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No Coop – General

**There are larger issues obstructing US-China cooperation in space**

**Logan, Congressional Research Service Specialist in Energy Policy, 8**

(Jefferey, CRS Report for Congress, “China’s Space Program: Options for US-China Cooperation”, September 29, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22777.pdf>) PG

**China and the United States have a limited history of both civilian and military collaboration in space.** China has publicly pushed for more dialogue and joint activities. **Mistrust of Chinese space intentions grew in the mid-1990s when U.S. companies were accused of transferring potentially sensitive military information** to China.12 Since then**, cooperation has stagnated, often roiled by larger economic, political, and security frictions in the U.S.-China relationship.**

Problems prevent coop between China and the US

Richburg, Washington Post Writer, 11

(Keith B, The Washington Post, “Mistrust stalls U.S.-China space cooperation,” 1-22, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012104480.html>, 7-1-11, GJV)

The Obama administration views space as ripe territory for cooperation with China. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has called it one of four potential areas of "strategic dialogue," along with cybersecurity, missile defense and nuclear weapons. And President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao vowed after their White House summit last week to "deepen dialogue and exchanges" in the field. But as China ramps up its space initiatives, the diplomatic talk of cooperation has so far found little traction. The Chinese leadership has shown scant interest in opening up the most sensitive details of its program, much of which is controlled by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). At the same time, Chinese scientists and space officials say that Washington's wariness of China's intentions in space, as well as U.S. bans on some high-technology exports, makes cooperation problematic. For now, the U.S.-China relationship in space appears to mirror the one on Earth - a still-dominant but fading superpower facing a new and ambitious rival, with suspicion on both sides.

Problems prevent coop between China and the US

Richburg, Washington Post Writer, 11

(Keith B, The Washington Post, “Mistrust stalls U.S.-China space cooperation,” 1-22, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/21/AR2011012104480.html>, 7-1-11, GJV)

"What you have are two major powers, both of whom use space for military, civilian and commercial purposes," said Dean Cheng, a researcher with the Washington-based Heritage Foundation and an expert on the Chinese military and space program. NASA's human spaceflight program has been in flux in recent years, fueling particular concern among some U.S. observers about the challenge posed by China's initiatives in that area. There is "a lot of very wary, careful, mutual watching," Cheng said. Song Xiaojun, a military expert and commentator on China's CCTV, said that substantial cooperation in the space field is impossible without mutual trust. Achieving that, he said, "depends on whether the U.S. can put away its pride and treat China as a partner to cooperate on equal terms. But I don't see that happening in the near future, since the U.S. is experiencing menopause while China is going through puberty."

No Coop – China Says No – General (1/2)

China has no interest in cooperation – it’s inviting everyone but America to the party.

Laxman, journalist for Asian Scientist, 6/27/11

(Srinivas, AsianScientist, “China’s Space Mission: The Long March To The Moon And Mars Home”, <http://www.asianscientist.com/features/chinas-space-mission-moon-mars/>, 6.30.11, SWolff)

On the 50th anniversary of the first human space flight by Yuri Gagarin, the Chinese government made an announcement which was extremely appropriate for the occasion: it will launch its own space station. This project was already on the cards, but it was formally confirmed during the 50th anniversary celebrations. Called Tiangong (天宫) or Heavenly Palace, the 60-ton space station will be constructed in orbit from a series of modules launched over the next few years. After the initial trials in docking and rendezvous, it will be manned by a three-man crew. The present International Space Station (ISS) weighs 419 tons and generally has a six-man crew or more. For quite some time, the US has been trying its best to include China in the ISS program, but the Chinese response has been lukewarm. The Chinese space station program envisages two spacecraft – Shenzhou-9 and Shenzhou-10 – being launched in 2012, which will dock with the Tiangong-1 module. The Chinese have invited scientists from all over the world to participate in the project, and speculation is rife that a Pakistani scientist could perhaps be one of the earliest guests. Apart from the scientific significance, space scientists feel that the Chinese space station project is endowed with a lot of political and geopolitical ramifications, and is being viewed as a clear challenge to US dominance in space. China’s Space Flight Program: Codenamed Project 921 The space station project is a part of China’s ambitious human space flight program, codenamed Project 921, which incorporates a number of Russian technologies. China already has many launch complexes; some of the important ones are the Jiaquan Launch Center, Taiyuan Launch Center, Xianchang Launch Center, and Newchang Launch Center. China also has a variety of rockets, and the Long March rocket has several versions. The country has laid out a clear and precise trajectory for Project 921. It launched its first manned space flight, Shenzhou-5, in October 2003 with Yang Liwei. The mission was an astounding success. This was followed by Shenzhou-6 in 2005 with a two-man crew, and a third one in 2008 with a three taikonauts (Chinese name for astronauts or cosmonauts), both equally successful. The importance of the third mission was that it included a spacewalk for 14 minutes. Though China is a late entrant to the human space flight program compared to the US and Russia, it has mastered the critical technologies in a short period of time. Experts believe that more taikonauts will be flying to space in the days ahead, and training is already in full progress. 2030: A Chinese Taikonaut On The Moon? Apart from the space station, China is also laying considerable emphasis on missions to the moon, with the ultimate aim of a manned lunar landing around 2030. Named after the Chinese goddess of the moon, China launched its first mission to the moon, Chang’e-1, on October 24, 2007. The mission ended on March 1, 2009 when it was taken out of orbit and impacted on the moon’s surface. Chang’e-1 helped to create an accurate and a high resolution map of the moon’s surface. Only a year later on October 22, 2008, India launched its first mission to the moon, Chandrayaan-1. Asked if India and China were on a race to the moon, ISRO (Indian Space Research Organisation) officials dismiss any suggestions that both the countries were competing with each other. “There is absolutely no rivalry and in fact we would like to collaborate,” remarked an ISRO official who declined to be identified.

No Coop – China Says No – General (2/2)

No cooperation with China – strained economy and China is not interested

Wolf, Defense Technology Correspondent at Reuters, 2011

(Jim, “Analysis: Space: a frontier too far for U.S.-China cooperation”, Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/02/us-china-usa-space-idUSTRE7010E520110102>, January 2, Accessed July 3, 2011, NS)

(Reuters) - The prospects for cooperation between the United States and China in space are fading even as proponents say working together in the heavens could help build bridges in often-testy relations on Earth. The idea of joint ventures in space, including spacewalks, explorations and symbolic "feel good" projects, have been floated from time to time by leaders on both sides. Efforts have gone nowhere over the past decade, swamped by economic, diplomatic and security tensions, despite a 2009 attempt by President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, to kick-start the bureaucracies. U.S. domestic politics make the issue unlikely to advance when Obama hosts Hu at the White House on Jan. 19. Washington is at odds with Beijing over its currency policies and huge trade surplus but needs China's help to deter North Korea and Iran's nuclear ambitions and advance global climate and trade talks, among other matters. Hu's state visit will highlight the importance of expanding cooperation on "bilateral, regional and global issues," the White House said. But space appears to be a frontier too far for now, partly due to U.S. fears of an inadvertent technology transfer. China may no longer be much interested in any event, reckoning it does not need U.S. expertise for its space program.

No Coop – ISS – China Says No

China has no interest in the ISS

Cowing, Astrobiologist, 10

(Keith, NASA Watch, “Has China Been Formally Invited to Join the ISS Program?,” 7-9-10, <http://www.nasawatch.com/archives/2010/07/has-china-been.html>, 6-29-11, GJV)

"International [Space Station](http://www.nasawatch.com/archives/2010/07/has-china-been.html) partners have not received any response from China on a proposal to join the [ISS](http://www.nasawatch.com/archives/2010/07/has-china-been.html)program, Roscosmos Head Anatoly Perminov stated during the International Economical Forum in St. Petersburg. Speaking about Russian role in the program, Perminov reminded that [US shuttles](http://www.nasawatch.com/archives/2010/07/has-china-been.html) are to be retired soon, leaving Soyuz to maintain crew transportation services solely for the ISS, Interfax informs. "This is rather dangerous, any expert recognizes that. There must a backup for the Soyuz. We wish some country would have it, and we contacted China with its human spaceflight program mature enough to maintain crew transportation in the program, asking to join the ISS partnership. However there was no response", Perminov said."

China has no interest in an ISS partnership

Cowing, Astrobiologist, 10

(Keith, NASA Watch, “Has China Been Formally Invited to Join the ISS Program?,” 7-9-10, <http://www.nasawatch.com/archives/2010/07/has-china-been.html>, 6-29-11, GJV)

"09.07.2010: Chinese space vehicles meet all safety requirements to provide redundancy for Soyuzes and Progresses during missions to the International Space Station, Anatoly Perminov, Roscosmos Head told RIA Novosti. According to him, the Chinese can support the program after shuttle retirement in 2011, when Russia remains the only country to maintain ISS crew rotation. "This is rather tough, so Russia is interested in backup Chinese vehicles", Perminov said. Five ISS partners have not received any answer from China for the proposal to join the program. "Administrator of the Chinese Space Administration has quit, and the new one has not been appointed yet. So, the issue is still open", Perminov concluded."

No Coop – China Says No – Not Prioritized

China is content with the status quo and is confident in its innovative abilities

Kulacki, senior analyst Global Union of Concerned Scientists, 1-19-11

(Greg, Dr. Kulacki served as an Associate Professor of Government at Green Mountain College, Director of External Studies at Pitzer College and Director of Academic Programs in China for the Council on International Educational Exchange.Dr. Kulacki earned a doctorate in Political Theory from the Department of Government and Politics and a master’s in International Relations from the University of Maryland, College Park. He also completed graduate certificates in Chinese Economic History and International Politics at Fudan University in Shanghai. “Engaging China on Space” accessed: 6-30-11 <http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/2826515287/engaging-china-on-space>) TJL

China no longer needs to import foreign technology and expertise. Moreover, many of the scientists and engineers in China’s space sector believe they make more rapid progress by pursuing a policy of self-reliance without the complications of joint programs. As a result, a significant number within China’s space community actively oppose increased international cooperation or is disinclined to support it. In addition, many in China’s space community resent U.S. policies, such as China’s exclusion from the International Space Station, export controls that have severely restricted China’s ability to participate in the international launch services market, and highly restrictive visa policies for Chinese space professionals. China’s space scientists and engineers are content with the status quo. Any impetus for change will need to come from outside the space sector. Unlike in the past, cooperation with the United States or other countries is no longer valued as a technical or economic necessity. Today, cooperation with other countries in space is likely to take place for political reasons. It will need to be imposed on China’s space sector by the political leadership, and this can only happen if Chinese leaders see cooperation as a high priority.

Chinese political leaders do not see Obama’s incremental cooperation as a high priority

Kulacki, senior analyst Global Union of Concerned Scientists, 1-19-11

(Greg, Dr. Kulacki served as an Associate Professor of Government at Green Mountain College, Director of External Studies at Pitzer College and Director of Academic Programs in China for the Council on International Educational Exchange.Dr. Kulacki earned a doctorate in Political Theory from the Department of Government and Politics and a master’s in International Relations from the University of Maryland, College Park. He also completed graduate certificates in Chinese Economic History and International Politics at Fudan University in Shanghai. “Engaging China on Space” accessed: 6-30-11 <http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/2826515287/engaging-china-on-space>) TJL

The Obama administration is reluctant to engage China on large or high profile projects in space, preferring instead to take incremental steps toward cooperation in space, as well as toward discussion of space security. Unfortunately, no one in China’s space sector is likely to assign a high priority to these incremental efforts in the absence of explicit directions from China’s senior political leadership Consequently the Obama administration’s overtures are passed down to the officials in China’s space bureaucracy assigned to interact with foreign space entities. These officials are often the least powerful, least informed, and most risk-averse individuals in the Chinese space sector.

No Coop – China Says No – Competitive (1/2)

China would say no – they want the high ground.

Tkacik, Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation, ’10

(John J. Tkacik Jr., The Washington Times, 8 January 2010, p. 11, “China eyes high ground; Obama talks of cooperation, not competition on space exploration”, LexisNexis, 7.1.11, SWolff)

[…] To be sure, China's imaginative and capable aerospace engineers have devised quite workable spacefaring designs, and their access to Russia's space science has helped accelerate their progress. And what the Chinese can't buy from the Russians, or learn at America's top universities, they can still pilfer from U.S. industry. In July, Dongfan Chung, a former stress engineer with Boeing, was convicted of economic espionage involving 300,000 pages of sensitive data, including information about the space shuttle and the fueling system for America's biggest booster rocket, the Delta IV. In his ruling, the judge in the case noted that Mr. Chung, a U.S. citizen, had decided "to serve the [People's Republic of China], which he proudly proclaimed as his 'motherland.' " In 2008, Shu Quan-sheng, an American physicist living in Virginia was convicted of transferring to the Chinese People's Liberation Army details of liquid hydrogen tanks for the Delta IV. This combination of financial wealth, educational excellence, advanced technology and a penchant for plundering intellectual property has enabled China's space program to develop swiftly. In 2003, China's gained entry into the exclusive manned-space club previously restricted to the United States and Russia. By 2008, Chinese astronauts were taking space walks and buzzing tiny "BX-1" nano-satellites around their space capsules, a technology that puts them on the cutting edge of "space situational awareness" that America's military space assets still lack. Beijing's political and military leaders alike foresee "competition" in space with the United States. They certainly plan to seize the high ground of low-Earth orbit and then will likely move to the even higher ground of moon landings perhaps before this decade is out. Judging from the past behavior of China's state-owned aerospace firms especially in their unseemly eagerness to proliferate ballistic missile technology to rogue states, it is unlikely that Mr. Obama can count on much "cooperation" with China in space - except on China's terms.

No Coop – China Says No – Competitive (2/2)

China thinks the U.S. is on an imperialist mission and feels threatened by it

Friedberg, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton, 6/21/11

(Aaron L., professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics”, The National Interest, July-August Issue, p.3, <http://nationalinterest.org/article/hegemony-chinese-characteristics-5439?page=1>, accessed 7/8/11) EK

But the mistrust between Washington and Beijing is not a one-way street—and with good reason. China’s current rulers do not see themselves as they once did, as the leaders of a global revolutionary movement, yet they do believe that they are engaged in an ideological struggle, albeit one in which, until very recently, they have been almost entirely on the defensive. While they regard Washington’s professions of concern for human rights and individual liberties as cynical and opportunistic, China’s leaders do not doubt that the United States is motivated by genuine ideological fervor. As seen from Beijing, Washington is a dangerous, crusading, liberal, quasi-imperialist power that will not rest until it imposes its views and its way of life on the entire planet. Anyone who does not grasp this need only read the speeches of U.S. officials, with their promises to enlarge the sphere of democracy and rid the world of tyranny.

In fact, because ideology inclines the United States to be more suspicious and hostile toward China than it would be for strategic reasons alone, it also tends to reinforce Washington’s willingness to help other democracies that feel threatened by Chinese power, even if this is not what a pure realpolitik calculation of its interests might seem to demand. Thus the persistence—indeed the deepening—of American support for Taiwan during the 1990s cannot be explained without reference to the fact that the island was evolving from an authoritarian bastion of anti-Communism to a liberal democracy. Severing the last U.S. ties to Taipei would remove a major source of friction with China and a potential cause of war. Such a move might even be conceivable if Taiwan still appeared to many Americans as it did in the 1970s, as an oppressive, corrupt dictatorship. But the fact that Taiwan is now seen as a genuine (if flawed) democracy will make it extremely difficult for Washington to ever willingly cut it adrift.

Having watched America topple the Soviet Union through a combination of confrontation and subversion, since the end of the Cold War China’s strategists have feared that Washington intends to do the same to them. This belief colors Beijing’s perceptions of virtually every aspect of U.S. policy toward it, from enthusiasm for economic engagement to efforts to encourage the development of China’s legal system. It also shapes the leadership’s assessments of America’s activities across Asia, which Beijing believes are aimed at encircling it with pro-U.S. democracies, and informs China’s own policies to counter that influence.

No Coop – China Says No – Doesn’t Need Coop

China is content with its current research and development—it is self sufficient

Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists Global Security Program senior analyst and China project manager, 10

(Dr. Gregory, UCS, “Potential for Cooperation with China”, December 15, p.4, <http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/cooperation-with-china-on-space-gkulacki.pdf>, accessed 6/30/11) PG

The growth in the size and capability of China’s space sector has virtually eliminated its previous incentives for cooperation in space. **China no longer needs to import foreign technology and expertise.** Moreover, **many of the scientists and engineers in China’s space sector believe they make more rapid progress by pursuing a policy of self-reliance.** As a result, a significant faction within the **Chinese space community either actively opposes increased international cooperation or is disinclined to support it. Increased proficiency in the field of space technology has reduced the Chinese political leadership’s anxieties about national status and international competitiveness in space.** Continued international isolation is an embarrassment to the Chinese leadership, and something they would like to change, but so long as the success of its own program continues to attract international attention, continued isolation does not carry any meaningful costs. **The international status Chinese leaders seek through space activity can be obtained without cooperation with the United States.** China’s space scientists and engineers are content with the status quo. **Any impetus for change will need to come from outside the space sector.** Unlike in the past, cooperation with the United States or other countries will only take place if it is imposed on China’s space sector by the political leadership because the political leadership saw doing so as a high priority.. Without this, **China’s space programs are likely to continue on their current trajectory.**

Chinese advanced space program is not looking for outside support

Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists Global Security Program senior analyst and China project manager, 11

(Gregory, “Engaging China in Space,” All Things Nuclear: Insights on Science and Security, <http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/2826515287/engaging-china-on-space>, January 19, Accessed July 1, 2011, NS)

Chinese commentators often compare the Shenzhou program—China’s human space flight program—to China’s nuclear weapons program. Western observers tend to hear this as reflecting China’s interest in the military utility of space technology. But this comparison instead reflects a long-running internal Chinese discussion about national status, international respect, and technological prowess—not military force. China’s broad investment in space technology in the 1980s included funding for military space programs, most notably the hit-to-kill technology demonstrated in its 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) test and 2010 missile interception. China had been observing U.S. and Soviet missile defense and ASAT tests since the late 1960s, so it is not surprising that it began a similar development program. That program progressed slowly with moderate funding, and the technology reached the point of testing only in the last few years. China’s initial investment in space faced two considerable obstacles: limited access to space technology and an even more limited supply of qualified scientists and engineers. The Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) had devastated the China’s intelligentsia and higher education, as well as its economy. China overcame its resource limitations by importing foreign space technology and expertise. This step was always conceived as a stopgap measure and not a permanent feature of China’s space program. The growth in size and capability of China’s space sector in recent years has virtually eliminated its previous incentives for cooperation in space. China has less concern that it is falling behind, or that its national survival or international status is in danger. China no longer needs to import foreign technology and expertise. Moreover, many of the scientists and engineers in China’s space sector believe they make more rapid progress by pursuing a policy of self-reliance without the complications of joint programs. As a result, a significant number within China’s space community actively oppose increased international cooperation or is disinclined to support it.

No Coop – China Says No – Doesn’t Need Coop

Without motivation to seek cooperation with the US, China’s space policy will remain independent

Kulacki, Union of Concerned Scientists Global Security Program senior analyst and China project manager, 11

(Gregory, “Engaging China in Space,” All Things Nuclear: Insights on Science and Security, <http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/2826515287/engaging-china-on-space>, January 19, Accessed July 1, 2011, NS)

In addition, many in China’s space community resent U.S. policies, such as China’s exclusion from the International Space Station, export controls that have severely restricted China’s ability to participate in the international launch services market, and highly restrictive visa policies for Chinese space professionals. China’s space scientists and engineers are content with the status quo. Any impetus for change will need to come from outside the space sector. Unlike in the past, cooperation with the United States or other countries is no longer valued as a technical or economic necessity. Today, cooperation with other countries in space is likely to take place for political reasons. It will need to be imposed on China’s space sector by the political leadership, and this can only happen if Chinese leaders see cooperation as a high priority. The Obama administration is reluctant to engage China on large or high profile projects in space, preferring instead to take incremental steps toward cooperation in space, as well as toward discussion of space security. Unfortunately, no one in China’s space sector is likely to assign a high priority to these incremental efforts in the absence of explicit directions from China’s senior political leadership Consequently the Obama administration’s overtures are passed down to the officials in China’s space bureaucracy assigned to interact with foreign space entities. These officials are often the least powerful, least informed, and most risk-averse individuals in the Chinese space sector.

China is not looking to cooperate – already developed

Sabathier, senior associate with the CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program, Faith, president of Sabathier Consulting for public and private aeronautics policy, 2011

(Vincent G., G. Ryan Faith, “The Global Impact of the Chinese Space Program,” World Politics Review, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8878/the-global-impact-of-the-chinese-space-program>, May 17, Accessed July 1, 2011, NS)

Although China has relied on cooperation in the past to develop its space capabilities, it is increasingly willing to go it alone, proceeding slowly and steadily in a "long march" fashion. China might cooperate on space activities to accelerate a particular program or to gain prestige and recognition along the way, but ultimately its aim is to become a global competitor in space. Over time, Chinese policymakers have studied, analyzed and understood both the successes and failures of the U.S.-Soviet space race as well as the benefits China can derive from space. One such benefit, increased national pride, is more important in China than in any other current major spacefaring power -- with the possible exceptions of India and Russia -- because it helps unify the country during periods of great stress and transformation. In addition to showing considerable signs of determination and an enormous ambition, China has the resources needed to comprehensively develop its space assets in all areas. This will eventually allow China to compete across the board, around the globe and throughout space. China will probably catch up with European commercial space assets and policies before 2020. Its navigation system, Beidou, will be operational before its European counterpart, Galileo, and the Long March 5 family of launch vehicles, slated for use starting in 2014, will outperform Ariane 5 and its foreseen successors. China will subsequently land a "taikonaut" on the moon in the middle of the next decade, at roughly the same time that China's GDP is projected to exceed that of the U.S. -- a subtle soft-power means of highlighting China's growing influence. A Chinese moon landing ought not to represent an existential threat to U.S. space leadership, given that the U.S. landed on the moon more than 40 years ago and remains far ahead in all fields.

No Coop – Lack of Compromise

Beijing would want substantial benefits for its help

Cheng, Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center, 09

(Dean, The Heritage Foundation, “U.S.-China Space Cooperation: More Costs Than Benefits,” 8-30-9, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/us-china-space-cooperation-more-costs-than-benefits>, 6-29-11, GJV)

Moreover, Beijing is likely to extract a price in exchange for such cooperation. The Chinese leadership has placed a consistent emphasis on developing its space capabilities indigenously. Not only does this ensure that China's space capabilities are not held hostage to foreign pressure, but it also fosters domestic economic development -- thereby promoting innovation within China's scientific and technological communities -- and underscores the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. Consequently, the PRC will require that any cooperation with the U.S. provides it with substantial benefits that would balance opportunity costs in these areas.

Negotiating with China will fail – lack of flexibility

Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009

(Dean B., “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space Defense: Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, p.12, <http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf>, accessed 7/6/11) EK

Another consideration is that the Chinese usually appear at the negotiating table with their own position already formulated. If they are seeking to determine their counterpart’s bottom lines, the Chinese negotiators are well aware of their own.“Before negotiations at any level begin, the central leadership will have assessed the ‘objective reality’ and determined its objectives vis-à-vis the principal ‘contradictions as well as the strategy for achieving those objectives.”30 Such assessments are likely to have been arrived at only after significant internal bargaining within the Chinese system, in order to create the necessary consensus among competing bureaucracies, stakeholders, and leadership groupings. They are therefore unlikely to be lightly modified, much less altered or abandoned.

No Coop – Negotiations Fail

Traditional negotiations with China fails, cooperation must be negotiated by the Chinese Politburo

Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009

(Dean B., “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space Defense: Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, p.12, <http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf>, accessed 7/6/11) EK

In order to shift the Chinese, then, it is essential to be able to traverse the labyrinthine bureaucracy of China. As one observer notes, “The first stage of wisdom in negotiating with the Chinese is to grasp that one is confronted with the world’s oldest bureaucracy.” 31 Apparent gains at the negotiating table are insubstantial unless they can garner support from the actual Chinese leadership. As one Japanese diplomat has observed, “In order for a point to be accepted by the Chinese side, it is important that our presentation is formulated in such a way that it would reach the top strata of the Chinese decision-making machinery.”32 Conversely, “pragmatism is displayed amply when there is positive political will in the top leadership of China to conclude an accord….” 33 The key leaders and decision-makers, however, are not located in the state bureaucracy, but within the Chinese Communist Party, specifically, the Chinese Politburo. This is because policy decisions are the purview of the Party’s leadership, whereas policy implementation is the responsibility of the state’s bureaucracy. It is arguably for this reason that the Chinese are extremely opaque about the details of their space policy decision-making process. The process of determining policy occurs, not in the government, but in the Party. Allowing outsiders to gain an understanding of said processes would also provide them with the ability to detect and exploit potential vulnerabilities.

Talks with Hu are not effective – he is only involved on a limited level

Houpt, Master of Arts, Security Studies, Georgetown University, 2011

(Daniel M., “Does China have a comprehensive, coordinated, and consistent space policy? Implications for U.S. policymakers,” ProQuest, accessed 7/1/11, p. 47) EK

In the case of the J-20 test flight, it is farfetched to believe that Hu was unaware of the production of a new stealth jet and that testing was imminent. In examining the J-20 episode, Andrew Scobell, an experienced China analyst, posited that the military may operate in such a way “whereby Hu is kept informed of all military programs and initiatives, but only on a general level with limited detail and degree of information.” 158 Therefore, it may well be true that he was not informed of the particular date, given the relative insignificance of a 10 minute test flight at the presidential level on any other day than when the U.S. Secretary of Defense is in Beijing. This is not enough, however, to believe the CCP leadership or CMC have lost their policy grip on the PLA.

No Coop – PLA Blocks

**Chinese military development makes cooperation impossible**

**Gill, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute director & Kleiber, Chair in Center for Strategic and International Studies Strategy chair, 7**

(Bates – China Specialist and Martin - Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies, Foreign Affairs May 2007 - June 2007, Pg. 2 Vol. 86 No. 3, China's Space Odyssey: What the Antisatellite Test Reveals About Decision-Making in Beijing, Lexis) AC

Regardless of who knew what when, the test can only fuel mounting concerns about China as a potential military threat. Vice President Dick Cheney has said that the "antisatellite test, and China's continued fast-paced military buildup ... are not consistent with China's stated goal of a 'peaceful rise.'" Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said the incident was "troubling"; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace called it "very worrisome." To Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.), it was a "threat," a "provocation," and a "wake-up call." It also seems to have been something of a surprise. For years, Chinese nuclear strategists had been quietly warning their U.S. counterparts that the PLA was working toward acquiring an ASAT capability. The most recent test was part of an ongoing series of ASAT trials, including one involving laser weapons that blind satellites. But the 2006 Pentagon report on the PLA's modernization appears to have underestimated China's capabilities: it claimed that China could destroy or disable a satellite only by attacking it with a nuclear-armed missile. In January, the PLA successfully tracked and destroyed a satellite with a direct, kinetic impact, suggesting that it was further along than the U.S. government had assumed. This realization surely will prompt more scrutiny of China's aerospace programs. The ASAT incident has already breathed new life into U.S. missile defense projects and the development of advanced technologies to counter the threat that China and other countries may pose to U.S. space-based assets. And it will strengthen arguments for proposed regulations that would impose tough export controls and further restrict high-tech trade with China, particularly in aerospace and information technologies. The ASAT test has also cast doubt on China's reliability as a global partner. China's move, many informed observers believe, has generated and thrown into orbit more space debris than any other single human event, putting at risk China's own satellites and those of other countries for decades to come. In performing the test, Beijing not only demonstrated its capacity to threaten U.S. military assets in space but also showed a lack of concern for other countries' interest in the safe operation of satellites for day-to-day civilian activities, such as weather forecasting, financial transactions, and telephone calls. None of this bodes well for relations between the United States and China. Even before the ASAT test, these were moving into a more difficult phase. Although the two sides managed to maintain a relatively stable relationship over the past two years, new concerns had arisen. Greater attention has been focused recently on China's diplomatic activity in places such as Southeast Asia and Africa. The new Democratic Congress in the United States is likely to pressure the Bush administration to confront China on a range of economic problems, from the growing U.S. trade deficit to China's currency manipulation and violations of intellectual property rights. As the presidency of George W. Bush -- now a lame duck with low popularity ratings -- winds down and the U.S. election cycle picks up, partisans on both the left and the right will be quicker to criticize China for its poor human rights record and its efforts to beef up its military and will demand tougher responses from the White House (or promise to deliver them if they are in power). The ASAT test will do nothing to dispel the pervading mistrust between the two countries. Already, it has undermined recent progress on U.S.-Chinese space cooperation. After Presidents Bush and Hu proposed strengthening such ties during an April 2006 summit in Washington, a congressional delegation visited the Jiuquan launch site last summer and the head of NASA went to China in September -- two firsts in the history of the states' relations. Cooperation of this type is now off the table. NASA's relatively muted official response to the ASAT test was that "China's development and testing of such weapons is inconsistent with the constructive relationship that our presidents have outlined." The subtext, however, was that moving ahead on a cooperative agenda -- already an uphill fight -- will now face tremendous political opposition, especially on Capitol Hill.

No Coop – Nationalism

Chinese nationalism strengthens opposition to the US and its space industry

Caldararo et al., graduate student University of Nebraska at Omaha studying

Public Administration, 08 (Kevin E Williams Deputy Director, Studies and Analyses, Assessments and Lessons Learned U.S. Air Force approved Michael, Jason Cantone graduated from the University of Nebraska College of Law with his J.D. and M.A. in Psychology and is currently a doctoral student in Law and Psychology. MEd Jonathan Cowin a senior at Creighton University, specializing in economics. Rachel Huggins junior at Creighton University studying political science and business administration. Hailey Rademacher junior at Creighton University, studying international relations and French Drew Sendelbach currently enrolled in the International Relations program to earn a Master of Arts degree from Creighton University “Global Innovation and Strategy Center Chinese Counterspace Intentions Fall 2008 – Project 08-05 December 2008, pg38 accessed:6-30-11, <http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA499438>.) TJL

Despite feelings of weakness, Chinese nationalism also remains strong when the U.S. is

considered an overly prideful country with “no ethical principles”151 seeking to “rule the

world”152 while “spiritually polluting”153 China. The Chinese believe that the U.S. defense

culture worships technology, particularly space technology. Combined, these beliefs likely

heighten an “us versus them” mentality of Chinese nationalism that also leads to a mistrust of the U.S. and its policies and stated peaceful intentions.

\*\*\* Coop Solvency Answers – Coop Fails

Coop Fails – Time Frame

Even if they do solve, their impacts will happen before they can access any solvency –

China-U.S. cooperation will take too long.

Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009

(Dean B., “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space Defense: Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, p.10, <http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf>, accessed 7/6/11) EK

Should the US and the PRC actively seek to cooperate, any ventures will first require extensive negotiations. As noted earlier, there has been only minimal interaction between American and Chinese space authorities. This means that there is not an extensive foundation of personal relationships or even negotiating experience on space issues between the two countries upon which to build. With neither institutional nor personal relations, the process is likely to be extremely lengthy. In particular, the absence of a legacy of interactions goes to the heart of the Chinese approach to negotiations. President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 and the subsequent establishment of diplomatic relations in 1979, for example, was the culmination of nearly twenty years of meetings in Geneva and Warsaw. 20 “From the Chinese perspective, these [Ambassadorial] Talks and the events leading to the Talks established the boundaries within which the ultimate solutions were found.Like building a stone house, a solid foundation for the relationship had to be laid, if the relationship was to endure.” 21 The absence of such a foundation means that any effort to foster cooperation in space arena, which touches on sensitive issues of national capabilities as well as being potentially highly technical, will also have to reconcile very different approaches to the process of negotiation.

Coop Fails – Empirically Proven (1/2)

US and China have tried to cooperate but problems keep getting in the way

Rutkowski, Johns Hopkins University International Studies Masters candidate, 9

(Ryan, 2-21-9, "US-China Cooperation in Manned-Space Exploration” <http://rrutkows.blogspot.com/2009/02/us-china-cooperation-in-manned-space.html>, MLF, accessed 7-1-11)

Despite the U.S. efforts to engage with the international community more in manned-space exploration, U.S. and China collaboration remains limited. Indeed, U.S.-China space cooperation has been poor since the mid-1990s when several U.S. companies were accused of transferring potentially sensitive military information to China. The primary problem with U.S-China space cooperation continues to be concerns about inadvertent technology transfers. Certain U.S. officials fear that dual-use space technology could easily be transferred to China. This is encompassed in the U.S ban on sale of military technology and export restrictions of certain “sensitive” technologies to China. Nonetheless, in 2006, NASA Administrator Michael Griffin visited China to begun a limited dialogue on cooperation. However, any progress towards cooperation on space technology was halted when China tested its first successful anti-Satellite weapons technology heightening security tensions between the U.S and China.

**Chinese cooperation internationally has empirically failed**

**Domme, Center for Strategic International Studies, Technology and Public Policy Program intern, 10**

(Lisa, Center for Strategic International Studies, “Chinese Space Policy: Collaboration or Competition?”, March 23, <http://csis.org/blog/chinese-space-policy-collaboration-or-competition>) PG

Some **efforts at international cooperation have resulted in failure**. **China was essentially “disinvited” from the European Galileo program,** which was designed to create a global locating and tracking system similar to GPS in the U.S.. China has now decided to create its own global location satellite system, named Beidou. And **while China does collaborate with Russia, its relationship with Russia has been described as “anemic” and “delayed” by some observe**rs. There has been little collaboration between **the US and China** on space exploration. Indeed, the **situation has been tense** at times. Some of **China’s space technology was stolen from US firms.** For example, a former engineer at Boeing, Dongfan Chung, was convicted in July 2009 of economic espionage on behalf of China. He provided information about the space shuttle and fueling system of the Delta IV booster rocket. Furthermore, **the US has historically disapproved of Chinese aeronautical firms selling missile technology** to countries like Iran, North Korea and Pakistan. On the other hand, **China resented a plan proposed by the US** delegation at the Copenhagen climate talks in December 2009, where foreign satellites would be used to monitor and verify carbon dioxide emissions in China. The Chinese argue that this would be an infringement upon their national sovereignty.

Coop Fails – Empirically Proven (2/2)

**Too much mistrust present for US-China cooperation—cooperation is empirically denied**

**Xinhua, PRC official press, 11**

(January 22, via China Military Power Mashup, “Mistrust stalls US-China space cooperation”, <http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/mistrust-stalls-us-china-space-cooperation.html>, accessed 7/2/11) PG

2011-01-22 (China Military News cited from washingtonpost.com and written by Keith B. Richburg) -- **China's grand ambitions extend literally to the stars, with the country now embarked on a multi-pronged program** to establish its own global navigational system, launch a space laboratory and put a Chinese astronaut on the moon within the next decade. The Obama administration, which has overseen large cutbacks in the U.S. space program, views space as ripe territory for cooperation with China. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has called it one of four potential areas of "strategic dialogue," along with cybersecurity, missile defense and nuclear weapons. And President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao vowed after their White House summit this week to "deepen dialogue and exchanges" in the field. But as China ramps up its space initiatives, the diplomatic talk of cooperation has so far found little traction. The Chinese leadership has shown scant interest in opening up the most sensitive details of its program, much of which is controlled by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). At the same time, Chinese scientists and space officials say that **U.S. wariness of China's extraterrestrial intentions, as well as bans on some high-technology exports, makes cooperation problematic.** For now, **the U.S.-China relationship in space appears to mirror the one on Earth - a still-dominant but fading superpower facing a new and ambitious rival, with suspicion on both sides**. "What you have are two major powers, both of whom use space for military, civilian and commercial purposes," said Dean Cheng, a researcher with the Washington-based Heritage Foundation and an expert on the Chinese military and space program. **There is, he added, "a lot of very wary, careful, mutual watching."** Song Xiaojun, a military expert and commentator on China's CCTV, said that substantial cooperation in the space field is impossible without **mutual trust.** Achieving that, he said, "**depends on whether the U.S. can put away its pride and treat China as a partner to cooperate on equal terms. But I don't see that happening in the near future, since the U.S. is experiencing menopause while China is going through puberty."**

Cooperation with China is impossible – empirics prove

Pollpeter, specialist on China policy, 8

(Kevin, specialist on China policy and former member of the RAND think tank, “BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE: CHINA’S PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOGY DURING THE TENTH 5-YEAR PLAN AND THE U.S. RESPONSE,” March 2008, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub852.pdf>, Jskoog)

Increasing trust in regards to space activities appears to be difficult when space operations, in particular counterspace operations, may figure prominently in Chinese efforts to strike asymmetrically at the United States in the event of an armed conflict. 100 In the past, cooperative efforts with China’s military have been difficult. The Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), designed to reduce the risk of accidents and miscommunication in the air and on the sea, has been bogged down since the collision of a Chinese fighter with a U.S. reconnaissance plane due to Chinese insistence on using the venue to claim sovereignty over its exclusive economic zone. Even when the United States transferred military technology to China during the 1980s, the Chinese were reluctant to provide the United States with the basic motivations for certain technologies. 101 and normally only divulge information that has already come out in the Chinese press. China’s space experts also appear to function as a conduit for disinformation. One prominent Chinese space expert concludes in an English language publication that “It is obvious that assertions judging China’s manned spacecraft program as a military threat are baseless.” 102 Yet, in an internal military publication the same author argues that human spaceflight technology “can carry a large amount of effective military payload” and can be used for information support missions as well as function as a weapon or as a weapons platform. 103

Coop Fails – Fundamental Differences (1/3)

The U.S.-China power struggle is deeply rooted and has many alternate factors – a change in policies or trust alone won’t solve

Friedberg, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton, 6/21/11

(Aaron L., professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics”, The National Interest, July-August Issue, p.1, <http://nationalinterest.org/article/hegemony-chinese-characteristics-5439?page=1>, accessed 7/8/11) EK

THE UNITED States and the People’s Republic of China are locked in a quiet but increasingly intense struggle for power and influence, not only in Asia, but around the world. And in spite of what many earnest and well-intentioned commentators seem to believe, the nascent Sino-American rivalry is not merely the result of misperceptions or mistaken policies; it is driven instead by forces that are deeply rooted in the shifting structure of the international system and in the very different domestic political regimes of the two Pacific powers.

Throughout history, relations between dominant and rising states have been uneasy—and often violent. Established powers tend to regard themselves as the defenders of an international order that they helped to create and from which they continue to benefit; rising powers feel constrained, even cheated, by the status quo and struggle against it to take what they think is rightfully theirs. Indeed, this story line, with its Shakespearean overtones of youth and age, vigor and decline, is among the oldest in recorded history. As far back as the fifth century BC the great Greek historian Thucydides began his study of the Peloponnesian War with the deceptively simple observation that the war’s deepest, truest cause was “the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.”

The fact that the U.S.-China relationship is competitive, then, is simply no surprise. But these countries are not just any two great powers: Since the end of the Cold War the United States has been the richest and most powerful nation in the world; China is, by contrast, the state whose capabilities have been growing most rapidly. America is still “number one,” but China is fast gaining ground. The stakes are about as high as they can get, and the potential for conflict particularly fraught.At least insofar as the dominant powers are concerned, rising states tend to be troublemakers. As a nation’s capabilities grow, its leaders generally define their interests more expansively and seek a greater degree of influence over what is going on around them. This means that those in ascendance typically attempt not only to secure their borders but also to reach out beyond them, taking steps to ensure access to markets, materials and transportation routes; to protect their citizens far from home; to defend their foreign friends and allies; to promulgate their religious or ideological beliefs; and, in general, to have what they consider to be their rightful say in the affairs of their region and of the wider world.

U.S.-China co-operation will fail – their politics and views are too drastically different to overcome

Friedberg, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton, 6/21/11

(Aaron L., professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics”, The National Interest, July-August Issue, p.2-3, <http://nationalinterest.org/article/hegemony-chinese-characteristics-5439?page=1>, accessed 7/8/11) EK

DEEP-SEATED patterns of power politics are thus driving the United States and China toward mistrust and competition, if not necessarily toward open conflict. But this is not all there is to the story. In contrast to what some realists claim, ideology matters at least as much as power in determining the course of relations among nations. The fact that America is a liberal democracy while China remains under authoritarian rule is a significant additional impetus for rivalry, an obstacle to stable, cooperative relations, and a source of mutual hostility and mistrust in its own right.

Relations between democracies and nondemocracies are always conducted in what political theorist Michael

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Coop Fails – Fundamental Differences (2/3)

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Doyle describes as an “atmosphere of suspicion,” in part because of “the perception by liberal states that nonliberal states are in a permanent state of aggression against their own people.” Democracies, in short, regard nondemocracies as less than legitimate because they do not enjoy the freely given consent of their own people. In their heart of hearts, most self-governing citizens simply do not believe that all states are created equal or that they are entitled to the same degree of respect regardless of how they are ruled.

Seen in this light, disputes between the United States and China over such issues as censorship and religious freedom are not just superficial irritants that can be dissolved or wished away. They are instead symptomatic of much deeper difficulties. To most Americans, China’s human-rights violations are not only intrinsically wrong, they are also powerful indicators of the morally distasteful nature of the Beijing regime. While the United States may be able to do business with such a government on at least some issues, the possibility of a warm, trusting and stable relationship is remote to say the least.

Democracies also tend to regard nondemocracies as inherently untrustworthy and dangerously prone to external aggression. Because of the secrecy in which their operations are cloaked, the intentions, and often the full extent of the military capabilities of nondemocratic states, are difficult to discern. In recent years, U.S. officials have pressed their Chinese counterparts to be more “transparent” about defense programs, but there is little expectation that these pleas will be answered in any meaningful way. And even if Beijing were to suddenly unleash a flood of facts and figures, American analysts would regard them with profound skepticism, scrutinizing the data for signs of deception and disinformation. And they would be right to do so; the centralized, tightly controlled Chinese government is far better situated to carry off such schemes than its open, divided and leaky American counterpart.

Space cooperation between China and U.S. won’t work – too many political and security disagreements.

Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009

(Dean B., “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space Defense: Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, p.5, <http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf>, accessed 7/6/11) EK

In considering the potential for cooperation, the discussions undertaken at the three workshops have served to highlight the very real obstacles to cooperation that exist between the PRC and the United States. At its most basic, cooperation between the two sides has to operate within the political realities that mark the Sino-American relationship. There are a number of outstanding issues that separate the two, from their respective political ideologies, to such issues as human rights, trade policy, and the status of Taiwan that make any improvements in relations a delicate process. An especially prominent obstacle to greater cooperation of any sort are the mutual suspicions over security issues. US-Chinese military-to-military contacts, for example, have varied greatly, reflecting the vagaries in the general tenor of Sino-American relations—and space was no exception. In October 2006, the commander of the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), Marine General James Cartwright, expressed interest in engaging the PLA on such space issues as collision avoidance and perceptions of attacks on satellites. He hoped to raise these topics in discussions with his counterpart, General Jing Zhiyuan, commander of the Chinese Second Artillery force (which is responsible for China’s nuclear forces). Indeed, Jing’s visit had been discussed as part of the same April 2006 Hu-Bush summit that had led to NASA Administrator Griffin’s visit. 8 As of the end of 2008, however, Jing had still not visited the United States, despite repeated invitations. The security issue is especially prominent in the multilateral arena, which directly affects prospects for space cooperation. Although both the US and the PRC are members of the UN Outer Space Committee (also known as the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space or COPUOS) and the Ad Hoc Committee for Preventing an

**[CARD CONTINUES]**

Coop Fails – Fundamental Differences (3/3)

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Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) within the UN Conference on Disarmament, little movement has occurred in either body. Significant differences of opinion on the utility of a new arms control agreement (proposed by the PRC and Russia, and opposed by the United States), coupled with complicating linkages to such issues as limits on new fissile materials, have led to few new space-related developments in these multilateral security arenas.

China’s challenges to US space leadership indicates they are our rivals, not collaborators

Statement by Wolf, (R-VA) chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee that oversees the budgets of NASA, 2011

(Frank R., “Wolf: U.S. Should Not Help China With Its Space Program”, Congressional Documents and Publications (U.S. House Of Representatives Documents), May 11, Lexis, accessed July 6, 2011, NS)

"Space is the ultimate 'high ground' that has provided the U.S. with countless security and economic advantages over the last 40 years. As the victor of the Cold War 'space race' with the Soviet Union, the U.S. has held an enormous advantage in space technology, defense capabilities, and advanced sciences."Our space program has been the envy of the world. Federal investments in NASA have generated entirely new sectors of our economy, creating hundreds of thousands of private sector jobs for Americans."It should not be surprising that many countries have taken notice of the tremendous benefits that the American space program has yielded. It is clear that we are now entering an era of much greater civil, defense and commercial competition in space."Most countries expanding their space programs are strong U.S. allies that are primarily interested in advancing science research or building a commercial space industry. The Chinese, however, do not fall into this category. Over the last decade, China has developed its space program at a surprising pace. In less than 10 years the Chinese have gone from launching their first manned spacecraft to unveiling plans last week for an advanced Chinese space station designed to rival the International Space Station. "However, the Chinese are not only focusing on establishing a significant presence in Low Earth Orbit. In March, the Chinese state news agency announced its plans for 'a powerful carrier rocket for making a manned moon landing and exploring deep space.' This announcement confirms what space experts have long believed: the Chinese have their sights set on the pinnacle of American achievement - landing a man on the moon."According to the article, the Chinese are planning a heavy lift rocket capable of carrying up to 130 tons. This would provide the capacity to launch the critical components for a lunar landing. The announcement made clear that if the United States does not get serious about its own Exploration Program, the next flag planted on the moon may be a Chinese flag.

Coop Fails – Different Goals

Cooperation won’t work – China and US have different goals

Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009

(Dean B., “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space Defense: Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, p.10-11, <http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf>, accessed 7/6/11) EK

In this regard, American and Chinese negotiators tend to take very different approaches. Chinese negotiators in general seek first to establish sets of principles that will then govern all subsequent interactions. 22 For example, in many international negotiations, the Chinese emphasize the importance of both sides starting from the “five principles of peaceful co-existence”: • Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty • Mutual non-aggression • Mutual non-interference in internal affairs • Equality and mutual benefit • Peaceful coexistence 23 This is in direct contrast to the American approach, in which negotiations begin by establishing specifics, “avoiding debates about generalities which can easily become entangled in political or philosophical differences.” 24 In essence, Chinese negotiators tend to adopt a “top-down” approach, with senior leaders focusing on broad principles, whereas American negotiators more frequently adopt a “bottom-up” approach, with working level officials focusing on concrete measures. The first two factors listed by Ambassador Matano indicate, again, that American and Chinese negotiators hold very different perceptions of the significance of negotiations. In general, the Chinese, unlike their American counterparts, do not see political negotiations as “a highly technical process of haggling over details in which the two sides move to a point of convergence from their original positions through incremental compromises.” 26 Instead, they are viewed an attempt to reconcile (or impose) “principles and objectives of the two sides and the testing of their interlocutor’s commitment to a relationship with the PRC.” 27 Rather than “getting to ‘Yes,’” for the Chinese “the purpose…is to size the opposition to draw out the US position with minimum exposure of China’s.” 28

Coop Fails – Bureaucracy

Differences in space organization make space cooperation between China and the U.S. nearly impossible.

Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009

(Dean B., “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space Defense: Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, p.8, <http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf>, accessed 7/6/11) EK

While this integration of civilian and military organizations and systems may be understandable, especially in light of constrained Chinese human, financial, and technological resources, it nonetheless complicates any effort at Sino-American cooperation. The opacity and uncertainty regarding the organization of China’s space efforts, beyond the role of the PLA, adds yet another layer of complication. The United States and the PRC have almost no parallels in how each has organized its overall space organizations and political infrastructure. This makes establishing counterparts for even discussing space cooperation much more difficult.

U.S.-China space cooperation won’t work – even Chinese officials don’t know how the Chinese space bureaucracy works.

Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009

(Dean B., “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space Defense: Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, p.10, <http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf>, accessed 7/6/11) EK

Even Chinese officials appear uncertain at this time about exactly how the various pieces of the Chinese space bureaucracy will fit together, noting that the reorganization remains “a work in progress.” Nonetheless, the uncertainty associated with the basic organization of the Chinese space bureaucracy, including who is subordinate to whom, underscores the potential difficulties confronting more extended negotiations between the two sides, as well as more extensive cooperation.

Coop Fails – Transparency (1/3)

**US-China Space cooperation requires completely transparency and remains unlikely**

**Economist ‘09**

(00130613, 10/24/2009, Vol. 392, Issue 8654 “Aiming High” <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=46&hid=10&sid=a03a83d6-ae6c-48cd-aed8-847f942a8f89%40sessionmgr10&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=a9h&AN=44812133>EBSCOhost 7/2/11 BLG)

But the prospects are dim. **Many American officials are still seething at China's test of an anti-satellite missile in 2007. It blew up an ageing Chinese weather satellite, leaving thousands of pieces of debris in orbit that pose considerable danger to other space-based equipment** (a small chunk came close to the ISS in September). Even if the Americans wanted to get Chinese help with the ISS project, they would have to get agreement from other ISS partners. The Russians might object to the introduction of a competitor to their space-transport service. Japan has similar ambitions, and launched its first unmanned spacecraft to the ISS in September**. A NASA official says that any co-operation would require "total transparency" from the Chinese. This would include allowing the Americans to go to China's launch-control centre and get to know the nuts and bolts of its launch vehicle. There seems little chance of this.** But the Americans hardly have to worry that the Chinese are about to surpass them, as they certainly did in 1957 when the Soviet Union became the first to put a satellite into orbit. Jiao Weixin of Peking University says China's space-exploration capabilities are 30 years behind America's. A billboard on a main thoroughfare in Wenchang tries to whip up space excitement with a huge picture of a launch pad at take-off. It shows flames pouring from boosters attached to what is clearly America's very own Space Shuttle

No transparency – other factors make any efforts fail

Martel and Yoshihara, The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 3

(William C. Martel is a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College in Rhode Island. Toshi Yoshihara is a doctoral candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and a research fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis in Massachusetts., “Averting a Sino-U.S. Space Race” The Washington Quarterly 26.4 (2003) 19-35, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v026/26.4martel.html>, Accessed July 1, 2011, EJONES)

Perhaps it is too soon to conclude that Beijing and Washington are locked on a path toward a military space race. Because of the potential for such competition, however, it is in both their interests to consider opportunities for cooperation that would ensure that the space infrastructure remains a public good for the international community. One option could be to develop [End Page 27] a series of measures to establish transparency in an effort to bolster mutual confidence, thus decreasing the likelihood of competition in space. The incentives for establishing transparency that could lead to further Sino-U.S. cooperation in space remain so woefully limited, however, that it may be years before these conditions could prevail.The term "transparency" basically refers to a condition of openness that allows states to signal their intentions and capabilities by obtaining or exchanging information on items or activities that are of interest to the parties involved. Transparency permits states to increase their confidence about whether an activity is taking place and, more importantly, provides early warning of suspicious behavior. Although the term is generally associated with arms control, the concept of transparency has broader applications, such as preserving openness in global financial transactions. In practical terms, transparency requires several key steps, including military-to-military contacts and broader exchanges (between weapons labs, for example) of information on defense budgets, doctrine, plans and operations, decisionmaking processes, acquisition, and research and development programs. In its most intrusive form, transparency involves full accounting of a declared activity or a commitment to a treaty regime. The purpose of mutually understood declaratory policies and doctrines is to spell out the rules of the game and thus those actions that could lead to confrontation. The goal is to enable each state to engage in reciprocal and observable activities that signal a commitment to enforcing predictable rules of behavior in times of peace and of crisis as part of a strategy to avoid the miscalculation that could lead to war. Transparency requires both sides to be ready to take measures that permit them to exchange sensitive information and to share perceptions about the risks and threats that could undermine international security. During the Cold War, the superpowers realized that they could inflict extraordinary harm on each other with nuclear weapons, and they experienced several near misses, such as the Cuban missile crisis. In that climate, both sides gradually came to understand that transparency, which was often pursued through arms control measures, could improve their security Today, however,

**[CARD CONTINUES]**

Coop Fails – Transparency (2/3)

**[CARD CONTINUED, NO TEXT REMOVED]**

no such degree of animosity exists between the United States and China; nor is it clear that Washington or Beijing believes that it confronts a common problem in space, which demands mutual collaboration. Ironically, the absence of prolonged, severe tensions and the ambiguity that continues to surround the future of bilateral ties have obscured the potential dangers of competition in space. This lack of urgency partly explains why there is stillno consensus in Washington on whether to constrain or expand U.S. military activities in space. [End Page 28] Even if Beijing and Washington were to engage in measures designed to build transparency into their space programs, the tremendous disparity in their technological capabilities creates another serious impediment to sharing information. The United States is so far ahead in almost every technological sense that Washington has relatively little, if anything, to learn from China's last generation of space technologies, whereas the PRC would benefit enormously from recent U.S. technological innovations. In the face of overwhelming U.S. technological superiority, China has few bargaining chips to offer. Equally problematic is the fact that both Washington and Beijing cloak their space programs in extraordinary levels of secrecy. Each side probably believes that maintaining great uncertainty in the minds of potential adversaries enhances their security.China shields its space program from scrutiny to hide its relatively inferior position; the United States does so to maintain its technological lead. This culture of secrecy creates an impediment to enhancing mutual understanding about the other's intentions. A dominant feature in Chinese policy has been Beijing's traditional reticence to reveal its intentions on matters of national security and military capabilities. Moreover, China's reluctance to reveal just how technologically backward and militarily weak it actually is reinforces this secretive tendency. Successive generations of defense White Papers have repeatedly demonstrated the insular nature of China's security apparatus. Unsurprisingly, U.S. efforts to encourage greater transparency on the part of the Chinese have invariably proved disappointing. For example, the initial curtailment of military-to-military contacts early in the Bush administration reflected U.S. officials' widespread frustration over the lack of Chinese reciprocity. Moreover, the internal opacity of Chinese policymaking casts doubt on the accuracy of the information flowing from China. The disastrous initial cover-up of the SARS outbreak offers clear evidence of this problem.

For all these reasons, Washington and Beijing lack the incentives needed to lead to information exchange. With the possible exceptions of vague unilateral declarations and bilateral exchanges, both sides are not at the stage where they are likely to pursue transparency in their space programs. Furthermore, as long as the United States maintains its technological lead while China accelerates its efforts to achieve some degree of parity in space, the elements of transparency will not exist for some time to come. [End Page 29] Meanwhile, a poisonous atmosphere of distrust continues to prevail as a result of allegations in the past decade that Chinese espionage and illegal transfers of U.S. space technologies strengthened China's military space program. For example, in the mid-1990s, after a series of launch failures, China turned to Loral Systems, a U.S. satellite firm, for technical assistance. Subsequent investigations revealed that Loral had released sensitive technical data to the Chinese that may have helped the PRC improve its missile guidance capabilities. In 1999 a U.S. congressional investigation chaired by Representative Christopher Cox (R-Calif.) concluded that the performance of China's launchers improved as a result ofthose transfers. [27](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v026/26.4martel.html#FOOT27) In another case, the Department of State recently charged that, in the 1990s, the Boeing Company and Hughes Electronics Corporation violated up to 123 export restrictions related to the transfer of missile and satellite data to China. [28](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v026/26.4martel.html#FOOT28) As a result of these events, lingering suspicions on Capitol Hill will impede efforts to spearhead bilateral cooperation in space and could provoke a congressional backlash against attempts to try. If these mutual suspicions and disincentives to cooperation persist, Washington and Beijing might be headed on a collision course in space. Therefore, the foreign policy and defense communities should address at least two important questions. First, how will China respond to continued U.S. dominance in space, especially if bilateral ties deteriorate into hostility in the future? In other words, will China devise counterstrategies and invest heavily in space capabilities to blunt or undermine U.S. supremacy in space? Second, under what scenarios or contingencies would China or the United States employ space-based warfare against the other? [29](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v026/26.4martel.html#FOOT29)

**Coop Fails – Transparency (3/3)**

No solvency – China won’t budge on transparency

Cheng, Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center, 09

(Dean, The Heritage Foundation, “U.S.-China Space Cooperation: More Costs Than Benefits,” 8-30-9, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/us-china-space-cooperation-more-costs-than-benefits>, 6-29-11, GJV)

So what would be the purpose of cooperation from the Chinese perspective? To sustain the ISS? China is hardly likely to be interested in joining the ISS just in time to turn out the lights. There is also the question of whether the other partners in the international station, such as Russia and Japan, are necessarily interested in including China, especially now that the most expensive work has already been completed. There is also the issue of transparency. While it seems logical that the principal partners for cooperation would be the Chinese and American civil space agencies, the reality is that the China National Space Agency is, in fact, nested within the Chinese military-industrial complex rather than being a stand-alone agency. Indeed, China's space program is overwhelmingly military in nature. And nowhere more so than in the manned space program, the "commanders" or "directors" of which include the head of the General Armaments Department, one of the four general departments responsible for day-to-day management of the entire People's Liberation Army (PLA). The challenges presented by the Chinese space program's strong ties to the PLA are exacerbated by the generally opaque nature of China's space program on issues ranging from who the top decision-makers are to the size of their budget. Any effort at cooperation is likely to be stymied so long as the PRC views transparency as a one-way affair.

Coop Fails – China is Behind

U.S.-China cooperation fails – China is too technologically behind and the U.S. would not gain anything from co-operation.

Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009

(Dean B., “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space Defense: Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, p.6, <http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf>, accessed 7/6/11) EK

At the most basic level, one of the key obstacles to increased Sino-American space cooperation is the disparity in space-related experience. The United States has placed over a thousand objects into orbit; by contrast, the PRC has only orbited a hundred. In the realm of human spaceflight, the disparity is even greater. The United States has nearly fifty years of experience with manned missions; the PRC, as of 2008, had thus far engaged in only three actual crewed flights. Paralleling the differences in experience, there are also differences in technological capability. Chinese systems often have a shorter lifespan than their Western counterparts. The Chinese Fengyun-2 geostationary weather satellites, for example, had projected lifespans of only two years; by contrast, the US GOES (Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite) has a projected lifespan of 5 years, but often exceeds that (GOES-10, for example, was launched in 1997, and exhausted its fuel in 2006). Chinese literature does suggest that the latest generation Fengyun weather satellite and Dongfanghong-4 communications satellite will have life-spans approaching those of their Western counterparts. These differences complicate any effort at cooperation, since it is not clear what the United States would necessarily gain from cooperating with the PRC, at least in terms of technology and experience.

The Chinese don’t have enough technology to work with the US on the ISS

Cheng, Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center, 09

(Dean, The Heritage Foundation, “U.S.-China Space Cooperation: More Costs Than Benefits,” 8-30-9, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/us-china-space-cooperation-more-costs-than-benefits>, 6-29-11, GJV)

The idea of relying on Chinese cooperation glosses over very real problems. At a minimum, it is an open question whether the PRC is capable of providing substantial support to the International Space Station (ISS) in the timeframes discussed by the report. It is important to recall that the PRC has had only three manned missions and has never undertaken a manned docking maneuver. Would the U.S. and its partners be comfortable inviting a neophyte Chinese crew to dock with the ISS?

Coop Fails – ISS – Coop Unlikely

Cooperation with China and the US has multiple problems

Foust, Aerospace Analyst, Journalist and Publisher, 03

(Jeff, The Space Review, “China, Shenzhou, and the ISS,” 8-20, <http://www.thespacereview.com/article/53/1>, 7-1-11, GJV)

While there may be a number of good reasons for adding China to the ISS project, there are a number of barriers as well. Hays believes that convincing China to join could be a bigger obstacle than convincing the US and the other existing international partners. “My perception is that the resistance is more on the part of the Chinese at this point than it is on the part of the space station partners,” he said, basing his comments on conversations he said he’s had with people in NASA’s international programs office. “China still has issues internally about where they are going,” said Hitchens, noting that the People’s Liberation Army runs the Chinese space program. If the US and the other partners decided they wanted to bring include China, there would still be problems to address on the US side. “The biggest challenge to bringing the Chinese on board the ISS will be dealing with elements of the US government—the State Department, the DoD—on Chinese nonproliferation issues,” said Hays. Hays also believed that timing was a key issue. “The window of opportunity [after Shenzhou 5] may close the further downstream the Chinese go” if they believe they will gain greater prestige benefits by going it alone, he suggested. “The United States and the world spaceflight community needs to seize this opportunity pretty quickly.” As the panel session was wrapping up in Arlington on the evening of the 14th, halfway around the world a Long March 2F rocket was lifting off from Jiuquan, carrying Yang Liwei aboard Shenzhou 5. If there is indeed a window of opportunity for adding China to the International Space Station, then that window is now open.

\*\*\* Relations Solvency Answers

No Relations Solvency – Coop Fails

Sino-US relations will take a lot time to develop and would only happen if they were reciprocal

Bolden, NASA administrator, 11/16/10

(Charles, All-hands Address at the Marshall Space Flight Center, Transcript provided by Space News, <http://www.spacenews.com/images/Marshallallhands.pdf>, accessed 7/6/11) EK

My opinion is they really want to be a member of the, what I call the society of space fearing nations. I went there with three principles and I repeated them over and over and over again everywhere I went, and that was if they were going to do anything with us, and we went there to listen. We didn’t go to propose or to make any deals or anything. We went to listen. But I told them that if anything was going to come from a relationship between the United States and China in space, then they would have to demonstrate to us that they could be transparent in all dealings, that they would have to demonstrate that they were willing to exercise reciprocity which means they give us something, we give them something and we go back and forth. And then the third thing is they had to be mutually beneficial to both nations. If we didn’t get anything out of it, we weren’t interested. We felt that they were the same way. “And I will tell you one thing. My final night there, I met with the big head of their human space flight program who ironically is also head of their anti-satellite program. An odd mix of responsibility. He is a Three-Star, a lieutenant general in the People’s Liberation Army Air Force or something. And he started out the conversation. He introduced the conversation and he said they’re going to be very candid. We don’t need you. We don’t need the United States, and you don’t need us. But the potential, if we choose to work together, is incredible. I thought that spoke volumes. Very, very candid. And they don’t. They don’t need us, and we don’t need them. But I happen to be one who kind of every once in a while just wonders about what things could be like if we were able to bring more countries into the partnership. It’s going to be difficult and it will take years, but we may get there sometime.”

Attempts to solve space issues do nothing to improve Sino-American relations

Hagt, World Security China Program Director, ‘8

(Eric, also editor of China Security, 26 February 2008, “Mirror Imaging and Worst Case Scenarios”, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/SurvivalTellis.pdf>, p. 164, 7.2.11, SWolff)

Ashley Tellis weaves a compelling argument of China’s counterspace strategy and its implications for space arms control. His logic rests on two principle elements. ‘China’s pursuit of counterspace capabilities … is not driven fundamentally by a desire to protest American space policies … but is part of a considered strategy designed to counter the overall military capability of the United States.’ This underpins Tellis’s conclusion that ‘Washington should not invest time, energy and resources in attempting to negotiate space-control arrangements ... Such regimes are destined to be stillborn because the larger strategic logic conspires against them.’ In other words, the pursuit of a space arms-control regime is futile, even harmful to US interests, because China’s strategy to challenge American space dominance is unyielding to anything the United States can do.

No Relations Solvency – Space Not Key

Mistrust and power struggles guarantee no cooperation with China.

Richburg, B.A. at University of Michigan in Poli Sci and History ‘11

(Keith B., B.A. at UMich in Political Science and History in the Honors Program, Washington Post New York Bureau Chief, London School of Economics, The Washington Post, 23 January 2011, “As China eyes the stars, U.S. watches warily”, LexisNexis, 7.1.11, SWolff)

China's grand ambitions extend literally to the moon, with the country now embarked on a multi-pronged program to establish its own global navigational system, launch a space laboratory and put a Chinese astronaut on the moon within the next decade. The Obama administration views space as ripe territory for cooperation with China. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has called it one of four potential areas of "strategic dialogue," along with cybersecurity, missile defense and nuclear weapons. And President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao vowed after their White House summit last week to "deepen dialogue and exchanges" in the field. But as China ramps up its space initiatives, the diplomatic talk of cooperation has so far found little traction. The Chinese leadership has shown scant interest in opening up the most sensitive details of its program, much of which is controlled by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). At the same time, Chinese scientists and space officials say that Washington's wariness of China's intentions in space, as well as U.S. bans on some high-technology exports, makes cooperation problematic. For now, the U.S.-China relationship in space appears to mirror the one on Earth - a still-dominant but fading superpower facing a new and ambitious rival, with suspicion on both sides. "What you have are two major powers, both of whom use space for military, civilian and commercial purposes," said Dean Cheng, a researcher with the Washington-based Heritage Foundation and an expert on the Chinese military and space program. NASA's human spaceflight program has been in flux in recent years, fueling particular concern among some U.S. observers about the challenge posed by China's initiatives in that area. There is "a lot of very wary, careful, mutual watching," Cheng said. Song Xiaojun, a military expert and commentator on China's CCTV, said that substantial cooperation in the space field is impossible without mutual trust. Achieving that, he said, "depends on whether the U.S. can put away its pride and treat China as a partner to cooperate on equal terms. But I don't see that happening in the near future, since the U.S. is experiencing menopause while China is going through puberty." But while China may still be an adolescent in terms of space exploration - launching its first astronaut in 2003 - it has made some notable strides in recent months and years, and plans seem on track for some major breakthroughs. On the day Hu left for his U.S. trip, Chinese news media reported the inauguration of a new program to train astronauts - called taikonauts here - for eventual deployment to the first Chinese space station, planned for 2015. As part of the project, two launches are planned for this year, that of an unmanned space module, called Tiangong-1, or "Heavenly Palace," by summer, and later an unmanned Shenzhou spacecraft that will attempt to dock with it. On a separate track, China is also working through a three-stage process for carrying out its first manned moon landing.

No Relations Solvency – Multiple Barriers

Multiple barriers to strong Sino-US relations: US-Japanese joint projects, the Taiwan conflict, and covert Chinese proliferation

**Martel, Naval War College professor of national security affairs & Yoshihara, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis research fellow, 3**

(William C. and Toshi, Autumn 2003, Washington Quarterly, “Averting Sino-US Space Race”, p. 23-25, <http://www.twq.com/03autumn/docs/03autumn_martel.pdf>, accessed: 7/1/11, SL)

At the same time that the United States views space dominance as a fundamental tenet of its national security, China evidently views U.S. space dominance as a major threat to its geostrategic interests. These views inevitably breed a zero-sum competition, in which one side perceives any loss as a gain for the other, and could ultimately prove destabilizing for Sino-U.S. relations. First, Beijing perceives the proposed U.S. missile defense system, which will be supported by an array of space systems and sensors , as a strategic menace to China and to international security. 15 Many China watchers contend that this perception stems from anxieties that any conceivable system of missile defenses being developed by the Bush administration will undermine China’s small nuclear deterrent. 16 Beijing remains wary of the joint research program on missile defense by the U.S.-Japanese alliance, which the PRC sees as a potential partnership for blocking Chinese regional aspirations or, in broader terms, for containing China. Of particular concern for Beijing is the possibility that Tokyo’s decision formally to join U.S. plans for deploying missile defense in Northeast Asia will significantly increase Japan’s military capabilities by providing an opportunity for Japanese forces to enjoy unprecedented military integration with U.S. forces in the areas of spacebased intelligence and communications. Second, the military use of space has profound implications for the uneasy stalemate in the Taiwan Strait, which has always presented the possi-bility of a major confrontation between Washington and Beijing. One argument is that U.S. capabilities allow the United States to project power near Taiwan, while the space-based sensors and weapons for missile defense could blunt China’s arsenal of ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan. Moreover, the prospect of transfers of missile defense systems to Taiwan, which could usher in a period of unprecedented military cooperation between Taipei and Washington, no doubt deeply troubles Beijing. China , for its par t , will increasingly need military space capabilities if it is to improve its ability to coerce Taiwan in a conflict and counter U.S. intervention to defend the island in a crisis or conflict. A final argument is that, even though recent Chinese efforts to curtail the transfer of technologies related to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have progressed (albeit haltingly), proliferation remains a key point of contention in Sino-U.S. relations. Indeed, China played a key role in the status of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities as well as in North Korea’s development of long-range Taepo-dong missiles . Recent revelations about Islamabad’s nuclear assistance to Pyongyang in exchange for missile technology suggest that many roads lead to Beijing when it comes to WMD proliferation in the region. In May 2003, the Bush administration imposed sanctions on a major, state-owned Chinese firm for allegedly assisting Iran’s ballistic missile program. 17 The technologies behind Beijing’s proliferation of ballistic missile technologies are highly relevant to the development of China’s space power. These differing bilateral perspectives on space and security are contributing to the growing perception in both capitals that the other poses a significant military and strategic threat in space. The prevailing assessments in Beijing and Washington are notable for their unmistakable apprehension of each other. For example, annual Pentagon reviews of China’s military, which began in 1998, have produced an ominous picture of PRC space capabilities. 18 Even while conceding that China’s technologies lag far behind those of the West, these reports argue that the exploitation of space is beginning to dominate Chinese military strategy. They also assert that the PRC has established key military programs for the specific purpose of denying the United States its use of space. For example, China is reportedly developing a high-energy laser that could temporarily dazzle or permanently blind the sensors on imaging satellites. Department of Defense assessments have also concluded that, by 2010, China will have indigenously developed advanced space technologies as well as imaging and communications satellites. Of particular concern and the subject of intense scrutiny by the Pentagon is China’s interest in developing antisatellite capabilities that would prevent the United States from using military and commercial satellites.19

No Relations Solvency – Taiwan

Space co-op can’t solve alone, only severing ties with Taiwan will solve for relations.

Friedberg, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton, 6/21/11

(Aaron L., professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, “Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics”, The National Interest, July-August Issue, p.3, <http://nationalinterest.org/article/hegemony-chinese-characteristics-5439?page=1>, accessed 7/8/11) EK

In fact, because ideology inclines the United States to be more suspicious and hostile toward China than it would be for strategic reasons alone, it also tends to reinforce Washington’s willingness to help other democracies that feel threatened by Chinese power, even if this is not what a pure realpolitik calculation of its interests might seem to demand. Thus the persistence—indeed the deepening—of American support for Taiwan during the 1990s cannot be explained without reference to the fact that the island was evolving from an authoritarian bastion of anti-Communism to a liberal democracy. Severing the last U.S. ties to Taipei would remove a major source of friction with China and a potential cause of war. Such a move might even be conceivable if Taiwan still appeared to many Americans as it did in the 1970s, as an oppressive, corrupt dictatorship. But the fact that Taiwan is now seen as a genuine (if flawed) democracy will make it extremely difficult for Washington to ever willingly cut it adrift.

No Relations Solvency – Human Rights

The US would never cooperate with an agency that props up an authoritarian regime

Logan, Specialist in energy policy, Congressional Research Service 9-29-08

(Jeffrey has a M.S. in environmental science and Master in Public Administration,1995, Indiana University, School of Public and Environmental Affairs B.S. in aerospace engineering and B.A. in general arts and sciences, 1985, Pennsylvania State University <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22777.pdf> “China’s Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation,” pg. 5 accessed: 6-28-11) TJL

Moral compromise.China is widely criticized for its record on human rights and non-democratic governance. Any collaboration that improves the standing of authoritarian Chinese leaders might thus be viewed as unacceptable.

Chinese human rights violations mean it is unethical and unconstitutional for the US to cooperate with their space program

Statement by Wolf, (R-VA) chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee that oversees the budgets of NASA, 2011

(Frank R., “Wolf: U.S. Should Not Help China With Its Space Program”, Congressional Documents and Publications (U.S. House Of Representatives Documents), May 11, Lexis, accessed July 6, 2011, NS)

"Consider our differing worldviews. The U.S. was founded on the premise that liberty is a birthright, that individual human life is sacred, that the freedom to worship according to the dictates of your conscience is paramount. The Chinese government operates antithetically to these beliefs."There is no clearer indication of the gulf that exists between our two countries than the Chinese government's treatment of its own people. "According to the Cardinal Kung Foundation, currently every one of the more than 30 underground bishops of the Catholic Church is either in jail, under house arrest, under strict surveillance, or in hiding. Protestant house church pastors are routinely intimidated and imprisoned. Their congregations worship in secret. "An underground house church in Beijing - that I visited shortly before the 2008 Olympic Games - has come under growing harassment from the government for daring to hold a worship service in public. Dozens have been arrested or detained. "According to the Congressional Executive Commission on China's Political Prisoner Database, as of July 2009, there were 689 Tibetan prisoners of conscience, 439 of whom were monks or nuns. Uyghur Muslims face persecution by the Chinese government as well. China maintains an extensive system of slave labor camps as large as that which existed in the former Soviet Union."This is but a snapshot of what can only be described as a grim human rights situation in China. But rather than being a voice for the voiceless, we see U.S. government officials - like the president's science advisor - who spent three weeks in China last year kowtowing to the Chinese regime. "Ronald Reagan once spoke of the U.S. constitution as a covenant 'we have made not only with ourselves, but with all of mankind.' We risk breaking that covenant with the kind of posture we display today. "At the same time that the 2010 Nobel Prize recipient Liu Xiaobo was jailed, the 2009 Nobel Prize winner, President Obama, was hosting a state dinner for Chinese premier Hu Jintao and committing the U.S. to more cooperation on space with China. One of the world's worst human rights abusers does not deserve to be rewarded with greater 'cooperation' with the U.S."For these reasons, I have been very concerned by this administration's apparent eagerness to work with China on its space program. The U.S. has no business cooperating with the PLA to help develop its space program."That is why I included language in the Fiscal Year 2011 Continuing Resolution preventing NASA and the Office of Science and Technology Policy from using federal funds 'to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company.'

No Relations Solvency – No Effective Communication

Dialogue alone does not solve conflict or relations

Houpt, Master of Arts, Security Studies, Georgetown University, 2011

(Daniel M., “Does China have a comprehensive, coordinated, and consistent space policy? Implications for U.S. policymakers,” ProQuest, accessed 7/1/11, p. 56) EK

To address the security challenges posed by China and influence Chinese thinking, some have argued the need for a strategic dialogue between U.S. and China to prevent miscalculation and misinterpretation of space goals. This is an important step, but it will take many years and dedicated discussions to end the mutual suspicion that seems to currently define U.S.-China space relations. For the time being, the U.S. will be captured more by the fervor sparked by a PLA general speaking about space war than Chinese MFA statements and the Chinese will continue to believe most U.S. space initiatives are aimed at preventing China’s success in space. Therefore, the U.S. needs to also undertake other actions to both prevent mutual distrust from leading to conflict and to shape the direction of Chinese space policy.

Relations & Coop Answers

\*\*\*Coop Bad

Coop Bad – Kills Relations

Cooperation will hurt US-Sino Relations

David, SPACE.com space insider columnist, 11

(Leonard, Winner of this year’s National Space Club Press Award, Leonard David has been reporting on the space industry for more than five decades, past editor-in-chief of the National Space Society’s Ad Astra and Space World magazines and has written for SPACE.com since 1999, SPACE.com, “China’s First Space Station: A New Foothold in Earth Orbit,” May 6, <http://www.space.com/11592-china-space-station-tiangong-details.html>, accessed 7/7/11) KA

**Military implications** Cheng sees potential military implications from the imminent testing of rendezvous and docking know-how by China. "Not so much in terms of manned military missions … Rather, rendezvous and docking skills can be transferred to unmanned spacecraft, whether it is for kinetic kill operations or inspection of foreign satellites -- say, for intelligence or war-fighting purposes or other malign purposes," Cheng said. All of this underscores why repeated attempts by the U.S. to ignite cooperation in the area of manned space are unlikely to bear fruit, Cheng said, "but likely to result in catastrophe." That is, if there is a failure in the cooperation (not technical failure, but failure of political will, or failure of political steadfastness to see things through), then it will have enormous repercussions, which would be bad for the larger Sino-US relationship, Cheng added. Cheng said that the Chinese are explicitly following a policy of "indigenous innovation" -- a heavy emphasis on self-reliance. "China's space program is largely home-grown and a point of pride to the Chinese," he added. "Why should they cooperate with the U.S.? What is in it for them … especially in light of the export control regulations aimed at China?"

Failure in U.S.-China co-op will damage relations for a long time - media would exacerbate this

Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009

(Dean B., “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space Defense: Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, p.16, <http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf>, accessed 7/6/11) EK

In particular, it is worth considering the consequences of potential failure—that is, if a given initiative were to fail, either due to internal political pressures from either side or external political developments (e.g., an EP-3 type incident), how would this affect the overall course of Sino-US cooperation in space and in other areas? The perceived failure of high-profile projects would likely generate a long-term adverse effect on US-Chinese cooperation in space and elsewhere. Conversely, while successes in small projects may not create as much benefit, they would provide additional data for subsequent cooperative efforts. In this regard, it is useful to consider that the Apollo-Soyuz mission occurred after the negotiation of the SALT I Accords, and in the midst of SALT II, as well as a variety of negotiations (e.g., Helsinki). The pressures of today’s media environment also would militate against high-visibility projects. On the one hand, news that the US was negotiating with China to cooperate on space issues would generate correspondingly heightened expectations from the American mass media—which the Chinese media would happily abet. The push to initial some kind of agreement would run counter to the need for patience when negotiating with Beijing.

Coop Bad – Cost

US-Sino space coop is costly and kills solvency

**Seedhouse,** aerospace scientist & PhD from German Space Agency's Institute of Space Medicine, 10

[Erik,aerospace scientist & PhD from German Space Agency's Institute of Space Medicine, “The New Space Race: China vs. the US” Springer and Praxis Publishing Co., <http://www.scribd.com/doc/31809026/The-New-Space-Race-China-Vs>, page 209-210, accessed6/31/11, HK]

Many analysis assert that china is serious about maintaining leadership in space, it should engage the Chinese in the ISS program, perhaps inviting them to dock a Shcazhou capsule at the ISS. Although the US has made several attempts in the direction of collaborating with China, the record shows mixed results. For example.in September. 2006. NASA Administrator. Dr Michael Griffin, visited his Chinese counterpart. Laiyan Sun, in China, to investigate the possibility of cooperating with the China National Space Administration (CNSA). NASA's proposal was to allow the cooperation of Chinese scientists in a mission to deliver the large Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS) to the ISS. No follow-on activities were announced following the trip, although ihe Chinese issued a proposal for ongoing dialog between NASA and the CNSA that suggested annual exchanges.1Any progress that the meeting between Laiyan and Griffin might have generated was quickly forgotten when, on January 11th. 2007. China conducted its first ASAT test. There are space experts who argue that international cooperation is essential in maintaining a space exploration program and. by collaborating with China, the US will surely save time and money in pursuing the VSE's goals. In reality, the US is already locked into partnerships with more than a dozen nations as a part of the ISS program, including most of Europe. Washington has learned from bitter experience that major international projects almost always end up costing more, taking longer, and delivering less than a national program. While many observers have extolled the benefits of US Russian cooperation during the ISS program, in reality, the venture was a disaster. First, because Russian hardware was years late in delivery, NASA's costs spiraled out of control. Second, the situation was exacerbated by the billions of dollars wasted in redesigning integration hardware. 1 hird.in exchange for just 5% of the financial contribution. Russia was granted 40% of the station's facilities, in addition to making billions of dollars in foreign sales of space hardware! Not surprisingly, from a financial perspective, the US-Russian cooperation experience is one that the Americans will not want to repeat by collaborating with the Chinese.

Coop Bad – Multiple Countries Backlash

US space cooperation with China will hurt alliance with Japan, triggering a space race – Nixon shocks prove

Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009

(Dean B., “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space Defense: Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, p.13-14, <http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf>, accessed 7/6/11) EK

For Japan, whose “peace constitution” forbids it from using war as an instrument of state policy, the United States is an essential guarantor of its security. Any move by the US that might undermine this view raises not only the prospect of weakening US-Japanese ties, but also potentially affecting Japan’s security policies. In this regard, then, it is essential not to engage in activities that would undercut perceptions of American reliability. Such moves, it should be noted, are not limited to those in the security realm. For example, the Nixon administration undertook several initiatives in the late 1960s and early 1970s that rocked Tokyo-Washington relations, and are still remembered as the “Nixon shocks.” While some of these were in the realm of security (including Nixon’s opening to China and the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine), the others were in the trade area. These included a ten percent surcharge on all imports entering the US and suspended the convertibility of the dollar (i.e., removed the US from the gold standard). 36 Part of the “shock” was the fundamental nature of these shifts. Even more damaging, however, was the failure of the Nixon Administration to consult their Japanese counterparts, catching them wholly off-guard. It took several years for the effects of these shocks to wear off.If the United States is intent upon expanding space relations with the PRC, then it would behoove it to consult Japan, in order to minimize the prospect of a “space shock.” Failing to do so may well incur a Japanese reaction. The decision on the part of Japan to build an explicitly intelligence-focused satellite was in response to the North Korean missile test of 1999, suggesting that Tokyo is fully capable of undertaking space-oriented responses when it is concerned.37 That, in turn, would potentially arouse the ire of China. The tragic history of Sino-Japanese relations continues to cast a baleful influence upon current interactions between the two states. If there is not a “space race” currently underway between Beijing and Tokyo, it would be most unfortunate if American actions were to precipitate one.

U.S.-Sino space cooperation is perceived by India and will trigger a backlash

Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009

(Dean B., “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space Defense: Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, p.14-15, <http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf>, accessed 7/6/11) EK

India constitutes yet another participant in a potential Asian space race. Fueled by a growing economy, India has steadily improved its space capabilities, launching the Chandrayaan-1 lunar probe in 2008, soon after the Japanese Kaguya and Chinese Chang’e-1 probes. Again, this is not to suggest that there is a space race underway, but it would be hard to deny that the major Asian powers are each watching the others carefully (or, more accurately, that China is being watched carefully by its neighbors). That space is a major potential arena for competition among these states is highlighted by the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation Between Japan and India, initialed by the Japanese and Indian Prime Ministers on October 22, 2008 in Tokyo. The final “mechanism of cooperation” listed in the agreement was for cooperation between the two nations’ space programs. “Cooperation will be conducted between the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) in the field of disaster management.” 38 For the United States, cooperating with China on space issues, when it is not yet doing so with India, could well send mixed messages to Delhi. In particular, there is a perception in many quarters that the United States is intent upon balancing China through India. 39 US space cooperation with China might allay such concerns and signal that the US is not seeking to counter China through India. It might, however, be seen as “double-dealing” by the Indian government, which has its own concerns about China stemming to at least the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

Coop Bad – US Heg Decline

Engaging China in negotiations will damage U.S. hegemony and reveal U.S. weakness.

Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009

(Dean B., “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space Defense: Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, p.11-12, <http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf>, accessed 7/6/11) EK

The first two factors listed by Ambassador Matano indicate, again, that American and Chinese negotiators hold very different perceptions of the significance of negotiations. In general, the Chinese, unlike their American counterparts, do not see political negotiations as “a highly technical process of haggling over details in which the two sides move to a point of convergence from their original positions through incremental compromises.” 26 Instead, they are viewed an attempt to reconcile (or impose) “principles and objectives of the two sides and the testing of their interlocutor’s commitment to a relationship with the PRC.” 27 Rather than “getting to ‘Yes,’” for the Chinese “the purpose…is to size the opposition to draw out the US position with minimum exposure of China’s.” 28 Under such circumstances, an opening position is unlikely to have “give,” since the aim is not so much to gain reciprocal concessions, but to address a counterpart’s bottom line requirements without compromising one’s own. This, again, is in contrast with most American negotiating styles. “Flexibility, by indicating the softness of the US position, may impede and not facilitate agreement.” 29 The resulting disconnect may well hamper negotiations.

\*\*\*Coop Bad – Militarization Turn

Militarization Turn

Turn – Plan increases Chinese militarization

A. Link – China cooperation undercuts US military advantages

Cheng, Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center, 09

(Dean, The Heritage Foundation, “U.S.-China Space Cooperation: More Costs Than Benefits,” 8-30-9, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/10/us-china-space-cooperation-more-costs-than-benefits>, 6-29-11, GJV)

Beyond the technical issues, however, there are more fundamental political concerns that must be addressed. The U.S. military depends on space as a strategic high ground. Space technology is also dual-use in nature: Almost any technology or information that is exchanged in a cooperative venture is likely to have military utility. Sharing such information with China, therefore, would undercut American tactical and technological military advantages.

B. Impact – Militarization risks Space Pearl Harbor

Logan, Specialist in energy policy, Congressional Research Service 9-29-08

(Jeffrey has a M.S. in environmental science and Master in Public Administration,1995, Indiana University, School of Public and Environmental Affairs B.S. in aerospace engineering and B.A. in general arts and sciences, 1985, Pennsylvania State University <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22777.pdf> “China’s Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation”pg 5 accessed: 6-28-11) TJL

Inadvertent technology transfer. From this perspective, increased space cooperation with China should be avoided until Chinese intentions are clearer. Joint space activities could lead to more rapid (dual-use)technology transfer to China, and in a worst-case scenario, result in a“space Pearl Harbor,” as postulated by a congressionally appointed commission led by Donald Rumsfeld in 2001.22

Militarization – AT – China Won’t Use (1/3)

Coop would share dual-use tech – and China has a history of taking advantage of sharing

Rhian, former NASA intern, 11

(Jason, has degrees in public relations and journalism and completed a NASA ESMD internship, Universe Today, “Can China enter the international space family?”, 1/10/11, <http://www.universetoday.com/82368/can-china-enter-the-international-space-family/>, accessed 6/30/11, CW)

China is only the third nation (behind Russia and the United States) to have a successful manned space program, having launched its first successful manned space flight in 2003. This first mission only had a single person onboard, and gave the world a new word – ‘taikonaut’ (taikong is the Chinese word for space). The country’s next mission contained two of these taikonauts and took place in 2005. The third and most current manned mission that China has launched was launched in 2008 and held a crew of three. Yang Liwei became the first of China's Taikonaut when he rocketed into orbit in 2003. Photo Credit: Xinhua China has steadily, but surely, built and tested capabilities essential for a robust manned space program. Considering that China very ambitious goals for space this would seem a prudent course of action. China has stated publically that they want to launch a space station and send their taikonauts to the moon – neither of which are small feats. China currently utilizes its Shenzhou spacecraft atop the Long March 2F booster from their Jiuquan facility. However, if China wants to accomplish these goals, they will need a more powerful booster. This has been part of the reason that the U.S. has been hesitant to include China due to concerns about the use of what are known as dual-use technologies (rockets that can launch astronauts can also launch nuclear weapons). Both China's rocket and spacecraft are derived from Soviet Soyuz designs. Photo Credit: Xinhua/Wang Jianmin Some have raised concerns about the nation’s human rights track record. It should be noted however that Russia had similar issues before being included in the International Space Station program. “In the early 1990′s, some at NASA thought having Russian cosmonauts on the Space Shuttle would mean giving away trade secrets to the competition,” said Pat Duggins, author of the book Trailblazing Mars. “It turned out Russian crew capsules saved the International Space Station when the Shuttles were grounded after the Columbia accident in 2003. So, never say never on China, I guess.” Duggins is not the only space expert who feels that China would make a good companion when mankind once again ventures out past low-Earth-orbit. “One of the findings of the Augustine Commission was that the international framework that came out of the ISS program is one of the most important. It should be used and expanded upon for use in international beyond-LEO human space exploration,” said Dr. Leroy Chiao a veteran of four launches and a member of the second Augustine Commission. “My personal belief is that countries like China, which is only the third nation able to launch astronauts, should be included. My hope is that the politics will align soon, to allow such collaboration, using the experience that the US has gained in working with Russia to bring it about.” Not everyone is completely convinced that China will be as valuable an asset as the Russians have proven themselves to be however. “It is an interesting scenario with respect to the Chinese participation in an international effort in space. The U.S. has made some tremendous strides in terms of historical efforts to bridge the gap with the Russians and the results have been superb,” said Robert Springer a two-time space shuttle veteran. “The work that has resulted in the successful completion of the International Space Station is an outstanding testimony to what can be done when political differences are set aside in the interest of International cooperation. So, there is a good model of how to proceed, driven somewhat by economic realities as well as politics. I am not convinced that the economic and political scenario bodes well for similar results with the Chinese. It is a worthwhile goal to pursue, but I am personally not convinced that a similar outcome will be the result, at least not in the current environment.”

Militarization – AT – China Won’t Use (2/3)

China spies to gain tech secrets

Aviation Week ‘08

(Aviation Week & Space Technology, 00052175, 10/26/2009, Vol. 171, Issue 16 “Like Minds” EBSCO host 7/1/11 BLG)

Foreign security agencies are increasingly targeting personal communications devices of visiting U.S. businessmen and officials. The upswing is construed by analysts as an effort to gather government, business and technical data on dual-use, export-controlled and military items. That assessment came in a report to Congress from the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. One U.S. security specialist had his hand-held communications device penetrated between Beijing's airport and his hotel. Targeted technology includes aeronautics, information systems, lasers, optics and sensors, the report says. The effort also includes more traditional spying methods to gather non-traditional weapons information. The report says federal authorities in the last year uncovered seven cases of Chinese-origin economic spying, involving illegal efforts to obtain technology on space launchers, UAVs, military aircraft, thermal imaging, missile targeting and military source codes. Over the Horizon The Congressional Research Service (CRS) politely suggests the debate on Capitol Hill about unrequested Boeing C-17 airlifters is too narrow and should also examine the underlying airlift force structure and the U.S. industrial base. A total of 213 Globemaster C-17s have been procured through Fiscal 2009, including eight via the supplemental spending law. The Obama administration's proposed Fiscal 2010 defense budget would end C-17 procurement, but lawmakers are debating how many more to buy (AW&ST Oct. 5, p. 24). In a new report, CRS notes: "Congress's decisions on these issues could affect [military] capabilities and funding requirements and the U.S. military aircraft industrial base." While the Air Force has been reviewing its airlifter fleet for years, the analysis has changed informally with U.S. wars overseas and congressional earmarking. More formal planning is expected under a slew of official reviews now underway in the Pentagon.

**China obtains satellite technology clandestinely and illegally**

Seedhouse,. Ph. D. in aerospace science and FBI consultant, 2010

(Erik, “The New Space Race: China vs. the US” Springer and Praxis Publishing Co., <http://www.scribd.com/doc/31809026/The-New-Space-Race-China-Vs>, accessed: 6/30/11, SL)

China has a long history of acquiring technology by nefarious means. A good example is the launch of China's lunar satellite, Chang'e, which appears to have been adapted from the design of DFI1-3. a Chinese communications relay satellite. The DFII-3 was developed in record speed thanks to a large number of Western components used." These components included elements such as the Matra Marconi-manufactured central processor, the infra-red Earth sensor built by Officine Galileo, and parts of the solar panel built by Messcrschmitt Boclkow Blohm. When the Chinese decided to build the lunar probe, it simply adapted the Western DFH-3 components, enabling them to proceed quickly and reliably. More recently, the FBI, in conjunction with other US counter-espionage agencies, have tagged more than 100 people and companies allegedly involved in clandestine aerospace technology transfer benefitting China's space program.3 For example, physicist Shu Quan-Sheng. a naturalized US citizen, was arrested on September 24th, 200S, on charges of illegally exporting space launch technical data and services, in addition to offering bribes to Chinese officials concerning the Long March (LM)-5. Shu. a president of a NASA subcontractor, provided technical assistance and foreign technology acquisition expertise to several of China's government entities involved in the design and development of the LM-5 space launch facility, an activity that the US alleges began in 200S.4 In another recent case. US citizen. Ping Cheng, and Singaporeans. Kok Tong Lim and Jian Wei Ding, were charged with conspiracy to violate export administration regulations by attempting to illegally export high-modulus carbon fiber to China. The material, known as Toray M40 and Toray M60. is a corrosion-resistant material used for electromagnetic shielding in rockets and spacecraft.

Militarization – AT – China Won’t Use (3/3)

The long Chinese espionage history makes Congress wary about sharing our scientific secrets with them

Financial Peoples 11

(online news source about US international influence in the business world, financialpeoples.com, 5/8/11, <http://we.financialpeoples.com/congress-bans-scientific-collaboration-with-china-cites-high-espionage-risks.html>, accessed 7/1/11, CW)

The history of China’s dabbling in cyber espionage is long. In a study for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Northrup Grumman created a chronology of alleged Chinese cyber-espionage incidents targeting the U.S. and foreign governments. Here is a sample of the chronology: November 2004: US media reports that Chinese hackers attacked multiple unclassified US military systems at the U.S. Army Information Systems Engineering Command at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, the Defense Information Systems Agency in Arlington, Virginia, the Naval Ocean Systems Center in San Diego, California and the United States Army Space and Strategic Defense installation in Huntsville, Alabama.117 August 2005: Media reporting first covers the story of a Chinese computer network exploitation operation codenamed “Titan Rain,” alleging the intrusions into DoD systems date back to 2003. July 2006: US media reports that intruders penetrate the US Department of State (DoS) networks, stealing sensitive information and user login credentials, and install backdoors on numerous computers, allowing them to return to the systems at will. DoS systems administrators are forced to limit Internet access until the investigation is completed. August 2006: Pentagon officials state hostile civilian cyber units operating inside China have launched attacks against the NIPRNET and have downloaded up to 20 terabytes of data. November 2006: Chinese hackers attack the US Naval War College computer infrastructure, possibly targeting war game information on the networks. The College’s Web and emails systems are down for at least two weeks while the investigation takes place. June 2007: Media reports indicate approximately 1,500 computers are taken offline following a penetration into the email system of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). October 2007: US media reports that China is suspected as the source of at least seven versions of socially engineered email targeting 1,100 employees at the Oak Ridge National Lab in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Eleven staff possibly opened the malicious attachment, allowing the attackers to gain access to, and potentially steal, sensitive data, including a database at the nuclear weapons laboratory housing personnel records going back to 1990. May 2008: U.S. authorities investigate claims that Chinese officials surreptitiously copied the contents of a US government laptop during then- Commerce Secretary Carlos Gutierrez’ visit to China. November 2008: Media sources report that Chinese hackers penetrate the White House information system on numerous occasions, penetrating for brief periods before systems are patched. November 2008: Business Week magazine publishes a report on significant cyber intrusions dating back several years at some of NASA’s most critical sites including the Kennedy Space Center and Goddard Space Flight Center. The operations to prevent the attacks from China are codenamed, “Avocado.” Attacks included socially engineered emails launched at top officials. Among the data stolen are operational details of the Space Shuttle including performance and engine data.

Militarization – Chinese Military Gets the Tech

China’s military space capabilities is inherently intertwined with its civilian space capabilities, there is no separation between the two

Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009

(Dean B., “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space Defense: Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, p.2-3, <http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf>, accessed 7/6/11) EK

Nor is the integration of Chinese civilian and military space capabilities limited to issues of dual-use systems. Broadly speaking, there is no bright dividing line between Chinese military and civilian space authorities, either. That the Chinese should have a closely integrated civilian and military space sector is not surprising. When Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, he set forth the general Chinese guideline (zongfangzhen) of “civilmilitary combined, wartime-peacetime combined, give preference to military goods, have the civilian nurture the military” [(junminjiehe, pingzhanjiehe, junpinyouxiang, yi min yiangjun)]. This general guideline remains a cornerstone in China’s efforts to foster broad national development. Deng’s call for close civil-military integration is echoed in the PRC’s 2006 space white paper. This paper (and its 2000 predecessor) issued by China’s State Council, the highest governmental body in the People’s PRC, was specifically cited by Chinese delegates to the 2008 workshop as essential for understanding China’s space program. The paper notes that a key principle underlying the development of China’s space industry is that it is “a strategic way to enhance its economic, scientific, technological, and national defense strength, as well as a cohesive force for the unity of the Chinese people.” 10 Nowhere is this more evident than in the management of the Chinese space infrastructure. On the one hand, the Chinese claim that their space facilities are managed by yet another subordinate organization to COSTIND, the China Satellite Launch and Tracking Control General (CLTC). This is the entity that has generally contracted with foreign space organizations for commercial or civilian space launches, such as the Brazilian space agency for the launch of CBERS-2. 11

Coop puts US space edge in jeopardy

Wolf, Defense Technology Correspondent at Reuters, 2011

(Jim, “Analysis: Space: a frontier too far for U.S.-China cooperation,” Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/02/us-china-usa-space-idUSTRE7010E520110102>, January 2, Accessed July 3, 2011, NS)

Possible U.S.-Chinese cooperation became more controversial after Beijing carried out a watershed anti-satellite test in January 2007, using a ground-based missile to knock out one of its inactive weather satellites in high polar orbit. No advance notice of the test was given. Thirteen months later, the United States destroyed a malfunctioning U.S. spy satellite using a ship-launched Raytheon Co (RTN.N) Standard Missile 3 after a high-profile buildup to the event. The U.S. interception was just outside the atmosphere so that debris would burn up promptly. U.S. officials say China's capabilities could threaten U.S. space assets in low orbit. The Chinese test also created a large cloud of orbital debris that may last for 100 years, boosting the risk to manned spaceflight and to hundreds of satellites belonging to more than two dozen countries.China's work on anti-satellite weapons is "destabilizing," Wallace Gregson, assistant U.S. secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs, said in December, also citing its investment in anti-ship missiles, advanced submarines, surface-to-air missiles and computer warfare techniques. "It has become increasingly evident that China is pursuing a long-term, comprehensive military buildup that could upend the regional security balance," Gregson told a forum hosted by the Progressive Policy Institute in Washington. The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, called on members of the incoming Congress to be wary of any space cooperation with China on the grounds it could bolster Beijing's knowledge and harm U.S. security. "Congress should reject (the Obama) administration attempts to curry favor with the international community while placing U.S. advantages in space at risk," Dean Cheng, a Heritage research fellow for Chinese political and security affairs, and two colleagues said in a Dec. 15 memo to lawmakers.

Militarization – Tech Boosts Chinese Military (1/2)

China can use space tech to bolster military programs

Johnson-Freese, Chair for the Department of National Security Studies at the U.S. Naval War College, 2007

(Dr. Joan, “China’s Space Ambitions”, IFIR Security Studies Proliferation Papers, p. 13-14, Summer, http://www.ifri.org/files/Securite\_defense/China\_Space\_Johnson\_Freese.pdf, accessed July 8, 2011, NS)

Manned spaceflight also pushes China up the technical learning curve very quickly. In a 2003 interview in People’s Daily, Zhang Qingwei, 9 For extended examinations of the Chinese manned space program, see: Joan Johnson-Freese, “China’s Manned Space Program: Sun Tzu or Apollo Redux?” op.cit.; “Space Wei Qi: The Launch of Shenzhou V”, Naval War College Review, Spring 2004. 10 Pew Global Attitudes Project, U.S. Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative: American Character Gets Mixed Reviews, Washington, D.C.: Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2005. - 14 - Deputy Director of Project 921 and president of China Aerospace

Corporation (CASC), stated that China had achieved breakthroughs in thirteen key technologies in conjunction with their first manned spaceflight, including reentry lift control of the manned spacecraft, emergency rescue, soft landing, malfunction diagnosis, module separation and heatprevention.11Indirect benefits accrue as well, some even more important because of their broad spectrum of relevance and applications. These include basic computer upgrading, manufacturing technology, electronic equipment, systems integration and testing. Systems integration, along with spacecraft navigation and propulsion,12 are particularly noteworthy. China, as well as many other Asian nations, has long experienced problems with systems integration. Development of an indigenous capability in that area would be a significant engineering step forward for China. That capability, with navigation and propulsion advancements, would be particularly useful formilitary space programs as well.

Militarization – Tech Boosts Chinese Military (2/2)

Dual-use technologies being smuggled out of the US into China can be used for military purposes

Cooper, contributing editor, 09

(Simon, “How China Steals U.S. Military Secrets” Popular Mechanics, <http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military/news/3319656>, accessed: 7/10/11, SL)

More typical cases are even harder to detect. ASTI agents often navigate the murky area of dual-use technologies, where pressure sensors could be used either for bombs or for washing machines, where computer chips with missile applications might actually be destined for in-car navigation systems. Furthermore, thousands of items prohibited for export can be bought over the Internet, shipped to a U.S. address, then simply mailed to China in a padded envelope. Such materials supply the building blocks needed for complex armaments.

In other cases, technology is smuggled out to an approved country using fake end-user certificates. For instance, Kwonhwan Park shipped his Black Hawk engines to Malaysia before sending them on to China. And, advanced technology such as the F-16 fighter has been sold to countries from Bahrain to Venezuela where controls may be less stringent than in the United States.

The situation outrages U.S. Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.), who successfully fought recent plans by the State Department to use Chinese-built computers for classified material. He says too little attention is paid to China's "aggressive spying program against the U.S." The legal deterrents to espionage are weak, says Wolf, who chairs a subcommittee overseeing security and technology. "In the Cold War people went to jail for a long time" for spying, he says, but today's "negligible penalties" are more appropriate to low-level embezzlement than military spying. Park was unusual in receiving a 32-month prison term and a deportation order; in contrast, Ting-Ih Hsu and Hai Lin Nee were each sentenced to three years of probation.

Meanwhile, says the IASC's Richard Fisher, a "battle is being waged. The Chinese have established a vast collection system that by the end of the decade will have helped them to become a global military power." While concern grows among policy-makers and wonks, Mangione and his team still labor in the shadows of the worldwide arms bazaar. They hope to prevent the day when U.S. troops could find themselves staring down the barrel of a high-tech weapon marked "Made in America."

Militarization – Impact

A PLA space program is violent – multiple attacks on the US prove

Statement by Wolf, (R-VA) chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee that oversees the budgets of NASA, 2011

(Frank R., “Wolf: U.S. Should Not Help China With Its Space Program”, Congressional Documents and Publications (U.S. House Of Representatives Documents), May 11, Lexis, accessed July 6, 2011, NS)

"What concerns me most about the Chinese space program is that unlike the U.S., it is being led by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). There is no reason to believe that the PLA's space program will be any more benign than the PLA's recent military posture."For example, according to the Congressional Research Service, 'on March 9, 2009, the Pentagon reported that PRC ships and aircraft operating in the South China Sea had been acting in increasingly aggressive ways toward two U.S. Navy ocean surveillance ships operating in the area...' "China is taking a more assertive posture globally, and their interests rarely intersect with ours. Consider the 2008 Senate testimony of then-director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell: 'China continues to develop and field conventional theater range ballistic and cruise missile capabilities that will put US forces and regional bases throughout the Western Pacific and Asia at greater risk.... China's arms sales in the Middle East are also destabilizing and a threat to US forces, while missile sales to Iran pose a threat to US forces in the Persian Gulf.'"The U.S. intelligence community notes that China's attempts to penetrate U.S. agencies are the most aggressive of all foreign intelligence organizations. The Chinese regime has launched some of the most aggressive and widespread espionage and cybersecurity attacks against U.S. agencies and contractors. Several years ago, the Chinese attacked my office computers and those of many other members of Congress and committees. China's aerospace industry for decades has provided missile technologies and equipment to rogue regimes such as Iran and North Korea. "China's aims globally are often directly at odds with those of the U.S. According to the Pentagon, weapons that PRC entities supplied to Iran were 'found to have been transferred to terrorist organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan.'"China has failed to use its influence to bring about a peaceful resolution to the multiple crises in Sudan. It is a major arms supplier and source of economic strength to President Bashir's government in Khartoum."China has been no friend in our engagement with Iran either. U.S. efforts to exert diplomatic pressure against Iran's nuclear weapons program have been thwarted by China's opposition to U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iran. In a column last year, Robert Samuelson summed it up this way, 'China's worldview threatens America's geopolitical and economic interests.'

Any U.S. cooperation with China will lead to improvements to China’s military capabilities.

Cheng, Asian Studies Center Research Fellow, 2009

(Dean B., “Reflections on Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space Defense: Scholarly Journal of the United States Air Force Academy’s, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, p.6, <http://web.mac.com/rharrison5/Eisenhower_Center_for_Space_and_Defense_Studies/Journal_Vol_2_No_3_files/Space%20and%20Defense%202_3.pdf>, accessed 7/6/11) EK

This is further complicated by the integrated nature of the Chinese space program. Any cooperation between the two states, from the American perspective, should not result in a transfer of militarily significant technology to the PRC. Indeed, it was precisely charges to this effect, leveled against the Loral and Hughes Aerospace corporations, which brought a halt to US use of Chinese launchers for commercial and civilian purposes. As the Cox Commission Report notes, “the guidance system used on the Long March-2C, Long March-2E, and Long March-3 rockets is also used on the CSS-4 intercontinental ballistic missile.” 9 The commonality of systems between Chinese civilian space launch vehicles and current Chinese missile systems means that any cooperation between the two nations’ space programs, even in ostensibly civilian or commercial areas, could well lead to improvements in China’s offensive missile capabilities. According to some of the Chinese participants in the Eisenhower Center workshops, they had been unaware of this concern.

Militarization – Prolif

**Cooperation with China risks proliferation**

**Sterner, NASA, Associate Deputy Administrator, Policy and Planning and Acting Chief of Strategic Communications ‘09**

(Eric R, 11/23/2009, Aviation Week & Space Technology 00052175, 11/23/2009, Vol. 171, Issue 19 “Dragon in Sheep’s Clothing?” EBSCOhost 7/1/11 BLG)

Second, **China is a serial proliferator. Some technologies could make their way to countries of even greater concern, including Iran and North Korea. The deputy director of national intelligence for analysis submits an unclassified annual proliferation report to Congress, known as the "721 Report."** The most recent report states, **"Chinese companies have been associated with nuclear and missile programs in Pakistan and missile programs in Iran; Chinese entities--which include private companies, individuals and state-owned military export firms--continue to engage in [weapons of mass destruction]-related proliferation activities**." **Remaining wary of China's intentions does not mean the U.S. should opt for isolation, but it does argue against close space cooperation. Instead, the U.S. should seek to increase transparency about China's intentions and capabilities through military channels, share scientific data about the solar system (but not the technology that collected the data), establish standards (such as limiting orbital debris creation) that serve mutual interests, and possibly coordinate some activities such as lunar or Earth science missions**. Existing international frameworks enable all of this, but China has resisted accepting the responsibilities that come with membership as a great space power. Aerospace technologies are high on China's illegal shopping list. **Until China's intentions are clearer and its behavior has verifiably and persistently changed, close cooperation entails risks that far exceed the potential benefits.**

Militarization – Tech Transfer

**Closer relations with China increase Chinese technological intelligence**

**Sterner, NASA, Associate Deputy Administrator, Policy and Planning and Acting Chief of Strategic Communications ‘09**

(Eric R, 11/23/2009, Aviation Week & Space Technology 00052175, 11/23/2009, Vol. 171, Issue 19 “Dragon in Sheep’s Clothing?” EBSCOhost 7/1/11 BLG)

**Closer relations create greater opportunities for China to acquire sensitive technology**. In 2007, the U.S. launched the interagency National Export Enforcement Initiative, designed to combat illegal trafficking in sensitive technologies. Within a year, charges were filed against 145 criminal defendants. Iran and China were the intended destinations for most of the known illegal exports. The Justice Dept. noted**, "The illegal exports to China have involved rocket launch data, space shuttle technology, missile technology, naval warship data, [UAV] technology, thermal imaging systems, military night-vision systems and other materials." This is consistent with other Chinese activities, including a massive 2005 cyber-raid on NASA's computers that exfiltrated data about the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter's propulsion system, solar panels and fuel tanks.** The U.S. should be concerned about such transfers for two reasons**. First, they will aid Chinese military modernization, particularly in areas where the U.S. holds an advantage (see p. 29). The Defense Dept.'s 2009 annual report on the Chinese military concludes, "The pace and scope of China's military transformation have increased in recent years, fueled by acquisition of advanced foreign weapons, continued high rates of investment in its domestic defense and science and technology industries, and far-reaching organizational and doctrinal reforms of the armed forces."**

Militarization – Turns Relations

The more China develops capabilities, the harder it is to maintain relations

**Richburg, New York Bureau Chief of the Washington Post, 1/23/11**

(Keith B., “As China eyes the stars, U.S. watches warily” The Washington Post, A-Section; Pg. A12, Lexis, accessed: 7/1/11, SL)

China's grand ambitions extend literally to the moon, with the country now embarked on a multi-pronged program to establish its own global navigational system, launch a space laboratory and put a Chinese astronaut on the moon within the next decade. The Obama administration Enhanced Coverage LinkingObama administration -Search using: Biographies Plus News News, Most Recent 60 Days views space as ripe territory for cooperation with China. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates has called it one of four potential areas of "strategic dialogue," along with cybersecurity, missile defense and nuclear weapons. And President Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao vowed after their White House summit last week to "deepen dialogue and exchanges" in the field. But as China ramps up its space initiatives, the diplomatic talk of cooperation has so far found little traction. The Chinese leadership has shown scant interest in opening up the most sensitive details of its program, much of which is controlled by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). At the same time, Chinese scientists and space officials say that Washington's wariness of China's intentions in space, as well as U.S. bans on some high-technology exports, makes cooperation problematic. For now, the U.S.-China relationship in space appears to mirror the one on Earth - a still-dominant but fading superpower facing a new and ambitious rival, with suspicion on both sides. "What you have are two major powers, both of whom use space for military, civilian and commercial purposes," said Dean Cheng, a researcher with the Washington-based Heritage Foundation and an expert on the Chinese military and space program. NASA's human spaceflight program has been in flux in recent years, fueling particular concern among some U.S. observers about the challenge posed by China's initiatives in that area. There is "a lot of very wary, careful, mutual watching," Cheng said. Song Xiaojun, a military expert and commentator on China's CCTV, said that substantial cooperation in the space field is impossible without mutual trust. Achieving that, he said, "depends on whether the U.S. can put away its pride and treat China as a partner to cooperate on equal terms. But I don't see that happening in the near future, since the U.S. is experiencing menopause while China is going through puberty."

Militarization – Missiles and Night Vision

China’s acquisition of missiles and night vision technology is geared towards military purposes

Arrillaga, AP National Writer and winner of the prestigious Livingston Award, 5/11/2011 (Pauline, “China’s Spying seeks secret US info: China, even more powerful, has become a major instigator of espionage in the United States” Chính's News, <http://chinhdangvu.blogspot.com/2011/05/chinas-spying-seeks-secret-us-info.html>, accessed: 7/11/11, SL)

Contrast that with this snapshot:

—In Honolulu, a former B-2 bomber engineer and one-time professor at Purdue gets 32 years in prison for working with the Chinese to develop a vital part for a cruise missile in a case that a high-ranking Justice Department official said resulted in the leak of "some of our country's most sensitive weapons-related designs."

—In Boston, a Harvard-educated businessman is sent to prison, along with his ex-wife, for conspiring for a decade to illegally export parts used in military radar and electronic warfare systems to research institutes that manufacture items for the Chinese military. The Department of Defense concluded the illegal exports "represented a serious threat to U.S. national and regional defense security interests."

—In Los Angeles, a man goes to jail for selling Raytheon-manufactured thermal imaging cameras to a buyer in Shanghai whose company develops infrared technology. The cameras are supposed to be restricted for export to China because of "their potential use in a wide variety of military and civilian applications," according to court documents.

—And in Alexandra, Va., there is Shriver, who told the judge quite simply: "Somewhere along the way, I climbed into bed with the wrong people."

All five of these defendants were sentenced over just an 11-day span earlier this year.

In Shriver's case, when once he asked his Chinese handlers—"What, exactly, do you guys want?"—the response, as detailed in court documents, was straightforward.

"If it's possible," they told him, "we want you to get us some secrets or classified information." Despite denials from Beijing, counterintelligence experts say the cases reveal the Chinese as among the most active espionage offenders in America today, paying more money and going to greater lengths to glean whatever information they can from the United States.

Militarization – Fighter Jets

China’s espionage has resulted in the development of stealth fighter jets months before their time

Arrillaga, AP National Writer and winner of the prestigious Livingston Award, 5/11/2011 (Pauline, “China’s Spying seeks secret US info: China, even more powerful, has become a major instigator of espionage in the United States” Chính's News, <http://chinhdangvu.blogspot.com/2011/05/chinas-spying-seeks-secret-us-info.html>, accessed: 7/11/11, SL)

Just after the New Year, at an airfield in Chengdu, the Chinese military unveiled its first prototype stealth fighter jet: A radar-eluding plane called the J-20, which made its maiden test flight even as U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates was in Beijing on a rare visit.

If most Americans paid little attention, U.S. defense analysts were watching closely.

And they were caught a bit off-guard.

Gates would later acknowledge that the flight came six months to a year before intelligence estimated it might happen.

So how did the Chinese do it?

Was it reverse-engineering from parts taken after an American aircraft was shot down over Serbia in 1999, as some Balkan military officials alleged in interviews with The Associated Press?

Or was some of the technological know-how obtained through a U.S. engineer who spent several years working illegally to help the Chinese develop stealth technology?

A federal prosecutor raised the possibility of a link between the activities of Noshir Gowadia, once a key engineer on America's B-2 bomber program, and the faster-than-expected development of Chinese stealth aircraft designs.

The comments came just before Gowadia was sentenced to prison in a Honolulu court in January on espionage charges.

He was convicted of 14 counts, including communicating national defense information to aid a foreign nation and violating the Arms Export Control Act.

"China aggressively seeks U.S. defense technologies, and the People's Liberation Army are now shown to have been actively working on stealth aircraft designs, most certainly during Gowadia's visits there," Assistant U.S. Attorney Ken Sorenson wrote in a court filing, noting Gowadia worked in and with China for two years developing a stealth engine nozzle design.

Militarization – Radar and Missiles

Dual-use tech like early warning radar and missile target acquisition systems will be stolen by China to attempt to modernize their military

Arrillaga, AP National Writer and winner of the prestigious Livingston Award, 5/11/2011 (Pauline, “China’s Spying seeks secret US info: China, even more powerful, has become a major instigator of espionage in the United States” Chính's News, <http://chinhdangvu.blogspot.com/2011/05/chinas-spying-seeks-secret-us-info.html>, accessed: 7/11/11, SL)

Indeed most of the Justice Department cases reviewed by the AP involve the illegal export of restricted defense-related parts or so-called "dual-use" technology, which can have commercial or military applications. These are items such as integrated circuits for radar systems, high-power amplifiers designed for use in early-warning radar and missile target acquisition systems, and military grade night-vision technology.

But that only scratches the surface.

Other cases involve the theft of trade secrets by individuals once employed at major U.S. corporations, including Boeing, Motorola and Dow.

In some instances, the secrets were computer source codes or, in cases still awaiting trial, related to the development of organic pesticides and telephone communications technology.

Stolen information about the space shuttle and technical data about the capabilities of the U.S. Navy's nuclear-powered submarines have also been passed along, as has simulation software used to help train fighter pilots.

While export cases and economic espionage comprise most of the China-related intelligence prosecutions in recent years, there have been a few notable instances of more traditional espionage—among them the Shriver case and that of Tai Shen Kuo, a Louisiana businessman born in Taiwan who obtained information from two federal government employees that he passed to China.

It all fits into what some experts call China's "vacuum cleaner" approach to information-collection: Catch whatever you can.

\*\*\*Relations & Coop Uniqueness Answers

Sino-US Relations High – US Seeking Coop

US is actively pursuing positive relations with China

Huffington Post, 11

(3-23-11, “China-U.S. Relations 'Critical' Ahead Of Hu Jintao's Washington Visit”, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/15/hu-jintao-washington-visit_n_809328.html> , MLF, accessed 7-1-11)

With the international media abuzz with rumors just days before Chinese President Hu Jintao touches down in Washington, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton dismissed calls for a Cold War-style containment policy and instead noted the U.S. sought a "positive, cooperative and comprehensive" relationship with China. As the AFP is reporting, Clinton's Friday speech indicated human rights -- particularly in the wake of jailed dissident Liu Xiaobo's historic Nobel Peace Prize win -- to be a topic of priority during Jintao's visit, scheduled for Jan. 18-21. "A vibrant civil society would help address some of China's most pressing issues, from food safety to pollution to education to health care," Clinton is quoted as saying. "The longer China represses freedoms, the longer it will miss out on these opportunities and the longer that Liu Xiaobo's empty chair in Oslo will remain a symbol of a great nation's unrealized potential and unfulfilled promise." Washington is reportedly hoping for progress on other fronts, too -- including climate change to the ongoing Sudan referendum. As Bonnie S. Glaser, a former consultant for the Department of Defense and the State Department and now chair of the China program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, tells the Washington Post: At the global level, the United States seeks greater Chinese cooperation in countering proliferation of nuclear weapons, reducing imbalances in the global economy, and combating climate change. Regional issues include preventing further North Korean provocations, promoting regional security cooperation in the East Asia Summit, and ensuring that the results of the referendum on southern Sudan are accepted by Sudan and the international community and that the 2005 peace agreement is fully implemented. Bilateral issues that will be raised by the U.S. side include human rights, trade, and the U.S.-China military relationship. The Obama administration would like some concrete deliverables to demonstrate to the American public that the president's policy is effective and producing results. Douglas H. Paal, a former unofficial U.S. representative to Taiwan and now with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noted a more lasting outcome of Hu's state visit -- scheduled to be his last as president and general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, before he steps down in 2012 -- may lay even further ahead: While results so far are on the whole good, perhaps the trickier part of the process is to make it survive the weeks after the summit. Past experience in times of constructive relations suggests the best method going forward is to engage a broader swath of the Chinese and American elites in a full agenda of exchanges. An important outcome of the summit, therefore, would be instructions from the two leaders for their colleagues to continue the process. An exchange of visits by Chinese Vice President and heir-apparent Xi Jinping and Vice President Joe Biden would be the first place to start.

**Sino-US Relations High – Common Interests**

China and US share compatible ideologies that don’t conflict

Lavin, former US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration director, 11

[Franklin headed the International Trade Administration for the United States Department of Commerce from 2005 until 2007, 4-20-11, Heritage Foundation, “Consequential China: U.S.–China Relations in a Time of Transition” <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/06/Consequential-China-US-China-Relations-in-a-Time-of-Transition,> MLF, accessed 6-30-11]

I mentioned that I have had the privilege of spending much of my professional life dealing with China and China-related matters, and maybe that is what makes me, in a broad sense, an optimist about China and U.S.–China relations. I think the more one watches China and works on U.S.–China relations, the more reason for optimism one sees, because China is going through quite significant changes, and I think they are overwhelmingly positive changes—not just for the people of China but also for U.S.–Chinese relations. But the size of China, as well as the size and complexity of the United States, means that this relationship might become the most complicated diplomatic relationship in the world. There are any number of differences, challenges, and even friction points in the bilateral relations, but I want to underscore my optimism because the policy emphasis is such that it requires that most of our time be spent discussing the problems or challenges. However, before I get to that, I want to talk a bit about what is working. For example, it is interesting to me that both China and the U.S. have a national-interest-focused foreign policy. Neither country, I think, subscribes to a philosophy that threatens the other. Neither country, as they say in China, tries to put sand in the other’s rice bowl. So I think there is a reasonably positive functional relationship between the two countries. From a U.S. point of view, if we look over the modern era, since the Nixon-to-China moment, we have about four decades of relations, across eight presidents, both political parties, a range of philosophies, different challenges, and different times. But, there is a high degree of continuity in that relationship and I think there are two pillars that allow for that continuity. One is the pillar of engagement that, regardless of the issue or the challenge, we were not going to break off or try to diminish relations but always try to find a way to improve them. The second pillar is respect for China’s one-China policy, that we would not seek to undermine that, although we certainly have interests vis à vis Taiwan. But we never tried to directly do something to diminish the one-China policy.

US and China both have common goals which improves relations

BBC News 11

(BBC News, “China US relations: China is changing” 1-20-2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-12244727>, MLF, accessed 7-1-11)

Mr Hu also acknowledged that "a lot still needs to be done" in China over human rights. Analysts say Mr Hu's visit is the most important by a Chinese leader in 30 years given China's growing military, economic and diplomatic clout. Chinese people around the world share their views on the importance of the state visit. I feel reassured when I see Chinese and US leaders holding friendly talks, because it shows both leaders are being responsible to their nations and to the world as a whole. In the past few months I have been worried about China-US relations, because of the tension between the US and North Korea. I think the world needs to see how much China has changed, and the role it has played in easing tensions in the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese people can see that China and the US have common interests and they are willing to work at the relationship. China is a big country with limited resources and an underdeveloped system of government, it is understandable that we have some human rights problems. President Hu's attitude shows the world that the Chinese people are willing to face their own problems honestly and are willing to improve the situation. I think the solution lies in development - generally the more developed the economy is, the better human rights situation is. As for the claims that China is deliberately manipulating its currency, I think Western countries should send journalists to China to see how ordinary families are living - they are not rich, they are living frugally and are saving money. It's not fair to pressure China to increase the value of the yuan.

Sino-US Relations High – Gates / Military

Gates says relations are going in the right direction

**Maroney,** Voice of America Islamabad Bureau Chief, **11**

(Sean, VOANews.com, 6-3-11, “Gates Says US, China Military Relationship on 'Positive Trajectory” <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/asia/south/Gates-US-China-Military-Relationship-on-Positive-Trajectory-123111433.html> MLF, accessed 6-30-11)

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and his Chinese counterpart General Liang Guanglie say they believe the military-to-military relationship between the United States and China is heading in the right direction. The two officials met Friday on the sidelines of the sidelines of the 10th annual Asia Security Summit. U.S. officials described their meeting as "cordial." Gates opened the talks by telling General Liang he was hopeful for the future of U.S.-Chinese relations. “As I leave office at the end of this month, I do so believing that our military relationship is on a more positive trajectory,” said Gates. He highlighted his visit to Beijing in January and other high-level defense exchanges, as well as the planned trip to China next month for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Admiral Mike Mullen. General Liang said he also sees positive progress in Beijing's and Washington's military-to-military relationship. According to Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell, the Chinese defense minister thanked Gates for his personal efforts in narrowing the gap in the relationship between the two countries. Despite the kind words, Friday's meeting comes as U.S. authorities investigate the search engine Google's allegations that hackers from China stole email passwords of senior U.S. officials. Beijing has denied responsibility. A senior U.S. defense official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said after the meeting that the two leaders discussed points of friction, including China's concerns over U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. However, the official added that the two leaders did not discuss cyber issues. Earlier in the day, Gates met with Japan's defense minister and Malaysia's prime minister. He also held talks with Singapore's Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen, who joined Gates in voicing support for Washington's continued engagement in Asia and for its cooperation in addressing transnational security threats and enhancing regional security. Gates is scheduled to deliver the opening address for the Shangri-La Dialogue Saturday morning. This is his fifth and final Asia Security Summit as U.S. defense secretary before he steps down on June.

Gates looking to improve Sino-US relations

**Burns,** Chairman of the Nominating/Corporate Governance Committee**, 11**

(Robert, Forbes.com, “Gates hopes to improve US-China relations” 6-3-2011, <http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2011/06/03/general-as-gates-china_8497969.html> MLF, accessed 6-30-11)

SINGAPORE -- U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates is meeting with his Chinese counterpart on the sidelines of an Asian security summit, hoping to add momentum to a recent improving trend in relations between the two military powers. The meeting Friday at a Singapore hotel sets the scene for a Gates speech to the security conference Saturday in which he is expected to offer assurances that the U.S. will maintain its security and military commitments in Asia even as its defense budgets shrink. China's defense minister is scheduled to deliver his own keynote address to the Singapore conference on Sunday. Gates will have left Singapore by then, heading for the next stop on an around-the-world journey that is his last overseas trip before stepping down as Pentagon chief on June 30.

Sino-US Relations High – Communication

China and US welcoming a “New Channel” of communication

Voice of America News 6-27-11

(Voice of America News: “China Welcomes 'New Channel' for Dialogue With US” 6-27-2011 [http://www.voanews.com/english/news/China-Welcomes-New-Channel-for-Dialogue-With-US-124580784.html MLF 6-30-11](http://www.voanews.com/english/news/China-Welcomes-New-Channel-for-Dialogue-With-US-124580784.html%20MLF%206-30-11))

China is welcoming the opening of a "new channel" of communications with the United States after talks in Hawaii where South China Sea tensions were discussed. A commentary Sunday in the official Xinhua news agency said the talks resulted from Washington's strategic emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region and China's growing global influence. It said China welcomes America's enhanced role in the region as long as it is constructive for peace and development. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell said after the talks on Saturday with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai that the two had "candid and clear" discussions about the South China Sea disputes. He said the United States wants tensions to subside and that it seeks a dialogue among all the key players in the disputes. Both Vietnam and the Philippines have protested recent actions by Chinese naval vessels in waters the two countries claim as their exclusive economic zones. The two have sought U.S. support in the conflicts, prompting China to warn the United States against outside interference. China and Vietnam agreed at a meeting Saturday in Beijing to peacefully resolve their dispute through negotiations and friendly consultations. The Philippines last week won assurances from Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that the United States remains committed to a 60-year-old mutual defense treaty with Manila. Despite the tensions, Campbell said the talks in Hawaii helped the the United States and China achieve a better understanding of each other's intentions, policies and actions. Xinhua quoted Cui as saying the talks had been "friendly, candid and constructive." The consultations grew out of the third round of a China-U.S. strategic and economic dialogue in May. China says they reflect an agreement between Presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao to build a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship. Further meetings are planned at a date that has not been determined.

Coop Now – Space (1/2)

China and the US are already cooperating in the status quo

China Defense Mashup, 11

(online news source specializing in Chinese military and Chinese Relations, 5/17/11, “U.S. Space Shuttle's Final Mission starts with China-made Device”, <http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/us-space-shuttles-final-mission-starts-with-china-made-device.html>, accessed 6/30/11, CW)

2011-05-17 (China Military News cited from Xinhua) -- Despite several delays, the AMS-02 particle detector took off from the Florida coast of the United States Monday to start its over-ten-year long march looking for antimatter and dark matter in space. "What is rarely known, the core component of the Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer (AMS), the world's most advanced and sophisticated particle detector, is a China-made giant permanent magnet," Professor He-Sheng Chen, one of the AMS project's team leaders, told Xinhua. The magnet will help to identify anti-matter from matter, which carry electrons with opposite charges. "Chinese scientists have helped to solve a decade-long problem of sending a giant magnet into space," according to Samuel Ting, a Chinese-born American scientist and Nobel laureate who heads the 600-member multinational team that developed the AMS project, commenting during an earlier interview with Xinhua. According to Chen, who is also the head of the Institute of High Energy Physics (IHEP) of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), the 2.6-tonne magnet looks like a large ring. The "magic" ring has almost no magnetic flux leakage, which makes it suitable for space operations. Chen said the giant magnet was first sent into space in 1998 as part of a ten-day AMS-01 project, a pilot flight to test its performance. "It worked quite well in AMS-01 throughout the voyage, underwent strict tests, and scientists finally decided to continue to use it for the much-longer AMS-02 mission," said Chen. Three Chinese research institutes, the CAS's Institute of Electrical Engineering and the IHEP, as well as the Chinese Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology (CALT), participated in the research, design and manufacturing of the permanent magnet and its supporting structures in the AMS project. The AMS-02 is being transported by the U.S. Space Shuttle Endeavor on its final mission. Physicists have observed that matter and anti-matter behave in an almost identical way. Each matter particle has an equivalent anti-particle that is very similar, but with opposite charges. Matter and anti-matter would have been created in equal amounts during the Big Bang, according to scientists. One of the main challenges of the AMS project is to address the question of whether there is a preference for matter over anti-matter in nature. The project will search for signals given off by large amounts of anti-matter in the Universe. Chinese scientists were among the first group of participants in the AMS project since its start in 1994.

Coop Now – Space (2/2)

**China and the US are moving towards cooperation in space**

**Sterner, NASA, Associate Deputy Administrator, Policy and Planning and Acting Chief of Strategic Communications ‘09**

(Eric R, 11/23/2009, Aviation Week & Space Technology 00052175, 11/23/2009, Vol. 171, Issue 19 “Dragon in Sheep’s Clothing?” EBSCOhost 7/1/11 BLG)

**This autumn, China and the U.S. began moving toward greater cooperation in space. As China lifted a little more of the veil covering its space program, U.S. officials expressed a greater desire to work together in exploring space. Presidential science adviser John Holdren floated the idea of increased cooperation in human spaceflight last spring**. The Augustine committee raised the idea again, and Presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao pledged to deepen space cooperation last week (see p. 33). Unfortunately, there are ample reasons for the U.S. to keep its distance. While the U.S. explicitly decided to separate its space exploration activities from the military, China's human spaceflight program is a subsidiary of the People's Liberation Army. =[In that context, the risks of illicit technology transfer are considerable. Closer relations create greater opportunities for China to acquire sensitive technology. In 2007, the U.S. launched the interagency National Export Enforcement Initiative, designed to combat illegal trafficking in sensitive technologies. Within a year, charges were filed against 145 criminal defendants. Iran and China were the intended destinations for most of the known illegal exports. The Justice Dept. noted, "The illegal exports to China have involved rocket launch data, space shuttle technology, missile technology, naval warship data, [UAV] technology, thermal imaging systems, military night-vision systems and other materials." This is consistent with other Chinese activities, including a massive 2005 cyber-raid on NASA's computers that exfiltrated data about the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter's propulsion system, solar panels and fuel tanks.

Future missions will be cooperative.

China Daily 6/9/11

(China Daily, 9 June 2011, “VETERAN US ASTRONAUT STILL PASSIONATE ABOUT SPACE TRAVEL”, LexisNexis, 7.1.11, SWolff)

SHANGHAI - Nearly 40 years since his milestone trip to the Moon, Eugene Cernan remains passionate about space. On a visit to Shanghai, Cernan shared his experiences of space flight and discussed the importance of flight safety with Chinese pilots. In his 20 years as a naval aviator, including 13 years with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Cernan made his mark with three historic space missions, including one as the lunar module pilot of Apollo XVII, the final Moon landing mission. His later best-seller The Last Man on the Moon vividly narrated his lunar experience. Cernan said he was not a stranger in China because he had "walked throughout China" decades ago. "On my very first flight in Earth orbit, I did a spacewalk, and I walked across all of China in 15 minutes," he said. Cernan said what impressed him most was looking back from the Moon to the Earth. "It is awe-inspiring, it's overwhelming I came to the conclusion - it is too beautiful to have happened by accident," said Cernan. Cernan is very confident about the future of space exploration. "We will go back to the Moon, and I believe we will go to Mars within the next generation and a half, and we will do it as an international community," he added. Concerning China's lunar landing plan, he said China's space program is very logical. "I look forward to the day when they can join us with putting people on the Moon,” he told China Daily. Having served as an astronaut, Cernan is well aware of the challenges and risks of working in the aviation industry. "If we have a problem, we don't have the luxury of waiting until tomorrow morning to have a meeting, we have to be prepared to solve the problem immediately the time it occurs," he said. Cernan will give a presentation on Thursday at an event organized by Canada-based aviation company Bombardier, which will discuss flight safety and what responsibilities an astronaut should take in a cabin. Puja Mahajan, director of flight operations at Bombardier Aerospace, said the event is a first for Bombardier in Asia, and the robust development of China's aviation industry was the main reason for holding the seminar in Shanghai.

Coop Now – Space Dialogue

China and the US are attempting to deepen dialogue regarding space

Morring, Senior Space Technology Editor of Aviation Week & Space Technology 1/21/11

(Frank Jr, “U.S., China Agree On More Military, Space Engagement” Aerospace Daily and Defense Report, Funding and Policy; Pg. 4 Vol. 237 no. 13, Lexis, SL)

U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao have agreed to continued engagement between their military and spaceflight organizations as part of the Washington summit between the two leaders Jan. 19. The summit’s formal joint statement, released by China’s foreign ministry, calls for Gen. Chen Bingde, chief of the general staff of the Peoples Liberation Army, to visit the U.S. «during the first half of 2011,» and notes the «successful» visit of U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates to China earlier this month. «Both sides agreed on the need for enhanced and substantive dialogue and communication at all levels; to reduce misunderstanding, misperception and miscalculation; to foster greater understanding and expand mutual interest; and to promote the healthy, stable and reliable development of the military-to-military relationship,» the joint document states. Similarly, Obama and Hu agreed to a visit by Chinese space officials to «NASA headquarters and other appropriate NASA facilities» this year, following the «productive» visit of NASA Administrator Charles Bolden to Chinese space facilities last year. The reciprocal visit had been expected as early as November 2010, but was held up by a U.S. interagency policy review after Republican members of Congress objected to U.S./Chinese human spaceflight cooperation. Among officials in China who expect to visit NASA this year are representatives of the China Manned Space Engineering Office, which hosted Bolden at the launch site for Shenzhou human spacecraft at Jiuquan. «China and the United States agreed to take specific actions to deepen dialogue and exchanges in the field of space,» according to the joint statement. «The two sides agreed to continue discussions on opportunities for practical future cooperation in the space arena, based on principles of transparency, reciprocity, and mutual benefit.» As noted on the military front, a trip to Beijing just days ago by Gates allowed the two countries to declare that military ties had been restored before Hu arrived in Washington. «The two sides believe that the expansion of exchanges and cooperation between our militaries contribute to deepening mutual trust between our two countries and to the growth of our overall relationship,» Hu echoed during a joint White House press conference with Obama. For his part, Obama said he used the opportunity to discuss other security concerns too. «I also said that North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile program is increasingly a direct threat to the security of the United States and our allies,» the president said. The two leaders also discussed economic issues of import, with the Chinese leader revealing his country’s plans to purchase 185 Boeing 737s and 15 777s with a combined list-price value of $19 billion. Boeing says all are firm orders.

Coop Now – Security

The US and China have made progress in global security with each other recently

Steinberg, Deputy Secretary of State, 10

(James B., American academic and political advisor, U.S. Department of State, 4-11-10, “U.S. - China Cooperation on Global Issues”, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/2010/141772.htm>, MLF, accessed 7-1-11)

On security issues, something clearly we at the State Department are very focused on, I think you can see that there are a number of areas where we have made significant progress, beginning with global security challenges like counterterrorism and counter-piracy, the attempt to build a more sustained military-to-military relationship, and most urgently, and the one that captures the headlines, dealing with Iran and North Korea.

Coop Now – Econ

The US and China have been working together to try to solve the economic crisis

Steinberg, Deputy Secretary of State, 10

(James B., American academic and political advisor, U.S. Department of State, 4-11-10, “U.S. - China Cooperation on Global Issues”, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/2010/141772.htm>, MLF, accessed 7-1-11)

So the third topic that the Secretary identified in her initial remarks was the challenge of the economic crisis and global growth. And I think here, again, we saw the potential of the partnership between the United States and China. This is not a G-2. We recognize that however important our two countries are to dealing with these challenges, that we need the cooperation of all the systemic international players, but without the United States and China playing constructive roles, that the prospects for dealing both with the short-term challenges of the recent economic crisis as well as the long-term challenge of sustainable global economic growth simply cannot be met. And on this, I think both countries did step up and do their part. China was a key player in the international coordination of the financial crisis. As you will all recall, this was the occasion of the President’s first meeting with President Hu, was in London for the G-20 meeting. Both the United States and China adopted historically large stimulus packages to support both our national economic activity, but also part of the global economic strategy.

Space Race & Weaponization Answers

\*\*\* ASATs Scenario Answers

ASATs Not a Threat – US Countermeasures

ASAT testing has encouraged the US to develop its own naval ASAT capacities

Metaparti, researcher of maritime security and terrorism at the Centre of Asian Studies, 2008

(Prakash Metaparti, “A shot across China's bow,” South China Morning Post, p. 13, March 1, NS)

The Chinese military is reportedly engaged in developing its cyber-warfare and Asat capabilities. China's Asat capabilities were openly displayed in January last year, when it destroyed one of its own weather satellites with a land-based missile. China's intention in conducting that test was, perhaps, not so much to challenge US domination of space, but to strengthen its own interests in East Asia, particularly in a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The demonstration did not go unnoticed: for the US, it was a reminder that its dominance of space is no longer unchallenged; for Japan, it was a reminder of its own vulnerability, coming not long after ballistic missile launches and a nuclear test by North Korea. America's response came on February 20, when the USS Lake Erie launched a modified SM-3 missile to successfully bring down the satellite - the first time any country has demonstrated a shipborne Asat weapon. The SM-3 is a proven anti-missile defence weapon that could knock down satellites as well as ballistic missiles, including Asats. In any future conflict, China could expect the US navy to thwart any attempts to bring down US satellites, by neutralising its Asat missiles before they reach their targets.

ASATs Not a Threat – Not Effective

No short term impact – the US has multiple GPS satellites. Destroying a few wouldn’t hamper the US’s military dominance

Seedhouse, aerospace scientist & PhD from German Space Agency's Institute of Space Medicine, 10

(Erik, “The New Space Race: China vs. the US” Springer and Praxis Publishing Co., <http://www.scribd.com/doc/31809026/The-New-Space-Race-China-Vs>, accessed: 6/30/11, SL)

It is likely that one day. China will attempt to forcibly claim Taiwan. :■ WS-Lm-long island lying some 120 km off the southeastern coast of China, knowing full well that such a campaign could lead to a conflict with the US. While most analysts would favor the US in a conflict with China, there are tactile subtleties and attack options that could conceivably change the outcome liable 5.1). In the following section, a scenario in which China loses a space war with the US is described, before analyzing a different set of parameters in which the tables are turned. How China would lose a war in space A conflict between China and the US will almost inevitably he fought over the status of Taiwan, since Beijing has indicated that it will use force if Taiwan takes steps to obtain independence The following scenario (based on an article by Geoffrey Forden) hypothesizes such a conflict occurring in 2010 and considers current Sino U S space assets and capabilities. First strike China's first step in any conflict with the US will be to dramatically compromise the ability of the US to use LEO at a tactical level. To do this. China would first identify LLO satellites passing over Chinese territory on a regular basis, It would then preposition its ASAT-tipped missiles and mobile launchers in remote areas determined by satellite orbits. Simultaneously. China would covertly assemble a fleet of Long March (LM Haunch vehicles capable of intercepting satellites in GEO. Four days before the attack, China would launch the first of its LM rockets, carrying a cluster of ASATs to a parking orbit in LEO. While the first launch would not attract any attention, the next LM launch, following shortly after the first, would set the alarms ringing in the Pentagon. Given their current LM inventory and the payload capacity of the LM launch vehicle, it is possible that the Chinese could place 12-16 ASATs in LEO. While the US has do/cm of satellites, including 32 GPS satellites. 23 military communications satellites, and more than \*>0 commercial communications satellites, China would not have to destroy all US space-based assets to compromise US military efforts. If China could destroy those satellites with a direct line of sight of the conflict, it would be able to disrupt US offensive capabilities. If however. would China be capable of achieving this? US satellites with direct line of sight would probably include eight military and 22 US civilian communications satellites in GEO. But even if China deployed all its ASATs. it would only be able to destroy 16 satellites, assuming an improbable 100% success rate. Even if China exclusively targeted GPS satellites, the US would still have 16 operating GPS satellites following the attack. However, if the Chinese targeted the nine GPS satellites normally positioned over China, it might be able to eliminate the use of US precision-guided weapons but only for a few hours, at best. Due to the redundancy in the US space-based satellite network, other GPS satellites would quickly take over the orbits of the damaged or destroyed GPS satellites and the US would be back in business.

ASATs Not a Threat – Peaceful Purposes

The Chinese government does not understand the consequences of deploying ASAT technology

Hitchens, Director of World Security Institute’s Center for Defense, 2007

(Theresa, “U.S.-Sino Relations in Space: From ‘War of Words’ to Cold War in Space?” China Security, p. 13-14, Winter, <http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=186>, Accessed June 30, 2011, NS)

Even more puzzling, and perhaps more worrisome, is the possibility – as has been speculated by some U.S. officials – that perhaps the Chinese leadership didn’t really understand what risks the test might entail, and that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) may have been less than forthcoming in briefing the leadership about those risks. U.S. National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley suggested in an interview with The New York Times that it was possible that Chinese President Hu Jintao and other senior leaders may not have been fully aware of the military’s plans regarding the test. “The question on something like this is, at what level in the Chinese government are people witting, and have they approved?” Hadley said. 11 U.S. analysts are divided on that question; and it may be that the initial response from the Bush administration was designed to give Hu some wiggle room to “save face.” Nonetheless, there is a fairly strong consensus that, at a minimum, the Chinese Foreign Ministry was neither informed nor ready to respond to the outcry that ensued. 12 Finally, recent remarks by senior PLA Col. Yao Yunzhu at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, who directs the Asia-Pacific Office at the Academy of Military Sciences in Beijing, lead toward the “mirror image” explanation: the Chinese and American militaries have come to the same pessimistic conclusion about the future of space and have decided to prepare for the worst, including a competition with each other. “My prediction:” said Yao, “Outer space is going to be weaponized in our lifetime.”13 She added, in an indirect allusion to the United States, that if there is going to be a “space superpower, it’s not going to be alone, and China is not going to be the only one.”

China will not use micro-satellites as ASATs- they will only be used to promote peaceful operations

Xianqi, professor at the Institute of Command and Technology, and Junqin, PhD candidate at the Institute of Command and Technology, 6

(Maj. Gen. Chang and Maj. Sui “Active Exploration and Peaceful Use of Outer Space” accessed: 6-30-11 [http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=244) TJL](http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=244)%20TJL)

However, China will continue to adhere to a defense-oriented national defense policy. Its exploration and utilization of space, including the development and application of micro-satellites, is for peaceful purposes only. China’s fledging micro-satellite capabilities are expected to make significant contributions to the civilian field of satellite telecommunications, environmental disaster monitoring, scientific experimentation and high altitude surveillance. In this way, China will be able to facilitate economic growth while enhancing its national strength. Currently, however, China does not have any plan to use micro-satellites as anti-satellite weapons. This appears to hold true for future defense planning as well. Like many new high technologies, small and micro-satellites are typical dual-use technologies with military and civilian applications. Since China is neither the first country to possess this technology, nor the country with the most advanced technology, it seems incomprehensible that China should cause concern to others.

China Not Agressive – ASATs Not Representative (1/2)

**The PLA developed and tested ASAT weapons secretly, they are isolated and don’t represent China’s desired policy**

**Gill, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute director & Kleiber, Chair in Center for Strategic and International Studies Strategy chair, 7**

(Bates – China Specialist and Martin - Chair in Strategy at Center for Strategic and International Studies, Foreign Affairs May 2007 - June 2007, Pg. 2 Vol. 86 No. 3, China's Space Odyssey: What the Antisatellite Test Reveals About Decision-Making in Beijing, Lexis) AC

This would not be the first time that the PLA concealed its operations from other parts of the Chinese security and foreign policy apparatus. In April 2001, soon after a Chinese fighter jet and a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane collided, it became apparent that the Chinese military was not fully disclosing what it knew about the incident. Military authorities on Hainan Island, where the EP-3 was forced to land, did not provide full or accurate details of the incident to Beijing -- especially not to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs -- frustrating efforts by U.S. and Chinese diplomats to resolve the crisis. Similarly, in early 2003, the PLA at first suppressed information about the spread of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), even though military doctors in the Guangzhou Military Region had been aware of an outbreak in southern China since January. Even when SARS spread to major military hospitals in Beijing in late February and early March, the PLA did not report these cases to civilian authorities. The news broke out only after a whistle-blowing PLA doctor informed the media that one hospital had 60 SARS patients and had had six SARS-related deaths. The information appeared in Time magazine in early April, prompting the Chinese government to mobilize to confront SARS and deal with the PLA's cover-up. Even today, information remains a highly prized and seldom-shared commodity in China's Leninist system. The Chinese government is stovepiped: the most critical linkages across agencies take place at the very top, with little horizontal communication or information sharing at the lower, working levels of government. In fact, Chinese bureaucrats tend to hoard information to ensure that rivals cannot manipulate it to their advantage. Although this dynamic is found in all bureaucracies, the current Chinese system takes it to an extreme. The PLA, which has long had considerable leeway to carry out its business as it saw fit, remains a particularly compartmentalized and secretive structure. Does this mean that the PLA operates as a rogue organization? No. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still controls the gun. Hu Jintao -- who simultaneously heads the PLA (as chair of the Central Military Commission), the CCP (as its general secretary), and the state (as the country's president) -- straddles the main parts of the political hierarchy. As the only civilian on the Central Military Commission, the country's most important civil-military communication node, Hu plays a singularly critical role. He was undoubtedly aware of and supportive of the ASAT testing program. But after obtaining explanations from Chinese diplomats about the ASAT test in January, officials from the United States and around the world concluded that the leaders of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had not been informed of -- much less consulted about -- it in advance. It took the ministry nearly two weeks to come out with a terse acknowledgment and explanation. Even as late as ten days after the incident, Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing said that he had "not received any confirmed information" about it. Chinese diplomats called in to explain themselves to governments around the world were often at a loss; they, too, were in the dark.

China Not Agressive – ASATs Not Representative (1/2)

ASAT test not consistent with China’s space policies – it was a fluke.

Houpt, Master of Arts, Security Studies, Georgetown University, 2011

(Daniel M., “Does China have a comprehensive, coordinated, and consistent space policy? Implications for U.S. policymakers,” ProQuest, accessed 7/1/11, p. 40-41) EK

Inconsistent policy is defined here as one in which the actions or statements of one part of China’s space program irreconcilably contradict or complicate the actions or statements of a different part. As the typology makes clear, even some of the most fundamental policies being pursued in China’s space program are at odds with one another. Indeed, the Space Dragons of the PLA are at loggerheads with nearly all other aspects of China’s space program. Glaringly obvious is the contradiction between the Space Dragons and China’s official diplomatic policy of the Doves/ Restrainers but there are also more subtle ways in which the policy paths that China’s different groups represent are inconsistent. The best example illuminating China’s policy inconsistencies is the 2007 ASAT test. If China’s leadership had been interested in matching rhetoric to action in a consistent manner, thereby maintaining the integrity of their official policy in the peaceful uses of space, the ASAT test could have been conducted in a much different way. For example, if it was determined that the defunct satellite was a threat to other assets in space, China could have given advance public notice—much the way the U.S. did prior to Operation Burnt Frost. By making the mission transparent and the end goal clear, China could have likely avoided much of the political blowback that it experienced. It could have made abundantly clear that the test was for peaceful purposes and reassured the international community of its intentions. Furthermore, China could have perhaps gained operational support from foreign countries in areas like space situational awareness. This course would have been much more effective in maintaining policy consistency. Instead, for weeks the particularities of the mission and the justification were withheld from the international community, and, it seems, from the civilians in the MFA. The inconsistency in this operation alone seemed to redouble anxiety about China’s space program in the U.S. and elsewhere. Days after the ASAT test, U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control described it as a “wake-up call” and declared that the U.S. needed “to ensure that we take the steps necessary to protect the space assets and unfettered access to space.” 150 India’s government also stated that China’s capability to destroy satellites is a direct threat to Indian national security. 151 Motivating foreign nations to counter China’s capabilities in space was surely not the intention going into the test and could have been avoided had China been sincerely following a consistent space policy.

No ASAT Attack – Empirically Proven

No ASAT attack- even the Cold War couldn’t prompt powers to consider them

Krepon, Stimson Center Co-founder, ‘8

(Michael, Co-Founder and President of Emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a non-profit institution that seeks to promote pragmatic steps to enhance international security. He directs the South Asia program, 26 February 2008, “China’s Military Space Strategy: An Exchange”, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/SurvivalTellis.pdf>, p. 160, 7.2.11, SWolff)

If so many influential US and Soviet military and strategic analysts subscribed to Tellis’s logic train, why did the superpowers exercise such uncommon restraint in pursuing anti-satellite weapons? Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the USSR tested ASATs a grand total of 53 times. To some, this may seem like a large number, but it pales in comparison to over 1,700 nuclear tests (on average, one per week from the Cuban missile crisis to the fall of the Berlin Wall), and the tens of ballistic missile flight tests conducted annually during these harrowing years. When many hundreds, and then thousands of nuclear weapons were deployed and ready for prompt launch, only a very few, rudimentary ASATs were considered deployed, and only then for brief periods. Tellis, who agrees that the heightened superpower competition did not extend into space, explains this as a natural consequence of a bipolar competition between two states whose huge nuclear arsenals were intimately connected to satellites. To attack satellites upon which both relied for intelligence, targeting, communication, early warning and military-related weather forecasting would invite uncontrolled escalation across the nuclear threshold.

No ASAT attack- conditions should have already triggered an attack.

Krepon, Stimson Center Co-founder, ‘8

(Michael, Co-Founder and President of Emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a non-profit institution that seeks to promote pragmatic steps to enhance international security. He directs the South Asia program, 26 February 2008, “China’s Military Space Strategy: An Exchange”, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/SurvivalTellis.pdf>, p. 162, 7.2.11, SWolff)

I believe that Tellis is correct in asserting that threats to space assets will grow, but so, too, will global dependency on satellites. In combination, these trend lines can continue to prevent space from becoming a shooting gallery. I happen to agree with Tellis that a treaty banning space weapons would be plagued by problems of definition, scope and verification. I appreciate Tellis’s cautious endorsement of a Code of Conduct for responsible spacefaring nations, an initiative of the Henry L. Stimson Center that has gained endorsement by the European Union and other governments. A Code of Conduct would, however, be greatly vitiated unless participating states agreed to a provision against harmful interference with satellites. When Tellis’s partial truths are complicated by other truths, the inadvisability of running and trying to win an offence–defence arms race in space becomes evident. There is nothing inevitable about the use of force against space objects. If this were the case, attacks on satellites would have already accompanied ground combat and deep crises. If common sense, let alone wisdom, prevails, barriers against attacking satellites can extend into the future as well.

No ASAT Attack – Space Dependency

No ASAT attack- space dependency acts as the ultimate deterrent

Krepon, Stimson Center Co-founder, ‘8

(Michael, Co-Founder and President of Emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, a non-profit institution that seeks to promote pragmatic steps to enhance international security. He directs the South Asia program, 26 February 2008, “China’s Military Space Strategy: An Exchange”, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/SurvivalTellis.pdf>, p. 161, 7.2.11, SWolff)

I believe there is reason to be optimistic rather than fatalistic. The more spacefaring nations become invested in satellites for economic growth, global commerce, and military capabilities, the more they will pause before opening Pandora’s Box. The constraints that worked against using satellites as target practice in the past are even stronger today. They will be stronger tomorrow, because dependency on satellites in growing in all spacefaring nations. I rest my case by citing as evidence the behaviour of the George W. Bush administration, which has not been shy about utilising American military superiority and about taking significant risks in pursuit of presumed security interests. Even the Bush administration – and even after the Chinese ASAT test – has refrained from undertaking the offensive ASAT programmes endorsed by Tellis. Notwithstanding existing US Air Force guidance and the Rumsfeld Commission’s recommendations, the Pentagon has so far confined its testing in space to the demonstration of multipurpose technologies that fall far short of dedicated ASATs. The United States, like China and Russia, is pursuing a hedging strategy in the event that the norm against harming satellites in crises or warfare is broken. This analysis suggests breaks in the logic train constructed by Tellis and others who advocate the testing and deployment of offensive counterspace capabilities. To be sure, ASAT programmes are driven by national interest, but national interest also recognises that a shooting war in space can have profoundly negative consequences. Chinese ASAT programmes do, indeed, have military logic, but it is probably incorrect to assume that Chinese space diplomacy serves entirely as a ruse to protect the PLA’s ASAT programmes. The Chinese government has many moving parts, and Beijing’s conspicuous silence after the January 2007 ASAT test suggests that the Foreign Ministry and the PLA tracks were not well coordinated. In all probability, Tellis is correct about PLA briefings to the Chinese leadership before the ASAT test, but it is also probably fair to conclude that the subject of debris did not figure prominently in these briefings.

No Solvency – ASATs Inevitable

China’s counterspace program will continue for a laundry list of reasons in the status quo – impact inevitable

Ressler, U.S. Air Force Major, 9

(Aaron R., Advancing Sino-U.S. Space Cooperation, April 2009, p. 19, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA539619, accessed 6/29/11) EK

Other Motivations for Chinese Counterspace Activities 1) To prove their ASAT capability works. At some point in developing this technology, one needs to eventually ensure the system works for advancement to the next level.104 2) A warning to Taiwan in their attempt for seeking independence.105 3) “The Chinese ASAT test (and possibly ongoing program) was conceived largely as a deterrent to U.S. space-based missile defenses, which China views as a threat to its nuclear deterrent, rather than an offensive program.”106 4) “China sees space weaponization as inevitable”107 5) A hard power display to “bring the United States to the negotiating table over space-based missile defense and space weapons.”108 6) Chinese perception that U.S. refuses to discuss military space intentions as indicated in October 2006 U.S. National Space Policy.109 This in turn leads China to believe the U.S. intends to “dominate and control space.”110 7) A means of protecting its nuclear deterrent which is threatened by U.S. theater and national missile defense systems.111 8) China takes extreme pride and prestige in its space program. The ASAT demonstration display a monumental achievement while showing China too intends to protect its interests in Space.112

International and domestic prestige motivate China’s space program

Ressler, U.S. Air Force Major, 9

(Aaron R., Advancing Sino-U.S. Space Cooperation, April 2009, p. 7, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA539619, accessed 6/29/11) EK

What are China’s motivations in pursuing such a space program? There are several different theories, with a recurring theme of national prestige that is often mentioned. A Congressional Research Service report mentioned that, “China has apparently chosen the more expensive route of sending humans into space, over machines, for the wider attention it attracts both domestically and internationally.”40 Another theory that appears plausible is that the space program helps in the unification and cohesion of the PRC.41 Similar to the Apollo program of the U.S., China’s “space program provides a mechanism for research and scientific exploration that will undoubtedly advance China’s education and high-tech industrial base.”42 In reviewing the 2006 White Paper, national prestige does appear to be an evident theme along with the aims listed in Appendix B. Under “the principles of development for China’s space industry,” the paper mentions “upholding independence and self-reliance policy,” describing how China to date has built “its space industry from scratch” and will continue to do so.43 The White Paper also mentions development of China’s space industry “as a cohesive force for the unity of the Chinese people.”44 This relates to the PRC unification theory mentioned earlier. Prestige is an important aspect of China’s program, as it is for other spacefaring nations like the U.S. and Russia. Advancements in the areas of economy, science, technology and national security are also evident as important themes. And then, of course, there is that first aim mentioned in China’s 2006 White Paper on exploration. Isn’t exploration a significant part of any manned space program? One key take away is that it appears China did not develop its program based on a “space race” like the former Soviet Union (FSU) and the U.S where each country was concerned about maintaining the military advantage.

No Solvency – ASATs Inevitable

China’s space program is economically motivated and wants to move into the industry

Ressler, U.S. Air Force Major, 9

(Aaron R., Advancing Sino-U.S. Space Cooperation, April 2009, p. 8, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA539619, accessed 6/29/11) EK

It appears the PRC is likely are developing their program based on 21st century motivations as space is an opportunity to not only build national prestige, but move forward in the global economy as a supplier and global player in the benefits of space development. They are highly interested in the commercial satellite industry, with plans to launch 100 satellites from 2006 to 2010.45 The construction of its fourth launch site will also greatly expand China’s capability of launching payloads into GEO orbit.46 Future manned and unmanned missions spanning the next 15 years include plans for orbital docking, moon voyages, and the beginnings of a Mars program.47 China’s resounding success and planned upgrades to its Long March series boosters will help in this endeavor. China’s commitment to space is evident with its possession of “the facilities, satellite technology, mission control centers, and launchers required of a space power.”48

\*\*\*Space Race/Threat Answers

Won’t Militarize

China’s space program is not intended to gain military advantage

Ressler, U.S. Air Force Major, 9

(Aaron R., Advancing Sino-U.S. Space Cooperation, April 2009, p. 8, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA539619, accessed 6/29/11) EK

Prestige is an important aspect of China’s program, as it is for other spacefaring nations like the U.S. and Russia. Advancements in the areas of economy, science, technology and national security are also evident as important themes. And then, of course, there is that first aim mentioned in China’s 2006 White Paper on exploration. Isn’t exploration a significant part ofany manned space program? One key take away is that it appears China did not develop its program based on a “space race” like the former Soviet Union (FSU) and the U.S where each country was concerned about maintaining the military advantage.

Won’t Militarize – Defense Policy

The Chinese are committed to a peaceful space program, even if the US were to directly weaponize space, the Chinese would continue a peaceful mission

Xianqi, professor at the Institute of Command and Technology, and Junqin, PhD candidate at the Institute of Command and Technology, 6

(Maj. Gen. Chang and Maj. Sui “Active Exploration and Peaceful Use of Outer Space” accessed: 6-30-11 [http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=244) TJL](http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=244)%20TJL)

In regard to the U.S. missile defense program, China opposes an arms race in any form. This position is evident in its consistent and strong support for the non-weaponization of space. China is willing to work with other nations to prevent the deployment of weapons in space by any country or region. If the United States ultimately chooses to deploy weapons in space, it will be profoundly regrettable; however, it will have no impact on China’s space program, particularly its manned space program. Regardless of circumstance, China will continue to resolutely uphold its defense-oriented national defense policy, and continue to explore and utilize outer space for peaceful purposes.

Assumptions China would use its spacecraft program as a military threat are baseless

Xianqi, professor at the Institute of Command and Technology, and Junqin, PhD candidate at the Institute of Command and Technology, 6

(Maj. Gen. Chang and Maj. Sui “Active Exploration and Peaceful Use of Outer Space” accessed: 6-30-11 [http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=244) TJL](http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=244)%20TJL)

As was explained above, the technologies adopted in China’s manned space flight program, including the Shenzhou series spacecraft, are essential for conducting space experiments. These experiments are aimed at developing basic technologies to be utilized for the peaceful exploitation of space. A reliable and accurate launch vehicle, with its fault self-detection systems, escape system as well as spacecraft orbital maneuver technology are capabilities that were mastered by the United States and Russia long ago. It is obvious that assertions judging China’s manned spacecraft program as a military threat are baseless.

Won’t Militarize – US Not A Threat

US space policy does not pose a threat to or limit China, their space program is developed

Shixiu, senior fellow of military theory studies and international relations at the Institute for Military Thought Studies, 2007

(Bao, “Deterrence Revisited: Space” China Security, Issue No. 5, p. 2-3, Winter, <http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=185&Itemid=8>, Accessed June 30, 2011, NS)

The United States denies that its position on space, as represented by the NSP, will inevitably lead to conflict in space. First, officials in the defense establishment argue that the United States is not opposed to others exploiting space commercially.3 Rather, it only opposes the utilization of space in a way that puts at risk U.S. dominance in space and its military capabilities. In this context, it is argued that if China has purely civilian and commercial interests in space, it should have no problem with U.S. policy in space. Put another way, implicit in much of American thinking regarding China’s intentions in space is a view that if China has no plan to militarize space or has no intention to develop space weapons, U.S. ambitions in space shouldn’t be considered inimical to China’s interests.

Won’t Militarize – OST (1/2)

China is abiding the outer space treaties and wants peace

Xinhua, official press agency to the People’s Republic of China, 4/8/11

(“China abides by all outer space treaties”, China Daily USA, <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-04/08/content_12290678.htm>, accessed 7/1/11) EK

China committed itself to stick to all basic principles provided in outer space treaties, conduct all explorations and use of outer space for the benefits of the whole mankind, said a Chinese envoy to the United Nations here on Thursday. Li Baodong, the Chinese permanent representative to the UN made the remarks at a plenary meeting of the General Assembly 65th session, in which a resolution was adopted to designate April 12 as the International Day of Human Space Flight. On April 12, 1961, astronaut Yuri Gagarin from the former Soviet Union made the first space flight on Vostok 1 opening the new chapter in human's exploration of the outer space. Li told the meeting that over the past 50 years, with the efforts of the space scientists of all countries, great progress has been made in manned space cause. "So far nearly 40 countries sent astronauts into the outer space. We are very happy to see that China is making its contribution to the development," he said. Since the year of 1999, the Chinese manned space project has successfully completed seven flights, sent six astronauts at three times into the outer space and executed spacewalk, Li said, adding that this year China would conduct the first rendezvous and docking flight and has begun building the space station. "With utmost confidence and courage, China would explore the unknown and further promote manned space program so as to make contributions to human space flight cause," Li said. China reiterated that it will always stick to all basic principles provided by conventions on outer space, conduct all explorations and use of outer space for the benefit of the mankind, and enhance international cooperation in exploring and making use of outer space making the progress of space science and technology benefit all countries, particularly the developing countries. "We hope that the international community would make joint efforts to build a harmonious outer space conducive to peace, development, cooperation and rule of law," Li said. China appreciated the leading role of Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in promoting the peaceful use of the outer space, improving outer space legislation and deepening the international cooperation, the ambassador said.

Won’t Militarize – OST (2/2)

The Chinese government upholds its aim to peacefully develop space per the framework of the United Nations

Govt. White Papers, releases from the People’s Republic of China, 2006 (<http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/183709.htm>, accessed: 6/30/11, SL)

The Chinese government holds that outer space is the common wealth of all mankind, and each and every country in the world enjoys equal rights to freely explore, develop and utilize outer space and celestial bodies; and that all countries' outer space activities should be beneficial to the economic development, social progress of nations, to security, subsistence and development of mankind, and to friendly cooperation between people of different countries. International space cooperation should adhere to the fundamental principles stated in the "Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries." China maintains that international space exchanges and cooperation should be strengthened on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, peaceful utilization and common development. Fundamental Policies The Chinese government has adopted the following policies with regard to developing international space exchanges and cooperation: -- Adhering to the principle of independence and taking the initiative in our own hands, carrying out active and practical international cooperation in consideration of the overall, rational utilization of domestic and international markets and resources to meet the needs of the national modernization drive. -- Supporting activities regarding the peaceful use of outer space within the framework of the United Nations. Supporting all inter- governmental activities for promoting the development of space technology, space application and space science as well as those conducted between non-governmental space organizations. -- Attaching importance to space cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, and supporting other regional space cooperation around the world. -- Reinforcing space cooperation with developing countries, and valuing space cooperation with developed countries. -- Encouraging and endorsing the efforts of domestic scientific research institutes, industrial enterprises, institutions of higher learning, as well as social organizations to develop international space exchanges and cooperation in different forms and at different levels under the guidance of relevant state policies, laws and regulations.

Won’t Militarize – Diplomacy

China won’t be violent – they look to achieve their goals through bureaucracy and domestic tools

Lavin, former US Department of Commerce International Trade Administration director, 11

[Franklin headed the International Trade Administration for the United States Department of Commerce from 2005 until 2007, 4-20-11, Heritage Foundation, “Consequential China: U.S.–China Relations in a Time of Transition” <http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2011/06/Consequential-China-US-China-Relations-in-a-Time-of-Transition,> MLF, accessed 6-30-11]

The core of foreign policy management for China is external equilibrium: How do you achieve your goals in a peaceful setting? But the policy decisions are driven by internal equilibrium, so we have an internal set of factors that limit, constrain and define policy options, but those policy options are projected externally. It is not necessarily a contradiction, but it is a constraint. In other words, China seeks to advance its foreign policy goals through a set of policies and tools, but a primary determinant of these foreign policy decisions are domestic political and bureaucratic requirements. China is not alone in this respect; this is a phenomenon in the United States as well, but sometimes the disconnect between internal requirements and external goals can be striking. To illustrate this point, let us look at some policy statements China made about South Korea late last year.

Won’t Militarize – Lack of Tech (1/2)

China is 22 years behind the US when it comes to offensive space weapons – the US will maintain its dominance

Seedhouse, aerospace scientist & PhD from German Space Agency's Institute of Space Medicine, 10

(Erik, “The New Space Race: China vs. the US” Springer and Praxis Publishing Co., <http://www.scribd.com/doc/31809026/The-New-Space-Race-China-Vs>, accessed: 6/30/11, SL)

The US won the Cold War because it was the most militarily powerful nation on Earth. In the same manner in which the Russians challenged the US during the Cold War. Beijing has indicated that it intends to challenge Washington for control of the Last Frontier. While the Chinese destroyed one of their own satellites in 2007. the test only replicated a test conducted by the US 22 years previously, with a weapon more advanced than that used by the Chinese. For years, the Chinese blustered about the peaceful uses of space and arms control treaties, before firing a shot across the bow and revealing their true intentions. In reality. China's ASAT test barely constituted a threat to US space dominance because the US military has at least four or five systems (Figure 5.2) capable of damaging and destroying satellites without creating an orbital debris cloud. Furthermore, the US. which was technologically superior to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. is. militarily, disproportionately more capable than the Chinese. While Beijing's capacity to develop counterspace and counter-counterspace capabilities will undoubtedly increase, many of the programs it initiates will falter, others will be stillborn, and many will prove unsuccessful. Meanwhile, the US will continue to develop its superior space capabilities and solidify its position of space dominance. The pursuit by the US and China for space superiority will likely continue until China either acquires the capacity to defeat the US. the investments in Chinese counterspace yield diminishing returns, or Sino American rivalry disappears completely. Since none of these scenarios is likely in the foreseeable future, the US will not waste time and energy attempting to negotiate space-control treaties that arc. in any case, unverifiable.

Won’t Militarize – Lack of Tech (2/2)

China is years behind the US in military and space technology

Paarlberg, Wellesley College Professor of Political Science, 4

(Robert L, Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College and Associate at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, “Knowledge as Power: Science, Military Dominance, and U.S. Security,” International Security, 29.1 (2004) 122-151, accessed on 7-8-11, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v029/29.1paarlberg.html>, JSkoog)

The Chinese economy has now enjoyed twenty-six consecutive years of strong growth based in part on the acquisition of new technologies. Today China's leaders clearly aspire to close the military technology gap with the United States, yet their science capacities remain far behind those of the United States. The list of deficits is long. In microelectronics China's most advanced facilities have been six to eight years behind the state of the art and continue to be critically dependent on imports. China has only limited supercomputer capabilities and its PCs are composed primarily of imported parts. In telecommunications China depends on foreign firms for advanced transmission technologies. China's nuclear power industry is rudimentary, and its aviation industry is based mostly on antiquated Soviet technology. In space China's launch capability is impressive for a developing country, but its satellite capabilities [End Page 134] remain limited.39 According to a 2001 assessment, in military technology China is destined to remain significantly behind well into the future: China's overall military technology in 2020 will still be significantly inferior to that of the United States, for several reasons. First,... China's average level of commercial technology will still lag behind advanced world practice. Second, because development cycles for weapons are long, military systems are often designed around technologies that are a decade or more old by the time the weapons become operational (In the United States, 13 to 15 years typically elapse between the initiation of a major weapon development program and the initial operational capability of the first production units). Thus, the military systems that the United States and China field in 2020 will largely reflect the technologies available to those countries in 2010 or earlier. Finally, the process of translating civilian technological capabilities to military technology is nontrivial. Even though military systems build on technologies that are fundamentally civilian, they still involve technologies that are specifically military and thus must be independently developed. Furthermore, even if all the component technologies of a weapon system are available, the process of integrating them into a smoothly functional whole is challenging. This has been demonstrated, for example, by the difficulties Japan's defense industries have experienced in developing F-2 indigenous fighter aircraft.40

Won’t Militarize – Budget

China has neither the resources nor the political will to engage in a space weapons race

Shixiu, senior fellow of military theory studies and international relations at the Institute for Military Thought Studies, 2007

(Bao, “Deterrence Revisited: Space” China Security, Issue No. 5, p. 2-3, Winter, <http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=185&Itemid=8>, Accessed June 30, 2011, NS)

Despite the need for an effective deterrent to meet security challenges that China may confront in space, it will not initiate a space weapons race with the United States or any other country. First, China does not have the ambition to enter a space weapons race. During the Cold War period, faced with a threat of nuclear war, China did not join in the nuclear weapons race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, China’s space program is pointed in the direction of peaceful development. The new political and diplomatic doctrines – a harmonious society and world – also curb China’s entrance to a space weapons race.14 Second, China does not have the ability to enter a space weapons race. Although China has ambitious plans in space, the technical gap, especially in the military area vis-à-vis the United States, is difficult if not impossible to fill. China will not and cannot expend significant budgetary resources pursuing space weapons, but will instead focus on civilian and commercial space assets.15 So, if China owns space weapons, their number and quality will be limited in their capacity to act as an effective defense mechanism and will not be a threat to other countries. China has every interest to avoid triggering a confrontation in outer space and it will never be a deliberate choice for China. Equally important, however, is that China will not shrink from defending its core national interests.

Won’t Militarize – Weak Currency

No Chinese economic edge in space – weak currency

Sabathier, senior associate with the CSIS Technology and Public Policy Program, Faith, president of Sabathier Consulting for public and private aeronautics policy, 2011

(Vincent G., G. Ryan Faith, “The Global Impact of the Chinese Space Program,” World Politics Review, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8878/the-global-impact-of-the-chinese-space-program>, May 17, Accessed July 1, 2011, NS)

However, it is far from certain that China will have a decisive edge in commercial space products. Unlike many of the other goods that China manufactures, the Chinese space program is primarily designed to meet national needs, rather than being designed and built solely to minimize costs. Considerations such as reliability and responsiveness, as well as a host of other domestic industrial and political factors, mean that in the long run, it is quite possible that China might find itself undercut commercially by other space powers -- especially if fears about yuan inflation prove true. Indeed, in coming years, it is entirely possible that the Long March launch systems will not be able to compete with Russian Proton rockets launched from Kazakhstan.

Won’t Militarize – Lack of Resolve

**China can’t engage in an offensive space race, any proliferation will be defensive in nature**

**Shixiu, Senior Fellow Academy of Military Sciences of PLA, 7**

(Senior fellow for the Institute for Military Thought – PLA – China US relations specialist, Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space, China Security Winter 2007 pp. 9, <http://www.wsichina.org/cs5_1.pdf>) AC

In basic terms, strategic deterrence theory demands three basic conditions be met to be effective. They are 1) the possession of an adequate deterrent force; 2) the will to use deterrent force; and 3) clear communication of both the possession and the determination to use a deterrent force against an adversary. Neither the United States nor any other nation should be led into thinking that China does not have the ability to acquire a fully effective deterrent in space or the determination to use it in its own defense. This article attempts to serve to communicate those realities. Despite the need for an effective deterrent to meet security challenges that China may confront in space, it will not initiate a space weapons race with the United States or any other country. First, China does not have the ambition to enter a space weapons race. During the Cold War period, faced with a threat of nuclear war, China did not join in the nuclear weapons race between the United States and the Soviet Union. Today, China’s space program is pointed in the direction of peaceful development. The new political and diplomatic doctrines – a harmonious society and world – also curb China’s entrance to a space weapons race.14 Second, China does not have the ability to enter a space weapons race. Although China has ambitious plans in space, the technical gap, especially in the military area vis-à-vis the United States, is difficult if not impossible to fill. China will not and cannot expend significant budgetary resources pursuing space weapons, but will instead focus on civilian and commercial space assets.15 So, if China owns space weapons, their number and quality will be limited in their capacity to act as an effective defense mechanism and will not be a threat to other countries. China has every interest to avoid triggering a confrontation in outer space and it will never be a deliberate choice for China. Equally important, however, is that China will not shrink from defending its core national interests.

Won’t Militarize – US Deters

China wants to use space peacefully

Zhang, physicist and research associate at Harvard, 7

**(**Hui, “Chinese Perspectives on Space Weapons,” January, p.31, <http://www.amacad.org/hui3.pdf>, accessed 6/30/11) PG

Although those in **the Chinese scientific community** have more nuanced perceptions than many officials, particularly regarding the feasibility and ultimate result of U.S. space plans, they **share in the widespread concern over U.S. ambitions**. **The prevailing view in China is that U.S. space weaponization plans will have disastrous consequences for international security and the peaceful use of outer space.** Through space weaponization, **the United States seeks to neutralize China’s nuclear deterrence capabilities. Many in China worry that this would free the United States to intervene in China’s affairs and to undermine efforts at reunification with Taiwan.** These concerns have prompted China to clearly express—with sufficient frequency to merit an acronym—that the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)is an urgent and realistic objective. A 2004 white paper on China’s national defenseemphasized, “Outer space is the common property of mankind. **China hopes that the international community would take action as soon as possible to conclude an international legal instrument on preventing the weaponization of and arms race in outer space through negotiations, to ensure the peaceful use of outer space**.”

\*\*\*No Space War

No Space War – MAD

No impact to space weapons—MAD

Shixiu, senior fellow of military theory studies and international relations at the Institute for Military Thought Studies, 2007

(Bao, “Deterrence Revisited: Space” China Security, Issue No. 5, p. 2-3, Winter, <http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=185&Itemid=8>, Accessed June 30, 2011, NS)

At a fundamental level, space weapons – like nuclear weapons – will not alter the essential nature of war. Throughout history, there has been much ink spilled over new weapons that have the unique power and ability to change the underlying quality of war. For example, military theorists once exaggerated the tank’s role in deciding the war’s outcome during World War I.11 The atom bomb itself is probably the most salient example, as many analysts and politicians described the weapon as the unique ultimate weapon.12 But this was a fundamental misunderstanding of war and its implements. Nuclear weapons crossed a threshold in terms of their immense capacity for destruction. But deterrence, mutual assured destruction and the nuclear taboo evolved to consign the use of nuclear weapons to a near impossibility, negating its utility as a tool of war-fighting. Weapons to change the nature of war have not emerged in the past and will not emerge in the future. As such, space weapons will not be the ultimate weapon nor will they be able to decide the outcome of war, even if they are used as a first strike.

No Sino-US Space War – China Deters

**The US won’t attack China, its deterrent capabilities are too strong**

**Shixiu, Senior Fellow Academy of Military Sciences of PLA, 7**

(Senior fellow for the Institute for Military Thought – PLA – China US relations specialist, Deterrence Revisited: Outer Space, China Security Winter 2007 pp.8, <http://www.wsichina.org/cs5_1.pdf>) AC

It is not sufficient to solely use physical counterattack mechanisms for deterrence in space. Capabilities must be paired with a wise strategy that includes important political and economic elements. Utilizing the full range of deterrent factors is the only way to maximize security advantage while minimizing the possibility of conflict. War is never purely a military action – it is also a political “event”- the two are indivisible. A successful national security strategy must be comprehensive and therefore cannot underestimate political and policy considerations. In basic terms, the initiator of a war must first find a favorable political position or a justified reason to instigate conflict. China has a strong political will to defend its national security. Political will is a type of ‘soft power’, which represents an important invisible force that can deter potential adversaries from initiating hostile actions. Other ‘soft power’ elements that China possesses: a reliable defense capability suited to its comprehensive national strength and which is sufficient to answer any challenge by its adversaries; and the deeply patriotic and unquestionable determination of the Chinese to use comprehensive national strength to safeguard national security – at any cost. China will live up to its reputation as a sovereign country with a rich history that holds an important and respected place in the global community. China’s national security strategy must also be based upon a precise calculation of economic benefit.. The United States and China share economic benefits and interests: with the United States as the world’s most developed country and China as the largest developing country, the two economies are highly complimentary. The United States and China are each other’s second largest trading partners. Meanwhile, investments between the two economies have been equally impressive. Politics and economics play an important role in the determination of war. However, the reality of capabilities and physical power cannot be ignored. Thus, China’s national strategy must include the precise calculation of these factors and seek holistic deterrence.

\*\*\*No Space Race Solvency

No Space Race Solvency – Race Inevitable (1/2)

Motivations overwhelm solvency – US-China space race inevitable

Martel, Associate Professor of International Security Studies at The Fletcher School, Tufts University, 5/26/2009

[William, Associate Professor of International Security Studies at The Fletcher School, Tufts University, All Academic, 5/26/2009, “United States, China, and the Race for Hegemony in Space“

<http://research.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/3/8/8/p73884_index.html?phpsessid=b2c05260f619fc3e8d5d20b08ca5fa78>, accessed 7/1/11, HK]

There is mounting evidence that the United States and China are positioning themselves to conduct an arms space in race. This race for hegemony in space is based on competing views about the longer-term consequences of the potential collision of American and Chinese interests in space. From China's perspective, America's hegemony in space is presumptuous and represents a significant challenge to its national security concerns and international security more generally. For the United States, China's growing space power symbolizes its ambitions to challenge U.S. national security. Deeply seated mutual suspicions are evident in their strategic assessments as the contours of potential strategic competition between Washington and Beijing emerge. In essence, both sides agree that the other represents a challenge and a source of hegemony. While this potential clash of interests in Sino-U.S. ties is not yet sufficiently severe to be visible to casual observers, the United States and China are on the threshold of a space race that could radically influence international security. This paper represents an initial step to clarify the sources of competition and the challenges faced by both sides as they seek to manage this search for hegemony in the context of space.

The militarization of space is inevitable- we must protect ourselves from China

Gagnon, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, ‘10

(Bruce K, Coordinator of the Global Network Against Weapons & Nuclear Power in Space, January 1, 2010, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 22:17–24 1469-9982 online “U.S. Space Technology for Controlling China and Russia” p.24 EBSCO host 7/1/11 BLG)

For many years, Russia and China have introduced resolutions at the UN calling for negotiations on a new treaty that would ban weapons in space. Since the mid-’80s, every UN member nation has supported the ‘‘Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space’’ (PAROS) resolution, with the exception of the United States, Israel, and Micronesia. This was true during the Clinton presidency, as well as during the reign of George W. Bush. It will be crucial for President Obama, if he truly hopes to reset relations with Moscow and Beijing,to seriously enter into negotiations for a global ban on weapons in space. But the patience of the Chinese seems to be wearing thin. On November 2, the London Telegraph reported that a high-level Chinese air force officer had urged his nation to drop its opposition to the militarization of outer space and to begin developing orbital weapons and defense systems. ‘‘As far as the revolution in military affairs is concerned, the competition between military forces is moving towards outer space. This is a historical inevitability and a development that cannot be turned back,’’ Xu Qiliang told the People’s Liberation Army Daily. ‘‘The PLA air force must establish in a timely manner the concepts of space security, space interests and space development. We must build an outer space force that conforms with the needs of our nation’s development (and) the demands of the development of the Space Age,’’ Xu said.

No Space Race Solvency – Race Inevitable (2/2)

China space leadership is inevitable – they won’t give up

China Daily ’10

(October 7, 2010, “CHINA HAS DUTY TO EXPLORE SPACE, SAYS PROBE CHIEF”, LexisNexis, 7.1.11, SWolff)

It started the first braking at 11:06 am and entered the 12-hour elliptical moon orbit 32 minutes later. The satellite needs to brake twice more before it can enter the designed 118-minute working orbit. To acquire more detailed moon data, Chang'e-2 will enter a lower lunar orbit about 100 km above the surface, compared with the 200-km altitude of Chang'e-1, according to the control center. Qian said China's vision of lunar probes and manned space flights is due to a sense of responsibility, rather than the need to follow in the footsteps of other countries. "Once our mind is made up we will do it, no matter how many years later," said the designer. "However, we can never go beyond scientific rules and find a shortcut. "What we're doing now is what others did 40 years ago, but that doesn't mean we're lagging behind by 40 years," he said, adding that the country's levels of telecommunication networks and scientific understanding, based on the progress in science and technology, are much more advanced than they were decades ago. "We will narrow the gap fast," he insisted. Some 40 years ago, Russia and the US were the only countries to have sent people into space. During the US Apollo 11 mission in 1969, Neil Armstrong became the first person to walk on the moon. China's space talents are outstanding and young, said Qian, who revealed that the average age of the design team for the country's manned and lunar probe projects is just a little over 30. Yet, a lunar probe was only the first step in China's quest for deep space exploration, said Qian. "We will walk on this road step by step - scientifically and gradually," he added. Meanwhile on Wednesday, China successfully launched two environmental research satellites from North China's Shanxi province. With a designed lifespan of more than two years, the two satellites of the Shijian VI-04 group will carry out probes on space environment and radiation and conduct space science experiments, according to the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center.

\*\*\*Politics & Rollback Disad

NASA Rollback

A. Congress will cut off NASA funding if U.S. co-operates with China

Svitak, Space News, 5/4/11

(Amy, Space News staff writer, “China Viewed as Potential U.S. Partner in Future Mars Exploration”, Space News, <http://www.spacenews.com/policy/110504-china-partner-mars-exploration.html>, accessed 7/1/11) EK

Wolf, who characterizes China’s government as “fundamentally evil,” said it is outrageous that the Obama administration would have close ties with Beijing’s space program, which is believed to be run primarily by the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA. “When you say you want to work in concert, it’s almost like you’re talking about Norway or England or something like that,” an irate Wolf told Holdren, repeatedly pounding a hand against the table top in front of him. “As long as I have breath in me, we will talk about this, we will deal with this issue, whether it be a Republican administration or a Democrat administration, it

is fundamentally immoral.” Culberson reminded Holdren that the administration’s civil research and development funding flows through Wolf’s subcommittee, and that funding could be choked off if the White House fails to comply with the law. “Your office cannot participate, nor can NASA, in any way, in any type of policy, program, order or contract of any kind with China or any Chinese-owned company,” Culberson said. “If you or anyone in your office, or anyone at NASA participates, collaborates or coordinates in any way with China or a Chinese-owned company … you’re in violation of this statute, and frankly you’re endangering your funding. You’ve got a huge problem on your hands. Huge.”

[Note – Culberson = Rep. John Culberson, R-TX, Wolf = Rep. Frank Wolf, R-VA, Holdren = John Holdren, White House Science advisor]

B. Cutting NASA funds leads to loss of global leadership

Svitak, Space News, 11

(Amy, Staff @SpaceNews, 3/17, <http://www.spacenews.com/civil/110317gop-lawmakers-appeal-for-manned-exploration-funds.html>)

The members lauded America’s history of global leadership in space exploration but criticized Obama for what they said was undermining the nation’s leadership in space exploration. Obama’s plan also supports commercial astronaut transportation services and space technology development over deep space exploration systems favored by Congress. “[O]nce again, the Obama Administration’s budget willingly cedes that leadership to China, Russia and India — countries that understand the importance of human space exploration,” the letter states. “We cannot continue to accept this administration’s assault on American exceptionalism and world leadership.”

Rollback Extension

Congress opposes cooperation with China – plan puts NASA funding in jeopardy

Robertson, Epoch Times Staff Writer, 5/15/11

(Matthew studied at the Australian National University in Canberra, Australia, and the National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan. “Wolf’s Clause Imperils (Some of) Administration’s China Plans”, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/united-states/bill-keeps-nasa-technology-out-of-china-57689.html., The Epoch Times is able to provide well-sourced stories through the original reporting done by the Chinese-language edition of The Epoch Times, pg 1, accessed: 6/27/11 [added by (R) Frank Wolf –VA]) TJL

Chief of the OSTP, John Holdren, told Wolf’s subcommittee in early May that “the prohibition should not be read as prohibiting interactions that are part of the president's constitutional authority to conduct negotiations,” effectively saying that the provision would not block cooperation. Rep. John Culberson, who sits on the committee, consulted with Wolf about that. Then he fired back: “You need to remember that Congress enacts these laws and it's the chief executive's job to enforce them. ... Now if anyone in your office, or at NASA, participates or collaborates or coordinates in any way with China, you're in violation of the statute. And frankly, you're endangering your funding and NASA's funding.” Holdren was unperturbed by the threats. The day after the hearing he participated in a major bilateral summit with senior Chinese officials over U.S.-China collaboration on science. “I take this blatant disregard for the law very seriously and the committee is currently reviewing its options,” Wolf told the U.S.-China Commission.

Wolf hates the plan and has a large amount of clout

DiMascio, congressional editor, 4-25-11

(Jen, “The Stopper” Aviation Week & Space Technology, Lexis, Accessed June 27, 2011, EJONES)

If the Obama administration wants to realize its goal of deepening space cooperation with China, it will have to circumvent Rep. Frank Wolf (R-Va.), the chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee that controls NASA's purse strings. The 16-term Republican objects to such teaming not just on moral grounds, but for economic and security reasons as well. He says China «has the most aggressive spying program against us of any government in the history of the world,» more extensive than the KGB in the Soviet Union's heyday. He has in his office a video of Chinese prisoners being executed, allegedly so their organs can be harvested by the People's Liberation Army—the same overseers, he says, that are responsible for the Chinese civil space program. And he complains that his computer was breached by Chinese hackers, as were those of 16 other members of Congress. Wolf has already succeeded in including means to stop a wide array of bilateral space cooperation with China or Chinese companies in the bill to fund the government for fiscal year 2011. The proposal would even bar the government from using money to host «official Chinese visitors» at NASA facilities. And that is just the beginning. «We're going to continue,» he says. «We're going to do everything we can» to block any cooperation with China. NASA officials did not return calls seeking comment, but presumably White House officials and Senate Democrats signed off on it during budget negotiations. Wolf's proposal, included in the appropriations bill approved by Congress earlier this month, makes it exceedingly difficult for the space agency to carry out a joint statement the White House issued with China in January to deepen dialogue and «continue discussions on opportunities for practical future cooperation in the space arena, based on principles of transparency, reciprocity and mutual benefit.» The administration wants greater access to China's largely opaque space program, in part because knowledge of the civil space program could be leveraged to provide a better understanding of its military space activities, according to a senior administration official. Also, because China and Russia are the only other nations that send humans to space, there are those who say cooperating with both countries could yield scientific, economic and diplomatic benefits.

\*\*\*Politics Links

Politics Link – Unpopular – Congress – GOP (1/3)

Space projects with China cause a strong GOP backlash --- independently turns the case by collapsing support for long-term cooperation

Page, Wall Street Journal China Correspondent 10

(Jeremy, China Correspondent – WSJ, “Orbital Paths of U.S., China Set to Diverge”, Wall Street Journal, 10-29, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303891804575575904021690456.html>)

The Obama administration's space policy, released earlier this year, went further than any previous administration in emphasizing international cooperation and Gen. Bolden has frequently spoken about its importance, with aides suggesting China could play a key role. But with Republicans expected to regain control of the House of Representatives in next month's mid-term elections—and China looming large as a campaign issue—experts now deem it unlikely that there will be real progress on joint manned missions in Mr. Obama's first term, and possibly for the next decade. "In the short term, I think there is little chance of such joint missions. I don't think Congress would accept it," said Peter Bond, consultant editor of the Jane's Space Systems & Industry directory. Dean Cheng, an expert on China's space program at the Heritage Foundation, said: "Any effort to push manned spaceflight cooperation without the necessary groundwork and high-level support is far more likely to lead to disappointment and frustration, retarding future cooperation." The controversy highlights the volatility of U.S.-China relations over the last year, with overlapping disputes on the value of China's currency, U.S.arms sales to Taiwan, Beijing's territorial claims and U.S.support for a Chinese dissident who won the Nobel Peace Prize. It also speaks to the longer-term anxiety in Washington—compounded since the 2008 financial crisis—about how China plans to use its rapidly expanding economic, military and technological power, and whether it could one day become more powerful than the U.S. "Ambivalence about human space cooperation with China reflects the mixed view of China's role in the world," said Scott Pace, director of the Space Policy Institute. "Any major cooperation with China will likely require a long period of building common understanding, transparency, and trust." China sent its first astronaut into space in 2003, launched its second unmanned lunar probe this month, and by 2025 plans to become the second country after the U.S. to land a man on the moon. The U.S., by contrast, canceled its manned lunar program in February and is due to ground its space shuttle fleet next year, relying entirely on Russia, at least through the first half of the decade, to take astronauts to the International Space Station. Yet opposition in the U.S. to space cooperation with China appears to be growing, even as the European Space Agency and other countries deepen their engagement with Beijing.

Politics Link – Unpopular – Congress – GOP (2/3)

Congress shuts the door on the Chinese and prevents any collaboration between “them” and NASA – eradicates the fears congress holds

Johnson-Freese, professor of National Security Studies at the Naval War College, 11 (Joan, China US Focus, “US-China Space Cooperation: Congress’ Pointless Lockdown”, 6/10/11, [http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/us-china-space-cooperation-congress’-pointless-lockdown/](http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/us-china-space-cooperation-congress'-pointless-lockdown/), accessed 7/1/11, CW)

In early May when the US government was scrambling to pass a budget, a provision was slipped into the NASA appropriations bill that while counter to Obama Administration policy of expanded space cooperation, was not as important as getting a continuing resolution passed and so allowed to slide through. Section 1340 of NASA’s budget prohibited NASA and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) from spending funds to “develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company.” It also prohibited the hosting of “official Chinese visitors” at any NASA facility. Clearly, a comprehensive ban on US-China space cooperation was intended. Just as clearly, ban supporters are under the impression that Chinese space officials are anxiously banging on the proverbial US door, waiting and hoping for the opportunity to work with the United States – which just isn’t the case. China has energetically and broadly moved out on their own in space, and based on watching on-going US political kabuki dances about its future space plans, and seeing how difficult and tenuous it can be for other countries to partner with the US – on the International Space Station (ISS), for example – most Chinese space officials consider working with the United States as a potential liability to their own already-underway plans. In fact, many countries consider that they can afford only so much US friendship, though Congress continues to act as though the US is the only game in town if countries want to develop a robust space program. Rarely do US attempts at isolating countries – ally or competitor – succeed without unexpected, and negative, consequences. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 restricted data sharing from the Manhattan Project with allies including Britain, resulting in a significant wartime rift and leading to Britain developing their own bomb. After the infamous Cox Commission Report in 1999 which investigated charges of theft and illegal satellite technology transfer to China, the US attempted to block dual-use satellite technology from sale or launch there. As a result, European space industries that had been niche providers developed much broader capabilities so they could circumvent US prohibitions. US companies have lost business and the globalization of technology marches on. For many years, Chinese politicians considered there would be geostrategic benefits to be derived from being a partner on the ISS, symbolic of the “international family of spacefaring nations.” The United States stiff-arming them from involvement is a factor behind China now developing its own space station. So what does a legislative prohibition such as this achieve? It is pile-on evidence that the United States, or at least some of the Congress, is oblivious to the state of the world and the US position in it. That is not a declaration of US “decline,” another popular though misplaced cry frequently heard. It simply says that, realistically, the gap between the US and countries such as China (and India, and Brazil) that were once “developing” and are now increasingly “developed” world has shrunk – which is to the benefit of the US if one believes that security risks largely originate in underdeveloped areas not connected to the globalized world. It will likely be read internationally with a certain degree of bemusement; Congress now declaring who NASA can talk to and who it can’t, as though snubbing China will either result in a change in the Chinese domestic policies (such as human rights) of concern to Congressional supporters of the ban, or inhibit its space plans. While the ban only covered expenditures through September 30, 2011, it could be an issue in Fiscal Year 2012 as well since Representative Frank Wolf(R-VA), a fierce critic of China and chair of the House spending committee that oversees NASA and several science agencies, and other committee Republicans, are clearly focused on the issue. Tetchy exchanges between ban supporters and presidential science advisor John Holdren occurred at subsequent Congressional hearings on the FY 2012 budget when Holdren stated that the ban did not apply to the President’s ability to conduct foreign policy.

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Politics Link – Unpopular – Congress – GOP (3/3)

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Wolf and company pushed back against anything that would provide a loophole for presidential discretion in working with China, tacitly threatening future NASA funding if the intent of their ban were to be evaded. After a hiatus following the Cox Commission Report, small gestures of space outreach between the US and China began with NASA Administrator Mike Griffin’s 2006 trip to China during the Bush Administration, though the overall US policy toward China on cooperation remained largely negative. While the Obama Administration has been much more generally positive about cooperation, including with China, there have been no US-China cooperative programs put on the table by either side to consider, nor are any apparently in the works. Since 2006, US-China space cooperation has been treading water at best, so why the need now to make this bold, and pointless, political statement is unclear. Perhaps supporters were just waving a “pay attention to us” flag at NASA regarding any potential future plans, though if that was the case there were certainly other ways to send that message while still considering the broader aspects of US strategic communication. What is clear, however, is that other countries have no such compunction as the US about working with China – indeed many are anxious to have the opportunity to work with a country they see as more open to partnerships, rather than the sub-contractor status some ISS “partners” have felt the US afforded them. There may be little need to bar the door to countries wanting to work with the US on space activities, as there may soon be fewer and fewer countries knocking. Congress and the Administration working together to refocus the US space program, including realistic cooperation, would go further to maintain US space leadership than pointless isolation gestures.

Politics Link – China Bashing (1/2)

Plan is injected into election year politics - triggering China bashing – economic fears, human rights, and political posturing

Burns, Former Editor for the Harvard Political Review, 5/24/11

(Alexander – Staff Writer Politico, Politico, 5/24/11, “GOP sees red over China”, Lexis, Accessed July 8, 2011) AC

The 2012 foreign policy debate is just getting under way, but already the Republican presidential field has picked a favorite overseas punching bag: China.

After several presidential elections dominated by security issues in the Middle East, fear of a red menace in the Far East is making a comeback. And no country in that region casts a larger or more frightening political shadow than China - a nation that seems to embody every economic and foreign policy anxiety of the GOP primary electorate.

The likely candidacy of Jon Huntsman, the Mandarin-speaking former ambassador to Beijing, ensures China will be on the Republican agenda in 2012. But that's only going to accelerate a trend that's already under way.

Tim Pawlenty, who announced his bid for president Monday, tells audiences that "America's rightful place is not lagging behind China," alluding to widespread concern among conservatives that the United States is on the down swing.

Another Minnesotan poised to run for president, Rep. Michele Bachmann, won applause at the Conservative Political Action Conference this year by railing against the national debt and proclaiming "Hu's your daddy!" - a reference to Chinese President Hu Jintao that Bachmann has used since.

Even Donald Trump, before he pulled his name out of the 2012 hat, found traction on the issue, telling workers in New Hampshire that China "is raping this country." The day after Mike Huckabee withdrew from consideration, he voiced a similar concern, noting that Americans are "getting shanghaied by China."

It's not just the activist right that's fired up about China. Former Massachusetts Gov. Mitt Romney has called China "a great threat to the stability of the world" - strong words from a former private-equity executive schooled in the ways of global economic competition.

Republicans say the early attention to China, driven in many cases by talk radio and conservative cable news, reflects the sheer number of core conservative issues that intersect there.

China's an economic juggernaut and the largest holder of U.S. debt. Based on that alone, the country would figure big in the imagination of Republicans concerned about the notion of American national decline. But China's also a national security rival and a human rights violator with little regard for religious freedom, making it especially relevant to the foreign policy and social conservative wings of the GOP.

"If you don't care about jobs, you don't care about defense and you don't care about the persecution of the Catholic Church, then you can ignore it," said Virginia Rep. Frank Wolf, a vocal Republican China hawk. "If the Republican Party doesn't talk about this issue, I think it's a failing of leadership."

On one level, China's presence on the campaign trail is nothing new: Many Democrats ran ads last year accusing the GOP of wanting to ship jobs overseas, including to China. In the special House election unfolding in upstate New York, tea party candidate Jack Davis has run a protectionism-heavy campaign with ads showing a laid-off father telling his family, "Company's moving to China."

But in the presidential race, it's not just job loss or trade issues that are making China part of the conversation. Former Tennessee Sen. Jim Sasser, a Democrat who served as President Bill Clinton's ambassador to Beijing, said that China serves as a stand-in for a much broader sense of unease.

"As far as the man in the street or the woman in the street is concerned, it's now a question of economic rivalry," Sasser said. "There is also a sense of curiosity about China and even a kind of grudging admiration for what they have accomplished in their economy."

"The shadow of Tiananmen still lingers in some people's minds and, I think, has an adverse, negative impact," Sasser continued, referring to the 1989 massacre of pro-democracy demonstrators in the Chinese capital

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Politics Link – China Bashing (2/2)

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A survey taken earlier this year by the Pew Research Center found that anxiety about China isn't confined to the right, even if that's where worries about East Asia have been aired most publicly.

In Pew's polling, a plurality of Americans - 20 percent - named China as the greatest international threat to the U.S. That compares with 18 percent who named North Korea and 12 percent who chose Iran.

More Americans pointed to China as the world's foremost economic power than the U.S., by 47 percent to 31 percent, vividly illustrating the electorate's sense of national vulnerability.

Andrew Kohut, who heads the Pew Research Center, said that voters' fears about China are overwhelmingly centered on the economy, which could make it even more relevant to the pocketbook-focused 2012 campaign.

Congress will bash China – human rights ensures debate

Rep. Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) Press Release, 7/1/11

(Ileana, US Federal News Service – Newswire, “CHAIRMAN ROS-LEHTINEN SAYS CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, AT 90, STILL BRUTAL PARTY OF MAO URGES ADMINISTRATION TO SPEAK OUT ON CHINA'S HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES,” Lexis, Accessed July 8, 2011) AC

WASHINGTON, July 1 -- The House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman issued the following statement:

U.S. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, released the following statement today on the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which was founded on July 1, 1921:

"A foreign implant of the Soviet Union's Comintern, the Chinese Communist Party has a bloody history. Tens of millions have been killed under the CCP's rule.

"The regime in Beijing is using the anniversary of the founding of the CCP to attempt to rewrite history and whitewash its current record.

"The truth is that, at 90, the CCP remains the brutal party of Mao. The present-day Chinese dictatorship oppresses the Chinese people and all those subjugated to its rule, imprisons dissidents, bans religious expression, and turns to violence against innocent people as a means of clinging to power.

"Rather than shrinking away from the topic, the President and the State Department should speak out loudly and frequently against China's terrible human rights record." For any query with respect to this article or any other content requirement, please contact Editor at [htsyndication@hindustantimes.com](mailto:htsyndication@hindustantimes.com)

Counterplans

Alternative Coop Mechanism CP – Solvency

China is interested in cooperating on other issues besides space

Jingwei, Chinese strategy researcher, 2011

(Zhang, “How Should China and the U.S. Discuss Security Strategies?,” Watching America, <http://watchingamerica.com/News/103666/how-should-china-and-the-u-s-discuss-security-strategies>, May 12, accessed July 6, 2011, NS)

China and the United States openly holding security strategy discussions is not only keeping up with the times, but is quite imperative. Therefore, sensitive observers will believe that the hot topic of this round of S&ED was the security strategy discussions. The former White House National Security Council Director for Asian Affairs, Jeffrey Bedford, currently a scholar at the China Center’s Brookings Institution, believes that Sino-U.S. security talks are below the level of “U.S.-Soviet” talks. The key is how China and the United States discuss these issues. First, identify the point of intersection to be able to have fruitful discussions as opposed to being at opposite poles with both sides trying to say what they want to say. The U.S. points of interest include missile defense, strategic weapons, Internet safety and space. China’s points of interest are Internet safety and maritime affairs, which include America claiming to be doing reconnaissance activities in exclusive economic zones. Under these circumstances, Internet safety could be a point of intersection for both countries; from here they can engage in deep discussions. Additionally, China and the U.S. also have plenty to discuss on the topic of missile defense and space.

Ban Weaponization CP – Solvency

Multilateral ban on the weaponization of space solves a space race, but the US is resisting in the status quo

Zhang, Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom, 6

(Hui Zhang - Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom in the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, Project on Managing the Atom, "Space Weaponization and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective", China Security, Vol 2, Issue 1) AC

A Space Weapons Ban A set of measures to limit space arms proliferation have been proposed, including a ban on the testing or use of any ASAT weapons and a declaration not to be the first to deploy weapons in space or to further test destructive ASATs. 22It should be noted that, even if the compromise route is taken, any multilateral attempt to address space security should consider all countries’ interests. One of China’s major motivations for a ban on space weaponization is to reduce its concerns regarding U.S. missile defense plans. Thus, any partial arms control measure involving China should emphasize this concern. For example, a proposal that restricted ASATs while allowing the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system would be perceived by China as discriminatory for two reasons. First, ASATs would be an effective way for China to counter the U.S. missile defense threat. Second, it is difficult to distinguish between anti-ballistic missile systems and ASATs, which would create a probable source of tension. In China’s view, the most effective way to secure space assets would be to agree on a space weaponization ban. Ambassador Hu stated, “If any country is really worried about possible menace to its space interests, this could certainly be alleviated through the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty on the prevention of space weaponization, as suggested by China… Such a legally binding international treaty will be the best tool to safeguard the interests of all sides.”23China’s stance on banning weapons in outer space has been consistent since 1985, when it first introduced a working paper to the U.N. Conference on Disarmament (CD). China’s most recent working paper on the issue, introduced in June 2002, emphasizes three basic obligations: (1) Not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kind of weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, and not to station such weapons in outer space in any other manner; (2) Not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects; and (3) Not to assist or encourage other States, groups of States, international organizations to participate in activities prohibited by this Treaty.24In recent years, the U.N. General Assembly has adopted resolutions calling for the CD to begin negotiations on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) with an overwhelming majority of support. However, John Bolton, then U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and non-proliferation, told the CD: “the current international regime regulating the use of space meets all our purposes. We see no need for new agreements.”25 Many Chinese leaders believe Bolton is wrong. There are no existing treaties that effectively prevent the testing, deployment and use of weapons, other than those of mass destruction, in outer space. In addition, none of these instruments covers the threat or use of force from Earth (land, sea and air) against objects in outer space. The history of proliferation has taught us that banning the testing and deployment of weapons from the outset is much more effective than attempting disarmament and nonproliferation after the fact.

No First Use CP – Shell

The USFG should pursue in conjunction with China and Russia a no first-use of space weapons, a self-imposed ban on ASAT’s, and a policy of no first deployment of space-based weapons

**CP solves diplomatic leadership, international cooperation, aggressive China rise, and space weaponization**

**Imran, Masters candidate at Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 10**

(Mara, “China's space program : a new tool for PRC "soft power" in international relations?” accessed:7-01-11, <http://run.unl.pt/handle/10362/5473> pg 92-94)TJL

Normally, the term “American unilateralism” connotes a sinister notion, especially for foreign audiences. However, there are areas in the context of space where unilateral measures may be extremely positive and productive. Washington should pursue a stated policy of no first-use of space weapons or, perhaps more directly, a policy of no first deployment of space-based weapons. Ever since the United States walked away from the ABM Treaty in June 2002, placed missile interceptors at Fort Greeley, Alaska, and started negotiating first with Poland and Czech Republic about potential sites for future missile defense sites. Obama administration shifted gears from Bush administration plans that were confirmed in February that Romania would host the first deployment of Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) land-based interceptors in 2015 and that Poland would host the next site in 2018. Turkey and Bulgaria may play a role as well, according to administration officials, who are seeking to soothe Russian concerns by inviting Moscow to join U.S.-NATO missile defense plans many countries have begun to view U.S. as an aggressor.321 Moscow has reacted by threatening to develop even more capable nuclear warheads.322 China has also reacted strongly by reiterating its stance that National Missile Defense (NMD) “does not contribute to global stability…and violates the ABM Treaty”.323 Although these are ground-based defensive systems, they also show American unwillingness to abandon any notion of placing similar weapons in space. By showing a willingness to support a joint resolution on “no space weapons” with Russia, and perhaps one that also involved China, Washington would be clearly demonstrating resolve that it is serious about keeping space peaceful for future generations. The Obama administration may indeed be willing to take a lead with regards to cooperative space policy. According to the official White House website, “The Obama-Biden Administration will restore American leadership on space issues, seeking a worldwide ban on weapons that interfere with military and commercial satellites”.324 While that sounds good initially, that phrase is immediately followed with more language on “assess[ing] possible threats to U.S. space assets and the best options…for countering them”.325 Nonetheless, this still seems to be a step in the right direction and hopefully will be actually carried out in the near-term. While any U.S.-led movement towards a ban on space weapons would be met with widespread international support, Washington also should issue a clearly stated moratorium on ASAT activities. The February 2008 U.S. shootdown of a malfunctioning satellite did not engender much goodwill. Although numerous statements were made that it was not in retaliation for the Chinese ASAT test, it did not appear that many people believed that the on-board hydrazine constituted a severe enough risk to humanity to justify even low-altitude satellite destruction. By promulgating a clearly-worded unilateral resolution or joint declaration with Russia and China to neither place nor use space weapons, coupled with a self-imposed ban, or at least a moratorium, on all ASAT testing, Washington would thereby broadcast a strong signal of intent to remain nonaggressive in space and maintain it as a sanctuary for the peaceful use of all mankind.326 Bottom line, these efforts could help counter China’s own hawkish defense establishment policymakers who may be seeking to balance or hedge against any attempt of U.S. space dominance and shape a new direction for China’s own space program.327

Bilateral Confidence Building CP – Solvency

China wants bilateral confidence building measures that would ensure deterrence against U.S. attacks.

Zhang, Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Project on Managing the Atom senior research associate, 6

(Hui, “Space Weaponization and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective”, China Security, vol. 2, issue 1, p. 33-34, <http://www.wsichina.org/attach/CS2_3.pdf>, accessed) EK

Other bilateral confidence-building measures between the United States and China would facilitate China’s consideration of a “focused approach” to space weapons negotiations. These measures might include: (1) A U.S. acknowledgment of the seriousness of China’s concerns, including an assurance that a U.S. missile defense system will not target China; (2) A U.S. pledge to adopt a bilateral no-first-use policy toward China, following the example of similar Chinese and Russian policies; such a policy would ease China’s major concern about the possibility of a U.S. preemptive strike; (3) The clear exclusion of Taiwan in the U.S.-Japan joint theater missile defense plan, and a U.S. move to block the sale of such systems to Taiwan; (4) A limitation on the scale and scope of the envisioned U.S. non-space-based BMD architecture, including placing a limit on the number of missile defense interceptors and restricting the scope of the overall system to the minimum required for dealing with rogue threats. This latter measure would ensure that China’s current stock of fissile materials would be sufficient to fill the number of new warheads needed to balance U.S. missile defense interceptors. In the absence of any limitations on U.S. missile defense systems, China harbors concerns about whether its current fissile material stocks are extensive enough to supply the warheads needed to counter the U.S. threat to its nuclear deterrent. This directly affects China’s willingness to participate in the Fissile Material CutOff Treaty. Restrictions on the U.S. BMD system would also ensure that China builds its nuclear arsenal in a predictable way – until it has the capacity to balance the U.S. defensive capabilities – which the United States would acknowledge and understand.

Deterrence CP – Solvency – Better Than Cooperation

**The US must strengthen its military as a response to ASAT tests, it’s the only approach**

**Kueter, George C Marshall Institute president, 7**

(Jeff – President of the George C Marshall Institute: a DC Think Tank, China's Space Ambitions -- And Ours, New Atlantis, Pg. 7-22 No. 16, Lexis) AC

On January 11, 2007, a missile was launched from Chinese territory. It arced upwards into space to an altitude of about 537 miles, where it slammed directly into its target, an obsolete Chinese weather satellite. The target was destroyed, reportedly producing some 900 trackable pieces of space debris in orbits from 125 miles to about 2,300 miles and resulting in an increase of 10 percent in the total amount of manmade debris in orbit. This demonstration of an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) was just the latest in a series of tests of China's space weapons program, and was a warning sign the United States should take very seriously. In the decades after the Soviet Union and the United States first designed and deployed so-called space weapons, some observers came to hope it would be possible to turn back history's pages and preserve space as a sanctuary, a pristine place of peace and international cooperation, where terrestrial disputes could be left behind. If these hopes were ever given credence, they have surely been dispelled by China's recent actions in space: vivid demonstrations that the country could threaten essential satellites both directly, by physically destroying them, and indirectly, employing lasers and other jamming techniques to make them unusable. China is now a military space power and space is once again an undeniably contested arena. There are several policy courses the United States could take in responding to this new reality. It could assume that China is not a significant threat to American space assets and determine that inaction is preferable to overreaction. But such a do-nothing approach would expose the United States to the dangers of what has been called a "space Pearl Harbor," a surprise attack on U.S. space capabilities with immediate consequences for the American military and for American interests the world over. Alternatively, American policymakers could conclude that negotiation and diplomacy offer the best path forward. Following this approach, the U.S. would embrace efforts to ban the introduction of weapons into space and negotiate codes of conduct to regulate the behavior of nation-states. But while some good could undoubtedly come from the emergence of international norms and rules, it is unlikely they would be sufficient to preserve security. Instead, the United States should adopt an active defensive posture, invigorating the research and technical base needed to defend or replenish space assets. This posture can complement diplomatic efforts by providing important verification and enforcement capabilities. Such an approach will be expensive and will need to overcome bureaucratic inertia as well as domestic and international opposition--but it is the only option that can ensure the security of American space assets.

Ban Space Mil Treaty CP – Solvency

China wants a space weaponization ban treaty

Zhang, Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Project on Managing the Atom senior research associate, 6

(Hui, “Space Weaponization and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective”, China Security, vol. 2, issue 1, p. 29<http://www.wsichina.org/attach/CS2_3.pdf>, accessed 7/2/11) EK

In China’s view, the most effective way to secure space assets would be to agree on a space weaponization ban. Ambassador Hu stated, “If any country is really worried about possible menace to its space interests, this could certainly be alleviated through the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty on the prevention of space weaponization, as suggested by China… Such a legally binding international treaty will be the best tool to safeguard the interests of all sides.” 23

China wants a treaty – PAROS proves

Povig, Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation research associate, Zhang, Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Project on Managing the Atom senior research associate, 8

(Pavel and Hui, “Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space”, Report for American Academy of Arts and Sciences, p.31-32, March 2008, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/militarySpace.pdf>, accessed 7/2/11) EK

Through space weaponization, the United States seeks to neutralize China’s nuclear deterrence capabilities. Many in China worry that this would free the United States to intervene in China’s affairs and to undermine efforts at reunification with Taiwan. These concerns have prompted China to clearly express—with sufficient frequency to merit an acronym—that the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) is an urgent and realistic objective. A 2004 white paper on China’s national defense emphasized, “Outer space is the common property of mankind. China hopes that the international community would take action as soon as possible to conclude an international legal instrument on preventing the weaponization of and arms race in outer space through negotiations, to ensure the peaceful use of outer space.” 2