# NEG

## Critical Terrorism Studies 1nc

### CTS 1nc

#### A. The aff’s description of the terrorist threat is over-exaggerated- these impact claims not only undermine the credibility of all terror scholarship, but are used to legitimize wars, torture, targeted killings, and elimination of civil liberties.

Jackson, Director at the National Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, 8

(Richard, 2/14/08, “The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments,” Political Studies Review, volume: 7, p. 171.184, CPO)

The vast majority of terrorism studies are predicated on, or at the very least, take for granted, the notion that terrorism represents one of the main threats facing states today. This is certainly the case with several of the books under review here (see Bar, 2006; Nesi, 2006; Sloan, 2006). Some terrorism scholars go so far as to suggest that terrorism is the premier international security threat today (Sageman, 2004, p. vii), and that it threatens the existence of the entire international system (Mendelsohn, 2005, p. 45).

Two aspects in particular are troubling about this situation. First, it is disappointing from a scholarly perspective that so few terrorism scholars make the effort to question or investigate the evidentiary basis of this popular narrative. If they did, they would note that there has in fact been a decrease in terrorist incidents over the past two decades, global terrorism-related deaths average no more than a few hundred per year and, in contrast to the tens of millions killed by disease, small arms, state repression, famine, automobile accidents, global warming, crime, natural disasters and numerous other phenomena, terrorism ranks extremely low as a risk to personal safety (Goodin, 2006, pp. 111–23; see also Jackson, 2007b; Mueller, 2005).They would also note that the preponderance of evidence suggests that the likelihood of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction is minuscule, given the not insignificant technical, strategic and political obstacles to their use (see Jenkins, 1998; Mueller, 2006; Sprinzak, 1998); that no state or society has ever been existentially threatened by acts of terrorism alone; and it is a gross simplification to assume that contemporary ‘religious terrorists’ are less discriminating than the ideological and nationalist terrorists of yesteryear (Jackson, 2007a). Refusing to reproduce or reinforce inaccurate and alarmist depictions of the current threat facing Western countries would go a long way to restoring academic credibility in the field – as well as providing a much needed degree of perspective to public debates and political deliberations.

Second, it is especially troubling that terrorism scholars lack any awareness of the ways in which the massively over-exaggerated terrorist threat (which they have in part helped to authoritatively construct as ‘real’) is used politically to legitimise a range of external and domestic political projects, many of which are of dubious efficacy or legitimacy. For example, the purported existential and ubiquitous threat posed by contemporary ‘Islamist’ terrorists has been used to justify foreign invasion and war, the use of torture, extraordinary rendition, the Guantánamo detentions, extra-judicial assassinations or ‘targeted killings’, military assistance to non-democratic regimes, domestic surveillance, shoot-to-kill policies, identity cards, expansion of the security services, increased military spending and the like (Jackson, 2007b).

#### Vote negative to reject the aff’s hegemonic truth regime about terrorism: their knowledge production only functions to legitimize state violence.

Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.77-80, GAL)

In contrast to first order critique, second order critique involves the adoption of a critical standpoint outside of the discourse. That is, based on an understanding of discourse as socially productive or constitutive and fully cognisant of the know­ledge-power nexus, a second order critique attempts to expose the political func­tions and ideological consequences of the particular narratives, practices, and forms of representation enunciated within the dominant terrorism studies discourse. In the first place, it can be argued that terrorism studies fulfills an obvious ideological function because, as Jeroen Gunning (2007a) has convincingly shown, the dominant knowledge' of the field is an ideal type of "problem-solving theory'. According to Robert Cox, ‘problem-solving theory takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action’, and then works to "make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble' (Cox. 1981: 128 129). In this instance, problem-solving theories of terrorism do not question the extent to which the status quo and the dominant actors within it, the hierarchies and operation of power and the inequalities and injustices thus generated could be impli­cated in the very 'problem' of terrorism itself or the many other forms of violence which it is inextricably bound up with. The problem-solving character of the field is illustrated most prosaically by the ubiquitous efforts of virtually every terrorism studies scholar to provide research that is 'policy relevant' and which will assist the state in its efforts to defeat terrorism, and by the widespread tendency to uncritically accept the state's categorisations, definitions, dichotomies, and demonisations (see Toms and Gunning, this volume). Andrew Silke's study concluded that a great deal of the field's output is driven by policy concerns and is limited to address­ing government agendas (Silke. 2004d: 58). This characteristic is not at all surprising given that terrorism studies' origins lie in counter-insurgency studies, security studies, and neo-realist approaches to international relations at the height of the cold war (Burnett and Whyte. 2005: 11-13). In fact, the first major review of the field concluded that much of its early output appeared to be 'counterinsurgency masquerading as political science\* (Schinid and Jongman, 1988: 182). More recently, the events of 11 September 2001 galvanised a whole new generation of scholars who were understandably eager to offer their skills in the cause of preventing further such attacks and "solving” the terrorism 'problem’. They therefore had little reason to question the dominant orientation of the field towards assisting state security or the underlying assumptions this necessarily entails. The desire to assist governments in their efforts to control the destructive effects of non-state terrorism is not necessarily problematic in and of itself; nor does it imply any bad faith on the part of individual scholars (Morgan and Boyle. 2008). In fact, the prevention of violence against civilians is a highly laudable aspiration. However, when virtually the entire academic field collectively adopts state priorities and aims, and when it tailors its research towards assisting state agencies in fighting terrorism (as defined by state institutions), it means that terrorism studies functions ideologically as an intellectual arm of the state and is aligned with its broader hegemonic project. The field's problem-solving, state-oriented and therefore ideological character is also illustrated by the way in which the field's 'knowledge' functions to delegitimise any kind of non-state violence while simultaneously reifying and legit­imising the state's employment of violence; and the way it constructs terrorism as a social problem to be solved by the state but never as a problem of state violence itself. From this viewpoint, the silence regarding state terrorism within the dis­course (Jackson. 2008b). and in particular the argument of many terrorism studies scholars that state actions should not be defined as 'terrorism', actually functions to furnish states with an authoritative academic justification for using what may actually be terroristic forms of violence against their opponents and citizens. In effect, it provides them with greater leeway when applying terror-based forms of violence against civilians, a leeway exploited by a great many states who intimi­date groups and individuals with the application of massive and disproportionate state violence. In other words, by occluding and obscuring the very possibility of state terrorism, and as a field with academic and political authority, the discourse of terrorism studies can be considered part of the conditions that actually make state terrorism possible. Furthermore, the discourse is deeply ideological in the way in which its core assumptions, narratives, and knowledge-producing practices function to legit­imise existing power structures and particular hegemonic political practices in society. For instance, the primary' focus on the 'problem' of non-state terrorism functions to distract from and deny the long history of Western involvement in terrorism (sec Blakeley. forthcoming), thereby constructing Western foreign policy as essentially benign - rather than aimed primarily at reifying existing structures of power and domination in the international system, for example. That is, by deflecting criticism of particular Western policies, the discourse works to maintain the potentially dangerous myth the accepted common sense among Western scholars and Western publics - of Western exceptionalism. This sense of exceptionalism in turn permits Western states and their allies to pursue a range of discrete and often illiberal political projects and partisan interests aimed at maintaining dominance in a hegemonic liberal international order. Specifically, by reinforcing the dominant 'knowledge’ that non-state terrorism is a much greater security threat than state terrorism and by obscuring the ways in which counterterrorism itself can morph into state terrorism (see Jackson, forthcoming), the discourse functions to legitimise the current global war on terror and its associated policies of military intervention and regime change, extraordinary rendition, military expansion to new regions, military assistance programmes (often to repressive regimes), the imposition of sanctions, the isolation of oppositional political movements, and the like (see, among many others, Stokes and Raphael, forthcoming; F.I Fadl. 2002; Mahajan. 2002, 2003; C'allinicos. 2003). More directly, the discourse provides legitimacy to broader counter-insurgency or counterterrorism programmes in strategic regions where the actual underlying aims clearly reside in the maintenance of a particular political-economic order such as is occurring in Colombia at the present time (see Stokes, 2006). At the domestic level, the dominant terrorism discourse can and has been used by political elites to justify and promote a whole range of political projects, such as: expanding and strengthening the institutions of national security and the military-industrial complex; the construction of extensive surveillance and social control systems; the normalisation of security procedures across all areas of social life; expanding the powers and jurisdiction of state security agencies and the executive branch, in large part by normalising a state of exception; controlling wider social and political dissent, restricting human rights, and setting the parameters for accept­able public debate; and altering (he legal system - among others (see. among manyothers. Mueller. 2006; Lustick. 2006; Cole, 2007. 2003; Jackson. 2007c; Scratou. 2002). Lastly, we must note that powerful economic interests particularly those linked to the security sector, such as private security firms, defence industries, and pharmaceutical companies, among others all benefit materially and politic­ally from the primary narratives of the terrorism studies discourse. For example, the accepted "knowledge' that non-state terrorism poses a catastrophic threat to Western society has in part resulted in contracts worth many millions of dollars to private security companies for site security at airports and government build­ings, while pharmaceutical companies have been contracted to provide millions of vaccines and decontamination material in case of bioterrorism (see Mueller, 2006). In other words, there are a clear set of identifiable political-economic and elite interests that are served by the discourse. In sum, it seems clear that the discourse functions to encourage the reification and extension of state hegemony both internationally and domestically, and directly serves a range of political and economic interests. Perhaps more import­antly, the discourse reinforces the widely accepted belief in the instrumental rationality of violence as an effective tool of politics (Burke. 2008), particularly as it relates to counterterrorism. As such, it can be argued that the discourse and knowledge practices of terrorism studies function as a kind of disciplinary and hegemonic truth regime designed to reify existing structures of power and domi­nance. Despite the intentions of individual terrorism scholars therefore, who may believe that they are engaged in objective academic analysis of a clearly defined phenomenon, the broader discourse which they reproduce and legitimise actually serves distinctly political purposes and has clear ideological consequences for society.

# Links

## Transportation Infrastructure

### General

#### Money spent securitizing US transportation is just security theater- it accomplishes nothing and is counterproductive.

Mann, 11

(Charles C. Mann , Charles C. Mann is an American journalist and author, specializing in scientific topics, “Smoke Screening”, <http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/12/tsa-insanity-201112>, Dec 20, 2011, NC)

Ten years ago, 19 men armed with utility knives hijacked four airplanes and within a few hours killed nearly 3,000 people. At a stroke, Americans were thrust into a menacing new world. “They are coming after us,” C.I.A. director George Tenet said of al-Qaeda. “They intend to strike this homeland again, and we better get about the business of putting the right structure in place as fast as we can.”

The United States tried to do just that. Federal and state governments embarked on a nationwide safety upgrade. Checkpoints proliferated in airports, train stations, and office buildings. A digital panopticon of radiation scanners, chemical sensors, and closed-circuit television cameras audited the movements of shipping containers, airborne chemicals, and ordinary Americans. None of this was or will be cheap. Since 9/11, the U.S. has spent more than $1.1 trillion on homeland security.

To a large number of security analysts, this expenditure makes no sense. The vast cost is not worth the infinitesimal benefit. Not only has the actual threat from terror been exaggerated, they say, but the great bulk of the post-9/11 measures to contain it are little more than what Schneier mocks as “security theater”: actions that accomplish nothing but are designed to make the government look like it is on the job. In fact, the continuing expenditure on security may actually have made the United States less safe.

### Ports

#### The moral panic over port security is a product of risk managers who create and legitimize endless new nightmare scenarios.

Salter, Master’s degree from the London School of Economics and a doctorate from the University of British Columbia 08

(Mark B. Salter is Associate Professor at the School of Political Studies, University of Ottawa, Canada. He received a Master’s degree from the London School of Economics and a doctorate from the University of British Columbia. He is currently researching the use of risk management in Canadian border policing and editing Politics of/at the Airport, “Risk and the War on Terror”, page# 233, 2008, NC)

Risk management has been adopted by a host of state agencies and private corporations as the gold standard in dealing with the new terrorist threat; in large part because it is premised on the idea that increased interdependence brought about by globalization also yields increased vulnerability. The tighter our production chains, the more integrated our economies, the more frequent our mobility, the less slack in our society, and the less redundancy in our security measures: the greater the efﬁciency, the greater the susceptibility to attack. Risk management as a governance framework seeks to focus scarce resources on risks that are ranked according to frequency and impact. Focusing on a pragmatic assessment of the possible and likely sources of danger for an organization, institutions have been prompted to reconsider old models of governance to focus on the new environment of emergency and exception. Analyses of the 9/11 attacks, especially in the comparison with the Pearl Harbor attacks of 1941, conclude that, rather than a failure of policing, of empire, of society – the 9/ 11 attacks represent a failure of the imagination. If only the policing and military powers of the state had been directed at the eighteen hijackers or the one shoe bomber or the four transit bombers, then surely it would have been successful. To cover up the plain failure of the military might of the world’s only superpower and its handmaidens to prevent the dramatic attacks in New York, Washington, Madrid, and London, the blame is assigned to those ‘‘managers of unease’’ for failing to convince policymakers that the sky was falling. And, now those self-same managers are made re-responsible for creating and legitimizing new nightmare scenarios (Amoore, this volume). The recent moral panics regarding border security, port security, container shipping, or explosive liquids are illustrative of the way in which the public imaginary of the war on terror is dominated by risk managers who, in Bigo’s terms, ‘‘not only respond to threat but also determine what is and what is not a risk’’ (2002: 74). Faced with the failure of the policy imaginary (or rather the failure of policymakers to be convinced by the imagination of the analysts, as we seebelow), there was frantic securitization of a number of sectors. In our exuberance to embrace the new realities of living under threat of terrorism, a raft of invasive and emergency programs was suggested – but not all programs were successful. For example, the following programs were cancelled or curtailed due to political and public pressure: total-then terrorist information awareness program; the terrorist futures markets; the terrorist information and prevention system; the color-coded threat advisory system; the ‘‘ReadyAmerica’’ program run by the Department of Homeland Security. In short, how do we analyze the politics of the risk imaginary in the war on terror?

#### Discourse of securitizing ports against terrorism institutionalizes surveillance and racial profiling against workers.

Cowen, 07

(Deborah Cowen SSHRC Postdoctoral Fellow, Division of Social Sciences, York University Toronto, Ontario, “STRUGGLING WITH ‘SECURITY’: NATIONAL SECURITY AND LABOUR IN THE PORTS”, Spring, 2007, PG# 30-31, NC)

Over the past five years, governments around the world have been busy crafting new policies, institutions, and rationales for national securitization. Largely at the behest of the United States, they have been compelled to define a wide range of new security measures. The ‘war on terror’ has focused heavily on securing the movement of people and goods across national borders, and the profiling of suspected terrorists on the basis of nationality, religion and ethnicity. This is the case, despite the fact that perhaps the only common thread to the various agents of non-state terror in the US, from Timothy McVeigh to Osama bin Laden, is some form of training by the US military.2 This incredible disjuncture between perceived ‘risks’ and response continues to inform dominant conceptions of security, as well as the practices they organize. While the control of human migration has intensified alongside the globalization of production over the past few decades, border control has nevertheless been rapidly reworked since 2001. Mobility has been newly constrained for many people, largely through racial profiling and its impacts on no-fly lists, security certificates, and international ‘information’ sharing. On the other hand, the movement of goods across national borders has been liberalized in recent decades to facilitate the massive volume of cargo movement that constitutes global trade. However, since 9/11, politicians and security officials have become increasingly concerned about the incredible volume of unchecked cargo crossing borders. They are particularly anxious about the mysterious contents of shipping containers. 31 Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society – Volume 10 – Spring 2007 The competing demands of ‘economy’ and ‘security’ have placed international ports at the centre of national security debates. In fact, key security initiatives target transport workers, who at once play a pivotal role in policing the territorial borders of the nation and are central to the global movement of goods. Security clearance programs are under development for port workers that will severely compromise employment security by making workers subject to extensive screenings that violate privacy, allow for job suspension based on ‘reasonable suspicion’ of terrorist affiliation, and offer no independent appeals process. New security regulations threaten to institutionalize racial profiling and directly undermine collective agreements and civil rights. Moreover, there are plans to generalize these programs across the transport sector – a large part of the labour force that includes trucking, mass transit, airport, and rail. In this paper, I look at struggles over port security regulations in Canada. I discuss the creative political response, particularly by the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) – Canada, which represents west coast port workers, in their coalition work to reform federal initiatives. I suggest that national security policy, as backdoor labour policy, works to institutionalize ‘anti-social’ forms of security. For port workers, security is already a dominant concern, but as these precedents are generalized beyond port workers, security policy will become an increasingly critical issue for the labour movement more broadly.

## Terror Scholarship Bad

### Laundry List

#### Terrorism scholarship is beset by multiple epistemological flaws- no consistent definition, no primary sources, narrow focus on policy making, and exaggeration of the threat.

Jackson, Director at the National Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, 8

(Richard, 2/14/08, “The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments,” Political Studies Review, volume: 7, p. 171.184, CPO)

More than seven years after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the exceptional nature of these crimes and the subsequent global war on terror continue to generate a vast literature. Research by Andrew Silke suggests that a new book on terrorism is published every six hours in the English language, and that on current trends it will soon be the case that over 90 per cent of all terrorism studies literature will have been published since 2001 (Shepherd, 2007).There are literally thousands of academic books, articles, reports and PhD dissertations published every year on terrorism – in addition to a vast popular cultural and political corpus of terrorism texts.

However, recent reviews of the scholarly literature on terrorism suggest that the field is beset by a persistent set of conceptual, epistemological, methodological and political normative weaknesses and challenges (see Burnett and Whyte, 2005; Jackson, 2007a; Jackson et al., 2009; Ranstorp, 2006; Silke, 2004a). Some of the main problems identified include, but are not limited to: the failure to develop rigorous theories or even to agree on a definition or set of identifying criteria for the field’s primary concept; a reliance on secondary sources and a failure to undertake primary research, particularly in terms of face-to-face engagement with ‘terrorists’; a narrow focus on a restricted set of topics frequently tailored to the demands of policy makers for practically useful knowledge; large numbers of new scholars lacking adequate grounding in the existing literature; and a persistent tendency to treat the current terrorist threat as unprecedented and exceptional. For the most part, terrorism research that is theoretically and methodologically sophisticated, intellectually independent, based on primary sources, normatively sensitised and rooted in the existing literature is, unfortunately, relatively rare.

#### Terrorism experts are fraudsters who recycle rumors and unverifiable information as empirical facts. The field has no barriers to entry, relies on cultural stereotypes and pop psychology, and lacks any academic rigor.

Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College, 9

(Magnus, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p. 25-31, GAL)

The art of masquerading evidence in terrorism research As Bruce Hoffman poignantly pointed out in a Foreign Affairs article, criticism about the field of terrorism studies is neither new nor unjustified" (B. Hoffman. 2008). In particular, Hoffman invoked the damning critique made thirty years ago by Professor Michael Howard, who charged that terrorism studies had "been responsible for more incompetent and unnecessary books than any other outside ... of sociology. It attracts phoneys and amateurs as a candle attracts moths' (ibid.). Howard's assessment can be considered as true today as it was thirty years ago. A major global strategic surprise event like 9/11 is bound to attract unscrupulous characters, pseudo-academics alongside outright fraudsters, often masquerading behind a thin facade of privileged access to secret sources, often unverifiable in contravention to standard academic praxis. In most cases, this type of rumor intelligence (RUMINT) masquerading as scientific evidence lacks any acceptable academic rigor. Additionally, journalistic speculation or even inaccuracies in reporting events as they unfold, move effortlessly from fiction to becoming established facts. Rarely are these empirical facts investigated or challenged with enough effort. Even rarer are those instances when these well-established facts are investigated to further develop a greater degree of granu­larity in both detail and context. This becomes especially troublesome as these established 'empirical' facts become continuously reused in other academic con­texts to fit ready-made assumptions and arguments. Blurring boundaries between journalism and academic expertise, facts or fiction obfuscate the reliability of data and erode serious terrorism research based on rigorous theory-building and the use of sound methodologies. Good journalism and interesting reporting should not be confused with academic rigor or scientific standards. Within terrorism studies, there are sometimes no bounds to the ingenuity of experts, and at times, outright deception and fraud. Perhaps the most celebrated and outrageous case is that of the Frenchman. Alexis Debat. who managed to rise from being a journalist reporter to the position of Director of the Terrorism and National Security Program at the Nixon Center in Washington DC, as well as contributing editor to The National Interest. In an extensive expose by the French news media Rue 89 in June 2007. it was revealed that Debat had made up several bogus interviews with former US President Bill Clinton, former US Secretary of Stale Colin Powell. New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg. Microsoft founder Bill Gates, former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, and former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, for the French magazine. Politique Internationale Ross. 2007). After resigning from ABC News as a terrorism consultant, after it was dis­covered he did not hold a PhD from Sorbonne University as he had claimed on his resume, a series of other claims also proved fraudulent, such as: being a former advisor to the French Ministry of Detente on Transatlantic Affairs; having been Director of the Scientific Committee for the lustilul Montaigne (Paris); 'working on the largest manuscript ever written on the history of the Central Intelligence Agency'; and working with RAND, among many other cases (Bourcier and Leslies'. 2007). This 'mythomaniac analyst' case, as dubbed by Rue 89, casts a dark shadow over the terrorism studies field. The fact that Alexis Debat went unchallenged for over ﬁve years in terms of faking interviews and rising to prestigious academic positions without postgraduate research qualiﬁcations illustrates the case that there is a real absence of critical rigor in questioning expertise and the way in which work is conducted and veriﬁed in a scientiﬁcally acceptable fashion. It would be easy to disregard the Debat case as the exception rather than a trend that negatively exposes terrorism studies to criticism. Unfortunately, he is far from alone. Another illuminating case is that of Evan Kohlmann. who authored Al-Quida s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan Bosnian Network (2004). Considering himself an academic and a 'micro-historian" (Mills, 2008), Kohlmann skillfully mastered the 'art of court diving', volunteering to become an expert witness for the prosecution where he gains access to all discovery material, which in turn, through snow­balling is reused in his analysis elsewhere. There is. of course, nothing innately wrong with this practice. However, as underscored by David Miller. Kohlmann has risen almost without a trace. With no expertise beyond an undergraduate law degree and an internship at a dubious think-tank, he has become a consul­tant to the US department of defence, the department of justice, the Fill, the Crown Prosecution Service, and Scotland Yard's SO-15 Counter Terrorism Command. (Crace, 2008) Subsequently, without any PhD degree in a cognate social science subject or few publications in any peer-reviewed scholarly journals. Kohlmann managed to testify as an expert witness in at least ten federal terrorism trials in the US and in six criminal (terrorism) cases in Europe. In one terrorist trial. Kohlmann was put forward as an expert witness on the Bangladeshi Islamist party Jamaat-e-hlami in USA v. Arefand Ilossain (Northern District of New York. 201)6). However under cross examination it transpired that he had never written any papers on the party, nor been interviewed about the group. He had never been to Bangladesh, could not name the country's Prime Minister nor the name of the leader of Jamaal-e-Islami. (Mills. 2008) Similarly. Kohlmann. who speaks some basic Arabic but has never been to Afghanistan or Pakistan, appeared before the first Guantanamo military commis­sion in the case of Salim llamdan (Bin Laden's chauffeur) in 2008. In this case. Kohlmann testified that the Office of Military Commission (OMC) had commis­sioned him to produce a seven-part, ninety-minute video about the evolution of al-Qaeda containing a select collage of violent images which he edited, pro­duced, and narrated himself and which was shown at the trial and is planned to be shown in subsequent Guantanamo military commissions. Handsomely paid $45,000 for the film and his testimony. Kohlmann admitted thai the OMC had changed his proposed name of ihe film from the "Rise of al-Qaeda" to "The al-Qaeda Plan" in order to draw closer comparison to "The Nazi Plan", a famous documentary movie produced during the Nuremburg trials by the US-led prosecution team. (Muhammad Ally. 2008) The fact that the prosecution needs to rely on what they themselves describe as a 'self-made al-Qaeda expert' as one of their principal witnesses, undermines severely the credibility of the proceedings and makes mockery of the principle of scientific expertise. Furthermore, it should bewilder most observers that a 'self-made al-Qaeda expert' becomes the custodian in the portrayal of the evolution of al-Qaeda, rather than seasoned scholars with superior knowledge and decades of experience in the region. Probably the answer is simply a financially-driven plia­bility to stay on message for the prosecution that would not easily exist with a reputable academic with his or her hard-earned reputation at stake. A principal problem with charlatans and self-proclaimed terrorism expertise in a court of law setting is that 'calling expert witnesses in legal cases is predicated on the assumption that the evidence given will be objective and factually correct governed by the principle of professional, scientific neutrality' (Crace. 2008). The court records show contradictory evidence, as only a handful of self-proclaimed experts become 'hired guns1 for the prosecution without regard for any scientific rigor or principles of impartiality. One of the most celebrated self-proclaimed al-Qaeda terrorism experts in the post 9/11 -period is Sri Lankan-born Rohan Gunaratna, author of Inside a/ Qaeda, who was paid S53.700 as the principal prosecution witness in USA v. Hassoun, Jayyousi and Padilh at the United District Court in Florida June July 2(107. Dubbed by the British Observer as 'probably the least reliable expert on al-Qaeda' (Bright. 2003). Gunaratna was thoroughly exposed by the Australian newspaper. The Age, as making dubious and incorrect claims about his numerous affiliations (Hughes. 2003). Additionally, questions have been raised as to the reasons why Gunaratna continues to downplay his role as a former researcher at St Andrews University when he otherwise engages in self-promotion about his affiliations. Gunaratna's cavalier attitude and mockery of rigor in academic research and scholarship was evidently displayed during his testimony at the trial in 2007. His testimony under oath claimed that it was academically acceptable to use classiRed sources mat could not be identified or substantiated, because if you name that source, the next week that source will be killed. So sometimes you cannot identify a source ... sometimes there is no opportunity for citations1 (USA v. Adham Amin Hassoun, Kifah Wad Jayyousi, Jose Paditla, 2007a: 82 83). At the same time. Gunaratna acknowledged under cross-examination by the defence lawyers that sound research and scholarship relied on three character­istics: 'accuracy, impartiality, honesty' (ibid.: 99 100). The problem with Gunaratna's approach to evidence through interviews is threefold, as explicitly documented by the 2007 court testimony: (1) it leaves scope to believe some interviews were fabricated; (2) that he cannot locate them in time nor (broadly without compromising security) place; and (3) that the circumstances of his interviews were dubious at times, as they involved tortured and imprisoned terrorist suspects before their cases had gone through any court of law. Contrary' to the claim on the jacket of Inside al Qaeda (a title 'borrowed" from Bruce Hoffman's 1998 book. Inside Terrorism) where Gunaratna claims he worked on al-Qaeda for over five years prior to 9/11, it is clear that he began working on the issue of Bin Laden and al-Qaeda in earnest only a few months prior to August 2001. when he published an article in Jane's Intelligence Review (Gunaratna. 2001). For four years prior to 9/11, he was a postgraduate research student at St Andrews University working on a thesis about Diaspora groups which did not include any analysis of militant Islamist movements; nor did he during this time period claim any specialized expertise on Islam, the Middle East, or Bin Laden. As pointed out by Peter Cronau a Sri Lankan, Gunaratna cut his teeth working for the Sri Lankan govern­ment from 1984 to 1994 researching ami writing about the bloody Tamil separatist conflict. Much of what he now writes he sees through the prism of that conflict. (Cronau. 21103: 202) Without Arabic or Urdu language skills, Gunaratna claims to have visited the Middle East region extensively in the past and to have interviewed terrorists. However, as admitted during the Pad ilia trial, he first visited Israel in 1999 or 2000 and had never been lo Lebanon. Egypt. Saudi Arabia, or Yemen, despite the fact that he claims lo have interviewed 200 terrorists for the hook. When pressed about this in the 2007 Padilla trial, he admitted Ihcy were actually not hardcore terrorists but rather 'sympathizers.' Another major revealing discrepancy relates to Gunaratna's belief that a majority of interviews with these terrorists cited as anonymous sources in undis­closed locations could be judged acceptable within sound and rigorous scholarly-standards. When pressed by the defense lawyers on the witness stand, 'a huge number of sources in your book cannot be checked by other authorities unless they have inside information from you?' - Gunaratna simply replied: 'I agree' (USA v. Uiuini Am in HasSQUtl, Kifah Wael Jayvousi, Jose Padilla, 2007a: 158-159). The fact is that there is no information at all about these sources which would allow for some form of corroboration. Under oath in testimony riddled with contradictions and exaggerations. Gunaratna revealed that he did not follow robust ethical codes of conduct or concern for protecting human subjects when interviewing terrorists. Specifically. Gunaratna claims to have 'debriefed' terrorists in detention facilities without them having court proceedings and to have interviewed detainees who had been tortured while in detention (ibid.: 178 179), sometimes for research purposes and at other times being 'engaged in some projects for various governments' (USA v. Adham Amin Hassoun, Kifah Wael Jayyousi. Jose Padilla, 2007b: 110 111). In particular, Gunaratna has repeatedly used alleged CIA interrogation reports of captured senior al-Qaeda operatives held in secret detention facilities, such as Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, as a source for scholarly articles, even though the detainee was subjected to 'hundreds of different (interrogation) techniques in just a two-week period soon after his capture' (Mayer, 2008) in 2003. It is doubtful that Gunaratna can produce these documents - if they exist at all. Moreover, this kind of unethical behavior and murky water seriously undermines not only the credibility of Gunaratna, but also casts a dark cloud over the entire terrorism studies community as to the general perception of their ethical codes of conduct during interviews. Critically, the terrorism research community ought to ponder why it is comfortable in using information gathered under torture. Gunaratna also admitted that he worked very closely with a number of intelligence services. As underscored by him in court testimony, 'you cannot become a terrorism specialist unless you have access to government collectors\* (USA v. Ad/tam Amin Ilassoun. Kifah Wad Jayyousi. Jose Padi/fa, 2007a: 181 182). It is very clear that Gunaratna has never heeded or heard of the famous advice by Schmid and Jongman that researchers should not confuse their roles: 'his role is not to "fight" the terrorist fire; rather than a "firefighter'\*, he should be a student of combustion' (Schmid and Jongman. 1988: 179). As an 'embedded academic'. Gunaratna admitted that there was no way of verifying intelligence information compared to information that had gone through a court of law (USA v. Adham Antin Ilassoun, Kifah IVael Jayyousi, Jose Padilla, 2007a: 182 183). Yet Gunaratna has repeatedly shown poor academic judgment, publishing an article in Play/toy magazine, as well as in the number of many poorly substan­tiated claims best exemplified by his contested testimony during the 9/11 Commission Hearing when a senior CIA official came out contradicting his claims (Carr, 2003). This is not to acknowledge that Gunaratna does offer some useful analysis; however, the principal problem remains that it is virtually impossible to decipher what is fact or fiction from his research claims or to trian­gulate his sources. Less than scientific conduct has sullied and overshadowed more substantive and scientifically more rigorous research efforts. In fact, the absence of scientific criticism of Gunaratna within the terrorism studies commun­ity is not only ethically and scientifically indefensible, but also illustrative of the fact that the orthodox terrorism studies community is still relatively embryonic and underdeveloped, it also vividly shows that a world of mutually reinforced Camaraderie is often valued over scientific scrutiny of methods, theory, and data. It is also indicative that the terrorism research community frequently adopts a common worldview, as it does not readily critique those who produce arguments that support accepted knowledge. In essence, this invisible college has lost track of the fact that 'strong research deals with events critically, evaluates all potential alternatives and arrives at a conclusion that is methodologically and empirically sound' (D. Jones. 2006). Some of the aforementioned 'self-anointed" terrorist experts are part of a growing phalanx of what some have called terrorologists' (see George. 1991a; Herman and O'Sullivan. 1989) 'who sell a toxic brew of cultural stereotypes and pop psychology packaged in pseudo-academic jargon' (Ahmad, 2008). They represent a minority within the terrorism studies field, but have had major visibility from media appearances and for their ﬂagrant disregard for standard scholarly and ethical codes of conduct. In some way, they have had an inverse positive effect in highlighting the crucial importance of ethical codes of conduct when dealing with a complex social and behavioral science such as terrorism research. They also underscore that the terrorism studies ﬁeld has low or no barriers of entry, unlike other social science areas where there is a high degree of professionalisation and clearly regulated barriers of entry. As such, it is critical that more established and more credible terrorism scholars assume a greater responsibility for the integrity of research ﬁndings; they need to engage more critically with colleagues who violate research standards, as they would never let their undergraduate students get away with this type of masquerading of evidence. It is incumbent upon them that they challenge and expose dubious research agendas and ﬁndings rather than, as now, silently sweeping it under the carpet in a bandwagon fashion.

### No Consistent Definition of “Terrorism”

#### There is no consistent definition for terrorism, it is socially constructed through subjective labeling practices.

Jackson, Director at the National Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, 8

(Richard, 2/14/08, “The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments,” Political Studies Review, volume: 7, p. 171.184, CPO)

It is something of a cliché to note that terrorism is an essentially contested concept and that there are over 200 definitions of terrorism in use in the literature. There are understandable reasons for this state of affairs. In the first place, terrorism is not a causally coherent, free-standing phenomenon that can be defined in terms of characteristics inherent to the violence itself. As two leading figures in the field put it, ‘The nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. One and the same act ... can be terrorist or not, depending on intention and circumstance’ (Schmid and Jongman, 1988, p. 101). In this sense, terrorism is fundamentally a social fact rather than a brute fact; the wider cultural-political meaning of terrorism is decided through symbolic labelling, social agreement and a range of inter-subjective practices (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996).

Second, most contemporary definitions of terrorism describe it as a form of illegitimate violence directed towards innocent civilians that is intended to intimidate or terrify an audience for political purposes. In combination with its uncertain ontological status, the necessity of subsequently determining what makes an act of violence legitimate or not, who counts as a civilian, how innocence can be measured, what the real intentions of often clandestine actors might be and what counts as a political aim introduces an unbearably high level of subjectivity into the discursive field. In practice, it is often the politically and culturally determined legitimacy of the particular group under scrutiny that determines whether its actions are labelled as ‘terrorism’ and not the characteristics inherent to the violence itself.

#### Lack of a consistent definition for terrorism leads to a “we know it when we see it” approach which causes bad research and bad policy.

Stampnitzky, fellow at the Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History at Harvard University, 10

Lisa, 1/14/2010, “Disciplining an Unruly Field: Terrorism Experts and Theories of Scientific/Intellectual Production,” Springer Science and Business Media, page 1-19 md

Finally, one of the most serious recurring problems for the field is what has generally been referred to as the “problem of definition.” As Brian Jenkins told me, “definitional debates are the great Bermuda Triangle of terrorism research. I’ve seen entire conferences go off into definitional debates, never to be heard from again.”23 A 1988 survey of the literature found over 100 different definitions in use among terrorism researchers (Schmid and Jongman 1988), an observer at a mid-1980s DOD symposium reported that there were “almost as many definitions as there were speakers” (Slater et al. 1988, p. 3), and a 2001 article described a “perverse situation where a great number of scholars are studying a phenomenon, the essence of which they have (by now) simply agreed to disagree upon” (Brannan et al. 2001, p. 11).

Yet a number of experts persist in trying to stabilize the definition of terrorism. Political scientist Martha Crenshaw argues for the importance of a neutral (non-partisan, non-polemical) definition: “(t)he task of definition...necessarily involves transforming ‘terrorism’ into a useful analytical term rather than a polemical tool” (Crenshaw 1995, p. 7). Schmid and Jongman argue for a definition that is universally applicable, based on transparent guidelines

The search for a universalist definition of terrorism is one which scientists cannot give up. Without some solution to the definitional problem, without isolating terrorism from other forms of (political) violence, there can be no uniform data collection and no responsible theory building. (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. 3)

And they argue, further, for the need for a stable definition for scientific progress and legitimacy:

The search for an adequate definition of terrorism is still on....[M]any authors seem fatigued about the need to still consider basic conceptual questions. This is a dangerous attitude as it plays in to the hands of those experts from the operational antiterrorist camp who have a ‘we-know-it-when-we-see-it’ attitude that easily leads to double standards which produce bad science and also, arguably, bad policies (Schmid and Jongman 1988, p. xxi).

### Ignores State Terrorism/Counterterrorism

#### Terrorism studies fail to analyze state terror and disregards the fact that state-terror is responsible for more deaths and atrocities than any other form of terror.

Jackson, Director at the National Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, 8

(Richard, 2/14/08, “The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments,” Political Studies Review, volume: 7, p. 171.184, CPO)

The terrorism studies field has been widely criticised for its failure to provide sustained analysis (and moral condemnation) of state terrorism. Indicative of the almost exclusive focus on ‘terrorism from below’ as opposed to ‘terrorism from above’ is Silke’s finding that only twelve or less than 2 percent of articles from 1990 to 1999 in the core terrorism studies journals focused on state terrorism (Silke, 2004b, p. 206), and Charles Townshend’s finding that only twelve of the 768 pages in the Encyclopedia of World Terrorism (1997) examined state terrorism in any form (quoted in Goodin, 2006, p. 55). Books on the subject are equally rare; it is actually something of an oddity that of the seven books reviewed for this article, as many as two of them (Goodin, 2006; Grosscup, 2006) contain in-depth discussion of state terrorism. As already noted, terrorism scholars frequently choose to ignore state terrorism even when they accept that by definition states can engage in political terror too. There are a number of obvious problems with this state of affairs. From a political-normative perspective it makes the field appear biased towards Western state interests (Jackson, 2007d).The failure to analyse state terrorism or to condemn it in the same morally assured terms as non-state terrorism – particularly the well-documented use of political terror by Western states during the colonial period, the ‘terror bombing’ during the Second World War and other conflicts, Cold War counter-insurgency and pro-insurgency campaigns, the active sponsorship of right-wing non-state terrorist groups and the widespread use of torture during certain counter-terrorism campaigns, among others – appears to many observers as pro-Western bias and a toleration of certain forms of state-practised terrorism.

In addition, it represents a breakdown of scholarly procedure and a self-imposed intellectual blindness; it is a surrender to partisanship and Eurocentrism over scholarly integrity and ethics. It is an intellectual absurdity to argue that states cannot practise terrorism against their own people and against other states – that a car bomb detonated on a city street by clandestine state agents is not an act of terrorism, but an identical attack by non-state actors is, for example. Accepting that terrorism can only really be described according to the nature and quality of the particular act of violence – rather than the purported legitimacy of the actor who commits it (states that employ terror as a mode of governance arguably lack legitimacy, in any case) – has a number of serious consequences and implications.

In the first place, it raises serious questions about the broader focus of the field and the empirical foundations it is based on. That is, while non-state terrorists have killed tens of thousands of people and caused significant damage during the past century-and-a-half, the acceptance that ‘states can be terrorists, too’ (Goodin, 2006, pp. 50–77) reveals that some individual states have been responsible for more terrorism than all non-state terrorist groups put together. A conservative estimate of state-instigated mass murder, forcible starvations and genocide against civilians, for example, suggests that governments were responsible for 170–200 million deaths in the twentieth century alone (Rummel, 1994; see also Goodin, 2006, p. 67). Clearly, the few hundred deaths caused every year by non-state terrorists pales beside the massive death, destruction and destabilisation caused by states. And yet the wider terrorism studies field does not include statistics on state terrorism in any of its recognised databases, nor does it expend any real effort in trying to understand the nature, causes, strategies and outcomes of state terrorism.

Another important consequence of the acceptance of the reality of state terrorism is the need to re-conceptualise some of the accepted truisms regarding the nature of terrorism. It is not the case, for example, that terrorism is solely the ‘weapon of the weak’; it can also be true that ‘the stronger the state, the stronger the temptation to rule through a regime of terror’ (Goodin, 2006, p. 52). In fact, the history of terrorism would suggest that strong actors use terror far more frequently than weak ones. Moreover, it is clear that in contradistinction to popular belief, terrorism can be employed during war as well as during peace, when for example states bomb civilian targets of no military value for the sole purpose of terrorising a population into surrender – a case of frightening one group of people in order to produce a political change in another (Goodin, 2006, p. 63). Similarly, counter-terrorism itself can become terrorism when it fails to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty, is highly disproportionate, aims to terrify or intimidate the wider population or a particular community into submission and when it is co-opted to serve a political agenda (Goodin, 2006, pp. 69–73).

#### History of counterterrorism operations conducted by the US and its allies demonstrates that they meet the consensus definition of terrorism: disappearances in El Salvador, state assassination campaigns in South Africa, targeted killings in Israel, funding insurgencies in Afghanistan, etc.

Raphael, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Kingston University, London, 9

(Sam, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p. 58-62, GAL)

Alongside the problem of sourcing lies the problem of silencing. Key actors and campaigns of terrorism are systematically ignored by the core experts, particu­larly, in the context of this chapter, those which have received ideological or material support from Washington. And this is true despite the fact that such examples clearly fit the consensus definition employed by the majority of experts whereby terrorism is: 1 violence (or the threat thereof): which is 2 instrumental, as opposed to aimless: and conducted for 3 political (i.e. non-personal) ends; in order to 4 influence an audience wider than the immediate target(s). generally through the creation of fear, achieved through 5 the deliberate and systematic violation of the established norms surrounding the use of force.7 This definition clearly encompasses state as well as non-state acts of terror and could easily be applied to many aspects of US-led 'counterterrorism'. The use of violence targeted against noncombatants in order to influence a wider audience has long been a hallmark of ‘counterterrorism' supported by the US. For example, the use of terrorism by pro-US security forces in Central America was systematic and was documented as such at the time. Amnesty International (1984: 155-156). for example, received "regular, often daily reports identifying El Salvador's regular security and military units as responsible for the torture, ""disappearance" and killing of non-combatant civilians from all sectors of Salvadoran society". The use of disappearance and torture was widespread throughout pro-US states in the region during the 1980s, often carried out by security forces trained and armed by US forces (sec Blum. 1995). Such tactics are clearly terrorist in nature, given the fact that 'it is a strategy designed primarily to induce extreme fear in a target popu­lation. It is a strategy of terrorism and is understood as such by the populations of targeted societies' (Stolil. 2006: 10). None of this was discussed at the time by the core experts and there has only been the odd brief acknowledgement of this record since (see for example. Wilkinson. 2002: 68). Likewise, expert discussion of state assassinations of foreign dissidents a tactic clearly considered terroristic - has been restricted solely to those govern­ments identified as terrorist-sponsoring by the US government. Thus, the Soviet Union and other Communist countries have 'used the weapon of international ter­rorism as a means of silencing and intimidating exiled dissidents and hunting down those alleged to have betrayed the Party' (Wilkinson. 1984: 293). Syria has arranged for the assassination of enemies and "allies\* alike (Alexander, 1986: 6), whilst Iraq, Iran, and Libya have also engaged in such activities (B. Jenkins, 1985: 11: Laqueur, 1999: 178 179). However, there is little or no discussion of, for instance, apartheid South Africa's extensive assassination campaign which was 'exercised quite openly by the apartheid government, especially against leaders of the liberation movements who were not based in South Africa but abroad (K. O'Brien, 2001: 108). Neither was there any analysis of the multinational Operation Condor which became the most sinister state-sponsored terrorist network in the Western Hemisphere, if not the world. Those targeted went far beyond members of the militant Southern Cone guerrilla movements ... they included civilian political figures from the region, and Latin American exile leaders living in Europe and the United States. (Kombluh. 2003: 324) A similar silence has greeted the clear use of terrorism by US-supported 'counterterrorist' forces operating in the post-cold war era, notably in Colombia. Turkey, and Israel. Thus, the use of terrorism by Colombian paramilitary groups receives little attention when compared to analyses of the left wing guerrilla movements, despite the fact that they have consistently been responsible for over 70 per cent of all terrorist attacks in the country (State Department, 2000). In contrast, the RAND database, maintained in part by Hoffman and Jenkins, attributes to the guerrillas more than twice the number of fatalities than it does to the paramilitaries, which were apparently responsible for only 12 per cent of incidents between 1998 and 2004.'' Where such violence is acknowledged, any discussion is exceedingly brief (see for example. Laqueur's (1999: 189) passing reference to the 'activities of counterinsurgency gangs'), and crucially, collabo­ration between these groups and Colombian security forces is rarely mentioned at all. This collusion has been extensively documented, with Human Rights Watch, for instance, clear that there exists 'abundant, detailed and compelling evidence that certain Colombian army brigades and police detachments continue to promote, work with, support, profit from, and tolerate paramilitary groups, treating them as a force allied to and compatible with their own' (Human Rights Watch. 2001: 1). Likewise, the systematic use of terrorism by Turkish counterterrorist forces throughout the 1990s, and US complicity in this has been extensively docu­mented (see van Bruincssen, 1996; Gabelnick <?/a/., 1999), but receives little to no treatment by the core literature. In a similar vein, Israel's extensive use of tar­geted killings, often directed against noncombatants and clearly employed as a strategy for installing fear in a wider target population, is largely ignored by the experts. Evidence regarding the use of this strategy is widespread and exists in relation to Israeli actions during its occupation of Lebanon, during the first and second intifadas, and during the Oslo Peace Process (see Fisk, 1992: 559 578; Human Rights Watch, 1993; li. Morris, 1999: 591-592; Byman, 2006). Overall, and in parallel with the silences regarding these forms of terrorism, the literature fails to acknowledge and analyse the role that the US has played in sup­porting these counterterror campaigns. US support for aggressive 'counterterror' campaigns throughout the South and its complicity in many instances of state ter­rorism which result, either through the training of host security forces in assassina­tion and torture techniques or through the waiver of human rights conditionalities in order to continue the funding of abusive militaries, has been well-documented elsewhere (see Klare and Kombluh, 19X9; Human Rights Watch, 2002; Stokes and Raphael, forthcoming). Likewise, the less-frequent but still significant use by Washington of insurgent forces to destabilise unfriendly regimes is almost totally ignored by the core experts. During the cold war, substantial support was provided to anti-government forces operating in Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan, and elsewhere (Copson and Cronin, 1987; Klare, 1989; Hiro, 2002: 179-264). This has been mirrored by the overt support provided to the Northern Alliance in the winter of 2001-2 against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (Rose el«/., 2001). whilst recent rumours of aid to anti-Tehran groups operating out of post-2003 Iraq potentially represents a con­tinuation of this strategy (llersh. 2006). Such forces have often employed terror­ism as a central strategy, making the silence in the literature significant. For example, very little attention was paid to the use of terrorism by the Contras who received extensive US support in their campaign against the Sandinista regime and this is the case even though the group shifted the focus of their campaign from early attempts to engage Sandinista military forces to widespread covert sabotage of key economic installations in Nicaragua, as well as systematic attacks on non-combatants (Taubman. 1983). Americas Watch concluded in 1985 that 'there can be no doubt, on the basis of what we heard and saw, that a planned strategy of ter­rorism is being carried out by the contras along the Honduras border' (quoted in Chomsky, 1985: 12-13). Indeed, by the end of the 1980s, Human Rights Watch (1990) confirmed that the Contras were major and systematic violators of the most basic standards of the laws of armed conflict, including by launching indis­criminate attacks on civilians, selectively murdering non-combatants, and mis­treating prisoners'. Evidence regarding this, as well as similar uses of terrorism by other US-backed forces, is largely written out of the core literature. Alongside this silencing of US-backed terrorism throughout the South, the core literature also consistently fails to provide an adequate understanding of the armed movements which it does focus on, through silencing the local social and political contexts within which they operate. 'Leftist’ movements throughout Latin America during the 1980s, the continuing resistance in Colombia, the history of Turkish separatism, even the 'global jihadi movement' all are dis­cussed in terms of their internal dynamics, motivating ideology, targets, tactics, and strategies, with very little said about the social and political conditions from which they arise and are often sustained. Indeed, core experts are often sceptical about the desirability of discussing such conditions at all. Jenkins (B. Jenkins, 2003: 5). for instance, is clear that whilst the US should 'help resolve conflicts that give rise to terrorism such as that in Northern Ireland and the Middle East\*.there is little convincing evidence to demonstrate that addressing the so-called root causes of terrorism - oppression, poverty, lack of education - has a causal impact on reducing terrorism1. This 'decontextualisation' can be seen clearly in relation to research on the various groups employing armed resistance against Israel. Palestinian movements (both secular and 'Islamist1), as well as the Shiite Hezbollah, are overwhelmingly represented by the experts as the aggressors, driven almost entirely by the dictates of an unwavering and fundamentalist ideology. Thus, such groups are responsible for a 'dramatic rise in fundamentalist Islamic-inspired terrorism', the influence of which has been "the primary driving factor behind savage civil conflicts and viol­ence' in the Occupied Territories and Lebanon (Chalk. 1999: 155.2000: 20-21). These groups have been increasingly understood through the lens of the 'new terrorism' thesis which emerged throughout the 1990s and has been outlined in greatest depth by Hoffman (B. Hoffman, 1989a, 1998: 87-129 and 197-205, 1999). Within this overall framework. Hoffman views Islamic groups as the clear aggres­sors in the Middle Last: although Hezbollah and Hamas perceive themselves as fighting 'an entirely self-defensive struggle", the experts cast their struggle 'in terms of an all-out war from which there can be no respite until the enemy is totally and utterly vanquished' (B. Hoffman. 1998: 95-98). Activists are 'engaged in what they regard as a "total war"', which sanctions wide-scale terrorism (B. Hoffman, 1989a: 369 370). This fundamentalist Islamist ideology and the armed struggle which emerges from it, it is suggested, has its roots firmly in Tehran's aim of 'extending the fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic law espoused in Iran to other Muslim countries' (B. Hoffman. 1998: 95 98). Indeed, for Laqueur (1999: 134), the emer­gence of both Hamas and Hezbollah 'was, of course, not accidental; it was another part of the fundamentalist wave occurring in the Muslim world', with the rise of Hezbollah 'directly connected with the victory of Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers in Iran\*. And as a result, these groups work uncompromisingly towards the complete destruction of the Israeli state\*, and thus view the 'present peace process' as tantamount to \*a wholesale betrayal of Islamic interests' (Chalk. 1999: 156-157). This can be seen not least in the suicide campaign waged by Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (P1J) in the mid-1990s, which, it is claimed by the experts, was designed to destroy the chances of peace through undermining the Oslo process (see for example. Merari, 2000). Absent from all analysis produced by the core experts on these issues is any real consideration of the history or conditions of occupation within southern Lebanon, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. This massively skews and distorts the picture painted of the motivations for armed resistance. Thus, the ' rejectionist' groups are seen to be opposed to the Oslo process due to a simple, unre­strained hatred of Israel. There is no acknowledgement of how the process itself has been inherently destructive, by for example, facilitating a year-on-year increase in settlement populations in the West Bank (B'Tselcm. undated; Said. 2000). Terrorism experts also spend a great deal of lime charting Israeli casual­ties at the hands of these armed groups. Chalk (2000: 23) found that 460 acts of terrorism were carried out in Israel and the Occupied Territories in the years following Oslo, claiming more than 265 Israeli lives which "represents the largest number of Israeli dead from terrorism in any comparable period since the birth of the State in 1948\*. Likewise. Laqueur (2003: 102) found that over a period of fifteen years Hezbollah had taken the lives of around 800 Israeli sol­diers and their allies in the South Lebanon Army (SLA). In neither case does the author acknowledge the extensive destruction wrought by the Israeli military and their paramilitary allies on the occupied populations, nor the fact that this occupation has directly resulted in substantially more Palestinian and Lebanese deaths than the Israeli casualties cited. Together, these silences pervading the literature ensure that official under­standings of the threat from terrorism have been largely unchallenged by the field. This characteristic of the research output is significant and works to legitimise US policies undertaken in 'response’. How this is so in practice will be explored in the final section.

#### Consistent application of the term “terrorism” would extend to use of the terrorist threat to frighten people for political advantage.

Jackson, Director at the National Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, 8

(Richard, 2/14/08, “The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments,” Political Studies Review, volume: 7, p. 171.184, CPO)

In addition, as Goodin aptly demonstrates, it is that terrorism is first and foremost a violent tactic aimed at frightening people for political advantage that is its distinctive wrong (Goodin, 2006, pp. 31–49). Although not its worst wrong – murdering and maiming innocent people are arguably worse moral wrongs – the intention to cause fear is what makes terrorism something more than ‘just’ murder, kidnapping, assassination and the like. The consequences of terrorism are, among others, the intrusion of fear into everyday public and private life, the denial of the right to live free from fear and the erosion of the capacity for clear thinking and unimpeded decision making – which is a fundamental denial of democratic politics. Importantly, Goodin makes the trenchant point that, when politicians use the terrorist threat deliberately to frighten people for their own political advantage, then to that extent they are committing the same core wrong as that committed by terrorists themselves (Goodin, 2006, p. 102).Another of Goodin’s perceptive insights is that there are real dangers in trying to apply just war concepts in the labelling of terrorism, not least because it actually leaves the door open to justifying some forms of terrorism – such as those directed at members of the armed forces rather than civilians (Goodin, 2006, p. 15).

In sum, despite the inherently insecure ontological and epistemological foundations of terrorism as the central concept of the field, Goodin demonstrates that it is possible to use the term in an intellectually credible manner, if one applies its core analytical and moral criteria consistently. Moreover, this insecurity, far from undermining the basis for further research into political terrorism, actually opens up new questions and avenues of exploration – into its conditions of possibility and the labelling practices of different institutions and societies, for example.

#### Colloquial definitions of terrorism focus solely on groups that oppose Western states and give a more forgiving term to State actors.

Jackson, Director at the National Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, 8

(Richard, 2/14/08, “The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments,” Political Studies Review, volume: 7, p. 171.184, CPO)

An initial definitional problem is the selection bias of much terrorism research whereby the terrorism label is applied almost solely to groups opposed to Western interests and not to groups supported by Western states – even when they commit identical acts of civilian directed violence such as hijackings, bombings, kidnappings and assassinations (see Livingston, 1994).Thus, while left-wing groups have always received a great deal of attention in the terrorism studies literature, right-wing groups like the Contras, anti-Castro groups, UNITA, RENAMO, various Afghan factions and numerous Latin American death squads have remained scandalously understudied.

Related to this is the issue of whether terrorism should be defined by the nature of the violent act itself – its modalities and intentions, the nature of its victims and its effects on a broader audience – or the nature of the actor who commits the act. A great many terrorism scholars actually follow the practice of states and international organisations in defining terrorism exclusively as violence committed by non-state actors, preferring to use alternative terms like ‘repression’ for similar actions by states. Alternatively, a number of often quite prominent scholars agree that under an objective interpretation of the characteristics of terrorist violence states can and do commit a great deal of terrorism, but then simply refuse to examine cases of state terrorism in their work. Walter Laqueur, one of the founding fathers of terrorism studies, makes exactly this point: states have killed many more people and caused more destruction than ‘terrorism from below’, but that is not the terrorism he wishes to examine (Laqueur, 1977, p. 6). Either way, the result is the limited and intellectually unsupportable discursive construction of terrorism as a form of non-state violence.

### AT: “Link of Omission”

#### Omission is commission: Acknowledging that states can engage in terrorism too and proceeding to only examine non-state terrorism still constructs a narrative that sanitizes state terror.

Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.70, GAL)

In the vast majority of texts I examined, the central concept of the field terrorism - is conceptualised and understood solely or primarily as a form of illegitimate non-state political violence. The construction of terrorism as a form of non-state violence is sustained by two common conceptual practices. First, a surprising number of scholars, including some leading scholars, adopt an actor-based definition of terrorism in which the nature of the actor deter­mines the character of the violence. For example. Bruce Hoffman, a leading figure in the field, argues that terrorism involves violence "perpetrated by a subnational group or non-state entity' (B. Hoffman, 1998: 43). This is in keeping with the US State Department's highly influential definition of ter­rorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetuated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience' (quoted in Martin, 2003: 33).

A second and more common practice among scholars involves defining terrorism as a strategy of political violence which any actor can employ, includ­ing states, but then failing to examine the vast amount of terrorism perpetrated by states in any systematic manner. Walter Laqueur. arguably one of the founders of terrorism studies, is emblematic of this practice: he openly accepts that states practice 'terrorism from above’ and have killed many more people and caused far more material and social destruction than "terrorism from below', but then argues that this is simply not the terrorism he wishes to examine (Laqueur, 1977: 6). Most texts in the field however, do not contain any such acknowledgement; they simply proceed to examine only the terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors (sec also, Raphael, this volume; Silke, 2004d). A recent introductory text for example.

typical of the burgeoning terrorism literature published today, does not contain a single mention of state terrorism (Sloan, 2006).

An important consequence of these conceptual practices is that terrorism comes to be understood and studied solely as a form of violence carried out by non-state groups, and terrorism by states remains unstudied and mostly invisible (sec Jackson. 2008a). When state terrorism is discussed, it is usually limited to descriptions of 'state-sponsored terrorism' by so-called 'rogue states’ (Jackson. 2007b). Further, the subsequent silence on the direct use of terrorism by state actors within the terrorism studies literature underpins a mostly unspoken belief that Western liberal democratic states in particular never engage in terrorism as a matter of policy, but only occasionally in error or misjudgement (see Blakcley. 2008). It is also frequently argued that violence by states is de facto legitimate, and therefore cannot be terrorism.

### AT: Only Non-State Actors can be Terrorists

#### Moral consistency demands that the definition of terrorism should include terroristic actions by the state.

Jackson, Director at the National Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, 8

(Richard, 2/14/08, “The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments,” Political Studies Review, volume: 7, p. 171.184, CPO)

In the end, there are important ethical-normative implications for the notion that states can be terrorists too, particularly in the current international climate where virtually every state has adopted new anti-terrorist legislation and where military force – including ‘strategic bombing’ – is being used as a counter-terrorism tool. At the very least, scholars should be highly suspicious of all attempts by states to define terrorism in ways that conveniently mean that no matter what they or their agents do (including the ‘strategic bombing’ of civilians), it cannot be considered terrorism. They should refuse to accede to this common practice, if for no other reason than that:

There is something morally suspicious, however, about people making laws that apply to everyone else except themselves. The sheer fact that politicians have entered into a mutual- protection pact not to prosecute one another as ‘terrorists’ cannot change any logical or deontological facts of the matter. If what they do is otherwise indistinguishable from what is done by non-state actors that we would deem to be terroristic, then the acts of the state officials doing the same thing would be morally wrong for just the same reasons (Goodin, 2006, p. 56).

### Islamic Terrorism

#### Discourses of Islamic Terrorism legitimize a narrow set of coercive counter-terrorism strategies and make dialogue and reform seem impossible.

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 07

Richard, 1/9/07 “the core commitments of critical terrorism studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 1-8 md

Beyond this broader systemic function, however, discourses affect certain kinds of social action ‘not by directly or inevitably determining them but rather by rendering these actions plausible or implausible, acceptable or unacceptable, conceivable or inconceivable, respectable or disrespectable, etc’. 103 That is, discourses establish the initial ideational conditions of possibility for action, while simultaneously constructing the wider meaning structures or common sense that make those actions intelligible and legitimate. In this case, for example, it can be argued that by denying the rational political demands of insurgent groups, demonizing them as fanatics and essentializing them as violent, irrational, savage and fanatical, the ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse normalizes and legitimizes a restricted set of coercive and punitive counter-terrorism strategies, whilst simultaneously making non-violent alternatives such as dialogue, compromise and reform appear inconceivable and nonsensical.

This understanding of discourse further draws our attention to the ways in which discourse can be deployed as a political technology in the hegemonic projects of various agents, such as state elites. In this case, it is possible to describe a number of means by which the ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse functions to reify and expand the hegemonic power of particular states. For example, by locating the source of contemporary terrorism in religious extremism, the discourse works to deny and obscure its political origins and the possibility that it is a response to speciﬁc Western policies. That is, by assigning non-rational, cosmic aims to violent groups, the discourse depoliticizes, decontextualizes and dehistoricizes the grievances and political struggles of groups and societies, thereby de-linking the motives of the terrorists from the policies of Western states or their allies. Such socially constructed ‘knowledge’ of ‘Islamic terrorism’ thus facilitates or enables the uninterrupted exercise of US and British power in the international sphere by obviating the need for policy reappraisal. At the same time, it functions directly as a powerful discursive tool designed to de-invest insurgent groups of any political authority or wider social-cultural legitimacy they may have, in large part by appealing to the secular prejudice of Western societies.

#### Many alternative framings for the current conflicts exist- rejecting the discourse of Islamic Terrorism is an act of counter-hegemonic struggle.

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 07

Richard, 1/9/07 “the core commitments of critical terrorism studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 1-8 md

Fortunately, discourses are never completely hegemonic; there is always room for counter-hegemonic struggle and subversive forms of knowledge. In this case, not only is the discourse inherently unstable and vulnerable to different forms of critique, but the continual setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, ongoing revelations of torture and rendition and increasing resistance to government attempts to restrict civil liberties suggest that the present juncture provides an opportune moment to engage in deliberate and sustained critique. Recent moves by ofﬁcials of the European Union for example, to review its lexicon of terms regarding ‘Islamic’ or ‘jihadi’ terrorism are indicative of a growing dissatisfaction with the discourse within parts of the political establishment. 112 In particular, given their public role, scholars in the ﬁeld have a responsibility to challenge the articulation of the central labels and narratives of the dominant discourse and to explore alternative forms of language and knowledge. As an initial starting point, reclaiming the labels and narratives of ‘political violence’, ‘revolutionaries’, ‘militants’, ‘nationalism’, ‘anti-imperialism’, ‘self-determination’, ‘insurgency’, ‘ideology’ and the like to describe the current conﬂict, could provide a more ﬂexible and ethically responsible alternative to the oppressive conﬁnes of the discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’.

#### Their depiction of Islamic terrorism relies on orientalist assumptions with no empirical grounding.

Jackson, Director at the National Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, 8

(Richard, 2/14/08, “The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments,” Political Studies Review, volume: 7, p. 171.184, CPO)

With a few notable exceptions (see Gerges, 2005; Gunning, 2007b; Halliday, 2002), the vast majority of this literature can be criticised for its orientalist outlook, its political biases and its descriptive over-generalisations, misconceptions and lack of empirically grounded knowledge (see Jackson, 2007a). Rooted in an uncritical and simple-minded acceptance of the notion of a ‘new’ kind of ‘religious terrorism’, this literature typically adopts an undifferentiated and highly exaggerated view of the threat posed by ‘Islamism’, traces a causal link between Islamic doctrine and terrorist violence, attributes religious as opposed to political motives to ‘Islamic terrorists’, fails to differentiate between local political struggles and a global anti-Western movement and assumes that the religious motivations of ‘Islamic terrorism’ rule out all possibilities for dialogue and diplomacy – among others.

#### The discourse of Islamic Terrorism fuels consolidation of state power- it is a justification used to sell regime change, expanded military presence, international surveillance, the military-industrial complex, and a Western-dominated world order.

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 07

Richard, 1/9/07 “the core commitments of critical terrorism studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 1-8 md

More prosaically, it can be seen that many of the policies made possible by the discourse also function directly to extend and consolidate state power, and provide direct material and discursive beneﬁts to elements of the national security sector. For example, intrusive surveillance, expanded police powers, control orders, the regulation of public speech, investigations of charities and the like, can and have been used to limit political dissent, strengthen state security institutions and bring previously unregulated social arenas like charities and religious activities under greater state control. Linked to this, the analysis of public discourse by politicians clearly demonstrates that elites in the USA and Britain frequently deploy the discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’ to legitimize or ‘sell’ a range of international and domestic political projects, including: regime change in states like Afghanistan and Iraq; the expansion of a military presence to new regions such as Central Asia; the control of strategic resources like oil; increased military and political support for allies in strategic regions like the Horn of Africa and Central America; increased resources and power for the military establishment; the construction of domestic and international surveillance systems; the control of international institutions and processes; and more broadly, the preservation and extension of a Western-dominated liberal international order. The frequency of narratives of ‘Islamic terrorism’ in contemporary political speeches suggests that, following earlier patterns, 105 the discourse is being used in a deliberative fashion as a political technology.

#### The discourse of Islamic Terrorism is derived from a series of Orientalist assumptions and fears- these assumptions directly affect policy making.

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 07

Richard, 1/9/07 “the core commitments of critical terrorism studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 1-8 md

Discourses produce meaning in part through drawing upon the linguistic resources and speciﬁc discursive opportunity structures – or the extant cultural raw materials – of a particular social context: ‘texts always refer back to other texts which themselves refer still to other texts’, in other words. 8 A genealogical approach to discourse therefore can help us understand how current forms of knowledge have been naturalized through time and discursive practice. This is not the place to outline a detailed genealogy of the contemporary ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse, but simply to suggest that three discernible discursive traditions would seem important for understanding its present form.

First and foremost, the current discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’ is rooted in the assumptions, theories and knowledge of terrorism studies – a discrete ﬁeld of academic research that has grown tremendously and gained genuine authority since the 11 September terrorist attacks. The notion of ‘Islamic terrorism’ appears to have emerged from studies of ‘religious terrorism’, a subject founded largely on David Rapoport’s seminal article from 1984. 9 Since then, a number of core texts and scholars have established reputations as leading sources of expert knowledge in ‘Islamic terrorism’. 10 As later sections of this article demonstrate, a great many of the central labels and narratives of the ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse are drawn from this body of work. Importantly, through well-established networks of inﬂuence linking ‘terrorism experts’ with the policy-making estab lishment many of these narratives have become politically inﬂuential.

Secondly, the discourse derives a great many of its core assumptions, labels and narratives from the long tradition and archive of orientalist scholarship on the Middle East and Arab culture and religion. 12 This literature expanded rapidly in response to the tumultuous events in the Middle East in the 1970s and 1980s – such as the 1972 Munich massacre, the 1973 oil shocks, the 1979 Iranian revolution and embassy hostage crisis, the Rushdie affair and the terrorist kidnappings and hijackings of the 1980s. It has been greatly stimulated once again by the 9/11 attacks and subsequent war on terrorism. Importantly, Samuel Huntington’s highly inﬂuential 1993 essay ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, the title of which is derived from a much-cited article by Bernard Lewis, 13 reproduced a number of orientalist claims for an international affairs audience and it is therefore an important antecedent of the current ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse. 14 As with terrorism studies scholars, a great many identiﬁable orientalist Middle East scholars, including Bernard Lewis, Noah Feldman and the late Raphael Patai, have made frequent appearances as advisers and expert witnesses for ofﬁcial bodies, thereby transmitting many of the central assumptions and narratives of orientalist scholarship into the policy process.

Thirdly, the discourse draws on a long tradition of cultural stereotypes and deeply hostile media representations and depictions of Islam and Muslims. 16 Typically, in portraying Muslims, the mainstream media has tended to employ frameworks centred on violence, threat, extremism, fanaticism and terrorism, although there is also a visual orientalist tradition in which they are portrayed as exotic and mysterious. 17 Moreover, these kinds of cultural representations have proved extremely resilient, perhaps because, as Said claims, they reﬂect deeper social-cultural fears, anxieties and stereotypes of the oriental ‘other’ that go back to the imperial age. 18 For others, they are the necessary cultural corollary of contemporary forms of imperialism.

#### Their focus on the religious and psychological motivations of terrorism constructs a narrative which ignores political and sociological factors.

Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.72-3, GAL)

A surprising number of terrorism studies texts promote the view that the roots and causes of terrorism lie in individual psychological abnormality, and religious or ideological extremism engendered through processes of 'radicalisation'. Although theories of individual psychopathology among terrorists have fallen out of favour among most leading scholars in recent years, the notion that terrorist behaviour is rooted in the personality defects of individuals remains close to the surface of most texts, not least in the notion that weak-minded, uneducated, or emotionally vulner­able young Muslims fall prey to indoctrination and brainwashing so-called 'radi­calisation' - by terrorist recruiters operating through madrasahs, radical mosques, or extremist internet sites (see Haqqani, 2002). Related to this, it is not uncommon to find texts which argue that 'Islamic’ suicide bombers are primarily young men driven by sexual frustration and impotence. In a much-cited text on contemporary "religious terrorism' for example. Mark Juergensmeyer states that "the young bachelor self-martyrs in the Hamas movement ... expect that the blasts that kill them will propel them to a bed in heaven where the most delicious acts of sexual consummation will be theirs for the taking' (Juergensmeyer, 2000: 201). In any case, such narratives construct the accepted knowledge that terrorists are different and abnormal and, more importantly, that their actions are rooted in their personalities rather than other factors related to their political situation, strategic calculation or experiences of oppression and humiliation.

During the cold war, many terrorism studies texts suggested that the roots and causes of terrorism lay within communist ideology and the direct involvement of the Soviet Union (see Raphael, this volume). Claire Sterling's (I95I) popular hook. The Terror Network, for example, posited the existence of a global terror­ist network sponsored by the Soviets that was behind many of the revolutionary and anti-colonial movements. As Sam Raphael illustrates in this volume, a great many of the leading terrorism studies scholars at the time subscribed to the "Soviet network theory" of terrorism.

In many ways, the cold war focus on left-wing ideology was replaced by what is now a vast and growing literature on the religious origins of terrorism, particu­larly as it relates to Islam (see Jackson. 2007a). Based on David Rapoport's (1984) initial formulation of 'religious terrorism', the discourse of 'Islamic terrorism' argues that the roots and causes of much of the al-Qaeda-related terrorism today can be found in 'Islamic extremism’. Walter Laqueur for example, suggests that while there is 'no Muslim or Arab monopoly in the field of religious fanaticism ... the frequency of Muslim- and Arab-inspired terrorism is still striking\* (Laqueur 1999: 129). Similarly, a prominent counterterrorism think tank publication argues that 'in the Islamic world one cannot differentiate between the political violence of Islamic groups and their popular support derived from religion ... the present terrorism on the part of the Arab and Muslim world is Islamic in nature' (Paz. 1998. emphasis added). Marc Sageman argues in relation to al-Qaeda: 'Salafi ideology determines its mission, sets its goals, and guides its tactics\* (Sageman, 2004: I). In sum, and similar to narratives of individual deviance, these narratives construct the widely accepted 'knowledge' that contemporary terrorism is primar­ily rooted in and caused by religious extremism and fanaticism, and not in rational calculation or other political, cultural, and sociological factors.

#### The discourse of ‘Islamic Terrorism’ casts the world into oppositional binaries, which eliminates any possibility for more nuanced discussion.

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 07

Richard, 1/9/07 “the core commitments of critical terrorism studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 1-8 md

The discourse is ﬁrst and foremost founded on the deployment of a series of core labels, terms and discursive formations, including, among others: ‘the Islamic world’, ‘the West’, ‘the Islamic revival’, ‘political Islam’, ‘Islamism’, ‘extremism’, ‘radicalism’, ‘fundamentalism’, ‘religious terrorism’, ‘jihadists’, ‘Wahhabis’, ‘Salaﬁs’, ‘militants’, ‘moderates’, ‘global jihadist movement’, ‘al-Qaeda’, and of course, ‘Islamic terrorism’. Crucially, in their textual usage these terms are often vaguely deﬁned (if at all), yet culturally loaded and highly ﬂexible in the way they are deployed.

In addition, these labels and terms are organized into a series of dramatic oppositional binaries, such as the West versus the Islamic world, extremists versus moderates, violent versus peaceful, democratic versus totalitarian, religious versus secular, medieval versus modern and savage versus civilized. Such powerful categories function to construct ‘Islamic terrorists’ and ‘extremists’ as particular kinds of subjects within the overall discourse and enforce highly constricting subject positions upon them vis-à-vis other subjects, such as ‘decent people’, ‘democratic states’ or ‘moderate Muslims’, for example. Importantly, they also render unreasonable more nuanced narratives about the often-contradictory identities and characteristics of the narratives’ central actors. The application of labels such as ‘terrorist’, ‘fundamentalist’ and ‘extremist’ to groups like Hamas and Hizbollah for example, functions to obscure their simultaneous existence as political party, social welfare provider, protection force, local association, relief agency, charity, education provider, bank, guerrilla force and the like – as well as position them as the enemy of Western societies.

#### The aff’s Islamic Terrorism narrative makes counterterrorism and extermination the only possible response.

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 07

Richard, 1/9/07 “the core commitments of critical terrorism studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 1-8 md

Crucially, the above narratives imply that because ‘Islamic terrorism’ is fanatical, religiously motivated, murderous and irrational, there is no possibility of negotiation, compromise or appeasement; instead, eradication, deterrence and forceful counter-terrorism are the only reasonable responses. In a typical expression of this narrative, Byman states: ‘Because of the scope of its grievances, its broader agenda of rectifying humiliation, and a poisoned worldview that gloriﬁes jihad as a solution, appeasing al-Qaeda is difﬁcult in theory and impossible in practice.’ 56 Similarly, Barber argues that ‘their purposes can be neither rationalized nor negotiated’ and ‘the terrorists offer no terms and can be given none in exchange’. The logic of this language implies that bringing terrorists ‘to justice can only take the form of extirpation – root, trunk and branch’. 57 The typical political attitude is expressed by Tony Blair, who argues that ‘you only have to read the demands that come out from Al Qaeda to realise that there is no compromise with these people possible, you either get defeated by them or defeat them’. economic matters but also on Islamic doctrinal issues.’ 81 We should also note that Islamist movements like Hamas, Hizbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood (referred to simply as ‘Islamic terrorists’ in most texts), as well as Islamist parties in several Central Asian states, 82 have not only participated in national elections, but have well-established internal democratic processes. In fact, Islamist groups have adopted a multitude of strategies and approaches to their interaction with the state and other social actors and are engaged in a variety of locally deﬁned projects, most of which are focused on winning power. From this perspective, Islamism is perhaps better understood as a dynamic set of processes rather than a ﬁxed or essential identity.

### AT: “But they ARE religiously motivated”

#### Every major empirical study undermines the supposed link between Islam and terrorism.

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 07

Richard, 1/9/07 “the core commitments of critical terrorism studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 1-8 md

In addition, and contrary to widely held beliefs, every major empirical study on the subject has thrown doubt on the purported link between religion and terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism, for example, which compiled a database on every case of suicide terrorism from 1980 to 2003, some 315 attacks in all, concluded that ‘there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the world’s religions’. 85 Some of the key ﬁndings of the study that support this assessment include: only about half of the suicide attacks from this period can be associated by group or individual characteristics with Islamic fundamentalism; the leading practitioners of suicide terrorism are the secular, Marxist–Leninist Tamil Tigers, who committed 76 attacks; of the 384 individual attackers on which data could be found, only 166 or 43 per cent were religious; there were 41 attacks attributed to Hizbollah during this period, of which eight were carried out by Muslims, 27 by communists and three by Christians (the other three attackers could not be identiﬁed); and 95 per cent of suicide attacks can be shown to be part of a broader political and military campaign that has a secular and strategic goal, namely, to end what is perceived as foreign occupation. 86

Similarly, Sageman’s widely quoted study compiled detailed biographical data on 172 participants of ‘Islamic terrorist’ groups. Some of the relevant ﬁndings of his study include, among others: only 17 per cent of the terrorists had an Islamic religious education; only 8 per cent of terrorists showed any religious devotion as youths; only 13 per cent of terrorists indicated that they were inspired to join solely on the basis of religious beliefs; increased religious devotion appeared to be an effect of joining the terrorist group, not the cause of it; there is no empirical evidence that the terrorists were motivated largely by hate or pathological prejudice; ‘Islamic terrorist’ groups do not engage in active recruitment, as there are more volunteers than they can accommodate; the data, along with ﬁve decades of research, failed to provide any support for the notion of religious brainwashing; and there is no evidence of any individual joining a terrorist group solely on the basis of exposure to internet-based material.

Interestingly, the data compiled in these two projects also demonstrate that the notion that ‘Islamic terrorism’ results from poverty, disaffection and alienation is unsupported. In fact, both of these studies show that the overwhelming majority of ‘terrorists’ are middle or upper class, of above-average educational standing, professionally employed, often married or in relationships, are well integrated into their communities and generally have good future prospects. Robert Pape concludes that the typical proﬁle of a ‘terrorist’ resembles ‘the kind of politically conscious individuals who might join a grassroots movement’ rather than a religious fanatic.

### Threat inflated

#### Their inflated impact claims feed a politics of fear that empowers elites and amplifies the impact of terrorism- endorse the critique to exorcise the power of their terrorist threat narrative.

Jackson, Director at the National Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, 8

(Richard, 2/14/08, “The Study of Terrorism after 11 September 2001: Problems, Challenges and Future Developments,” Political Studies Review, volume: 7, p. 171.184, CPO)

In contrast to the dominant approach within terrorism studies, two of the featured books in this review – Goodin’s What’s Wrong with Terrorism? and David Altheide’s Terrorism and the Politics of Fear – join a small but growing number of studies that question the accepted knowledge and interrogate the rise and functions of a ‘politics of fear’ as seen in the popular terrorism threat narrative. Goodin, for example, has an excellent chapter in which he dissects and deconstructs the exaggerated claims about the terrorist threat using both statistical evidence that illustrates its extremely low risk to individual safety, as well as arguments about the current nature and processes of risk assessment. He makes a number of insightful and frequently ignored points: given the way people receive messages about risks and dangers, politicians (and academics) ought to know that their warnings about terrorism and weapons of mass destruction will be received in an ‘alarmist’ way (Goodin, 2006, p. 112); there are some particular irrationalities in risk assessments of terrorism, in part due to psychological processes, but also because of the way the terrorist threat is constructed by the media (pp. 123–36); the argument that terrorism would be much worse if not for all the government warnings lacks credibility given the evidence (p. 122); arguments that terrorists are likely to employ weapons of mass destruction are not entirely convincing for reasons of rational self-interest and practical obstacles (pp. 136–42); and applying the precautionary principle to the terrorist threat results in a number of absurdities and is a costly waste of scarce resources (pp. 142–55).

Altheide’s highly stimulating and informative book takes a slightly different approach in that it focuses on the social construction of the terrorist threat and the political economy of its continual reproduction – although he does pointedly note that American citizens are healthier, safer and live more predictable lives than at any other time in history but are also more anxious about the dangers of crime and terrorism than ever before (Altheide, 2006, p. 73).He attributes this extraordinary reality–perception gap to a dominant ‘politics of fear’ in American society. He describes this as a process by which the media uses fear to construct news and popular culture, political elites manipulate these fears to enable social control and achieve political goals, and various economic and social interests profit materially from the production of fear (pp. 1–2). Importantly, he argues that social fear does not occur naturally, but is deliberately constructed and managed by political actors to promote their own partisan goals (p. 18), as well as broader social goals like the construction of national identity (p. 89).Although Altheide does not make clear whether this process is initially driven by the media or by political elites, it is nonetheless the case that the media’s perpetuation of fear encourages politicians to frame their messages in similar ways as a means of generating publicity (p. 16).

What becomes clear from Altheide’s incisive analysis is that there are powerful systemic forces that sustain the politics of fear and its associated counter-terrorism industry through the generation of vast profits, increased prestige and careerism. Apart from the obvious beneficiaries in the Homeland Security sector, the military sector and the military– industrial and military–media complexes, other actors with a vested interest in the terrorism threat narrative include, among many others: pharmaceutical companies contracted to supply vaccines and decontamination suits; private security firms that provide airport security services; local councils and politicians who can draw upon funding for surveillance equipment; scientists, academics and researchers drawing upon research funding for antiterrorism projects; and journalists, commentators and ‘terrorism experts’ who build prestigious careers on the back of dire warnings of impending attack. In particular, Altheide highlights some of the ways in which the academy in America has been co-opted into the broader counter-terrorism project in ways strikingly reminiscent of the Cold War (Altheide, 2006, pp. 34–7).

What these two books starkly highlight is that terrorists, the media and politicians make gain from the production and manipulation of the public’s fear of sudden, unpredictable political violence, and that from this perspective at least there is a symbiotic relationship – and perhaps a form of unconscious coordination – between terrorism and counterterrorism. At the very least, the media and politicians who play the fear card actually empower terrorism and amplify its impact far beyond its objective capabilities to cause material harm. Moreover, as a consequence and as suggested by Goodin, all these actors share responsibility in the distinctive moral wrong that belongs to terrorism. In such a situation, there is an urgent need for immanent critique and deconstruction – what anthropologists would recognise as exorcism of the demonic power of the terrorism threat narrative (see Zulaika and Douglass, 1996).

#### Their extinction impacts are a link: their claim that terrorism threatens all of civilization is a core sustaining narrative used to justify a permanent state of exception and various counterterrorism operations.

Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.71-2, GAL)

Perhaps the core sustaining narrative of the field is that non-state terrorism poses a significant and existential threat to modern societies and without significant investment in counterterrorism it could have catastrophic consequences for Western states and wider international stability. In most texts, it is viewed as self-evident that terrorism remains 'one of the most significant threats to the Western world in general and US national security in particular\* (Mishal and Rosenthal. 2005: 276). Marc Sageman, a leading terrorism scholar, similarly argues: "A new type of terrorism threatens the world, driven by networks of fanatics determined to inflict maximum civilian and economic damages on distant targets in pursuit of their extremist goals\* (Sageman, 2004: vii). Government officials and state-linked scholars, in particular, are apt to suggest that terrorism is such a potent force that it threatens to destroy Western democracy, social stability, the entire Western way of life, and the international system itself (see Jackson, 2007c).

Other related narratives and assumptions which are virtually ubiquitous across the literature include the argument that al-Qaeda, purportedly the primary non-state terrorist group operating in the world today, is a formidable, globally net­worked foe with tens of thousands of trained 'jihadists’ and millions of supporters, and that there are sleeper cells of jihadists and fifth columnists within Western societies ready and waiting to attack. For example, Jessica Stem, a recognised ter­rorism 'expert', asserted that "by September 11. 2001. between 70,000 and 110,000 radical Muslims had graduated from Al Qaeda training camps\* (Stern. 2003: 260), while a popular textbook suggested that there may be between 35,000 and 50,000 'Al Qaeda operatives\* in the world today, many of them in 'independ­ent "sleeper" cells committed to waging holy war against the West' (Martin, 2003: 194, 198). Similarly, it is frequently asserted as common sense that non-state ter­rorists are eager and willing to use weapons of mass destruction, and that there are 'rogue states", such as Iran, Syria, North Korea, and, until recently, Iraq, who would be willing to provide WMD to terrorists as means of waging proxy warfare against the West.

Tied in with the broader threat narrative is a growing literature on what has been called a 'new terrorism' (see B. Hoffman. 1998; Laqueur. 1999; Kegley. 2003). The 'new terrorism' thesis suggests that driven by hatred, fanaticism, and extremism rather than by political ideology or rational calculation, today's 'new' religiously-inspired terrorists are determined to cause mass casualties among civilians, are driven to sacrifice themselves in murderous suicide attacks, would be willing to employ weapons of mass destruction, and are not amenable to traditional forms of negotiation and dialogue. It is therefore a more murderous and dangerous form of terrorism than the world has ever seen before. Jessica Stern has argued that 'religious terrorist groups are more violent than their secular counterparts and are probably more likely to use weapons of mass destruction' (Stern, 2003: xxii). Similarly. Daniel Byman, another leading ter­rorism scholar argues that due to its religious world view, 'appeasing al-Qaeda is difficult in theory and impossible in practice' (Byman. 2003: 147).

In sum, these frequent narratives within the literature construct the widely accepted 'knowledge' that non-state terrorism represents a major security threat to the international community and to democratic societies in particular, in part because their inherent freedoms make them more vulnerable to terrorist infiltra­tion and attack. Moreover, these narratives construct a common sense and widely, though not totally, accepted 'knowledge" that contemporary terrorism is a new and deadlier form of terrorism than any encountered previously, one which creates an exceptional state of emergency requiring 'new' counterterrorism meas­ures to defeat and which cannot be dealt with using negotiation and dialogue, methods which have been previously successful in dealing with the 'old' ideological and nationalist terrorism.

#### Depicting terrorism as an existential threat justifies any means necessary to deal with the threat, legitimizing counterterrorism and the global ‘war on terror’.

Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.73-4, GAL)

A final set of assumptions and narratives within the broader literature relates to questions about how to respond to terrorism. Following the logic of the preced­ing notions of the existential threat posed by the 'new terrorism', as well as the fanatical nature and origins of religiously-inspired terrorism, it is frequently argued in the literature that 'new' methods of counterterrorism are required for its control, and that there are justifiable reasons to employ any means neces­sary, including torture, targeted killings, and restrictions on human rights, to deal with the threat (see Jackson, 2007d). Rohan Gunaralna, Paul Wilkinson, and Daniel Byman. all major figures in the field, for example, have openly con­doned the extra-judicial assassination of terrorist leaders as a potentially effect­ive method of counterterrorism (sec Ciunaratna. 2003: 233 235; Wilkinson. 2002: 68; Byman, 2006, 2007). At the very least, it is commonly accepted that coercive instruments, including sanctions, pre-emption and military force, are both legal and effective forms of counterterrorism (see for example, Shult/ and Vogt. 2003; Byman, 2003). Often unstated, but appearing as a subtext, it is implicitly assumed that non-violent responses to terrorism such as dialogue and political reform are simply bound to fail in the current context (see Toros. forthcoming).

More specifically, as I have shown elsewhere (Jackson. 2005). the global counterterrorism campaign known as the 'war on terror' is based on a particular series of defining narratives. The most important narrative at the heart of the war on terror is the notion that the attacks of 11 September 2001 amounted to an "act of war'. This narrative in turn, logically implies that a war-based counterterror­ism strategy is both necessary to counter the threat and legal under international law. Consequently, a great many terrorism studies texts take it as axiomatic or common sense that the war on terror, and force-based counterterrorism in general, is both legitimate and efficacious. In this way. the notion that respond­ing to terrorism requires force and counter-violence, and sometimes even war and torture, has come to assume a form of widely accepted 'knowledge'.

In short, the assumptions, narratives and knowledge-practices I have described above, and quite a few more besides, collectively make up much of the widely accepted body of terrorism 'knowledge', or, the discourse of terrorism studies. This 'knowledge" is reproduced, often with little deviation from the central assumptions and narratives, continuously in the field's journals, confer­ences, and in literally thousands of publications every year by academics and think tanks. Furthermore, as Michael Stohl has recently illustrated, many of these core narratives or ‘myths', as he terms them, have proved to be extremely durable over several decades (see Stohl. 1979, 2008).

#### Terror scholarship focuses disproportionately on WMD impacts- the same stale assumptions are recycled with no regard for context.

Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College, 9

(Magnus, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p. 23, GAL)

By contrast, in 2007 alone, almost half of all articles (thirty-nine of eighty) were devoted to al-Qaeda or a 9/11-related topic such as martyrdom, suicide-bombings, or Muslim extremism. In fact, some have argued that the research agenda has disproportionately inflated the focus on certain topics such as al-Qaeda, suicide-bombing, and the threat of WMD (chemical, biological, radio­logical, nuclear, and explosive weapons (CBRNE)) terrorism. And yet. few studies exist on the polymorphous nature of al-Qaeda that capture the way different layers are structured and connected to each other and the way the regional and local affil­iations interact with core al-Qaeda elements and to different conflict zones (see Byman. 2007; Baaker and Boer, 2007). While it is true that 'terrorism exists as a rhizome, it is inherently nomadic' (Ausclmi el al., 2004), this has meant that al-Qaeda means simultaneously everything and nothing - a catch-all phrase for trying to describe complexity and anything unknown. Similarly, as argued by Gary Ackerman. the WMD studies literature has reached something of an interpretative impasse', in which terrorism researchers reiterate the same stale assumptions and mix different CBRN agents indiscriminately with each other and without regard for the specificity of context (Ackerman. 2005).

Threat of WMD terrorism is massively over-inflated- of the 300 most deadly terror attacks in the past 20 years, not one involved use of WMDs.

Silke, Chair in Criminology at the University of East London and the Programme Director for Terrorism Studies, 9

(Andrew, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth and Gunning, p. 44-45, GAL)

The increased work being focused on suicide terrorism is arguably both overdue and useful. However, increased research is also being focused on other aspects of terrorism which are less obviously of growing importance. Of particu­lar concern was the rapid growth in research investigating the (potential) use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear weapons (CBRN) - also often referred to as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) - by terrorists. Figure 2.7 shows that the amount of research focused on CBRN terrorism more than doubled in the first three years after 9/11. Yet why did this happen? After all, 9/11 was not a CBRN attack. Nearly 3,000 people may have been killed, but the hijackers did not use a nuclear bomb to cause the carnage, they did not spray poisonous chemicals into the atmo­sphere or release deadly viruses. They used box-cutters. Nevertheless, CBRN research experienced major growth in the aftermath. Arguably, CBRN research has always been over-subscribed. Prior to 9/11, nearly six times more research was being conducted on CBRN terrorist tactics than on suicide tactics. Indeed, no other terrorist tactic (car-bombings, hijack­ings, assassinations, and the like) received anywhere near as much research attention in the run-up to 9/11 as CBRN. If the relatively low amount of research attention which was given to al-Qaeda is judged to be the most serious failing of terrorism research in the years prior to 9/11, the relatively high amount of research focused on the terrorist use of CBRN must inevitably be seen as the next biggest blunder. To date, in the few cases where terrorists have attempted to develop CBRN weapons, they have almost always failed, in the handful of instances where they have actually managed to develop and use such weapons, the highest number of individuals they have ever been able to kill is twelve people. In the list of the 300 most destructive terrorist attacks of the past twenty years, not a single one involved the use of CBRN weapons. Yet somehow, one impact of the 9/11 attacks was that CBRN research already the most studied terrorist tactic during the 1990s - actually managed to attract even more research attention and funding, doubling the proportion of articles focused on CBRN in the journals. A degree of research looking at CBRN terrorism is justified. Instances such as the 1995 Tokyo subway attack and the post-9/11 anthrax letters show that CBRN attacks can happen (albeit only rarely). Such attacks have never caused mass fatalities however, and the popular acronym of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in describing CBRN weapons is desperately misleading. Despite the rarity and the extreme unlikelihood of terrorists being able to accomplish a truly devastating attack using these weapons CBRN remains a popular topic for government and funding bodies. They will award research grants for work on this topic when other far more common and consistently far more deadly terrorist tactics are ignored. This popularity with funding sources partly helps to explain the continuing high profile of CBRN in the literature. It has to be acknowledged, however, that some articles on the subject in the core journals are actually arguing that the issue is blown out of proportion and does not warrant the research funding it has and continues to receive (see Claridge. 1999; Leitenberg. 1999).

#### Threats of terrorism are massively exaggerated.

Mueller, Political Scientist in the field of international relations, 6

(John, September 2006, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?” Foreign Affairs, volume: 85 number: 5, p. 2, CPO)

A fully credible explanation for the fact that the United States has suffered no terrorist attacks since 9/11 is that the threat posed by homegrown or imported terrorists -- like that presented by Japanese Americans during World War II or by American Communists after it -- has been massively exaggerated. Is it possible that the haystack is essentially free of needles?

The FBI embraces a spooky I-think-therefore-they-are line of reasoning when assessing the purported terrorist menace. In 2003, its director, Robert Mueller, proclaimed, "The greatest threat is from al Qaeda cells in the U.S. that we have not yet identified." He rather mysteriously deemed the threat from those unidentified entities to be "increasing in part because of the heightened publicity" surrounding such episodes as the 2002 Washington sniper shootings and the 2001 anthrax attacks (which had nothing to do with al Qaeda). But in 2001, the 9/11 hijackers received no aid from U.S.-based al Qaeda operatives for the simple reason that no such operatives appear to have existed. It is not at all clear that that condition has changed.

Mueller also claimed to know that "al Qaeda maintains the ability and the intent to inflict significant casualties in the U.S. with little warning." If this was true -- if the terrorists had both the ability and the intent in 2003, and if the threat they presented was somehow increasing -- they had remained remarkably quiet by the time the unflappable Mueller repeated his alarmist mantra in 2005: "I remain very concerned about what we are not seeing."

#### The probability of a terrorist attack is low—no incentive and counterproductive

Mueller, Political Scientist in the field of international relations, 6

(John, September 2006, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?” Foreign Affairs, volume: 85 number: 5, p. 2, CPO)

One reason al Qaeda and "al Qaeda types" seem not to be trying very hard to repeat 9/11 may be that that dramatic act of destruction itself proved counterproductive by massively heightening concerns about terrorism around the world. No matter how much they might disagree on other issues (most notably on the war in Iraq), there is a compelling incentive for states -- even ones such as Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Syria -- to cooperate in cracking down on al Qaeda, because they know that they could easily be among its victims. The FBI may not have uncovered much of anything within the United States since 9/11, but thousands of apparent terrorists have been rounded, or rolled, up overseas with U.S. aid and encouragement.

Although some Arabs and Muslims took pleasure in the suffering inflicted on 9/11 -- Schadenfreude in German, shamateh in Arabic -- the most common response among jihadists and religious nationalists was a vehement rejection of al Qaeda's strategy and methods. When Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979, there were calls for jihad everywhere in Arab and Muslim lands, and tens of thousands flocked to the country to fight the invaders. In stark contrast, when the U.S. military invaded in 2001 to topple an Islamist regime, there was, as the political scientist Fawaz Gerges points out, a "deafening silence" from the Muslim world, and only a trickle of jihadists went to fight the Americans. Other jihadists publicly blamed al Qaeda for their post-9/11 problems and held the attacks to be shortsighted and hugely miscalculated.

#### Threat of terrorism is low—al Qaeda’s capacity has been overstated

Mueller, Political Scientist in the field of international relations, 6

(John, September 2006, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?” Foreign Affairs, volume: 85 number: 5, p. 2, CPO)

The results of policing activity overseas suggest that the absence of results in the United States has less to do with terrorists' cleverness or with investigative incompetence than with the possibility that few, if any, terrorists exist in the country. It also suggests that al Qaeda's ubiquity and capacity to do damage may have, as with so many perceived threats, been exaggerated. Just because some terrorists may wish to do great harm does not mean that they are able to.

Gerges argues that mainstream Islamists -- who make up the vast majority of the Islamist political movement -- gave up on the use of force before 9/11, except perhaps against Israel, and that the jihadists still committed to violence constitute a tiny minority. Even this small group primarily focuses on various "infidel" Muslim regimes and considers jihadists who carry out violence against the "far enemy" -- mainly Europe and the United States -- to be irresponsible, reckless adventurers who endanger the survival of the whole movement. In this view, 9/11 was a sign of al Qaeda's desperation, isolation, fragmentation, and decline, not of its strength.

### Field is Coopted

#### The entire field of terrorism studies is coopted by state interests- researchers should maintain independence and distance from the state to avoid feedback loops of incestuous echo-talk between terrorism researchers and policy-makers.

Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College, 9

(Magnus, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p. 25, GAL)

Over the last three decades, terrorism studies have been criticized for the event-driven nature of research efforts and its policy-driven character. The problem of perceived 'embedded' terrorism expertise existed well before 9/11, but the subsequent dramatic policy focus on terrorism has contributed to even more attention being paid to the nexus between policymakers in the corridors of power and terrorism expertise. As correctly argued by those advocating a critical terrorism studies approach, there is a danger that terrorism studies 'is a largely co-opted field of research that is deeply enmeshed with the actual practices of counterterrorism and the exercise of state power' (Jackson, 2007c: 245). There is a critical issue to bear in mind, namely, that terrorism research may be per­ceived to be co-opted by government interests and the associated risks of becoming an uncritical mouthpiece of state interests, rather than speaking truth to power (Gunning. 2007b: 240). It is critical to maintain an independent and non-operational role as a researcher in relation to the highly contentious term 'terrorism' and its essence as a subject matter.

The various sensational revelations of terrorist plots, many of which are still unverifiable through documentation, are illustrative of the problematic relationship between terrorism research and policymakers. The claims by Rohan Gunaratna that the 11 September 2001 hijackers planned to hijack a plane and crash it into Big Ben and the House of Commons is illustrative of many unsubstantiated claims by terror­ism experts allegedly based on privileged government access that go unchallenged (CNN, 2002). This and other unverifiable claims, often highly publicized at the lime of revelation, can often be confused with scientific fact and migrate into so-called "knowledge". It is starkly illustrative of the corrosive problem of'embedded expertise' that provides those critical of the field with ample ammunition to conduct assaults on the science. As poignantly argued by A. Jones, the problem with this is that 'researcher-policy maker relations often devolve into "slightly incestuous echo-talk"' (Jones, 2007). where policymakers and researchers are mutually reinforcing each others' claims as authoritative. Identification of boundaries is in the interest of both the terrorism researcher and policymakers. However, the post-9/11 milieu has produced even greater dangers of a new breed of'embedded expertise\* that exploits crevices in the undergrowth of terrorism studies field that provide them with enough grip to push forward effectively various duplicitous agendas under the guise of ‘honest' social scientific projects. As acknowledged by John Morgan, 'the unfor­tunate popularity of the study of terrorism has drawn a lot of opportunists who do not do serious work\* (Horgan. 2008: 58).

#### Their terrorism experts are an epistemic community who provide a cloak of objectivity for policymakers to justify military interventions throughout the global South.

Raphael, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Kingston University, London, 9

(Sam, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p. 49-51, GAL)

Over the past thirty years, a small but politically-significant academic field of 'terrorism studies\* has emerged from the relatively disparate research efforts of the 1960s and 1970s, and consolidated its position as a viable subset of 'security studies' (Rcid, 1993: 22; Laqueur, 2003: 141). Despite continuing concerns that the concept of 'terrorism', as nothing more than a specific socio-political phenom­enon, is not substantial enough to warrant an entire field of study (see Morgan and Boyle, 2008), it is nevertheless possible to identity a core set of scholars writing on the subject who together constitute an 'epistemic community' (Haas, 1992: 2 !\*>>. That is, there exists a 'network of knowledge-based experts' who have 'recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain'. This community, or 'network of productive authors', has operated by establishing research agendas, recruiting new members, securing funding opportunities, sponsoring conferences, maintaining informal contacts, and linking separate research groups (Reid. I99.V 1997). Regardless of the largely academic debate over whether the study of terror­ism should constitute an independent field, the existence of a clearly-identifiable research community (with particular individuals at its core) is a social fact.2

Further, this community has traditionally had significant influence when it comes to the formulation of government policy, particularly in the United States. It is not the case that the academic field of terrorism studies operates solely in the ivory towers of higher education; as noted in previous studies (Schmid ami Jongman. 1988: 181); Burnett and Whyte, 2005). it is a community which has intricate and multifaceted links with the structures and agents of state power, most obviously in Washington. Thus, many recognised terrorism experts have either had prior employment with, or major research contracts from, the Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, and other key US Govern­ment agencies (Herman and O'Sullivan. 1989: 142-190; RAND, 2004). Like­wise, a high proportion of'core experts’ in the field (see below) have been called over the past thirty years to testify in front of Congress on the subject of terrorism (Raphael, forthcoming). Either way, these scholars have fed their knowledge' straight into the policymaking process in the US.'

The close relationship between the academic field of terrorism studies and the US state means that it is critically important to analyse the research output from key experts within the community. This is particularly the case because of the aura of objectivity surrounding the terrorism 'knowledge\* generated by academic experts. Running throughout the core literature is a positivist assumption, explic­itly stated or otherwise, that the research conducted is apolitical and objective (see for example, Hoffman, 1992: 27; Wilkinson. 2003). There is little to no reflexivity on behalf of the scholars, who see themselves as wholly dissociated from the politics surrounding the subject of terrorism. This reification of acade­mic knowledge about terrorism is reinforced by those in positions of power in the US who tend to distinguish the experts from other kinds of overtly political actors. For example, academics are introduced to Congressional hearings in a manner which privileges their nonpartisan input:

Good morning. The Special Oversight Panel on Terrorism meets in open session to receive testimony and discuss the present and future course of ter­rorism in the Middle East.... It has been the Terrorism Panel's practice, in the interests of objectivity and withering all the facts, to pair classified briefings

and open briefings.... This way we garner the best that the classified world of intelligence has to offer and the best from independent scholars working in universities, think tanks, and other institutions...

(Saxton, 2010, emphasis added)

The representation of terrorism expertise as ‘independent' and as providing 'objectivity' and 'facts' has significance for its contribution to the policymaking process in the US. This is particularly the case given that, as we will see, core experts tend to insulate the broad direction of US policy from critique. Indeed, as Alexander George noted, it is precisely because 'they are trained to clothe their work in the trappings of objectivity, independence and scholarship' that expert research is 'particularly effective in securing influence and respect for' the claims made by US policymakers (George, 1991b: 77).

Given this, it becomes vital to subject the content of terrorism studies to close scrutiny. Based upon a wider, systematic study of the research output of key figures within the field (Raphael, forthcoming), and building upon previ­ous critiques of terrorism expertise (see Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Herman. 1982; Herman and 0'Sullivan, 1989; Chomsky. 1991; George, 1991; Jackson, 2007g). this chapter aims to provide a critical analysis of some of the major claims made by these experts and to reveal the ideological functions served by much of the research. Rather than doing so across the board, this chapter focuses on research on the subject of terrorism from the global South which is seen to challenge US interests. Examining this aspect of research is important, given that the 'threat' from this form of terrorism has led the US and its allies to intervene throughout the South on behalf of their national security, with profound consequences for the human security of people in the region.

Specifically, this chapter examines two major problematic features which characterise much of the field's research. First, in the context of anti-US terrorism in the South, many important claims made by key terrorism experts simply repli­cate official US government analyses. This replication is facilitated primarily through a sustained and uncritical reliance on selective US government sources, combined with the frequent use of unsubstantiated assertion. This is significant, not least because official analyses have often been revealed as presenting a politically-motivated account of the subject. Second, and partially as a result of this mirroring of government claims, the field tends to insulate from critique those 'counterterrorism' policies justified as a response to the terrorist threat. In particular, the experts overwhelmingly 'silence' the way terrorism is itself often used as a central strategy within US-led counterterrorist interventions in the South. That is, "counterterrorism" campaigns executed or supported by Washing­ton often deploy terrorism as a mode of controlling violence (Crelinsten, 2002: 83; Stohl.2006: 18-19).

These two features of the literature are hugely significant. Overall, the core figures in terrorism studies have, wittingly or otherwise, produced a body of work plagued by substantive problems which together shatter the illusion of 'objectivity'. Moreover, the research output can be seen to serve a very particu­lar ideological function for US foreign policy. Across the past thirty years, it has largely served the interests of US state power, primarily through legitimising an extensive set of coercive interventions in the global South undertaken under the rubric of various \*war(s) on terror'. After setting out the method by which key experts within the field have been identified, this chapter will outline the two main problematic features which characterise much of the research output by these scholars. It will then discuss the function that this research serves for the US state.

#### Methodology is wrong – suffers from state bias

Gunning (Jeroen Gunning; Reader in Middle East Politics and Conflict Studies, Durham University, UK) 07

Jeroen, 6-21-07 “Government and Opposition”, Blackwell Publishing, Vol.42, No. 3, pp. 363–393, MD

A related critique is that ‘terrorism studies’ tends to accept uncritically the framing of the ‘terrorism problem’ by the state. Herman and O’Sullivan observed this in their tirade against the ‘terrorism industry’, as did George, equally stridently, in his article ‘The Discipline of Terrorology’. 23 But even ‘engaged’ critics such as Silke, O’Leary, Crelinsten and Schmid and Jongman argue that ‘terrorism studies’ often suffers from state bias. Schmid and Jongman observed in exasperation that much of the ﬁeld’s output resembled ‘counterinsurgency masquerading as political science’. 24 Crelinsten, Silke and O’Leary were more forgiving, simply observing that, as a result of government-funding opportunities and afﬁnities between state institutions and researchers, research often displayed an uncritical orientation towards state perspectives and concerns. 25 The effect of this orientation can be seen in both methodology and in the types of questions that remain unasked. One of the reasons so few articles draw on personal interviews or attempt to understand those using terroristic methods subjectively, through empathy and placing oneself in their shoes, 26 is arguably this predisposition towards the status quo. This same orientation makes it difﬁcult to ask questions about the extent to which counter-terrorism policies perpetuate the ‘terrorist threat’ or whether political transformation may be more effective than mere coercive force aimed at eradication. Researchers may be too embedded socially and culturally in an entity under ‘attack’ from ‘others’ to engage these ‘others’ subjectively or contemplate radically different counter-terrorism tactics. Existing research foci and practices may also prevent researchers from doing so by acting as disciplining agents.

#### **All of their epistemological claims about terrorism are wrong because the state controls knowledge production.**

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 07

Richard, 1/9/07 “the core commitments of critical terrorism studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 1-8 md

Without discounting the contributions of positivist social science, I would argue that CTS rests firstly upon an understanding of knowledge as a social process constructed through language, discourse and inter-subjective practices. From this perspective, it is understood that terrorism knowledge always reflects the social– cultural context within which it emerges, which means among other things that it tends to be highly gendered and Eurocentric. CTS understands that knowledge is always intimately connected to power, that knowledge is ‘always for someone and for some purpose’ and that ‘regimes of truth’ function to entrench certain hierarchies of power and exclude alternative, counter-hegemonic forms of knowledge and practice. CTS therefore begins with an acceptance of the basic insecurity of all knowledge and the impossibility of neutral or objective knowledge about terrorism. It also evinces an acute sensitivity to the ways in which terrorism knowledge can be deployed as a political technology in the furtherance of hegemonic projects and directs attention to the interests that underlie knowledge claims. Thus, CTS starts by asking: who is terrorism knowledge for, and what functions does it serve in supporting their interests?

#### Their knowledge production is coopted: Terrorism studies is intimately connected with state priorities and perspectives.

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 07

Richard, 1/9/07 “the core commitments of critical terrorism studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 1-8 md

Second, traditional terrorism studies has its theoretical and institutional origins in orthodox security studies and counterinsurgency studies (Burnett and Whyte, 2005: 11–13; Schmid and Jongman, Q1 1988: 182). An influential review described much of the field’s early output as ‘counterinsurgency masquerading as political science’ (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 182). As a consequence, much terrorism research adopts state-centric priorities and perspectives and tends to reproduce a limited set of assumptions and narratives about the nature, causes and responses to terrorism. Collectively, these narratives make up a widely accepted ‘knowledge’ or discourse of terrorism (see Jackson, forthcoming, 2005). The key problem is that much of this ‘knowledge’ is highly contestable and largely unsupported by empirical research. In effect, this means that the field is in large part dominated by ‘a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths whose reach extends even to the most learned and experienced’ (Silke, 2004a: 20).

A third and related criticism of the field pertains to the ‘embedded’ or ‘organic’ nature of many terrorism experts and scholars; that is, the extent to which terrorism scholars are directly linked to state institutions and sources of power in ways that make it difficult to distinguish between the state and academic spheres (see George, 1991; Herman and O’Sullivan, 1989; Ilardi, 2004). Crucial in the evolution of what has been called ‘the terrorism industry’ has been the influence of the RAND Corporation, a non-profit research foundation founded by United States Air Force with deep ties to the American military and political establishments (Burnett and Whyte, 2005: 8). The main consequence of such links is that together with certain state, military, think-tank and public intellectuals, the leading terrorism studies scholars now constitute an influential and exclusive ‘epistemic community’ – a network of ‘specialists with a common world view about cause and effect relationships which relate to their domain of expertise, and common political values about the type of policies to which they should be applied’ (Stone, 1996: 86). From a Gramscian perspective, the core terrorism studies scholars can be understood as ‘organic intellectuals’ intimately connected – institutionally, financially, politically and ideologically – with a state hegemonic project.

### Field Coopted: [Alexander, Chalk, Cline, Laqueur, Livingstone]

#### Key terrorism experts work to legitimize counterterrorism by echoing unsubstantiated government assertions- the field has been heavily coopted throughout its history.

Raphael, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Kingston University, London, 9

(Sam, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p. 53-58, GAL)

The problems associated with the research output of terrorism studies do not characterise the entire work of all thirty-one core experts. Some, such as Crenshaw and CreIilisten, and to a lesser extent Schmid and Sprinzak, have at times adopted an agenda which critiques the general reliance on US government sources and which addresses some of the silences laid out in the present chapter. Indeed, it is possible to find examples of all of the key figures producing research which docs not directly serve the ideological function identified here (see Morgan and Boyle, 2008: 56). Notwithstanding this fact, however, a comprehensive survey of the output from these key scholars leads to the unavoidable conclusion that they over­whelmingly work to legitimise US counterterrorism policy. One may be able to identify specific passages which buck the trend in this regard. However, such instances are rare in the context of the millions of words and thousands of publica­tions cumulatively produced by these experts. Overall, following the methodology set out by Haas (1992: 35), the ideo­logical function described here is identified by this study as a result of the detailed examination of a wide range of publications authored by the key figures in the field. I surveyed literally hundreds of publications, ensuring a balanced inclusion of the scholars' major monographs, refereed-journal articles, and other publications (including Congressional testimonies and newspaper interviews), released across the thirty years during which the field has existed. When examining these sources, attention was paid to discussions regarding the nature of terrorism from the South which supposedly presented a threat to the interests of the US and its allies, as well as to the policies which were recommended in response. Where claims were made, the presence and content of any citations were analysed to reveal the empirical basis of the research. They were also over­laid with US government analysis of the same subject, in order to identify the degree to which the expert research confirmed or challenged this. By a wider reading of relevant literature, the study also revealed the silences which run through the research output. Given present space constraints, analysis will be focused on ten of the key experts who have testified to Congress at some point in the past thirty years, thus feeding their 'independent’ knowledge directly into a central policymaking forum. These individuals are in alphabetical order: Yonah Alexander, Peter Chalk, Ray Cline, Bruce Hoffman, Brian Jenkins. Robert Kuppennan, Walter Laqueur, Neil Livingstone. Ariel Merari. and Paul Wilkinson. References to particular publica­tions by these experts, cited here to support the argument, are necessarily illustrative rather than all-encompassing. Likewise, there is room here merely to outline the broad characteristics of the literature, and the mechanisms by which academic 'knowledge\* on terrorism works to legitimate US 'counterterror’ interventions in the global South. A more comprehensive account of the extent of the bias, and its often-complex position within the field can be found in a forthcoming major study (Raphael, forthcoming). The problem of sourcing The first significant characteristic of the core literature which ensures a legitimisation of policy is its often uncritical use of certain key US government sources, alongside the extensive reproduction of 'facts’ with little or no empirical basis. Many of the official documents and speeches used are highly political, with US administrations frequently presenting a particular understanding of the reality of terrorism in order to gain support for a specific set of interventions. Likewise, the continuous repetition of mere assertions, which take on appearance of 'facts', works to further distort the academic value of the research, and when these are aligned with official assertions, contribute to the overall legitimisation of policy. This characteristic is evident at many points throughout the literature; several examples of it in operation are highlighted here to provide an indication of its pervasiveness and significance. Terrorism studies literature published during the cold war overwhelmingly repli­cated the claims made by the Reagan administration that there existed a network of radical states throughout the South, ultimately supported by Moscow. This network was supposedly united in opposition to Washington and worked together to sponsor subversion and terrorism in order to undermine US interests (see Haig, 1981; Slnili/. cited in Omang. 19X4; Reagan, 1985). Such claims formed a central plank of US foreign policy analysis within Washington during the 1980s and provided the intellectual backdrop to an extensive set of "counterterror\* interventions throughoutthe South. Echoing official analysis, the core figures overwhelmingly signed up to some version of the 'Soviet network theory\* (amongst many, see Livingstone. 1980; Alexander, 1980; Elad and Merari, 1984; Kuppcrman and Taylor, 1985; Wilkinson. 1985: 74). Almost all experts reached a broad consensus regarding the Soviet use of 'surrogate or "proxy" forces to test the resolve of the West and to put pressure on the noncommunist world without running the risk of all-out war\* (Livingstone, 1980: 16). The Kremlin was claimed to support "terrorist opera­tions that attempt to tear down the fabric of Western society and weaken other nonsocialist governments1 (Alexander, 1985: 106). Moreover, this support was not undertaken on an ad hoc basis: 'there exists a carefully developed international terrorist infrastructure that serves Moscow's foreign policy objectives of destabil­ising non-Communist governments' (Cline and Alexander, 1984: 55. emphasis added). However, when this consensus analysis is examined in detail, with attention paid to the specific claims that facilitated such wide-ranging conclusions regarding Soviet sponsorship, it becomes clear that little evidence was presented that stood independent from key US government officials. As just one example, Cline and Alexander (1984: 29 30) base their analysis overwhelm­ingly upon congressional reports and other files of evidence\* presented by the Reagan administration. The entire foundation of their 'Soviet network' theory is therefore reliant on highly political sources of information. For instance, that the Kremlin was behind the purported Cuban sponsorship of terrorism was a claim made repeatedly by the authors, despite the fact that it relied solely on the remarks of extreme anti-Communist Senator Jeremiah Denton that the Soviets 'seem to direct certain Cuban activities' (Cline and Alexander. 1984: 72-73). Likewise, their claim that Libyan support for terrorism such that it exists -forms part of an identifiable Soviet-centred network is based upon the remarks of the State Department's spokesman who spoke of the 'surrogate use of Cubans and Libyans to assist terrorist organisations' (1984: 21), as well as a newspaper article which, when examined, refers to 'intelligence experts\* who 'suspect Libya of ... laundering Soviet money and disbursing it to terrorist groups' (C'haze, 1981. cited in Cline and Alexander, 1984: 21). To more fully examine the reliance on problematic government sources in the context of the "Soviet network theory' subscribed to by the experts, their analy­sis of'communist-inspired terrorism in Central America will now be explored. This is not the only example of relevance, but it provides a good insight into the pervasiveness of the problem. The cold war terrorism literature examined the terrorist threat in Central America in some depth, and echoing the claims made by the Reagan administration (see for example, Maig, cited in Pearce, 1982: 184). it overwhelmingly argued that such terrorism stemmed from the revolu­tionary objectives of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, backed up with ideo­logical and material support from Cuba, Libya, and the Soviet Union. For example. Kupperman and Taylor (1985: 210) claimed that '[violence and coun-terviolence have increased rapidly throughout the region as the Sandinistas and their supporters execute a long-term design to export totalitarian revolution\*. Indeed, the Sandinistas have 'engaged in subversive activities against neigh­bouring countries' (Elad and Mcrari. 1984: 55). However, as elsewhere, such claims are either entirely unsupported or rely solely on publications or speeches originating from a high-level within the US government. These include President Reagan himself, the US State Department, the Pentagon, and the Kissinger Commission (see for example. Boyd, 1985; Enders, 1982; State Department, 1983; Pentagon and State Department, 1983; National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. 1984)." in particular, key documents released by the State Department, which purported to demon­strate external influences in 1:1 Salvador are used entirely uncritically by the literature. Thus: In February 1981 the US Department of Slate issued a White Paper citing definitive evidence of support given to Salvadoran rebels in late 1979 and early 1980, immediately after the Communist takeover in Nicaragua, by the Soviet Union, Cuba. Hast Germany, and their allies…The evidence, drawn from captured guerrilla documents and war materiel and corroborated with intelligence reports, leaves no doubt that the Communist role was to provide direct and decisive support to Marxist factions in their effort to install a Communist regime against the will of the Salvadoran people. (('line and Alexander. 1984: 22. emphasis added) Indeed, several experts claimed explicitly that the Sandinistas were pursuing a "revolution without borders\* (see for example. Gonzalez et at., 1984: 12-13; Cline and Alexander, 1986: 68). This phrasing was lifted from the title of a State Depart­ment (1985) White Paper, where it was provided as an alleged excerpt from a speech by the Sandinista, Tomas Borgc, and used repeatedly by US officials to prove the expansionist and subversive nature of Nicaraguan foreign policy (Stokes. 2003: 89). Key claims made by the literature in relation to terrorism in Central America were supported by no independent evidence whatsoever, they were cither unsup­ported assertions or referenced back solely to US government sources. Such claims included the following; the logistical support provided to terrorists via the Cuban. Nicaraguan. and Libyan embassies in Panama {Alexander, 1989; 40); the presence of Nicaraguan and Cuban officials at the unification negotiations of the Guatemalan guerrilla groups (Wad and Merari, 1984: 28); Cuban support for llonduran terrorists (Livingstone. 1983a: 97); the provision of Cuban and Nicaraguan weapons and training to the FMLN in LI Salvador, and the further transfer of these weapons from the FMLN to terrorist groups throughout the region (Clinc and Alexander. 1986: 51); the arms deliveries from Libya to the Salvadoran guerrillas (as opposed to the sovereign state of Nicaragua) (Alexander. 1986: 11-12); the military training provided by Libya to the group (Cline and Alexander, 1984: 70); the operation of three training camps by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Nicaragua for teaching terrorist tactics to revolutionaries from Fl Salvador and other Latin American countries (Livingstone, 1983b: 8); and the Spanish group HTA's staging of terrorist opera­tions in the region on behalf of the Salvadoran guerrillas (Livingstone and Arnold. 1986; 20). In addition, ostensibly independent secondary sources cited by the terrorism experts are often themselves based upon uncritical readings of US government documentation (for example, Leiken, 1982. cited by Kupperman and Taylor, 1985: 210, is based largely upon State Department. 1981). This reliance by key experts on US government sources (if any) when dis­cussing communist-supported terrorism in Central America is not prima facie problematic. In actuality however, the body of research is built upon an uncritical acceptance of the Reagan administration's propaganda efforts to justify its military intervention in the region. Indeed, key evidence, such as that compiled by the administration regarding the shipment of arms to Salvadoran rebels by Cuba and the USSR through Nicaragua (State Department. 1981), was quickly revealed to form part of a 'public relations war'. These documents were 'quintessentially political", in that they were 'designed not so much to clarify the international dimensions of the Salvadoran civil war as to provide a justification for the Reagan administration's determination to cast the issue of El Salvador in East-West terms\* (LeoGrande, 1981: 43 47). Not only were these claims designed to per­suade public and elite opinion in the United States of the necessity of military aid to the Salvadoran and Honduran governments and to the Contras fighting in Nicaragua, but careful scholarship has also demonstrated many of them to be exaggerated, mis-contcxtualiscd. inconsistent, or even wholly inaccurate (see for example, Petras, 1981; LeoGrande, 1984: 252-254). Indeed, Human Rights Watch (1990) was clear that 'US pronouncements on human rights exaggerated and distorted the real human rights violations of the Sandinista regime', whilst the International Court of Justice (1986) found that although the US government 'con­tended that Nicaragua was actively supporting armed groups in lil Salvador', it could only 'infer the provision of aid from Nicaraguan territory, especially up to early 1981, (and] it remained to be proved, given the circumstances characterising that part of Central America, that the Nicaraguan government was at any time responsible". Of particular note, given its repetition by several terrorism experts, the use by administration officials of the Uorge's phrase 'a revolution without borders' as proof of the Sandinistas' expansionist plans was revealed to be a mis­representation of what Borge said. The actual words uttered by Borge reveal an entirely different meaning: 'This revolution transcends national boundaries. Our revolution has always been internationalist ... this does not mean that we export revolution' (Marcus, 1982: 132, cited in Stokes, 2003: 90. emphasis added). A similarly heavy reliance on official sources and unsubstantiated assertion characterises core terrorism research in the post-cold war era. Again, there is space only for a few illustrative examples. Indicative of scholarship in the 1990s dealing with state-sponsorship of terrorism is Hoffman's monograph (B. Hoffman. 1998: 191-196). which provides analysis of a very narrow set of states (those designated as sponsors by the US State Department). Moreover, this analysis is remarkably similar to that produced by government officials, a fact which is unsurprising, given the extent to which he draws upon the key government annual report on terrorism to demonstrate Iranian. Libyan, and Syrian sponsorship (State Department, 1997). Furthermore, this was complemented by the use for support of a 'recent high-level discussion paper circulated within the American intelligence community' when discussing ongoing Libyan sponsorship (Hoffman, 1998: 191); an assessment of 'Israeli and American intelligence sources' when considering the scale of Iranian arms shipments to Hezbollah; allegations by Secretary of State Warren Christopher regarding Iranian funding to Islamist groups (Jehl, 1996. cited in I). Hoffman. 1998: 194); and a presentation by, and personal discussions with. State Department officials regarding the groups training in the Bekaa Valley (Hoffman, 1998: 195). There is limited independent sourcing to back up the claims made, with many solely reliant on official sources. A similar picture can be found in many other core publications dealing with the subject of post-cold war state-sponsored ter­rorism, almost all of which focus exclusively on the sponsors outlined by the State Department, with official sources or simple assertions forming the major­ity of the support (see for example. Laqueur. 1999: 156-183; Wilkinson. 2002: 21.63 65). US government employees and documents are not the only official sources relied upon by the literature; over the past thirty years many of the claims made by the core experts find support from government agencies in pro-US states which are directly fighting the 'terrorist' threat and which are supported to do so by Washington. This can be seen throughout cold war scholarship where, for instance, Elad and Merari rely upon nothing other than a South African "security force spokesman\* as evidence that members of a national liberation movement (the South West African People's Organisation. SWAPO) had admitted to under­taking training in the Soviet Bloc (BBC. 1982. cited in Elad and Merari, 1984: 18). The release of such information came as high-level South African officials declared that the country was 'not going to sit back until it is too late to secure our survival' against the threat of a communist takeover in neighbouring South-West Africa (now Namibia) (Associated Press. 1982); a pretext for an acceleration of the national security slate against a supposed 'total onslaught' (Minter, 1994: 37). Again, the clearly political nature of such sources is left unacknowledged and unchallenged in the core literature. Likewise, Chalk's understanding of the nature of terrorism in Colombia and his consequent mirroring of US government analysis which consistently and overwhelmingly focuses on the activities of the FARC and FLN guerrilla groups (Stokes. 2005; State Department, IW). is heavily influenced by Colombian military briefings and interviews with Colombian defence officials (Rabasa and Chalk, 2001). This is regardless of the fact that the Colombian Defence Ministry was at the time engaged in a sustained campaign to persuade the US to remove official distinctions between "insurgents” and "drug traffick­ers' and allow funding to flow to campaigns against both. That this interest may lead Colombian officials to overplay the nature of the threat posed by leftist insurgents is a possibility not considered by Chalk, who deploys their claims uncritically in order to build an analysis closely mirroring that of the US government. The above examples are merely indicative of a wider manifestation of this reliance on official sources and on unsubstantiated assertion, in order to produce an analysis which mirrors directly that emerging from high-level officials in the US government.

### Low Barrier to Entry

#### There are no barriers of entry to the field: anyone can become a “terrorism expert” overnight.

Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College, 9

(Magnus, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p. 14-15 GAL)

Another exceptionally perceptive explanation offered to account for the absence of introspective critiques within the terrorism studies field is made by Lisa Stampnitzky. Convincingly, she argues that this absence is due to the fact there are no barriers of entry to the terrorism studies field and 'that a high pro­portion of those writing on the topic have no significant background in the topic' (Stampnitzky, 2007a). Unlike area studies or more professionally spe­cialized social scientific disciplines where there is greater rigor in peer-review practices and professionalized barriers of entry, any retrained Soviet special­ist or international relations generalist can in theory and practice become a specialized terrorism 'expert' overnight. As outlined by Andrew Silke. There were 490 articles in the two core terrorism studies journals in the period 1990-99 with 83 percent written by one-time authors (Silke, 2003).

The transitory nature of the field of terrorism studies can provide the seeds of intellectual vitality. However, it can also be a major drawback as very few one­time contributors are ambitious enough to critique the field of study or command enough knowledge to do so. The case made by Stampnitzky about no or low barriers of entry into terrorism studies is supported by Avishai Gordon's study that suggests that 'core journals in terrorism studies had significantly higher rates of contributions from non-academic authors than journals in political science or communication studies' (Gordon, 2001). Hence, even journalists, like Peter Bergen, without PhD or social scientific training in methodology or theory but with privileged access from the terror frontlines, have become the new form of'pseudo-academic' terrorism expert. As noted by Stampnitzky,

terrorism expertise is constructed and negotiated in an interstitial space between academia, the state, and the media. The boundaries of legitimate knowledge and expertise are particularly open to challenges from self-proclaimed experts from the media and political fields, and this has had

significant consequences for the sort of expert discourses that tend to be produced and disseminated.

(Stampnitzky, 2007b)

#### The way you become a terror expert is to declare yourself one- the literature is dominated by one time authors with no background in the field.

Stampnitzky, fellow at the Charles Warren Center for Studies in American History at Harvard University, 10

Lisa, 1/14/2010, “Disciplining an Unruly Field: Terrorism Experts and Theories of Scientific/Intellectual Production,” Springer Science and Business Media, page 1-19 md

There is no set career path to becoming a terrorism expert, nor is there any recognized credentialing body. As one expert noted, “My becoming a so-called expert on terrorism simply evolved from the fact that I spent such a lot of time talking about it” (Richard Clutterbuck, quoted in Kahn 1978, p. 55). Even specialized research journals and conferences, which represent the most professionalized and internally regulated areas of the terrorism studies world, have been populated by a high proportion of one-time authors, those who enter with no significant background in the field, and then disappear. Of 1,796 individuals presenting at conferences on terrorism between 1972 and 2001, 1,505 (84%) made only one appearance.14 Similarly, a study of journal articles published on terrorism during the 1990s found more than 80% to be by one-time authors (Silke 2004, p. 69), while another study found that core journals in terrorism studies had significantly higher rates of contributions from non-academic authors than journals in political science or communica- tions studies (Gordon 2001).

There is little regulation of who may become an expert, and the key audience for terrorism expertise has not been an ideal-typical scientific community, but rather the public and the state. The production of terrorism expertise has been particularly vulnerable to interlopers from other fields, including the political and military arenas, various academic disciplines, and the journalistic field. This produces an especially complex situation, since these fields of politics and the media are also sites for the legitimation and dissemination of terrorism expertise.

### No Primary Sources

#### Terror scholarship relies overwhelmingly on secondary sources which just recycle group-think.

Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College, 9

(Magnus, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p. 17 GAL)

Evidence-based research should be at the core of terrorism research. As argued by Sageman: 'there is no substitute for careful scrutiny of primary sources, field research, and analysis of court documents (in which suspected terrorists challenge government claims)\* (ibid.). The pre-9/11 literature on terrorism has been criti­cized for its over-reliance on recycled secondary sources and for academics being ensconced in ivory towers, instead of field research and talking to actual terrorists. As Andrew Silke showed, only roughly eleven percent of articles published in the period 1990 9 contained significant amounts of primary source interviews; the majority of articles relied exclusively on secondary sources (Silke, 2003). A prin­cipal problem with relying only on secondary material is naturally that no new information is generated, thereby complementing existing knowledge rather than pushing the research envelope in new directions. At the same time, terrorism researchers ought to be cautious about the scientific limits of relying on. and drawing over-generalised conclusions from, interviews with terrorists or former terrorists, especially when matched from different contexts, different degrees of involvement, all under different interview conditions. Some useful and limited insights can be made as long as the methodology is sound, as illustrated by John Morgan's interviews (since 2006) with twenty-eight former terrorists spanning thirteen organizations (including five extremist Islamist groups) about why they left the groups (Ripley, 200X). Similarly, Jeroen Gunning's use of interviews in shedding further light on Hamas's inner workings and the ideological framework of its members is another useful illustration of where primary research can unearth new and significant knowledge (Gunning. 2007c).

#### Our knowledge of terrorism is based entirely on recycled second hand knowledge

Gunning (Jeroen Gunning; Reader in Middle East Politics and Conflict Studies, Durham University, UK) 07

Jeroen, 6-21-07 “Government and Opposition”, Blackwell Publishing, Vol.42, No. 3, pp. 363–393, MD

Reviews of ‘terrorism studies’ – or ‘terrorism research’ for those who dispute that such a ﬁeld exists 8 – typically revolve around four sets of criticisms. One is the observed lack of primary research and the recycling of data. In their seminal review of the ﬁeld, Schmid and Jongman observed in 1988 that ‘there are probably few areas in the social science literature on which so much is written on the basis of so little research’, concluding that ‘as much as 80 per cent of the literature is not research-based in any rigorous sense; instead, it is too often narrative, condemnatory, and prescriptive’. 9 In 2004, Silke noted, on the basis of an analysis of articles published between 1995 and 1999 in the two key journals – Terrorism and Political Violence and Studies in Conﬂict and Terrorism – that ‘over 80 per cent of all research on “terrorism” is based either solely or primarily on data gathered from books, journals, the media or media-derived databases, or other published documents’. 10 In other words, it is predominantly based on ‘secondary data analysis’ and includes few primary sources or new data (for example, only 13 per cent of the articles drew substantially on personal interviews). 11 Or, as Silke commented in 2006, much of the research is little more than a gloriﬁed literature review. 12 Although Silke’s conclusion is somewhat undermined by his not differentiating between secondary documents and primary documents produced by insurgent groups (which appear to be used more frequently than personal interviews), 13 his overall observation that ‘terrorism research’ relies heavily on recycled data remains valid.

### Event-Driven

#### Terrorism research is like a children’s soccer game- everyone chases after the latest trends with no sense of larger strategy. Their scholarship is event driven and lacks the larger context necessary to form a cohesive theory.

Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College, 9

(Magnus, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p. 18, GAL)

The steady proliferation of terrorism publications after 9/11 has not necessar­ily increased a balanced analytical focus. According to Andrew Silke. excessive focus on suicide terrorism has contributed to skewing the research focus on certain issues at the peril of ignoring other forms of terrorism and in different historical, political, and social contexts other than the contemporary Arab world or south Asia (Silke, 2004c). Conceptual issues such as the definitional debate and the history of terrorism continue to be largely ignored. A key problem is that current terrorism research efforts can be compared to a game of children's foot­ball where all the players are rushing after the ball (the latest terrorism trends) without a strategy, rather than marking different players or utilizing different areas of the pitch.

Although recent years have seen some major leaps in the quantity, and to some extent, quality of research output, terrorism studies research suffers from serious shortcomings as it needs to further develop theoretically and methodolog­ically. As authoritatively argued by terrorism studies doyenne Martha Crenshaw, the problem is that the field

is probably still plagued by the enduring challenges posed by a lack of definition (what terrorism constitutes); the inability to build a cohesive integrated and cumulative theory (built around larger data-sets and over longer time periods) and the event-driven character of much research.

(Crenshaw. 2000: 405)

### Ahistorical/Lacks Context

#### Their research ignores historical context- terrorism is at least a 2,000 year old phenomenon, but their literature is entirely driven by short term threat assessment.

Silke, Chair in Criminology at the University of East London and the Programme Director for Terrorism Studies, 9

(Andrew, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth and Gunning, p. 44-45-46, GAL)

Terrorism research has never been especially good at exploring the past. Prior to 9/11, only 3.9 percent of articles examined non-contemporary terrorism and less than half of these looked at terrorism prior to 1960. We know that terrorism is not a recent phenomenon and that it has been occurring in some form or another for over 2,000 years (Asprey, 1994). Yet this wider context is almost entirely ignored, as terrorism research is increasingly driven by a need to provide a short-term, immediate assessment of current groups and threats. Efforts to estab­lish more contextualized and stable guiding principles have been almost entirely side-lined. As Figure 2.X shows, very little research explores past terrorist con­flicts. Before 9/11, only one article in twenty-six looked at historical conflicts. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, interest in historical cases effectively collapsed and not even one article in fifty was focused away from current events. It is natural and reasonable that, in the years immediately after the most destructive terrorist attacks in recorded history, the research field should focus heavily on the now, on current issues, actors, and events. Such a strong focus on contemporary issues, however, runs the real risk of losing an understanding of the broader context of terrorist conflicts, patterns, and trends and without such awareness important lessons can be missed.

### Positivism/Empiricism

#### Their reliance on positivism and empiricism presents terrorism as an objective, neutral, and unproblematic field of inquiry.

Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.70-71, GAL)

Lastly, the majority of terrorism studies texts take as their starting point the assumption that terrorism is a phenomenon that can he understood and studied fairly objectively and can be explained using traditional social scientific method­ologies. Consequently, the majority of terrorism studies research tends to adopt a positivist ontology and employ empirical methodologies involving the collection of observable quantitative, case study, and historical data. Related to this, in the vast majority of studies, scholars rely on secondary information gathered from news media, government sources, or intelligence agencies (Silke, 2004d; Silke. Ranstorp. Raphael. Breen Smyth, this volume). Great store is put in large 'objec­tive' databases on terrorism for example, such as the RAND-MIPT (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism) Terrorism Incident Database (RAND. 2006). which are then widely used to develop statistical models and investigate correlations. In combination, these underlying assumptions and conceptual prac­tices construct a widely accepted 'knowledge' that terrorism is a relatively unproblematic form of non-state violence that can be objectively identified, measured and systematically studied.

# Impacts

### Endless War

#### The core terrorism narrative creates an insatiable war machine which continually demands new blood- new wars must be constantly found and justified.

Debrix Professor of International Relations at Florida International University 7

(François Debrix is Associate Professor of International Relations at Florida International University in Miami, “Tabloid Terror”, Page #117-118, NC)

In his essay produced a few days after the 9/11 attacks, Baudrillard writes: “[N]obody seems to have understood that Good and Evil climb to power at the same time and in the same move.” Baudrillard goes on: “The triumph of the one does not imply the vanquishing of the other . . . At the bottom, Good could only defeat Evil by renouncing its claim to be Good.”112 Turning to final/fatal truths (defeating “evil,” protecting the “good,” revealing the ultimate “what is,” absolutely triumphing over despair) and making use of total heroic warfare as a preferred technique to reach such truths is a self-defeating project, Baudrillard intimates. Only by becoming what one never wants to be and what one allegedly abjects can such a prophecy become realized. “Good” can triumph over “evil” only by renouncing its claim to be good, as Baudrillard suggests, and the American state/nation can only defeat terror and terrorism by turning into a terrifying and terrorizing war machine. But, in order to avoid the frightful revelation that, eventually, if “we” do take this path, “we” may be no different from “them” (and that in fact “we” are abject and crave abjection) and, moreover, “our” ideologies and moralities may be just as disruptive and even destructive as “theirs” are said to be,113 “we” must try to postpone this ultimate realization. In the meantime, to lend credence to the moral superiority (the “good”) of our ideologies and policies (and to convince “ourselves” that “we” are different, that “we” are not “evil”), “we” seek to mark the distinction between “us” and “them” through the use of the war machine, through countless instances of agonal violence. Yet, as was the case with abjection, this sovereign agonal violence brings “us” ever closer to being undistinguishable from “them.” In these instances of agony that endlessly seek to postpone the fateful realization that “our” so-called better and superior values may themselves, sometimes, be “evil” (at least, to some “others”), the aesthetics of combat and destruction are prized for what they show, that is to say, for the heroism of the deed that they appear to reveal, and nothing else. Foolishly, “we” believe (often because “we” are told that this is so, that it is what “we” need to escape loss and despair) that only in those moments can the claim that “we” are “good” and that “they” are “evil” be demonstrated. This modality of action that advocates sovereignty, victory, and salvation from “evil” through the glory of war’s theatrical brutality is the most insecure and unsafe strategy that could ever be selected. Far from (re)securing the state, the nation, or those who believe or have been told they are “good,” it puts us all on a path toward annihilation. The war machine demands ever more blood, ever more battles, and ever more deaths. Since the fateful end can never be accepted or reached (for then, as Baudrillard claims, “we” would have to see that the “good” is indeed not “good” as such, and perhaps not so distinguishable from “evil”), new wars have to be found and must be justified. This is exactly the message that American tabloid imperialistic proponents of agonal violence (and not just statecraft anymore) like Kaplan and Kristol and Ledeen, among others, leave us with. The wars that have been started by the American war machine after 9/11 and championed by these tabloid intellectuals of terror and absolute warfare are just the beginning of things to come. They are part and parcel of an approach to security and sovereignty ad absurdum, one that secretly (or unconsciously perhaps) recognizes that the “evil” it fights will never be caught, or else the moment of confrontation between “our good” and “their evil” would take place and reveal not a final triumph of the “good,” but rather its possible indistinction from “evil.” (Could we perhaps not use this critical insight to make sense of the decision by the United States’ war makers in the summer to fall of 2002, when it appeared that they had cornered Bin Laden in some caves in the mountains separating Afghanistan from Pakistan, around an area called Tora Bora, to turn around and start up a plan to invade Iraq instead?).

### Epistemology/Method First

#### Vote Neg- Our criticism of their knowledge production is a necessary precursor to any further research. Reject their non-falsifiable conclusions which fail basic epistemological standards for social science.

Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College, 9

(Magnus, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p. 13-14 GAL)

For almost thirty years the terrorism studies field occupied a marginal position within mainstream academic circles. Only a handful of academics toiled away individually to provide some social scientific meaning and order out of a catalogue of acute terrorism crisis events as they unfolded across time and contexts. This intellectual effort was largely preoccupied with immediate events, academics being engulfed in making sense of evolving trends and in trying to predict what new waves of terrorism would appear on the horizon. Towards these ends, researchers developed various theories of terrorism. They focused principally on the causes of the phenomenon, the evolution and dynamics of terrorist groups, and how to deal with it from a state perspective (Maskaliunaite, 2004). Some argued that 'the very fact that the subject of terrorism is studied from so many different angles may well be an advantage and not a shortcoming of the field\* (ibid.). It requires increasingly interdisciplinary collaboration, as terrorism in the age of globalization and increased complexity can be characterized, in the words of Nancy Hayden, as a 'wicked problem\* (Hayden. 2006). As such, it requires knit ling together a range of disciplinary approaches outside of international relations and security studies. This social and behavioral research is inherently difficult to conduct as it is 'socially constructed, culturally specific and changing\* (Stohl. 2005: 28). Others scathingly 'characterized the field of terrorism studies as stag­nant, poorly conceptualized, lacking in rigor, and devoid of adequate theory, data, and methods\* (Stampnitzky, 2007a). As Alex Schmid and Berto Jongman lamented back in 1988: "there are probably few areas in the social science liter­ature in which so much is written on the basis of so little research' (Schmid and Jongman, 1988).

A principal cause for this critique is the surprisingly few research inventories conducted over the years designed to fundamentally question theories, assump­tions, and knowledge production. This type of state-of-the-art research inventory is necessary for preparing the next wave of research. My own anthology. *Mapping Terrorism Research* (2006a), convinced me that every new researcher entering the field of terrorism studies ought to produce their own critique and research inven­tory as a precursor for any further research - to fundamentally question established epistemological and methodological approaches. Far too few self-reflexive books, chapters, or journal articles actually exist taking stock in a unifying sense of the terrorism studies field to account for what we know; how we know what we know; and what research questions we ought to focus on in terms of individual and collective research efforts, even fewer exist which address the theory and methods of studying terrorism. One explanation for this absence pertains to the relative absence of debate among the orthodox terrorism scholars. This 'invisible college' of terrorism researchers often recycled empirical information, some with ques­tionable credibility and precision, and interchanged contexts, frequently without sufficient regard for situational, political, social or security specificity. As argued by Martha Crenshaw, researchers should try to avoid 'constructing general cat­egories of terrorist actors that lump together dissimilar motivations, organizations, resources and contexts' (Crenshaw. 2000: 405). Often disparate evidence is woven together selectively to suit the case without regard for specific context. Relying on each others' work alongside government and media reports produced an ever-expanding intellectual quilt that had a tendency to grow in size, but less in layered intellectual depth. The same mantras or analogies - as exemplified by Brian Jenkins\* 'terrorism likes a lot of people watching not a lot of people dead\* (see Jenkins. 1998) - appeared across the terrorism studies literature without anyone ever critically questioning what it really meant and the social scientific basis or qualitative quantitative method for getting to this conclusion. This problem has been underscored by Michael Stohl who accurately pointed towards what:

Popper (1934) might caustically designate as 'wisdom\* rather than 'science'. Thus, the assembled wisdom might be correct but the demarcation between wisdom and science that would allow proposing the necessary conjectures, collecting the appropriate data and subjecting these conjectures and data to tests which might arguably demonstrate their falsifiability has not yet met the standards of social science epistemology.(Stohl, 2005) As complained by Schmid and Jongman. much of the writing in terrorism studies is 'impressionistic, superficial, and at the same time often also preten­tious, venturing far-reaching generalizations on the basis of episodal evidence' (Schmid and Jongman. 1988).

#### Our methodological and epistemological criticisms come first- it’s the only way to resolve contradictory findings and improve knowledge production.

Ranstorp, Research Director of the Centre for Asymmetric Threat Studies at the Swedish National Defence College, 9

(Magnus, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p. 32-33, GAL)

Boundless research horizons have opened up as a result of 9/11, which has moved terrorism studies from the periphery to center stage. Much rich knowledge exists on various dimensions of terrorism that needs to be explored in greater ana­lytical depth and through interdisciplinary breadth. Taking intellectual stock as to the state of the art of terrorism research and where there are problems and prospects is essential in order to reflect on past achievements and where research needs to head. Terrorism research has come a long way, but has even further to journey in different directions. The time has come for more rigorous research inventories and exploration of muliidisciplinary approaches into terrorism as a complex social and behavioral phenomenon. In turn, this multi-disciplinarity

requires self-reflexivity about methodology, ontology, and epistemology to work. Otherwise, you end up with mutually contradictory findings with no way of adjudicating between them or resolving them. More orthodox terrorism studies ought to recognize that vigorous debates, critical self-reflexivity, and alternative analytical assumptions and approaches do not constitute a threat to knowledge production, but instead, are essential ingredients for moving the next wave of pioneering research forward. After all, this is the very essence of the academic enterprise.

### Discourse/Representations Matter

#### Terrorism is socially constructed via speech acts by policymakers and academics- their narrative constructs terrorism as exclusively practiced by non-state actors, over-exaggerates the scope of the threat, and ascribes all terrorism to religious or psychological motivations. Destabilizing this narrative opens space to pursue alternative political projects.

Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.74-7, GAL)

Having briefly outlined some of its main characteristics, the purpose of this section is to provide a critical analysis of the broader terrorism studies discourse employing a first and second order critique. The main argument I wish to advance here is that most of what is accepted as well-founded 'knowledge’ in terrorism studies is, in fact, highly debatable and unstable. More importantly, this know­ledge functions ideologically in society to reify existing power structures and advance particular political projects.

First order critique

As explained earlier, a first order or immanent critique employs the same modes of analysis and categories to criticise the discourse on its own terms and expose the events and perspectives that the discourse fails to acknowledge or address. From this perspective, and employing the same social scientific modes of analy­sis, terminology, and empirical and analytical categories employed within terrorism studies, as well as many of its own texts and authors, it can be argued that virtually all the narratives and assumptions described in the previous section are contestable and subject to doubt There is not the space here to provide counter-evidence or arguments to all the assumptions and narratives of the wider dis­course; I have provided more detailed counter-evidence to many of them

elsewhere (see Jackson, 200Sa. 2008b. 2007a. 2007b, 2007c). It must instead suffice to discuss a few points which illustrate how unstable and contested this widely accepted ‘knowledge' is. The following discussion therefore focuses on a limited number of core narratives, such as the terrorism threat, "new terrorism', and counterterrorism narratives.

In the first instance, the conceptual practices which construct terrorism exclus­ively as a form of non-state violence are highly contestable. Given that terrorism is a violent tactic in the same way that ambushes are a tactic, it makes little sense to argue that some actors (such as states) are precluded from employing the tactic of terrorism (or ambushes). A bomb planted in a public place where civilians are likely to be randomly killed and that is aimed at causing widespread terror in an audience is an act of terrorism regardless of whether it is enacted by non-state actors or by agents acting on behalf of the state (sec Jackson. 2008a). It can there­fore be argued that if terrorism refers to violence directed towards or threatened against civilians which is designed to instill terror or intimidate a population for political reasons a relatively uncontroversial definition within the field and wider society then states can also commit acts of terrorism. Furthermore, as I and many others have documented elsewhere (for a summary, see Jackson. 2008b), states have killed, tortured, and terrorised on a truly vast scale over the past few decades, and a great many continue to do so today in places like Colombia, Zimbabwe, Darfur, Myanmar, Palestine, Chechnya. Iraq and else­where. Moreover, the deliberate and systematic use of political terror by Western democratic slates during the colonial period, in the 'terror bombing' of World War II and other air campaigns, during cold war counter-insurgency and pro-insurgency campaigns, through the sponsorship of right-wing terrorist groups and during certain counterterrorism campaigns, among others, is extremely well documented (see, among many others, Gareau. 2004; Grey, 2006; Grosscup. 2006; Sluka, 2000a; Blakclcy, 2006, forthcoming; Blum, 1995; Chomsky, 1985; Gabelnick el al, 1999; Herman. 1982; Human Rights Watch. 2001. 2002; Klare, 1989: Minter. 1994; Stokes. 2005.2006; McSherry. 2002).

The assumption that terrorism can he objectively defined and studied is also highly questionable and far more complex than this. It can be argued that terrorism is not a causally coherent, free-standing phenomenon which can be identified in terms of characteristics inherent to the violence itself (see Jackson, 2008a). In the first instance, 'the nature of terrorism is not inherent in the violent act itself. One and the same act ... can be terrorist or not, depending on intention and circum­stance’ (Schmid and Jongman, 1988: 101) and depending on who is describing the act. The killing of civilians, for example, is not always or inherently a terrorist act; it could perhaps be the unintentional consequence of a military operation during war. Terrorism is therefore a social fact rather than a brute fact, and like 'security', it is constructed through speech-acts by socially authorised speakers. That is, 'terrorism' is constituted by and through an identifiable set of discursive practices - such as the categorisation and collection of data by academics and security officials, and the codification of certain actions in law which thus make it a contingent 'reality’ for politicians, law enforcement officials, the media, the public, academics, and so on. In fact, the current discourse of terrorism used by scholars, politicians and the media is a very recent invention. Before the late 1960s, there was virtually no "terrorism" spoken of by politicians, the media, or academics; instead, acts of political violence were described simply as 'bomb­ings', 'kidnappings', 'assassinations', 'hijackings', and the like (see Zulaika and Douglass. 1996). In an important sense then, terrorism does not exist outside of the definitions and practices which seek to enclose it, including those of the terrorism studies field.

Second, an increasing number of studies suggest that the threat of terrorism to Western or international security is vastly over-exaggerated (see Jackson. 2007c; Mueller, 2006). Related to this, a number of scholars have convincingly argued that the likelihood of terrorists deploying weapons of mass destruction is in fact, miniscule (B. Jenkins. 199$), as is the likelihood that so-called rogue states would provide WMD to terrorists. A number of recent studies have also seriously questioned the notion of 'new terrorism’, demonstrating empirically and through reasoned argument that the continuities between 'new\* and 'old' terrorism are much greater than any differences. In particular, they show how the assertion that the 'new terrorism' is primarily motivated by religious concerns is largely unsup­ported by the evidence (Copeland. 2001; Duyvesteyn, 2004), as is the assertion that 'new terrorists" are less constrained in their targeting of civilians.

Third, considering the key narratives about the origins and causes of terrorism, studies by psychologists reveal that there is little if any evidence of a 'terrorist personality" or any discernable psychopathology among individuals involved in terrorism (Morgan, 2005; Silke. 1998). Nor is there any real evidence that suicide bombers are primarily driven by sexual frustration or that they are 'brainwashed' or 'radicalised' in mosques or on the internet (see Sageman. 2004).

More importantly, a number of major empirical studies have thrown doubt on the broader assertion of a direct causal link between religion and terrorism and, specifically, the link between Islam and terrorism. The Chicago Project on Suicide Terrorism for example, which compiled a database on every case of suicide terror­ism from 1980 to 2003, some 315 attacks in all, concluded that 'there is little con­nection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism, or any one of the worlds religions' (Pape, 2005: 4). Some of the key findings of the study include: only about half of the suicide attacks from this period can be associated by group or individual characteristics with Islamic fundamentalism; the leading practitioners of suicide terrorism are the secular, Marxist-Leninist Tamil Tigers, who commit­ted seventy-six attacks: of the 354 individual attackers on which data could be found, only 166. or 43 per cent, were religious; and 95 per cent of suicide attacks can be shown to be part of a broader political and military campaign which has a secular and strategic goal, namely, to end what is perceived as foreign occupation (Pape, 2005: 4, 17, 139, 210). Robert Pape's findings are supported by other studies which throw doubt on the purported religion-terrorism link (see Bloom, 2005: Sageman. 2004; Holmes. 2005).

Lastly, there are a number of important studies which suggest that force-based approaches to counterterrorism are not only ineffective and counterproductive, but can also be damaging to individuals, communities, and human rights (see Hillyard, 1993; Cole. 2003). Certainly, there are powerful arguments to be made against the use of torture in counterterrorism (Brechcr. 2007; Scarry. 2004; Jackson, 2007d), and a growing number of studies which are highly critical of the efficacy and wider consequences of the war on terrorism (see. among many others. Rogers, 2007; Cole, 2007; Luslick. 2006).

In sum, much of what is accepted as unproblematic 'knowledge' in terrorism studies is actually of dubious provenance. In a major review of the field, Andrew Silke has described it as 'a cabal of virulent myths and half-truths whose reach extends even to the most learned and experienced’ (Silke, 2004b: 20). However, the purpose of the first order critique I have undertaken here is not necessarily to establish the real and final 'truth' about terrorism. Rather, first order critique aims simply to destabilise dominant understandings and accepted knowledge, expose the biases and imbalances in the field, and suggest that other ways of understand­ing, conceptualising, and studying the subject - other ways of 'knowing’ - are possible. This kind of critical destabilisation is useful for opening up the space needed to ask new kinds of analytical and normative questions and to pursue alternative intellectual and political projects.

#### Language shapes reality- their terrorism discourse is a regime of truth with is used by elites to legitimize their policies.

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 11

Richard, 3/1/11, “Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of ) change in US counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama,” Macmillan Publishers, Volume 48: Number 2/3, page 390–411 md

Across American politics and society therefore, through these myriad social practices and sites, the language and narratives of the war on terror have taken on a kind of material externality that creates a shared understanding of the new ‘reality’ of the threat of terrorism – a ‘grid of intelligibility’ (Milliken, 1999, p. 230) – through which to interpret events, distinguish truth and falsity, and determine future courses of action. This circular system of knowledge production in which a discourse is accepted as true and an interlocking complex of social institutions and processes then functions to make it true, can be understood as a ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault, 2002, pp. 131–132). This shared understanding not only provides a cultural resource which political elites can ‘hail’ or tap into when trying to legitimise or ‘sell’ new policies and programmes, as well as a social structure which constrains the choices elites have in articulating their policies, but is a form of power wielded by elites in itself. This is because the accepted knowledge about terrorism works for the interests of the elites who articulate and seek to normalise it (see Cox, 1981).

#### Discourse analysis is key to analyze the political consequences of adopting a particular mode of representation- their narrative excludes alternative representations.

Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.67-68, GAL)

The approach I have utilised to examine the discourse of terrorism studies falls broadly under the mantle of discourse analysis (see Milliken. 1999; Laffey and Weldes, 1997; Purvis and I hint, 1993; Yce, 1996). Discourse analysis is a form of critical theorising which aims primarily to illustrate and describe the relationship between textual and social and political processes. It is particularly concerned with the politics of representation the manifest political or ideological consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another. In this case I am concerned with the ways in which the subject of terrorism and counterterrorism is represented, narrated, and studied within the terrorism studies field.

Although discourse theorising is employed within a range of different epistemological paradigms, including post-stmcturalist. postmodernist, feminist, and social constructivist approaches, it is predicated on a shared set of theoretical commitments (Milliken. 1999). Broadly speaking, these include: an understand­ing of language as constitutive or productive of meaning; an understanding of discourse as structures of signification which construct social and political realities, particularly in terms of defining subjects and establishing their rela­tional positions within a system of signification; an understanding of discourse as being productive of subjects authorised to speak and act. legitimate forms of knowledge and political practices and. importantly, common sense within particular social groups and historical settings; an understanding of discourse as necessarily exclusionary and silencing of other modes of representation; and an understanding of discourse as historically and culturally contingent, inter-textual, open-ended, requiring continuous articulation and re-articulation and. therefore, open to destabilisation and counter-hegemonic struggle.

#### Their discourse and knowledge production construct reality- the War on Terror narrative sustains a regime of truth which has real world consequences.

Hodges 11 (Adam, Postdoctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Carnegie Mellon University, “The War on Terror Narrative: Discourse and Intertextuality in the Construction and Contestation of Sociopolitical Reality”, pg. 3, July 10, 2012, DAG)  
  
Immediately upon the impact of the first plane into the north lower of the World Trade Center on September II, 2001, people began talking. Live images of lower Manhattan and accompanying words were broadcast across the nation and around the world. Journalists began to ask questions, bystanders recounted their personal experience of the events, and the nation (and broader world) entered into a conversation about the nature and meaning of what would come to be known as "9/II" and its aftermath. The events of 9/11 have produced an abundance of reactions, among scholars in particular and the nation in general. Regardless of the specific details of those reactions, they all have one thing in common: they are interpretive acts achieved through discourse. Although the events of 9/11 are actual happenings in the world, those events do not intrinsically contain their own interpretation. Only through language are such events turned into a full account of that experience. Through language, we name protagonists. that applying ideas on intertextuality to the analysis of political discourse is central to understanding this micro/macro connection. As widely recognized by language scholars, language—and more specifically, discourse—does not simply reflect events that take place in the world. Discourse infuses events with meaning, establishes widespread social understandings, and constitutes social reality. The beginning of the 9/11 Commission's Executive Summary states, "At 8:46 on the morning of September 11. 2001, the United States became a nation transformed" (NC 2004a: 1). Yet any transformation that may have occurred was realized through discourse and the stories told about the experience. As Bruner (1991) notes, "we organize our experience and our memory of human happenings mainly in the form of narrative—stories, excuses, myths, reasons for doing and not doing, and so on" (4). The Bush "War on Terror" Narrative has provided "the official story, the dominant frame" (Chernus 2006: 4) for understanding 9/11 and America's response to terrorism. It has allowed for the discursive justification not just of a metaphorical "war on terror" but of the very real wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. At the outset, it is worth emphasizing both what this book is about and what it is not about. I am not attempting to assess the truth of the statements that underlie the Bush "War on Terror" Narrative. That is, I am not attempting to assess the Narrative's adequacy (or lack thereof) for accurately describing and explaining the world. Instead, the point is to focus on the way discourse effectively brings into existence a "truth" with real world consequences rather than to evaluate that truth against a supposedly more objective body of knowledge.1 In Foucault's (1980) terms, the Bush "War on Terror" Narrative is a type of discursive formation that sustains a regime of truth. It places boundaries around what can meaningfully be said and understood about the subject. As Blommaert (2005) summarizes. "'Whenever we speak, we speak from within a particular regime of language (the title of Kroskrity 2000)'" (102: italics in original). The Narrative has provided that regime from within which supporters and critics of the Bush administration have operated. Regardless of the accuracy of the assumptions and explanations that the Narrative forwards about America's struggle against terrorism since September II, 2001, the knowledge that it spawns serves as the truth in the sense that it produces real effects in the world.

#### Their discourse is part of the War on Terror discourse which constrains thinking and understanding.

Hodges 11 (Adam, Postdoctoral Fellow in the Humanities at Carnegie Mellon University, “The War on Terror Narrative: Discourse and Intertextuality in the Construction and Contestation of Sociopolitical Reality”, pg. 7, July 10, 2012, DAG)

Central to the analysis in this book is a broad understanding of discourse, which takes into account Foucault's (1972) conception of the term. Thus, it is important to lay some definitional groundwork by differentiating between discourse in the linguistic sense and discourses in the Foucauldian sense. Most simply, the term discourse refers to language use: and the study of discourse from a sociolinguistic perspective deals with the situated use of language, or language use in context (Brown and Yule 1983). Yet Foucault's notion of discourse adds a different understanding. Foucault speaks not just of discourse, but of "a discourse" or "discourses" (as a count noun). A discourse is a "way of representing the knowledge about [...] a particular topic at a particular historical moment" (Hall 1997: 44). It refers to the "forms of knowledge or powerful sets of assumptions, expectations and explanations, governing mainstream social and cultural practices" (Baxter 2003: 7). In other words, a discourse regulates the way a topic can be talked about meaningfully in a particular culture at a particular point in history. For example, Foucault (1978) examines the discourse of sexuality, which provides a way for talking about and governing forms of sexual behavior. As Foucault describes, it only makes sense to talk about certain social subjects (e.g.. the "homosexual") within this particular discourse, or discursive formation. Moreover, for Foucault. discourse not only refers to objects of knowledge, but constitutes those objects of knowledge. Thus, '"the homosexual' as a specific kind of social subject, was produced, and could only make its appearance" (Hall 1997: 46: italics in original) within the discourse of sexuality that arose, as Foucault (1978) documents, in the late nineteenth century. Within the context of this books topic, the Bush "War on Terror" Narrative provides a way for talking about Americas response to terrorism after September 11. 2001. This discourse, in the Foucauldian sense, governs public discussion and debate on the topic. It provides a common language to refer to objects of knowledge. For example, the crashing of airplanes into the World Trade Center becomes an "act of war" that launches a "war on terror." Moreover, this discourse effectively constitutes these and other understandings of the world. Instead of being seen as one among several possible interpretations, the "war on terror" discourse becomes naturalized as a widely accepted, "common sense" way for viewing and talking about 9/11 and Americas response to terrorism. In Foucauldian terms, the Narrative represents the knowledge about this topic and thereby constrains what can be meaningfully said about it. Gee (1996. 2005) provides a helpful way of thinking about these different notions of discourse with his labels "little d" discourse versus "big D" discourse. By "little d" discourse. Gee (2005) means discourse in the linguistic sense, that is. "language-in-use, or stretches of language" (26).

#### Representations have broad ideological effects- our critique is necessary to destabilize their regime of truth.

Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.68-9, GAL)

A second order critique on the other hand, entails reflecting on the broader political and ethical consequences the wider ideological and historical-material effects - of the representations in the texts. In part, it involves an exploration of the ways in which the discourse can function as a 'symbolic technology' (LatTey and Weldes. 1997) that can be wielded by particular elites and institutions to:

Structure the primary subject positions, accepted knowledge, common sense, and legitimate policy responses to the actors and events being described; exclude and delegitimise alternative forms of knowledge and practice; naturalise a particular political and social order; and construct and sustain a hegemonic 'regime of truth'. A range of specific discourse analytic techniques can be employed in second order critique: genealogical analysis, predicate analysis, narrative analysis and deconstructive analysis (Milliken, 1999).

#### Discourse shapes reality – the way we talk about terrorism provides justifications for the material actions taken.

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 11

Richard, 3/1/11, “Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of ) change in US counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama,” Macmillan Publishers, Volume 48: Number 2/3, page 390–411 md

The war on terror is expressed through, and constituted by, first, a set of rhetorical and ideational elements, and second, an array of material practices. These two elements are not separate ‘variables’ but are mutually constitutive of each other. First, the war on terror is socially constructed through the public language or linguistic representations expressed by political leaders and counterterrorism officials, which provide the explanation, rationale, justification and necessary social consensus for the particular policies made and actions undertaken. In addition, the public language is accompanied by a familiar set of symbolic and ritualistic elements, which provide narrative coherence and public legitimacy, such as flags, ribbons, medals, symbols, ceremonies, public rituals and the like.

Second, the war on terror is co-constituted by its material practices and actions which thus far includes, among many others: military actions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Georgia, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere; a global intelligence-gathering and terrorist suspect interdiction and rendition programme; an international public diplomacy programme; the expansion of military assistance programmes; the enactment of major new domestic counterterrorism legislation; the reorganisation of domestic security and intelligence agencies; the construction of a vast new public safety infrastructure, including widespread surveillance and data-collection; vastly increased expenditures for the military and security agencies; and the funding of counterterrorism research and development programmes.

These two elements – the language and practices of the war on terror – are interdependent and co-constitutive to the extent that language and narrative gives meaning to, and therefore ‘makes possible’, the material practices. For example, the articulation of the 9/11 attacks as an ‘act of war’ and the necessity to prevent its recurrence provides the logic and rationale for – and thus makes possible – the launching of an actual war against terrorists. Language and practice thus shape each other in an ongoing dialectical manner and together form or constitute the war on terror ‘discourse’.

#### Discourse matters - New policies and counter terror have been established as a result of flawed discourses on terrorism

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 11

Richard, 3/1/11, “Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of ) change in US counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama,” Macmillan Publishers, Volume 48: Number 2/3, page 390–411 md

The central elements of the war on terror discourse were deliberately embedded in the institutions and practices of American government and security in the years following 9/11. The Bush administration and its top officials worked to institutionalise the war on terror approach to counterterrorism at all levels of national and local government. For example, the primary assumptions, beliefs and narratives about terrorism were given concrete expression in, among others: the establishment of major new government departments like the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); new legislation such as the PATRIOT Acts; new security doctrines, action plans, strategic plans, official reports, memos and operating procedures; the reorganisation and reform of the security services, policing, the military, the justice system and the immigration system to include counterterrorism as a core responsibility; the common language of political debate in the institutions of government; and the activities lobby groups and advisory think tanks (see Croft, 2006; Jackson, 2009). In other words, in their daily practices and activities and through the written and spoken texts they articulated, these governmental institutions and the individuals within them through their words and related actions continuously reproduced and reinforced the core interpretations and narratives of the war on terror, giving it a concrete external ‘reality’ and a sense of legitimacy for the public.

In addition, institutions like DHS and the personnel within them have subsequently acquired or reinforced concrete material interests linked to the maintenance of the war on terror in its present form (see Mueller, 2006) – just as occurred during the cold war. More than 180 000 employees in DHS, for example, now have careers in counterterrorism that depend upon the continued widespread acceptance of the terrorist threat narrative and the ongoing commitment of resources to its control. Agencies like the military, DHS and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) moreover, depend upon counterterrorism for large parts of their annual budgets, and the increased prestige and recognition that goes with it. Beyond this, other actors like military contractors, private security companies who supply screening services and protection and pharmaceutical firms who supply vaccines in preparation for bioterrorism, for example, also now have direct material interests in maintaining the widespread acceptance of the core narratives of the war on terror. In all, a recent study identified some 1271 government bodies and 1931 private contractor companies working on counterterrorism in the United States, employing nearly a million people and costing the taxpayer tens of billions of dollars (Pilkington, 2010). Over time therefore, the war on terror discourse has been institutionalised and embedded within the institutions, practices and material interests of American society and politics. It has become a materially grounded, self-perpetuating structure of American society or a ‘regime of truth’ in which the accepted truths about terrorism and its war appear as external and self-evident.

### Legitimizes Counterterrorism/State Terrorism

#### Their repetition of the official terrorist threat narrative functions to legitimize counterterrorism.

Raphael, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Kingston University, London, 9

(Sam, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p. 62-64, GAL)

Through replicating official analyses of the terrorist threat facing the US and its allies, and through failing to acknowledge the role that US-led 'counterterrorism' policies have played in sustaining and promoting terrorism in the South, the liter­ature has long worked to legitimise these policies. This has been so as a result of omission or the silencing of a great deal of facts and perspectives relevant to the study of terrorism as well as more overt policy prescriptions laid out by the experts. This was evident during the cold war when the experts tended to recom­mend a wide set of coercive interventions in the region, broadly aligned to those undertaken by the US government. For instance. Kupperman was clear that:

If [arresting suspects and diplomatic sanctions on sponsors] were to fail, which is quite likely, the administration must then confront the problems of using covert force, including eliminating the bombers and their leaders. If such operations were to be undertaken. Congress must share responsibility. Other­wise, another 'Iran-Contra' debacle would assuredly arise. If covert operations, in particular assassination by executive order, remain proscribed, certain allied secret services would be less squeamish. In any case, the terrorists must be sent a clear message.

(Kupperman and Kameu, 1989)

In particular, the US needed to continue 'to provide security assistance and military training' to the government in El Salvador and elsewhere, through 'expanded mili­tary training programs in the United States, the School of Americas, and individual central American countries', in order to 'improve the capabilities of local military organisations to engage in couuterinsurgency. the defence of economic targets, and nation-building' (Gonzalez et al.. 1984: 31 33). According to Livingstone (1984). US policy should also be directed to providing aid to 'governments resisting Soviet- or proxy-backed insurgents or terrorists. This support should take the form of economic, police, and military aid, including supplying training to counterinsurgency and counterterrorist forces. |and| the introduction of US military advisors". Likewise, several core experts advocated continued assistance to the Contras. According to (line and Alexander (1986: 67 68). the 'US policy for countering terrorism by aid to anti-Sandinista insurgents' is motivated by 'collective defence of people fighting for their freedom |and| is impeccable and fully justified in inter­national law\*, as 'enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter\*. The US should 'provide training, arms, and materiel to resistance forces in ... Nicaragua; and we should design psychological operations to buttress that resistance' (Livingstone, 1984). Indeed. 'Somoza was a bad guy, but these guys are worse. The right thing in my judgement is to overthrow that government. Whether the contras or the United States should go in and throw them out I'm not prepared to say' (Livingstone, cited in MacPherson. 1986).

A similar overt legitimisation of US coercive intervention characterises post-cold war terrorism studies. This can be seen not least in relation to research on terrorism in Colombia, where for example, experts recommend the (cautious) application of a 'traditional counterinsurgency strategy |which| would support improved tactical intelligence, the creation of crack fighting units, and increased air mobility' (B. Jenkins 2000/1: 53 55). Indeed: 'Without external assistance. Colombia cannot defeat the guerrilla-gangster Minotaur that consumes it. It is in our national interest to help' (B. Jenkins, 21)01). Chalk sees the 'US program of military assistance to El Salvador during the Reagan administration' as a relevant model for the necessary aid to Colombia, given that it 'succeeded in transforming the unprepossessing Salvadoran military into a force capable of turning back a formidable guerrilla threat". Assistance required includes measures 'to move forces out of static defence, to the extent possible, and remake them into mobile units to retake the initiative from the guerrillas', which in turn will require 'the develop­ment of rapid reaction capabilities, including transport and attack helicopters ... and intelligence collection' (Rabasa and Chalk. 2001: 95-96).

Likewise, Israeli counterterrorism policy and US support for it has long been overtly legitimised by the core experts, with, for instance, Hoffman (B. Hoffman, 1989b) asserting that 'Israel should not be condemned, but be praised for its bold' policies against Hezbollah, given that 'we should accept that no progress will be made in the struggle against terrorism until the terrorists' state sponsors are held accountable for their aid and encouragement'. More recently. Jenkins has been clear that whilst it is 'easy to deplore Israeli tactics in the West Bank (such as the razing of buildings and neighbourhoods or the deporting of ter­rorists' family members)', given the problem of suicide bombings 'precisely what alternatives suggest themselves in the current environment?1 (P. Davis and Jenkins. 2002: 29).

In sum, core terrorism experts tend to legitimate US-led and US-supported counterterrorism policies through insulating them from critique and openly supporting them. This function does not apply in all cases, but there is no doubt that it is served in a systematic fashion throughout the literature. And given the close relationship between these experts and state power in the US already discussed, it is a function of huge significance for the formulation of counterterrorism policy in Washington.

### Counterterrorism Fails/Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

#### Counterterrorism fails and creates a self-fulfilling prophecy- their assertions are tautological, untestable and rely on faith in secret information.

Jackson, Director at the National Center for Peace and Conflict Studies, 12

(Richard, February 6, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, “Does Counter-terrorism work? Or, counter-terrorism as divination…” <http://richardjacksonterrorismblog.wordpress.com/2012/02/06/does-counter-terrorism-work-or-counter-terrorism-as-divination/>, accessed 7/3/12, CPO)

Imagine that one day Counter-terrorism officers appear on television and announce that to keep evil terrorists at bay – to protect us from the cancer of terrorism which daily haunts us – every family is required to leave a saucer of milk out by the nearest fence-post on a Wednesday at dusk, while chanting the words ‘numpty, numpty, noo noo’ precisely seven times. The Counter-terrorist official goes on to assert that this ritual must be done every week, indefinitely, because it is the only way to keep us safe from terrorism. Of course, most people would consider this to be a little bit insane, to say the least, and would naturally ask: what evidence or information do you have exactly, Mr Counter-terrorist, to suggest that this will remotely work? What is your counter-terrorist theory based on? What is the logic and evidence you are basing this on?¶ While this is a humorous scenario, it is only slightly alarming that this is actually an accurate description of how counter-terrorism has come to work in the era of the war on terror. For the past ten years at least, we have been told that terrorism is a massive, evil force which is inevitable in this day and age – it is only a matter of when, not if a terrorist attack will take place. Terrorists are everywhere and can strike at any time and with any weapon. The only way to control terrorism is to spend billions of dollars improving security in public places, increase surveillance on all people at all times, get rid of legal protections for suspects, make everyone prove their identity, bring in harsh new laws, dispatch drones to kill hundreds of nameless people in foreign lands, torture suspects for information, kidnap and render people to secret prisons around the world, encourage people to spy on their neighbours, watch what we talk or read about lest we glorify terrorism, and much more besides. Moreover, we are told that these security rituals will have to be observed pretty much forever, because the threat of terrorism will never end, and we must include counter-terrorism in ever more areas of modern life because terrorism is spreading.¶ As before, the questions we should ask are: what evidence or information do you have, Mr Counter-terrorist, to suggest that this will in any way work – that it will actually make us safe from the evil scourge of terrorism? What is your counter-terrorist theory based on? What logic and evidence are you basing this on?¶ The alarming fact is that most counter-terrorism today is not based on theories and actual evidence, nor is it rooted in a historical or theoretical understanding of terrorism as a form of political violence. Significantly, not a single government since 9/11 has conducted a major study to examine whether the measures they have undertaken and the billions they have spent have either worked effectively to prevent terrorism, provides value for money, or could have been achieved some other less costly way. In reality, they are spending all that money and undertaking all those measures purely on faith. At the same time, scholars have also been very lax in studying whether counter-terrorism measures actually work, or how well they work; there are very few empirically-based studies on the effectiveness of different counter-terrorism measures. Interestingly, the few studies that have been done have concluded that either they don’t work (this is the case for security measures such as extra screening at airports, for example; these measures have a displacement effect, which means that terrorists tend to choose other less well-guarded targets), or importantly, they are actually counter-productive (this is the case for measures like targeted killings, for example, which tend to increase the number of recruits for terrorist groups).¶ In fact, most counter-terrorism during the last ten years of war on terror, as Joseba Zulaika has so eloquently shown, has been a self-fulfilling prophesy: actions undertaken which produce the very thing it is designed to destroy. We went to war against Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere, tortured, assassinated and rendered thousands of suspected terrorists, all to prevent terrorism, while simultaneously knowing that it would most likely produce more terrorism (as foreign military intervention usually does) – which would then in turn, necessitate more counter-terrorism. On a smaller scale, FBI agents go out and encourage disaffected individuals to undertake terrorist operations, and then arrest them before they can undertake their plot – with massive publicity about ‘foiled plots’.¶ Importantly (and a little insanely), the sequence of events which occurs is then used as proof of the original assertion: ‘See, there are terrorists in Iraq/Pakistan/Yemen/Somalia, which is why we had to go there to fight them’; ‘See, there are terrorists within America who want to kill US citizens.’ In other words, we are told that we have to follow the prescriptions of the counter-terrorist, knowing that it will produce the very terrorism it is designed to counter, which will then justify further counter-terrorism measures.¶ The interesting thing is that this kind of tautological, mystical thinking and this kind of self-confirming behavior is what, so anthropologists tell us, characterizes the thinking and practices of divination and witchcraft. In a sense, counter-terrorists have become oracles or shamans in our society: they rely on secret knowledge, they tell us how to ritually fight the evil of terrorism, and they can never be tested or proven wrong. Their predictions and assertions do not require scientific validation or confirmation; instead, they tell us what to do to prevent terrorism and if no terrorism occurs, they claim they were therefore right to prescribe such measures. If terrorism does occur, they can also claim they were right about the danger of terrorism, and that more clearly needs to be done to counter it. In other words, there is no real (logical or empirical) way to prove a diviner or an oracle wrong. In the end, all we can do is to keep putting out the milk by the fencepost and chant, ‘numpty, numpty, noo noo’ while the sun sets on our civil liberties and freedoms…

### State Terrorism Outweighs

#### State terrorism is one of the greatest sources of human suffering- the deaths caused by state terrorism vastly outnumber those caused by non-state actors.

Jackson et al 10 (Richard, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence and Reader in Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Eamon Murphy is Professor of History and International Relations at Curtin University of Technology in Western Australia, and Scott Poynting is Professor in Sociology, Manchester Metropolitan University, “Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice, p. 1 DAG)  
   
By all accounts, state terrorism has been one of the greatest sources of human suffering and destruction of the past five centuries. Employing extreme forms of exemplary violence against ordinary people and specific groups in order to engender political submission to newly formed nation states, transfer populations, and generate labour in conquered colonial territories, imperial powers and early modem states killed literally tens of millions of people and destroyed entire civilizations and peoples across the Americas, the Asia-Pacific, the subcontinent, the Middle East, and Africa. Later, during the twentieth century, modem states were responsible for the deaths of 170 million to 200 million people outside of war (Rummel 1994), a great many of them murdered during notorious campaigns of state terrorism such as Stalin's great terror, Mao's Great Leap Forward, and Kampuchea's return to Year Zero, and the rule of various dictatorial regimes in Chile, Argentina, South Africa, Uganda, Somalia, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq and dozens of other countries. During the great wars of the twentieth century, millions of civilians were killed in atomic attacks and 'terror bombing' campaigns designed specifically to undermine morale and intimidate into submission — a case of randomly killing some people in order to influence others, which is the essence of the terrorist strategy (Grosscup 2006). Disturbingly, state terrorism remains as one of the single greatest threats to human and societal security and well- being today. Certainly, in comparison to the terrorism perpetrated by non-state insurgent groups, the few thousand deaths and injuries caused by 'terrorism from below' every year pales into relative insignificance besides the hundreds of thousands of people killed, kidnapped, 'disappeared', injured, tortured, raped, abused, intimidated, and threatened by state agents and their proxies in dozens of countries across the globe in places like Chechnya, Kashmir, Palestine, Iraq, Colombia, Zimbabwe, Darfur, Congo, Somalia, Uzbekistan, China and elsewhere. Even more disturbingly, government-directed campaigns of counter-terrorism in the past few decades have frequently descended into state terrorism by failing to distinguish between the innocent and the guilty, responding highly disproportionately to acts of insurgent violence, and aiming to terrify or intimidate the wider population or particular communities into submission (Goodin 2006: 69—73). Consequently, the victims of state counter-terrorism have always vastly outnumbered the deaths caused by non-state or insurgent terrorism, including in the ongoing global war on terrorism.

#### State terrorism outweighs violence by non-state actors.

Mickler 10 (David, teaches in Security, Terrorism and Counterterrorism Studies at Murdoch University, Western Australia, “Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice”, ed. Jackson, Murphy, and Poynting, p. 28 DAG)

The Darfur case demonstrates vividly that regimes of terror are not only phenomena of history. In their daily lives, millions of ordinary people across the globe continue to experience politically motivated repression, violence and terrorism. Such instances are particularly concerning when it is in fact the institutions of the state which are the source of acute - and indeed intentional - human suffering. In addition to the basic immorality of such violence, this is a matter of fundamental social, political, and intellectual importance because of the powerfully destructive capabilities of modern states, the violation of the posited social contract between citizens and their governments, and also because of an emerging international consensus that states which abuse the fundamental human rights or security of their populations should incur a suspension of their assumed sovereign legitimacy and immunity (ICISS 2001). Using Darfur as a case study, this chapter argues that in addition to more commonly used legal designations such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, we can characterize certain forms of state violence as 'terrorism' if those acts conform to the following constitutive criteria: they are politically motivated, intentional and pre-determined, and they intend to cause fear and intimidate a wider audience than just the immediate targets, which are primarily (but not only) civilians (Jackson 2008: 29-30).

In a context in which 'no word in the contemporary American and international political lexicon is more frequently invoked or more emotionally charged than "terrorist" ' (Selden and So 2004: 3), however, critics highlight the intellectual anomaly of how - historically and at present - such 'state terrorism' has been collectively responsible for a vast number of civilian deaths per annum but is generally de-emphasized, ignored, or even justified in much of the burgeoning contemporary discourse and analysis of terrorism (Blakeley 2007; Booth 2008). Indeed, one observation is that 'mainstream social scientists have failed to recognise the possibility that states ... can and do carry out acts of terrorism' (Selden and So 2004: 4). Yet, as Sluka has argued convincingly: If we allow the definition [of terrorism] to include violence by states and agents of states, then we find that the major form of terrorism in the world today is that practiced by states and their agents and allies, and that, quantitatively, antistate terrorism pales into relative insignificance compared to it. (Sluka 2000: 1)

### Islamophobia

#### The discourse of Islamic Terrorism feeds Islamophobia, undermines public morality, and destroys any chance for effective and legitimate response to terrorism.

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 07

Richard, 1/9/07 “the core commitments of critical terrorism studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 1-8 md

Beyond exposing the ideological functions of the discourse, another purpose of second-order critique is to examine the ethical normative consequences of the discourse. In this case, it is suggested that the ‘Islamic terrorism’ discourse is proving harmful to community relations, public morality and the search for effective, proportionate and legitimate responses to terrorist acts. First, given the way the Western self has been constructed in opposition to the Islamic other, and given the negative subject positioning and predication within the discourse, the evidence of rising tensions between and within local, national and global communities does not seem at all surprising. A recent survey of global opinion found that many Westerners see Muslims as fanatical, violent and intolerant, while many Muslims have an aggrieved view of the West. 106 There is also evidence of increasing levels of Islamophobia across the European Union 107 and increases in faith-hate crime in Britain and elsewhere. 108 It seems reasonable to assume that this situation is at least in part due to the ubiquitous public discourse that identiﬁes Islam and Muslims as a source of terrorism, extremism and threat.

Related to this, it is possible to detect an erosion of public morality in polling data that shows that signiﬁcant proportions of the public in many Western countries, but most notably in the United States, now agree that torturing terrorist suspects is justiﬁed in some circumstances. 109 It can also be seen in the absence of public concern or outrage at the public evidence of torture and abuse, the muted response to human rights abuses committed by the security forces during counter-terrorism operations and the ongoing and very serious public debate by academics, ofﬁcials and journalists about the necessity and ethics of torture and other human rights abuses against terrorist suspects. This erosion of public morality is, I would suggest, directly linked to the social and political construction of a pervasive discourse of threatening, murderous, fanatical ‘Islamic terrorists’ who must be eradicated in the name of national security.

### Military-Industrial Complex

#### The War on Terror is the best thing since the cold war for enriching the military-industrial complex- their discourse provides rhetorical resources to justify a whole range of practices to suppress any opposition.

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 11

Richard, 3/1/11, “Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of ) change in US counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama,” Macmillan Publishers, Volume 48: Number 2/3, page 390–411 md

At the domestic level, the war on terror has offered opportunities for corporate and institutional enrichment and empowerment not seen since the height of the cold war for the military-industrial complex, the private security industry and the military, police and intelligence services (Mueller 2006; Zalman and Clarke, 2009; Pilkington, 2010). In addition, the war on terror has directly empowered governments by providing rhetorical and legal resources to curtail and suppress political opposition and to promote other political projects only indirectly related to counterterrorism, such as immigration control, societal surveillance, financial regulation and the curtailment of political protest (Jackson, 2007).

In sum, the war on terror has been constructed and employed as a key tool of US hegemony both internationally and domestically, as well as a highly profitable industry for a great many powerful groups in the United States. It now reflects and accords with the logic, structures and processes of US capitalism and politics, and reaffirms and reinscribes existing power structures of the society. This explains in large part why so many powerful actors within US society vigorously fight to defend the war on terror, oppose its critics and ensure its continuation. As a consequence of these processes, in everyday political life, the central narratives and tenets of the war on terror discourse are rarely questioned, even by political opponents. Although the efficacy of particular strategies or tactics may be vigorously debated, no one doubts the reality of the terrorist threat or the need for large-scale investment in counterterrorist measures.

### Global Carceral Complex

#### The War on Terror results in a global carceral complex- it extends US state terror and mass incarceration to encompass the entire globe.

McCulloch 10 (Jude, Professor of Criminology at Monash University, Melbourne, “Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice”, ed. Jackson, Murphy, and Poynting, p. 28 DAG)  
  
The War on Terror, and specifically the expansion of US mass incarceration to encompass the entire planet, provide an emblematic example of states strategic deployment of 'counter-terrorism to engage in the widespread use of terror against people and communities stereotyped as terrorists. Despite protestations to the contrary the documented state terror and torture of prisoners and detainees in the War on Terror are not outside the moral framework of the United States but instead reveal the values put into practice daily upon the bodies of millions of prisoners by thousands of American citizens, both in the country itself and increasingly in its global prisons offshore. Increasingly, the boundaries between 'homeland and global security, domestic and offshore prisons, are rendered porous as state terror and terrorism circulate between spaces of violence and incarceration. The internal drivers of mass incarceration in the United States — inequality, racism, prisons for profit and neoliberalism — more generally are embracing new frontiers and capturing new markets. The people of the world represent the bodies upon which US state terror, in the form of mass incarceration and torture, will be practised. The War on Terror, including the Presidential Order that allows for the capture and detention of non-citizens of the United States anywhere in the world, the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the establishment of a global carceral complex, have extended and transformed mass incarceration from a US-based phenomenon to a process that encompasses the entire globe: a move from garrison state to garrison planet.

### Biopolitics

#### The War on Terror produces bare life and necessitates biopolitical killing.

Debrix, Professor of International Relations at Florida International University 7

(François Debrix is Associate Professor of International Relations at Florida International University in Miami, “Tabloid Terror”, Page #119, NC)

As the war machine does away with security and with most recognizable forms of state sovereignty, it does not care much about preserving humanity, or at least about providing a new definition of what it means to be human in an age of global terror or of a global crusade against “evil.” If my suggestion presented in this chapter is correct that, through the American war on terror since 9/11, we have witnessed the conceptual passage of sovereignty from juridical, to biopolitical, and eventually to agonal, then there is also a parallel movement in the significance of political subjectivity and/or agency. What it means to be or remain human in the era of the war on terror and of sovereign military violence necessarily has to follow suit and adapt to the new geopolitical situation. What concerns me here is the way the notion of the human, of human life, also has to change according to the different modalities of sovereignty and power we have encountered. Whereas the belief that juridical sovereignty matters could leave a place and a role to play for individual political subjects as citizens, with rights and prerogatives, within the state (through constitutional guarantees) or outside the state (under international law and human rights treaties in particular), the passage to considerations of biopower and to biopolitical sovereignty left room only for docile bodies, for human bodies that “could be killed but never sacrificed” (as Agamben put it). The transfer of human beings from political subjects to docile bodies was probably a key conceptual/cultural moment in contemporary discourses of geopolitical terror and war. It removed any sense of sovereign importance from the idea that individual beings must have juridical personalities and are rational agents (with their corresponding adornments, such as inalienable rights, freedom, and so on). Instead, this passage to bare life introduced the belief that individuals as bodies are eminently replaceable, malleable, and workable. Only those characteristics can give humans their value, their meaningful place in the body politic. Although they can be (must be?) killed through biopolitical designs, their killing is never superfluous, never a vain sacrifice. Their bodies count and matter as bodies, as a quantifiable mass of live, positive, and efficient energies. Every single one of those docile bodies is of importance to the life and being of the larger unit, the nation. Thus, they can never be wasted or sacrificed.

# Alternative

### Alt- Critical Terrorism Studies

#### Terrorism studies needs to undergo a critical turn to question its core ontological, epistemological, and methodological commitments. This solves our criticisms of the aff’s knowledge production.

Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.82, GAL)

The analysis of the terrorism studies field presented in this chapter clearly has some important analytical and normative implications. In the first instance, it sug­gests that the field has a number of serious analytical weaknesses in terms of its broader ontological, epistemological, and methodological approaches, as well as its highly-restricted research focus, conformity in outlook, acceptance and repro­duction of dubious 'knowledge', and obvious political bias towards Western states and interests. This state of affairs places major obstacles in the way of theo­retical and empirical innovation, the articulation of new questions and approaches and the contestation of dominant knowledge claims. More prosaically, it is rather worrying that the field's 'knowledge' presently forns one of the bases of policy­making deliberations and public debate about how to respond to acts of terrorism.

Perhaps more importantly, an ethical-normative perspective suggests that terrorism studies is a largely (but not completely) co-opted field of research that is deeply enmeshed with the exercise of state power and the actual practices of counterterrorism. That is, it provides both a specific set of intellectual justifica­tions for counterterrorist and security policies, and a broader academic legitimacy for the state." This is disturbing, because it means that the field is in some small ways at least, complicit in some of the counterterrorism practices employed in the war on terrorism and in places like Colombia and Israel that are morally question­able, such as increased surveillance, profiling, shoot-to-kill policies, collective punishments, creeping restrictions on civil liberties, regime change, support for repressive governments, rendition, torture, and extrajudicial assassination.

In the end, the analysis presented here strongly suggests that it is time (again) for a more 'critical' approach to the study of political terrorism. More specifi­cally, it suggests that there is an urgent need for further sustained review and reflection regarding the dominant knowledge and knowledge-generating prac­tices of terrorism research, and the need to adopt an alternative set of ontologi­cal, epistemological, methodological, and ethical-normative commitments (see Jackson, Gunning and Brecn Smyth, this volume). The open and determined adherence to these core commitments by all terrorism scholars would, I believe, go some way towards rectifying the key problems and challenges highlighted in this chapter.

#### Terrorism research must undergo a critical turn which challenges existing expert knowledge and exposes silences in the current narrative.

Raphael, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Kingston University, London, 9

(Sam, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p. 64, GAL)

As mentioned, the analysis presented in this chapter forms part of a wider project examining the research output from the core figures within terrorism studies (Raphael, forthcoming), and in a paper of this length the examples provided are necessarily illustrative. However, suffice it to say that the problematic features of the literature described here are at play throughout the field, in a variety of specific contexts. If nothing else, this fact points to the need for a 'critical turn' in terrorism studies. As the US continues to lead a worldwide 'war on terror' throughout the global South with profound consequences for the human security of populations in this region, it is vital to continue to investigate the role of 'independent, objective’ academic experts in the policymaking process. Further­more, and crucially, it is necessary to continue to subject their output to critical analysis in order to reveal the ways in which expert 'knowledge’ on terrorism, considered to originate outside of politics, in fact relies upon the claims and analyses of deeply political actors and institutions.

A 'critical’ study of terrorism should also work to expose the silences present in current mainstream research, particularly regarding the terroristic nature of many aspects of US-led and US-supported 'counterterrorist' policy. Once exposed, there is an urgent need to engage in substantial, rigorous research on the subjects silenced thus far. It is vitally important to understand how practices and policies in past and current "wars on terror' utilise terrorism as a strategy of political violence, whether directly by the US itself (for example, in Iraq) or more often by its state allies (in Colombia, Turkey, the Occupied Territories, and elsewhere). In sum, there exists a clear research agenda for critical terror­ism studies' which will be of great importance in coming years: to reveal the ideological function served by much core terrorism research and to challenge this through undertaking rigorous research into major instances of terrorism in the modern world; instances which have thus far been almost wholly ignored.

### Alt- Emancipation

#### Identification of the ‘terrorist other’ defines who may be legitimately killed or tortured by the state. Vote neg to reject their narrowly defined conception of security and instead embrace an ethic of emancipation.

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 07

Richard, 1/9/07 “the core commitments of critical terrorism studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 1-8 md

In addition to reasons alluded to earlier, CTS is openly normative in orientation for the simple reason that through the identification of who the ‘terrorist other’ actually is – deciding and affirming which individuals and groups may be rightly called ‘terrorists’ is a routine practice in the field – terrorism studies actually provides an authoritative judgement about who may legitimately be killed, tortured, rendered or incarcerated by the state in the name of counter-terrorism. In this sense, there is no escaping the ethico-political content of the subject. Rather than projecting or attempting to maintain a false neutrality or objectivity, CTS openly adheres to the values and priorities of universal human and societal security, rather than traditional, narrowly defined conceptions of national security in which the state takes precedence over any other actor. Moreover, in the tradition of Critical Theory, the core commitment of CTS is to a broad conception of emancipation, which is understood as the realisation of greater human freedom and human potential and improvements in individual and social actualisation and well-being.

In practice, such a standpoint necessarily entails transparency in specifying one’s political–normative stance and values, a continuous critical reflexivity regarding the aims, means and outcomes of terrorism research, particularly as it intersects with state counter-terrorism, and an enduring concern with questions of politics and ethics. In turn, this has clear implications for research funding, knowledge production and the ethics of research in ‘suspect communities’. It also entails an enduringly critical stance towards projects of state counter-terrorism, particularly as they affect human and societal security. CTS recognises that such a stance involves a delicate and creative balance between avoiding complicity in oppressive state practices through a continual process of critique, while simultaneously maintaining access to power in order to affect change. From this perspective, CTS is determined to go beyond critique and deconstruction and actively work to bring about positive social change – in part through an active engagement with the political process and the power holders in society

In short, based on an acceptance of a fundamental prior responsibility to ‘the other’, CTS sees itself as being engaged in a critical praxis aimed at ending the use of terror by any and all actors and in promoting the exploration of non-violent forms of conflict transformation. Specifically, this entails a willingness to try to understand and empathise with the mindsets, world views and subjectivities of non-Western ‘others’ and a simultaneous refusal to assume or impute their intentions and values (Barkawi, 2004). CTS scholars recognise that in relation to the ‘terrorist other’, this is a taboo stance within Western scholarship. Moreover, it is a taboo that has been institutionalised in a legal framework in which withholding information from the authorities is a crime, in which academics are being asked to report on their students and in which attempting to understand the subjectivities of ‘terrorist’ suspects could be interpreted as ‘glorification of terrorism’ – a crime under UK law. Nonetheless, CTS scholars view it as both analytically and ethically responsible and remain committed to defending the intellectual and ethical integrity of such work.

#### The alternative is emancipation- a process of freeing space for deliberation.

McDonald (Assistant Professor of International Security in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick.) 07

Matt, 1/9/07, “Emancipation and Critical Terrorism Studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 252 – 259 md

The above concerns remind us of the need to reflect on key research concepts and their application to particular contexts, and of the need to avoid drawing narrow boundaries of appropriate or legitimate research. Indeed, such reflexivity must be at the heart of any attempt to approach the study of international politics, and certainly those adopting the preface ‘critical’. With these issues firmly in mind, I want to suggest that defining critical terrorism studies in terms of a concern with emancipation may prove useful both in guiding the types of questions we might ask and particularly in providing ‘philosophical anchorage’ (Booth, 1999: 43) for an emphasis on those voices marginalised or excluded from traditional accounts of ‘terrorism’ and responses to it. Drawing on the insights of the so-called Welsh School of critical security studies, particularly associated with the work of Ken Booth (1991; 1999; 2005), I suggest that an understanding of emancipation as a process of freeing up space for dialogue and deliberation – the diffusion of power to ‘speak’ security – enables a focus on crucial questions, experiences and practices neglected in dominant accounts of security and terrorism.

#### There is an ethical obligation to adopt an emancipatory approach and challenge the violence of the War on Terror.

McDonald (Assistant Professor of International Security in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick.) 07

Matt, 1/9/07, “Emancipation and Critical Terrorism Studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 252 – 259 md

While the (forcible) application of particular versions of emancipation may be troubling, and while we might also note that emancipation is less a framework for analysis than a form of philosophical anchorage, the questions encouraged by adopting an emancipatory approach to the study of terrorism are crucial to developing a sophisticated and reflexive understanding of this phenomenon, one informed by a set of core ethical commitments to the most vulnerable. The questions outlined above have the potential to provide important analytical insights into contemporary practices that are neglected in traditional approaches. And of course, asking such questions in the context of the US-led ‘war on terror’ – dominated by zero-sum calculations and violence – could hardly be more ethically important.

### AT: Emancipation is Utopian

#### You should view emancipation as a process, not an end state- freeing up space for alternate representations of dissident groups diminishes both terrorist and counter-terrorist violence.

McDonald (Assistant Professor of International Security in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick.) 07

Matt, 1/9/07, “Emancipation and Critical Terrorism Studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 252 – 259 md

A fourth and final question suggested here is: ‘what would emancipation look like in the context of approaches to and practices of ‘‘terrorism’’ and ‘‘counterterrorism’’ in international politics?’ One of the most prominent critiques of critical theory has been that the conditions for the realisation of emancipation (such as Habermas’ ‘ideal speech situation’) are utopian and almost impossible to recognise analytically, much less imagine in practice. This criticism becomes less devastating if however, emancipation is conceived as ‘a (strategic) process of freeing up’ rather than ‘a condition of being freed’. Viewed in such terms, defined by Wyn Jones (1999: 76–8) as a concern with locating and outlining ‘concrete utopias’, it is easier to address questions about what emancipation might look like in contemporary contexts. Here, analyses might locate emancipatory practices in the increasing role of moderate voices and political representation of dissident groups and its relationship to diminishing frequency of ‘terrorist’ and ‘counter-terrorist’ violence. Such processes have been evident in changing relationships between the Turkish government and Kurdish population in Turkey, and more recently between government and separatist groups in the Indonesian province of Aceh. In both cases, movements towards increased political representation and peace have been intimately related, a development that might be defined in different critical theoretical traditions as processes enabling more open communication (Habermas, 1987) or as allowing for – and based upon – the mutual recognition of identity (Honneth, 1995). Recognising such processes as emancipatory, asking how they came about and how applicable they might be to other contexts must be central to an emancipatory critical terrorism studies agenda concerned with escaping the zero-sum logics of security that legitimise – and arguably encourage – violence.

# AT: Common Arguments

### AT: Permutation

#### The research of critical scholars is coopted when working in conjunction with state and perpetuates a flawed epistemology

Gunning (Jeroen Gunning; Reader in Middle East Politics and Conflict Studies, Durham University, UK) 07

Jeroen, 1/9/07, “babies and bathwaters: reflecting on the pitfalls of critical terrorism studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 236 – 243 md

However, engaging policy-makers raises the issue of co-optation. One of the fears of critical scholars is that by engaging with policy-makers, either they or their research become co-opted. A more intractable problem is the one highlighted by Rengger that ‘the demand that theory must have a praxial dimension itself runs the risk of collapsing critical theory back into traditional theory by making it dependent on instrumental conceptions of rationality’ (Rengger, 2001: 107). A related problem is that by becoming embedded in the existing power structures, one risks reproducing existing knowledge structures or inadvertently contributing to counter-terrorism policy that uncritically strengthens the status quo. Such dilemmas have to be confronted and debated; non-engagement is not an option.

Engagement is facilitated by the fact that, as counter-terrorism projects flounder, advisors to policy-makers are increasingly eager for advice, even when it is ‘critical’. The problem is thus not access per se, but the level of access and how advice is acted upon. Whenever I have addressed foreign affairs personnel, the response to my research has been positive. However, according to those present, the advice they produce seldom influences official policy, as other more pressing concerns affect actual policymaking. Because of this distance between critical academics and policy-makers, the advice becomes too diluted.

#### Their representations of terrorism from pundits of statecraft overwhelm the alt

Debrix, Professor of International Relations at Florida International University 7

(François Debrix is Associate Professor of International Relations at Florida International University in Miami, “Tabloid Terror”, Page #100, NC)

As was already noted in the previous chapters, the Y2K/cyberterror syndrome around 1999–2000, the aftermath of the presidential elections in November 2000, the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, and the US-led war in Iraq in March–April 2003 have unleashed a flurry of media punditry and “intellectual statecraftism” in the United States. Nowadays, any self-proclaimed public intellectual figure, any cable news network talk-show host, any government official in search of visibility, any disgruntled CIA or State Department bureaucrat, or any retired military officer feels that s/he is authorized to write and publish his/her own impressions about the war on terror and the role of the United States in it. Inevitably, these new pundits of statecraft and their tabloid geopolitical discourses reveal strong opinions about the war, whether it is desirable (some of them think it is), whether it is necessary (the majority of them believe it is in some circumstances), and how it should be fought (they often disagree on this last point). More importantly, the tabloid writings by these pundits of statecraft go a long way in trying to explain to Americans what the war means and, by extension, how the United States as a war nation is supposed to act.31 As we saw in Chapter 3, many of these discourses of America at war are moral, ideological, and tactical conditioning mechanisms that contribute to normalizing and perhaps abjecting war as the key contemporary explanatory variable for both domestic and international politics. These discourses establish the idea that American citizens have no choice but to define their everyday life in relation to war, at home and abroad.

### AT: Framework

#### Their “problem-solving” framework is part of the problem- it takes the world as it is and uncritically accepts prevailing power relationships.

Gunning (Jeroen Gunning; Reader in Middle East Politics and Conflict Studies, Durham University, UK) 07

Jeroen, 6-21-07 “Government and Opposition”, Blackwell Publishing, Vol.42, No. 3, pp. 363–393 MD

Each of these critiques goes some way to explain the shortcomings in ‘terrorism research’, although the argument that funding is not available for projects critical of the status quo is perhaps overstated. 30 It will always be difﬁcult to obtain reliable data on clandestine violence, so that scholars will inevitably be tempted to draw heavily on secondary sources or build elaborate theories on very little, and often dubious, information. 31 Equally, given prevailing power structures, the embeddednes of researchers within them, and the shock that terroristic tactics typically seek to induce, it will arguably always be tempting to demonize the ‘terrorist other’. However, what most of the critiques overlook is the crucial fact that, beyond these inherent difﬁculties, many of the observed shortcomings can be traced back to the dominance in ‘terrorism research’ of what Robert Cox famously called a ‘problem-solving’ approach: one that ‘takes the world as it ﬁnds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action’.

#### The focus on short-term problem-solving leads to over-identification with the state and legitimizes counterterrorism.

Gunning (Jeroen Gunning; Reader in Middle East Politics and Conflict Studies, Durham University, UK) 07

Jeroen, 6-21-07 “Government and Opposition”, Blackwell Publishing, Vol.42, No. 3, pp. 363–393 MD

Not only can many of these characteristics be found in more or less diluted form in ‘terrorism research’ 41 – a legacy of the ﬁeld’s origins as a sub-ﬁeld within ‘traditional’ security and strategic studies – but these ‘problem-solving’ characteristics can also be shown to contribute directly to its observed shortcomings. The reported lack of primary data, the dearth of interviews with ‘terrorists’ and the ﬁeld’s typical unwillingness to ‘engage subjectively with [the terrorist’s] motives’, 42 is in part fuelled by the ﬁeld’s over-identiﬁcation with the state, and by the adoption of dichotomies that depict ‘terrorism’ as ‘an unredeemable atrocity like no other’, that can only be approached ‘with a heavy dose of moral indignation’, although other factors, such as security concerns, play a role too. 43 Talking with ‘terrorists’ thus becomes taboo, unless it is done in the context of interrogation. 44

Such a framework also makes it difﬁcult to enquire whether the state has used ‘terroristic’ methods. If the state is the primary referent, securing its security the main focus and its hegemonic ideology the accepted framework of analysis, ‘terrorism’, particularly if deﬁned in sharp dichotomies between legitimate and illegitimate, can only be logically perpetrated by insurgents against the state, not by state actors themselves. State actors are engaged in counterterrorism, which is logically depicted as legitimate, or at least, ‘justiﬁable’ given the ‘terrorist threat’ and the ﬁeld’s focus on shortterm ‘problem-solving’. Where ‘traditional terrorism studies’ do focus on state terrorism, it is in the context of the ‘other’: the authoritarian or totalitarian state that is the nemesis if not the actual ‘enemy’ of the liberal democratic state. 45

#### Framework is a link: Orthodox terrorism studies maintains its legitimacy by policing the boundaries of acceptable knowledge and marginalizing any experts without a strong pro-Western bias.

Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.80-1, GAL)

From a certain perspective, the analysis above presents a genuine puzzle: how does a field based on a series of 'virulent myths', 'half-truths' and contested claims, and which is so obviously biased towards Western state priorities, main­tain academic credibility and political influence over several decades? In large part, the answer lies in the position that the field occupies in the existing structures of power, and in its long-standing knowledge practices.

First, it can be argued that the core terrorism studies 'knowledge' persists and is continually reproduced because its nature and form reflect (and simultan­eously construct) dominant values and existing cultural narratives. On the one hand, it provides a coherent and familiar discursive frame for internal policy debate; it confirms state perspectives and approaches and simplifies a set of complex challenges to an identifiable 'problem'. For the wider public, the narra­tives of the discourse construct a broad common sense understanding of terror­ism and counterterrorism, or a 'grid of intelligibility' through which to interpret and make sense of events and actions. This is another of its key hegemonic or ideological effects, as this common sense 'knowledge' predisposes the public to accept and acquiesce to particular kinds of counterterrorism policies.

On the other hand, the terrorism studies discourse draws on a series of powerful cultural frames and existing discursive structures, making it ideal for the genera­tion of public legitimacy and the construction of political boundaries (see Olivcrio. 1997). For example, as Zulaika and Douglass's (1996) ground-breaking anthro­pological study demonstrated, the construction of the fanatical, dangerous terror­ist reflects the 'wild man' figure of Western cultural imagination. Similarly, the field's construction of the threat posed by suicide bombers and WMD-terrorism taps into culturally defined taboos of suicide and the fear of poison, while the notion that Western states never commit terrorism but only respond to it reinforces the widespread belief in Western exceptionalism.

Second, the discourse maintains its dominance through a self-perpetuating set of knowledge-generating practices. For example, based on an examination of thirty-two prominent terrorism studies experts, Edna Reid describes the research process among these scholars as a closed, circular, and static system of information and investigation which tends to accept dominant "myths' about terrorism without strong empirical investigation for long periods before empiri­cal research disproves them (Reid. 1993: 28). The circular nature of the know­ledge process can be further illustrated by noting how some terrorism scholars provide expert testimony to special commissions, such as the Bremer Commis­sion and the 9/11 Commission, and then reference the commission reports in order to legitimise their own knowledge claims in later publications. In a related process of exclusion, a recent analysis concluded that terrorism "experts" who do not maintain a strong pro-Western bias in their work soon become marginalised in the field and are denied access to policymakers and major conferences (llardi. 2004; 222).

#### Their appeal to policy relevance is part of the problem- the field of terrorism studies is deeply coopted, and there is no distinction between academics and policymakers.

Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.81, GAL)

Lastly, the persistence and dominance of the core terrorism studies "know­ledge" is a consequence of the "embedded" or organic\* nature of many terror­ism experts and scholars; that is, the extent to which terrorism scholars are directly linked to state institutions and sources of power in ways that make it difficult to distinguish between the state and academic spheres (see Herman and O'SuIiivan, 1989; George. 1991a: Burnett and Whyte. 2005). Crucial here has been the influence of the RAND Corporation, a non-profit research foundation founded by the United States Air Force with deep ties to the American military and political establishments, as well as private security and military companies. Some RAND scholars have been influential in both constructing the accepted knowledge of the terrorism studies field and in communicating it to policymak­ers and the wider public for several decades now. Senior officials in several US administrations have held positions in RAND, and as with other foundations and think tanks, there is a revolving door of personnel between RAND and the state. For example. Condolee/.za Rice and Donald Rumsfeld are both former RAND administrators (Burnett and Whyte. 2005: 8). Moreover, RAND schol­ars have been influential in establishing other influential terrorism research centres, such as the St Andrews Centre for Studies in Terrorism and Political Violence, and have been involved in the running of both Terrorism and Polit-ical Violence and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. In fact. RANI) scholars author a significant proportion of the articles published in these two popular journals (Silke, 2004c: 194).

#### Rejecting their state-centric focus is critical to breaking out of the epistemic community of orthodox terrorism scholarship which recycles the same narratives and myths.

Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.81, GAL)

In other words, it can be argued that the leading terrorism studies scholars now constitute an influential and exclusive 'epistemic community' a network of 'specialists with a common world view about cause and effect relationships which relate to their domain of expertise, and common political values about the type of policies to which they should be applied' (Stone. 19%: 86). From a Gramscian perspective, the leading terrorism studies scholars can be understood as 'organic intellectuals' connected institutionally, financially and ideologically to the state. From this perspective, the state-centric orientation of the field and its continuing reproduction of the guiding myths is a natural and thoroughly unsur­prising consequence of its position within society's existing power structure.

#### Their problem-solving approach leaves the status quo’s inequalities and injustices unquestioned.

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 07

Richard, 1/9/07 “the core commitments of critical terrorism studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 1-8) md

A fourth main criticism is that the dominant knowledge of the field is an ideal type of ‘problem-solving theory’ (Gunning, forthcoming). As Robert Cox argues, problem-solving theory ‘takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organised, as the given framework for action’, and then works to ‘make these relationships and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of trouble’ (Cox, 1981: 128–9). It does not question the extent to which the status quo – the hierarchies and operation of power and the inequalities and injustices thus generated – is implicated in the ‘problem’ of terrorism and other forms of subaltern violence. Moreover, through the use of social scientific language and modes of inquiry, political assumptions about terrorism are masqueraded as technical issues and sides are taken on terrorism’s major ethical and political questions.

### AT: Not All Terror Experts Bad

#### Our critique is about analyzing the discursive effects of the conventional terrorism narrative at a broader level- it’s not about the conclusions of any particular text or scholar.

Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, ed. Jackson, Smyth, and Gunning, p.68-9, GAL)

It is important to note that when we examine a discourse as a broad form of knowledge and practice, it is never completely uniform, nor is it necessar­ily entirely coherent or consistent. Rather, it always has porous borders and often contains numerous exceptions, inconsistencies, and contradictions by different speakers and texts. Many terrorism studies scholars for example, upon a close reading of their individual texts, express more nuanced arguments and view­points than are necessarily presented here. In addition, orthodox terrorism scholars sometimes engage in fairly vigorous debates and disagreements (see Ranstorp. this volume), although these rarely involve questioning fundamental underlying ontological. epistemological. or methodological assumptions about the primary subject.

The important point is not that each text or scholar can be characterised in the same uniform way or even that these scholars agree on a broad set of know­ledge claims; as suggested, there are ongoing debates within the field about a great many key issues. Nor is there any suggestion that individual terrorism studies scholars are engaged in some kind of "bad faith' conspiracy to promote

a particular political agenda or ideological viewpoint (Morgan and Boyle, 2008). It is, rather, that taken together as a broader discourse and a body of work that presently has political and, importantly, cultural, currency, the narra­tives and forms of the discourse function to construct and maintain a specific understanding of, and approach to, terrorism and counterterrorism and the 'knowledge' generated in the field has certain academic, political, and social effects.

### AT: State Terrorism is covered by Human Rights, etc.

#### State and non-state terrorism both utilize instrumental violence to spread fear in the broader population- both should be described with the same term to maintain analytical consistency.

Jackson et al 10 (Richard, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence and Reader in Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Eamon Murphy is Professor of History and International Relations at Curtin University of Technology in Western Australia, and Scott Poynting is Professor in Sociology, Manchester Metropolitan University, “Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice, p. 4 DAG)

A third objection suggests that state repressive violence is not terrorism because state agents do not seek publicity but rather try to hide their involvement - unlike non-state terrorism which is aimed at maximizing publicity. This argument mistakes publicity for communication. It is communication to an audience which is one of the key elements of terrorist violence, not necessarily publicity (see Duvall and Stohl 1988: 239-40). For non-state actors lacking societal penetration, publicity is the easiest way to communicate, but this is not the case for states whose violence does not necessarily require publicity to reach its intended audience. In reality, when an individual in a terror state is kidnapped and then 'disappeared', returned following torture or their corpse is left mutilated in a public place, the local observers know exactly who the intended audience is, what the message is intended to convey, and who has sent it. The body with its physical marks of violence - or the absence of their bodily presence - serves as a direct reminder of the presence and power of the state and the need to acquiesce. The lack of publicity and denial by the state is usually for external audiences in order to maintain international assistance or for domestic constituents whom the state relies upon for support - such as the white community in South Africa who were largely unaware of the violence meted out to its nonwhite population. A fourth objection is that what we have called 'state terrorism’ is already covered by terms like 'repression' and 'human rights abuses', and that acts of state terrorism are already circumscribed in international law and do not require new legal or analytical concepts. This is a political or pragmatic argument which, as we have shown, ignores the fundamental scholarly principle of including all the cases that fit the criteria in order to retain analytical consistency. Moreover, it ignores the fact that the same situation applies to non-state 'terrorism': all the acts and activities performed by non-state terrorists are also already circumscribed in law and there exist a range of useful terms to describe their actions. It can also be argued that state (and non-state) actions are never solely 'terrorism', 'human rights abuses', or 'repression'. They can be - and by definition always are - both acts of 'terrorism' and 'human rights abuses' at the same time, and there is no contradiction in describing them using either term. In the end, we follow Robert Goodin and Ruth Blakeley in suggesting that terrorism, whether conducted by state or non-state actors, involves a number of specific moral wrongs (beyond unjustified killing and harm), such as the instrumentalization of human suffering, the intention to cause widespread fear, and the betrayal of the duty of care towards fellow\* citizens (see Goodin, 2006: 102; Blakeley this volume). For this and other reasons, we argue that the term 'state terrorism' should be retained as an analytical and political category. A final related objection is that although states may engage in terrorism which is far more destructive than non-state terrorism, it is qualitatively different in aims, modes, and outcomes and there is therefore little analytical value in studying state violence and non-state violence under the same label. In response to this, we would argue that, given the aetiology of the term 'terrorism' as a descriptor of violent state consolidation, state terrorism represents the purest and original form of the terrorism phenomenon and therefore has much to tell us about its causes and effects. Certainly, state terrorism comes closest to generating real 'terror' among a population and this is what non-state groups also frequently aspire to achieve in their actions. In practice however, state and non-state actors actually employ many of the very same strategies - kidnap, extra-judicial killing, bombing, torture and the like - and have similar aims - intimidation of an audience to achieve political aims, either revolutionary or conservative. In essence, state and non-state terrorism utilizes violence instrumentally in identical ways and often for similar reasons.

### AT: No Solvency- Can’t Change Discourse

#### Even if we can’t totally displace the affs narrative, it’s still worth the fight- abjecting others abjects us too- terrorizing discourse imposes an unlivable identity on both self and other.

Debrix, Professor of International Relations at Florida International University, 7

(François Debrix is Associate Professor of International Relations at Florida International University in Miami, “Tabloid Terror”, Page #155-156, NC)

As always when critical challenges are introduced, a note of caution is necessary. Indeed, it bears remembering that contemporary dominant tabloid geopolitical discourses of war, terror, and violence are robust. Far more than the policies, institutions, or agents that they empower and whose fateful actions they authorize, these geopolitical discourses are strong, persistent, and long-lasting because, once again, they are seated in everyday culture, in the politics of the mundane or the ordinary, in our most commonsensical mythological significations, as Barthes famously argued, 40 or in the sort of ideological/cultural operations that “go without saying.” 41 They also have ways of capturing, recombining, or even reinventing popular beliefs that defy seemingly evident trends. For example, despite the growing backlash since 2005 against the war in Iraq, the intensity of the tabloid imperialist discourse of global expansion of/through war and of limitless utilization of the war machine has not abated (at least, as of the writing of this chapter). In fact, tabloid imperialism of late has started to turn its attention towards possible new targets such as Iran, North Korea, or even (as some pundits of statecraft have argued) “radical Islam” in its entirety. 42 Thus, the failure or collapse of the contemporary tabloid geopolitical discursive formations of terror cannot be anticipated, wished for, or taken for granted just because public opinion appears to swing in a different direction (as seemed to be the case with the overwhelming anti-Bush and anti-Republican party returns of the 2006 midterm elections in the United States). 43 As tabloid geopolitical discourses of terror seek to spread their narrative tentacles to ever more zones of intervention (perhaps Iran, perhaps North Korea, perhaps a global “Islamo-fascism”), the so-called “we” that tabloid geopolitical experts in the United States claim they wish to protect are not left with too many political and cultural options to live “our” lives. As we saw in Chapter 3, abjecting others inevitably means abjecting “us” too. In the war on terror and in its dominant tabloid productions, it is after all not just others who are left with an “uninhabitable identification,” as Butler would have it. “We,” the supposedly protected and cared-for ones, also have such an unlivable identity ultimately imposed on us since, as a result of these discourses and representations of boundless 56 Conclusion violence and terror, “we” actually end up more vulnerable than ever. Once again, “we” too are docile bodies (or body parts) that at any moment can be mobilized for the next war or terror campaign. But this vulnerability or docility is never one that allows “us” to open up to others, or that permits “us” to apprehend a fragility or precariousness of being that might rescue everyone, “us” and “them,” from agonal destruction. A few critical thinkers have recognized that, as the tabloid production and control of war and terror in the public domain of appearances has become “a major organizing principle of all aspects of [‘our’] daily life, it is all the more imperative for educators, artists, parents, students, and others to develop a language of critique and possibility capable of expressing what is new and different in the constantly shifting interface of politics and culture.” 44 This kind of plea to come up with a different critical language or posture suggests that, although fighting off tabloid geopolitical impositions may be fruitless in the end, it is still worth the fight. Perhaps a democracy-to-come will reveal itself as “a language of critique and possibility” in the course of the struggle. Or perhaps, if nothing else, it is worth trying to oppose today’s tabloid imperialism and its terrorizing discourses and representations in order to (try to) remain human, in order to (try to) discover what it might mean for human lives, “us” and “them,” to be precarious again. Thus, it is by offering a brief reflection on the precariousness of life as a possible motif of resistance to dominant tabloid geopolitical constructs that I wish to conclude this book.

### AT: Obama is Different

#### The Obama administration still operates within the core narrative of the war on terror- his policy changes just reflect tactical disagreements.

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 11

Richard, 3/1/11, “Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of ) change in US counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama,” Macmillan Publishers, Volume 48: Number 2/3, page 390–411 md

Although some would argue that these represent major new policy initiatives in the area of counterterrorism or at least the beginnings of significant change, closer examination does not fully support this interpretation. For example, the decision to close the Guantanamo Bay detention centre, apart from the ongoing challenges of actually enacting this policy, was accompanied by the decision to continue the preventive detention of individuals suspected of being an ongoing threat to American security, and the continuation of the global terrorist interdiction and arrest programme. Similarly, the decision to withdraw troops from Iraq was accompanied by the decision to expand the war on terror in the Afghanistan–Pakistan region. 5 As President Obama stated during the election campaign, ‘the central front in the war on terror is not Iraq, and it never was. That is why the second goal of my new strategy will be taking the fight to al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Obama, 15 July 2008). In any event, it is arguable whether a ‘withdrawal’ is an accurate description of the decision to leave 35–50 000 troops in Iraq. It can be argued that these policy decisions indicate disagreement over the strategies and tactics of the war on terror, not whether the threat of terrorism warrants or is best dealt with by a ‘war’, or whether the war on terror has failed to achieve any significant gains and should be ended.

In terms of the public language of President Obama, the evidence is even clearer that he publicly accepts the core narratives of the war on terror and is committed to its continuation, even if he has stopped using the phrase ‘war on terror’. In Table 1, I have compiled a few illustrative quotations from major speeches by President Obama over the past 3 years, which relate to the war on terror and national security; they are a small sample of many dozens of examples where he expresses the existing widely accepted core narratives. At the most fundamental level, the Obama administration continues to employ the term ‘war’ in relation to ‘terrorism’ regularly in its public communication, describing acts of terrorism as ‘acts of war’ (thereby retaining counterterrorism within a war-based framework), for example. 6 Beyond this, a comparison with the original narratives clearly demonstrates that President Obama accepts most, if not all of the central narratives of the war on terror, such as the argument that the 9/11 attacks were unprovoked and completely unrelated to any foreign policy actions by the United States, the essential justice and necessity of a ‘war’ on terrorism, America’s historic call and duty to lead the war on terror, the ‘new’ threat posed by WMD terrorism and rogue states and the need for new tools to fight them, the duty to promote America’s universal values internationally, the right of pre-emptive action against terrorists, the need to prevent the emergence of terrorist safe havens in collapsed and failed states, the likelihood of a long war against terrorism and the inevitability of American victory – among many others. In other words, the ‘war on terror continues to operate as the dominant framework of the Obama administration’ (Parmar, 2010, p. 15).

#### Obama remains the guardian of terrorism discourse by not changing his policies

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 11

Richard, 3/1/11, “Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of ) change in US counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama,” Macmillan Publishers, Volume 48: Number 2/3, page 390–411 md

In this situation, where do the possibilities for change in US counterterrorism policy lie? As Stuart Croft (2006) has ably demonstrated, it is in the space opened up by a sense of crisis or rupture that the possibility for articulating a ‘new’ political discourse emerges – provided a willing agent, specifically a norm entrepreneur, is present to engage in a ‘decisive intervention’. Such a crisis can occur as the result of either a sudden set of unforeseen events (such as an act of political violence) which appear to shatter existing commonsense perceptions, or gradual change over a long period brought about by sustained resistance to the dominant discourse. That is, over time counter-hegemonic opposition can destabilise and deconstruct accepted knowledge, eventually leading to a crisis of credibility and the need for a new set of narratives. In this instance, it could conceivably be argued that a number of recent crises – the setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan, or the global financial crisis, for example – could have provided the discursive opening for such a decisive intervention. The fact that Obama has not exploited these opportunities to change the dominant discourse reaffirms my argument that despite popular expectations, he is not a norm entrepreneur determined to change the war on terror, but is rather its guardian.

#### Must continue to challenge Obama’s omissions and practice of counterterrorism.

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 11

Richard, 3/1/11, “Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of ) change in US counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama,” Macmillan Publishers, Volume 48: Number 2/3, page 390–411 md

In addition to the stated policies and language of the Obama administration, it is also important to interrogate the silences and omissions in the Obama administration’s language and practice of counterterrorism – the things that are not said or done – particularly those things that could provide evidence of a genuinely new approach to the war on terror. Among a long list of possibilities, it seems significant that the new administration is not, for example, seeking to reassure the American public about the terrorist threat. The presentation of all the evidence and arguments which show that the real risk of terrorism is extremely low by any statistical or empirical measures (see Mueller, 2006) might reassure the public, but it could also undermine the entire rationale for the war on terror and open up the possibility of substantively changing policy direction. Nor is the administration engaging in public debate on, or questioning, US foreign policies which might be provoking violent resistance in regions like the Middle East, the failures of war-based approaches to political challenges like terrorism, or the possible lessons from earlier terrorist campaigns. In terms of concrete policy action, the new administration is also clearly not making moves or signalling its intentions to overturn the Patriot Acts, give terrorist suspects full legal rights within a criminal justice framework, dismantle or re-task the DHS away from counterterrorism, open negotiations with al Qaeda and its affiliates, end policies of military intervention against Islamist groups in the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere, close down its network of forward military bases, end covert military and intelligence counterterrorism operations or end policies of conditioning aid to developing countries on counterterrorism cooperation – among many other things.

# AFF

### Less Absurd Replacement for Corsi Impact

#### Nuclear terrorism causes nuclear war with Russia and China.

Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 10 (“After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)

A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves.

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem.

It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well.

Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41

Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo?

In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack?

Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response.

As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.

There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability?

If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation.

If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure?

If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

### Successful Attack => Police State

#### Turn- their counterterrorism and civil liberties impacts are much worse in a world of a successful terror strike.

Ignatieff 4 [Michael, former director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, former Professor in Human Rights Policy at the University of Toronto and a senior fellow of the university's Munk Centre for International Studies; “Could We Lose the War on Terror? Lesser Evils,” New York Times Magazine, 5/02]  
  
Consider the consequences of a second major attack on the mainland United States -- the detonation of a radiological or dirty bomb, perhaps, or a low-yield nuclear device or a chemical strike in a subway. Any of these events could cause death, devastation and panic on a scale that would make 9/11 seem like a pale prelude. After such an attack, a pall of mourning, melancholy, anger and fear would hang over our public life for a generation. An attack of this sort is already in the realm of possibility. The recipes for making ultimate weapons are on the Internet, and the materiel required is available for the right price. Democracies live by free markets, but a free market in everything -- enriched uranium, ricin, anthrax -- will mean the death of democracy. Armageddon is being privatized, and unless we shut down these markets, doomsday will be for sale. Sept. 11, for all its horror, was a conventional attack. We have the best of reasons to fear the fire next time. A democracy can allow its leaders one fatal mistake -- and that's what 9/11 looks like to many observers -- but Americans will not forgive a second one. A succession of large - scale attacks would pull at the already-fragile tissue of trust that binds us to our leadership and destroy the trust we have in one another. Once the zones of devastation were cordoned off and the bodies buried, we might find ourselves, in short order, living in a national-security state on continuous alert , with sealed borders, constant identity checks and permanent detention camps for dissidents and aliens. Our constitutional rights might disappear from our courts, while torture might reappear in our interrogation cells. The worst of it is that government would not have to impose tyranny on a cowed populace. We would demand it for our own protection. And if the institutions of our democracy were unable to protect us from our enemies, we might go even further, taking the law into our own hands. We have a history of lynching in this country, and by the time fear and paranoia settled deep in our bones, we might repeat the worst episodes from our past, killing our former neighbors, our onetime friends. That is what defeat in a war on terror looks like. We would survive, but we would no longer recognize ourselves. We would endure, but we would lose our identity as free peoples. Alarmist? Consider where we stand after two years of a war on terror. We are told that Al Qaeda's top leadership has been decimated by detention and assassination. True enough, but as recently as last month bin Laden was still sending the Europeans quaint invitations to surrender. Even if Al Qaeda no longer has command and control of its terrorist network, that may not hinder its cause. After 9/11, Islamic terrorism may have metastasized into a cancer of independent terrorist cells that, while claiming inspiration from Al Qaeda, no longer require its direction, finance or advice. These cells have given us Madrid. Before that, they gave us Istanbul, and before that, Bali. There is no shortage of safe places in which they can grow. Where terrorists need covert support, there are Muslim communities, in the diasporas of Europe and North America, that will turn a blind eye to their presence. If they need raw recruits, the Arab rage that makes for martyrs is still incandescent. Palestine is in a state of permanent insurrection. Iraq is in a state of barely subdued civil war. Some of the Bush administration's policies, like telling Ariel Sharon he can keep settlements on the West Bank, may only be fanning the flames. So anyone who says "Relax, more people are killed in road accidents than are killed in terrorist attacks" is playing games. The conspiracy theorists who claim the government is manufacturing the threat in order to foist secret government upon us ought to wise up. Anyone who doesn't take seriously a second major attack on the United States just isn't being serious. In the Spanish elections in March, we may have had a portent of what's ahead: a terrorist gang trying to intimidate voters into altering the result of a democratic election. We can confidently expect that terrorists will attempt to tamper with our election in November. Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, said in a recent television interview that the Bush administration is concerned that terrorists will see the approaching presidential election as "too good to pass up." Thinking the worst is not defeatist. It is the best way to avoid defeat. Nor is it defeatist to concede that terror can never be entirely vanquished. Terrorists will continue to threaten democratic politics wherever oppressed or marginalized groups believe their cause justifies violence. But we can certainly deny them victory. We can continue to live without fear inside free institutions. To do so, however, we need to change the way we think, to step outside the confines of our cozy conservative and liberal boxes.

### No Alternative

#### It’s not enough to just criticize our scholarship- they need to explain a realistic alternative.

Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, et al 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Jeroen Gunning is Lecturer in International Politics at Aberystwyth University and Deputy Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence and co-editor of the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism, Marie Breen Smyth is Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisalion and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV) at Aberystwyth University, and a Reader in International Politics and co-editor of the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, p. 4 GAL)

In this broader context, the specific aim of this volume is to bring together an eminent group of scholars to explore. First, why a new "critical' approach to the study of political terrorism is needed and. second, what such an approach might entail in terms of its ontology, epistemology, methodology, normative stand­point, ethics, contribution to policy, its relation to other disciplines, and most importantly, its future research agenda. We accept that articulating a clear, achievable, and relevant research agenda is the litmus test of any new approach.

It is not enough to simply point out what is lacking in current research; a clear and realistic alternative must also be provided. In essence, our primary purpose was to make the case for critical terrorism studies in a much clearer and more developed form than we have up to this point. We hope that the following chap­ters will go some way towards this goal, while at the same time opening up and stimulating new questions, issues, debates, relationships, and collaborations.

#### Counter-discourses remain marginal or get co-opted- can’t change political discourse about terrorism.

Jackson (Department of International Politics, University of Wales) 11

Richard, 3/1/11, “Culture, identity and hegemony: Continuity and (the lack of ) change in US counterterrorism policy from Bush to Obama,” Macmillan Publishers, Volume 48: Number 2/3, page 390–411 md

Of course, these sites and social practices are not monolithic or free from contradiction; they have also been the means through which the dominant discourse or truth regime has been resisted, contested, challenged and deconstructed (see Croft, 2006). However, counter-narratives and discourses expressed through movies, books, jokes, protests and other texts have to date remained relatively marginal in America’s broader culture and political system, or have been successfully incorporated into the dominant discourse. Certainly, they have yet to make a significant impact on counterterrorism policy, the proposed reforms of the Obama administration notwithstanding (see below) or on US political discourse about terrorism more broadly. There are very few national-level politicians publically arguing that terrorism is a relatively minor threat, that the United States has overreacted, that terrorists oppose US policies rather than its values, or that a ‘war’ on terror is a misguided and unhelpful response, for example.

### Emancipation Alt Bad

#### The alternative denies a pragmatic understanding of politics- don’t make the perfect the enemy of the good, you should endorse our specific action instead of their utopian universalism.

Jones, Associate Professor and editorial board member on the Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Smith, Professor of War Studies, 8

(David Martin & M.L.R., April 13, 2008, “We’re All Terrorists Now: Critical—or Hypocritical—Studies “on” Terrorism?”*Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* accessed 7/3/12, CPO)

In analogous visionary terms, Booth defines real security as emancipation in a way that denies any definitional rigor to either term. The struggle against terrorism is, then, a struggle for emancipation from the oppression of political violence everywhere. Consequently, in this Manichean struggle for global emancipation against the real terror of Western democracy, Booth further maintains that universities have a crucial role to play. This also is something of a concern for those who do not share the critical vision, as university international relations departments are not now, it would seem, in business to pursue dispassionate analysis but instead are to serve as cheerleaders for this critically inspired vision.

Overall, the journal’s fallacious commitment to emancipation undermines any ostensible claim to pluralism and diversity. Over determined by this transformative approach to world politics, it necessarily denies the possibility of a realist or prudential appreciation of politics and the promotion not of universal solutions but pragmatic ones that accept the best that may be achieved in the circumstances. Ultimately, to present the world how it ought to be rather than as it is conceals a deep intolerance notable in the contempt with which many of the contributors to the journal appear to hold Western politicians and the Western media.6

It is the exploitation of this oughtistic style of thinking that leads the critic into a Humpty Dumpty world where words mean exactly what the critical theorist “chooses them to mean—neither more nor less.” However, in order to justify their disciplinary niche they have to insist on the failure of established modes of terrorism study. Having identified a source of government grants and academic perquisites, critical studies in fact does not deal with the notion of terrorism as such, but instead the manner in which the Western liberal democratic state has supposedly manipulated the use of violence by non-state actors in order to “other” minority communities and create a politics of fear.

#### The alternative is overly utopian- you can’t solve terrorism by recognizing interconnectedness and singing Kumbaya.

Jones, Associate Professor and editorial board member on the Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Smith, Professor of War Studies, 8

(David Martin & M.L.R., April 13, 2008, “We’re All Terrorists Now: Critical—or Hypocritical—Studies “on” Terrorism?”*Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* accessed 7/3/12, CPO)

Moreover, the resolution of this condition of escalating violence requires not any strategic solution that creates security as the basis for development whether in London or Kabul. Instead, Booth, Burke, and the editors contend that the only solution to “the world-historical crisis that is facing human society globally” (p. 76) is universal human “emancipation.” This, according to Burke, is “the normative end” that critical theory pursues. Following Jurgen Habermas, the godfather of critical theory, terrorism is really a form of distorted communication. The solution to this problem of failed communication resides not only in the improvement of living conditions, and “the political taming of unbounded capitalism,” but also in “the telos of mutual understanding.” Only through this telos with its “strong normative bias towards non violence” (p. 43) can a universal condition of peace and justice transform the globe. In other words, the only ethical solution to terrorism is conversation: sitting around an un-coerced table presided over by Kofi Annan, along with Ken Booth, Osama bin Laden, President Obama, and some European Union pacifist sandalista, a transcendental communicative reason will emerge to promulgate norms of transformative justice. As Burke enunciates, the panacea of un-coerced communication would establish “a secularism that might create an enduring architecture of basic shared values” (p. 46).

In the end, un-coerced norm projection is not concerned with the world as it is, but how it ought to be. This not only compounds the logical errors that permeate critical theory, it advances an ultimately utopian agenda under the guise of soi-disant cosmopolitanism where one somewhat vaguely recognizes the “human interconnection and mutual vulnerability to nature, the cosmos and each other” (p. 47) and no doubt bursts into spontaneous chanting of Kumbaya.

#### Turn- Their emancipation alternative will be coopted to justify further violence.

McDonald (Assistant Professor of International Security in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick.) 07

Matt, 1/9/07, “Emancipation and Critical Terrorism Studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 252 – 259 md

Defining an overtly emancipatory approach to the study of terrorism is not without its dangers and certainly not without its critics. The language of ‘emancipation’, albeit a version of it that few working in the critical theoretical tradition would endorse, was invoked by President Bush to justify intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the ‘war on terror’. At this level, advancing the normative imperative of emancipation (however defined) risks contributing to the possibility of its invocation and ‘use’ as intellectual ballast for violent crusades involving the ‘enforcement’ of freedom. This concern is evident in post-modern objections to the violence of Enlightenment ‘grand narratives’, and will be somewhat familiar to those engaged in debates concerning ‘humanitarian intervention’ or ‘human security’ in international relations. But rather than illustrating the inherent problems of emancipation as a guiding normative principle, it may well be that precisely the internal tensions and contradictions of practices carried out in the name of ‘emancipation’ (e.g. the tens of thousands of dead among those ‘liberated’ in the case of Iraq) provide the basis for immanent critique and genuine emancipatory change. Genuine emancipation cannot, as Booth (1999) has suggested, be achieved at the expense of others.

### Permutation

#### The permutation creates dialogue between orthodox and critical approaches to terrorism- pure critique is alienating and kills alternative solvency.

Jackson, Senior Researcher @ Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Contemporary Political Violence, et al 9

(Richard, Reader in the Department of International Politics @ Aberystwyth University, Jeroen Gunning is Lecturer in International Politics at Aberystwyth University and Deputy Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence and co-editor of the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism, Marie Breen Smyth is Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisalion and Contemporary Political Violence (CSRV) at Aberystwyth University, and a Reader in International Politics and co-editor of the journal Critical Studies on Terrorism, Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda, p. 4 GAL)

In tandem with these broader aims, we also recognised a pressing need to engage with the existing terrorism studies field in a new, more dialogic manner than some of our critically-oriented predecessors. We are fully cognisant that pre­vious efforts to influence the field have been largely unsuccessful; many of the criticisms made in the 1980s and 1990s, particularly by left-wing scholars and anthropologists, are still, unfortunately, valid today. In part, this previous failure was the result of a tendency by some critically-oriented scholars to couch their critique in polemical and therefore alienating terms, and the fact that many of them originated outside of the field they were criticising. There was also a certain unwillingness to engage in respectful dialogue with orthodox scholars of terror­ism; it often appeared to be a case of throwing rocks from the sidelines. Acutely aware of the potential for a similarly unhelpful outcome in this case, we view the call for a critical approach to the study of terrorism as an opportunity for dialogue and debate, conducted in a respectful manner, and occurring primarily within the central concerns, issues, approaches, and scholarly activities of the broader field. We believe that our efforts to date, including this volume, reflect and express this spirit of inclusive, respectful dialogue. Finally, we should make it clear that our intentions in this project are not to bifurcate or splinter the field, establish political or ideological dividing lines, or create a set of competing intellectual factions. Nor is it our intention to simply replace an established orthodoxy with a new orthodoxy. Rather, our hope is to generate real dialogue and debate, open up new questions and areas of research, and re-energise, revitalise and improve the contemporary study of political terrorism.

#### Permutation is best- critique alone can’t move beyond deconstruction, it must be combined with our problem-solving approach.

Gunning (Jeroen Gunning; Reader in Middle East Politics and Conflict Studies, Durham University, UK) 07

Jeroen, 6-21-07 “Government and Opposition”, Blackwell Publishing, Vol.42, No. 3, pp. 363–393 MD

None of this is intended to downplay the achievements of ‘traditional terrorism studies’. At its best, a ‘problem-solving’ approach can be more rigorous and precise than ‘critical’ approaches because it does not constantly have to interrogate itself and works within ﬁxed, measurable parameters. 54 It can offer very practical advice where ‘critical’ perspectives often struggle to go beyond critique and deconstruction. 55 It acknowledges the centrality of the state ‘as a locus . . . of effective political action’ and what this means for security issues where ‘critical’ approaches may be tempted to ‘exclude a focus on state action . . . on the grounds that it plays inevitably within the rules of existing conceptions’. 56 These are challenges that any ‘critical’ perspective has to wrestle with. In addition, a number of scholars who have a broadly ‘problem-solving’ approach, simultaneously display several ‘critical’ characteristics by, for instance, going some way in historicizing ‘terrorism’ or recognizing that state actions have helped to produce insurgent ‘terrorism’. 57 The distinction between ‘problem-solving’ and ‘critical’ is thus not sharp but moves along a continuum. However, while ‘traditional terrorism research’ has produced some solid exploratory and descriptive knowledge, and, within the limits of an un-problematized status quo, explanatory knowledge, 58 the shortcomings of this research – from over-reliance on secondary data rather than ﬁeldwork, to uncritical adoption of state accounts, and lack of imagination regarding alternative solutions – are unlikely to be adequately addressed from within a purely ‘problem-solving’ paradigm. It is no coincidence that the more rigorous and informative ‘traditional’ scholars are typically those who display some ‘critical’ characteristics. An explicitly ‘critical turn’, therefore, is called for.

A critically constituted ‘terrorism studies’ would encourage scholars to move beyond the state as the sole legitimate referent, and beyond state-centric security notions, to the wider notion of human security and an analysis of how ‘terrorism’ and counter-terrorism affect the security of all, starting from the (gendered) individual, through the community to the state, and including such concerns as social justice, inequality, ‘structural violence’, culture and discrimination. 59 It would enable research into the dynamic of violence between state and non-state actors, and particularly the extent to which state policies (re)produce oppositional political violence and vice versa, as well as what impact both oppositional and state violence have on individuals and society. 60 It would encourage researchers to historicize and contextualize the conﬂict by looking at the evolution of violence, broader processes of radicalization, the relationship between violent organizations and wider social movements, and the relationship between social movements and the state, by drawing, for instance, on social movement theory.

### AT: Non-State Terrorist Focus/You Ignore State Terrorism

#### Orthodox terrorism studies doesn’t ignore state violence or neglect non-state perspectives.

Lutz, Professor at Indiana University, 10

(James M., December 2010, “A Critical View of Critical Terrorism Studies,” Perspectives on Terrorism, volume: 4, p. 31-40, CPO)

Supporters of the CTS perspective also argue that the conventional approach to terrorism noticeably ignores the violence involved in the counterterrorism strategies of governments. They further argue that governments take advantage of the presence of dissident terrorist actions to crack down on opponents to the regime in power. It has even been suggested that the recent wave of attacks by dissident groups has led governments “to manufacture” a new concept of terrorism in order to further the interests of the elite. [21] Governments in many circumstances have indeed long used threats and acts of violent protest from dissidents as often not unwelcome pretexts for crackdowns on dissenters or for other political purposes. Such manipulation of public events, however, does not necessarily qualify as terrorism even when it frequently involves manipulation and repression.

The use of dissident actions as an excuse for government repression or the excesses of counterterrorism have also been cited by CT scholars to allege that the conventional ‘orthodox’ terrorism perspective is flawed in another way. They often suggest that the research focus has been on government reactions while discussing terrorism from the perspective of the terrorists is “a taboo stance within Western scholarship.” [22] While much of the conventional literature on terrorism does not directly address the viewpoint of the terrorists directly, the whole issue of the causes of terrorism (e.g. in studies on radicalisation) does address the perspectives of those involved in terrorist actions. For example, arguments that repression or lack of participation lead to political violence, including acts of terrorism, clearly involves looking at events from the perspective of the dissidents. [23] Admittedly, since it is – at least in Western democracies much easier to get documentary material on the perspectives of governments and their counterterrorism strategies, greater attention has been given to these. Even so, communiqués and statements by leaders of dissident groups to provide insights into the perspectives of the dissident groups, have been used for analyses of the origins and motives of dissident and insurgent groups using tactics of terrorism. Further, considerations of reform and concessions as counterterrorist strategies implicitly view events also from the perspective of the terrorist groups rather than merely that of the government. [24]

#### Their argument that terror scholarship ignores state violence is a straw person- political scientists have a long history of analyzing state violence, even if it’s not labeled terrorism.

Lutz, Professor at Indiana University, 10

(James M., December 2010, “A Critical View of Critical Terrorism Studies,” Perspectives on Terrorism, volume: 4, p. 31-40, CPO)

There is little doubt that one of the reasons for the increase in Homeland Security Studies results from the fact that government grants and contracts are more readily available for these types of analysis since terrorist attacks can be a major threat to the security of states and the safety of their citizens. The consequent increase in the number of studies that deal with this type of threat obviously does respond to the needs of governments that are attempting to provide better security, even if these studies do not necessarily enhance a more basic understanding of the sources of violence—terrorist and otherwise. Governments, much to the dismay of academics everywhere, are more interested in practical research (often narrowly defined) and not very interested in the pure research that so many academics are particularly fond of. This focus on Homeland Security is therefore a rather natural government response; it does not necessarily constitute proof of any effort to eliminate or prevent any alternative analysis of violence by the state from those interested in Terrorism Studies even if it does lead some more researchers to focus on dissident terrorism. Moreover, the claim that a “terrorism industry” has been established that serves the state [8], appears to be something of an overstatement; it appears to be designed to discredit those who are primarily interested in dissident and insurgent terrorism.

The claim that the study of state uses of terrorism has been ignored predates the emergence of the CTS perspective. One earlier search of the literature in 1987 claimed that there have been virtually no discussions of state uses of terrorism in the social science literature [9], a claim that the CTS perspective has widely accepted. Yet, while political scientists may not have referred to the use of violence by governments as terrorism (see the next section), they actually have a long history of looking at violent state activities in domestic arenas. In the past, political scientists regularly divided forms of government into totalitarian, authoritarian, and democratic regimes. The authoritarian category has perhaps been an overly broad one as it was used to encompass everything not fitting easily in the other two categories. In discussions of totalitarian societies, however, inevitably one criterion among others that was applied was the use of terror as a means of social control, especially through secret police agencies. [10] Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, and Mao’s Peoples Republic of China were held up as classic examples of such totalitarian systems. More recent examples would include North Korea and the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, at least before he engaged in a war to ‘liberate’ Kuwait. Many of the authoritarian regimes in a variety of forms also relied on the explicit or implicit use of illegal or illegitimate force against dissenters. Some of the rulers, such as Idi Amin in Uganda or Francois Duvalier in Haiti, were notorious for the level of violence perpetuated by their security forces or (para-) military units. To reiterate the basic point, violence by governments against domestic populations has hardly been ignored by political scientists in academia. The fact that it has not been analyzed under the heading ‘terrorism’ does not mean that it has not been studied. It has, in fact, been studied for long time and in some depth, for instance in the literature on human rights violations.

#### Terrorism studies don’t exclude state terror from their analysis.

Lutz, Professor at Indiana University, 10

(James M., December 2010, “A Critical View of Critical Terrorism Studies,” Perspectives on Terrorism, volume: 4, p. 31-40, CPO)

State reliance on terrorist techniques that is directed against its own citizens, moreover, has also been considered in the ‘orthodox’ terrorist literature. Wilkinson [11] in one of his early works, discussed the differences between revolutionary terrorism and repressive (state) terrorism in a period well before terrorism became a hot topic. Even before him Thornton [12] noted that terrorism could begin with the state and its security forces and not with dissidents. More recently, David Claridge [13] provided not only a very good definition of terrorism covering both dissident and regime terrorism, he also provided a rather compelling argument that some governments could and did indeed engage in campaigns of terrorism. These early references in the literature suggest that the field of Terrorism Studies has not ignored terrorism from above or been pre-empted by Homeland Security analysts or ‘the establishment’ in quite the way that CTS scholars claim. While a majority of those interested in the use of terrorism may not focus on such activities by states, it does not mean that they deny the existence state terrorism as such.

Some direct state-inspired or -supported violent activities utilized in international politics, of course, have not been ignored by social scientists or by government themselves. There has been a great deal of interest in practices that would generally be considered ‘terrorist’. Security agencies such as the CIA, KGB, SIS, PIDES, and a multitude of others have been directly responsible for assassinations, bombings, and other types of unlawful behavior – some more than others. Further, they have provided support for existing violent insurgent groups in other countries. That goes back a long way in history. Bulgarian governments supported the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) in the 1920s, the Italian OVRA aided Croatian dissidents in Yugoslavia in the 1930s, the East German Democratic Republic (DDR) supported the West German Red Army Faction in the 1970s, the Czech communist regime provided support for the Italian Red Brigades in the same decade, the US Reagan administration States supported the Nicaraguan Contras in the 1980s while Pakistan has provided various types of support for Islamist groups active in Kashmir and Afghanistan for decades. These and other examples are known well enough to suggest that such government activities in the international arena have not been ignored by academia. In fact, these kinds of covert operations, while different than attacks against one’s own citizens, have been quite well studied, most frequently in the context of international relations rather than terrorism studies. This also explains in part why discussions of these type of war by proxy activities have been under-represented in key terrorism journals. [14]

### State Violence ≠ Terrorism

#### Not every form of state violence is terrorism. Alleging this drains the term ‘terrorism’ of any real meaning.

Lutz, Professor at Indiana University, 10

(James M., December 2010, “A Critical View of Critical Terrorism Studies,” Perspectives on Terrorism, volume: 4, p. 31-40, CPO)

It needs to be recognized that not every form of violence that is evil or reprehensible, when performed by governments, constitutes terrorism. Genocide is far worse than terrorism, but genocide does not primarily seek to create fear in a target audience. In fact governments undertaking genocide may even seek to lull the victims into a false sense of security to make the killing easier. This was the case with the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, the Jews during the Holocaust and, more recently, according to some reports, also with the Tutsi in Rwanda. Similarly, harsh repression of non-violent dissent is evil, but it is usually not terrorism as long as it is not indiscriminate. Slavery is a pernicious attack on human dignity, but it is not terrorism. Institutional violence in which some citizens have fewer rights or situations where equal rights are not equally protected are to be deplored, but it is not terrorism (unless accompanied by government-tolerated vigilante violence intended to enforce the control of particular groups). It is quite legitimate and desirable to focus public and scholarly attention on these issues, but it is not appropriate to consider them to be examples of terrorism. To fault those who study other forms of terrorism than state terrorism, as CTS scholars do, is unjust since these type of situations are actually frequently analyzed in other academic (sub-)disciplines. Therefore, it cannot be said that ‘ orthodox’ analysts “refuse to examine cases of state terrorism” (very broadly defined). [20] If almost every example of government use of force to maintain law and order is labeled state terrorism, then the concept of ‘terrorism’ ceases to have any real meaning and simply becomes a polemic term used to apply a negative and pejorative label to a government or states that an observer dislikes.

#### Repression is not the same as terrorism- state repression, while terrible, is avoidable by obeying laws. Terrorism involves random and indiscriminate use of violence.

Lutz, Professor at Indiana University, 10

(James M., December 2010, “A Critical View of Critical Terrorism Studies,” Perspectives on Terrorism, volume: 4, p. 31-40, CPO)

A second distinction relevant to a consideration of the claims advanced by CTS scholars about certain state actions involves the essential difference between state repression and state terrorism. All countries and their governments can be considered repressive in the sense that they enforce laws with which some citizens will disagree. Ordinary criminals are naturally also concerned with repression by the police. Repression can also occur in institutional contexts where a particular group in society is disadvantaged. These inequalities can take an institutional form and even be considered structural violence (e.g. if woman are legally prohibited from voting or from engaging in certain occupations or are not allowed to own property). Certain religious or ethnic groups may have fewer rights of face special barriers to social mobility. If a day of worship does not fall on the traditional “weekend,” adherents can perceive themselves as suffering disadvantages. It has been suggested that such inequalities and injustices in the system have become an underlying cause of terrorism. [15] While all of these situations of discrimination and unequal treatment are clearly deplorable, they are not necessarily examples of terrorism. They may not constitute terrorism even in cases of governments that are truly repressive, regimes that deny or deprive some or all of their citizens of their most basic civil rights and liberties since there are many other forms of political violence and repression.

Distinguishing between repression and terrorism is important. Sproat made a key distinction between the two. [16] Repression involves state uses of violence against specific individuals who have violated the laws of the land, however unfair these laws may be. Any citizen, however, can avoid such negative actions by state authorities by obeying the laws. Individuals who are arrested for violating the laws do serve as an example and a deterrent to others, but the persons who are arrested are chosen because of their individual transgressions. Terrorism by the government, on the other hand, occurs when a member of a group is selected for victimization, usually at random, to provide a negative example for others belonging to the same (sub-) group. The choice of victims does not distinguish between the innocent and the guilty. The key element is the external audience that is being targeted. [17] In such circumstances, it is not possible for any individual to avoid the negative state action by obeying the laws of the land. Such exemplary violence meant to intimidate others qualifies as terrorism and is different from mere repression. It is important to note that not all repression is terrorism, even though state terrorism in most cases probably would qualify as repression.

#### Terrorism and state repression should be conceptually distinct.

Lutz, Professor at Indiana University, 10

(James M., December 2010, “A Critical View of Critical Terrorism Studies,” Perspectives on Terrorism, volume: 4, p. 31-40, CPO)

This distinction between repression and terrorism is important to bear in mind when charges are made that Western countries have actively supported terrorist regimes. To some extent this claim would appear to result from confusing repression with terrorism. It loses a great deal of its salience when it is recognized that it has been repressive states that have been supported by the West, but not necessarily terrorist regimes. The distinction, of course, may not be important for the citizens who suffer in one form or another at the hands of security forces and secret police agencies. Yet for analytic purposes, it is important to distinguish terrorism as a technique of intimidation and group punishment from repression—or from even harsh repression—as a technique for governing against the will of the population or sectors thereof.

### CTS Scholarship Bad

#### Their criticism of our scholarship is like the pot calling the kettle black- neg authors make unevidenced assertions and construct a straw person of traditional terror experts.

Jones, Associate Professor and editorial board member on the Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Smith, Professor of War Studies, 8

(David Martin & M.L.R., April 13, 2008, “We’re All Terrorists Now: Critical—or Hypocritical—Studies “on” Terrorism?”*Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* accessed 7/3/12, CPO)

Stohl further compounds this incoherence, claiming that “the media are far more likely to focus on the destructive actions, rather than on . . . grievances or the social conditions that breed [terrorism]—to present episodic rather than thematic stories” (p. 7). He argues that terror attacks between 1968 and 1980 were scarcely reported in the United States, and that reporters do not delve deeply into the sources of conflict (p. 8). All of this is quite contentious, with no direct evidence produced to support such statements. The “media” is after all a very broad term, and to assume that it is monolithic is to replace criticism with conspiracy theory. Moreover, even if it were true that the media always serves as a government propaganda agency, then by Stohl’s own logic, terrorism as a method of political communication is clearly futile as no rational actor would engage in a campaign doomed to be endlessly misreported.

Nevertheless, the notion that an inherent pro-state bias vitiates terrorism studies pervades the critical position. Anthony Burke, in “The End of Terrorism Studies” (pp. 37–49), asserts that established analysts like Bruce Hoffman “specifically exclude states as possible perpetrators” of terror. Consequently, the emergence of “critical terrorism studies” “may signal the end of a particular kind of traditionally state-focused and directed ‘problem-solving’ terrorism studies—at least in terms of its ability to assume that its categories and commitments are immune from challenge and correspond to a stable picture of reality” (p. 42).

Elsewhere, Adrian Guelke, in “Great Whites, Paedophiles and Terrorists: The Need for Critical Thinking in a New Era of Terror” (pp. 17–25), considers British government–induced media “scare-mongering” to have legitimated an “authoritarian approach” to the purported new era of terror (pp. 22–23). Meanwhile, Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass, in “The Terrorist Subject: Terrorist Studies and the Absent Subjectivity” (pp. 27–36), find the War on Terror constitutes “the single,” all embracing paradigm of analysis where the critical voice is “not allowed to ask: what is the reality itself?” (pp. 28–29). The construction of this condition, they further reveal, if somewhat abstrusely, reflects an abstract “desire” that demands terror as “an ever-present threat” (p. 31). In order to sustain this fabrication: “Terrorism experts and commentators” function as “realist policemen”; and not very smart ones at that, who while “gazing at the evidence” are “unable to read the paradoxical logic of the desire that fuels it, whereby lack turns to excess”(p. 32). Finally, Ken Booth, in “The Human Faces of Terror: Reflections in a Cracked Looking Glass” (pp. 65–79), reiterates Richard Jackson’s contention that state terrorism “is a much more serious problem than non-state terrorism” (p. 76).

Yet, one searches in vain in these articles for evidence to support the ubiquitous assertion of state bias: assuming this bias in conventional terrorism analysis as a fact seemingly does not require a corresponding concern with evidence of this fact, merely its continual reiteration by conceptual fiat. A critical perspective dispenses not only with terrorism studies but also with the norms of accepted scholarship. Asserting what needs to be demonstrated commits, of course, the elementary logical fallacy petitio principii. But critical theory apparently emancipates (to use its favorite verb) its practitioners from the confines of logic, reason, and the usual standards of academic inquiry.

Alleging a constitutive weakness in established scholarship without the necessity of providing proof to support it, therefore, appears to define the critical posture. The unproved “state centricity” of terrorism studies serves as a platform for further unsubstantiated accusations about the state of the discipline. Jackson and his fellow editors, along with later claims by Zulaika and Douglass, and Booth, again assert that “orthodox” analysts rarely bother “to interview or engage with those involved in ‘terrorist’ activity” (p. 2) or spend any time “on the ground in the areas most affected by conflict” (p. 74). Given that Booth and Jackson spend most of their time on the ground in Aberystwyth, Ceredigion, not a notably terror rich environment if we discount the operations of Meibion Glyndwr who would as a matter of principle avoid pob sais like Jackson and Booth, this seems a bit like the pot calling the kettle black. It also overlooks the fact that Studies in Conflict and Terrorism first advertised the problem of “talking to terrorists” in 2001 and has gone to great lengths to rectify this lacuna, if it is one, regularly publishing articles by analysts with first-hand experience of groups like the Taliban, Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah.

### Discourse/Ontology Focus Bad

#### Their focus on questioning discourse and ontology prevents us from having any objective data or policy prescriptions- the permutation is best.

Jones, Associate Professor and editorial board member on the Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Smith, Professor of War Studies, 8

(David Martin & M.L.R., April 13, 2008, “We’re All Terrorists Now: Critical—or Hypocritical—Studies “on” Terrorism?”*Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* accessed 7/3/12, CPO)

Firstly, to challenge dominant knowledge and understanding and retain sensitivity to labels leads inevitably to a fixation with language, discourse, the ambiguity of the noun, terror, and its political use and abuse. Terrorism, Booth enlightens the reader unremarkably, is “a politically loaded term” (p. 72). Meanwhile, Zulaika and Douglass consider terror “the dominant tropic [sic] space in contemporary political and journalistic discourse” (p. 30). Faced with the “serious challenge” (Booth p. 72) and pejorative connotation that the noun conveys, critical terrorologists turn to deconstruction and bring the full force of postmodern obscurantism to bear on its use. Thus the editors proclaim that terrorism is “one of the most powerful signifiers in contemporary discourse.” There is, moreover, a “yawning gap between the ‘terrorism’ signifier and the actual acts signified” (p. 1). “[V]irtually all of this activity,” the editors pronounce ex cathedra, “refers to the response to acts of political violence not the violence itself” (original italics) (p. 1). Here again they offer no evidence for this curious assertion and assume, it would seem, all conventional terrorism studies address issues of homeland security.

In keeping with this critical orthodoxy that he has done much to define, Anthony Burke also asserts the “instability (and thoroughly politicized nature) of the unifying master-terms of our field: ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’” (p. 38). To address this he contends that a critical stance requires us to “keep this radical instability and inherent politicization of the concept of terrorism at the forefront of its analysis.” Indeed, “without a conscious reflexivity about the most basic definition of the object, our discourse will not be critical at all” (p. 38).More particularly, drawing on a jargon-infused amalgam of Michel Foucault’s identification of a relationship between power and knowledge, the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School’s critique of democratic false consciousness, mixed with the existentialism of the Third Reich’s favorite philosopher,Martin Heidegger, Burke “questions the question.” This intellectual potpourri apparently enables the critical theorist to “question the ontological status of a ‘problem’ before any attempt to map out, study or resolve it” (p. 38).

Interestingly, Burke, Booth, and the symposistahood deny that there might be objective data about violence or that a properly focused strategic study of terrorism would not include any prescriptive goodness or rightness of action. While a strategic theorist or a skeptical social scientist might claim to consider only the complex relational situation that involves as well as the actions, the attitude of human beings to them, the critical theorist’s radical questioning of language denies this possibility.

#### Their discourse and ontology arguments are non-falsifiable and can’t produce a coherent method for understanding terrorism.

Jones, Associate Professor and editorial board member on the Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Smith, Professor of War Studies, 8

(David Martin & M.L.R., April 13, 2008, “We’re All Terrorists Now: Critical—or Hypocritical—Studies “on” Terrorism?”*Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* accessed 7/3/12, CPO)

The critical approach to language and its deconstruction of an otherwise useful, if imperfect, political vocabulary has been the source of much confusion and inconsequentiality in the practice of the social sciences. It dates from the relativist pall that French radical post structural philosophers like Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, cast over the social and historical sciences in order to demonstrate that social and political knowledge depended on and underpinned power relations that permeated the landscape of the social and reinforced the liberal democratic state. This radical assault on the possibility of either neutral fact or value ultimately functions unfalsifiably, and as a substitute for philosophy, social science, and a real theory of language.

The problem with the critical approach is that, as the Australian philosopher John Anderson demonstrated, to achieve a genuine study one must either investigate the facts that are talked about or the fact that they are talked about in a certain way. More precisely, as J.L. Mackie explains, “if we concentrate on the uses of language we fall between these two stools, and we are in danger of taking our discoveries about manners of speaking as answers to questions about what is there.”2 Indeed, in so far as an account of the use of language spills over into ontology it is liable to be a confused mixture of what should be two distinct investigations: the study of the facts about which the language is used, and the study of the linguistic phenomena themselves.

It is precisely, however, this confused mixture of fact and discourse that critical thinking seeks to impose on the study of terrorism and infuses the practice of critical theory more generally. From this confused seed no coherent method grows.

### CTS => Relativism

#### Their critical theory’s attempt to empathize with the terrorist collapse into Marxist relativism.

Jones, Associate Professor and editorial board member on the Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and Smith, Professor of War Studies, 8

(David Martin & M.L.R., April 13, 2008, “We’re All Terrorists Now: Critical—or Hypocritical—Studies “on” Terrorism?”*Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* accessed 7/3/12, CPO)

Critical theory, then, embraces relativism not only toward language but also toward social action. Relativism and the bizarre ethicism it engenders in its attempt to empathize with the terrorist other are, moreover, histrionic. As Leo Strauss classically inquired of this relativist tendency in the social sciences, “is such an understanding dependent upon our own commitment or independent of it?” Strauss explains, if it is independent, I am committed as an actor and I am uncommitted in another compartment of myself in my capacity as a social scientist. “In that latter capacity I am completely empty and therefore completely open to the perception and appreciation of all commitments or value systems.” I go through the process of empathetic understanding in order to reach clarity about my commitment for only a part of me is engaged in my empathetic understanding. This means, however, that “such understanding is not serious or genuine but histrionic.”5 It is also profoundly dependent on Western liberalism. For it is only in an open society that questions the values it promotes that the issue of empathy with the non-Western other could arise. The critical theorist’s explicit loathing of the openness that affords her histrionic posturing obscures this constituting fact.

On the basis of this histrionic empathy with the “other,” critical theory concludes that democratic states “do not always abjure acts of terror whether to advance their foreign policy objectives . . . or to buttress order at home” (p. 73). Consequently, Ken Booth asserts: “If terror can be part of the menu of choice for the relatively strong, it is hardly surprising it becomes a weapon of the relatively weak” (p. 73). Zulaika and Douglass similarly assert that terrorism is “always” a weapon of the weak (p. 33).

At the core of this critical, ethicist, relativism therefore lies a syllogism that holds all violence is terror: Western states use violence, therefore, Western states are terrorist. Further, the greater terrorist uses the greater violence: Western governments exercise the greater violence. Therefore, it is the liberal democracies rather than Al Qaeda that are the greater terrorists.

In its desire to empathize with the transformative ends, if not the means of terrorism generally and Islamist terror in particular, critical theory reveals itself as a form of Marxist unmasking. Thus, for Booth “terror has multiple forms” and the real terror is economic, the product it would seem of “global capitalism” (p. 75). Only the engaged intellectual academic finding in deconstructive criticism the philosophical weapons that reveal the illiberal neo-conservative purpose informing the conventional study of terrorism and the democratic state’s prosecution of counterterrorism can identify the real terror lurking behind the “manipulation of the politics of fear” (p. 75).

### AT: Terror Talk/Terrorism = Dirty Word

#### Retaining the term terrorism is critical to deconstructing its current meaning.

Gunning (Jeroen Gunning; Reader in Middle East Politics and Conflict Studies, Durham University, UK) 07

Jeroen, 6-21-07 “Government and Opposition”, Blackwell Publishing, Vol.42, No. 3, pp. 363–393 MD

Besides offering a central, organizing concept under which these fragmented voices can converge, there are two further reasons for retaining the term ‘terrorism’. One of the key tasks of a critically constituted ﬁeld is to investigate the political usage of this term. For that reason alone, it should be retained as a central marker. But, even more compellingly, the term ‘terrorism’ is currently so dominant that a critically constituted ﬁeld cannot afford to abandon it. Academia does not exist outside the power structures of its day. However problematic the term, it dominates public discourse and as such needs to be engaged with, deconstructed and challenged, rather than abandoned and left to those who use it without problematization or purely for political ends. Using the term also increases the currency and relevance of one’s research in both funding and policy circles, as well as among the wider public. It is because of this particular constellation of power structures that a ‘critical’ ﬁeld cannot afford, either morally or pragmatically, to abandon the term ‘terrorism’.

#### Terrorism is so dominant as a concept that the term shouldn’t be abandoned to less critical scholars.

Gunning (Jeroen Gunning; Reader in Middle East Politics and Conflict Studies, Durham University, UK) 07

(Jeroen, 1/9/07, “babies and bathwaters: reflecting on the pitfalls of critical terrorism studies” European Political Science, Volume 6 Number 3, pages 236 – 243) md

There are two further reasons for retaining ‘terrorism’ as a central organising concept. One of the key tasks of CTS is to investigate the political usage of this term. For that reason alone, it should be retained as a central marker. The term ‘terrorism’ is, furthermore, currently so dominant that CTS cannot afford to abandon it. Academia does not exist outside the power structures of its day. However problematic the term, it dominates public discourse and as such needs to be engaged with, deconstructed, and challenged, rather than abandoned and left to less critical scholars.

## AFF- Hard(er) Right (Not Recommended)

### Gotta Kill Terrorists

#### Terrorists have religious motivations that make discourse and compromise meaningless. The only way to win the war we are in is to kill them before they kill us.

Peters 4 - (Ralph, Retired Army Officer, “In Praise of Attrition,” Parameters, Summer)

Trust me. We don’t need discourses. We need plain talk, honest answers, and the will to close with the enemy and kill him. And to keep on killing him until it is unmistakably clear to the entire world who won. When military officers start speaking in academic gobbledygook, it means they have nothing to contribute to the effectiveness of our forces. They badly need an assignment to Fallujah. Consider our enemies in the War on Terror. Men who believe, literally, that they are on a mission from God to destroy your civilization and who regard death as a promotion are not impressed by elegant maneuvers. You must find them, no matter how long it takes, then kill them. If they surrender, you must accord them their rights under the laws of war and international conventions. But, as we have learned so painfully from all the mindless, left-wing nonsense spouted about the prisoners at Guantanamo, you are much better off killing them before they have a chance to surrender. We have heard no end of blather about network-centric warfare, to the great profit of defense contractors. If you want to see a superb—and cheap—example of “net-war,” look at al Qaeda. The mere possession of technology does not ensure that it will be used effectively. And effectiveness is what matters. It isn’t a question of whether or not we want to fight a war of attrition against religion-fueled terrorists. We’re in a war of attrition with them. We have no realistic choice. Indeed, our enemies are, in some respects, better suited to both global and local wars of maneuver than we are. They have a world in which to hide, and the world is full of targets for them. They do not heed laws or boundaries. They make and observe no treaties. They do not expect the approval of the United Nations Security Council. They do not face election cycles. And their weapons are largely provided by our own societies. We have the technical capabilities to deploy globally, but, for now, we are forced to watch as Pakistani forces fumble efforts to surround and destroy concentrations of terrorists; we cannot enter any country (except, temporarily, Iraq) without the permission of its government. We have many tools—military, diplomatic, economic, cultural, law enforcement, and so on—but we have less freedom of maneuver than our enemies. But we do have superior killing power, once our enemies have been located. Ultimately, the key advantage of a superpower is superpower. Faced with implacable enemies who would kill every man, woman, and child in our country and call the killing good (the ultimate war of attrition), we must be willing to use that power wisely, but remorselessly. We are, militarily and nationally, in a transition phase. Even after 9/11, we do not fully appreciate the cruelty and determination of our enemies. We will learn our lesson, painfully, because the terrorists will not quit. The only solution is to kill them and keep on killing them: a war of attrition. But a war of attrition fought on our terms, not theirs. Of course, we shall hear no end of fatuous arguments to the effect that we can’t kill our way out of the problem. Well, until a better methodology is discovered, killing every terrorist we can find is a good interim solution. The truth is that even if you can’t kill yourself out of the problem, you can make the problem a great deal smaller by effective targeting. And we shall hear that killing terrorists only creates more terrorists. This is sophomoric nonsense. The surest way to swell the ranks of terror is to follow the approach we did in the decade before 9/11 and do nothing of substance. Success breeds success. Everybody loves a winner. The clichés exist because they’re true. Al Qaeda and related terrorist groups metastasized because they were viewed in the Muslim world as standing up to the West successfully and handing the Great Satan America embarrassing defeats with impunity. Some fanatics will flock to the standard of terror, no matter what we do. But it’s far easier for Islamic societies to purge themselves of terrorists if the terrorists are on the losing end of the global struggle than if they’re allowed to become triumphant heroes to every jobless, unstable teenager in the Middle East and beyond. Far worse than fighting such a war of attrition aggressively is to pretend you’re not in one while your enemy keeps on killing you. Even the occupation of Iraq is a war of attrition. We’re doing remarkably well, given the restrictions under which our forces operate. But no grand maneuvers, no gestures of humanity, no offers of conciliation, and no compromises will persuade the terrorists to halt their efforts to disrupt the development of a democratic, rule-of-law Iraq. On the contrary, anything less than relentless pursuit, with both preemptive and retaliatory action, only encourages the terrorists and remaining Baathist gangsters.

#### Aggressive military action against terrorists and their sponsors is the only way to end their jihad against the west - embrace of nonviolence makes future attacks inevitable.

Mcinerney and vallely, 4 (Thomas and Paul, Lt. General USAF (Retired) and Maj. General US Army (Retired), both analysts for Fox News, Endgame: The Blueprint for Victory in the War on Terror, p. 167-8)  
  
After the axis powers declared war on the United States in December 1941, the United States did not limit its response to fortifying the Hawaiian Islands, increasing antisubmarine patrols along the Atlantic Coast, and upgrading the efforts of the FBI to crack rings of domestic Axis sympathizers and capture saboteurs. Osama bin Laden has openly and repeatedly declared war on the United States. The radical Islamists see themselves in jihad against the West, and they see the United States as the leading “Crusader” power. They see moderate Muslims who wish live in peace as traitors. Backed by state sponsors of terror like Iran they have become a global threat just as much as the National Socialists were. Though militarily puny their dreams and their potential danger are grandiose: inflaming a billion Muslims worldwide and creating a radical Islamist empire. To that end they will cooperate with rogue states like North Korea. They will do everything they can to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The bottom line is that they must be stopped. End their state sponsorship, and they wither. Buttress the forces of moderate Islam, encourage freedom and tolerance in Islamic societies grant Muslims in Iraq and Iran the opportunity to vote against tyranny and the mullahs, then the radicals do more than wither, they disappear to the fringes of Muslim society. If we are to stop the spread of radical Islam we cannot be satisfied with the conviction of a failed terrorist bomber, dismantling a terrorist cell, or freezing the bank account of a terrorist front – however necessary all these things are. To rely purely on defensive measures cedes the initiative to the radical Islamists. Instead, we need to take the battle to them. The counteroffensives in Afghanistan and Iraq were first steps to the endgame, they are not the endgame itself. The endgame is taking down the Web of Terror entirely so that the global terror threat dissolves. We have laid out the broad parameters of an active strategy for this war. Despite the best wishes of some, the Web of Terror cannot be talked to death, no “peace process” will work, no foreign aid will suffice unless the countries involved make a commitment – as Libya has apparently done – to forgo jihad, forgo terrorism, forgo weapons of mass destruction. Countries that will not do this willingly must be compelled to do it. Terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are not something we have to live with; they are something that the rogue states of the Web of Terror have to live without.

### Moral Obligation to Kill Terrorists

#### The willingness to use violence against the evil of terrorism is a moral obligation.

Beres 5 - (Louis Rene, Professor of International Law, Department of Political Science, Purdue University. Ph.D., Princeton University, 1977 “Terrorism's Executioner” The Washington Times May 31, 2005L/N)

Our world is "normally" silent in the face of evil. At worst, many are directly complicit in the maimings and slaughters. At best, the murderers are ignored. In this unchanging world Israel must soon decide whether to face the evil of Palestinian terrorism as a pitiable victim or to use whatever reasonable force is needed to remain alive. The use of force is not inherently evil. Quite the contrary; in opposing terrorist mayhem, force is indispensable to all that is good. In the case of Israel, Palestinian terrorism is unique for its cowardice, its barbarism and its genocidal goal. Were Israel to depend upon the broader international community for relief - upon the so-called road map - its plea would be unheard. All states have a right of self-defense. Israel has every lawful authority to forcibly confront the still-growing evil of Palestinian terror. Facing even biological and nuclear forms of terrorism, it now has the clear legal right to refuse to be a victim and to become an executioner. From the standpoint of providing security to its own citizens, this right even becomes an obligation. Albert Camus would have us all be "neither victims nor executioners," living not in a world in which killing has disappeared ("we are not so crazy as that"), but one wherein killing has become illegitimate. This is a fine expectation, yet the celebrated French philosopher did not anticipate another evil force for whom utter extermination of "the Jews" was its declared object. Not even in a world living under the shadow of recent Holocaust did Camus consider such an absurd possibility. But Israel lacks the quaint luxury of French philosophy. Were Israel to follow Camus' genteel reasoning, perhaps in order to implement Mr. Sharon's disengagement, the result would be another boundless enlargement of Jewish suffering. Before and during the Holocaust, for those who still had an opportunity to flee, Jews were ordered: "Get out of Europe; go to Palestine." When they complied (those who could), the next order was: "Get out of Palestine." For my Austrian-Jewish grandparents, their deaths came on the SS- killing grounds at Riga, Latvia. Had they made it to Palestine, their sons and grandsons would likely have died in subsequent genocidal wars intended to get the Jews "out of Palestine." Failure to use force against murderous evil is invariably a stain upon all that is good. By declining the right to act as a lawful executioner in its struggle with terror, Israel would be forced by Camus' reasoning to embrace its own disappearance. Barring Mr. Sharon's disengagement, the Jewish state would never accept collective suicide. Why was Camus, who was thinking only in the broadest generic terms, so mistaken? My own answer lies in his presumption of a natural reciprocity among human beings and states in the matter of killing. We are asked to believe that as greater numbers of people agree not to become executioners, still greater numbers will follow upon the same course. In time, the argument proceeds, the number of those who refuse to accept killing will become so great that there will be fewer and fewer victims. But Camus' presumed reciprocity does not exist, indeed, can never exist, especially in the jihad-centered Middle East. Here the Islamist will to kill Jews remains unimpressed by Israel's disproportionate contributions to science, industry, medicine and learning. Here there are no Arab plans for a "two- state solution," only for a final solution. In counterterrorism, Jewish executioners must now have an honored place in the government of Israel. Without them, evil would triumph again and again. For Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and Fatah, murdered Jews are not so much a means to an end as an end in themselves. In this unheroic Arab Islamist world, where killing Jews is both a religious mandate and sometimes also a path to sexual ecstasy and personal immortality, an Israeli unwillingness to use necessary force against terror will invite existential terror. Sadly, killing is sometimes a sacred duty. Faced with manifest evil, all decent civilizations must rely, in the end, on the executioner. To deny the executioner his proper place would enable the murderers to leer lasciviously upon whole mountains of fresh corpses.