# 26 LA Wave 3 Cards

## Neoliberalism Neg

### No Solvency

#### Their solvency author is in the context of a specific CITIZEN’s movement for neoliberalism—it’s just about Toronto and doesn’t recommend the plan

Schein 2011 (Assistant Prof Human Rights –The Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies at Carleton 2011, Rebecca. "Free Transit and Social Movement Infrastructure: Assessing thePolitical Potential of Toronto’s Nascent Free Transit Campaign", Alternate Routes volume http://www.alternateroutes.ca/index.php/ar/article/view/14421)

Abstract: This article examines the movement-building potential of a campaign for free and accessible public transit in the city of Toronto. The campaign, launched by the newly formed “Greater Toronto Workers’ Assembly,” calls for the de-commodification of Toronto’s transit system, arguing that mass transportation is a public good that should be paid for by fair taxation. The demand for free transit represents a positive, concrete anti-capitalist vision for the future of the city, which could open a space for a broader public dialogue about public goods and public control over resource allocation.  The process of developing and organizing a free transit campaign will present a productive set of challenges to the newly formed Assembly, pushing it to develop the relationships, skills, and internal processes necessary for nurturing a broad-based anti-capitalist movement.

### Ontology Bad

#### Ontology not first—causes intellectual elitism

Jarvis 0 (Darryl, Senior Lecturer in International Relations – University of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, p. 128-9) LA

More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflect our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. But to support that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, smacks of intellectual elitism and displays a certain contempt for those who search for guidance in their daily struggle as actors in international politics. What does Ashley’s project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the émigrés of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to support that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or in some way bad—is a contemptuous position that abrogates any hope of solving some of the nightmarish realities that millions confront daily. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, “So what?” To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this “debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics” be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate. Contrary to Ashley’s assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than analyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render and intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight of those who struggle at marginal places.

### Fare Free Expensive

#### It would be too expensive and increased ridership metrics are wrong

Perone and Volinski 4 (Jennifer S.—Center for Urban Transportation Research, Joel M.—Director of National Center for Transportation Research, *Fare, Free, or Something In Between*, http://www.nctr.usf.edu/pdf/473-132.pdf) LA

In larger transit systems, fareboxes generate much more of an agency’s operating revenue than smaller systems. At Miami-Dade Transit, fareboxes generate $70 million per year (or 33.33 percent) of the approximately $210 million in operating costs (25). Comparatively, in many smaller systems the farebox recovers less than ten percent of the yearly operating cost. Removing the farebox might make fiscal sense in smaller systems because the costs associated with farebox collection and farebox maintenance may equal the fare revenue. However, in larger transit systems, the actual cost of removing the fareboxes will leave the system with a very large revenue shortfall. Although the Mercer County (Trenton, NJ) fare-free demonstration in 1979 was conducted only during non-peak hours, their system sustained a loss in peak hour fares as well. A total of one-fourth (24.7 percent) of their revenue was lost from the fare-free experiment, with 4.3 percent of that loss coming from fare revenue lost during peak transit hours. Additionally, Mercer Metro had to provide additional bus service to meet excessively high passenger demands during the fare-free hours, causing operation costs to skyrocket (9). The Capital Metro fare-free experience in Austin, Texas mirrors the Mercer Metro results. The system quickly became overburdened with requirements for capacity expansion and a subsequent increase of operating costs. The skyrocketing operation and maintenance costs became a substantial drain on the system. Officials at Capital Metro described the cost of operation in a fare-free system as “staggering” (29). Negative effect on internal transit environment Fare-free systems can attract problem riders, resulting in vandalism and problems for other riders. The Miami Beach Transportation Management Association sponsors electric shuttle bus service in Miami Beach. For the first year of operations, the service was offered for free. This new service attracted over a million riders in its first year, with only seven buses in operation. However, the free fares also attracted undesirable passengers. The absence of fares can make riders feel a lack of responsibility for the well being of the transit system, also resulting in a negative impact on driver satisfaction. In the Trenton, New Jersey fare-free experiment, 92 percent of transit drivers found their jobs to be less enjoyable as a result of the fare-free program (9). In the Austin, Texas experiment, officials claim that transit operators came close to “insurrection” as their transit system became flooded with truant school children, vagrants, and other “dubious categories” of passengers (29). It is important to note that these findings contradict the findings by Hodge et al. (16) that eliminating the fare would result in a more positive environment for transit vehicle operators because they wouldn’t have to argue with passengers over fares. However, the psychological barrier of the farebox and hunting for change and dealing with paper transfers could be minimized with new fare structures (e.g., an all-day pass) or new farebox technology, which would eliminate transfers and accept stored-value cards or even credit cards. However, psychological costs in personal security and physical crowding seen in these fare-free demonstrations may actually cause more problems than the psychological cost of the farebox. Problem riders increase personal security costs of transit use and cause a decrease in ridership of both new and existing quality riders (16). As evidenced in the Austin experiment, quality riders do not immediately return 6 to the system once they’ve been driven out, and the system must prove itself over time to disenfranchised riders (29). Steiner and Starling (32) claim that eliminating the farebox may cause a decrease in average boarding times, but it will cause an increase in aggregate boarding times. The reality is that increased ridership will result in more crowding, which will negatively impact boarding times. Additionally, schedule adherence will be negatively impacted by a larger number of people riding the bus short distances who might have otherwise walked (32). As mentioned previously, the transit industry standard for measuring increase in ridership is fare elasticity (16). However, elasticity estimates do not take into account the impact that system-wide fare-free implementation can have on encouraging problem riders and what ramifications that might have on long- term riders. A farebox may be seen as a psychological barrier to the new transit user, but it may also be a barrier in keeping out a less desirable type of transit rider. According to Hodge et al.(16), there are two negative sources of ridership change, which can possibly overwhelm a system and drive away quality ridership: Transit riders who would have used other modes, but choose transit because it is free Transit riders who enter the system for the negative and criminal purposes.  In the Austin, Texas fare-free demonstration, both anecdotal and official data suggest that problem riders increased substantially and drove away other riders. In both the Mercer Metro and the Austin, Texas experiences, problem riders actually drove away many of the regular bus commuters. In none of the experiments did the increase in transit ridership include automobile commuters enticed by the fare-free service (9, 20, 29).  System efficiency— Disadvantages in a fare-free system  System effectiveness can be measured by the farebox recovery rate. Fare-free advocates suggest that system effectiveness could instead be measured by per rider cost. In another example, consider a fairly large transit system that moved approximately 270,000 riders per day. If that system experienced a 30 percent increase in ridership due to fare-free program implementation, it would have an increase of approximately 81,000 riders per day, based on fare elasticity analysis. A caveat here: As the fare approaches zero, there may be changes around zero which are not accounted for by the Simpson-Curtain rule of fare elasticity. Based upon the information from both Mercer Metro (Trenton, New Jersey) and Capital Metro (Austin, Texas), most transit systems could not recover from such a loss of revenue, even if the system might be regarded as more efficient on a cost-per-passenger basis. Imagine that the system becomes overwhelmed with passengers, and must provide expansion of service. Also imagine that the system must now pay for maintaining the system in the face of vandalism and property damage from  7 problem passengers, as well as hiring off-duty police officers to control security incidents. Without passenger-generated revenues, most transit systems would be unable to pay for additional services and quality of service will suffer.