Edgework: Critical Essays on Knowledge and Politics, http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8079.pdf) LA

On the one hand, critical theory cannot let itself be bound by politi­ cal exigency; indeed, it has something of an obligation to refuse such exigency. While there are always decisive choices to be made in the po­ litical realm (whom to vote for, what policies to support or oppose, what action to take or defer), these very delimitations of choice are often themselves the material of critical theory. Here we might remind ourselves that prising apart immediate political constraints from intel­ lectual ones is one path to being “governed a little less” in Foucault’s sense. Yet allowing thinking its wildness beyond the immediate in order to reset the possibilities of the immediate is also how this degov­ erning rearticulates critical theory and politics after disarticulating them; critical theory comes back to politics offering a different sense of the times and a different sense of time. It is also important to remem­ ber that the “immediate choices” are just that and often last no longer than a political season (exemplified by the fact that the political conun­ drums with which this essay opened will be dated if not forgotten by the time this book is published). Nor is the argument convincing that critical theory threatens the possibility of holding back the political dark. It is difficult to name a single instance in which critical theory has killed off a progressive political project. Critical theory is not what makes progressive political projects fail; at worst it might give them bad conscience, at best it renews their imaginative reach and vigor.

#### Foucauldian politics are a pre-requisite to effective pragmatism—standards for success are politically constructed and should be interrogated—the alternative is error replication

May 11(Todd, Professor of Philosophy and Religion at Clemson, “A New Neo-Pragmatism: From James and Dewey to Foucault,” 2011, Foucault Studies, http://rauli.cbs.dk/index.php/foucault-studies/article/view/3205/3399, Pg. 60-62, JS)

I believe we can answer this question in the affirmative. The claim is not that all prac-tices have the same level of depth or influence when it comes to relations of power and know-ledge. If that were the case, then it would have been just as expedient for Foucault to study baseball as psychotherapeutic practice. Rather, the idea is that, to one extent or another, power and knowledge, and particularly their relationship, arises within practices. So in the case of baseball one might find it operating, at least at the margins—indeed it is not difficult to imagine such a case. Think, for instance, of a baseball player who is about to give a public speech being told that he is ‚on deck.‛ The implication here is that the person is about to en-gage in a competitive activity whose goal is to win something, whether that be audience’s respect, other speaking engagements, or something else. Inasmuch as this person understands himself through the game of baseball, transferring the image of being on deck to other activities promotes a competitive self-understanding, which generates beliefs and actions en-gaged with the world in a competitive mode. It might be pointed out here that not only baseball players, but other people as well are subject to the locution of being on deck. This is true. It is also true that people who are not in psychotherapy are subject to influences from that practice. Practices do not exist in isolation. They are intertwined and pervade our culture and society in different ways and to different extents. Moreover, an individual’s immersion in different practices can cause cross-fertiliza-tion of the power/knowledge effects of those practices within his or her beliefs, actions, and engagements. What Foucault offers in focusing on the level of practices as his unit of histo-rical and genealogical inquiry is not a specialized or narrow analytic, but instead a way of understanding ourselves and how we got to be who we are through the most common and pervasive ways in which we engage with the world. The addition I have made to Foucault’s own claim about practices is that it is in the practices that the power/knowledge relationships May: A New Neo-Pragmatism 61 are to be found. Even this is not an addition so much as a clarification that allows us to see more straightforwardly the relationship between his work and pragmatism. Having made this clarification, though, we must ask about that relationship. What is the implication of all this for pragmatism? It lies in introducing a complexity that appears to have escaped James and, to a lesser extent, Dewey, for whom the success of a practice lay in its ability to help us navigate the world. If Foucault’s genealogical approach is helpful, the con-cept of success must itself be investigated rather than being a sort of ‚unexplained ex-plainer.‛17 Successful navigation of the world seems to be a matter of accomplishing one’s goals better or more efficiently or more meaningfully. This being said, we might ask, what are the self-understandings tied up with particular senses of success? If, for instance, we are pro-duced to one extent or another to be psychological beings with personalities of the type that psychotherapy promotes, then success will be defined in psychotherapeutic terms. This, in turn, has its own political effects, effects Foucault has traced in Discipline and Punish and the first volume of the History of Sexuality. These effects are not always ones we would, on reflec-tion, seek to ratify. Some of them, for example the making-docile of human bodies, are, in Foucault’s term, intolerable. We cannot, then, take the notion of success or the idea of navi-gating the world more successfully at face value. We must see it as the name of a problem to be investigated rather than a solution to be attained. This, it seems to me, is a point that would deepen pragmatism without violating any of its central commitments. It would, instead, offer a historical dimension to pragmatist thought. Success in navigating the world is not a given. Rather, one is successful within parti-cular parameters, and those parameters have political inflections. It is not only that the para-meters provide territorial borders within which one can have more or less success in one’s navigation. The problem is deeper: what counts as success as well as what is encouraged or discouraged (or even prohibited) in the name of that success are political matters. They are matters of whom we have been shaped to be and what our understanding and self-under-standing consists in. We might, from another angle, locate the difference between Foucault and the prag-matists and neo-pragmatists this way. For the latter, pragmatism is a matter of what is prac-tical; while for Foucault, pragmatism is a matter of taking our practices as the unit of analysis. What gives Foucault’s work its force, and what makes it relevant for pragmatism, is that it is through our practices what is considered practical arises for us. We cannot take the practical, or successful within it, as a given. That is the lesson of his genealogies. Foucault’s work does not, of course, replace classical pragmatism or neo-pragmatism. Pragmatism’s emphasis on the bond between belief and action and between them and the world remain relevant for us. Even its notion of successful navigation of the world, suitably complicated by political analysis, has much to say. If what I have argued here is right, rather than seeing Foucault’s work as a replacement of pragmatism, we ought to see it in a line that extends from James and Dewey through Rorty to Foucault (even if the chronology of the latter two must at moments be reversed). Pragmatism has offered us a powerful philosophical per-spective on the intertwining of our selves and our world, no doubt as powerful as the best of 17 I am grateful to Colin Koopman for suggesting this helpful term. Foucault Studies, No. 11, pp. 54-62. 62 the phenomenological tradition. Seeing Foucault’s work engaged with that tradition does not permit us to surpass it, but instead to add a dimension to its already rich tradition.

#### The critique of the biopolitical dimensions of the state comes before policymaking because we have to understand what we mean by life before we start to regulate it.

Milchman and Rosenberg 5 (Alan and Alan, Both @ Queens College, Review Essay: Michel Foucault: Crises and Problemizations, The Review of Politics vol67 no2, JSTOR) LA

Thus, an analytics of government in the Foucauldian mode, is genealogical; it examines the historicity and contingency of both liberal regimes of practices, and the modes of subjectification to which they give rise, even as it eschews any metaphysics, philoso phy of history, or philosophical anthropology. Moreover, such an analytics of government also acknowledges the enormous signifi cance of political power beyond the state in the liberal regimes of modern democracy. From the perspective of governmentality, with its arts and regimes encompassing, as Rose points out, "amultitude of programmes, strategies, tactics, devices, calculations, negotiations, intrigues, persuasions and seductions aimed at the conduct of individuals, groups, populations—and indeed oneself”(p.5), the state is no longer the sole, or necessarily primary, power contrainer. Indeed, for Rose: From this perspective, the question of the state was so central to earlier investigations of political power is relocated. The state now appears simply s one element?whose function ishistorically specific and contextually variable?in multiple circuits of power, connecting a diversity of authorities and forces, within awhole variety of complex assemblages (p. 5). Thus, governmentality studies, which investigate power relations at the molecular as well as at the molar level, cannot limit themselves to an analysis of the state. The web of power relations inmodern democracies requires an analytics of government that is, as Dean claims, pluralistic; that acknowledges the existence of "aplurality of regimes of practices in a given territory, each composed from a multiplicity of in principle unlimited and heterogeneous elements bound together by a variety of relations and capable of polymor phous connections with one another" (p.27). Such an analytics, will investigate the distribution of power between state and civil society, public and private, juridical and social, coercive and non-coercive, disciplinary and normalizing. And according to Dean, the point of departure for such ‘an analytics of government is the identification and examination of specific situations in which the activity of governing comes to be called into question, the moments and the situations in which government becomes a problem” (p.27). It is just such a problemization, we believe, that sent the final Foucault on his "journey to Greece." The spatial/temporal setting for Foucault's Berkeley lecture course, published as Fearless Speech, is far removed from the setting of his lecture on governmentality, and the glosses that Dean and Rose have provided. In Fearless Speech, Foucault's focus is on the ancient world, from the Athens of Socrates to the imperial Rome of Seneca. Foucault's interest in the ancient world was not motivated by a conviction that he could find there a solution to the problems ofmodernity. Indeed, far from romanticizing the ancient world, Foucault pointed to the existence of slavery and misogyny, as well as rigid class hierarchies, to make it clear that Greco\_Roman antiquity was not the answer to the cultural and political crises of modernity. Indeed, far from romanticizing the ancient world, Foucault pointed to the existence of slavery and misogyny, as well as rigid class hierarchies, to make it clear that Greco-Roman antiquity was not the answer to the cultural and political crises of modernity. What Foucault did find in the ancient world, however, was an emphasis on self-fashioning, on truth-telling, and on friendship, that—beyon the prevailing class and gender hierarchies—seemed to contain possibilities for meeting the challenge of contemporary crises and problemizations. In what ways could one re-function the ancient concern with self-fashioning and parrhesia so that it could be meaningful in a world shaped by biopower?

### Critique Key (Automobility)

#### Critique is the ‘turning point’ – we need to question the idea that automobility is normative and natural.

Urry 4 (John, professor of Sociology at Lancaster, editor of the International Library of Sociology, “The ‘System’ of Automobility’, 2004, Theory Culture Society 21:25, 7/6/12, BR)

Thus in order to break with the current car system, what Adams terms ‘business as usual’ (1999), we need to examine the possibilities of ‘turning points’. Abbott argues that change is the normal order of things and indeed many assessments of contemporary social life emphasize the increasingly accelerating nature of such profound changes. But there are certain networks of social relations that get stabilized for long periods of time, what are often called social structures. One such structure is the car system that is remarkably stable and unchanging, even though a massive economic, social and technological maelstrom of change surrounds it. The car-system seems to sail on regardless, now over a century old and increasingly able to ‘drive’ out competitors, such as feet, bikes, buses and trains. The car system, we might say, is a Braudelian longue durée (Abbott, 2001: 256). But as Abbott notes, and indeed it is a key feature of complexity approaches to systems, nothing is ﬁxed forever. Abbott maintains that there is: ‘the possibility for a pattern of actions to occur to put the key in the lock and make a major turning point occur’ (2001: 257). Such non-linear outcomes are generated by a system moving across turning or tipping points (Gladwell, 2000). Tipping points involve three notions: that events and phenomena are contagious, that little causes can have big effects, and that changes can happen not in a gradual linear way but dramatically at a moment when the system switches. Gladwell describes the consumption of fax machines or mobile phones, when at a particular moment every ofﬁce appears to need a fax machine or every mobile ‘cool’ person requires a mobile. Wealth in such a situation derives not from the scarcity of goods as in conventional economics but from abundance (Gladwell, 2000: 272–3). Current thinking about automobility is characterized by linear thinking: can existing cars can be given a technical ﬁx to decrease fuel consumption or can existing public transport be improved a bit (see Urry, 2003, on non-linearity)? But the real challenge is how to move to a different pattern involving a more or less complete break with the current car system. The current car-system could not be disrupted by linear changes but only by a set of interdependent changes occurring in a certain order that might move, or tip, the system into a new path (see Gladwell, 2000; Sheller and Urry, 2000).

### Critique Before IR Theory

#### Biopower, ethics, and political battles influences the way that states react

Matiasek 04 (Edward, political theory and methodology at Illinois State University, "\"Fasten Your Safety Belts Kids! Security: from the Local to the International." http://pol.illinoisstate.edu/downloads/icsps\_papers/2004/matiasek13.pdf, accessed 7-7-12, CNM)

In this section I will compare the theoretical concepts that have been introduced by Kenneth Waltz and Neta Crawford. The reading presented in class gave a small taste of what Waltz thinks the concepts of IR should consist of.35 He argues that structural stability of the international system is all that matters. Therefore, the most powerful nation or nations are responsible for keeping the system stable. Waltz argues that the style of how the sovereign nation or nations rule does not matter, but only how power is distributed between the nation states. He thinks that because power of sovereign states is all that really matters, history is cyclical or static by its very nature. Waltz believes that stability should be strived for and is a necessity to ensure preservation of the power structures and peace. In contrast, Neta Crawford argues in, Argument and Change in World Politics,36 that history is not cyclical. Through her exegesis of decolonization, Crawford illustrates how ethical arguments play a big factor on how hegemons act in the international system. Thus, she disagrees with Waltz that sovereign decision and action should be the only concepts involved in IR. Crawford characterizes IR as more of a political battle by means of norms on all sides of the disagreement. I think that Crawford’s book is an excellent response to Waltz’s argument that sovereign power and stability should be the major concepts condoned in international relations. Her explication of how sovereign interest did not explain many of the aspects involved in decolonization shows some blatant flaws in Waltz’s argument. Furthermore, Crawford coheres with all aspects of Foucault’s theory of power on a global scale. Waltz can also be seen as a standard Hobbesian, and therefore their major flaws seem to be equivalent. So, following the reasoning of this paper, we must look at the people in the international system that have been determined outsiders from the dominant political discourse. This can be readily seen by the West’s economic exploitation reified exponentially by the debts built by the IMF and the World bank, war policy (think Normal police substation), and racist discourse concerning the Global South. These are just a few of the power systems used by the West to keep these people disenfranchised. The international policies and discursive attacks on these states are completely analogous to the system of oppression that I have been trying to develop about the Town of Normal in this paper. I think Crawford’s explanation of argument wonderfully illustrates how change occurs in these sorts of power systems. Crawford explicates how arguments go through many processes such as legitimization and delegitimization, and how their success depends on many other complex factors. She emphasizes that change is a slow process with normative or ethical arguments being constantly converted, changed, and realigned within the political discourse and action. This is also consistent with Foucault’s explanation of how resistance is everywhere, and how it constantly changes and reformats the existing power structure. This leaves us at least some hope for positive change in the future, although it may be agonizingly dawdling.37

### Roleplaying Bad

#### Role-playing causes passivity, tyranny and denies agency.

Antonio ‘95 (Robert, University of Kansas, Nietzsche's Antisociology: Subjectified Culture and the End of History American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, No. 1 (Jul., 1995), pp. 1-43, JS)

The "problem of the actor," Nietzsche said, "troubled me for the longest time."'12 He considered "roles" as "external," "surface," or "foreground" phenomena and viewed close personal identification with them as symptomatic of estrangement. While modern theorists saw dif- ferentiated roles and professions as a matrix of autonomy and reflexivity, Nietzsche held that persons (especially male professionals) in specialized occupations overidentify with their positions and engage in gross fabrica- tions to obtain advancement. They look hesitantly to the opinion of oth- ers, asking themselves, "How ought I feel about this?" **They are so thoroughly absorbed in simulating effective role players that they have trouble being anything but actors**-"The role has actually become the character." **This highly subjectified social self or simulator suffers devas- tating inauthenticity.** The powerful authority given the social greatly amplifies Socratic culture's already self-indulgent "inwardness." Integ- rity, decisiveness, spontaneity, and pleasure are undone by paralyzing overconcern about possible causes, meanings, and consequences of acts and unending internal dialogue about what others might think, expect, say, or do (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 83-86; 1986, pp. 39-40; 1974, pp. 302-4, 316-17). **Nervous rotation of socially appropriate "masks" reduces persons to hypostatized "shadows," "abstracts," or simulacra.** One adopts "many roles," playing them "badly and superficially" in the fashion of a stiff "puppet play." Nietzsche asked, "Are you genuine? Or only an actor? A representative or that which is represented? . . . [Or] no more than an imitation of an actor?" Simulation is so pervasive that it is hard to tell the copy from the genuine article; social selves "prefer the copies to the originals" (Nietzsche 1983, pp. 84-86; 1986, p. 136; 1974, pp. 232- 33, 259; 1969b, pp. 268, 300, 302; 1968a, pp. 26-27). Their inwardness and aleatory scripts foreclose genuine attachment to others. This type of actor cannot plan for the long term or participate in enduring net- works of interdependence; such a person is neither willing nor able to be a "stone" in the societal "edifice" (Nietzsche 1974, pp. 302-4; 1986a, pp. 93-94). Superficiality rules in the arid subjectivized landscape. Neitzsche (1974, p. 259) stated, "One thinks with a watch in one's hand, even as one eats one's midday meal while reading the latest news of the stock market; one lives as if one always 'might miss out on something. ''Rather do anything than nothing': this principle, too, is merely a string to throttle all culture. . . . Living in a constant chase after gain compels people to expend their spirit to the point of exhaustion in continual pretense and overreaching and anticipating others." Pervasive leveling, improvising, and faking foster an inflated sense of ability and an oblivious attitude about the fortuitous circumstances that contribute to role attainment (e.g., class or ethnicity). The most medio- cre people believe they can fill any position, even cultural leadership. Nietzsche respected the self-mastery of genuine ascetic priests, like Socra- tes, and praised their ability to redirect ressentiment creatively and to render the "sick" harmless. But he deeply feared the new simulated versions. Lacking the "born physician's" capacities, these impostors am- plify the worst inclinations of the herd; they are "violent, envious, ex- ploitative, scheming, fawning, cringing, arrogant, all according to cir- cumstances. " Social selves are fodder for the "great man of the masses." Nietzsche held that "the less one knows how to command, the more ur- gently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely- a god, prince, class, physician, father confessor, dogma, or party conscience. The deadly combination of desperate conforming and overreaching and untrammeled ressentiment **paves the way for a new type of tyrant** (Nietzsche 1986, pp. 137, 168; 1974, pp. 117-18, 213, 288-89, 303-4).

### Critique Before K Affs

#### Foucauldian politics set up a framework for action that solves their harms—the recognition that power is everywhere enables creative avenues of resistance

White ’92(Lucia, Professor of Law @ UCLA, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1499, lexis, Date Accessed: 7/11, JS)

The second reason that Foucault's picture of power is so important to progressive advocates is that it has opened up new possibilities in the political practice of relatively disempowered groups. The conventional theory of power reveals a dichotomized world of domination and subordination; through such a lens, the hegemony of the dominant class is virtually absolute. Not only does that class confine the actions of the subordinated, but it also dictates their language, preferences, thoughts, dreams, and indeed most deeply held moral and political intuitions. In American legal scholarship, Catharine MacKinnon has used this dichotomized picture of power with great skill to challenge claims that women can experience authentic subjectivity in contemporary society. 22 MacKinnon posed this challenge in an encounter with Carol Gilligan at Buffalo Law School in 1984. 23 In that exchange, MacKinnon argued that values of "caring" and "connection" that Gilligan and other feminists sought to reclaim and celebrate are symptoms of women's subordinate position in a closed system of power. 24 According to MacKinnon, even women's feelings of sexual pleasure are suspect; these feelings, like every other feature of Woman, define [\*1504] a colonized subject, a being whose essence has been shaped by and for men. 25 Thus, as Angela Harris has demonstrated in her critique of Catharine MacKinnon's work, 26 a conventional understanding of power locks women, and indeed every subordinated group, in a discursive "prison-house" 27 from which there is no escape. Just as the dominators can do nothing except wield their power, the subordinated can speak nothing except their masters' will. No change is possible in this universe; indeed, even the most creative tactics of resistance or gestures of solidarity reinforce the bonds of domination. This understanding of domination, designed to reveal injustice, leads to two perverse results. First, it excuses those in the dominant class from attempting to reflect on or change their own conduct, or to ally themselves with subordinate groups. Second, it reinforces in relatively disempowered groups the very doubts about their feelings, capacities, and indeed human worth that subordination itself engenders. Foucault's picture of power disrupts this closed circle of domination. By showing that the dominators do not "possess" power, his picture makes possible a politics of resistance. It opens up space for a self-directed, democratic politics among subordinated groups, a politics that is neither vanguard-driven nor co-opted, as the politics of the colonized subject inevitably is. At the same time, and of more immediate relevance to lawyers, this new picture of power makes possible a self-reflective politics of alliance and collaboration between professionals and subordinated groups. Given the new theaters of political action that Foucault's theory of power has opened up, it is not surprising that it has stolen the stage in historical, cultural, and finally legal studies from those who speak of power in more conventional terms. The Foucaultian picture of power makes insurgent politics interesting again; it brings possibility back into focus, even in apparently quiescent times when resistance is visible only in the microdynamics of everyday life.

### Critique Solves

#### Reject the aff in favor of a political ideology that does not engage in the destructive discourse of the 1AC

Foucault 72+ (Michael, Professor of the History of Systems of Thought College De France, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, pg. 63) LD

Q: Perhaps this is because it has always been thought that power is mediated through the forms prescribed in the great juridical and philosophical theories, and that there is a fundamental, immutable gulf between those who exercise power and those who undergo it.

MF: I wonder if this isn't bound up with the institution of monarchy. This developed during the Middle Ages against the backdrop of the previously endemic struggles between feudal power agencies. **The monarchy presented itself as a referee, a power capable of putting an end to war, violence, and pillage and saying no to these struggles and private feuds. It made itself acceptable by allocating itself a juridical and negative function, albeit one whose limits it naturally began at once to overstep. Sovereign, law, and prohibition formed a system of representation of power which was extended during the subsequent era by the theories of right: political theory has never ceased to be obsessed with the person of the sovereign. Such theories still continue today to busy themselves with the problem of sovereignty.** What we need, however, is a political philosophy that isn't erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the king's head: in political theory that has still to be done.

### Knowledge/Power

#### The affirmative’s paradigm of knowledge is flawed—technological society assumes knowledge as distinct from power, but all knowledge is an aftereffect of power.

Read 9 (Stephen, Delft University, Another Form: From the ‘Informational’ to the ‘Infrastructural’ City, http://repository.tudelft.nl/view/ir/uuid%3A9124271d-6373-4541-a5cd-54ba3e3373f4/) LA

Ole Hanseth points out that even if we could regard knowledge as composed of pure information we would still have to contend with the systematicity of knowledge itself - the fact that bits of information may only make sense in a very restricted number of combinations with other information bits. The idea therefore that knowledge is decomposable into facts or information-bits that are unproblem- atically recomposable in different combinations becomes questionable. Knowledge itself needs to be constructed into whole sense-making combina- tions, and paradigms are the guiding framework of starting assumptions and taken-for-granteds for such work. The construction of a new paradigm is as much about constructing the framework as about constructing knowledge as such, and the interrelat- edness and systemic character of the knowledge makes changes from old to new very challenging.26 Then paradigms don’t simply exist as pure knowl- edge, they rely on an interconnected apparatus of texts, institutions, writing and publishing practices and so on. All of this needs to be installed, fine-tuned and maintained, with all the work and expense that entails. Hanseth explores the idea of knowledge as a network further by considering the internet. The first thing he notes is that in practice, knowledge in networks is dependent on high degrees of technical standardisation. Standardisation also means that network externalities apply: a particular standard connection protocol may confer increasing value on the network and information as more and more connections with the same technical standard are made. Historical or path-dependent processes then kick in, with an increasing systematisation of information and increasing lock-in of people already committed to the system. A technically or operationally better standard will have to overcome these network externalities, and objectively superior standards may be locked out.27 New standards do make the leap however and one of the ways they do this is by being compatible backwardly with old standards. New information is assembled or constructed in the new standard so that it is compatible (or at least translatable) in the old standard. This mode of piggy-backing on old technical standards while allowing access to the new is one of the ways that technical advance happens today and we see all sorts of technologies from information exchange protocols to computer oper- ating systems, software and hardware, designed to new standards while being backwardly compatible with the old.28 Knowledges are embedded in historically elabo- rated and refined paradigms involving investment in work already done, procedures in place, and systems already made, and these simply cannot stop suddenly and shift to new paradigms. Networks of knowledge become, according to Hanseth, more like infrastructures of knowledge as all the structure and then all the associated apparatus, practices and organisation is factored in. Infrastructures in our common understanding tend to be large and heavy and hard to change. Knowledge has similar features: it is ‘big, heavy and rigid - and not light and flexible’.29 Castells’s new paradigm is explicitly techno- logical - he conceives of it as constituted around a complex of microelectronics-based information and communication technologies and genetic engineer- ing, and replacing the technological paradigm of the industrial age organised around the production and distribution of energy. His information is almost a taken-for-granted in all this: content or flow in the network, and dependant on this lightness of infor- mation for the ‘synergies’ he understands between different technologies.30 Without this implausible lightness the synergies will depend on an ongoing work of translation and the maintenance of back- ward compatibilities. Knowledge paradigms are likely to be dense, specific, ‘heavy’ and durable. The fact that these networks are made and sited tech- nical constructions would also suggest they can’t be global in any way we can conceive outside of the networks themselves. It suggests that we tech- nically construct more limited and specific ‘global’ paradigms in specific technical systems. I will illus- trate this by looking at the work of Karin Knorr Cetina and her colleagues on working practices in financial markets and the way information and technology is incorporated into these practices, and then use their conceptual scheme to begin to interpret other real rather than virtual infrastructures.

### Individual Ethic Key

#### We must establish an ethical relation to ourselves before we decide on the state’s power to regulate life.

Milchman and Rosenberg 5 (Alan and Alan, Both @ Queens College, Review Essay: Michel Foucault: Crises and Problemizations, The Review of Politics vol67 no2, JSTOR) LA

But speaking truth to power, political parrhesia, also entails a rapport ? soi, an ethical relationship to oneself. "When you accept the parrhesiastic game in which your own life is exposed, you are taking up a specific relationship to yourself: you risk death to tell the truth instead of reposing in the security of a life where the truth goes unspoken. Of course, the threat of death comes from the Other, and thereby requires a relationship to the Other. But the parrhesiastes primarily chooses a relationship to himself: he prefers himself as a truth-teller, in contrast to the modern focus on possession of the Truth, that Foucault seeks to re-function in his own problemization of the modern subject. For Foucault, it is Socrates who embodies ethical or philosophi cal parrhesia in the form of philosophy as away of life, inasmuch as the aim of his truth-telling "isnot to persuade the Assembly, but to convince someone that he must take care of himself and of others; and this means that he must change his life. This theme of changing one's life, of conversion, becomes very important from the fourth century B.C. to the beginnings of Christianity. It is essential to philo sophical parrhesiastic practices." Conversion here is not a religious experience, a revelation of the divine; it is, rather, a transfiguration of "one's style of life, one's relation to others, and one's relation to oneself" (p. 106). For Socrates, it enables him to fulfill the basanic role, and to forge a link between logos and bios (life). For Foucault, this ethical parrhesia is inseparable from inter subjective and communal relationships: First, parrhesia occurs as an activity in the framework of small groups of people, or in the context of community life. Secondly, parrhesia can be seen in human relationships occurring in the framework of public life. And finally, parrhesia occurs in the context of individual personal relationships (p. 108). Foucault illustrates these dimensions of parrhesia with examples drawn from the Cynics, the Stoics, and the Epicureans. Perhaps an example drawn from the Epicurean Philodemus, who placed great emphasis on the role of friendship in the transfiguration of one's self, can illuminate the significance of community and group sessions in the task of discovering the truth about oneself: He speaks of this practice as “the salvation by one another” …. The world sozesthai—to save oneself—in the Epicurean tradition means to gain access to a good, beautiful, and happy life. It does not refer to any kind of afterlife of divine judgment. In one’s own salvation, other members of the Epicurean community [The Garden] have a decisive role to play as necessary agents enabling one to discover the truth about oneself and in helping one to gain access to a happy life. Hence the very important emphasis on friendship in the Epicurean groups (pp. 114-15). Whether it is the action of the parrhesiastes in the Athenian assembly or in the Epicurean Garden, confronting her fellow citizens or his friends, Foucault’s meditation on parrhesia is linked to a vision of democracy. Foucault's discourse has moved from a parrhesia constituted by the courage to tell the truth to others, a tyrant or to a friend, both of which carry a risk (death or imprisonment in the first case, loss of friendship in the second), to another form of parrhesia, "which now consists in being courageous enough to disclose the truth about oneself (p.1 A3). This particular parrhesiastic game, which is integral to the fashioning of a self , entails what the Greeks termed askesis or asceticism. Yet the asceticism towhich Foucault refers is antithetical to the tradition of Christian asceticism, or at least to its dominant forms. Indeed, Foucault here is engaged in a re-functioning of the concept of asceticism, one that harks back to its Greco-Roman meaning, and that has close links to Nietzsche's project. In these lectures, Foucault shows that asceticism as an art of living, with its techniques of the self: demands practice and training: askesis. But the Greek conception of askesis differs from Christian ascetic practices in at least two ways: (1)Christian asceticism has as its ultimate aim or target the renunciation of the self, whereas the moral askesis of the Greco-Roman philosophies has as its goal the establishment of a specific relatioship to oneself?a relationship of self-possessing and self-sovereignty; (2) Christian asceticism takes as its principal theme detachment from the world, whereas the ascetic practices of the Greco-Roman philosophies are generally concerned with endowing the individual with the preparation and the moral equipment that will permit him to fully confront the world in an ethical and rational manner (pp. 143-44). What can be described as Foucault's ethical turn, however, does not seem to us to entail a retreat from the political, any kind of solipsistic withdrawal. Indeed, Foucault's preoccupation with Greco-Roman thought, his focus on ethics, constitutes a new, and potentially very fruitful way, to grapple with the question(s) of the political. For Foucault, ethics is politics. Foucault's ethical turn, inseparable from his journey to Greece, and linked to his focus on governmentality, with its linkage between technologies of domination and technologies of the self, entails a recognition that the personal is not private, but political. This was the case, Foucault claims, in the Greco-Roman world, and it is the case with the government of the modern subject. As Jon Simons has persuasively argued: governmentality “refers to the connection between power as the regulation of others and a relationship with oneself. In other words, government is the connection between ethics and politics. One governs one’s own conduct, while government guides the conduct of others.”10 Foucault’s preoccupation with parrhesia is a case in point for this link between ethics and politics. We are today again expe riencing in a dramatic way, in our liberal democracy, the danger or risk of telling truth to power. The parrhesiastes may not risk his his life, but she certaintly risks her career, and faces the danger of becoming scorned and marginalized. The case of BUnnatine Greenhouse, a high-ranking contracting specialist for the Army Corps of Engineers, who vociferously objected to the no-bid contracts “won” by Halliburton to restore Iraq’s oil facilities, and who faces the risk of downgrading for her willingness to speak truth to power, is illustrative of a widespread phenomenon. Nor is the dilemma of the parrhesiastes limited to such situations. We also confront the phenomenon of bureaucrats and technocrats in our democratic societies, for whom truth-telling or speaking frankly has been sacrificed to the need for control as a hallmark of their “calling.”11 We are perhaps witnessing the outcome of that long process that Foucault traced back to Descartes, in which the identification of truth with correct method, the veritable basis of modern science, its separation from the possession of moral qualities, and the excision of parrhesia from the mechanisms of government, can have disasterous consequences for our political life. Foucault’s articulation of parrhesia and its links to a re-functionined cision of asceticism, permits him to conceive of an ethics of self-fashioning as a possible response to the dangers of biopower to which he has alerted us. Those dangers, of which state racism and “thanato-politics” loom so large, can be confronted precisely because the modes of subjectification linked to biopower, not only instantiate discipline, normalization, and control, but also contain a potential for autonomy. Paradoxically, that potential is embedded in the freedom that is inseparable from the very control mechanisms of a bio-political regime, from the actual practices of liberal government. Foucault saw himself as engaged in a “history of the present.” Even when he was investigating the origins of biopower, providing us with a geneology of government, or reading the ancient texts in an effort to explore the significance or parrhesiastic practices, his focus was on our own world, our own time, and both its dangers can provide a point of departure for political theory to respond t the crises that confront us today.

### Specific Intellectual

#### The role of intellectuals is to problematize regimes of truth.

Edkins ‘6(Jenny, Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK, “The Local, the Global and the Troubling,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy Vol. 9, No. 4, 499–511, December 2006, JS)

The second preliminary point is that contemporary intellectuals in the Western context operate within a particular ‘‘regime’ of truth’ (Foucault 1980a: 133), one that constitutes as ‘truth’ knowledge that is the product of scientific methods of working. Michel Foucault argues that the figure of what he calls ‘**the specific intellectual’ is of central importance in present day struggles**. Specific intellectuals, such as atomic scientists for example, who have a ‘direct and localised relation to scientific knowledge and institutions’ (Foucault 1980a: 128) constitute a political threat because of their ability ‘to intervene in contemporary political struggles in the name of a “local” scientific truth’ (Foucault 1980a: 129). In other words, because of their status as experts, and despite the fact that ‘the specific intellectual serves the interests of State or Capital’ (Foucault 1980a: 131), they remain in a strategic position to intervene on behalf of local struggles. There are dangers, of course: the risk of remaining at the level of local struggles, of manipulation or control by other interests, and of not being able to gain widespread support. Nevertheless, the specific intellectual should not be discounted (Foucault 1980a: 131). What is important is the relation between ‘truth’ and power, and the way in which Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged of saying what counts as true. (Foucault 1980a: 131) Foucault argues that, in our societies, the dominant regime of truth is centred on scientific discourse and the institutions that support this. The specific intellectual has a particular class position, as Gramsci noted too, and particular conditions of work, but more than that, a particular connection to the way that the politics of truth works. This gives such an intellectual the possibility of struggle **at the level of the regime of truth**. Of course, ‘this regime is not merely ideological or superstructural; it was a condition of the formation and development of capitalism’ (Foucault 1980a: 133), which means **that interventions that challenge the regime of truth constitute a challenge to the hegemony of the** social and economic **system with which it is bound up**. It is in this context of a particular, scientific regime of truth and the role of the intellectual that I want to discuss the ways in which the academic search for ‘causes’ and ‘solutions’ to the Northern Ireland conflict operates, and how this mode of working can prohibit change. The role of the intellectual, as both Gramsci and Foucault have argued, can be central to change and contestation, but it can also be part of the structures that prohibit change and keep existing structures and problematisations in place. I suggest that the particular form of intellectual work that identifies ‘problems’ and then proposes ‘solutions’ is problematic. It ultimately **reinforces or reproduces** certain ways of thinking and conceals the way that identifying something as a problem in the first place is already to take a particular stance in relation to it. I argue that **the alternative in the case of violence** in particular is to engage in intellectual activity that brings to light struggles hidden in detailed historical records or localised knowledges – an activity that Foucault calls genealogy – and emphasises the necessity for a gradual remaking of the world, not through narrative accounts that regularise and normalise history in terms of cause and effect, but through a slow re-building**,** brick by brick.

### Rejection (Topic-Specific)

#### Rejection problematizes the biopolitics of mobility

Lundborg and Vaugn-Williams 11 (Tom—Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Nick—University of Warwick) LA

First, a molecular frame posits a radically relational ontology, which encourages greater sensitivity toward the active role that material forces play in the composition of contemporary social and political life. The stuff that is part of our everyday milieu of interaction shapes behaviors, conditions the possibility of different outcomes, and is performative of different types of subjectivities. Moreover, the shared reliance on access to CIs indicates their vital function in reproducing certain forms of life and communities based around those visions. For this reason, CI and attempts to securitize it must be read as performing a political role in the fashioning of global security relations. Second, thinking in terms of the molecular politics of resilience and CIP chal- lenges molar conceptions of such systems as totalizing, infallible structures of biopolitical control. The examples of the grossly inaccurate no-fly list and absurd terror target lists illustrate that far from being resilient these systems are prone to fail, breakdown, and back-fire according to their own logic. These ‘‘failures’’ are of course ‘‘successful’’ in the Foucauldian sense as they reproduce the need for better resilience, more investment in technology, and enhanced attempts to securitize facets of life. However, a molar orientation remains blind to such dynamics and their effects. Third, taking the power of materiality’s variation seriously involves heightened awareness of the role of nonhuman forces in various ‘‘becomings.’’ For example, the production of the children as terrorist suspects on their journeys to the US from Europe was a direct result of automated risk assessments rather than human immigration officials. In turn this prompts the need for greater critical reflection on the role that technē plays in the (re)production of sovereign lines between those who are deemed worthy to be mobile on the one hand, and those cast outside as risks and thereby rendered immobile on the other. Finally, the molecularization of the study of resilient CIs does not imply the abandonment of molar categorizations, positions, and perceptions. Deleuze and Guattari insist that the two modes of composition are not posited in a zero-sum relation to each other. Rather, a molecular approach works alongside molar registers by complicating them, destabilizing their attempts at creating coherence, and challenging the totalizing horizons that they represent. For the purposes of this article, this serves as a significant reminder that while the fan- tasy of molar biopolitical logics may be all-too readily detectable in the context of the war on terror, these logics are only ever attempts at producing and secur- ing life in particular ways. Life is more than code: there is always an excess of life in biopolitics.

### Rejection

#### Rejecting governmentality solves biopower

Hamann 9 (Trent H., St. John’s U, Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and Ethics, Foucault Studies No6 Feb 2009) LA

Whether neoliberalism will ultimately be viewed as having presented a radically new form of governmentality or just a set of variations on classical liberalism, we can certainly recognize that there are a number of characteristics in contemporary practices that are new in the history of governmentality, a number of which I’ve al- ready discussed. Another one of these outstanding features is the extent to which the imposition of market values has pushed towards the evisceration of any autonomy that may previously have existed among economic, political, legal, and moral dis- courses, institutions, and practices. Foucault notes, for example, that in the sixteenth century jurists were able to posit the law in a critical relation to the reason of state in order to put a check on the sovereign power of the king. By contrast, neoliberalism, at least in its most utopian formulations, is the dream of a perfectly limitless (as op- posed perhaps to totalizing) and all-encompassing (as opposed to exclusionary and normalizing) form of governance that would effectively rule out all challenge or op- position. This seems to be the kind of thing that Margaret Thatcher was dreaming about when she claimed that there is “no alternative”.34 Such formulations of what might be called “hyper-capitalism” seem to lend themselves to certain traditional forms of criticism. However, critical analyses that produce a totalizing conception of power and domination risk the same danger, noted above, of overlooking the some- times subtle and complex formations of power and knowledge that can be revealed through genealogical analyses of local practices. Important for any genealogical analysis is the recognition that, while there is no ”outside” in relation to power, re- sistance and power are coterminous, fluid, and, except in instances of domination, reversible. There is an echo of this formulation in Foucault’s understanding of go- vernmentality as ”the conduct of conduct”. Governmentality is not a matter of a dominant force having direct control over the conduct of individuals; rather, it is a matter of trying to determine the conditions within or out of which individuals are able to freely conduct themselves. And we can see how this is especially true in the case of neoliberalism insofar as it is society itself and not the individual that is the direct object of power. Foucault provides examples of this in “The Subject and Pow- er”, in which he discussed a number of struggles of resistance that have developed over the past few years such as “opposition to the power of men over women, of parents over children, of psychiatry over the mentally ill, of medicine over the popu- lation, of administration over the ways people live”.35 Despite their diversity, these struggles were significant for Foucault because they share a set of common points that allow us to recognize them as forms of resistance to governmentality, that is, ”critique”. Through the examples he uses Foucault notes the local and immediate nature of resistance. These oppositional struggles focus on the effects of power expe- rienced by those individuals who are immediately subject to them. Despite the fact that these are local, anarchistic forms of resistance, Foucault points out that they are not necessarily limited to one place but intersect with struggles going on elsewhere. Of greatest importance is the fact that these struggles are critical responses to con- temporary forms of governmentality, specifically the administrative techniques of subjectification used to shape individuals in terms of their free conduct.36 These struggles question the status of the individual in relation to community life, in terms of the forms of knowledge and instruments of judgment used to determine the ”truth” of individuals, and in relation to the obfuscation of the real differences that make individuals irreducibly individual beings.

#### Critiquing governmentality solves biopower

Hamann 9 (Trent H., St. John’s U, Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and Ethics, Foucault Studies No6 Feb 2009) LA

Foucault explicitly identified critique, not as a transcendental form of judgment that would subsume particulars under a general rule, but as a specifically modern ”atti- tude” that can be traced historically as the constant companion of pastoral power and governmentality. As Judith Butler points out in her article “What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault’s Virtue”,39 critique is an attitude, distinct from judgment, pre- cisely because it expresses a skeptical or questioning approach to the rules and ra- tionalities that serve as the basis for judgment within a particular form of gover- nance. From its earliest formations, Foucault tells us, the art of government has al- ways relied upon certain relations to truth: truth as dogma, truth as an individualiz- ing knowledge of individuals, and truth as a reflective technique comprising general rules, particular knowledge, precepts, methods of examination, confessions, inter- views, etc. And while critique has at times played a role within the art of government itself, as we’ve seen in the case of both liberalism and neoliberalism, it has also made possible what Foucault calls “the art of not being governed, or better, the art of not being governed like that and at that cost” (WC, 45). Critique is neither a form of ab- stract theoretical judgment nor a matter of outright rejection or condemnation of specific forms of governance. Rather it is a practical and agonistic engagement, re- engagement, or disengagement with the rationalities and practices that have led one to become a certain kind of subject. In his essay “What is Enlightenment?” Foucault suggests that this modern attitude is a voluntary choice made by certain people, a way of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of be- longing and presents itself as a task.40 Its task amounts to a “historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, [and] saying” (WE, 125). But how can we distinguish the kinds of resistance Foucault was interested in from the endless calls to ”do your own thing” or ”be all you can be” that stream forth in every direction from political campaigns to commercial advertising? How is it, to return to the last of the three concerns raised above, that Foucault does not simply lend technical sup- port to neoliberal forms of subjectivation? On the one hand, we can distinguish criti- cal acts of resistance and ethical self-fashioning from what Foucault called ”the Cali- fornian cult of the self” (OGE, 245), that is, the fascination with techniques designed to assist in discovering one’s ”true” or ”authentic” self, or the merely ”cosmetic” forms of rebellion served up for daily consumption and enjoyment. On the other hand we might also be careful not to dismiss forms of self-fashioning as ”merely” aesthetic. As Timothy O’Leary points out in his book Foucault and the Art of Ethics, Foucault’s notion of an aesthetics of existence countered the modern conception of art as a singular realm that is necessarily autonomous from the social, political, and ethical realms, at least as it pertained to his question of why it is that a lamp or a house can be a work of art, but not a life. O’Leary writes: Foucault is less interested in the critical power of art, than in the ‘artistic’ or ‘plas- tic’ power of critique. For Foucault, not only do no special advantages accrue from the autonomy of the aesthetic, but this autonomy unnecessarily restricts our possibilities for self-constitution. Hence, not only is Foucault aware of the specif- ic nature of aesthetics after Kant, he is obviously hostile to it.41

## Permutation

### Top-Level

#### The permutation is possible only because the political and ethical assumptions about life which render the affirmative a coherent normative imperative simultaneously renders the critique unintelligible and therefore compatible with anything.

Burke 2005 [Anthony, *Beyond Security* pp. 3-4]

It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethi­cally suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alterna­tives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques – whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on terri­torial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophobic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique. <p3-4>

#### Critique must take aim at the whole political rationality which undergirds the affirmative.

Wendy Brown, Political Theory @ UC Berkeley, 2001, Politics Out of History. p 115-116

Regardless of whether Foucault is invoking political rationality as a proper or improper noun, the invocation calls attention to the limited efficacy of any resistance or critique that attacks only the effects of a particular rationality rather than the scheme as a whole. In this regard, political rationality may be seen as replacing the notion of "the system" in political thinking, a notion that seeks to reach beyond epiphenomenal injustices in order to criticize the grounds of those injustices: "Those who resist or rebel against a form of power cannot merely be content to denounce violence or criticize an institution. Nor is it enough to cast the blame on reason in general. What has to be questioned is the form of rationality at stake. . . . Liberation can only come from attacking . . . political rationality's very roots."28 **It is precisely the difference between a "rationality" and a "system" that is significant in Foucault's reformulation of the political** and that prevents this seemingly foundational account from being so. For unlike the coherently bounded, internally consistent (or internally contradictory), and relatively ahistorical figure of a system, a political rationality cannot be apprehended through empirical description or abstract principles, nor can it be falsified through general critique. Political rationalities are orders of practice and orders of discourse, not systems of rule; what must be captured for them to be subject to political criticism is their composition as well as their contingent nature. Similarly, the exploitable weaknesses in a political rationality are not systemic contradictions; they are instead effects of fragmented histories, colliding discourses, forces that persisted without triumphing decisively, unintended effects, and arguments insecure about themselves. **Such weaknesses cannot be exploited through philosophical critique that remains internal to or unaware of the terms of a particular rationality.** Genealogical critique aims to reveal various rationalities as the ones in which we live, to articulate them as particular forms of rationality. This articulation enables us to call into question the terms of political analysis from a standpoint outside those terms as well as to discern the historically produced fissures in their construction. Hence Foucault's remark that “the history of various forms of rationality is sometimes more effective in unsettling our certitudes and dogmatism than is **abstract criticism.”**

### No Solvency

#### The permutation is the status quo: the uniqueness question is implicated by 2400 years of biopolitical control of life. Until a completely new political relation between life and biopolitics can be articulated, the affirmative can only reproduce the violences of the status quo.

Agamben 1998 [Giorgio, professor of philosophy at the University of Verona, *Homo Sacer*, pg. 11]

In contrasting the “beautiful day” (euemeria) of simple life with the “great difficulty” of political bios in the passage cited above, Aristotle may well have given the most beautiful formulation to the aporia that lies at the foundation of Western politics. The 24 centuries that have since gone by have brought only provisional and ineffective solutions. In carrying out the metaphysical task that has led it more and more to assume the form of a biopolitics, Western politics has not succeeded in constructing the link be­tween zoe and bios, between voice and language, that would have healed the fracture. Bare life remains included in politics in the form of the exception, that is, as something that is included solely through an exclusion. How is it possible to “politicize” the “natural sweetness” of zoe? And first of all, does zoe really need to be politicized, or is politics not already contained in zoe as its most precious center? The biopolitics of both modern totalitarianism and the society of mass hedonism and consumerism certainly constitute answers to these questions. Nevertheless, until a com­pletely new politics—that is, a politics no longer founded on the exception of bare life—is at hand, every theory and every praxis will remain imprisoned and immobile, and the “beautiful day” of life will be given citizenship only either through blood and death or in the perfect senselessness to which the society of the spectacle condemns it.

### Sovereignty DA

#### We should not attempt to understand biopolitics from within the framework of sovereignty.

Prozorov ‘7(Sergei, Collegium Research Fellow, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland, “The Unrequited Love of Power: Biopolitical Investment and the Refusal of Care,” *Foucault Studies,* no. 4, pp. 53-77, JS)

This brings us to the normative question of whether one of these two forms of power is less violent and hence more preferable than the other so that we may avoid the perils of the synthesis of sovereign and biopolitical power by opting for a predominance of one form of power over the other. It would of course be facile to infer the inherent benevolence of biopower from its paradigmatic structure of ‘power‐as‐care’: “Biopower is love and care only to the same extent that the law […] is violence, namely by its origin.” 16 One should not oppose biopower to violence as such but only to the violence of the law, and ultimately, to the violence of politics, which is unthinkable without the presupposition of difference, conflict and violence. What biopower effects in its displacement of the city‐citizen game is the de‐activation of the transcendent violence of the law in favour of the immanent power of the norm that no longer merely threatens life, deducts from its forces and constrains its energies but rather incites and supports life, maximises its potential and nurtures its capacities. It is precisely in these operations that biopower is violent: at the same time as it disqualifies death from politics, it deploys a myriad of techniques of intervention into human existence that, in Michael Dillon’s words, allow the individual to be ‘cared to death’ by the ‘experts of life’ who are capable of what no sovereign ever cared for: manipulating the life choices of the individual, intervening into the most mundane individual practices, restructuring the entire period of human existence in terms of a variable distribution of restrictions, sanctions and regimens. 17 If the paradigm of sovereign violence, so illustriously depicted by Foucault in Discipline and Punish, 18 consists in inflicting unbearable pain on the living being through torture to the point of death, biopolitical violence consists in making life itself unbearable. “Sovereign power may be lethal but biopower is suffocating. Consequently, biopower may be kind but sovereign power allows for freedom.” 19 This difference carries important consequencesfor theorising resistance to the biopolitical investment of human existence. While the modalities of resistance to sovereign power, ranging from the retreat into the zoe of private life to the rebellion for the purpose of the institution of the new bios, are well‐known both as historical examples and theoretical artefacts, the question of resistance to biopower is a far more complex question. Thus, our discussion of anti‐biopolitical resistance in the remainder of this article is primarily conceptual rather than normative, which also accords with our Foucauldian points of departure. The question is not whether biopower must be resisted, which is always decided in concrete situations by concrete subjects, but **how it might be resisted**, given its idiosyncratic modus operandi. What ought to be problematised from the outset **is every attempt** to resist the subjection of man from the perspective of the citizen, i.e., to challenge biopolitics from the standpoint of sovereignty. This strategy is arguably at work in the contemporary global discourse of human rights, which ventures to resist domination by extending what are evidently the rights of a citizen to all humanity and in this manner explicating the particular bios into the universal zoe. However, our preceding discussion permits us to make an undoubtedly controversial claim that the very notion of human rights is meaningless in the biopolitical terrain of late modernity. 20 Indeed, it is only citizens who can make recourse to rights as members of a certain political bios, while the synthetic life of the ‘man’ of biopolitical investment is not a right but rather a duty of both the individual and the state. The ‘human rights’ listed in innumerable scriptures of contemporary world politics are, of course, historically nothing other than the civic rights of the citizens of Western liberal democracies, which are a result of political struggles in particular settings rather than essential attributes of a human being. In other words, the subjects of Western democracies have gained these rights as citizens rather than as men and these rights belong to the domain of the bios rather than zoe, even if their function is precisely to delimit the domain of zoe from state intervention. The logically necessary form of promoting these rights globally is the establishment of the structure of the ‘world state’, in which all men are present as citizens. 21 Anything short of that, for example ‘regime change’ military operations that seek to establish democratic structures of citizenshipin target societies, only serves to subject these populations to the sovereignty of another state, establishing what, irrespective of all emancipatory rhetoric, is a relationship of domination.

#### The perm is a link; assuming that we have the right to do something is staking up the role of the sovereign, which furthers the cover of disciplinary power.

Foucault in 2k [Michel, Philosopher, “Society Must Be Defended”, pgs. 39-40]

Having recourse to sovereignty against discipline will not enable us to limit the effects of disciplinary power. Sovereignty and discipline, legislation, the right of the sovereignty and disciplinary mechanics are in fact the two things that constitute – in an absolute sense – the general mechanisms of power in our society. Truth to tell , if we are to struggle against disciplines, or rather against disciplinary power, in our search for a nondisciplinary power, we should not be turning to the old right of sovereignty; we should be looking for a new right that is both antidisciplinary and emancipated from the principle of sovereignty.

#### The inclusion of the state as *the agent of decision* ensures the perm co-opts the alternative. Even progressive action will merely rein scribe the state as the decider of politics and life, making biopolitics inevitable and violent

Burke 2005 (Anthony, Senior Lecturer in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Beyond Security)

Agamben, drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault, has done most to describe and denounce the violent and impoverished conceptualisation of life implicit in such a politics. He saw in the convergence of a Schmittian theory of sovereignty and what Foucault termed `biopolitics' a diabolical system of political and administrative power that reduced human existence to 'bare life' (Homo sacer) that 'may be killed and yet not sacrificed' – Homo sacer being 'an obscure figure of archaic Roman law in which human life is included in the juridical order solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be killed)'.18 He sees such a simultaneously exceptional and biopolitical power at work in `the Camp', which took on its most horrific form in the Holocaust but is also in operation at the US prisons in Cuba and Abu Ghraib, and, as Suvendrini Perera19 has shown, at immigration detention centres like Woomera and Baxter in remote South Australia, where sovereign power is unchecked and life is taken hold of outside the existing legal order (or at least within a radically unstable and arbitrary one). The camp, Agamaben argues, is 'the biopolitical paradigm of the modern' and the state of exception is becoming normalised and universalised: it 'tends increasingly to appear as the dominant paradigm of government in con­temporary politics'.20 Agamben thus issues a profound warning for anyone concerned with interrogating modern conceptions of security – which, after all, posit the sovereign nation-state as the collective to be secured and abrogate to government powers to protect the 'life' of this collective. Yet life is not valued equally and its 'protection' comes with a simultaneous seizing of life by power: . . . in the age of biopolitics this power [to decide which life can be killed] becomes emancipated from the state of exception and trans­formed into the power to decide the point at which life ceases to be politically relevant. When life becomes the supreme political value, not only is the problem of life's nonvalue thereby posed as Schmitt suggests, but further, it is as if the ultimate ground of sovereign power were at stake in this decision. In modern biopolitics, sovereign is he who decides on the value or nonvalue of life as such.21In a world where life and existence are defined biopolitically, and government takes on the responsibility to secure, enable, regulate and order life, Agamben argues (after Foucault) that it is as if: 'every deci­sive political event were double-sided: the spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts with central powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of individuals' lives within the state order, thus offering a new more dreadful foundation for the sovereign power from which they wanted to free themselves.'22 In this light, the 'active defense of the American people' comes to sound sinister indeed, for Americans and their Others alike. <8-9>

### Masking/Co-Option DA

#### The permutation is not net-beneficial because it reduces political action to the machinations of state actors. Small victories like the permutation only provide a more dreadful foundation for the sovereign power from which we would free ourselves.

Burke 2005 [Anthony, *Beyond Security* pp. 8-9]

Agamben, drawing on the work of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault, has done most to describe and denounce the violent and impoverished conceptualisation of life implicit in such a politics. He saw in the convergence of a Schmittian theory of sovereignty and what Foucault termed `biopolitics' a diabolical system of political and administrative power that reduced human existence to 'bare life' (Homo sacer) that 'may be killed and yet not sacrificed' – Homo sacer being 'an obscure figure of archaic Roman law in which human life is included in the juridical order solely in the form of its exclusion (that is, of its capacity to be killed)'.18 He sees such a simultaneously exceptional and biopolitical power at work in `the Camp', which took on its most horrific form in the Holocaust but is also in operation at the US prisons in Cuba and Abu Ghraib, and, as Suvendrini Perera19 has shown, at immigration detention centres like Woomera and Baxter in remote South Australia, where sovereign power is unchecked and life is taken hold of outside the existing legal order (or at least within a radically unstable and arbitrary one). The camp, Agamaben argues, is 'the biopolitical paradigm of the modern' and the state of exception is becoming normalised and universalised: it 'tends increasingly to appear as the dominant paradigm of government in con­temporary politics'.20 Agamben thus issues a profound warning for anyone concerned with interrogating modern conceptions of security – which, after all, posit the sovereign nation-state as the collective to be secured and abrogate to government powers to protect the 'life' of this collective. Yet life is not valued equally and its 'protection' comes with a simultaneous seizing of life by power: . . . in the age of biopolitics this power [to decide which life can be killed] becomes emancipated from the state of exception and trans­formed into the power to decide the point at which life ceases to be politically relevant. When life becomes the supreme political value, not only is the problem of life's nonvalue thereby posed as Schmitt suggests, but further, it is as if the ultimate ground of sovereign power were at stake in this decision. In modern biopolitics, sovereign is he who decides on the value or nonvalue of life as such.21In a world where life and existence are defined biopolitically, and government takes on the responsibility to secure, enable, regulate and order life, Agamben argues (after Foucault) that it is as if: 'every deci­sive political event were double-sided: the spaces, the liberties, and the rights won by individuals in their conflicts with central powers always simultaneously prepared a tacit but increasing inscription of individuals' lives within the state order, thus offering a new more dreadful foundation for the sovereign power from which they wanted to free themselves.'22 In this light, the 'active defense of the American people' comes to sound sinister indeed, for Americans and their Others alike.

#### The permutation transforms the critique into another instrument of biopolitics; you should reject the perm because they frame the net-benefit to the permutation as the biopolitics of the 1ac.

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**Political historicism**, notes Foucault, encountered two obstacles in his revolutionary path: in the seventeenth century a hegemonic philosophico-juridical discourse that tried to suppress and disqualify it; in the nineteenth and twentieth century, a rising dialectics, which attempted, often successfully, "to colonize, it and exploit for purposes of social conservatorism"46. We have, then, a sort of major parting of the ways. On one side we have a recasting of the theme of national-racial confrontations in terms of social Darwinism, on the other a recasting of the theme of class struggles in the form of the dialectic. Both these mechanisms of discursive colonization, nevertheless, are outermost variations of that ***dispositif*** for the appropriation of historicism that was first crafted after the French revolution and that led to the appearance "of what might be called centralized State racism". Before proceeding to explore the infamy of social Darwinism and soviet dialectical materialism we want therefore to pause for a moment and ponder on the nature of state racism in its most general outline47.If "racism is, quite literally, revolutionary discourse in an inverted form" we might then single out three fundamental moments of this post-revolutionary inversion. Again: what happens after the revolution? First of all, the peace is declared and war is expelled in two directions: out of the borders of the state and backward in time, in the form of an odious past. Second, a unity of the people is discovered under the ashes of the war. The revolution, having eliminated all forms of domination in a single stroke, projects forward a pacified society to be managed, protected and biopolitically enhanced. Third, a fundamental modification in the discourse of sovereignty radically alters the relationship between the state and society. The paradigmatic figure of state practice will be no longer the sovereign-conqueror or the neutral judge but the humble servant of civil society. Accordingly, the state ceases to be identified either as a weapon in the hands of a hegemonic nation against the others or as a neutral third between conflicting parties. It becomes instead the protector of the welfare of the homogeneous and unitary post-revolutionary Nation. The state will have the duty to preserve the Nation from the threats that continuously jeopardize its feeble unity48. Fourth, **the relationship with the 'other' is recast**. We pass from a political relationship of enmity to a biological relationship of normalization49. When the agonistic plurality of classes, races and nations is subverted by the unity of the Class, Race or Nation, also the very ideas of classism, nationalism and racism suffer a dialogical inversion. For example, while traditional racism took the form of a clash of identities, **now a new racism emerges** as a practice of immunization against the multitude of viral threats menacing the social body of the population. Sovereignty, understood as the power over life and death, does not fade away; we witness instead a transformation of its meaning and logic from the political to the biopolitical. The state continues to kill, therefore exercising what for Foucault is the fundamental act of sovereignty. And **yet state murder is less and less the result of a political decision on the friend/enemy distinction, it is instead the "collateral effect" of a biopolitical *practice* aimed at maximizing the life of the population.** If the political sovereign was identifiable with the figure of the Schmittian 'decisionist', the biopolitical sovereign is most certainly an 'expert', a 'manager' or a 'technician'. Biopolitical sovereignty, in fact, does not require political decisions but "technical awareness"50.While State racism remained a general logic connected to the rise of the biopolitical nation-state, modern practices of racism took starkly different forms throughout the twentieth century. The historicist discourse of "nations at war" was appropriated by the bourgeois nation-state after the French Revolution. The Third Estate, after declaring its Universality, would subsequently recode it in terms of modern nationalism, re-constructing the state as 'guardian' of the nation. The discourse of 'race war' was appropriated most infamously by the Nazi state, which took on itself the task of the biological protection of the homogenized German nation. Modern racism therefore would find its extreme form in eugenic practice and the genocide of the Jewish race. The discourse of 'class war', finally, was phagocytized by the Soviet State. After 1917, in fact, **a slow process of bureaucratization undermined the possibilities opened up by the destruction of the czarist autocracy**. It was in particular the imposition of a process of normalization by Stalin, **and the suppression of the alternative theory of 'permanent revolution' associated with Trotsky and the Left Opposition, that led to a total identification of the social field with a homogeneous proletarian class, which the state had to serve and defend**. The dialectic as a totalizing philosophy of history became the discursive guarantee of the universality of the proletariat as the Class, and of the Soviet state as its 'protector'. If the bourgeois 'other' had represented the class *enemy*, the idle, the mad and the socially subversive now became the 'betrayer of the class', the internal virus, the secret disease. Classism, or in Foucault's terminology 'social-racism', was an inverted image, cast by the dialectical mirror of the biopolitical state on the body of the Soviet population51.

### Normalization DA

#### The final end of biopolitical domination is to “normalize” resistance so that even projects which attempt to overcome biopolitics must be framed themselves in biopolitical terms.

Dumm 1996 [Thomas, Professor of Political Science at Amherst College, *Michel Foucault and the Politics of Freedom*, pp. 116-117]

Here I am slightly ahead of myself. The problem of the normalization of norms is perhaps better discussed under the rubric “bio-power.” The emergence of this more complete normalizing discourse is itself not neatly or completely separate from its own genealogy within disciplinary society. However, in working to normalize even that which resists normalization, in normalizing the forms of resistance as they emerge from delinquency, those who engage in contemporary exercises of power may have been able to put at risk more than just a mode of freedom but the very possibility of free existence itself. Normalizing the norm—is there a more succinct definition of cybernetics than that? Normalizing the norm---is this not the great (unannounced) end of the various strategies aimed at human extinction? A question that emerges for us at the end of the twentieth century is whether the style of freedom that has accompanied disciplinary society and that has been nurtured by it—and for the sake of brevity let us call that freedom liberal freedom---has itself been the reason leading humankind to this moment of terminal risk. But even if it has, this does not mean that liberal freedom has not been a way of being free. Instead, what it may suggest is that the freedom that has been so long associated with a particular organization under the banner of sovereign right may need to be rethought so that we may better understand and give shape to a politics of freedom more commensurate with the conditions of late modernity. I believe that this is what Foucault may be thinking when he urges us to rethink the form that the idea of right might take as sovereignty and normalization vitiate the very possibility of repression in a disciplinary age.

# Affirmative Answers

## Link Answers

### Permutation Top-Level

#### Any alternative to biopolitics is necessarily incomplete unless it includes an acute awareness of political realities and a desire to lessen human suffering in the short term, like the plan. Our permutation can capture all the benefits of their criticism with none of the devastating disads to their alternative.

Robert Sinnerbrink, Professor of Philosophy at Macquarie University, 2005, Critical Horizons, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 258-259

Foucault and Agamben leave us with a stark alternative: either to take the ethical turn towards practices of freedom compatible with neo-liberalist governmentality, or accelerate biopolitical nihilism in the hope that a messianic overcoming of the breach between bare life and sovereign power will institute a redeemed human community. In short, affirm pragmatic practices of ethical self-formation, or prepare for the messianic overcoming of biopolitical domination. These alternatives, however, seem partial and inadequate. Foucault’s turn to ethics and liberalism underplays the political urgency of confronting societies of biopolitical control; this is a point not lost on Deleuze and taken up by Hardt and Negri in their neo-Marxist version of biopolitical production.70 Agamben’s despairing account of biopolitical nihilism, on the other hand, overemphasises the ontological ‘sameness’ of biopower regimes, and retreats from concrete politics into a metaphysical messianism prophetically gesturing towards a utopian community to come. What my brief genealogy of biopower and biopolitics suggests, then, is the need to find a path between these alternatives. We should retain the Foucaultian emphasis on a critical analysis of biopower without acquiescing to an ethical accommodation with neo-liberalism. And we ought to affirm Agamben’s profound questioning of the biopolitical foundations of modernity without succumbing to a utopian metaphysical messianism. We also need to question the Heideggerian metaphysical critique of modernity that has profoundly marked both Foucaultian and Agambenian conceptions of biopower and biopolitics. Finally, this genealogy suggests the need to restore the experience of injustice, the suffering of human beings, to any philosophical account of biopolitics, and to articulate political responses to biopower that go beyond ethical acquiescence and metaphysical longing.

### Permutation – Ethics

#### Their knee-jerk rejection of the plan relies on a totalizing binary that makes ethics impossible – only the perm solves.

Peter Pericles Trifonas, Professor at the Center for Social Justice and Cultural Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, 2002, Ethics, Institutions, and the Right to Philosophy, p. 73

A critique—coming down on one side or the other—of its efficacy is not at all useful, but a misleading endeavor seeking an ethical refuge in the evaluative power of a binary form of metaphysical reasoning that pits “the good” against “the bad,” “essentialism” against “anti­essentialism,” “Eurocentrism” against “anti-Eurocentrism,” and so on. The endwork of a critical task that freely places blame or adjudi­cates value for the sake of a castigation or rejection of worth is per­formed too quickly and easily. Its decisions are rendered by and ap­peal to the dictates of a universalist conception of “reason” and its demotic (and not at all democratic) corollary of “common sense” to construct the ideologico-conceptual grounds of what is “good” and what is “bad.” The judgmental edifice of its either/or rationale pre­sumes a lack of interpretative complexity, a plainness of truth that is totally transparent and obvious to everyone, a clear-cut and unargu­able judgment made with no room to fathom the possibility of oppo­sition or exemption to the rule of law. One life-world. One reality. One Truth. The metaphysical value of this ethic of perception and its monological model of representation determines the nonoppositional grounds of truth. Conditional and definitive limits thereby demarcate the freedom of what it is possible to know, think, and say without offending the much guarded sensibilities of “reason” and “good taste”—however their values might be constructed and articu­lated—as the ideals of commonly held responses to cultural institu­tions and practices. Difference is abdicated in favor of a community of shared interpretative responsibility and the unethical hegemony of its “majority rules” attitude that bids one to erect barriers against di­versity, “to see and talk about things only as they are or could be.” For the priority of clarity as an ethical prerequisite of a “responsible response” is, without a doubt, everything when the analytical impera­tive is nothing but an exercise of choosing sides. There is a more pro­ductive approach, nevertheless, that would open up the possibility of reaffirming the utility and necessity of UNESCO as a cosmopolitical institution by recontextualizing the conditions of its founding to the “new situation”53 of the present day, without having to tear down the conceptual frame of its material structures in order to set up some­thing else that would reproduce and multiply the faults of the origi­nal. What would this involve? Deconstruction, of course!

### Permutation – Solvency

#### Only the permutation can solve their impacts

White 92 **(Lucie E White B.A. Radcliffe College, J.D. Harvard Law School, Cornell Law Review, “SYMPOSIUM: SEEKING ‘. . . THE FACES OF OTHERNESS: A RESPONSE TO PROFESSORS SARAT, FELSTINER, AND CAHN”, Nexis)**

While the Foucaultian lens reveals the fluidity of power, it does not show how power can become congealed in social institutions in ways that sustain domination. It may be true that everyday interactions create and maintain social institutions, but this insight does not enable us to map those interactions against the institutional matrices they create. Nor does this insight show us how institutions constrain the circulation of power, channeling it to flow toward some social groups and away from others. In short, the Foucaultian lens does not move us toward a theoretics and a reconstructive politics of institutional design. Without richer meta-theories -- stronger lenses -- that focus on institutional as well as interpersonal realities, we will remain bewildered by exactly how our actions reiterate what has been called "structural" or "institutional" subordination. [n30](https://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.503479.44859916985&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1246316971929&returnToKey=20_T6868072191&parent=docview" \l "n30) We will remain unable to critique and repattern our actions, so that we enact more democratic institutions as we seek to live more ethical lives. These other lenses need not replace Foucault's; rather, they can provide a second filter on the same landscape, enabling us to study the geology  [\*1506]  of the ocean floor as well as the action of the waves. Without these other lenses, the dynamics of systemic injustice -- dynamics that stunt the life-chances of some social groups with more than random frequency -- will remain invisible and therefore go unchallenged. In divorce lawyering, Professors Felstiner and Sarat have studied an area in which systemic patterns of race and class privilege do not always figure in obvious ways. Therefore, in that setting it may be, as they suggest, that their theoretical framework does pick up much of what is interesting to see. However, we cannot tell what different lenses might show us until we try them out. The work of Martha Fineman, [n31](https://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.503479.44859916985&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1246316971929&returnToKey=20_T6868072191&parent=docview" \l "n31) for instance, suggests that theories about gender and motherhood, as well as a Foucaultian theory of power, might help us make sense of Felstiner and Sarat's story of the unsupported wife. [n32](https://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.503479.44859916985&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1246316971929&returnToKey=20_T6868072191&parent=docview" \l "n32) And in areas of legal practice where hierarchies of race and class routinely figure, such as criminal law or social welfare law, the risk that a Foucaultian lens will unduly limit our vision is great. In those domains of practice, recurring patterns of domination will go uncharted unless lawyer-client interactions are studied through a lens that explicitly theorizes race and class. [n33](https://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.503479.44859916985&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1246316971929&returnToKey=20_T6868072191&parent=docview" \l "n33) Getting stuck inside the Foucaultian worldview carries a second risk as well. In addition to stunting our ability to rethink institutions in emancipatory ways, this lens obscures our human capacity -- or, more accurately, our longing -- to realize ourselves in the world by feeling with other people, as well as by winning against them. Foucault's lens defines and thereby reveals human interactions as strategic contests. Our personhood takes form in those moments when the contest shifts power our way. This lens does not pick up those moments when we feel the force of another's emotions or the resolve behind her commitments. If such moments appear at all, they look like surges of the other's power rather than images of the other's face.

### Permutation – Coalitions

#### Permutation builds communities of intellectuals and liberal activists

Brown and Halley 2 (Wendy—UC Berkeley and Janet—Harvard, Left Legalism/Left Critique) LA

Critique offers another source of pleasure related to this one. It can interrupt the isolation of those silenced or excluded by the binds of current legal or political strategies; indeed, it can produce conversation in which alternative political formations might be forged. Far from being the isolated reproach of a malcontent, critique can conjure intellectual community where there was none, where the hegemonic terms of political discourse only set one for or against a particular issue or campaign but did not permit of alternatives. The relief effect, in other words, can be contagious, releasing from political intellectual constraints not only the authors of critique but an audience interpellated by it. To consider this in terms of the concrete project of this book: if part of the reason the left feels so small and beleaguered today pertains to the fact that legalism has nearly saturated the entire political culture, thus making left projects nearly indistinguishable from more mainstream liberal ones, then critique of the sort this book features enables the possibility of discerning and reclaiming left projects within liberalism, thereby connecting with one another those who have a common concern with certain kinds of political problems, constraints, and ideals. In this light, critique binds to operate as the basis of the resuscitation of left communities; it can be formative and potentially connective, an image which stands in sharp contrast to the now conventional view of critique as either destructive or irrelevant. This discovery of others who share one’s worries and discontents with existing political practices or reform strategies, this opening of conversation outside the lines of existing practices also sketches a sensibility that itself might be worth cultivating both politically and intellectually. This is a sensibility extralegal in character, one that presses against the limits in part to understand their binding force, one that is irreverent toward identity categories and other governing norms, and above all, one that is unattached to the intellectual suffering that attends intellectual isolation. It wants to recover the pleasure of connection in intellectual and political work; indeed, it casts pleasure as that which makes such work both rich and compelling.

### No Link – Democracy Checks

#### Even if they are right that our policy is biopolitical, the fact that it is carried out by a democratic state makes it profoundly different.

Dickinson 4

[Edward Ross Dickinson, Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley, 2004 “Biopolitics, Fascism,

Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48 BC]

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany.90 Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering.

#### Biopower is not genocidal when it is deployed by a government which also respects rights.

Dickinson 4 [Edward Ross Dickinson, Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley, 2004 “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48 BC]

At its simplest, this view of the politics of expertise and professionalization is certainly plausible. Historically speaking, however, the further conjecture that this “micropolitical” dynamic creates authoritarian, totalitarian, or homicidal potentials at the level of the state does not seem very tenable. Historically, it appears that the greatest advocates of political democracy —in Germany left liberals and Social Democrats —have been also the greatest advocates of every kind of biopolitical social engineering, from public health and welfare programs through social insurance to city planning and, yes, even eugenics.102 The state they built has intervened in social relations to an (until recently) ever-growing degree; professionalization has run ever more rampant in Western societies; the production of scientistic and technocratic expert knowledge has proceeded at an ever more frenetic pace. And yet, from the perspective of the first years of the millennium, the second half of the twentieth century appears to be the great age of democracy in precisely those societies where these processes have been most in evidence. What is more, the interventionist state has steadily expanded both the rights and the resources of virtually every citizen — including those who were stigmatized and persecuted as biologically defective under National Socialism. Perhaps these processes have created an ever more restrictive “iron cage” of rationality in European societies. But if so, it seems clear that there is no necessary correlation between rationalization and authoritarian politics; the opposite seems in fact to be at least equally true.

## Impact Answers

### No Impact

#### Biopower is a description of our era—it is neither inherently good, nor bad. Our specific context is more important than their sweeping generalization.

Dickinson 4 [Edward Ross Dickinson, Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley, 2004 “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48 BC]

This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very *different* ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal stifling night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate. The varying possible constellations of power in modern societies create “multiple modernities,” modern societies with quite radically differing potentials.91

#### Biopolitical modes of governance are no longer a threat to anyone – the crisis of the sovereign state has caused violent biopolitics to be abandoned entirely

Jonathan Short, Ph.D. candidate in the Graduate Programme in Social & Political Thought, York University, 2005, “Life and Law: Agamben and Foucault on Governmentality and Sovereignty,” Journal for the Arts, Sciences and Technology, Vol. 3, No. 1

Adding to the dangerousness of this logic of control, however, is that while there is a crisis of undecidability in the domain of life, it corresponds to a similar crisis at the level of law and the national state. It should be noted here that despite the new forms of biopolitical control in operation today, Rose believes that bio-politics has become generally less dangerous in recent times than even in the early part of the last century. At that time, bio- politics was linked to the project of the expanding national state in his opinion. In disciplinary-pastoral society, bio-politics involved a process of social selection of those characteristics thought useful to the nationalist project. Hence, according to Rose, "once each life has a value which may be calculated, and some lives have less value than others, such a politics has the obligation to exercise this judgement in the name of the race or the nation" (2001: 3). Disciplinary-pastoral bio- politics sets itself the task of eliminating "differences coded as defects", and in pursuit of this goal the most horrible programs of eugenics, forced sterilization, and outright extermination, were enacted (ibid.: 3). If Rose is more optimistic about bio-politics in 'advanced liberal' societies, it is because this notion of 'national fitness', in terms of bio- political competition among nation-states, has suffered a precipitous decline thanks in large part to a crisis of the perceived unity of the national state as a viable political project (ibid.: 5). To quote Rose once again, "the idea of 'society' as a single, if heterogeneous, domain with a national culture, a national population, a national destiny, co-extensive with a national territory and the powers of a national political government" no longer serves as premises of state policy (ibid.: 5). Drawing on a sequential reading of Foucault's theory of the governmentalization of the state here, Rose claims that the territorial state, the primary institution of enclosure, has become subject to fragmentation along a number of lines. National culture has given way to cultural pluralism; national identity has been overshadowed by a diverse cluster of identifications, many of them transcending the national territory on which they take place, while the same pluralization has affected the once singular conception of community (ibid.: 5). Under these conditions, Rose argues, the bio-political programmes of the molar enclosure known as the nation-state have fallen into disrepute and have been all but abandoned.

#### There’s no impact to biopower and their insistence on constant references to it is a scare tactic that deters actual alternatives to biopower

Paolo Virno, philosopher, former Professor of philosophy of language, semiotics, and the ethics of communication at the University of Calabria, June 2002, online: http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpvirno2.htm

Agamben is a problem. Agamben is a thinker of great value but also, in my opinion, a thinker with no political vocation. Then, when Agamben speaks of the biopolitical he has the tendency to transform it into an ontological category with value already since the archaic Roman right. And, in this, in my opinion, he is very wrong-headed. The problem is, I believe, that the biopolitical is only an effect derived from the concept of labor-power. When there is a commodity that is called labor-power it is already implicitly government over life. Agamben says, on the other hand, that labor-power is only one of the aspects of the biopolitical; I say the contrary: over all because labor power is a paradoxical commodity, because it is not a real commodity like a book or a bottle of water, but rather is simply the potential to produce. As soon as this potential is transformed into a commodity, then, it is necessary to govern the living body that maintains this potential, that contains this potential. Toni (Negri) and Michael (Hardt), on the other hand, use biopolitics in a historically determined sense, basing it on Foucault, but Foucault spoke in few pages of the biopolitical - in relation to the birth of liberalism - that Foucault is not a sufficient base for founding a discourse over the biopolitical and my apprehension, my fear, is that the biopolitical can be transformed into a word that hides, covers problems instead of being an instrument for confronting them. A fetish word, an "open doors" word, a word with an exclamation point, a word that carries the risk of blocking critical thought instead of helping it. Then, my fear is of fetish words in politics because it seems like the cries of a child that is afraid of the dark..., the child that says "mama, mama!", "biopolitics, biopolitics!". I don't negate that there can be a serious content in the term, however I see that the use of the term biopolitics sometimes is a consolatory use, like the cry of a child, when what serves us are, in all cases, instruments of work and not propaganda words.

### No Impact – Conflation

#### Their argument conflates sovereign power and biopower – biopower isn’t concerned with creating large-scale death, on the contrary biopower improves the quality of life for populations

Mika Ojakangas, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, Finland, May 2005, Foucault Studies, No. 2, p. 6-7

Foucault points out, however, that since the seventeenth century the West has undergone a very profound transformation in terms of mechanisms of power. Little by little, the violent sovereign power has been replaced by the power that Foucault calls biopower. In the case of biopower it is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility. Its task is to take charge of life that needs a continuous regulatory and corrective mechanism. The logic of biopower  is not deduction but production:  “It exerts a positive influence on life, endeavours to administer, optimize, and multiply it.”4 Biopower replaces the right to “take life and let live” with that of a power to foster life  – or disallow it to the point of death. Instead of being exercised by means of law and violence, biopower is exercised through the normalising biological, psychological and social technologies – through the “methods of power capable of optimizing forces, aptitudes, and life general.”5 Unlike sovereign power, it does not celebrate death. On the contrary, biopower wants to exclude it  (“disqualification of death”6).  Death is no longer the way in which power expresses itself, but rather its absolute limit. Instead of death, the focus of biopower is on the birth and life of individuals and populations.7

### No Impact – Intentions

#### The purpose of biopower is to improve the health, longevity and happiness of everyone

Mika Ojakangas, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, Finland, May 2005, Foucault Studies, No. 2, p. 18-19

To say that biopower stands outside the law does not yet mean that it outside state power. On the contrary, as we have already noted and as Foucault himself has shown, it was precisely the modern sovereign state that first started to use biopolitical methods extensively for the care of individuals and populations. Undoubtedly, the original purpose of these methods was to increase state power, but its aim has also been, from the beginning, the welfare of the individual and of the entire population, the improvement of their condition, the increase of their wealth, their longevity, health and even happiness71 – happiness of “all and everyone” (omnes et singulatim): “The sole purpose of the police”, one of the first institutional loci of the nascent biopower, “is to lead man to the utmost happiness to be enjoyed in this life”, wrote De Lamare in Treaty on the Police at the beginning of the eighteenth century.72 According to Foucault, one should not, however, concentrate only on the modern state in looking for the origin of biopower. One should examine also the religious tradition of the West, especially the Judeo-Christian idea of a shepherd as a political leader of his people.73

### No Internal Link to Nazis

#### Nazi biopolitics were unique.

Dickinson 4 [Edward Ross Dickinson, Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley, 2004 “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48 BC]

Again, Peukert was very aware that he was writing the history of only one kind of modernity, and that the most destructive potentials of modern social engineering discourse were only to be realized in a very specific historical context. The “Final Solution” was, as he remarked, “one among other possible outcomes of the crisis of modern civilization,” and one possible only in the context of the concatenation of economic, social, and political disasters through which Germany passed in the two decades before 1933. The fact that Nazism was “one of the pathological developmental forms of modernity does not imply that barbarism is the inevitable logical outcome of modernization,” which also created “opportunities for human emancipation.” And yet, again, the history that Peukert actually wrote was the history of disaster— a disaster that, frequently, does seem at least highly likely. The “fatal racist dynamic in the human and social sciences,” which consists in their assignment of greater or lesser value to human characteristics, does “inevitably become fixated on the utopian dream of the gradual elimination of death,” which is “unfailingly” frustrated by lived reality. In periods of fiscal crisis the frustration of these “fantasies of omnipotence” generates a concern with “identifying, segregating, and disposing of ” those judged less valuable.68 In the most detailed exposition of his analysis, Grenzen der Sozialdisziplinierung, Peukert argues that, given the “totalitarian claim to validity” of bourgeois norms, only the two “strategies of pedagogical normalization or eugenic exclusion” were open to middle-class social reformers; when the one failed only the other remained. Yet the failure of pedagogical normalization was preprogrammed into the collision between middle-class “utopias of order” and the “life-worlds” of the working class, which were rendered disorderly by the logic of industrial capitalism.69 Again, in Peukert’s model it seems to me that it is really only a matter of time and circumstance before the fundamentally and necessarily murderous potential of modernity is unleashed.

### Impact Turn – Democracy

#### Biopower in a DEMOCRATIC government is vital to rights, tolerance, and inclusion—this takes out their all of their impacts

Dickinson 4 [Edward Ross Dickinson, Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley, 2004 “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48 BC]

In the Weimar model, then, the rights of the individual, guaranteed formally by the constitution and substantively by the welfare system, were the central element of the dominant program for the management of social problems. Almost no one in this period advocated expanding social provision out of the goodness of their hearts. This was a strategy of social management, of social engineering. The mainstream of social reform in Germany believed that guaranteeing basic social rights— the substantive or positive freedom of all citizens — was the best way to turn people into power, prosperity, and profit. In that sense, the democratic welfare state was— and is — democratic not despite of its pursuit of biopower, but because of it. The contrast with the Nazi state is clear. National Socialism aimed to construct a system of social and population policy founded on the concept of individual duties, on the ubiquitous and total power of the state, and on the systematic absorption of every citizen by organizations that could implant that power at every level of their lives — in political and associational life, in the family, in the workplace, and in leisure activities. In the welfarist vision of Weimar progressives, the task of the state was to create an institutional framework that would give individuals the wherewithal to integrate themselves successfully into the national society, economy, and polity. The Nazis aimed, instead, to give the state the wherewithal to do with every citizen what it willed. And where Weimar welfare advocates understood themselves to be constructing a system of knowledge and institutions that would manage social problems, the Nazis fundamentally sought to abolish just that system by eradicating — by finding a “final solution” to — social problems. Again, as Peukert pointed out, many advocates of a rights-based welfare structure were open to the idea that “stubborn” cases might be legitimate targets for sterilization; the right to health could easily be redefined as primarily a duty to be healthy, for example. But the difference between a strategy of social management built on the rights of the citizen and a system of racial policy built on the total power of the state is not merely a semantic one; such differences had very profound political implications, and established quite different constraints. The rights-based strategy was actually not very compatible with exclusionary and coercive policies; it relied too heavily on the cooperation of its targets and of armies of volunteers, it was too embedded in a democratic institutional structure and civil society, it lacked powerful legal and institutional instruments of coercion, and its rhetorical structure was too heavily slanted toward inclusion and tolerance.

### Impact Turn – Violence

#### They’ll win ZERO percent of their impact – the massacres that their over-hyped impact evidence cites are NOT because of biopolitics – biopower prevents those massacres.

Mika Ojakangas, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, Finland, May 2005, Foucault Studies, No. 2, p. 20-21

According to Foucault, it is that transformation which constitutes the background of what he calls governmentality, that is to say, bio-political rationality within the modern state.78 It explains why political power that is at work within the modern state as a legal framework of unity is, from the beginning of a state’s existence, accompanied by a power that can be called pastoral. Its role is not to threaten lives but to “ensure, sustain, and improve” them, the lives of “each and every one”.79 Its means are not law and violence but care, the “care for individual life”.80 It is precisely care, the Christian power of love (agape), as the opposite of all violence that is at issue in bio-power. This is not to say, however, that bio-power would be nothing but love and care. Bio-power is love and care only to the same extent that the law, according to Benjamin, is violence, namely, by its origin.81 Admittedly, in the era of bio-politics, as Foucault writes, even “massacres have become vital.”82 This is the case, however, because violence is hidden in the foundation of bio-politics, as Agamben believes. Although the twentieth century thanatopolitics is the “reverse of bio-politics”,83 it should not be understood, according to Foucault, as “the effect, the result, or the logical consequence” of  bio-political rationality.84 Rather, it should be understood, as he suggests, as an outcome of the “demonic combination” of the sovereign power and bio-power, of “the city-citizen game and the shepherd-flock game”85 – or as I would like to put it, of patria potestas (father’s unconditional power of life and death over his son) and cura materna (mother’s unconditional duty to take care of her children). Although massacres can be carried out in the name of care, they do not follow from the logic of bio-power for which death is the “object of taboo”.86 They follow from the logic of sovereign power, which legitimates killing by whatever arguments it chooses, be it God, Nature, or life.

### Impact Turn – Bare Life

#### Biopower actually makes the creation of bare life impossible – bare life is the opposite of the form of life that biopolitics necessitates

Mika Ojakangas, Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, Finland, May 2005, Foucault Studies, No. 2, p. 13-14

Moreover, life as the object and the subject of bio-power given that life is everywhere, it becomes everywhere –is in no way bare, but is as the synthetic notion of life implies, the multiplicity of the forms of life, from the nutritive life to the intellectual life, from the biological levels of life to the political existence of man.43 Instead of bare life, the life of bio-power is a plenitude of life, as Foucault puts it.44 Agamben is certainly right in saying that the production of bare life is, and has been since Aristotle, a main strategy of the sovereign power to establish itself – to the same degree that sovereignty has been the main fiction of juridico-institutional thinking from Jean Bodin to Carl Schmitt. The sovereign power is, indeed, based on bare life because it is capable of confronting life merely when stripped off and isolated from all forms of life, when the entire existence of a man is reduced to a bare life and exposed to an unconditional threat of death. Life is undoubtedly sacred for the sovereign power in the sense that Agamben defines it. It can be taken away without a homicide being committed. In the case of bio-power, however, this does not hold true. In order to function properly, bio-power cannot reduce life to the level of bare life, because bare life is life that can only be taken away or allowed to persist – which also makes understandable the vast critique of sovereignty in the era of bio-power. Bio-power needs a notion of life that corresponds to its aims. What then is the aim of bio-power? Its aim is not to produce bare life but, as Foucault emphasizes, to “multiply life”,45 to produce “extra-life.”46 Bio-power needs, in other words, a notion of life which enables it to accomplish this task. The modern synthetic notion of life endows it with such a notion. It enables bio-power to “invest life through and through”, to “optimize forces, aptitudes, and life in general without at the same time making them more difficult to govern.” 47

### Impact Turn – Capitalism Turn

#### A. Biopower is key to Capitalism

Read 03 (Jason; Assistant Professor of Philosophy – University of Southern Maine The Micro-Politics of Capital: Marx and the Prehistory of the Present p. 140-1 KNP)

In many ways the articulation of the concept of biopower falls outside of Marx’s problematic. Foucault argues that biopower predates the emergence of industrial capitalism: “This bio-power was without question an indispensable element in the development of capitalism; the latter would not have been possible without the controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery of production and the adjustment of the phenomenon of population to economic processes.” Biopower predates capitalism insofar as the recognition of the relationship between the population as a vital entity and the state dates back to at least early mercantilism, or mercantile capitalism. Population does not simply designate the number of individuals bounded by a territory but the dynamic relations of birth and death, sickness and health, which are vital to a nation politically and economically. It is only later, after the rise of the urban centers of production and the threat of revolution, after the health of the rich and the poor become intertwined, that the state concerns itself not only with the population as a statistical entity but specifically with the health and environment of the working body. What is essential for Foucault is the manner in which the investment of the state into the life and death of the population, the environmental conditions of the cities, and the health and longevity of the working class in each case is a properly political relation forming a biopolitics. In each instance the goals of the intervention are political: Biopolitics functions to increase productivity while at the same time reducing the conditions and causes for revolt. Thus, it is more accurate to say that biopolitics works for both economic and political goals, or better, it is constituted at the point at which political power becomes inseparable form economic power. Biopolitics, like Marx’s critique of political economy, short-circuits the division between the economic and the political. Moreover, at the same time as biopolitics functions in the service of political and economic goals, is also works to restructure and transform political and social space, for example, by imposing grids and models drawn from the control of contagions onto the city, models that are always both hygienic and political. It brings with it new models of the partitioning of social space, new forms of knowledge regarding social space, new ways of living and understanding life.

#### B. Capitalism’s socializing functions are key to survival

Heilbroner 85(Robert L.; Norman Thomas Professor of Economics – New School for Social Research The Nature and Logic of Capitalism p. 23-4 KNP)

Of at least equal importance with the institutions that shape the economic activities of the system are those that mold behavior and belief at the diffuse, unspecialized level we call social life. Here, typical behavioral ways are influenced by the pressures of indoctrination and education – experiences that make it possible for individuals to enter their social formations with a sense of familiarity and acceptance. These pressures begin with the family that introduces the infant to the norms of private and public existence; continue with the reinforcement of, and sometimes with the challenge to, those norms by the child’s peers and teachers; and are capped by the enticements, rewards and punishments administered by larger social organizations, from churches to corporations to the state itself. The latter includes, of course, the socio-legal framework that casts its powerful compulsions over so much of social activity, establishing with the force of law what we must do and what we may not do. This socializing and normalizing process is by no means a completely integrated or frictionless one. As they move through history, all societies must make their peace with nature and with themselves, the latter constituting the theme of domination and oppression that will play a very large role in our analysis. Here we need only note that the institutions in which are molded typical patterns of rule, obedience, and beliefs are themselves molded by an inner dynamic that may take the form of class against class, against tribe, even civilization against civilization, or at times contests that focus on color, religion, sex. For these reasons, at close range the socialization process is often a tense and sometimes turbulent one. But at a sufficient historic distance, the spectrum of socializing institutions clearly succeeds in creating typical behavioral patterns. Primitive societies produce hunters and gatherers with their requisite attitudes as well as skills; imperial and feudal societies produce peasants and lords with their respective mentalities and accepted roles; and capitalist societies create workers and capitalists who also bring to their activities deeply ingrained conceptions of their social functions. Were there not a high degree of dependability to this indoctrination process, the extraordinary stability of social formations would not be the rule, and humanity would long ago have perished or found its way to a heaven on earth. The viscosity that is so prominent a feature of social history must therefore be traced to the stabilizing influence of the behavior-shaping cores of its social formations.

### Transportation Biopolitics Good

#### Biopower in transportation culture good: achieves positive cultural change

Moeckli and Lee 07

(Jane, staff research assistant at the National Advanced Driving Simulator, professor of cultural geography at University of Iowa; John D, professor of Industrial Engineering at the University of Iowa, with positions in Department of Neurology & the Public Policy Center, “The Making of Driving Cultures,” AAA Foundation, 7/8/12, BR)

Culture is always an effect of power. Closely related to the previous point, because culture is reproduced through social relations, it is necessarily imbued with power. Power here is not sovereign power, but rather decentered, relational power, following from Michel Foucault’s extensive work on the subject. Examining the social processes at play in the stabilization of culture provides great insight into the way in which power shapes what emerges as “culture.” The transformation of public perception and social practice brought on by the success of the organization Mothers Against Drunk Driving (MADD) after its inception in 1980 illustrates this point. In its first four years of activism, then-President Ronald Reagan announced a Presidential Commission on Drunk Driving, federal highway funds were set aside for state-level anti-drunk driving initiatives, state-level anti-drunk driving bills were enacted, and the Federal 21 Minimum Drinking Age Law was passed. MADD’s early achievements represent a success in promoting driving safety culture through grassroots activism. Such successes demonstrate that while the driving public is often characterized as acquiescent, they are capable of producing radical cultural change. An important point of leverage for national organizations committed to traffic safety is collaborations with community-based initiatives that promote culture’s change through local activism.

#### Biopower is the only way to achieve safety, especially in transportation culture

Moeckli and Lee 07

(Jane, staff research assistant at the National Advanced Driving Simulator, professor of cultural geography at University of Iowa; John D, professor of Industrial Engineering at the University of Iowa, with positions in Department of Neurology & the Public Policy Center, “The Making of Driving Cultures,” AAA Foundation, 7/8/12, BR)

Culture is best modified through changes in social practice. Risk management literature suggests that the most productive points of leverage are material in nature, advocating a focus on modifying structures, policies, and controls over attempting to change beliefs, values, and attitudes (Reason 1998). The move many states are making toward graduated licensure for new teen drivers bears this out. While drivers’ education is instructive in communicating traffic laws that govern driving, graduated licensure has shown promise in reducing teen driver crash rates through restricting when, how, and with whom teens drive (Insurance Institute for Highway Safety 2006). For the traffic safety community, interventions must value praxis-oriented solutions ranging, for example, from implementing a compulsory “How's My Driving?” program for all motor vehicles (Strahilevitz 2006) to reallocating enforcement funds to increase police presence on roadways. Such approaches can be powerful. Commercial fleets that have placed “How’s My Driving?” placards on trucks have seen 20–53% reductions in crash rates. The following section builds on these insights to identify ways in which driving culture might be altered to promote traffic safety

## Alternative Answers

### No Alternative – Contextualization

#### As Foucault argues, power is fluid. Biopower has created new freedoms as well as new oppressions—context is key.

Dickinson 4 [Edward Ross Dickinson, Associate Professor, History Ph.D., U.C. Berkeley, 2004 “Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy: Some Reflections on Our Discourse About “Modernity,” Central European History, vol. 37, no. 1, 1–48 BC]

Uncoupling “technocracy” from “discourse” is not yet enough, however. We should also be alive to the ways in which new social practices, institutions, and knowledge generated new choices — a limited range of them, constrained by all kinds of discursive and social frameworks, but nonetheless historically new and significant. Modern biopolitics did create, in a real sense, not only new constraints but also new degrees of freedom— new levers that increased people’s power to move their own worlds, to shape their own lives. Our understanding of modern biopolitics will be more realistic and more fruitful if we reconceptualize its development as a complex process in which the implications of those new choices were negotiated out in the social and discursive context. Again, in the early twentieth century many more conservative biopolitical “experts” devoted much of their energy precisely to trying— without any discernable success— to control those new degrees of freedom. For most social liberals and Social Democrats, however, those new choices were a potential source of greater social efficiency and social dynamism. State policy reflected the constant negotiation and tension between these perspectives. Nor should we stop at a reexamination of knowledge and technology. It might make sense, too, to reexamine the process of institution-building, the elaboration of the practices and institutions of biopolitics. No doubt the creation of public and private social welfare institutions created instruments for the study, manipulation, or control of individuals and groups. But it also generated opportunities for self-organization and participation by social groups of all kinds.

#### We can use the tools of biopower to challenge its worst manifestations- rejecting these tools leads to horrid violence

Deranty 4 [Jean-Phillipe, Philosophy Professor Macquarie University, 2004 Borderlands Vol. 3 # 1 “Agamben’s Challenge to normative theories…” p. online BC]

48. One can acknowledge the descriptive appeal of the biopower hypothesis without renouncing the antagonistic definition of politics. As Rancière remarks, Foucault’s late hypothesis is more about power than it is about politics (Rancière 2002). This is quite clear in the 1976 lectures (Society must be defended) where the term that is mostly used is that of "biopower". As Rancière suggests, when the "biopower" hypothesis is transformed into a "biopolitical" thesis, the very possibility of politics becomes problematic. There is a way of articulating modern disciplinary power and the imperative of politics that is not disjunctive. The power that subjects and excludes socially can also empower politically simply because the exclusion is already a form of address which unwittingly provides implicit recognition. Power includes by excluding, but in a way that might be different from a ban. This insight is precisely the one that Foucault was developing in his last writings, in his definition of freedom as "agonism" (Foucault 1983: 208-228): "Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free" (221). The hierarchical, exclusionary essence of social structures demands as a condition of its possibility an equivalent implicit recognition of all, even in the mode of exclusion. It is on the basis of this recognition that politics can sometimes arise as the vindication of equality and the challenge to exclusion. 49. This proposal rests on a logic that challenges Agamben’s reduction of the overcoming of the classical conceptualisation of potentiality and actuality to the single Heideggerian alternative. Instead of collapsing or dualistically separating potentiality and actuality, one would find in Hegel’s modal logic a way to articulate their negative, or reflexive, unity, in the notion of contingency. Contingency is precisely the potential as existing, a potential that exists yet does not exclude the possibility of its opposite (Hegel 1969: 541-554). Hegel can lead the way towards an ontology of contingency that recognises the place of contingency at the core of necessity, instead of opposing them. The fact that the impossible became real vindicates Hegel’s claim that the impossible should not be opposed to the actual. Instead, the possible and the impossible are only reflected images of each other and, as actual, are both simply the contingent. Auschwitz should not be called absolute necessity (Agamben 1999a: 148), but absolute contingency. The absolute historical necessity of Auschwitz is not "the radical negation" of contingency, which, if true, would indeed necessitate a flight out of history to conjure up its threat. Its absolute necessity in fact harbours an indelible core of contingency, the locus where political intervention could have changed things, where politics can happen. Zygmunt Bauman’s theory of modernity and his theory about the place and relevance of the Holocaust in modernity have given sociological and contemporary relevance to this alternative historical-political logic of contingency (Bauman 1989). 50. In the social and historical fields, politics is only the name of the contingency that strikes at the heart of systemic necessity. An ontology of contingency provides the model with which to think together both the possibility, and the possibility of the repetition of, catastrophe, as the one heritage of modernity, and the contingency of catastrophe as logically entailing the possibility of its opposite. Modernity is ambiguous because it provides the normative resources to combat the apparent necessity of possible systemic catastrophes. Politics is the name of the struggle drawing on those resources. 51. This ontology enables us also to rethink the relationship of modern subjects to rights. Modern subjects are able to consider themselves autonomous subjects because legal recognition signals to them that they are recognised as full members of the community, endowed with the full capacity to judge. This account of rights in modernity is precious because it provides an adequate framework to understand real political struggles, as fights for rights. We can see now how this account needs to be complemented by the notion of contingency that undermines the apparent necessity of the progress of modernity. Modern subjects know that their rights are granted only contingently, that the possibility of the impossible is always actual. This is why rights should not be taken for granted. But this does not imply that they should be rejected as illusion, on the grounds that they were disclosed as contingent in the horrors of the 20th century. Instead, their contingency should be the reason for constant political vigilance. 52. By questioning the rejection of modern rights, one is undoubtedly unfaithful to the letter of Benjamin. Yet, if one accepts that one of the great weaknesses of the Marxist philosophy of revolution was its inability to constructively engage with the question of rights and the State, then it might be the case that the politics that define themselves as the articulation of demands born in the struggles against injustice are better able to bear witness to the "tradition of the oppressed" than their messianic counterparts.

### No Alternative – Co-Option

#### Their alternative will be co-opted, resistance can’t break down biopower

Haber, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at University of Colorado-Denver, 94 ( H.F. BEYOND POSTMODERN POLITICS, p. 99 KNP)

Foucault states in the passage quoted above, that the existence of power "depends on a multiplicity of points of resistance," that resistance "can only exist in the strategic field of power relations." But this means that resistance is co-opted for the purposes of disciplinary and normalizing regimes of power, and is evidence of the fact that resistance need not result in transformation. And in fact, Foucault is not wrong. We see this co-opting of resistance all the time. Enough white middle-class women objected to being confined to the role of housewife for it to have become the norm for those women to find jobs outside of the home. But, far from changing the basic power structure, the phenomenon of women in the workplace has served to strengthen it. The male-dominated society hasn't given much up-women are still responsible for the household; government has not taken on the responsibility of making day care available to all, it has not sufficiently altered the workplace to accommodate demands for maternity (much less demands for paternity) leave, women are still not given equal pay for equal work, etc., it would not then be surprising if these women "chose" to go back to being housewives. The dominant power regime assures a no-win situation. If women work, more can be produced, and two-income families are able to spend more in an inflationary age than a single-income family would. On the other hand, if women are forced to go back to being housewives, the patriarchal power regime wins by having its values reinforced. Either way the dominant power regime is able both to benefit from, and deflect, resistance. Or one could take the example of how resistances are used as a target to strengthen the hold of the dominant powers by unifying the people against a common enemy.

### No Alternative – Work Within

#### Working within the system is critical to progressive changes – history proves that non-statist movements, such as their alternative, are total failures.

Grossberg, Professor of Communications at the University of Illinois, 92 [Lawrence, *We Gotta Get Out of This Place*, p. 390-391 KNP]

But this would mean that the Left could not remain outside of the systems of governance. It has sometimes to work with, against and with in bureaucratic systems of governance. Consider the case of Amnesty International, an immesely effective organization when its major strategy was (similar to that of the Right) exerting pressure directly on the bureaucracies of specific governments. In recent years (marked by the recent rock tour), it has apparently redirected its energy and resources, seeking new members (who may not be committed to actually doing anything; memebership becomes little more than a statement of ideological support for a position that few are likely to oppose) and public visibility. In stark contrast, the most effective struggle on the Left in recent times has been the dramatic (and, one hopes continuing) dismantling of apartheid in South Africa. It was accomplished by mobilizing popular pressure on the institutions and bureaucracies of economic and governmental institutions and it depended on a highly sophisticated organizational structure. The Left too often thinks that it can end racism and sexism and classism by changing people's attitudes and everyday practices (e.g. the 1990 Black boycott of Korean stores in New York). Unfortunately, while such struggles may be extremely visible, they are often less effective than attempts to move the institutions (e.g.,banks, taxing structures, distributors) which have put the economic realtions of black and immigrant populations in place and which condition people's everyday practices. The Left needs institutions which can operate within the system of governance, understanding that such institutions are the mediating structures by which power is actively realized. It is often by directing opposition against specific institutions that power can be challenged. The Left assumed for some time now that, since it has so little access to the apparatuses of agency, its only alternative is to seek a public voice in the media through tactical protests. The Left does in fact need more visibility, but it also needs greater access to the entire range of apparatuses of decision making power. Otherwise the Left has nothing but its own self-righteousness. It is not individuals who have produced starvation and the other social disgraces of our world, although it is individuals who must take responsibility for eliminating them. But to do so, they must act with organizations, and within the systems of organizations which in fact have the capacity (as well as responsibility) to fight them.

#### Intellectuals should not try to spark change against biopower, we need to work within the state

Kelly, PhD Foucault author, 2009

Mark, eInternation Relations Michel Foucault’s Political Philosophy, 3-31-09, <http://www.e-ir.info/?p=618>, Accessed 7-9-09)

Such considerations inform Foucault’s late thought, in which he is concerned with ancient ethics and practices of the self. While new practices of the self are putatively suggested as a corrective for subjection, this is not proposed as an immediate solution. It is unclear for Foucault to what extent ethical practices are possible today. Rather, an orientation towards the self is advised as a way of dealing with the inevitable frustrations of political praxis, though certainly not as an alternative to organised political activity. That said, for Foucault political activity must limit itself. Firstly, a division must be observed between the critical activity of the intellectual and the actions of the masses. Intellectuals like Foucault have a particular responsibility to advise the masses, which means that they should neither attempt to lead the masses or tell them what to do, nor even to join them, but to stand to one side advising them as to the situation through analysis of it, and indeed to criticise the actions of the masses if need be. Note that there is no proper role here for politicians qua leaders – Foucault has no advice for such people, but for him the point of mass political activity is to achieve liberation, hence ultimately it is oriented against leadership. However, Foucault is not an anarchist. The central political role of the intellectual is to advise as to the possibilities of political action, though an analysis of the strategies of power. Thus, there must be a decision, made by those who resist but informed by a critical analysis, of what can be achieved and where we should attack. That is, Foucault does not valorise all resistance per se, or condemn all power out of hand: both things are too ubiquitous for such anarchist fantasies to make sense. Rather, anarchism qua opposition to power per se suggests a futile attack on all power simultaneously. While Foucault does not want us ever to accept any power uncritically, we can never be free of power. Thus, we must always question and challenge power, with new problems and new priorities continually emerging in response to our probing resistance.

### No Alternative – Nihilism

#### The alternative only breeds nihilism and worse oppression

Collins ‘97(Patricia Hill, Department of Sociology, PhD, Brandeis University, President-Elect of the American Sociological Association, Fighting Words, p 135-136 KNP)

In this sense, postmodern views of power that overemphasize hegemony and local politics provide a seductive mix of appearing to challenge oppression while secretly believing that such efforts are doomed. Hegemonic power appears as ever expanding and invading. It may even attempt to “annex” the counterdiscourses that have developed, oppositional discourses such as Afrocentrism, postmodernism, feminism, and Black feminist thought. This is a very important insight. However, there is a difference between being aware of the power of one’s enemy and arguing that such power is so pervasive that resistance will, at best, provide a brief respite and, at worst, prove ultimately futile. This emphasis on power as being hegemonic and seemingly absolute coupled with a belief in local resistance as the best people can do, flies in the face of actual, historical successes. African-Americans, women, poor people, and others have achieved results through social movements, revolts, revolutions, and other collective social action against government, corporate, and academic structures. As James Scott queries, “What remains to be explained…is why theories of hegemony….have…retained an enormous intellectual appeal to social scientists and historians” (1990, 86). Perhaps for colonizers who refuse, individualized, local resistance is the best they can envision. Overemphasizing hegemony and stressing nihilism not only does not resist injustice but participates in its manufacture. Views of power grounded exclusively in notions of hegemony and nihilism are not only pessimistic, they can be dangerous for members of historically marginalized groups. Moreover, the emphasis on local versus structural institutions makes it difficult to examine major structures such as racism, sexism, and other structural forms of oppression. Social theories that reduce hierarchal power relations to the level of representation, performance, or constructed phenomena not only emphasize the likelihood that resistance will fail in the face of a pervasive hegemonic presence, they also reinforce perceptions that local, individualized micropolitics constitutes the most effective terrain of struggle. The emphasis on the local dovetails nicely with increasing emphasis on the “personal” as a source of power and with parallel attention to subjectivity. If politics becomes reduced to the “personal,” decentering relations of ruling in academia and other bureaucratic structures seems increasingly unlikely. As Rey Chow opines, “What these intellectuals are doing is robbing the terms of oppression of their critical and oppositional import, and this depriving the oppressed of even the vocabulary of protest and rightful demand

#### Foucault’s notion of rejecting biopower in all instances necessitates nihilism

Taylor, associate professor at Stanford University ‘86

(Charles, “Foucault on Freedom and Truth,” in Hoy, David Couzens. Ed. Foucault: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell: 69–102. AD:7-8-9, 1986, CMM)

Dennis (2006) builds on Foucault’s notion of shepherd/police who spy on people’s private and public lives with the intent of shaping ethical behavior from the top-down. Foucault differentiated between the function of what is commonly known as policing with the function of 17th century German Polizeiwissenschaft (police)which branched out into “all of the people’s conditions, everything that they do or undertake.” (Turquet cited in Dennis 2006). Dennis argues that the “Polizeiwissenschaft project has been re-animated, via digital technologies.” Dennis echoes Foucault’s concerns that there is a “widespread acceptance of some morally and politically significant beliefs that mislead, distort, and give us a false sense of what is happening around and to us (Kumar 2005).” Charles Taylor distinguishes between ethics and morality by describing the latter as “that part of ethics which is concerned with our obligations to others, in justice and benevolence.” In the course that he is currently teaching (2007) Taylor examines how, For some thinkers, this is the really important department of ethics, far more significant than questions about what constitutes a good or worth-while life. For others, this primacy is quite mistaken and unacceptable. This issue is often fought out under the description “the primacy of the right over the good”. If one accepts the primacy, certain questions open up: viz, utilitarianism versus a Kantian approach. If one refuses this primacy, then another set of questions become important, because there are a host of different ways of defining the good life (Taylor 2007). I am intrigued by the tension between top-down morals and bottom-up ethics. Taylor’s notion of morality is that part of ethics which concerns issues such as social justice, hospitality, politics of friendship and other relationships where we have social responsibilities. With this notion of morality there is always space for agency at the individual level. There may be economic, political, legal or even physical and emotional consequences to making ethical choices that run counter to pervasive moral codes. In a police state, an ethical choice may be a dangerous choice. In a capitalist-dependent democracy, one’s personal code of ethics may conflict with a code of professional ethics. But are these pervasive moral codes imposed top-down by shepherds of consciousness on powerless individuals? Or are they accepted and obeyed by individuals for the sake of expediency? In other words, we have a choice but with it comes consequences. In risk society much of what is discussed under the name of ethics seems to be related to measuring costs and benefits. The encoding of these into measurable and accountable standards of practice within professions for example is not a guaranteer of ethical behaviour. Ethical standards can be morphed over time and become part of our inner topography simply through desensitization or sensitization. We may not even be aware of their source or legitimacy. Charles Taylor described how any form of domination, “even if it is partly self-imposed, is possible only if there is “a background of desires, interests, purposes” that people have and if “it makes a dent in these, if it frustrates them, prevents them from fulfilment, or perhaps even from formulation,” diminishing freedom in these ways (Taylor 1986: 91 cited in Kumar).” In the early 1970s Foucault called for intellectuals, particularly in the social and human sciences, to immediately undertake the urgent task of revealing hidden relationships of political power which controlled, oppressed and/or repressed the social body (Foucault 1974:171). Foucault was impatient with the project of modernity seeing it as regressive not progressive. He challenged modern techniques of discipline for their growing systems of control (Taylor 1986:80). While he defended certain disadvantaged groups and adopted his own causes, Foucault rejected the possibility of imagining a future social order in which human nature could be fully realized. He rejected grounding his own ethics in God’s will, human nature or even Habermas’ universal presuppositions (Kumar 2005). Is this what Taylor would describe as moral subjectivism, the view that morality is grounded not in reason or the way things are but in the preferences of individual subjects (Taylor EA)? Foucault’s seventies project was an attempt to heighten awareness of ways in which ruling classes deceive people and undermine their freedom in many ways including exercising power in a repressive, hidden, top-down manner. Now that he has succeeded beyond his wildest imagination so that we are all somewhat street-smart and cynical about truth claims from Big Science, Big Government, Mass Media and now Big Technology, where does that leave us? Wistfully nihilistic? Taylor argues that Foucault’s portrait of social change in the late 20th century leaves us with a disempowering nihilism. See Kumar (2005) on Fraser, Habermas, Walzer and Taylor. Taylor feels that we should reject our desire to discern irreversible optimistic or pessimistic (Bell, Daniel Bloom, Allan) societal trends and cultural trends. In between is the space of moral philosophy where conscious ethical choice is not only possible but the only responsible action. So where does the ethical turn in the social sciences lead us?

### Power/Knowledge Bad

#### Rejecting the notion of objective truth embraces rape, racism, and Holocaust denial

Catharine A. MacKinnon 2000 (Chicago Kent Law Review, 75 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 687)

It is my view that it is the *relation* of theory to reality that feminism changed, and it is in part a reversion to a prefeminist relation of theory to reality that postmodernism is reimposing. This is not about truth. Truth is a generality, an abstraction of a certain shape and quality. Social realities are something else again. Postmodernism has decided that because truth died with God, there are no social facts. The fact that reality is a social construction does not mean that it is not there; it means that it is there, in society, where we live. According to postmodernism, there are no facts; everything is a reading, so there can be no lies. Apparently it cannot be known whether the Holocaust is a hoax, whether women love to be raped, whether Black people are genetically intellectually inferior to white people, whether homosexuals are child molesters. To postmodernists, these factish things are indeterminate, contingent, in play, all a matter of interpretation. Similarly, whether or not acts of incest happened or are traumatic to children become fogged over in "epistemological quandaries" as beyond thinking, beyond narrative, beyond intelligibility, as "this event that is no event"--as if survivors have not often reported, in intelligible narratives, that such events did happen and did harm them. [**41**](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=643a6fda80f503aa2e38f535669adcef&csvc=bl&cform=bool&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzz-zSkAW&_md5=d4f0e7942677cfa6e668fc08336261e8#n41) That violation often damages speech and memory does not mean that, if one has speech and memory, one was not violated. Recall when Bill Clinton, asked about his sexual relationship with a young woman intern, said that it all depended on what "is" means. The country jeered his epistemic dodge as a transparent and slimy subterfuge to evade accountability: get real. The postmodernists were strangely silent. But you can't commit perjury if there are no facts. Where are these people when you need them?

## Indicts

### Foucault-Specific

#### **Foucauldian criticism is flawed it obscures genuine analysis and denies progressive action.**

Sangren 1999 [Department of Anthropology at Cornell University. *“Power” Against Ideology: A Critique of Foucaultian Usage.* Jstor KNP]

It is Foucault's explicit disarticulation of power from subjectivity or agency that arguably most defines the novelty of his usage, and it is this element of his thinking that is most widely emulated by other scholars. Against Foucault's reifying, transcendental notion of power - a notion in which intentional action is incidental to power - I argue that power can be employed coherently as an analytical category only when it is linkable to some socially constituted agent - that is, to a person or to a socially constituted collectivity. This is not to say that actors or agents are possessed of complete knowledge of how their own desires and motives are also products of complex social circumstances or of how their actions have effects that exceed intentions.8 As Foucault frequently emphasizes, people, selves, the subjects are in part products of historically and locationally specific circumstances, cultures, discourses. However, denying agency - that is, power to actors, viewing people even at the level of their desires primarily as products and only trivially, if at all, as producers, is not only fatalistic, it significantly misrecognizes the realities of social life.9 In comparing "Chinese" notions of power (or, more precisely, some notions of power produced by Chinese culture) with Foucault's, my intention is to draw attention to similarities in their alienating properties. I suggest that in the Foucaultian categories of power and its ineluctable other, resistance, one can perceive remarkable affinities to Chinese contrastive oppositions such as yang (a metaphysically conceived representation of ordering) and yin (yang's disordering, resistant alter). Far from providing the kind of critical insights that Foucault would claim, Foucaultian power and resistance obstruct genuine critical analysis and constitute elements of a romantic ideology whose "effects of truth" are most socially manifest in providing an avant-gardist intelligentsia an ideology that dissociates its "theory" from its own individual and class interests - and, paradoxically, all this in the name of reflexivity and high-minded political virtue. This representative dissociation of power from intention in Foucault is also apparent in Chinese ideologies of power. Such dissociations-forms of alienation-are defining characteristics of ideology's operations in social processes.

### Agamben-Specific

#### Agamben’s impacts misinterpret biopower, and trivialize the holocaust.

Rainbow and Rose ’06 ( Nikolas, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley, Paul, Department of Sociology, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, Biopower today. July 2006 http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?t ype=1&fid=44777 8&jid=BI O&volumeId=1&issueId=02&aid=446739)

Agamben takes seriously Adorno’s challenge—how is it possible to think after Auschwitz (Mesnard and Kahan, 2001)? But, for that very reason, it is to trivialize Auschwitz to see it as the hidden possibility in every instance where living beings enter the scope of regulation, control and government. The power to command under threat of death is exercised by States and their surrogates in multiple instances, in micro forms and in geopolitical relations. But this does not demonstrate that this form of power—commands backed up b the ultimate threat of death—is the guarantee or underpinning principle of all forms of biopower in contemporary liberal societies. Nor is it useful to use this single diagram to analyse every contemporary instance of thanatopolitics—from Rwanda to the epidemic of Aids deaths across Africa. Surely the essence of critical thought must be its capacity to make distinctions that can facilitate judgement and action. Holocaust is undoubtedly one configuration that modern biopower can take. Racism allows power to subdivide a population into subspecies, to designate these in terms of in terms of a biological substrate, and to initiate and sustain an array of dynamic relations in which the exclusion, incarceration or death of those who are inferior can be seen as something that will make life in general healthier and purer. As Foucault put it in 1976, ‘racism justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principle thatthe death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or a population’ (2002: 258). It is true that in this lecture he suggests that it is ‘the emergence of biopower that inscribes [racism] in the mechanisms of the State . . . as the basic mechanism of power, as it is exercised in modern States’ (2002: 254). But the Nazi regime was, in his view, exceptional—‘a paroxysmal development’: We have, then, in Nazi society something that is really quite extraordinary: this is a society which has generalized biopower in an absolute sense, but which has also generalized the sovereign right to kill . . . to kill anyone, meaning not only other people but also its own people . . . a coincidence between a generalized biopower and a dictatorship that was at once absolute and retransmitted throughout the entire social body. (2002: 260) Biopower, in the form it took under National Socialism, was a complex mix of the politics of life and the politics of death—as Robert Proctor (1999) points out, Nazi doctors and health activists waged war on tobacco, sought to curb exposure to asbestos, worried about the over-use of medication and X-rays, stressed the importance of a diet free of petrochemical dyes and preservatives, campaigned for whole-grain bread and foods high in vitamins and fibre, and many were vegetarians. But, within this complex, the path to the death camps was dependent upon a host of other historical, moral, political and technical conditions. Holocaust is neither exemplary of thanatopolitics, nor the hidden dark truth of biopower.

#### Turn – Agamben’s biopolitics focuses too much on the Nazi state to recognize that liberal societies rule through new multiplicities of agencies to coerce a self-regulating subject.

Lemke 5 (PhD in political science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-University in Frankfurt/Main. (Thomas, 2005, “"A Zone of Indistinction' - A Critique of Giorgio Agamben's Concept of Biopolitics” OUTLINES -COPENHAGEN- 2005, VOL 7; NUMB 1, pages 3-13 UNIVERSITY PRESS OF SOUTHERN DENMARK)

Agamben sees the novelty of the modern biopolitics in the fact that “the biological given is as such immediately political, and the political is as such immediately the biological given” (1998: 148; emphasis in orig.). In the political program of the Nazis, the preoccupation with life is at the same time a struggle against the enemy. While there are probably convincing reasons to state that in the present we are one step further on the way towards a politicisation of nature, there are at least two major problems that this conception of biopolitics fails to address. Firstly, Agamben does not take into account that the site of sovereignty has been displaced. While in the eugenic programs in the first half of the 20th century biopolitical interventions were mainly executed by the state that controlled the health of the population or the hygiene of the race, biopolitics today is becoming more and more a responsibility of sovereign subjects. As autonomous patients, active consumers or responsible parents they demand medical or biotechnological options. Today, it is less the state that regulates by direct interventions and restrictions, since the capacity and competence of decision-making is increasingly ascribed to the individual subject to make “informed choices” beyond political authoritarianism and medical paternalism. Decisions on life and death are less the explicit result of legal provisions and political regulations but the outcome of an “invisible hand” that represents the options and practices of sovereign individuals (Lemke 2002b; Koch 2002). Agamben’s analysis is too state-centred, or rather, it relies on a limited conception of the state which does not take into account important political transformations since the Nazi era. He does not take into account that in contemporary liberal societies political power is exercised through a multiplicity of agencies and techniques that are often only loosely associated with the formal organs of the state. The self-regulating capacities of subjects as autonomous actors have become key resources for present forms of government that rely in crucial respects on forms of scientific expertise and knowledge (Rose/Miller 1992).

#### Agamben’s mode of challenging sovereignty is oversimplified and doesn’t account for inequality

Rabinow and Rose ’06 ( Nikolas, Department of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley, Paul, Department of Sociology, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, Biopower today. July 2006 http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?t ype=1&fid=44777 8&jid=BI O&volumeId=1&issueId=02&aid=446739)

In short, unlike Foucault, Agamben's approach to biopolitics evidenced by his claim about the body as ``always already a biopolitical body and bare life'' (page 187, emphasis added)renders all places subject to the biopolitics of the sovereign ban, without differentiation; in so doing, it also uniformly treats bodies across space, regardless of race/class/gender/sexuality, as all potentially homines sacri (Mitchell, 2006). In this sense, we think that Agamben, in large measure because of his reading of biopolitics through the threshold, has an abridged understanding of the unevenness of political, economic, and social space. However, most important for us is the way that this totalizing vision of sovereign space or inattention to the complexly scaled habitats and embodiments of sovereign poweröworks alongside what Connolly (2004, page 30) calls Agamben's proclivity to ``overstate the extent to which the complexity of biopolitical culture is resolvable into a consummate logic'' of the sovereign ban.