# \*\*\*Kritiks Bad\*\*\*

# \*\*Shells

## \*Aff

### 2AC Shell

#### A. Our interpretation is that the affirmative should be able to weigh the advantages of the plan against the kritik alternative, which must be enacted by the United States federal government.

#### B. Violation – they don’t let us weigh the aff and their aff is not enacted by the USfg

#### C. Vote Aff

#### 1. Plan focus – we allow for a stable locus for links and comparison of alternatives. Their framework makes confusion and judge intervention inevitable.

#### 2. Ground – they access a massive amount of K frameworks, links, and impacts. They can leverage framework to moot the 1AC. We can never predict what we will have to compare the plan to. Even if we get ground, it’s bad and unpredictable.

#### 3. Topic education – their framework encourages generic Ks that get rehashed every year. We change the topic to learn about new things.

#### **Apolitical alternatives fail**

Rorty 98 (prof of philosophy at Stanford, Richard, 1998, “achieving our country”, Pg. 7-9)JFS

Such people find pride in American citizenship impossi­ble, and vigorous participation in electoral politics pointless. They associate American patriotism with an endorsement of atrocities: the importation of African slaves, the slaughter of Native Americans, the rape of ancient forests, and the Viet­nam War. Many of them think of national pride as appropri­ate only for chauvinists: for the sort of American who re­joices that America can still orchestrate something like the Gulf War, can still bring deadly force to bear whenever and wherever it chooses. When young intellectuals watch John Wayne war movies after reading Heidegger, Foucault, Stephenson, or Silko, they often become convinced that they live in a violent, inhuman, corrupt country. They begin to think of themselves as a saving remnant-as the happy few who have the insight to see through nationalist rhetoric to the ghastly reality of contemporary America. But this insight does not move them to formulate a legislative program, to join a political movement, or to share in a national hope. The contrast between national hope and national self­-mockery and self-disgust becomes vivid when one compares novels like Snow Crash and Almanac of the Dead with socialist novels of the first half of the century-books like The Jungle, An American Tragedy, and The Grapes of Wrath. The latter were written in the belief that the tone of the Gettysburg Address was absolutely right, but that our country would have to transform itself in order to fulfill Lincoln's hopes. Transfor­mation would be needed because the rise of industrial capi­talism had made the individualist rhetoric of America's first century obsolete. The authors of these novels thought that this rhetoric should be replaced by one in which America is destined to become the first cooperative commonwealth, the first class­less society. This America would be one in which income and wealth are equitably distributed, and in which the govern­ment ensures equality of opportunity as well as individual liberty. This new, quasi-communitarian rhetoric was at the heart of the Progressive Movement and the New Deal. It set the tone for the American Left during the first six decades of the twentieth century. Walt Whitman and John Dewey, as we shall see, did a great deal to shape this rhetoric. The difference between early twentieth-century leftist in­tellectuals and the majority of their contemporary counter­parts is the difference between agents and spectators. In the early decades of this century, when an intellectual stepped back from his or her country's history and looked at it through skeptical eyes, the chances were that he or she was about to propose a new political initiative. Henry Adams was, of course, the great exception-the great abstainer from ·politics. But William James thought that Adams' diagnosis of the First Gilded Age as a symptom of irreversible moral and political decline was merely perverse. James's pragmatist theory of truth was in part a reaction against the sort of de­tached spectators hip which Adams affected. For James, disgust with American hypocrisy and self­-deception was pointless unless accompanied by an effort to give America reason to be proud of itself in the future. The kind of proto- Heideggerian cultural pessimism which Adams cultivated seemed, to James, decadent and cowardly. "Democracy," James wrote, "is a kind of religion, and we are bound not to admit its failure. Faiths and utopias are the no­blest exercise of human reason, and no one with a spark of reason in him will sit down fatalistically before the croaker's picture. "2

## \*Neg

### 1NC Shell 1/3

#### (IF THEY READ A PLAN TEXT)

#### A. Interpretation: The affirmative must present and defend the hypothetical implementation of [plan] by the United States federal government.

#### (IF THEY DON’T READ A PLAN TEXT)

#### A. Interpretation: The affirmative must present and defend the hypothetical implementation of a substantial increase in development and/or exploration beyond the Earth’s mesosphere by the United States federal government.

#### (BOTH)

#### “Resolved” proves the framework for the resolution is to enact a policy.

**Words and Phrases 64** (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### The USFG is the government in Washington D.C.

**Encarta** 2k (<http://encarta.msn.com>)

“The federal government of the United States is centered in Washington DC”

#### B. Violation – [fill in]

#### C. Vote neg

####  1. Topicality – they don’t defend the resolution, which is a voting issue to preserve competitive equity and jurisdictional integrity

####  2. Fairness – their framework allows infinite non-falsifiable, unpredictable, totalizing, and personal claims – impossible to be neg

####  3. Switch-side debate – spending every round theorizing about your K is unproductive – you cannot know your argument is true unless you consider both sides of it

####  4. No offense – you can read this arg when you’re negative – to win this round, they have to prove why reading this aff and not being topical is good

####  5. Topicality before advocacy – vote negative to say that you think they are not topical, not that you don’t believe in their project

### 1NC Shell 2/3

#### This is an a priori issue

**Shively 2k** (Assistant Prof Political Science at Texas A&M, Ruth Lessl, Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p. 181-2)JFS

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to-they must reject and limit-some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest-that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect-if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the starting condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

#### **Limits are key – infinite political theories exist, artificial limits are key**

Lutz 2k (Donald S. Professor of Polisci at Houston, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 39-40)JFS

Aristotle notes in the Politics that political theory simultaneously proceeds at three levels—discourse about the ideal, about the best possible in the real world, and about existing political systems.4 Put another way, comprehensive political theory must ask several differ­ent kinds of questions that are linked, yet distinguishable. In order to understand the interlocking set of questions that political theory can ask, imagine a continuum stretching from left to right. At the end, to the right, is an ideal form of government, a perfectly wrought con­struct produced by the imagination. At the other end is the perfect dystopia, the most perfectly wretched system that the human imagi­nation can produce. Stretching between these two extremes is an infi­nite set of possibilities, merging into one another, that describe the logical possibilities created by the characteristics defining the end points. For example, a political system defined primarily by equality would have a perfectly inegalitarian system described at the other end, and the possible states of being between them would vary prima­rily in the extent to which they embodied equality. An ideal defined primarily by liberty would create a different set of possibilities be­tween the extremes. Of course, visions of the ideal often are inevitably more complex than these single-value examples indicate, but it is also true that in order to imagine an ideal state of affairs a kind of simpli­fication is almost always required since normal states of affairs invari­ably present themselves to human consciousness as complicated, opaque, and to a significant extent indeterminate. A non-ironic reading of Plato's Republic leads one to conclude that the creation of these visions of the ideal characterizes political philoso­phy. This is not the case. Any person can generate a vision of the ideal. One job of political philosophy is to ask the question "Is this ideal worth pursuing?" Before the question can be pursued, however, the ideal state of affairs must be clarified, especially with respect to con­ceptual precision and the logical relationship between the proposi­tions that describe the ideal. This pre-theoretical analysis raises the vision of the ideal from the mundane to a level where true philosophi­cal analysis, and the careful comparison with existing systems can proceed fruitfully. The process of pre-theoretical analysis, probably because it works on clarifying ideas that most capture the human imagination, too often looks to some like the entire enterprise of political philosophy.5 However, the value of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's concept of the General Will, for example, lies not in its formal logical implications, nor in its compelling hold on the imagination, but on the power and clarity it lends to an analysis and comparison of ac­tual political systems.

### 1NC Shell 3/3

#### We control external impacts – abandoning politics causes war, slavery, and authoritarianism

Boggs 2k (CAROL BOGGS, PF POLITICAL SCIENCE – SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 00, THE END OF POLITICS, 250-1)

But it is a very deceptive and misleading minimalism. While Oakeshott debunks political mechanisms and rational planning, as either useless or dangerous, the actually existing power structure-replete with its own centralized state apparatus, institutional hierarchies, conscious designs, and indeed, rational plans-remains fully intact, insulated from the minimalist critique. In other words, ideologies and plans are perfectly acceptable for elites who preside over established governing systems, but not for ordinary citizens or groups anxious to challenge the status quo. Such one-sided minimalism gives carte blanche to elites who naturally desire as much space to maneuver as possible. The flight from “abstract principles” rules out ethical attacks on injustices that may pervade the status quo (slavery or imperialist wars, for example) insofar as those injustices might be seen as too deeply embedded in the social and institutional matrix of the time to be the target of oppositional political action. If politics is reduced to nothing other than a process of everyday muddling-through, then people are condemned to accept the harsh realities of an exploitative and authoritarian system, with no choice but to yield to the dictates of “conventional wisdom”. Systematic attempts to ameliorate oppressive conditions would, in Oakeshott’s view, turn into a political nightmare. A belief that totalitarianism might results from extreme attempts to put society in order is one thing; to argue that all politicized efforts to change the world are necessary doomed either to impotence or totalitarianism requires a completely different (and indefensible) set of premises. Oakeshott’s minimalism poses yet another, but still related, range of problems: the shrinkage of politics hardly suggests that corporate colonization, social hierarchies, or centralized state and military institutions will magically disappear from people’s lives. Far from it: the public space vacated by ordinary citizens, well informed and ready to fight for their interests, simply gives elites more room to consolidate their own power and privilege. Beyond that, the fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian civil society, not too far removed from the excessive individualism, social Darwinism and urban violence of the American landscape could open the door to a modern Leviathan intent on restoring order and unity in the face of social disintegration. Viewed in this light, the contemporary drift towards antipolitics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more authoritarian and reactionary guise-or it could simply end up reinforcing the dominant state-corporate system. In either case, the state would probably become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.16 And either outcome would run counter to the facile antirationalism of Oakeshott’s Burkean muddling-through theories.

# \*\*Overviews

## \*Aff

### 1AR Overview

#### Extend the interpretation – they must allow us to weigh the impact of our aff and must defend USFG action – they do neither, and that’s a reason to reject the team

#### They kill plan focus, and it’s the only way to have predictable limits – all debates need a starting locus for educational clash

#### K Ground is too large – they give us unpredictable and generic ground that is only tangentially related to the plan

#### We’re key to topic-specific education – they can run “state bad” every year, but we won’t learn anything new – education is the central mission of debate – it’s the only thing we take away from debate after we leave the activity

#### Extend the Rorty evidence – their K is impotent and it allows the structures it criticizes to stay in place

#### It actually strengthens those structures by giving the elites a power vaccum to seize – this is an external impact

Boggs 2k (CARL, PF POLITICAL SCIENCE – SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 00, THE END OF POLITICS, 250-1)JFS

But it is a very deceptive and misleading minimalism. While Oakeshott debunks political mechanisms and rational planning, as either useless or dangerous, the actually existing power structure-replete with its own centralized state apparatus, institutional hierarchies, conscious designs, and indeed, rational plans-remains fully intact, insulated from the minimalist critique. In other words, ideologies and plans are perfectly acceptable for elites who preside over established governing systems, but not for ordinary citizens or groups anxious to challenge the status quo. Such one-sided minimalism gives carte blanche to elites who naturally desire as much space to maneuver as possible. The flight from “abstract principles” rules out ethical attacks on injustices that may pervade the status quo (slavery or imperialist wars, for example) insofar as those injustices might be seen as too deeply embedded in the social and institutional matrix of the time to be the target of oppositional political action. If politics is reduced to nothing other than a process of everyday muddling-through, then people are condemned to accept the harsh realities of an exploitative and authoritarian system, with no choice but to yield to the dictates of “conventional wisdom”. Systematic attempts to ameliorate oppressive conditions would, in Oakeshott’s view, turn into a political nightmare. A belief that totalitarianism might results from extreme attempts to put society in order is one thing; to argue that all politicized efforts to change the world are necessary doomed either to impotence or totalitarianism requires a completely different (and indefensible) set of premises. Oakeshott’s minimalism poses yet another, but still related, range of problems: the shrinkage of politics hardly suggests that corporate colonization, social hierarchies, or centralized state and military institutions will magically disappear from people’s lives. Far from it: the public space vacated by ordinary citizens, well informed and ready to fight for their interests, simply gives elites more room to consolidate their own power and privilege. Beyond that, the fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian civil society, not too far removed from the excessive individualism, social Darwinism and urban violence of the American landscape could open the door to a modern Leviathan intent on restoring order and unity in the face of social disintegration. Viewed in this light, the contemporary drift towards antipolitics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more authoritarian and reactionary guise-or it could simply end up reinforcing the dominant state-corporate system. In either case, the state would probably become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.16 And either outcome would run counter to the facile antirationalism of Oakeshott’s Burkean muddling-through theories.

## \*Neg

### 2NC Overview

#### 3 key arguments in this debate

#### 1. Switch-Side debate solves all of the affirmative’s offense – all of your reasons why your kritik is good can be ran while you are negative without a blatant violation of the resolution

#### 2. Shively – this precedes all other questions – we cannot even debate until we know the conditions, subjects, and limits of this debate – you can’t evaluate the content of their claims until rules have been set up

#### 3. Boggs – we are the only ones with an external impact – if we fail to engage politics, then elites fill the vacuum who push forth imperialist, oppressive agendas

# \*\*Interpretation Debate

## 2NC Interpretation Extension

### (IF THEY READ A PLAN TEXT)

#### Our interpretation is that the affirmative must defend the hypothetical world in which their plan is passed by the USfg – this is reasonable interp because all we ask is that the affirmative defend something they already advocate – and this argument is the most predictable given the wording of the resolution because –

#### A. Resolved means to enact by law

#### B. The USfg is the government in Washington, we are not the government, so the affirmative changes the actor of the resolution

### (IF THEY DON’T)

#### Our interpretation is that the affirmative must defend the resolution – this is fair because the debate community agreed on a resolution and the affirmative needs to abide by that – they don’t enact a governmental policy – their failure to do so proves them non-topical because

#### A. Resolved means to enact by law

#### B. The USFG is the government in Washington, we are not the government, so the

#### affirmative changes the actor of the resolution

## 2NC AT: Counter-Interpretation

#### The affirmative claims that they are a form of politics –

#### 1. They don’t meet – they still fail to defend a hypothetical implementation of the plan by the United States federal government

#### 2. Their form of thinking is bad – regardless of whether “thinking is good”, a failure to engage in governmental reforms causes a takeover by imperialist elites – that’s Boggs

#### 3. This interpretation is arbitrary and unlimiting – in their view, anything can count as politics, which justifies all counter interpretations, impacted by Lutz

#### 4. Switch-Side debate solves this – all conceptions of politics can be run on the negative

## 2NC AT: Your Interpretation is Exclusionary

#### 1. Exclusion is inevitable – win/losses, elim rounds, speech times – everything about debate excludes certain things

#### 2. Switch-side debate solves – anything outside of the resolution can be ran on the negative

#### 3. Excluding certain things is good for education and fairness – our Lutz evidence says that theorizing about politics is unproductive and lazy unless we consider its realistic relevance to real-world politics

#### 4. Limits are necessary to sustain nonviolent debate

Graham 99, (Philip School of Communication Queensland University of Technology, Heidegger’s Hippies Sep 15 <http://www.geocities.com/SunsetStrip/Palms/8314/index.html>)

Politics has historically been about how people can best live together. Today’s politics is not about that. If we allow public institutions, public consciousness, and, therefore, society itself to be manipulated by undemocratic organisations, such as media behemoths and multilateral and transnational organisations, then democracy is doomed to an undemocratic death. If democracy is doomed, then the potential for real equality (as opposed to empty gestures of equivalence) is doomed. If this is destroyed, then politics is dead. Healthy politics is a necessarily violent space (Bewes 1997). But we can choose between different sorts of violence. We can have violent dialectical debate, or violent war. We can have a violent clash of ideas or a violent clash with weapons. Humans speak. They speak about the realities they inhabit. They will not remain silent about them. If they are temporarily silenced - whether by violence, threats, or intellectual confusion - they will eventually make themselves heard. History show us that this is so. Somewhere, someone must make a choice about when, whether, and how the current political space can be opened up to the public before it is prised open, once again, by mass annihilations.

## 2NC AT: We Meet – We Affirm the Rez as “X”

#### This does not meet our interpretation

#### 1. You do not defend an implementation by the USfg – that is the vital internal link to all of our offense

#### 2. This is the death of fairness – you can affirm the topic as a metaphor, doorknob, dance, rap, dream, or literally anything you want – Lutz impacts this

#### 3. Our definitions of Resolved and the USfg prove that this argument is false – affirming the resolution is a governmental action – they do not do this

# \*\*Fairness Debate

## 2NC Fairness Extension

#### Extend our fairness claim – if the aff doesn’t have to defend a policy action they can defend an action that is:

#### A. Non-falsifiable – they can run affirmatives that have no proof and means we cannot have arguments against them

#### B. Unpredicable – they can run something we have never heard of, the resolution sticks them to the scope of a pre-determined stasis for debate – impacted by Shively

#### C. Totalizing – the aff can say that rape is bad and we have no arguments against it

#### D. Personal Claims – they can tell a story, recount a dream, or any number of things that only have happened to them, and we cannot be ready for them

#### impacted by Shively – fair limits and rules are a precursor to debate

#### Turns the aff – their movement is more successful in a world of fairness because all people have equal opportunities to access its benefits

## 2NC AT: Nazis Wanted Fairness

#### This argument is absurd

#### 1. I’m sure the Jews wanted fairness too…

#### 2. We aren’t Nazis…

#### 3. The Nazis did a lot of things, just because the Nazis wore pants and so did we doesn’t mean we are Nazis

## 2NC AT: Your Conception of Fairness is Bad

#### They say our conception of fairness is bad -

#### 1. Shively precludes this argument – we agree to a conception of fairness prior to the round by selecting the resolution – this concept of fairness is agreed on as a point of stasis – it is not arbitrary

#### 2. Your conception of fairness is worse – it argues that people can do whatever they want and ignore rules – that justifies endless violence and the worst excesses of humans

## 2NC AT: Education Precedes Fairness

#### They say education precedes fairness –

#### 1. We access a better internal to education –

#### A. Because fairness is key to clash, which means better education about both sides of any issue

#### B. Because learning about the implementation of the plan is key to understanding governmental procedure

#### C. Because resolutional education means we learn new things every year

#### 2. Fairness precedes education

#### A. Education is inevitable, if we sit around and debate for an hour, we will learn something – it’s a question of balanced arguments

#### B. The best education is research – if we research for the topic and can’t use it because you run a kritik aff, then we don’t learn how to implement our information and analyze information

#### 3. Education is inevitable – it’s a question of policy vs. kritikal education

## 2NC AT: Fairness is Arbitrary

#### They say fairness is arbitrary

#### 1. Shively precludes this argument – we agree to a conception of fairness prior to the round by selecting the resolution – this concept of fairness is agreed on as a point of stasis – it is not arbitrarily conceived of by us

#### 2. And, the affirmative is more arbitrary – they run arguments that are not even tangentially related to the resolution –

#### 3. No impact – even if it is arbitrary, we’re proving it’s the best model for debate

## 2NC AT: Fairness is Utopian

#### They say we can never have fair debates

#### 1. This isn’t true – sticking to a prior point of stasis allows for predictable arguments that can be met with clash

#### 2. Even if fairness if impossible, we should strive towards it – fairness is a question of degree, not yes/no – even if we are not 100% fair, being more fair is a good thing

# \*\*Switch-Side Debate

## 2NC Switch-Side Extension

#### Three arguments on the Switch Side debate

#### 1. Spending aff and neg rounds theorizing about the failure of the IR system is a waste – only considering both sides of an issue allows for true education about it

#### 2. Voting affirmative is not key – you can vote negative to endorse their project – in fact, their focus on the ballot is flawed – they still focus on winning, which means their project is not truly revolutionary –

#### 3. They can run their kritik when they are negative while still preserving fairness by being topical

#### No offense – even though debate might be flawed, switch-side checks all offense

Muir 93 (Department of Communications at George Mason, Star, “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 26(4), Gale Academic)JFS

Contemporary debate, even in the context of a vigorous defense, does have its drawbacks. It tends to overemphasize logic and tactics and to downplay personal feelings; it is by nature competitive, and therefore susceptible to competitive impulses and techniques (such as rapid speaking and a multiplicity of arguments); and it can desensitize debaters to real human problems and needs through continual labeling and discussion of abstract issues on paper. These problems, however, are more than matched by the conceptual flexibility, empathy, and familiarity with significant issues provided by switch-side debate. The values of tolerance and fairness, implicit in the metaphor of debate as game, are idealistic in nature. They have a much greater chance of success, however, in an activity that requires students to examine and understand both sides of an issue. In his description of debating societies, Robert Louis Stevenson questions the prevalence of unreasoned opinion, and summarizes the judgment furthered in this work: Now, as the rule stands, you are saddled with the side you disapprove, and so you are forced, by regard for your own fame, to argue out, to feel with, to elaborate completely, the case as it stands against yourself; and what a fund of wisdom do you not turn up in this idle digging of the vineyard! How many new difficulties take form before your eyes! how many superannuated arguments cripple finally into limbo, under the glance of your enforced eclecticism! . . . It is as a means of melting down this museum of premature petrifactions into living and impressionable soul that we insist on their utility.

## 2NC AT: Switch-Side Kills Advocacy

#### They say switch-side kills real advocacy

#### 1. Switch side is key to true advocacy – before we make up our mind about what we believe in, we must consider both positions

#### 2. Debate is not a forum for advocacy – speech times, judging, competition

## 2NC AT: Switch-Side Causes Relativism

#### They claim switch-side debating causes relativism –

#### 1. Switch-side debate doesn't encourage relativism – it fosters tolerance without committing students to active moral irresponsibility

Muir 93 (Department of Communications at George Mason, Star, “A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 26(4), Gale Academic)JFS

A final indictment of values clarification education is that it encourages relativism, Stewart, for example, sees value clarification as individualistic, personal, and situational.^' He also characterizes values clarification as possessing a hidden set of values (an "absolute relativism") that includes purposefulness, strong beliefs, and thoughtfulness, among others. This "hidden curriculum" of values clarification formulates responses to situations while decrying such pre-judgment. In obvious ways, switch-side debate illustrates the same dilemma: No one value is seen as correct and unassailable, yet certain values get placed above others as a matter of procedure. Both features need to be explicitly addressed since both reflect directly on debate as a tool of moral pedagogy. The first response to the charge of relativism is that switch-side debate respects the existence of divergent beliefs, but focuses attention on assessing the validity of opposing belief systems. Scriven argues that the "confusion of pluralism, of the proper tolerance for diversity of ideas, with relativism—the doctrine that there are no right and wrong answers in ethics or religion—is perhaps the most serious ideological barrier to the implementation of moral education today. "^ The process of ethical inquiry is central to such moral education, but the allowance of just any position is not. Here is where cognitive-development diverges from the formal aims of values clarification. Where clarification ostensibly allows any value position, cognitive-development progresses from individualism to social conformity to social contract theory to universal ethical principles. A pluralistic pedagogy does not imply that all views are acceptable: It is morally and pedagogically correct to teach about ethics, and the skills of moral analysis rather than doctrine, and to set out the arguments for and against tolerance and pluralism. All of this is undone if you also imply that all the various incompatible views about abortion or pornography or war are equally right, or likely to be right, or deserving of respect. Pluralism requires respecting the right to hold divergent beliefs; it implies neither tolerance of actions based on those beliefs nor respecting the content of the beliefs. The role of switch-side debate is especially important in the oral defense of arguments that foster tolerance without accruing the moral complications of acting on such beliefs. The forum is therefore unique in providing debaters with attitudes of tolerance without committing them to active moral irresponsibility. As Freeley notes, debaters are indeed exposed to a multivalued world, both within and between the sides of a given topic. Yet this exposure hardly commits them to such "mistaken" values. In this view, the divorce of the game from the "real world" can be seen as a means of gaining perspective without obligating students to validate their hypothetical value structure through immoral actions.

#### 2. Relativism is good – it allows us to adapt and understand context – the affirmative tries to posit universal truths which are false – preemptive killing may be bad, but killing in self-defense might not, understanding these distinctions is key to true ethics

# \*\*Shively Debate

## 2NC Shively Extension

#### Extend our Shively argument – The question of what we are debating about takes precedence over all other claims – we must establish what we are debating about before we do it

#### This is a d-rule – impossible to be negative without it

Shively 2k (Ruth Lessl, Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 182-3)

The point may seem trite, as surely the ambiguists would agree that basic terms must be shared before they can be resisted and problematized. In fact, they are often very candid about this seeming paradox in their approach: the paradoxical or "parasitic" need of the subversive for an order to subvert. But admitting the paradox is not helpful if, as usually happens here, its implications are ignored; or if the only implication drawn is that order or harmony is an unhappy fixture of human life. For what the paradox should tell us is that some kinds of harmonies or orders are, in fact, good for resistance; and some ought to be fully supported. As such, it should counsel against the kind of careless rhetoric that lumps all orders or harmonies together as arbitrary and inhumane. Clearly some basic accord about the terms of contest is a necessary ground for all further contest. It may be that if the ambiguists wish to remain full-fledged ambiguists, they cannot admit to these implications, for to open the door to some agreements or reasons as good and some orders as helpful or necessary, is to open the door to some sort of rationalism. Perhaps they might just continue to insist that this initial condition is ironic, but that the irony should not stand in the way of the real business of subversion.Yet difficulties remain. For and then proceed to debate without attention to further agreements. For debate and contest are forms of dialogue: that is, they are activities premised on the building of progressive agreements. Imagine, for instance, that two people are having an argument about the issue of gun control. As noted earlier, in any argument, certain initial agreements will be needed just to begin the discussion. At the very least, the two discussants must agree on basic terms: for example, they must have some shared sense of what gun control is about; what is at issue in arguing about it; what facts are being contested, and so on. They must also agree—and they do so simply by entering into debate—that they will not use violence or threats in making their cases and that they are willing to listen to, and to be persuaded by, good arguments. Such agreements are simply implicit in the act of argumentation.

#### Grounding their movement in the context of the resolution is even more subversive

Shively 2k (Ruth Lessl Assoc Prof Polisci at Texas A&M, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 180)

'Thus far, I have argued that if the ambiguists mean to be subversive about anything, they need to be conservative about some things. They need to be steadfast supporters of the structures of openness and democracy: willing to say "no" to certain forms of contest; willing to set up certain clear limitations about acceptable behavior. To this, finally, I would add that if the ambiguists mean to stretch the boundaries of behavior—if they want to be revolutionary and disruptive in their skepticism and iconoclasm—they need first to be firm believers in something. Which is to say, again, they need to set clear limits about what they will and will not support, what they do and do not believe to be best. As G. K. Chesterton observed, the true revolutionary has always willed something "definite and limited." For example, "The Jacobin could tell you not only the system he would rebel against, but (what was more important) the system he would not rebel against..." He "desired the freedoms of democracy." He "wished to have votes and not to have titles . . ." But "because the new rebel is a skeptic"—because he cannot bring himself to will something definite and limited— "he cannot be a revolutionary." For "the fact that he wants to doubt everything really gets in his way when he wants to denounce anything" (Chesterton 1959,41). Thus, the most radical skepticism ends in the most radical conservatism. In other words, a refusal to judge among ideas and activities is, in the end, an endorsement of the status quo. To embrace everything is to be unable to embrace a particular plan of action, for to embrace a particular plan of action is to reject all others, at least for that moment. Moreover, as observed in our discussion of openness, to embrace everything is to embrace self-contradiction: to hold to both one's purposes and to that which defeats one's purposes—to tolerance and intolerance, open-mindedness and close-mindedness, democracy and tyranny. In the same manner, then, the ambiguists' refusals to will something "definite and limited" undermines their revolutionary impulses. In their refusal to say what they will not celebrate and what they will not rebel against, they deny themselves (and everyone else in their political world) a particular plan or ground to work from. By refusing to deny incivility, they deny themselves a civil public space from which to speak. They cannot say "no" to the terrorist who would silence dissent. They cannot turn their backs on the bullying of the white supremacist. And, as such, in refusing to bar the tactics of the anti-democrat, they refuse to support the tactics of the democrat. In short, then, to be a true ambiguist, there must be some limit to what is ambiguous. To fully support political contest, one must fully support some uncontested rules and reasons. To generally reject the silencing or exclusion of others, one must sometimes silence or exclude those who reject civility and democracy.

# \*\*Lutz Debate

## 2NC Lutz Extension

#### Extend the Lutz evidence – there are an infinite number of frameworks between degrees – there are two opposite extremes, and everything in between, the aff could pick any of these frameworks, jacking predictability – and Lutz says anyone can idealize about a perfect world, but our duty as debaters is to prescribe pragmatic policies that can actually have real change

# \*\*Boggs Debate

## 2NC Boggs Extension

#### Extend the Boggs card – a failure to engage politics leaves a vacuum for elites to fill with racist, imperialist, warmongering policies – critiques of the state fail and lead to more authoritarianism

#### Exposing the flaws of the system does nothing – real change must start with the state

**Johnston 5** (Adrian, Dept of Philosophy, New Mexico University, International Journal of Zizek Studies, Vol. 1)JFS

However, the absence of this type of Lacan-underwritten argument in Žižek’s socio- political thought indicates something important. Following Lacan, Žižek describes instances of the tactic of “lying in the guise of truth” and points to late-capitalist cynicism as a key example of this (here, cynically knowing the truth that “the System” is a vacuous sham produces no real change in behavior, no decision to stop acting “as if” this big Other is something with genuine substantiality).149 Žižek proclaims that, “the starting point of the critique of ideology has to be full acknowledgement of the fact that it is easily possible to lie in the guise of truth.”150 Although the Lacanian blurring of the boundary between theoretical thinking and practical action might very well be completely true, accepting it as true inevitably risks strengthening a convenient alibi—the creation of this alibi has long been a fait accompli for which Lacan alone could hardly be held responsible—for the worst sort of intellectualized avoidance of praxis. Academics can convincingly reassure themselves that their inaccessible, abstract musings, the publications of which are perused only by their tiny self-enclosed circle of “ivory tower” colleagues, aren’t irrelevant obscurities made possible by tacit complicity with a certain socio-economic status quo, but, rather, radical political interventions that promise sweeping changes of the predominating situation. If working on signifiers is the same as working in the streets, then why dirty one’s hands bothering with the latter?

#### Debate empowers democratic decision-makers and preserves the process of democratic deliberation.

**Hill 8** (Sara, Afterschool Matters: Creative Programs That Connect Youth Development and Student Achievement, MEd from the Harvard Graduate School of Education, and her EdD from Peabody College, Vanderbilt University)JFS

Civic education, or what we are calling democracy skill-building experiences, can help to empower youth to become engaged learners, critical thinkers, and active citizens, as well as to be more academically prepared. At a time when the civic participation of young people is becoming less frequent, out-of-school time and youth development programs, such as an urban debate club, offers a possible model for using the out-of-school time hours to foster civic participation, democracy skill building, and learning. This chapter describes an urban youth debate league and how this type of program can be a part of the vision of a more informed and active youth citizenry. This chapter discusses these questions: What might “democracy in action” look like in out-of-school time and youth development programs, and how does it relate to learning? How does urban debate serves as an example of democracy skill building during the out-of-school time hours? What are the program and policy supports needed to support a civic engagement and democracy skill-building role for out-of-school time hours? The chapter concludes with information important for youth program providers, policy makers, and other individuals and organizations seeking to foster youth democracy development and participation during out-of-school time hours. There is consensus that to preserve a democracy requires the development of democratic citizens. How we think about the formation of democratic citizens depends on the specific conception of democracy we hold, whether it is a set of skills, level of participation, civic discourse, community mobilization, or exercise of certain rights and responsibilities (Galston, 2001). Educators and government leaders agree on the importance of democratic education because of society’s reliance on the people to make deliberate choices about the direction of their collective lives (Battistoni, 1985). Yet there is a range of terms used in the language to describe democratic development or civic engagement.

## 2NC AT: Debate 🡪 Social Movements

#### They say debate can be used for social movements –

#### 1. This isn’t true – debate is a contest to see who can make better arguments – its competitive nature makes it non-receptive to movement

#### 2. Debate is a bad place for movements – nobody pays attention to debates besides debaters – there will be less overall change in a debate movement

#### 3. The aff is a pointless cultural criticism – they only affect the people in this room – vote neg to prevent debate from becoming an underground irrelevancy

Mann 95 (Paul, Pomona College, Dept. of English, Post-Modern Culture 5(3), [http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/text-only/issue.595/mann.595)JFS](http://pmc.iath.virginia.edu/text-only/issue.595/mann.595%29JFS)

Apocalyptic cults and youth gangs, garage bands and wolfpacks, \*colleges\* and phalansteries, espionage network trading in vaporous facts and networks of home shoppers for illicit goods; monastic, penological, mutant-biomorphic, and anarcho-terrorist cells; renegade churches, dwarf communities, no-risk survivalist enclaves, unfunded quasi-scientific research units, paranoid think tanks, unregistered political parties, sub-employed workers councils, endo-exile colonies, glossolaliac fanclubs, acned anorexic primal hordes; zombie revenants, neo-fakirs, defrocked priests and detoxing prophets, psychedelic snake-oil shills, masseurs of undiagnosed symptoms, bitter excommunicants, faceless narcissists, ideological drag queens, mystical technophiles, sub-entrepreneurial dealers, derivative \*derivistes\*, tireless archivists of phantom conspiracies, alien abductees, dupe attendants, tardy primitives, vermin of abandoned factories, hermits, cranks, opportunists, users, connections, outriders, outpatients, wannabes, hackers, thieves, squatters, parasites, saboteurs; wings, wards, warehouses, arcades, hells, hives, dens, burrows, lofts, flocks, swarms, viruses, tribes, movements, groupuscules, cenacles, isms, and the endlessly multiplied hybridization of variant combinations of all these, and more... Why this stupid fascination with stupid undergrounds? What is it about these throwaway fanzines and unreadable rants, these neo-tattoos and recycled apocalypses, this mountainous accumulation of declassified factoids, these bloody smears, this incredible noise? Why wade through these piles of nano-shit? Why submit oneself to these hysterical purveyors, these hypertheories and walls of sound? Why insist on picking this particular species of nit? Why abject criticism, whose putative task was once to preserve the best that has been known and thought, by guilty association with so fatuous, banal, idiotic, untenable a class of cultural objects? Why not decline, not so politely, to participate in the tiny spectacle of aging intellectuals dressing in black to prowl festering galleries and clubs where, sometime before dawn, they will encounter the contemptuous gaze of their own children, and almost manage to elide that event when they finally produce their bilious reports, their chunks of cultural criticism? No excuse, no justification: all one can put forward is an unendurable habit of attention, a meager fascination, no more or less commanding than that hypnosis one enters in the face of television; a rut that has always led downward and in the end always found itself stuck on the surface; a kind of drivenness, if not a drive; a \*critique\*, if you can forgive such a word, that has never located any cultural object whose poverty failed to reflect its own; a rage to find some point at which criticism would come to an end, and that only intensified as that end-point receded and shrunk to the size of an ideal. [2] Then if one must persist in investigating these epi-epiphenomena, perhaps compelled by some critical fashion (no doubt already out of vogue), perhaps merely out of an interminable immaturity, why not refer the stupid underground back to all the old undergrounds, back to the most familiar histories? Why not cast it as nothing more than another and another and another stillborn incarnation of an avant-garde that wallows in but doesn't quite believe its own obituaries, and that one has already wasted years considering? Why not just settle for mapping it according to the old topography of center and margin, or some other arthritic dichotomy that, for all their alleged postness, the discourses we are about to breach always manage to drag along behind them? Why not simply accede to the mock-heroic rhetoric of cultural opposition (subversion, resistance, etc.) that, after a generation of deconstructions, we still don't have the strength to shake; or to the nouveau rhetoric of multiplicity (plurality, diversity, etc.), as if all one needed was to add a few more disparate topic headings to break the hold of a One that, in truth, one still manages to project in the very act of superceding it? Nothing will prevent us—indeed, nothing can save us--from ransoming ourselves again and again to the exhausted mastery of these arrangements; nothing will keep us from orienting ourselves toward every difference by means of the most tattered maps. But at the same time we must entertain--doubtless the right word--the sheer possibility that what we encounter here is not just one more margin or one more avant-garde, however impossible it will be to avoid all the orders and terms attendant upon those venerable and ruined cultural edifices. We must remain open to the possibility that this stupid underground poses all the old questions but a few more as well, that it might suggest another set of cultural arrangements, other topographies and other mappings, however unlikely that might be. In any case, whatever vicarious attractions the stupid underground offers the bored intellectual groping for a way to heat up his rhetoric, if not his thought, whatever else we might encounter here, it is important to insist that you will not find these maps laid out for your inspection, as if on an intellectual sale table, and rated for accuracy and charm. No claim is being staked here; no one is being championed, no one offered up on the critical auction block as the other of the month. There is nothing here to choose; all the choices have already been made. One can only hope, in what will surely prove an idle gesture, to complicate cultural space for a moment or two,

## 2NC Apolitical Theorizing Does Nothing

#### **Apolitical theorizing exists only in the ivory tower and fails to persuade anyone or change anything**

Lepgold and Nincic 1 (Joesph, associate professor of Government at Georgetown and Miroslav professor of Poly Sci at UC-Davis, Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance pg. 2-4)JFS

For many reasons, connections between scholarly ideas and policymakers’ thinking in international relations are less common today, and the gap may grow unless we rethink carefully our approach to policy relevance. Deep, often ritualized rivalry among theoretical schools makes it unlikely that fu- ture officials will leave their university training in this subject with a clear, well-formed worldview. Such intellectual competition, of course, could be stimulating and useful, especially if it led officials to question their basic causal assumptions or consider rival explanations of the cases they face. More commonly, officials seem to remember the repetitive, often strident theo- retical debates as unproductive and tiresome. Not only is much international relations scholarship tedious, in their view; it is often technically quite dif- ficult. Partly for this reason, much of it is so substantively arid that even many scholarly specialists avoid trying to penetrate it. From a practitioner’s perspective, it often seems as if university scholars are increasingly “with- drawing . . . behind a curtain of theory and models” that only insiders can penetrate. In addition, for many observers, the end of the cold war has made it harder to find models providing a compelling link between the international environment and manipulable policy instruments. One exception to this growing split between scholars of international relations and policymakers is the work on the inter-democratic peace, which we discuss in chapter 5. This work, as we will show, has deeply influenced many contemporary policymakers. But, for the most part, it remains the exception; the profes- sional gap between academics and practitioners has widened in recent years. Many scholars no longer try to reach beyond the Ivory Tower, and officials seem increasingly content to ignore it. According to much conventional wisdom, this situation is unsurprising. International relations scholars and practitioners have different professional priorities and reflect different cultures. Not only is it often assumed that good theory must sacrifice policy relevance; but also those seeking guidance in diagnosing policy situations and making policy choices, it is often thought, must look for help in places other than contemporary social science research. This book challenges much of the conventional wisdom on these issues. It argues that IR theorists and foreign policy practitioners have important needs in common as well as needs that are different. Social science theory seeks to identify and explain the significant regularities in human affairs. Because people’s ability to process information is limited, they must perceive the world selectively in order to operate effectively in it; constructing and using theories in a self-conscious way helps to inject some rigor into these processes.6 For these reasons, both theorists and practitioners seek a clear and powerful understanding of cause and effect about policy issues, in order to help them diagnose situations, define the range of possibilities they con- front, and evaluate the likely consequences of given courses of action. At the same time, a deep and continuing concern for the substance and stakes involved in real-world issues can help prevent theorists’ research agendas from becoming arid or trivial. This book therefore has two objectives: to elaborate and justify the reasoning that leads to these conclusions, and to illustrate how scholarship on international relations and foreign policy can be useful beyond the Ivory Tower.

## 2NC Apolitical Theorizing Does Nothing

#### Theorizing about epistemology, ontology, and methodology is useless – only policy discussions will have an impact outside of this debate

Lepgold and Nincic 1 (Joesph, associate professor of Government at Georgetown and Miroslav professor of Poly Sci at UC-Davis, Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance pg. 6-7)JFS

Unlike literature, pure mathematics, or formal logic, the study of inter- national relations may be valued largely for its practical implications and insights. SIR, like the major social-science disciplines, initially gained a firm foundation in academia on the assumption that it contributes to improved policy.9 It is part of what August Comte believed would constitute a new, “positive” science of society, one that would supersede the older tradition of metaphysical speculation about humanity and the social world. Progress toward this end has been incomplete as well as uneven across the social sciences. But, in virtually all of these fields, it has been driven by more than just curiosity as an end in itself. Tightening our grip on key social processes via improved understanding has always been a major incentive for new knowledge in the social sciences, especially in the study of international relations. This broad purpose covers a lot of specific ground. Policymakers want to know what range of effective choice they have, the likely international and domestic consequences of various policy decisions, and perhaps whether, in terms of more general interests and values, contemplated policy objectives are really desirable, should they be achievable. But the practical implications of international issues hardly end there. How wars start and end, the causes and implications of economic interdependence, and what leverage individ- ual states might have on trans-state problems greatly affects ordinary citizens’ physical safety, prosperity, and collective identity. Today, it is hard to think of any major public-policy issue that is not affected by a state’s or society’s relationships with other international actors. Because the United States looms so large within the international system, its citizens are sometimes unaware of the range and impact of international events and processes on their condition. It may take an experience such as the long gas lines in the 1970s or the foreign-inspired terrorist bombings in the 1990s to remind them how powerfully the outside world now impinges upon them. As Karl Deutsch observed, even the smallest states can no longer effectively isolate themselves, and even the largest ones face limits on their ability to change others’ behavior or values.11 In a broad sense, globalization means that events in many places will affect people’s investment opportu- nities, the value of their money, whether they feel that their values are safe or under attack, and perhaps whether they will be safe from attack by weap- ons of mass destruction or terrorism. These points can be illustrated by observing university undergraduates, who constitute one of the broadest categories of people who are potentially curious about IR. Unlike doctoral students, they care much less about po- litical science than about the substance of politics. What they seem to un- derstand is that the subject matter of SIR, regardless of the level of theoretical abstraction at which it is discussed, inherently has practical implications. One might argue that whatever our purpose in analyzing IR might be, we can have little confidence in our knowledge absent tightly developed theory and rigorous research. One might then infer that a concern with the practical implications of our knowledge is premature until the field of SIR is better developed on its own terms. But if one assumes that SIR inherently has significant real-world implications, one could also conclude that the balance in contemporary scholarship has veered too far from substance and too close to scholasticism. As in other fields driven by a concern with real-world developments, SIR research has been motivated by both internally- and externally-driven con- cerns. The former are conceptual, epistemological, and methodological mat- ters that scholars believe they need to confront to do their intellectual work: Which research programs are most apt to resolve the field’s core puzzles? What is the meaning of contested concepts? Which empirical evidence or methods are especially useful, convincing, or weak in this field? The latter consist of issues relevant to policy practitioners and citizens: How can people prepare to deal with an uncertain future? More specifically, how can they anticipate future international developments to which they might need to adapt, assess the likely consequences of measures to deal with that future, or at least think about such matters intelligently?12 While the best scholarly work tends to have important ramifications for both types of concerns, the academic emphasis has shifted too far toward work with little relevance out- side academia. This balance must be redressed if SIR is to resonate outside the Ivory Tower.

## 2NC Policy Debate Can Influence Policymakers

#### Theory can impact policymakers, but only if it focuses on practical policy issues

Lepgold and Nincic 1 (Joesph, associate professor of Government at Georgetown and Miroslav professor of Poly Sci at UC-Davis, Beyond the Ivory Tower: International Relations Theory and the Issue of Policy Relevance pg. 11-12)JFS

In some areas, foreign-policymakers have been deeply influenced by the theoretical literature in International Relations. Aside from the work the work on the interdemocratic peace discussed in chapter 5, and, to a lesser extent, some of the literature on international institutions examined in chap- ter 6, strategic studies has been most important in this respect. Such concepts as “escalation dominance” as well as the more general notion of the pris- oners’ dilemma were conceived by academics but have become part of the daily vocabulary of many practitioners. Work on deterrence, nuclear prolif- eration, arms control, and the use of coercive force has influenced a host of U.S. weapons-acquisition and force-management issues.24 At one time, such an impact on official thinking was not unusual. Concerns about effective public policy have traditionally been part of the academic study of politics; the American Political Science Association (APSA), for example, was founded in part to “bring political science to a position of authority as regards practical politics.”25 By moving professional scholars away from externally- driven issues, the professionalization of political science has molded the kind of work by which they earn professional prestige, making them less able or willing to communicate with policymakers. From the perspective of many officials, SIR scholars are comfortable on their side of the gap, free of any obligation to address practical issues.26 As a result, the public intellectuals who address current foreign policy issues now tend to have few or weak connections to universities, while the prominent scholars in this field tend to write almost exclusively for their own colleagues.

## 2NC Theory Trades Off With Politics

#### Theorizing is a direct trade-off with political action – that causes a resurgence of the genocidal atrocities of the 20th century

Wolin 4 (Richard, distinguished professor of intellectual history at Graduate Center, City University of New York, The Seduction of Unreason: the intellectual romance with fascism from Nietzsche to Postmodernism, pg. 8-9)JFS

The Seduction of Unreason is an exercise in intellectual genealogy. It seeks to shed light on the uncanny affinities between the Counter-Enlightenment and postmodernism. As such, it may also be read as an archaeology of postmodern theory. During the 1970s and 1980s a panoply of texts by Derrida, Foucault, Deleuze, and Lyotard were translated into English, provoking a far-reaching shift in American intellectual life. Many of these texts were inspired by Nietzsche’s anticivilizational animus: the conviction that our highest ideals of beauty, morality, and truth were intrinsically nihilistic. Such views found favor among a generation of academics disillusioned by the political failures of the 1960s. Understandably, in despondent times Nietzsche’s iconoclastic recommendation that one should “philosophize with a hammer”—that if something is falling, one should give it a final push—found a ready echo. Yet, too often, those who rushed to mount the Nietzschean bandwagon downplayed or ignored the illiberal implications of his positions. Moreover, in retrospect, it seems clear that this same generation, many of whose representatives were comfortably ensconced in university careers, had merely exchanged radical politics for textual politics: unmasking “binary oppositions” replaced an ethos of active political engagement. In the last analysis it seems that the seductions of “theory” helped redirect formerly robust political energies along the lines of acceptable academic career tracks. As commentators have often pointed out, during the 1980s, while Republicans were commandeering the nation’s political apparatus, partisans of “theory” were storming the ramparts of the Modern Language Association and the local English Department. Ironically, during the same period, the French paradigms that American academics were so busy assimilating were undergoing an eclipse across the Atlantic. In France they were perceived as expressions of an obsolete political temperament: gauchisme (“leftism”) or “French philosophy of the 1960s.”21 By the mid-1980s French intellectuals had passed through the acid bath of antitotalitarianism. Under the influence of Solzhenitsyn’s pathbreaking study of the Gulag as well as the timely, if slick, anticommunist polemics of the “New Philosophers” such as André Glucksmann and Bernard Henri-Lévy, who were appalled by the “killing fields” of Pol Pot’s Cambodia (the Khmer Rouge leader had been educated in Paris during the 1950s) and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, French intellectuals began returning to the indigenous tradition of democratic republicanism—thereby leaving the 1960s leftists holding the bag of an outmoded philosophical anarchism. The tyrannical excesses of Third Worldism—China’s Cultural Revolution, Castro’s Cuba, Idi Amin’s Uganda, Mobutu’s Zaire, Duvalier’s Haiti—finally put paid to the delusion that the “wretched of the earth” were the bearers of a future socialist utopia. Suddenly, the nostrums of Western humanism, which the poststructuralists had emphatically denounced, seemed to merit a second look.

## 2NC Engaging Politics Solves Totalitarianism

#### A revitalized public sphere solves totalitarianism and includes all people

Lakeland 93 (Paul, Fairfield Religious Studies Professor, “Preserving The Lifeworld, Restoring the Public Sphere, Renewing Higher Education” [http://www.crosscurrents.org/lakeland2)JFS](http://www.crosscurrents.org/lakeland2%29JFS)

How did we get from a democratic society in which the citizens--no matter how small a minority of the total community they constituted--truly felt they owned it, to one in which so many are alienated from the political process? One reason is that in the earlier years the expansion of citizenship and the subsequent increase in educational opportunities did not lead to the admission of these newly educated classes into the dialogue. Educational reform and improvement in the standard of living took place within European societies whose class, gender, and race-based social constraints underwent no serious change; a little learning did not a gentleman make. Another, more recent reason is that democratization was accompanied by capitalization, so that the passive consumption of culture and commodities with its attendant apolitical sociability was the path preferred by, or at least open to, the vast majority. In other words, there are just a lot more citizens; but many of these citizens are the victims of structural oppression, and all are lured by the blandishments of material ease. Again, to return to Habermas's forms of expression, all this amounts to the progressive colonization of the lifeworld by the system. If, in the past two hundred years, the public sphere has so completely failed to fulfill its promise as a market-place for the discourse of a free society, the project must be to restore it through the revival of true communicative action, that is, to persuade people to talk to one another with respect, to listen fairly, to argue cleanly, and to move towards consensus on norms for action. That way lies a democratic future. Any other way leads to one or another form of totalitarianism, including the totalitarianism of mass consumption culture whose victims are so easily persuaded to pursue its spurious salvation and ersatz heaven. However, the character of our modern world requires that steps taken to transform the public sphere respect and reflect the complexity of modern society. We are not just so many individuals sorted into different social classes. We are rather members of a number of sub-groups, perhaps defined by race, class, gender or religion, as well as members of the larger body politic. What will be needed is a confluence of these autonomous publics or distinct interest groups coming together in common concern for the preservation of democratic life. The public sphere will have to include many more voices than it did in the time of Samuel Johnson, and the consensus on social goods may seem even more elusive; but the dynamics of the process, so argues Habermas, will help ensure the preservation of a human society.

## 2NC Policy Debate Fractures Movements

#### **Using the debate space for social change creates backlash and fractures coalitions. The neg becomes a scapegoat for the movement**

Atchison and Panetta 9 (Jarrod, PhD. In Speech Communication.  Edward, Ph.D. in Communication. “Intercollegiate Debate Speech Communication: Historical Developments and Issues for the Future”; The SAGE Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Pg. 28-9)JFS

The larger problem with locating the "debate as activism" perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents' academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community. If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed. From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

#### **They preclude community cooperation to make debate more open to solving community problems**

Atchison and Panetta 9 (Jarrod Atchison, PhD. In Speech Communication.  Edward Panetta, Ph.D. in Communication. “Intercollegiate Debate Speech Communication: Historical Developments and Issues for the Future”; The SAGE Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Pg. 28)JFS

The final problem with an individual debate round focus is the role of competition. Creating community change through individual debate rounds sacrifices the "community" portion of the change. Many teams that promote activist strategies in debates profess that they are more interested in creating change than winning debates. What is clear, however, is that the vast majority of teams that are not promoting community change are very interested in winning debates. The tension that is generated from the clash of these opposing forces is tremendous. Unfortunately, this is rarely a productive tension. Forcing teams to consider their purpose in debating, their style in debates, and their approach to evidence are all critical aspects of being participants in the community. However, the dismissal of the proposed resolution that the debaters have spent countless hours preparing for, in the name of a community problem that the debaters often have little control over, does little to engender coalitions of the willing. Should a debate team lose because its director or coach has been ineffective at recruiting minority participants? Should a debate team lose because its coach or director holds political positions that are in opposition to the activist program? Competition has been a critical component of the interest in intercollegiate debate from the beginning, and it does not help further the goals of the debate community to dismiss competition in the name of community change.

## 2NC No Spillover

#### Individual debates can’t create change—no audience and forgetfulness

Atchison and Panetta 9 (Jarrod Atchison, PhD. In Speech Communication.  Edward Panetta, Ph.D. in Communication. “Intercollegiate Debate Speech Communication: Historical Developments and Issues for the Future”; The SAGE Handbook of Rhetorical Studies, Pg. 27)JFS

The first problem that we isolate is the difficulty of any individual debate to generate community change. Although any debate has the potential to create problems for the community (videotapes of objectionable behavior, etc.), rarely does any one debate have the power to create communitywide change. We attribute this ineffectiveness to the structural problems inherent in individual debates and the collective forgetfulness of the debate community. The structural problems stem from the current tournament format that has remained relatively consistent for the past 30 years. Debaters engage in preliminary debates in rooms that are rarely populated by anyone other than the judge. Judges are instructed to vote for the team that does the best debating, but the ballot is rarely seen by anyone outside the tabulation room. Given the limited number of debates in which a judge actually writes meaningful comments, there is little documentation of what actually transpired during the debate round. During the period when judges interact with the debaters, there are often external pressures (filing evidence, preparing for the next debate, etc.) that restrict the ability of anyone outside the debate to pay attention to the judges' justification for their decision. Elimination debates do not provide for a much better audience because debates still occur simul­taneously, and travel schedules dictate that most of the participants have left by the later elimination rounds. It is difficult for anyone to substantiate the claim that asking a judge to vote to solve a community problem in an individual debate with so few participants is the best strategy for addressing important problems. In addition to the structural problems, the collective forgetfulness of the debate community reduces the impact that individual debates have on the community. The debate community is largely made up of participants who debate and then move on to successful careers. The coaches and directors that make up the backbone of the community are the people with the longest cultural memory, but they are also a small minority of the community when considering the number of debaters involved in the activity. This is not meant to suggest that the activity is reinvented every year—certainly there are conventions that are passed down from coaches to debaters and from debaters to debaters. However, the basic fact remains that there are virtually no transcriptions available for the community to read, and, therefore, it is difficult to substantiate the claim that the debate community can remember any one individual debate over the course of several generations of debaters. Additionally, given the focus on competition and individual skill, the community is more likely to remember the accomplishments and talents of debaters rather than a specific winning argument. The debate community does not have the necessary components in place for a strong collec­tive memory of individual debates. The combination of the structures of debate and the collective forgetfulness means that any strategy for creating community change that is premised on winning individual debates is less effective than seeking a larger community dialogue that is recorded and/or transcribed.

# \*\*Answers To

## AT: Mitchell

#### He changed his mind – debate as a political safe space is key to true political experimentation

Mitchell 2 (Gordon, debate coach at Pittsburgh, Nov 09, [http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200211/0136.html)JFS](http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200211/0136.html%29JFS)

Politically I have moved quite a bit since 1998, when I wrote that debate institutions should pay more attention to argumentative agency, i.e. cultivation of skills that facilitate translation of critical thinking, public speaking, and research acumen into concrete exemplars of democratic empowerment. Back then I was highly skeptical of the "laboratory model" of "preparatory pedagogy," where students were kept, by fiat, in the proverbial pedagogical bullpen. Now I respect much more the value of a protected space where young people can experiment politically by taking imaginary positions, driving the heuristic process by arguing against their convictions. In fact, the integrity of this space could be compromised by "activist turn" initiatives designed to bridge contest round advocacy with political activism. These days I have much more confidence in the importance and necessity of switch-side debating, and the heuristic value for debaters of arguing against their convictions. I think fashioning competitive debate contest rounds as isolated and politically protected safe spaces for communicative experimentation makes sense. However, I worry that a narrow diet of competitive contest round debating could starve students of opportunities to experience the rich political valence of their debating activities.

## AT: Spanos

#### Spanos misconceptualizes the dialogic student-teacher relationship

Devyne 96 (John, NYU Ed School, Maximum Security: The Culture of Violence in Inner City Schools, p. 191)JFS

I argue that Spanos’ epistemology should be challenged on two essential points. First, in reconceptializes ideal education along the lines of Paulo Freire, Spanos conflates the dialogic aspect of teaching with the totality of the student-teacher relationship. Teacher and student, we are told, should enter into a “reciprocal deconstructive learning process, one in which the oppositional teacher becomes a student and the interested student a teacher” (1993, 202), the teacher now experiencing what it feels like to be subjected to the disciplinary gaze. Such an educational philosophy has delusions of omnipotence: it wishes to extend its valid insights to encompass all aspects of teaching and learning, to become a totalizing vision. To accept the concept that not all knowledge is immediately generated through the dialogic relationship does not, however, equal an “oppressor ideology” or “the absolutizing of ignorance”. It simply represents a recognition that the student needs to be aware of what things or concepts mean for other people outside the context of the immediate dialogic relationship. In other words, while knowledge constructed through dialogue is to be valued as essential to the pedagogic process, it is also true that not all knowledge is or should be so conceptualized. Constructivism is splendid, but it has limits.

## AT: Kulynych

#### Kulynych concludes aff – the aff is performative politics

Kulynych 97 (Jessica, Asst Professor of Political Science at Winthrop University, Polity, Winter, n2 p315(32)JFS

When we look at the success of citizen initiatives from a performative perspective, we look precisely at those moments of defiance and disruption that bring the invisible and unimaginable into view. Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the policy debate and experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate within the energy commissions could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics. The existence of a goal-oriented debate within a technically dominated arena defied the normalizing separation between expert policymakers and consuming citizens. Citizens momentarily recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients.

## AT: Karl Rove Was A Debater

#### **Not an argument – and there are many examples the other way**

Whitmore 9 (Whit, Assistant Debate Coach at the University of Michigan, The 3NR, <http://www.the3nr.com/2010/01/17/spanos-on-debate/#more-919)JFS>

I hear this Karl Rove example all the time, and it seems like the dumbest thing ever. First, I don't know where he debated or when. He went to college at the University of Utah. I've personally never heard of a debate team from that school, but whatever. (EDIT: just looked it up --- some NPR article says, "In high school, Rove was a skilled debater and was elected president of the Student Council." ... so I guess student council presidents are the devil also) I've just heard it asserted by teams that like to make the debate bad argument. Second, an anecdote is not an argument. Karl Rove was a debater therefore debaters are evil is just an asinine statement. Third, there are plenty of counter anecdotes of pretty sweet people who debated and are now awesome: Neal Katyal - Defended Gore in Bush v. Gore, and defended the Detainees from Gitmo in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld - Debated for Dartmouth Laurence Tribe - one of the foremost constitutional scholars of our time, has argued before the supreme court over 30 times - Debated for Harvard

## AT: Hicks & Greene

#### Framework doesn’t cause U.S. exceptionalism – It solves it

Stannard 6 (Matt, U of Wyoming, <http://globaldebateblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/from-httpwww.html>.)

If it is indeed true that debate inevitably produces other-oriented deliberative discourse at the expense of students’ confidence in their first-order convictions, this would indeed be a trade-off worth criticizing. In all fairness, Hicks and Greene do not overclaim their critique, and they take care to acknowledge the important ethical and cognitive virtues of deliberative debating. When represented as anything other than a political-ethical concern, however, Hicks and Greene’s critique has several problems: First, as J.P. Lacy once pointed out, it seems a tremendous causal (or even rhetorical) stretch to go from “debating both sides of an issue creates civic responsibility essential to liberal democracy” to “this civic responsibility upholds the worst forms of American exceptionalism.” Second, Hicks and Greene do not make any comparison of the potentially bad power of debate to any alternative. Their implied alternative, however, is a form of forensic speech that privileges personal conviction. The idea that students should be able to preserve their personal convictions at all costs seems far more immediately tyrannical, far more immediately damaging to either liberal or participatory democracy, than the ritualized requirements that students occasionally take the opposite side of what they believe. Third, as I have suggested and will continue to suggest, while a debate project requiring participants to understand and often “speak for” opposing points of view may carry a great deal of liberal baggage, it is at its core a project more ethically deliberative than institutionally liberal. Where Hicks and Greene see debate producing “the liberal citizen-subject,” I see debate at least having the potential to produce “the deliberative human being.” The fact that some academic debaters are recruited by the CSIS and the CIA does not undermine this thesis. Absent healthy debate programs, these think-tanks and government agencies would still recruit what they saw as the best and brightest students. And absent a debate community that rewards anti-institutional political rhetoric as much as liberal rhetoric, those students would have little-to-no chance of being exposed to truly oppositional ideas.

#### The historical basis for their exceptionalism claims is backward

Harrigan 8 (Casey, M.A. Wake, <http://globaldebateblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/from-httpwww.html>.)

However, the arguments in “Lost Convictions” alone should not be read as a sweeping indictment of SSD for two reasons. First, Greene and Hicks make a specific and context-dependent claim about the Cold War that cannot be easily applied to contemporary discussion of the merits of SSD. 1954 was a time of McCarthyism and anti-Communist witch-hunts. It was quite possible then that one justification for debating both sides was a re-affirmation of liberalism against the communists. Now, in the midst of the “war on terrorism,” widespread restrictions on civil liberties, and President Bush’s mantra of “with us or against us,” it seems like the opposite is truer. Fidelity to the American cause is performed through the willing silence of its citizens. Dissent is quelled and the public is encouraged to view the world through the singular lens of “freedom” against the forces of terrorism. Debating both sides—and lacking immediate conviction—is a sign of weakness and waffling in the face of imminent threats to national security. Thus, in the contemporary context, to reject SSD and promote argument only through conviction is far more conducive to supporting American exceptionalism than debating multiple sides is as a liberal democratic justification.

## AT: Hicks & Greene

#### Experience proves that their exceptionalism argument is backward

English 7 (Eric, M.A. Pitt, [http://globaldebateblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/from-httpwww.html.)JFS](http://globaldebateblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/from-httpwww.html.%29JFS)

It is our position, however, that rather than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes. Several prominent voices reshaping the national dialogue on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead plaintiff’s counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions.12 The foundation for Katyal’s winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyal’s contemporary public interventions, which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a staunch commitment to democratic principles. Katyal’s reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicago’s North Shore provides a vivid illustration. “I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyola’s debate team opened my eyes to a different world: one of argumentation and policy.” As Katyal recounts, “the most important preparation for my career came from my experiences as a member of Loyola’s debate team.”14 The success of former debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of progressive change. Moreover, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and the classical liberalism which underpins it would help prevent misappropriation of the technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies. For buried within an inner-city debater’s files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as “with us or against us,” the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story should be [end page 224] apparent—the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthy’s ideological heirs to brand the activity as a “weapon of mass destruction.”

## AT: You Exclude Critiques

#### False – you just need to make your critique relevant to policy action – this is better for education

Walt ’91 (Stephen, Professor – U Chicago, International Studies Quarterly, 35)JFS

A second norm is relevance, a belief that even highly abstract lines of inquiry should be guided by the goal of solving real-world problems. Because the value of a given approach may not be apparent at the beginning-game theory is an obvious example-we cannot insist that a new approach be immediately applicable to a specific research puzzle. On the whole, however, the belief that scholarship in security affairs should be linked to real-world issues has prevented the field from degenerating into self-indulgent intellectualizing. And from the Golden Age to the present, security studies has probably had more real-world impact, for good or ill, than most areas of social science. Finally, the renaissance of security studies has been guided by a commitment to democratic discourse. Rather than confining discussion of security issues to an elite group of the best and brightest, scholars in the renaissance have generally welcomed a more fully informed debate. To paraphrase Clemenceau, issues of war and peace are too important to be left solely to insiders with a vested interest in the outcome. The growth of security studies within universities is one sign of broader participation, along with increased availability of information and more accessible publications for interested citizens. Although this view is by no means universal, the renaissance of security studies has been shaped by the belief that a well-informed debate is the best way to avoid the disasters that are likely when national policy is monopolized by a few self-interested parties.

#### And- their version of “critiques” is educationally devastating, it creates outcomes where teams can learn nothing about the topics.  Our version forces them to learn about criticism and policy

#### **This is offense – scholars have a responsibility to be policy relevant**

Jentleson 2 (Bruce, Director of the Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy and Professor of Public Policy and Political Science at Duke University, International Security 26.4 (2002) 169-183, projectmuse)JFS

To be sure, political science and international relations have produced and continue to produce scholarly work that does bring important policy insights. Still it is hard to deny that contemporary political science and international relations as a discipline put limited value on policy relevance—too little, in my view, and the discipline suffers for it. 1 The problem is not just the gap between theory and policy but its chasmlike widening in recent years and the limited valuation of efforts, in Alexander George's phrase, at "bridging the gap." 2 The [End Page 169] events of September 11 drive home the need to bring policy relevance back in to the discipline, to seek greater praxis between theory and practice. This is not to say that scholars should take up the agendas of think tanks, journalists, activists, or fast fax operations. The academy's agenda is and should be principally a more scholarly one. But theory can be valued without policy relevance being so undervalued. Dichotomization along the lines of "we" do theory and "they" do policy consigns international relations scholars almost exclusively to an intradisciplinary dialogue and purpose, with conversations and knowledge building that while highly intellectual are excessively insular and disconnected from the empirical realities that are the discipline's raison d'être. This stunts the contributions that universities, one of society's most essential institutions, can make in dealing with the profound problems and challenges society faces. It also is counterproductive to the academy's own interests. Research and scholarship are bettered by pushing analysis and logic beyond just offering up a few paragraphs on implications for policy at the end of a forty-page article, as if a "ritualistic addendum." 3 Teaching is enhanced when students' interest in "real world" issues is engaged in ways that reinforce the argument that theory really is relevant, and CNN is not enough. There also are gains to be made for the scholarly community's standing as perceived by those outside the academic world, constituencies and colleagues whose opinions too often are self-servingly denigrated and defensively disregarded. It thus is both for the health of the discipline and to fulfill its broader societal responsibilities that greater praxis is to be pursued.

## AT: Debate Produces Bad Policymakers

#### We can influence policy with debate – we choose whether to be good or bad policymakers

Walt ’91 (Stephen, Professor – U Chicago, International Studies Quarterly, 35)JFS

A second norm is relevance, a belief that even highly abstract lines of inquiry should be guided by the goal of solving real-world problems. Because the value of a given approach may not be apparent at the beginning-game theory is an obvious example-we cannot insist that a new approach be immediately applicable to a specific research puzzle. On the whole, however, the belief that scholarship in security affairs should be linked to real-world issues has prevented the field from degenerating into self-indulgent intellectualizing. And from the Golden Age to the present, security studies has probably had more real-world impact, for good or ill, than most areas of social science. Finally, the renaissance of security studies has been guided by a commitment to democratic discourse. Rather than confining discussion of security issues to an elite group of the best and brightest, scholars in the renaissance have generally welcomed a more fully informed debate. To paraphrase Clemenceau, issues of war and peace are too important to be left solely to insiders with a vested interest in the outcome. The growth of security studies within universities is one sign of broader participation, along with increased availability of information and more accessible publications for interested citizens. Although this view is by no means universal, the renaissance of security studies has been shaped by the belief that a well-informed debate is the best way to avoid the disasters that are likely when national policy is monopolized by a few self-interested parties.

#### Can’t always be true – people choose their arguments – debate does not force people to be bad policymakers

#### Academics’ role in policy is key to check war

Walt ’91 (Stephen, Professor – U Chicago, International Studies Quarterly, 35)JFS

A recurring theme of this essay has been the twin dangers of separating the study of security affairs from the academic world or of shifting the focus of academic scholarship too far from real-world issues. The danger of war will be with us for some time to come, and states will continue to acquire military forces for a variety of purposes. Unless one believes that ignorance is preferable to expertise, the value of independent national security scholars should be apparent. Indeed, history suggests that countries that suppress debate on national security matters are more likely to blunder into disaster, because misguided policies cannot be evaluated and stopped in time. As in other areas of public policy, academic experts in security studies can help in several ways. In the short term, academics are well place to evaluate current programs, because they face less pressure to support official policy. The long-term effects of academic involvement may be even more significant: academic research can help states learn from past mistakes and can provide the theoretical innovations that produce better policy choices in the future. Furthermore, their role in training the new generation of experts gives academics an additional avenue of influence. Assuming they perform these tasks responsibly, academics will have a positive-albeit gradual-impact on how states deal with the problem of war in the future.

## AT: You Create Spectators

#### 1. No uniqueness – people are complacent now towards politics – only a risk we increase involvement

#### **2. Policy debate is good – it solves the spectator phenomenon and increases both critical and policy education**

Joyner 99 (Christopher Professor of International Law in the Government Department at Georgetown University, Spring, [5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377]

Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense. A debate exercise is particularly suited to an examination of United States foreign policy, which in political science courses is usually studied from a theoretical, often heavily realpolitik perspective. In such courses, international legal considerations are usually given short shrift, if discussed at all. As a result, students may come to believe that international law plays no role in United States foreign policy-making. In fact, serious consideration is usually paid by government officials to international law in the formulation of United States policy, albeit sometimes ex post facto as a justification for policy, rather than as a bona fide prior constraint on consideration of policy options. In addition, lawyers are prominent advisers at many levels of the foreign-policy-making process. Students should appreciate the relevance of international law for past and current US actions, such as the invasion of Grenada or the refusal of the United States to sign the law of the sea treaty and landmines convention, as well as for  [\*387]  hypothetical (though subject to public discussion) United States policy options such as hunting down and arresting war criminals in Bosnia, withdrawing from the United Nations, or assassinating Saddam Hussein.

## AT: K Precedes Theoretical Arguments

#### Switch-side solves – run this K on the negative and you access all of its benefits without violating the resolution

#### **Extend Lutz – tying abstract ideals down to things like fairness and limits is the only productive form of politics**

#### **Political perfectionism is easy – the only productive philosophy is realistic policy**

Ignatieff 4 (Michael, Lesser Evils, Carr professor of human rights at Harvard, p. 20-1)

As for moral perfectionism, this would be the doctrine that a liberal state should never have truck with dubious moral means and should spare its officials the hazard of having to decide between lesser and greater evils. A moral perfectionist position also holds that states can spare their officials this hazard simply by adhering to the universal moral standards set out in human rights conventions and the laws of war. There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards is relatively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases. What is the line between interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and moral distinctions between these are clear in the abstract, abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders have to choose between them in practice. Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standards is that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another.

## AT: Rules Are Violent

#### Rules inevitable – speech times, win/losses, and aff/neg

#### Turn – rules check human excesses of violence – link turn outweighs link

Dietz 2k (Mary, Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, Political Theory and Partisan Politics p. 123-4)JFS

Habermas's distinction between "pure" communicative action and strategic action raises many difficulties, not the least of which is its adherence to an idealized model of communication that, as Habermas himself acknowledges, does not fit a great deal of everyday social interaction (McCarthy 1991,132). Machiavelli's famous riposte to those thinkers who "have imagined republics and principalities which have never been seen or known to exist in reality" (Machiavelli 1950, 56) seems pertinent here, for the idealized model that Habermas imagines and the distinction that supports it appear boldly to deny the Machia­vellian insight that "how we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will rather learn to bring about his own ruin than his pres­ervation" (56). I will return to this point as it relates to politics later. For now, it is important to underscore that Habermas relies upon the communicative-strategic distinction to do at least two things: first, to show that on the level of linguistics, communicative action enjoys an "originary" priority over strategic and all other modes of linguistic usage, which are themselves "parasitic" (Rasmussen 1990, 38) or "de­rivative" (McCarthy 1991, 133) upon the former.12 Second, on the level of political theory, Habermas introduces the distinction in order to limit the exercise of threats and coercion (or strategic action) by enu­merating a formal-pragmatic system of discursive accountability (or communicative action) that is geared toward human agreement and mutuality. Despite its thoroughly modern accouterments, communica­tive action aims at something like the twentieth-century discourse-equivalent of the chivalric codes of the late Middle Ages; as a normative system it articulates the conventions of fair and honorable engage­ment between interlocutors. To be sure, Habermas's concept of com­municative action is neither as refined nor as situationally embedded as were the protocols that governed honorable combat across Euro­pean cultural and territorial boundaries and between Christian knights; but it is nonetheless a (cross-cultural) protocol for all that. The entire framework that Habermas establishes is an attempt to limit human violence by elaborating a code of communicative conduct that is de­signed to hold power in check by channeling it into persuasion, or the "unforced" force of the better argument (Habermas 1993b, 160).^

## AT: Minority Participation

#### 1. No uniqueness – Beacon and Millard South were both successful at the TOC last year and minority debaters are successful in traditional debate as well

#### 2. Your argument is racist – the notion that we need to change debate for minorities assumes that they cannot compete in the existing debate structure – this is essentializing and constructs minorities as inferior – turns your impacts

## AT: Resolved Is Before The Colon

#### **1.  The resolution still includes the federal government, meaning that individuals have to be “resolved” that the federal government should act**

#### 2.  Resolved is designed for political discussion in the context of policy debate

Parcher 1 (Jeff, Fmr. Debate Coach at Georgetown University, February, [http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html)JFS](http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html%29JFS)

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constituent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision.  (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of course, are answers to a question.

#### Everything after the colon is key

Webster’s Guide to Grammar and Writing 2k (<http://ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/marks/colon.htm>)

Use of a colon before a list or an explanation that is preceded by a clause that can stand by itself. Think of the colon as a gate, inviting one to go on… If the introductory phrase preceding the colon is very brief and the clause following the colon represents the real business of the sentence, begin the clause after the colon with a capital letter.

#### And, our interpretation is good–we have no evidence about the stance of individuals which hurts predictability – if we win that policy education is good, our interp is preferable

#### And, our ground and education arguments outweigh this–even if their grammar claims are correct, they still destroy debate

## AT: Words Lack Determinate Meaning

#### **First, even if words mean different things to different people, we can still create some consensus –if I speak English, everyone understands me**

#### **And, they should lose in this world – their words have no meaning and have not formed an argument – vote on presumption**

#### Intersubjective consensus solves this arg

Ferguson and Mansbausch 2 (Yale, Prof of IR at Rutgers, Richard, Prof of IR at Iowa State, International Relations and the “Third Debate,” ed. Jarvis)JFS

Although there may be no such thing as “absolute truth” (Hollis, 1994:240-247; Fernandez-Armesto, 1997:chap.6), there is often a sufficient amount of intersubjective consensus to make for a useful conversation.  That conversation may not lead to proofs that satisfy the philosophical nit-pickers, but it can be educational and illuminating.  We gain a degree of apparently useful “understanding” about the things we need (or prefer) to “know.”

#### Their arg leads to the linguistic masking of atrocities like the Holocaust

Hexham 99 (Irving, in Mission and the State, ed. Ulrich van der Hayden, 2000, [http://www.ucalgary.ca/~hexham/courses/Courses-2006/Rels-339/IRVING/Ulrich-revised.htm)JFS](http://www.ucalgary.ca/~hexham/courses/Courses-2006/Rels-339/IRVING/Ulrich-revised.htm%29JFS)

Deborah Lipstadt warns historians about the dangers of adopting fashionable theories like deconstruction without solidly grounding their work in an accurate representation of source materials [1994]. She makes a passionate plea for historical accuracy while demonstrating the real dangers that occur when people distort the facts. The techniques used by Holocaust deniers, who use history to propagate their views, are not isolated to rogue historians. The basic arguments used by the deniers are not as absurd as most decent people, who instinctively reject such claims, think. In fact, they are increasingly common in popular scholarship. As Lipstadt points out "It is important to understand that the deniers do not work in a vacuum." [Lipstadt 1984:17]. Rather, holocaust "denial can be traced to an intellectual climate that has made its mark in the scholarly world during the past two decades. The deniers are plying their trade at a time when history seems to be up for grabs and attacks on the Western rationalist tradition have become commonplace." [Lipstadt 1994:17]. She continues: "This tendency can be traced, at least in part, to intellectual currents that began in the late 1960's. Various scholars began to assert that texts had no fixed meaning. The reader's interpretation, not the author's intention, determined meaning." [Lipstadt 1984:18] The danger here is not that established scholars are likely to become converts to holocaust denial, although in places like France this is a clear possibility, rather it is the effect such techniques have on students. As Lipstadt observes: "The scholars who supported this deconstructionist approach were neither deniers themselves nor sympathetic to the deniers' attitudes; most had no trouble identifying Holocaust denial as disingenuous." But, "when students had to confront the issue. Far too many of them found it impossible to recognize Holocaust denial as a movement with no scholarly, intellectual, or rational validity" [Lipstadt 1984:18]. At the end of her work she warns again that some "historians are not crypto-deniers, but the results of their work are the same: the blurring of boundaries between fact and fiction and between persecuted and persecutor [Lipstadt 1994:215]. Further Lipstadt correctly observes that "If Holocaust denial has demonstrated anything, it is the fragility of memory, truth, reason, and history." She is right. As scholars it is our duty to defend history based upon the accurate and the objectivity of scholarship. No doubt some people will bristle at the suggestion that we ought to strive for objectivity. Such critics regard the discovery of bias as something totally new without realizing that the hermeneutics of suspicion existed long before Foucault or Deridda [Spencer 1874] History and the deconstruction of Afrikaner Ideology With Lipstad's warning in mind let us turn to the study of South Africa history. During the 1980's various writers used history to deconstruct the claims of Afrikaner Nationalism [Hexham 1981; du Toit and Giliomee 1983; du Toit 1983; Elphick and Giliomee 1988]. These works made an impact among Afrikaners because they exposed the inconsistencies of the historical claims used to legitimate the ideology of apartheid. This delegitimation was possible because these studies were based on the same historical sources as those used by Afrikaner Nationalists used to justify apartheid. By demonstrating that the sources themselves did not support Nationalist claims these authors struck a body blow at the intellectual edifice that maintained the self-confidence of Afrikaner Nationalist intellectuals. At the same time other authors, such as Charles Villa-Vicencio and James Cochran, joined the fray. But, these latter writers were not trained historians. Rather they were theologians who used history as a tool in the "as a basis for ecclesial renewal" and to "understand the character of the church in South Africa and identify its social function" [Villa-Vicenciio 1988:1]. Worthy as these goals were these theologians appropriated historical evidence rather like fundamentalist Christians use proof texts from the Bible to support their arguments. Thus the historical record was forced into preconceived neo-Marxist ideological frameworks for the purpose of undermining support for apartheid. The problem with this approach was that it often distorted and misrepresented the source documents [Cf. Hexham 1989; 1993]. At this point, it is necessary to add that whenever one talks about the "distortion" or “misrepresentation” of sources it is important to recognize that everyone makes the occasional mistake. It is also true that in many cases legitimate questions of interpretation may arise when various scholars see the significance of the same piece of evidence differently. Therefore, what I am objecting to is not the occasional mistake, questionable usage, or issues of genuine interpretation. Rather, it is the systematic use or misuse of source texts to support a grand theory without regard to the context and clear intent of the original sources. Such practices ignore historical methods for the purpose of promoting an ideology [Himmelfarb 1987; Elton 1967 and 1991] The problem, of course, is that once these techniques are generally accepted the choice of ideology can change. Today they are used to promote democracy and tolerance. Tomorrow they may be used to promote totalitarianism and racism.

# \*\*Policymaking/Roleplaying

## 2NC Oasis Wall

[note: the ‘oasis’ argument is that debate should be an isolated oasis of political discussion, as opposed to a place for activism]

#### **Specialized frameworks good – keep debate pure**

Roston 2 (Michael, Whitman coach, January 30, [www.ndtceda.com)JFS](http://www.ndtceda.com)JFS)

I grew up in West Rogers Park on the north side of Chicago, and up and down California Ave there are men of all ages going in and out of yeshivas where they study the torah and the talmud. many of their theological discussions occur (in hebrew) at a rapid pace, employing highly technical and difficult forms of argumentation, relying on arcane examples and evidence, some of which reaches back into previous millenia. one could even say that when they are praying, they bob back and forth in a way that many of us would instantly recognize from many of our debate rounds. I would say that even among the more conservative wings of my family, few of us can really understand what they do. I never learned Hebrew, and can't their discussions. Yet I'm certain that if their first priority were always accessibility and transparency, the whole of Jewish religion and culture would have no soul.

#### Information overload destroys decision-making abilities are key – oasis debate teaches these skills

Coverstone 95 (Alan, BRILLIANT DEBATE THEORIST, "An Inward Glance: A Response To Mitchell's Outward Activist Turn," DRG, URL: http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm)JFS

Mitchell's argument underestimates the nature of academic debate in three ways. First, debate trains students in the very skills required for navigation in the public sphere of the information age. In the past, political discourse was controlled by those elements who controlled access to information. While this basic reality will continue in the future, its essential features will change. No longer will mere possession of information determine control of political life. Information is widely available. For the first time in human history we face the prospect of an entirely new threat. The risk of an information overload is already shifting control of political discourse to superior information managers. It is no longer possible to control political discourse by limiting access to information. Instead, control belongs to those who are capable of identifying and delivering bits of information to a thirsty public. Mitchell calls this the "desertification of the public sphere." The public senses a deep desire for the ability to manage the information around them. Yet, they are unsure how to process and make sense of it all. In this environment, snake charmers and charlatans abound. The popularity of the evening news wanes as more and more information becomes available. People realize that these half hour glimpses at the news do not even come close to covering all available information. They desperately want to select information for themselves. So they watch CNN until they fall asleep. Gavel to gavel coverage of political events assumes top spots on the Nielsen charts. Desperate to decide for themselves, the public of the twenty-first century drinks deeply from the well of information. When they are finished, they find they are no more able to decide. Those who make decisions are envied and glorified. Debate teaches individual decision-making for the information age. No other academic activity available today teaches people more about information gathering, assessment, selection, and delivery. Most importantly, debate teaches individuals how to make and defend their own decisions. Debate is the only academic activity that moves at the speed of the information age. Time is required for individuals to achieve escape velocity. Academic debate holds tremendous value as a space for training. Mitchell's reflections are necessarily more accurate in his own situation. Over a decade of debate has well positioned him to participate actively and directly in the political process. Yet the skills he has did not develop overnight. Proper training requires time. While there is a tremendous variation in the amount of training required for effective navigation of the public sphere, the relative isolation of academic debate is one of its virtues. Instead of turning students of debate immediately outward, we should be encouraging more to enter the oasis. A thirsty public, drunk on the product of anyone who claims a decision, needs to drink from the pool of decision-making skills. Teaching these skills is our virtue.

## 2NC Oasis Wall

#### Non-activist debate key to true testing of political theories – solves political activism better

Coverstone 95 (Alan, BRILLIANT DEBATE THEORIST, "An Inward Glance: A Response To Mitchell's Outward Activist Turn," DRG, URL: [http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm)JFS](http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm%29JFS)

As we enter the twenty-first century, let us take pride in the unique activity in which we engage. Debaters, more than any other segment of American society, are capable of functioning effectively in the political world. Debaters acquire superior skills in information management and decision-making. Because our activity is non-political, students receive the space they need to test ideas, opinions, and beliefs. This testing process is put at risk by an outward activist turn. Yet, even more dangerous is the potential for new forms of domination within our academic oasis. We must be careful not to replace domination by media/government elites with domination with our community elite. Mitchell's call for activism, as well as his examples of thriving participation should raise our awareness of both our responsibilities and opportunities. Individuals who have learned to make and defend their own political decisions will continue to move easily into political life. Let us do nothing to lessen that impact. Let us encourage greater involvement in debate. Such involvement holds greater potential for reinvigoration of political discourse than direct mass activism. Let us not stoop to the level of modem political discourse, but elevate that discourse to our own level of deliberation.

#### Politicization of the debate community is horrible – laundry list

Coverstone 95 (Alan, BRILLIANT DEBATE THEORIST, "An Inward Glance: A Response To Mitchell's Outward Activist Turn," DRG, URL: http://www.wfu.edu/Student-organizations/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/Coverstone1995China.htm)JFS

My third, and final reaction to Mitchell's proposal, targets his desire for mass action. The danger is that we will replace mass control of the media/government elite with a mass control of our own elite. The greatest virtue of academic debate is its ability to teach people that they can and must make their own decisions. An outward turn, organized along the lines of mass action, threatens to homogenize the individual members of the debate community. Such an outcome will, at best, politicize and fracture our community. At worst, it will coerce people to participate before making their own decisions. Debate trains people to make decisions by investigating the subtle nuances of public policies. We are at our best when we teach students to tear apart the broad themes around which traditional political activity is organized. As a result, we experience a wide array of political views within academic debate. Even people who support the same proposals or candidates do so for different and inconsistent reasons. Only in academic debate will two supporters of political views argue vehemently against each other. As a group, this reality means that mass political action is doomed to fail. Debaters do not focus on the broad themes that enable mass unity. The only theme that unites debaters is the realization that we are all free to make our own decisions. Debaters learn to agree or disagree with opponents with respect. Yet unity around this theme is not easily translated into unity on a partisan political issue. Still worse, Mitchell's proposal undermines the one unifying principle. Mitchell must be looking for more. He is looking for a community wide value set that discourages inaction. This means that an activist turn necessarily will compel political action from many who are not yet prepared. The greatest danger in this proposal is the likelihood that the control of the media/government elite will be replaced by control of our own debate elite. Emphasizing mass action tends to discourage individual political action. Some will decide that they do not need to get involved, but this is by far the lesser of two evils. Most will decide that they must be involved whether or not they feel strongly committed to the issue. Mitchell places the cart before the horse. Rather than letting ideas and opinions drive action as they do now, he encourages an environment where action drives ideas for many people. Young debaters are particularly vulnerable. They are likely to join in political action out of a desire to "fit in." This cannot be what Mitchell desires. Political discourse is a dessert now because there are more people trying to "fit in" that there are people trying to break out.

## Policy Framework Good – Inevitable

#### Policy involvement is inevitable- we need to proactively engage in the language of policy making for movements to be effective

Makani 2k (Themba-Nixon, Executive Director of The Praxis Project, Former California Staffer,  Colorlines. Oakland: Jul 31, 2000.Vol.3, Iss. 2; pg. 12)

The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. Policy is for wonks, sell-out politicians, and ivory-tower eggheads. Organizing is what real, grassroots people do. Common as it may be, this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. Given who's usually present, most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, and the tried and true: cold, hard cash. Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at the smaller scale of local politics. At the local level, we have greater access to elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for reelection. For example, getting 400 people to show up at city hall in just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand, 400 people at the state house or the Congress would have a less significant impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually constituents, and the impact is even greater. Recent trends in government underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of measures devolving significant power to state and local government. Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water safety are among the areas where states and localities now have greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure. History has taught us that, for social services and civil rights in particular, the lack of clear federal standards and mechanisms for accountability lead to uneven enforcement and even discriminatory implementation of policies. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing progressive initiatives in this more localized environment. Greater local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement important social policies that were heretofore out of reach. To do so will require careful attention to the mechanics of local policymaking and a clear blueprint of what we stand for. Getting It in Writing Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.

## Policy Framework Good – Decision-Making

#### **We have a responsibility as scholars to evaluate the policy debate- we shape decision making**

Edkins and Zehfussi 5 (Review of International Studies (2005),31,p. 454-5)

What we are attempting in this article is an intervention that demonstrates how the illusion of the sovereign state in an insecure and anarchic international system is sustained and how it might be challenged. It seems to us that this has become important in the present circumstances. The focus on security and the dilemma of security versus freedom that is set out in debates immediately after September 11th presents an apparent choice as the focus for dissent, while concealing the extent to which thinking is thereby confined to a specific agenda. Our argument will be that this approach relies on a particular picture of the political world that has been reflected within the discipline of international relations, a picture of a world of sovereign states. We have a responsibility as scholars; we are not insulated from the policy world. What we discuss may not, and indeed does not, have a direct impact on what happens in the policy world, this is clear, but our writings and our teaching do have an input in terms of the creation and reproduction of pictures of the world that inform policy and set the contours of policy debates.21 Moreover, the discipline within which we are situated is one which depends itself on a particular view of the world – a view that sees the international as a realm of politics distinct from the domestic – the same view of the world as the one that underpins thinking on security and defence in the US administration.22 In this article then we develop an analysis of the ways in which thinking in terms of international relations and a system of states forecloses certain possibilities from the start, and how it might look to think about politics and the international differently.

## Policy Framework Good – International Law

#### Our education arguments outweigh all of their critical nonsense – we must train future policymakers in rules and procedure to prevent human extinction – this concern comes prior to all attempts to change world order

Beres 3 (Louis Rene, Prof. of International Law at Purdue, Journal and Courier, June 5)JFS

The truth is often disturbing. Our impressive American victories against terrorism and rogue states, although proper and indispensable, are inevitably limited. The words of the great Irish poet Yeats reveal, prophetically, where our entire planet is now clearly heading. Watching violence escalate and expand in parts of Europe and Russia, in Northern Ireland, in Africa, in Southwest Asia, in Latin America, and of course in the Middle East, we discover with certainty that "... the centre cannot hold/Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world/The blood-dimmed tide is loosed/and everywhere The Ceremony of innocence is drowned."   Our response, even after Operation Iraqi Freedom, lacks conviction. Still pretending that "things will get better," we Americans proceed diligently with our day-to-day affairs, content that, somehow, the worst can never really happen. Although it is true that we must go on with our normal lives, it is also true that "normal" has now become a quaint and delusionary state. We want to be sure that a "new" normal falls within the boundaries of human tolerance, but we can't nurture such a response without an informed appreciation of what is still possible.  For us, other rude awakenings are unavoidable, some of which could easily overshadow the horrors of Sept. 11. There can be little doubt that, within a few short years, expanding tribalism will produce several new genocides and proliferating nuclear weapons will generate one or more regional nuclear wars. Paralyzed by fear and restrained by impotence, various governments will try, desperately, to deflect our attention, but it will be a vain effort. Caught up in a vast chaos from which no real escape is possible, we will learn too late that there is no durable safety in arms, no ultimate rescue by authority, no genuine remedy in science or technology.  What shall we do? For a start, we must all begin to look carefully behind the news. Rejecting superficial analyses of day-to-day events in favor of penetrating assessments of world affairs, we must learn quickly to distinguish what is truly important from what is merely entertainment. With such learning, we Americans could prepare for growing worldwide anarchy not as immobilized objects of false contentment, but as authentic citizens of an endangered planet.  Nowhere is it written that we people of Earth are forever, that humankind must thwart the long-prevailing trend among all planetary life-forms (more than 99 percent) of ending in extinction. Aware of this, we may yet survive, at least for a while, but only if our collective suppression of purposeful fear is augmented by a complementary wisdom; that is, that our personal mortality is undeniable and that the harms done by one tribal state or terror group against "others" will never confer immortality. This is, admittedly, a difficult concept to understand, but the longer we humans are shielded from such difficult concepts the shorter will be our time remaining. We must also look closely at higher education in the United States, not from the shortsighted stance of improving test scores, but from the urgent perspective of confronting extraordinary threats to human survival. For the moment, some college students are exposed to an occasional course in what is fashionably described as "global awareness," but such exposure usually sidesteps the overriding issues: We now face a deteriorating world system that cannot be mended through sensitivity alone; our leaders are dangerously unprepared to deal with catastrophic deterioration; our schools are altogether incapable of transmitting the indispensable visions of planetary restructuring.  To institute productive student confrontations with survival imperatives, colleges and universities must soon take great risks, detaching themselves from a time-dishonored preoccupation with "facts" in favor of grappling with true life-or-death questions. In raising these questions, it will not be enough to send some students to study in Paris or Madrid or Amsterdam ("study abroad" is not what is meant by serious global awareness). Rather, all students must be made aware - as a primary objective of the curriculum - of where we are heading, as a species, and where our limited survival alternatives may yet be discovered.  There are, of course, many particular ways in which colleges and universities could operationalize real global awareness, but one way, long-neglected, would be best. I refer to the study of international law. For a country that celebrates the rule of law at all levels, and which explicitly makes international law part of the law of the United States - the "supreme law of the land" according to the Constitution and certain Supreme Court decisions - this should be easy enough to understand. Anarchy, after all, is the absence of law, and knowledge of international law is necessarily prior to adequate measures of world order reform.  Before international law can be taken seriously, and before "the blood-dimmed tide" can be halted, America's future leaders must at least have some informed acquaintance with pertinent rules and procedures. Otherwise we shall surely witness the birth of a fully ungovernable world order, an unheralded and sinister arrival in which only a shadowy legion of gravediggers would wield the forceps.

## Roleplaying Good – Education

#### Simulation of different roles through fiat encourages learning and empowerment

Innes and Booher 99 (Judith, Director – Institute of Urban and Regional Development and Professor at UC Berkeley and David, Visiting Scholar at the Institute, Journal of the American Planning Association, Winter, Vol. 65, Iss. 1)

Our observation and practice of consensus building suggests that the analogy to role-playing games will help to illuminate the dynamic of effective consensus processes. Even when the dispute seems intractable, role playing in consensus building allows players to let go of actual or assumed constraints and to develop ideas for creating new conditions and possibilities. Drama and suspension of reality allows competing, even bitterly opposed interests to collaborate, and engages individual players emotionally over many months. Scenario building and storytelling can make collective sense of complexity, of predicting possibilities in an uncertain world, and can allow the playful imagination, which people normally suppress, to go to work. In the course of engaging in various roles, participants develop identities for themselves and others and become more effective participants, representing their stakeholders' interests more clearly. In many of their most productive moments, participants in consensus building engage not only in playing out scenarios, but also in a kind of collective, speculative tinkering, or bricolage, similar in principle to what game participants do. That is, they play with heterogeneous concepts, strategies, and actions with which various individuals in the group have experience, and try combining them until they create a new scenario that they collectively believe will work. This bricolage, discussed further below, is a type of reasoning and collective creativity fundamentally different from the more familiar types, argumentation and tradeoffs.[sup11] The latter modes of problem solving or dispute resolution typically allow zero sum allocation of resources among participants or finding the actions acceptable to everyone. Bricolage, however, produces, rather than a solution to a known problem, a new way of framing the situation and of developing unanticipated combinations of actions that are qualitatively different from the options on the table at the outset. The result of this collective tinkering with new scenarios is, most importantly, learning and change among the players, and growth in their sophistication about each other, about the issues, and about the futures they could seek. Both consensus building and roleplaying games center on learning, innovation, and change, in a process that is entertaining and-when conducted effectively-in some fundamental sense empowers individuals.

## Roleplaying Good – Devil’s Advocate

#### Roleplaying lets us learn about other’s opinions – this refines our strategy – Malcolm X proves

Branham 95 (Robert, Professor Rhetoric at Bates College, Argumentation and Advocacy, "`I Was Gone On Debating': Malcolm X's Prison Debates And Public Confrontations," Winter, vol. 31, no. 3, p.117)JFS

As Malcolm X sought new outlets for hisheightened political consciousness, he turned tothe weekly formal debatessponsored by the inmate team. "My reading had my mind like steam under pressure,"he recounted; "Some way, I had to start telling the white man about himself to his face. I decided to do this by putting my name down to debate" (1965b, p. 184). Malcolm X'sprisondebate experience allowed him to bring his newly acquired historical knowledge and critical ideology tobear on a wide variety of social issues. "Whichever side of the selected subject was assigned to me, I'd track down and study everything I could find on it," wrote Malcolm X. "I'd put myself in my opponent's place and decide how I'd try to win if I had the other side; and then I'd figure out a way to knock down those points"(1965b, p. 184). Preparation for each debate included four or five practice sessions.

## Roleplaying Good – Empowerment

#### **Role-playing is key to democratic decision-making and empowers individuals**

Rawls 99 (John, Professor Emeritus – Harvard University, The Law of Peoples, p. 54-7)0

Developing the Law of Peoples within a liberal conception of justice, we work out the ideals and principles of the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people. I distinguish between the public reason of liberal peoples and the public reason of the Society of Peoples. The first is the public reason of equal citizens of domestic society debating the constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice concerning their own government; the second is the public reason of free and equal liberal peoples debating their mutual relations as peoples. The Law of Peoples with its political concepts and principles, ideals and criteria, is the content of this latter public reason. Although these two public reasons do not have the same content, the role of public reason among free and equal peoples is analogous to its role in a constitutional democratic regime among free and equal citizens. Political liberalism proposes that, in a constitutional democratic regime, comprehensive doctrines of truth or of right are to be replaced in public reason by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens. Here note the parallel: public reason is invoked by members of the Society of Peoples, and its principles are addressed to peoples as peoples. They are not expressed in terms of comprehensive doctrines of truth or of right, which may hold sway in this or that society, but in terms that can be shared by different peoples. 6.2. Ideal of Public Reason. Distinct from the idea of public reason is the ideal of public reason. In domestic society this ideal is realized, or satisfied, whenever judges, legislators, chief executives, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the idea of public reason and explain to other citizens their reasons for supporting fundamental political questions in terms of the political conception of justice that they regard as the most reasonable. In this way they fulfill what I shall call their duty of civility to one another and to other citizens. Hence whether judges, legislators, and chief executives act from and follow public reason is continually shown in their speech and conduct. How is the ideal of public reason realized by citizens who are not government officials? In a representative government, citizens vote for representatives-chief executives, legislators, and the like-not for particular laws (except at a state or local level where they may vote di¬rectly on referenda questions, which are not usually fundamental ques¬tions). To answer this question, we say that, ideally, citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact.7l When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason, forms part of the political and social basis of liberal democracy and is vital for its enduring strength and vigor. Thus in domestic society citizens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason, while doing what they can to hold government officials to it. This duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. I emphasize that it is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech.

## Roleplaying Good – Politics

#### Role-playing solves political apathy and reinvigorates personal politics – turns the K

Mitchell 2k (Gordon, Director of Debate and Professor of Communication – U. Pittsburgh, Argumentation & Advocacy, Vol. 36, No. 3, Winter)JFS

When we assume the posture of the other in dramatic performance, we tap into who we are as persons, since our interpretation of others is deeply colored by our own senses of selfhood. By encouraging experimentation in identity construction, role-play "helps students discover divergent viewpoints and overcome stereotypes as they examine subjects from multiple perspectives..." (Moore, p. 190). Kincheloe points to the importance of this sort of reflexive critical awareness as an essential feature of educational practice in postmodern times. "Applying the notion of the postmodern analysis of the self, we come to see that hyperreality invites a heteroglossia of being," Kincheloe explains; "Drawing upon a multiplicity of voices, individuals live out a variety of possibilities, refusing to suppress particular voices. As men and women appropriate the various forms of expression, they are empowered to uncover new dimensions of existence that were previously hidden" (1993, p. 96). This process is particularly crucial in the public argument context, since a key guarantor of inequality and exploitation in contemporary society is the widespread and uncritical acceptance by citizens of politically inert self-identities. The problems of political alienation, apathy and withdrawal have received lavish treatment as perennial topics of scholarly analysis (see e.g. Fishkin 1997; Grossberg 1992; Hart 1998; Loeb 1994). Unfortunately, comparatively less energy has been devoted to the development of pedagogical strategies for countering this alarming political trend. However, some scholars have taken up the task of theorizing emancipatory and critical pedagogies, and argumentation scholars interested in expanding the learning potential of debate would do well to note their work (see e.g. Apple 1995, 1988, 1979; Britzman 1991; Giroux 1997, 1988, 1987; Greene 1978; McLaren 1993, 1989; Simon 1992; Weis and Fine 1993). In this area of educational scholarship, the curriculum theory of currere, a method of teaching pioneered by Pinar and Grumet (1976), speaks directly to many of the issues already discussed in this essay. As the Latin root of the word "curriculum," currere translates roughly as the investigation of public life (see Kincheloe 1993, p. 146). According to Pinar, "the method of currere is one way to work to liberate one from the web of political, cultural, and economic influences that are perhaps buried from conscious view but nonetheless comprise the living web that is a person's biographic situation" (Pinar 1994, p. 108). The objectives of role-play pedagogy resonate with the currere method. By opening discursive spaces for students to explore their identities as public actors, simulated public arguments provide occasions for students to survey and appraise submerged aspects of their political identities. Since many aspects of cultural and political life work currently to reinforce political passivity, critical argumentation pedagogies that highlight this component of students' self-identities carry significant emancipatory potential.

## Roleplaying Good – Solves Exclusion

#### **Pretending to fill the role of policymakers is key to prevent exclusion and fight political passivity**

Kulynych 97 (Jessica, Winthrop University, Polity, Winter, p. 344-5)JFS

Unfortunately, it is precisely these elements of citizen action that cannot be explained by a theory of communicative action.  It is here that a performative conception of political action implicitly informs Hager’s discussion.  From a performative perspective, the goal of action is not only to secure a realm for deliberative politics, but to disrupt and resist the norms and identities that structure such a realm and its participants.  While Habermas theorizes that political solutions will emerge from dialogue, a performative understanding of participation highlights the limits of dialogue and the creative and often uncontrollable effect of unpremeditated action on the very foundations of communication.  When we look at the success of citizen initiatives from a performative perspective, we look precisely at those moments of defiance and disruption that bring the invisible and unimaginable into view.  Although citizens were minimally successful in influencing or controlling the outcome of the policy debate and experienced a considerable lack of autonomy in their coercion into the technical debate, the goal-oriented debate within the energy commissions could be seen as a defiant moment of performative politics.  The existence of a goal-oriented debate within a technically dominated arena defied the normalizing separation between expert policymakers and consuming citizens.  Citizens momentarily recreated themselves as policymakers in a system that defined citizens out of the policy process, thereby refusing their construction as passive clients.

## Roleplaying Good – Democracy

#### Instrumental affirmation of a policy through role-playing is a prerequisite to liberal democratic participation – key to peace

Rawls 99 (John, bad-ass, also prof @ harvard The Law of Peoples, p. 56-57)JFS

To answer this question, we say that, ideally, citizens are to think of themselves as if they were legislators and ask themselves what statutes, supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most reasonable to enact. When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason, forms part of the political and social basis of liberal democracy and is vital for its enduring strength and vigor. Thus in domestic society citizens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason, while doing what they can to hold government officials to it. This duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. I emphasize that it is not a legal duty, for in that case it would be incompatible with freedom of speech. Similarly, the ideal of the public reason of free and equal peoples is realized, or satisfied, whenever chief executives and legislators, and other government officials, as well as candidates for public office, act from and follow the principles of the Law of Peoples and explain to other peoples their reasons for pursuing or revising a people’s foreign policy and affairs of state that involve other societies. As for private citizens, we say, as before, that ideally citizens are to think of themselves as if they were executives and legislators and ask themselves what foreign policy supported by what considerations they would think it most reasonable to advance. Once again, when firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal executives and legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate the public reason of free and equal peoples, is part of the political and social basis of peace and understanding among peoples.

## A2: Roleplaying Utopian

#### **Utopianism good – key to change**

Streeten 99 (Paul, Development, v. 42 n.2 ingenta)JFS

First, Utopian thinking can be useful as a framework for analysis. Just as physicists assume an atmospheric vacuum for some purposes, so policy analysts can assume a political vacuum from which they can start afresh. The physicists’ assumption plainly would not be useful for the design of parachutes, but can serve other purposes well. Similarly, when thinking of tomorrow’s problems, Utopianism is not helpful. But for long-term strategic purposes it is essential. Second, the Utopian vision gives a sense of direction, which can get lost in approaches that are preoccupied with the feasible. In a world that is regarded as the second-best of all feasible worlds, everything becomes a necessary constraint. All vision is lost. Third, excessive concern with the feasible tends to reinforce the status quo. In negotiations, it strengthens the hand of those opposed to any reform. Unless the case for change can be represented in the same detail as the case for no change, it tends to be lost. Fourth, it is sometimes the case that the conjuncture of circumstances changes quite suddenly and that the constellation of forces, unexpectedly, turns out to be favourable to even radical innovation. Unless we are prepared with a carefully worked out, detailed plan, that yesterday could have appeared utterly Utopian, the reformers will lose out by default. Only a few years ago nobody would have expected the end of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, the disappearance of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, the break-up of Yugoslavia, the marketization of China, the end of apartheid in South Africa. And the handshake on the White House lawn between Mr Peres and Mr Arafat. Fifth, the Utopian reformers themselves can constitute a pressure group, countervailing the self interested pressures of the obstructionist groups. Ideas thought to be Utopian have become realistic at moments in history when large numbers of people support them, and those in power have to yield to their demands. The demand for ending slavery is a historical example. It is for these five reasons that Utopians should not be discouraged from formulating their proposals and from thinking the unthinkable, unencumbered by the inhibitions and obstacles of political constraints. They should elaborate them in the same detail that the defenders of the status quo devote to its elaboration and celebration. Utopianism and idealism will then turn out to be the most realistic vision. It is well known that there are three types of economists: those who can count and those who can’t. But being able to count up to two, I want to distinguish between two types of people. Let us call them, for want of a better name, the Pedants and the Utopians. The names are due to Peter Berger, who uses them in a different context. The Pedants or technicians are those who know all the details about the way things are and work, and they have acquired an emotional vested interest in keeping them this way. I have come across them in the British civil service, in the bureaucracy ofthe World Bank, and elsewhere. They are admirable people but they are conservative, and no good companions for reform. On the other hand, there are the Utopians, the idealists, the visionaries who dare think the unthinkable. They are also admirable, many of them young people. But they lack the attention to detail that the Pedants have. When the day of the revolution comes, they will have entered it on the wrong date in their diaries and fail to turn up, or, if they do turn up, they will be on the wrong side of the barricades. What we need is a marriage between the Pedants and the Utopians, between the technicians who pay attention to the details and the idealists who have the vision of a better future. There will be tensions in combining the two, but they will be creative tensions. We need Pedantic Utopian Pedants who will work out in considerable detail the ideal world and ways of getting to it, and promote the good cause with informed fantasy. Otherwise, when the opportunity arises, we shall miss it for lack of preparedness and lose out to the opponents of reform, to those who want to preserve the status quo.

# \*\*Transportation Debate Good

### Policy Making

#### Discussion about transportation enhances policy making decisions- that’s key to countering power imbalances and corruption

Wilson et al 3 (Richard, interim Dean at the College of Environmental Design at California State Polytechnic University, Marianne Payne, directs strategic planning at the Bay Area Rapid Transit District, and Ellen Smith, manages BART’s planning in Contra Costa County, Does Discussion Enhance Rationality? APA Journal, 69(4), Autumn 2003, pg. 365-366) PCS

The case study presented here suggests that discussion enhances rationality, given our view that rationality is a collective process of giving reasons for beliefs. For BART, it brought agreement on plans, overcame stalemates, and generated new ideas. It led to action and built social and intellectual capital in the organization. We find that discussion is the essential link between analysis and decision-making. Through discussion, we recognize value differences, rather than avoid them. We create opportunities for learning and exploring practical actions that are acceptable to the parties without requiring them to forsake their differences. Indeed, the presence of value differences is a signal that planning processes should emphasize discussion. And by acknowledging our role in enabling (or potentially inhibiting) democratic discourse, we become more honest as planners. We are less likely to disguise covert activist roles in technocratic clothes. By elevating discussion to a central position, we acknowledge the importance of analysis in testing the efficiency and equity of policy ideas. Analysis plays an essential role in countering corruption, power imbalances, administrative empire building, and excessive public obstructionism. But analysis should address stakeholders’ different ways of understanding and should be responsive enough to be part of the conversation. The outcomes of planning, then, are profoundly shaped by choices about planning processes and the planner’s role in discussions. Our suggestions for transportation planning are as follows: transportation planners should take planning processes as seriously as their models, investing time on process design and seeking consensual ground rules for discussion.

#### Transportation Education at the high school level is key to better policy action and citizen making

Center for Urban Transportation Research 03

(Center for Urban Transportation Research at University of South Florida, 3/19/03, High school transportation curriculum being developed, <http://cutr.usf.edu/pubs/news_let/articles/winterC98/news933.htm>) Azimi

In addition, by introducing high school students to transportation issues, a secondary benefit may be increased interest in future career opportunities. CUTR recently completed a review of transportation curriculum programs around the country and has proposed that development of similar curricula be advanced at the senior high school level in Florida. The project considered how best to introduce high school students to public policy questions related to transportation, expand their knowledge as citizens, and enable them to make educated transportation decisions in the future. Of primary consideration was examining the feasibility of developing a transportation course module that could be offered to senior level high school students.

#### Citizens, not engineers, key to make a difference in transportation policy

Jennings 6-29 (Jim, Senior manager of external relations at ASCE, “Media Coverage: It’s Easier than You Think”, *American Society of Civil Engineers*, <http://blogs.asce.org/prblog/>) GSK

Late last month, as Congress was debating a new transportation reauthorization bill, civil engineers at the local level were enlisted to spread the word on the important need for passage of the legislation. Working with the government and media relations staff, volunteers in key states were identified and offered the opportunity to author letters to the editor of their local newspapers. Surprisingly, letters by volunteers in Duluth, Pittsburgh, Detroit, New Orleans and Vancouver, Wa., were all published in their local newspapers in advance of the conference committee’s vote. When it comes to issues such as roads, bridges, water, wastewater, energy and all aspects of our nation’s infrastructure, civil engineers are the experts and the profession should weigh in publicly. When it comes to local issues having to do with infrastructure, your expertise is even more important. When local infrastructure matters arise, reporters are always looking for local subject matter experts. They will quote city, county and town officials because they are the ones who own the infrastructure. But they will seize your information because they see you as a third party expert. This is an excellent opportunity for the profession and working with the media isn’t difficult. If an issue comes up that you feel strongly about and would like to make a comment, contact ASCE’s communication/media relations staff and talk about it. It might be an opportunity for a letter to the editor from you, or you can help ASCE staff reach out to the reporter/media outlet and offer an interview. If you are hesitant or this idea piques your interest and you would like to talk about it, staff members can walk you through the process and guide you step-by-step. All you need to do is make a phone call or send an email; we will be more than happy to work with you to help get your expertise into the conversation. Put your Civil Engineering education and experience to work for your neighbors and make a difference in your community.

#### Competing viewpoints of transportation policy is crucial to become an effective transportation policymaker – the best impact for the resolution

Waidley and Bittner 7, (Greg, Wisconsin Transportation Center University of Wisconsin, Madison, and Jason, Wisconsin Transportation Center University of Wisconsin, Madison, “An Interdisciplinary Approach to Transportation Education”, http://www.ctre.iastate.edu/pubs/midcon2007/WaidleyEducation.pdf) DMD

One could argue that a student gains significant benefit simply by sitting in the same classroom as students from other transportation-related disciplines. Students appear to gain insight into the perspectives of other disciplines through discussion with these peers and hearing the questions asked by these peers. In a transportation planning course at the University of Tennessee, a civil engineering student asked the question, “Why do we even need to involve the public in the transportation decision-making process?” This was a valid question and probably not one most engineers in the class had given too much thought to before. The professor turned to the planning students in the room and asked for them to provide an answer to the question, which they did, since public involvement is an essential part of the planning process that every planning student, even in his or her first semester of graduate school, is keenly aware of. A similar situation occurred during a discussion in a course at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. The instructor posed the scenario of funding a bypass around an urban center. The planning and public policy students were quick to attack the idea for its many potential environmental and socially disruptive side effects. An engineering student pointed out advantages, such as safety and mobility, that this kind of facility might provide. All valid points. Still, these points may not have been heard in a classroom with students of the same discipline. At the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering offers a Master of Science in Transportation (MST). The interdisciplinary degree, which typically takes students two years to complete, consists of two core courses – one focused on an introduction to transportation systems using a “softer” approach, while the other is a more technical analysis of the modal systems and tools used to operate and analyze these systems. Other course requirements include building a depth of understanding in a select area of interest, such as one of the transportation modes like air transport or ocean systems; that depth could also be attained through coursework in planning, policy, logistics, or management. Or, rather than focusing on depth, the student may choose to take coursework in numerous areas and build a broader understanding of transportation. Since research is at the heart of the program, a research-based thesis is also required. Though this program is located within the School of Engineering, it brings in students with backgrounds in the physical and social sciences, urban planning, management, as well as engineering. All that is specifically required for admission are two courses in calculus and one each in economics and probability. The requirement for two courses in calculus appears to be unique to MIT and likely reflects MIT’s reputation as a leader in technical education. Dual degrees are also an option with pairings available in MST/Master of Science in the Technology and Policy Program, MST/Master of Science in Operations Research, and MST/Master of City Planning. Based on a preliminary review of the MIT program, it appears that the second option, where a student is able to build a broader understanding of transportation and the disciplines involved, is more likely to develop the skills and perspective that are desirable of a well-rounded transportation professional. This is the type of professional an interdisciplinary transportation education program seeks to develop.

#### **Innovations in transportation affects the global dynamics of the world – learning about contemporary problems in transportation infrastructure is crucial to our role as policy makers**

Candemir and Hisarciklilar 10+ (Yücel, Emeritus Professor of Economics. Istanbul Technical University, and Mehtap, Ass. Professor of Econometrics. ITU, “TRANSPORTATION EDUCATION WITH SPECIAL REGARD TO GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS”, <http://intranet.imet.gr/Portals/0/UsefulDocuments/documents/01635.pdf>) DMD

Transport as well as logistics has always been the primary activities the humanity has been concerned – though in the case of logistics not so explicitly as of the present. While unprecedented innovations in transportation were taking place following the industrial revolution in the 19 th century onwards, none of them like steamboats and railways, and automobiles and aeroplanes, have been the products of the formal educational systems, but have been created by the imaginative entrepreneurs. However nearly 200 years after these developments, the sector which accommodates the basic means of transport and its full-time partner logistics are intermingled with the global economic system to such an extent that it is impossible to either analyse or to design and implement policies to bring solutions to them. With the general approach of the past to transport issues it is apparently impossible to tackle the contemporary problems of environment, urbanisation, traffic jams and the extent of public spending, and others. Then the importance of education as such at the beginning and multi-disciplinary education in particular later sat high on the agenda of transportation analysis. The literature of the subject area followed the suit. Until the last quarter of the 20 th century transportation education has been based exclusively on engineering sciences. Then, as the global economic developments of our time began to take their present shape, it gradually transformed into its contemporary multi-disciplinary format. The problem here is closely related to the level of development of the countries. As in every field and as always the rich developed nations pay the required attention to education issues and for the most part it is not a problem to review the literature on the subject of transport education for these countries. On the other hand, for the developing nations the present situation is not promising. We have been intending to concentrate on the developing side to analyse the relations reflected in the title of this paper. But we faced the problem of finding relevant literature for this part of the globe. However this made us more convinced to say that the loophole here is, though seems paradoxical, the issue of education itself. Without it neither the there can be any hope from the knowledge producing side, the developed, can ever offer any work for the underdog, nor the developing can produce something for themselves as there could not be the potential to do that.

#### Local discussions about transportation are key to fostering educated decision-makers

Holeywell 12 (Ryan, Staff, *Governing*, “Transportation's Messaging Problem”, April 5th, <http://www.governing.com/blogs/fedwatch/transportations-messaging-problem.html>) AH

Talk to anyone in the transportation community, and they'll say the ongoing debate about the federal highway and transit bill is the biggest issue -- the only issue -- facing Washington. At stake: hundreds of billions of dollars in spending affecting every state, city and county, not to mention huge American industries. It's a debate that's only become more intense as time has dragged on, and it's been dragging for a while: the last highway and transit bill was passed more than six-and-a-half-years ago. But look at any survey in which Americans name the most serious challenges facing the country, and transportation infrastructure doesn't register. At all. For transportation stakeholders, that's a big problem. Now, a growing number of them are shifting their strategies to try to capture an audience that's often left out of the conversation: everyday Americans. Historically, organizations pushing for increased transportation investment generally don't get grassroots support in the form of rallies and letter-writing campaigns endorsing their cause in the way that organizations involved with high-profile issues like reproductive rights, immigration and the environment do. Instead, members of the transportation community tend to operate within the Washington echo chamber, with minimal focus on appealing to the everyman. When transportation stakeholders do make their case, their argument has sometimes been a simple one: our roads are crumbling, and we need more money to fix them. The problem is, as many are starting to realize, that message doesn't resonate. "They can’t get constituents to write letters saying ‘we need to get DOTs more money, and more work for the road builders,'” says Joshua Schank of the Eno Center for Transportation. Former Transportation Secretary Norman Mineta puts it in even more stark terms, calling infrastructure “a ho-hum subject” to most people. “Everyone falls asleep about it," Mineta said at a recent transportation event in Washington. In the coming weeks, University of Virginia's Miller Center, a policy think tank, will release a report explaining how the transportation community can retool its message. Already, the organization has opted to stop harping on crumbling infrastructure. “Nobody believes it,” says Jeffrey Shane, a former USDOT undersecretary who’s a visiting fellow at the Miller Center. Others are trying to change the conversation too. Building America's Future Education Fund, a bipartisan group calling for infrastructure investment, ran television ads in early Republican primary states New Hampshire and South Carolina. The group learned during focus groups that Republican primary voters would support infrastructure spending – so long as it came with reforms. So instead of emphasizing crumbling infrastructure in their ads, BAF Ed Fund focused on the importance of having a long-term plan and avoiding cost overruns. The American Society of Civil Engineers has tried to bring the issue home as well, putting it in terms that even people who aren't transportation wonks can understand. Among the costs affiliated with a deteriorating transportation system are increased maintenance and repair costs to the family car. ASCE also cites the damage the economy at-large would suffer without an effective transportation network. Still, ASCE President Andrew Hermann acknowledges, it seems that the message may not be resonating -- at least not yet -- given the relative inattention the general public has paid to the issue. "Obviously, we're not getting loud enough,” Hermann says. "If we don't educate the public that we have a need, they won't contact legislators, and we won't get anything," But what may be at the root of the problem is the fact that anyone who isn't well-versed in transportation policy would have a hard time noticing the infrastructure funding crisis, based on the actions and rhetoric of Congress. The Highway Trust Fund -- the primary account used to fund federal spending on roads and transit -- is in fiscal straits. Some time during 2013, its highway account will no longer be able to meet its obligations. The same will happen to the transit account in 2014. That’s largely because the federal gas tax of 18.4 cents per gallon of gasoline isn't tied to inflation and hasn't been increased since 1993. As a result, its purchasing power has declined dramatically. Yet members of Congress on both sides of the aisle, as well as President Obama, have opposed any proposals to increase the gas tax to help shore up the fund. That dichotomy is illustrated perfectly by a recent op-ed penned by Republican Sen. Bob Corker of Tennessee in the Washington Post. His piece noted "two options for restoring sound financing" to the highway bill: cut spending on transportation, or cut spending elsewhere. Corker didn’t mention the other option – increasing revenue – that almost every association, industry, and academic involved with transportation policy believes is necessary. Yet Corker’s approach isn’t unique among federal lawmakers, and the idea of a gas-tax hike is so politically unpalatable that it's not just opposed by legislators; it's simply not discussed. Instead, lawmakers have assembled piecemeal solutions (like finding revenue in something called the Leaking Underground Storage Tank Fund) to help bridge the funding gap. As one lobbyist noted, “most supporters of the bill couldn't understand or explain (or even seem to care much about) the funding gimmicks” in the Senate’s highway bill. Meanwhile, in the midst of a presidential election, neither of the GOP front runners has spent much time addressing transportation. Rick Santorum appears to have no mention of transportation policy on his campaign website, and Mitt Romney's mentions of the subject are minimal. Meanwhile, President Obama hasn't played a major role in the debate about transportation policy. Last year, his budget called for doubling transportation spending, but Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood told reporters that it was Congress's job to figure out how to pay for it. "[A]t the most basic level, no one in Washington has mustered the will to tell Americans the truth: 'Transportation isn’t free'," writes Streetsblog's Ben Goldman. What is clear is that by not acknowledging the revenue question, lawmakers of both parties aren’t doing much to help educate citizens about fiscal challenges facing the transportation system. "One of these days, there needs to be a conversation: what do the people in America want to pay for?" says Bill Kennedy, a commissioner from Yellowstone County, Mont. who served on a federal panel charged with figuring out how to pay for infrastructure. "The reality is, people don't understand what it costs to maintain a roadway or build a new roadway."

### Education

#### Civil engineering becoming more important—important to education in every area of society

Jamal no date (Haseeb, educator of civil engineers, “Importance and applications of civil engineering”, *AboutCivil.com*, <http://www.aboutcivil.com/importance-and-applications-of-civil-engineering.html>) GSK

Civil engineers are becoming more and more important with time. Now, they are also responsible for looking after the fire control systems and installing quick fire exit points in the buildings they design. This will help in minimizing the loss of life during fire accidents. Civil engineering is one of the oldest of the engineering professions. Ancient feats such as the building of the Egyptian pyramids and Roman road systems are based on civil engineering principles. Another very important aspect of civil engineering is environmental engineering. In this case, the civil engineers are concerned with applications of various methods to purify the contaminated air, water and soil. The polluted system should be cleaned, the waste extracted and the purified constituent must be sent back to the natural system. Civil engineers are also responsible for building good quality transportation systems like highways, airports, rail lines, sea ports, etc. A civil engineer is concerned with determining the right design for these structures and looking after the construction process so that the longevity of these structures is guaranteed after completion. These structures should also be satisfactory for the public in terms of comfort.

#### Education about transportation policy develops instrumental and communicative rationality, which is key to social progress

Wilson 1’ (Richard, Professor at Department of urban and regional planning at California State Polytechnic University, with research in transportation planning “Assessing communicative rationality as transportation planning paradigm”, 2001, p. 16) LD

Whereas **the larger project of instrumental rationality could be described as increasing rationality,** social progress and individual freedom**, the larger project of communicative rationality is to enhance the quality of community and political dialogue in** support of democracy, **creating a transportation planning process that fully addresses both means and ends and links transportation issues to broader social concerns.** **The effects of this approach are greater attention to ends (goals), better integration of means and ends, new forms of participation and learning, and enhanced democratic capacity.** 16 Example: **The transportation planner explicitly identifies the roles he or she will play in leading the parking policy process**. **The planner seeks the consent of decision-makers on those roles, e.g., technical expert, process facilitator, educator, coordinator, negotiator, shuttle diplomat, or mediator.** These roles will change as the planning process progresses – some transitions are predictable and others depend on the unique circumstance of the planning exercise. For example, **there may be a need for a technical/education role in helping decision makers and the public understand the dynamic**s of parking demand across the system, while later in the process the planner’s main focus might be mediating conflict between suburban and urban elected representatives. When there are multiple planners on the team a strategy can be crafted around the strengths of team members in these various areas. **Because of the** educational function **of planning, planning documents and presentations do more than document technical analysis – they engage the public in thinking about fundamental questions, explore images, ideals and values, and open up the process to creative participation. Public participation is seen as a part of an ongoing learning process, not an episodic event prior to the adoption of a new plan.**

#### Education about transportation infrastructure is key to producing future engineers

Tighe 06 (Susan L, Ph.D., P.E. University of Waterloo Waterloo, Ontario, “ Improving Pavements With Long-Term Pavement Performance: Products for Today and Tomorrow Study of Long-Term Pavement Performance (LTPP): Pavement Deflections PAPER 5: ASSIGNMENTS WITH PURPOSE: USING LTPP FOR EDUCATING TOMORROW’S ENGINEER”<http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/research/infrastructure/pavements/ltpp/06109/paper5.cfm>)

The overall scope of this paper involves a university perspective on how the Long-Term Pavement Performance (LTPP) program can be used to educate and train skilled engineers in the pavement sector. Building on a presentation at the 2003 Transportation Research Board Annual Meeting, this paper first presents a context for using the LTPP data. In formulating and addressing the use of the data, the following main points are discussed: education and training using LTPP, development of assignments with purpose, discussion of using LTPP to develop pavement research themes, and conclusions. The paper is directed primarily at academics. However, it does have relevance to the public and private sectors, as it directs assignments that will result in highly qualified people and potential leaders in the field of pavement engineering. It also recognizes the competing demands that face academics, so the assignments are intended to be straightforward and are designed for academics with limited preparation time. Overall there is a need to produce intelligent engineers with good problem-solving skills. Thus, the primary focus is to encourage independence and creativity through inquiry-based learning. In summary, the basic premise of this paper is that good design, construction, and maintenance of long-life pavements can be realized most effectively in education and training through inquiry-based learning with LTPP. INTRODUCTION The broad issue of transportation education and training and the associated issues of supply and demand have existed for decades. A key motivating factor for training and educating future engineers in the transportation sector is concern about whether the transportation sector is and will be adequately served in terms of education and training, supply of skilled people, availability of resources, and future demands and commitment by both public and private agencies. Overall, the transportation sector has many dimensions. It can be viewed by modal type, public versus private versus academic, professionals versus technologists/technicians versus operators, function ranging from engineering to financial or accounting to planning to administrative or management, supply sources, skill sets needed, breakdown of demand, remuneration levels—and the list goes on. This paper recognizes the many dimensions of the needs of the transportation sector, while the focus remains on the academic perspective and the use of the Long-Term Pavement Performance (LTPP) program to promote transportation and more specifically to attract highly qualified people to the pavement sector.

#### Education about transportation policy is key to the environment

Ayutur 7’ (Semra A, PhD in Epidemiology at UNC, “Promoting Active Community Environments Through Land Use and Transportation Planning” 2007 pg. 405) LD

This **study identifies previously unexamined policy and institutional correlates of PA related to land use and transportation planning**. While we cannot conclude that planning causes behavior change, our findings demonstrate that counties with higher ACE scores have higher prevalences of both leisure and transportation PA. Because a higher score indicates a more comprehensive implementation tool set complementing NMTI and mixed land use classification, this suggests that counties with land-use policies and implementation tools that support nonmotorized modes may foster diverse environments conducive to various types of PA (e.g., greenways, parks, open space, and walkable downtown areas). **Improving the quality of local land-use plans may provide a means for communities to integrate transportation projects with appropriate land uses and improve access to health-promoting infrastructure**. Partnerships between public health and urban planning professionals could translate into innovative interventions tailored to meet the needs of diverse communities. Future healthpromotion efforts should consider the implications of transportation and land-use policies, especially with respect to the distribution of resources that support transportation PA as well as leisure PA. Transdisciplinary collaboration may contribute to more comprehensive methodologic frameworks and inform policy recommendations to promote active community environments. This study appears to indicate that land use and transportation planning may play a role in supporting active community environments**. After controlling for sociodemographic factors, higher ACE scores were associated with leisuretime PA, transportation-related PA, and meeting public health recommendations for PA in North Carolina. If this assertion holds true, land-use and transportation plans may provide a means through which community support for active living can be incorporated into the public policy process. Additionally, these findings could be used to tailor transdisciplinary interventions to promote active living in diverse populations.**

### Misc

#### Plan focused knowledge is key to public participation which can affect controversial issues

Wilson et al 3 (Richard, interim Dean at the College of Environmental Design at California State Polytechnic University, Marianne Payne, directs strategic planning at the Bay Area Rapid Transit District, and Ellen Smith, manages BART’s planning in Contra Costa County, Does Discussion Enhance Rationality? APA Journal, 69(4), Autumn 2003, pg. 355) PCS

In the last decade, transportation agencies have addressed new and controversial issues such as travel behavior modification, pricing, and environmental justice. Moreover, their plans recognize interdependencies among transportation, land use, community development, and environmental systems and reflect a diverse set of stakeholder interests and interagency relationships. Langmyhr (2000) describes this transition as one in which transportation problems become increasingly “wicked” and increasingly politicized (p. 678). Although the 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act (ISTEA) and the 1998 Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) spurred improvements to transportation planning processes, including public participation, the epistemological root of many plans lies in technical knowledge. Most research grants and consulting studies focus on analytic tasks. Community members now participate more fully than in the highway-building period of the 1960s, but that participation is often limited to providing “input” on goals and commenting on alternatives that reflect predetermined issue frames. Our argument is that the process of transportation planning must change substantially to respond to its changing context and to address contested policy choices.

#### With the number of young drivers on the rise, and the overall increase in teenagers in need of transportation methods, discussion on transportation policy is needed.

Clifton 2003

(Kelly J, November 18th 2003, Graduate Program in Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Iowa, “INDEPENDENT MOBILITY AMONG TEENAGERS: AN EXPLORATION OF TRAVEL TO AFTER-SCHOOL ACTIVITIES” pg 3-4 <http://www.ltrc.lsu.edu/TRB_82/TRB2003-001412.pdf> accessed 7/10/12) ZLH

Teenagers are poised at the cusp of adulthood. On one hand, their activity participation and mobility are constrained by parental consent and age restrictions on driving. On the other, their burgeoning maturity grants them increasing license to make independent decisions and spend time without the supervision of adults. This unique juncture in a person’s life proves an interesting time to study his or her travel behavior. The automobile plays an important role in shaping teenagers’ lives and transportation policies. Travel by the private automobile is the mode of choice for most Americans and teenagers are no exception. The automobile is the predominant mode of travel for children aged 10 to 15 years (1). This places an additional travel burden on parents as they chauffeur their younger teens to activities. Obtaining a drivers license is a significant rite of passage for most teenagers, symbolizing independence and freedom from parental control. Many parents frequently support the increased autonomy that accompanies their children’s ability to drive as it relieves their chauffeuring responsibilities and allows teenagers to contribute more to household errands (2). But with addition of a driver, these households must bear an increase in transportation expenditures, including the cost of additional vehicle purchases and insurance. The safety issues surrounding young drivers cannot be overlooked. Young drivers are involved in a disproportionately higher number of motor-vehicle crashes than their older counterparts (3), due in part, to their inexperience, immaturity, and lack of judgment (4). The number of young drivers aged 15 to 19 is expected to rise as much as 25% over the next 15 years (5) and this has important implications for traffic safety and future directions of transportation policy. For these reasons, teenage travel patterns warrant closer inspection. Understanding more about how American teenagers travel may provide insight into how policy can respond to their current mobility needs and their preferences and behaviors. Efforts to divert Americans out of their cars, improve access, and increase the retail and other non-work opportunities available in and near residential neighborhoods may find teenagers to be responsive targets. At the same time, these policies may address concerns about safety, additional household driving burden, and the associated costs with automobile use. But a better understanding of current teenage travel and its contribution to household travel demand is necessary before policy can respond to this need.

#### Must learn about transportation—key to resolving traffic and sprawl

Navea 5-13 (Luis, Venezuelian, “Cars and a bit more”, *Blogspot.com*, <http://cmld11.blogspot.com/2012/05/why-we-should-all-learn-to-appreciate.html>) GSK

I've got a friend who once said "I'd love to be an astronomer, but that doesn't really pay out and I want a Lamborghini. Ergo, I'll study business." We can all agree that certain cars are one of the many joys of life. However, let's analyse my friend's statement for a moment (without actually thinking too much on the professions involved). He's trading his passion for a Lambo; well a Lambo is also a passion, so I guess that driving one everyday to work would certainly ease out the pain of having a job which you hate (as he does hate business). But, not so fast, think twice. The increasing density of people and cars in major cities (the hubs of business, naturally) causes an increasing amount of traffic jams. Traffic jams are dream-breakers, they can certainly make a perfect day turn out to be dreadfully pathetic. Maybe small city and townspeople do not understand or could not really fathom the magnitude of certain jams, or the sorrow and desperation they bring. However, seldom a day goes by that I don't see at least a 1 hour traffic jam that slowly but surely drains my time and patience, and I'm quite certain that other people suffer of such adversities as well. Not long ago, I pretended to leave a mall, while I was in it's underground parking lot I was given an unpleasant surprise: a traffic jam on it's third basement! The underground parking lot was jammed for god's sake! How's that even logical at all? Well, it turns out that the traffic jam directly outside of the mall was so bad that it infiltrated like a malignant virus into the depths of the mall's underground parking. FANTASTIC! However, I wish not to keep dwelling on my grief or that of all the other people that feel that traffic follows them everywhere. Truth is, I want to make a calling for solution. We all know and love the comfort of owning a car, the freedom of being able to go anywhere we please, when we please and with whom we please to, or the unanimity of being inside your vehicle. Now, here's some bad news, we have to learn how to partially renounce to such a pleasure or to such pleasures. Frightening as it may sound, we have to embrace mass transportation. Oh yes! There will be bus... and metro stations. Well it turns out, most of us are reluctant of getting into public transportation, not only because we would be renouncing to the commodity of our own cars, but also because of the fact that when rush hour comes, it infects absolutely everything. New York, for example, in the case of my friend he would wake up everyday and get on his Lambo and he'll try to drive to Wall Street, and to his surprise... it's rush hour! Therefore, he'll spend hours inside the poor Lamborghini which will be desperately stuck in traffic. But, people don't actually see an escape in public transportation since getting on a bus would be exactly the same, only sharing it with a couple of strangers, and the metro or subway stations would be just as crowded, not to mention the people walking on the streets. There's traffic jam everywhere, in the roads and in the streets. Nevertheless, in order to solve this situation we do have to turn to public and mass transportation. However, in many countries, even in major cities, public transportation is very underdeveloped, ergo, there seems to be virtually no ease on traffic, but if we do develop the public transportation, if we investigate and develop new ways to transport people everyday from their homes to their jobs without the need of a personal car, we'll see a great difference on the road. This doesn't necessarily mean that we should not own our own cars. Cars would be used then when one has a cargo or some luggage that would, otherwise, be very hard to carry in public transportation, and of course, we would use our cars for the recreational purpose every weekend or every now and then. We will not renounce to our very favoured toys, all the contrary, as a matter of fact we will make them more enjoyable since we wouldn't have to spend countless hours in bitter traffic.

#### Quality of community directly related to quality of transportation

Davis no date (James, Executive Director and CEO of American Society of Civil Engineers, “Civil Engineering Building the Future”, *Transworld Education*, <http://www.transworldeducation.com/articles/engciv.htm>) GSK

Transportation Engineering The quality of a community is directly related to the quality of its transportation system. Transportation engineers work to move people, goods and materials safely and efficiently. They find ways to meet our ever-increasing travel needs on land, air and sea. They design, construct and maintain all types of transportation facilities, including airports, highways, railroads, mass transit systems and ports. An important part of transportation engineering is upgrading our transportation capability by improving traffic control and mass transit systems, and by introducing high­speed trains, people movers and other intermodal transportation methods.

#### Transportation policy is key to determining equity

Wilson 1’ (Richard, Professor at Department of urban and regional planning at California State Polytechnic University, with research in transportation planning “Assessing communicative rationality as transportation planning paradigm”, 2001, p. 16) LD

**Transportation planners are attentive to the way in which language frames the possibilities for action, helping planning participants discover how information and metaphor to shape perceptions, preferences and policy choices**. 5 **They seek arrangements with decision-making bodies that give them the latitude to develop processes that promote inclusive and fair discussion.** They seek to reduce communicative distortions brought about by unequal access to information**, the influence of special interests, or the restrictive nature of an engineering problem frame**. Their work counteracts false claims and the disguising of value issues as technical issues. Planners articulate their own value positions as participants in the planning process, but disclose the basis for the claim (e.g., technical or moral). **Transportation planners balance specialized and interdisciplinary knowledge and participate in cross-functional teams**. For example, modelers engage in participatory activities with the community so they understand individuals’ motivations for travel behavior and the consequences of their analytic work. **The role of the planner, then, is centrally as a communicative and process design expert with technical expertise – a person who can design and guide processes for making sense about controversial issues with decision-makers and the public.** This greater range of discourse facilitation, education, mediation and negotiation roles distinguishes the communicative rationality model from its instrumental rationality counterpart. As mentioned, an example transportation planning issue – parking policy at fixed rail transit stations – follows in the text boxes for each of the six discussion areas. The scenario is a transit agency considering parking charges for facilities in a regional rail transit system. Assume that the system 15experiences high parking demand levels and is receiving pressure for policy change from the agency’s funding partners and stakeholders. **A wide range of problem definitions, goals, and preferred means exist among staff, board members, stakeholders and the public.**

#### **Debate over the best policy method for transportation infrastructure development is key to effective solutions – other methods result only in competing interests**

Waidley and Bittner 7, (Greg, Wisconsin Transportation Center University of Wisconsin, Madison, and Jason, Wisconsin Transportation Center University of Wisconsin, Madison, “An Interdisciplinary Approach to Transportation Education”, Mid-Continent Transportation Research Symposium, http://www.ctre.iastate.edu/pubs/midcon2007/WaidleyEducation.pdf) DMD

Our nation’s transportation system is a complex one. It consists of many modes, owned by many parties, travels through many jurisdictions, and impacts many people, communities, businesses, and even ecosystems. Because our transportation system is such a complex one, the planning, design, construction, and operation of such a system requires a vast number of skilled professionals working together towards a common goal of an efficient transportation system that moves people and goods safely and effectively. These professionals come from a number of different backgrounds. Planners determine need through collection of data, detailed analysis, and communication with the public and politicians to begin the project development process. Engineers design and oversee the construction and operation of the infrastructure. Environmentalists provide input during the NEPA process. Real estate specialists get involved during property appraisal and acquisition. Financial analysts prepare budgets and track expenditures throughout the process. Public affairs professionals coordinate political efforts and administer the funds. This is only a partial description and barely scratches the surface of the disciplines involved but makes the point that the players often come from very different professional and educational backgrounds. Table 1 provides a description of how various disciplines contribute to each phase of the transportation project development process (Faucett 2003). This description of disciplines and their responsibilities is an extensive one, though not entirely exhaustive (especially if you consider modes other than highway). Some of the other disciplines not mentioned but that are still integral to the overall successful operation of a multimodal transportation system include researchers, law enforcement officers, vehicle and system operators, and managers of port authorities, among others. While it is absolutely critical for these parties to be involved to provide a transportation system of high quality, getting these parties to work together can be a very real challenge. This is a challenge not because they do not get along, but because they often do not truly understand one another. This difficulty in communication is rooted in the fact that each discipline has their own vocabulary and approaches to problem solving that are part of their discipline’s culture, or as Hugh Petrie calls it, a discipline’s “cognitive map,” i.e., the cognitive and perceptual approach connected to a discipline. The longer a practitioner operates within a discipline, the more engrained this cognitive map becomes. It can get to the point where, “…quite literally, two opposing disciplinarians can look at the same thing and not see the same thing.” (Petrie 1976; Hall and Weaver 2001) For example, when looking at the problem of a congested segment of urban highway, an engineer may suggest expanding the highway to include another lane. The urban planner may attempt to employ demand management strategies such as car pooling, parking restrictions, and telecommuting to alleviate the peak hour volumes. The transit operator will likely suggest encouraging commuters to switch their trips to bus or commuter rail. The traffic control engineer may recommend the use of ramp metering and incident management control measures. Meanwhile the environmentalist is in favor of whatever strategy is least likely to adversely impact air and water quality and nearby sensitive ecosystems. Having different view points should not be considered a bad thing. It is true that it can be a struggle to find a solution when you have so many competing interests, but it is these competing interests that help to ensure all angles are examined, or at least considered, when attempting to find a solution to such a problem. Often time there is no one right answer. It might be that the solution is a combination of the suggestions above. But if we did not have these groups working together at various points in the project development process, solutions considered best for all involved may have been missed. In order to find these solutions, the multitude of disciplines involved in the process must be able to communicate. In order to communicate effectively, we must have foundational understanding of where each other is coming from and why we each think and talk like we do. So the question being begged here is, “How do we begin to understand one another?” “How do we learn to communicate more effectively?” Perhaps we need to begin this learning process before we become so immersed in our own subcultures. A natural place to start seems to be in college. It is during this time that transportation professionals begin to take on the vocabulary and approaches to problem solving that makes an engineer and engineer, a planner a planner, an environmentalist and environmentalist, and so on.

#### Civil engineering key to quality of life—need to think like them to solve the world`s problems

Davis no date (James, Executive Director and CEO of American Society of Civil Engineers, “Civil Engineering Building the Future”, *Transworld Education*, <http://www.transworldeducation.com/articles/engciv.htm>) GSK

Civil engineers have one of the world's most important jobs: they build our quality of life. With creativity and technical skill, civil engineers plan, design, construct and operate the facilities essential to modern life, ranging from bridges and highway systems to water treatment plants and energy­efficient buildings. Civil engineers are problem solvers, meeting the challenges of pollution, traffic congestion, drinking water and energy needs, urban redevelopment and community planning. As the technological revolution expands, as the world's population increases, and as environmental concerns mount, civil engineering skills will be needed throughout the world. Whatever area you choose, be it design, construction, research, planning, teaching or management, civil engineering offers you a wide range of career choices. And there's no limit to the personal satisfaction you will feel from helping to make our world a better place to live.

# \*\*Consequentialism

## Policymaking Requires Consequentialism

#### Even if their values are good, policymaking necessitates consequentialism

Brock 87  [Dan W. Brock, Professor of Philosophy and Biomedical Ethics, and Director, Center for Biomedical Ethics at Brown University, Ethics, Vol. 97, No. 4, (Jul., 1987), pp. 786-791, JSTOR]JFS

When philosophers become more or less direct participants in the policy-making process and so are no longer academics just hoping that an occasional policymaker might read their scholarly journal articles, this scholarly virtue of the unconstrained search for the truth-all assumptions open to question and follow the arguments wherever they lead-comes under a variety of related pressures. What arises is an intellectual variant of the political problem of "dirty hands" that those who hold political power often face. I emphasize that I do not conceive of the problem as one of pure, untainted philosophers being corrupted by the dirty business of politics. My point is rather that the different goals of academic scholarship and public policy call in turn for different virtues and behavior in their practitioners. Philosophers who steadfastly maintain their academic ways in the public policy setting are not to be admired as islands of integrity in a sea of messy political compromise and corruption. Instead, I believe that if philosophers maintain the academic virtues there they will not only find themselves often ineffective but will as well often fail in their responsibilities and act wrongly. Why is this so? The central point of conflict is that the first concern of those responsible for public policy is, and ought to be, the consequences of their actions for public policy and the persons that those policies affect. This is not to say that they should not be concerned with the moral evaluation of those consequences-they should; nor that they must be moral consequentialists in the evaluation of the policy, and in turn human, consequences of their actions-whether some form of consequentialism is an adequate moral theory is another matter. But it is to say that persons who directly participate in the formation of public policy would be irresponsible if they did not focus their concern on how their actions will affect policy and how that policy will in turn affect people. The virtues of academic research and scholarship that consist in an unconstrained search for truth, whatever the consequences, reflect not only the different goals of scholarly work but also the fact that the effects of the scholarly endeavor on the public are less direct, and are mediated more by other institutions and events, than are those of the public policy process. It is in part the very impotence in terms of major, direct effects on people's lives of most academic scholarship that makes it morally acceptable not to worry much about the social consequences of that scholarship. When philosophers move into the policy domain, they must shift their primary commitment from knowledge and truth to the policy consequences of what they do. And if they are not prepared to do this, why did they enter the policy domain? What are they doing there?

## Policymaking Requires Consequentialism

#### Even if deontology is right, states must act as consequentialists

Stelzig 98 [Tim Stelzig, B.A. 1990, West Virginia University; M.A. 1995, University of Illinois at Chicago; J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Pennsylvania, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 901, March, 1998, L/N]JFS

This Comment seeks to dissipate the tension Blackstone broached when he stated that the "eternal boundaries" provided by our "indelible rights" sometimes must be "modified" or "narrowed" by the "local or occasional necessities of the state."(n269) Rights, as trumps against the world, ostensibly ought not to be things that may be cast aside. Yet, it is intuitively obvious that the state justifiably acts in ways impermissible for individuals as it collects taxes, punishes wrongdoers, and the like. Others have offered explanations for why coercive state action is morally justified. This Comment adds another. This Comment began by adopting deontology as a foundational theoretic assumption and briefly describing how deontology was to be understood herein. I then examined the characteristics of two leading theories of rights--Dworkin's theory of legal rights and Thomson's theory of moral rights. Although neither Dworkin nor Thomson is an absolutist with respect to rights, neither account explains why the state, but not individuals, may act in ways seemingly justifiable only on consequentialist grounds: that is, why the state may override the trumping effect of rights. In attempting to provide an answer to this question, I first noted that deontology does not exhaust moral discourse. The deontologist is forced to recognize that rights cannot capture everything of moral importance. I then provided several examples of distinctions recognized in the philosophical literature that delimit areas in which deontology does not apply, focusing in particular on the Trolley Problem and the distributive exemption from deontological norms that the Trolley Problem illustrates. The deontological exemption was examined fairly closely in order to enumerate the criteria that trigger the exemption and understand the principles that guide its application. By applying the distributive exemption to the state, I accomplished two things. First, I was able to provide a new justification for the existence of the coercive state, both when premised on the traditional assumptions of social contractarians, and when premised on a more realistic understanding of the modern state. Second, I was able to sketch the relationship between the constraints of rights and the demands of policy, justifying a state that provides for the general welfare without violating rights in a way objectionable to liberals. Libertarians have argued that such a state violates deontologicalnorms, that governmental intervention going beyond what is minimally necessary to preserve social order is not justified. Deontology does not require such a timid state and, moreover, finds desirable a state which promotes the general welfare to the fullest extent possible, even if in so doing it acts in ways deontologically objectionable for anyone other than one filling the government's unique role in society. More specifically, I argued that the government must consequentially justify its policy choices. The elegance of this particular rationale for the contours of permissible governmental action is that it remains a deontological justification at base. One of the worries of full-blown consequentialism is that it requires too much, that any putative right may be set aside if doing so would produce greater good. The justification offered here does not suffer that flaw. The distributive exemption does not permit that any one be sacrificed for the betterment of others; rather, it only permits a redistribution of inevitable harms, a diversion of an existing threatened harm to many such that it results in harm to fewer individuals.

## Consequentialism Good – Lesser Evil

#### We must choose the lesser evil. Hard and fast rules about what is right must be made to limit further atrocities against civilization

Issac 2 (Prof of political science at Indiana-Bloomington, PhD from Yale Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, p.)JFS

WHAT WOULD IT mean for the American left right now to take seriously the centrality of means in politics? First, it would mean taking seriously the specific means employed by the September 11 attackers--terrorism. There is a tendency in some quarters of the left to assimilate the death and destruction of September 11 to more ordinary (and still deplorable) injustices of the world system--the starvation of children in Africa, or the repression of peasants in Mexico, or the continued occupation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. But this assimilation is only possible by ignoring the specific modalities of September 11. It is true that in Mexico, Palestine, and elsewhere, too many innocent people suffer, and that is wrong. It may even be true that the experience of suffering is equally terrible in each case. But neither the Mexican nor the Israeli government has ever hijacked civilian airliners and deliberately flown them into crowded office buildings in the middle of cities where innocent civilians work and live, with the intention of killing thousands of people. Al-Qaeda did precisely this. That does not make the other injustices unimportant. It simply makes them different. It makes the September 11 hijackings distinctive, in their defining and malevolent purpose--to kill people and to create terror and havoc. This was not an ordinary injustice. It was an extraordinary injustice. The premise of terrorism is the sheer superfluousness of human life. This premise is inconsistent with civilized living anywhere. It threatens people of every race and class, every ethnicity and religion. Because it threatens everyone, and threatens values central to any decent conception of a good society, it must be fought. And it must be fought in a way commensurate with its malevolence. Ordinary injustice can be remedied. Terrorism can only be stopped. Second, it would mean frankly acknowledging something well understood, often too eagerly embraced, by the twentieth century Marxist left--that it is often politically necessary to employ morally troubling means in the name of morally valid ends. A just or even a better society can only be realized in and through political practice; in our complex and bloody world, it will sometimes be necessary to respond to barbarous tyrants or criminals, with whom moral suasion won't work. In such situations our choice is not between the wrong that confronts us and our ideal vision of a world beyond wrong. It is between the wrong that confronts us and the means--perhaps the dangerous means--we have to employ in order to oppose it. In such situations there is a danger that "realism" can become a rationale for the Machiavellian worship of power. But equally great is the danger of a righteousness that translates, in effect, into a refusal to act in the face of wrong. What is one to do? Proceed with caution. Avoid casting oneself as the incarnation of pure goodness locked in a Manichean struggle with evil. Be wary of violence. Look for alternative means when they are available, and support the development of such means when they are not. And never sacrifice democratic freedoms and open debate. Above all, ask the hard questions about the situation at hand, the means available, and the likely effectiveness of different strategies.

## Consequentialism Good – Not Calculation

#### **No turns – consequentialism is more than pure calculation**

Ord 5 (Toby, Thesis Paper for Oxford in Philosophy, http://tinyurl.com/2c5456q)JFS

Consequentialism is often charged with being self-defeating, for if a person attempts to apply it, she may quite predictably produce worse outcomes than if she applied some other moral theory. Many consequentialists have replied that this criticism rests on a false assumption, confusing consequentialism’s criterion of the rightness of an act with its position on decision procedures. Consequentialism, on this view, does not dictate that we should be always calculating which of the available acts leads to the most good, but instead advises us to decide what to do in whichever manner it is that will lead to the best outcome. Whilst it is typically afforded only a small note in any text on consequentialism, this reply has deep implications for the practical application of consequentialism, perhaps entailing that a consequentialist should eschew calculation altogether.

## **Consequentialism Good – Morals**

#### **Consequentialism is compatible with morals – moralists do things based on whether they will have moral consequences**

Frank 2 (Robert, Cornell University, “The Status of Moral Emotions in Consequentialist Moral Reasoning”, http://tinyurl.com/22truv3)JFS

The philosopher Bernard Williams describes an example in which a botanist wanders into a village in the jungle where ten innocent people are about to be shot. He is told that nine of them will be spared if he himself will shoot the tenth. What should the botanist do? Although most people would prefer to see only one innocent person die rather than ten, Williams argues that it would be wrong as a matter of principle for the botanist to shoot the innocent villager.2 And most people seem to agree. The force of the example is its appeal to a widely shared moral intuition. Yet some philosophers counter that it is the presumed validity of moral intuitions that such examples call into question (Singer, 2002). These consequentialists insist that whether an action is morally right depends only on its consequences. The right choice, they argue, is always the one that leads to the best overall consequences. I will argue that consequentialists make a persuasive case that moral intuitions are best ignored in at least some specific cases. But many consequentialists appear to take the stronger position that moral intuitions should play no role in moral choice. I will argue against that position on the grounds that should appeal to their way of thinking. As I will attempt to explain, ignoring moral intuitions would lead to undesirable consequences. My broader aim is to expand the consequentialist framework to take explicit account of moral sentiments.

## Morality Bad – International Violence

#### Morality cannot address international violence – we must make sacrifices

Issac 2 (Prof of political science at Indiana-Bloomington, PhD from Yale Jeffery C., Dissent Magazine, Vol. 49, Iss. 2, p.)JFS

As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of "aggression," but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime--the Taliban--that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most "peace" activists would prefer not to ask: What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime? What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

# \*\*Utilitarianism

## Utilitarianism Good – Public Sphere

#### Util can be used in the public sphere, and deontology in the private sphere

Goodin 95 (Robert E., Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy, Google Books)JFS

My concern in this book, true to the thrust of this introduction, is with utilitarianism as a public philosophy. My main concern is with the ways in which utilitarianism can be a good guide to public policies without necessarily being a good guide to private conduct. Nonetheless, in adducing many of its most important implication for public policy it is important to see at leas in broad outline how it would set about shaping private conduct. Utilitarians, and consequentialists more generally, are outcome-oriented. In sharp contrast to Ten Commandment-style deontological approaches, which specify certain actions to be done as a matter of duty, utilitarian theories assign people responsibility for producing certain results, leaving the individuals concerned broad discretion about how to achieve those results. The same basic difference in the two theories' approaches to assigning moral jobs reappears across all levels of moral agency, from private agency, from private individuals to collective (especially state) actors. The distinctively utilitarian approach, thus conceived, to international protection of the ozone layer is to assign states responsibility for producing certain effects, leaving them broad discretion in how they accomplish it (Chapter 18). The distinctively utilitarian approach, thus conceived, to the ethical defense of nationalism is couched in terms of delimiting state boundaries in such a way as to assign particular organization (Chapter 16). And, at a more domestic level of analysis, the distinctively utilitarian approach to the allocation of legal liabilities is to assign them to whomsoever can best discharge them (Chapters 5 through 7). The great advantage of utilitarianism as a guide to public conduct is that it avoids gratuitous sacrifices, it ensures we are able to ensure in the uncertain world of public policy-making that politics are sensitive to people's interests or desires or preferences. The great failing of more deontological theories, applied to those realism, is that they fixate upon duties done for the sake of duty rather than for the sake of any good that is done by doing one's duty. Perhaps it is permissible (perhaps it is even proper) for private individuals in the course of their personal affairs to fetishize duties done for their own sake. It would be a mistake for public officials to do likewise, not least because it is impossible. The fixation of motives makes absolutely no sense in the public realm, and might make precious little sense in the private one even, as Chapter 3 shows. The reason public action is required at all arises form the inability of uncoordinated individual action to achieve certain orally desirable ends. Individuals are rightly excused from pursuing those ends. The inability is real; the excuses, perfectly valid. But libertarians are right in their diagnosis, wrong in their prescription. That is the message of Chapter 2. The same thing that makes those excuses valid at the individual level the same thing that relives individuals of responsibility - makes it morally incumber upon individuals to organize themselves into collective units that are capable of acting where they as isolated individuals are not. When they organize themselves into these collective units, those collective deliberations inevitably take place under very different forms. Individuals are morally required to operate in that collective manner, in certain crucial respects. But they are practically circumscribed in how they can operate, in their collective mode. and those special constraints characterizing the public sphere of decision-making give rise to the special circumstances that make utilitarianism peculiarly apt for public policy-making, in ways set out more fully in Chapter 4. Government house utilitarianism thus understood is, I would argue, a uniquely defensible public philosophy.

## Utilitarianism Good - Inevitable

#### Utilitarianism inevitable even in deontological frameworks

Green 2 (Asst Prof Department of Psychology Harvard University Joshua, November 2002, 314) JFS

Some people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take priority over which. If that’s what we mean by 302 “balancing rights,” then we are wise to shun this sort of talk. Attempting to solve moral problems using a complex deontological algorithm is dogmatism at its most esoteric, but dogmatism all the same. However, it’s likely that when some people talk about “balancing competing rights and obligations” they are already thinking like consequentialists in spite of their use of deontological language. Once again, what deontological language does best is express the thoughts of people struck by strong, emotional moral intuitions: “It doesn’t matter that you can save five people by pushing him to his death. To do this would be a violation of his rights!”19 That is why angry protesters say things like, “Animals Have Rights, Too!” rather than, “Animal Testing: The Harms Outweigh the Benefits!” Once again, rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and absoluteness of the answer. But sometimes rights talk persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has faded. One thinks, for example, of the thousands of children whose lives are saved by drugs that were tested on animals and the “rights” of those children. One finds oneself balancing the “rights” on both sides by asking how many rabbit lives one is willing to sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so on, and at the end of the day one’s underlying thought is as thoroughly consequentialist as can be, despite the deontological gloss. And what’s wrong with that? Nothing, except for the fact that the deontological gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth that there really are “rights,” etc. Best to drop it. When deontological talk gets sophisticated, the thought it represents is either dogmatic in an esoteric sort of way or covertly consequentialist.

## Utilitarianism Good – Moral

#### The advent of the nuclear age necessitates utilitarianism – absolutist ethics are self-contradictory

Nye 86 (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 18-19) JFS

The significance and the limits of the two broad traditions can be captured by contemplating a hypothetical case.34 Imagine that you are visiting a Central American country and you happen upon a village square where an army captain is about to order his men to shoot two peasants lined up against a wall. When you ask the reason, you are told someone in this village shot at the captain's men last night. When you object to the killing of possibly innocent people, you are told that civil wars do not permit moral niceties. Just to prove the point that we all have dirty hands in such situations, the captain hands you a rifle and tells you that if you will shoot one peasant, he will free the other. Otherwise both die. He warns you not to try any tricks because his men have their guns trained on you. Will you shoot one person with the consequences of saving one, or will you allow both to die but preserve your moral integrity by refusing to play his dirty game? The point of the story is to show the value and limits of both traditions. Integrity is clearly an important value, and many of us would refuse to shoot. But at what point does the principle of not taking an innocent life collapse before the consequentialist burden? Would it matter if there were twenty or 1,000 peasants to be saved? What if killing or torturing one innocent person could save a city of 10 million persons from a terrorists' nuclear device? At some point does not integrity become the ultimate egoism of fastidious self-righteousness in which the purity of the self is more important than the lives of countless others? Is it not better to follow a consequentialist approach, admit remorse or regret over the immoral means, but justify the action by the consequences? Do absolutist approaches to integrity become self-contradictory in a world of nuclear weapons? "Do what is right though the world should perish" was a difficult principle even when Kant expounded it in the eighteenth century, and there is some evidence that he did not mean it to be taken literally even then. Now that it may be literally possible in the nuclear age, it seems more than ever to be self-contradictory.35 Absolutist ethics bear a heavier burden of proof in the nuclear age than ever before.

## Utilitarianism Good – Must Assess All Risks

#### The recent possibility of extinction requires assessment of all risks despite probability

Yudkowsky 8 (Full-time Research Fellow at the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence and Cofounder Eliezer, January 22nd 2008, “Circular Altruism”)JFS

Overly detailed reassurances can also create false perceptions of safety: "X is not an existential risk and you don't need to worry about it, because A, B, C, D, and E"; where the failure of any one of propositions A, B, C, D, or E potentially extinguishes the human species. "We don't need to worry about nanotechnologic war, because a UN commission will initially develop the technology and prevent its proliferation until such time as an active shield is developed, capable of defending against all accidental and malicious outbreaks that contemporary nanotechnology is capable of producing, and this condition will persist indefinitely." Vivid, specific scenarios can inflate our probability estimates of security, as well as misdirecting defensive investments into needlessly narrow or implausibly detailed risk scenarios. More generally, people tend to overestimate conjunctive probabilities and underestimate disjunctive probabilities. (Tversky and Kahneman 1974.) That is, people tend to overestimate the probability that, e.g., seven events of 90% probability will all occur. Conversely, people tend to underestimate the probability that at least one of seven events of 10% probability will occur. Someone judging whether to, e.g., incorporate a new startup, must evaluate the probability that many individual events will all go right (there will be sufficient funding, competent employees, customers will want the product) while also considering the likelihood that at least one critical failure will occur (the bank refuses a loan, the biggest project fails, the lead scientist dies). This may help explain why only 44% of entrepreneurial ventures3 survive after 4 years. (Knaup 2005.) Dawes (1988) observes: 'In their summations lawyers avoid arguing from disjunctions ("either this or that or the other could have occurred, all of which would lead to the same conclusion") in favor of conjunctions. Rationally, of course, disjunctions are much more probable than are conjunctions.' The scenario of humanity going extinct in the next century is a disjunctive event. It could happen as a result of any of the existential risks discussed in this book - or some other cause which none of us fore saw. Yet for a futurist, disjunctions make for an awkward and unpoetic-sounding prophecy.

## Morality Bad – Survival Comes First

#### Survival comes first – there is no point in preserving morality if we all die

Nye 86 (Joseph S. 1986; Phd Political Science Harvard. University; Served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; “Nuclear Ethics” pg. 45-46)JFS

Is there any end that could justify a nuclear war that threatens the survival of the species? Is not all-out nuclear war just as self contradictory in the real world as pacifism is accused of being? Some people argue that "we are required to undergo gross injustice that will break many souls sooner than ourselves be the authors of mass murder."73 Still others say that "when a person makes survival the highest value, he has declared that there is nothing he will not betray. But for a civilization to sacrifice itself makes no sense since there are not survivors to give meaning to the sacrifical [sic] act. In that case, survival may be worth betrayal." Is it possible to avoid the "moral calamity of a policy like unilateral disarmament that forces us to choose between being dead or red (while increasing the chances of both)"?74 How one judges the issue of ends can be affected by how one poses the questions. If one asks "what is worth a billion lives (or the survival of the species)," it is natural to resist contemplating a positive answer. But suppose one asks, "is it possible to imagine any threat to our civilization and values that would justify raising the threat to a billion lives from one in ten thousand to one in a thousand for a specific period?" Then there are several plausible answers, including a democratic way of life and cherished freedoms that give meaning to life beyond mere survival. When we pursue several values simultaneously, we face the fact that they often conflict and that we face difficult tradeoffs. If we make one value absolute in priority, we are likely to get that value and little else. Survival is a necessary condition for the enjoyment of other values, but that does not make it sufficient. Logical priority does not make it an absolute value. Few people act as though survival were an absolute value in their personal lives, or they would never enter an automobile. We can give survival of the species a very high priority without giving it the paralyzing status of an absolute value. Some degree of risk is unavoidable if individuals or societies are to avoid paralysis and enhance the quality of life beyond mere survival. The degree of that risk is a justifiable topic of both prudential and moral reasoning.

## AT: Calculation Bad

#### Your authors misunderstand utilitarianism – link turn – utilitarianism is against calculation

Chappell 5 (Richard, PhD in Philosophy from Princeton, Philosophy, Et Cetera, http://www.philosophyetc.net/2005/06/indirect-utilitarianism.html)JFS

Utilitarianism is a much maligned moral theory, in part because it's so easily abused. It's easy for people to misunderstand the theory, and use it, for example, to argue for totalitarianism. But of course utilitarianism properly understood recommends no such thing. In fact, it tends to support our common-sense moral intuitions. Strange as it may seem, utilitarianism recommends that we do not base our everyday moral decision-making on calculations of utility. Why is this? Well, utilitarianism says that we ought to do whatever would maximize utility. But attempting to reason in a utilitarian fashion tends to have disastrous consequences, and fails miserably to maximize utility. Therefore, we ought not to reason in a utilitarian manner. Instead, we should try to inculcate those dispositions and attitudes, and abide by those principles, that would tend to promote utility. That is, we should be honest, compassionate, loyal, trustworthy, averse to harming others, partial towards loved ones, and so forth. We should, in other words, be virtuous rather than scheming. J.L. Mackie (p.91) offers six utilitarian reasons for opposing "the direct use of utilitarian calculation as a practical working morality": 1. Shortage of time and energy will in general preclude such calculations. 2. Even if time and energy are available, the relevant information commonly is not. 3. An agent's judgment on particular issues is likely to be distorted by his own interests and special affections. 4. Even if he were intellectually able to determine the right choice, weakness of will would be likely to impair his putting of it into effect. 5. Even decisions that are right in themselves and actions based on them are liable to be misused as precedents, so that they will encourage and seem to legitimate wrong actions that are superficially similar to them. 6. And, human nature being what it is, a practical working morality must not be too demanding: it is worse than useless to set standards so high that there is no real chance that actions will even approximate to them.

# \*\*Extinction

## Extinction Outweighs – Laundry List

#### Extinction outweighs – no coping mechanisms, no experience, no trial-and-error, future generations

Bostrom 2 (Nick Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale.. www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.)JFS

Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are mere ripples on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[[2]](%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn2)At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[[3]](%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn3)A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that mighthave been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn4) Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century. The special nature of the challenges posed by existential risks is illustrated by the following points: Our approach to existential risks cannot be one of trial-and-error. There is no opportunity to learn from errors. The reactive approach – see what happens, limit damages, and learn from experience – is unworkable. Rather, we must take a proactive approach. This requires foresight to anticipate new types of threats and a willingness to take decisive preventive action and to bear the costs (moral and economic) of such actions. We cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, social attitudes or national security policies that developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Existential risks are a different kind of beast. We might find it hard to take them as seriously as we should simply because we have never yet witnessed such disasters.[[5]](%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn5) Our collective fear-response is likely ill calibrated to the magnitude of threat. Reductions in existential risks are global public goods [13] and may therefore be undersupplied by the market [14]. Existential risks are a menace for everybody and may require acting on the international plane. Respect for national sovereignty is not a legitimate excuse for failing to take countermeasures against a major existential risk. If we take into account the welfare of future generations, the harm done by existential risks is multiplied by another factor, the size of which depends on whether and how much we discount future benefits [15,16]. In view of its undeniable importance, it is surprising how little systematic work has been done in this area. Part of the explanation may be that many of the gravest risks stem (as we shall see) from anticipated future technologies that we have only recently begun to understand. Another part of the explanation may be the unavoidably interdisciplinary and speculative nature of the subject. And in part the neglect may also be attributable to an aversion against thinking seriously about a depressing topic. The point, however, is not to wallow in gloom and doom but simply to take a sober look at what could go wrong so we can create responsible strategies for improving our chances of survival. In order to do that, we need to know where to focus our efforts.

## Extinction Outweighs – Discussion Key

#### **Discussing existential risks is key to prevent neglectful attitudes toward them**

Bostrom 2 (Nick Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale.. www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.)JFS

Existential risks have a cluster of features that make it useful to identify them as a special category: the extreme magnitude of the harm that would come from an existential disaster; the futility of the trial-and-error approach; the lack of evolved biological and cultural coping methods; the fact that existential risk dilution is a global public good; the shared stakeholdership of all future generations; the international nature of many of the required countermeasures; the necessarily highly speculative and multidisciplinary nature of the topic; the subtle and diverse methodological problems involved in assessing the probability of existential risks; and the comparative neglect of the whole area. From our survey of the most important existential risks and their key attributes, we can extract tentative recommendations for ethics and policy: We need more research into existential risks – detailed studies of particular aspects of specific risks as well as more general investigations of associated ethical, methodological, security and policy issues. Public awareness should also be built up so that constructive political debate about possible countermeasures becomes possible. Now, it’s a commonplace that researchers always conclude that more research needs to be done in their field. But in this instance it is *really* true. There is more scholarly work on the life-habits of the dung fly than on existential risks. Since existential risk reduction is a global public good, there should ideally be an institutional framework such that the cost and responsibility for providing such goods could be shared fairly by all people. Even if the costs can’t be shared fairly, some system that leads to the provision of existential risk reduction in something approaching optimal amounts should be attempted. The necessity for international action goes beyond the desirability of cost-sharing, however. Many existential risks simply cannot be substantially reduced by actions that are internal to one or even most countries. For example, even if a majority of countries pass and enforce national laws against the creation of some specific destructive version of nanotechnology, will we really have gained safety if some less scrupulous countries decide to forge ahead regardless? And strategic bargaining could make it infeasible to bribe all the irresponsible parties into subscribing to a treaty, even if everybody would be better off if everybody subscribed [14,42].

## Extinction Outweighs - Policymaking

#### **It is our duty to support policy that counters extinction**

Bostrom 2 (Nick Professor of Philosophy and Global Studies at Yale.. www.transhumanist.com/volume9/risks.html.)JFS

Some of the lesser existential risks can be countered fairly cheaply. For example, there are organizations devoted to mapping potentially threatening near-Earth objects (e.g. NASA’s Near Earth Asteroid Tracking Program, and the Space Guard Foundation). These could be given additional funding. To reduce the probability of a “physics disaster”, a public watchdog could be appointed with authority to commission advance peer-review of potentially hazardous experiments. This is currently done on an ad hoc basis and often in a way that relies on the integrity of researchers who have a personal stake in the experiments going forth. The existential risks of naturally occurring or genetically engineered pandemics would be reduced by the same measures that would help prevent and contain more limited epidemics. Thus, efforts in counter-terrorism, civil defense, epidemiological monitoring and reporting, developing and stockpiling antidotes, rehearsing emergency quarantine procedures, etc. could be intensified. Even abstracting from existential risks, it would probably be cost-effective to increase the fraction of defense budgets devoted to such programs.[[23]](%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn23) Reducing the risk of a nuclear Armageddon, whether accidental or intentional, is a well-recognized priority. There is a vast literature on the related strategic and political issues to which I have nothing to add here. The longer-term dangers of nanotech proliferation or arms race between nanotechnic powers, as well as the whimper risk of “evolution into oblivion”, may necessitate, even more than nuclear weapons, the creation and implementation of a coordinated global strategy. Recognizing these existential risks suggests that it is advisable to gradually shift the focus of security policy from seeking national security through unilateral strength to creating an integrated international security system that can prevent arms races and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Which particular policies have the best chance of attaining this long-term goal is a question beyond the scope of this paper.

## Extinction Outweighs – Comparative

#### **Extinction outweighs all other threats – life is a prerequisite**

Ochs 2 [Richard Ochs, “BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS MUST BE ABOLISHED IMMEDIATELY,” Free From Terror, [http://www.freefromterror.net/other\_articles/abolish.html,](http://www.freefromterror.net/other_articles/abolish.html%2C) June 9th 2002 ]JFS

Against this tendency can be posed a rational alternative policy. To preclude possibilities of human extinction, "patriotism" needs to be redefined to make humanity’s survival primary and absolute. Even if we lose our cherished freedom, our sovereignty, our government or our Constitution, where there is life, there is hope. What good is anything else if humanity is extinguished? This concept should be promoted to the center of national debate. For example, for sake of argument, suppose the ancient Israelites developed defensive bioweapons of mass destruction when they were enslaved by Egypt. Then suppose these weapons were released by design or accident and wiped everybody out? As bad as slavery is, extinction is worse. Our generation, our century, our epoch needs to take the long view. We truly hold in our hands the precious gift of all future life. Empires may come and go, but who are the honored custodians of life on earth? Temporal politicians? Corporate competitors? Strategic brinksmen? Military gamers? Inflated egos dripping with testosterone? How can any sane person believe that national sovereignty is more important than survival of the species? Now that extinction is possible, our slogan should be "Where there is life, there is hope." No government, no economic system, no national pride, no religion, no political system can be placed above human survival. The egos of leaders must not blind us. The adrenaline and vengeance of a fight must not blind us. The game is over. If patriotism would extinguish humanity, then patriotism is the highest of all crimes. There are many people who believe it is their God-given right to do whatever is deemed necessary to secure their homeland, their religion and their birthright. Moslems, Jews, Hindus, ultra-patriots (and fundamentalist Christians who believe that Armageddon is God’s prophesy) all have access to the doomsday vials at Fort Detrick and other labs. Fort Detrick and Dugway employees are US citizens but may also have other loyalties. One or more of them might have sent the anthrax letters to the media and Congress last year. Are we willing to trust our security, NO -- trust human survival to people like this? Human frailty, duplicity, greed, zealotry, insanity, intolerance and ignorance, not to speak of ultra-patriotism, will always be with us. The mere existence of these doomsday weapons is a risk too great for rational people to tolerate. Unless guards do body crevice searches of lab employees every day, smuggling out a few grams will be a piece of cake. Basically, THERE CAN BE NO SECURITY. Humanity is at great risk as we speak. All biological weapons must be destroyed immediately. All genetic engineering of new diseases must be halted. All bioweapons labs must be dismantled. Fort Detrick and Dugway labs must be decommissioned and torn down. Those who continue this research are potential war criminals of the highest order. Secret bioweapons research must be outlawed.

## **Extinction Outweighs – Suffering**

#### **Extinction will be the greatest moment of suffering in history – abject fear of it is self-defeating – rational attempts to prevent it are best**

Epstein and Zhao 9  (Richard J. and Y. Laboratory of Computational Oncology, Department of Medicine, University of Hong Kong, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine Volume 52, Number 1, Winter 2009, Muse)JFS

Human extinction is 100% certain—the only uncertainties are when and how. Like the men and women of Shakespeare’s As You Like It, our species is but one of many players making entrances and exits on the evolutionary stage. That we generally deny that such exits for our own species are possible is to be expected, given the brutish selection pressures on our biology. Death, which is merely a biological description of evolutionary selection, is fundamental to life as we know it. Similarly, death occurring at the level of a species—extinction—is as basic to biology as is the death of individual organisms or cells. Hence, to regard extinction as catastrophic—which implies that it may somehow never occur, provided that we are all well behaved—is not only specious, but self-defeating. Man is both blessed and cursed by the highest level of self-awareness of any life-form on Earth. This suggests that the process of human extinction is likely to be accompanied by more suffering than that associated with any previous species extinction event. Such suffering may only be eased by the getting of wis- dom: the same kind of wisdom that could, if applied sufficiently early, postpone extinction. But the tragedy of our species is that evolution does not select for such foresight. Man’s dreams of being an immortal species in an eternal paradise are unachievable not because of original sin—the doomsday scenario for which we choose to blame our “free will,” thereby perpetuating our creationist illusion of being at the center of the universe—but rather, in reductionist terms, because paradise is incompatible with evolution. More scientific effort in propounding this central truth of our species’ mortality, rather than seeking spiritual comfort in escapist fantasies, could pay dividends in minimizing the eventual cumulative burden of human suffering.

### Extinction Outweighs – Ontology

#### Extinction precedes ontology – existence is a prerequisite for the self

Wapner 3 [Paul Wapner is associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, DISSENT / Winter 2003]JFS

All attempts to listen to nature are, indeed, social constructions, except one. Even the most radical postmodernist acknowledges the distinction between physical existence and nonexistence. As mentioned, postmodernists assume that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world, even if they argue about its different meanings. This substratum is essential for allowing entities to speak or express themselves. That which doesn't exist, doesn't speak. That which doesn't exist, manifests no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And everyone should be wary about those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including when environmentalists and students of global environmental politics do so). But we should not doubt the simple-minded notion that a prerequisite of expression is existence. That which doesn't exist can never express itself. And this in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

# \*\*Pragmatism

## Pragmatism 2AC – Rorty

#### Only pragmatic philosophy can evade the logical harms of the K and still take action against great atrocities – We’re not committed to their slippery slope link args

Rorty 2 (Richard, U Minn, http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/us/rorty.htm)JFS

The most powerful reason for thinking that no such culture is possible is that seeing all criteria as no more than temporary resting-places, constructed by a community to facilitate its inquiries, seems morally humiliating. **Suppose** that Socrates was wrong, that **we have not** once **seen the Truth**, and so will not, intuitively, recognise it when we see it again. This means that when the secret police come, **when the torturers violate the innocent, there is nothing to be said** to them of the form “**There is something within you which you are betraying.** Though you embody the practices of a totalitarian society which will endure forever, there is something beyond those practices which condemns you.” This thought is hard to live with, as is Sartre’s remark: Tomorrow, after my death, **certain people may decide to establish fascism**, and the others may be cowardly or miserable enough to let them get away with it. **At that moment, fascism will be the truth of man**, and so much the worse for us. In reality, **things will be as much as man has decided they are**. This hard saying brings out what ties Dewey and Foucault, James and Nietzsche, together- the sense that **there is nothing** deep down **inside us except what we have put there ourselves**, no criterion that we have not created in the course of creating a practice, no standard of rationality that is not an appeal to such a criterion, no rigorous argumentation that is not obedience to our own conventions. **A post-philosophical culture**, then, **would be one in which men and women felt** themselves **alone**, merely **finite, with no links to something Beyond.** On **the pragmatist’s** account, **position was** only a halfway stage in the development of such a culture-the **progress toward**, as Sartre puts it, **doing without God**. For positivism preserved a god in its notion of Science (and in its notion of “scientific philosophy”), the notion of a portion of culture where we touched something not ourselves, where we found Truth naked, relative to no description. **The culture of positivism** thus **produced** endless **swings** of the pendulum **between** the view that **“values are** merely ‘**relative’** (or ‘emotive,’ or ‘subjective’)” **and** the view that **bringing the “scientific method”** to bear on questions of political and moral choice **was the solution to all our problems. Pragmatism**, by contrast, **does not erect Science as an idol** to fill the place once held by God. **It views science as one genre** of literature-or, put the other way around, literature and the arts as inquiries, on the same footing as scientific inquiries. Thus **it sees ethics as neither more “relative”** or “subjective” than scientific theory, **nor as needing to be made “scientific.”** Physics is a way of trying to cope with various bits of the universe; ethics is a matter of trying to cope with other bits. Mathematics helps physics do its job; literature and the arts help ethics do its. Some of these inquiries come up with propositions, some with narratives, some with paintings. The question of what propositions to assert, which pictures to look at, what narratives to listen to and comment on and retell, are all questions about what will help us get what we want (or about what we should want). No. The question of whether **the pragmatist view of truth**-that it is t a profitable topic-**is** itself true is thus **a question about whether a post-Philosophical culture is a good thing** to try for. **It is not a question about what** the word **“true” means, nor** about **the requirements of** an adequate philosophy of **language**, nor about whether the world “exists independently of our minds,” **nor about** whether the intuitions of **our culture** are captured in the pragmatists’ slogans. **There is no way in which the issue between the pragmatist and his opponent can be** tightened up and **resolved** according to criteria agreed to by both sides. **This is one of those issues which puts everything up for grabs at once** -where there is no point in trying to find agreement about “the data” or about what would count as deciding the question. But **the messiness of the issue is not a reason for setting it aside.** The issue between religion and secularism was no less messy, but it was important that it got decided as it did.

## Cede The Political 1NC – Ketels

#### The critique’s methodology causes cynical withdrawal from action which ensures apathy toward atrocities

Ketels ‘96 [Violet. Prof of English @ Temple. “Havel to the Castle!” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol 548, No 1. Nov 1996]JFS

Intellectuals can choose their roles, but cannot not choose, nor can we evade the full weight of the consequences attendant on our choices. "It is always the intellectuals, however we may shrink from the chilling sound of that word ... who must bear the full weight of moral responsibility."55 Humanist intellectuals can aspire to be judged by more specifically ex-acting criteria: as those whose work is worthwhile because it has human uses; survives the test of reality; corresponds to history; represses rationalizing in favor of fact; challenges the veracity of rulers; refuses the safety of abstraction; recognizes words as forms of action, as likely to be lethal as to be liberating; scruples to heal the rupture between words and things, between things and ideas; re-mains incorruptibly opposed to the service of ideological ends pursued by unnecessary violence or inhumane means; and, finally, takes risks for the sake of true witness to events, to the truth even of unpopular ideas or to the lies in popular ones. Above all, intellectuals can resist the dreary relativism that neutralizes good and evil as if in defense of the theoretical pseudo-notion that distinguishing between them is not possible. The hour is too late, the situation too grave for such pettifoggery. Bearing witness is not enough, but it is something. At the dedication of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum inWashington, D.C., Elie Wiesel spoke. "We must bear witness," he said. "What have we learned? ... We are all responsible. We must do some-thing to stop the bloodshed in Yugoslavia." He told a story of a woman from the Carpathian Mountains who asked of the Warsaw Uprising, "Why don't they just wait quietly until after the war?" In one year she was packed into a cattle car with her whole family on the way to Auschwitz. "That woman was my mother," Wiesel said. Viclav Havel, the humanist intellectual from Bohemia, spoke too: of the Holocaust as a memory of democratic appeasement, live memory of indifference to the danger of Hitler's coming to power, of indifference to the Munich betrayal of Prague. "Our Jews went to concentration camps. . . . Later we lost our freedom." We have lost our metaphysical certainties, our sense of responsibility for what comes in the future. For we are all responsible, humanly responsible for what happens in the world. Do we have the right to interfere in internal conflict? Not just the right but the duty. Remember the Holocaust. To avoid war, we watched-silently and, so, complicitly, unleashing darker, deadlier demons. What should we have done about Yugoslavia? Something. Much earlier. We must vigilantly listen for the early warning signs of threats to freedoms and lives everywhere. We must keep the clamorous opposition to oppression and violence around the world incessant and loud. Cry out! Cry havoc! Call murderers murderers. Do not avoid violence when avoidance begets more violence. There are some things worth dying for. Do not legitimize the bloodletting in Bosnia or anywhere by negotiating with the criminals who plotted the carnage. Do not join the temporizers. Take stands publicly: in words; in universities and boardrooms; in other corridors of power; and at local polling places. Take stands prefer-ably in written words, which have a longer shelf life, are likelier to stimu-late debate, and may have a lasting effect on the consciousnesses of some among us.

#### **Extinction**

Ketels ‘96 [Violet. Prof of English @ Temple. “Havel to the Castle!” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol 548, No 1. Nov 1996]JFS

Characteristically, Havel raises lo-cal experience to universal relevance. "If today's planetary civilization has any hope of survival," he begins, "that hope lies chiefly in what we understand as the human spirit." He continues: If we don't wish to destroy ourselves in national, religious or political discord; if we don't wish to find our world with twice its current population, half of it dying of hunger; if we don't wish to kill ourselves with ballistic missiles armed with atomic warheads or eliminate ourselves with bacteria specially cultivated for the purpose; if we don't wish to see some people go desperately hungry while others throw tons of wheat into the ocean; if we don't wish to suffocate in the global greenhouse we are heating up for ourselves or to be burned by radiation leaking through holes we have made in the ozone; if we don't wish to exhaust the nonrenewable, mineral resources of this planet, without which we cannot survive; if, in short, we don't wish any of this to happen, then we must-as humanity, as people, as conscious beings with spirit, mind and a sense of responsibility-somehow come to our senses. Somehow we must come together in "a kind of general mobilization of human consciousness, of the human mind and spirit, human responsibility, human reason." The Prague Spring was "the inevitable consequence of a long drama originally played out chiefly in the theatre of the spirit and the con-science of society," a process triggered and sustained "by individuals willing to live in truth even when things were at their worst." The process was hidden in "the invisible realm of social consciousness," conscience, and the subconscious. It was indirect, long-term, and hard to measure. So, too, its continuation that exploded into the Velvet Revolution, the magic moment when 800,000 citizens, jamming Wenceslas Square in Prague, jingled their house keys like church bells and changed from shouting 'Truth will prevail to chanting" Havel to the castle."

## Cede The Political 1NC – Rorty

#### This failure to engage the political process turns the affirmative into spectators who are powerless to produce real change.

Rorty 98 (prof of philosophy at Stanford, Richard, 1998, “achieving our country”, Pg. 7-9)JFS

Such people find pride in American citizenship impossi­ble, and vigorous participation in electoral politics pointless. They associate American patriotism with an endorsement of atrocities: the importation of African slaves, the slaughter of Native Americans, the rape of ancient forests, and the Viet­nam War. Many of them think of national pride as appropri­ate only for chauvinists: for the sort of American who re­joices that America can still orchestrate something like the Gulf War, can still bring deadly force to bear whenever and wherever it chooses. When young intellectuals watch John Wayne war movies after reading Heidegger, Foucault, Stephenson, or Silko, they often become convinced that they live in a violent, inhuman, corrupt country. They begin to think of themselves as a saving remnant-as the happy few who have the insight to see through nationalist rhetoric to the ghastly reality of contemporary America. But this insight does not move them to formulate a legislative program, to join a political movement, or to share in a national hope. The contrast between national hope and national self­-mockery and self-disgust becomes vivid when one compares novels like Snow Crash and Almanac of the Dead with socialist novels of the first half of the century-books like The Jungle, An American Tragedy, and The Grapes of Wrath. The latter were written in the belief that the tone of the Gettysburg Address was absolutely right, but that our country would have to transform itself in order to fulfill Lincoln's hopes. Transfor­mation would be needed because the rise of industrial capi­talism had made the individualist rhetoric of America's first century obsolete. The authors of these novels thought that this rhetoric should be replaced by one in which America is destined to become the first cooperative commonwealth, the first class­less society. This America would be one in which income and wealth are equitably distributed, and in which the govern­ment ensures equality of opportunity as well as individual liberty. This new, quasi-communitarian rhetoric was at the heart of the Progressive Movement and the New Deal. It set the tone for the American Left during the first six decades of the twentieth century. Walt Whitman and John Dewey, as we shall see, did a great deal to shape this rhetoric. The difference between early twentieth-century leftist in­tellectuals and the majority of their contemporary counter­parts is the difference between agents and spectators. In the early decades of this century, when an intellectual stepped back from his or her country's history and looked at it through skeptical eyes, the chances were that he or she was about to propose a new political initiative. Henry Adams was, of course, the great exception-the great abstainer from ·politics. But William James thought that Adams' diagnosis of the First Gilded Age as a symptom of irreversible moral and political decline was merely perverse. James's pragmatist theory of truth was in part a reaction against the sort of de­tached spectators hip which Adams affected. For James, disgust with American hypocrisy and self­-deception was pointless unless accompanied by an effort to give America reason to be proud of itself in the future. The kind of proto- Heideggerian cultural pessimism which Adams cultivated seemed, to James, decadent and cowardly. "Democracy," James wrote, "is a kind of religion, and we are bound not to admit its failure. Faiths and utopias are the no­blest exercise of human reason, and no one with a spark of reason in him will sit down fatalistically before the croaker's picture. "2

#### Failure to engage in the political process will result in the takeover by the extreme right, leading to discrimination and war worldwide.

Rorty 98 (prof of philosophy at Stanford, Richard, 1998, “achieving our country” pg. 89-94)JFS

Many writers on socioeconomic policy have warned that the old industrialized democracies are heading into a Weimar-like period, one in which populist movements are likely to overturn constitutional governments. Edward Luttwak, for example, has suggested that fascism may be the American future. The point of his book The Endangered Ameri­can Dream is that members of labor unions, and unorganized unskilled workers, will sooner or later realize that their gov­ernment is not even trying to prevent wages from sinking or to prevent jobs from being exported. Around the same time, they will realize that suburban white-collar workers-them- selves desperately afraid of being downsized-are not going to let themselves be taxed to provide social benefits for any­one else. At that point, something will crack. The nonsuburban electorate will decide that the system has failed and start looking around for a strongman to vote for-someone willing to assure them that, once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats, tricky lawyers, overpaid bond salesmen, and postmodernist professors will no longer be calling the shots. A scenario like that of Sinclair Lewis’ novel It Can’t Happen Here may then be played out. For once such a strongman takes office, nobody can predict what will happen. In 1932, most of the predictions made about what would happen if Hindenburg named Hitler chancellor were wildly overoptimistic. One thing that is very likely to happen is that the gains made in the past forty years by black and brown Americans, and by homosexuals, will be wiped out. Jocular contempt for women will come back into fashion. The words "nigger" and "kike" will once again be heard in the workplace. All the sadism which the academic Left has tried to make unaccept­able to its students will come flooding back. All the resent­ment which badly educated Americans feel about having their manners dictated to them by college graduates will find an outlet. But such a renewal of sadism will not alter the effects of selfishness. For after my imagined strongman takes charge, he will quickly make his peace with the international super­rich, just as Hitler made his with the German industrialists. He will invoke the glorious memory of the Gulf War to pro­voke military adventures which will generate short-term prosperity. He will be a disaster for the country and the world. People will wonder why there was so little resistance to his evitable rise. Where, they will ask, was the American Left? Why was it only rightists like Buchanan who spoke to the workers about the consequences of globalization? Why could not the Left channel the mounting rage of the newly dispossessed? It is often said that we Americans, at the end of the twenti­eth century, no longer have a Left. Since nobody denies the existence of what I have called the cultural Left, this amounts to an admission that that Left is unable to engage in national politics. It is not the sort of Left which can be asked to deal with the consequences of globalization. To get the country to deal with those consequences, the present cultural Left would have to transform itself by opening relations with the residue of the old reformist Left, and in particular with the labor unions. It would have to talk much more about money, even at the cost of talking less about stigma. I have two suggestions about how to effect this transition. The first is that the Left should put a moratorium on theory. It should try to kick its philosophy habit. The second is that the Left should try to mobilize what remains of our pride in being Americans. It should ask the public to consider how the country of Lincoln and Whitman might be achieved. In support of my first suggestion, let me cite a passage from Dewey's Reconstruction in Philosophy in which he ex­presses his exasperation with the sort of sterile debate now going on under the rubric of "individualism versus commu­nitarianism." Dewey thought that all discussions which took this dichotomy seriously suffer from a common defect. They are all committed to the logic of general notions under which specific situa­tions are to be brought. What we want is light upon this or that group of individuals, this or that concrete human being, this or that special institution or social arrangement. For such a logic of inquiry, the tradition­ally accepted logic substitutes discussion of the mean­ing of concepts and their dialectical relationships with one another. Dewey was right to be exasperated by sociopolitical theory conducted at this level of abstraction. He was wrong when he went on to say that ascending to this level is typically a right­ist maneuver, one which supplies "the apparatus for intellec­tual justifications of the established order. "9 For such ascents are now more common on the Left than on the Right. The contemporary academic Left seems to think that the higher your level of abstraction, the more subversive of the estab­lished order you can be. The more sweeping and novel your conceptual apparatus, the more radical your critique. When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been "inadequately theorized," you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of lan­guage, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist ver­sion of economic determinism. Theorists of the Left think that dissolving political agents into plays of differential sub­jectivity, or political initiatives into pursuits of Lacan's im­possible object of desire, helps to subvert the established order. Such subversion, they say, is accomplished by "problematizing familiar concepts." Recent attempts to subvert social institutions by prob­lematizing concepts have produced a few very good books. They have also produced many thousands of books which represent scholastic philosophizing at its worst. The authors of these purportedly "subversive" books honestly believe that they are serving human liberty. But it is almost impossi­ble to clamber back down from their books to a level of ab­straction on which one might discuss the merits of a law, a treaty, a candidate, or a political strategy. Even though what these authors "theorize" is often something very concrete and near at hand-a current TV show, a media celebrity, a re­cent scandal-they offer the most abstract and barren expla­nations imaginable. These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into polit­ical relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left re­treats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice pro­duces theoretical hallucinations. These result in an intellec­tual environment which is, as Mark Edmundson says in his book Nightmare on Main Street, Gothic. The cultural Left is haunted by ubiquitous specters, the most frightening of which is called "power." This is the name of what Edmund­son calls Foucault's "haunting agency, which is everywhere and nowhere, as evanescent and insistent as a resourceful spook."10

## AT: We Can Never Change Politics

#### This argument is how the state suppresses individual politics

Dean 8 (Joan, Politics Without Politics, political theorist, http://publishing.eur.nl/ir/darenet/asset/15161/oratiejodidean.pdf)JFS

In *Disagreement* (published in French in 1995; English 1999), Ranciere attends to some of these specificities. He claims that “the state today legitimizes itself by declaring that politics is impossible” (110). The present is thus marked by more than politics’ paradoxical essence— the suppression of the political. It is characterized by the explicit acknowledgement of depoliticization as the contemporary state’s legitimizing ideal. Accordingly, Ranciere identifies several elements of contemporary post-politics as they confirm the impossibility of politics and hence legitimize the state: the spread of law, the generalization of expertise, and the practice of polling for opinion (112). Polling, for example, renders the people as “identical to the sum of its parts” (105). “Their count is always even and with nothing left over,” he writes, “And this people absolutely equal to itself can always be broken down into its reality: its socioprofessional categories and its age brackets,” (105). It is worth nothing that Ranciere’s emphasis on law repeats the “juridification” thesis Habermas offered already in the nineteen eighties. For Habermas, the problem was law’s encroachment on the lifeworld. Excess regulation risked supplanting the communicative engagement of participants in socio-political interaction. For Ranciere, the problem is a legal resolution of conflict that forecloses the possibility of politicization.

# \*\*Generic K Answers

## \*Statism

### Focusing on State Bad

#### Making the State the center of analysis is bad – ruins the K

Constable 91 (Marianne, Polity, Professor at Berkeley, Winter 1991, <http://www.jstor.org.floyd.lib.umn.edu/stable/pdfplus/3235041.pdf>, accessed 7-9-09, AMG)

Foucault's point is that the modern state is not the most useful focus, target, or model of power or of resistance today. To conceive of the modern state as a unified entity loses sight of the fact that today's governmental society and today's state, no less than the sovereign-state of political theorists, is not a unified whole. Perhaps, Foucault suggests, the State is no more than a composite reality and a mythical abstraction whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. Maybe what is really important for our modern times ... is not so much the State-domination of society, but the "governmentalisation" of the State.48

### State Good – Movements

#### Turning away from the state prevents mobilization for good causes.

Goble 98 (Paul, Publisher of RFE/RL, “THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEPOLITICIZATION,” Radio Free Europe, October 12, 1998, http://www.friends-partners.org/friends/news/omri/1998/10/981012I.html(opt,mozilla,unix,english,,new), accessed July 07)

First, as people turn away from the state as the source of support, they inevitably care less about what the state does and are less willing to take action to assert their views. That means that neither the state nor the opposition can mobilize them to take action for or against anything. As a result, the opposition cannot easily get large numbers of people to demonstrate even if the opposition is taking positions that polls suggest most people agree with. And the government cannot draw on popular support even when it may be doing things that the people have said they want. That means that the size of demonstrations for or against anything or anyone are an increasingly poor indicator of what the people want or do not want the state to do. Second, precisely because people are focusing on their private lives and taking responsibility for them, they are likely to become increasingly upset when the state attempts to intervene in their lives even for the most benign purposes, particularly if it does so in an ineffective manner. Such attitudes, widespread in many countries and important in limiting the power of state institutions, nonetheless pose a particular danger to countries making the transition from communism to democracy. While those views help promote the dismantling of the old state, they also virtually preclude the emergence of a new and efficient one. As a result, these countries are often likely to find themselves without the effective state institutions that modern societies and economies require if they are to be well regulated. And third, countries with depoliticized populations are especially at risk when they face a crisis. The governments cannot count on support because people no longer expect the governments to be able to deliver.

### State Good – Extinction

#### Transition from the nation-state system ensures violent extinction

Rubin 8 (Dani, Earth Editor for PEJ News. “Beyond Post-Apocalyptic Eco-Anarchism,” <http://www.pej.org/html/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=7133&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0>.)

Unlike twenty-five years ago, increasingly, people are adopting the anarcho-apocalyptic, civilization-must-fall-to-save-the-world attitude. It is a fairly clean and tight worldview, zealously bulletproof, and it scares me. I want the natural world, the greater community of life beyond our species, with all its beautiful and terrifying manifestations, and its vibrant landscapes to survive intact – I think about this a lot. A quick collapse of global civilization, will almost certainly lead to greater explosive damage to the biosphere, than a mediated slower meltdown. When one envisions the collapse of global society, one is not discussing the demise of an ancient Greek city-state, or even the abandonment of an empire like the Mayans. The end of our global civilization would not only result in the death of six billion humans, just wiping nature’s slate clean. We also have something like 5,000 nuclear facilities spread across the planet’s surface. And this is just one obvious and straightforward fact cutting across new radical arguments in favor of a quick fall. We have inserted ourselves into the web of life on planet Earth, into its interstitial fibers, over the last 500 years. We are now a big part of the world’s dynamic biological equation set – its checks and balances. If we get a “fever” and fall into social chaos, even just considering our non-nuclear toys laying about, the damage will be profound. It will be much more devastating than our new visionaries of post-apocalyptic paradise have prophesized. If one expands upon current examples of social chaos that we already see, like Afghanistan or Darfur, extrapolating them across the globe, encompassing Europe, Asia, North and South America, and elsewhere, then one can easily imagine desperate outcomes where nature is sacrificed wholesale in vain attempts to rescue human life. The outcomes would be beyond “ugly”; they would be horrific and enduring. That is why I cannot accept this new wave of puritanical anarcho-apocalyptic theology. The end-point of a quick collapse is quite likely to resemble the landscape of Mars, or even perhaps the Moon. I love life. I do not want the Earth turned barren. I think that those who are dreaming of a world returned to its wilderness state are lovely, naive romantics – dangerous ones. Imagine 100 Chernobyl’s spewing indelible death. Imagine a landscape over-run with desperate and starving humans, wiping out one ecosystem after another. Imagine endless tribal wars where there are no restraints on the use of chemical and biological weapons. Imagine a failing industrial infrastructure seeping massive quantities of deadly toxins into the air, water and soil. This is not a picture of primitive liberation, of happy post-civilized life working the organic farm on Salt Spring Island.

### State Good – Environment

#### State is the only actor that can solve the environment

Yacobucci 6 (Brent, Science, and Industry Division, Feb, “Climate Change: Federal Laws and Policies Related to Greenhouse Gas Reductions”)JFS

Climate change is generally viewed as a global issue, but proposed responses generally require action at the national level. In 1992, the United States ratified the United Nations’ Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which called on industrialized countries to take the lead in reducing greenhouse gases. During the past decade, a variety of voluntary and regulatory actions have been proposed or undertaken in the United States, including monitoring of electric utility carbon dioxide emissions, improved appliance efficiency, and incentives for developing renewable energy sources. This report provides background on the evolution of U.S. climate change policy, from ratification of the UNFCCC to the Bush Administration’s 2001 rejection of the Kyoto Protocol to the present. The report focuses on major regulatory programs that monitor or reduce greenhouse gas emissions, along with their estimated effect on emissions levels. In addition, legislation in the 109th Congress calling for monitoring or reducing greenhouse gas emissions is identified and examined. The earlier Bush, Clinton, and current Bush Administrations have largely relied on voluntary initiatives to reduce the growth of greenhouse gas emissions. This focus is particularly evident in the current Administration’s 2002 Climate Action Report (CAR), submitted under the provisions of the UNFCCC. Of the 50-plus programs summarized in the 2002 CAR, 6 are described as “regulatory.” However, this small subset of the total U.S. effort accounts for a large share of greenhouse gas emission reductions achieved over the past decade. In general, these efforts were established and implemented in response to concerns other than climate change, such as energy efficiency and air quality.

### State Good – Strategic Reversibility

#### Power is strategically reversible – The resistance to state power counteracts the disciplinary power at the heart of their impacts

Campbell 98 (David- PHD, Prof of cultural & poli geog @ U of Durham, Writing Security, p.257-258,ET)

The possibility of rearticulating danger leads us to a final question: what modes of being and forms of life could we or should we adopt? To be sure, a comprehensive attempt to answer such a question is beyond the ambit of this book. But it is important to note that asking the question in this way mistakenly implies that such possibilities exist only in the future. Indeed, the extensive and intensive nature of the relations of power associated with the society of security means that there has been and remains a not inconsiderable freedom to explore alternative possibilities. While traditional analyses of power are often economistic and negative, Foucault's understanding of power emphasises its productive and enabling nature.36 Even more importantly, his understanding of power emphasizes the ontology of freedom presupposed by the existence of disciplinary and normalizing practices. Put simply, there cannot be relations of power unless subjects are in the first instance free: the need to institute negative and constraining power practices comes about only because without them freedom would abound. Were there no possibility of freedom, subjects would not act in ways that required containment so as to effect order.37 Freedom, though, is not the absence of power. On the contrary, because it is only through power that subjects exercise their agency, freedom and power cannot be separated. As Foucault maintains: At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom. Rather than speaking of an essential freedom, it would be better to speak of an `agonism' — of a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation.38 The political possibilities enabled by this permanent provocation of power and freedom can be specified in more detail by thinking in terms of the predominance of the `bio-power' discussed above. In this sense, because the governmental practices of biopolitics in Western nations have been increasingly directed towards modes of being and forms of life — such that sexual conduct has become an object of concern, individual health has been figured as a domain of discipline, and the family has been transformed into an instrument of government — the on-going agonism between those practices and the freedom they seek to contain, means that individuals have articulated a series of counter-demands drawn from those new fields of concern. For example, as the state continues to prosecute people according to sexual orientation, human rights activists have proclaimed the right of gays to enter into formal marriages, adopt children, and receive the same health and insurance benefits granted to their straight counterparts. These claims are a consequence of the permanent provocation of power and freedom in biopolitics, and stand as testament to the 'strategic reversibility' of power relations: if the terms of governmental practices can be made into focal points for resistances, then the 'history of government as the "conduct of conduct" is interwoven with the history of dissenting "counter- conducts" '.39 Indeed, the emergence of the state as the major articulation of 'the political' has involved an unceasing agonism between those in office and those they ruled. State intervention in everyday life has long incited popular collective action, the result of which has been both resistance to the state and new claims upon the state. In particular, 'The core of what we now call "citizenship" . . . consists of multiple bargains hammered out by rulers and ruled in the course of their struggles over the means of state action, especially the making of war.'40 In more recent times, constituencies associated with women's, youth, ecological, and peace movements (among others) have also issued claims upon society.

### State Good – Violence

#### States check negative human nature – and prevent violence

Weingast 9 (Barry, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and \Professor in the Department of Political Science at Stanford U, February, http://cadmus.eui.eu/dspace/bitstream/1814/11173/1/MWP\_LS\_2009\_02.pdf )JFS

All states must control the fundamental problem of violence. In natural states, a dominant coalition of the powerful emerges to solve this problem. The coalition grants members privileges, creates rents through limited access to valuable resources and organizations, and then uses the rents to sustain order. Because fighting reduces their rents, coalition members have incentives not to fight so as to maintain their rents. Natural states necessarily limit access to organizations and restrict competition in all systems. Failing to do so dissipate rents and therefore reduces the incentives not to fight. We call this order the natural state because for nearly all of the last 10,000 years of human history – indeed, until just the last two centuries – the natural state was the only solution to the problem of violence that produced a hierarchical society with significant wealth. In comparison with the previous foraging order, natural states produced impressive economic growth, and even today we can see the impressive wealth amassed by many of the early civilizations. In contrast to open access orders, however, natural states have significant, negative consequences for economic growth.

#### State-based approaches to violence exist and are successful

UN Secretary General 6 (“Ending violence against women: from words to action,” October 9, 2006, Accessed 7/10/09, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/vaw/launch/english/v.a.w-exeE-use.pdf) KSM

Many States have developed good or promising practices to prevent or respond to violence against women. State strategies to address violence should promote women’s agency and be based on women’s experiences and involvement, and on partnerships with NGOs and other civil society actors. Women’s NGOs in many countries have engaged in innovative projects and programmes, sometimes in collaboration with the State. Generic aspects of good or promising practices can be extracted from a variety of experiences around the world. Common principles include: clear policies and laws; strong enforcement mechanisms; motivated and well-trained personnel; the involvement of multiple sectors; and close collaboration with local women’s groups, civil society organizations, academics and professionals. Many governments use national plans of action — which include legal measures, service provision and prevention strategies — to address violence against women. The most effective include consultation with women’s groups and other civil society organizations, clear time lines and benchmarks, transparent mechanisms for monitoring implementation, indicators of impact and evaluation, predictable and adequate funding streams, and integration of measures to tackle violence against women in programmes in a variety of sectors.

## \*Language

### No Alternative

#### The alt is exactly like the link or the perm solves – Totalizing rejection of the aff premises is a right-wing fascistic tactic to control the terms of debate – Liberal reason defines progressive politics and solves best

Hicks 9 (Stephen PhD Phil, <http://www.stephenhicks.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/hicks-ep-ch4.pdf>)

What links the Right and the Left is a core set of themes: antiindividualism, the need for strong government, the view that religion is a state matter (whether to promote or suppress it), the view that education is a  process of socialization, ambivalence about science and technology, and strong themes of group conflict, violence, and war. Left and Right have often divided bitterly over which themes have priority and over how they should be applied. Yet for all of their differences, both the collectivist Left and the collectivist Right have consistently recognized a common enemy: liberal capitalism, with its individualism, its limited government, its separation of church and state, its fairly constant view that education is not primarily a matter of political socialization, and its persistent Whiggish optimism about prospects for peaceful trade and cooperation between members of all nations and groups. Rousseau, for example, is often seen as being a man of the Left, and he has influenced generations of Left thinkers. But he was also inspirational to Kant, Fichte, and Hegel—all men of the Right. Fichte in turn was used regularly as a model for Right thinkers— but he was also an inspiration for Left socialists such as Friedrich Ebert, president of the Weimar Republic after World War I. Hegel’s legacy, as is well known, took both a Right and a Left form. While the details are messy the broad point is clear: the collectivist Right and the collectivist Left are united in their major goals and in identifying their major opposition. None of these thinkers, for example, ever has a kind word for the politics of John Locke. In the twentieth century, the same trend continued. Scholars debated whether George Sorel is Left or Right; and that makes sense given that he inspired and admired both Lenin and Mussolini. And to give just one more example, Heidegger and the thinkers of the Frankfurt School have much more in common politically than either does with, say, John Stuart Mill. This in turn explains why thinkers from Herbert Marcuse to Alexandre Kojève to Maurice Merleau-Ponty all argued that Marx and Heidegger are compatible, but none ever dreamed of connecting either to Locke or Mill. The point will be that liberalism did not penetrate deeply into the main lines of political thinking in Germany. As was the case with metaphysics and epistemology, the most vigorous developments in social and political philosophy of the nineteenth and early twentieth century occurred in Germany, and German socio-political philosophy was dominated by Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Nietzsche, and Heidegger. By the early twentieth century, accordingly, the dominant issues for most Continental political thinkers were not whether liberal capitalism was a viable option—but rather exactly when it would collapse—and whether Left or Right collectivism had the best claim to being the socialism of the future. The defeat of the collectivist Right in World War II then meant that the Left was on its own to carry the socialist mantle forward. Accordingly, when the Left ran into its own major disasters as the twentieth century progressed, understanding its fundamental commonality with the collectivist Right helps to explain why in its desperation the Left has often adopted ‚fascistic‛ tactics.

### A2: Word PICs

#### Language is reversible – The introduction of injurious language simultaneously introduces the prospect of contestation – Their erasure avoids the prospect of contestation

Butler 97 (Judith, Excitable Speech, UC-Berkeley, p. 2)

One is not simply fixed by the name that one is called. In being called an injurious name, one is derogated and demeaned. But the name holds out another possibility as well: by being called a name, one is also, paradaoxically, given a certain possibility for social existence, initiated into a temporal life of language that exceeds the prior purposes that animate that call. Thus the injurious address may appear to fix or paralyze the one it hails, but it may also produce an unexpected and enabling response. If to be addressed is to be interpellated, then the offensive call runs the risk of inaugurating a subject in speech who comes to use language to counter the offensive call. When the address is injurious, it works its force upon the one in injures.

#### Their certainty about the effects of language belies the nature of human agency and the importance of context, making us powerless in the face of language – Extricating the language from the plan doesn’t make the words “go away” – Confrontation via the permutation solves best

Butler 97 (Judith, Excitable Speech, UC-Berkeley, p. 13)

Indeed, recent effort to establish the incontrovertibly wounding power of certain words seem to founder on the question of who does the interpreting of what such words mean and what they perform. The recent regulations governing lesbian and gay self-definition in the military of, indeed, the recent controversies over rap music suggest that no clear consensus is possible on the question of whether there is a clear link between the words that are uttered and their putative power to injure. To argue, on the one hand, that the offensive effects of such words is fully contextual, and that a shift of context can exacerbate or minimize that offensiveness, is still not to give an account of the power that such words are said to exercise. To claim, on the other hand, that some utterances are always offensive, regardless of context, that they carry their contexts with them in ways that are too difficult to shed, is still not to offer a way to understand how context is invoked and restaged at the moment of utterance.

#### This theory of agency is critical to true liberation – Their conception of liberty is in service to the state and systemic power – “Only policy formulations *truly* matter” is their arg

Butler 97 (Judith, Excitable Speech, UC-Berkeley, p. 15)

Those who seek to fix with certainty the link between certain speech acts and their injurious effects will surely lament the open temporality of the speech act. That no speech act has to perform injury as its effect means that no simple elaboration of speech acts will provide a standard by which the injuries of speech might be effectively adjudicated. Such a loosening of the link between act and injury, however, opens up the possibility for a counter-speech, a kind of talking back, that would be foreclosed by the tightening of that link. Thus, the gap that separates the speech act from its future effects has its auspicious implications: it begins a theory of linguistic agency that provides an alternative to the relenetless search for legal remedy. Te interval between instances of utterance not only makes the repetition and resignifcation of the utterance possible, but shows how words might, through time, become disjoined from their power to injure and recontextualized in more affirmative modes. I hope to make clear that by affirmative, I mean “opening up the possibility of agency” where agency is not the restoration of a sovereign autonomy in speech, a replication of conventional notions of mastery.

#### Only we have a legitimate theory of human agency

Butler 97 (Judith, Excitable Speech, UC-Berkeley, p. 16)

Whereas some critics mistake the critique of sovereignty for the demolition of agency, I propose that agency begins where sovereignty wanes. The one who acts (who is not the same as the sovereign subject) acts precisely to the extent that he or she is constituted as an actor and, hence, operating within a linguistic field of enabling constraints from the outset.

#### They can’t solve the case--Censoring words transforms politics into a fight over language rather than the institutions that generate true violence. Perm solves

Brown 1 [Wendy Brown, professor at UC-Berkeley, 2001 Politics Out of History, p. 35-36]JFS

 “Speech codes kill critique,” Henry Louis Gates remarked in a 1993 essay on hate speech. Although Gates was referring to what happens when hate speech regulations, and the debates about them, usurp the discursive space in which one might have offered a substantive *political* response to bigoted epithets, his point also applies to prohibitions against questioning from within selected political practices or institutions. But turning political questions into moralistic ones—as speech codes of any sort do—not only prohibits certain questions and mandates certain genuflections, it also expresses a profound hostility toward political life insofar as it seeks to preempt argument with a legislative and enforced truth. And the realization of that patently undemocratic desire can only and always convert emancipatory aspirations into reactionary ones. Indeed, it insulates those aspirations from questioning at the very moment that Weberian forces of rationality and bureaucratization are quite likely to be domesticating them from another direction. Here we greet a persistent political paradox: the moralistic defense of critical practices, or of any besieged identity, weakens what it strives to fortify precisely by sequestering those practices from the kind of critical inquiry out of which they were born. Thus Gates might have said, “Speech codes, born of social critique, kill critique.” And, we might add, contemporary identity-based institutions, born of social critique, invariably become conservative as they are forced to essentialize the identity and naturalize the boundaries of what they once grasped as a contingent effect of historically specific social powers. But moralistic reproaches to certain kinds of speech or argument kill critique not only by displacing it with arguments about abstract rights versus identity-bound injuries, but also by configuring political injustice and political righteousness as a problem of remarks, attitude, and speech rather than as a matter of historical, political-economic, and cultural formations of power. Rather than offering analytically substantive accounts of the forces of injustice or injury, they condemn the manifestation of these forces in particular remarks or events. There is, in the inclination to ban (formally or informally) certain utterances and to mandate others, a politics of rhetoric and gesture that itself symptomizes despair over effecting change at more significant levels. As vast quantities of left and liberal attention go to determining what socially marked individuals say, how they are represented, and how many of each kind appear in certain institutions or are appointed to various commissions, the sources that generate racism, poverty, violence against women, and other elements of social injustice remain relatively unarticulated and unaddressed. We are lost as how to address those sources; but rather than examine this loss or disorientation, rather than bear the humiliation of our impotence, we posture as if we were still fighting the big and good fight in our clamor over words and names. Don’t mourn, moralize

#### Their language K’s imply a relativism about language that equates right and wrong with effectiveness, allowing their evidence to employ a bias that you should be skeptical toward

Hicks 9 (Stephen PhD Phil, <http://www.stephenhicks.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/hicks-ep-ch4.pdf>)

This explains the harsh nature of much postmodern rhetoric. The regular deployments of ad hominem, the setting up of straw men, and the regular attempts to silence opposing voices are all logical consequences of the postmodern epistemology of language. Stanley Fish, as noted in Chapter Four, calls all opponents of racial preferences bigots and lumps them in with the Ku Klux Klan. Andrea Dworkin calls all heterosexual males rapists6 and repeatedly labels ‚Amerika‛ a fascist state.7 With such rhetoric, truth or falsity is not the issue: what matters primarily is the language’s effectiveness. If we now add to the postmodern epistemology of language the far Left politics of the leading postmodernists and their firsthand awareness of the crises of socialist thought and practice, then the verbal weaponry has to become explosive.

### Punishment of Language Bad

#### Punishing offensive language makes it worse—censorship only drives it underground where its effects are more acutely felt.

 Roskoski and Peabody 91 (Matthew, and Joe, “A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language ‘Arguments,’” 1991, http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques, accessed 10/17/02

If language "arguments" become a dominant trend, debaters will not change their attitudes. Rather they will manifest their attitudes in non-debate contexts. Under these conditions, the debaters will not have the moderating effects of the critic or the other debaters. Simply put, sexism at home or at lunch is worse than sexism in a debate round because in the round there is a critic to provide negative though not punitive feedback. The publicization effects of censorship are well known. "Psychological studies reveal that whenever the government attempts to censor speech, the censored speech - for that very reason - becomes more appealing to many people" (Strossen 559). These studies would suggest that language which is critiqued by language "arguments" becomes more attractive simply because of the critique. Hence language "arguments" are counterproductive. Conclusion Rodney Smolla offered the following insightful assessment of the interaction between offensive language and language "arguments": The battle against {offensive speech} will be fought most effectively through persuasive and creative educational leadership rather than through punishment and coercion... The sense of a community of scholars, an island of reason and tolerance, is the pervasive ethos. But that ethos should be advanced with education, not coercion. It should be the dominant voice of the university within the marketplace of ideas; but it should not preempt that marketplace. (Smolla 224-225).1 We emphatically concur. It is our position that a debater who feels strongly enough about a given language "argument" ought to actualize that belief through interpersonal conversation rather than through a plea for censorship and coercion. Each debater in a given round has three minutes of cross-examination time during which he or she may engage the other team in a dialogue about the ramifications of the language the opposition has just used. Additionally even given the efficacy of Rich Edwards' efficient tabulation program, there will inevitably be long periods between rounds during which further dialogue can take place.

#### Punishing offensive language creates a backlash and drives it underground

Roskoski and Peabody 91 (Matthew, and Joe, “A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language Arguments”, 1991)

Previously, we have argued that the language advocates have erroneously reversed the causal relationship between language and reality. We have defended the thesis that reality shapes language, rather than the obverse. Now we will also contend that to attempt to solve a problem by editing the language which is symptomatic of that problem will generally trade off with solving the reality which is the source of the problem. There are several reasons why this is true. The first, and most obvious, is that we may often be fooled into thinking that language "arguments" have generated real change. As Graddol and Swan observe, "when compared with larger social and ideological struggles, linguistic reform may seem quite a trivial concern," further noting "there is also the danger that effective change at this level is mistaken for real social change" (Graddol & Swan 195). The second reason is that the language we find objectionable can serve as a signal or an indicator of the corresponding objectionable reality. The third reason is that restricting language only limits the overt expressions of any objectionable reality, while leaving subtle and hence more dangerous expressions unregulated. Once we drive the objectionable idea underground it will be more difficult to identify, more difficult to root out, more difficult to counteract, and more likely to have its undesirable effect. The fourth reason is that objectionable speech can create a "backlash" effect that raises the consciousness of people exposed to the speech. Strossen observes that "ugly and abominable as these expressions are, they undoubtably have had the beneficial result of raising social consciousness about the underlying societal problem..." (560).

## \*Biopower

### No Link – Government

#### No link – their link arguments presume governmentality and biopower remain linked – this relationship is fundamentally broken now

Fraser 3 (Henry A. and Louise Loeb Professor of Politics and Philosophy at the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science (The New School for Social Research) (Nancy, Constellations, Vol 10, No 2, p. 165-166)

The preceding account of fordist discipline assumes at least three empirical propositions that no longer hold true today. It assumes, first, that social regulation is organized nationally, that its object is a national population living in a national society under the auspices of a national state, which in turn manages a national economy. It assumes, second, that social regulation constitutes a nonmarketized counterpart to a regime of capital accumulation, that it is concentrated in the zone of “the social,” and that its characteristic institutions are the governmental and nongovernmental agencies that comprise the (national) social-welfare state. It assumes, finally, that regulation’s logic is subjectifying and individualizing, that in enlisting individuals as agents of self-regulation, it simultaneously fosters their autonomy and subjects them to control, or rather, it fosters their autonomy as a means to their control. If these propositions held true in the era of fordism, their status is doubtful today. In the post-89 era of postfordist globalization, social interactions increasingly transcend the borders of states. As a result, the ordering of social relations is undergoing a major shift in scale, equivalent to denationalization and transnationalization. No longer exclusively a national matter, if indeed it ever was, social ordering now occurs simultaneously at several different levels. In the case of public health, for example, country-based agencies are increasingly expected to harmonize their policies with those at the transnational and international levels. The same is true for policing, banking regulation, labor standards, environmental regulation, and counterterrorism.9 Thus, although national ordering is not disappearing, it is in the process of being decentered as its regulatory mechanisms become articulated (sometimes cooperatively, sometimes competitively) with those at other levels. What is emerging, therefore, is a new type of regulatory structure, a multi-layered system of globalized governmentality whose full contours have yet to be determined. At the same time, regulation is also undergoing a process of desocialization. In today’s hegemonic – neoliberal – variant of globalization, massive, unfettered, transnational flows of capital are derailing the Keynesian project of national economic steering. The tendency is to transform the fordist welfare state into a postfordist “competition state,” as countries scramble to cut taxes and eliminate “red tape” in hopes of keeping and attracting investment.10 The resulting “race to the bottom” fuels myriad projects of deregulation, as well as efforts to privatize social services, whether by shifting them onto the market or by devolving them onto the family (which means, in effect, onto women). Although the extent of such projects varies from country to country, the overall effect is a global tendency to destructure the zone of “the (national) social,” formerly the heartland of fordist discipline. Decreasingly socially concentrated, and increasingly marketized and familialized, postfordist processes of social ordering are less likely to converge on an identifiable zone. Rather, globalization is generating is a new landscape of social regulation, more privatized and dispersed than any envisioned by Foucault. Finally, as fordist discipline wanes in the face of globalization, its orientation to self-regulation tends to dissipate too. As more of the work of socialization is marketized, fordism’s labor-intensive individualizing focus tends to drop out. In psychotherapy, for example, the time-intensive talk-oriented approaches favored under fordism are increasingly excluded from insurance coverage and replaced by instant-fix pharma-psychology. In addition, the enfeeblement of Keynesian state steering means more unemployment and less downward redistribution, hence increased inequality and social instability. The resulting vacuum is more likely to be filled by outright repression than by efforts to promote individual autonomy. In the US, accordingly, some observers posit the transformation of the social state into a “prison-industrial complex,” where incarceration of male minority youth becomes the favored policy on unemployment.11 The prisons in question, moreover, have little in common with the humanist panopticons described by Foucault. Their management often subcontracted to for-profit corporations, they are less laboratories of self-reflection than hotbeds of racialized and sexualized violence – of rape, exploitation, corruption, untreated HIV, murderous gangs, and murderous guards. If such prisons epitomize one aspect of postfordism, it is one that no longer works through individual self-governance. Here, rather, we encounter the return of repression, if not the return of the repressed. In all these respects, postfordist globalization is a far cry from Foucauldian discipline: multi-layered as opposed to nationally bounded, dispersed and marketized as opposed to socially concentrated, increasingly repressive as opposed to self-regulating. With such divergences, it is tempting to conclude that the disciplinary society is simply dépassé. One might even be tempted to declare, following Jean Baudrillard, that we should all “oublier Foucault.”

### Biopower Good – Democracy

#### Turn - Biopolitics are not totalitarian – it strengthens democracy and prevents the impacts they describe. And, the type of power present in democracy is wholly distinct from the type of power responsible for their impacts

Ross 4 (Edward, Berkeley history professor, “Central European History,” AD:7-8-9March, p. 35-36) PMK

In short, the continuities between early twentieth-century biopolitical discourse and the practices of the welfare state in our own time are unmistakable. Both are instances of the “disciplinary society” and of biopolitical, regulatory, social-engineering modernity, and they share that genealogy with more authoritarian states, including the National Socialist state, but also fascist Italy, for example. And it is certainly fruitful to view them from this very broad perspective. But that analysis can easily become superficial and misleading, because it obfuscates the profoundly different strategic and local dynamics of power in the two kinds of regimes. Clearly the democratic welfare state is not only formally but also substantively quite different from totalitarianism. Above all, again, it has nowhere developed the fateful, radicalizing dynamic that characterized National Socialism (or for that matter Stalinism), the psychotic logic that leads from economistic population management to mass murder. Again, there is always the potential for such a discursive regime to generate coercive policies. In those cases in which the regime of rights does not successfully produce “health,” such a system can —and historically does— create compulsory programs to enforce it. But again, there are political and policy potentials and constraints in such a structuring of biopolitics that are very different from those of National Socialist Germany. Democratic biopolitical regimes require, enable, and incite a degree of self-direction and participation that is functionally incompatible with authoritarian or totalitarian structures. And this pursuit of biopolitical ends through a regime of democratic citizenship does appear, historically, to have imposed increasingly narrow limits on coercive policies, and to have generated a “logic” or imperative of increasing liberalization. Despite limitations imposed by political context and the slow pace of discursive change, I think this is the unmistakable message of the really very impressive waves of legislative and welfare reforms in the 1920s or the 1970s in Germany. Of course it is not yet clear whether this is an irreversible dynamic of such systems. Nevertheless, such regimes are characterized by sufficient degrees of autonomy (and of the potential for its expansion) for sufficient numbers of people that I think it becomes useful to conceive of them as productive of a strategic configuration of power relations that might fruitfully be analyzed as a condition of “liberty,” just as much as they are productive of constraint, oppression, or manipulation. At the very least, totalitarianism cannot be the sole orientation point for our understanding of biopolitics, the only end point of the logic of social engineering. This notion is not at all at odds with the core of Foucauldian (and Peukertian) theory. Democratic welfare states are regimes of power/knowledge no less than early twentieth-century totalitarian states; these systems are not “opposites,” in the sense that they are two alternative ways of organizing the same thing. But they are two very different ways of organizing it. The concept “power” should not be read as a universal staring night of oppression, manipulation, and entrapment, in which all political and social orders are grey, are essentially or effectively “the same.” Power is a set of social relations, in which individuals and groups have varying degrees of autonomy and effective subjectivity. And discourse is, as Foucault argued, “tactically polyvalent.” Discursive elements (like the various elements of biopolitics) can be combined in different ways to form parts of quite different strategies (like totalitarianism or the democratic welfare state); they cannot be assigned to one place in a structure, but rather circulate.

### Alt Increases Biopower

#### Lifting biopolitical constraints necessarily creates new ones. The illusion that we can be free from biopower makes the impact worse.

Shapiro 7 (Steve, , April 22, Foucault and Constraints on Individualism, http://www.gather.com/viewArticle.action?articleId=281474976965588) PMK

A prime example of this is during the 1970s when the Soviet Union and the United States were still in an arms race. In 1979, guerrilla opposition forces started to threaten the government of Afghanistan. The Soviets interfered trying to end the conflict, but instead, the conflict led to the Afghan War which lasted ten years, taking an enormous human and economic toll. Only after the Soviet withdrawal could the Afghan people take control of their government. The Soviets let the Afghan people take care of it themselves. It so happened to be that when the Soviets lifted their biopower, the Taliban seized control of the government and exerted far greater biopower than before. The truth is, however, that lifting a biopolitical constraint is an endless process. Foucault himself states the fact that it is impossible to be in a world without biopower, because as soon as a constraint has been lifted, another one sets into place. Foucault uses the historical example of the French revolution and how the French overthrew their government, a constraint that led to their suffering at the time, but then had to face a new governmental power. The power structures circulate if individualism is preserved, and that, Foucault explains, is the sole priority of a society: to ensure that it does circulate. As soon we try to infringe on a constraint and use power to limit it, we are stopping this cycle, only increasing biopower within the constraint itself.

### Alt Increases Biopower

#### Attempting to break free from biopolitical control will only cause greater suffering

Shapiro 7 (Steve, Critical Theorist and UCLA graduate, “Gather, Foucault and Constraints on Individualism, 4-22-07 <http://www.gather.com/viewArticle.action?articleId=281474976965588>, Accessed 7-8-09)

Think of the amount of suffering that binds us within small deviations of relative constraints. Any biopolitical means is already a constraint of individualism in itself, therefore any attempt other than the attempt of the individual to end that constraint is already deviating that biopolitical limitation the individual. Attempting to change a constraint will only lead to a greater biopolitical constraint over the individual. Any attempt to end the suffering of the individual will only lead to more suffering. Essentially, this action is the destruction of that constraint altogether, but a destruction of a constraint can be as devastating, if not more devastating, than the status quo itself. The constraint cannot be destroyed by any means, it can only be limited through use of power over the initiation of that constraint. What can seem like agonizing to one outside the constraint can be a simple form of life for another within it. Changing that form of life tremendously increases the power structures over the individuals within the constraint, further leading to power over that individual's mind. Interference can devastate the mind of the individual, making the lifting of the constraint even more difficult. In particular instances, it takes more exertion of power to deviate a system than to control it. “Breaking free” in essence, is the only possible change that can be enacted by the individual as a means of deviating the constraint. Examining the contextuality of the historical abstract can lead us to a possible non-biopolitical deviation of the status quo. Instead of attempting the impossible, destroying the constraint altogether, the individual can lift that constraint through the visualization of its context. Only when the individual discovers the source of his suffering can he truly be free from that constraint.

#### The act of resistance assures more biopower

Kelly 9 (Mark, , PhD Foucault author eInternation Relations Michel Foucault’s Political Philosophy, 3-31-09, <http://www.e-ir.info/?p=618>, Accessed 7-9-09) AMG

Against the strategies of power is arrayed our resistance. This is a resistance that is today however badly undermined by the emergence of a form of power that seizes us in the core of our being, subjection, the investment by power of the formation of our subjectivity itself. Nevertheless, for Foucault, resistance is not merely a permanent possibility, but an inevitable corollary of power. Resistance is presupposed by power: to induce someone to do something implies that they otherwise would have done something else. This means that power can only occur where there is already an inclination that runs contrary to it. As Foucault puts it, ‘Resistance comes first’.[iii] Still, power is ubiquitous, as is resistance – animal activity inevitably implies the existence of both, as a matter of some animals trying to get others to conform to their will, and the inevitable excess of the will of the victim over that of the wielder of power.

### Alt Leads To Violence

#### We can use the tools of biopower to challenge its worst manifestations- rejecting these tools leads to horrid violence

Deranty 4 (Jean-Phillipe, Philosophy Prof. @ Macquarie University, “Agamben’s Challenge to normative theories…” Borderlands, 3(1))

48. One can acknowledge the descriptive appeal of the biopower hypothesis without renouncing the antagonistic definition of politics. As Rancière remarks, Foucault’s late hypothesis is more about power than it is about politics (Rancière 2002). This is quite clear in the 1976 lectures (Society must be defended) where the term that is mostly used is that of "biopower". As Rancière suggests, when the "biopower" hypothesis is transformed into a "biopolitical" thesis, the very possibility of politics becomes problematic. There is a way of articulating modern disciplinary power and the imperative of politics that is not disjunctive. **The power that subjects and excludes socially can also empower politically simply because the exclusion is already a form of address which unwittingly provides implicit recognition. Power includes by excluding, but in a way that might be different from a ban**. This insight is precisely the one that Foucault was developing in his last writings, in his definition of freedom as "agonism" (Foucault 1983: 208-228): "Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free" (221). The hierarchical, exclusionary essence of social structures demands as a condition of its possibility an equivalent implicit recognition of all, even in the mode of exclusion. **It is on the basis of this recognition that politics can sometimes arise as the vindication of equality and the challenge to exclusion.** 49. This proposal rests on a logic that challenges Agamben’s reduction of the overcoming of the classical conceptualisation of potentiality and actuality to the single Heideggerian alternative. Instead of collapsing or dualistically separating potentiality and actuality, one would find in Hegel’s modal logic a way to articulate their negative, or reflexive, unity, in the notion of contingency. Contingency is precisely the potential as existing, a potential that exists yet does not exclude the possibility of its opposite (Hegel 1969: 541-554). Hegel can lead the way towards an ontology of contingency that recognises the place of contingency at the core of necessity, instead of opposing them. The fact that the impossible became real vindicates Hegel’s claim that **the impossible should not be opposed to the actual. Instead, the possible and the impossible are only reflected images of each other and, as actual, are both simply the contingent. Auschwitz should not be called absolute necessity** (Agamben 1999a: 148), **but absolute contingency. The absolute historical necessity of Auschwitz is not "the radical negation" of contingency, which, if true, would indeed necessitate a flight out of history to conjure up its threat. Its absolute necessity in fact harbours an indelible core of contingency, the locus where political intervention could have changed things, where politics can happen.** Zygmunt Bauman’s theory of modernity and his theory about the place and relevance of the Holocaust in modernity have given sociological and contemporary relevance to this alternative historical-political logic of contingency (Bauman 1989). 50. In the social and historical fields, politics is only the name of the contingency that strikes at the heart of systemic necessity. An ontology of contingency provides the model with which to think together both the possibility, and the possibility of the repetition of, catastrophe, as the one heritage of modernity, and the contingency of catastrophe as logically entailing the possibility of its opposite. **Modernity is ambiguous because it provides the normative resources to combat the apparent necessity of possible systemic catastrophes**. Politics is the name of the struggle drawing on those resources. 51. **This ontology enables us also to rethink the relationship of modern subjects to rights. Modern subjects are able to consider themselves autonomous subjects because legal recognition signals to them that they are recognised as full members of the community, endowed with the full capacity to judge. This account of rights in modernity is precious because it provides an adequate framework to understand real political struggles, as fights for rights**. We can see now how this account needs to be complemented by the notion of contingency that undermines the apparent necessity of the progress of modernity. Modern subjects know that their rights are granted only contingently, that the possibility of the impossible is always actual. This is why **rights should not be taken for granted. But this does not imply that they should be rejected as illusion, on the grounds that they were disclosed as contingent in the horrors of the 20th century. Instead, their contingency should be the reason for constant political vigilance.** 52. By questioning the rejection of modern rights, one is undoubtedly unfaithful to the letter of Benjamin. Yet, if one accepts that one of the great weaknesses of the Marxist philosophy of revolution was its inability to constructively engage with the question of rights and the State, then it might be the case that the **politics that define themselves as the articulation of demands born in the struggles against injustice are better able to bear witness to the "tradition of the oppressed" than their messianic counterparts.**

### Alt Fails – Biopower Inevitable

#### Attempts to defy biopower fail

Parry 5 ( associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, “SOCIETY MUST BE [REGULATED]”: BIOPOLITICS AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE IN GONZALES V. RAICH, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\_id=854564) PMK

What, then, about individual rights-based resistance to biopolitics? For several reasons, I think rights-based objections fail almost completely.76 First, one must formulate the right at issue, and there is no general right not to have a regulatory state. Not all of the work of biopolitics turns on direct management of people in ways that restrict their liberty. The collection and publication of data on the economy or education, and much of the work of the Army Corps of Engineers or the National Institutes of Health, for example, trespasses on no individual liberty interests in any sense that would have a hope of legal recognition. With respect to those activities that more often implicate liberty interests—the activities of, say, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, or large parts of the Department of Health and Human Services—the most one could argue for, I think, is a “presumption that any restriction on the rightful exercise of liberty is unconstitutional unless and until the government convinces a hierarchy of judges that such restrictions are both necessary and proper.”77 One might even argue that this formulation is truest to the original understanding of the Constitution.78 The problem, of course, is that the courts have never read the Constitution to include such a broad rule—and they are unlikely ever to do so. Although it is a signpost of modernity, the meaning of the Constitution nonetheless also reflects and changes in response to the forces of modernity that include the development of biopolitics. Without broad-based liberty claims, procedural and substantive due process provide the most obvious avenues for relief. One of the touchstones of procedural due process, however, is the balancing of individual interests against government interests and the interests of the process itself.79 Such claims do not prevent biopolitical regulation; rather they merely require it to work through channels in which individuals may be heard. The fact that, for example, a welfare recipient has the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner does not make the provision and administration of welfare benefits less biopolitical in any “meaningful” way. The person being heard, whatever the outcome of the hearing, has still been inspected, recorded, and placed within a rationally-defined category that is managed, perhaps perfectly appropriately, for the greater good.

### Alt Fails – Biopower Inevitable

#### Foucoult’s self-contradictions and vagueness makes the alt impossible to ever solve

Haber 94 ( Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, (Honi Fern, “Beyond postmodern politics: Lyotard, Rorty, Foucault,” Routledge. JM)

This is analogous to the domination of phrase regimes talked about in Lyotard; because everything is formulated within the domain of a phrase and a phrase is both the "effect of power" and exclusionary of other powers, it is seen by Lyotard as a mark of terror. It is impossible then to locate within Lyotard the voice of resistance; it is as if his thesis of the terrorizing by "phrase regimes" forces him to conclude that to speak is already to be co-opted, and this is why the presentation of the unpresentable is totally mystified. **Foucault, on the other hand, at least claims to be able to both postulate the omnipresence and ubiquity of power, even as inscribed on our very bodies, and still allow for the possibility of resistance and oppositional transformation. The question, though, is how? How can he both universalize the domina­tion of subjectless power and still leave space for the empowerment of marginalized voices?** In fact he sometimes uses his refusal to speak for oppositional voices as a shield to hide behind; we cannot allow his refusal to speak for marginalized voices to excuse him from ad­dressing the difficult questions regarding resistance—made even more difficult, given the context of power in which resistances arise and are said to be products.This leads us then to consider more closely his notion of resistance. Granted, he need not provide a blueprint for the form oppositional struggles must or should take, still**, his thesis of the ubiquity of nor­malizing and disciplinary power, along with its implication for his theory of the subject as an effect and also the vehicle of such power, forces us to ask questions such as: How is resistance possible, where does it come from, why would it arise? How can we affect conscious choices for resistance or subvert those powers which both constitute and oppress it? Does Foucault's analysis of the ubiquity of power eliminate reference to a thinking/willing subject who might motivate resistances?** In short, the thesis that "we cannot abandon our own order, even where we would attack it," **renders Foucault's theory of power prob­lematic for the possibility of resistance, and an evaluator of Foucault interested in the formation of oppositional struggles, and the voicing of marginalized voices, can both respect his refusal to shape those struggles while at the same time refusing to thereby be put off from demanding a more constructive (or even coherent) notion of resistance and transformation.**

#### Non-Unique: Foucault’s assertions of biopower vastly transcend the negative’s link

IPCE No Date (Analysis of The History of Sexuality, http://www.ipce.info/ipceweb/Library/history\_of\_sexuality.htm) PMK

**There was also an element of social control in this. A power relation was created between the preacher and the confessant, between the psychoanalyst and his patient. Power relations are to Foucault central to any analysis of society**, and this is especially true for sexuality. **Power relations are formed in all relations where differences exist. What Foucault means by power is not necessarily what is ordinarily meant by the word. It is something ubiquitous and cannot be thought of as dual, as creating a division between those dominating and those being dominated. Power in Foucault's meaning of the word is not an exclusively negative force. He claims that we have had a juridical view of power in our society; we tend to see it as something negative, oppressing, defining what is not to be done. Instead, power is the basis of Foucault's analysis of society. Common power relations** related to sexuality **are, in addition to the ones mentioned between the one who confesses and the one that receives the confession, those between teacher and pupil, between parent and child, and between doctor and patient. to bring biological objects and processes into political and economic calculation; discipline does so by addressing the animal body of individualized man whereas biopolitics does so by addressing the species body of the total population.**

### Alt Fails – Biopower Inevitable

#### Modern biopolitics inevitable

Perry 7 (Joshua, Prof. Sociology at Vanderbilt University, DePaul Journal of Health Care Law, “PARTIAL BIRTH BIOPOLITICS”, Spring 2007, CMM)

Ultimately, it is the use of this political power of regulation over the body politic that is cause for some concern. Surely, some instances of social benefit can be imagined. [n30](http://www.lexisnexis.com:80/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.156391.2189871083&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1247109335756&returnToKey=20_T6928233401&parent=docview#n30) However, as contemporary issues of life and death trigger power dynamics between individuals, an administratively-bureaucratized state, and a conservative ideological movement which seeks to regulate the culture via legislation advancing its version of the common good, perhaps it is inevitable that biopower more often gives rise to a more objectionable brand of biopolitics. For instance, in the realm of reproductive rights one finds increasing attempts by the state to control mechanisms relating to the biological beginnings of life, even as individuals attempt to assert claims to autonomy and rights to self-determination. It is to this particular expression of biopolitics that our discussion now returns.

#### Biopower is inevitable, it is a circular system

Shapiro 7 (Steve, Critical Theorist and UCLA graduate Gather, Foucault and Constraints on Individualism, 4-22-07 <http://www.gather.com/viewArticle.action?articleId=281474976965588>, Accessed 7-8-09) AMG

A prime example of this is during the 1970s when the Soviet Union and the United States were still in an arms race. In 1979, guerrilla opposition forces started to threaten the government of Afghanistan. The Soviets interfered trying to end the conflict, but instead, the conflict led to the Afghan War which lasted ten years, taking an enormous human and economic toll. Only after the Soviet withdrawal could the Afghan people take control of their government. The Soviets let the Afghan people take care of it themselves. It so happened to be that when the Soviets lifted their biopower, the Taliban seized control of the government and exerted far greater biopower than before. The truth is, however, that lifting a biopolitical constraint is an endless process. Foucault himself states the fact that it is impossible to be in a world without biopower, because as soon as a constraint has been lifted, another one sets into place. Foucault uses the historical example of the French revolution and how the French overthrew their government, a constraint that led to their suffering at the time, but then had to face a new governmental power. The power structures circulate if individualism is preserved, and that, Foucault explains, is the sole priority of a society: to ensure that it does circulate. As soon we try to infringe on a constraint and use power to limit it, we are stopping this cycle, only increasing biopower within the constraint itself.

### Alt Fails – Biopower Inevitable

#### Biopower has evolved in a nature more complex than Foucault ever fathomed. Complexity has become inevitability.

Dreyfus 4 (Hubert, PhD in Philosophy from Harvard University and Professor at U.C. Berkeley, “Being and Power: Heidegger and Foucault, http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/html/paper\_being.html) PMK

This raises an important question. When Foucault describes power as "coming from everywhere" is he describing power in general, i.e. the social clearing, or is he describing bio-power, which is uniquely discrete, continuous and bottom-up? This seeming problem is cleared up, I think, if we remember Heidegger's account of onto-theology. Like the understanding of being, power, always, in fact, "comes from everywhere," in that it is embodied in the background of everyday practices. But what these background practices have made possible up to recently is monarchical and state-juridical power, i.e. power administered from above. But now, Foucault tells us, things have changed: To conceive of power [in these terms] is to conceive of it in terms of a historical form that is characteristic of our societies: the juridical monarchy. Characteristic yet transitory. For while many of its forms have persisted to the present, it has gradually been penetrated by quite new mechanisms of power that are probably irreducible to the representation of law. Just as for Heidegger the technological understanding of being, by treating everything as resources, levels being to pure ordering, and so gets rid of all onto-theology --the idea that some entity is the ground of everything -- so bio-power reveals the irrelevance of questions of the legitimacy of the state as the source of power. Foucault says: At bottom, despite the differences in epochs and objectives, the representation of power has remained under the spell of monarchy. In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king. Hence the importance that the theory of power gives to the problem of right and violence, law and illegality, freedom and will, and especially the state and sovereignty. That is, just as total mobilization cannot be understood by positing subjects and objects, so normalization works directly through new sorts of invisible, continuous practices of control Foucault calls micro-practices. The everyday person to person power relations whose coordination produces the style of any regime of power are, indeed, everywhere. But in earlier regimes of power they are not micro-practices. Only disciplinary power works meticulously by ordering every detail. So, while for Foucault all forms of power are bottom up and the understanding of power as monarchical misses this important fact, nonetheless bio-power is bottom-up in a new and dangerously totalizing way, so that understanding power on the model of the power of the king (the equivalent of onto-theology) covers up an important change in how our practices are working.

### Alt Fails – Biopower Inevitable

#### **The American political system will inevitably exert biopower.**

Agamben 2k (professor of philosophy at the College International de Philosophie in Paris, “Means Without End: Notes on Politics”, p. 113-115.) PMK

**While the state in decline lets its empty shell survive everywhere as a pure structure of sovereignty and dom­ination, society as a whole is instead irrevocably deliv­ered to the form of consumer society, that is, a society in which the sole goal of production is comfortable living**. The theorists of political sovereignty, such as Schmitt, see in all this the surest sign of the end of politics. And the planetary masses of consumers, in fact, do not seem to foreshadow any new figure of the polis (even when they do not simply relapse into the old ethnic and reli­gious ideals). However, the problem that the new politics is facing is precisely this: is it possible to have a political community that is ordered exclusively for the full en­joyment of wordly life? But, if we look closer, isn’t this precisely the goal of philosophy? And when modern po­litical thought was born with Marsilius of Padua, wasn’t it defined precisely by the recovery to political ends of the Averroist concepts of “sufficient life” and “well-liv­ing”? Once again Walter Benjamin, in the “Theologico­Political Fragment,” leaves no doubts regarding the fact that “The order of the profane should be erected on the idea of happiness.”’ The definition of the concept of “happy life” remains one of the essential tasks of the coming thought (and this should be achieved in such a way that this concept is not kept separate from ontol­ogy, because: “being: we have no experience of it other than living itself”). **The “happy life” on which political philoso­phy should be founded thus cannot be either the naked life that sovereignty posits as a presupposition so as to turn it into its own subject or the impenetrable extrane­ity of science and of modern biopolitics that everybody today tries in vain to sacralize. This “happy life” should be, rather, an absolutely profane “sufficient life” that has reached the perfection of its own power and of its own communicability—a life over which sovereignty and right no longer have any hold.**

### Alt Fails – Biopower Inevitable

#### Biopower is inevitable, so it shouldn’t be resisted.

Nadesan 8 (Majia Holmer, professor of communication in the Division of Social and Behavioral Sciences in the New College of Interdisciplinary Arts and Sciences, San Diego University Google Books, “Governmentality, Biopower, and Everyday Life,” 208, http://books.google.com/books?id=7ywbHl9DnkEC&pg=PA23&dq=prisons+biopower, accessed 7-8-9) SLR

By the closing decades of the twentieth century, formalized and state-sponsored liberal technologies designed to produce self-governing subjects and to securitize the market were under attack for governing too much. The liberal capacity to “steer from the centre” was suspect, as was the liberal state’s success in producing self-governing subjects (Rose, 2000, p. 159). Neoliberal reforms sought to disperse liberal centers of government and to empower “market” mechanisms, thereby targeting the “excesses” of liberal government. In effect, neoliberal governmentalities extend liberal strategies of government or “action at a distance” (Latour, 1987, p. 219; Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 9) by further deterritorializing the operations of power, particularly through the extension of biopower and through circulating market networks. Foucault and other expanded on how the assemblages and technologies of biopower operate on populations through geographically diffuse technologies that render populations increasingly visible in particular ways using expert knowledge and interventions while simultaneously encouraging individuals’ self-regulation and “optimization” (Rose, 2007). In order to know and regulate the health of populations, biopower pursues greater knowledge about and regulatory mechanisms over, populations, which are themselves fragmented along increasingly nuanced lines of divisibility (see Deleuze, 1992). As shall be demonstrated, the degree of surveillance implicated in neoliberal governmentalities and the progressively demanding requirements for risk reduction and social and economic success have complex effects that often increase social control while encouraging self-regulation. In contrast, neoconservative governmentalities strive to reinvigorate older forms of state sovereignty in order to remoralize the population while securitizing global circuits.

**Biopower is inevitable, it is a circular system**

Shapiro 7 (Steve, “Gather, Foucault and Constraints on Individualism”, 4-22-07 http://www.gather.com/viewArticle.action?articleId=281474976965588, Accessed 7-8-09) AMG

A prime example of this is during the 1970s when the Soviet Union and the United States were still in an arms race. In 1979, guerrilla opposition forces started to threaten the government of Afghanistan. The Soviets interfered trying to end the conflict, but instead, the conflict led to the Afghan War which lasted ten years, taking an enormous human and economic toll. Only after the Soviet withdrawal could the Afghan people take control of their government. The Soviets let the Afghan people take care of it themselves. It so happened to be that when the Soviets lifted their biopower, the Taliban seized control of the government and exerted far greater biopower than before. The truth is, however, that lifting a biopolitical constraint is an endless process. Foucault himself states the fact that it is impossible to be in a world without biopower, because as soon as a constraint has been lifted, another one sets into place. Foucault uses the historical example of the French revolution and how the French overthrew their government, a constraint that led to their suffering at the time, but then had to face a new governmental power. The power structures circulate if individualism is preserved, and that, Foucault explains, is the sole priority of a society: to ensure that it does circulate. As soon we try to infringe on a constraint and use power to limit it, we are stopping this cycle, only increasing biopower within the constraint itself.

### Alt Fails – Biopower Too Complex

#### **Biopower has evolved in a nature more complex than Foucault ever fathomed**

Dreyfus 04 (Hubert, PhD in Philosophy from Harvard University and Professor at U.C. Berkeley, “Being and Power: Heidegger and Foucault”, http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/html/paper\_being.html) PMK

This raises an important question. **When Foucault describes power as "coming from everywhere" is he describing power in general**, i.e. the social clearing, **or is he describing bio-power, which is uniquely discrete, continuous and bottom-up? This seeming problem is cleared up**, I think, if we remember Heidegger's account of onto-theology**. Like the understanding of being, power, always, in fact, "comes from everywhere," in that it is embodied in the background of everyday practices**. But what these background practices have made possible up to recently is monarchical and state-juridical power, i.e. power administered from above. But now, Foucault tells us, things have changed: To conceive of power [in these terms] is to conceive of it in terms of a historical form that is characteristic of our societies: the juridical monarchy. Characteristic yet transitory. For while many of its forms have persisted to the present, it has gradually been penetrated by quite new mechanisms of power that are probably irreducible to the representation of law. Just as for Heidegger the technological understanding of being, by treating everything as resources, levels being to pure ordering, and so gets rid of all onto-theology --the idea that some entity is the ground of everything -- so **bio-power reveals the irrelevance of questions of the legitimacy of the state as the source of power. Foucault says: At bottom, despite the differences in epochs and objectives, the representation of power has remained under the spell of monarchy**. In political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king. Hence the importance that the theory of power gives to the problem of right and violence, law and illegality, freedom and will, and especially the state and sovereignty. That is, **just as total mobilization cannot be understood by positing subjects and objects, so normalization works directly through new sorts of invisible, continuous practices of control** Foucault calls micro-practices. **The everyday person to person power relations whose coordination produces the style of any regime of power are, indeed, everywhere**. But in earlier regimes of power they are not micro-practices. Only disciplinary power works meticulously by ordering every detail. So, while for Foucault all forms of power are bottom up and the understanding of power as monarchical misses this important fact, nonetheless **bio-power is bottom-up in a new and dangerously totalizing way, so that understanding power on the model of the power of the king** (the equivalent of onto-theology**) covers up an important change in how our practices are working.**

### No Impact

#### Totalitarianism and Ethnic Racism caused the Holocaust, NOT biopolitics.

Dickinson 4 (Edward, Biopolitics, Facism, Democracy, Central European History v37 n1, Ass. Prof. Hist. at University of Cincinnati)

In an important programmatic statement of 1996 Geoff Eley celebrated the fact that Foucault’s ideas have “fundamentally directed attention away from institutionally centered conceptions of government and the state . . . and toward a dispersed and decentered notion of power and its ‘microphysics.’”48 The “broader, deeper, and less visible ideological consensus” on “technocratic reason and the ethical unboundedness of science” was the focus of his interest.49 But the “power-producing effects in Foucault’s ‘microphysical’ sense” (Eley) of the construction of social bureaucracies and social knowledge, of “an entire institutional apparatus and system of practice” ( Jean Quataert), simply do not explain Nazi policy.50 The destructive dynamic of Nazism was a product not so much of a particular modern set of ideas as of a particular modern political structure, one that could realize the disastrous potential of those ideas. What was critical was not the expansion of the instruments and disciplines of biopolitics, which occurred everywhere in Europe. Instead, it was the principles that guided how those instruments and disciplines were organized and used, and the external constraints on them. In National Socialism, biopolitics was shaped by a totalitarian conception of social management focused on the power and ubiquity of the völkisch state. In democratic societies, biopolitics has historically been constrained by a rights-based strategy of social management. This is a point to which I will return shortly. For now, the point is that what was decisive was actually politics at the level of the state. A comparative framework can help us to clarify this point. Other states passed compulsory sterilization laws in the 1930s — indeed, individual states in the United States had already begun doing so in 1907. Yet they did not proceed to the next steps adopted by National Socialism — mass sterilization, mass “eugenic” abortion and murder of the “defective.” Individual . gures in, for example, the U.S. did make such suggestions. But neither the political structures of democratic states nor their legal and political principles permitted such policies actually being enacted. Nor did the scale of forcible sterilization in other countries match that of the Nazi program. I do not mean to suggest that such programs were not horrible; but in a democratic political context they did not develop the dynamic of constant radicalization and escalation that characterized Nazi policies. The radicalizing dynamic of the Nazi regime was determined, however, not only by its structure but also by its ideology. The attentive reader will have noticed a degree of conceptual slippage in many of the quotations used in the foregoing pages between ethnic racialism and eugenics, between “eugenic” murder and the Final Solution. This slippage between “racialism” and “racism” is not entirely justified. After the rigors of the Goldhagen debate, it takes some sangfroid to address the topic of anti-Semitism in Germany at all.But it appears from the current literature that there was no direct connection between anti- Semitism and eugenic ideas. Some German eugenicists were explicitly racist; some of those racist eugenicists were anti-Semites; but anti-Semitism was not an essential part of eugenic thought. As Peter Fritzsche — among many others — has pointed out, racism really is at the heart of the Nazi “discourse of segregation,” and the “fantastic vision” of all-out racial war that motivated the Nazis is not explained merely by the logic of enlightened rationalism, technocracy, and scientism.51 Eugenics did not “pave the way” for the murder of millions of Jews. Ethnic racism — and particularly anti-Semitism— did.

### No Impact

#### The final solution was the byproduct of a unique understanding of the relationship between Jews and Germans. Biopolitics does NOT necessitate extermination of the Other.

Dickinson 4 (Edward, Biopolitics, Fascism, Democracy, Central European History v37 n1, Ass. Prof. Hist. at University of Cincinnati)

And yet, it is clear that anti-Semitism and eugenics did not imply, presuppose, or necessitate each other. The Nazi variant of biopolitical modernity was in fact quite idiosyncratic. It is very difficult to assess the place of explicitly ethnic racist thinking in the development of eugenics; but despite a resurgence of interest in the differing “character” and fate of ethnic groups after about 1927, on the whole ethnic racism appears to have become gradually less interesting to eugenicists from the late imperial period forward. The Nazis shifted the balance quite suddenly and forcibly in favor of ethnic racial thought after 1933. It may be that the growing in uence of eugenics made National Socialist thinking more plausible for many people in the early 1930s; but it seems equally likely that the moderation of eugenics in the 1920s may have increased the appeal of the Social Democratic Party (as the strongest advocate, among the non-Nazi political parties, of eugenic policies) while actually discrediting the Nazis’ more dated ideas.53 In fact, it may be useful to consider not only what eugenic ideas and euthanasia policy contributed to the implementation of the Final Solution, but also how momentum toward the Final Solution shaped Nazi eugenics. The context for Nazi eugenic policies was shaped fundamentally by the Nazis’ sense that Germany was in a permanent racial war with “the Jews” (or communists and democrats, which in the Nazi worldview amounted to the same thing). The urgency of Nazi eugenic policy —the scope of forcible sterilization, the murder of tens of thousands of “defective” people— derived not just from the “normal” fear of degeneration typical of eugenics since its inception, but also from a quite extraordinary understanding of the immediacy of racial confrontation.

#### The holocaust was the result of a series of unique conditions, not the endpoint of all biopolitical regimes.

Ranibow and Rose 3 (Paul/Nikolas, Thoughts On The Concept of Biopower Today, The Molecular Science Institute, Professor of Anthropology at University of Chicago, Professor of Sociology at James Martin White)

Holocaust is undoubtedly one configuration that modern biopower can take. This, as we have already implied, was also Foucault’s view in 1976: racisms allows power to sub-divide a population into subspecies known as races, to fragment it, and to allow a relationship in which the death of the other, of the inferior race, can be seen as something that will make life in general healthier and purer: “racism justifies the deathfunction in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principle that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as ones is a member of a race or a population (2003: 258). The Nazi regime was, however, exceptional – “a paroxysmal development”: “We have, then, in Nazi society something that is really quite extraordinary: this is a society which has generalized biopower in an absolute sense, but which has also generalized the sovereign right to kill… to kill anyone, meaning not only other people but also its own people… a coincidence between a generalized biopower and a dictatorship that was at once absolute and retransmitted throughout the entire social body” (2003: 260). Schmitt argued, erroneously in our view, that the “state of exception” was the guarantee of modern constitutional power. But the articulation of biopower in the form it took under National Socialism was dependent upon a host of other historical, moral, political and technical conditions. Holocaust is neither exemplary of thanato-politics, nor is it in some way the hidden dark truth of biopower.

## \*Security

### Apocalyptic Imagery Good – Social Change

#### Apocalypse is the purest test of dialogue – we should be open to the transformative potential of vulnerability to apocalyptic imagery

Franke 9 (Associate Prof of Comparative lit at Vanderbilt William Poetry and Apocalypse Page 92-93)JFS

Apocalypse prima facie refuses and makes an end of dialogue: it thunders down invincibly from above. But for this very reason the greatest test of our dialogical capacity is whether we can dialogue with the corresponding attitude or must resort to exclusionary maneuvers and force. What is called for here is a capacity on the part of dialogue not to defend itself but to let itself happen in interaction with an attitude that is apparently intolerant of dialogue. Letting this possibility be, coming into contact with it, with the threat of dialogue itself, may seem to be courting disaster for dialogue. It is indeed a letting down of defenses. Can dialogue survive such a surrendering of itself in utter vulnerability to the enemy of dialogue? Or perhaps we should ask, can it rise up again, after this self-surrender, in new power for bringing together a scattered, defeated humanity to share in an open but commonly sought and unanimously beckoned Logos of mutual comprehension and communication? May this, after all, be the true and authentic “end” of dialogue provoked by apocalypse? For what it is worth, my apocalyptic counsel is that we must attempt an openness to dialogue even in this absolute vulnerability and risk. The world is certainly not a safe place, and it will surely continue not to be such, short of something … apocalyptic. Needed, ever again, is something on the order of an apocalypse, not just a new attitude or a new anything that we can ourselves simply produce. Philosophy itself, thought through to its own end, can hardly resist concluding that “only a god can save us” (Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten). But can not our attitude make a difference- perhaps make possible the advent of apocalypse beyond all our powers, even those of our own imaginations? I will wager an answer to this question only in the operative mood. May we bring a voice speaking up for mutual understanding onto the horizon of discourse in our time, a time marked by the terrifying sign of apocalyptic discourse. May we do this not by judging apocalyptic discourse, but by accepting that our condition as humans is as much to be judged as to judge and that all our relatively justified judgments are such to the extend that they offer themselves to be judged rather than standing on their own ground as absolute. In other words, may our discussions remain open to apocalypse, open to what we cannot represent or prescribe but can nevertheless undergo in a process of transformation that can be shared with others – and that may be genuinely dialogue.

#### **Our encounter with the apocalypse is an aesthetic approach – this opens up space for imagining a new world**

Franke 9 (Associate Prof of Comparative lit at Vanderbilt William Poetry and Apocalypse Page 40) JFS

Envisioning an end to the game of the present in all spheres of social and political life, with its embittered alignments and its entrenched impasses, as insidiously difficult as that may be for us to “do” (as Beckett’s Endgame so wittily insinuates), enables us to envisage, and so also to beginning to enact, new possibilities. And yet, apocalypse, as the advent of the end, is nothing that we can do, though we can be aware of and perhaps cooperate with its happening to us. Indeed, from a certain point of view, this is already what our tradition itself is all about. Apocalyptic, as the ultimate expression of transcendent, metaphysical vision in poetry, rather than being taken as an aberration, symptomatic of a pathology of Western civilization that could be cured, should be accepted as part of the whole and as standing for the possibility of renewal inherent within this tradition. From this type of imagination, new and different proposals unceasingly draw their inspiration. All representations and imaginings have their limits. Apocalypse thematizes this inherent destiny for every order of imagination to have its end and give place to a new, thitherto unimaginable order. Every imagination of the end in apocalyptic style is the occasion for new orientation toward the open space we call the future. This future, however, is not for us to name, in the end, since it is beholden to the Other. And this may mean – and has meant, in the terms forged by a certain tradition embracing Dante, Celan, and Stevens – being beholden to an apocalypse, to the revelation of the “eternity” that surpasses us utterly and unutterably.

### Apocalyptic Imagery Good – Social Change

#### Apocalypse is the vision of change –the imagination of something entirely different

Franke 9 (Associate Prof of Comparative lit at Vanderbilt William Poetry and Apocalypse Page 91)JFS

“Apocalyptic” in the proper sense is a biblical or apocryphal literary genre that develops especially in the inter-testamental period, but it must also be understood as a mode of vision that views life as destined to convert into something utterly strange and different: it envisions our life as radically relational and as dependent ultimately on an absolute Other. This is the vision of the Bible and of the plethora of disparate cultural outlooks and religious ways of life it has spawned.102 Apocalyptic in this sense raises the issue of the ultimate groundlessness of all our own judgments through opening up beneath them the abyss of a judgment by which they are all to be judged: their partial perspective is then set to be measured against a whole vision and absolute standard and last judgment in order to avoid assuming the role of God and the prerogatives of revelation ourselves, thereby setting dialogue into a frame not itself open to dialogue and negotiation.

### Apocalyptic Imagery – Alt Fails

#### Their alternative only recreates the violence they attempt to stop –the anti-apocalyptic position fails to transgress their link arguments

Franke 9 (Associate Prof of Comparative lit at Vanderbilt William Poetry and Apocalypse Page 4-5)JFS

There is a temptation, especially appealing to articulate, dialectically skillful academicians, perhaps particularly in the postmodern climate where “deconstruction” has become as much a common denominator as a radical challenge, to say that every party to the discussion must simply avoid assertions presuming to any final disclosure of truth, or, in other words, that we must all learn to avoid “apocalyptic” discourse.1 But the viability of precisely this solution seems to me to have been belied by discussions even in purely academic contexts, such as an interdisciplinary seminar among humanities scholars.2 for this solution draws the boundaries of acceptable discourse in a tendentious and exclusionary way: it in effect makes a rational, pragmatic, relativistic approach normative for all. And to that extend, so far from overcoming the arbitrary and dogmatic method of absolutistic religious belief, it risks becoming just one further manifestation and application of it, the imposition of one’s own apocalypse, however liberal, enlightened, and philosophical it may be, on others. Indeed, any drawing of boundaries by us – that is, by certain of us, however the claim to being representative may itself be drawn – cannot but be tendentious and exclusionary. That is why we have no right to shut out the final judgment from above of beyond us – though, of course, also not to appropriate this judgment in order to use it, in the name of God or truth of facts or the future, in our own biased way against others. The problem here is that the “anti-apocalyptic” position belongs to a system of oppositions with apocalypticist positions, and so can do no more than turn their violence in the opposite direction. The bracketing or banning of apocalyptic discourse, even when only by ostracizing it, does not solve the problem posed by this form of communication so difficult to accommodate alongside other in an open, neutral forum of debate. It shifts the imposition of an absolute from the level of the expressed, the propositions affirmed, to the unending, free, unjudged and unjudgeable status of conversation itself: anything may be said, but nothing must be said that would call into question this activity of unrestricted discourse and mark its limits against something that could perhaps reduce it to vanity and, in effect, end it. That would be a threat to the dialogue’s own unimpeachable power of self-validation. Higher powers, such as those revealed, at least purportedly, by apocalypse, must be leveled in the interest of this power of our own human Logos that we feel ourselves to be in command of, or that is, at any rate, relatively within our control. Of course, the “we” here depends on who is the most dialectically powerful, and its established not without struggle and conflict.

#### Rejection of the apocalyptic vision entrenches an apocalyptic theology which dictates absolute truth – censorship of aesthetics destroys dialogue

Franke 9 (Associate Prof of Comparative lit at Vanderbilt William Poetry and Apocalypse Page 83-84)JFS

Yet this rejection of apocalyptic vision itself involves a claim, and it is not without pretenses of its own. It wishes to draw the bounds of legitimate representations and to circumscribe what ought and ought not be brought to the table as lying within the compass of discussion. And to set the limits and establish the law for representation is in and of itself to assume a position beyond all representation. 97 There is perhaps an apocalyptic theology (or its negation and inversion) buried even here, a belief about what ultimately is true or, at any rate, about what makes a difference or really matters in the end. Rather than attempting to exorcise this residual haunting presence of truth, or at least of a pretended disclosure of what is decisive in the end, I submit that we should accept it as belonging to the very dialogical nature of our common pursuit. For to the extend that we gather to talk and exchange views with one another and argue over them, we are seeking some generally valid and communicable understanding. And yet the dialogue can have no pre-established framework that would not be biased – the work of some and the imposition on others. Any delimitation of a framework for dialogue, unless they have previously accepted the conditions that are not of their own making, does presuppose what in crucial respects is indistinguishable from an absolute “theological” type of authority, a sort of positively given “revelation”.

### Predictions Good

#### Predictions are imperfect but inevitable and critical to preventing major war

Kagan & Kagan 2k (Donald & Frederick, American Enterprise, While America Sleeps, p. 5)

Predicting the future is a difficult and uncertain business, but for those who make international and military policy there is no escape from it. Any future course of action rests on assumptions about how events are likely to develop and how political and military leaders will try to shape and react to them. Simply to project the behavior of the past in a straight line into the future is a mistake, for history does not repeat itself with precision. A far worse mistake, however, is to project a future that is entirely different from the past, to assume that all previous human behavior has been made irrelevant by some developments or discoveries. It is tempting to construct a vision of the future that, however pleasing, is entirely unprecedented and most unlikely. Men have been making such optimistic projections since the eighteenth century, at least, predicting the end of war because of new conditions and always turning out to be devastatingly wrong. For all its shortcomings, past behavior remains the most reliable predictor of future behavior. History can enlighten critical elements of the debate over our national security policy by examining what once was as a way of conceiving what might be. The center of any argument against the need to maintain large armed forces and an active foreign policy as a way of preventing war is the refusal to admit that we could face a serious threat in a very short time. A corollary to that refusal is the assumption that warning signs will be seen well before the threat materializes.

#### **We have an ethical obligation to act – if the future is uncertain, we must do everything we can to intervene.**

Kurasawa 4 (Fuyuki, Professor of Sociology @ York University of Toronto, “Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight,” http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf, AD: 7/11/09) jl

In addition, farsightedness has become a priority in world affairs due to the appearance of new global threats and the resurgence of ‘older’ ones. Virulent forms of ethno-racial nationalism and religious fundamentalism that had mostly been kept in check or bottled up during the Cold War have reasserted themselves in ways that are now all-too-familiar – civil warfare, genocide, ‘ethnic cleansing,’ and global terrorism. And if nuclear mutually assured destruction has come to pass, other dangers are filling the vacuum: climate change, AIDS and other diseases (BSE, SARS, etc.), as well as previously unheralded genomic perils (genetically modified organisms, human cloning). Collective remembrance of past atrocities and disasters has galvanized some sectors of public opinion and made the international community’s unwillingness to adequately intervene before and during the genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or to take remedial steps in the case of the spiraling African and Asian AIDS pandemics, appear particularly glaring. Returning to the point I made at the beginning of this paper, the significance of foresight is a direct outcome of the transition toward a dystopian imaginary (or what Sontag has called “the imagination of disaster”).11 Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, two groundbreaking dystopian novels of the first half of the twentieth century, remain as influential as ever in framing public discourse and understanding current techno-scientific dangers, while recent paradigmatic cultural artifacts – films like The Matrix and novels like Atwood’s Oryx and Crake – reflect and give shape to this catastrophic sensibility.12 And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts.13 Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their own nightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action, spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight. Several bodies of literature have touched upon this sea-change toward a culture of prevention in world affairs, most notably just-war theory,14 international public policy research,15 and writings from the risk society paradigm.16 Regardless of how insightful these three approaches may be, they tend to skirt over much of what is revealing about the interplay of the ethical, political, and sociological dynamics that drive global civil society initiatives aimed at averting disaster. Consequently, the theory of practice proposed here reconstructs the dialogical, public, and transnational work of farsightedness, in order to articulate the sociopolitical processes underpinning it to the normative ideals that should steer and assist in substantively thickening it. As such, the establishment of a capacity for early warning is the first aspect of the question that we need to tackle.

#### Predictions are necessary in a realist world

Mearsheimer 1 [John J. Prof. of Poli Sci at U Chicago. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Pg 7-8] JL

Despite these hazards, social scientists should nevertheless use their theories to make predictions about the future. Making predictions helps inform policy discourse, because it helps make sense of events unfolding in the world around us. And by clarifying points of disagreement, making explicit forecasts helps those with contradictory views to frame their own ideas more clearly. Furthermore, trying to anticipate new events is a good way to test social science theories, because theorists do not have the benefit of hindsight and therefore cannot adjust their claims to fit the evidence (because it is not yet available). In short, the world can be used as a laboratory to decide which theories best explain international politics. In that spirit, I employ offensive realism to peer into the future, mindful of both the benefits and the hazards of trying to predict events.

#### Predictions are useful to develop a superior framing of ideas

Mearsheimer 1 (John, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001 p. 8, googleprint)

As a result, all political forecasting is bound to include some error. Those who venture to predict, as I do here, should therefore proceed with humility, take care not to exhibit unwarranted confidence, and admit that hindsight is likely to reveal surprises and mistakes. Despite these hazards, social scientists should nevertheless use their theories to make predictions about the future. Making predictions helps inform policy discourse, because it helps make sense of events unfolding in the world around us. And by clarifying points of disagreement, making explicit forecasts helps those with contradictory views to frame their own ideas more clearly. Furthermore, trying to anticipate new events is a good way to test social science theories, because theorists do not have the benefit of hindsight and therefore cannot adjust their claims to fit the evidence (because it is not yet available). In short, the world can be used as a laboratory to decide which theories best explain international politics. In that spirit I employ offensive realism to peer into the future, mindful of both the benefits and the hazards of trying to predict events.

#### Identifying causal forces of past events helps predict the future and better enable policymakers to respond to future crises

Walt 5 – (Prof, Kennedy School of Government @ Harvard (Stephen M., Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2005. 8:23–48, pg. 31, “The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations,” http://www.iheid.ch/webdav/site/political\_science/shared/political\_science/3452/walt.pdf)

**PREDICTION IR theories can also help policy makers anticipate events. By identifying the central causal forces at work in a particular era, theories offer a picture of the world and thus can provide policy makers with a better understanding of the broad context in which they are operating. Such knowledge may enable policy makers to prepare more intelligently and in some cases allow them to prevent unwanted developments**. To note an obvious example, different theories of international politics offered contrasting predictions about the end of the Cold War. Liberal theories generally offered optimistic forecasts, suggesting that the collapse of communism and the spread of Western-style institutions and political forms heralded an unusually peaceful era (Fukuyama 1992, Hoffman et al. 1993, Russett 1995, Weart 2000). By contrast, **realist theories of IR predicted that the collapse of the Soviet threat would weaken existing alliances** (Mearsheimer 1989, Waltz 1994–1995, Walt 1997c), stimulate the formation of anti-U.S. coalitions (Layne 1993,Kupchan 2000), and generally lead to heightened international competition. **Other realists foresaw a Pax Americana based on U.S. primacy** (Wohlforth 1999, Brooks & Wohlforth 2000–2001), **whereas scholars from different traditions anticipated either a looming “clash of civilizations”** (Huntington 1997) or a “coming anarchy” arising from failed states in the developing world (Kaplan 2001). **Some of these works were more explicitly theoretical than others, but each highlighted particular trends and causal relationships in order to sketch a picture of an emerging world.**

### Threats Real – Objectivity

#### **Threats real – empirics and objective reality**

Sokal 96 (Professor of Physics at New York University, 1996 (“A Physicist Experiments With Cultural Studies” http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/lingua\_franca\_v4/lingua\_franca\_v4.html)

Why did I do it? While my method was satirical, my motivation is utterly serious. What concerns me is the proliferation, not just of nonsense and sloppy thinking per se, but of a particular kind of nonsense and sloppy thinking: one that denies the existence of objective realities, or (when challenged) admits their existence but downplays their practical relevance. At its best, a journal like Social Text raises important questions that no scientist should ignore -- questions, for example, about how corporate and government funding influence scientific work. Unfortunately, epistemic relativism does little to further the discussion of these matters. In short, my concern over the spread of subjectivist thinking is both intellectual and political. Intellectually, the problem with such doctrines is that they are false (when not simply meaningless). There is a real world; its properties are not merely social constructions; facts and evidence do matter. What sane person would contend otherwise? And yet, much contemporary academic theorizing consists precisely of attempts to blur these obvious truths -- the utter absurdity of it all being concealed through obscure and pretentious language. Social Text's acceptance of my article exemplifies the intellectual arrogance of Theory -- meaning postmodernist literary theory -- carried to its logical extreme. No wonder they didn't bother to consult a physicist. If all is discourse and ``text,'' then knowledge of the real world is superfluous; even physics becomes just another branch of Cultural Studies. If, moreover, all is rhetoric and ``language games,'' then internal logical consistency is superfluous too: a patina of theoretical sophistication serves equally well. Incomprehensibility becomes a virtue; allusions, metaphors and puns substitute for evidence and logic. My own article is, if anything, an extremely modest example of this well-established genre. Politically, I'm angered because most (though not all) of this silliness is emanating from the self-proclaimed Left. We're witnessing here a profound historical volte-face. For most of the past two centuries, the Left has been identified with science and against obscurantism; we have believed that rational thought and the fearless analysis of objective reality (both natural and social) are incisive tools for combating the mystifications promoted by the powerful -- not to mention being desirable human ends in their own right. The recent turn of many ``progressive'' or ``leftist'' academic humanists and social scientists toward one or another form of epistemic relativism betrays this worthy heritage and undermines the already fragile prospects for progressive social critique. Theorizing about ``the social construction of reality'' won't help us find an effective treatment for AIDS or devise strategies for preventing global warming. Nor can we combat false ideas in history, sociology, economics and politics if we reject the notions of truth and falsity.

#### **Dogmatic realism leads us to universal truth- security threats exist.**

Kwan and Tsang 1 (Kai-Man, Department of Religion and Philosophy, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong, Eric W. School of Business Administration, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, U.S.A, December, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 22, No. 12 (Dec., 2001), pp. 1163-1168, “Realism and Constructivism in Strategy Research: A Critical Realist Response to Mir and Watson”,) CH

The problem with Mir and Watson here is again their failure to distinguish different kinds of real- ism. It is important to distinguish a dogmatic realist from a critical realist. Both believe that theories can be true or false, and rigorous scientific research can move us progressively towards a true account of phenomena. Dogmatic realists further believe that current theories correspond (almost) exactly to reality, and hence there is not much room for error or critical scrutiny. This attitude is inspired by (but does not strictly follow from) a primitive version of positivism which believes in indubitable observations as raw data and that an infallible scientific method can safely lead us from these data to universal laws. In contrast, critical realists, though believing in the possibility of progress towards a true account of phenomena, would not take such progress for granted. Exactly because they believe that reality exists independently of our minds, our theories, observations and methods are all fallible. Critical realists also insist that verification and falsification are never conclusive, especially in social sciences. So critical testing of theories and alleged universal laws need to be carried out continuously. A more detailed description of critical realism, which is now a growing movement transforming the intellectual scene.

### **Realism Inevitable**

#### **The power politics of realism enter into any possible system – even a critical approach leads back into realism.**

Murray 97 (Alastair J.H., Prof. of Poli. Theory at Univ. of Edinburgh, *Reconstructing Realism: Between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics*, pp. 130)

The other members of the group varied in their emphases, but there are clear parallels to this formulation in their conceptions which suggest its employment as a framework to assist understanding. The extent to which power infuses all social relations, the extent to which all social structures are marred by relations of domination and subordination, forms a pervasive theme throughout their work. It was this awareness of the intrusion of power into all social relations that generated their emphasis on 'the inevitable imperfections of any organization that is entangled with the world. l 1 " As Morgenthau once put it, the ideal 'can never be fully translated into political reality but only at best approximated ... there shall always be an element of political domination preventing the full realization of equality and freedom'. "9 The principal focus of this critique of the corrupting influence of power was, of course, international relations. Here, economic and legal mechanisms of domination are ultimately reduced to overt violence as the principal mechanism of determining political outcomes. The diffusion of power between states effectively transforms any such centrally organized mechanisms into simply another forum for the power politics of the very parties that it is supposed to restrain. As Kennan put it: ‘The realities of power will soon seep into anv legalistic structures which we erect to govern international life. They will permeate it. They will become the content of it; and the structure will replace the form.' 1:1 The repression of such power realities is, however, impossible; the political actor must simply 'seek their point of maximum equilibrium'. This conception of the balance of ultimately aimed, in Morgenthau’s words, 'to maintain the stability of the system without destroying the multiplicity of the elements composing it'. First, it was designed to prevent universal domination, to act as a deterrent to the ambitions of any dominant great power and as a safeguard against any attempt to establish **its** sway over the rest of the system.]-'4 Second, it was designed to preserve the independence and freedom of the states of the system, particularly the small states. **1"** I Only through the operation of the balance of power between great powers can small powers gain any genuine independence and any influence in the international system.1-" However, as Morgenthau pointed out, whilst, in domestic society, the balance of power operates in a context characterized by the existence of a degree of consensus and by the presence of a controlling central power, these factors are lacking in international relations and, thus, the balance is both much more important and yet much more flawed, the maintenance of equilibrium being achieved at the price of large-scale warfare and periodic eliminations of smaller states.] 7

#### States inherently compete with each other through any means necessary – realism is the only possible system.

Mearsheimer 1 (John, Prof. of Poli Sci at the Univ. of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 35)

All states are influenced by this logic, which means that not only do they look for opportunities to take advantage of one another, they also work to ensure that other states do not take advantage of them. After all, rival states are driven by the same logic, and most states are likely to recognize their own motives at play in the actions of other states. In short, states ultimately pay attention to defense as well as offense. They think about conquest themselves, and they work to check aggressor states from gaining power at their expense. This inexorably leads to a world of constant security competition, where states are willing to lie, cheat, and use brute force if it helps them gain advantage over their rivals. Peace, if one defines that concept as a state of tranquility or mutual concord, is not likely to break out in this world.

#### States naturally act based upon external influences of competition – this forces realism to be the only viable system of international relations.

Mearsheimer 1 (John, Prof. of Poli Sci at the Univ. of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 17)

This gloomy view of international relations is based on three core beliefs. First, realists, like liberals, treat states as the principal actors in world politics. Realists focus mainly on great powers, however, because these **states dominate and shape international politics and they also cause the deadliest wars.** Second, realists believe that **the behavior of great powers is influenced mainly by their external environment, not by their internal characteristics**. The structure of the international system, which all slates must deal with, largely shapes their foreign policies. Realists tend mint to draw sharp distinctions between “good” and “bad” states, because **all great powers act according to the same logic regardless of their culture, political system, or who runs the government**.27 It is therefore difficult to discriminate among states, save for differences in relative power. In essence, great powers are like billiard balls that vary only in size.28 Third, realists hold that **calculations about power dominate states’ thinking, and** that **states compete for power among themselves. That competition sometimes necessitates going to war,** which is considered an acceptable instrument of statecraft. To quote Carl von Clausewitz, the nineteenth-century military strategist, **war is a continuation of politics by other means**.29 Finally, a zero-sum quality characterizes that competition, sometimes making it intense and unforgiving. **States may cooperate with each other on occasion, but at root they have conflicting interests.**

### A2: Root Cause

#### **Wars don’t have single causes – consensus of experts**

Cashman 2k (Greg, Professor of Political Science at Salisbury State University “What Causes war?: An introduction to theories of international conflict” pg. 9)

Two warnings need to be issued at this point. First, while we have been using a single variable explanation of war merely for the sake of simplicity, multivariate explanations of war are likely to be much more powerful. Since social and political behaviors are extremely complex, they are almost never explainable through a single factor. Decades of research have led most analysts to reject monocausal explanations of war. For instance, international relations theorist J. David Singer suggests that we ought to move away from the concept of “causality” since it has become associated with the search for a single cause of war; we should instead redirect our activities toward discovering “explanations”—a term that implies multiple causes of war, but also a certain element of randomness or chance in their occurrence.

#### **Monocausal explanations impoverish scholarship**

Martin 90 (Brian, Department of Science and Technology Studies, University of Wollongong, Australia, Uprooting War, 1990 edition http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/90uw/uw13.html)

In this chapter and in the six preceding chapters I have examined a number of structures and factors which have some connection with the war system. There is much more that could be said about any one of these structures, and other factors which could be examined. Here I wish to note one important point: attention should not be focussed on one single factor to the exclusion of others. This is often done for example by some Marxists who look only at capitalism as a root of war and other social problems, and by some feminists who attribute most problems to patriarchy. The danger of monocausal explanations is that they may lead to an inadequate political practice. The ‘revolution’ may be followed by the persistence or even expansion of many problems which were not addressed by the single-factor perspective. The one connecting feature which I perceive in the structures underlying war is an unequal distribution of power. This unequal distribution is socially organised in many different ways, such as in the large-scale structures for state administration, in capitalist ownership, in male domination within families and elsewhere, in control over knowledge by experts, and in the use of force by the military. Furthermore, these different systems of power are interconnected. They often support each other, and sometimes conflict. This means that the struggle against war can and must be undertaken at many different levels. It ranges from struggles to undermine state power to struggles to undermine racism, sexism and other forms of domination at the level of the individual and the local community. Furthermore, the different struggles need to be linked together. That is the motivation for analysing the roots of war and developing strategies for grassroots movements to uproot them

### **No Impact**

#### The security dilemma doesn’t apply to situations where states pose genuine threats

Schweller 96(Randall, professor of political science at Ohio State, Security Studies, Spring, p. 117-118)

The crucial point is that **the security dilemma is always apparent, not real**. If states are arming for something other than security; that is, **if aggressors do in fact exist, then it is no longer a security dilemma but rather an example of a state or a coalition mobilizing for the purpose of expansion and the targets of that aggression responding and forming alliances to defend themselves**. Indeed, Glenn Snyder makes this very important point (disclaimer?) in his discussion of the security dilemma and alliance politics: “Uncertainty about the aims of others is inherent in structural anarchy. If a state clearly reveals itself as an expansionist, however, the alliance that forms against it is not self defeating as in the prisoners’ dilemma (security dilemma) model” 89 That is, if an expansionist state exists, there is no security dilemma/spiral model effect. Moreover, **if all states are relatively sure that none seeks expansion, then the security dilemma** similarly **fades away**. It is only the misplaced fear that others harbor aggressive designs that drive the security dilemma.

#### Empirically, responses to threats don’t create self-fulfilling prophesies—conveying weakness is more likely to spur aggression

Jervis 76 (Robert, prof of political science at Columbia University, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, p. 84)

**Spiral and deterrence theories thus contradict each other at every point**. They seem to be totally different conceptions of international relations claiming to be unconditionally applicable. **If this were true, it would be important to gather evidence that would disconfirm at least one of them**. 53 A look at the basic question of the effects of the application of negative sanctions makes it clear that neither theory is confirmed all the time. **There are lots of cases in which arms have been increased, aggressors deterred, significant gains made, without setting off spirals**. And there are also many instances in which the use of power and force has not only failed or even left the state worse off than it was originally (both of these outcomes can be explained by deterrence theory), but has led to mutual insecurity and misunderstanding that harmed both sides. Evidence Against the Spiral Model **The most obvious embarrassment to the spiral model is posed when an aggressive power will not respond in kind to conciliation**. Minor **concessions**, the willingness to treat individual issues as separate from the basic conflict, **and even an offer to negotiate can convince an aggressor that the status quo power is weak. Thus in 1903 Russia responded to British ex-pressions of interest in negotiating** the range of issues that divided them **by stiffening** her position **in the Far East, thus increasing the friction that soon led to the Russo-Japanese War**. 54 Whatever the underlying causes of Anglo-German differences before World War I, once the naval race was under way the kaiser interpreted any hesitancy in the British build-ing as indicating that, as he had predicted, the British economy could not stand the strain. As he read a dispatch describing a debate on naval esti- mates in Parliament in which more attention was paid to the costs of the program than to the two-power standard, the kaiser scribbled in the mar-gin: “They respect our firm will, and must bow before the accomplished fact [of the Gennan naval program]! Now further quiet building.” 55 And, as events of the 1930s show, **once an aggressor thinks the defenders are weak, it may be impossible to change this image short of war. Unambig-uous indicators of resolve are infrequent, and the aggressor is apt to think that the defender will back down at the last minute.** Concessions, made in the incorrect belief that the other is a status quo power are especially apt to be misinterpreted if the other does not under- stand that the state's policy is based on a false image. The spiral theorists have made an important contribution by stressing the serious conse-quences that flow from the common situation when a status quo power does not realize that others see it as aggressive, but they have ignored the other side of this coin. **Aggressors often think that their intentions are obvious to others and therefore conclude that any concessions made to them must be the result of fear and weakness**. Thus, by the time of Mu-nich, **Hitler** seems to have believed that the British realized his ambitions were not limited to areas inhabited by Germans and **concluded that Chamberlain was conciliatory not because he felt Germany would be sated but because he lacked the resolve to wage a war to oppose Ger-man domination** of the Continent. Since Hitler did not see that British policy rested on analysis of German intentions that was altered by the seizure of the non-German parts of Czechoslovakia he could not under-stand why British policy would be different in September 1939 than it had been a year earlier. 56 Even when the adversary aims for less than domination, concessions granted in the context of high conflict will lead to new demands if the adversary concludes that the state's desire for better relations can be ex-ploited. Thus Germany increased her pressure on France in the first Moroccan crisis after the latter assumed a more conciliatory posture and fired the strongly anti-German foreign minister. Similar dynamics pre-ceded the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war. More recently. the United States responded to Japanese concessions in the fall of 1941 not by making counter-concessions, but by issuing more extreme demands. Less frequently, even a status quo power may interpret conciliation as indicating that the other side is so weak that expansion is possible at little risk. As Herman Kahn notes, **prophecies can be self-denying**. To trust a person and place him in a position where he can make gains at your expense can awaken his acquisitiveness and lead him to behave in an untrustworthy manner.57 Similarly, **a state’s lowered level of arms can tempt the other to raise, rather than lower, its forces**. For example, the United States probably would not have tried to increase NATO's canven-tional forces in the 1960s were it not for the discovery that the Soviet Union had fewer troops than had been previously believed, thereby bringing within grasp the possibility of defending West Europe without a resort to nuclear weapons. It is also possible that the Soviets drastically increased their misslle forces in the late 1960s and early 1970s not only because of the costs of remaining in an inferior position but also because they thought the United States would allow them to attain parity.

#### Changing discourse doesn’t eliminate security dilemmas

Copeland 2k (Dale, professor of government at University of Virginia, International Security 25:2, Fall 2000, ingenta)

Although the road ahead for Wendt’s neoconstructivism is still long, Social Theory of International Politics provides a solid constructivist vehicle for travel-ing it. The book allows scholars to differentiate clearly between truly material and ideational explanations, and between accounts that emphasize the role of states as actors and those that incorporate transnational forces and divisions within polities. It has reinforced the importance of diplomacy as a tool for re-ducing high levels of misunderstanding that can impede cooperation. Yet **by bracketing off domestic processes, Wendt has overlooked the irony of constructivism: that the mutability of human ideational structures at the do-mestic level reinforces leaders’ great uncertainty about future intentions at the interstate level. The security dilemma, with all its implications, is real and per-vasive. It cannot be talked away through better discursive practices. It must be faced.**

### No Solvency

#### Abandoning realism doesn’t eliminate global violence—alternative worldviews will be just as violent or worse

O'Callaghan 2 (Terry, lecturer in the school of International Relations at the University of South Australia, International Relations and the third debate, ed: Jarvis, 2002, p. 79-80) [George = postmodernist guy]

In fact, if we explore the depths of George's writings further, we find remarkable brevity in their scope, failing to engage with practical issues beyond platitudes and homilies. George, for example, is concerned about the violent, dangerous and war-prone character of the present international system. And rightly so. The world is a cruel and unforgiving place, especially for those who suffer the indignity of human suffering beneath tyrannous leaders, warrior states, and greedy self-serving elites. But surely the problem of violence is not banished from the international arena once the global stranglehold of realist thinking is finally broken? It is important to try to determine the levels of violence that might be expected in a nonrealist world. How will internecine conflict be managed? How do postmodernists like George go about managing conflict between marginalized groups whose "voices" collide? It is one thing to talk about the failure of current realist thinking, but there is absolutely nothing in George's statements to suggest that he has discovered solutions to handle events in Bosnia, the Middle East, or East Timor. Postmodern approaches look as impoverished in this regard as do realist perspectives. Indeed, it is interesting to note that George gives conditional support for the actions of the United States in Haiti and Somalia "because on balance they gave people some hope where there was none" (George, 1994:231). Brute force, power politics, and interventionism do apparently have a place in George's postmodem world. But even so, the Haitian and Somalian cases are hardly in the same intransigent category as those of Bosnia or the Middle East. Indeed, the Americans pulled out of Somalia as soon as events took a turn for the worse and, in the process, received a great deal of criticism from the international community. Would George have done the same thing? Would he have left the Taliban to their devices in light of their complicity in the events of September 11? Would he have left the Somalians to wallow in poverty and misery? Would he have been willing to sacrifice the lives of a number of young men and women (American, Australian, French, or whatever) to subdue Aidid and his minions in order to restore social and political stability to Somalia? To be blunt, I wonder how much better off the international community would be if Jim George were put in charge of foreign affairs. This is not a fatuous point. After all, George wants to suggest that students of international politics are implicated in the trials and tribulations of international politics. All of us should be willing, therefore, to accept such a role, even hypothetically. I suspect, however, that were George actually to confront some of the dilemmas that policymakers do on a daily basis, he would find that teaching the Bosnian Serbs about the dangers of modernism, universalism and positivism, and asking them to be more tolerant and sensitive would not meet with much success. True, it may not be a whole lot worse than current realist approaches, but the point is that George has not demonstrated how his views might make a meaningful difference. Saying that they will is not enough, especially given that the outcomes of such strategies might cost people their lives. Nor, indeed, am I asking George to develop a "research project" along positivist lines. On the contrary, I am merely asking him to show how his position can make a difference to the "hard cases" in international politics. My point is thus a simple one. Despite George's pronouncements, there is little in his work to show that he has much appreciation for the kind of moral dilemmas that Augustine wrestled with in his early writings and that confront human beings every day. Were this the case, George would not have painted such a black-and- white picture of the study of international politics.

# \*\*Misc

## \*Narratives

### Narratives Bad – Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

#### Narrative fails to subvert the dominant paradigm – They recreate absolutisms

Clawson 98 (Mark, J.D. – Stanford, 22 Legal Stud. Forum 353)

These subjective identities give certain individuals solid ground upon which they can build a progressive framework of thought. But the narrowly defined identities of contemporary progressivism limit the possibility that those outside the narrow group of interest will share the agenda. One might hope that progressives could be somewhat open-minded. But as Stanley Fish has observed, "to say that one's mind should be open sounds fine until you realize that it is equivalent to saying that one's mind should be empty of commitments, should be a purely formal device." n165 Assuming that a broad base of progressive factions can mold diverse individuals-with distinct notions of identity-into a cohesive whole is simply asking the framework of progressive thought to do something that, in the end, it cannot. Contemporary narratives of identity seek to resolve the questions of authority that plague progressivism, but they lack the power that religion once held. In an earlier era, progressives could unite behind an over-arching paradigm that commanded them to "do as they would be done by." n166 Since widely shared cultural assumptions fueled the progressive agenda of early decades, slavery was vanquished and monopolies were crushed. But increasingly subjective narratives of identity command obeisance only within narrow spheres, not translating easily into the realities of other social worlds. The interpretation of the world facilitated by these narrow identities-including a well-defined course of future action-is accessible only to those who share their cultural assumptions. This interpretation may, in fact, challenge the social worlds established by other progressives. In the end, it seems that progressive narratives, like Frye's romances, end where they began, but with a difference. n167 Questions of authority and feelings of dissonance remain in the larger progressivism, but those who gain new identities now live in temporary worlds of absolutes.

### Narratives Bad – Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

#### Narratives support hegemonic structures- they link personal experience to universal unquestionable truth

Ewick and Silbey 95 (Patricia Susan S. Law & Society Review, 00239216, 19, Vol. 29, Issue 2)

In the previous section, we discussed how narratives, like the lives and experiences they recount, are cultural productions. Narratives are generated interactively through normatively structured performances and interactions. Even the most personal of narratives rely on and invoke collective narratives — symbols, linguistic formulations, structures, and vocabularies of motive — without which the personal would remain unintelligible and uninterpretable. Because of the conventionalized character of narrative, then, our stories are likely to express ideological effects and hegemonic assumptions.[ [10](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=106&sid=c00733b3-4acd-4926-b4f9-94f849d6e9f1%40sessionmgr109" \l "bib10" \o "10)] We are as likely to be shackled by the stories we tell (or that are culturally available for our telling) as we are by the form of oppression they might seek to reveal. In short, the structure, the content, and the performance of stories as they are defined and regulated within social settings often articulate and reproduce existing ideologies and hegemonic relations of power and inequality. It is important to emphasize that narratives do more than simply reflect or express existing ideologies. Through their telling, our stories come to constitute the hegemony that in turn shapes social lives and conduct "The hegemonic is not simply a static body of ideas to which members of a culture are obliged to conform" (Silberstein 1988:127). Rather, Silberstein writes, hegemony has "a protean nature in which dominant relations are preserved while their manifestations remain highly flexible. The hegemonic must continually evolve so as to recuperate alternative hegemonies." In other words, the hegemonic gets produced and evolves within individual, seemingly unique, discrete personal narratives. Indeed, the resilience of ideologies and hegemony may derive from their articulation within personal stories. Finding expression and being refashioned within the stories of countless individuals may lead to a polyvocality that inoculates and protects the master narrative from critique. The hegemonic strength of a master narrative derives, Brinkley Messick (1988:657) writes, from "its textual, and lived heteroglossia … [, s]ubverting and dissimulating itself at every … turn"; thus ideologies that are encoded in particular stories are "effectively protected from sustained critique" by the fact that they are constituted through variety and contradiction. Research in a variety of social settings has demonstrated the hegemonic potential of narrative by illustrating how narratives can contribute to the reproduction of existing structures of meaning and power. First, narratives can function specifically as mechanisms of social control (Mumby 1993). At various levels of social organization — ranging from families to nation-states — storytelling instructs us about what is expected and warns us of the consequences of nonconformity. Oft-told family tales about lost fortunes or spoiled reputations enforce traditional definitions and values of family life (Langellier & Peterson 1993). Similarly, bureaucratic organizations exact compliance from members through the articulation of managerial prerogatives and expectations and the consequences of violation or challenge (Witten 1993). Through our narratives of courtship, lost accounts, and failed careers, cultures are constructed; we "do" family, we "do" organization, through the stories we tell (Langellier & Peterson 1993). Second, the hegemonic potential of narrative is further enhanced by narratives' ability to colonize consciousness. Well-plotted stories cohere by relating various (selectively appropriated) events and details into a temporally organized whole (see part I above). The coherent whole, that is, the configuration of events and characters arranged in believable plots, preempts alternative stories. The events seem to speak for themselves; the tale appears to tell itself. Ehrenhaus (1993) provides a poignant example of a cultural meta-narrative that operates to stifle alternatives. He describes the currently dominant cultural narrative regarding the United States's involvement in the Vietnam War as one that relies on themes of dysfunction and rehabilitation. The story, as Ehrenhaus summarizes it, is structured as a social drama which characterizes both the nation and individual Vietnam veterans as having experienced a breakdown in normal functioning only recently resolved through a process of healing. This narrative is persuasive because it reiterates and elaborates already existing and dominant metaphors and interpretive frameworks in American culture concerning what Philip Rieff (1968) called the "triumph of the therapeutic" (see also Crews 1994). Significantly, the therapeutic motif underwriting this narrative depicts veterans as emotionally and psychologically fragile and, thus, disqualifies them as creditable witnesses. The connection between what they saw and experienced while in Vietnam and what the nation did in Vietnam is severed. In other words, what could have developed as a powerful critique of warfare as national policy is contained through the image of illness and rehabilitation, an image in which "'healing' is privileged over 'purpose' [and] the rhetoric of recovery and reintegration subverts the emergence of rhetoric that seeks to examine the reasons that recovery is even necessary" (Ehrenhaus 1993:83). Constituent and distinctive features of narratives make them particularly potent forms of social control and ideological penetration and homogenization. In part, their potency derives from the fact that narratives put "forth powerful and persuasive truth claims — claims about appropriate behavior and values — that are shielded from testing or debate" (Witten 1993:105). Performative features of narrative such as repetition, vivid concrete details, particularity of characters, and coherence of plot silence epistemological challenges and often generate emotional identification and commitment. Because narratives make implicit rather than explicit claims regarding causality and truth as they are dramatized in particular events regarding specific characters, stories elude challenges, testing, or debate. Van Dijk (1993) has reported, for instance, that stories containing negative images and stereotypes of nonwhite persons are less subject to the charge of racism when they recount personal experiences and particular events. Whereas a general claim that a certain group is inferior or dangerous might be contested on empirical grounds, an individual story about being mugged, a story which includes an incidental reference to the nonwhite race of the assailant, communicates a similar message but under the protected guise of simply stating the "facts." The causal significance or relevance of the assailant's race is, in such a tale, strongly implied but not subject to challenge or falsifiability. Thus representations, true and/or false, made implicitly without either validation or contest, are routinely exchanged in social interactions and thereby occupy social space. Third, narratives contribute to hegemony to the extent that they conceal the social organization of their production and plausibility. Narratives embody general understandings of the world that by their deployment and repetition come to constitute and sustain the life-world. Yet because narratives depict specific persons existing in particular social, physical, and historical locations, those general understandings often remain unacknowledged. By failing to make these manifest, narratives draw on unexamined assumptions and causal claims without displaying these assumptions and claims or laying them open to challenge or testing. Thus, as narratives depict understandings of particular persons and events, they reproduce, without exposing, the connections of the specific story and persons to the structure of relations and institutions that made the story plausible. To the extent that the hegemonic is "that order of signs and practices, relations and distinctions, images and epistemologies … that come to be taken-for-granted as the natural and received shape of the world and everything that inhabits it" (Comaroff & Comaroff 1991), the unarticulated and unexamined plausibility is the story's contribution to hegemony. The following two examples drawn from recent sociolegal research illustrate the ways in which legally organized narrativity helps produce the taken-for-granted and naturalized world by effacing the connections between the particular and the general. Sara Cobb (1992) examines the processes through which women's stories of violence are "domesticated" (tamed and normalized) within mediation sessions. Cobb reports that the domestication of women's stories of violence are a consequence of the organization of the setting in which they are told: within mediation, the storyteller and her audience are situated within a normative organization that recognizes the values of narrative participation over any substantive moral or epistemological code or standard. Being denied access to any external standards, the stories the women tell cannot therefore be adjudged true or compelling. The stories are interpreted as one version of a situation in which "multiple perspectives are possible." Cobb demonstrates how this particular context of elicitation specifically buries and silences stories of violence, effectively reproducing women's relative powerlessness within their families. With women deprived of the possibility of corroboration by the norms of the mediation session, their stories of violence are minimized and "disappeared." As a consequence, the individual woman can get little relief from the situation that brought her to mediation: she is denied an individual legal remedy (by being sent from court to mediation) and at the same time denied access to and connections with any collective understanding of or response to the sorts of violence acknowledged by the law (through the organization of the mediation process). Through this process, "violence, as a disruption of the moral order in a community, is made familiar (of the family) and natural — the extraordinary is tamed, drawn into the place where we eat, sleep and [is] made ordinary" (ibid., p. 19). Whereas mediation protects narratives from an interrogation of their truth claims, other, formal legal processes are deliberately organized to adjudicate truth claims. Yet even in these settings, certain types of truth claims are disqualified and thus shielded from examination and scrutiny. The strong preference of courts for individual narratives operates to impede the expression (and validation) of truth claims that are not easily represented through a particular story. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in the McClesky case (1986). The defendant, a black man who had been convicted of the murder of a police officer, was sentenced to death. His Supreme Court appeal of the death sentence was based on his claim that the law had been applied in a racially discriminatory way, thus denying him equal protection under the law. As part of McClesky's appeal, David Baldus, a social scientist, submitted an amicus brief in which he reported the results of his analysis of 2,000 homicide cases in that state (Baldus 1990). The statistical data revealed that black defendants convicted of killing white citizens were significantly more likely to receive the death sentence than white defendants convicted of killing a black victim. Despite this evidence of racial discrimination, the Court did not overturn McClesky's death sentence. The majority decision, in an opinion written by Justice Powell, stated that the kind of statistical evidence submitted by Baldus was simply not sufficient to establish that any racial discrimination occurred in this particular case. The court declared, instead, that to demonstrate racial discrimination, it would be necessary to establish that the jury, or the prosecutor, acted with discriminatory purpose in sentencing McClesky.[ [11](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=106&sid=c00733b3-4acd-4926-b4f9-94f849d6e9f1%40sessionmgr109" \l "bib11" \o "11)] Here, then, an unambiguous pattern of racial inequity was sustained through the very invocation of and demand for subjectivity (the jury's or prosecutor's state of mind) and particularity (the refusal to interpret this case as part of a larger category of cases) that are often embodied in narratives. In this instance, relative powerlessness and injustice (if one is to believe Baldus's data) were preserved, rather than challenged, by the demand for a particular narrative about specific concrete individuals whose interactions were bounded in time and space. In other words, the Court held that the legally cognizable explanation of the defendant's conviction could not be a product of inferential or deductive comprehension (Mink 1970; Bruner 1986). Despite its best efforts, the defense was denied discursive access to the generalizing, and authoritative, language of social logico-deductive science and with it the type of "truths" it is capable of representing. The court insists on a narrative that effaces the relationship between the particular and the general, between this case and other capital trials in Georgia. Further, the McClesky decision illustrates not only how the demand for narrative particularity may reinscribe relative powerlessness by obscuring the connection between the individual case and larger patterns of institutional behavior; it also reveals how conventionalized legal procedures impede the demonstration of that connection.[ [12](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=106&sid=c00733b3-4acd-4926-b4f9-94f849d6e9f1%40sessionmgr109" \l "bib12" \o "12)] The court simultaneously demanded evidence of the jurors' states of mind and excluded such evidence. Because jury deliberations are protected from routine scrutiny and evaluation, the majority demanded a kind of proof that is institutionally unavailable. Thus, in the McClesky decision, by insisting on a narrative of explicit articulated discrimination, the court calls for a kind of narrative truth that court procedures institutionally impede. As these examples suggest, a reliance on or demand for narrativity is neither unusual nor subversive within legal settings. In fact, given the ideological commitment to individualized justice and case-by-case processing that characterizes our legal system, narrative, relying as it often does on the language of the particular and subjective, may more often operate to sustain, rather than subvert, inequality and injustice. The law's insistent demand for personal narratives achieves a kind of radical individuation that disempowers the teller by effacing the connections among persons and the social organization of their experiences. This argument is borne out if we consider that being relieved of the necessity, and costs, of telling a story can be seen as liberatory and collectively empowering. Insofar as particular and subjective narratives reinforce a view of the world made up of autonomous individuals interacting only in immediate and local ways, they may hobble collective claims and solutions to social inequities (Silbey 1984). In fact, the progressive achievements of workers' compensation, no-fault divorce, no-fault auto insurance, strict liability, and some consumer protection regimes derive directly from the provision of legal remedies without the requirement to produce an individually crafted narrative of right and liability.

### Narratives Bad – Fetishization

#### The affirmative fetishizes the narrative – prevents true change

Brown 96 (Wendy is Professor of Women's Studies and Legal Studies, and is Co-Director of the Center for Cultural Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable)

But if the silences in discourses of domination are a site for insurrectionary noise, if they are the corridors we must fill with explosive counter-tales, it is also possible to make a fetish of breaking silence. Even more than a fetish, it is possible that this ostensible tool of emancipation carries its own techniques of subjugation--that it converges with non-emancipatory tendencies in contem- porary culture (for example, the ubiquity of confessional discourse and rampant personalization of political life), that it establishes regulatory norms, coincides with the disciplinary power of confession, in short, feeds the powers we meant to starve. While attempting to avoid a simple reversal of feminist valorizations of breaking silence, it is this dimension of silence and its putative opposite with which this Article is concerned. In the course of this work, I want to make the case for silence not simply as an aesthetic but a political value, a means of preserving certain practices and dimensions of existence from regulatory power, from normative violence, as well as from the scorching rays of public exposure. I also want to suggest a link between, on the one hand, a certain contemporary tendency concerning the lives of public figures--the confession or extraction of every detail of private and personal life (sexual, familial, therapeutic, financial) and, on the other, a certain practice in feminist culture: the compulsive putting into public discourse of heretofore hidden or private experiences--from catalogues of sexual pleasures to litanies of sexual abuses, from chronicles of eating disorders to diaries of homebirths, lesbian mothering, and Gloria Steinam's inner revolution. In linking these two phenomena--the privatization of public life via the mechanism of public exposure of private life on the one hand, and the compulsive/compulsory cataloguing of the details of women's lives on the other--I want to highlight a modality of regulation and depoliticization specific to our age that is not simply confessional but empties private life into the public domain, and thereby also usurps public space with the relatively trivial, rendering the political personal in a fashion that leaves injurious social, political and economic powers unremarked and untouched. In short, while intended as a practice of freedom (premised on the modernist conceit that the truth shall make us free), these productions of truth not only bear the capacity to chain us to our injurious histories as well as the stations of our small lives but also to instigate the further regulation of those lives, all the while depoliti- cizing their conditions.

#### This turns the case- it writes oppression into the law

Brown 96 (Wendy is Professor of Women's Studies and Legal Studies, and is Co-Director of the Center for Cultural Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable)

These questions suggest that in legally **codifying a fragment of an insurrec- tionary discourse as a timeless truth,** interpellating women as unified in their victimization, **and casting the "free speech" of men as that which "silences" and thus subordinates women, MacKinnon not only opposes bourgeois liberty to substantive equality, but potentially intensifies the regulation of gender and sexuality in the law,** abetting rather than contesting the production of gender identity as sexual. In short, **as a regulatory fiction of a particular identity is deployed to displace the hegemonic fiction of universal personhood, the discourse of rights converges insidiously with the discourse of disciplinarity to produce a spectacularly potent mode of juridical-regulatory domination.** Again, l**et me emphasize that the problem I am seeking to delineate is not specific to MacKinnon or** even **feminist legal reform. Rather, MacKinnon's and kindred efforts at bringing subjugated discourses into the law merely constitute examples of what Foucault identified as the risk of re-codification** and re- colonisation of "disinterred knowledges" **by those "unitary discourses, which first disqualified and then ignored them when they made their appearance."** n23 They exemplify how the work of breaking silence can metamorphose into new techniques of domination, how our truths can become our rulers rather than our emancipators, how our confessions become the norms by which we are regulated.

### Narratives Bad – Victimization

#### Their narratives of suffer produce flawed knowledge about the other and exclude those whose narratives aren’t about suffering

Brown 96 (Wendy is Professor of Women's Studies and Legal Studies, and is Co-Director of the Center for Cultural Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable)

If, taken together, the two passages from Foucault we have been consider- ing call feminists to account in our compulsion to put everything about women into discourse, they do not yet exhaust the phenomenon of being ensnared 'in the folds of our own discourses.' For if the problem I have been discussing is easy enough to see--indeed, largely familiar to those who track techniques of co-optation--at the level of legal and bureaucratic discourse, **it is altogether more disquieting when it takes the form of regulatory discourse in our own sub- and counter-cultures of resistance . . . when confessing injury becomes that which attaches us to the injury, paralyzes us within it, and prevents us from seeking or even desiring a status other than injured.** In an age of social identification through attributes marked as culturally significant--gender, race, sexuality, and so forth--**confessional discourse, with its truth-bearing status in a post-epistemological universe, not only regulates the confessor in the name of freeing her** as Foucault described that logic, but extends beyond the confess- ing individual to constitute a regulatory truth about the identity group. **Confessed truths are assembled and deployed as "knowledge" about the group.** This phenomenon would seem to undergird a range of recurring troubles in feminism, from the "real woman" rejoinder to post-structuralist deconstructions of her, to totalizing descriptions of women's experience that are the inadvertent effects of various kinds of survivor stories. Thus, for example, the porn star who feels miserably exploited, violated and humiliated in her work invariably monopolizes the truth about sex work; as the girl with math anxieties constitutes the truth about women and math; as eating disor- ders have become the truth about women and food; as sexual abuse and viola- tion occupy the knowledge terrain of women and sexuality. In other words, even as feminism aims to affirm diversity among women and women's ex- periences, confession as the site of production of truth and its convergence with feminist suspicion and deauthorization of truth from other sources tends to reinstate a unified discourse in which the story of greatest suffering becomes the true story of woman. (I think this constitutes part of the rhetorical power of MacKinnon's work; analytically, the epistemological superiority of confes- sion substitutes for the older, largely discredited charge of false consciousness). Thus, the adult who does not suffer from her or his childhood sexual experi- ence, the lesbian who does not feel shame, the woman of color who does not primarily or "correctly" identify with her marking as such--these figures are excluded as bonafide members of the categories which also claim them. Their status within these discourses is that of being "in denial," "passing" or being a "race traitor." **This is the norm-making process in feminist traditions of "breaking silence" which, ironically, silence and exclude the very women these traditions mean to empower.** (Is it surprising, when we think in this vein, that there is so little feminist writing on heterosexual pleasure?) But **if these practices tacitly silence those whose experiences do not parallel those whose suffering is most marked** (or whom the discourse produces as suffering markedly), **they also condemn those whose sufferings they record to a** permanent identification **with that suffering**. Here, **we experience a temporal ensnaring in 'the folds of our own discourses' insofar as we identify ourselves in speech in a manner that condemns us to live in a present dominated by the past.** But what if speech and silence aren't really opposites? Indeed, **what if to speak incessantly of** one's **suffering is to silence the possibilities of overcoming it,** of living beyond it, of identifying as something other than it? **What if this incessant speech not only overwhelms the experiences of others, but alternative** (unutterable? traumatized? fragmentary? inassimilable?) **zones of one's own experience**? Conversely, what if a certain modality of silence about one's suffering--and I am suggesting that we must consider modalities of silence as varied as modalities of speech and discourse--is to articulate a variety of possibilities not otherwise available to the sufferer?

#### Victimization turns and outweighs the case – causes oppression and denies agency

Kappeller 95 (Susanne, Associate Prof @ Al-Akhawayn University, The Will to Violence: The Politics of Personal Behavior, pg. 18)

There cannot therefore in the context of specific women’s actions be continued and undifferentiated talk of ‘women’s powerlessness’ —~ viewed simply in relation to men, the state, the power of leading capitalists or any other more powerful groups which can always be found. The discussion about power relations among women or within the women’s movement should have once and for all dispelled the simplistic view of women as powerless, impotent or ‘victims’. On the contrary, we are trying to gain an understanding of the position each of us has in a variety of power structures, where we are sometimes on the side of the oppressed, sometimes of the oppressors, in a complex network of relative power relations which have to be specifically analysed in each situation and cannot be determined simply in terms of social ‘identities’. Moreover, feminism has produced an analysis — if not of action generally, at any rate of sexual violence — which not only emphasizes the abuser’s will and choice of action, but also uniquely recognizes the survivor’s action of resisting, and in this her will to resist. While violence constitutes precisely the violator’s attempt to reduce his victim’s freedom of action to nought — where the ultimate con­sequence is indeed her total victimization in death — the survivor’s survival means that she has recognized and made use of her remaining, even if minimal, scope for action. Feminist analysis sees in the survivor not a passive victim, but a person and agent who has successfully sought to resist. This means recognizing even in her virtual powerless­ness the still existing potential for action. Resistance by definition means acting in situations of violence and oppression where our freedom’- of action is severely limited and circumscribed. All the more vital that we recognize what scope for action there is. All the more vital, also, that we recognize how much greater is our scope of action and resistance most of the time, compared to the extremity of victimization in experiences of life—threatening violence and enslave­ment - which we invoke metaphorically and all too lightly by claim­ing victim status on account of oppression.

### Narratives Bad – Narcissism

#### They narcissistically use narratives for the ballot – guts solvency and furthers oppression

Darling-Wolf 98 (Fabienne, Phd candidate at the University of Iowa, “White bodies and feminist dilemmas: on the complexity of positionality. (Constructing (Mis)Representations). Journal of Communication Inquiry v.22.n4(Oct1998): pp410(16)

**If our position can render even well-intended and carefully crafted speech epistemologically dangerous and place it beyond our control,** **attempts to speak for others motivated by self-interest and/or ignorance can conceivably have even more damaging consequences**. Consciously or not, **our speech might not be as well intended as we claim**. Rey Chow's (1993) Maoist, described in her book Writing Diaspora, exemplifies how identification with the subaltern can be self-interestingly used by academics pressured to include issues of gender, race, or class into their work. Chow defines the Maoist as **a person who desires a social order opposed to the one supporting her undertaking but refuses to recognize her own complicity with it**. **Identifying with a generalized non-Western subaltern, the Maoist uses the subaltern as a "subject" to advance her career and places herself in a fraudulent position of self-subalternization employed to claim authority in academia**. **The urge to speak for the subaltern may also originate in** white Western **theorists' desire to assuage their guilt**. Such a desire is exemplified by a telling anecdote mentioned by both Sabina Sawhney (1995) and Dympna Callaghan (1995) in which two feminist publishing houses made special efforts to publish writings on the plight of Asian girls by a young theorist named Rahila Khan--until they found out that Khan was in fact a male, middle-class, white vicar from Brighton named Toby Forward. Callaghan interprets the publishing houses' participation in the masquerade as a sign of "white feminism's still troubled encounter with racial difference" (p. 198). **While attempting to "give Khan a voice," white feminists treated her as an anthropological case study of an "authentic" other, as exemplified by their constant requests for more "ethnic" writings. In their search for ethnic specimens to increase their own knowledge, white feminists were not ready to deal with the complexity of positionality and consequently eagerly participated in the commodification of ethnic identity. They contributed to "a fetishization of women of color that once again reconstitutes them as other caught in the gaze of white feminist desire**" (Friedmah 1995, 11). Like Costner, Western theorists are searching for the authentic other in ethnic difference and an idealized past. In Writing Diaspora, Chow (1993) quotes a sinologist complaining about the fact that Chinese writers are losing their heritage. She compares the orientalist's desire to save the perishing traditions of "native" cultures and the "culture collecting" tendencies of "new historicism" to the work of primatologists capturing specimens for the safe enjoyment of white audiences at home. She also notes that in East Asian studies, political and cultural difference is frequently used as a judgment of authenticity. "**Natives" of communist China are treated as communist specimens who ought to be faithful to their nation's official political ideology. This focus on authenticity and national identity is often accompanied by pressures to concentrate on the "internal" and specific problems of a culture and serves to gloss over the impact of imperialism**. "**Native others are thus put to the difficult task of "authentically" representing their culture. Like the white model on the cover of a Japanese magazine, they are forced to stage their "exoticism" and turned into cultural icons**. For instance, while she acknowledges that her work as a cultural critic is intimately related to her experience as an Asian American woman, Leslie Bow (1995) expresses her discomfort with the fact that her Asian body serves to authenticate her "knowledge claims" about Asian Americans, Asian women, and, to some extent, women of color within the academy. As she explains, "[This] makes me acutely aware that we can be positioned not only according to our own agenda, but to that of others" (pp. 41-42). Furthermore**, if the representation is judged inadequate--**that is, if their work does not fit the dominant group's nostalgic notion of authenticity--**native others are exposed to the danger of being charged with self-interest**. Chow mentions the case of the Chinese poet Bei Dao accused of being "supremely translatable" by a Western sinologist, or her own experience of being deemed not "really" Chinese. **Others, judged to be authentic enough by the dominant group, may become canonized in the academy and championed as a major cultural voice** (Lakritz 1995). **Those token "native informants" can be used to assuage the guilt** and hide the ignorance of a majority concerned with including multiculturalism in its curriculum, a majority that, **in the process of granting space to select informants, keeps control over the terms of the debate**. **Another side effect of this forced positioning is exclusion from the dominant discourse**. As Trinh Minh-ha (1992, 164) puts it, "We have been herded as people of color to mind only our own culture." Uma Narayan (1989) notes that **scholars of mixed ethnic and racial origin often see the "darker side" of their identity played up, while the fact that they are distanced from the groups they are supposed to represent is ignored.** On a more general level, Chow (1993) observes that the framing of Chinese literature as minority discourse impedes its ascension to the status of world literature, as the rhetoric of universals ensures its ghettoization. She maintains that Chinese literature is thus trapped in its minority status because it is that status that gives it legitimacy. Furthermore, Chow (1993) notes that within Chinese studies, **minority discourse is not simply a fight for the content of oppression but also a fight for the ownership of speaking**. She explains that male Chinese authors often denounce feminist scholarship in their efforts to defend tradition, sinocentrism, and heritage. By doing so, such authors claim the minority discourse for themselves and in turn relegate Chinese women to minority status within the field of Asian studies. Thus, a feminist perspective may be considered compromising for minority scholars who can easily be accused of cultural betrayal (Bow 1995; Zavella 1996). For instance, bell hooks has been accused of committing acts of betrayal when turning her feminist critique to African American males. She warns that such practices can lead to hazardous self-censorship within minority communities. As she notes, "**The equation of truth-telling with betrayal is one of the most powerful ways to promote silence**" (hooks 1994, 68). The claims of Japanese feminists have often similarly been dismissed as manifestations of Western influence (Fujieda and Fujimura-Fanselow 1995)--that is, as not "truly" Japanese (see also Gamham 1993). But while minority discourse can be a trap, it can also serve the interests of academics in the West. Chow (1993) charges Chinese intellectuals speaking within the American academy on behalf of the neglected other in China with a certain level of dishonesty, especially if the former do not acknowledge the privilege afforded by their position overseas. She notes that scholars working in Western institutions might have more in common with their white middle-class colleagues than with the women "back home" they are supposed to represent. As she writes, "**If it is true that 'our' speech takes its `raw materials' from the suffering of the oppressed, it is also true that it takes its capital from the scholarly tradition, from the machineries of literacy and education, which are affordable only to a privileged few**" (p. 114). Bow (1995) similarly questions the self-positioning of some scholars, including Trinh Minh-ha and Gayatri Spivak, as Third World cultural critics rather than Asian Americanists. She wonders about the effects of disavowing American national affiliation on the part of scholars benefiting from American resources. Finally, the fact that **the act of speaking itself is necessarily embedded in structures of domination and reinforces the speaker's authority over "subaltern subjects" spoken for or about** raises the question of whether the subaltern can ever speak. According to Spivak, she or he cannot. As Spivak puts it, "If the subaltern can speak then, thank God, the subaltern is not subaltern any more" (quoted in Chow 1993, 36). Thus, Spivak urges us to recognize the double bind of identification that either results in the subaltern's protection against her own kind (Dunbar saving the Lakota Sioux women from the patriarchal attitudes of the men in their own culture) or in the assimilation of her voice into the project of imperialism (Khan's "ethnic" writings embraced by white feminists).

#### Their narcissistic movement begs for attention, ensuring hegemonic elites will notice it and crush it

Carlson 96 (Distinguished Professor of Theatre and Comparative Literature in the Ph.D. Program at the City University of New York, Marvin A., Performance: A critical Introduction, p. 181)

So much attention has been given to the social importance of visibility, in fact, that Peggy Phelan, in her recent book *Unmarked* (1993), has cautioned that **the operations of visibility itself need to be subjected to more critical inquiry**. In stressing performance’s ability to make visible, feminists have not considered the power of the invisible, nor the unmarked quality of live performance, which “becomes itself through disappearance.” **Without seeking to preserve itself through a stabilized copy, it “plunges into visibility – in a maniacally charged present – and disappears into memory, into the realm of invisibility and the unconscious where it eludes regulation and contro**l.” Phelan cites the performance works of Angelika Festa as work “in which she appears in order to disappear” – **appearing as a motionless figure wearing a mirror as a mask** (*You Are Obsessive, Eat Something*, 1984) or hanging for hours from a slanted pole, her eyes covered and her body wrapped in cocoon – like sheets (*Untitled Dance (with fish and others*), 1987**). Traditional representation, committed to resemblance and repetition, attempts to establish and control the “other” as “same.” This is the strategy of voyeurism, fetishism, and fixity, the ideology of the visible. If performance can be conceived as representation without reproduction, it can disrupt the attempted totalizing of the gaze and thus open a more diverse and inclusive representational landscape. As Elwes has noted, women performers should “never stay the same long enough to be named, fetishized**.”

## \*Irony

### Irony Bad – Non-Falsifiable

#### Irony is kinetic and determined by the listener – necessitates judge intervention

Karyshyn 95 (Jennifer Reksovna, prof @ Johns Hopkins University, Project Muse, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/mln/v110/110.4br_hutcheon.html>) JFS

According to Hutcheon, irony does not "exist." Instead, it is a kinetic--indeed, almost ephemeral--event that can "happen" between speaker and auditor, or between curator and museum visitor; and "the final responsibility for deciding whether irony actually happens in an utterance or not (and what that ironic meaning is) rests, in the end, solely with the interpreter" (45), rather than with the initiating ironist. The political force of this shift from a receptive recognition to a kinetic "happening," as the author herself admits, is to dislodge the commonplace that those who don't "get" particular ironies lack the cognitive skills the rest of us enjoy. "Interpretive competence" is a term often used in speech act theory; Hutcheon sets out to banish it--with its ironist-centric perspective--from the lexicon of irony, in favor of the more egalitarian concept of felicitously overlapping (or not) "communities": the cultural competence that *interpreters* are said to need might be more a matter of overlapping discursive communities between *both* participants. In a sense, then, it would be less a matter of the *competence of one* than of what Dan Sperber and Diedre Wilson have called the relevance of the context to *both*. (96; emphasis in original)

### Irony Bad – Alt Fails

#### Irony can never replace the existing system and it provides cover for tyrannical intentions

Wallace 97 (David Foster, Professor of Creative Writing and English at Pomona College, “A Supposedly Fun Thing I’ll Never Do Again”, p. 66-68) JFS

So thenhow have irony, irreverence, and rebellion come to be not liberating but enfeeblingin the culture today's avant-garde tries to write about?One clue's to be found in the fact that irony is still around**,** bigger than everafter 30 long years as the dominant mode of hip expression. It's not a rhetorical mode that wears well. As Hyde (whom I pretty obviously like) puts it, "Irony has only emergency use. Carried over time, it is the voice of the trapped who have come to enjoy their cage:'32 This is because irony, entertaining as it is,serves an almost exclusively negative function. It's critical and destructive, a ground-clearing. Surely this is the way our postmodern fathers saw it.But irony's singularly unuseful when it comes to constructing anything to replace the hypocrisies it debunks. This is why Hyde seems right about persistent irony being tiresome. It is unmeaty.Even gifted ironists work best in sound bites. I find gifted ironists sort of wickedly fun to listen to at parties, but I always walk away feeling like I've had several radical surgical procedures. And as for actually driving cross-country with a gifted ironist, or sitting through a 300-page novel full of nothing but trendy sardonic exhaustion,one ends up feeling not only empty but somehow . . . oppressed.Think, for a moment,of Third World rebels and coups. Third World rebels are great at exposing and overthrowing corrupt hypocritical regimes, but they seem noticeably less great at the mundane, non-negative task of then establishing a superior governing alternative. Victorious rebels, in fact, seem best at using their tough, cynical rebel-skills to avoid being rebelled against themselves — in other words, they just become better tyrants**.** And make no mistake:irony tyrannizes us. The reason why our pervasive cultural irony is at once so powerful and so unsatisfying is that an ironist is impossible to pin down. All U.S. irony is based on an implicit "I don't really mean what I'm saying." So what does irony as a cultural norm mean to say? That it's impossible to mean what you say? That maybe it's too bad it's impossible, but wake up and smell the coffee already? Most likely, I think, today's irony ends up saying: "How totally banal of you to ask what I really mean." Anyone with the heretical gall to ask an ironist what he actually stands for ends up looking like an hysteric or a prig. And herein lies the oppressiveness of institutionalized irony, the too-successful rebel: the ability to interdict the question without attending to its subject is, when exercised, tyranny. It is the new junta, using the very tool that exposed its enemy to insulate itself.

### Irony Bad – Apolitical

#### Irony is apolitical

Karyshyn 95 (Jennifer Reksovna, prof @ Johns Hopkins University, Project Muse, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/mln/v110/110.4br_hutcheon.html>) JFS

The variety of densely-textured and lucid readings that Hutcheon provides--of Kenneth Branagh's 1989 response to Olivier's 1944 Henry V, of the Ring cycle performed at Théâtre de la Monnaie in 1991, of Beauvais Lyons' art exhibit "Reconstruction of an Aazudian Temple"--seems to demonstrate the sheer variety of disciplines to which irony is available; although the reader notes that, in each of these extended readings, the "dominant" or "in" group (colonizers, white English males, members of academe, non-semitic Germans) inevitably is ironized by a member of its own ranks. This choice of practical examples gently undermines Hutcheon's claim that irony can be used by any group for any reason. Her theory, however, is useful in its very gesture to dissociate irony from unilateral political ramifications; and her recognition of the interpretive vicissitudes that result from one's individuality and simultaneous "membership" in a community fruitfully takes into account contemporary debates about identity politics and obligation. Yet the emphasis on individuals and their particular matrices of discursive communities makes any irony seem more accidental than political. Hutcheon repeatedly uses "happens" to describe irony's operation: "that's the verb I think best describes the process." The verb is appropriate: the great, unnamed determinant of Irony's Edge is hap, happenstance, the sheer (remote) chance that discursive communities will overlap and irony will "happen." The chanciness of irony leads us to question--appropriately, in this self-proclaimed age of irony--whether there could ever be a coherent "politics of irony" at all.

#### Irony is slacktivism – we parody problems but do nothing about them

Goerlandt 6 (Iannis, Professor at Ghent University, Critique, “"Put the Book Down and Slowly Walk Away": Irony and David Foster Wallace's Infinite Jest”, Volume 47, Issue 3, Spring, Proquest)

Hutcheon also spots the possibility of complacency in irony: irony becomes a kind of surrogate for actual resistance and opposition. Ironists have been accused of smugness before, [. . .] but this time it is the interpreter too who is not being let off the hook. Even worse, irony is seen by some to have become a cliché of contemporary culture, a "convention for establishing complicity," a "screen for bad faith" [. . .]. What was once an "avenue of dissent" is now seen as "a commodity in its own right" [. . .]. This position is usually articulated in terms of contrast: the "authentic" or "sincere" past versus the ironic present of the "total" ironist [. . .] whose use of what is interpreted as a mode of "monadic relativism" [. . .] prevents taking any stand on any issue. (28)9

#### Irony can’t challenge the dominant ideology – not linked to a political movement

Bewes 97 (Timothy, Assistant Professor of English at University of Sussex, “Cynicism and Postmodernity”, p. 41) JFS

There is a second, more obviously `dangerous' way in which irony functions as a kind of ideological sophistry. `The greatest advantage that irony gives to those who possess it [sic],' writes Toby Young, is `the ability to resist passionate political movements'. The extent to which irony, or laughter, might be harnessed by forces of political reaction is obvious. Slovenian critic Slavoj Zizek provides perhaps the most lucid account of this in the opening chapter of his The Sublime Object of Ideology. With reference to Peter Sloterdijk's distinction between `cynicism' and `kynicism', cynicism as irony, says Zizek, has replaced the classical Marxist notion of `false consciousness' as the dominant operational mode of ideology. The ruling ideology is no longer even meant to be taken seriously, according to Zizek. Irony as an end in itself represents the rapid commodification of a strategy that once provided a legitimate means of challenging the dominant ideology. Kynicism, by taking itself too seriously, becomes vulnerable to precisely its own critical processes — the moment when, as Sloterdijk says, `critique changes sides', and cynicism is perversely reconstituted as a "negation of the negation" of the official ideology'.66 Toby Young's version of irony is a psychic reification, a critique that no longer has an object, that exists solely and absurdly as an assertion of superiority over all conditions of representation. Since in principle nothing escapes its invective, enlightened cynicism is in effect a disabled critique that mistakes its own absence for a kind of universalized rigour.

### Irony Bad – Solvency Turn

#### Irony plays into the existing political system

Martin 10 (Bill, DePaul University, Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Volume 24, No. 1, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal\_of\_speculative\_philosophy/v024/24.1.martin.html)JFS

But here is where we need a political economy of irony, or an ironic reading of political economy. I love the fact that Willett is aiming very high, at the very heart of our heartless social system, as captured well by the title of her second chapter, “Laughter Against Hubris: A Preemptive Strike.” It is a matter of deploying the comedic modes against imperial hubris, as a strike against empire itself. Irony absolutelyabounds in this crazy social system, from the couple whose money went toward a dirt bike rather than health insurance to the role that “exotic financial instruments” (such as the bizarre phenomenon of “naked short selling”) have played in the current economic crisis, to say nothing of a seven-hundred-billion-dollar bailout for “capitalists” who are criminal rip-off artists on a scale and who are playing the central contradiction of capitalism, of socialized production and privatized accumulation, at a pitch that Marx could not have imagined. Surely there is a large role for ridicule here, but perhaps even much more for simple, outright condemnation and even more for, as Marx said, the weapons of criticism to go over to “criticism” by weapons! Irony, on the one hand, works differently from “simple” ridicule (even if it can fill out a certain kind of ridicule); among other complexities it always comes in at an angle, so to speak, and not simply straight on. On the other hand, for this very reason, it may not be able to play an emancipatory role in a world that is so upside down—or, at the very least, we’d better be careful in how we approach the question of a politics of irony.

### Irony Bad – Not Subversive

#### Radicalization of irony destroys its subversive potential

Asquith 9 (Nicole, UC Davis, SubStance Issue 118, Volume 38, No. 1, Project Muse http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/substance/v038/38.1.asquith.html)JFS

She focuses in particular on Baudelaire’s mastery of irony—his “self fractured by irony” serving as a useful model for our modern condition. Her term “irony as counterviolence,” a rubric for the committed yet vexed authors that interest her, does not seem to capture the full range of poetic engagement she describes. However, her analysis of Baudelaire’s irony is a good example of the way that she rehabilitates the theory of [End Page 161] modern poetry by mediating between seemingly opposed views. In this case, she critiques—and yet claims for her own purposes—deconstructionism’s “radicalization of irony as constitutive indeterminacy of meaning,” pointing out that, while the latter captures the breakdown of meaning associated with the psychological condition of trauma, it also threatens to undermine the critical edge of irony in a normative context (37). She resists dehistoricizing the aporia produced by irony, insisting that even a fractured discourse exists in historical context “within a shared representational context or *habitus*” (49).

### A2: Irony Avoids Cooption

#### Irony is easily commodified

Duncombe 97 (Stephen, Professor at the Gallatin School of New York University, “Notes From Underground: Zines and the Politics of Alternative Culture”, p. 148)JFS

Besides, the article of faith that critical irony cannot be co-opted by the commercial culture is a shaky one. Exactly how shaky was demonstrated in 1996 when Nike, the master of this game, added the song "Search and Destroy" to its sneaker ad lineup. The song, written in the early seventies by draft-dodging punk pioneer Iggy Stooge (aka Iggy Pop), was originally a mock celebration of the Vietnam War and American testosterone-driven culture. Reborn and stripped of any ironic message, "Search and Destroy" is now the soundtrack to a testosterone-driven basketball game and marketing strategy. I suppose it's only a matter of time until "Kill the Poor" sells Nikes too, most likely providing the musical backdrop to a scene of Nike-wearing ghetto kids playing aggressive b-ball.

#### No uniqueness – irony has already been coopted

Kuspit 4 (Donald, Professor of Art and Philosophy at University of Michigan, “Revising the Spiritual in Art”, Presented at Ball State Unviersity, January 21, http://www.bsu.edu/web/jfillwalk/BrederKuspit/RevisitingSpiritual.html)JFS

One of the reasons that Kandinsky was concerned with inner life is that it registers the pernicious emotional effects of outer materialistic life, affording a kind of critical perspective on materialism that becomes the springboard for emotional transcendence of it. The inability of Pop art to convey inner life, which is a consequence of its materialistic disbelief in interiority, and especially spirituality, which is the deepest interiority, indicates that Pop art’s irony is at best nominally critical. Irony in fact mocks belief, even as it spices up materialism, making it seem less banal, that is, populist, thus giving Pop art the look of deviance characteristic of avant-garde art. In Pop art it is no more than a simulated effect. I dwell on irony because it is opposed to spirituality, not to say incommensurate with it, and also its supposedly more knowing alternative, and because irony has become the ruling desideratum of contemporary art, apparently redeeming its materialism. This itself is ironical, for contemporary materialistic society and its media have discovered the advantage of being ironical about themselves, namely, it spares them the serious trouble of having to change. This suggests that irony has become a form of frivolity. It is no longer the revolutionary debunking understanding it once claimed to be, e.g., in Jasper Johns’s American flag paintings, but an expression of frustration.

# \*\*\*Kritiks Good\*\*\*

## \*\*Epistemology

### Epistemology Good – Policy Relevance

#### A flawed epistemology shapes their policy relevance arguments – must be questioned

Owen 2 (David, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653)JFS

The first dimension concerns the relationship between positivist IR theory and postmodernist IR ‘theory’ (and the examples illustrate the claims concerning pluralism and factionalism made in the introduction to this section). It is exhibited when we read Walt warning of the danger of postmodernism as a kind of theoretical decadence since ‘issues of peace and war are too important for the field [of IR] to be diverted into a prolix and self-indulgent discourse that is divorced from the real world’,12 or find Keohane asserting sniffily that Neither neorealist nor neoliberal institutionalists are content with interpreting texts: both sets of theorists believe that there is an international political reality that can be partly understood, even if it will always remain to some extent veiled.13 We should be wary of such denunciations precisely because the issue at stake for the practitioners of this ‘prolix and self-indulgent discourse’ is the picturing of international politics and the implications of this picturing for the epistemic and ethical framing of the discipline, namely, the constitution of what phenomena are appropriate objects of theoretical or other forms of enquiry. The kind of accounts provided by practitioners of this type are not competing theories (hence Keohane’s complaint) but conceptual reproblematisations of the background that informs theory construction, namely, the distinctions, concepts, assumptions, inferences and assertability warrants that are taken for granted in the course of the debate between, for example, neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists (hence the point-missing character of Keohane’s complaint). Thus, for example, Michael Shapiro writes: The global system of sovereign states has been familiar both structurally and symbolically in the daily acts of imagination through which space and human identity are construed. The persistence of this international imaginary has helped to support the political privilege of sovereignty affiliations and territorialities. In recent years, however, a variety of disciplines have offered conceptualizations that challenge the familiar, bordered world of the discourse of international relations.14 The point of these remarks is to call critically into question the background picture (or, to use another term of art, the horizon) against which the disciplinary discourse and practices of IR are conducted in order to make this background itself an object of reflection and evaluation. In a similar vein, Rob Walker argues: Under the present circumstances the question ‘What is to be done?’ invites a degree of arrogance that is all too visible in the behaviour of the dominant political forces of our time. . . . The most pressing questions of the age call not only for concrete policy options to be offered to existing elites and institutions, but also, and more crucially, for a serious rethinking of the ways in which it is possible for human beings to live together.15 The aim of these comments is to draw to our attention the easily forgotten fact that our existing ways of picturing international politics emerge from, and in relation to, the very practices of international politics with which they are engaged and it is entirely plausible (on standard Humean grounds) that, under changing conditions of political activity, these ways of guiding reflection and action may lose their epistemic and/or ethical value such that a deeper interrogation of the terms of international politics is required. Whether or not one agrees with Walker that this is currently required, it is a perfectly reasonable issue to raise. After all, as Quentin Skinner has recently reminded us, it is remarkably difficult to avoid falling under the spell of our own intellectual heritage. . . . As we analyse and reflect on our normative concepts, it is easy to become bewitched into believing that the ways of thinking about them bequeathed to us by the mainstream of our intellectual traditions must be the ways of thinking about them.16 In this respect, one effect of the kind of challenge posed by postmodernists like Michael Shapiro and Rob Walker is to prevent us from becoming too readily bewitched.

### Epistemology Good – Prerequisite

#### **Epistemic adequacy is a prerequisite to the choice between the K and policy relevance**

Owen 2 (David, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653)JFS

The third dimension concerns the relationship between positivist IR theory and critical IR theory, where White’s distinction enables us to make sense of a related confusion, namely, the confusion between holding that forms of positivist IR theory (e.g., neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism) are necessarily either value-free or evaluative. It does so because we can now see that, although forms of positivist IR theory are not normative theories, they presuppose a background picture which orients our thinking through the framing of not only what can be intelligibly up for grabs as true-or-false (the epistemic framing) but also what can be intelligibly up for grabs as good-or-bad (the ethical framing). As Charles Taylor has argued, a condition of our intelligibility as agents is that we inhabit a moral framework which orients us in ethical space and our practices of epistemic theorising cannot be intelligibly conceived as existing independently of this orientation in thinking.21 The confusion in IR theory arises because, on the one hand, positivist IR theory typically suppresses acknowledgement of its own ethical presuppositions under the influence of the scientific model (e.g., Waltz’s neorealism and Keohane’s neoliberal institutionalism), while, on the other hand, its (radical) critics typically view its ethical characteristics as indicating that there is an evaluative or normative theory hidden, as it were, within the folds of what presents itself as a value-free account. Consequently, both regard the other as, in some sense, producing ideological forms of knowledge; the positivist’s claim is that critical IR theory is ideological by virtue of its explicitly normative character, the critical theorist’s claim is that positivist IR theory is ideological by virtue of its failure to acknowledge and reflect on its own implicit normative commitments. But this mutual disdain is also a product of the confusion of pictures and theories. Firstly, there is a confusion between pictures and theories combined with the scientistic suppression of the ethical presuppositions of IR theory. This finds expression in the thought that we need to get our epistemic account of the world sorted out before we can engage responsibly in ethical judgement about what to do, where such epistemic adequacy requires the construction of a positive theory that can explain the features of the world at issue. An example of this position is provided by Waltz’s neorealism.22 Against this first position, we may reasonably point out that epistemic adequacy cannot be intelligibly specified independently of background ethical commitments concerning what matters to us and how it matters to us. Secondly, there is the confusion of pictures and theories combined with the moralist overestimation of the ethical (ideological) commitments of IR theory. This finds expression in the thought that we need to get our ethical account sorted out before we can engage responsibly in epistemic judgement about what to know, where such ethical adequacy requires the construction of a moral theory and, more particularly, a moral ideal that can direct the enterprise of epistemic theorising. An example of this position is provided by Linklater ’s version of critical IR theory.23 Against this position, we can reasonably point out that the kind of ethical adequacy required does not entail the construction of a moral ideal but only the existence of some shared ethical judgements concerning what matters to us that orient our epistemic enquiries. The dual confusion in question leads fairly straightforwardly to the thought that what is at stake here are incompatible epistemological commitments and hence that debate between positivist and critical forms of IR theory needs to be conducted at an epistemological level. However, as my remarks indicate, this thought is mistaken insofar as the apparent incompatibility from which it derives is an illusion.

### Epistemology Good – Subjective

#### **Knowledge production is based on a violent subjectivity – epistemic inquiry is necessary**

Chow 6 (Rey, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities and Professor of Modern Culture & Media Studies, Comparative Literature, and English, The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work, Duke University Press, pg. 40-41)

Often under the modest and apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the "scientific" and "objective" production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special "areas" became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic conception of the world as target.52 In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war—if, for instance, the ability to translate a difficult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes53—is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to "know" the other cultures? Can "knowledge" that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare's accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign "self"/"eye"—the "I"—that is the United States, the other will have no choice but remain just that—a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as at the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber—such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter—will never receive the attention that is due to them. "Knowledge," however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences.54 This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has been, since its inception, haunted by "the absence of a definable object"-and by "the problem of the vanishing object."

## \*\*Ontology

### Ontology Good – Nuclear

#### **The nuclear predicament can only be understood in terms of ontology – it’s a necessary prerequisite to any understanding of the current condition**

Santoni 85 (Ronald, Prof of Philosphy @ Denison U, “Nuclear War Philosophical Perspectives, pp. 153-4)

In contrast, Zimmerman, who essentially restates the position of the German existentialist Martin Heidegger, argues that the origins of the arms race are deeper then psychological. Thus, the arms race is rooted in a radical misunderstanding of who we are as human beings, and is also a particularly dangerous symptom of “anthropocentric humanism” – an idolatrous modern humanism which, among other defects, both self-centeredly views the human being as the only being which possesses any intrinsic worth or value *and* understands human beings as things; e.g., as their “egos,” bodies, or “pesonae.” Adherents to two competing views of anthropocentric humanism, the two nuclear giants vie to secure the earth and all of its commodities. Each regards as a threat to its individual goals of power, security and domination of the Earth. Each prepares to annihilate the other for the sake of its won idolatrous, self-logical misunderstanding of both human and nonhuman being (the latter perceived as “raw material to be consumed by human kinds”). Our craving to consume things betrays insecurity and expresses the sense of ontological isolation we experience as a result of anthropocentric humanism’s subject-object dualism. Our distorted images and anxieties about “the enemy” stem in part from the arrogant view that *other* people, advocating a divergent ideology and a different form of humanism, must stand as obstacles to our controlling or appropriating the world. 6 Each sides preparations for nuclear wear epitomize the “dark side” of modern humanism – its distorted drive to domination the Earth at any cost to lie. So steeped are we in this eco-centered humanism that we remain anchored to it as we try to find our way beyond it. It accounts for our resort to psychological maneuvers which Fox discusses, not the other way round. Given this analysis, what is needed to liberate us from the spiral of the arms race is no less than a “paradigm shift” in our understanding of what it means to be a human being. We need a “more profound humanism” that both acknowledges the uniqueness of the human being (we are not things but the “awareness” or “opening” in which things manifest themselves) and recognizes that the “highest human possibility “ is not to dominate other beings but to serve them by letting them reveal themselves as they are. As Zimmerman and Heidegger put it, we must “let beings be” we must take the anxiety that reveals to us the facticitiy of our death, that returns us to the truth of who we are that summons us to relinquish old destructive patterns and open new creative ways. Only when we accept the creative disclosures of anxiety, “recollect what we have forgotten,” refuse to be controlled by fear, and being in terms of “open awareness” and love will eliminate the threat of the Other and the motive for the arms race. Although Zimmerman appear to agree with Fox concerning our need to admit to ourselves our anxiety and fear, and to see through our self-deceptive efforts to evade the possibility of our extinction, it is clear that for Zimmerman the cure to our contemporary malady demand first and foremost a correction on our ontology – in our understanding of and attitude toward being – rather then a correction of our psychology. Coming to understand who we are in relation to the rest of being is a prerequisite to understanding and overcoming the psychological aberrations that spawn, nourish and hold us hostage to the arms race. Trying to own up to fear and anxiety without succumbing to delusive defense mechanisms – in the matter that Fox prescribes – requires, for Zimmerman, addressing our self-understanding and approach to all beings: only then will language be able to “speak through us in a new way”; only then will we be more open to serve than to dominate. I agree with Zimmerman that the underlying causes of the arms race are deeper than psychological, that the psychological fears and distortions which heat the arms are an outcome of our idolatrous attitude to ourselves and our exploitative attitude to other beings. I believe that the problem of what constitutes a person represents the fundamental philosophical issue of the twentieth century, and that it is in our confusions about and failures to discern the distinguishing ontological features of a human being that we find the bases of vexing contemporary problems of violence and dehumanization. These problems reflect the way in which we violate the dignity, freedom and autonomy of human reality, in which we treat persons as things. The Zimmerman-Heidegger analysis serves to underscore my conviction that our present preoccupations with violence and preparations for nuclear “war” reveal a distorted existential perspective on all being, not just human being. We objectify human reality and are quite ready to devour the rest of Being for our human “ends” even if that process means the extinction of all life.2

### Ontology Good – Violence

#### **The affirmatives attempt to secure our world leads to an endless spiral of violence – only prioritizing ontology can remedy violence**

Zimmerman 85 (Michael, Prof of Philosophy @ U of Colorado, Nuclear War Philosophical Perspectives, pp. 135-36)

We live in an age of crisis. Crises threaten to destroy established states of affairs, but crises are also opportunities for creating something novel and beautiful. At first glance, it would appear that the nuclear arms race is the most pressing crisis facing us. Surely if this arms race ends like those before it, we will destroy much of humanity as well as many other forms of life that share the Earth with us. The nuclear arms race, however, as I shall argue in the following essay, may only be a symptom of a deeper crisis that has been developing for many centuries. This crisis has to do with how we understand ourselves as human beings. Today, human beings in the so-called developed countries regard humankind as the center of reality, the source of all meaning, and the only beings with intrinsic value. I shall use the term “anthropocentric humanism” to refer to this way of understanding who we are. The dark side of humanism is often ignored in favor of the positive dimensions of the humanism with which we are more familiar. The positive thrust of humanism includes its recognition of the importance of individual human freedom and its affirmation of the dignity of humankinds. The dark side of humanism involves an arrogant human-centeredness that reduces the nonhuman world to the status of a commodity whose only value lies in its usefulness for human purposes. According to the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, conceiving of ourselves as masters of all beings, we adopt a false sense of superiority that undermines our true humanity. In the following essay, which will make use of some of Heidegger’s thoughts about human existence in the nuclear age, I argue that this same drive to dominate the natural world is present in the armed struggle between nations. The current nuclear arms race can be interpreted as a conflict between two great representatives of anthropocentric humanism, the United States and the Soviet Union. Strangely, each nation is prepared to annihilate the other side in order to defend the principles of “true humanism”. Marxists and capitalist alike regard their life as the only legitimate fulfillment of the Enlightenment ideal of human progress and freedom. But to a large extent both superpowers are guided by anthropocentric humanism, whose highest aim is power and security, Hence, neither superpower can rest content until the other side is eliminated or at least neutralized. Paradoxically, the quest for total security leads to total insecurity, as we are finding out now that the nuclear arms race is moving to even more threatening levels. In my view, the dangers of nuclear war will not be eliminated, even though some arms controls might be successfully negotiated, until there occurs a basic shift in our understanding of what it means to be human. The positive side of humanism, which has some insight into what it means to be fully human, points in the right direction, but the dark of anthropocentric side predominates today. Let us consider for a moment Heidegger’s view that anthropocentric humanism is the underling disorder, of which the nuclear arms race is but a particularly dangerous symptom.

### Ontology Good – Shapes Thought

#### **Ontology shapes thought processes and actions – it operates subconsciously as well**

Campbell and Shapiro 96 (eds., Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pg. 96)

As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other-regional-modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate through the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or *aporia*, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock-innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making. While Certain continental thinkers like Blumenberg and Lowith, for example, were prompted to interrogate or challenge the modern’s claim to being distinctively “modern,” and others such as Adorno questioned its enlightened credentials, philosophers like Derrida and Levinas pursued the metaphysical implications (or rather the implications for metaphysics) of the thinking initiated by Kierkegaard, as well as by Nietzsche and Heidegger. The violence of metaphysics, together with another way of thinking about the question of the ethical, emerged as the defining theme of their work. Other, notably Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard, Baudrillard, and Bataille turned the thinking of Nietzsche and Heidegger into a novel kind of social and political critique of both the regimes and the effects of power that have come to distinguish late modern times; they concentrated, in detail, upon how the violence identified by these other thinkers manifested itself not only in the mundane practices of modern life, but also in those areas that claimed to be most free of it, especially the freedom and security of the subject as well as its allied will to truth and knowledge. Questioning the appeal to the secure self-grounding common to both its epistemic structures and its political imagination, and in the course of reinterrogating both the political character of the modern and the modern character of the political, this problematization of modernity has begun to prompt an ontopolitcally driven reappraisal of modern political thought.

### Ontology Good – Politics

#### Ontology determines what does and does not count as political

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, The Politics of Security, pp. 84-86]

One has consequently always to give things more than their due if one is to do Justice to them.17 Freed into no escape from death we are nonetheless also free, however, to deny demission’s commission and are prone ordinarily to do so. Such is the common anti-political fallenness which technology has made its own, in its own specific enterprisingly narcotic way, from which the political has to be recovered in our age. The radical hermeneutical phenomenology which issues from Heidegger’s thinking and questioning shows how we understand as we do because we exist as we do. Understanding as we do in the way that we exist, we came, in the tradition The topos of encounter 85 of the ‘West’, to think metaphysically. Metaphysics asked about the truth of Being, of what is, but answered with an account of the truth of the Being of beings, that is to say of things we find present to hand. Truth was therefore thought to be lodged in the truthfulness of the assertion about the Being of beings. In the absence of God it came to be founded in the subject making the assertion. The result was the dominance of the representative-calculative thought of modern subjectivity in which truth is a measure of the adequation of the correspondence between the thinking subject’s assertions and entities themselves. (Such that: ‘For representational thinking everything comes to be a being’.18 Even Being.) Hence, the absolute centrality of the subject in the modern age. For a flakey subject— riven with Otherness and bearing difference within itself—becomes an absolute abhorrence to truth itself when truth and knowledge demand a secure and reliable subject for their certain foundation: ‘But not every way of being a self is subjectivity’.19 Heidegger’s entire corpus of thinking is tenaciously devoted to uncovering metaphysics’ missed ontology not only in the various projects (‘ontology’, epistemology, phenomenology)—and the core concept (correctness), method (logic) and epistemological ambition (theory, or the report of the sight of the truth)—of Western thought, but also in the very life of the ‘West’ itself (technicity). Show Heidegger a thinker, a thought, a practice or a way of life and he will go after the ontology—ontic (metaphysical) as well as fundamental—sequestered there. In this respect, his lecture course, Basic Questions of Philosophy. Selected ‘Problems’ of ‘Logic’, is a virtual text book on the way he habitually proceeds.20 In every epistemology, too, there is an ontology. Because we are as we understand and think, in our modern political practices as well as in our ‘political science’— or knowledge of politics where a well-founded modesty about scientific pretensions is expressed—there therefore lurks the ontology of metaphysics. Heidegger’s deconstruction of metaphysics consequently leads to the following chain of thought, in which we must also never lose sight of the mutually disclosive twofold duality of Being and beings. Thrown, we exist. Existing, we project and understand. Existing, understanding and projecting as thrown we are obliged to think.21 Thinking we think Being. Thinking Being, we have not only come to think (‘ontologically’) the Being of beings, but also the Being of Being as an, albeit Supreme, being (‘onto-theology’). Thrown into existing as understanding and thinking we inhabit worlds. The world we inhabit expresses the ways in which we have come to understand and think. The end of the way that we think—metaphysics—is technology. Technology is the mounting oblivion of the aletheic truth of the Being of human being, and the radical impoverishment of human being’s capacity to create and live in a world, a condition globalised by the ballistic power of technology’s trajectory. We, therefore, think the political in the way that we do because of the way that we think. Thinking the political in the way that we do because of the way that we think, the political too has become technologised such that politics threatens to become identical with technicity. The political problematic of the modern age, as Heidegger might have expressed it, is the globalisation of technology as politics and the globalisation of politics as technology. Thinking differently, Heidegger necessarily, therefore, came to think the political differently as well. Specifically, when he came to think differently about the political he inevitably did so through the different thought of the truth of Being, and the Being of truth, to which his entire deconstructive mode of thought was devoted. That different thought of truth was primarily expressed and explored through his rethinking of the Greek word for truth, aletheia, where truth is the truth of disclosure in which revealing and concealing are simultaneously involved. We cannot think with and against Heidegger’s thought of the political therefore without appreciating how the political arises for him through the aletheic character of truth. Truth and politics are as intimately related for Heidegger, therefore, as ever they are in modern thought.

## \*\*A2: Utilitarianism/Consequentialism

### Utilitarianism Bad – Genocide/War/Morals

#### Policy decisions directed at maintaining human survival through whatever means will encourage genocide, war, and the destruction of moral values

Callahan 73 (Co-Founder and former director of The Hastings Institute, PhD in philosophy from Harvard University, Daniel, “The Tyranny of Survival”, p 91-93)

The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of Communist domination has for over two decades fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs. During World War II, native Japanese-Americans were herded, without due process of law, to detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944) in the general context that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise blatantly unjustifiable. The survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimations of Nazism. Under the banner of survival, the government of South Africa imposes a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has seen one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival: the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evoked as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B. F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. For Jacques Monod, in Chance and Necessity, survival requires that we overthrow almost every known religious, ethical and political system. In genetics, the survival of the gene pool has been put forward as sufficient grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from marrying and bearing children. Some have even suggested that we do the cause of survival no good by our misguided medical efforts to find means by which those suffering from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a normal life, and thus procreate even more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than to cite Paul Ehrlich, whose works have shown a high dedication to survival, and in its holy name a willingness to contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to surviving populations of nations which have not enacted population-control policies. For all these reasons it is possible to counterpoise over against the need for survival a "tyranny of survival." There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for sake of survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny survival as value is that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive single-mindedness that will stop at nothing. We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without the premise of a right to life—then how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in the process, destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival. To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic victories. Yet it would be the defeat of all defeats if, because human beings could not properly manage their need to survive, they succeeded in not doing so.

### Utilitarianism Bad – Individuality

#### Utilitarianism disregards respect for the individual and perpetuates societal inequality by evaluating utility as a whole

Freeman 94 (Avalon Prof in the Humanities @ U of Penn, Ph.D. Harvard University, J.D. University of North Carolina Samuel, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 313-349, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265463)

The inclusion of all sentient beings in the calculation of interests severely undermines the force of any claim that utilitarianism is an "egalitarian" doctrine, based in some notion of equal concern and respect for persons. But let us assume Kymlicka can restore his thesis by insisting that it concerns, not utilitarianism as a general moral doctrine, but as a more limited thesis about political morality. (Here I pass over the fact that none of the utilitarians he relies on to support his egalitarian interpretation construe the doctrine as purely political. The drift of modern utilitarian theory is just the other way: utilitarianism is not seen as a political doctrine, to be appealed to by legislators and citizens, but a nonpublic criterion of right that is indirectly applied [by whom is a separate issue] to assess the nonutilitarian public political conception of justice.) Still, let us assume it is as a doctrine of political morality that utilitarianism treats persons, and only persons, as equals. Even in this form it cannot be that maximizing utility is "not a goal" but a "by-product," "entirely derived from the prior requirement to treat people with equal consideration" (CPP, p. 31) Kymlicka says, "If utilitarianism is best seen as an egalitarian doctrine, then there is no independent commitment to the idea of maximizing welfare" (CPP, p. 35, emphases added). But how can this be? (i) What is there about the formal principle of equal consideration (or for that matter occupying a universal point of view) which would imply that we maximize the aggregate of individuals' welfare? Why not assume, for example, that equal consideration requires maximizing the division of welfare (strict equality, or however equal division is to be construed); or, at least maximize the multiple (which would result in more equitable distributions than the aggregate)? Or, why not suppose equal consideration requires equal proportionate satisfaction of each person's interests (by for example, determining our resources and then satisfying some set percentage of each person's desires) . Or finally we might rely on some Paretian principle: equal consideration means adopting measures making no one worse off. For reasons I shall soon discuss, each of these rules is a better explication of equal consideration of each person's interests than is the utilitarian aggregative method, which in effect collapses distinctions among persons. (2) Moreover, rather than construing individuals' "interests" as their actual (or rational) desires, and then putting them all on a par and measuring according to intensity, why not construe their interests lexically, in terms of a hierarchy of wants, where certain interests are, to use Scanlon's terms, more "urgent" than others, insofar as they are more basic needs? Equal consideration would then rule out satisfying less urgent interests of the majority of people until all means have been taken to satisfy everyone's more basic needs. (3) Finally, what is there about equal consideration, by itself, that requires maximizing anything? Why does it not require, as in David Gauthier's view, optimizing constraints on individual utility maximization? Or why does it not require sharing a distribution? The point is just that, to say we ought to give equal consideration to everyone's interests does not, by itself, imply much of anything about how we ought to proceed or what we ought to do. It is a purely formal principle, which requires certain added, independent assumptions, to yield any substantive conclusions. That (i) utilitarian procedures maximize is not a "by-product" of equal consideration. It stems from a particular conception of rationality that is explicitly incorporated into the procedure. That (2) individuals' interests are construed in terms of their (rational) desires or preferences, all of which are put on a par, stems from a conception of individual welfare or the human good: a person's good is defined subjectively, as what he wants or would want after due reflection. Finally (3), aggregation stems from the fact that, on the classical view, a single individual takes up everyone's desires as if they were his own, sympathetically identifies with them, and chooses to maximize his "individual" utility. Hare, for one, explicitly makes this move. Just as Rawls says of the classical view, Hare "extend[s] to society the principle of choice for one man, and then, to make this extension work, conflat[es] all persons into one through the imaginative acts of the impartial sympathetic spectator" (TJ, p. 27). If these are independent premises incorporated into the justification of utilitarianism and its decision procedure, then maximizing aggregate utility cannot be a "by-product" of a procedure that gives equal consideration to everyone's interests. Instead, it defines what that procedure is. If anything is a by-product here, it is the appeal to equal consideration. Utilitarians appeal to impartiality in order to extend a method of individual practical rationality so that it may be applied to society as a whole (cf. TJ, pp. 26-27). Impartiality, combined with sympathetic identification, allows a hypothetical observer to experience the desires of others as if they were his own, and compare alternative courses of action according to their conduciveness to a single maximand, made possible by equal consideration and sympathy. The significant fact is that, in this procedure, appeals to equal consideration have nothing to do with impartiality between persons. What is really being given equal consideration are desires or experiences of the same magnitude. That these are the desires or experiences of separate persons (or, for that matter, of some other sentient being) is simply an incidental fact that has no substantive effect on utilitarian calculations. This becomes apparent from the fact that we can more accurately describe the utilitarian principle in terms of giving, not equal consideration to each person's interests, but instead equal consideration to equally intense interests, no matter where they occur. Nothing is lost in this redescription, and a great deal of clarity is gained. It is in this sense that persons enter into utilitarian calculations only incidentally. Any mention of them can be dropped without loss of the crucial information one needs to learn how to apply utilitarian procedures. This indicates what is wrong with the common claim that utilitarians emphasize procedural equality and fairness among persons, not substantive equality and fairness in results. On the contrary, utilitarianism, rightly construed, emphasizes neither procedural nor substantive equality among persons. Desires and experiences, not persons, are the proper objects of equal concern in utilitarian procedures. Having in effect read persons out of the picture at the procedural end, before decisions on distributions even get underway, it is little wonder that utilitarianism can result in such substantive inequalities. What follows is that utilitarian appeals to democracy and the democratic value of equality are misleading. In no sense do utilitarians seek to give persons equal concern and respect.

### Utilitarianism Bad – Morals

#### Owning oneself is a moral imperative – utilitarianism imposes interpersonal obligations to society, which destroys morality

Freeman 94 (Avalon Prof in the Humanities @ U of Penn, Ph.D. Harvard University, J.D. University of North Carolina Samuel, Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 4, Autumn, pp. 313-349, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265463)

Kymlicka distinguishes two interpretations of utilitarianism: teleological and egalitarian. According to Rawls's teleological interpretation, the "fundamental goal" (LCC, p. 33) of utilitarianism is not persons, but the goodness of states of affairs. Duty is defined by what best brings about these states of affairs. " [M] aximizing the good is primary, and we count individuals equally only because that maximizes value. Our primary duty isn't to treat people as equals, but to bring about valuable states of affairs" (LCC, p. 27). It is difficult to see, Kymlicka says, how this reading of utilitarianism can be viewed as a moral theory. Morality, in our everyday view at least, is a matter of interpersonal obligations-the obligations we owe to each other. But to whom do we owe the duty of maximizing utility? Surely not to the impersonal ideal spectator . . . for he doesn't exist. Nor to the maximally valuable state of affairs itself, for states of affairs don't have moral claims." (LCC, p. 28-29) Kymlicka says, "This form of utilitarianism does not merit serious consideration as a political morality" (LCC, p. 29). Suppose we see utilitarianism differently, as a theory whose "fundamental principle" is "to treat people as equals" (LCC, p. 29). On this egalitarian reading, utilitarianism is a procedure for aggregating individual interests and desires, a procedure for making social choices, specifying which trade-offs are acceptable. It's a moral theory which purports to treat people as equals, with equal concern and respect. It does so by counting everyone for one, and no one for more than one. (LCC, p. 25)

### Utilitarianism Bad – Mass Death

#### Risks taken by the government to increase overall utility will severely compromise the individual which will result in fatality

Schroeder 86 (Christopher H., Prof of Law at Duke, “Rights Against Risks,”, April, Columbia Law Review, pp. 495-562, http://www.jstor.org/pss/1122636)

Equity has provided a limited answer to the question of acceptable risk. The traditional doctrine of injunctions against tortious behavior holds that courts may enjoin behavior that is virtually certain to harm an identifiable individual in the near future.'2 This body of law, however, focuses more on avoidance of harm to specific persons than on regulation of risk.'3 It is thus inapposite to the questions of modern technological risk, risk that is quite unlikely to injure any identifiable individual in the short-term, but that carries severe consequences that are certain to occur to someone in the medium to distant future. Consider the paradigm of the Acme Chemical Company: Acme Chemical Company is discovered to be storing chemical wastes on its land in such a way that seepage containing traces of those wastes are entering an underground water system that serves as the sole drinking water supply for a town several miles away. One of the chemicals has been classified as a carcinogen in laboratory experiments on mice. Although extrapolating from these results to predictions of human carcinogencity is somewhat controversial, federal agencies routinely do so. Under one of a number of plausible sets of assumptions, a concentration of ten parts per billion (ppb) in drinking water is estimated to increase a human's chance of contracting cancer by one in one hundred thousand if the human is assumed to consume a normal intake over the course of twenty years. Analyses show that the current concentration in the underground aquifer near Acme's plant is ten ppb. This case exhibits the typical features of risky actions associated with modern technology. The probability of risk to any individual is relatively small while its severity is substantial, perhaps fatal. Risk is being imposed on individuals who have not consented to it in any meaningful sense. Finally, risk is unintentional in the sense that imposing risk on others is not an objective of Acme's plan.'4 We may assume its executives in fact would be tremendously relieved if they could avoid the risk.

### Utilitarianism Bad – Value to Life

#### Utilitarianism destroys value to life by forcing the individual to take risks for the overall utility

Schroeder 86 (Christopher H., Prof of Law at Duke, “Rights Against Risks,”, April, Columbia Law Review, pp. 495-562, http://www.jstor.org/pss/1122636)

From the individual's point of view, the balancing of costs and benefits that utilitarianism endorses renders the status of any individual risk bearer profoundly insecure. A risk bearer cannot determine from the kind of risk being imposed on him whether it is impermissible or not. The identical risk may be justified if necessary to avoid a calamity and unjustified if the product of an act of profitless carelessness, but the nature and extent of the underlying benefits of the risky action are fre quently unknown to the risk bearer so that he cannot know whether or not he is being wronged. Furthermore, even when the gain that lies behind the risk is well-known, the status of a risk bearer is insecure because individuals can justifiably be inflicted with ever greater levels of risk in conjunction with increasing gains. Certainly, individual risk bearers may be entitled to more protection if the risky action exposes many others to the same risk, since the likelihood that technological risks will cause greater harm increases as more and more people experience that risk. This makes the risky action less likely to be justifiable. Once again, however, that insight seems scant comfort to an individual, for it reinforces the realization that, standing alone, he does not count for much. A strategy of weighing gains against risks thus renders the status of any specific risk victim substantially contingent upon the claims of others, both those who may share his victim status and those who stand to gain from the risky activity. The anxiety to preserve some fundamental place for the individual that cannot be overrun by larger social considerations underlies what H.L.A. Hart has aptly termed the "distinctively modern criticism of utilitarianism,"58 the criticism that, despite its famous slogan, "everyone [is] to count for one,"59 utilitarianism ultimately denies each individual a primary place in its system of values. Various versions of utilitarian ism evaluate actions by the consequences of those actions to maximize happiness, the net of pleasure over pain, or the satisfaction of desires.60 Whatever the specific formulation, the goal of maximizing some mea sure of utility obscures and diminishes the status of each individual. It reduces the individual to a conduit, a reference point that registers the appropriate "utiles," but does not count for anything independent of his monitoring function.61 It also produces moral requirements that can trample an individual, if necessary, to maximize utility, since once the net effects of a proposal on the maximand have been taken into account, the individual is expendable. Counting pleasure and pain equally across individuals is a laudable proposal, but counting only plea sure and pain permits the grossest inequities among individuals and the trampling of the few in furtherance of the utility of the many. In sum, utilitarianism makes the status of any individual radically contingent. The individual's status will be preserved only so long as that status con tributes to increasing total utility. Otherwise, the individual can be discarded.

### Consequentialism Bad – Epistemology

#### **We don’t evaluate consequences neutrally – epistemic basis bankrupts their consequentialist analysis**

Owen 2 (David, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653)JFS

 First, ‘human acts’ and ‘consequences’ should both be construed broadly to include, in the former case, human practices in general and, in the latter case, effects ranging from transformations of being to transformations of environment across both material and conceptual registers. Second, Dewey’s point concerning the perception of consequences draws to our attention the fact that the visibility of consequences is dependent on the background picture in terms of which the practices in question are situated and hence the central role that world-disclosure plays in the constitution of forms of government. Third, Dewey’s stress on the relationship between common perception and action-coordination directed to governing the effects of the practices in question. Fourth, and particularly importantly, the reflexive character of this starting point, that is, the fact the efforts at governing the effects of certain practices themselves involve practices which have consequences. This fourth point is significant because it indicates that Dewey is providing a way of accounting not only for the emergence and development of forms of government, but also for the emergence and development of forms of contesting or governing government (such as, for example, criticism in the sense of an art of reflexive indocility which protests against being governed like this, at this costs and with these consequences). In other words, Dewey’s pragmatist approach to the issue of government links perception, knowledge and action in orienting itself to our conduct and the ways in which we seek to conduct our conduct. Although this approach may be readily aligned with the burgeoning literature within IR on government and governance, a literature prompted in part by Kratochwil and Ruggie,25 it has two significant advantages with respect to this literature. First, the focus on perception opens up a space within which questions of the background picture informing the discourse and practices of international relations can be perspicuously posed. Second, its reflexive application to practices of government and governance clarifies the relationship between government and freedom such that the legitimacy of practices of government is seen to depend not simply on its efficacy but on the consent of those who are governed by it. This starting point is, as I have noted, very general and since our concern is not with government in general, but with government of the common or public affairs of humanity, it is appropriate to note that Dewey specifies this more restricted sense by distinguishing between public transactions, transactions which have significant effects for others beyond those involved in the transaction, and private transactions, transactions whose significant effects do not extend beyond the parties engaged in the transaction.26 This is still fairly general, not to mention rough and ready, but that may not be a bad thing since, on this account, publics are formed on the basis of the shared practical judgement that a given (type of) transaction has consequences of extensive significance—and it would be wholly against Dewey’s general ethical orientation to seek to specify standards of significance in advance, as I shall illustrate in the next section. It follows from this account that (political) publics are specified relative to practices of political government in terms of advocating a practice of government at a given level and/or in terms of contesting a practice, or proposed practice, of government. Publics can be local, regional, national, transnational or global, and publics form, dissolve and reform over time— some may be relatively enduring, others relatively passing. In the contemporary context, we may take it as a strength of Dewey’s approach that it does not presuppose what we might call methodological statecentrism; on the contrary, precisely because it takes government as its focus, it is methodologically suited to reflecting not only on states but on the whole panoply of agencies involved in government and governance, or in contesting these practices, without prejudging their significance.27

## \*\*A2: Pragmatism

### Pragmatism Bad – Empty Rhetoric

#### Rorty is heavy on rhetoric, weak on reason – Be skeptical of their willy-nilly combinations and put a premium on our links

Davidson 7 (John, Princeton, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rorty/)JFS

One particularly contentious issue has arisen in connection with Rorty's appropriation of earlier philosophers; prominent readers of the classical American pragmatists have expressed deep reservations about Rorty's interpretation of Dewey and Peirce, in particular, and the pragmatist movement in general. Consequently, Rorty's entitlement to the label "pragmatist" has been challenged. For instance Susan Haack's strong claims on this score have received much attention, but there are many others. (See, for example, the discussions of Rorty in Thomas M. Alexander, 1987; Gary Brodsky, 1982; James Campbell, 1984; Abraham Edel, 1985; James Gouinlock, 1995; Lavine 1995; R.W: Sleeper, 1986; as well as the essays in Lenore Langdorf and Andrew R. Smith, 1995.) For Rorty, the key figure in the American pragmatist movement is John Dewey, to whom he attributes many of his own central doctrines. In particular, Rorty finds in Dewey an anticipation of his own view of philosophy as the hand-maiden of a humanist politics, of a non-ontological view of the virtues of inquiry, of a holistic conception of human intellectual life, and of an anti-essentialist, historicist conception of philosophical thought. To read Dewey his way, however, Rorty explicitly sets about separating the "good" from the "bad" Dewey. (See "Dewey's Metaphysics," CP, 72-89, and "Dewey between Hegel and Darwin", in Saatkamp, 1-15.) He is critical of what he takes to be Dewey's backsliding into metaphysics in Experience and Nature, and has no patience for the constructive attempt of Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. Rorty thus imposes a scheme of evaluation on Dewey's works which many scholars object to. Lavine, for instance, claims that "scientific method" is Dewey's central concept (Lavine 1995, 44). R.W. Sleeper holds that reform rather than elimination of metaphysics and epistemology is Dewey's aim (Sleeper 1986, 2, chapter 6). Rorty's least favourite pragmatist is Peirce, whom he regards as subject to both scheme-content dualism and to a degree of scientism. So it is not surprising that Haack, whose own pragmatism draws inspiration from Peirce, finds Rorty's recasting of pragmatism literally unworthy of the name. Rorty's key break with the pragmatists is a fundamental one; to Haack's mind, by situating himself in opposition to the epistemological orientation of modern philosophy, Rorty ends up dismissing the very project that gave direction to the works of the American pragmatists. While classical pragmatism is an attempt to understand and work out a novel legitimating framework for scientific inquiry, Haack maintains, Rorty's "pragmatism" (Haack consistently uses quotes) is simply an abandonment of the very attempt to learn more about the nature and adequacy conditions of inquiry. Instead of aiding us in our aspiration to govern ourselves through rational thought, Rorty weakens our intellectual resilience and leaves us even more vulnerable to rhetorical seduction. To Haack and her sympathisers, Rorty's pragmatism is dangerous, performing an end-run on reason, and therefore on philosophy.

### Pragmatism Bad – Atrocities

#### Pragmatism opens the door for genocide and nuclear war

Leiter 7 (Brian, Law@UTexas, http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/issues/archive/v74/74\_3/04.Leiter.pdf)JFS

Now Rorty does sometimes write as though, in terms of practical success, science and morals are on a par. He says, for example, “We have been equally successful in both morals and physics. To be sure, we have more difficulty convincing people of our moral views than of our scientific views, but this does not mean that the two differ in something called ‘epistemic status.’”18 Yet what could count as the evidence of “equal success” in morals and physics that Rorty has in mind? It can’t be that those who try to violate the laws of physics end up frustrated, maimed, or dead, while those who violate the moral law (however it is understood) suffer no predictable set of consequences at all. It can’t be that Nazi scientists and Manhattan Project scientists were interested in the same physics, but had rather different morals and politics. It can’t be that the academic community in physics is global, transcending culture and nationality, while most moral debate is parochial in the worst sense of that term, that is, tracking the interests and horizons of particular classes, cultural traditions, and experiences. Rorty objects, however, that “brute facts about the presence or absence of consensus—whether about planetary orbits or about sodomy—are to be explained sociologically rather than epistemologically.” For this to be persuasive, however, we would need to hear the details about how the actual sociological explanation goes, and Rorty, alas, never offers any. About the only explanatorily relevant psychosocial factor in the offing is that humans everywhere share an interest in predicting the future course of their experience, but that simply explains why the Scientific Norm works for human purposes, and why Nazis and social democrats share the same physics, but not the same morals. But that is a “sociological” explanation that simply underlines the fundamental difference between morals and science.

### Pragmatism Bad – Decision-Making

#### Many decisions need to be based in frames other than practicality

Leiter 7 (Brian, Law@UTexas, http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/issues/archive/v74/74\_3/04.Leiter.pdf)

If I am right, then perhaps there is only one plausible pragmatic thesis that deserves notice in philosophy, and it is the one suggested by the powerful metaphor of Neurath’s boat. This thesis is, contra Rorty, very much an epistemological thesis, that is, a thesis about the justification of what we ought to believe. And it says that justification can not run all the way down, that it is grounded, unavoidably, in propositions (and practices) that we accept because they work, and not for any other reason. But nothing in human experience or history gives us any reason to think that the criterion of “what works” extends all the way up the chain of justification. For it turns out that from human experience and human history, the practices “that work” are practices whose criteria of belief and action have nothing to do with practical considerations. And when we take those practices seriously, natural science and morality seem to be very different indeed.

### Pragmatism Bad – Tautological

#### Rorty is tautological – How can we “prove” prag w/o an epistemological basis for favoring what “works?

Olsen 6 (Michael, UC-SD undergrad, Cal Undergrad Philo Review, http://www.cupr.org/VI2/VoicingIdeas-Olsen.pdf)

Richard Rorty argues in “Solidarity or objectivity?” that the course of philosophy since the time of Plato has concerned two opposing ways of thinking of one’s life: objectivity or solidarity. The first is defined as a pursuit of justification for knowledge independent of appearance, or “standing in relation to a nonhuman reality” (Rorty 1991, p. 21). Solidarity is, on the other hand sought among the relations of individuals in a community without the detachment of a “God’s eye view.” Rorty proposes that we accept solidarity, looking at “knowledge [and truth] as a compliment paid to the beliefs […] we think so well justified that, for the moment, further justification is not needed” (Rorty 1991, p. 24). Problematic to Rorty’s pragmatism is that it leaves us in a regress in attempt to justify our knowledge. Additionally, even if we accept his theory as coherent, coherence can be grounded in falsity and truth alike. At the heart of our desire for objectivity, is not to seek Truth for its own sake as Rorty contends (Rorty 1991, p. 21), but to seek truth for the very purpose of reasoned communal discourse. While we should always be willing to adjust our beliefs and grow, a view that Rorty espouses, his view of knowledge in fact hinders our ability to move forward.

### Pragmatism Bad – Epistemology

#### Their argument for pragmatism is circular – It presumes that there is a rationality to their epistemology

Leiter 7 (Brian, Law@UTexas, http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/issues/archive/v74/74\_3/04.Leiter.pdf)

We may see how Rorty’s “pragmatism,” as he calls it, goes wrong by recalling the most evocative metaphor in the pragmatist genre, “Neurath’s boat,” an image due to the logical positivist Otto Neurath but made famous in post-WWII philosophy by the American pragmatist Quine.16 Neurath (and Quine) analogized our epistemological situation to that of sailors at sea who must rebuild the boat in which they sail. Being afloat, they cannot abandon the ship and rebuild it from scratch, so they must choose to stand firm on certain planks of the ship while rebuilding others. They, of course, choose to “stand firm” on those planks that are the most sturdy and reliable—the ones that “work” the best—though there may come a point when the sailors will tear those up too and replace them with new ones. Our epistemological situation, on this Quinean pragmatic view, is the same. In figuring out what we ought to believe, we necessarily “stand firm” on certain epistemic “planks” in our best-going theory of the world, the one that, to date, has worked the best. To be sure, we cannot rule out that we may one day want to replace those planks too—just as our predecessors replaced planks like “the truth is what the Good Book says” and “Newtonian mechanics describes the laws governing all matter”—but that is just to renounce absolute certainty and accept fallibilism as fundamental to our epistemological situation.

#### Rorty is backward on epistemology – Fundamentally undermines prag

Leiter 7 (Brian, Law@UTexas, http://lawreview.uchicago.edu/issues/archive/v74/74\_3/04.Leiter.pdf)

Where the Neurath/Quine picture agrees with Rorty is that all our epistemic judgments are “parochial,” but only in the fairly trivial sense that it is conceptually (hence practically) impossible for us to climb out of our ship (our best-going theory of the world) and rebuild the whole edifice from scratch by reference to nonparochial (nonhistorical) standards of truth and warrant. (On Quine’s view, “there is no Archimedean point of cosmic exile from which to leverage our theory of the world.”17) We must necessarily rely on certain epistemic criteria—criteria for what we ought to believe—any time we ask about the justification of any other belief (including beliefs about epistemic criteria). That is just to say that we must stand firm on certain “planks” in the boat while rebuilding (or figuring out whether we ought to rebuild) any other planks. The only question, then, is which planks we ought to “stand firm” on because they work so well.

## \*\*A2: Switch Sides Debate

### Switch Sides Bad – Spanos

#### Switch-side debate makes people disinterested in real belief and prepares a world of neocons

Spanos 4 (William, in Joe Millers’ Book Cross-ex pg. 467)JFS

Dear Joe Miller, Yes, the statement about the American debate circuit you refer to was made by me, though some years ago. I strongly believed then –and still do, even though a certain uneasiness about “objectivity” has crept into the “philosophy of debate” — that debate in both the high schools and colleges in this country is assumed to take place nowhere, even though the issues that are debated are profoundly historical, which means that positions are always represented from the perspective of power, and a matter of life and death. I find it grotesque that in the debate world, it doesn’t matter which position you take on an issue — say, the United States’ unilateral wars of preemption — as long as you “score points”. The world we live in is a world entirely dominated by an “exceptionalist” America which has perennially claimed that it has been chosen by God or History to fulfill his/its “errand in the wilderness.” That claim is powerful because American economic and military power lies behind it. And any alternative position in such a world is virtually powerless. Given this inexorable historical reality, to assume, as the protocols of debate do, that all positions are equal is to efface the imbalances of power that are the fundamental condition of history and to annul the Moral authority inhering in the position of the oppressed. This is why I have said that the appropriation of my interested work on education and empire to this transcendental debate world constitute a travesty of my intentions. My scholarship is not “disinterested.” It is militant and intended to ameliorate as much as possible the pain and suffering of those who have been oppressed by the “democratic” institutions that have power precisely by way of showing that their language if “truth,” far from being “disinterested” or “objective” as it is always claimed, is informed by the will to power over all manner of “others.” This is also why I told my interlocutor that he and those in the debate world who felt like him should call into question the traditional “objective” debate protocols and the instrumentalist language they privilege in favor of a concept of debate and of language in which life and death mattered. I am very much aware that the arrogant neocons who now saturate the government of the Bush administration — judges, pentagon planners, state department officials, etc. learned their “disinterested” argumentative skills in the high school and college debate societies and that, accordingly, they have become masters at disarming the just causes of the oppressed. This kind leadership will reproduce itself (along with the invisible oppression it perpetrates) as long as the training ground and the debate protocols from which it emerges remains in tact. A revolution in the debate world must occur. It must force that unworldly world down into the historical arena where positions make a difference. To invoke the late Edward Said, only such a revolution will be capable of “deterring democracy” (in Noam Chomsky’s ironic phrase), of instigating the secular critical consciousness that is, in my mind, the sine qua non for avoiding the immanent global disaster towards which the blind arrogance of Bush Administration and his neocon policy makers is leading.

### Switch Sides Bad – Hicks and Green

#### Debating on both sides of an issue severs sincerity and ethics from public speaking; ethical speech becomes impossible, this causes moral relativism

Green and Hicks 5 (Ronald Water, and Darrin, Cultural Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 100-126, “Lost Convictions: Debating both sides and the ethical self-fashioning of liberal citizens”, January 2005)

LOST CONVICTIONS Debating both sides and the ethical self-fashioning of liberal citizens This paper takes as its point of departure the ethical problematization of debating both sides #/ having students argue both affirmative and negative on a debate resolution #/ in order to highlight the role of communication as a cultural technology of liberalism. It argues that debating both sides contributed to the cultural governance of cold war liberalism by separating speech from conviction to cultivate the value of debate as a method of democratic decision-making.The valorization of free and full expression as a pre-requisite for ‘decision by debate’ prepared the ground for dis-articulating debate from cold war liberalism and rearticulating it as a game of freedom that contributes to the moral education of liberal citizens. In so doing, debate becomes a global technology of liberalism creating exceptional subjects by circulating the communicative norms of deliberative democracy. Keywords conviction; free speech; cold war; debate; American exceptionalism; deliberative democracy In 1954, the US military academies, and a host of other colleges, refused to affirm the national debate resolution: ‘Resolved: The United States should diplomatically recognize the People’s Republic of China’. The problem of speaking in favour of the diplomatic recognition of ‘Red China’ came amidst an acute moment in the US containment strategy of domestic and international communism (Ross 1989). This, in turn, sparked a national controversy that included discussion in the New York Times (Burns 1954). Due to the growing prevalence of ‘switch-side debating’, a procedure that required teams to debate both sides of the resolution in consecutive debate rounds at intercollegiate debate tournaments, the controversy manifested itself as an ethical concern about the relationship between public speaking and the moral attributes of good citizenship. At the heart of the ‘debate about debate’ (Ehninger 1958) was the idea of conviction and how it should guide the moral economy of liberal citizenship. But why dredge up this event from the archive of communication education? First, since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been a vigorous trade in debate as a tool for democratic education, often with the hope of inculcating students with the norms necessary for deliberative democracy. For example, since 1994, the International Debate Education Association ‘has introduced debate to secondary schools and universities throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the Former Soviet Union, Central Asia and Haiti and continues to grow throughout the world’ (idebate.org 2004). The promotion and circulation of debate as a technique of democratic decision-making suggests a need to explore the history of its ethical problematization. As a cultural technology, the value of debate rests on its claim to cultivate the ethical attributes required for democratic citizenship. Therefore, those challenges to debate’s civic function require special consideration in order to assess the role of communication in the selffashioning of liberal citizens.1 In Foucauldian fashion, we are interested in the ethical problematization of debating both sides so that we might learn how this pedagogical technique organizes forms of democratic subjectification available in the present (Foucault 2001).The second reason to write about the debating both sides controversy is because it highlights how communication becomes an object, instrument and field of cultural governance. The emphasis on the linguistic dimension of communication tends to privilege a methodological and political commitment to read the circulation of power as an ideological phenomenon mediated by the process of generating and controlling the meaning of contested values, identities, and symbols (Nelson & Gaonkar 1998, Rosteck 1999). As an alternative to this vision of a ‘communicational cultural studies’ (Grossberg 1997) this paper highlights the ‘technical dimension’ of speech, that is, itscirculation as an object and instrument for regulating the conduct of citizensubjects. 2 Therefore, we approach the debating both sides controversy in terms of what Michel Foucault (2001) calls a ‘history of thought’ #/ a ‘history of how people become anxious about this or that’ (p. 74). Moreover, to write a history of debate as a cultural technology reveals how power works productively by augmenting the human capacity for speech/communication. For us, an under-appreciated aspect of the productive power of cultural governance resides in the generation of subjects who come to understand themselves as speaking subjects willing to regulate and transform their communicative behaviours for the purpose of improving their political, economic, cultural and affective relationships.This paper argues that the strong liberal defence of debating both sides separates speech from conviction. Debating both sides does so by de-coupling the sincerity principle from the arguments presented by a debater. In place of the assumption that a debater believes in what he or she argues, debating both sides grooms one to appreciate the process of debate as a method of democratic decision-making. We argue the debating both sides controversy articulates debate to Cold War liberal discourses of ‘American exceptionalism’ by folding the norm of free and full expression onto the soul of the debater. In turn, a debater willing to debate both sides becomes a representative of the free world. Furthermore, we will demonstrate how debating both sides as a technique of moral development works alongside specific aesthetic modes of class subjectivity increasingly associated with the efforts of the knowledge class to legitimize the process of judgment. Debating both sides reveals how the globalization of liberalism is less about a set of universal norms and more about the circulation and uptake of cultural technologies. In the first part of this essay, we will offer a thick description of how the relationship between speech and conviction led to the ethical problematization of debating both sides. In the second part of the essay, we contextualize this history through an encounter with Cold War liberalism and the importance of debating both sides as a technology capable of generating a commitment to free speech. The third section of the paper will describe how debate re-invents itself as a game of freedom that instils the ethical attributes of deliberative democracy by re-coding debating both sides as necessary to the moral development of students.4 Debate and the problem of conviction In the United States, the 1920s and 1930s saw a veritable explosion in the popularity of intercollegiate debate. To accommodate the growing numbers of students wishing to debate and the rising costs of hosting and travelling to debates, the model of annual contests between rival schools gave way to triangular and quadrilateral debating leagues and eventually to the debate tournament. Intercollegiate debating underwent major transformations during this period, many of them brought on by tournament competition.5 Perhaps the most significant #/ and certainly the most controversial #/ transformation resulting from tournament debating was the practice of having participants debate both sides of the proposition. Debating both sides, its proponents argued, had the pragmatic benefit of allowing more teams to participate in more debates and to make scheduling tournaments much more efficient. There was, as well, the pedagogical benefit of rewarding those students with the most refined skills in marshalling evidence and formulating arguments in support of their respective positions. By the 1950s, debating both sides had become so prevalent that the West Point National Debate Tournament, the largest and most prestigious tournament of the day, mandated it as a condition of participation.6 The growing professionalization of tournament debating carried out in extra-curricular competitive spaces increasingly relied on debating both sides.1 0 2 CULTURAL STUDIES As a tournament progresses, a student moves from one side of the resolution to the next, a switch in sides, demarcated by the next ‘round’ of debate. The technique of debating both sides increases the efficiency of debate to train students in critical thinking and argumentative advocacy by modifying the side of the resolution the debater advocates. Since each debate is a situated rhetorical event with changing interlocutors and different individual judges, each debate round allows a unique pedagogical opportunity to learn and evaluate behaviour. The relationship between debate as a competitive activity amenable to pedagogical intervention and debating both sides as a specific technique of debate pedagogy and tournament administration, however, did not appear naturally, but was the effect of intellectual struggle. While the opposition to debating both sides probably reaches back to the challenges against the ancient practice of dissoi logoi , we want to turn our attention to the unique cultural history of debate during the Cold War. In the midst of Joseph McCarthy’s impending censure by the US Senate, the US Military Academy, the US Naval Academy and, subsequently, all of the teacher colleges in the state of Nebraska refused to affirm the resolution #/ ‘Resolved: The United States should diplomatically recognize the People’s Republic of China’. Yet, switch-side debating remained the national standard, and, by the fall of 1955, the military academies and the teacher colleges of Nebraska were debating in favour of the next resolution. Richard Murphy (1957), however,was not content to let the controversy pass without comment. Murphy launched a series of criticisms that would sustain the debate about debate for the next ten years. Murphy held that debating both sides of the question was unethical because it divorced conviction from advocacy and that it was a dangerous practice because it threatened the integrity of public debate by divorcing it from a genuine search for truth. Murphy’s case against the ethics of debating both sides rested on what he thought to be a simple and irrefutable rhetorical principle: A public utterance is a public commitment. In Murphy’s opinion, debate was best imagined as a species of public speaking akin to public advocacy on the affairs of the day. If debate is a form of public speaking, Murphy reasoned, and a public utterance entails a public commitment, then speakers have an ethical obligation to study the question, discuss it with others until they know their position, take a stand and then #/ and only then #/ engage in public advocacy in favour of their viewpoint.Murphy had no doubt that intercollegiate debate was a form of public advocacy and was, hence, rhetorical, although this point would be severely attacked by proponents of switch-side debating. Modern debating, Murphy claimed, ‘is geared to the public platform and to rhetorical, rather than dialectical principles’ (p. 7). Intercollegiate debate was rhetorical, not dialectical, because its propositions were specific and timely rather than speculative and universal. Debaters evidenced their claims by appeals to authority and opinion rather than formal logic, and debaters appealed to an audience, even if that audience was a single person sitting in the back of a room at a relatively isolated debate tournament. As such, debate as a species of public argument should be held to the ethics of the platform. We would surely hold in contempt any public actor who spoke with equal force, and without genuine conviction, for both sides of a public policy question. Why, asked Murphy, would we exempt students from the same ethical obligation? Murphy’s master ethic #/ that a public utterance entails a public commitment #/ rested on a classical rhetorical theory that refuses the modern distinctions between cognitive claims of truth (referring to the objective world), normative claims of right (referring to the intersubjective world), and expressive claims of sincerity (referring to the subjective state of the speaker), although this distinction, and Murphy’s refusal to make it, would surface as a major point of contention in the 1960s for the proponents of debating both sides.7 Murphy is avoiding the idea that the words spoken by a debater can be divorced from what the speaker actually believes to be true, right, or good (expressive claims of sincerity). For Murphy, to stand and publicly proclaim that one affirmed the resolution entailed both a claim that the policy being advocated was indeed the best possible choice, given extant social conditions, and that one sincerely believed that her or his arguments were true and right. In other words, a judge should not make a distinction between the merits of the case presented and the sincerity of the advocates presenting it; rather, the reasons supporting a policy and the ethos of the speakers are mutually constitutive forms of proof. The interdependency of logos and ethos was not only a matter of rhetorical principle for Murphy but also a foundational premise of public reason in a democratic society. Although he never explicitly states why this is true, most likely because he assumed it to be self-evident, a charitable interpretation of Murphy’s position, certainly a more generous interpretation than his detractors were willing to give, would show that his axiom rests on the following argument: If public reason is to have any legitimate force, auditors must believe that advocates are arguing from conviction and not from greed, desire or naked self-interest. If auditors believe that advocates are insincere, they will not afford legitimacy to their claims and will opt to settle disputes through force or some seemingly neutral modus vivendi such as voting or arbitration. Hence, sincerity is a necessary element of public reason and, therefore, a necessary condition of critical deliberation in a democratic society. For Murphy, the assumption of sincerity is intimately articulated to the notion of ethical argumentation in a democratic political culture. If a speaker were to repudiate this assumption by advocating contradictory positions in a public forum, it would completely undermine her or his ethos and result in the loss of the means of identification with an audience. The real danger of undermining the assumption of sincerity was not that individual speakers would be rendered ineffective #/ although this certainly did make training students to debate both 1 0 4 CULTURAL STUDIES sides bad rhetorical pedagogy. The ultimate danger of switch-side debating was that it would engender a distrust of public advocates. The public would come to see the debaters who would come to occupy public offices as ‘public liars’ more interested in politics as vocation than as a calling. Debate would be seen as a game of power rather than the method of democracy. The nation’s leading debate coaches, taking Murphy’s condemnation as an accusation that they had failed in their ethical responsibility as educators, quickly and forcefully responded to his charges. They had four primary rejoinders to Murphy: that he had misunderstood the nature of tournament debate; that switch-side debating was a sound educational procedure; that intercollegiate debate should be held accountable to a different ethic than those of the platform; and that switch-side debating was necessary to the maintenance of intercollegiate debate. Proponents of switch-side debating, such as A. Craig Baird (1955), Nicholas Cripe (1957), and George Dell (1958) agreed that Murphy’s ethic applied ‘to argument in the pulpit, in the legislative halls, in the courtroom, and the marketplace’ (Cripe 1957, p. 209).. This ethic, that a public utterance entails a public commitment, should not, however, apply to the forms of advocacy performed in tournament debating. For the proponents of switch-side debating, there was a sharp distinction between school and public debate. School debate, in particular tournament debating, was not a species of public argument geared towards gaining the consent of an audience to the rightness of the speaker’s stand on a public issue, but, rather, a pedagogical tool designed to help students develop their critical thinking skills. Not only did tournament debating differ in purpose, but it also differed in method from public debate. Tournament debate was defined as a dialectical method of disputation, a method suitable for adjudication by an expert judge on technical criteria rather than by a public audience. Hence, the sincerity principle simply did not apply to intercollegiate debate. The description of debate as a dialectical method did not mean that the proponents of switch-side debating rejected the importance of conviction for public argument. They did, however, claim that sound conviction, as opposed to dogmatism, was a product of debate, not its prerequisite. Baird (1955), arguing that debate should be understood less as public advocacy and more as a dialectical method of inquiry, claimed that sound conviction was a product of a rigorous analysis of all aspects of a question and that this analysis was best conducted through a method which had students practice defending and rejecting the major arguments on both sides. Thus, debating both sides should be understood as an educational procedure designed to generate ‘sound’ convictions prior to public advocacy. Baird urged that the critics of switch-side debating should understand the practice as a pedagogical device and to judge it accordingly. ‘These student exercises’, he told debaters and their coaches, ‘are to be sharply distinguished from the later ‘practical life’ situations in which you are preachers, lawyers, business men and women, politicians and community LOST CONVICTIONS 1 0 5 leaders. Debate and discussion training is essentially training in reflective thinking, in the defence of different sides (‘role playing’ as some call it), and in the revelation of strength and weakness of each position’ (p. 6). It was Baird’s recognition that debating both sides was equivalent to role-playing that warranted re-thinking the fit between the speaker and the words spoken. Furthermore, if a debater did in fact appear to be shallow, insincere and prone to manipulate public opinion for her or his own ends, this was certainly not, argued Wayne Thompson (1944) and Nicholas Cripe, the fault of switch-side debating, but the ‘result of other causes #/ weakness in the character of the offender or a misunderstanding of the proper functioning of debate’ (Thompson 1944, p. 296). The proper way to deal with any ethical shortcomings in debaters, the proponents argued, was for the national forensics associations to develop a code of ethics that would stress the ethical responsibility of intercollegiate debaters (to present the best possible case according to facts as the debater understood them) and to forcefully condemn individual acts of malfeasance such as misconstruing evidence, falsifying sources, and misrepresenting their opponents’ positions. For Robert Newman (1963), the controversy over debating both sides was simple to resolve: as long as a good case could be made on each side of the resolution and individual debaters did not lie or cheat, there simply was no ethical dilemma and certainly no need for a disciplinary-based ethic to guide debate practice. Finally, debate coaches justified switch-side debate on the pragmatic grounds that it was a necessary component of tournament debating and that abandoning the practice would mean the end of intercollegiate debating. ‘In fact, if the proponents of ethical debate are correct’, Cripe warned, ‘and it is immoral for a team to debate both sides, then many schools would have to discontinue debate as we practice today’ (1957, p. 209). Baird’s defence of debating both sides #/ in which he defined it as an educational procedure designed to generate sound conviction #/ was the most formidable of the defences of switch-side debating. However, it was defeated,according to Murphy (1957), once educators understood that there were many ways of teaching students to see both sides of an issue. He or she could prepare briefs on both sides of the question, form roundtable discussions where students would play devil’s advocate to test the strength of each other’s positions, and even have informal practice rounds in a closed club setting where students debated both sides to test and strengthen their convictions. It was not the fact that students explored all sides of an issue that worried Murphy. Rather, Baird’s defence, and any defence that claimed debating both sides was ethical because it was a pedagogical tool, ignored ‘a basic rhetorical principle that the speaker should read and discuss, and inquire, and test his [sic ]position before he [sic ] takes the platform to present it’ (Murphy 1957, p. 5).

#### Turn: we cannot be educated by just anybody speaking on an issue; real education occurs when those who really care about an issue speak to us about it in earnest.

Green and Hicks 5 (Ronald Walter, and Darrin, Cultural Studies, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 100-126, “Lost Convictions: Debating both sides and the ethical self-fashioning of liberal citizens”, January 2005)

**Because debate propositions are deliberately worded so good arguments can be made on both sides, there should never be a shortage of speakers on both sides of the issue, speakers who really believe in what they were arguing. The real benefit of hearing both sides of an issue, Murphy claimed, is that it encourages individuals to open their minds to other perspectives and to modify their beliefs if so warranted. Yet, alternative views will not be taken seriously, unless we ‘hear them from persons who actually believe them, who defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them’**  (Murphy 1957, p. 4). Switch-side debating, Murphy argued, is not justified by the principles of free speech; rather, those principles support revoking the practice. For Day, in contrast, the re-coding of free speech as the ethical substance of debate, a substance that was internal to its procedures, allowed for an ethical re-description of debate as a deliberative technique. For instance, as Day argues, the ‘prime requisite which must be met if debate is to provide sound decisions is that it be thorough and complete, that all arguments and information relevant to a decision be known and understood’ (1966, p. 6). Day’s commitment to free speech is based on a radical reading of Mill: Freedom of expression entails more than lifting prior restraints on argumentation; it necessitates the construction of avenues of access for minority views within dominant media outlets and, if necessary, the restructuring of deliberative forums so minority views will not be rejected outright because they challenge hegemonic methods of interpretation. ‘Free speech is the necessary prerequisite of full debate’, Day argues, because ‘it guarantees that full debate can take place’ (p. 6). Yet, freedom of speech does 1 1 0 CULTURAL STUDIES not guarantee that full debate will take place. It is in this gap between opportunity and outcome that Day discovers the ethical demand for debating both sides: ‘A commitment to debate as the method of democratic decisionmaking demands an overriding ethical responsibility to promote the full confrontation of opposing opinions, arguments, and information relevant to decision. Without the confrontation of opposing ideas debate does not exist, and to the extent that that confrontation is incomplete so is debate incomplete’ (p. 6). To promote debate as a democratic mode of decision-making required full and free expression so as to maximize the confrontation of opposing ideas. Debating both sides emerged as a specific pedagogical technique to inculcate and encourage students to embrace the norm of full and free expression. Two practical obligations are entailed in the acceptance of this ethic: First, the forums for public deliberation must be fully inclusive; encouragement and incentive must be provided to those who hold unpopular views to express themselves. Second, and more important, ‘all must recognize and accept personal responsibility to present, when necessary, as forcefully as possible, opinions and arguments with which they may personally disagree’ (p. 7). Few are likely to challenge the first entailment, but the second provided Day with a radical redefinition of the ethics of conviction. Day argues that persuasively presenting a position that contradicts one’s personal conviction is the ‘highest ethical act in democratic debate’ (p. 7). Moreover, to argue forcefully for a position one abhors is the hallmark of democratic citizenship. To set aside one’s convictions and present the argument for the other side demonstrates that the citizen has forsaken her or his personal interests and particular vision of the good for the benefit of the commonweal. That is, the citizen recognizes the moral priority of democratic debate when she or he agrees to be bound by its results regardless of personal conviction. Debating both sides, then, is necessitated by the ethical obligations intrinsic to the technology of democratic debate. Both of Murphy’s charges that **debating both sides is unethical #/ that requiring students to debate both sides is a form of blackmail and that the separation of speech and conviction courts sophistry #/ are answered by this position.** On the one hand, if debating both sides of a question is an ethical duty, requiring students to do so as a condition of participation is not an immoral imposition but rather an ethical and pedagogical duty. On the other hand, given the political dangers that privileging personal conviction over democratic process courts, divorcing speech from conviction is a prerequisite to democratic legitimacy. In so doing, one’s convictions should be reassigned so as to promote a commitment to debate as the fundamental process of a democratic form of public deliberation. The practice of debating both sides does not warrant support simply because it is ethical; it does so because it is an effective pedagogical technique for inculcating the communicative ethics necessary for democratic citizenship. According to Day, ‘Debating both sides teaches students to discover, analyze, LOST CONVICTIONS 1 1 1 and test all the arguments, opinions, and evidence relevant to a decision. In addition, it provides an opportunity for students to substantiate for themselves the assumption that ‘‘truthful’’ positions may be taken on both sides of controversial questions’ (1966, p. 13).

### Affirmative Kritiks Good

#### Affirmation is necessary for criticism

Johnson 97 (James, Rochester, Political Theory 25(4), JSTOR)

This is an essay of criticism in the sense Foucault seems to intend. It targets the postmodern consensus among political theorists. This consensus consists of the view, common to both its admirers and detractors, that postmodern political thought is corrosively skeptical, that it relentlessly uncouples its critical pretensions from any constructive normative commitment. Jacques Derrida once made a comment which, by its very incongruity, highlights the postmodern consensus. He confessed to an interviewer: "Indeed, I cannot conceive of a radical critique which would not be ultimately motivated by some sort of affirmation, acknowledged or not."'This remark should seem highly discordant to anyone who has witnessed the persistent jousting between critics and defenders of postmodernism.2 The postmodern consensus takes as primitive precisely what Derrida, surprisingly but rightly in my estimation, deems inconceivable.

#### Affirmation is critical to value to life

Heiner 3 (Brady, U of Padua, differences: a Jnl of Feminist Cultural Studies, 15.1, Muse)

Points of resistance exist virtually everywhere in the network of power established by contemporary social institutions. 30 The affective intensities of the multitude are what simultaneously fuel social production and disrupt the institutional mechanisms of control. Potentia, or the art of existence, gives rise to a notion of resistance that is radically distinguished from the dialectic. Where the dialectic valorizes the sad passions, potentia presents itself as a joyful practice; where the dialectic posits affirmation as the theoretical and practical product of the suffering of the negative, potentia presents affirmation as that which destroys the will to nothingness that fuels the negative dialectic; and whereas the dialectic seeks transformation through the negation of the negation, potentia constitutes transformation as the affirmation of affirmation. “Do not think,” Foucault affirms, “that one has to be sad in order to be militant, even though the thing one is fighting is abominable. It is the connection of desire to reality (and not its retreat into the forms of representation) that possesses revolutionary force” (preface to Deleuze and Guattari xiii–xiv). It is toward the self-productive potentiality of the multitude that Foucault’s later work moves—toward a creative militancy that enacts resistance as counterpower and rebellion as a praxis of joy.

#### Affirmation is key to solution – negative criticism is fruitless

Johnson 97 (James, Rochester, Political Theory 25(4), JSTOR)

In his analysis of modern power, Foucault focuses on what he terms the "micro-physics of power" and, in particular, on the "effects of domination" that it induces. He claims that this power operates through "techniques of subjection and methods of exploitation" which, considered as a whole, constitute a "policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipu- lation of its elements."'8 Nancy Fraser suggests that this sort of language, this talk of domination, coercion, exploitation, and so on, may betray an unstated affirmative stance. She finally concedes, however, that Foucault's writings afford "no clues . . . as to what his alternative norms might be." And she concludes that his attempt to sustain a critical stance on the basis of a totalizing analysis of power is "normatively confused."19 This judgment is too quick. In the next section, I show that Foucault's analytics of power-not just his language, but the conceptual structure of his analysis-in fact harbors a crucial, if understated, affirmative dimension. In this section, I first want to explore two themes in his work that potentially afford escape from the postmodern consensus. Political theorists commonly present the promise of a dialogical ethics and the notion of resistance to suggest how Foucault indeed does strike, however tentatively, an affirmative stance. On this view, dialogical ethics and resistance each occupy and extend the sort of "space for freedom" that could facilitate a "possible transformation" of extant practices and institutions. I argue that both themes comport poorly with conventional understandings of Foucault's writings on power precisely insofar as they exhibit the crucial value he places on relations of communication. Consequently, both the promise of a dialogi- cal ethics and the concept of resistance prompt us to reexamine those conventional understandings.

#### Only affirmation empowers resistance

Johnson 97 (James, Rochester, Political Theory 25(4), JSTOR)

Resistance trades upon a number of affirmative possibilities. Foucault locates these possibilities within a quite specific understanding of the rela- tions that obtain between intellectuals and political movements.27 As he explains: If one wants to look for a non-disciplinary form of power, or rather, to struggle against disciplines and disciplinary power, it is not towards the ancient right of sovereignty that one should turn, but towards the possibility of a newform of right, one which must indeed be anti-disciplinarian, but at the same time liberated from the principle of sovereignty. (Foucault 1980, 108; emphasis added) The essential political problem for the intellectual is ... that of ascertaining the possibil- ity of constituting a new politics of truth. (Foucault 1980, 133; emphasis added) Political analysis and criticism have in large measure still to be invented-so too have the strategies which will make it possible to modify the relations of force, to co-ordinate them in such a way that such a modification is possible and can be inscribed in reality. That is to say, the problem is ... to imagine and to bring into being new schemas of politicization. (Foucault 1980, 190; emphasis added)

#### Affirmation is critical

Heiner 3 (Brady, U of Padua, differences: a Jnl of Feminist Cultural Studies, 15.1, Muse)

Here we can see an “explosion” and “return of masks” similar to what Foucault referred to above when invoking Nietzsche. The aggression that drives the negation-beyond-negation of his early work resolutely differs from the inherent sadness of the dialectic; the negativity of total critique manifests itself as affirmation. “[A]ggression,” Deleuze affirms, “is the negative, but the negative as the conclusion of positive premises, the negative as the product of activity, the negative as the consequence of the power of affirming” (Nietzsche 121). Like Nietzsche, Foucault flees from the labor of opposition and the suffering of the negative in order to enact [End Page 32] “the warlike play of difference, affirmation and the joy of destruction” (191). For the negative dialectic lacks a will that goes beyond it; it has no power of its own but remains a mere reaction to (a mere representation of) power. 11 Deleuze describes this “ontological emptiness” of negativity in the context of a discussion of Nietzsche: Nietzsche’s enemy [. . .] is the dialectic which confuses affirmation with the truthfulness of truth or the positivity of the real; and this truthfulness, this positivity, are primarily manufactured by the dialectic itself with the products of the negative. The being of Hegelian logic is merely “thought” being, pure and empty, which affirms itself by passing into its own opposite. But this being was never different from its opposite, it never had to pass into what it already was. Hegelian being is pure and simple nothingness; and the becoming that this being forms with nothingness, that is to say with itself, is a perfectly nihilistic becoming; and affirmation passes through negation here because it is merely the affirmation of the negative and its products. (183) Therefore, Deleuze continues, “An activity which does not raise itself to the powers of affirming, an activity which trusts only in the labor of the negative is destined to failure; in its very principle it turns into its opposite” (196). Separated from the power of affirmation—the creative motor of being—the dialectic can do nothing but reactively turn against itself. “Separated from what it can do,” Deleuze argues, “active force does not evaporate. Turning back against itself it produces pain” (128). The aim of total critique, as distinguished from the dialectic, is a different way of feeling—another sensibility. The aim of total critique is the constitution of a joyful practice. 12 In all of Foucault’s work, he actively dismantles the reactive conception of power as negativity—as that which says “no.” 13 He reaffirms Nietzsche’s discovery that the dialectic only produces a phantom of affirmation. 14 Whether in the form of an overcome opposition or a resolved contradiction, the image of positivity yielded by the dialectic is a radically false one (196). 15 Through the nondialectical negation enacted in the limit-experience, Foucault affirms that positivity is not “a theoretical and practical product of negation itself,” 16 but rather that which destroys the will to nothingness that fuels the dialectic. Positivity, first taking form in the becoming-active “joy of annihilation,” the “affirmation of annihilation and destruction,” clears the terrain for a truly active, which is to say, a joyful [End Page 33] practice of constitution (Nietzsche 3). For only an unrestrained aggression against the established “essence”—the death of the adversary—can procure the opportunity for a positive creation. Only by the light of this conflagrant destruction is it possible to discern the potentialities of contemporary thought and practice.

## \*\*State-Centricity Bad

### Statism Bad – Agency

#### **An analysis of policymaking that proceeds from the state cannot provide the resources to articulate a capacity for human agency.**

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While opening up the study of global politics to a variety of new domains, most efforts to rethink the international have not gone as far as they could have, or, indeed, should have gone. Here too, questions of conceptualisation and representation are of crucial importance. Campbell stresses that for all their efforts to understand a wide range of global phenomena, most approaches to international theory have displayed a remarkably persistent compulsion to anchor an under­ standing of the complexities of global life in a 'something-national' formulation — whether it is 'international', 'multinational', or 'transna­ tional'.[14](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471070#14)Representative for such forms of conceptualising is Mark Zacher's seemingly sensible claim that 'non-state actors such as multi­ national corporations and banks may increase in importance, but there are few signs that they are edging states from centre stage'.[15](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471070#15) Debates about the role of human agency display similar state-centric tendencies. There are disagreements on various fronts, but virtually all discussions on agency in international theory remain focused on conceptualising state behaviour. Alexander Wendt, who has been instrumental in bringing issues of agency to the study of international relations, has been equally influential in directing ensuing discussions on a state-centric path. He explicitly and repeatedly acknowledges 'a commitment to states as units of analysis' and constructs much of his theoretical work around an examination of states and the constraints within which they operate.[16](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471070#16) Here too, the logic behind adapting a state-centric form of representation rests on the assumption that 'as long as states are the dominant actors in international politics, it is appropriate to focus on the identity and agency of the state rather than, for example, a transnational social movement'.[17](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471070#17) Questions of agency in international theory should not and cannot be reduced to analyses of state behaviour. This book demonstrates how an instance of transversal dissent may influence global politics at least as much as, say, a diplomatic treatise or a foreign policy decision. At a time when processes of globalisation are unfolding and national boundaries are becoming increasingly porous, states can no longer be viewed as the only consequential actors in world affairs. Various scholars have thus begun to question the prevalent spatial modes of representation and the artificial separation of levels of analysis that issues from them. They suggest, as mentioned above, that global life is better understood as a series of transversal struggles that increasingly challenge what Richard Ashley called 'the paradigm of sovereign man.' Transversal struggles, Ashley emphasises, are not limited to established spheres of sovereignty. They are neither domestic nor international. They know no final boundaries between inside and out­ side.[18](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471071#18) And they have come to be increasingly recognised as central aspects of global politics. James Rosenau is among several scholars who now acknowledge that it is along the shifting frontiers of trans­ versal struggles, 'and not through the nation state system that people sort and play out the many contradictions at work in the global scene'.[19](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471071#19)

#### We can claim our agency only by rejecting the state-centric view of politics.

Bleiker 2k (Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague,(Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Questions of agency have been discussed extensively in international theory, mostly in the context of the so-called structure—agency debate. Although strongly wedded to a state-centric view, this debate nevertheless evokes a number of important conceptual issues that are relevant as well to an understanding of transversal dynamics. The roots of the structure—agency debate can be traced back to a feeling of discontent about how traditional approaches to international theory have dealt with issues of agency. Sketched in an overly broad manner, the point of departure looked as follows: At one end of the spectrum were neorealists, who explain state identity and behaviour through a series of structural restraints that are said to emanate from the anarchical nature of the international system. At the other end we find neoliberals, who accept the existence of anarchy but seek to understand the behaviour of states and other international actors in terms of their individual attributes and their ability to engage in cooperative bargaining. If pushed to their logical end-point, the two positions amount, respectively, to a structural determinism and an equally farfetched belief in the autonomy of rational actors. [24](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471074#24)  The structure—agency debate is located somewhere between these two poles. Neither structure nor agency receive analytical priority. Instead, the idea is to understand the interdependent and mutually constitutive relationship between them. The discussions that have evolved in the wake of this assumption are highly complex and cannot possibly be summarised here. [25](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471074#25) Some of the key premises, though, can be recognised by observing how the work of Anthony Giddens has shaped the structure—agency debate in international relations. Giddens speaks of the 'duality of structure,' of structural properties that are constraining as well as enabling. They are both 'the medium and outcome of the contingently accomplished activities of situated actors'. [26](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471075#26) Expressed in other words, neither agents nor structures have the final word. Human actions are always embedded in and constrained by the structural context within which they form and evolve. But structures are not immutable either. A human being, Giddens stresses, will 'know a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member'. [27](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471075#27) The actions that emerge from this awareness then shape the processes through which social systems are structurally maintained and reproduced.

### Statism Bad – Violence

#### **State-centricity leads to the violent exclusion of other viewpoints**

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To expand the scope of international theory and to bring transversal struggles into focus is not to declare the state obsolete. States remain central actors in international politics and they have to be recognised and theorised as such. In fact, my analysis will examine various ways in which states and the boundaries between them have mediated the formation, functioning and impact of dissent. However, my reading of dissent and agency makes the state neither its main focus nor its starting point. There are compelling reasons for such a strategy, and they go beyond a mere recognition that a state-centric approach to international theory engenders a form of representation that privileges the authority of the state and thus precludes an adequate understand­ing of the radical transformations that are currently unfolding in global life. Michael Shapiro is among an increasing number of theor­ists who convincingly portray the state not only as an institution, but also, and primarily, as a set of 'stories' — of which the state-centric approach to international theory is a perfect example. It is part of a legitimisation process that highlights, promotes and naturalises cer­tain political practices and the territorial context within which they take place. Taken together, these stories provide the state with a sense of identity, coherence and unity. They create boundaries between an inside and an outside, between a people and its others. Shapiro stresses that such state-stories also exclude, for they seek 'to repress or delegitimise other stories and the practices of identity and space they reflect.' And it is these processes of exclusion that impose a cer­tain political order and provide the state with a legitimate rationale for violent encounters.[22](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471072#22)

### Statism Bad – Education

#### State-centricity leads to a monopoly on education that silences other viewpoints

Biswas 7 (Shampa, Professor of Politics at Whitman College, December, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1, p. 125-126)

In making a case for the exilic orientation, it is the powerful hold of the nation-state upon intellectual thinking that Said most bemoans. 31 The nation-state of course has a particular pride of place in the study of global politics. The state-centricity of International Relations has not just circumscribed the ability of scholars to understand a vast ensemble of globally oriented movements, exchanges and practices not reducible to the state, but also inhibited a critical intellectual orientation to the world outside the national borders within which scholarship is produced. Said acknowledges the fact that all intellectual work occurs in a (national) context which imposes upon one’s intellect certain linguistic boundaries, particular (nationally framed) issues and, most invidiously, certain domestic political constraints and pressures, but he cautions against the dangers of such restrictions upon the intellectual imagination. 32 Comparing the development of IR in two different national contexts – the French and the German ones – Gerard Holden has argued that different intellectual influences, different historical resonances of different issues, different domestic exigencies shape the discipline in different contexts. 33 While this is to be expected to an extent, there is good reason to be cautious about how scholarly sympathies are expressed and circumscribed when the reach of one’s work (issues covered, people affected) so obviously extends beyond the national context. For scholars of the global, the (often unconscious) hold of the nation-state can be especially pernicious in the ways that it limits the scope and range of the intellectual imagination. Said argues that the hold of the nation is such that even intellectuals progressive on domestic issues become collaborators of empire when it comes to state actions abroad. 34 Specifically, he critiques nationalistically based systems of education and the tendency in much of political commentary to frame analysis in terms of ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our’ - particularly evident in coverage of the war on terrorism - which automatically sets up a series of (often hostile) oppositions to ‘others’. He points in this context to the rather common intellectual tendency to be alert to the abuses of others while remaining blind to those of one’s own. 35

### Statism Bad - Identity

#### It is bad to focus on the state in IR- the state creates boundaries within its self and excludes and represses certain aspects in order to reflect a certain identity

Bleiker 2k (Roland, Senior Lecturer and Coordinator of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Queensland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics)

To expand the scope of international theory and to bring transversal struggles into focus is not to declare the state obsolete. States remain central actors in international politics and they have to be recognised and theorised as such. In fact, my analysis will examine various ways in which states and the boundaries between them have mediated the formation, functioning and impact of dissent. However, my reading of dissent and agency makes the state neither its main focus nor its starting point. There are compelling reasons for such a strategy, and they go beyond a mere recognition that a state-centric approach to international theory engenders a form of representation that privileges the authority of the state and thus precludes an adequate understanding of the radical transformations that are currently unfolding in global life. Michael Shapiro is among an increasing number of theorists who convincingly portray the state not only as an institution, but also, and primarily, as a set of 'stories' — of which the state-centric approach to international theory is a perfect example. It is part of a legitimisation process that highlights, promotes and naturalises certain political practices and the territorial context within which they take place. Taken together, these stories provide the state with a sense of identity, coherence and unity. They create boundaries between an inside and an outside, between a people and its others. Shapiro stresses that such state-stories also exclude, for they seek 'to repress or delegitimise other stories and the practices of identity and space they reflect.' And it is these processes of exclusion that impose a certain political order and provide the state with a legitimate rationale for violent encounters.

The state sustains collective identity through an increasing process of oppressive power struggles, culminating in violence

Connoly in 2k2(William, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science @ Johns Hopkins University, Identity/Difference, expanded edition)

 In several domains, the state no longer emerges as a consummate agent of efficacy, even though it expands as a pivotal agent of power.4 A crack in the very unity of "power" has opened up. We have entered a world in which state power is simultaneously magnified and increasingly disconnected from the ends that justify its magni- fication. As obstacles to its efficacy multiply, the state increasingly sustains collective identity through theatrical displays of punish- ment and revenge against those elements that threaten to signify its inefficacy. It launches dramatized crusades against the internal other (low-level criminals, drug users, disloyalists, racial minor- ities, and the underclass), the external other (foreign enemies and terrorists), and the interior other (those strains of abnormality, subversion, and perversity that may reside within anyone). The state becomes, first, the screen upon which much of the resentment against the adverse effects of the civilization of produc- tivity and private affluence is projected; second, the vehicle through which rhetorical reassurances about the glory and durability of that civilization are transmitted back to the populace; and third, the instrument of campaigns against those elements most disturbing to the collective identity. In the first instance, the welfare apparatus of the state is singled out for criticism and reformation. In the second, the presidency is organized into a medium of rhetorical diversion and reassurance. In the third, the state disciplinary-police-punitive apparatus is marshaled to constitute and stigmatize constituencies whose terms of existence might otherwise provide signs of defeat, injury, and sacrifice engendered by the civilization of productivity itself. <p206>

## \*\*Answers To

### AT: Predictability

#### Unpredictability is inevitable – embracing this fact, however, allows us to live meaningful lives.

Bleiker and Leet 6 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, and Martin, Senior Research Officer with the Brisbane Institute, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 34(3), p. 729-730)JM

Dramatic, sublime events can uproot entrenched habits, but so can a more mundane cultivation of wonder and curiosity. Friedrich Nietzsche pursued such a line of enquiry when reflecting upon what he called the ‘ after effects of knowledge’. He considered how alternative ways of life open up through a simple awareness of the fallibility of knowledge. We endure a series of non-dramatic learning experiences as we emerge from the illusions of childhood. We are confronted with being uprooted from the safety of the house. At first, a plunge into despair is likely, as one realises the contingent nature of the foundations on which we stand and the walls behind which we hide and shiver in fear: All human life is sunk deep in untruth; the individual cannot pull it out of this well without growing profoundly annoyed with his entire past, without finding his present motives (like honour) senseless, and without opposing scorn and disdain to the passions that urge one on to the future and to the happiness in it.43 The sense of meaninglessness, the anger at this situation, represents a reaction against the habits of one’s upbringing and culture. One no longer feels certain, one no longer feels in control. The sublime disruption of convention gives rise to the animosity of loss. The resentment may last a whole lifetime. Nietzsche insists, however, that an alternative reaction is possible. A completely different ‘after effect of knowledge’ can emerge over time if we are prepared to free ourselves from the standards we continue to apply, even if we do no longer believe in them. To be sure, the: old motives of intense desire would still be strong at first, due to old, inherited habit, but they would gradually grow weaker under the influence of cleansing knowledge. Finally one would live among men and with oneself as in nature, without praise, reproaches, overzealousness, delighting in many things as in a spectacle that one formerly had only to fear.44 The elements of fear and defensiveness are displaced by delight if and when we become aware of our own role in constructing the scene around us. The ‘cleansing knowledge’ of which Nietzsche speaks refers to exposing the entrenched habits of representation of which we were ignorant. We realise, for example, that nature and culture are continuous rather than radically distinct. We may have expected culture to be chosen by us, to satisfy our needs, to be consistent and harmonious, in contrast to the strife, accident and instinct of nature. But just as we can neither predict a thunderstorm striking nor prevent it, so we are unable ever to eliminate the chance of a terrorist striking in our midst. We can better reconcile ourselves to the unpredictability and ‘irrationality’ of politics and culture by overcoming our childhood and idealistic illusions. The cultivation of the subliminal, then, can dilute our obsession with control by questioning the assumptions about nature and culture in which this obsession is embedded. Without this work of cultivation, we are far more vulnerable once hit by the after effects of knowledge. We find ourselves in a place we never expected to be, overwhelmed by unexamined habits of fear and loathing. But if, as Nietzsche suggests, we experiment with the subliminal disruptions encountered in the process of ‘growing up’, we may become better prepared. We may follow Bachelard’s lead and recognise that the house not only offers us a space to withdraw from the world when in fear, but also a shelter in which to daydream, to let our minds wander and explore subliminal possibilities. That, Bachelard believes, is indeed the chief benefit of the house: ‘it protects the dreamer’ .45

#### Their predictability claims pervert education – Uncertainty encourages interrogation, not the other way around

McDonough 93 (Kevin, U-Ill-Educ, http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/eps/PES-Yearbook/93\_docs/MCDONOUG.HTM)

The fact that individuals (and their aims) are necessarily embedded in power relations also structures the educational task in an interesting way. The Foucauldian educational task becomes not the common sense one of making the uncertain certain, the unfamiliar familiar.8 That is the logic of the examination, which assumes prior fixed knowledge which individuals must acquire. Rather, Foucault would regard education as primarily a matter of making the certain uncertain, the familiar unfamiliar, the given contingent. If nothing else, this educational ideal embodies more than a little of the spirit of Deweyan inquiry.

### AT: Limits

#### A focus on limits engenders violent practices by stopping productive discussions.

Bleiker and Leet 6 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, and Martin, Senior Research Officer with the Brisbane Institute, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 34(3), p. 733-734)JM

A subliminal orientation is attentive to what is bubbling along under the surface. It is mindful of how conscious attempts to understand conceal more than they reveal, and purposeful efforts of progressive change may engender more violence than they erase. For these reasons, Connolly emphasises that ‘ethical artistry’ has an element of naïveté and innocence. One is not quite sure what one is doing. Such naïveté need not lead us back to the idealism of the romantic period. ‘One should not be naïve about naïveté’, Simon Critchley would say.56 Rather, the challenge of change is an experiment. It is not locked up in a predetermined conception of where one is going. It involves tentatively exploring the limits of one’s being in the world, to see if different interpretations are possible, how those interpretations might impact upon the affects below the level of conscious thought, and vice versa. This approach entails drawing upon multiple levels of thinking and being, searching for changes in sensibilities that could give more weight to minor feelings or to arguments that were previously ignored.57 Wonder needs to be at the heart of such experiments, in contrast to the resentment of an intellect angry with its own limitations. The ingre d i e n t of wonder is necessary to disrupt and suspend the normal pre s s u res of returning to conscious habit and control. This exploration beyond the conscious implies the need for an ethos of theorising and acting that is quite diff e rent from the mode directed towards the cognitive justification of ideas and concepts. Stephen White talks about ‘circ u i t s of reflection, affect and arg umentation’.58 Ideas and principles provide an orientation to practice, the implications of that practice feed back into our affective outlook, and processes of argumentation introduce other ideas and affects. The shift, here, is from the ‘vertical’ search for foundations in ‘skyhooks’ above or ‘foundations’ below, to a ‘horizontal’ movement into the unknown.

#### We must incorporate alternative perspectives in order to stop violence.

Bleiker 1 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 30(3), p. 519)JM

Hope for a better world will, indeed, remain slim if we put all our efforts into searching for a mimetic understanding of the international. Issues of global war and Third World poverty are far too serious and urgent to be left to only one form of inquiry, especially if this mode of thought suppresses important faculties and fails to understand and engage the crucial problem of representation. We need to employ the full register of human perception and intelligence to understand the phenomena of world politics and to address the dilemmas that emanate from them. One of the key challenges, thus, consists of legitimising a greater variety of approaches and insights to world politics. Aesthetics is an important and necessary addition to our interpretative repertoire. It helps us understand why the emergence, meaning and significance of a political event can be appreciated only once we scrutinise the representational practices that have constituted the very nature of this event.

#### **Limits exclude and are an innately subjective process -- Objectifying rules obliterates agency**

Bleiker 3 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, Contemporary Political Theory, 2, p. 39-40)JM

Approaching the political - and by extension dilemmas of agency requires tolerance towards various forms of insight and levels of analysis, even if they contradict each other’s internal logic. Such differences often only appear as contradictions because we still strive for a universal standard of reference that is supposed to subsume all the various aspects of life under a single totalizing standpoint (Adorno, 1992, 17–18). Every process of revealing is at the same time a process of concealing. Even the most convincing position cannot provide a form of insight that does not at the same time conceal other perspectives. Revealing always occurs within a frame. Framing is a way of ordering, and ordering banishes all other forms of revealing. This is, grossly simplified, a position that resonates throughout much of Heidegger’s work (1954, 35). Taking this argument to heart is to recognize that one cannot rely on one form of revealing alone. An adequate understanding of human agency can be reached only by moving back and forth between various insights. The point, then, is not to end up with a grand synthesis, but to make most out of each specific form of revealing (for an exploration of this theme, via an analysis of Kant’s Critique of Judgement, see Deleuze, 1994).

### AT: Rules Good

#### Rules undermines interrogation

McDonough 93 (Kevin, U-Ill-Educ, http://www.ed.uiuc.edu/eps/PES-Yearbook/93\_docs/MCDONOUG.HTM)

The “for better or for worse” is important here since discipline for Foucault, by producing individuals, does not merely hinder resistance, but also enables it (“once one knows where to look for it,” as Covaleskie says). Similarly, educators should consider the possibility that Foucault’s insight might enable, rather than hinder, a deeper understanding of what Dewey meant by discipline as intelligent inquiry. For Foucault, once one recognizes that one’s aims are the product of power relations, they becomes “contingent and arbitrary.” What once seemed inevitable and natural, now seems open to inquiry and investigation. Thus, the teacher may come to realize that she has unconsciously been shaping her classroom behavior to conform to the imperatives of an assessment driven educational system. Even after recognizing this, she may continue to regard her behavior as in many respects beyond her control. For example, she may find herself unable simply to refuse to prepare her students for the test, because they’ll fail and she might lose her job. But the fact that she now recognizes her behavior as an effect of power, and thus no longer legitimate, may also open up for her a new “field of action” for resistance.

#### Regulation of communication exemplifies power over, much like prison – academics key

Deacon 6 (Roger, Aukland U.-NZ, http://www.ajol.info/index.php/saje/article/viewFile/25063/20733)

Over a comparatively short period of time, modern schooling has brought countless individuals and diverse populations to accept and tolerate steadily increasing degrees of subjection. Aside from the more historical and methodological aspects discussed in the preceding two sections, Foucault's work also offers nuanced understandings of the manifestations, functioning and effects of contemporary educational institutions and practices. Such institutions, where relations of power and knowledge come to support and link up with each other in more or less constant ways, form what Foucault called 'blocks of capacity–communication–power'. These 'regulated and concerted systems' fuse together the human capacity to manipulate words, things and people, adjusting abilities and inculcating behaviour via 'regulated communications' and 'power processes', and in the process structuring how teaching and learning take place. What distinguishes educational institutions from prisons, armies, and hospitals is that the former emphasize 'communication' above 'capacity' and 'power' (Foucault, 1982:218-219).184 Deacon Universities, like schools, are multifaceted amalgamations of economic, political, judicial and epistemological relations of power, which still reflect the exclusionary and inclusionary binaries of their origins: university campuses are relatively artificial enclaves where students are expected to absorb socially desirable modes of behaviour and forms of knowledge before being recuperated into society. Foucault predicted that universities will become increasingly important politically, because they multiply and reinforce the power-effects of an expanding stratum of intellectuals and, not least, as a result of new global demands for active, multi-skilled and self-regulated citizens.

#### Only our method provides students with the means to criticize education itself, fundamentally expanding the scope of our turns

Mourard 1 (Roger, Wastenaw CC-College of educ, http://inkido.indiana.edu/research/onlinemanu/papers/focault.pdf)

Critical scholarship in education is largely confined to critique about education as a discrete social and cultural institution. The shortcoming is that such work does not really step “outside” of the histories and practices of schooling. This inferiority unjustifiably limits the possibilities for critical scholarship in several ways. First, it does not encourage borrowing ideas from other fields and disciplines that could provide a new vantage point for critique. Second, it places conceptual barriers on critical reflection about education. These boundaries consist of the basic components of schooling that place a context around students, such as curricula, teachers, classrooms, methods, grade levels, and administrators.

### AT: Education

#### Orienting ourselves to understanding experts is a bad educational lens – We can more effectively combat covert control through thinking outside the box

Biswas 7 (Professor of Politics at Whitman College, December, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1, p. 124)

What Said offers in the place of professionalism is a spirit of ‘amateurism’ – ‘the desire to be moved not by profit or reward but by love for and unquenchable interest in the larger picture, in making connections across lines and barriers, in refusing to be tied down to a specialty, in caring for ideas and values despite the restrictions of a profession’, an amateur intellectual being one ‘who considers that to be a thinking and concerned member of a society one is entitled to raise moral issues at the heart of even the most technical and professionalized activity as it involves one’s country, its power, its mode of interacting with its citizens as well as with other societies’. ‘(T)he intellectual’s spirit as an amateur’, Said argues, ‘can enter and transform the merely professional routine most of us go through into something much more lively and radical; instead of doing what one is supposed to do one can ask why one does it, who benefits from it, how can it reconnect with a personal project and original thoughts.’ 24 This requires not just a stubborn intellectual independence, but also shedding habits, jargons, tones that have inhibited IR scholars from conversing with thinkers and intellectuals outside the discipline, colleagues in history, anthropology, cultural studies, comparative literature, sociology as well as in non-academic venues, who raise the question of the global in different and sometimes contradictory ways. Arguing that the intellectual’s role is a ‘non-specialist’ one, 25 Said bemoans the disappearance of the ‘general secular intellectual’ – ‘figures of learning and authority, whose general scope over many fields gave them more than professional competence, that is, a critical intellectual style’. 26 Discarding the professional strait- jacket of expertise-oriented IR to venture into intellectual terrains that raise questions of global power and cultural negotiations in a myriad of intersecting and cross-cutting ways will yield richer and fuller conceptions of the ‘politics’ of global politics. Needless to say, inter- and cross- disciplinarity will also yield richer and fuller conceptions of the ‘global’ of global politics. It is to that that I turn next.

### AT: You Lead To No Limits

#### Their 'no limits' args are overstated -- openness is a leap of faith guided by ethics which prevents the abuse of conversational encounters

Bleiker and Leet 6 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, and Martin, Senior Research Officer with the Brisbane Institute, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 34(3), p. 737)JM

The most typical objection to such an open-ended approach to ethics is, of course, the accusation that it inevitably leads into a relativist void from whence it becomes impossible to separate good and evil: that only a categorical approach to ethics can save us in a time of moral need. But our most difficult ethical decisions must usually be taken precisely at a time when subliminal events have shaken the very foundations of our principles, at moments when the boundaries between good and evil need to be revisited and redrawn. Falling back into old intellectual habits, whether they are codified or not, will not give us any answers, at least not those we need to deal with the issues in an innovative, sensitive and fair way. Finding ethical solutions at such times of dearth requires a leap of faith into the unknown. Søre n K i e r k e g a a rd already knew that the results of such a leap can never be known, that the ensuing decisions are, by nature, terrible.63 No foundation can ever guarantee to save us from a fall. No pre - e s t a b l i s h e d principles can give us certainty that we are on the right path. Nothing, in short, can absolve us from the terrible burden of decision-making. But we are most likely to face the ensuing challenges successfully when equipped with an aesthetic and ethical sensibility that the conscious alone cannot provide. It is at such moments of need that the lessons learned from the sublime and the subliminal can become most useful – as long as we have discovered ways of embracing the sense of wonder and enchantment they engender.

### AT: Limits/Exclusion Inevitable

#### Language has an infinite number of constructions – there are no limits

Warsi no date (jilliani, linguistics author, jilaniwarsi.tripod.com/language.pdf)JFS

Language provides opportunities to send the message that has never been sent before and to understand novel messages. It also suggests that number of sentences in language is limitless. Any speaker can construct a sentence that has never been constructed before. It is this feature of language that is referred to as productivity or creativity of language.

#### **Language has no limits – politics transcends to the personal level and becomes infinite**

Okadigbo 2 (Chuba, former African Senate President, http://groups.yahoo.com/group/ChatAfriK/message/2824)JFS

Yes. Dialogue has no limits especially when the dialogue leads to a general, consensual agreement. The purpose of politics is the well-being of the masses; the common good is the object of politics. These calculations focus on the subject of power and politics. Where politics stops, government begins. Where government stops, politics begins. Now, I give you one example. Do you know, Mr. Editor, that there are already manipulations in the press to reduce the impeachment saga into a regional affair between North and South? By not being emotive but intellectual about it, I watch that argument with every discretion. Dialogue is of the essence right now. If you allow any emotive, temperamental or tribal argument in the calculus, we will lose the objective of state policy

#### **Dialogue is limitless and allows new possibilities for thought**

CII no date (The Co-Intelligence Institute non-profit research institute, http://www.co-intelligence.org/P-dialogue.html)JFS

The late quantum physicist David Bohm observed that both quantum mechanics and mystical traditions suggest that our beliefs shape the realities we evoke. He further postulated that thought is largely a collective phenomenon, made possible only through culture and communication. Human conversations arise out of and influence an ocean of cultural and transpersonal meanings in which we live our lives, and this process he called dialogue. Most conversations, of course, lack the fluid, deeply connected quality suggested by this oceanic metaphor. They are more like ping-pong games, with participants hitting their very solid ideas and well-defended positions back and forth. Such conversations are properly called discussions. "Discussion," Bohm noted, derives from the same root word as "percussion" and "concussion," a root that connotes striking, shaking and hitting. Dialogue, in contrast, involves joining our thinking and feeling into a shared pool of meaning which continually flows and evolves, carrying us all into new, deeper levels of understanding none of us could have foreseen. Through dialogue "a new kind of mind begins to come into being," observed Bohm, "based on the development of common meaning... People are no longer primarily in opposition, nor can they be said to be interacting, rather they are participating in this pool of common meaning, which is capable of constant development and change." Bohm's approach to dialogue involved participants working together to understand the assumptions underlying their individual and collective beliefs. Collective reflection on these assumptions could reveal blind spots and incoherences from which participants could then free themselves, leading to greater collective understanding and harmony. Bohm maintained that such collective learning increases our collective intelligence. (For links to sites, groups, and listservs working with Bohm's approach to dialogue, click here.) (For Bohm's introduction to group dialogue, click here.)

### AT: Limits/Exclusion Inevitable

#### Limits are not inevitable – They naturalize them

Robbins 4 (Paul, p. 109, Political Ecology: A Critical Introduction, U of Az-Geography & Dev’t)

Moreover, the politics that govern the fate of natural systems are secured without resistance to the degree that this constructedness is hidden from view. Political ecologists suggest, therefore, that because this stuff is not inevitable and has history, it can be unmasked for what it is, reinvented, and changed for a better and more sustainable future. In any case, in political ecology, things are rarely what they appear.

#### Their limits are socially constructed and we have impacts to the specific limits they construct

Rorty 99 (Richard, Atlantic Monthly, Yale-Phil, http://www.wsu.edu/~kimander/phonysciencewars.htm)

These philosophers can agree with the social constructionists that notions like "the homosexual" and "the Negro" and "the female" are best seen not as inevitable classifications of human beings but rather as inventions that have done more harm than good. But they are not sure that "X is a social construction" adds much to "talking about X is not inevitable, and there are probably better ways of talking." They see the point of Foucault's famous observation that in the nineteenth century homosexuality was "transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphroditism of the soul." Foucault went on to say, "The sodomite had been a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species." They agree that we would have been better off with the commonsensical thought that some men prefer to have sex with other men than with the sophisticated attempt to ground this preference in a deep, dark psychopathology. But they think that the energy Foucault's disciples have put into arguing that something is a social construction would be better put into proposing some alternative social construction: a more effective and less damaging way of talking about what is going on. All our controversial ways of talking are, to be sure, choices that society has made about how to classify things. In that sense these classifications are of course socially constructed. But the interesting question is whether anybody can suggest a better classification.

#### Their inevitability claims crush agency

Clare 2 (blogger, https://inputs.wordpress.com/2009/05/24/foucault-quote-for-may-2/)

Since the early 1980s Foucault has been criticised – particularly by sociologists and also by Habermas et al for not having a theory of ‘agency’. Quite apart from indicating an inability to think outside the boundaries of a certain way of conceptualising the world, this criticism also indicates an ahistorical reading of Foucault’s work. If in his earlier work he doesn’t discuss in detail the interiority of the way people made decisions about action, his work is all about showing that these decisions were not inevitable and that the current configuration of culture is not the result of some pre-determined process. Quite the contrary in fact. There is a good deal of accident, chance, and petty politicking which operates in any situation making its outcome unpredictable.

### AT: You Lead To Different Limits

#### Dialogue is intersubjective

Kent et al 2 (Michael L. Kent, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Strategic Communication, Maureen Taylor, Ph.D., is Gaylord Family Chair of Strategic Communication, Sheila M. McAllister-Spooner, Ph.D., is Assistant Professor of Communication, Monmouth University, Research in dialogic theory and public relations)

Since dialogue is intersubjective, it necessitates interpretation and understanding by all parties involved. Dialogue necessitates that all participants are willing to exert themselves on the part of others in a dialogue to understand often- diverse positions. Commitment to interpretation also means that efforts are made to grasp the positions, beliefs, and values of others before their positions can be equitably evaluated (Gadamer, 1994; Ellul, 1985; Makay & Brown, 1972).

#### These intersubjective limits are better than imposed limits for self/other worth

Kent et al 2 (Michael L. Kent, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Strategic Communication, Maureen Taylor, Ph.D., is Gaylord Family Chair of Strategic Communication, Sheila M. McAllister-Spooner, Ph.D., is Assistant Professor of Communication, Monmouth University, Research in dialogic theory and public relations)

Genuine dialogue, involves more than just a commitment to a relationship. Dialogue occurs when individuals (and sometimes groups) agree to set aside their differences long enough to come to an understanding of the others’ positions. Dialogue is not equivalent to agreement. Rather, dialogue is more akin to intersubjectivity where both parties attempt to understand and appreciate the values and interests of the other. Dialogue is both Socratic and Kantian. Dialogue rests on an acknowledgement of the worth of the other as well as a willingness to “continue the conversation”—not for purposes of swaying the other with the strength of one’s erudition, but as a means of understanding the other and reaching mutually satisfying positions.

#### Open-ended dialogue solves colonizing tendencies of externally imposed limits

Hawkins and Muecke 3 (Gay and Stephen, Culture and Waste, p. 54, Google Books)

Monologue is the narcissistic conversation that the 'West has with itself key feature of which is that the other never gets to talk bark on its terms. Monologue is a practice of power, of course. since it involves silencing the people whose words and though. would require a break with self=absorption. Much of what passes for conversation is actually monologue because it is constructed around a self=other structure such that the "other. is the absence or reflection of self In contrast. dialogue is intersubjective It is an openended meeting of subjects. Emil Fackenheim articulates two main precepts for structuring the ground for ethical dialogue.' The first that dialogue begins where one is, and thus is always situated; the second is that dialogue is Open, and I thus that the outcome is not known in advance. Openness produces reflexivity, to that one's own round becomes destabilized. In open dialogue one holds one's self available to be surprised, to be challenged, and to be knocked out of narcissism. Dialogue breaks up monologue, it clears a round for meeting, generating a place where people cm speak on their own terms. It thus requires attentive listening and an open mind. Construed in this way, dialogue is a decolonizing practice leading toward unpredictable outcomes.

#### Dialogue exchange ensures agency

Guilar 6 (Joshua, School of Communication and Culture)

In dialogic education, students, teachers, and content are related intersubjectively. Different disciplines have contributed to the understanding of such relations. One source for understanding the intersubjective nature of instruction is the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1982: 1960; Smith, 1993). Gadamer proposed a dialogical mode of knowing through shared conversation regarding the interpretation of texts. An educational community is intersubjective in nature when all parties relate to one another as having a sense of agency and a unique perspective. In such a community there is not a knowing subject (e.g., the teacher) and a known object (e.g., the student or the content of instruction). Rather, all three elements—the teacher, the student, and the content—relate in an intersubjective, interpretive community. In this community, roles such as teacher and student are still significant. However, the nature of the dialogic conversation changes power relations in contrast to conventional pedagogy. Particularly, the nature of the conversation is such that the students become agents in the hermeneutic community. Students’ roles change from being passive learners to becoming co-creators. In expressing his or her perspective, a student co-creates along with other students and the teacher a shared world in which difference is expressed and respected. Power is shared mutually in this co-created community.

### AT: Shively

#### **It is no longer a question of searching for Truth, but rather of accepting difference and facilitating dialog within that difference**

Bleiker 98 (asst. prof. of International Studies at Pusan National University (Roland, “Retracing and redrawing the boundaries of events: Postmodern interferences with international theory”, Alternatives, Oct-Dec 1998, Vol. 23, Issue 4)

In the absence of authentic knowledge, the formulation of theoretical positions and practical action requires modesty. Accepting difference and facilitating dialogue becomes more important than searching for the elusive Truth. But dialogue is a process, an ideal, not an end point. Often there is no common discursive ground, no language that can establish a link between the inside and the outside. The link has to be searched first. But the celebration of difference is a process, an ideal, not an end point. A call for tolerance and inclusion cannot be void of power. Every social order, even the ones that are based on the acceptance of difference, excludes what does not fit into their view of the world. Every form of thinking, some international theorists recognize, expresses a will to power, a will that cannot but "privilege, oppress, and create in some manner."[54] There is no all-encompassing gaze. Every process of revealing is at the same time a process of concealing. By opening up a particular perspective, no matter how insightful it is, one conceals everything that is invisible from this vantage point. The enframing that occurs by such processes of revealing, Martin Heidegger argues, runs the risk of making us forget that enframing is a claim, a disciplinary act that "banishes man into that kind of revealing that is an ordering." And where this ordering holds sway, Heidegger continues, "it drives out every other possibility for revealing."[55] This is why one must move back and forth between different, sometimes incommensurable forms of insights. Such an approach recognizes that the key to circumventing the ordering mechanisms of revealing is to think in circles--not to rest too long at one point, but to pay at least as much attention to linkages between than to contents of mental resting places. Inclusiveness does not lie in the search for a utopian, all-encompassing worldview, but in the acceptance of the will to power--in the recognition that we need to evaluate and judge, but that no form of knowledge can serve as the ultimate arbiter for thought and action. As a critical practice, postmodernism must deal with its own will to power and to subvert that of others. This is not to avoid accountability, but to take on responsibility in the form of bringing modesty to a majority.

#### Truth seeking is bad – Truth to power is key

Mourard 1 (Roger, Wastenaw CC-College of educ, http://inkido.indiana.edu/research/onlinemanu/papers/focault.pdf)

The political task is not to discover the truth and thereby free humanity from domination or alienation. Truth is a function of power/knowledge. Rather, the task is to conduct “a battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role that it plays.” Foucault’s approach is to challenge the existing social order of the present by showing how it emerged from the will to dominate through the creation of a fictitious individual self and its equally manufactured objectification as an entity to be investigated scientifically.

### AT: Do It On The Neg

#### "Do it on the neg" marginalizes our arg.

Bleiker 1 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 30(3), p. 523)JM

A second and related shortcoming of early postmodern contributions is their focus on criticising/deconstructing the shortcomings of dominant Realist and Liberal approaches to international political theory. While essential at a time when there was little space for alternative knowledge, this process of critique has nevertheless limited the potential of postmodern contributions. Discourses of power politics and their framing of political practice cannot overcome all existing theoretical and practical dilemmas. By articulating critique in relation to arguments advanced by orthodox approaches to IR, the impact of critical voices remains confined within the larger discursive boundaries that were established through the initial framing of these debates.

#### "Run it as an advantage” pigeon-holes our args.

Bleiker 1 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 30(3), p. 523)JM

My suggestion is, thus, to ‘forget IR theory’, to see beyond a narrowly defined academic discipline and to refuse tying future possibilities to established forms of life.57 Instead of seeking nostalgic comfort and security in the familiar interpretation of long gone epochs, even if they are characterised by violence and insecurity, conscious forgetting opens up possibilities for a dialogical understanding of our present and past. Rather than further entrenching current security dilemmas by engaging with the orthodox discourse that continuously gives meaning to them, forgetting tries to escape the vicious circle by which these social practices serve to legitimise and objectivise the very discourses that have given rise to them.

#### “Do it on the aff” compromises our arguments.

Herring 6 (Eric, Reader in International Politics at the University of Bristol, [http://mil.sagepub.com/content/35/1/105.full.pdf] AD: 7/9/10)JM

Insider activism (that is, intellectual and policy work within mainstream institutions) risks co-option and deradicalisation. For some, being an activist scholar necessarily involves being an anti-military, anti-state, anti-capitalist outsider opposing British-backed US foreign policy, but there is no consensus on this.21 The risks of co-option and deradicalisation needs to be considered in relation to context, strategy and tactics as well as theorised understandings of the underlying characteristics of those mainstream institutions. To insist on or assume pacifism, anarchism, socialism and opposition to all aspects of British and US foreign policy misses what may turn out to be the ambiguous, contingent, factionalised and therefore potentially progressive aspects of the military, the state, capitalism and the foreign policies of Britain and the United States.

### AT: Wrong Forum

#### Debate is a place for the voice of the oppressed – this is the key arena for our movement

Warner and Bruschke 3 (Ede, University of Loiusville, John, CSU Fullerton, “GONE ON DEBATING:” COMPETITIVE ACADEMIC DEBATE AS A TOOL OF EMPOWERMENT FOR URBAN AMERICA)JFS

These arguments are theoretical; they cannot speak as powerfully as the voices of those who have experienced both the oppression of an education system failing from the “unique synergy between lack of funding and anachronistic pedagogical practices.” Ed Lee, who now holds a Master’s degree and works for an Urban Debate League in San Francisco, recounts his experience as an urban debater: Educated in the public school system of inner-city Atlanta, my high school experience was tragically similar to the one depicted above. My savior, like many others**,** was the Atlanta Urban Debate League. It provided the opportunity to question the nefarious rites of passage (prison, drugs, and drinking) that seem to be uniquely debilitating to individuals in the poor urban communities. In enclaves of poverty, there is also an undercurrent of nihilism and negativity that eats away at the soul of the community. Adults are hopeless. Children follow their lead and become hopeless. The solution isto offer people a choice beyond minimum wage or prison. UrbanDebateLeagues provide that. Debating delivers a galaxy of alternatives and opportunity for those who are only offered hopelessness and were unnecessary elements of our culture that existed becaused they (predominantly) go unquestioned. Questioning the very nature of our existence is at the heart of the debate process. I am left wondering what would occur if debate became as compulsory in inner-city educational culture as football and basketball? Imagine graduating from high school each year millions of underprivileged teenagers with the ability to articulate their needs, the needs of others, and the ability to offer solutions. I am convinced that someone would be forced to listen. Urban debate Leagues offers a pedagogical tool that simultaneously opens the mind to alternatives and empowers students to take control of their lives. Half of the time, students are disseminating information and forming arguments about complexphilosophical andpolitical issues. In the other half, they answer the arguments of others. Self-reflexivity is an inherent part of the activity. Debating gives students the ability to articulate the partiality of all critical assessments. Contemporary educational techniques teach one side of the issue and universalize it as the only “truth.” Debate forces students to evaluate both sides, and determine their independent contextualized truth. Additionally, unlike the current pedagogy, debate allows everything to be questioned…The ability to question subjectivities presented as the objective truth makes debate uniquely empowering for individuals disenfranchised by the current system. It teaches students to interrogate their own institutionalized neglect and the systemic unhindered oppression of others. It is one of the few venues we are able to question authority. (pp. 95-6) Given the possibilities an urban debate program presents, it is worth examining the practical possibilities for a revitalization of urban debate. One thing is clear: Urban debate is under-utilized at present. Many urban debate programs died in the late sixties and early seventies as the result of massive budget cuts. As tax revenues diminished in educational coffers, debate programs, always treated as just one of the “extracurricular” activities, got lost in efforts to stop the institutional bleeding by “doing more with less.” While college debate is more vibrant, as early as 1975 major college debate organizations were acknowledging the lack of diversity in intercollegiate forensics. Little has changed over the past twenty-five years; minority participation remains exceptionally low at the two major national policy debate tournaments, the Cross Examination Debate Association championship and the National Debate Tournament (Hill, 1997; Stepp, 1997)

### AT: Debate Community

#### Linking education to group outcomes ruins the value to life

Mourard 1 (Roger, Wastenaw CC-College of educ, http://inkido.indiana.edu/research/onlinemanu/papers/focault.pdf)

It is no answer to ground pedagogy in the notion of “building community.” The idea that something must be built implies that something must be made better in order for it to be tolerated. Moreover, “community” carries with it the prerequisite that one be made competent to be a member – again, the presumption that something must be done to the person to make it better in some way. I do not mean to say that educators have bad intent. I do mean to say that this ethos of betterment through competency will inevitably fail to fulfill the dream of reformers and revolutionaries. It does not consider the human being as an entity to care for but rather as something to be equipped with skills and knowledge in order to improve itself.

### AT: Policymaking

#### Policy making framework makes a commodity of violence – ensures its continuance – and is unethical

Makau 96 (Josina., Ph.D. in Rhetoric at the University of California-Berkeley, Responsible Communication, Argumentation Instruction in the Face of Global Perils)

Weisel's critique of German education prior to world war II points to another danger of traditional argumentation instruction . Like the Nazi doctors, students in traditional argumentation courses are taught "how to reduce life and the mystery of life to abstraction." Weisel urges educators to teach students what the Nazi doctors never learned – that people are not abstractions. Weisel urges educators to learn from the Nazi experience the importance of humanizing their charges, of teaching students to view life as special, 'with its own secrets, its own treasures, its own sources of anguish and with some measure of triumph.' Trained as technocrats with powerful suasory skills but little understanding, students participating in traditional argumentation courses would have difficulty either grasping or appreciating the importance of Weisel's critique. Similarly, they would have difficulty grasping or appreciating Christian's framework for an ethic of technology an approach that requires above all, openness, trust and care. The notion of conviviality would be particularly alien to these trained technocrats. Traditionally trained debaters are also likely to fail to grasp the complexity of issues. Trained to view problems in black and white terms and conditioned to turn to "expertise" for solutions, students, and traditional courses become subject to ethical blindness. As Benhabib noted, 'Moral blindness implies not necessarily an evil or unprincipaled person, but one who can not see the moral texture of the situation confronting him or her.' These traditional debaters, deprived of true dialogic encounter , fail to develop 'the capacity to represent' to themselves the 'multiplicity of viewpoints, the variety of perspectives, the layers of meaning, etc. which constitute a situation'. They are thus inclined to lack 'the kind of sensitivity to particulars, which most agree is essential for good and perspicacious judgment.' Encouraging student to embrace the will to control and to gain mastery, to accept uncritically a sovereign view of power, and to maintain distance from their own and others 'situatedness,' the traditional argumentation course provides an unlikely site for nurturing guardians of our world's precious resources. It would appear, in fact, that the argumentation course foster precisely the 'aggressive and manipulative intellect bred by modern science and discharged into the administration of things' associated with most of the world's human made perils. And is therefore understandable that feminist and others critics would write so harshly of traditional argumentation of debate.

#### Their limitation of politics to the state denies creativity which eliminates the things that makes life worth living and perverts politics.

Bleiker and Leet 6 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, and Martin, Senior Research Officer with the Brisbane Institute, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34(3), p. 735-736)JM

Promoting aesthetic engagements with politics is not to replace social scientific enquiries or to suggest that art offers a solution to all problems. The point, rather, is that the key political challenges of our time, from terrorism to poverty, are far too complex not to employ the full register of human intelligence and creativity to deal with them. Aesthetic engagements with the sublime are central to this endeavour. But to remain valid, such engagements must go beyond a mere process of aestheticising the political. Establishing societal models based on beauty and harmony has led to dangerous political experiments. We need to acknowledge, along with George Kateb, that the aesthetic is a dominant force in human life. But we need to do so while recognising the potentially problematic practice of searching for stability amidst chaos and contingency through a resort to beauty as the ultimate value. In his view, such ‘unaware and unrationalized aestheticism’ is responsible for a great deal of immorality.60 In attempts to transform the ambivalent experience of the sublime into something unambiguously ‘beautiful’, moral limits are often ignored. In contrast to aesthetic ‘cravings’, then, the challenge is to cultivate an appreciation of sublimity in the everyday, and to use the aesthetic not to mask our fears of the uncertain, but to recognise them and search for ways of living comfortably with the contingent dimensions of life.

#### The conception of politics devolves to a form of absolute control that overlimits the realm of the political, making true representation impossible & violence inevitable.

Bleiker and Leet 6 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, and Martin, Senior Research Officer with the Brisbane Institute, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 34(3), p. 736)JM

An aesthetic engagement with the sublime inevitably contains an ethical component. But the ethics we find here is very different from the automatic and codified form of ethics that prevails in much of the theory and practice of international politics. This is so because prevailing approaches to scholarship and decision-making have stated a clear preference for the conscious in the fields of politics and ethics, to the point of imposing order in an attempt to repress ambivalence. The ethical significance of the aesthetic ensues from the effort to be mindful about the inherent violence of such forms of representation. It involves relaxing pressures always working to cut the world down to the size and shape of our fears, needs and desires. Morton Schoolman, for instance, argues that the aesthetic refers to a kind of openness and responsiveness that contrasts sharply with those tendencies in the modern world towards control and the repression of difference. He distinguishes ‘formal reason’ which ‘finds what is unknown and diff e rent from thought to be an obstacle to its emancipation from fear’, from an ‘aesthetic reason’ that is ‘unafraid of the unfathomable in which it finds the source of its receptivity to the diversity of diff e rent forms of life’.61 John Gray illustrates the practical dimensions of this position by reminding us that consciousness can actually be an obstacle, that the most accomplished pianist, for instance, is at his or her most skilful when playing with the least amount of self-awareness .62 Similarly, in the domain of ethics, the conscious self can be both the source of moral behaviour and an obstacle to it.

#### Expanding what counts as politics is critical to solve environmental crisis.

Mallory 8 (Chaone, prof of environmental philosophy @ Villanova U, [http://www.environmentalphilosophy.org/ISEEIAEPpapers/2008/Mallory.pdf] AD: 7/9/10)JM

Although I think that Sandilands overstates the case somewhat—environmental movements, even those which utilize fairly conventional discourses and strategies, are always self-consciously calling for political action and thus understand themselves as political actors as such—nonetheless Sandilands points out something very significant. One of the most salient questions for environmentalists is not how to best exploit existing political avenues for the sake of making gains for the more-than-human world, not about how humans ought best “represent” the interests of nature in incorrigibly anthropocentric political arenas, but to question, and ultimately reconfigure what counts as politics itself; to revise, or rupture where necessary, traditional political categories and assumptions about who or what counts as a political subject and what counts as political action and speech, and challenge the instrumentalist view of politics in favor of a view that considers politics as a space where ecological subjectivities are formed, contested, destabilized, and re-formed. Ecofeminist political philosophy wonders how nature can have a voice in the polis. This leads to other sorts of philosophical tasks and questions, as Sandilands notes.

#### The kritik doesn’t preclude politics – it allows for an understanding of it that can solve problems more effectively.

Zalewski 2K (Marysia, Director, Centre for Gender Studies, Feminism After Postmodernism, p. 67-68)JM

A typical postmodern claim is that power is not something that is simply or only repressive. In keeping with a desire to dismantle dualistic thinking, postmodernists refuse to perceive power as fundamentally opposed to resistance, hence the intertwined phrase; power/resistance. Indeed, the idea that there is a monolithic power ‘out there’, whether that is patriarchy, racism or capitalism, can lead to a sense of fatalism and despair, which is hardly the best way to achieve emancipatory ends, postmoderns might argue. This links into the notion of productive power introduced earlier, which implies that the persistent battle over the meanings of things will inevitably foster new forms of resistance and new meanings emerge from this. The battles over the words 'queer' and 'nigger\* serve as good examples of this. The consistent postmodern emphasis on disputing meanings and displacing traditional ideas and values, inevitably leads to a questioning and dishevelling of modernist definitions and certainties about what counts as politics. This imposition of the authority of correct meaning is something that postmodernists are keen to expose. Postmodernists also resist the idea that their views of the subject and epistemology lead to an inability to be political or do politics. If we think of a specific postmodern method, deconstruct ion, we can understand it as something that questions the terms in which we understand the political, rather than an abandonment of the political. Surely, postmodernists argue, questioning what counts as politics is a political act? Rethinking what the political is can allow a whole range of differences of opinions to appear. Additionally, rather than concentrating on the 'why' of things, postmodernists prefer to focus on effects. So instead of asking. 'Why are women oppressed?', postmodernists are more likely to ask questions about the effects of particular practices. For example. 'What are the effects of beliefs about the "proper" roles for women such as those espoused by the Catholic Church?' Or in other (postmodern) words. "How do women gel said [or described] as "good wives" by the Catholic Church?' Questioning foundations, beliefs about who and what 'the subject is' and opening the notion of politics surely counts as taking feminist responsibility seriously?

#### A focus on politics proper is neither inevitable nor natural – The presumption that we should debate politics and produce research on politics proper reifies policymaking as a verified truth which devolves agency, obscures social change, and naturalizes state violence – Put away your limits and ground da’s: The historical moment of the state is tiny; debate is older and more robust

Lemke 97 (Thomas, German Science Foundation-heisenberg fellow, <http://www.thomaslemkeweb.de/publikationen/Indigestible%20Meal%20-%20Proofs.pdf>)

It follows that an analytics of government takes seriously the historical and systematic importance of ‘political knowledge’ (Foucault, 1997: 67) for state analysis. Historically, the emergence and stability of state agencies is intimately tied to the incessant generation, circulation, storage and repression of knowledge. The constitution of the modern state was closely connected with the rise of the human sciences and the production of knowledge about the population and individuals. It depended on information concerning the physical condition of the national territory, diplomatic and secret knowledge about the strengths and weaknesses of foreign states, and other forms of knowledge that made objects visible and rendered them into a calculable and programmable form. State actors and agencies used statistical accounts, medical expertise, scientific reports, architectural plans, bureaucratic rules and guidelines, surveys, graphs, and so on to represent events and entities as information and data for political action. These ‘inscription devices’ (Latour, 1986) made it possible to define problems, specify areas of intervention, calculate resources, and determine political goals (Burke, 2000; Vismann, 2000; Desrosières, 2002; Collin and Horstmann, 2004). In systematic terms, political knowledge plays a dual role in the constitution of the modern state. On the one hand, political rationalities provide cognitive and normative maps that open up spaces of government which are intrinsically linked to truth. State agencies produce and proliferate forms of knowledge that enable them to act upon the governed reality. On the other hand, the state is constituted by discourses, narratives, world-views and styles of thought that allow political actors to develop strategies and realize goals. What is more, these symbolic devices even define what it means to be an actor, who may qualify as a political actor and citizen (Nullmeier, 1993; Meyer, 1999; Steinmetz, 1999a; Müller, Raufer and Zifonun, 2002; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003). Finally, it would be a misunderstanding to reduce political knowledge to scientific reasoning and rational argumentation since it is also embodied in routine action, cultural self-evidence and normative orientations. Thus the state is not only a material structure and a mode of thinking, but also a lived and embodied experience, a mode of existence (see Maihofer, 1995; Sauer, 2001: 110–12). This analytical perspective has two important theoretical merits. First, the commonplace contrast between state formation and policymaking loses credibility, since the former is not a single event but an enduring process in which the limits and contents of state action are permanently negotiated and redefined. It follows ‘that “policies” that affect the very structure of the state are part of the ongoing process of stateformation’ (Steinmetz, 1999b: 9; Gottweis, 2003). Second, this approach makes it possible to include the observer’s position in the process of theory construction. Political and sociological knowledge, operating with dualisms like individual and state, knowledge and power, and so on, plays a constitutive role in the emergence and reproduction of concrete forms of statehood. It provides a symbolic infrastructure that maps possible sites of intervention, and it is also inside this cultural framework that subjects define and live their relation to the state (Demirovic, 1998: 49–50; Mitchell, 1991: 94; Rose and Miller, 1992: 182).

### AT: Policymaking Solves Violence

#### Empirically, policymaking can't solve violence

Bleiker 1 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 30(3), p. 509-510)JM

Those who make the analysis of these political events their professional purview—the students of international relations (ir)—adhere to representational habits that have become equally objectified and problematic. Many of them are social scientists for whom knowledge about the ‘facts’ of the ‘real world’ emerges from the search for ‘valid inferences by the systematic use of well-established procedures of inquiry’.3 But relatively little practical knowledge has emerged from these efforts, even after successive generations of social scientists have refined their models and methods. Our insights into the international have not grown substantially, nor have our abilities to prevent deadly conflicts. From Kosovo to Afghanistan violence remains the modus operandi of world politics. Even proponents of scientific research lament that ‘students of international conflict are left wrestling with their data to eke out something they can label a finding’.4

#### Expanding what is considered political is crucial to solve global problems.

 Bleiker 1 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 30(3), p. 519)JM

To broaden our knowledge of the international does, however, require more than simply adding a few additional layers of interpretation. What is needed is a more fundamental reorientation of thought and action: a shift away from harmonious common sense imposed by a few dominant faculties towards a model of thought that enables productive flows across a variety of discordant faculties. For Deleuze, this difference amounts to a move from recognition to a direct political encounter, from approaches that affirm appearances without disturbing thought towards approaches that add to our understanding and, indeed, force us to think.44

#### Their framework constrains meaningful discussion – this allows violence to persist.

Bleiker 1 (Roland, prof of International Relations @ U of Queensland, Brisbane, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 30(3), p. 524)JM

Being aware of the problematic dimensions of representation, aesthetic approaches view academic disciplines as powerful mechanisms that direct and control the production and diffusion of knowledge. Disciplines establish the rules of intellectual exchange and define the methods, techniques, and instruments that are considered proper for the pursuit of knowledge. While providing meaning, coherence and stability, these rules also delineate the limits of what can be thought, talked, and written of in a normal way. Innovative solutions to existing problems cannot be found if our efforts at understanding the international remain confined to a set of rigid and well-entrenched disciplinary rules.

### AT: Must Be Policy Relevant

#### Academics don’t influence policy

Barnett 6 (Michael What the Academy Can Teach by Academy and Policy, Vol. 28 (2) - Summer 2006 the Harold Stassen Prof of IR at the Humphrey Institute and Profof Poli Sci at the U of Minnesota http://hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=1553&p=1) TBC 7/9/10

Over the years I have had a recurring encounter at professional meetings: a cluster of academics, discussing the implications of their research, worry that the findings, if ripped out of context and misappropriated by government officials, could have unintended consequences. A debate follows about whether academics are responsible for how their research is used and, if so, how they can control its interpretation and appropriation. I have always been bemused by these exchanges—academics worry about the implementation of their ideas, without realizing that policymakers simply might not care what international relations scholars have to say, let alone listen to their opinions. At these moments I am reminded of a classic exchange in Casablanca between Peter Lorre and Humphrey Bogart. Lorre asks, “You despise me, don’t you, Rick?” Bogart replies, “I guess I would if I thought about you.” Although US government officials are not nearly as dismissive of academics and their ideas as Bogart was of Lorre, they certainly have a low threshold for academic research. Some of their dismissiveness is understandable. Policymakers need to act in complex situations defined by tremendous uncertainty and with some knowledge of the key participants before deciding what to do. Academic knowledge rarely meets this standard of “usability.” Yet the impatience of policymakers cannot be completely attributed to the kind of knowledge they desire. It also is a result of a general intolerance for theory and frustration with the ways in which academics collect and analyze information. This dismissal of scholarly knowledge and research can be dangerous in several ways, including a failure both to acknowledge important developments in world affairs that should affect policy and to recognize the positive effects of thinking like a scholar.

#### **Academics don’t influence policy – Methodology**

Barnett 6 (Michael What the Academy Can Teach by Academy and Policy, Vol. 28 (2) - Summer 2006 the Harold Stassen Prof of IR at the Humphrey Institute and Profof Poli Sci at the U of Minnesota http://hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=1553&p=1) TBC 7/9/10

Academics pay considerable attention to sources, data, methods, and research design. While there are places in the foreign policy bureaucracy that approximate this logic of inquiry, often what passes for research in government is not scientifically driven observation but rather arguments that conform to the political realities of the moment. Academics consider alternative hypotheses and appeal to evidence to show why their proposed argument is superior to existing explanations. Many policymakers do not. Academics privilege relatively long, exhaustive, footnote-crowded papers that methodically consider an issue from all angles. Policymakers, as they rise in status, become less likely to read anything longer than three pages. I learned the art of writing memos that did not exceed two pages, stripped complex processes down to their bare bones, and simplified issues to the point of being simple-minded and one-dimensional. The immediate victims of this makeover were nuance, complexity, and contingency. Academics tend toward probabilistic statements, while policymakers favor deterministic, “if-then” statements. Academics tend to favor conclusions that are provisional and invariably call for further study, while policymakers assert their findings with an air of confidence that suggests that no further debate is needed.

#### Academics don’t influence policy – Academics aren’t accessible

Barnett 6 (Michael What the Academy Can Teach by Academy and Policy, Vol. 28 (2) - Summer 2006 the Harold Stassen Prof of IR at the Humphrey Institute and Profof Poli Sci at the U of Minnesota http://hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=1553&p=1) TBC 7/9/10

The fast-paced policy world left little time to read academic research, though there were occasions when scholarly findings penetrated the thick walls of government. These successful “crossover” ideas shared certain attributes. They were easily digestible. If scholarly research is to have an impact, it must be presented in a “talking points” formula—relatively short, simplified, representations of the world. A good, if somewhat extreme, example is Foreign Policy magazine. It used to resemble Foreign Affairs with relatively lengthy, serious examinations of contemporary issues. Several years ago Foreign Policy switched to a new format with fewer articles and a preference for simplified statements (globalization is a myth) and highly provocative, sometimes inflammatory claims (Mexicans are taking over the United States) as well as many bright, multicolored graphics. There is, in essence, a preference for style over substance, for simplicity over complexity. A close friend of mine who works in the US Department of State tells me that he and his colleagues like the change in part because it is their version of People magazine.

### AT: Elite Takeover

Elites control society – they influence all aspects of decision making.

Amsden, DiCaprio, and Robinson 9 (Alice, prof of Political Economics at MIT, Alisa, Research Fellow at UNU-WIDER, and James, prof of Government at Harvard U, August, [http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/newsletter/articles/en\_GB/05-08-2009/] AD: 7/9/10)JM

Elites also impact development outcomes through their control over decision-making processes that allocate political resources within a society. This introduces two additional channels through which their activities impact growth in the long run. The first is that elites have the resources to design and implement institutions that favour their interests. Such institutions may promote participation and information flow. Or they may simply cement the position of a particular group within the governance structure. Another feature of elite control over institutions is that they are able to influence how both elites and non-elites within a society perceive different issues. Elites control how issues are framed through their ability to distribute or withhold information, and their influence over and within the media. Even where there is a free media, it depends on elites for information, and can choose to present issues that reflect a particular bias. The extent to which these channels are used for social or personal welfare gain varies among societies. But the fact that these channels exist in every society highlights the fact that if elites can be induced to adopt developmental behaviour, it can have a disproportionately positive impact on growth and development.

#### Elite control now

Saeger 7 (Olivia, Haverford College. Dept. of Political Science, [http://thesis.haverford.edu/dspace-xml/handle/10066/1035] AD: 7/9/10)JM

It is also important to realize that the space for civil society to thrive is created by political elites outside of the state. Essentially, political elites control the creation of civil society by allowing for civil society to function autonomously. Once it was determined that political elites were the vital factor in creating a successful democratic transition, two case studies were examined which allowed us insight into how political elites work and what they must do in order to succeed.

#### Democracy is a sham – current events prove

Wafawarova 7 (Reason, postgraduate student in International Relations at Macquarie U, March 6, [http://raceandhistory.com/selfnews/viewnews.cgi?newsid1173219724,4349,.shtml] AD: 7/9/10)JM

Neo-liberal democracy is the pretext upon which the Americans invaded Iraq and now they have a crisis on how they should be handling their defeat there. It is the pretext they used to be in Afghanistan and the same pretext they used to come up with the so-called Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act. It is the pretext they use to call their perceived enemies "axes of evil, dictators, despots, tyrants, extremists and rogue or failed states." Democracy as a model of governance will always be excellent but America's version of democracy is a sham. It is not designed for governance but for fomenting conflict between the middle class and the lower class of the developing countries.

### AT: Topical Version

#### The neg rigs debate to forego social change and creates stale education

Lemke 97 (Thomas, German Science Foundation-heisenberg fellow, http://www.thomaslemkeweb.de/engl.%20texte/ The%20Birth%20of%20Biopolitics%203.pdf)

The semantic linking of governing ("gouverner") and modes of thought ("mentalité") indicates that it is not possible to study the technologies of power without an analysis of the political rationality underpinning them. In other words, there are two sides to governmentality (at certain points Foucault also speaks of "the art of government"). First, the term pin-points a specific form of representation; government defines a discursive field in which exercising power is "rationalized". This occurs, among other things, by the delineation of concepts, the specification of objects and borders, the provision of arguments and justifications etc. In this manner, government enables a problem to be addressed and offers certain strategies for solving/handling the problem. In this way, it also structures specific forms of intervention. For a political rationality is not pure, neutral knowledge which simply "re-presents" the governing reality; instead, it itself constitutes the intellectual processing of the reality which political technologies can then tackle. This is understood to include agencies, procedures, institutions, legal forms etc. that are intended to enable us to govern the objects and subjects of a political rationality.

#### Their version of the aff is strategic politics that produces tyrannical control

Smith 9 (Neil, CUNY-Anthro, http://neil-smith.net/news/another-revolution-is-possible-foucault-ethics-and-politics)

But Foucault must be defended. He was writing only months after Iranian oil workers sparked the revolution by going on strike and at a time when the hijacking of the revolt by a theocratic elite was far from certain. For him, in the spring of 1979, the “Iranian movement” still defied “that `law’ of revolutions” whereby “the tyranny lurking within them” comes to the surface. Yet the controversy over Foucault’s revolu- tionism has largely sidestepped a central and symptomatic dilemma in Foucault’s forceful defense of revolution, and here he may be on less secure ground. Insofar as the penchant for revolt is, as he suggests, universal, this sits very awkwardly with the “subjectivity” of revolution to which he is just as equally attuned. To span the breach between universality and irreducibility on the one side and subjectivity on the other Foucault proposes a “theoretical ethics”. This theoretical ethics is opposite to, and for Foucault replaces, any strategic politics; it is explicitly “antistrategic”, he says. Potential tyranny lurks not only in revolt, he implies, but equally in a strategic politics. As an intellectual, he feels that his role therefore is to “keep watch, a bit behind politics, over what must unconditionally limit it.”

#### They vacate individual agency to politics proper, weakening politics and overdefining the value in life

Influxus 7 (Major contributor, Foucault blog, http://foucaultblog.wordpress.com/2007/05/13/dividing-the-individual/)

When you say that the individual is not un-political are you agreeing with Craig’s point that liberal political theory, cannot recognise the political, because it vacates all dividing practices from the domain of politics proper? Taking the individual as object, as base unit, is precisely not the disciplinary pole of anatomo-politics. Disciplinary power, as Foucault articulates it in HoSv1, is about dividing and sharing the body through a series of drives, impulses etc. The relationship between liberal political theories, that take the individual as base point, and a management of the body, that divides the anatomy into a series of potentials, should be antagonistic to say the least. Which might be why disciplinary techniques often come as challenges to liberal rights – to privacy and bodily integrity. The standard move of declaring someone pathological or deviant, “in serious need of help”, is to exclude them from the liberal body, from being a candidate for ordinary ethical relations between citizens. In other words if politics is taken to appropriately be concerned with the individual person, then it can only be a form of biopolitics. It is a way of organising the mass-population as though it were a collection of atomic particles. As you point out through Hacking the person is an entity that is generated and categorised through many forms of auto-management. However, if politics takes the relevant aspects of personhood to be attributes that all persons (supposedly) share-alike, such as reason, autonomy and universal rights then the only division that matters is the original division of the population into individual persons. Hence, once liberal political theory is taken up, all relevant decisions of division are already made for it.

### AT: Must Debate About Policy

#### Thousands of years of history prove that debate is possible without the gov’t proper

Lemke 97 (Thomas, German Science Foundation-heisenberg fellow, http://www.thomaslemkeweb.de/engl.%20texte/ The%20Birth%20of%20Biopolitics%203.pdf)

Second, Foucault uses the concept of government in a comprehensive sense geared strongly to the older meaning of the term and adumbrating the close link between forms of power and processes of subjectification. While the word government today possesses solely a political meaning, Foucault is able to show that up until well into the 18 th century the problem of government was placed in a more general context. Government was a term discussed not only in political tracts, but also in philosophical, religious, medical and pedagogic texts. In addition to control/management by the state or the administration, "government" also signified problems of self-control, guidance for the family and for children, management of the household, directing the soul, etc. For this reason, Foucault defines government as conduct, or, more precisely, as "the conduct of conduct" and thus as a term which ranges from "governing the self" to "governing others". All in all, in his history of governmentality Foucault endeavors to show how the modern sovereign state and the modern autonomous individual co-determine each other's emergence (Lect. Feb. 8, 1978/1982b, 16/17; Foucault, 1982a, 220-1; Senellart, 1995).

### AT: Cede The Political

#### Power is not monolithic, but has fissures that can be exploited – The aff empowers said resistance – Elitism now, we solve

Smith 97 (University of Wales, Professor and Pro-Vice Chancellor of the University, University of Wales, Aberystwyth Steve, “Power and Truth, A Reply to William Wallace,” Review of International Studies, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Oct., 1997), p. 513)

Those academics who do get involved in talking truth to power must accept that in so doing they must adopt the agenda of those to whom they are talking. They will be involved in problem-solving, and thereby must accept the 'givens' of the policy debate. Policy-makers see certain things as givens; therefore if you write about them in order to influence the policy debate, you tend to have to write as if they are given as well. For academics such 'givens' are rarely seen as such. This has extremely important political and intellectual consequences since it questions the very notion of talking 'truth' to power. It is more a case of accepting the policy agenda of those to whom one is talking and then giving them a series of alternative ways of proceeding. I see no connection between this and speaking 'truth to power'. I can also admit the tendency to make what one says acceptable to those 'listening', so as to ensure that one is indeed 'listened to'. But more importantly, why should academics take the policy agenda of governments as the starting point? Why do we privilege that starting point rather than the needs and wants of the have-nots in our society or in the global political system? Indeed, maybe speaking 'truth to power' is itself a very political act, albeit in the name of academic neutrality, an act that supports the existing division of resources in the world. This situation is made all the worse once the possibility arises of getting funding from policy-making bodies, however much the individual academic wants to maintain the independence of his or her research. In my view, academics need a critical distance from which to look at the activities of governments. Perhaps the greatest form of isolation and self-righteousness is to accept the policy-makers' view of the world as the starting point, so that the academic sees the world as the policy-maker sees it. Where would questions of gender, famine, and racism fit into that world-view? Yet aren't these every bit as 'political' and 'international' as the traditional agenda? This seems to me to take us very far indeed from the idea of 'speaking truth to power'; the danger must be of telling the powerful what they want to hear and of working within their world-view. Of course, academics spend much time trying to avoid these dangers, and Wallace himself cannot be accused of simply adopting the agenda of the powerful, but surely he would admit that these dangers are profound and very difficult to avoid, especially if one wants to have influence and prestige within the policy-making community. My objection is really to those who pretend that any of this has anything to do with truth and academic objectivity.

#### Policy pros can’t slap us down – People have power through agency

Bleiker 98 (asst. prof. of International Studies at Pusan National University, Roland, “Retracing and redrawing the boundaries of events: Postmodern interferences with international theory”, Alternatives, Oct-Dec 1998, Vol. 23, Issue 4)

In rendering meaningful, one is not describing or representing, one is intervening.[29] An event today is no longer apprehensible through traditional spatial understandings of world politics. Advances in economic, technological, and informational domains have led to what could be called a "deterritorialization" of the world, a situation in which "the local is instantly global."[32] This transformation has rendered obsolete the convention of investigating world politics through several distinct levels of analysis.[33] David Campbell argues convincingly that globalized life is best seen "as a series of transversal struggles rather than as a complex of inter-national, multi-national or trans-national relations."[34] The latter, he points out, are modes of representation that have strong investments in the very borders that are currently being questioned. By contrast, to conceptualize global politics as a site of transversal struggles is to draw attention to the multiple and multilayered interactions that make up contemporary life. It is to recognize the complex cross-border flow of people, goods, ideas, capital-in short, "the increasing irruptions of accelerated and nonterritorial contingencies upon our horizons."[35] (A world political event, such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall, cannot be understood through a spatial mode of representation that relies on a distinction between different levels of analysis. The key dynamics took place in various interstices, in the transversal gray zones that loom along the boundaries between local, domestic, and international politics. The processes that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall are thus best characterized as a series of diverse but interconnected occurrences that transgressed the spatial and political givenness of both East German and Cold War international politics.)[36]

#### **Their arg obliterates agency**

Bleiker 00 (Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague,(Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

An approach that specifies operational schemes recognises these limits to cognition. Instead of establishing a new and better theory of agency, it is content with formulating a framework that facilitates understanding of how human agency is incessantly constituted and reconstituted in the context of transversal struggles. Expressed in de Certeau's language, one must comprehend forms of action in the context of their regulatory environment. Such an approach departs from ways in which traditional philosophy (and, by extension, international theory) has framed the understanding of human action. This framing process has revolved around three ways of explaining action: teleological, causal and intentional. [39](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/prev/105471106#39) My analysis breaks with most elements that are entailed in this mode of analysis. It does not assume that agency can be assessed only by establishing links between means and ends. It does not assume that every form of agency needs an identifiable agent that causes an identifiable outcome. It does not assume that agency occurs only if it stands in a relationship with a declared intention. What is left of the concept of human agency if one no longer relies upon causal, teleological and intentional explanations? The Interlude situated between chapters 7 and 8 deals with this question at a conceptual level. Its objective is to outline a framework that facilitates an understanding of the discursive conditions that are necessary for the exertion of human agency. From this vantage point, the most potent forms of transversal dissent operate in tactical, rather than strategic ways. They move along an indeterminate trajectory, transgress political boundaries and slowly transform values. They becomes visible and effective only through maturation over time and space.

#### Power can’t crush tactical resistance like the aff

Bleiker 00 (Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague,(Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

A further deconstruction of the notion of discourse is necessary to appreciate the unfolding of transversal dissent through tactic and temporality. Despite their power to frame the world, discourses are not monolithic forces that crush everything in sight. They are often thin, unstable, fragmented. They contain cracks. By moving from epistemological to ontological levels of analysis, the inquiry explores the ways in which people can resist discursive domination (chapter 7). Human beings have hyphenated identities. Furthermore, these identities are not frozen in time, but part of a constantly unfolding process of becoming. By tapping into these multiple and shifting dimensions of Being, individuals are able to think and act beyond the narrow confines of the established discursive order. They engage in everyday forms of resistance that allow them to reshape the social context in which they are embedded. Such forms of discursive dissent can be found in countless seemingly insignificant daily acts of defiance. They transform values, transgress boundaries and may eventually promote social change far more effectively than the so-called great events of international politics.

#### **Cede the political fails – reinforces capitalism and strengthens the right**

Dean 8 (Joan, Politics Without Politics, political theorist, http://publishing.eur.nl/ir/darenet/asset/15161/oratiejodidean.pdf)JFS

Democracy, though, is inadequate as a language and frame for left political aspiration. Here are two reasons why; there are others. First, the right speaks the language of democracy. It voices its goals and aspirations in democratic terms. One of the reasons given for the U.S. invasion of Iraq, for example, was the goal of bringing democracy to the Middle East. Similarly, leftists in the United States urge inclusion and participation, and so do those on the political right. The right complains about the exclusion of conservatives from the academy and God from politics. They, too, try to mobilize grass-root support and increase participation. There is nothing particularly left, then, about inclusion and participation. These are elements of democracy the right also supports. This rightwing adoption of democratic ideals prevents the left from occupying the position of a political alternative to the right—if left positions are the same right ones then the left isn’t an alternative. Slavoj Zizek describes this situation where one’s enemy speaks one’s language as “victory in defeat” (2008, p. 189). When one's enemy accepts one's terms, one's point of critique and resistance is lost, subsumed. The dimension of antagonism (fundamental opposition) vanishes. A second reason democracy is inadequate as an expression of left aspiration is that contemporary democratic language employs and reinforces the rhetoric of capitalism: free choice, liberty, satisfaction, communication, connection, diversity. Like any media savvy corporation, democratic activists want to ensure that voices are heard and opinions registered. Corporations and activists alike are united in their preoccupation with awareness: people need to be aware of issues, of products, of products as signs of issues. In this concrete sense, Zizek is right to claim that attachment to democracy is the form our attachment to capital takes (2002, p. 273; 2008, p. 184). In the consumption and entertainment-driven setting of the contemporary United States, one’s commitments to capitalism are expressed as commitments to democracy. They are the same way of life, the same daily practices of “aware-ing” oneself and expressing one’s opinion, of choosing and voting and considering one’s choice a vote and one’s vote a choice.

#### **Leftist politics are worthless – they lead to deadlock and whining**

Dean 8 (Joan, Politics Without Politics, political theorist, http://publishing.eur.nl/ir/darenet/asset/15161/oratiejodidean.pdf)JFS

The criticisms of left embrace of democracy I raise here are part of a broadly shared frustration with and on the contemporary left. Indeed, left complaining or whining might even be the primary mode of left theorizing today. We wallow in misery, in the deadlock in which we find ourselves. But whereas my emphasis is on democracy as the name of left deadlock, of the fantasy of politics without politics, others view the current problem as a crisis of de- democratization (Wendy Brown) or de-politicization (Jacques Ranciere). As Ranciere makes clear in his writings from the nineties , elements of the depoliticization thesis resonate with mainstream political discussions of the end of ideology, the rise of consensus politics, and even the neoliberal withering away of the state, that is, the revisioning of the state as just another contractor of economic services—we were told that the era of big government was over. Financial crises that manifest themselves in the U.S. in 2008 and led to what the Bush administration presented as a necessary 700 billion dollar bailout of banks and institutions “too big to fail” quickly made this notion seem quaint and unconvincing. Nonetheless, the theme of depoliticization has been a pronounced one in the United States and Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It makes sense, then, to consider this theme more closely, interrogating its suppositions and their applicability in the contemporary setting. If the diagnosis of de- democraticization and de-politicization is correct, then left politics should seek more democracy, should attempt re-politicization. But if I am right about the contemporary democratic deadlock, then a politics that reasserts democracy as the solution to all our problems will continue to entrap us in the same old circuits of defeat. It will fail, moreover, to attend to the politicizations already conditioning the current conjuncture.

### AT: Focus On Solvency/Procedure

#### Structural focus on mechanisms for solvency crushes human agency, controlling expression of the value in life

Bleiker 2k (Ph.D. visiting research and teaching affiliations at Harvard, Cambridge, Humboldt, Tampere, Yonsei and Pusan National University as well as the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press)

Questions of agency have been discussed extensively in international theory, mostly in the context of the so-called structure—agency debate. Although strongly wedded to a state-centric view, this debate nevertheless evokes a number of important conceptual issues that are relevant as well to an understanding of transversal dynamics. The roots of the structure—agency debate can be traced back to a feeling of discontent about how traditional approaches to international theory have dealt with issues of agency. Sketched in an overly broad manner, the point of departure looked as follows: At one end of the spectrum were neorealists, who explain state identity and behaviour through a series of structural restraints that are said to emanate from the anarchical nature of the international system. At the other end we find neoliberals, who accept the existence of anarchy but seek to understand the behaviour of states and other international actors in terms of their individual attributes and their ability to engage in cooperative bargaining. If pushed to their logical end-point, the two positions amount, respectively, to a structural determinism and an equally farfetched belief in the autonomy of rational actors. [24](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471074#24) The structure—agency debate is located somewhere between these two poles. Neither structure nor agency receive analytical priority. Instead, the idea is to understand the interdependent and mutually constitutive relationship between them. The discussions that have evolved in the wake of this assumption are highly complex and cannot possibly be summarised here. [25](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471074#25) Some of the key premises, though, can be recognised by observing how the work of Anthony Giddens has shaped the structure—agency debate in international relations. Giddens speaks of the 'duality of structure,' of structural properties that are constraining as well as enabling. They are both 'the medium and outcome of the contingently accomplished activities of situated actors'. [26](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471075#26) Expressed in other words, neither agents nor structures have the final word. Human actions are always embedded in and constrained by the structural context within which they form and evolve. But structures are not immutable either. A human being, Giddens stresses, will 'know a great deal about the conditions of reproduction of the society of which he or she is a member'. [27](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/next/105471075#27) The actions that emerge from this awareness then shape the processes through which social systems are structurally maintained and reproduced.

#### We meet by discussing the state, but a procedural focus reads the narrative of state primacy as natural and inevitable

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To expand the scope of international theory and to bring transversal struggles into focus is not to declare the state obsolete. States remain central actors in international politics and they have to be recognised and theorised as such. In fact, my analysis will examine various ways in which states and the boundaries between them have mediated the formation, functioning and impact of dissent. However, my reading of dissent and agency makes the state neither its main focus nor its starting point. There are compelling reasons for such a strategy, and they go beyond a mere recognition that a state-centric approach to international theory engenders a form of representation that privileges the authority of the state and thus precludes an adequate understanding of the radical transformations that are currently unfolding in global life. Michael Shapiro is among an increasing number of theorists who convincingly portray the state not only as an institution, but also, and primarily, as a set of 'stories' — of which the state-centric approach to international theory is a perfect example. It is part of a legitimisation process that highlights, promotes and naturalises certain political practices and the territorial context within which they take place. Taken together, these stories provide the state with a sense of identity, coherence and unity. They create boundaries between an inside and an outside, between a people and its others. Shapiro stresses that such state-stories also exclude, for they seek 'to repress or delegitimise other stories and the practices of identity and space they reflect.' And it is these processes of exclusion that impose a certain political order and provide the state with a legitimate rationale for violent encounters.

### AT: Focus On Solvency/Procedure

#### The impact is banality of violence – The focus on means ignores productive discussion on the lens of power which makes violent procedures seem like a natural choice

Connoly in 2k (William, Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science @ Johns Hopkins University, Identity/Difference, expanded edition)

 In several domains, the state no longer emerges as a consummate agent of efficacy, even though it expands as a pivotal agent of power.4 A crack in the very unity of "power" has opened up. We have entered a world in which state power is simultaneously magnified and increasingly disconnected from the ends that justify its magni- fication. As obstacles to its efficacy multiply, the state increasingly sustains collective identity through theatrical displays of punish- ment and revenge against those elements that threaten to signify its inefficacy. It launches dramatized crusades against the internal other (low-level criminals, drug users, disloyalists, racial minor- ities, and the underclass), the external other (foreign enemies and terrorists), and the interior other (those strains of abnormality, subversion, and perversity that may reside within anyone). The state becomes, first, the screen upon which much of the resentment against the adverse effects of the civilization of produc- tivity and private affluence is projected; second, the vehicle through which rhetorical reassurances about the glory and durability of that civilization are transmitted back to the populace; and third, the instrument of campaigns against those elements most disturbing to the collective identity. In the first instance, the welfare apparatus of the state is singled out for criticism and reformation. In the second, the presidency is organized into a medium of rhetorical diversion and reassurance. In the third, the state disciplinary-police-punitive apparatus is marshaled to constitute and stigmatize constituencies whose terms of existence might otherwise provide signs of defeat, injury, and sacrifice engendered by the civilization of productivity itself. <p206>