Root Cause Bad

Root Cause Bad 1

A2 Cap=root cause of war 2

A2 Cap=root cause of war 3

A2 Cap=root cause of war 4

A2 Patr=root cause of war 5

No root cause- war 6

No root cause- war 7

No root cause- war 8

No root Cause-war 9

Root cause bad- war 10

No Root Cause – Enviro 11

No Root Cause – Enviro 12

No Root Cause – Enviro 13

No Root Cause – Enviro – A2 – Population 14

A2 Root cause bad- war 15

A2 Root cause bad- war 16

A2 Root cause bad- war 17

A2 Cap=root cause of war

Capitalism isn’t the root cause of militarism and war

DANDEKER 2 (CHRISTOPHER, Department of War Studies, King's College, http://books.google.com/books?id=TNhFH5g3sCsC&dq=Effects+of+War+on+Society+Christopher+Dandeker&source=gbs\_navlinks\_s, DA 7/11/11, OST)

Despite the fact that industrial capitalism has produced two world wars, as Aron (1954) and more recently Michael Mann (1984) have argued, there is no 'special relationship1 between capitalism and militarism—or the tendency to war—only one of historical indifference. All the pre-dispositions of 'capitalist states' to use warfare calculatively as a means of resolving their disputes with other states predate the formation of capitalism as an economic system. Of course, it could be argued that capitalism merely changes the form of militarism. That is to say, pre-capitalist patterns of militarism were still expressions of class relations and modern capitalism has just increased the destructive power of the industrialised means of war available to the state. But this argument will not do. Socialist societies in their use of industrialised power show that the technological potential for war is transferable and can be reproduced under non-capitalist conditions. Furthermore, the military activities of socialist states cannot be explained in terms of a defensive war against capitalism or even an aggressive one. as national and geopolitical power motives are arguably just as significant in the determination of state behaviour. Furthermore, imperial expansion not only predates capitalism but it is also difficult to reduce the causes of wars then and now to the interests of dominant economic classes (Mann 1984:25-46).

The role of the capitalist warmonger is over- the international community is now the mechanism for intervention

DANDEKER 2 (CHRISTOPHER, Department of War Studies, King's College, http://books.google.com/books?id=TNhFH5g3sCsC&dq=Effects+of+War+on+Society+Christopher+Dandeker&source=gbs\_navlinks\_s, DA 7/11/11, OST)

Arguments put forward by Comte and Durkheim are also at the root of Charles Moskos' analysis of the prospects of a warless society and Fukuyama's idea of the end of history (Fukuyama 1989:3-35; Moskos 1990). It has been argued that, with the death of communism and the emergent hegemony of the values of market capitalism and liberal democracy, war and military power focused on the modern nation-state are of declining relevance in the increasingly interdependent planet which we inhabit. Neither of these authors has suggested that we should expect the growth of a warless planet. Rather, war and military power will have relevance more for the relations between the developed capitalist world and the underdeveloped nations than for relations amongst the developed powers themselves, and moreover, the community of the latter is likely to grow and take in more of the planet as we head into the twenty-first century. Thus in the relations between developed and developing nations, with the death of communism, it can be argued that the prospects for the spread of pacific-inclined liberal capitalism look brighter. The use of force against regional dictators who stand in the way of the triumph of liberal values will continue to be necessary (echoes here of Durkheim\*s views of Germany's responsibility for the First World War) but this can take place under the aegis of an international community no longer riven by the bipolar superpower conflict, and indeed guaranteed militarily if not economically by the only remaining genuine superpower, the USA. The developed powers have now and will have even less reason in the future to resort to military means in order to resolve disputes with those who are economically and politically rather like themselves. Winners and losers there will continue to be amongst societies; but these will be selected by 'soft' social and economic power mechanisms not hard military ones, and their root of war, for the other it is the root of peace.

A2 Cap=root cause of war

Democratic bourgeois societies aren’t necessarily prone to war

DANDEKER 2 (CHRISTOPHER, Department of War Studies, King's College, http://books.google.com/books?id=TNhFH5g3sCsC&dq=Effects+of+War+on+Society+Christopher+Dandeker&source=gbs\_navlinks\_s, DA 7/11/11, OST)

Marxist sociological theory has had an ambiguous relationship with the problems of warfare and military power. Some writers have acknowledged that, for the most part, Marxism has largely ignored them while others regard Marxism as well equipped to provide an adequate account of war (Mackenzie 1983:33-73; Shaw 1984:1-24). Both these views should be understood in the context of the relationships between the development of capitalism and of Marxist social theory itself. The expansion of industrial capitalism in the nineteenth century was associated with the gradual extension of liberal parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and civil liberties in a number of Western nation-states. Accordingly, while Marx envisaged the possibility that force—civil war—might be a necessary means of effecting the transformation from capitalism to socialism, the peaceful methods of bourgeois democracy—freedom of association, the free press, extension of the franchise, and industrial action were the principal weapons for achieving the victory of the working class. Indeed, it was the Asiatic states—backward, feudal societies with relatively underdeveloped and weak capitalist enclaves and repressive political systems—that provided the conditions under which terrorism and violence by the working class or, in their absence, intellectuals acting on their behalf, would be the only means available for the effective advance of socialism (Feuer 1969:511-18; Semmel 1981:8-10)

Liberal capitalist societies deemphasize the importance of war

DANDEKER 2 (CHRISTOPHER, Department of War Studies, King's College, http://books.google.com/books?id=TNhFH5g3sCsC&dq=Effects+of+War+on+Society+Christopher+Dandeker&source=gbs\_navlinks\_s, DA 7/11/11, OST)

Until quite recently, sociology has tended to steer clear of war and military power. However, in order to understand the nature, origins and prospects of modern nation-slates—the building blocks of the modern world—war and military power must be central themes in that investigation. The recent 'mini-renaissance\* of the sociology of war and military power has involved a re-assertion of what I have called non-Machiavellian social theory (Creighton and Shaw 1986; Dandeker 1990; Giddens 1985; Hall 1986; Mann 1988; 1989). Until recently, this tradition of sociological thought has been marginalized by the two pre-eminent paradigms in the history of modern sociology since the late eighteenth century: the liberal theory of industrial society deriving from Saint-Simon, Comte, Spencer and Durkheim, and Marxism. Proponents of each of these traditions argue that war and the importance of military power will decline with the maturation of modern societies, either through the global extension of the capitalist division of labor and liberal values, or through the abolition of capitalism and the creation of a classless, world society based on a peaceful confederation of socialist nation-states. In contrast, neo-Machiavellian writers such as Hintze, Weber, and Mosca argue that war is inherent in society and resistant to the corrosive effects of modernization although the social organization and manifestations of warfare do change (see Ashworth and Dandeker 1987).

A2 Cap=root cause of war

Nationalism occurs outside of capitalism and can cause war

DANDEKER 2 (CHRISTOPHER, Department of War Studies, King's College, http://books.google.com/books?id=TNhFH5g3sCsC&dq=Effects+of+War+on+Society+Christopher+Dandeker&source=gbs\_navlinks\_s, DA 7/11/11, OST)

Meanwhile, modern attempts to explain patterns of military expenditure in terms of the imperatives of capital accumulation face major difficulties. The association between economic boom and military spending has been revealed as an empirical association not an inherent connection; indeed the evidence from Germany and Japan indicates that low levels of military spending might well be associated with economic performances superior to those of societies which commit more of their GNP to defence expenditure. Furthermore, the idea that war and the threat of war are weapons of national mythology used by dominant classes to confuse the working class and weaken their natural affinity with international socialism faces the problem that, as in the case of Europe in 1914, national enthusiasms were such that truly remarkable powers would have to be attributed to ruling classes in order to make sense of them while in any case alternative explanations are at hand (Howard 1976:108-15).

A2 Patr=root cause of war

Feminism lacks structural consideration of how it relates to the system of war

Reardon 96 (Betty, Founding Director Emeritus International Institute Peace Education, Sexism and the war system, books.google.com/books?id=i8HRsXjhGbQC&dq=reductionism+war&lr=&source=gbs\_navlinks\_s, DA 7/11/11, OST)

My own critique of contemporary North American mainstream feminism as a political movement as well as a field of study focuses primarily on its lack of structural considerations. This, in turn, seems to impose some serious perspective limitations on the feminist approach to war and the war system. The primary limitations that world order analysts would attribute to feminist perspectives, as applied to social, economic, and political problems, especially problems of violence, are a lack of structural analysis and insufficient attention to the characteristics of the overall system. As the purpose of world order studies is to analyze systems in terms of their capacities to achieve values, world order advocates would say that feminists cannot produce a valid or adequate diagnosis of the fundamental problems unless they analyze the structural, systemic foundations.

Feminism fails to recognize alternate causes to war and focuses on a narrow biased framework intent on blaming patriarchy

Reardon 96 (Betty, Founding Director Emeritus International Institute Peace Education, Sexism and the war system, books.google.com/books?id=i8HRsXjhGbQC&dq=reductionism+war&lr=&source=gbs\_navlinks\_s, DA 7/11/11, OST)

One example of this limited perspective was the International Tribunal on Crimes Against Women, which was held in Belgium in 1976. This tribunal has much lo recommend it as an event contributing toward raising public awareness about the oppression of women: first, in specifying and documenting those forms of violence that could be categorized as crimes against women; second, as "a major accomplishment in breaking through nationalisms: women of the world uniting to oppose patriarchy everywhere." The official report of the tribunal, however, makes little or no recognition of cither militarization or the economic control exercised by multinational corporations as major causes of women's oppression. It makes no reference at all to political or economic structures. This document seems to me to have been drafted in a very narrow frame of reference, particularly its attribution of blame solely to patriarchy in its traditional form without acknowledging its present manifestations in militarism and neocolonialism. One of the strongest statements in the report, while indicating a certain degree of transcendence of male-dominated international politics, also, I believe, reflects this narrowness of focus.

There are other causes to war aside from patriarchy

Reardon 96 (Betty, Founding Director Emeritus International Institute Peace Education, Sexism and the war system, books.google.com/books?id=i8HRsXjhGbQC&dq=reductionism+war&lr=&source=gbs\_navlinks\_s, DA 7/11/11, OST)

I sincerely doubt that such a statement would have been made by most Arab women, who, the changes in world power balance notwithstanding, still see themselves as oppressed more by Western imperialism than by their own men. As women of the Third World they know that all people in their society, both men and women, are oppressed. Although women in these societies are certainly more oppressed, their oppression is part of a total system that such Western feminist analysis has not taken sufficiently into account. Indeed, to assert "that our oppression is by men and not by opposing nationalities" not only ignores the structures that enforce sexist oppression and contemporary economic paternalism, but also attributes to nation-states a degree of autonomy they simply do not have. This reinforces the myth of sovereignty, which is another significant support of the war system. The assertion also fails to challenge the nation-state itself and all related international structures as essentially patriarchal.

No root cause- war

No single cause of war

Ehrenreich 98 (Barbara, Feminist, books.google.com/books?id=C2GM\_xXM3pYC&dq, DA 7/11/11, OST)

The deeper we delve in search of these causes the more of them we discover, and each single cause or series of causes appears to us equally valid in itself, and equally false by its insignificance compared to the magnitude of the event.1 It was a long time before I was able to make this distinction—that is, to understand that the feelings we bring to war are not, in themselves, a full and complete explanation for the persistence of war. What war is, why it "really" happens, and what we might do to keep it from happening are questions we will return to in the second half of this book, and especially at the very end. Until then, the focus will be on the feelings we bring to war, with the understanding that they are not the sole "cause" of war. They are the way it digs its talons into us; no more than that, and no less.

The cause that we isolate to war is only our emotional response to war not the actual cause

Ehrenreich 98 (Barbara, Feminist, books.google.com/books?id=C2GM\_xXM3pYC&dq, DA 7/11/11, OST)

Neither of these responses is the "cause\*' of war. They are simply part of the repertory of emotional responses we bring to war, no matter what happens to have "caused" it. But it is these responses. I am suggesting, that color war with the profound feelings—dread, awe, and the willingness to sacrifice—that make it "sacred" to us. The alarm response infuses war and stories of war with urgency and excitement, while the solidarity response, if we may call it that, mobilizes our most altruistic and exalted impulses. And these are the very feelings which give us some purchase on our notions of a mystic entity—a nation, or an all-encompassing deity—of which we individuals are only the parts.

War occurs out of defensive actions not an inevitable human condition

Ehrenreich 98 (Barbara, Feminist, books.google.com/books?id=C2GM\_xXM3pYC&dq, DA 7/11/11, OST)

To put it another way: We will not find the roots of the human attraction to war by searching the human psyche for some innate flaw that condemns us to harass and kill our fellows. In war we act as if the only enemies we have are human ones, but I am proposing that the emotions we bring to war are derived, in an evolutionary sense, from a primal battle that the entire human species might easily have lost. We are not alone on this planet, and we were once decisively outnumbered by creatures far stronger and more vicious than ourselves. Medicine offers a useful analogy. In an autoimmune disease, the body's immunological defenses turn against the body itself. Cellular responses which evolved to combat invading microorganisms start combatting, instead, the tissues of heart or muscle. We do not understand exactly why, in all cases, the immune mechanism becomes so confused that it can no longer distinguish "self\* from "other." But we could not even begin to comprehend these perverse ills if we had no inkling of humankind's long struggle against an external enemy— the viruses, bacteria, and parasites that cause so many diseases— because it was out of that struggle that the immune system evolved in the first place. Similarly with war: The weapons have changed beyond recognition over the millennia, but the basic emotional responses represent defensive mechanisms which evolved in combat with a deadly, non-human "other."

No single cause of war

Magstadt 8 (Thomas M, Intelligence Analyst @ USfg, books.google.com/books?id=soAZSTHmAaIC&dq, DA 7/11/11, OST)

Simplistic theories of war abound. For instance, some quantitative theorists have described in fine detail recurring patterns that often lead to war-making military alliances, which are then followed by military buildups, the making of threats. a series of crises, and so on. Such studies have also shown that certain actions undertaken by political leaders in an effort to reduce the possibility of war (for example, making alliances) may actually increase its likelihood. However, none of these studies proves that acts such as making or joining military alliances or any of the other steps associated with the pattern leading to war actually cause war. Rather, each of these phenomena may result from another underlying cause. Furthermore, the "typical" pattern is itselfsoniewh.it limited, as it represents only those conflicts fought between major states of approximately equal power.'

No root cause- war

Violence existed before any of their root causality claims

Horgan 8 (John, Director of the Center Sci Write @ SIT, stwr.org/global-conflicts-militarization/we-will-abolish-war.html, 2/22, 7/11/11, OST)

We also need to come to grips with the scale of the problem. As far back as anthropologists have peered into human history and pre-history, they have found evidence of group bloodshed. In War Before Civilization, Lawrence Keeley estimates that as many as 95 percent of primitive societies engaged in at least occasional warfare, and many fought constantly. Tribal combat usually involved skirmishes and ambushes rather than pitched battles. But over time the chronic fighting could produce mortality rates as high as 50 percent.

Humanity has become less violent since the advent of modernity

Horgan 8 (John, Director of the Center Sci Write @ SIT, stwr.org/global-conflicts-militarization/we-will-abolish-war.html, 2/22, 7/11/11, OST)

In fact, hard as it may be to believe, humanity as a whole has become much less violent than it used to be. Despite the massive slaughter that resulted from World Wars I and II, the rate of violent death for males in North America and Europe during the 20th century was one percent. Worldwide, about 100 million men, women, and children died from war-related causes, including disease and famine, in the last century. The total would have been 2 billion if our rates of violence had been as high as in the average primitive society. These statistics contradict the myth that war is a constant of the human condition. They also suggest that civilization has not created the problem of warfare, as some Luddites have suggested; civilization is helping us solve the problem. We need more civilization, not less, if we wish to eradicate war. Civilization has given us legal institutions that resolve disputes by establishing laws, negotiating agreements, and enforcing them. These institutions, which range from local courts to the United Nations, have vastly reduced the risk of violence both within and between nations. They are what keep us from succumbing to the chronic violence that afflicts societies like the Yanomamo. Even if warfare is at least in part biologically based – and what human behavior isn’t? – we cannot end it by altering our biology. Modern war is primarily a social and political phenomenon, and we need social and political solutions to end it. Many such solutions have been proposed, but all are problematic. One perennial plan is for all nations to yield power to a global institution that can enforce peace. This was the vision that inspired the League of Nations and the UN. But neither the US nor any other major power is likely to entrust its national security to an international entity any time soon. And even if we did, how would we ensure that a global military force does not become repressive?

Most wars are overdetermined- Iraq was

Lieberfeld 5 (Daniel, PHD international relations @ fletcher, gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol10\_2/wLieberfeld10n2IJPS.pdf, DA 7/11/11, OST)

Each analytic perspective discussed above—realism, liberalism, elite interests, ideological influences, and personal and social psychology—can account for important aspects of the Iraq invasion, so that, cumulatively, the decision appears “overdetermined.” Distinguishing among different types of causality may help to counter the retrospective bias toward seeing past events as inevitable. Considering the invasion decision in light of a range of theories also provides an opportunity to identify links among them.

No root cause- war

War is over determined

Levy 98(Jack, PolSci @ Rutgers, fas-polisci.rutgers.edu/levy/1998%20causes%20of%20war%20&%20conditions%20of%20peace.pdf, DA 7/11/11, OST)

The question of how to explain variations in war and peace is the second meaning of the broader question of what causes war. Why does war occur at some times rather than other times, between some states rather than other states, under some political leaders rather than others, in some historical and cultural contexts rather than others, and so on? This differs from still a third question: How do we explain the origins of a particular war? Most international relations scholars (and particularly those in North America) focus primarily on the second question, explaining variations in war and peace. They leave the question of why war occurs at all to philosophers and biologists and leave the question of why a particular war occurs to historians. This is not to pass judgment on the relative importance of the three questions, only to say that they are different and that their investigation may require different theoretical orientations, different conceptions of causation and explanation, and different methodologies. One important exception to this focus on variations in war and peace is the argument by Waltz (1979) and other neorealists that the fundamental cause of war is the anarchic structure of the international system. Anarchy, defined as the absence of a legitimate governmental authority to regulate disputes and enforce agreements between states, causes war in the sense that there is no governmental enforcement mechanism in the international system to prevent wars. 5 Although anarchy may provide one persuasive answer to the question of the permissive causes of war, it is generally treated as a structural constant and consequently it cannot account for variations in war and peace. Waltz (1988, p. 620) seems to concede this point and argues, Although neorealist theory does not explain why particular wars are fought, it does explain wars dismal recurrence through the millennia. Other neorealists also recognize this limitation and have begun to incorporate other variables including the polarity of the system and the offensive/defensive balance in order to explain variations of war and peace in anarchic systems

Monocausality doesn’t exist

Pearse 7 (Meic, Prof History @ Houghton, The gods of war: is religion the primary cause of violent conflict?, DA 7/11/11, OST)

The Holy Land had remained accessible to Christian pilgrims even after the original Muslim invasions of the seventh century. But when it subsequently fell under the control of later Muslim invaders (an event that illustrates the frequent willingness of Muslims to fight one another, in spite of theoretical prohibitions), Palestine was closed to Christian visitors.21 This provocation is often seen as one of the causes of the Crusades, but almost no major conflicts are monocausal, and in this case also several other factors were involved. In the first place, the Saracens were encroaching on the eastern borders of the Byzantine Empire. Bernard Lewis describes the Crusades as an "ultimately unsuccessful series of counterattacks" in the face of relentless Muslim advance into Christian space."" Furthermore, although the Byzantine and Roman churches had drifted into schism, at least formally, from 1054, hopes for reconciliation lingered; the pope calculated, with good reason, that rescuing the ailing Eastern empire from the infidels might facilitate a healing of the breach— on Western terms. The papacy had recently emerged from a period of internal reform and was recovering its power on the European stage; a papal call to arms would emphasize the pontiff's leadership of the Catholic world.

Wars aren’t monocausal and arise from different events

Pearse 7 (Meic, Prof History @ Houghton, The gods of war: is religion the primary cause of violent conflict?, DA 7/11/11, OST)

In the first place, few events, and wars least of all, are monocausal, and that makes it a difficult question how much weight to assign to religious and nonreligious causes in respect of many particular conflicts. Furthermore, even if we could make such measurements, how would we then weigh one conflict against another? How do we compare like with like? If we can all agree thai the brief, localized, secular Falklands War, for example, was less appalling than the supposedly religious Thirty Years War (1618-1648), how would one compare two conflicts of broadly similar scale with one another? Do we merely add up body counts? When asking about the frequency of religion as the motivator for violence, do we simply count the numbers of wars? (Do the French Wars of Religion count as nine, because the same basic struggle kept breaking out over three decades, compared with the secular Franco-Prussian Wars one?) The stupidity of even asking such questions should put us on our guard and make it clear that our goals in this chapter are necessarily modest. We can do no more than note the fact that some conflicts can be traced to causes in which religious considerations loom large, while in others they have been minimal or irrelevant.

No root Cause-war

Modern models of war that don’t assume multi causality are flawed and without any value

Fangyin 10 (Zhou, PhD International Studies @ Tsinghua, cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/79.full, DA 7/11/11, OST)

Terminating a state of war involves, in essence, factors relating to the belligerents collectively, and not just unilateral considerations. Belligerents do not consider whether or not continuing the war is beneficial from an individual standpoint, but take into consideration whether or not the opponent is able to persist in its war efforts. Actors cannot simply compute their own costs and benefits, but must include in their calculations considerations of the response of the opponent (even though such considerations may not necessarily be correct). As no act in the course of war can be separated from the response of the other parties to it, making estimates of the costs and benefits accruing to any party is difficult, and computing expected utility is impossible without consideration of such dynamic strategic processes. Although it is often possible to explicate expected utility in retrospect, a detailed understanding of the situation is needed to provide an estimate that is of any value. Theories of expected utility, therefore, cannot provide effective explanations without the ability both to determine the actual points at which expected utilities change and to assess their specific impact on the decisions of actors. Most models used in studies on the causes of war through to the late 1990s suggest that dynamic strategic tactics come to a close as soon as war breaks out, and that belligerents in the ensuing war then vie to obtain value reflective of their status within the power structure. It should be obvious that such an understanding is a gross oversimplification that neglects the dynamic process involved in war and the bargaining process between belligerents throughout a conflict. Beginning in the 21st century, however, a second wave of models considering war as an extremely costly and dynamic process began to appear, which represent states at war as being in a constant process of bargaining.10 Harris Wagner might be seen as the first to derive the bargaining model of war.11 Wagner holds that the process of bargaining during war is a variation on Rubinstein’s pattern, which became the archetypal bargaining model. I present below an explication and analysis of Rubenstein’s model.

Analysis of war require analysis and prediction based on both parties and reactions

Fangyin 10 (Zhou, PhD International Studies @ Tsinghua, cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/3/1/79.full, DA 7/11/11, OST)

The findings of this article contrast starkly with the expectations of the Rubinstein model. As will later be shown, the costs incurred in a round of war in the Thirty Years War and the Opium War are not determined as a significant factor, and the contents of a settlement are largely independent of such costs. One issue with Rubinstein’s model is that player A (who goes first) has the distinct advantage. As the order in which the players make their moves is predetermined, player B cannot make a proposal when it is player A’s turn to propose a distribution. This is a gross oversimplification, as in real negotiations both parties make proposals simultaneously and either party can make an immediate counteroffer in response to the other’s proposal. Neither party needs to wait out a round of conflict before making a new proposal. In pursuing this line of study, it is helpful to look at games of imperfect information. Warring states may be divided into satisfied states and dissatisfied states. Satisfied states face a risk-return trade-off in which the more they give to the other party, the greater the prospects of peaceful settlement, but the lower their share of the benefits.17 As a satisfied state does not know a dissatisfied state’s costs of war, an information problem ensues. Robert Powell argues that under such circumstances a satisfied state will gradually increase its distribution of benefits to a dissatisfied state, and the dissatisfied state will continue to fight until it receives a satisfactory distribution. The lower a dissatisfied state’s cost of war, the longer it is willing to continue its war efforts, and the greater the benefits it will receive.

Root cause bad- war

Overgeneralized interpretations of causality fail to take into account other causes

Baldwin 96 (David, Prof Institute of War and Peace Studies @ Columbia University, muse.jhu.edu/journals/world\_politics/v048/48.1er\_allison.html, DA 7/11/11, OST)

If the cold war stimulated and nourished security studies before 1965, the decreased salience of the cold war during the next fifteen years contributed to a period of decline. 25 As Americans turned their interest from the cold war with the Soviet Union to the hot war in Vietnam, their interest in security studies waned. Although some might view this as an irrational reaction on the part of those who thought they could stop war by not studying it, this would be an oversimplification. In the first place, security studies had been so preoccupied with U.S.-Soviet relations, NATO, and nuclear strategy that it offered little help to those seeking to understand the Vietnam War. As Colin Gray put it, the leading strategists knew "next to nothing" about "peasant nationalism in Southeast Asia or about the mechanics of a counterrevolutionary war." 26 Second, security studies had become so preoccupied with war as an instrument of national policy that it had slighted the legal, moral, and other aspects of war emphasized in Wright's A Study of War. Third, the desire to be "policy relevant" had led some scholars into such close relationships with policymakers that they ceased to be perceived as autonomous intellectuals and came to be considered instead as part of the policy-making establishment. And fourth, the decline of interest in traditional security studies was partially offset by increased interest in peace studies and peace research during the 1960s and 1970s, thus indicating that declining interest in security studies was not tantamount to a lack of intellectual interest in war. 27 Interest in security studies did not revive immediately after the Vietnam War; rather the lessened cold war tensions associated with détente allowed other issues, such as economic interdependence, Third World poverty, and environmental issues, to increase in salience. And the Arab oil embargo served as a sharp reminder that threats to the American way of life emanated from nonmilitary sources, as well as from military ones.

Oversimplification of the causes of war guarantees the continuation of war

Magstadt 8 (Thomas M, Intelligence Analyst @ USfg, books.google.com/books?id=soAZSTHmAaIC&dq, DA 7/11/11, OST)

Mans of the factors discussed so far in this chapter, from human nature to scarce resources, and many of the characteristics associated with war, including population size, economic development, and holder problems, are difficult or impossible to change, especially in the short run. The American humorist Will Rogers once suggested that world peace could be advanced if nations—like people—could move; but nations cannot move (although populations can, and do, migrate). Furthermore, the false belief that conflict can be eradicated or that it can be traced to one single factor can actually increase the possibility of war. As European history from 1919 to 1939 illustrates, concentrating solely on rearranging the international system while ignoring the role of human nature may encourage the ruthless to resort to war by removing impediments in the path of self-interested, ambitious rulers.'' Had American, French, and British leaders in the l930s not underestimated the role of the Nazi ultranationalistic ideology or of Hitler's evil designs, World War 11 may have been contained or averted. An understanding of the complex curses mid factors associated with war, then, may help effect modest improvement in the international system of conflict management by dispelling illusions about the prospects for peace. In such important matters, simple solutions can be worse than no solutions at all; some of history's foremost political simplifies have also been among the foremost contributors to war.

The notion that war is inevitable and caused by a single factor makes war inevitable

Horgan 8 (John, Director of the Center Sci Write @ SIT, stwr.org/global-conflicts-militarization/we-will-abolish-war.html, 2/22, 7/11/11, OST)

Obviously, ending war will not be easy. War, it seems fair to say, is overdetermined – that is, it can spring from many different causes. Peace, if it is to be permanent, must be overdetermined too. Scientists could help promote peace in two ways: first, by rejecting the notion that warfare is inevitable; and second, by doing much more research on the causes of war and peace. The short-term goal of this research would be finding ways to reduce conflict in the world today, wherever it might occur. The long-term goal would be to identify ways for humanity to achieve permanent disarmament: the elimination of armies, arms, and arms industries.

No Root Cause – Enviro

There is no root cause to environmental destruction – assuming so prevents effective solutions to specific issues

Garrard 4 (Greg, PhD in Humanities and Cultural Industries @ Liverpool U, “Ecocriticism”, pp.

176-178, Questia) JPG

Much ecocriticism has taken for granted that its task is to overcome anthropocentrism, just as feminism seeks to overcome androcentrism. The metaphysical argument for biocentrism is meant to sustain moral claims about the intrinsic value of the natural world, which will in turn affect our attitudes and behaviour towards nature. Wilderness experiences, or apocalyptic threats, or Native American ways of life, are supposed to provide the impetus or the example by which individuals come to an authentic selfhood orientated toward right environmental action. Whilst the importance of changing the minds and lives of individuals is undeniable, this book has aimed to show the political dimension that this moralistic emphasis may occlude. However, the politicisation of ecocriticism does pose its own problems. Dwelling on the troubling example of Heidegger (Chapter 6), who espoused both Nazism and a kind of deep ecology, Jonathan Bate asserts in The Song of the Earth that 'The dilemma of Green reading is that it must, yet it cannot, separate ecopoetics from ecopolitics' (2000:266). Environmentalism is compatible with most political positions, and while we have seen possible dangers inherent in this, it might also give us a clear argument for better, not less, political attunement in ecocriticism. Bate rightly points out that poets are not the engineers of the world, and that literature cannot provide specific solutions, which means that ecocriticism must continue to adopt and adapt theories from feminist and Marxist traditions, enabling positive engagement in cultural politics. I would argue that the promise of ecofeminist literary and cultural theory has yet to be realised. With important exceptions such as Haraway, Armbruster, Westling and Murphy, such criticism has been held back by the overstated anti-rationalism and gynocentric dualism of radical ecofeminism. The work of Australian philosopher Val Plumwood offers ecofeminism a sound basis for a much-needed critique of the dynamics of domination as they operate in a range of cultural contexts. A monolithically conceived root cause of environmental destruction, be it labelled anthropocentrism or androcentrism is bound to misrepresent the complexity of causation in the real world. Ecofeminism, modified by dialogue with social ecological positions, can provide insight into the cultural operations of environmental injustice. In this way, the fusion of environmental and social development agendas that has occurred so strikingly within and between global NGOs might come to ecocriticism; Beyond Nature Writing (2001), edited by Karla Armbruster and Kathleen Wallace, includes several essays in this emergent field of enquiry. Ecocritics therefore continue to experiment with hybridised reading practices, drawing on various philosophical and literary theoretical sources. Bennett and Teague's The Nature of Cities (1999) reveals a new emphasis on bringing cultural theorists such as Cronon, Ross, Luke and Haraway into dialogue with literary ecocritics, thereby consolidating the field around a critical encounter between genres, perspectives and politics. The work of Richard Kerridge is exemplary in this respect: he writes with as much insight about postmodern risk as he does about Thomas Hardy. Harrison's eclectic Forests (1993), which ranges from Grimm fairy tales to the architecture of Frank Lloyd Wright, fosters the making of connections between disparate cultural phenomena without eliminating their peculiarities. Bate and Buell first published books that identified a single 'environmental tradition' in Britain and the USA, stemming from Wordsworth and Thoreau respectively. In later works, however, they favour an explicitly dialectical approach. In The Song of the Earth, Wordsworth's piety is leavened with Byron's wit, and Heidegger's portentousness gets a learned sneer from Theodor Adorno. For Buell, Writing for an Endangered World involves juxtaposing urbanites like Theodor Dreiser and Gwendolyn Brooks with the more obvious candidates for ecocritical treatment, Jeffers and Berry. Drawing upon such diverse resources of hope enables ecocriticism to connect with the urban and suburban places in which most of us will continue to live, and will add depth to the ecological critique of modernity; material and economic progress is no more the root of all evils than it is an unalloyed benefit to people or the natural world. By such means the risk of fostering reactionary politics might be minimized.

No Root Cause – Enviro

Environmental problems have multiple causes – determining one issue as the root cause makes the impacts inevitable

Mitchell 9 (Ronald B., PhD in Poli Sci @ Harvard, Prof of Poli Sci w/ focus on enviro studies @ Oregon U, “International Politics and the Environment”, Dec. 2009, http://people.reed.edu/~ahm/Courses/Reed-POL-372-2011-S1\_IEP/Syllabus/EReadings/02.2/02.2.Mitchell2010International048-079.pdf) JPG

Because environmental problems tend to illustrate multifinality- in the sense that most causes proposed by the six perspectives are individually sufficient to cause environmental degradation -individual environmental problems often are over-determined. That is, most environmental problems arise from several of these forces working together, with each deserving a significant, and overlapping, share of the blame for the observed degradation. Early on, ignorance about the existence and magnitude of a problem and its human causes often coincides with a lack of concern about the environmental harm itself and government subsidies that reduce the costs of engaging in the responsible activities. Indeed, the coincidence of factors that often cause environmental degradation is not always accidental; the nature of some variables means that synergies, interactions, and interdependencies among them are particularly likely. Thus, value systems that de-prioritize environmental protection tend to produce political structures that give leaders few incentives to protect the environment, economic structures that are unlikely to reflect environmental costs in prices, and legal structures that grant rights and obligations that do not inhibit, and may promote, environmental degradation. Likewise, ignorance of an activity's environmental consequences creates a context in which maintaining the resource as open access, failing to regulate such access, and even subsidizing appropriation may appear as reasonable policies even among environmentally-sensitive governments. Put differently, environmental protection is rare because it depends on so many, and sometimes all, causal forces being properly aligned. A wide range of necessary conditions must be met. It requires not only knowledge of the effects of our actions but also concern about those effects and the existence of both domestic and international institutions that allow for a quick and effective expression of those concerns in policies that establish appropriate legal rights and obligations and ensure that the costs of environmental damages are reflected in market prices. Failing to meet even one of these conditions can easily lead to environmental degradation in a context that might otherwise seem conducive to environmental protection. Given that so many human activities – at least when conducted at high aggregate levels - pose a risk of environmental harm, that environmental degradation can emerge as a result of so many forces, and that environmental protection requires so many variables to be properly aligned, it becomes less surprising that we face an international landscape in which environmental problems are so distressingly common.

Monocausal explanations of environmental issues fail – there is a combination of factors that affect each situation

Silva 98 (Eduardo, PhD in wildlife ecology & conservation @ Florida U, Latin America Research Review, Vol. 33, No. 3, 1998 pp. 230-247, “The Politics of Environment and Development”, JStor) JPG

At the core, Forestsand Livelihoods analyzes how the extension of capitalist relations of production in the developing world have robbed rural populations, forest dwellers in particular, of alternatives to defor- estation in their struggle for survival. Given this diagnosis, Barraclough and Ghimire argue that population pressure or any other monocausal explanation cannot account for the problem of deforestation, nor can any single solution rectify the current unsustainable course. Instead, the dilemma of sustainable development has to be understood in relation to the role of developing countries in the world economic system and how that affects their agrarian and resource extraction policies. As the world economy has expanded from colonial times to the present, domestic eco- nomic and political elites have entered into alliances with international forces to change traditional land-tenure patterns, technological "packages," and the settlement practices of local peoples. Given this perspective in the book, political-economy criteria largely (but not exclusively) define actors and their interests. These crite- ria include location in the structure of production, occupation, status, and ethnicity in the case of indigenous peoples. Dominant social groups, in their thirst to control extraction of natural resources, rely on their control of political and economic institutions to enact policies that effectively dis- possess and displace subordinate social groups. The market structures supported by those dominant groups and their international allies have the same effect. These processes cause unchecked deforestation, with highly nega- tive impacts at the local, regional, national, and global levels. Locally, resi- dents suffer from decreased fuelwood and construction materials, an impoverished diet, decreased agricultural yields, and changes in micro- climates. The decline in livelihood alternatives for local inhabitants due to agricultural modernization has also encouraged migration by displaced rural populations, siltation of rivers, soil erosion, and possible negative contributions to greenhouse gases and global warming.

No Root Cause – Enviro

Singular explanations of environmental collapse ignore other environmental issues which cause the same impact

Homer-Dixon 8 (Thomas, PhD in IR @ MIT, Prof @ Centre for Enviro and Business, Waterloo U, 1/2/8, http://homerdixon.com/forum/read.php?1,851) JPG

I, too, noticed the disclaimer at the beginning of the book. But I still found the remainder of the book often slipped into the kind of monocausal argument that gets us into trouble. I?m again in an airplane at the moment, so I don’t have the book with me to give you some specific examples. But notice the language in the very quotation you sent me: he talks about explaining putative environmental collapse, which sounds a bit like he is disposed to favor the environmental cause up front. I would argue that the emphasis should be on "multiple" stresses that a key cause of collapse is the very multiplicity of problems rather than the intrinsic character of any particular problem. Of course, environmental factors can be part of the total set of challenges, but they don’t have to be, and more often than not aren’t (at least in recent history that may change in the future). More specifically, Diamond’s key causal or “contributing” factors are badly defined and analytically confused, and his treatment shows little familiarity with the vast literature on precisely these subjects. For instance, he lists twelve environmental problems, which he admits in passing are neither necessary nor sufficient causes of collapse. The list includes deforestation and habitat destruction, soil problems, water-management problems, overhunting, overfishing, effects of introduced species on native species, human population growth, increased per-capita impact of people, human-caused climate change, build-up of toxic chemicals in the environment, energy shortages, and full human utilization of Earth’s photosynthetic capacity. This is an analytically confused list, a mix of apples and oranges. Some of its elements, like population growth and increased per-capita impact, aren’t environmental problems in themselves, but rather are possible precursors of environmental problems. (Diamond encourages this confusion by referring in various places to the list’s elements as both “environmental problems” and as “processes” that lead to environmental problems.) Also, energy shortages shouldn’t be in the list at all, since such shortages are a matter (generally) of non-renewable resource availability, not environmental damage.

Reducing environmental issues to monolithic root causes ignores solutions and recreates the impact

Garrard 4 (Greg, PhD in Humanities and Cultural Industries @ Liverpool U, “Ecocriticism”, pp.

104-106, Questia) JPG

Apocalyptic rhetoric seems a necessary component of environmental discourse. It is capable of galvanising activists, converting the undecided and ultimately, perhaps, of influencing government and commercial policy. In the United States, in particular, it can draw upon deep wellsprings of popular and literary apocalyptic sentiment. The news media often report environmental issues as catastrophes not only because this generates drama and the possibility of a human interest, but also because news more easily reports events than processes. Apocalypse provides an emotionally charged frame of reference within which complex, long-term issues are reduced to monocausal crises involving conflicts between recognisably opposed groups, such as Greenpeace versus whalers. John Hannigan's study of the sociology of environmental conflict specifies the most common inflection: 'Employing a series of medical metaphors, our planet is depicted as facing a debilitating, perhaps terminal, illness' (1995:72). Ehrlich's Population Bomb is an early example of the rhetorical link that is now commonly made between the ancient apocalyptic trope and the inflection of ecology as a science of planetary health, as discussed further in Chapter 8. Eschatological narrative, then, brings with it philosophical and political problems that seriously compromise its usefulness, especially in its radical, tragic form. It tends to polarise responses, prodding sceptics towards scoffing dismissal and potentially inciting believers to confrontation and even violence, a pattern familiar from conflicts between liberal society and apocalyptic cults. On the other hand, while radical ecological groups are rhetorically akin to traditional millenarians, they are sociologically very different, stressing openness to diverse beliefs and maintaining a solid resistance to charismatic leadership. Even if this is allowed, however, the propensity of apocalypticism to turn ugly in relation to population growth must be confronted. A more general problem is that the rhetoric of catastrophe tends to 'produce' the crisis it describes, as in the Malthusian depiction of extreme poverty as 'famine'. Moreover, as Richard North shows in two detailed case studies, the political objectives of campaigning organisations may dovetail too neatly with journalistic desire for scientific integrity to be sustained in the reporting of ecological 'disaster'. North analyses media responses to the 1993 sinking of the oil tanker Braer, and claims that they show a marked preference for apocalyptic comments from campaign organisations over less dramatic assessments from government or oil industry scientists.

No Root Cause – Enviro – A2 – Population

Blaming the root cause of environmental destruction on population growth shifts the focus to developing countries – prevents any solutions

Arizpe 94 (Lourdes, PhD in Social Anthro @ London School of Econ and Poli Sci, Prof @ Natl Autonomous Mexico U, Population and Environment: Rethinking the Debate, pp. 5, 1994, Questia) JPG

Adopting a different view will serve as a corrective in itself: much of the present debate is about population policies to implement in the South rather than about policies to curb equally damaging environmental phenomena in the industrialized North. Much of the public attention to specific cases of degradation relates to events in the South, such as the destruction of the Amazonian rainforest, with policies being advanced to halt such environmental depredations. Curbing wasteful consumption of the earth's resources in the North is not being given equal public attention.Policies developed on the presumption that population increase is the root cause of environmental degradation affect the peoples of the South most directly, especially poor women, because it is there that population is increasing most rapidly. Policies developed on the presumption that human ingenuity will solve all problems tend to benefit the North more quickly and directly. As a consequence, under the terms of the current policy debate, much of the cost of environmental protection would be borne by the world's most vulnerable people, and the blame for the problems would be laid at their door. This prospect does not offer much hope for the success of international negotiations to address environmental problems. A new global understanding and conceptualization are needed.

A2 Root cause bad- war

Even if oversimplification causes loss of accuracy it’s the only way to address social issues

Gilpin 83 (Robert, Prof Emeritus of Politics & International Affairs @ Princeton, books.google.com/books?id=2iKL7zr3kl0C&dq, DA 7/11/11, OST)

Thus this study will draw on both the sociological approach and the economic approach to social theory in an attempt to develop a theory or conception of international political change. At the same time, we are mindful of the severe limitations of both types of social theories and of the fact that even though each approach partially compensates for the weaknesses of the other, a combination of the two approaches does not provide a comprehensive explanation of political change nor resolve the basic dilemma of social science: whether to explain trivial matters with exactitude or to treat significant matters with imprecision. In this study we have chosen to follow the latter course in the belief that possible errors and certain oversimplification are the price one must pay if one is to deal with the important issues of our age. This sacrifice of precision is justifiable only if this study clarifies the issues of war and change in world politics more than it obfuscates.

Generalizations are true and useful- Probability

Minsky 9 (Hyman , Macroeconomist, falkenblog.blogspot.com/2009/12/are-generalizations-useful.html, December, DA 7/12/11, OST)

So, Robin noted a generalization (women have a propensity to do X more than men), and some women got hysterical (heh) about the insight. Let's be clear. A stereotype is that all A are A. These are generally untrue, because there are exceptions to most assertions (eg, 'men are taller than women'). But generalizations are true and useful. It is useful to know that walking in a dark alley containing a bunch of young men is dangerous for a young woman. Not that all such situations mean bad things will happen, but the odds imply it is not a good idea. Most things come down to probabilities, and learning to slant them in your favor is part of an intelligent life. For those who think only deterministic relations are interesting, or known facts about individuals, I just can't empathize. I find it a childish view of life. Not that anecdotes and biographies aren't interesting, but they are primarily interesting as how they are relevant to everyone's story, or a metaphor for something larger.

Generalization inevitable- experience leads to it

Stake 78 (Robert, Prof Emeritus @ Illinois, jstor.org/stable/1174340, DA 7/12/11, OST)

It is widely believed that case studies arc useful in the study of human affairs because they are down-to-earth and attention-holding but that they are not a suitable basis for generalization. In this paper, I claim that case studies will often be the preferred method of research because they may be epistemologically in harmony with the reader's experience and thus to that person a natural basis for generalization. Experience. We expect an inquiry to be carried out so that certain audiences will benefit — not just to swell the archives, but to help persons toward further understandings. If the readers of our reports are the persons who populate our houses, schools, governments, and industries; and if we are to help them understand social problems and social programs, we must perceive and communicate (see Bohm, 1974;Schon, 19771 in a way that accommodates their present understandings.2 Those people have arrived at their understandings mostly through direct and vicarious experience.

A2 Root cause bad- war

Generalizations have predictive value

Valquez 93 (John ,Ph.D. (Political Science) Syracuse, DA 7/12/11, OST, books.google.com/books?id=kx733WVFq5QC&dq=generalizations+useful+war&lr=&source=gbs\_navlinks\_s )

The (ask set forth in this book would be almost impossible for a single individual to tackle were it not for an international community of peace researchers who have been dedicated to investigating manageable portions of the problem in a rigorous way. Their efforts have made mine possible. They have contributed a new body of evidence and insight on war and peace distinct from those provided by history, traditional discourse, and political philosophy. In this book, I seek to integrate and explain their findings in a way that will move the culmination of scientific knowledge on war and peace forward. My greatest debt is to those peace researchers who have painstakingly worked to document generalizations about war and peace. My debt to them is acknowledged in the text every lime I discuss their work and cite their studies. This is particularly the case when I am critical of an explanation or give an alternate interpretation to a finding. Just because I have disagreed with something does not mean I have not found it valuable.

Generalizations are predictively true

Valquez 93 (John ,Ph.D. (Political Science) Syracuse, DA 7/12/11, OST, books.google.com/books?id=kx733WVFq5QC&dq=generalizations+useful+war&lr=&source=gbs\_navlinks\_s )

The Korean War illustrates a different kind of model of how alliances might produce war. Here there is no direct war between the major rivals, and the effect of alliances is more systemic and indirect. Nevertheless, war comes, and when it does, it is more of a surprise and unwanted. Within the quantitative literature, the Korean War is a case supporting the generalization that alliances are followed by war. In 1949 NATO is formed, in Levy's terms a "great power" alliance, and it is followed within three years by a war involving at least one of the "great powers." If China is considered a "major power," as Small and Singer (1982: 50), consider it, then the Korean War is a war between major powers. Likewise, Wayman (1985:129) found that alliance polarization increased just prior to the Korean War. Yet, clearly NATO did not cause the Korean War, and how NATO gave rise to the Korean War is different from how the Triple Entente and Dual Alliance gave rise to World War I.

Society dictates which actions are even possible

Gilpin 83 (Robert, Prof Emeritus of Politics & International Affairs @ Princeton, books.google.com/books?id=2iKL7zr3kl0C&dq, DA 7/11/11, OST)

The fundamental feature of sociological theory is its emphasis on whole societies or whole social systems. Although definitions of social systems vary, they have in common the notion of a set of identifiable elements characterized by explicit or implicit interrelationships. Whether these elements are individuals, groups, social roles, or other factors, sociological theory assumes that individual behavior is explained by the nature of the system and one's place in it The social system is the primary determinant of behavior, either by socializing the actor with respect to a particular set of norms and values or by exercising constraints on the actor. In brief, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, and the social system itself must be the focus of theorizing.

A2 Root cause bad- war

Systemic issues determine the framework in which overdetermined events occur

Gilpin 83 (Robert, Prof Emeritus of Politics & International Affairs @ Princeton, books.google.com/books?id=2iKL7zr3kl0C&dq, DA 7/11/11, OST)

It is worth noting, as Joseph Schumpeter pointed out, that the natural development of any science is from static analysis to dynamic analysis (1954b, p. 964). Static theory is simpler, and its propositions are easier to prove. Unfortunately, until the statics of a field of inquiry are sufficiently well developed and one has a good grasp of repetitive processes and recurrent phenomena, it is difficult if not impossible to proceed to the study of dynamics. From this perspective, systematic study of international relations is a young field, and much of what passes for dynamics is in reality an effort to understand the statics of interactions of particular international systems: diplomatic bargaining, alliance behavior, crisis management, etc. The question whether or not our current understanding of these static aspects is sufficiently well advanced to aid in the development of a dynamic theory poses a serious challenge to the present enterprise.