# Hegemony Bad

## 1NC – Hegemony Bad Case Turn

#### A. Transition to multipolarity now

Brzezinski, Center for Strategic and International Studies Counselor and Trustee, Feist, CNN’s Washington Bureau Chief and Senior Vice President 12

(Zbigniew, Former White House National Security Adviser, Sam, March 29, 2012, Council of Foreign Relations, “A Conversation With Zbigniew Brzezinski,” <http://www.cfr.org/us-strategy-and-politics/conversation-zbigniew-brzezinski/p27829>, accessed 7/4/12, YGS)

QUESTIONER: Thank you very much. Dr. Brzezinski, I want to ask you about the other side of the coin. I was just at the World -- the Affordability World Security (sic\Affordable World Security two-day meeting here in town that was put on by the East-West Center and Kerry Foundation (ph), and had an amazing collection of people. But what they said that means is that we have to address climate, water, food, population, jobs -- I mean, it was this long list of things that we have to figure out how to work together on solving them so that we all sort of stay alive. How do we make that happen? BRZEZINSKI: Well, you make that happen by avoiding the kind of global politics that we have had for the last 200 years. And that is to say we have to have entities that are to some extent balanced in equilibrium and as there a consequence of which they realize they cannot prevail. And I think what gives me some degree of optimism is also the knowledge that we now live in a world in which in fact hegemony by a single power is not attainable because the people the worldwide are politically awakened. I've written a great deal about the notion of the global political awakening, and that's a new phenomenon; we've never had that historically. It only started with the French Revolution, then it spread to Asia with World War I and its aftermath. It's now global, and that makes it much more difficult for any power to think it can be dominant. You know, President George Bush II once said that God has chosen America to be the model for the world. Well, you know, I don't know where he got this information -- whether it was from the CIA -- my sources tell me that God is neutral on these subjects. (Laughter.) But in any case, the world is no longer congenial to domination by a single power. So we and the Chinese are operating in a very different environment from the one in which we and the Soviets competed and threatened each other, or we and the Nazis fought against each other or the British and the French fought against the Germans and then we joined in in World War I and so forth, because these problems are potentially as destructive or even more destructive than the wars that we have fought. FEIST: Question. Yes sir? QUESTIONER: Zbig, my question to you is a follow-on for really, I think, what you've just been talking about. And that is, you've laid out a pretty sophisticated kind of road map, as you say -- but maybe a vision for where the United States should go in terms of thinking about its role. But -- BRZEZINSKI: You'd better speak up, because I'm not sure everyone can hear you. QUESTIONER: I'm sorry. But -- do we have a political culture and a political system that is capable of thinking in these terms? Or do we have to instead talk about exceptionalism and think in terms of bumper sticker terms in terms of foreign policy? BRZEZINSKI: Well, that's one of my grave concerns in my book. In fact, I talk about some of the basic structural weaknesses of America, which actually threaten our ability to play a preeminent role. And I leave that slightly open in terms of whether we will or will not be able to do it.

#### B. Primacy rationalizations are compelling – begetting more efforts at primacy

Walt, Harvard University international affairs professor, 11

(Steven M., professor of international affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, October 25, 2011, The National Interest, *“*The End of the American Era,”<http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037?page=show>, Accessed: 6/29/12, LPS)

**THE UNITED States has been the dominant world power since 1945, and U.S. leaders have long sought to preserve that privileged position. They understood, as did most Americans, that primacy brought important benefits. It made other states less likely to threaten America or its vital interests directly. By dampening great-power competition and giving Washington the capacity to shape regional balances of power, primacy contributed to a more tranquil international environment. That tranquility fostered global prosperity; investors and traders operate with greater confidence when there is less danger of war. Primacy also gave the United States the ability to work for positive ends: promoting human rights and slowing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.** It may be lonely at the top, but Americans have found the view compelling.

#### C. Prolonging transition risks global stability

Farley, University of Kentucky assistant professor of Diplomacy and International Commerce, 3-7-12

(Dr. Robert, World Politics Review, "Over the Horizon: The Future of American Hegemony," http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11696/over-the-horizon-the-future-of-american-hegemony, accessed 7-6-12, CNM)

What are the dangers? Hegemony has never meant the ability to achieve any outcome the United States wants, whenever it wants. Indeed, hegemony may mean the luxury to make dreadful mistakes without suffering dreadful consequences. However, as the gap between the United States and other great powers declines, the margin for error narrows. The most dangerous steps for the United States to take would involve projects that threaten fiscal capacity while also undercutting the U.S.-sponsored system of global management. The invasion of Iraq, for example, is not an undertaking that the United States would want to repeat in the future. It undermined global confidence in both the international system of governance and the decision-making capacity of the United States government, while damaging the fiscal health of the United States. Ironically, advocates of the war believed that it would demonstrate not only American power, but also reinforce confidence in American leadership.

For better or worse, the U.S. has imparted the character of the major formal and informal institutions that have managed international life for the past 70 years. The shift from U.S. hegemony to multipolarity -- or to unipolarity around another nation -- will change the nature of those institutions, likely leading to a significant degree of upheaval and uncertainty. The great danger is that the United States will, in an effort to prolong and maintain its hegemony, undertake policies that undermine the foundations of American’s place in the world. It is not comforting that those who talk loudest of U.S. exceptionalism and a new American Century consistently recommend policies that misunderstand the relationship between U.S. power and the modern international system. Nothing about the future is guaranteed; wise policies can revise and extend a globally acceptable “American Century,” while foolish policies can cut it short.

#### D. Turns the case – makes war inevitable

Layne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6

(Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,” 2006, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html>, Accessed: 7/5/12, MLF)

If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint, it probably will, at some point, have to fight to uphold its primacy, which is a potentially dangerous strategy. Maintaining U.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle, especially given that U.S. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Paradoxically, attempting to sustain U.S. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States, thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Rather than risking these outcomes, the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. Unilateral offshore balancing, indeed, is America's next grand strategy.

## Hegemony Bad Uniqueness

### Uniqueness – Brink

#### Hegemony is in crisis

Ikenberry, Princeton University professor of Politics and International Affairs, 11

(John, 10-16-11, Foreign Policy, "Ikenberry's turn," http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/16/ikenberrys\_turn, accessed 7-3-12, CNM)

I go on to argue that this hegemonic order is in crisis. Importantly, it is not liberal internationalism -- as a logic of order -- that is in crisis. It is America's hegemonic role that is in trouble. There is a global struggle underway over the distribution of rights, privileges, authority, etc. I argue that this is a "crisis of success" in that it is the rise of non-Western developing states and the ongoing intensification of economic and security interdependence that have triggered the crisis and overrun the governance institutions of the old order. This is a bit like Samuel Huntington's famous "development gap" -- a situation in which rapidly mobilizing and expanding social forces and economic transformation, facilitated by the old political institutions, have outpaced and overrun those institutions. That is what has happened to American hegemony. The book ends by asking: what comes next? And I argue that the constituencies for open, rules-based order are expanding, not contracting. The world system may become "less American," but it will not become "less liberal." So that is my argument.

### Transition Now

#### US hegemony is declining now

Brzezinski, Center for Strategic and International Studies Counselor and Trustee, Feist, CNN’s Washington Bureau Chief and Senior Vice President 3/29/12

(Zbigniew, Former White House National Security Adviser, Sam, Council of Foreign Relations, “A Conversation With Zbigniew Brzezinski,” <http://www.cfr.org/us-strategy-and-politics/conversation-zbigniew-brzezinski/p27829>, accessed 7/4/12, YGS)

QUESTIONER: Thank you. Thank you. Laura Schultz from USAID. Thank you so much. I was wondering if I could ask you a question about the Middle East. It's been a little more than a year since we saw some of the dramatic transitions in the Arab Spring, Arab transitions. What would be your assessment and thoughts in terms of U.S. policy over the past year in the region? And what would you advise in terms of the priorities and issues that should shape USG approach moving forward. Thank you. BRZEZINSKI: Well, I think we have to face the fact that the era of American paramounce (sic) in the region is coming to a gradual end. You know, we weren't dominant in that region until after WWII, when we replaced the British and the French. And we were welcomed as such. We're less welcome today. And we are increasingly, I think, being gradually forced out by a domsetic self-assertion, which is nationalistic and religious, depending on the country involved. So that, for example, when I worked in the White House, we had good relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey -- the four most important countries in the region.

#### US hegemony is declining now

Layne, Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 8

(Christopher, PhD, January, “China’s Challenge to US Hegemony,” <http://acme.highpoint.edu/~msetzler/IR/IRreadingsbank/chinauscontain.ch08.6.pdf>, p. 13, accessed 7/5/12, YGS)

The Soviet Union’s collapse transformed the bipolar cold war international system into a “unipolar” system dominated by the United States. During the 1990s, the us foreign policy community engaged in lively debate about whether America’s post–cold war hegemony could be sustained over the long haul or was merely a “unipolar moment.” More than 15 years after the cold war’s end, it is obvious that American hegemony has been more than momentary. Indeed, the prevailing view among policy makers and foreign policy scholars today is that America’s economic, military, and technological advantages are so great that it will be a long time before us dominance can be challenged. There is mounting evidence, however, that this view is mistaken, and that, in fact, the era of American hegemony is drawing to a close right before our eyes. The rise of China is the biggest reason for this. Notwithstanding Washington’s current preoccupation with the Middle East, in the coming decades China’s great power emergence will be the paramount issue of grand strategy facing the United States.

### Hegemony Constrained Now

#### Hegemony is unsustainable – hegemony constrained now – realists agree

**Snyder, University of Maryland Center for International Development and Conflict Management Research Scholar, 12**

(Quddus Z. Snyder, Fall 2009, University of Maryland, “Systemic Theory in an Era of Declining US Hegemony,” <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder.pdf>, pgs. 10-2, Accessed 6/29/12, THW)

At the turn of the century it appeared as if we were living through a ‘hegemonic age.’ But recent developments might justify a reevaluation of this conclusion. With its armed forces over-extended, and resources stretched, the US appears much weaker today than it did five years ago. The classic Gilpinian dilemma provides insight into the present predicament the US finds itself in: This three-way struggle over priorities (protection, consumption, and investment) produces a profound dilemma for society. If it suppresses consumption, the consequence can be severe internal social tensions and class conflict…If the society neglects to pay the costs of defense, external weakness will inevitably lead to its defeat by rising powers. If the society fails to save and reinvest a sufficient fraction of its surplus wealth in industry and agriculture, the economic basis of the society and its capacity to sustain either consumption or protection will decline. Thus far the US has maintained a massive defense budget while consumption and investment have been sustained by deficit spending. It is unclear how long this formula will work. The problem does not only stem from fact that the US is bogged down in two wars, it is also in the throes of a serious economic downturn. Of course, everyone is getting hit. Because all are suffering, the US is still a giant in terms of relative power differentials. Relative power is important, but so is the hegemon’s ability to actually do things. It is unlikely that the US will have either the political will or capability to take on major international undertakings. It is unclear when the US will fully withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan; however, these projects will gobble up massive amounts of resources and treasure at a time when America’s own recovery is being partly bankrolled by foreign powers like China.43 The point is simply that America’s unilateral assertiveness on the international scene is changing. US security guarantees may prove less credible than they once were, leading allies to enhance their own military capabilities. The US may still be a giant, but one that, for now at least, seems more bound.

#### Constraints on foreign policy now – domestic intervention fatigue and overstretch

Grunstein, World Politics Review's editor-in-chief, 6-22-12

(Judah, World Politics Review, 6-22-12, “Obama's Record: Tactics Trump Strategy in an Age of Constraints,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12085/obamas-record-tactics-trump-strategy-in-an-age-of-constraints, accessed 7-8-12, CNM)

One common criticism of Obama -- that he just hasn't accomplished anything of significance -- is in large part due to the geopolitical context in which the administration is operating, characterized most prominently by constraints on action. Some of these constraints have to do with the Bush administration’s legacy, not least the need to nurture multilateral legitimacy for U.S. action. Domestic intervention fatigue and the need to reset an overstretched U.S. military also mean that the use of military force must be reserved for cases of either vital national interest or little risk (Libya), leaving out the broad middle range of typical crises, such as Syria.

### Hegemony Low – No Leverage

#### US has no leverage – Egypt proves

Weisbrode, European University Institute diplomatic historian, 11

(Kenneth Weisbrode is a diplomatic historian at the European University Institute and author of "The Atlantic Century." 2-8-11, World Politics Review, “The U.S. and Egypt: The Limits of Hegemony,” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7805/the-u-s-and-egypt-the-limits-of-hegemony>, accessed 7-8-12, CNM)

When U.S. President Barack Obama dispatched diplomat Frank Wisner to deliver a personal message to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, the symbolism was obvious to anyone who remembered Ronald Reagan's message in 1986 to Philippine leader Ferdinand Marcos, then in power for 20 years, at the acme of the "People Power" movement in the Philippines: Yes, you have been among our most loyal allies, but your time is up.

Either Mubarak didn't get the message or Wisner delivered a somewhat different one. The diplomat waited in Cairo a day or two, then returned home while Mubarak continued to resist ever louder calls for his resignation. A few days later Wisner spoke publicly in favor of keeping Mubarak in place. Meanwhile Obama resorted to a long phone call and a subsequent public insistence that the Egyptian ruler begin a "transition," repeated several times over the course of the week.

This was not to be, either, at least not right away, raising the question: If the U.S. can't compel the leader of a country that is the second-largest recipient of direct assistance and whose welfare depends in so many ways directly upon the United States to do as it wishes, then who can it compel? What does this say about American power? Having graduated from the status of superpower to that of hyperpower, has the U.S. still not moved beyond the Gulliver stereotype of the 1960s?

### Decline Coming Now – Challengers

#### Decline in heg is inevitable – challengers coming now

Bacevich, Boston University professor of history and international relations, 2-19-12

(Andrew J., professor of history and international relations at Boston University. He is editor of The Short American Century: A Postmortem, just published by Harvard University Press, February 19, 2012**,** *The Chronicle of Higher Education, “*Good bye the American Century- Good Riddance,” <http://chronicle.com/article/The-American-Century-Is/130790/>, Accessed: 6/29/12, LPS)

**Strategy is a quintessential American Century word, ostensibly connoting knowingness and sophistication. Whether working in the White House, the State Department, or the Pentagon, strategists promote the notion that they can anticipate the future and manage its course. Yet the actual events of the American Century belie any such claim.** Remember when Afghanistan signified victory over the Soviet empire? Today, the genius of empowering the mujahedin seems less than self-evident. **Strategy is actually a fraud perpetrated by those who covet power and are intent on concealing from the plain folk the fact that the people in charge are flying blind. With only occasional exceptions, the craft of strategy was a blight on the American Century**. What does the passing of the American Century hold? To answer that question, inquisitive students of international relations might turn for instruction to television commercials now being aired by Allstate Insurance. The ads feature a character called Mayhem, who unbeknownst to you, hangs onto the side of your car or perches on your rooftop concocting mischief. The message is clear. Be alert: Mayhem is always lurking in your path.Throughout the American Century, Mayhem mocked U.S. strategic pretensions. His agents infiltrated the National Security Council, sowing falsehoods. Mayhem whispered in the ear of whoever happened to occupy the Oval Office. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff met in the "Tank," he had a seat at the table. Mayhem freely roamed the halls of the Capitol (although Congressional dysfunction of our own day may have rendered such efforts redundant).**Having learned nothing from the American Century, present-day strategists—the ones keen to bomb Iran, confront China, and seize control of outer space as the "ultimate high ground"—will continue the practice of doing Mayhem's bidding. As usual, the rest of us will be left to cope with the havoc that results, albeit this time without the vast reserves of wealth and power that once made an American Century appear plausible**. Brace yourself.

#### US hegemonic decline coming

Layne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6

(Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,” 2006, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html>, Accessed: 7/5/12, MLF)

U.S. hegemony cannot endure indefinitely. Even the strongest proponents of primacy harbor an unspoken fear that U.S. hegemony will provoke the very kind of geopolitical backlash that they say cannot happen (or at least cannot happen for a very long time). 119 In fact, although a new geopolitical balance has yet to emerge, there is considerable evidence that other states have been engaging in balancing against the United States—including hard balancing. U.S. concerns about China's great power emergence reflect Washington's fears about the military, as well as economic, implications of China's rise. Other evidence suggests—at least by some measures—that the international system is closer to a multipolar distribution of power than primacists realize. In its survey of likely international developments through 2020, the National Intelligence Council's report Mapping the Global Future notes: "The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players—similar to the rise of Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the early 20th century—will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous two centuries. In the same way that commentators refer to the 1900s as the American Century, the early 21st century may be seen as the time when some in the developing world led by China and India came into their own." 120 In a similar vein, a recent study by the Strategic Assessment Group projects that by 2020 both China (which Mapping the Global Future argues will then be "by any measure a first-rate military power") and the European Union could each have nearly as much power as the United [End Page 37] States. 121 Projecting current trends several decades into the future has its pitfalls (not least because of the difficulty of converting economic power into effective military power). But if this ongoing shift in the distribution of relative power continues, new poles of power in the international system are likely to emerge in the next decade or two.

#### Other countries will come together to rise up against the US – empirically proven

Layne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6

(Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,” 2006, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html>, Accessed: 7/5/12, MLF)

Second, hegemons invariably are defeated because other states in the international system, frequently spearheaded by newly emerged great powers, form counterbalancing coalitions against them. Thus, the English and the Dutch defeated Philip II. Various coalitions anchored by Holland, the newly emerged great powers of England and Austria, and an established great power in Spain undid Louis the XIV. A coalition composed of England, Russia, Austria, and Prussia rebuffed Napoleon's bid for hegemony. Instead of war, the enervating economic effects of trying to maintain primacy against the simultaneous challenges of the United States, Russia, France, and Germany undermined British hegemony in the nineteenth century. The wartime grand alliance of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union defeated Hitler.

#### Challenges now

Patrick, Council on Foreign Relations senior fellow, 11

(Stewart M., senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance, 7-3-11, CNNWorld, "Don’t tread on me! July 4th and U.S. sovereignty," http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/07/03/don%E2%80%99t-tread-on-me-july-4th-and-u-s-sovereignty/, accessed 7-2-12, CNM)

The sovereignty of all nations is being challenged by a combination of forces, including deepening global integration, rising security interdependence and developing international law. Multilateral cooperation does pose dilemmas for traditional concepts of U.S. sovereignty. It’s important to think clearly about the implications of these trends, about what U.S. prerogatives must be protected and about what circumstances might warrant adjustments in U.S. psychology and policy.

The place to begin is by getting clarity on what’s at stake. The sovereignty debate actually encompasses several categories of concern:

For some, the basic problem is a loss of U.S. freedom of action. As the nation becomes enmeshed in multilateral institutions or treaties, it may well find its room for maneuver constrained, whether the issue is the use of force (governed by the UN Security Council) or trade policy (where the U.S. has accepted a binding WTO dispute resolution mechanism).

### Collapse Inevitable

#### Heg collapse is inevitable by 2020 – economic decline will prompt gradual military retrenchment culminating in multipolarity

Layne, Texas A&M National Security Professor, 11

(Christopher, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M’s George H.W. Bush School of Government & Public Service, 3/28/2011**,** The European Magazine, http://theeuropean-magazine.com/223-layne-christopher/231-pax-americana, Accessed: 6/27/12, LS)

The epoch of American hegemony is drawing to a close. Evidence of America’s relative decline is omnipresent. According to the Economist, China will surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy in 2019. The U.S. relative power decline will affect international politics in coming decades: the likelihood of great power security competitions – and even war – will increase; the current era of “globalization” will end; and the post-1945 Pax Americana will be replaced by a new international order that reflects the interests of China and the other emerging great powers.  American primacy’s end is result of history’s big, impersonal forces compounded by the United States’ own self-defeating policies. Externally, the impact of these big historical forces is reflected in the emergence of new great powers like China and India which is being driven by the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro-Atlantic area to Asia. China’s economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States’ over the last two decades and continues to do so.  The US decline reflects its own economic troubles  U.S. decline reflects its own economic troubles.  Optimists contend that current worries about decline will fade once the U.S. recovers from the recession. After all, they say, the U.S. faced a larger debt/GDP ratio after World War II, and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. But the post-war era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and sustained high growth rates. Those days are gone forever. The United States of 2011 are different from 1945. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis facing a grave fiscal crisis. The looming fiscal results from the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the U.S. will incur for at least a decade. When these are bundled with the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security) and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about United States’ long-term fiscal stability – and the role of the dollar. The dollar’s vulnerability is the United States’ real geopolitical Achilles’ heel because the dollar’s role as the international economy’s reserve currency role underpins U.S. primacy. If the dollar loses that status America’s hegemony literally will be unaffordable.  In coming years the U.S. will be pressured to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require fiscal self-discipline through a combination of tax increases and big spending cuts. Meaningful **cuts** in federal spending **mean deep reductions in defense expenditures** because discretionary non-defense – domestic – spending accounts for only about 20% of annual federal outlays. **Faced with these hard choices, Americans may contract hegemony fatigue.** If so, **the U.S. will be compelled to retrench strategically** and the Pax Americana will end.  The Pax Americana is already crumbling in slow motion  The current international order is based on the economic and security structures that the U.S. created after World War II. The entire fabric of world order that the United States established after 1945 – the Pax Americana – rested on the foundation of U.S. military and economic preponderance. **The decline of American power means the end of U.S. dominance** in world politics **and the beginning of the transition to a new constellation of world power.** Indeed, the Pax Americana is already is crumbling in slow motion.

### Multipolarity Coming Now

#### Multipolarity coming now – heg isn’t sustainable

**Edelman, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments Distinguished Fellow, 10**

(Eric S. Edelman, ambassador, 10/21/10, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, “Understanding America’s Contested Primacy,” <http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/10/understanding-americas-contested-primacy/1/>, p. 1, Accessed 6/29/12, THW)

In November 2008, the National Intelligence Council released Global Trends 2025 which argued that “the international system — as constructed following the Second World War — will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy, a historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing influence of non-state actors. By 2025 the international system will be a global multipolar one with gaps in national power continuing to narrow between developed and developing countries” [emphasis in original].” This conclusion represented a striking departure from the NIC’s conclusion four years earlier in Mapping the Global Future 2020 that unipolarity was likely to remain a persistent condition of the international system.

Between the two reports America’s zeitgeist had clearly shifted under the impact of persistent difficulty in the counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and increased questioning of United States global leadership (at home and abroad), the seemingly inexorable rise of the newly emerging economies (suggestively labeled as the BRICs by Goldman Sachs analysts), and the global economic downturn and recession in the United States. The overall impact was the creation of a new conventional wisdom that foresees continued decline of the United States, an end to the unipolar world order that marked the post-Cold War world and a potential departure from the pursuit of US primacy that marked the foreign policies of the three presidential administrations that followed the end of the Cold War.

The debate over unipolarity and continued US primacy is not merely an academic debate. Perceptions of US power will guide both American policymakers and other nations as they consider their policy options. Primacy has underpinned US grand strategy since the end of the Cold War because no other nation was able to provide the collective public goods that have upheld the security of the international system and enabled a period of dramatically increased global economic activity and prosperity. Both the United States and the global system have benefitted from that circumstance.

The arguments for US decline are not new but before they harden into an unchallenged orthodoxy it would be good to carefully examine many of the key assumptions that undergird the emerging conventional wisdom. Will the undeniable relative decline of the United States, in fact, lead to the end of unipolarity? Do the BRIC countries really represent a bloc? What would multipolarity look like? How does one measure national power anyhow, and how can one measure the change in the power distribution globally? Is the rise of global competitors inevitable? What are some of the weaknesses that might hamper the would-be competitors from staying on their current favorable economic and political trajectory? Does the United States possess some underappreciated strengths that might serve as the basis for continued primacy in the international system and, if so, what steps would a prudent government take to extend that primacy into the future?

The history of straight-line projections of economic growth and the rise of challengers to the dominance of the United States has not been kind to those who have previously predicted US decline. It is not necessarily the case that the United States will be caught between the end of the “unipolar moment” of post-Cold War predominance and a global multipolar world. The emerging international environment is likely to be different than either of the futures forecast by the NIC in Mapping the Global Future in 2004 or Global Trends 2025 in 2008. It would seem more likely that the relative decline of American power will still leave the United States as the most powerful actor in the international system. But the economic rise of other nations and the spread of nuclear weapons in some key regions are likely to confront the US with difficult new challenges.

The revived notion of America’s decline has once again brought to the fore a question about the purposes of United States power and the value of US international primacy. Seeking to maintain America’s advantage as the prime player in the international system imposes costs on the US budget and taxpayer. It is certainly fair to ask what the United States gets from exerting the effort to remain number one. It is also worth considering what the world would look like if the United States was just one power among many, and how such perceptions might affect the strategic and policy choices national security decision-makers will face over the next twenty-odd years.

#### Unipolarity is collapsing in the status quo and will result in multipolarity

Layne, Texas A&M professor in national security, 4-25-12

(Christopher, professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, National Interest, “The Global Power Shift from West to East,” <http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-global-power-shift-west-east-6796>, JS)

The signs of the emerging new world order are many. First, there is China’s astonishingly rapid rise to great-power status, both militarily and economically. In the economic realm, the International Monetary Fund forecasts that China’s share of world GDP (15 percent) will draw nearly even with the U.S. share (18 percent) by 2014. (The U.S. share at the end of World War II was nearly 50 percent.) This is particularly startling given that China’s share of world GDP was only 2 percent in 1980 and 6 percent as recently as 1995. Moreover, China is on course to overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy (measured by market exchange rate) sometime this decade. And, as argued by economists like Arvind Subramanian, measured by purchasing-power parity, China’s GDP may already be greater than that of the United States. Until the late 1960s, the United States was the world’s dominant manufacturing power. Today, it has become essentially a rentier economy, while China is the world’s leading manufacturing nation. A study recently reported in the Financial Times indicates that 58 percent of total income in America now comes from dividends and interest payments. Since the Cold War’s end, America’s military superiority has functioned as an entry barrier designed to prevent emerging powers from challenging the United States where its interests are paramount. But the country’s ability to maintain this barrier faces resistance at both ends. First, the deepening financial crisis will compel retrenchment, and the United States will be increasingly less able to invest in its military. Second, as ascending powers such as China become wealthier, their military expenditures will expand. The Economist recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. Thus, over the next decade or so a feedback loop will be at work, whereby internal constraints on U.S. global activity will help fuel a shift in the distribution of power, and this in turn will magnify the effects of America’s fiscal and strategic overstretch. With interests throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the Caucasus—not to mention the role of guarding the world’s sea-lanes and protecting U.S. citizens from Islamist terrorists—a strategically overextended United States inevitably will need to retrench. Further, there is a critical linkage between a great power’s military and economic standing, on the one hand, and its prestige, soft power and agenda-setting capacity, on the other. As the hard-power foundations of Pax Americana erode, so too will the U.S. capacity to shape the international order through influence, example and largesse. This is particularly true of America in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession. At the zenith of its military and economic power after World War II, the United States possessed the material capacity to furnish the international system with abundant financial assistance designed to maintain economic and political stability. Now, this capacity is much diminished. All of this will unleash growing challenges to the Old Order from ambitious regional powers such as China, Brazil, India, Russia, Turkey and Indonesia. Given America’s relative loss of standing, emerging powers will feel increasingly emboldened to test and probe the current order with an eye toward reshaping the international system in ways that reflect their own interests, norms and values. This is particularly true of China, which has emerged from its “century of humiliation” at the hands of the West to finally achieve great-power status. It is a leap to think that Beijing will now embrace a role as “responsible stakeholder” in an international order built by the United States and designed to privilege American interests, norms and values.

#### No one will dominate the 21st century – no one has the material and ideological strength

Kupchan, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow, 4-14-12

(Charles A. Kupchan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, 4-14-12, Council on Foreign Relations, "Why Nobody Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century," http://www.cfr.org/foreign-policy-history/why-nobody-dominate-twenty-first-century/p27958, accessed 7-3-12, CNM)

Many analysts foresee a twenty-first century that will belong to China, whose decades of impressive economic growth make its steady rise seem unstoppable. Most American politicians, with the backing of commentators such as Robert Kagan and Robert Lieber, are quick to dismiss the prospects for a changing of the guard, insisting that U.S. hegemony is alive and well. They contend that the U.S. economy will snap back and that America's military superiority is untouchable. The dark horse candidates are India and Brazil. India will have the world's largest population by about 2025, while Brazil is blessed with abundant resources and a benign geopolitical environment. Both have democratic governments that may give them the legitimacy and good governance needed to make it to the top.

The absence of consensus over which country will oversee the coming world is just as it should be. That's because the twenty-first century will not be dominated by any country. The United States will do just fine, but the era of Western primacy is coming to an end. Meanwhile, none of the world's rising nations will have the combination of material and ideological strength needed to exercise global hegemony. And although ascending nations have forged a new grouping - the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) - to coordinate their policies and aggregate their muscle, they do not share a coherent vision of what comes next. They know what they do not want: the continuation of a world dominated by the West. But they are very unlikely to arrive at a common view of what they want instead. This century will not belong to the United States, China, India, Brazil, or anyone else; it will be no one's world.

### No Unilateralism Now

#### No unilateralism now – global economic integration

Grunstein, World Politics Review's editor-in-chief, 6-22-12

(Judah, World Politics Review, 6-22-12, “Obama's Record: Tactics Trump Strategy in an Age of Constraints,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12085/obamas-record-tactics-trump-strategy-in-an-age-of-constraints, accessed 7-8-12, CNM)

The global financial crisis has further limited the range of options by introducing budgetary constraints that require strategic choices and trade-offs. At the same time, rapidly accelerating global economic integration has added another layer of constraints, with the economic framework of mutually assured dependence deterring unilateral action, even as the global shift of power to the emerging East and South has expanded opportunities to block collective action.

## Economic Uniqueness

### Decline Now – Economic

#### Heg decline now – economic strength declining

Kupchan, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow, 4-14-12

(Charles A. Kupchan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, 4-14-12, Council on Foreign Relations, "Why Nobody Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century," http://www.cfr.org/foreign-policy-history/why-nobody-dominate-twenty-first-century/p27958, accessed 7-3-12, CNM)

The distribution of global power is fast changing. That much is certain. China and other developing nations are quickly ascending the pecking order. Meanwhile, the three pillars of the Western world - the United States, Europe, and Japan - are beset by a prolonged economic downturn and disaffected electorates.

#### Heg decline now – output proves

Kupchan, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow, 4-14-12

(Charles A. Kupchan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, 4-14-12, Council on Foreign Relations, "Why Nobody Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century," http://www.cfr.org/foreign-policy-history/why-nobody-dominate-twenty-first-century/p27958, accessed 7-3-12, CNM)

The United States, due to its economic resilience, rising population, and military superiority, will make it into the top ranks for decades to come. Nonetheless, the supremacy that the United States and its Western allies have enjoyed since World War II is fast fading. During the second half of the twentieth century, the Western allies usually accounted for over two-thirds of global output. They now provide about half of global output - and soon much less.

#### The West is economically falling behind

Kupchan, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow, 4-14-12

(Charles A. Kupchan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, 4-14-12, Council on Foreign Relations, "Why Nobody Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century," http://www.cfr.org/foreign-policy-history/why-nobody-dominate-twenty-first-century/p27958, accessed 7-3-12, CNM)

In 2010, four out of the top five economies in the world came from the developed West - the United States, Japan, Germany, and France. Only one developing country - China, at number two - qualified for this exclusive club. In 2050, according to Goldman Sachs, the United States will be the only Western power to make it into the top five. China will be number one, followed - at a significant distance -- by the United States, India, Brazil, and Russia.

Key aspects of this reordering are poised to occur sooner rather than later. China's wealth is expected to surpass that of the United States by the second half of the next decade. The World Bank foresees the dollar, euro, and China's renminbi as co-equals in a "multi-currency" monetary system by 2025. Goldman Sachs predicts that the collective GDP of the top four developing countries -- Brazil, China, India, and Russia - will match that of today's leading industrialized nations by 2032. The United States will no doubt find its way out of the ongoing slump. But it will bounce back into a global economy in the midst of a dramatic change in the pecking order.

#### Decline is inevitable – heg is economically unsustainable

Layne, Texas A&M Bush School of Government and Public Service International Affairs professor, 9

(Christopher Layne, Professor of International Affairs, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, Summer 2009, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, <https://www.webdepot.umontreal.ca/Usagers/fortmanm/MonDepotPublic/9.%20La%20fin%20de%20l'unipolarit%C3%A9/Layne%20Waning%20of%20US%20hegemony.pdf>, pgs. 167-9, Accessed 6/29/12, THW)

The publications reviewed in this essay examine whether the United States is in (or is headed for) relative decline.74 Brooks and Wohlforth purport to deny the possibility that America is in relative decline, but a growing number of analysts disagree.75 The long-term impact of the current economic crisis largely will determine who is right (and to be fair, Brooks and Wohlforth wrote their book before its effects became evident). Yet, even before the meltdown, longterm structural weaknesses that have been accumulating for more than three decades were causing U.S. economic power to wane.76 The warning signs with respect to U.S. decline are a looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the future of the dollar as the reserve currency, both of which are linked to the fear that after recovery, the United States will face a serious inflationary threat.77 Optimists contend that once the United States recovers, fears of a fiscal crisis will fade: the country faced a larger debt to GDP ratio after World War II, and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. The postwar era, however, was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and sustained high growth rates. The United States of 2009 is far different from the United States of 1945, however, which is why many economists believe that even in the best case, it will emerge from the current crisis with serious macroeconomic handicaps.78 Chief among these handicaps are the increase in the money supply (caused by the massive amount of dollars the Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped into circulation to rescue the economy), and the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) project the United States will incur for at least a decade.79 When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current account deficit, the entitlements overhang, and the cost of two ongoing wars, there is reason to worry about the United States’ longterm fiscal stability.80 The CBO states, “Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem.”81 If the Congressional Budget Office is right, it spells trouble ahead for the dollar. As Jonathan Kirshner noted on the eve of the meltdown, the dollar’s vulnerability “presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance.”82 The dollar’s loss of reserve currency status would undermine U.S. dominance, and recent events have magnified concerns that predated the financial and economic crisis. 83 First, the other big players in the international economy now are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous “allies” (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Because of these two factors, as Eric Helleiner notes, if the dollar experiences dramatic depreciation in the future, there is a “risk of defections generating a herd-like momentum” away from it.84

### Unsustainable – Debt

#### American debt destroys ability to spend and deploy power

Rachman, Financial Times chief foreign-affairs commentator, 2-14-12

(Gideon, Robert Kagan is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School, Foreign Policy, "The Rise or Fall of the American Empire," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the\_rise\_or\_fall\_of\_the\_american\_empire?page=full, accessed 7-5-12, CNM)

Furthermore, it is not just China that faces troubling questions. You are right to point out America's enduring strengths. But the rapid growth of the U.S. national debt raises the prospect of a really nasty fiscal crunch. When it comes to sovereign debt, we in Europe have just discovered the truth of that old economists' joke that "things that can't go on forever, don't." The United States cannot continue running up debts at its current rate. And even a controlled, rational effort to manage the debt will have serious implications for U.S. spending -- and deployable power.

### Economic – China Taking Over

#### The United States is declining economically – China is taking over

Rachman, Financial Times chief foreign-affairs commentator, 2-14-12

(Gideon, Robert Kagan is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School, Foreign Policy, "The Rise or Fall of the American Empire," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the\_rise\_or\_fall\_of\_the\_american\_empire?page=full, accessed 7-5-12, CNM)

In 2008, there was indeed a massive economic and financial crisis, but it came in the West, not in China. This unexpected development has accelerated a trend that was already in place: a shift in economic power from West to East and, within that, from the United States to China. Since then, it has become much harder to argue that globalization has created a win-win world. Instead, Americans are beginning to wonder, with good reason, whether a richer and more powerful China might mean a relatively poorer, relatively weaker United States. That is why I called my book Zero-Sum Future.

Now, I know that Bob disputes the idea that there has been a shift in economic power. He says the U.S. share of the world economy has stayed roughly steady at 25 percent. But that is not how I read the figures. The Economist (my old employer) now projects that China will be the world's largest economy, in real terms, by 2018. Writing in Feb. 9's Financial Times, Jeffrey Sachs puts it well:

In 1980, the US share of world income (measured in purchasing power parity prices) was 24.6 per cent. In 2011, it was 19.1 per cent. The IMF projects that it will decline to 17.6 per cent as of 2016.

China, by contrast, was a mere 2.2 per cent of world income in 1980, rising to 14.4 per cent in 2011, and projected by the IMF to overtake the US by 2016, with 18 per cent.

If this isn't a world-altering shift, it's hard to imagine what would be.

[Note – IMF = International Monetary Fund]

#### Chinese competitiveness now spreads to developed countries

Freeman, Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Senior Adviser in Trade and Economics, ‘11

(Charles, CSIS, “China’s innovation and competitiveness policies,” <http://csis.org/program/chinas-innovation-and-competitiveness-policies-lessons-us-and-japan>, accessed 6-27-12, FFF)

Over the past few decades, China’s rapid economic transformation into a global manufacturing hub has attracted billions of dollars in foreign direct investment, and lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty.  The growth of the Chinese economy is astonishing. In 2000, China’s GDP was just a quarter of Japan’s but in 2010 China became the second largest economy in the world. In comparison with the U.S. GDP, China’s GDP was a little more than a tenth in 2000 but reached two fifths in 2010. Standard Chartered Bank issued a report in November 2010 stating that China would likely overtake the U.S. to become the world’s largest economy by 2020.

Chinese companies have competitiveness in producing low-value, labor-intensive goods. Today, Chinese competitiveness is not confined to traditional areas. China successfully absorbed foreign technologies and has become a strong competitor to companies of the developed countries. The Chinese leadership is trying to upgrade Chinese innovative capabilities; Beijing has set clear objectives to promote indigenous innovations with the recently approved 12th Five Year Plan (2011-2015), which calls for bolder steps in reform and innovation.

### Economic – US Won’t Play Leadership Role

#### The US won’t play an economic leadership role

Rachman, Financial Times chief foreign-affairs commentator, 2-14-12

(Gideon, Robert Kagan is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School, Foreign Policy, "The Rise or Fall of the American Empire," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the\_rise\_or\_fall\_of\_the\_american\_empire?page=full, accessed 7-5-12, CNM)

This shift in economic and political power has important implications for the world order. A weaker United States is less willing and able to play a leading role in sorting out the world's economic and political crises. There will be no Marshall Plan for Europe. There will not even be an American-led "committee to save the world" as there was during the Asian and Russian crises. And when it comes to the turmoil in the Middle East, the United States was more than happy to "lead from behind" on Libya. Meanwhile, the United States has pulled out of Iraq and is pulling back from Afghanistan. Don't get me wrong. I think it's perfectly sensible for Obama to try to reduce U.S. military commitments around the world, especially given the grim budgetary outlook. But we are unmistakably in a new era. No U.S. president can now say the country will "bear any burden" to secure its goals.

### Economic – AT – China Decline

#### Even if China has an economic crisis – it will still be number 1

Rachman, Financial Times chief foreign-affairs commentator, 2-14-12

(Gideon, Robert Kagan is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School, Foreign Policy, "The Rise or Fall of the American Empire," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the\_rise\_or\_fall\_of\_the\_american\_empire?page=full, accessed 7-5-12, CNM)

All this, of course, is posited on the continuing growth of the Chinese economy. So what about those "hints that China's economic growth is slowing down"? I wouldn't be at all surprised. Indeed, I would go further and suggest that both the Chinese economy and the Chinese political system are unstable and crisis-prone. If a crisis hits, plenty of people in the United States and elsewhere will eagerly proclaim that the rise of China was a mirage. They will be wrong. This is a long-term process of huge historical significance, comparable with the rise of the United States in the 19th century. U.S. history should tell you that it is perfectly possible to combine political turmoil with the rise of a dynamic, continental economy. After all, America fought a civil war and still emerged as "No. 1" by the early 20th century.

### Economic – AT – Econ Not Only Factor

#### The economy is key to influence

Rachman, Financial Times chief foreign-affairs commentator, 2-14-12

(Gideon, Robert Kagan is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School, Foreign Policy, "The Rise or Fall of the American Empire," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the\_rise\_or\_fall\_of\_the\_american\_empire?page=full, accessed 7-5-12, CNM)

That said, even though political power and economic size are not the same thing, they surely are closely related. So as China becomes wealthier, its geopolitical power grows and becomes much more of a challenge to America's. China's growing wealth gives it more money to spend on assets abroad, foreign aid, and its military. Above all, the lure of Chinese investment and the Chinese market become a powerful tool to shape the behavior of other countries. You can see this with Europe right now. China's ability to supply credit and juicy contracts is making Europeans significantly less willing to confront China, whether on human rights or the environment.

### Unsustainable – Budget Cuts

#### This year’s budget is inadequate to keep the lead in weapons technology

Spring, Heritage Foundation National Security Policy research fellow, 12

(Baker, 3/1/12, *The Heritage Foundation,* “Obama’s Defense Budget Makes Protecting America its Lowest Priority,” <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/obamas-defense-budget-makes-protecting-america-its-lowest-priority>, accessed 6-29-12, FFF)

President Obama has stated that he supports sustaining the U.S. lead in weapons technology. Specifically, in his cover letter to the defense strategic review, he stated: “In particular, we will continue to invest in the capabilities critical to future success, including intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; counterterrorism; countering weapons of mass destruction; operating in anti-access environments; and prevailing in all domains, including cyber.”[[13]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/obamas-defense-budget-makes-protecting-america-its-lowest-priority" \l "_ftn13)

The problem is that the President’s budget does not provide the resources to preserve the overwhelming U.S. technological lead in advanced weapons and equipment. In FY 2010, the Department of Defense provided $216 billion in budget authority to the modernization accounts, compared with just $178.2 billion proposed for FY 2013. This is an almost $38 billion (17 percent) reduction in the budget authority in just three years without accounting for inflation. (See Chart 2.)

Programmatically, the Administration’s defense budget curtails advancements in a number of weapons systems. It would slow the acquisition of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter aircraft, the Army Ground Combat Vehicle, and a system for defending against land-attack cruise missiles. It reduces the Joint Air-to-Ground Munition program, and it delays the Army’s helicopter modernization program. It terminates the Global Hawk Block 30 and the Defense Weather Satellite System. Finally, the budget also delays a large-deck amphibious ship, a new Virginia-class submarine, and a helicopter modernization program by three to five years.

In addition, the Administration has consistently been unenthusiastic about other programs that have continued to receive inadequate support. These include the Airborne Laser program, the development of a new Navy cruiser, space-based missile defense interceptors, ground-based missile defense interceptors for countering long-range missiles, anti-satellite systems, and the combat search and rescue helicopter

The proposed budget makes the military too small

Spring, Heritage Foundation National Security Policy research fellow, 12

(Baker, 3/1/12, *The Heritage Foundation,* “Obama’s Defense Budget Makes Protecting America its Lowest Priority,” <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/obamas-defense-budget-makes-protecting-america-its-lowest-priority>, accessed 6-29-12, FFF)

In asserting that the size and structure of the U.S. military force of the future will be driven by strategy and not budget considerations, President Obama wants the American people to believe that the military will not become too small under his policies. Specifically, he said: “That’s why I called for this comprehensive defense review—to clarify our strategic interests in a fast-changing world, and to guide our defense priorities and spending over the coming decade—because the size and the structure of our military and defense budgets have to be driven by a strategy, not the other way around.”[[14]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/obamas-defense-budget-makes-protecting-america-its-lowest-priority" \l "_ftn14)

In fact, the President’s defense budget is significantly reducing the military’s personnel levels and force structure. On the personnel side, the active Army would decline to 490,000 soldiers, down from the current 562,000—a reduction of 72,000 (13 percent). Similarly, the active Marine Corps would decline to 182,000 persons from the current 202,000—a reduction of 20,000 (10 percent).[[15]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/obamas-defense-budget-makes-protecting-america-its-lowest-priority" \l "_ftn15)

These personnel reductions will result in an active Army and Marine Corps that are simply too small to meet the full range of military responsibilities assigned to them under a policy and strategy that assume the continuation of existing national and international security commitments. For example, U.S. military forces “will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.”[[16]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/obamas-defense-budget-makes-protecting-america-its-lowest-priority" \l "_ftn16) Accordingly, U.S. policy assumes that the nation will never again need to undertake a “surge” of the sort that turned the tide in Iraq. Likewise, the smaller ground forces raise questions about the military being able to sustain two combat operations of significant size that overlap. The Department of Defense describes the residual capability in its January 26, 2012, budget preview document only as denying enemy objectives or imposing unacceptable costs, not as being able to prevail in the second operation.[[17]](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/03/obamas-defense-budget-makes-protecting-america-its-lowest-priority" \l "_ftn17) This language is reminiscent of Secretary of Defense Les Aspin’s ill-fated “win-hold-win” proposal during the Clinton Administration. Yet in this case, the department is not even bothering with the pretension of promising the later win. Budget considerations are the only plausible explanation for the loss of these vital capabilities.

#### Declining defense spending risks losing U.S. prosperity and economic growth

Carafano, Kathyrn’s Deputy Director and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, et al., 11

(James Jay, and Mackenzie Eaglen, National Security Studies Research Fellows, and Baker Spring, F.M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy, 3-17-11*, The Heritage Foundation,* “How to Field the Right Military Force to Protect America,” <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/03/how-to-field-the-right-military-force-to-protect-america>, accessed 6-29-12, FFF)

Adequate defense funding is affordable. To sustain this force over time, however, requires addressing (1) mandatory federal government outlays that, if unchecked, will consume the entire federal budget; (2) defense manpower costs that will need to be controlled without cutting overall manning levels; and (3) wasteful, unnecessary, and inefficient defense expenditures.

Reducing U.S. forces below strategic requirements also presents grave risks to U.S. prosperity and economic growth. The military’s reliability has reassured allies and deterred potential adversaries from aggression. If the U.S. lacks the capacity to protect its vital interests, both the security and economy of the nation will suffer in the long term.

## Links

### Link – Primacy Confidence

#### Primacy rationalizations are compelling – begetting more efforts at primacy

Walt, Harvard University international affairs professor, 11

(Steven M., professor of international affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, October 25, 2011, The National Interest, *“*The End of the American Era,”<http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-end-the-american-era-6037?page=show>, Accessed: 6/29/12, LPS)

**THE UNITED States has been the dominant world power since 1945, and U.S. leaders have long sought to preserve that privileged position. They understood, as did most Americans, that primacy brought important benefits. It made other states less likely to threaten America or its vital interests directly. By dampening great-power competition and giving Washington the capacity to shape regional balances of power, primacy contributed to a more tranquil international environment. That tranquility fostered global prosperity; investors and traders operate with greater confidence when there is less danger of war. Primacy also gave the United States the ability to work for positive ends: promoting human rights and slowing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.** It may be lonely at the top, but Americans have found the view compelling.

#### American exceptionalism narrative becomes all-consuming, rationalizing extending malignant hegemony

Bacevich, Boston University professor of history and international relations, 09

(Andrew, April 30, 2009, Salon, “Farewell to the American Century” <http://www.salon.com/writer/andrew_bacevich/>. Accessed: 6/29/12, LPS)

So goes the preferred narrative of the American Century, as recounted by its celebrants. The problems with this account are twofold. First, it claims for the United States excessive credit. Second, it excludes, ignores or trivializes matters at odds with the triumphal story line. **The net effect is to perpetuate an array of illusions that, whatever their value in prior decades, have long since outlived their usefulness. In short, the persistence of this self-congratulatory account deprives Americans of self-awareness, hindering our efforts to navigate the treacherous waters in which the country finds itself at present. Bluntly, we are perpetuating a mythic version of the past that never even approximated reality and today has become downright malignant**. Although Richard Cohen may be right in declaring the American Century over, the American people — and especially the American political class — still remain in its thrall.

## Internal Link Uniqueness – Competitiveness

### Infrastructure Gap Killing Competitiveness Now

#### Infrastructure gap hurts U.S. competitiveness

Mallet, Specialist Transportation Policy, Maguire, Specialist Public Finance, and Kosar, Analyst American National Government, ’11

(William, Steven, and Kevin, Federation of American Scientists, “National Infrastructure Bank: Overview and Current Legislation”, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42115.pdf>,  6/24/12, LS)

**The infrastructure gap also hinders America’s global competitiveness. Logistics costs for American business are on the rise,** but similar costs in countries like Germany, Spain, and France are set to decrease.18 **And while America’s infrastructure spending struggles to keep pace,19 several main global competitors are poised to make significant infrastructure enhancements. China leads the world with a projected $9 trillion in infrastructure investments slated for the next ten years, followed by India, Russia, and Brazil.**20 In a recent survey, 90% of business executives around the world indicated that the quality and availability of infrastructure plays a key role in determining where they do business.21 **If America is going to remain on strong economic footing compared to its competitors, it must address its infrastructure challenges. There are too many cost overruns and unnecessary projects—but not enough funds.** Cost overruns on infrastructure projects are increasingly prevalent and exact real costs. One survey of projects around the world found that costs were underestimated for almost 90% of projects, and that cost escalation on transportation projects in North America was almost 25%.22 Boston’s Central Artery/Tunnel Project (a.k.a. the “Big Dig”) came in 275% over budget, adding $11 billion to the cost of the project. The construction of the Denver International Airport cost 200% more than anticipated. The San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge retrofit project witnessed overruns of $2.5 billion—more than 100% of the original project cost— before construction even got underway.23 And of course, there are the “bridge to nowhere” earmarks that solve a political need, but not an economic one.

#### America’s infrastructure gap hurts competitiveness

Mallet, Specialist Transportation Policy, Maguire, Specialist Public Finance, and Kosar, Analyst American National Government, ’11

(William, Steven, and Kevin, Federation of American Scientists, “National Infrastructure Bank: Overview and Current Legislation”, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42115.pdf>,  6/24/12, LS)

**As America’s population and economic activity increases, the stress on its infrastructure will only grow**. The number of trucks operating daily on each mile of the Interstate Highway system is expected to jump from 10,500 to 22,700 by 2035,9 while freight volumes will have increased by 70% over 1998 levels.10 It is also expected that transit ridership will double by 2030 and that the number of commercial air passengers will increase by 36% from 2006 to 2015.11 Total electricity use is projected to increase by 1148 billion kWh from 2008 to 2035.12 In order to cope, **America’s infrastructure will need a significant upgrade. America’s infrastructure deficit hurts its competitiveness and is a drain on the economy. America’s infrastructure gap poses a serious threat to our prosperity. In 2009, the amount of waste due to congestion equaled 4.8 billion hours (equivalent to 10 weeks worth of relaxation time for the average American) and 3.9 billion gallons of gasoline, costing $115 billion in lost fuel and productivity.13**

#### US infrastructure lagging behind – competitive decline now

Strauss, associate director of Renewing America Publications, 12

(Rebecca, June, Council On Foreign Relations, “Road To Nowhere: Federal Transportation Infrastructure Policy,” <http://www.cfr.org/united-states/road-nowhere-federal-transportation-infrastructure-policy/p28419>, Accessed: 7/5/12, GJV)

The first installment of the series, "Road to Nowhere: Federal Transportation Infrastructure Policy," provides a critical assessment of federal transportation policy. Just a generation ago, the United States invested heavily to create one of the world's best transportation infrastructure networks. But now, with real investment stagnating even as much of the infrastructure is reaching the end of its useful life, global economic competitors are leaving the United States behind. Along with a description of major policy initiatives, the report analyzes what's needed to get U.S. transportation infrastructure back on track.

### US Behind on Infrastructure Investment Now

#### **The U.S. lags behind the world in infrastructure investment**

Crebo-Rediker, the founding Co-Director of the Global Strategic Finance Initiative founding co-direcotr, , Rediker, International Monetary Fund Executive Board member representing the US, 8

(Heidi and Douglas, New American Foundation, “Financing America’s Infrastructure: Putting Global Capital To Work”, 7/08/08, http://newamerica.net/files/Financing\_America\_Infrastructure.PDF, Pg. 1, accessed 6/25/12 FFF)

America’s basic infrastructure is outdated, worn, and in some cases, failing. Most experts agree that it is inadequate for meeting the demands of the 21st-century global economy. If we are to remain competitive, we must invest in capital assets like roads, ports, bridges, mass transit, water systems, and broadband infrastructure. Many other countries—both rich and poor—see investing in infrastructure as imperative for economic survival and success in an increasingly competitive economic environment. But the United States has lagged in infrastructure investment, in both relative and absolute terms. We are spending less than 2 percent of GDP on infrastructure, while China and India are spending 9 percent and 5 percent of GDP, respectively.

#### Uniqueness and link – US lags behind now – Investment bolsters competitiveness

Abraham, member of the Council of Economic Advisors for the White House, Krueger, Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors for the White House, and Shapiro, member of the Council of Economic Advisors for the White House, 12

(Katharine, Alan, Carl, 3-23-2012, Department of the Treasury, “A NEW ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT,” <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/Documents/20120323InfrastructureReport.pdf>, Accessed 6-23-12, p.1, LS)

**By most measures, the United States is investing less in infrastructure than other nations. While there are reasons for this disparity, international comparisons can offer a useful benchmark to assess our investment decisions.** We spend approximately 2 percent of GDP on infrastructure, a 50 percent decline from 1960.65,66 China, India and Europe, by contrast, spend close to 9 percent, 8 percent, and 5 percent of GDP on infrastructure, respectively.67 To be clear, these simple cross-country comparisons do not account for differences in the current public capital stock, differences in demographics and population densities, and different transportation preferences across nations. **However, it is clear that persistent neglect of our infrastructure will impact America’s competitive position *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world. Indeed, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce noted in their *Policy Declaration on Transportation Infrastructure* that, “Long- 31 term underinvestment in transportation infrastructure is having an increasingly negative effect on the ability of the United States and its industries to compete in the global economy.”** The Gallup World Poll indicates that compared to other OECD countries, Americans are relatively dissatisfied with their local public infrastructure systems (see Figures 5 and 6). Americans’ satisfaction with highways and public transit ranks in the middle of the pack globally. With respect to our public transit, we are tied with four other countries at rank 13 out of 32 OECD nations. We rank similarly with respect to satisfaction with our roads and highways: 15th out of 32 OECD countries.

**An analysis of the economic impact of transportation investment indicates that now is an optimal time to increase the nation’s investment in transportation infrastructure. Investing in transportation infrastructure would generate jobs to employ workers who were displaced because of the housing bubble**. We estimate that the average unemployment rate among those who would gain employment in the jobs created by additional infrastructure investment has averaged approximately 13 percent over the past twelve months. **There is also accumulating evidence that construction costs are currently low because of underutilized resources, so it would be especially cost-effective to seize this opportunity to build the quality infrastructure projects that are ready to be built. Historically, we also know that state and local governments are more prone to cut back on infrastructure spending during tough economic times, despite the growing need and demand for these projects. Americans overwhelmingly support increasing our infrastructure investment, as evidenced by consistent support for local investments on ballot initiatives.** This is hardly surprising given that our report documents that the American public is less satisfied with our transportation infrastructure than residents of most other OECD nations.

Merely increasing the amount that we invest, however, must not be our only goal. Selecting projects that have the highest payoff is critically important, as is providing opportunities for the private sector to invest in public infrastructure. Given the significant need for greater investment, the federal government cannot, and should not, be expected to be the sole source of additional investment funds. More effectively leveraging federal investment by pairing it with state, local, and private investment is necessary to meet the challenges we face in expanding our transportation network. Thus, establishing a National Infrastructure Bank, along with other significant reforms in our infrastructure financing system, should remain a top priority.

Evidence also shows that well-functioning infrastructure systems generate large rates of return not only for the people who travel on the systems every day – the direct beneficiaries – but also for those in the surrounding regions and our nation more generally. Investment in infrastructure today will employ underutilized resources and raise the nation’s productivity and economic potential in the future. By contrast, poorly planned, non-strategic investment is not only a waste of resources, but can also lead to lower economic growth and production in the future. That is why any increase in investment should be coupled with broad-based reform to select infrastructure projects more wisely. The President’s proposal to increase our nation’s investment in transportation infrastructure, coupled with broad-based reform of our transportation funding system, would have a significant and positive economic impact in both the short and long term, raising our nation’s economic output, creating quality middle-class jobs, and enhancing America’s global economic competitiveness.

#### US infrastructure is a weakness now

McMahon, Editor for the Council on Foreign Relations, 9

(Robert, 2/24/09, Council on Foreign Relations, “Transportation Infrastructure: Moving America,” <http://www.cfr.org/economic-development/transportation-infrastructure-moving-america/p18611>, Accessed: 7/2/12, GJV)

There is a further homeland security dimension, says CFR Senior Fellow [Stephen E. Flynn](http://www.cfr.org/bios/3301/stephen_e_flynn.html). He refers to the current state of U.S. infrastructure as the "soft underbelly" of the nation's security. "This is a core vulnerability for U.S. society," Flynn told a [January 2009 CFR meeting](http://www.cfr.org/publication/18399/homeland_security_in_transition.html?breadcrumb=%2Fbios%2F3301%2F). "It's very costly, after things fall apart, to try to put them back together again. And so, as I would forecast more generally in the twenty-first century, infrastructure is going to be [an] appealing target" to terrorists. Former Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff has also expressed concern about the federal government's [failure to make long-term infrastructure investments](http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1220876790967.shtm) to overcome degradation of roads, bridges, dams, and other such "common goods." Many experts say transportation infrastructure spending over the past several decades has failed to keep pace with the increasing burden absorbed by the country's roadways, bridges, and mass transit networks. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office shows that spending for infrastructure relative to gross domestic product (GDP) [declined about 20 percent (PDF)](http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/85xx/doc8517/08-08-Infrastructure.pdf) from 1959 to 2004. A number of experts also point to flaws in the manner of funding and planning U.S. infrastructure. Part of that involves abuses in the congressional earmarking process, epitomized by Alaska's so-called Bridge to Nowhere, a once-approved plan, later cancelled, for federal funding to build a $200 million bridge to a remote island. Another serious problem is coordination between different forms of transportation, experts say. Congress aligns transportation funding with specific modes like highways, rail, and mass transit. It sought to improve coordination between these modes through legislation originating with the 1991 Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act. But the legislation did little to alter the congressional appropriations approach, the Government Accountability Office, a government watchdog body, found in a [2007 report (PDF)](http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07718.pdf). "As a result," the report says, "there is little assurance that projects, including intermodal projects--which could most efficiently meet the nation's mobility needs--will be selected and funded." The failure to achieve such coordination, [note](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0115_infrastructure_katz_puentes.aspx) Brookings Institution experts Bruce Katz and Robert Puentes, leaves the United States as "one of the few industrialized countries that fails to link aviation, highways, freight rail, mass transit, and passenger rail networks."

#### The US is falling behind on infrastructure

Milikowsky, researcher Building America's Future Educational Fund, 11

(Brina, Building America’s Future Educational Fund, “Americas Future Falling Apart and Falling Behind,”, <http://www.bafuture.com/sites/default/files/Report_0.pdf>, Pg. 24 Accessed 6/28, GJV)

While Americans are wasting time, money, and fuel stuck in traffic, nations around the world are investing in cutting-edge infra­structure to make their transportation networks more efficient, more sustainable, and more competitive than ours. Even since the global recession forced cutbacks in government spending, other countries are investing significantly more than the U.S. to expand and update their transportation networks.

#### Competitors outpacing US on infrastructure investment

Milikowsky, researcher Building America's Future Educational Fund, 11

(Brina, Building America’s Future Educational Fund, “Americas Future Falling Apart and Falling Behind,”, <http://www.bafuture.com/sites/default/files/Report_0.pdf>, Pg. 16 Accessed 6/28, GJV)

In stark contrast to our most agile and aggressive foreign competitors, the U.S. stands increasingly alone in our failure to reorient our transportation spending according to a new forward-looking vision that could build a transportation network fit for a 21st-century economy. Without a similarly strategic plan of attack to create a state-of-the-art transportation network, the U.S. will be left far behind.

#### Others investing more than US

Milikowsky, researcher Building America's Future Educational Fund, 11

(Brina, Building America’s Future Educational Fund, “Americas Future Falling Apart and Falling Behind,”, <http://www.bafuture.com/sites/default/files/Report_0.pdf>, Pg. 24 Accessed 6/28, GJV)

Many countries are investing according to national infrastructure plans designed to strategically improve their economically critical gateways and corridors. They are focusing on strategic points in their trans­portation networks to yield the greatest benefits on their investments. And, unlike the United States, they are channeling investments toward high-speed rail, public transit, and other cutting-edge innovations to improve intermodal mobility for passen­gers and freight—and giving the United States, long the world’s economic super­power, a run for its money as a result.

### Failure to Invest Kills Competitiveness

#### Failure to invest in transit infrastructure kills competitiveness.

McConaghy, Deputy Director, Economic Program at Third Way, and Kessler, Senior Vice President for Policy and a co-founder of Third Way, ‘11

(Ryan and Jim, January 2011, The Third Way, “A National Infrastructure Bank”, pg. 3, http://www.bernardlschwartz.com/political-initiatives/Third\_Way\_Idea\_Brief\_-\_A\_National\_Infrastructure\_Bank-1.pdf, A.D. 6/24/12, JTF)

The infrastructure gap also hinders America’s global competitiveness. Logistics costs for American business are on the rise, but similar costs in countries like Germany, Spain, and France are set to decrease. 18 And while America’s infrastructure spending struggles to keep pace, 19 several main global competitors are poised to make significant infrastructure enhancements. China leads the world with a projected $9 trillion in infrastructure investments slated for the next ten years, followed by India, Russia, and Brazil. 20 In a recent survey, 90% of business executives around the world indicated that the quality and availability of infrastructure plays a key role in determining where they do business. 21 If America is going to remain on strong economic footing compared to its competitors, it must address its infrastructure challenges.

### Others Lead on Infrastructure Now

#### Specifically, China and Brazil are pulling ahead

Milikowsky, researcher Building America's Future Educational Fund, 11

(Brina, Building America’s Future Educational Fund, “Americas Future Falling Apart and Falling Behind,”, <http://www.bafuture.com/sites/default/files/Report_0.pdf>, Pg. 25 Accessed 6/28, GJV)

In the last five years, all of our major global competitors have launched ambitious, forward-looking initiatives to strategically fund their intermodal transportation networks. Emerging economic powerhouses like China and Brazil are building state-of-the-art transportation networks practically from scratch, leapfrogging us from behind to invest in the most cutting-edge transporta­tion innovations. Meanwhile, other countries saddled with aging infrastructure like ours—Canada, Australia, and the EU—are adjusting to the 21st-century global econo­my by investing more significantly and more strategically in transportation projects of national significance.

#### China leading on infrastructure now

Milikowsky, researcher Building America's Future Educational Fund, 11

(Brina, Building America’s Future Educational Fund, “Americas Future Falling Apart and Falling Behind,”, <http://www.bafuture.com/sites/default/files/Report_0.pdf>, Pg. 31 Accessed 6/28, GJV)

To paraphrase New York Times columnist Tom Friedman, traveling from New York to Shanghai today is like moving from the Flintstones to the Jetsons.17 It is China, not the U.S., that has the most bullet trains in the world. It is China that boasts the world’s largest ports—and it is the Shanghai port that moves more containers than the top 7 U.S. container ports combined. It is Switzer­land that is building the world’s longest freight rail tunnel. It is Canada that is capturing a larger portion of Pacific trade to and from China. It is cities like Hong Kong and London, not New York or San Francisco, where you can check your luggage for a flight at the train station downtown before taking a quick train ride to the airport. When put in this global context, the U.S.’s transportation system looks that much more antiquated.

## Infrastructure Internal Links

### Transportation Infrastructure Bolsters Heg

#### Investment in transportation infrastructure increases the economy which is key to hegemony

Associated General Contractors of America, 11

(5/19/2011, The Associated General Contractors of America, “THE CASE FOR INFRASTRUCTURE & REFORM: Why and How the Federal Government Should Continue to Fund Vital Infrastructure in the New Age of Public Austerity,” <http://www.agc.org/galleries/news/Case-for-Infrastructure-Reform.pdf> p. 4, Accessed: 7/3/12, GJV)

It also is important to note that the federal programs for investing in highway and transit projects has traditionally been self-funded. Since the 1950s, highway users have, through a mixture of gas taxes and other use-related fees, provided all of the funds that go into the Highway Trust Fund. Until only recently all federal surface transportation investments had come from this self-funded Trust Fund. In other words, structured correctly, the federal surface transportation program does not have to cost anyone that doesn’t use the highway system a single penny.

As important, there is a strong argument to be made for the fact that the proper role of the federal government is to create and set conditions favorable to private sector job creation. For example, in an economy where the difference between success and failure is often measured by a company’s ability to deliver goods quickly and efficiently, maintaining transportation infrastructure is as important to the success of the private sector as are stable and low tax rates, minimal red tape and regulations and consistent and stable rule of law.

Officials in Washington also need to understand that allowing our transportation infrastructure to deteriorate will serve as an added tax on private citizens and the business community alike. That is because added congestion, shipping delays and transportation uncertainty will raise commuting costs, the price of most retail and grocery goods and the cost of getting supplies and delivering products for most U.S. businesses.

Investing in infrastructure is vital to our national economic security. America’s position and power in the world is directly dependent on its economic supremacy. It is, after all, our national wealth that funds the country’s highly skilled Armed Forces, that allows us to direct global trade policy and that allows our currency to dominate global marketplaces. Without continued investments to support and nurture that economic vitality, America will surely be eclipsed by other, fast-growing competitors like China, Brazil and/or India. Given that so much of the U.S. economy has evolved into a just-in-time model where as-needed deliveries are far more efficient than expensive warehousing and storage, maintaining our transportation infrastructure is vitally important to the health of our economy. Traffic congestion and aging roads already cost U.S. businesses $80 billion a year because of deferred infrastructure maintenance and our failure to keep pace with the growth of shipping and other traffic. Allowing our transportation infrastructure to deteriorate will only further undermine our businesses and erode our national economic security.

In other cases, the federal government has an obligation to invest in infrastructure to avoid imposing costs on U.S. businesses and imposing unfunded mandates on state and local governments. For example, local governments had long been responsible for paying to maintain and operate water systems. That meant only major cities and wealthy towns had access to modern water systems. Much of that changed when the federal government began mandating quality standards for drinking water and wastewater discharge through legislation like the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act. These standards were in the best interest of the nation, ensuring protection of public health and environmental quality. By mandating quality standards, however, the federal government forces local governments to spend billions of dollars to upgrade equipment and comply with regulatory burdens. The federal government must not foist the burden of maintaining national standards onto local ratepayers alone. Given that it is in the federal interest to set water quality standards, then so too must it be in the federal interest to provide – primarily in the form of state revolving loan funds – financing help to operators so they can meet those standards.

### Transportation Infrastructure Bolsters Competitiveness

#### Transportation infrastructure investment is key to competiveness and growth

McConaghy, Third Way Economic Program Deputy Director, & Kessler, Third Way Senior Vice President for Policy, 11

(Ryan, past legislative director at US House of Representatives, Jim, January, The Economic Program: Schwartz Initiative on American Economic Policy, “A National Infrastructure Bank,” p. 2-3, <http://content.thirdway.org/publications/365/Third_Way_Idea_Brief_-_A_National_Infrastructure_Bank.pdf>, accessed 6/29/12, YGS)

America’s infrastructure deficit hurts its competitiveness and is a drain on the economy. America’s infrastructure gap poses a serious threat to our prosperity. In 2009, the amount of waste due to congestion equaled 4.8 billion hours (equivalent to 10 weeks worth of relaxation time for the average American) and 3.9 billion gallons of gasoline, costing $115 billion in lost fuel and productivity. 13 Highway bottlenecks are estimated to cost freight trucks about $8 billion in economic costs per year, 14 and in 2006, total logistics costs for American businesses increased to 10% of GDP. 15 Flight delays cost Americans $9 billion in lost productivity each year, 16 and power disruptions caused by an overloaded electrical grid cost between $25 billion and $180 billion annually. 17 These losses sap wealth from our economy and drain resources that could otherwise fuel recovery and growth. The infrastructure gap also hinders America’s global competitiveness. Logistics costs for American business are on the rise, but similar costs in countries like Germany, Spain, and France are set to decrease. 18 And while America’s infrastructure spending struggles to keep pace, 19 several main global competitors are poised to make significant infrastructure enhancements. China leads the world with a projected $9 trillion in infrastructure investments slated for the next ten years, followed by India, Russia, and Brazil. 20 In a recent survey, 90% of business executives around the world indicated that the quality and availability of infrastructure plays a key role in determining where they do business. 21 If America is going to remain on strong economic footing compared to its competitors, it must address its infrastructure challenges.

#### Transportation infrastructure investment bolsters global competitiveness

Miller, [AIA New York Chapter Health Facilities Committee](http://www.linkedin.com/company/the-american-institute-of-architects-aia?trk=ppro_cprof) Primary Author, Myerson, independent consulting Planning & Development, MacCleery, Urban Land Institute Vice President for infrastructure, 12

(Jonathan D., Deborah, Rachel**,** 2012**,**Urban Land Institute and Ernst and Young, “Infrastructure 2012: Spotlight on leadership,” <http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=9&ved=0CGoQFjAI&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ey.com%2FPublication%2FvwLUAssets%2FInfrastructure-2012%2F%24FILE%2FInfrastructure-2012.pdf&ei=ZzvrT_HHCMqOrAGbmJHXBQ&usg=AFQjCNGu1D_nLw_WInqHT_8LX69srgz9hg&sig2=G_q8mSkQ71LAIZ5vxZgebw>,P. 32, Access 6-27-12, LS)

**Infrastructure is a long-term proposition, one that has always required an understanding of future demand and trends, balanced with a realistic appraisal of available resources. Despite a very challenging economy, many leaders are forging ahead, applying innovations and trying out new ideas and approaches in an effort to bring America’s infrastructure into the 21st century.** This chapter provides concrete, recent examples of how politicians,agency directors, **and** members of the business community are working **to meet infrastructure needs in the new economic era.** The six case studies in this section examine approaches that have been successfully applied in a variety of metropolitan areas across the country. Three focus on how regions are using ballot measures to fund critical infrastructure, and three showcase **other examples of infrastructure leadership. Global economic competitiveness demands new kinds of regional entrepreneurship,** and each of these place-based stories provides insights and inspiration for leaders seeking infrastructure solutions:

#### Investment is key to international competitiveness

Abraham, member of the Council of Economic Advisors for the White House, Krueger, Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors for the White House, and Shapiro, member of the Council of Economic Advisors for the white House, 12

(Katharine, Alan, Carl, 3-23-2012, Department of the Treasury, “A NEW ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT,” <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/Documents/20120323InfrastructureReport.pdf>, p. 30-33, Accessed 6-23-12, p.1, LS)

**By most measures, the United States is investing less in infrastructure than other nations. While there are reasons for this disparity, international comparisons can offer a useful benchmark to assess our investment decisions.** We spend approximately 2 percent of GDP on infrastructure, a 50 percent decline from 1960.65,66 China, India and Europe, by contrast, spend close to 9 percent, 8 percent, and 5 percent of GDP on infrastructure, respectively.67 To be clear, these simple cross-country comparisons do not account for differences in the current public capital stock, differences in demographics and population densities, and different transportation preferences across nations. **However, it is clear that persistent neglect of our infrastructure will impact America’s competitive position *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world. Indeed, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce noted in their *Policy Declaration on Transportation Infrastructure* that, “Long- 31 term underinvestment in transportation infrastructure is having an increasingly negative effect on the ability of the United States and its industries to compete in the global economy.”** The Gallup World Poll indicates that compared to other OECD countries, Americans are relatively dissatisfied with their local public infrastructure systems (see Figures 5 and 6). Americans’ satisfaction with highways and public transit ranks in the middle of the pack globally. With respect to our public transit, we are tied with four other countries at rank 13 out of 32 OECD nations. We rank similarly with respect to satisfaction with our roads and highways: 15th out of 32 OECD countries.

**An analysis of the economic impact of transportation investment indicates that now is an optimal time to increase the nation’s investment in transportation infrastructure. Investing in transportation infrastructure would generate jobs to employ workers who were displaced because of the housing bubble**. We estimate that the average unemployment rate among those who would gain employment in the jobs created by additional infrastructure investment has averaged approximately 13 percent over the past twelve months. **There is also accumulating evidence that construction costs are currently low because of underutilized resources, so it would be especially cost-effective to seize this opportunity to build the quality infrastructure projects that are ready to be built. Historically, we also know that state and local governments are more prone to cut back on infrastructure spending during tough economic times, despite the growing need and demand for these projects. Americans overwhelmingly support increasing our infrastructure investment, as evidenced by consistent support for local investments on ballot initiatives.** This is hardly surprising given that our report documents that the American public is less satisfied with our transportation infrastructure than residents of most other OECD nations.

Merely increasing the amount that we invest, however, must not be our only goal. Selecting projects that have the highest payoff is critically important, as is providing opportunities for the private sector to invest in public infrastructure. Given the significant need for greater investment, the federal government cannot, and should not, be expected to be the sole source of additional investment funds. More effectively leveraging federal investment by pairing it with state, local, and private investment is necessary to meet the challenges we face in expanding our transportation network. Thus, establishing a National Infrastructure Bank, along with other significant reforms in our infrastructure financing system, should remain a top priority.

Evidence also shows that well-functioning infrastructure systems generate large rates of return not only for the people who travel on the systems every day – the direct beneficiaries – but also for those in the surrounding regions and our nation more generally. Investment in infrastructure today will employ underutilized resources and raise the nation’s productivity and economic potential in the future. By contrast, poorly planned, non-strategic investment is not only a waste of resources, but can also lead to lower economic growth and production in the future. That is why any increase in investment should be coupled with broad-based reform to select infrastructure projects more wisely. The President’s proposal to increase our nation’s investment in transportation infrastructure, coupled with broad-based reform of our transportation funding system, would have a significant and positive economic impact in both the short and long term, raising our nation’s economic output, creating quality middle-class jobs, and enhancing America’s global economic competitiveness.

#### Transportation investment is key to competitiveness – Productivity and manufacturing

Heintz, Political Economy Research Institute associate director and research professor, et al. 9

(James, Robert Pollin, PERI Professor of economics and co-director, Heidi Garret-Peltier, PERI Research assistant, January 2009, Political Economy Research Institute, “How Infrastructure Investments Support The U.S Economy: Employment, Productivity, and Growth,” http://americanmanufacturing.org/files/peri\_aam\_finaljan16\_new.pdf, Pg. 43, Accessed: 6/26/12, GJV)

As we have already discussed, the decline in public investment has been linked to slower growth in economic productivity, particularly during the 1970s and 1980s (Aschauer, 1989a; Munnell 1990a). Other researchers have shown that public investments have helped to reduce the cost of production in U.S. manufacturing (Nadiri and Mamuneas, 1994; Morrison and Schwartz, 1996). The results of our study—summarized above—also show that public investment improves private sector productivity, and the impact is proportionately larger for the manufacturing sector than for the private sector as a whole. All of this suggests that public investment in infrastructure will have a positive impact on the U.S. economy’s competitive position in the world—by raising productivity and reducing production costs. It follows that a lack of decent infrastructure will hurt U.S. competitiveness and further undermine the performance of the manufacturing sector. Manufacturing businesses rely on public goods, such as transportation systems, to operate. Reliable, affordable, and sustainable sources of energy are also essential. Inefficient infrastructure raises costs and increases risks—all of which will compromise the competitive position of the economy. Therefore, the research results presented here affirm the importance of world-class infrastructure to maintain U.S. economic performance in this era of global integration.

### Transportation Infrastructure Bolsters Growth

#### Transportation infrastructure is key to long term economic growth

Milikowsky, Building America's Future Educational Fund researcher, 11

(Brina, Building America’s Future Educational Fund, “Americas Future Falling Apart and Falling Behind,”, <http://www.bafuture.com/sites/default/files/Report_0.pdf>, Pg. 8, Accessed 6/28, GJV)

In the last decade, our global economic competitors have led the way in planning and building the transportation networks of the 21st century. Leading countries around the world have not only started spending more than the United States does today, but they made those financial commitments—of both public and private dollars—on the basis of 21st-century strategies that will equip them to make commanding strides in economic growth over the next 20–25 years. These decisions have put them on a cycle of investment and economic growth that will improve their standard of living and improve their citizens’ quality of life. Unless we make significant changes in our course and direction, the foreign competi­tion will pass us by and a real opportunity to restore America’s economic strength will be lost.

### Infrastructure Key – History Proves

#### Infrastructure key to US economic super power – history proves

Building America’s Future Educational Fund, 11

(Building America’s Future Educational Fund, a bipartisan coalition of elected officials dedicated to bringing about a new era of U.S. investment in infrastructure, Transportation Infrastructure Report 2011 “Building America’s Future, Falling Apart and Falling Behind” p. 4 2011 [http://www.bafuture.com/sites/default/files/Report\_0.pdf 6/25/12](http://www.bafuture.com/sites/default/files/Report_0.pdf%206/25/12) MLF)

Rebuilding America’s economic foundation is one of the most important missions we face in the 21st century. Our parents and grandparents built America into the world’s leading economic superpower. We have a responsibility to our own children and grandchildren to strengthen—not squander —that inheritance, and to pass on to them a country whose best days are still ahead. Our citizens live in a turbulent, complicated, and competitive world. The worst recession in eighty years cost us trillions in wealth and drove millions of Americans out of their jobs and homes. Even more, it called into question their belief in our system and faith in the way forward. Our infrastructure—and the good policy making that built it—is a key reason America became an economic superpower. But many of the great decisions which put us on that trajectory are now a half-century old. In the last decade, our global economic competitors have led the way in planning and building the transportation networks of the 21st century. Countries around the world have not only started spending more than the United States does today, but they made those financial commitments—of both public and private dollars—on the basis of 21st-century strategies that will equip them to make commanding strides in economic growth over the next 20-25 years. Unless we make significant changes in our course and direction, the foreign competition will pass us by, and a real opportunity to restore America’s economic strength will be lost. The American people deserve better.

## Federal Commitment Key to Competitiveness

#### Transportation infrastructure in the US is key to the global economic power and key to maintaining the United States’ position as the global hegemon

Building America’s Future Educational Fund, 11

(Building America’s Future Educational Fund, a bipartisan coalition of elected officials dedicated to bringing about a new era of U.S. investment in infrastructure, Transportation Infrastructure Report 2011 “Building America’s Future, Falling Apart and Falling Behind” p. 42 2011 [http://www.bafuture.com/sites/default/files/Report\_0.pdf 6/25/12](http://www.bafuture.com/sites/default/files/Report_0.pdf%206/25/12) MLF)

Getting America back on track economically is not going to be easy. But to succeed, we must think and act anew. During a time when Congress is cutting budgets, it may seem incongruous to step forward with an ambitious program of rebuilding our national transportation. But the Erie Canal was begun not long after economic collapse; Lincoln’s Transcontinental Railroad was launched during a time when the country was still torn apart by war; and even Eisenhower’s Interstate Highway System was launched amid concerns over deficit spending. There are always excuses to delay tough decisions, but the time has come for the U.S. to join China, India, Canada, Brazil, France, Spain, and the United Kingdom by committing to a long-term infrastructure revitalization plan. It should focus on transportation but should also include our water and wastewater systems, our dams, our electric grid, and our broadband system. To be as significant in scale as the plans adopted by our competitor nations, it must spur an investment of at least $200 billion a year. 7 Not all of that needs to be a federal commitment—state and local government and the private sector must also do their share. And it need not all be new investment because a significant amount of dollars should be forthcoming from the gas tax and other fees. But make no mistake: We cannot long stay atop the global economy without a significant new federal commitment. Inaction by the federal government would mean consigning our children and theirs to economic decline, and watching as other countries surge ahead and enjoy the fruit of their infrastructure investments for themselves. That would fly in the face of America’s history—and it would squander the America that our parents and theirs worked so hard to build. To remain the world’s economic superpower, to bequeath to future generations a country that is still on the rise, we must act with the same foresight and boldness that has always characterized American leadership. The foundations of our national economy are cracking—and it is not enough to repair the cracks. We must extend the foundation, stronger and wider, to support a new century of economic growth—and a new century of American greatness. Doing that will require not only visionary leadership, but bi-partisan cooperation. Rebuilding America’s future cannot be a Democratic or Republican political cause; it must be a national undertaking. And if it is, there will be no stopping it.

## Economy Internal Links

### Economic Heg is Key to Military Heg

#### Economic power is a prerequisite to military power

Beckley, Harvard International Security Program Research Fellow, 11

(Michael, Winter 2011/12, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, ""China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure," p. 57-58, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21649/chinas\_century\_why\_americas\_edge\_will\_endure.html?breadcrumb=%2Fproject%2F58%2Fquarterly\_journal%3Fparent\_id%3D46, accessed 7-5-12, CNM)

The key point is that national power is multifaceted and cannot be measured with a single or a handful of metrics. In the analyses that follow, I allot more space to economic indicators than to military indicators. This is not because economic power is necessarily more important than military power, but rather because most declinist writings argue that the United States is in economic, not military, decline. Moreover, military power is ultimately based on economic strength. International relations scholars tend to view civilian and military realms as separate entities, but militaries are embedded within economic sys- tems. In a separate study, I show that countries that excel in producing com- mercial products and innovations also tend to excel in producing military force.83 Part of this advantage stems from greater surplus wealth, which allows rich states to sustain large military investments. Economically developed states, however, also derive military benefits from their technological in- frastructures, efficient production capacities, advanced data analysis net- works, stocks of managerial expertise, and stable political environments. In short, economic indicators are, to a significant degree, measures of military ca- pability. Focusing on the former, therefore, does not imply ignoring the latter.

#### Economic supremacy is a linchpin of hegemony

Layne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6

(Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,” 2006, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html>, Accessed: 7/5/12, MLF)

What is hegemony? First, hegemony is about raw, hard power. Militarily, a hegemon's capabilities are such that "no other state has the wherewithal to put up a serious fight against it." 11 A hegemon also enjoys "economic supremacy" in the international system and has a "preponderance of material resources." 12 Second, hegemony is about the dominant power's ambitions. A hegemon acts self-interestedly to safeguard its security, economic, and ideological interests. 13 Third, hegemony is about polarity. Because of its overwhelming advantages in relative military and economic power over other states in the international system, a hegemon is the only great power in the system, which is therefore, by definition, unipolar. 14 Fourth, hegemony is about will. A hegemon purposefully exercises its overwhelming power to impose order on the international system. 15 Finally, hegemony is fundamentally about structural change, because "if one state achieves hegemony, the system ceases to be anarchic and becomes hierarchic." 16 Yet, as Robert Gilpin notes, because "no state has ever completely controlled an international system," hegemony is a relative, not an absolute, concept. 17 When a great power attains hegemony, as, for example, the United States did in Western Europe after World War II, the system is more hierarchic—and less anarchic—than it would be in the absence of hegemonic power. 18 Implicit in Gilpin's observation is a subtle, but important, point: although [End Page 11] the United States is a hegemon, it is not omnipotent—there are limits to its ability to shape international outcomes. This explains why the United States has been unable to suppress the insurgency in Iraq (and failed in the Vietnam War), and why it has not succeeded in compelling either North Korea or Iran to halt their nuclear weapons programs.

Nevertheless, the United States' hegemonic power is not illusory. As Kenneth Waltz notes, power does not mean that a state possesses the ability to get its way all of the time. 19 Material resources never translate fully into desired outcomes (military strategists acknowledge this when they observe that "the enemy has a vote" in determining the degree to which a state can realize its strategic goals). Although a hegemon does not get its way all of the time, its vast power will help it get its way with other states far more often than they will get their way with it. Precisely because the United States is a hegemon, there is a marked asymmetry of influence in its favor. In international politics, the United States does not get all that it wants all of the time. But it gets most of what it wants an awful lot of the time, and it affects other states far more than other states affect it.

### Economic Leverage Key to Exercising Hegemony

#### Economic power allows US to use leverage to perpetuate hegemony

Layne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6

(Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,” 2006, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html>, Accessed: 7/5/12, MLF)

Hegemonic stability theory posits that the United States can employ its many military, economic, and diplomatic instruments as inducements to ward [End Page 17] off potential challenges to its preeminence. 40 Militarily, it has considerable leverage. For example, it can offer a protective shield to states in unstable regions, which is a strong incentive for them to bandwagon with the United States—or, less charitably, to free ride by passing the buck for maintaining their security to the United States. 41 Also, U.S. military power helps provide the geopolitical prerequisites for an open international economy from which most states supposedly benefit: stability in key regions as well as secure access to what Barry Posen calls the "global commons" of sea, air, and space—that is, the media through which global communications are transmitted and through which goods and people move. 42 In addition, the United States has lots of economic and financial carrots that it can either withhold from states that contest its hegemony or give as rewards to those that accept it. 43

The United States also supposedly can defuse other states' fears of its hegemonic power by voluntarily exercising self-restraint and forgoing unilateral actions. As Ikenberry puts it, "American hegemony is reluctant, open, and highly institutionalized—or, in a word, liberal. This is what makes it acceptable to other countries that might otherwise be expected to balance against hegemonic power, and it is also what makes it so stable and expansive." 44 That is, by exercising its preponderance through multilateral institutions and accepting externally imposed restraints on its power, the United States can demonstrate to others that its hegemony is benign, because it is based on mutual consent, and give-and-take. 45 Moreover, the fact that the United States is a democratic hegemon not only alleviates others' fears of its hegemonic power, [End Page 18] but also pulls them into the U.S. orbit. Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan have argued that the liberal democratic nature of the United States' domestic political system legitimates U.S. hegemony and simultaneously reassures others of its benevolence. 46

### Economic Power Key to Soft & Hard Power

#### **Strong economy key to soft and hard power**

Nye, former US assistant secretary of defense, 11

(Joseph S, Project Syndicate, “Has Economic Power Replace Military”, 6-6-11, <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/has-economic-power-replaced-military-might->, accessed 6-29-12, FFF)

Economic resources can produce soft-power behavior as well as hard military power. A successful economic model not only finances the military resources needed for the exercise of hard power, but it can also attract others to emulate its example. The European Union’s soft power at the end of the Cold War, and that of China today, owes much to the success of the EU and Chinese economic models.

## Aviation Internal Links

### Aviation Solves Competitiveness

#### Investment in civil aviation promotes security, economic competitiveness, and homeland defense- that’s key to heg

DRI·WEFA, Inc., A Global Insight Company, 02

(privately-owned U.S. consulting firm providing a wide range of services to the aviation industry, JULY 2002, The Campbell-Hill Aviation Group, Inc. “THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CIVIL AVIATION” <http://www.aia-aerospace.org/stats/resources/DRI-WEFA_EconomicImpactStudy.pdf>, P. 23, Accessed: 6/27/12, LS)

The importance of civil aviation to the economy, to the nation, and to the quality of life of Americans was made readily apparent by the terrible events of September 11, 2001. Layoffs and financial losses in civil aviation, its supplier industries, the tourism industry, and the broader economy rose sharply. As air traffic returns to pre-September 11 rates of growth—as projected in the Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA) most current forecast1—air traffic delays will resume and increase dramatically.2 Congestion and delay, a function of capacity-constrained airport and airway infrastructure, not only will inconvenience passengers and shippers; it also will impose considerable costs on the United States as a whole. Conversely, **investment in** this **infrastructure will foster economic growth and enhance safety and security.** On November 27, 2001, just 11 weeks after the terrorist attacks, J**ohn Marburger, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, reiterated** the continued need for investment in the nation’s airports and airways **in remarks** to the Commission on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry: **“We need to develop a 21st Century global air transportation system that provides safe, secure, efficient and affordable transportation of people, goods, and information in peacetime and wartime—enabling people and goods to move freely anywhere, anytime, on time. We need a system that: -** Enhances national security by strengthening homeland defense while enabling the military to project power anywhere in the world at any time; **- Increases U.S. economic competitiveness by building a more efficient, higher capacity air transportation system;** and - Improves the quality of life of all Americans by enabling them to do *what* they want to do *when and where* they want to do it.?3 This study addresses the economic competitiveness and quality benefits that Dr. Marburger describes.

### Aviation Solves Economic Growth

#### Airport transportation key to global and domestic economic growth- constraint inhibit U.S international competitiveness that is key to U.S. hegemony

DRI·WEFA, Inc., A Global Insight Company, 02

(privately-owned U.S. consulting firm providing a wide range of services to the aviation industry, JULY 2002, The Campbell-Hill Aviation Group, Inc., “THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CIVIL AVIATION,” <http://www.aia-aerospace.org/stats/resources/DRI-WEFA_EconomicImpactStudy.pdf>, P. 23, Accessed: 6/27/12, LS)

Clearly, air transportation has facilitated business’ ability to move its products around the world. But it has played a far more important role in bringing business managers together, enabling them to build the links, communications, and personal relationships necessary to achieve such a level of international business activity. Despite continuous advances in telecommunications technologies, the growth in global business over the past 50 years could not have been achieved without the personal contact enabled by the world’s air transportation system. **Not only is air transportation important to the global economy; it is also an important enabler of economic growth for individual economies. By developing its air transportation system, a country can better link itself to the global economy and provide an environment for its business that facilitates global activity.** Conversely, there are distinct disadvantages for regions or communities that are beyond the reaches of efficient air transportation. In these regions, business remains more isolated and less able to reap the benefits offered by being connected to global economic activity**. Both adequate airport capacity and the efficiency with which the air transportation system works are critical to generating economic benefits.** The main body of this report examines the impacts that a constrained system in the United States would have on the U.S. economy later in the decade. But it is also true that these **constraints would inhibit the ability of the United States to compete in global markets, damaging its international competitiveness** in general and the international competitiveness of U.S. civil aviation specifically. This chapter examines some of the elements of such potential damage.

### Aviation Solves Heg

New Airport Infrastructure is vital for hegemony  
DRI, Global Insight Company, 2

(Global Insight Company, July 2002, “The National Economic Impact of Civil Aviation,”<http://www.aia-aerospace.org/stats/resources/DRI-WEFA_EconomicImpactStudy.pdf>, p. 1, Accessed: 6/27/12, LS)

On November 27, 2001, just 11 weeks after the terrorist attacks, John Marburger, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, reiterated the continued need for investment in the nation’s airports and airways in remarks to the Commission on the Future of the U.S. Aerospace Industry: “We need to develop a 21st Century global air transportation system that provides safe, secure, efficient and affordable transportation of people, goods, and information in peacetime and wartime—enabling people and goods to move freely anywhere, anytime, on time. We need a system that: - Enhances national security by strengthening homeland defense while enabling the military to project power anywhere in the world at any time; - Increases U.S. economic competitiveness by building a more efficient, higher capacity air transportation system; and - Improves the quality of life of all Americans by enabling them to do what they want to do when and where they want to do it.? 3 This study addresses the economic competitiveness and quality of life benefits that Dr. Marburger describes.

## Freight Internal Links

### Freight Solves Competitiveness

#### Transportation Infrastructure is key to our competitiveness

Milikowsky, researcher Building America's Future Educational Fund, 11

(Brina, “Americas Future Falling Apart and Falling Behind,”, <http://www.bafuture.com/sites/default/files/Report_0.pdf>, Pg. 11 Accessed 6/28/12, GJV)

Our freight transportation system was not built for the explosive growth of coast-to-coast shipping and international trade experienced over the past two decades, and our economically vital gateways and corridors—our primary port, road, and rail routes for shipping goods in and out of the country—now operate at or over capacity. Congestion plagues our freight corridors and acts as a drag on the American economy as a whole. In Chicago, the nation’s biggest rail center, congestion is so bad that it takes a freight train longer to get through the city limits than it does to get to Los Angeles.3 Freight bottlenecks and other forms of congestion cost about $200 billion, or 1.6% of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), a year.4 Freight moving by water is slowed by similar constraints on capacity and limitations of aging infrastructure. Our ports were built for the last century’s economy, without suffi­cient intermodal access for increased container traffic. Our inland waterways are similarly overburdened: dozens of locks along major inland shipping routes are past their 50-year life span, and some are more than a century old and showing their age. Congestion and capacity constraints threaten to increase the cost of trade and impede our global competitiveness. Delays in freight movement impose real costs on businesses that reduce productivity, impede our competitiveness, and increase prices for consumers. General Mills estimates that every one mile per hour reduction in average speed of its trucking shipments below posted limits adds $2 million in higher annual costs.5 According to UPS, if conges­tion causes each UPS delivery driver to incur 5 minutes of delay, it would cost the company $100 million.

## Hegemony Bad Impacts

### Prolonging Transition Causes War

#### Try or die – the longer the transition, the more dangerous the decline

Larison, American Conservative contributing editor, 9

[Daniel Larison has a *PhD in Byzantine history* and is a contributing editor at the American Conservative and a columnist for The Week online. 12-12-9, “Six questions for Daniel Larison,” <http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2009/12/six_questions_for_daniel_laris>.

DIA: Do you think Barack **Obama's** conciliatory gestures to the rest of the world represent an abandonment of American hegemony, or are they an effort to make the world more comfortable with it?

Mr Larison: Most of his **conciliatory gestures have been nothing more than** just that, **gestures. I find this preferable to riding roughshod over allies and rivals, but it is undeniably a matter of adopting a different tone and style rather than changing the nature of America's relations with other nations**. Mr **Obama has no interest in abandoning American hegemony** or, as he would prefer to call it, American leadership, but he is attempting to exercise it under straitened conditions. To that end he has made a number of speeches, and these have naturally been misunderstood and distorted as "apologies". In reality, Mr Obama has not once apologised for anything America has done in the past, but he is ridiculed this way because he does not engage in boastful triumphalism. In the zero-sum reckoning of his extremely insecure domestic critics, any rhetorical or symbolic concession, no matter how minor, is a defeat and an embarrassment for America. **Even on those policies where he has made a great show of changing course, such as** engaging with Iran or "resetting" relations with **Russia, the substance of the policies has not changed much** at all.

DIA: You are not a hegemonist. Is that a result of the way America has conducted itself abroad, or do you think unipolarity is inherently bad?

Mr Larison: Unipolarity is abnormal and it is unsustainable, **so I think it unwise to organize American foreign policy around the preservation of something that is going to disappear sooner or later. Because unipolarity never lasts, the chief means for preserving it is military power, and this leads a government to entangle itself in a number of unnecessary, costly and ultimately ruinous wars** to keep hold of something that will slip away from it in any case. **Indeed, the strenuous effort to hold on to preeminence usually hastens an even steeper decline than would have happened otherwise**. The paradox is that it is the hegemonists who have done more to undermine American hegemony than anything their opponents could have hoped to achieve, while their opponents have called for husbanding America's resources responsibly and carefully rather than frittering them away. Certainly, **the frequent recourse to military force over the last 20 years has deepened my antipathy to the constant and unnecessary projection of American power around the world**. The goal of maintaining hegemony seems to me a foolish one, but it is the means employed to that end that I find indefensible and outrageous.

#### Heg causes instability

Layne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6

(Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,” 2006, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html>, Accessed: 7/5/12, MLF)

Although at first the conclusion may appear counterintuitive, states that seek hegemony invariably end up being less, not more, secure. Being powerful is good in international politics, but being too powerful is not. The reasoning behind this axiom is straightforward as well as the geopolitical counterpart to the law of physics that holds that, for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. Simply put, the response to hegemony is the emergence of countervailing power. Because international politics is indeed a competitive, "self-help" system, when too much power is concentrated in the hands of one state, others invariably fear for their own security. Each state fears that a hegemon will use its overwhelming power to aggrandize itself at that state's expense and will act defensively to offset hegemonic power. Thus, one of hegemony's paradoxes is that it contains the seeds of its own destruction.

#### Risk is linear – costs to maintaining heg will only escalate

Layne, Texas A&M University Bush School of Government and Public Services international affairs professor, 6

(Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, 2006, *The Peace of Illusions*, p 190, Accessed 6/27/12, THW)

Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing, and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. As other states—notably China—rapidly close the gap, U.S. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U.S. efforts to prolong it. At the same time, understandable doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America’s Eurasian allies, which, in turn, is leading to a reversion to multipolarity. In this changing geopolitical context, the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia, America’s military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States, because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in a great power Eurasian wars.

#### Prolonging hegemony ensures backlash and conflict

Layne, Texas A&M University Bush School of Government and Public Services international affairs professor, 3

(Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush school of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, “The American Conservative, The Cost of Empire”, October 6 2003, <http://www.amconmag.com/10_06_03/cover.html>, accessed 6/27/12, THW)

These are not compelling arguments. In international politics, benevolent hegemons are like unicorns—there are no such animals. Hegemons love themselves, but others mistrust and fear them. Others dread both the over-concentration of geopolitical weight in America’s favor and the purposes for which it may be used. Washington’s (purportedly) benevolent intentions are ephemeral, but the hard fist of American power is tangible—and others worry that if U.S. intentions change, they might get smacked. As for the argument that the U.S. is too mighty to be counter-balanced, history reminds us that things change fast in international politics. The British found out toward the end of the 19th century that a seemingly unassailable international power position can melt away with unexpected rapidity.

Perhaps the proponents of America’s imperial ambitions are right and the U.S. will not suffer the same fate as previous hegemonic powers. Don’t bet on it. The very fact of America’s overwhelming power is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—which is why it’s only a short step from the celebration of imperial glory to the recessional of imperial power. Indeed, on its present course, the United States seems fated to succumb to the “hegemon’s temptation.” Hegemons have lots of power and because there is no countervailing force to stop them, they are tempted to use it repeatedly, and thereby overreach themselves. Over time, this hegemonic muscle-flexing has a price. The cumulative costs of fighting —or preparing to fight—guerilla wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, asymmetric conflicts against terrorists (in the Philippines, possibly in a failed Pakistan, and elsewhere), regional powers (Iran, North Korea), and rising great powers like China could erode America’s relative power—especially if the U.S. suffers setbacks in future conflicts, for example in a war with China over Taiwan.

### Heg Bad – Laundry List

#### Hegemony causes nuclear war, peak oil, extinction from warming, and hunger – transition is key

Foster, University of Oregon professor of sociology, 5

(John Ballamy, editor of Monthly Review, 5-25-05, Monthly Review, "Peak Oil and Energy Imperialism," http://monthlyreview.org/2008/07/01/peak-oil-and-energy-imperialism, accessed 7-6-12, CNM)

The supreme irony of the peak oil crisis of course is that the world is rapidly proceeding down the path of climate change from the burning of fossil fuels, threatening within a matter of decades human civilization and life on the planet. Unless carbon dioxide emissions from the consumption of such fuels are drastically reduced, a global catastrophe awaits. For environmentalists peak oil is therefore not a tragedy in itself since the crucial challenge facing humanity at present is weaning the world from excessive dependence on fossil fuels. The breaking of the solar energy budget that hydrocarbons allowed has generated a biospheric rift, which if not rapidly addressed will close off the future.43

Yet, heavy levels of fossil fuel, and particularly petroleum, consumption are built into the structure of the present world capitalist economy. The immediate response of the system to the end of easy oil has been therefore to turn to a new energy imperialism—a strategy of maximum extraction by any means possible: with the object of placating what Rachel Carson once called “the gods of profit and production.”44 This, however, presents the threat of multiple global conflagrations: global warming, peak oil, rapidly rising world hunger (resulting in part from growing biofuel production), and nuclear war—all in order to secure a system geared to growing inequality.

In the face of the immense perils now facing life on the planet, the world desperately needs to take a new direction; toward communal well-being and global justice: a socialism for the planet. The immense danger now facing the human species, it should be understood, is not due principally to the constraints of the natural environment, whether geological or climatic, but arises from a deranged social system wheeling out of control, and more specifically, U.S. imperialism. This is the challenge of our time.

### Heg Bad – Prolif

#### American Hegemony created nuclear weapons and prolif – further heg will lead to nuclear war

Bacevich, Boston University professor of history and international relations, 09

(Andrew, April 30, 2009, Salon, “Fairwell to the American Century” <http://www.salon.com/writer/andrew_bacevich/>. Accessed: 6/29/12, LPS)

**What flag-wavers tend to leave out of their account of the American Century is not only the contributions of others, but the various missteps perpetrated by the United States — missteps, it should be noted, that spawned many of the problems bedeviling us today.**The instances of folly and criminality bearing the label “made in Washington” may not rank up there with the Armenian genocide, the Bolshevik Revolution, the appeasement of Adolf Hitler, or the Holocaust, but they sure don’t qualify as small change. To give them their due is necessarily to render the standard account of the American Century untenable. Here are several examples, each one familiar, even if its implications for the problems we face today are studiously ignored:*Cuba.* In 1898, the United States went to war with Spain for the proclaimed purpose of liberating the so-called Pearl of the Antilles. When that brief war ended, Washington reneged on its promise. If there actually has been an American Century, it begins here, with the U.S. government breaking a solemn commitment, while baldly insisting otherwise. By converting Cuba into a protectorate, the United States set in motion a long train of events leading eventually to the rise of Fidel Castro, the Bay of Pigs, Operation Mongoose, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and even today’s Guantánamo Bay prison camp. The line connecting these various developments may not be a straight one, given the many twists and turns along the way, but the dots do connect.*The Bomb.* **Nuclear weapons imperil our existence. Used on a large scale, they could destroy civilization itself.** Even now, the prospect of a lesser power like North Korea or Iran acquiring nukes sends jitters around the world. American presidents — Barack Obama is only the latest in a long line — declare the abolition of these weapons to be an imperative. **What they are less inclined to acknowledge is the role the United States played in afflicting humankind with this scourge.** **The United States invented the bomb. The United States** — alone among members of the nuclear club — actually employed it as a weapon of war. **The U.S. led the way in defining nuclear-strike capacity as the benchmark of power in the postwar world**, leaving other powers like the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and China scrambling to catch up. Today**, the U.S. still maintains an enormous nuclear arsenal at the ready and adamantly refuses to commit itself to a no-first-use policy, even as it professes its horror at the prospect of some other nation doing as the United States itself has done.** *Iran.* Extending his hand to Tehran, President Obama has invited those who govern the Islamic republic to “unclench their fists.” Yet to a considerable degree, those clenched fists are of our own making. For most Americans, the discovery of Iran dates from the time of the notorious hostage crisis of 1979-1981 when Iranian students occupied the U.S. embassy in Tehran, detained several dozen U.S. diplomats and military officers and subjected the administration of Jimmy Carter to a 444-day-long lesson in abject humiliation.

#### Heg causes WMD prolif

Layne, Texas A&M University Bush School of Government and Public Services international affairs professor, 7

(Christopher Layne is Professor, and Holder of the Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professorship of International Affairs at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. He is the author of *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present* (Cornell University Press, 2006), and (with Bradley A. Thayer) *American Empire: A Debate* (Routledge, 2006), 8/2/7, “America's Middle East Grand Strategy after Iraq: The Moment for Offshore Balancing has Arrived,” <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/1/0/9/7/pages210973/p210973-1.php>, Accessed 6/27/12, THW)

In addition to soft balancing, asymmetric strategies are another type of non- traditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. When employed by states, asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. Regional powers – especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant high-tech conventional forces. Because they are threatened by the US, however, these states seek other methods of offsetting American power, and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them. WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing field and deter the US from attacking them. Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance.

### Heg Bad – Terrorism

#### Heg causes terror and nuclear proliferation

Layne, Texas A&M University Bush School of Government and Public Services international affairs professor, 7

(Christopher Layne is Professor, and Holder of the Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professorship of International Affairs at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. He is the author of The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present (Cornell University Press, 2006), and (with Bradley A. Thayer) American Empire: A Debate (Routledge, 2006), 8/2/7, “America's Middle East Grand Strategy after Iraq: The Moment for Offshore Balancing has Arrived,” <http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/1/0/9/7/pages210973/p210973-1.php>, Accessed 6/27/12, THW)

In addition to soft balancing, asymmetric strategies are another type of non- traditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. When employed by states, asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. Regional powers – especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant high-tech conventional forces. Because they are threatened by the US, however, these states seek other methods of offsetting American power, and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them. WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing field and deter the US from attacking them. Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance.

#### Heg causes terror – empirics and polls prove

Eland, Independent Institute Center on Peace and Liberty director and senior fellow, 8

(Ivan. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Washington University and Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. “Reverend Wright Is Not Totally Wrong”, May 5 2008, The Independent Institute, <http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2182>, accessed 6/27/12, THW)

But what about Wright’s implication that U.S. foreign policy causes blowback terrorism against the United States? Again, the facts are on his side. Poll after poll in the Arab/Islamic world indicates that U.S. political and economic freedoms, technology, and even culture are popular in these countries, but U.S. interventionist foreign policy toward the Middle East is not. Bin Laden has repeatedly said that he attacks the United States because of its occupation of Muslim lands and its support for corrupt Middle Eastern governments. Finally, empirical studies have linked U.S. foreign occupation and military interventions with blowback terrorism against the U.S. targets.

#### Hegemony is empirically and by definition what makes terrorism possible - terrorism is a refusal to consent with the dominant hegemonic system

Butko, University of Alberta international relations professor, 5

(Thomas, Professor of International Relations, teaches about terrorism at the University of Alberta, Ph.D at University of Alberta, Researches Terrorism as counter-hegemonic violence and Middle East Politics. “TERRORISM REDEFINED: TERRORISM AS “COUNTER-HEGEMONIC POLITICAL VIOLENCE,” Published As a Paper in the Canadian Political Science Association in 2005, page 13, no specific date provided, <http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers-2005/Butko.pdf>, accessed 6/27/12, THW)

In this section, a historical analysis will assist in linking the phenomenon of “terrorism” with the broader concept of hegemony. Throughout the modern historical age, commencing with the first contemporary usage of “terrorism” during the French Revolution, the term has been solely applied to those states, groups, organizations, or individuals who have refused to consent to the “common sense” views or hegemony of the dominant powers within the international system. Perhaps Beril Dedeoglu is most succinct in creating this link when he states: “In other words, actors capable of defining the international system rules can define certain facts that seem in opposition to their way of existence as manifestations of ‘terror’ and thus identify them as ‘other’.”36 It is through this hegemony that the principal powers have been able to designate as “terrorists” their specific enemies or opponents within the international system. Once more, Dedeoglu argues: As each state’s ‘terror criminal’ (its enemy) is different, its perception of crime or enemy is also different. This difference is based on the various interests of the states in the international system.”37 Of course, it is only when a particular power is dominant and hegemonic, such as the United States, that such a classification can be internationalized and accepted, either coercively or consensually, by all the constituent parts of the system (i.e., the weaker powers).

#### Hegemony leads to terrorism

Muzaffar, International Movement for a Just World president, 7

(Chandra, 2007, Author, and political scientist, President of the International Movement for a Just World (JUST), an international NGO concerned with challenges to social justice and human dignity in global politics, “Hegemony, Terrorism, and War—Is Democracy the Antidote?” Widener Law Review Vol. 13:361, <http://static7.userland.com/ulvs1-j/gems/wlr/08muzaffar.pdf>, Page 2, Accessed 6/28/12, THW)

If we reflect upon al-Qaeda attacks, it is obvious that the military, political, and economic dimensions of U.S. hegemony figure prominently on its radar screen. It is seldom acknowledged, however, that the cultural dimension of hegemony has also been a consideration. For instance, during their trial, a couple of the Bali bombers inveighed against Western cultural imperialism and how it was destroying the identity and integrity of indigenous communities. By arguing that hegemony in all its manifestations breeds terrorism, we are in no way condoning terrorism. Al-Qaeda’s deliberate targeting of noncombatants and civilians in general—in East Africa, on 9-11, in Bali, in Madrid—has been condemned by right-thinking people everywhere. Leading Muslim theologians and scholars have not only denounced al-Qaeda’s misdeeds from a humanitarian perspective, but have also castigated Osama and his underlings as men who have shamelessly violated the essence of Islamic teachings.2 Nonetheless, if we fail to recognize how hegemony— control and dominance over people—leads to acts of terror, we will be no better than the proverbial ostrich that buries its head in the sand.

#### Hegemony is the root cause of terrorism

Muzaffar, International Movement for a Just World president, 7

(Chandra, 2007, Author, and political scientist, President of the International Movement for a Just World (JUST), an international NGO concerned with challenges to social justice and human dignity in global politics, “Hegemony, Terrorism, and War—Is Democracy the Antidote?” Widener Law Review Vol. 13:361, <http://static7.userland.com/ulvs1-j/gems/wlr/08muzaffar.pdf>, Page 1, Accessed 6/28/12, THW)

Al-Qaeda, the world’s most notorious terrorist network, was, in a sense, a response to the most obvious manifestation of global hegemony, namely, military power. As soon as the United States had established a military base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1991, immediately after the Kuwait War, the al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, announced to the world that he would attack Dhahran. He considered the establishment of an “infidel” military base in Islam’s holiest land—Saudi Arabia, where Islam’s two holiest cities, Mecca and Media, are situated—an act of sacrilege.1 In June 1996, al-Qaeda was allegedly involved in a bomb attack upon the base, killing 19 American airmen and wounding 250 others. Two years later, al-Qaeda targeted U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. This was followed by the 2000 assault on a U.S. warship, the USS Cole, off the coast of Yemen.

The climax was of course the infamous 9-11 episode when al-Qaeda operatives allegedly smashed aircrafts into the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Almost three thousand men and women were massacred in those horrendous tragedies on the eleventh of September 2001. There is no need to emphasize that the WTC was a symbol of U.S.’s global economic power while the Pentagon represented its global military might.

### Heg Bad – Backlash

#### Maintaining heg even just to shape the new multipolar system causes backlash and war – only a complete transition away solves

Layne, Texas A&M University Bush School of Government and Public Services international affairs professor, 6

(Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 158, Accessed 6/27/12, THW)

At the same time, it doubtless is true that it will take some time for others' balancing efforts to realize their intended outcome. Although the United States, contrary to my 1993 prediction, probably will not be challenged by great power rivals as early as 2010, it is even more doubtful that U.S. hegemony will endure until the early 2030s. Is it worthwhile paying the price to hang onto unipolarity for,at best,another two decades? Given that American hegemony is destined to end sooner rather than later and that the costs of trying to "shape the international system" to America's liking will rise (even as the benefits of doing so diminish), it would make more sense grand strategically for the United States to retrench and husband its resources for the long haul. The United States can do this by adopting an offshore balancing grand strategy.

### Heg Bad – Oil Dependence

#### US hegemony causes oil dependence

Foster, University of Oregon professor of sociology, 5

(John Ballamy, editor of Monthly Review, 5-25-05, Monthly Review, "Peak Oil and Energy Imperialism," http://monthlyreview.org/2008/07/01/peak-oil-and-energy-imperialism, accessed 7-6-12, CNM)

The rise in overt militarism and imperialism at the outset of the twenty-first century can plausibly be attributed largely to attempts by the dominant interests of the world economy to gain control over diminishing world oil supplies.1 Beginning in 1998 a series of strategic energy initiatives were launched in national security circles in the United States in response to: (1) the crossing of the 50 percent threshold in U.S. importation of foreign oil; (2) the disappearance of spare world oil production capacity; (3) concentration of an increasing percentage of all remaining conventional oil resources in the Persian Gulf; and (4) looming fears of peak oil.

The response of the vested interests to this world oil supply crisis was to construct what Michael Klare in Blood and Oil has called a global “strategy of maximum extraction.”2 This required that the United States as the hegemonic power, with the backing of the other leading capitalist states, seek to extend its control over world oil reserves with the object of boosting production. Seen in this light, the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan (the geopolitical doorway to Western access to Caspian Sea Basin oil and natural gas) following the 9/11 attacks, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the rapid expansion of U.S. military activities in the Gulf of Guinea in Africa (where Washington sees itself as in competition with Beijing), and the increased threats now directed at Iran and Venezuela—all signal the rise of a dangerous new era of energy imperialism.

### Oil Dependence Impact – Iran Nuclearization

#### US oil dependence causes Iran nuclearization

Foster, University of Oregon professor of sociology, 5

(John Ballamy, editor of Monthly Review, 5-25-05, Monthly Review, "Peak Oil and Energy Imperialism," http://monthlyreview.org/2008/07/01/peak-oil-and-energy-imperialism, accessed 7-6-12, CNM)

The tightening oil situation has prompted the rapid on the ground growth of U.S. energy imperialism, beyond the continuing Iraq and Afghan wars. The security of Saudi Arabia remains an overriding focus. Washington’s plans for a massive expansion of investment and production in Saudi Arabia, which according to the U.S. Department of Energy needs to double its oil output by 2030, depends on the feudal kingdom remaining in place. Meanwhile, there is rising social tension, emanating from the vastly unequal distribution of the country’s oil revenues. Ninety percent of private sector jobs go to foreigners. The sexes are entirely segregated. The repressive structure of the society conceals massive popular resentment. Any destabilization of the society would likely prompt U.S. military intervention. As James Howard Kunstler has written in The Long Emergency, “a desperate superpower might feel it has no choice except to attempt to control the largest remaining oil fields on the planet at any cost”—particularly if faced by growing rivalry from other states.35

The United States has sought to counter the possibility of an energy alliance between Russia, China, Iran, and Central Asian oil states by expanding its military bases in Afghanistan and Central Asia, notably its Manas air base in Kyrgyzstan on the border of oil-rich Kazakhstan.

Threats of U.S. “preemptive” military intervention directed at Iran meanwhile have been continuous, based on its alleged attempts to acquire nuclear weapons through the aggressive pursuit of nuclear energy, and its “interference” in Iraq. Iran’s pursuit of nuclear power, as a 2007 study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences has confirmed, is due to an oil export decline rate of 10–12 percent, arising from the growth of domestic energy demand plus a high rate of oil field depletion and a lack of investment growth in expanded capacity. This led to Iran’s recent inability to meet its OPEC oil export quota. The current trend points to the likelihood of Iranian petroleum exports falling to zero by 2014–15. From the standpoint of Western energy and national security analysts, Iran’s government and its national oil corporation have adopted the monopolistic policy of underinvesting in oil, deliberating slowing its production in expectation of continually rising prices, thereby holding back on the lifeblood of the world economy.36

### Oil Dependence Impact – War

#### Oil dependence from hegemony causes the worst wars

Foster, University of Oregon professor of sociology, 5

(John Ballamy, editor of Monthly Review, 5-25-05, Monthly Review, "Peak Oil and Energy Imperialism," http://monthlyreview.org/2008/07/01/peak-oil-and-energy-imperialism, accessed 7-6-12, CNM)

All of this is in accord with the history of capitalism, and the response of declining hegemons to global forces largely outside their control. The new energy imperialism of the United States is already leading to expanding wars, which could become truly global, as Washington attempts to safeguard the existing capitalist economy and to stave off its own hegemonic decline. As Simmons has warned, “If we don’t create a solution to the enormous potential gap between our inherent demand for energy and the availability of energy we will have the nastiest and last war we’ll ever fight. I mean a literal war.”39

### Hard Power Bad – Undercuts Soft Power

#### Over-reliance on hard power undercuts soft power

Nye, former US assistant secretary of defense and National Intelligence Council chair, 2

(Joseph S, The Guardian, 3-30-2002, “Why military power is no longer enough”, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/mar/31/1>, accessed 6-29-12, FFF)

There is also an indirect way to exercise power. A country may secure the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries aspire to its level of prosperity and openness. It is just as important to set the agenda in world politics and attract others as it is to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons. This aspect of power is "soft power" - getting people to want what you want.

Wise parents know that if they have brought up their children with the right values, their power will be greater than if they have relied only on cutting off allowances or taking away the car keys. Similarly, political leaders and thinkers such as Antonio Gramsci have long understood the power that comes from determining the framework of a debate. If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want to do.

Soft power is not simply the reflection of hard power. The Vatican did not lose its soft power when it lost the Papal States in Italy in the nineteenth century. Conversely, the Soviet Union lost much of its soft power after it invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, even though its economic and military resources continued to grow. Imperious policies that utilised Soviet hard power actually undercut its soft power. And countries like the Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states have political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight because of their support for international aid and peace-keeping.

The countries that are likely to gain soft power are those closest to global norms of liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy; those with the most access to multiple channels of communication; and those whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international performance. These dimensions of power give a strong advantage to the United States and Europe.

### Multipolarity Good – Cooperation

#### Multipolarity good – leads to great power cooperation

Layne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6

(Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,” 2006, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html>, Accessed: 7/5/12, MLF)

Second, although a competitive component to U.S. relations with the other great powers in a multipolar world would be inescapable, multipolar politics have historically engendered periods of great-power cooperation. On the cooperative side, an offshore balancing strategy would be coupled with a policy of spheres of influence, which have always been an important item in the toolbox of great-power policymakers. By recognizing each other's paramount interests in certain regions, great powers can avoid the kinds of misunderstandings that could trigger conflict. Moreover, the mere act of signaling that one country understands another's larger security stake in a particular region, a stake that it will respect by noninterference, allows states to communicate a nonthreatening posture to one another. By recognizing the legitimacy of other interests, a great power also signals that it accepts them as equals. An offshore balancing strategy would immunize the United States against a post-war-on-terrorism backlash against U.S. hegemony in one other way. By accepting the emergence of new great powers and simultaneously pulling back from its primacy-driven military posture, the United States would reduce perception of a "U.S. threat," thereby lowering the chances that others will view it as an [End Page 246] overpowerful hegemon. In this sense, offshore balancing is a strategy of restraint that would allow the United States to minimize the risks of open confrontation with the new great powers.

### Multipolarity Good – Economy

#### Turn- The “American Century” is coming to an end – transition to multipolarity is key to international relations and the economy

Bacevich, Boston University professor of history and international relations, 2-19-12

(Andrew J., professor of history and international relations at Boston University. He is editor of The Short American Century: A Postmortem, just published by Harvard University Press, February 19, 2012**,** *The Chronicle of Higher Education, “*Good bye the American Century- Good Riddance” <http://chronicle.com/article/The-American-Century-Is/130790/>, Accessed: 6/29/12, LPS)

Here was **the moment when what remained of the American Century ran out of steam and ground to a halt.** More specifically, when Bush gave up on victory in Iraq (thereby abandoning expectations of U.S. military power transforming the Greater Middle East) and **when the Great Recession brought the U.S. economy to its knees** (the consequences of habitual profligacy coming home to roost), Luce's formulation lost any resemblance to reality.Politicians insist otherwise, of course. Has the American Century breathed its last? Mitt Romney, front-runner for the Republican presidential nomination, leaves no room for doubt where he stands on the matter: As a member of the historical fraternity, count me among those more than content to consign the American Century to the past. After all, what's past becomes our turf—precisely where the American Century ought to be. Exploration of that myth-enshrouded territory has barely begun. Grasping what this era actually signified and what it yielded promises to be an exciting enterprise, one that may leave the reputations of heroes like John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan a bit worse for wear. From the jaded, not to say cynical, observer of international politics, the passing of the American Century elicits a more ambivalent response. I'd like to believe that the United States will accept the outcome gracefully. Rather than attempting to resurrect Luce's expansive vision, I'd **prefer to see American policy makers attend to the looming challenges of multipolarity. Averting the serial catastrophes that befell the planet starting just about 100 years ago, when the previous multipolar order began to implode, should keep them busy enough.**

But I suspect that's not going to happen. The would-be masters of the universe orbiting around the likes of Romney and Obama won't be content to play such a modest role. With the likes of Robert Kagan as their guide—"It's a wonderful world order," he writes in his new book, The World America Made (Knopf)—they will continue to peddle the fiction that with the right cast of characters running Washington, history will once again march to America's drumbeat. Evidence to support such expectations is exceedingly scarce—taken a look at Iraq lately?—but no matter. Insiders and would-be insiders will insist that, right in their hip pocket, they've got the necessary strategy.

### Coalition-Building Cooperation Solves Leadership

#### Coalition-building cooperation is the best way to assert leadership through diplomacy

Gvodsdev, National Interest former editor, 6-15-12

(Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the former editor of the National Interest and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College. 6-15-12, World Politics Review, “The Realist Prism: In a G-Zero World, U.S. Should Go Minilateral,” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12061/the-realist-prism-in-a-g-zero-world-u-s-should-go-minilateral>, accessed 7-8-12, CNM)

Bremmer says that this gives Washington a choice: It can persist in trying to work through an increasingly dysfunctional global architecture, or it can focus on reasserting U.S. leadership, but at a regional level or among “coalitions of the willing.” In this way, rather than struggling to find compromises in order to set up global arrangements, whether on trade, climate or human security, Washington would focus time and effort on developing workable structures between like-minded states. In some areas, such as trade issues, this is already happening. As Daniel Wu and Marc Mealy recently noted, “With stuttering progress in the WTO Doha Round, the proliferation of bilateral and regional preferential trade liberalization efforts seems to suggest that it’s easier for small groups of states that share common goals and values to make progress than it is for 200 sovereign states in the world to find common ground.”

The Obama administration came into office with high hopes that it could resuscitate a truly global consensus on key issues that the Bush administration’s preferences for unilateral action had damaged. It believed that diplomatic engagement rather than a “my way or the highway” approach would produce results. The reality has been disappointing, and not just from Washington’s perspective: International polling data collected by Gallup earlier this year show that the image of U.S. leadership is under increasing strain in the third year of Barack Obama's presidency, with approval waning “even among some of the biggest fans of the country's leadership” now that the initial euphoria over Obama's election has worn off.

Focusing efforts on a smaller group of countries more predisposed to share the U.S. view of things might be a better approach to enhancing American leadership. This does not mean writing off efforts to diplomatically engage other major powers, such as China, or to try to find points of commonality with them for global action. But it recognizes that there will be times when trying to find a common position will be futile -- and that sometimes seeking one will lead to the U.S. being blocked from taking the types of action it might prefer. Syria may end up being one such test case.

#### Focusing on regional cooperation allows the exclusion of countries that would block action

Gvodsdev, National Interest former editor, 6-15-12

(Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the former editor of the National Interest and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College. 6-15-12, World Politics Review, “The Realist Prism: In a G-Zero World, U.S. Should Go Minilateral,” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12061/the-realist-prism-in-a-g-zero-world-u-s-should-go-minilateral>, accessed 7-8-12, CNM)

At the same time, the United States can work on developing institutions more limited in scope. By surrendering the pretense to aspire to universality, Washington could then exclude from these initiatives those countries that otherwise would have the power to block action. Taking a page from the European Union’s efforts to engage with Russia, which involved establishing a series of “common spaces,” the United States could work with a set of countries in Europe, West Africa, Latin America and East Asia to create a series of common spaces among like-minded nations that promote free movement of people, goods and ideas, and which provide the basis for security cooperation. Both the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area are moves in this direction.

### Setting Cooperation Standards Key to Hegemony

#### Setting the standards for cooperation and trade is key to leadership

Gvodsdev, National Interest former editor, 6-15-12

(Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the former editor of the National Interest and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College. 6-15-12, World Politics Review, “The Realist Prism: In a G-Zero World, U.S. Should Go Minilateral,” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12061/the-realist-prism-in-a-g-zero-world-u-s-should-go-minilateral>, accessed 7-8-12, CNM)

TPP = Trans Pacific Partnership

Critics would argue that such a proposal is an abrogation of U.S. global leadership: By focusing on a smaller group of states, the United States would in essence be writing off the rest to fall under the “hegemony” of other rising and resurgent powers like China or Russia. Others might be concerned about whether or not institutions that did not include major powers might fail in the same way that the League of Nations failed in the period between the two world wars.

But the real test for global leadership in the 21st century will be which country sets the standards that become commonly accepted as the rules of the road. The West won the last expression of this kind of competition, with Western standards going global after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The rise of the rest has now challenged those assumptions, so the United States needs to go back to the drawing board. In terms of trade in the Asia-Pacific region, what will end up being more attractive to most of the states of the region: a Chinese-led process of integration or the U.S.-backed TPP? Would countries such as Brazil or India prefer to build their own institutions with China and Russia or become partners with the United States in constructing common spaces? And if they decline, what about what Dan Twining has called the other “set of ascending powers,” countries such as Mexico or Indonesia, which may be more open to forming these common spaces with Washington?

Though we may be returning to an era of competition, it need not be characterized by hostility; there is no reason, as Wu and Mealy put it, why different institutions cannot “coexist but engage in friendly rivalry.” The U.S. experience in institution-building, and in offering its partners alliances on easy terms, gives it some major advantages over its erstwhile rivals in such a global environment. There is no reason why it shouldn’t take advantage of them.

### AT – Transition Wars

Hegemony is not key to stability and no transition wars – empirics prove the theory false

Fettweis, Naval War College, Professor of Security Studies, 10

(Christopher J., Tulane University’s Assistant Professor of Political Science, October 27, 2010, “Dangerous Times?: The International Politics of Great Power Peace”, p.173-4, accessed 7/5/12, YGS)

Simply stated, the hegemonic stability theory proposes that international peace in only possible when there is one country strong enough to make and enforce a set of rules. At the height of Pax Romana between 27 BC and 180 AD, for example, Rome was able to bring unprecedented peace and security to the Mediterranean. The Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century brought a level of stability to the high seas. Perhaps the current era is peaceful because the United States has established a de facto Pax Americana where no power is strong enough to challenge its dominance, and because it has established a set of rules that are generally in the interests of all countries to follow. Without a benevolent hegemon, some strategists fear, instability may break our around the globe.70 Unchecked conflicts could cause humanitarian disaster and, in today’s interconnected world, economic turmoil that would ripple throughout global financial markets. If the United States were to abandon its commitments abroad, argued Art, the world would “become a more dangerous place” and, sooner or later, that would “redound to America’s detriment.”71 If the massive spending that the United States engages in actually provides stability in the international political and economic systems, then perhaps internationalism is worthwhile. There are good theoretical and empirical reasons, however, to believe that U.S hegemony is not the primary cause of the current era of stability. First of all, the hegemonic-stability argument overstates the role that the United States plays in the system. No country is strong enough to police the world on its own. The only way there can be stability in the community of great power is if self-policing occurs, if states have decided that their interests are served by peace. If no pacific normative shift had occurred among the great powers that was filtering down through the system, then no amount of international constabulary work by the United States could maintain stability. Likewise, if it is true that such a shift has occurred, then most of what the hegemon spends to bring stability would be wasted. The 5 percent of the world’s population that live in the United States simply could not force peace upon an unwilling 95. At the risk of beating the metaphor to death, the United States may be patrolling a neighborhood that has already rid itself of crime. Stability and unipolarity may be simply coincidental. In order for U.S. hegemony to be the reason for global stability, the rest of the world would have to expect reward for good behavior and fear punishment for bad. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not always proven to be especially eager to engage in humanitarian interventions abroad. Even rather incontrovertible evidence of genocide has not been sufficient to inspire action. Hegemonic stability can only take credit for influencing those decisions that would have ended in war without the presence, whether physical or psychological, of the United States. Ethiopia and Eritrea are hardly the only states that could go to war without the slightest threat of U.S. intervention. Since most of the world today is free to fight without U.S. involvement, something else must be at work. Stability exists in many places where no hegemony is present. Second, the limited empirical evidence we have suggests that there is little connection between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. During the 1990s the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998 the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.72 To internationalists, defense hawks, and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”73 If the pacific trend were due not the U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, however, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable Pentagon, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove mistrust and arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and it kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. It is also worth noting for our purposes that the United States was no less safe.

#### Transition from unipolarity will be to multipolarity – that ensures stability through international institutions

Ikenberry, Princeton Politics and International Affairs professor, 11

(G. John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, “The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism After America,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2011, lexis, accessed 6/28/12, THW)

There is no longer any question: wealth and power are moving from the North and the West to the East and the South, and the old order dominated by the United States and Europe is giving way to one increasingly shared with non-Western rising states. But if the great wheel of power is turning, what kind of global political order will emerge in the aftermath? Some anxious observers argue that the world will not just look less American -- it will also look less liberal. Not only is the United States' preeminence passing away, they say, but so, too, is the open and rule-based international order that the country has championed since the 1940s. In this view, newly powerful states are beginning to advance their own ideas and agendas for global order, and a weakened United States will find it harder to defend the old system. The hallmarks of liberal internationalism -- openness and rule-based relations enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and norms such as multilateralism -- could give way to a more contested and fragmented system of blocs, spheres of influence, mercantilist networks, and regional rivalries. The fact that today's rising states are mostly large non-Western developing countries gives force to this narrative. The old liberal international order was designed and built in the West. Brazil, China, India, and other fast-emerging states have a different set of cultural, political, and economic experiences, and they see the world through their anti-imperial and anticolonial pasts. Still grappling with basic problems of development, they do not share the concerns of the advanced capitalist societies. The recent global economic slowdown has also bolstered this narrative of liberal international decline. Beginning in the United States, the crisis has tarnished the American model of liberal capitalism and raised new doubts about the ability of the United States to act as the global economic leader. For all these reasons, many observers have concluded that world politics is experiencing not just a changing of the guard but also a transition in the ideas and principles that underlie the global order. The journalist Gideon Rachman, for example, says that a cluster of liberal internationalist ideas -- such as faith in democratization, confidence in free markets, and the acceptability of U.S. military power -- are all being called into question. According to this worldview, the future of international order will be shaped above all by China, which will use its growing power and wealth to push world politics in an illiberal direction. Pointing out that China and other non-Western states have weathered the recent financial crisis better than their Western counterparts, pessimists argue that an authoritarian capitalist alternative to Western neoliberal ideas has already emerged. According to the scholar Stefan Halper, emerging-market states "are learning to combine market economics with traditional autocratic or semiautocratic politics in a process that signals an intellectual rejection of the Western economic model." But this panicked narrative misses a deeper reality: although the United States' position in the global system is changing, the liberal international order is alive and well. The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles. China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it. Indeed, today's power transition represents not the defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance. Brazil, China, and India have all become more prosperous and capable by operating inside the existing international order -- benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the newly organized G-20. Their economic success and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world politics, and they have deep interests in preserving that system. In the meantime, alternatives to an open and rule-based order have yet to crystallize. Even though the last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system -- the emergence of new powers, bitter disputes among Western allies over the United States' unipolar ambitions, and a global financial crisis and recession -- the liberal international order has no competitors. On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies for it. To be sure, as wealth and power become less concentrated in the United States' hands, the country will be less able to shape world politics. But the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive. Indeed, now may be the best time for the United States and its democratic partners to update the liberal order for a new era, ensuring that it continues to provide the benefits of security and prosperity that it has provided since the middle of the twentieth century.

#### No transition wars – rising powers will integrate into international institutions with no incentives for aggression

Ikenberry, Princeton Politics and International Affairs professor, 11

(G. John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, “The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism After America,” Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis, accessed 6/28/12, THW)

REASON FOR REASSURANCE Rising powers will discover another reason to embrace the existing global rules and institutions: doing so will reassure their neighbors as they grow more powerful. A stronger China will make neighboring states potentially less secure, especially if it acts aggressively and exhibits revisionist ambitions. Since this will trigger a balancing backlash, Beijing has incentives to signal restraint. It will find ways to do so by participating in various regional and global institutions. If China hopes to convince its neighbors that it has embarked on a "peaceful rise," it will need to become more integrated into the international order. China has already experienced a taste of such a backlash. Last year, its military made a series of provocative moves -- including naval exercises -- in the South China Sea, actions taken to support the government's claims to sovereign rights over contested islands and waters. Many of the countries disputing China's claims joined with the United States at the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July to reject Chinese bullying and reaffirm open access to Asia's waters and respect for international law. In September, a Chinese fishing trawler operating near islands administered by Japan in the East China Sea rammed into two Japanese coast guard ships. After Japanese authorities detained the trawler's crew, China responded with what one Japanese journalist described as a "diplomatic 'shock and awe' campaign," suspending ministerial-level contacts, demanding an apology, detaining several Japanese workers in China, and instituting a de facto ban on exports of rare-earth minerals to Japan. These actions -- seen as manifestations of a more bellicose and aggressive foreign policy -- pushed ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea perceptibly closer to the United States. As China's economic and military power grow, its neighbors will only become more worried about Chinese aggressiveness, and so Beijing will have reason to allay their fears. Of course, it might be that some elites in China are not interested in practicing restraint. But to the extent that China is interested in doing so, it will find itself needing to signal peaceful intentions -- redoubling its participation in existing institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, or working with the other great powers in the region to build new ones. This is, of course, precisely what the United States did in the decades after World War II. The country operated within layers of regional and global economic, political, and security institutions and constructed new ones -- thereby making itself more predictable and approachable and reducing the incentives for other states to undermine it by building countervailing coalitions. More generally, given the emerging problems of the twenty-first century, there will be growing incentives among all the great powers to embrace an open, rule-based international system. In a world of rising economic and security interdependence, the costs of not following multilateral rules and not forging cooperative ties go up. As the global economic system becomes more interdependent, all states -- even large, powerful ones -- will find it harder to ensure prosperity on their own. Growing interdependence in the realm of security is also creating a demand for multilateral rules and institutions. Both the established and the rising great powers are threatened less by mass armies marching across borders than by transnational dangers, such as terrorism, climate change, and pandemic disease. What goes on in one country -- radicalism, carbon emissions, or public health failures -- can increasingly harm another country. Intensifying economic and security interdependence are giving the United States and other powerful countries reason to seek new and more extensive forms of multilateral cooperation. Even now, as the United States engages China and other rising states, the agenda includes expanded cooperation in areas such as clean energy, environmental protection, nonproliferation, and global economic governance. The old and rising powers may disagree on how exactly this cooperation should proceed, but they all have reasons to avoid a breakdown in the multilateral order itself. So they will increasingly experiment with new and more extensive forms of liberal internationalism.

### AT – Loss of Alliances Causes Violence

#### Loss of allies doesn’t cause violence – 1960’s France proves

Weisbrode, European University Institute diplomatic historian, 11

(Kenneth Weisbrode is a diplomatic historian at the European University Institute and author of "The Atlantic Century." 2-8-11, World Politics Review, “The U.S. and Egypt: The Limits of Hegemony,” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7805/the-u-s-and-egypt-the-limits-of-hegemony>, accessed 7-8-12, CNM)

Some of today's big powers resemble hegemons; others are more imperial. But all, to one degree or another, find their responses toward smaller powers driven by circumstance and not merely by inclination. The United States, for example, has invaded and occupied several countries over the years. But when former President Charles de Gaulle of France withdrew that country from NATO's military command in 1966, then-President Lyndon Johnson did not lead an armed overthrow of the French government. In fact, he barely did more than wish the French a bon voyage. Here, too, gradations of influence and power mattered: France never defected from the North Atlantic alliance itself, but merely from its military organization. If it had joined the Soviet bloc, or declared itself to be genuinely neutral, Johnson may have reacted differently.

The French case offers a useful comparison in another respect. To what extent does world order require the semblance of tolerance among allies? Among the many grievances against Mubarak held by own people was that he has been too loyal to his American backers, to the detriment of Egypt's interests. A certain respect for independence, and not just codependence, can have a certain utility in sustaining order. It preserves the voluntary character of hegemony, tempers the tendency of the superpower to overcommit itself and enhances the perception among allies that they are not mere satraps.

### AT – History Proves US Leadership Good

#### History proves the United States causes violence

Walt, Harvard School of Government professor of international affairs, 11

(Stephen M., November 2011, Foreign Policy, "The Myth of American Exceptionalism," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the\_myth\_of\_american\_exceptionalism?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full, accessed 7-2-12, CNM)

Declarations of American exceptionalism rest on the belief that the United States is a uniquely virtuous nation, one that loves peace, nurtures liberty, respects human rights, and embraces the rule of law. Americans like to think their country behaves much better than other states do, and certainly better than other great powers.

If only it were true. The United States may not have been as brutal as the worst states in world history, but a dispassionate look at the historical record belies most claims about America's moral superiority.

For starters, the United States has been one of the most expansionist powers in modern history. It began as 13 small colonies clinging to the Eastern Seaboard, but eventually expanded across North America, seizing Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California from Mexico in 1846. Along the way, it eliminated most of the native population and confined the survivors to impoverished reservations. By the mid-19th century, it had pushed Britain out of the Pacific Northwest and consolidated its hegemony over the Western Hemisphere.

The United States has fought numerous wars since then -- starting several of them -- and its wartime conduct has hardly been a model of restraint. The 1899-1902 conquest of the Philippines killed some 200,000 to 400,000 Filipinos, most of them civilians, and the United States and its allies did not hesitate to dispatch some 305,000 German and 330,000 Japanese civilians through aerial bombing during World War II, mostly through deliberate campaigns against enemy cities. No wonder Gen. Curtis LeMay, who directed the bombing campaign against Japan, told an aide, "If the U.S. lost the war, we would be prosecuted as war criminals." The United States dropped more than 6 million tons of bombs during the Indochina war, including tons of napalm and lethal defoliants like Agent Orange, and it is directly responsible for the deaths of many of the roughly 1 million civilians who died in that war.

More recently, the U.S.-backed Contra war in Nicaragua killed some 30,000 Nicaraguans, a percentage of their population equivalent to 2 million dead Americans. U.S. military action has led directly or indirectly to the deaths of 250,000 Muslims over the past three decades (and that's a low-end estimate, not counting the deaths resulting from the sanctions against Iraq in the 1990s), including the more than 100,000 people who died following the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. U.S. drones and Special Forces are going after suspected terrorists in at least five countries at present and have killed an unknown number of innocent civilians in the process. Some of these actions may have been necessary to make Americans more prosperous and secure. But while Americans would undoubtedly regard such acts as indefensible if some foreign country were doing them to us, hardly any U.S. politicians have questioned these policies. Instead, Americans still wonder, "Why do they hate us?"

The United States talks a good game on human rights and international law, but it has refused to sign most human rights treaties, is not a party to the International Criminal Court, and has been all too willing to cozy up to dictators -- remember our friend Hosni Mubarak? -- with abysmal human rights records. If that were not enough, the abuses at Abu Ghraib and the George W. Bush administration's reliance on waterboarding, extraordinary rendition, and preventive detention should shake America's belief that it consistently acts in a morally superior fashion. Obama's decision to retain many of these policies suggests they were not a temporary aberration.

The United States never conquered a vast overseas empire or caused millions to die through tyrannical blunders like China's Great Leap Forward or Stalin's forced collectivization. And given the vast power at its disposal for much of the past century, Washington could certainly have done much worse. But the record is clear: U.S. leaders have done what they thought they had to do when confronted by external dangers, and they paid scant attention to moral principles along the way. The idea that the United States is uniquely virtuous may be comforting to Americans; too bad it's not true.

#### Most recent history proves heg is bad

Walt, Harvard School of Government professor of international affairs, 11

(Stephen M., November 2011, Foreign Policy, "The Myth of American Exceptionalism," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the\_myth\_of\_american\_exceptionalism?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full, accessed 7-2-12, CNM)

Finally, any honest accounting of the past half-century must acknowledge the downside of American primacy. The United States has been the major producer of greenhouse gases for most of the last hundred years and thus a principal cause of the adverse changes that are altering the global environment. The United States stood on the wrong side of the long struggle against apartheid in South Africa and backed plenty of unsavory dictatorships -- including Saddam Hussein's -- when short-term strategic interests dictated. Americans may be justly proud of their role in creating and defending Israel and in combating global anti-Semitism, but its one-sided policies have also prolonged Palestinian statelessness and sustained Israel's brutal occupation.

#### The US got lucky to be successful - geography

Walt, Harvard School of Government professor of international affairs, 11

(Stephen M., November 2011, Foreign Policy, "The Myth of American Exceptionalism," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the\_myth\_of\_american\_exceptionalism?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full, accessed 7-2-12, CNM)

The United States has enjoyed remarkable success, and Americans tend to portray their rise to world power as a direct result of the political foresight of the Founding Fathers, the virtues of the U.S. Constitution, the priority placed on individual liberty, and the creativity and hard work of the American people. In this narrative, the United States enjoys an exceptional global position today because it is, well, exceptional.

There is more than a grain of truth to this version of American history. It's not an accident that immigrants came to America in droves in search of economic opportunity, and the "melting pot" myth facilitated the assimilation of each wave of new Americans. America's scientific and technological achievements are fully deserving of praise and owe something to the openness and vitality of the American political order.

But America's past success is due as much to good luck as to any uniquely American virtues. The new nation was lucky that the continent was lavishly endowed with natural resources and traversed by navigable rivers. It was lucky to have been founded far from the other great powers and even luckier that the native population was less advanced and highly susceptible to European diseases. Americans were fortunate that the European great powers were at war for much of the republic's early history, which greatly facilitated its expansion across the continent, and its global primacy was ensured after the other great powers fought two devastating world wars. This account of America's rise does not deny that the United States did many things right, but it also acknowledges that America's present position owes as much to good fortune as to any special genius or "manifest destiny."

#### History doesn’t prove that US leadership is good

Patrick, Program on International Institutions and Global Governance Director, 11

(Stewart M., 11-12-11, Council on Foreign Relations, "Still Exceptional After All These Years?" http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2011/10/12/still-exceptional-after-all-these-years/, accessed 7-2-12, CNM)

Walt seeks to demolish the pillars of American exceptionalism, showing that the United States is neither particularly benevolent nor divinely predestined. He documents historical excesses of America’s global role, from its scorched earth atrocities in the Philippines from 1898-1903 to its controversial conduct in the global war on terrorism. He suggests that “America’s past success is due as much to good luck”—including a fortunate geographical location—“as to any uniquely American virtues.” Walt disputes the tendency of U.S. politicians and academics alike to attribute all positive global trends and outcomes—from the spread of democracy to postwar global prosperity—to U.S. global leadership. He points out that such analysis ignores the downside of U.S. primacy, like lack of progress on climate change. Finally, Walt dismisses the myth that God has somehow granted the United States a special providence, or “mandate of heaven,” to bring freedom, peace and justice to the world.

### AT – Heg Solves Bad Governments

#### Hegemony doesn’t solve bad forms of government – they would fail anyway

The Economist 2-2-12

(The Economist, news source, "The stakes of American hegemony ," http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2012/02/world-order, accessed 7-6-12, CNM)

There is much to quibble with here. It may be that the current global dispensation to some extent "reflects American principles and preferences". If it does, however, it's not because it "was built and preserved by American power", except in a rather trivial sense. The American model of political economy has proved in many ways to be the world's most successful. As the 20th century's main rivals to capitalist liberal democracy failed, polities worldwide looked to the example of Western Europe and North America, and this led to a glad flowering of democracy and prosperity. But America didn't cause the world's numerous socialist and/or authoritarian experiments to fail. Those regimes faltered first and foremost because socialism and authoritarianism tend not to work out in the long run. And America didn't compel aspiring first-worlders to try market economies and democratic governance. The nations of the world could see for themselves what was working and, in their own ways, have mostly followed suit.

### AT – Heg Solves Conflicts

#### Heg doesn’t solve global conflicts

Bacevich, Boston University professor of history and international relations, 09

(Andrew, April 30, 2009, Salon, “Fairwell to the American Century” <http://www.salon.com/writer/andrew_bacevich/>. Accessed: 6/29/12, LPS)

**Had the United States acted otherwise, would Cuba have evolved into a stable and prosperous democracy, a beacon of hope for the rest of Latin America? Would the world have avoided the blight of nuclear weapons? Would Iran today be an ally of the United States, a beacon of liberalism in the Islamic world, rather than a charter member of the “axis of evil?” Would Afghanistan be a quiet, pastoral land at peace with its neighbors? No one, of course, can say what might have been. All we know for sure is that policies concocted in Washington by reputedly savvy statesmen now look exceedingly ill-advised.** What are we to make of these blunders? The temptation may be to avert our gaze, thereby preserving the reassuring tale of the American Century. We should avoid that temptation and take the opposite course, acknowledging openly, freely and unabashedly where we have gone wrong. We should carve such acknowledgments into the face of a new monument smack in the middle of the Mall in Washington: We blew it. We screwed the pooch. We caught a case of the stupids. We got it ass-backwards. Only through the exercise of candor might we avoid replicating such mistakes. Indeed, we ought to apologize. When it comes to avoiding the repetition of sin, nothing works like abject contrition. We should, therefore, tell the people of Cuba that we are sorry for having made such a hash of U.S.-Cuban relations for so long. President Obama should speak on our behalf in asking the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki for forgiveness. He should express our deep collective regret to Iranians and Afghans for what past U.S. interventionism has wrought.

### AT – Heg Influence Good

#### Heg can’t cause smaller countries to obey – smaller countries realize their relative power

Weisbrode, European University Institute diplomatic historian, 11

(Kenneth Weisbrode is a diplomatic historian at the European University Institute and author of "The Atlantic Century." 2-8-11, World Politics Review, “The U.S. and Egypt: The Limits of Hegemony,” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/7805/the-u-s-and-egypt-the-limits-of-hegemony>, accessed 7-8-12, CNM)

The Obama administration's air of ambivalence, however, evokes a perennial condition of international relations. Accustomed as most of us are to power hierarchies, we often overlook how difficult and complex actual relations can be between big and small countries, especially when those relations fall into the category of patron and client.

In this respect, the difficulties the U.S. confronts as its Egyptian ally shows signs of collapsing are similar to those China has faced in recent years with regard to North Korea, those between Iran and its various auxiliaries in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region, and, for that matter, between the United States and other important allies, like Israel: For every bit of leverage a patron seeks to wield, the client comes to realize its own relative power. Rarely does the big power command and the smaller obey. In other words, no member of the latter group above is a proxy, strictly speaking.

### AT – US Heg Benign/Restrained

#### Benign hegemonic restraint theory flawed – hegemon will act to preserve its interests when threatened

Layne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6

(Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,” 2006, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html>, Accessed: 7/5/12, MLF)

Many primacists believe that the United States can be a successful, benevolent hegemon because it is a liberal democracy. This argument rests on wobbly reasoning. Certainly, there is a considerable literature purporting to show that the quality of international politics among democracies differs from that between democracies and nondemocracies; that is, democracies cooperate with each other, constitute a "pluralistic security community," accord each other respect, and conduct their affairs based on shared values and norms (transparency, give-and-take, live and let live, compromise, and peaceful dispute resolution). These ideas comport with the Wilsonian ideology that drives U.S. grand strategic behavior, but there is powerful evidence demonstrating that democracies do not behave better toward each other than toward nondemocracies.

The mere fact that the United States is a democracy does not negate the possibility that other states will fear its hegemonic power. First, theories that posit a special democratic (or liberal) peace are contradicted by the historical record. When important geopolitical interests are at stake, realpolitik—not regime type—determines great power policies. 69 Contrary to liberal theory, democracies (and liberal states) have threatened to use military force against each other to resolve diplomatic crises and have even gone to the brink of war. Indeed, democracies have not just teetered on the brink; they have gone over it. The most notable example of a war among democracies occurred in 1914 when democratic Britain and France went to war against democratic Germany. 70 Today, the gross imbalance of U.S. power means that whenever the United States believes its interests are threatened, it will act like other hegemons typically have acted, notwithstanding that it is a democracy. 71 [End Page 26]

#### Benign hegemony is a myth – like unicorns

Layne, Texas A&M University Bush School of Government and Public Services international affairs professor, 3

(Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush school of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, “The American Conservative, The Cost of Empire”, October 6 2003, <http://www.amconmag.com/10_06_03/cover.html>, accessed 6/27/12, THW)

These are not compelling arguments. In international politics, benevolent hegemons are like unicorns—there are no such animals. Hegemons love themselves, but others mistrust and fear them. Others dread both the over-concentration of geopolitical weight in America’s favor and the purposes for which it may be used. Washington’s (purportedly) benevolent intentions are ephemeral, but the hard fist of American power is tangible—and others worry that if U.S. intentions change, they might get smacked. As for the argument that the U.S. is too mighty to be counter-balanced, history reminds us that things change fast in international politics. The British found out toward the end of the 19th century that a seemingly unassailable international power position can melt away with unexpected rapidity.

Perhaps the proponents of America’s imperial ambitions are right and the U.S. will not suffer the same fate as previous hegemonic powers. Don’t bet on it. The very fact of America’s overwhelming power is bound to produce a geopolitical backlash—which is why it’s only a short step from the celebration of imperial glory to the recessional of imperial power. Indeed, on its present course, the United States seems fated to succumb to the “hegemon’s temptation.” Hegemons have lots of power and because there is no countervailing force to stop them, they are tempted to use it repeatedly, and thereby overreach themselves. Over time, this hegemonic muscle-flexing has a price. The cumulative costs of fighting —or preparing to fight—guerilla wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, asymmetric conflicts against terrorists (in the Philippines, possibly in a failed Pakistan, and elsewhere), regional powers (Iran, North Korea), and rising great powers like China could erode America’s relative power—especially if the U.S. suffers setbacks in future conflicts, for example in a war with China over Taiwan.

#### Benign hegemony is a myth – geopolitical blowback inevitable

Layne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6

(Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,” 2006, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html>, Accessed: 7/5/12, MLF)

Although U.S. policymakers have convinced themselves that the United States is a benign hegemon, no such animal exists in international politics. A hegemon is a threat to the security of others simply because it is so powerful. The United States is not immune to the kind of geopolitical blowback experienced by previous hegemonic aspirants. Thus, in a self-help world the United States must perform the strategic equivalent of threading a needle. [End Page 243] It cannot abrogate its freedom to act unilaterally to defend its interests, but Washington needs simultaneously to find a grand strategy that reduces fears of U.S. preponderant power, thereby reducing incentives to engage in counterhegemonic balancing directed at the United States. A good starting point is the war on terrorism itself.

### AT – US Is Exceptional

#### People who claim American exceptionalism are deluded – every country thinks they’re exceptional

Patrick, Program on International Institutions and Global Governance Director, 11

(Stewart M., 11-12-11, Council on Foreign Relations, "Still Exceptional After All These Years?" http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2011/10/12/still-exceptional-after-all-these-years/, accessed 7-2-12, CNM)

The United States is hardly alone in seeing itself as exceptional—or having a unique global vocation. Consider France. Beyond its historical claims to a mission civilisatrice (civilizing mission), France maintains an enduring commitment to la Francophonie. Even despite France’s relatively diminished global status since 1940,the notion of being globally indispensable remains engrained in French political culture.(Indeed, one reason the post-war U.S.-French relationship has been such a prickly Cold Alliance stems from the two countries’ jockeying for similar universalisms. The American Revolution and U.S. Bill of Rights compete with the French Revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man).

“Among great powers,” Walt reminds us, “thinking you’re special is the norm, not the exception.” That’s certainly true for today’s putative challenger to American hegemony. Under a veneer of Communist Party ideology, today’s Chinese foreign policy is imbued with an enduring sense of national—indeed civilizational—self-importance. It dates back millennia, and depicts the country as standing apart. At times, “Chinese exceptionalism” depicts the country as literally the political center of the world.

#### The US is not exceptional – everyone thinks they are

Walt, Harvard School of Government professor of international affairs, 11

(Stephen M., November 2011, Foreign Policy, "The Myth of American Exceptionalism," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/10/11/the\_myth\_of\_american\_exceptionalism?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full, accessed 7-2-12, CNM)

Whenever American leaders refer to the "unique" responsibilities of the United States, they are saying that it is different from other powers and that these differences require them to take on special burdens.

Yet there is nothing unusual about such lofty declarations; indeed, those who make them are treading a well-worn path. Most great powers have considered themselves superior to their rivals and have believed that they were advancing some greater good when they imposed their preferences on others. The British thought they were bearing the "white man's burden," while French colonialists invoked la mission civilisatrice to justify their empire. Portugal, whose imperial activities were hardly distinguished, believed it was promoting a certain missão civilizadora. Even many of the officials of the former Soviet Union genuinely believed they were leading the world toward a socialist utopia despite the many cruelties that communist rule inflicted. Of course, the United States has by far the better claim to virtue than Stalin or his successors, but Obama was right to remind us that all countries prize their own particular qualities.

So when Americans proclaim they are exceptional and indispensable, they are simply the latest nation to sing a familiar old song. Among great powers, thinking you're special is the norm, not the exception.

### AT – Heg Good – China Rise

#### China won’t dominate – lack of democratic legitimacy

Kupchan, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow, 4-14-12

(Charles A. Kupchan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, 4-14-12, Council on Foreign Relations, "Why Nobody Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century," http://www.cfr.org/foreign-policy-history/why-nobody-dominate-twenty-first-century/p27958, accessed 7-3-12, CNM)

If China is poised to sit atop the global economy, why not expect a Chinese century? The appeal of China's brand of state capitalism - its competence and performance - is offset by its lack of democratic legitimacy. China's success also depends on assets that many other countries lack - a communitarian ethic with deep roots in Confucian culture, a meritocratic leadership and bureaucracy, a vast labor pool, and a top-notch industrial and transportation infrastructure. Moreover, although Beijing will surely seek to extend its sway in its own neighborhood, China's ethnocentrism suggests that its hegemonic aspirations may well be only regional, not global, in scope.

#### No China rise - geography

Kagan, Brookings Institute senior fellow, 2-14-12

(Robert, Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School, Gideon Rachman is chief foreign-affairs commentator for the Financial Times, Foreign Policy, "The Rise or Fall of the American Empire," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the\_rise\_or\_fall\_of\_the\_american\_empire?page=full, accessed 7-5-12, CNM)

China, in fact, has significant obstacles to overcome before it can become a global power on a par with the United States -- above all, the fears and suspicions of neighbors who are themselves pretty powerful and, in the case of India, rising almost as fast as China. It is a cliché, but the United States really was blessed with a favorable geographic situation. It has no great powers in its hemisphere and faces no direct threat from any of its neighbors. China is surrounded by past and future adversaries. Even the Soviet Union was in better shape during the Cold War.

# Hegemony Good

## Uniqueness

### Sustainable

#### Hegemony is currently economically and politically sustainable

**Kagan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace senior associate, 7**

(Robert, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, July 17, 2007, Hoover Institution, No. 144, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136>, Accessed 6/27/12, THW)

The world’s failure to balance against the superpower is the more striking because the United States, notwithstanding its difficult interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, continues to expand its power and military reach and shows no sign of slowing this expansion even after the 2008 elections. The American defense budget has surpassed $500 billion per year, not including supplemental spending totaling over $100 billion on Iraq and Afghanistan. This level of spending is sustainable, moreover, both economically and politically. 14 As the American military budget rises, so does the number of overseas American military bases. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has built or expanded bases in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia; in Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in Europe; and in the Philippines, Djibouti, Oman, and Qatar. Two decades ago, hostility to the American military presence began forcing the United States out of the Philippines and seemed to be undermining support for American bases in Japan. Today, the Philippines is rethinking that decision, and the furor in Japan has subsided. In places like South Korea and Germany, it is American plans to reduce the U.S. military presence that stir controversy, not what one would expect if there was a widespread fear or hatred of overweening American power. Overall, there is no shortage of other countries willing to host U.S. forces, a good indication that much of the world continues to tolerate and even lend support to American geopolitical primacy if only as a protection against more worrying foes. 15

### Lead Now

#### US has an unprecedented lead

Kagan, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, 1-11-12

(Robert, The New Republic, "Not Fade Away: The Myth of Decline," http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI&utm\_source=Editors+and+Bloggers&utm\_campaign=cbaee91d9d-Edit\_and\_Blogs&utm\_medium=email, accessed 7-6-12, CNM)

Less than a decade ago, most observers spoke not of America’s decline but of its enduring primacy. In 2002, the historian Paul Kennedy, who in the late 1980s had written a much-discussed book on “the rise and fall of the great powers,” America included, declared that never in history had there been such a great “disparity of power” as between the United States and the rest of the world. Ikenberry agreed that “no other great power” had held “such formidable advantages in military, economic, technological, cultural, or political capabilities.... The preeminence of American power” was “unprecedented.” In 2004, the pundit Fareed Zakaria described the United States as enjoying a “comprehensive uni-polarity” unlike anything seen since Rome. But a mere four years later Zakaria was writing about the “post-American world” and “the rise of the rest,” and Kennedy was discoursing again upon the inevitability of American decline. Did the fundamentals of America’s relative power shift so dramatically in just a few short years?

### Lead Now – Military

#### Lead now – military

Kagan, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, 1-11-12

(Robert, The New Republic, "Not Fade Away: The Myth of Decline," http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?page=0,1&passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI&utm\_source=Editors%20and%20Bloggers&utm\_campaign=cbaee91d9d-Edit\_and\_Blogs&utm\_medium=email, accessed 7-6-12, CNM)

Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-century China learned and Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, “military strength underpins hegemony.” Here the United States remains unmatched. It is far and away the most powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no decline in America’s relative military capacity—at least not yet. Americans currently spend less than $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers combined. (This figure does not include the deployment in Iraq, which is ending, or the combat forces in Afghanistan, which are likely to diminish steadily over the next couple of years.) They do so, moreover, while consuming a little less than 4 percent of GDP annually—a higher percentage than the other great powers, but in historical terms lower than the 10 percent of GDP that the United States spent on defense in the mid-1950s and the 7 percent it spent in the late 1980s. The superior expenditures underestimate America’s actual superiority in military capability. American land and air forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and are the most experienced in actual combat. They would defeat any competitor in a head-to-head battle. American naval power remains predominant in every region of the world.

By these military and economic measures, at least, the United States today is not remotely like Britain circa 1900, when that empire’s relative decline began to become apparent. It is more like Britain circa 1870, when the empire was at the height of its power. It is possible to imagine a time when this might no longer be the case, but that moment has not yet arrived.

## Uniqueness – Challengers

### AT – Challengers Now

#### Heg high – everyone is declining

Gvodsdev, National Interest former editor, 6-15-12

(Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the former editor of the National Interest and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College. 6-15-12, World Politics Review, “The Realist Prism: In a G-Zero World, U.S. Should Go Minilateral,” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12061/the-realist-prism-in-a-g-zero-world-u-s-should-go-minilateral>, accessed 7-8-12, CNM)

This is not to argue that the United States has entered into a period of irreversible decline. Indeed, the other major power centers that are often presented as future peer competitors are experiencing their own shocks, from the eurozone crisis to economic stagnation in Japan to the protests rocking Russia to the formidable challenges that Xi Jinping and the “fifth generation” of leadership in China will have to confront. As a result, the United States is benefiting from the perception that it, like the dollar, remains a “safe haven.” But though the U.S. is still a superpower, its current fiscal and economic problems leave it in no position to finance a new global system or impose common standards on the nations of the world, the way it did in the postwar period by rebuilding Western Europe and East Asia and creating the institutional foundations that paved the way for globalization.

#### No major rival now – but US must act to preserve its status

Beckley, Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, International Security Program Research Fellow, 12

(Michael, University of Virginia’s Miller Center’s fellow, International Security, Volume 36, Issue 3, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CFEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mitpressjournals.org%2Fdoi%2Fpdf%2F10.1162%2FISEC\_a\_00066&ei=zkvrT9T8E8q1rQHeorDwBQ&usg=AFQjCNGn9W7Ei82Wbsof4yj6KORthY-71g, pg.78, accessed 6-27-12, FFF)

Order and prosperity, however, are unnatural. They can never be presumed. When achieved, they are the result of determined action by powerful actors and, in particular, by the most powerful actor, which is, and will be for some time, the United States. Arms buildups, insecure sea-lanes, and closed markets are only the most obvious risks of U.S. retrenchment. Less obvious are transnational problems, such as global warming, water scarcity, and disease, which may fester without a leader to rally collective action.

Hegemony, of course, carries its own risks and costs. In particular, America’s global military presence might tempt policymakers to use force when they should choose diplomacy or inaction. If the United States abuses its power, however, it is not because it is too engaged with the world, but because its engagement lacks strategic vision. The solution is better strategy, not retrenchment.

The first step toward sound strategy is to recognize that the status quo for the United States is pretty good: it does not face a hegemonic rival, and the trends favor continued U.S. dominance. The overarching goal of American foreign policy should be to preserve this state of affairs. Declinists claim the United States should “adopt a neomercantilist international economic policy” and “disengage from current alliance commitments in East Asia and Europe.”161 But the fact that the United States rose relative to China while propping up the world economy and maintaining a hegemonic presence abroad casts doubt on the wisdom of such calls for radical policy change.

### AT – China Threat Now

#### China is not a threat now – US still has heg

Beckley, Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, International Security Program, Research Fellow, 12

(Michael, University of Virginia’s Miller Center, fellow, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure”, International Security, Volume 36, Issue 3, Pg. 42-43, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CFEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mitpressjournals.org%2Fdoi%2Fpdf%2F10.1162%2FISEC\_a\_00066&ei=zkvrT9T8E8q1rQHeorDwBQ&usg=AFQjCNGn9W7Ei82Wbsof4yj6KORthY-71g, accessed 6-27-12, FFF)

Resolving the debate between these two perspectives is imperative for prudent policymaking. If proponents of the dominant, or “declinist,” perspective are correct, then the United States should contain China’s growth by “[adopting] a neomercantilist international economic policy” and subdue China’s ambitions by “disengag[ing] from current alliance commitments in East Asia.”4 If, however, the United States is not in decline, and if globalization and hegemony are the main reasons why, then the United States should do the opposite: it should contain China’s growth by maintaining a liberal international economic policy, and it should subdue China’s ambitions by sustaining a robust political and military presence in Asia.

With few exceptions, however, existing studies on the decline of the United States and the rise of China suffer from at least one of the following shortcomings. 5 First, most studies do not look at a comprehensive set of indicators. Instead they paint impressionistic pictures of the balance of power, presenting tidbits of information on a handful of metrics. In general, this approach biases results in favor of the declinist perspective because most standard indicators of national power—for example, gross domestic product (GDP), population, and energy consumption—conºate size with power and thereby overstate the capabilities of large but underdeveloped countries. For example, in a recent study Arvind Subramanian contends that “China’s dominance is a sure thing” based on “an index of dominance combining just three factors: a country’s GDP, its trade (measured as the sum of its exports and imports of goods), and the extent to which it is a net creditor to the world.”6 The United States and China, however, are each declining by some measures while rising in terms of others. To distinguish between ascendance and decline writ large, therefore, requires analyzing many indicators and determining how much each one matters in relation to others.

Second, many studies are static, presenting single-year snapshots of U.S. and Chinese power. This ºaw tends to bias results in favor of the alternative perspective because the United States retains a significant lead in most categories. The key question, however, is not whether the United States is more powerful than China at present, but whether it will remain so in the future. Without a dynamic analysis, it is impossible to answer this question.

### **AT – China Economic Threat**

#### No threat – China is not a competitive threat and will remain behind for years

Beckley, Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, International Security Program, Research Fellow, 12

(Michael, University of Virginia’s Miller Center, fello*w, Harvard Business Review*, “How Big a Competitive threat is China, Really?”, 2-29-12, http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2012/02/how\_big\_a\_competitive\_threat\_i.html, accessed 6-27-12, FFF)

In the 1980s, Japanese leaders spoke openly about bankrupting American firms and turning the United States into an economic backwater. Today, by comparison, U.S.-China economic relations are characterized not so much by head-to-head competition for control of industries, but by a division of labor within industries and, often, within individual products — iPads, Intel computer chips, and Nike shoes, to take just a few examples, are all designed in America and assembled in China.

Of course, this system has turned China into a manufacturing juggernaut. But only 8% of American workers work in manufacturing, and many of those jobs are high-skill, capital-intensive jobs — think operating robots and writing computer code, not snapping together parts by hand — that are unlikely to be outsourced to China.

China is obviously an important economic player. Simply because of its size, it commands attention in global negotiations on trade, finance, and the environment. But China will remain poor and technologically underdeveloped for many years. As a result, its prosperity will remain dependent on ties to the global economy and, in particular, on good economic relations with the United States. For the past 30 years, the United States and China have grown their economies through a division of labor. This cooperation can endure, but only if Americans and Chinese disabuse themselves of the notion that they are locked in zero-sum economic competition.

#### No China economic threat – trends reversing

Beckley, Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, International Security Program, Research Fellow, 12

(Michael, University of Virginia’s Miller Center, fellow, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure”, International Security, Volume 36, Issue 3, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CFEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mitpressjournals.org%2Fdoi%2Fpdf%2F10.1162%2FISEC\_a\_00066&ei=zkvrT9T8E8q1rQHeorDwBQ&usg=AFQjCNGn9W7Ei82Wbsof4yj6KORthY-71g, p. 60-61, accessed 6-27-12, FFF)

These predictions are speculative and may turn out to be overly pessimistic. 94 What is more certain, however, is that several factors that allowed for rapid Chinese growth (e.g., a surplus of cheap labor and capital, expanding export markets abroad, and sufficient water supplies) are disappearing.95 Chief among these factors is China’s “demographic dividend.”96 In the 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese government encouraged Chinese women to bear multiple children to boost the working-age population. In the 1970s, however, the Chinese government reversed course and instituted the one-child policy. As a result, China will soon confront the most severe aging process in human history. Within twenty years, China will have 300 million pensioners, causing the ratio of workers per retiree to plummet from 8 to 1 today to 2 to 1 by 2040.97 The fiscal cost of this swing in dependency ratios may exceed 80 to 100 percent of China’s GDP.

### AT – China Economic Threat – GDP

#### No China threat – GDP is not synonymous with national power

Beckley, Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, International Security Program, Research Fellow, 12

(Michael, University of Virginia’s Miller Center, fellow, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure”, International Security, Volume 36, Issue 3, Pg. 58-59, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CFEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mitpressjournals.org%2Fdoi%2Fpdf%2F10.1162%2FISEC\_a\_00066&ei=zkvrT9T8E8q1rQHeorDwBQ&usg=AFQjCNGn9W7Ei82Wbsof4yj6KORthY-71g, accessed 6-27-12, FFF)

Economic size, however, does not necessarily make China a contender for superpower status. After all, China was the largest economy in the world throughout most of its “century of humiliation,” when it was ripped apart by Western powers and Japan. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, ruled a quarter of the globe for more than a century, but was never, even at its peak, the largest economy in the world. Britain’s GDP was far smaller than China’s and India’s for all of the eighteenth century and much of the nineteenth century. 86 Britain, however, was able to establish imperial control over India and to defeat China militarily, imposing unequal treaties on Beijing, acquiring Hong Kong and various other concessions, and establishing a sphere of inºuence in East Asia. This dominance stemmed not from the absolute size of Britain’s economy, but from its superior level of economic development, measured in terms of per capita income, which was the highest in the world and several times higher than China’s and India’s at the time.87

This is not to say that size is irrelevant. Luxembourg’s per capita income is almost double that of the United States, but its tiny population precludes it from raising a meaningful army, let alone entering the ranks of the great pow- ers. It is, however, important to recognize that GDP is not synonymous with national power, and that countries with larger economies do not necessarily have more resources at their disposal. Half a billion peasants will produce a large volume of output, but most of it will be immediately consumed, leaving little left over for national purposes. As Klaus Knorr argued, what matters for national power is not wealth, but “surplus wealth.”88 It is therefore significant that the average Chinese citizen is more than $17,000 poorer relative to the average American than he was in 1991 (see figure 1).

### **AT – China Tech Threat**

#### China’s technological development stagnating

Beckley, Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, International Security Program, Research Fellow, 12

(Michael, University of Virginia’s Miller Center’s fellow, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” International Security, Volume 36, Issue 3, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CFEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mitpressjournals.org%2Fdoi%2Fpdf%2F10.1162%2FISEC\_a\_00066&ei=zkvrT9T8E8q1rQHeorDwBQ&usg=AFQjCNGn9W7Ei82Wbsof4yj6KORthY-71g, pg. 69-70, accessed 6-27-12, FFF)

Chinese technological stagnation is also evident in sales and patent statistics. From 1991 to 2008, Chinese firms’ sales of new products as a share of total sales revenues remained ºat at 15 percent.137 In the United States, by contrast, new products account for 35 to 40 percent of sales revenue.138 The Chinese government grants the majority of its invention patents to foreign firms even though Chinese firms are ªve times more numerous.139 This result is all the more startling because many foreign firms do not seek Chinese patents. Instead they seek “triadic patents,” which are simultaneously recognized by the patent offices of the three largest markets for high-technology products (the United States, Europe, and Japan), and are thus the most secure and most difficult to obtain. Figure 6 shows that the U.S. lead in triadic patents has increased over the last twenty years.

Chinese firms, moreover, do not seem to be taking genuine steps to improve their technological abilities. For the past twenty years, Chinese firms’ total spending on R&D as a percentage of sales revenue has remained at levels seven times below the average for American ªrms.140 Between 1995 and 2008, the share of Chinese enterprises engaged in scientific or technological activities declined from 59 percent to 37 percent, and the share of Chinese firms with an R&D department declined from 60 percent to 24 percent.141 When Chinese firms import technology, they spend a fraction of the total cost on absorbing the technology. This fraction increased recently from 4 percent to 25 percent, but it remains far lower than the 200 to 300 percent spent by Korean and Japanese firms when they were trying to catch up to the West in the 1970s.142

#### China’s scientific sector often fabricates their findings and its rarely ever comes close to competing amongst other countries

Beckley, Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, International Security Program, Research Fellow, 12

(Michael, University of Virginia’s Miller Center’s fellow, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” International Security, Volume 36, Issue 3, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CFEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mitpressjournals.org%2Fdoi%2Fpdf%2F10.1162%2FISEC\_a\_00066&ei=zkvrT9T8E8q1rQHeorDwBQ&usg=AFQjCNGn9W7Ei82Wbsof4yj6KORthY-71g, pg.64, accessed 6-27-12, FFF)

There are, however, reasons to question comparisons between imperial Germany and contemporary China. For starters, offcial Chinese statistics overstate the volume of China’s scientific resources. Half of China’s “engineers” are auto mechanics or graduates of two-year vocational programs (zhuanke).111 In addition, data on China’s R&D spending are intiated because they are based on the real purchasing power of the Chinese yuan even though most research equipment is purchased on international markets.112 Nevertheless, the United States increased its lead in terms of R&D spending over the last twenty years (see figure 4), and still accounts for 50 percent of the world’s most highly cited scientific articles.113

Over the next few decades, Chinese scientific research will increase significantly. In fact, it is the law: the Chinese government has decreed that, by 2020, R&D expenditures will constitute 2.5 percent of GDP and China will rank among the top ªve countries in terms of scientific article output.114 Topdown decrees and resource infusions, however, will not necessarily turn China into an innovation powerhouse.115 After all, imperial Germany coupled size with sophistication, producing not only many scientists but also world-class research. Evidence to date suggests China tends to prioritize the former at the expense of the latter. The rush to increase the quantity of Chinese scientists, for example, has reduced the quality of their education, as evidenced by sharp declinesin teacher-student and funding-per-student ratios.116 Moreover, China’s determination to boost its article output has fostered “a Wild West climate where top researchers, under intense pressure to produce, are tempted to fake results or copy the works of others.”117 Chinese scientists are “preoccupied with quick outcomes and immediate returns,” and as a result, “quantitative gains in Chinese research productivity have not always been matched by qualitative gains.”118 According to a former Chinese biochemist turned whistle- blower, “Misconduct is so widespread among Chinese academics that they have almost become used to it.”119 Indeed, a significant portion of new R&D spending has simply disappeared because China’s Ministry of Science and Technology lacks the capacity to monitor the flood of new research grants.120 According to the most comprehensive study on Chinese scientiªc research, the result of all these deficiencies is that “much of the work coming out of Chinese laboratories and research institutes still tends to be not yet close to the cutting edge or to be derivative of what has been done elsewhere, with minor new contributions.”121

### AT – Brazil Dominance

#### No Brazil dominance – lack of economic strength and isolation

Kupchan, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow, 4-14-12

(Charles A. Kupchan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, 4-14-12, Council on Foreign Relations, "Why Nobody Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century," http://www.cfr.org/foreign-policy-history/why-nobody-dominate-twenty-first-century/p27958, accessed 7-3-12, CNM)

Brazil is in important respects best set to emerge as a global trendsetter. It is a stable democracy, blessed with ample, land, labor, and natural resources. At least for now, Brasilia has found a developmental path that combines economic openness with redistribution programs aimed at alleviating inequality. And Brazil faces no geopolitical rivals and resides in a region that has been remarkably free of inter-state war.

But Brazil is not headed for the top ranks; its economy is expected to be five times smaller than that of China in 2050. And Brazil's benign location in South America cuts both ways. Its relative isolation will enable Brasilia to remain aloof from the fray set to ensue in Eurasia and the western Pacific as China, India, Russia, and Indonesia ascend. But its distance will also limit its influence in this geopolitical heartland. Brazil is destined for regional hegemony, not global ambition.

### AT – India Dominance

#### No India dominance – domestic and geopolitical issues

Kupchan, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow, 4-14-12

(Charles A. Kupchan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn, 4-14-12, Council on Foreign Relations, "Why Nobody Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century," http://www.cfr.org/foreign-policy-history/why-nobody-dominate-twenty-first-century/p27958, accessed 7-3-12, CNM)

Like China, India has an expansive labor pool at its disposal. And its embrace of democracy gives India an international appeal that China lacks. But India's democratic institutions are also a liability. Lethargic bureaucracies, social stratification, biting inequality, and striking linguistic and ethnic diversity make the Indian government weak and ineffective; New Delhi enjoys none of Beijing's purposeful efficiency. Indeed, India's private sector has thrived in spite of, not because of, its democratic institutions. The lack of good governance will ensure that India's rise is slow and bumpy.

India also resides in a dangerous neighborhood that will hem in its geopolitical ascent. Rivalry and territorial disputes with China, overt hostility from Pakistan, and proximity to Afghanistan and Iran will constrain New Delhi's statecraft and prevent India from straying too far from home.

## Uniqueness – Economic

### Economic – Deleveraging

#### The US is successfully deleveraging now

Drezner, Tufts University School of Law and Diplomacy professor of international politics, 1-22-12

(Daniel W., Foreign Policy, "Predictions about the death of American hegemony may have been greatly exaggerated," http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/22/predictions\_about\_the\_death\_of\_american\_hegemony\_may\_have\_been\_greatly\_exaggerated, accessed 7-5-12, CNM)

What about the future? One could point to the last few months of modestly encouraging economic data, but that's ephemeral. Rather, there are three macrotrends that are worth observing now before (I suspect) they come up in the State of the Union:

1) The United States is successfully deleveraging. As the McKinsey Global Institute notes, the United States is actually doing a relatively good job of slimming down total debt -- i.e., consumer, investor and public debt combined. Sure, public debt has exploded, but as MGI points out, that really is the proper way of doing things after a financial bubble:

The deleveraging processes in Sweden and Finland in the 1990s offer relevant lessons today. Both endured credit bubbles and collapses, followed by recession, debt reduction, and eventually a return to robust economic growth. Their experiences and other historical examples show two distinct phases of deleveraging. In the first phase, lasting several years, households, corporations, and financial institutions reduce debt significantly. While this happens, economic growth is negative or minimal and government debt rises. In the second phase of deleveraging, GDP growth rebounds and then government debt is gradually reduced over many years....

As of January 2012, the United States is most closely following the Nordic path towards deleveraging. Debt in the financial sector has fallen back to levels last seen in 2000, before the credit bubble, and the ratio of corporate debt relative to GDP has also fallen. US households have made more progress in debt reduction than other countries, and may have roughly two more years before returning to sustainable levels of debt.

Indeed, the deleveraging is impressive enough for even Paul Krugman to start sounding optimistic:

the economy is depressed, in large part, because of the housing bust, which immediately suggests the possibility of a virtuous circle: an improving economy leads to a surge in home purchases, which leads to more construction, which strengthens the economy further, and so on. And if you squint hard at recent data, it looks as if something like that may be starting: home sales are up, unemployment claims are down, and builders’ confidence is rising.

Furthermore, the chances for a virtuous circle have been rising, because we’ve made significant progress on the debt front.

[Notes – McKinsey Global Institute, global management consulting firm, works with leading businesses, governments, and institutions, Paul Krugman – American economist, Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs’ Economics and International Affairs professor, London School of Economics Centenary Professor, *The New York Times,* op-ed columnist, won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences]

### Economic – Manufacturing

#### Manufacturing is on the rise

Drezner, Tufts University School of Law and Diplomacy professor of international politics, 1-22-12

(Daniel W., Foreign Policy, " Predictions about the death of American hegemony may have been greatly exaggerated," http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/22/predictions\_about\_the\_death\_of\_american\_hegemony\_may\_have\_been\_greatly\_exaggerated, accessed 7-5-12, CNM)

2) Manufacturing is on the mend. Another positive trend, contra the Harvard Business School and the GOP presidential candidates, is in manufacturing. Some analysts have already predicted a revival in that sector, and now the data appears to be backing up that prediction. The Financial Times' Ed Crooks notes:

Plenty of economists and business leaders believe that US manufacturing is entering an upturn that is not just a bounce-back after the recession, but a sign of a longer-term structural improvement. Manufacturing employment has grown faster in the US since the recession than in any other leading developed economy, according to official figures. Productivity growth, subdued wages, the steady decline in the dollar since 2002 and rapid pay inflation in emerging economies have combined to make the US a more attractive location.

“Over the past decade, the US has had some huge gains in productivity, and we have seen unit labour costs actually falling,” says Chad Moutray, chief economist at the National Association of Manufacturers. “A lot of our members tell us that it sometimes is cheaper to produce in the US, especially because labour costs are lower.”

Ed Crooks, Financial Times US industry and energy editor

### Economic – GDP Proves

#### Hegemony high now – GDP

Kagan, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, 1-11-12

(Robert, The New Republic, "Not Fade Away: The Myth of Decline," http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?page=0,1&passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI&utm\_source=Editors%20and%20Bloggers&utm\_campaign=cbaee91d9d-Edit\_and\_Blogs&utm\_medium=email, accessed 7-6-12, CNM)

The answer is no. Let’s start with the basic indicators. In economic terms, and even despite the current years of recession and slow growth, America’s position in the world has not changed. Its share of the world’s GDP has held remarkably steady, not only over the past decade but over the past four decades. In 1969, the United States produced roughly a quarter of the world’s economic output. Today it still produces roughly a quarter, and it remains not only the largest but also the richest economy in the world. People are rightly mesmerized by the rise of China, India, and other Asian nations whose share of the global economy has been climbing steadily, but this has so far come almost entirely at the expense of Europe and Japan, which have had a declining share of the global economy.

#### The US has not declined – GDP has remained stable

Kagan, Brookings Institute senior fellow, Drezner, Tufts University’s Fletcher School International Politics professor, Rachman, Financial Times chief foreign-affairs commentator, 2-14-12

(Robert, Daniel, Gideon, "The Rise or Fall of the American Empire," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the\_rise\_or\_fall\_of\_the\_american\_empire?page=full, accessed 7-5-12, CNM)

First, those GDP figures. My argument that the U.S. share has held fairly steady with roughly a quarter of world GDP since 1969 rests on the U.S. government's figures, which can be found here.

### Economic – AT – Economic Data Proves Decline

#### Economic data is all over the place

Kagan, Brookings Institute senior fellow, 2-14-12

(Robert, Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School, Gideon Rachman is chief foreign-affairs commentator for the Financial Times, Foreign Policy, "The Rise or Fall of the American Empire," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the\_rise\_or\_fall\_of\_the\_american\_empire?page=full, accessed 7-5-12, CNM)

Anyone who takes the trouble to look into this question quickly discovers that, of course, the numbers are a bit all over the place. The IMF's own numbers are constantly changing, even in regard to the past. For instance, as I wrote in response to Luce and Sachs, according to the IMF's 2010 World Economic Outlook report, the U.S. share of world GDP based on purchasing power parity in 1980 was 22.499 percent. In 2007, the last year before the Great Recession, the U.S. share was 21.289 -- not much of a shift. In its 2011 report, however, the IMF put the share in 1980 at 24.6, making the shift seem greater. Which is right? As for the IMF's projections, can we wait and see how they turn out before building an entire global theory around them? They are constantly revising those up and down, too, and things may look different when the United States pulls out of its recession.

### Economic – AT – Recession

#### Recessions don’t cause hegemonic decline

Kagan, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, 1-11-12

(Robert, The New Republic, "Not Fade Away: The Myth of Decline," http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI&utm\_source=Editors+and+Bloggers&utm\_campaign=cbaee91d9d-Edit\_and\_Blogs&utm\_medium=email,

accessed 7-6-12, CNM)

SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS for America’s relative decline these days would be more potent if they had not appeared only in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. Just as one swallow does not make a spring, one recession, or even a severe economic crisis, need not mean the beginning of the end of a great power. The United States suffered deep and prolonged economic crises in the 1890s, the 1930s, and the 1970s. In each case, it rebounded in the following decade and actually ended up in a stronger position relative to other powers than before the crisis. The 1910s, the 1940s, and the 1980s were all high points of American global power and influence.

#### The global financial crisis has destabilized counter-balancers and made US hegemony sustainable

Mead, Council on Foreign Relations Kissinger Senior Fellow, 9

(Walter Russell, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, 2/4, www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/2169866/posts, AD: 6/20/10)

**Even before the Panic of 2008 sent financial markets into turmoil** and launched what looks like the worst global recession in decades, **talk of American decline was omnipresent. In the long term, the United States faces the rise of Asia and the looming fiscal problems posed by** Medicare and other **entitlement programs**. In the short term, there is a sense that, **after eight years of** George W. **Bush, the world, full of disdain for our way of life, seems to be spinning out of** our--and perhaps anybody's--**control**. The financial panic simply brought all that simmering anxiety to a boil, and **the consensus now seems to be that the United States isn't just in danger of decline, but in the full throes of it--the beginning of a "post-American" world.**

Perhaps--but the long history of **capitalism suggests another possibility**. After all, capitalism has seen a steady procession of economic crises and panics, from the seventeenth-century Tulip Bubble in the Netherlands and the Stop of the Exchequer under Charles II in England through the Mississippi and South Sea bubbles of the early eighteenth century, on through the crises associated with the Napoleonic wars and the spectacular economic crashes that repeatedly wrought havoc and devastation to millions throughout the nineteenth century. The panics of 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, and 1907 were especially severe, culminating in the Great Crash of 1929, which set off a depression that would not end until World War II. The series of crises continued after the war, and the last generation has seen the Penn Central bankruptcy in 1970, the first Arab oil crisis of 1973, the Third World debt crisis of 1982, the S&L crisis, the Asian crisis of 1997, the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2001, and today's global financial meltdown.

And yet, this relentless series of crises has not disrupted the rise of a global capitalist system, centered first on the power of the United Kingdom and then, since World War II, on the power of the United States. After more than 300 years, **it seems reasonable to conclude that financial and economic crises do not, by themselves, threaten either the international capitalist system or the special role within it** of leading capitalist powers like the United Kingdom and the United States. If anything, **the opposite seems true**--that **financial crises in some way sustain Anglophone power and capitalist development.**

Indeed, **many critics of both capitalism and the "Anglo-Saxons**" who practice it so aggressively **have pointed to what seems to be a perverse relationship between such crises and the consolidation of the "core" capitalist economies against the impoverished periphery**. Marx noted that **financial crises remorselessly crushed weaker companies, allowing the most successful and ruthless capitalists to cement their domination** of the system. For dependency theorists like Raul Prebisch, **crises served a similar function in the international system, helping stronger countries marginalize and impoverish developing ones.**

Setting aside the flaws in both these overarching theories of capitalism, this analysis of economic crises is fundamentally sound--and especially relevant to the current meltdown. Cataloguing the early losses from the financial crisis, **it's hard not to conclude that the central capitalist nations will weather the storm far better than those not so central. Emerging markets have been hit harder by the financial crisis than developed ones as investors around the world seek the safe haven provided by U.S. Treasury bills, and commodity-producing economies have suffered extraordinary shocks as commodity prices crashed from their record, boom-time highs. Countries like Russia, Venezuela, and Iran, which hoped to use oil revenue to mount a serious political challenge to American power and the existing world order, face serious new constraints**. Vladimir Putin, Hugo Chavez, **and** Mahmoud Ahmadinejad **must now spend less time planning big international moves and think a little bit harder about domestic stability. Far from being the last nail in America's coffin, the financial crisis may actually resuscitate U.S. power relative to its rivals**

## Hegemony Good Impacts

### Laundry List

#### Hegemony solves all the impacts – Economy, Free Trade, Great Power, Nuclear, Regional and Smaller Wars. Collapse triggers those impacts

Kagan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Senior Associate, 11

(Robert, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, 7-17-07, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136>, Accessed 6/27/12, THW)

Others have. For decades “realist” analysts have called for a strategy of “offshore balancing.” Instead of the United States providing security in East Asia and the Persian Gulf, it would withdraw its forces from Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East and let the nations in those regions balance one another. If the balance broke down and war erupted, the United States would then intervene militarily until balance was restored. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, for instance, Christopher Layne has long proposed “passing the mantle of regional stabilizer” to a consortium of “Russia, China, Iran, and India.” In East Asia offshore balancing would mean letting China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others manage their own problems, without U.S. involvement—again, until the balance broke down and war erupted, at which point the United States would provide assistance to restore the balance and then, if necessary, intervene with its own forces to restore peace and stability.

Before examining whether this would be a wise strategy, it is important to understand that this really is the only genuine alternative to the one the United States has pursued for the past 65 years. To their credit, Layne and others who support the concept of offshore balancing have eschewed halfway measures and airy assurances that we can do more with less, which are likely recipes for disaster. They recognize that either the United States is actively involved in providing security and stability in regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, which means maintaining a robust presence in those regions, or it is not. Layne and others are frank in calling for an end to the global security strategy developed in the aftermath of World War II, perpetuated through the Cold War, and continued by four successive post-Cold War administrations.

At the same time, it is not surprising that none of those administrations embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea of relying on Russia, China, and Iran to jointly “stabilize” the Middle East and Persian Gulf will not strike many as an attractive proposition. Nor is U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific likely to have a stabilizing effect on that region. The prospects of a war on the Korean Peninsula would increase. Japan and other nations in the region would face the choice of succumbing to Chinese hegemony or taking unilateral steps for self-defense, which in Japan’s case would mean the rapid creation of a formidable nuclear arsenal.

Layne and other offshore balancing enthusiasts, like John Mearsheimer, point to two notable occasions when the United States allegedly practiced this strategy. One was the Iran-Iraq war, where the United States supported Iraq for years against Iran in the hope that the two would balance and weaken each other. The other was American policy in the 1920s and 1930s, when the United States allowed the great European powers to balance one another, occasionally providing economic aid, or military aid, as in the Lend-Lease program of assistance to Great Britain once war broke out. Whether this was really American strategy in that era is open for debate—most would argue the United States in this era was trying to stay out of war not as part of a considered strategic judgment but as an end in itself. Even if the United States had been pursuing offshore balancing in the first decades of the 20th century, however, would we really call that strategy a success? The United States wound up intervening with millions of troops, first in Europe, and then in Asia and Europe simultaneously, in the two most dreadful wars in human history.

It was with the memory of those two wars in mind, and in the belief that American strategy in those interwar years had been mistaken, that American statesmen during and after World War II determined on the new global strategy that the United States has pursued ever since. Under Franklin Roosevelt, and then under the leadership of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, American leaders determined that the safest course was to build “situations of strength” (Acheson’s phrase) in strategic locations around the world, to build a “preponderance of power,” and to create an international system with American power at its center. They left substantial numbers of troops in East Asia and in Europe and built a globe-girdling system of naval and air bases to enable the rapid projection of force to strategically important parts of the world. They did not do this on a lark or out of a yearning for global dominion. They simply rejected the offshore balancing strategy, and they did so because they believed it had led to great, destructive wars in the past and would likely do so again. They believed their new global strategy was more likely to deter major war and therefore be less destructive and less expensive in the long run. Subsequent administrations, from both parties and with often differing perspectives on the proper course in many areas of foreign policy, have all agreed on this core strategic approach.

From the beginning this strategy was assailed as too ambitious and too expensive. At the dawn of the Cold War, Walter Lippmann railed against Truman’s containment strategy as suffering from an unsustainable gap between ends and means that would bankrupt the United States and exhaust its power. Decades later, in the waning years of the Cold War, Paul Kennedy warned of “imperial overstretch,” arguing that American decline was inevitable “if the trends in national indebtedness, low productivity increases, [etc.]” were allowed to continue at the same time as “massive American commitments of men, money and materials are made in different parts of the globe.” Today, we are once again being told that this global strategy needs to give way to a more restrained and modest approach, even though the indebtedness crisis that we face in coming years is not caused by the present, largely successful global strategy.

Of course it is precisely the success of that strategy that is taken for granted. The enormous benefits that this strategy has provided, including the financial benefits, somehow never appear on the ledger. They should. We might begin by asking about the global security order that the United States has sustained since Word War II—the prevention of major war, the support of an open trading system, and promotion of the liberal principles of free markets and free government. How much is that order worth? What would be the cost of its collapse or transformation into another type of order?

Whatever the nature of the current economic difficulties, the past six decades have seen a greater increase in global prosperity than any time in human history. Hundreds of millions have been lifted out of poverty. Once-backward nations have become economic dynamos. And the American economy, though suffering ups and downs throughout this period, has on the whole benefited immensely from this international order. One price of this success has been maintaining a sufficient military capacity to provide the essential security underpinnings of this order. But has the price not been worth it? In the first half of the 20th century, the United States found itself engaged in two world wars. In the second half, this global American strategy helped produce a peaceful end to the great-power struggle of the Cold War and then 20 more years of great-power peace. Looked at coldly, simply in terms of dollars and cents, the benefits of that strategy far outweigh the costs.

The danger, as always, is that we don’t even realize the benefits our strategic choices have provided. Many assume that the world has simply become more peaceful, that great-power conflict has become impossible, that nations have learned that military force has little utility, that economic power is what counts. This belief in progress and the perfectibility of humankind and the institutions of international order is always alluring to Americans and Europeans and other children of the Enlightenment. It was the prevalent belief in the decade before World War I, in the first years after World War II, and in those heady days after the Cold War when people spoke of the “end of history.” It is always tempting to believe that the international order the United States built and sustained with its power can exist in the absence of that power, or at least with much less of it. This is the hidden assumption of those who call for a change in American strategy: that the United States can stop playing its role and yet all the benefits that came from that role will keep pouring in. This is a great if recurring illusion, the idea that you can pull a leg out from under a table and the table will not fall over.

### Solves War

#### Unipolarity prevents conflict and solves great power war – a transition would be disastrous

Wohlforth, professor of government at Dartmouth College government professor, 9.

[William, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics v61, n1, January, Muse. ]

The evidence suggests that narrow and asymmetrical capabilities gaps foster status competition even among states relatively confident of their basic territorial security for the reasons identified in social identity theory and theories of status competition. Broad patterns of evidence are consistent with this expectation, suggesting that unipolarity shapes strategies of identity maintenance in ways that dampen status conflict. The implication is that unipolarity helps explain low levels of military competition and conflict among major powers after 1991 and that a return to bipolarity or multipolarity would increase the likelihood of such conflict. This has been a preliminary exercise. The evidence for the hypotheses explored here is hardly conclusive, but it is sufficiently suggestive to warrant further refinement and testing, all the more so given [End Page 56] the importance of the question at stake. If status matters in the way the theory discussed here suggests, then the widespread view that the rise of a peer competitor and the shift back to a bipolar or multipolar structure present readily surmountable policy challenges is suspect. Most scholars agree with Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke’s argument: “[S]hould a satisfied state undergo a power transition and catch up with dominant power, there is little or no expectation of war.” 81 Given that today’s rising powers have every material reason to like the status quo, many observers are optimistic that the rise of peer competitors can be readily managed by fashioning an order that accommodates their material interests. Yet it is far harder to manage competition for status than for most material things. While diplomatic efforts to manage status competition seem easy under unipolarity, theory and evidence suggest that it could present much greater challenges as the system moves back to bipolarity or multipolarity. When status is seen as a positional good, efforts to craft negotiated bargains about status contests face long odds. And this positionality problem is particularly acute concerning the very issue unipolarity solves: primacy. The route back to bipolarity or multipolarity is thus fraught with danger. With two or more plausible claimants to primacy, positional competition and the potential for major power war could once again form the backdrop of world politics. [End Page 57]

#### U.S. hegemonic decline causes global great power war

Zhang, Researcher at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & Shi, consultant for the World Bank, 11

(Yuhan Zhang, researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Lin Shi, Columbia University, independent consultant for the Eurasia Group and consultant for the World Bank, January 22, 2011, “America’s decline: A harbinger of conflict and rivalry,” East Asia Forum, online: <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/01/22/americas-decline-a-harbinger-of-conflict-and-rivalry/>, accessed 6/27/12, THW)

Over the past two decades, no other state has had the ability to seriously challenge the US military. Under these circumstances, motivated by both opportunity and fear, many actors have bandwagoned with US hegemony and accepted a subordinate role. Canada, most of Western Europe, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and the Philippines have all joined the US, creating a status quo that has tended to mute great power conflicts. However, as the hegemony that drew these powers together withers, so will the pulling power behind the US alliance. The result will be an international order where power is more diffuse, American interests and influence can be more readily challenged, and conflicts or wars may be harder to avoid. As history attests, power decline and redistribution result in military confrontation. For example, in the late 19th century America’s emergence as a regional power saw it launch its first overseas war of conquest towards Spain. By the turn of the 20th century, accompanying the increase in US power and waning of British power, the American Navy had begun to challenge the notion that Britain ‘rules the waves.’ Such a notion would eventually see the US attain the status of sole guardians of the Western Hemisphere’s security to become the order-creating Leviathan shaping the international system with democracy and rule of law. Defining this US-centred system are three key characteristics: enforcement of property rights, constraints on the actions of powerful individuals and groups and some degree of equal opportunities for broad segments of society. As a result of such political stability, free markets, liberal trade and flexible financial mechanisms have appeared. And, with this, many countries have sought opportunities to enter this system, proliferating stable and cooperative relations. However, what will happen to these advances as America’s influence declines? Given that America’s authority, although sullied at times, has benefited people across much of Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe, the Balkans, as well as parts of Africa and, quite extensively, Asia, the answer to this question could affect global society in a profoundly detrimental way. Public imagination and academia have anticipated that a post-hegemonic world would return to the problems of the 1930s: regional blocs, trade conflicts and strategic rivalry. Furthermore, multilateral institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank or the WTO might give way to regional organisations. For example, Europe and East Asia would each step forward to fill the vacuum left by Washington’s withering leadership to pursue their own visions of regional political and economic orders. Free markets would become more politicised — and, well, less free — and major powers would compete for supremacy. Additionally, such power plays have historically possessed a zero-sum element. In the late 1960s and 1970s, US economic power declined relative to the rise of the Japanese and Western European economies, with the US dollar also becoming less attractive. And, as American power eroded, so did international regimes (such as the Bretton Woods System in 1973). A world without American hegemony is one where great power wars re-emerge, the liberal international system is supplanted by an authoritarian one, and trade protectionism devolves into restrictive, anti-globalisation barriers. This, at least, is one possibility we can forecast in a future that will inevitably be devoid of unrivalled US primacy.

#### Hegemony solves war – prevents hostile global rivals

Khalilzad, RAND foreign policy analyst, 95

(Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND, Former US Ambassador to the UN, March 22 1995, The Washington Quarterly, “Losing the moment? The United States and the world after the Cold War,” http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-16781957/losing-moment-united-states.html)

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

**Unipolarity deflates Great Power War – we control the key internal for motives and decision-making**

Wohlforth, Dartmouth College government professor, 9

[William, “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics v61, n1, January, Muse.

Does unipolarity promote peace among major powers? Would the return of multipolarity increase the prospects for war? Although **unipolarity has been marked by very low levels of militarized competition among major powers**, many scholars doubt whether the association is causal. Mainstream theories of war long ago abandoned the notion of any simple relationship between polarity and war, positing that conflict emerges from a complex interaction between power and dissatisfaction with the status quo. “While parity defines the structural conditions where war is most likely,” one team of prominent power transition theorists notes, “the motivation driving decisions for war is relative satisfaction with the global or regional hierarchy.”1 High levels of dissatisfaction may prompt states to take on vastly superior rivals. To explain the low levels of conflict since 1991, therefore, scholars must look beyond the distribution of capabilities to account for the absence of such dissatisfaction. To most observers, moreover, satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the status quo among today’s great powers appear to be driven by factors having little or nothing to do with the system’s polarity. “For most scholars,” writes Robert Jervis, “the fundamental cause of war is international anarchy, compounded by the security dilemma. These forces press hardest on the leading powers because while they may be able to [End Page 28] guarantee the security of others, no one can provide this escape from the state of nature for them.”2 But for today’s leading powers anarchyinduced security problems appear to be ameliorated by nuclear deterrence, the spread of democracy, the declining benefits of conquest, and changing collective ideas, among other factors. In combination, these factors appear to moderate insecurity and resulting clashes over the status quo, which most scholars believe drive states to war. **Mainstream theories of war thus seem irrelevant to what Jervis terms an “era of leading power peace.”** The upshot is a near scholarly consensus that unpolarity’s consequences for great power conflict are indeterminate and that a power shift resulting in a return to bipolarity or multipolarity will not raise the specter of great power war. **This article questions the consensus** on two counts. First, I show that **it depends crucially on a dubious assumption about human motivation. Prominent theories of war are based on the assumption that people are mainly motivated by the instrumental pursuit of tangible ends** such as physical security and material prosperity. This is why such theories seem irrelevant to interactions among great powers in an international environment that diminishes the utility of war for the pursuit of such ends. **Yet we know that people are motivated by a great many noninstrumental motives**, not least by concerns regarding their social status. 3 As John Harsanyi noted, “Apart from economic payoffs, social status (**social rank) seems to be the most important incentive and motivating force of social behavior**.”4 This proposition rests on much firmer scientific ground now than when Harsanyi expressed it a generation ago, as cumulating research shows that humans appear to be hardwired for sensitivity to status and that relative standing is a powerful and independent motivator of behavior.5 [End Page 29] **Second**, I question the dominant view that **status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities.** If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. 6 Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that **even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo**. And **the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is.** Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.7 “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”8 While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum.9

### Collapse Triggers War

#### Hegemony collapse guarantees several scenarios for extinction within a year

Drezner, University of Chicago political science professor, 3

[Daniel W., Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago, “The perils of hegemonic power”, January 6, 2003, <http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/2003_01.html>]

Michael Ignatieff's cover story on empire in yesterday's New York Times Magazine will be discussed in the next few days, but I actually think James Dao's Week in Review piece on U.S. troops in Korea makes many of the same points more concisely. The problem facing the U.S. is that even though critics on all sides are currently attacking the U.S. right now for trying to dictate affairs across the globe, these same critics are also likely to assail the U.S. for any retreat from its current positions.

Imagine for a second that the U.S. announced that it had decided to heed the calls to reign in its power. Say U.S. troops were pulled out of Europe, Korea, and the Middle East. No change in our economic or cultural policies, just a withdrawal of troops from the globe. What would happen? Undoubtedly, some of the animus towards the U.S. would dissipate in the short run. However, within the next year:

1) Japan would go nuclear.  
2) The Balkans would be likely to erupt again, with Macedonia being the trigger this time.  
3) Afghanistan would implode.  
4) India and Pakistan would likely escalate their border skirmishes.  
5) Israel would escalate its quasi-military actions in the occupied territories.  
6) Arab fury at the U.S. inaction in the Middle East would rise even further.  
7) Anti-American activists would criticize the U.S. for isolationism and inaction in the face of global instability.

I don't deny that the looming specter of U.S. hard power in Iraq and elsewhere is eroding our capital of soft power. However, to paraphrase Churchill, the current policy is without question an awful one, until you consider the alternatives.

On the margins, I believe that more accommodating U.S. policies on trade and the environment might buy an additional amount of good will from the developing and developed world, respectively. But those changes will not conceal the overwhelming U.S. advantage in military might, nor will it erase the natural emnity that comes with it.

Hegemony collapse causes major escalating regional wars

**Lieber, Georgetown government and international affairs professor, 5**

[Robert J., The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century, p. 53-54]

Withdrawal from foreign commitments might seem to be a means of evading hostility toward the United States, but the consequences would almost certainly be harmful both to regional stability and to U.S. national interests. Although Europe would almost certainly not see the return to competitive balancing among regional powers (i.e., competition and even military rivalry between France and Germany) of the kind that some realist scholars of international relations have predicted," elsewhere the dangers could increase. In Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would have strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons – which they have the technological capacity to do quite quickly. Instability and regional competition could also escalate, not only between India and Pakistan, but also in Southeast Asia involving Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and possibly the Philippines. Risks in the Middle East would be likely to increase, with regional competition among the major countries of the Gulf region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) as well as Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Major regional wars, eventually involving the use of weapons of mass destruction plus human suffering on a vast scale, floods of refugees, economic disruption, and risks to oil supplies are all readily conceivable.

### Transition Wars

Decline in hegemony means transition wars

Mearsheimer, University of Chicago professor of Political Science, 5

(John J., November 18,2005, The Australian, “The Rise of China Will Not Be Peaceful at All,” p. 1, <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/P0014.pdf>, accessed 7/5/12, YGS)

THE question at hand is simple and profound: will China rise peacefully? My answer is no. If China continues its impressive economic growth over the next few decades, the US and China are likely to engage in an intense security competition with considerable potential for war. Most of China's neighbours, to include India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Russia and Vietnam, will join with the US to contain China's power. To predict the future in Asia, one needs a theory that explains how rising powers are likely to act and how other states will react to them. My theory of international politics says that the mightiest states attempt to establish hegemony in their own region while making sure that no rival great power dominates another region. The ultimate goal of every great power is to maximise its share of world power and eventually dominate the system. The international system has several defining characteristics. The main actors are states that operate in anarchy which simply means that there is no higher authority above them. All great powers have some offensive military capability, which means that they can hurt each other. Finally, no state can know the future intentions of other states with certainty. The best way to survive in such a system is to be as powerful as possible, relative to potential rivals. The mightier a state is, the less likely it is that another state will attack it.

#### Heg is sustainable but a collapse would lead to transition wars leading to all the impacts – and it solves everything

Thayer, Missouri State University Department of Defense and Strategic Studies professor, 6

[Bradley, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, “In Defense of Primacy, The National Interest”, December (lexis), accessed 6/28/12, THW]

A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power--the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, either because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for retrenchment.1 Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests. But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action--but they fail to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. And when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. Indeed, a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global commons"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space--allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased.2 This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly. A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--is that countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies. U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg.

#### Super-power transitions lead to Great Power Wars

Khanna, New America Foundation Global Governance Initiative director, 9

(Parag, Director of the Global Governance Initiative at the New America Foundation, “The second world: how emerging powers are redefining global competition in the twenty-first century,” p. 337-338, Accessed 6/28/12, THW)

Even this scenario is optimistic, for superpowers are by definition willing to encroach on the turf of others—changing the world map in the process. Much as in geology, such tectonic shifts always result in earthquakes, particularly as rising powers tread on the entrenched position of the reigning hegemon.56 The sole exception was the twentieth century Anglo-American transition in which Great Britain and the United States were allies and shared a common culture—and even that took two world wars to complete.57 As the relative levels of power of the three superpowers draw closer, the temptation of the number-two to preemptively knock out the king on the hill grows, as does the lead power’s incentive to preventatively attack and weaken its ascending rival before being eclipsed.58 David Hume wrote, “It is not a great disproportion between ourselves and others which produces envy, but on the contrary, a proximity.”59 While the density of contacts among the three superpowers makes the creation of a society of states more possible than ever—all the foreign ministers have one anothers’ mobile phone numbers—the deep differences in interests among the three make forging a “culture of peace” more challenging than ever.60 China seas, hyperterrorism with nuclear weapons, an attack in the Gulf of Aden or the Straits of Malacca. The uncertain alignments of lesser but still substantial powers such as Russia, Japan, and India could also cause escalation. Furthermore, America’s foreign lenders could pull the plug to undermine its grand strategy, sparking economic turmoil, political acrimony, and military tension. War brings profit to the military-industrial complex and is always supported by the large patriotic camps on all sides. Yet the notion of a Sino-U.S. rivalry to lead the world is also premature and simplistic, for in the event of their conflict, Europe would be the winner, as capital would flee to its sanctuaries. These great tensions are being played out in the world today, as each superpower strives to attain the most advantageous position for itself, while none are powerful enough to dictate the system by itself. Global stability thus hangs between the bookends Raymond Aron identified as “peace by law” and “peace by empire,” the former toothless and the latter prone to excess.61 Historically, successive iterations of balance of power and collective security doctrines have evolved from justifying war for strategic advantage into building systems to avoid it, with the post-Napoleonic “Concert of Europe” as the first of the modern era.62  Because it followed rules, it was itself something of a societal system.\* Even where these attempts at creating a stable world order have failed—including the League of Nations after World War I—systemic learning takes place in which states (particularly democracies) internalize the lessons of the past into their institutions to prevent history from repeating itself.63  Toynbee too viewed history as progressive rather than purely cyclical, a wheel that not only turns around and around but also moves forward such that Civilization (with a big C) could become civilized.64  But did he “give too much credit to time’s arrows and not enough to time’s cycle”?65 Empires and superpowers usually promise peace but bring wars.66 The time to recognize the current revolutionary situation is now—before the next world war.67

#### Collapse of US hegemony causes a multipolar vacuum leading to multiple scenarios for extinction

Ferguson, New York University Stern School of Business history professor & Senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, 4

[Niall, “A world without power,” Foreign Policy 143, p. 32-39, July-August]

So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous--roughly 20 times more--so friction between the world's disparate "tribes" is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization--which a new Dark Age would produce--would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.

### Decline Bad – Taiwan War

#### Heg decline causes Taiwan war

Kagan, Brookings Institute senior fellow, 2-14-12

(Robert, Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School, Gideon Rachman is chief foreign-affairs commentator for the Financial Times, Foreign Policy, "The Rise or Fall of the American Empire," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the\_rise\_or\_fall\_of\_the\_american\_empire?page=full, accessed 7-5-12, CNM)

The Chinese, as good historians, are acutely aware of the fate that befell these others and have worked hard to avoid a similar fate, following as best they can Deng Xiaoping's advice to "keep a low profile and never take the lead." As relative power shifts, however, that advice becomes harder and harder to follow. We saw some early signs of what the future might hold in China's increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea. The response of the United States, which swung in behind the nervous powers in the region, has possibly convinced the Chinese that their moves were premature. They may have themselves bought in too much to the widespread talk of America in decline. Were that decline to become real in the coming years, however, it is a certainty that Chinese pressures and probes will return. Greater relative power on China's part might also lead Beijing to become less patient with Taiwan's lack of movement toward acquiescing to the mainland's sovereignty. A situation in which U.S. power were declining, China's power were rising, and the Taiwan issue became fractious is practically a textbook instance of how wars start -- even if neither side wants war. That is why some have referred to Taiwan as East Asia's Sarajevo.

### Russia-US Relations

#### Transitions away from hegemony lead the US to seek confrontation with Russia in the Middle East

Friedman, Stratfor president, 8

[George. 4-1. <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/rotating_focus> “Russia and Rotating the U.S. Focus.”]

The global system is making a major shift now, as we have been discussing. Having gotten off balance and bogged down in the Islamic world, the only global power is trying to extricate itself while rebalancing its foreign policy and confronting a longer-term Russian threat to its interests. That is a delicate maneuver, and one that requires deftness and luck. As mentioned, it is also a long shot. The Russians have a lot of cards to play, but perhaps they are not yet ready to play them. Bush is risking Russia disrupting the Middle East as well as increasing pressure in its own region. He either thinks it is worth the risk or he thinks the risk is smaller than it appears. Either way, this is an important moment.

#### US-Russia relations on the Middle East are key to preventing Russia collapse and nuclear war

Suslov, Deputy Director on Research at the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Moscow, Russia, ‘5

[Dmitry V., 2-28-5, “US-Russia Relations Saved for Now”, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5348>]

**Putin's appreciation of power** - and his readiness to use it - could **allow him to realize the objective necessity to become a good US partner**, but only if Russia's almost desperate domestic situation is changed, or at least better managed. "Containing Putin's authoritarianism" is already off the Bush agenda. Russia's domestic situation is so unstable and explosive, its state apparatus so ineffective, and the majority of bureaucrats so frightened (and deaf at the same time), that **an overt attempt to stop Putin would produce an opposite result: a severe blowback on the part of the regime, which would finally destabilize the situation altogether.** However, a disaster might come even sooner should the US consider a "regime change" in Russia itself. Most likely, **the result would be either total chaos - with an uncontrollable nuclear arsenal - or an authoritarian nationalist regime.**

**The outlet for the United States to strengthen Russian democracy is through continuing dialogue** with Putin, and cautious actions that disprove his advisors' arguments. Possibilities include real support to stabilize the CIS, avoiding indirect help to Chechen separatists, easing access of Russian non-fuel goods to the Western markets, and strengthening Russian civil society by intensified US-Russian civil society dialogue. The Bush administration must convince Putin that it is truly interested in a stable, strong, and integral Russia. As **for the foreign policy agenda, its basis should be** stabilization and **governance promotion in the broader Middle East.**

### Terrorism

#### Hegemony is crucial to preventing WMD terrorism that guarantees immediate extinction

Korb, Council on Foreign Relations Council Policy Initiative Project Director, 3

[Lawrence, “A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction”, <http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/National_Security_CPI.pdf>]

U.S. Dominance and Preventive Action. The most serious threats to American security come from the combination of terrorism, rogue states, and WMD. The temptation to try using these weapons against Americans is high for several reasons, including the fact that clearly identifying and punishing an attacker is inherently difficult. We are not going to be able to talk others out of developing these weapons, nor are we likely to be able to build an international coalition to help us get rid of these weapons. Therefore we must have both the capability and the will to use force against those states and the groups within them that represent the most serious threats to our security and way of life. And we should be prepared to do this essentially with U.S. military power alone, unbound by the need for allies or UN approval. In the longer term, we must undercut our potential adversaries by ensuring the spread of free market democracy throughout the world.

Larger trends have conspired to make the threat posed by radicalism much greater in recent times. Given the rapid dissemination of destructive technologies, sensitive information, and capital flows in today’s globalized world, threats from terrorist networks and rogue states can and will **materialize** more **rapidly** than in the past. Moreover, any attacks promise to be **much more devastating** if and when these actors get their hands on WMD. As the world’s leading military and economic power, the United States is the most likely target of these terrorists and tyrants. In the face of, and in response to, these imminent dangers, it has not only the duty but also the legal and moral right to launch preemptive attacks, unilaterally if necessary. Common sense dictates that the government not stand idly by and wait to act until catastrophic attacks are visited upon the American people.

The United States has the unrivaled military and economic capability to repel these challenges to our security, but it must display the will to do so. To be able to carry out a strategy of preventive action, taking preemptive military action when necessary, this country must be a hegemonic power. The United States can protect its security and that of the world in the long run only by maintaining military dominance. Only America can effectively respond to the perils posed by terrorists, regional thugs, weapons proliferators, and drug traffickers. It can do the most to resolve problems created by “failed” states before they fester into major crises. And it alone can ensure that the world’s sea lanes and skies are kept safe and open for free trade. But the array of challenges in its path requires military dominance and cannot be met on the cheap.

The ultimate goal of American foreign policy will be to use this power, alone if necessary, to extend free-market democracy around the globe. This is the only way in which the United States can deal with the long-term causes of terrorism. These terrorists come from countries that suffer from political repression, economic incompetence, and a broad lack of respect for the rule of law. And, contrary to what some believe, democracy and capitalism do not spread inexorably on their own. The United States therefore needs to assume a leadership role in spreading and accelerating the growth of free-market democracies that have been taking hold in the aftermath of the Cold War.

#### Heg solves nuclear terrorism, which would lead to US retaliation and extinction

Kagan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace senior associate, 7

(Robert, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, 7-17-07, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136>, Accessed 6/27/12, THW)

Throughout all these efforts, whose success is by no means guaranteed and certainly not any time soon, the United States and others will have to persist in fighting what is, in fact, quite accurately called “the war on terrorism.” Now and probably for the coming decades, organized terrorist groups will seek to strike at the United States, and at modernity itself, when and where they can. This war will not and cannot be the totality of America ’s worldwide strategy. It can be only a piece of it. But given the high stakes, it must be prosecuted ruthlessly, effectively, and for as long as the threat persists. This will sometimes require military interventions when, as in Afghanistan, states either cannot or will not deny the terrorists a base. That aspect of the “war on terror” is certainly not going away. One need only contemplate the American popular response should a terrorist group explode a nuclear weapon on American soil. No president of any party or ideological coloration will be able to resist the demands of the American people for retaliation and revenge, and not only against the terrorists but against any nation that aided or harbored them. Nor, one suspects, will the American people disapprove when a president takes preemptive action to forestall such a possibility — assuming the action is not bungled.

#### Hegemony is crucial to preventing WMD terrorism

Schmitt, American Enterprise Institute Program on Advanced Strategic Studies director and resident scholar, 6

[Gary, “Is there any alternative to U.S. primacy?” The Weekly Standard, Books & Arts, Vol. 11 No. 22, February, Lexis]

The core argument itself is not new: The United States and the West face a new threat--weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists--and, whether we like it or not, no power other than the United States has the capacity, or can provide the decisive leadership, required to handle this and other critical global security issues. Certainly not the United Nations or, anytime soon, the European Union. In the absence of American primacy, the international order would quickly return to disorder. Indeed, whatever legitimate concerns people may have about the fact of America's primacy, the downsides of not asserting that primacy are, according to The American Era, potentially far more serious. The critics "tend to dwell disproportionately on problems in the exercise of [American] power rather than on the dire consequences of retreat from an activist foreign policy," Lieber writes. They forget "what can happen in the absence of such power.

#### Heg solves terrorism via deterrence

Thayer, Missouri State University Department of Defense and Strategic Studies professor, 7

(Bradley A., Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, American Empire, Routledge, page 16, <http://www.ewidgetsonline.com/dxreader/Reader.aspx?token=ngtpyRGJisBAPGQYv2lU8Q%3d%3d&rand=1449293188&buyNowLink=&page=&chapter>=, Accessed 6/27/12, THW)

Another critical question is not simply how much the United States spends on defense but what benefits it receives from its spending: “Is the money spent worth it?” The benefits of American military power are considerable, and I will elaborate on five of them. First, and most importantly, the American people are protected from invasion and attack. The horrific attacks of 9/11 are—mercifully—an aberration. The men and women of the U.S. military and intelligence community do an outstanding job deterring aggression against the United States.

Second, American interests abroad are protected. U.S. military power allows Washington to defeat its enemies overseas. For example, the United States has made the decision to attack terrorists far from America’s shores, and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. Its military power also gives Washington the power to protect its interests abroad by deterring attacks against America’s interests or coercing potential or actual opponents. In international politics, coercion means dissuading an opponent from actions America does not want it to do or to do something that it wants done. For example, the United States wanted Libya to give up the weapons of mass destruction capabilities it possessed or was developing. As Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said, “I think the reason Mu’ammar Qadhai agreed to give up his weapons of mass destruction was because he saw what happened to Saddam Hussein.”21

#### Heg solves terrorism – hearts and minds

Thayer, Missouri State University Department of Defense and Strategic Studies professor, 6

(Bradley A., National Interest, November/December 2006, Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University “In Defense of Primacy,” <http://citation.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/1/0/9/7/pages210973/p210973-1.php>, Accessed 6/27/12, THW)

American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States.

### Prolif

#### Hard power prevents nuclear acquisition

Mandelbaum, Johns Hopkins American Foreign Policy Program Professor and Director, 5

[Michael, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World’s Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 46]

By contributing in this way to the global public good of nuclear nonproliferation, the United States functions as governments do within sovereign states. American nuclear guarantees help to secure something that all countries want but would probably not get without the United States. The military deployments and political commitments of the United States have reduced the demand for nuclear weapons, and the number of nuclear-armed countries, to levels considerably below what they would otherwise have reached. But American policies have not entirely eliminated the demand for these armaments, and so the ongoing effort to restrict their spread must address the supply of them as well.

### AT – Multipolar Cooperation Good

#### Cooperation doesn’t solve security issues – no consensus

Gvodsdev, National Interest former editor, 6-15-12

(Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the former editor of the National Interest and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College. 6-15-12, World Politics Review, “The Realist Prism: In a G-Zero World, U.S. Should Go Minilateral,” <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12061/the-realist-prism-in-a-g-zero-world-u-s-should-go-minilateral>, accessed 7-8-12, CNM)

As for the possibility that the “international community” might play the collective role of system-enabler, Bremmer is pessimistic, as am I. He anticipates no significant outcomes from the upcoming G-20 summit, for instance, because there is simply no consensus among the participating states on how to cope with any of the problems topping the global agenda. No state, not even the United States, can impose its will on the rest, while all the major powers can exercise effective vetoes to torpedo action. The United Nations Security Council resolution that authorized the no-fly zone over Libya last year, once considered a possible model of great power cooperation, looks more and more like an outlier.

## Impacts – Economic

### Economy

#### Collapse of hegemony leads to massive economic collapse that has a high probability of nuclear escalation

Mandelbaum, Johns Hopkins American Foreign Policy Program director and professor, 5

[Michael, The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World’s Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 224]

At best, an American withdrawal would bring with it some of the political anxiety typical during the Cold War and a measure of the economic uncertainty that characterized the years before World War II. At worst, the retreat of American power could lead to a repetition of the great global economic failure and the bloody international conflicts the world experienced in the 1930s and 194os. Indeed, the potential for economic calamity and wartime destruction is greater at the outset of the new century than it was in the first half of the preceding one because of the greater extent of international economic interdependence and the higher levels of prosperity—there is more to lose now than there was then—and because of the presence, in large numbers, of nuclear weapons.

#### US hegemony is crucial to the global economy

Thayer, University of Minnesota political science professor, 7

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page 43]

Economic prosperity is also a product of the American Empire. It has created a Liberal International Economic Order (LIED)—a network of worldwide free trade and commerce, respect for intellectual property rights, mobility of capital and labor markets—to promote economic growth. The stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly states in the Third World. The American Empire has created this network not out of altruism but because it benefits the economic well-being of the United States. In 1998, the Secretary of Defense William Cohen put this well when he acknowledged that "economists and soldiers share the same interest in stability"; soldiers create the conditions in which the American economy may thrive, and "we are able to shape the environment [of international politics] in ways that are advantageous to us and that are stabilizing to the areas where we are forward deployed, thereby helping to promote investment and prosperity...business follows the flag.

### Economic Leadership

#### A competitive American economy translates into global leadership and solves instability.

Milner, Princeton Politics and International Affairs professor, ’98

(Helen, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Chair of the Department of Politics, "International Political Economy: Beyond Hegemonic Stability," Foreign Policy, No. 110, Spring 1998, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/milner.htm, A.D. 6/29/12, JTF)

The cause of this tragic chain of events has often been laid at America's doorstep. The United States was, at the end of World War I, the world's strongest economic power. But it steadfastly refused to take on the leadership role that Britain could no longer play. This "irresponsibility" was most vividly exemplified in the minds of many people by the infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff (1930), which raised the average tax on imports to the United States by about 40 percent. At the beginning of the depression, the United States shut its markets to foreign goods and thus helped propel the world economy into its worst swoon ever. The unwillingness of the United States to coordinate its monetary and currency policies with other countries merely exacerbated the situation. This isolationist posture on the part of the world's economic hegemon had negative consequences for most other countries and the United States itself.

The perils of isolationism seemed to have been well learned by American policymakers after the end of World War II. Then, the United States quickly assumed a leadership role and steadily moved forward to create an open international trade system based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and a stable monetary system founded on the Bretton Woods system. The Marshall Plan was perhaps the direct antithesis of the Smoot-Hawley tariff. It symbolized recognition of America's special role and responsibility for peace and prosperity beyond its borders - indeed, globally. U.S. leadership, it is asserted, helped create the conditions necessary for the steady economic growth experienced by the industrial countries up to the 1970s and the rapid development of countries such as Japan and South Korea.

### WTO

#### Hegemony is crucial to the US ability to finesse other WTO members – sustained allies resolve other deficits to US hegemony

Thayer, University of Minnesota political science professor, 7

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page 26]

The soft power of the United States is considerable. We are able to persuade many countries to work with us, whether in military actions like Iraq, or in the economic realm, such as in the World Trade Organization. Why do other countries often want to work with the United States? This is so for two major reasons.

The first reason is self-interest. Countries may help the United States because they want to seek favor from Washington. For example, by participating in the occupation of Iraq, a country like El Salvador earns good will in Washington. At some point in time, El Salvador will remind U.S. officials of that when it needs a favor from Washington. This is what political experts call "logrolling," or, put another way, "If you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours."

The second reason is soft power. Other countries want to work with the United States because they share its goals and want what the United States wants. This is not logrolling. They help because they really want to, not with the expectation that they will receive some specific reward. At some point, the soft power of the United States has changed their opinion, so that individuals or countries that once opposed the United States now understand its actions, and, most often, support them. The soft power of the United States goes far in explaining why the United States has so many allies and so much support in other countries.

### AT – Economic Interdepence Ensures Stable Decline

#### In a decline, hegemons will use foreign economic policy to create leverage and help itself

Beckley, Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, International Security Program, Research Fellow, 12

(Michael, University of Virginia’s Miller Center, fellow ,“China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure”, International Security, Volume 36, Issue 3, Pg. 50, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CFEQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.mitpressjournals.org%2Fdoi%2Fpdf%2F10.1162%2FISEC\_a\_00066&ei=zkvrT9T8E8q1rQHeorDwBQ&usg=AFQjCNGn9W7Ei82Wbsof4yj6KORthY-71g, accessed 6-27-12, FFF)

Finally, given its position at the top of the world trade regime, the United States can distort international markets in its favor.48 Declinists expect the hegemon to use its power magnanimously. According to the alternative perspective, however, American foreign economic policy involves the routine use of diplomatic leverage at the highest levels to create opportunities for U.S. firms.49 U.S. trade officials, “acting as self-appointed enforcers of the free trade regime, asserted the right with their own national law to single out and punish countries they judged to be unfair traders.”50 Globalization, therefore, may not be a neutral process that diffuses wealth evenly throughout the international system, but a political process shaped by the United States in ways that serve its interests.

# Internal Link Answers

## Primacy Confidence Internal Link Answer

### Primacy Confidence Inevitable

#### Massive confidence in primacy strategy now

Layne, Texas A&M University School of Government Chair in Intelligence and National Security, 6

(Christopher, The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment,” 2006, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v031/31.2layne.html>, Accessed: 7/5/12, MLF)

The key grand strategic issue confronting U.S. policymakers today is whether the United States can escape the same fate that has befallen the other great powers that have contended for hegemony since the origin of the modern international state system (circa 1500). Since the early 1990s, U.S. policymakers have embraced primacy and adopted an ambitious grand strategy of expanding the United States' preponderant power—notwithstanding the seemingly ironclad rule of modern international history that hegemons always provoke, and are defeated by, the counterhegemonic balancing of other great powers. U.S. primacy also has widespread support in the scholarly community. Primacist scholars claim that U.S. hard-power capabilities are so overwhelming that other states cannot realistically hope to balance against the United States, nor do they have reason to because U.S. hegemony is benevolent. 1 Like their policymaking counterparts, they believe that hegemony advances U.S. interests and that the United States can maintain its preeminence deep into the century.

## Economics Not Key

### GDP Not Key

#### Size of economy is not key to hegemony

Kagan, Brookings Institute senior fellow, 2-14-12

(Robert, Daniel W. Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University's Fletcher School, Gideon Rachman is chief foreign-affairs commentator for the Financial Times, Foreign Policy, "The Rise or Fall of the American Empire," http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/the\_rise\_or\_fall\_of\_the\_american\_empire?page=full, accessed 7-5-12, CNM)

As a matter of geopolitics and power, the size of a country's economy by itself is not a great measure. If it were, then China would have been the world's strongest power in 1800, when it had the largest share of global GDP. So the next question is whether China can translate its economic power into geopolitical influence. Again, it will undoubtedly do so to some extent. But power and influence do not stem from economic strength alone, and China is already the best proof of this. Over the past couple of years, as the U.S. economy has been slumping and China's has been booming, the United States has significantly improved its standing in East Asia and Southeast Asia, while China's position has deteriorated. In fact, the more China uses its newfound muscle, the more it sparks a reaction in the region, which then looks to the United States for succor. (This was the key insight of William Wohlforth years ago in his brilliant essay, "The Stability of a Unipolar World.") Gideon keeps predicting that Japan is about to tilt toward China, but all signs point in the opposite direction -- and not only for Japan but also for most of China's other neighbors. The fact that China is the top trading partner of all these countries does not necessarily increase China's clout. I gather that even Brazilians are increasingly unhappy at becoming merely a raw materials provider to the Chinese. No economy in the world is more dependent on China than Australia's, but look at the new U.S. base the Australians just welcomed onto their soil. Trade does not necessarily breed comity or strategic dependence. As many have pointed out, in 1914 Germany and Britain were each other's largest trading partners too.

#### Growth is not the sole determinant of influence

Kagan, senior fellow at the Brookings Institute, 1-11-12

(Robert, The New Republic, "Not Fade Away: The Myth of Decline," http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?page=0,1&passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI&utm\_source=Editors%20and%20Bloggers&utm\_campaign=cbaee91d9d-Edit\_and\_Blogs&utm\_medium=email, accessed 7-6-12, CNM)

BUT WHAT ABOUT the “rise of the rest”—the increasing economic clout of nations like China, India, Brazil, and Turkey? Doesn’t that cut into American power and influence? The answer is, it depends. The fact that other nations in the world are enjoying periods of high growth does not mean that America’s position as the predominant power is declining, or even that “the rest” are catching up in terms of overall power and influence. Brazil’s share of global GDP was a little over 2 percent in 1990 and remains a little over 2 percent today. Turkey’s share was under 1 percent in 1990 and is still under 1 percent today. People, and especially businesspeople, are naturally excited about these emerging markets, but just because a nation is an attractive investment opportunity does not mean it is a rising great power. Wealth matters in international politics, but there is no simple correlation between economic growth and international influence. It is not clear that a richer India today wields greater influence on the global stage than a poorer India did in the 1950s under Nehru, when it was the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, or that Turkey, for all the independence and flash of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, really wields more influence than it did a decade ago.

## Heg Inevitable

### Inevitable – Power Consolidation

#### Hegemony is inevitable – America has consolidated power

**Brooks, Dartmouth associate government professor, and Wohlforth, Dartmouth government professor, 8**

(Stephen G. Brooks, Associate Professor of Government in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College and William C. Wohlforth, Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, World Out of Balance, “Realism, Balance-of-Power Theory , and the Counterbalancing Constraint,” p. 27-31, Accessed 6/29/12, THW)

“Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing,” historian Paul Kennedy observes: “I have returned to all of the comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation comes close.” Though assessments of U.S. power have changed since those words were written in 2002, they remain true. Even when capabilities are understood broadly to include economic, technological, and other wellsprings of national power, they are concentrated in the United States to a degree never before experienced in the history of the modern system of states and thus never contemplated by balance-of-power theorists. The United spends more on defense than all the other major military powers combined, and most of those powers are its allies. Its massive investments in the human, institutional, and technological requisites of military power, cumulated over many decades, make any effort to match U.S. capabilities even more daunting that the gross spending numbers imply. Military research and development (R&D) may best capture the scale of the long-term investment that give the United States a dramatic qualitative edge in military capabilities. As table 2.1 shows, in 2004 U.S. military R&D expenditures were more than six times greater than those of Germany, Japan, France, and Britain combined. By some estimates over half the military R&D expenditures in the world are American. And this disparity has been sustained for decades: over the past 30 years, for example, the United States has invested over three times more than the entire European Union on military R&D. These vast commitments have created a preeminence in military capabilities vis-à-vis all the other major powers that is unique after the seventeenth century. While other powers could contest U.S. forces near their homelands, especially over issues on which nuclear deterrence is credible, the United States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally. This capacity arises from “command of the commons” – that is, unassailable military dominance over the sea, air, and space. As Barry Posen puts it, Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the U.S global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power, including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military, and political assistance….Command of the commons provides the United States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy than any other offshore power has ever had. Posen’s study of American military primacy ratifies Kennedy’s emphasis on the historical importance of the economic foundations of national power. It is the combination of military and economic potential that sets the United States apart from its predecessors at the top of the international system. Previous leading states were either great commercial and naval powers or great military powers on land, never both. The British Empire in its heyday and the United States during the Cold War, for example, shared the world with other powers that matched or exceeded them in some areas. Even at the height of the Pax Britannica, the United Kingdom was outspent, outmanned, and outgunned by both France and Russia. Similarly, at the dawn of the Cold War the United States was dominant economically as well as in air and naval capabilities. But the Soviet Union retained overall military parity, and thanks to geography and investment in land power it had a superior ability to seize territory in Eurasia. The United States’ share of world GDP in 2006, 27.5 percent, surpassed that of any leading state in modern history, with the sole exception of its own position after 1945 (when World War II had temporarily depressed every other major economy). The size of the U.S economy means that its massive military capabilities required roughly 4 percent of its GDP in 2005, far less than the nearly 10 percent it averaged over the peak years of the Cold War, 1950-70, and the burden borne by most of the major powers of the past. As Kennedy sums up, “Being Number One at great cost is one thing; being the world’s single superpower on the cheap is astonishing.”

### Inevitable – Other Countries Want Unipolarity

#### Hegemony is inevitable – The US has consolidated power and other countries want a unipolar world

**Ye, Boston University international relations professor, 4**

(Min Ye, “The US Hegemony and Implication for China,” <http://www.chinaipa.org/cpaq/v1i1/Paper_Ye.pdf>, pgs. 25-6, accessed 6/29/12, THW)

First, from the aggregate power perspective, the U.S is simply too powerful for the other nations to catch up. William Wohlforth has done a comprehensive empirical study of U.S power, and concluded that U.S has enormous supremacy in all aspects of military power and almost all aspects of economic power as well, not to mention its normative and cultural powers. He also pointed out the U.S is a “benign hegemon” and it is in the world’s benefit for its presence. Similarly, Joanne Gowa observed that allies of the U.S benefited from trading with the U.S, hence it is in the nations’ interest to have an enduring U.S hegemony. Second, alliance against the U.S is unlikely and ineffective. Stephen Walt has listed the causes for alliance formation. Alliances form not to balance the biggest power but to balance against the biggest threat. Threat, in turn, is determined by (1) aggregate power, (2) geographic proximity, (3) offensive power, and (4) aggressive intention. The U.S is distant from all major powers geographically, although the most powerful nation in the world. Clearly the U.S does not demonstrate aggressive intentions against other major powers. Hence their balancing against the U.S is unlikely. Wohlforth observed that the other major powers before they balance against the U.S face counterbalancing of their own. China was perceived as a potential balancer of the U.S in many cases. Yet, China faces counterbalancing from Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Russia, and India in the Asian continent alone. Similarly, the other major powers— Russia, Japan, India, and Europe—have more difficulties dealing with their relationships than their relations with the U.S. In belief, the American hegemon not only does not face substantial balancing but serve as a balancer against others’ balancing actions. As a result, we see more “bandwagoning” with the U.S superpower rather than “balancing”. Finally, as John Ikenberry and other scholars observed, the U.S unipolarity is a hegemony based on “constitutional order”. At the end of the World War II, alongside its supremacy in power, the U.S. also established the UN, IMF, World Bank, and other institutions in dealing with weapons proliferation and managing relations with allies. U.S exercise of power was self-restraint through its memberships in the international institutions. Consequently, the other nations in the world can not only benefit from this constitutional order but to an extent exercise checks on the sole superpower and feel safer even in the unipolar world.

### Inevitable – Nuclear Deterrence

#### **US deterrence sustainable – empirics prove**

Brzezinski, Center for Strategic and International Studies Counselor and Trustee, Feist, CNN’s Washington Bureau Chief and Senior Vice President 12

(Zbigniew, Former White House National Security Adviser, Sam, March 29, 2012, Council of Foreign Relations, “A Conversation With Zbigniew Brzezinski,” <http://www.cfr.org/us-strategy-and-politics/conversation-zbigniew-brzezinski/p27829>, accessed 7/4/12, YGS)

Look, that kind of a guarantee by the United States has a solid, 100 percent record of reliability. We have protected Japan and South Korea from North Korea on that basis, and neither one of them is pleading for a war against North Korea. We defended our allies in Europe for 40 years during the worst days of the Cold War -- very threatening days of the Cold War -- and nothing happened. So deterrence does work. So first of all that's one option. Secondly, if for some reason there was evidence that the Iranians seeking a large-scale nuclear program with weaponry, we could go to the Security Council and ask for approval for action against Iran from China and from Russia -- FEIST: Do you think we would get it? BRZEZINSKI: Probably not. But if we don't get it, isn't that a significant message to us, that we are no longer the unilateral policemen of the world? I think these are the kinds of things we have to think about and talk about seriously and calmly and without hype and without too much emotion, but with a sense of responsibility. FEIST: What if they were to get a nuclear weapon before the U.S. or Israel took action? So imagine for a moment that we are in a world where Iran has now tested a nuclear weapon. How de-stabilizing is that? Fareed Zakaria last week said, you know, it might not be so bad, it might not be de-stabilizing at all. It might actually be stabilizing. BRZEZINSKI: Well, first of all, I don't understand, frankly, what you're talking about, because how can you have a nuclear weapon without having nuclear explosions or test it? FEIST: I'm just saying, if you have a -- if you test -- if Iran becomes a nuclear capable power -- BRZEZINSKI: It -- I don't know what nuclear capable is. It either has them or doesn't have them. FEIST: They have them. BRZEZINSKI: Well, that means they have had to test it. FEIST: OK. BRZEZINSKI: After testing it, they have to weaponize it and they have to have a delivery system. In other words, there are time sequences here. So it doesn't become weapons capable all at once. FEIST: No. BRZEZINSKI: There are stages and stages. We have plenty of time. FEIST: So -- BRZEZINSKI: And during that time, we can make it very clear that if they use that weapon to threaten anyone, it is as if they were threatening us. And that is a system of deterrence that has worked reliably for decades. There's no argument to the contrary because it has, except one extremely silly argument that, somehow or other, the Iranians are messianic; they want desperately to commit suicide, a course of action which apparently hasn't occurred to them in the course of 3,000 years of their history. But all of a sudden, now they want to be messianic. You know who's messianic? Netanyahu, because he talks that way. And that's a very risky position. This is why I favor the position that most Israelis have, which is this should not be done. Public opinion polls in Israel are very clear: that the majority of the Israelis don't want that to happen. FEIST: A strike. BRZEZINSKI: Yeah. FEIST: Sounds like you're less concerned if Iran were to gain that power. BRZEZINSKI: Well, why should I be so concerned if I dealt with the Soviet Union, which had 4,000 weapons, and I remember being woken up one night at 3:00 a.m. to be told by my military assistant that we are under nuclear attack. It obviously didn't happen, since we're all here. (Laughter.) There would have been 85,000 -- 85 million Americans and Soviets dead six hours later. FEIST: All right, I want to talk about -- BRZEZINSKI: We deterred them. If we can deter the Soviet Union, if we can deter North Korea, why on earth can't we deter Iran?

### Inevitable – Multipolarity Fails

#### No real multipolarity – US uses multilateralism as a cover for unilateralist motives

Grunstein, World Politics Review's editor-in-chief, 6-22-12

(Judah, World Politics Review, 6-22-12, “Obama's Record: Tactics Trump Strategy in an Age of Constraints,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12085/obamas-record-tactics-trump-strategy-in-an-age-of-constraints, accessed 7-8-12, CNM)

In the meantime, in the absence of diplomatic progress toward halting Iran’s nuclear ambitions, Obama has resorted to covert action (Flame, Stuxnet), with unpredictable consequences for both outcomes in Iran and broader policy precedents in the cyber domain. Along with his use of drone warfare, this highlights another major facet of Obama’s idealist-realist split, whereby his highly visible multilateralism in support of collective action is undergirded by a hidden unilateralism in pursuit of U.S. national interests. On one hand, the U.S. is posited as the guarantor of global stability in the transition to an uncertain and unstable emergent order. On the other, it is placed above that order as the unilateral rule-set enforcer. In a 21st century update of Theodore Roosevelt’s famous “walk softly but carry a big stick,” Obama leads from behind but strikes from above.

# Terminal Impacts

## Free Trade

### Free Trade Good – Nuclear War

#### Collapse of free trade risks nuclear war

Copley News Service, 99

[12-1-99, Commentary, Lexis]

**For decades**, many **children** in America and other countries **went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war**. The specter of nuclear winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that nations join together in groups like the WTO not just **to further their own prosperity, but also to forestall conflict with other nations.** In a way, **our planet has traded in the threat of a worldwide nuclear war for the benefit of cooperative global economics**.  Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the mold of nuclear disarmament or anti-Vietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're special-interest activists, whether the cause is environmental, labor or paranoia about global government.  Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists, such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged people and nations to work together rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135 WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs.  **As long as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have a major disincentive to wage war**. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important. As exports to the United States and the rest of the world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's not the military-industrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make high-tech goods. And those companies provide a growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for everyday workers. **Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of the world are learning to live and work together**, like the singers of anti-war songs once imagined. **Those who care about world peace shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it.**

#### Free trade checks global nuclear conflict

Miller & Elwood, International Society for Individual Liberty, President and Vice President, 88

[Vincent and James, Founder and President of the International Society for Individual Liberty, and Vice-President of the ISIL, “FREE TRADE OR PROTECTIONISM? The Case Against Trade Restrictions,” http://www.isil.org/resources/lit/free-trade-protectionism.html]

WHEN GOODS DON'T CROSS BORDERS, ARMIES OFTEN DO

History is not lacking in examples of cold trade wars escalating into hot shooting wars:

\* Europe suffered from almost non-stop wars during the 17th and 18th centuries, when restrictive trade policy (mercantilism) was the rule; rival governments fought each other to expand their empires and to exploit captive markets.

\* British tariffs provoked the American colonists to revolution, and later the Northern-dominated US government imposed restrictions on Southern cotton exports - a major factor leading to the American Civil War.

\* In the late 19th Century, after a half century of general free trade (which brought a half-century of peace), short-sighted politicians throughout Europe again began erecting trade barriers. Hostilities built up until they eventually exploded into World War I.

\* In 1930, facing only a mild recession, US President Hoover ignored warning pleas in a petition by 1028 prominent economists and signed the notorious Smoot-Hawley Act, which raised some tariffs to 100% levels. Within a year, over 25 other governments had retaliated by passing similar laws. The result? World trade came to a grinding halt, and the entire world was plunged into the "Great Depression" for the rest of the decade. The depression in turn led to World War II.

THE #1 DANGER TO WORLD PEACE

The world enjoyed its greatest economic growth during the relatively free trade period of 1945-1970, a period that also saw no major wars. Yet we again see trade barriers being raised around the world by short-sighted politicians. Will the world again end up in a shooting war as a result of these economically-deranged policies? Can we afford to allow this to happen in the nuclear age?

## Prolif

### Prolif Bad Impact

#### Prolif will trigger preemptive nuclear wars around the planet

Utgoff, Institute for Defense Analysis Strategy, Forces and Resources Division deputy director, 2

[Victor A., “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions,” *Survival,* Summer, p. 87-90]

**Escalation of violence is** also basic **human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges** of violent acts **can escalate to levels unimagined** by the participants before hand. Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, **widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons**, and that such **shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible** with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, **we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West** of the late 1800s. **With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips**, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but **every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even  whole nations**. This kind of world is in no nation’s interest. The means for preventing it must be pursued vigorously. And, as argued above, a most powerful way to prevent it or slow its emergence is to encourage the more capable states to provide reliable protection to others against aggression, even when that aggression could be backed with nuclear weapons. In other words, the world needs at least one state, preferably several, willing and able to play the role of sheriff, or to be members of a sheriff’s posse, even in the face of nuclear threats.

## Asia

### Asian Instability

#### Asian instability leads to nuclear war

Landay, Knight Ridder Washington Bureau, 00

[Jonathan, 3-10-00, Knight Ridder, “Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts”, Lexis]

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy, and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan, and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations, and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe.

“Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster.

In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month.

For America, the stakes could hardly be higher.

There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime.

### India-Pakistan Nuclear War

#### India-Pakistan nuclear war risks extinction

Caldicott, Physicians for Social Responsibility founder, 2

[Helen, Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility and Nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize, “The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush’s Military-Industrial Complex”, p. xiii]

The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reaction. Nuclear-armed India, an ancient enemy could respond in kind. China, India’s hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear weapons, triggering a nuclear holocaust on the subcontinent. If any of either Russia or America’s 2,250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were launched either accidentally or purposefully in response, nuclear winter would ensue, meaning the end of most life on earth.

# Impact Defense

## No War

### Can’t Solve War

#### It’s impossible to plan for every worst case scenario

Greenblatt, NPR, 2-15-12

(Alan, NPR, “As Wars Wind Down, What Are U.S. Security Needs?”, <http://www.npr.org/2012/02/14/146892853/as-wars-wind-down-what-are-u-s-security-needs>, accessed 6-29,12, FFF)

It's impossible to plan for every scenario. There's no amount of military spending that would keep the nation completely safe.

"We could spend the entire federal budget on the military and we wouldn't be able to eliminate every risk to U.S. national security," Bensahel says.

That leaves open the question of how much risk policymakers are willing to tolerate. That's inevitably a political question, Feaver says, and one that never gets fully resolved.

After the Cold War, Washington was too complacent about U.S. security, he says. After Sept. 11, many politicians exaggerated the threat that terrorism posed, he adds.

"The al-Qaida threat was and to a certain extent is very, very serious, but it was not the Soviet Union with tens of thousands of nuclear-tipped missiles on hair-trigger alert," Feaver says. "So it's a categorically different threat."

### Risk of War Low

#### Threat of war and terrorism exaggerated

Greenblatt, NPR writer, 2-15-12

(Alan, NPR, “As Wars Wind Down, What Are U.S. Security Needs?”, <http://www.npr.org/2012/02/14/146892853/as-wars-wind-down-what-are-u-s-security-needs>, accessed 6-29-12, FFF)

Wars are less frequent — and far less deadly — than they were even a few decades ago. The U.S. has built up a military apparatus that dwarfs any potential rivals — spending nine times as much as China on defense, for instance.

Even terrorist attacks pose little threat to most Americans, Zenko and Cohen argue. They are fellows, respectively, at the Council on Foreign Relations and the Century Foundation.

They note that in 2010, 13,186 people were killed in terrorist attacks worldwide, but only 15 of them were Americans. In other words, Americans face [greater risk from drowning in a bathtub](http://www.npr.org/2011/09/08/140306410/security-since-sept-11-worth-the-cost).

"The world that the United States inhabits today is a remarkably safe and secure place," Zenko and Cohen write. "It is a world with fewer violent conflicts and greater political freedom than at virtually any other point in human history."

#### Even with budget cuts the military still remains high and war is unlikely

Greenblatt, NPR, 2-15-12

(Alan, NPR, “As Wars Wind Down, What Are U.S. Security Needs?”, <http://www.npr.org/2012/02/14/146892853/as-wars-wind-down-what-are-u-s-security-needs>, accessed 6-29,12, FFF)

Even Obama's budget, despite its significant cuts, assumes U.S. troop levels will remain higher than they were before 2001. Figuring out just how much military force and spending is enough is going to remain a primary argument in Washington.

It's "preposterous" to worry that the U.S. can't afford to cut defense spending because of threats that might arise years down the road, says Jack Snyder, an international relations professor at Columbia University.

On the other hand, Snyder says, a good deal of the security the U.S. enjoys today is the byproduct of its military resolve.

U.S. strategy hasn't always been flawless, he says, but the country has made it clear it won't tolerate aggression across internationally recognized borders — and has had the wherewithal to back that policy up.

"War is less likely and the U.S. is certainly more secure now than it has been in a long, long time," Snyder says. "But some of the reasons for the decline of war have to do with the power of the United States and the other liberal advanced democracies."

### Risk of Missile Attack Low

#### Missile attacks pose no threat, interceptors and relations check

Pak, Medill National Security zone writer, 6-9-12

(Susanna, *Medill National Security zone,* “U.S. more secure today despite growing ballistic missile threat”, 6-9-12, <http://nationalsecurityzone.org/site/u-s-more-secure-today-despite-growing-ballistic-missile-threat/>, accessed 6-28-12, FFF)

“The situation today is radically different,” said Stephen Rademaker, a former Bush administration arms control and nonproliferation official, in a phone interview. “Ten years ago, America was completely defenseless against the threat of missile attack.”

Rademaker says the U.S. now has about 45 interceptors in Alaska and California, which is “more than enough” to defend against accidental launches from Russia, as well as attacks from Iran and North Korea. He adds that tensions between the U.S. and Russia have relaxed since the Cold War, so that intentional launches are unlikely and accidental launches pose the greatest threat.

The improved relationship with Russia and the technological advances allowing the U.S. to build a stronger defense system come years after the U.S. walked away from an agreement to stop building missile defenses.