# Case Materials

## 1NC—Status Quo Solves

### Status quo solves monitoring:

### A. UN Observation

Van Wyk 8 [Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, lecturer with the Department of Political Sciences at the University of South Africa, “space for peace? The use of space technology to monitor conflict trends and human security in Africa,”]

UNOSAT is the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) Operational Satellite Applications Programme, which is implemented in cooperation with the European Organisation of High Energy Physics (CERN). Since 1963, UNOSAT has delivered satellite images to relief and development organisations. These images assist decision-makers to track and resolve humanitarian crises.10

Since 2004, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has been using satellite data to identify underground water resources for almost 200 000 Sudanese refugees in nine UNCHR refugee camps in eastern Chad. Figure 5 is an example of satellite data that identified underground water for these camps.1

### B. Darfur

Mayroz 8 [Eyal Mayrov, PhD candidate at Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney, “Ever again? The United States, genocide suppression, and the crisis in Darfur,” Journal of Genocide Research, IngentaConnect]

Based on the ADT’s findings, satellite images, and other data, Secretary of State Powell declared during a testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- tee on September 9, six weeks after returning from a high-profile visit in Darfur: “We concluded—I concluded—that genocide has been committed in Darfur and that the government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility—and geno- cide may still be occurring” (all emphases added).64 However, Secretary Powell went on, importantly, to say:

### C. Congo

Van Wyk 8 [Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, lecturer with the Department of Political Sciences at the University of South Africa, “space for peace? The use of space technology to monitor conflict trends and human security in Africa,”]

The application of space S&T such as Earth Observation (EO), geographic information systems (GIS), global position systems (GPS) and remote sensing can assist the continent’s decision-makers to determine and assess conflict trends, human security and states’ compliance with international agreements.2 For decades, illegal logging in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has been conducted to support conflicts. Most of these areas have been inaccessible, but recent satellite imagery reveals the extent of these activities. Figure 1 shows deforestation in the Nord-Ubangi and Mongala provinces of Zaire (now the DRC) in 1975. Here, deforestation occurs along roads, as indicated by the loops of light green through the dense rain forest.

### D. UN, governments, and NGOs

Van Wyk 8 [Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, lecturer with the Department of Political Sciences at the University of South Africa, “space for peace? The use of space technology to monitor conflict trends and human security in Africa,”]

Notwithstanding these limitations, space S&T has and will increasingly continue to contribute to human security and justice in Africa. Space S&T may assist governments and humanitarian organisations achieve this against the approaching deadlines for the Millennium Development Goals.

The use of satellite imagery to support human rights abuses undertaken by national governments remains controversial. However, the UN Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Space (1986) encourages the use of EO and remote sensing to improve human security.28 Access to space S&T is no longer limited only to governments and commercial actors. The ‘democratisation’ of this type of technology is increasingly assisting humanitarian organisations to ‘reach’ people in Africa who are severely affected by conflict and violence. It can also assist in bringing individuals to book for crimes against humanity and war crimes, which they may have denied, but are clearly visible and accessible via satellite imagery.

## Extend That The UN Solves

### Even the UN thinks information is sufficient in the status quo

UNITAR 7 [United Nations Institute for Training and Research, New York, Seminar Report, “UNITAR Peace and Security Series: Preventing Genocide,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Summary\_Report\_with\_contacts.pdf]

The discussion about early warning mechanisms reflected on how information, knowledge and action can be linked better. Most speakers agreed that there is no lack of information. Technological development allows for immediate availability of information worldwide and accessibility of even the most remote areas through satellite systems. Apart from media coverage and the internet, which provide information of human rights violations, there are a number of actors within the UN system that gather such evidence, including Special Rapporteurs and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, who have the capacity to bring the attention of the international community to a situation. In 2004, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed the first Special Advisor (SA) on the Prevention of Genocide, whose mandate is to provide early-warning and proposals for early-action to the UN Secretary-General and through him to the Security Council. However, the outgoing Special Adviser, Mr. Juan Mendez, whose term expired at the end of March 2007, mentioned that, due to the reluctance of Member States, there is no agreed set of indicators for early warning on conflict and genocide within the UN Secretariat. Also, while several UN agencies like OHCHR, UNHCR and ILO collect information that could be used for early warning purposes none of these organizations undertakes comprehensive risk assessments and analysis.

## Extend That NGOs Solve

### NGOs are solving in the status quo.

Nerenberg 10 (Jenara Nerenberg is an overseas reporter for Fast Company and a freelance writer/producer in Asia, regularly on CNNGo, and a graduate of Harvard and UC Berkeley. “Google and George Clooney Aim Satellites at Sudan, Become "Anti-Genocide Paparazzi"” URL: <http://www.fastcompany.com/1712971/google-and-george-clooney-employ-commercial-satellites-amid-sudans-referendum>. DA: 7/22/11] NG

George Clooney is joining Google, the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, and the United Nations in an effort called the Satellite Sentinel Project to monitor violence and human rights violations in Sudan as the country prepares to vote on January 9 on whether or not to split into two nations--North and South Sudan. The explicit goal of the partnership is deterrence--Clooney and his partners want to make sure that Sudan does not erupt in another civil war. Some small pockets of violence have already been reported and the employment of satellites is meant to give war-mongers on the ground the message that the world is watching and genocide will not be tolerated. Clooney's interest in Sudan is not new--back in 2007 he was featured in the documentary film, Darfur Now, co-produced by actor Don Cheadle. And he has maintained his interest in the embattled country since then, paying a recent visit amidst preparations for the upcoming referendum. The partnership pulls on the diverse strengths of the participating organizations--Clooney and his organization, Not On Our Watch, add star power--not to mention awareness power--and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT) will collect and analyze the satellite images. The Harvard Humanitarian Initiative, meanwhile, will provide field research and Google is setting up a web platform to provide public access to information with the goal of pressuring public officials. (We profiled an independent, Ushahidi-backed voting monitoring project just a couple of weeks ago--carried out by a Sudan-born Texan.) UNOSAT has done this before--in fact it is their mission to snap satellite images in cases of such disaster, but in the case of Sudan they've more or less been on standby to see what happens and will start snapping satellite images as soon as they receive requests from their field staff and partner organizations to do so. "It's a good thing that we haven't yet had to take many images in Sudan," Lars Bromley of UNOSAT tells Fast Company. So the idea is not entirely Clooney's alone (despite what a Time magazine article suggests). I had spoken to UNOSAT several weeks ago, prior to the announcement of Clooney's project, and, for them, this is essentially routine work. But there is one difference this time around. It's Clooney who has hired the satellites. That means there is more freedom to snap away in whatever geographical areas and on whatever basis the group wants, as opposed to the U.N., which has certain rules and guidelines to work within. Specifically, Clooney will monitor the movement of troops, whereas UNOSAT's primary--and most flexible--prerogative is the monitoring of natural disasters, not man-made ones. "We are the anti-genocide paparazzi," Clooney told Time. "We want them to enjoy the level of celebrity attention that I usually get. If you know your actions are going to be covered, you tend to behave much differently than when you operate in a vacuum." The project as a whole is a multi-layered approach and the programming and monitoring capabilities of multiple crisis mapping tools, websites, and organizations are being pulled together. The work of the Sudan Vote Monitor--who we profiled earlier this month--will soon be incorporated and the Google mapping component was actually built off the work of two Pakistani-British entrepreneurs who built LOCAL, a monitoring site for the Pakistan floods. "What is new and transforming is the concept of leveraging Google Map Maker into a public human rights and human security early warning system to stop a war before it starts," Jonathan Hutson of the Enough Project, another partner, tells Fast Company. "We'd like to engage the worldwide, volunteer community of Google power mappers," adds Hutson, "and combine their efforts with on-the-ground field reports from the Enough Project and crowd-sourced, crisis response information from groups like Ushahidi, analyze it, add context and concise clear calls to action, and publish it all on a public platform to detect and deter war crimes, including potential genocide."

## Extend That Geospatial Satellites Solve

### Geospatial imagery solves for uncovering unknown locations of Genocide. Key to prevention

Kaplowitz and Qi 10 **—** Hank Kaplowitz is Professor of Psychology and Special Assistant to the President for the Human Rights Institute at Kean University. Feng Qi is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Geology and Meteorology at Kean University. She received her M.S. in Cartography and Geographic Information Science. “Science and Human Rights: A Bridge Towards Benefiting Humanity” URL: <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/human_rights_quarterly/v032/32.4.toney.html>. DA: 7/23/11] NG

In a satellite image captured 2 July 2004 (Figure 1: left-hand image), soil above the purported mass grave at Dasht-e-Leili appeared to be undisturbed, according to Lars Bromley, director of the AAAS Geospatial Technologies and Human Rights project.25 A satellite image captured 5 August 2006 (Figure 1: right-hand image) revealed a large pit on one side of the roadway, and two large vehicles on the other side of the roadway. Based on their dimensions and appearance, the vehicles could have been a hydraulic excavator and a dump truck.26 [End Page 1014] With the advancement of image acquisition and analysis capabilities over the past two decades, remote monitoring of human rights issues is possible using geospatial technologies. Geospatial imageries such as satellite images taken from space and aerial photographs taken from airborne platforms use color and panchromatic images to capture and rapidly convey information about the natural world as well as human activities occurring on earth's surface. Moreover, web-based virtual globe applications such as Google Earth and Microsoft Virtual Earth have made such digital images available to all users who have access to a computer and the Internet since 2005. The fast development of sensing technology and an increase of customer requests have led to the acquisition of an array of images of higher spatial resolution and more frequent temporal coverage.27 Commercial satellite sensors such as Ikonos and GeoEye-1 by GeoEye, capture panchromatic images at spatial resolutions of 1m and 50cm, respectively.28 DigitalGlobe's QuickBird and WorldView-1 satellites are now supplying images with pixel sizes of 61cm and 50cm, respectively.29 Every object on earth can be referenced geospatially using a coordinate referencing system. This geospatial information is used to represent the geographic locations and features of objects on earth's surface in a digital form. Represented in a so-called raster format, the data contained in the pixel-by-pixel digital form can be measured, analyzed, and disseminated using spatial analysis functions provided by Geographic Information Systems (GIS), which transform the gathered data into information over time and space.30 High-resolution imagery and spatial analysis have found a powerful application in the documentation of humanitarian crises and human rights assessments. Along with their unequivocal timing, the photographs provide authentic, accurate images and sometimes the photographs are the only form that shows the before-and-after visual evidence of damage to houses, fields, and other properties or the shift of human populations. As noted by researchers such as Dr. Amy Ross, from the University of Georgia, who study regions experiencing mass atrocity, there is great difficulty in collecting data for such studies due to the dangers researchers have to face, and the fact that interviews obtained in conflict zones are often precarious and problematic.31 Geospatial technologies thus provide an essential supplement for studying human right issues in these areas. [End Page 1015] Lars Bromley, a geoinformation specialist and Project Director of the Science and Human Rights Program at the AAAS, has been using high-resolution digital imagery obtained from satellites to help document large-scale crisis zones in Darfur, Burma, Ethiopia, and other regions.32 In partnership with human rights organizations including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, AAAS obtains images from commercial satellites based on the spatial coordinates of the regions in crisis and analyzes them for evidence of refugee camps, burned villages, leveled fields, and mass graves.33 In a series of historical satellite images compiled in 2007, using coordinates provided by Physicians for Human Rights (36.65° latitude, 65.70° longitude), Bromley located and analyzed the suspected site of a mass grave in northern Afghanistan (see Figure 1). The images were acquired by QuickBird, Ikonos, TopSat, and SPOT-5 satellites, operated by a combination of US, British, and French companies.34 The satellite images from 2004 indicated the absence of pits at 36.65° latitude, 65.70° longitude, while an image from August 2006 indicated the presence of one pit, as well as two vehicles with dimensions and appearance consistent with those of a dump truck and a hydraulic excavator on top of what later developed into a second pit.35 Images from January and October 2007 indicated the presence of both pits. The timeline of the appearance of the pits and soil disturbance in the alleged site supported allegations of the existence of a mass grave.36 As web-based virtual globes are making the once limited-access imageries available to the general public, large-scale human rights violations all around the world can be witnessed, and such information can be distributed broadly and instantly.37 The US Holocaust Memorial Museum and Google Earth have collaborated to post enormous amounts of evidence of the human rights crisis in Darfur, Sudan.38 Together with the recently available historical [End Page 1016] image viewing function provided by Google Earth, the archived imageries and documents make visible the destructions of over three thousand villages in the region.39 Geospatial tools such as remote sensing and GIS offer a transparent recording of the earth's surface unlike anything available before. Would awareness of an "Eye in the Sky" give a dictator pause, or prevent altogether, an atrocity such as genocide?

## 1NC—Genocide Monitoring Fails

### No solvency – access, false readings, difficult to interpret, and lack of institutional support.

Van Wyk 8 [Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, lecturer with the Department of Political Sciences at the University of South Africa, “space for peace? The use of space technology to monitor conflict trends and human security in Africa,”]

Despite its limited use, this article has illustrated that space S&T can be applied to address conflict trends and human security in Africa. However, there continues to be some limitations to the application of space S&T:

• First, satellite imagery can be costly and therefore inaccessible to organisations − for example, most African humanitarian organisations.

• Second, some tribes, clans and ethnic groups in some areas are nomadic and, if these groups are moving into or out of a conflict-ridden area, it may be difficult to determine whether it is a forced displacement or part of the groups’ seasonal movement. It is therefore, necessary, that the images that capture these movements be clearly analysed. A humanitarian group may respond to images that reflect movements, only to find that it is part of a seasonal nomadic movement.

• Third, lacking a scientific support base means that satellite imagery cannot be interpreted. This is particularly the case in underdeveloped states, which may have access to these images but do not have the skilled scientists to interpret the images in order for the government to respond to humanitarian crises appropriately and adequately.

• Fourth, weak African states lack the institutional capacity to implement decisions relating to the interpretation of EO, remote sensing and GIS areas relating to the resolution of conflict, or humanitarian assistance.27

### All genocide monitoring fails without boots on the ground

Brown 11 [Tim Brown, imagery analyst and Senior Fellow at Globalsecurity.org., Imaging Notes, “Satellites for Human Rights: Can They Stop Genocide?” http://www.imagingnotes.com/go/article\_freeJ.php?mp\_id=269 June 9, 2011]

How much evidence is required to detect and demonstrate violence in significant enough levels to cause the International Community and the United Nations to act? High-resolution overhead imagery is best used to detect, identify, and characterize activity in denied-access areas. Since there is an abundance of ”ground truth” of what is going on in Sudan, from journalists and non-governmental aid and human rights organizations showing dead bodies, burned villages, and people suffering in refugee camps, satellite imagery can do little more than provide a context to the imagery that is hard to get from the ground. Overhead imagery alone does not seem to move public opinion, nor does it cause the perpetrators to stop, nor the International Community and the United Nations to act. The fundamental question is whether documenting ongoing war crimes and genocide for later use in court has any effect on the behavior of perpetrators. So far, it doesn’t seem to. Deterring killing and genocide in the disputed regions of Sudan is a noble cause, but it is a daunting task to dedicate satellite imagery collection time to monitor an area larger than the state of Texas. At a speed of four miles per second, these satellites are pre-programmed to point and click at areas already identified by people on the ground reporting killing. Instead of satellites discovering new knowledge, they are more often than not used to illustrate what is already known. Persistent staring (observation) from a variety of platforms such as commercial high-resolution imaging satellites, aerostat balloons, and unmanned drones is useful only with “boots on the ground.” International Peacekeepers are needed, with a mandate to protect life and property and to stop the violence. The Satellite Sentinel Project as currently envisioned does not have boots on the ground to go with it. The goal of documenting violence, war crimes and genocide to prosecute is more attainable. This action is akin to crime scene investigators who show up after a murder has been committed to collect evidence and create a documentary chain of evidence to be used later in a trial. Using satellite imagery and analysis to document war crimes presumes that some of the perpetrators will be caught and brought to justice. George Clooney and other celebrities have lent their good names and money to raise international awareness about the killing going on in Sudan(2). Mr. Clooney has actually been to refugee camps on the borders of Sudan enough times that his trips cannot be dismissed as mere photo-ops. He has provided substantial financial support and personal commitment to the Satellite Sentinel Project and has the support of other celebrities. The satellite company DigitalGlobe has made available to the effort its constellation of high-resolution imaging satellites. Harvard University’s Humanitarian Initiative, the groups Not On Our Watch and Enough Project, co-founded by John Prendergast, along with Amnesty International, scholars, organizers, and activists, have made the violence, war crimes and genocide in Sudan hard to ignore. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations UNITAR Operational Satellite Applications Program (UNOSAT), along with the International Criminal Court, which has handed down indictments, all send a strong message that war crimes and genocide in Sudan will not go unnoticed, and hopefully not unpunished. The question is whether Mr. Clooney, the satellite companies, prosecutors, scholars, and human rights activists can raise public awareness to a sufficient level to pressure the U.S., the West, and the International Community to act in time to stop more violence in Sudan, or at least not to interfere in a U.N.-mandated peace enforcement. The answer lies in a highly complex international process requiring cooperation and commitment that, at this point, have not been possible. Part of that complexity is that the Sudanese ethnic minorities occupy land where the government wants to drill oil to sell to countries like China. The current Sudanese government does not want to share profits with Southern Sudan, though they will have to, once the south is independent. Also, China holds a seat on the U.N. Security Council, and could veto any vote to send in troops. In its present form, the Satellite Sentinel Project can actually do little to deter violence or stop aggression. To do that, governments, not satellite companies and celebrities, must act by putting troops on the ground and using force if necessary to stop the actions and deter further violence. Satellites watching genocide being committed and reporting after the fact is a relatively inexpensive proposition, but may also be ineffective. Whether the Satellite Sentinel Project can raise enough awareness to cause governments to act is an open question.

# Counterplan Materials

## Stratosats Solvency

### Stratosats solve genocide monitoring

Peifer 8 [Douglas C. Peifer, associate professor at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, teacher of strategy, European security, and Genocide intervention, PhD in history from UNC Chapel Hill, “Genocide and Airpower,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA508720&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf]

If Army or Marine UASs are unavailable due to commitments elsewhere (or to interservice rivalry**),** the Air Force should consider the utility of substituting disposable, high-altitude observation balloons for UAV or satellite coverage.Tethered balloons have been used to monitor activity along the Mexican border and provide coverage at “a fraction of the cost of one” manned surveillance aircraft.67 Rather than thinking in terms of US “boots on the ground” in crisis areas such as Darfur, Somalia, and the Congo, the United States should support regional and international forces by providing them with ISR capabilities so that reconnaissance rests on more than lightly armed troops in a jeep.

## 1NC—United Nations Counterplan

### The United Nations Security Council should increase its use of sanctions and preventive deployment troops to stop genocide. The sanctions should target economic actors most responsible for the illegal activities, and the sanctions should narrow the focus of economic coercion to micro-activity constraints.

### Security Council action is key – it is the most effective way to deter genocide, but differences between members is stalling action in the status quo

UNITAR 7 [United Nations Institute for Training and Research, New York, Seminar Report, “UNITAR Peace and Security Series: Preventing Genocide,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Summary\_Report\_with\_contacts.pdf]

The implementation of the responsibility to protect agenda has a large deterrence potential, depending on the willingness of the Security Council to act. On the normative side, some advancement has already been made, with Security Council mandates today, e.g. for Darfur being much more robust and comprehensive than the mandate given to the UN Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) at the time of the genocide. However, differences among the five Permanent Members are likely to stall the Council’s capacity to act, especially when it comes to taking measures under Chapter VII of the Charter against the will of the State concerned. It was suggested that the Permanent Five should abstain from using their veto power in cases falling under the responsibility to protect, especially genocide.

## Sanctions Solvency

### Unification is critical for successful sanction implementation and enforcement

UNITAR 7 [United Nations Institute for Training and Research, New York, Seminar Report, “UNITAR Peace and Security Series: Preventing Genocide,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Summary\_Report\_with\_contacts.pdf]

The use of coercive tools, such as sanctions will only be an effective means of prevention, making targets come to the bargaining table, if there is a unity of purpose of the imposing States. The Security Council has used sanctions with a view to preventing large-scale violence and human rights abuses: Resolution 1572 on Cote d’Ivoire demands that all media and broadcast diffusing hate speech be stopped and imposes travel bans and asset freezes on all those who incite to hatred and violence and impede the peace process. Likewise, resolution 1591 on the situation in Sudan threatens with travel bans and asset freezes all those impeding the peace process. However, the success of sanctions does not only depend on unified political will, but also on the capacity of the monitoring regime that enforces them. This is why the Security Council has set up expert panels for each situation.

### Targeted micro-sanctions are effectiveness and solve their sanctions offense

Lopez and Stuhldreher 8 [George A. Lopez, founding faculty at the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at Notre Dame, Kathryn Stuhldreher, The Prevention and Intervention of Genocide, Genocide: A Critical Bibliographic Review: volume 6, “Sanctions as Counter-Genocide Instruments]

Adapting and Reforming Sanctions The strongest reason for placing some hope in the arena of economic sanctions as an effective diplomatic tool is that over the past decade groups of diplomats. sanctions specialists, representatives of international governmental and non-governmental organizations, and a wide array of experts (e.g.. in banking. commodities trade. law enforcement. transportation. comparative legislative behavior} have worked in concert to decline. develop, and revise substantial proposals for the formulation and implementation of targeted sanctions (which are often referred to as "smart" sanctions). These efforts, in turn. have been further relined in the practice of the Council itself and through the development of legislative model laws for national member states. These new formulations are the subject of on-going exploration and consultation by a select group of specialists in the US. in Europe. and within the UN Secretariat. Sanctions deemed smart or targeted are comprised of two key dimensions: (l) they take as their target specific economic actors (companies. entities, or individuals) deemed most responsible for the policies or actions considered by the international community as illegal or abhorrent: and (2) they narrow the locus of economic coercion to a micro-activity that constrains the target in unique and painful ways (Cortri ght and Lopez, 2002b. pp. 23-40). Since the late I990s, targeted financial sanctions have been the cornerstone of effective UN sanctions imposition (WaI|ensteen and Staibano. 2005). The impetus for smart sanctions came from increased concern about the inefficiencies and negative humanitarian consequences of comprehensive trade sanctions. This prompted the search for more effective means of economic coercion that were within the bounds and spirit of action that the UN might take under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. For example. in l998 and l999, the Swiss government convened two international seminars at Interlaken. The meetings brought together financial experts and regulators, bankers, international practitioners. lawyers and academic researchers from about two dozen nations to develop concrete proposals for instituting and improving financial sanctions. Special attention was devoted to exploring how to increase the technical capacity of the UN system and member states in locating and locking down assets and in harmonizing financial terminology (such as what comprises an "asset" in various national banking systems). This led to the development of model Security Council resolutions and the exploration of how to strengthen national member state capacity to implement targeted financial sanctions. From 2000 until the present, refinement of these techniques has been greatly assisted by the research of scholars at the WHL$<)H Institute for International Studies at Brown University. Concomitantly. in a series of workshops and practitioner oriented sessions, the German Foreign Ministry asked the Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC) to spearhead an initiative on the strengthening of travel bans. aviation sanctions. and the strengthening of arms embargoes. Expert meetings were held in Bonn in 1999 and Berlin in 2000. with follow-up work continuing through 2006 at the BICC and the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame. both of which will be involved in the analysis of the effectiveness of arms embargoes. The Bonn-Berlin process was especially effective in that its designers aimed to link distinct types of targeted measures within at similar framework vis—a-vis both policy and implementation. Special attention was devoted to arms embargo monitoring. The outcome was the development of model language to guide future Security Council resolutions and national legislation to enhance arms embargo enforcement (Brzoska. 200l ). ln October 2(`Kll, Sweden announced its initiation of a third process. which would focus on the implementation of targeted sanctions. The Stockholm process was comprised of an intense series of seminars and commissioned research papers that made detailed recommendations for each type of targeted sanctions. Beyond the critically important advancement of best practices in each area of targeted sanctions. the Stockholm process explored significant issues coming out of new UN practices with smart sanctions, such as those developing in the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee. it also developed comprehensive recommendations for improved implementation and monitoring for` sanctions, To this day. the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University continues to conduct research and convene seminars examining these themes (Wallenstcen and Staibano 2005). Ultimately. the three aforementioned retom1 processes were dynamically interactive and resulted in innovations introduced by the Security Council in the 1990s in each category of targeted sanctions. More specifically. there has been considerable refinement in the technique of imposing sanctions. which has. in turn. increased their impact. Significantly. it has also influenced the sharpening of the monitoring process. Interestingly. too. it has also contributed to improving the quality and attention devoted to national laws that are needed to support effective Security Council sanctions. For example. efforts were made to encourage member states to criminalize violations of UN arms embargoes md strengthen export control laws and regulations. These initiatives helped to create a firmer foundation in the domestic law of member states for penalizing those who supply arms and military related goods in violation of UN arms embargoes. In 2004. the Security Council directed UN peace-keeping forces in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Cote d'lvoirc to assist with the monitoring of arms embargoes in those countries. This added significant responsibilities to the mission of UN peace-keepers in those coutnries, but it might also help prevent the devastating killing in genocide in the future.

## Forces Solvency

### Preventative deployment of troops is the most effective way to deter violence

UNITAR 7 [United Nations Institute for Training and Research, New York, Seminar Report, “UNITAR Peace and Security Series: Preventing Genocide,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Summary\_Report\_with\_contacts.pdf]

Intervening while there is still a peace to keep is probably the most effective way to prevent mass violence. The preventive deployment of troops can enhance the chances for a political solution in situations of imminent violence. However, it cannot substitute for a political process. Ms. Jane Holl Lute cautioned that in the context of the massive surge in UN peacekeeping operations in recent years (over the last four years 10 new missions have been deployed), gaining support for a preventive deployment is not an easy task, all the more since it requires Member States to incur political costs today, to prevent something from happening tomorrow. She outlined some of the principles for successful deployment, including: a clear mandate; consent of the parties; a viable mechanism for dialogue; a credible troop size; unity of command; clear guidance on the use of force; and enough financial support. Capabilities matter, especially intelligence capacity to understand the tactical environment and combat power to deter spoilers. When adequately equipped and part of a package of measures, a preventive deployment mission can be an effective deterrent, serve as a cross-party mechanism and provide the “eyes and ears” of the international community on the ground. However, there are external challenges for UN peace operations, such as rampant lawlessness in many arenas of deployment, and internal challenges, including the lack of a standing military force, of a body of doctrine, and of a standing strategic planning unit within the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). There is a need for training to move from transplanting experiences from one situation to the next to the development of expertise.

### Forces are key to deter genocide offensives – Darfur proves

Labott 6 [Elise Labott, CNN, Senior US State Department producer, CNN.com “US: UN Forces are needed to stop Sudan ‘genocide,’” http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/africa/08/25/un.darfur/index.html]

WASHINGTON (CNN) -- A U.N. force is critical to prevent a "planned offensive

e" on Darfur by the Sudanese government, the U.S. State Department's top diplomat on Africa said Friday while accusing Sudan of committing genocide. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer made the remarks before a trip to the central African nation. There she plans to press the government on allowing U.N. troops into the war-ravaged region, a move Khartoum opposes. "I'm fully confident there will be a transition to a U.N. force," Frazer said. Without it, she said, the international community would have no capability to "stop this government from carrying out what has been the genocide." However, atrocities are not confined to government forces, she said. Frazer accused rebel troops of burning villages and killing civilians. "All forces in Darfur are potentially and probably involved in atrocities," she said. Violence erupted three years ago in Darfur, when ethnic African rebels took up arms over what they saw as neglect by the Arab-dominated central government. The Sudanese government is accused of responding by unleashing Arab militias called Janjaweed, which have systematically raped women and pillaged entire villages in a campaign the United States and other nations has branded genocide. Violence has increased in the Darfur region of Sudan despite a May 5 peace agreement between the Sudanese government and the largest of three rebel groups -- the Sudan Liberation Army. President Bush has instructed Frazer to carry a message to Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir, explaining that the U.S. is willing to "go the last mile" to overcome Khartoum's reluctance to a U.N. presence. In a media briefing Thursday, Frazer denied Khartoum's contention that the U.N. peacekeepers would make up "an occupation force." "The people of Darfur don't have confidence in the ability of the government to protect them, so you need and impartial, credible multilateral U.N. force with the sole purpose of helping to implement the [Darfur Peace Agreement] and providing an environment of security," she said. Atrocities have included the abuse of children, sexual violence against women and attacks on humanitarian workers, according to the United Nations. Nine humanitarian workers have been killed in the past month, more than 200 women have been raped at a Darfur refugee camp in the past five weeks, and on Saturday two soldiers with the African Union's mission were killed by an unidentified group of men. The financially strapped African Union force of 7,000 troops has been unable to quell the violence in Darfur. Khartoum has resisted international pressure to send in a robust, well-equipped U.N. force that would be in place until the other two rebel groups signed the peace agreement. The United States and Britain have introduced a draft resolution to the Security Council, recommending 17,000 soldiers and 3,000 police be sent to Darfur when the African Union's mandate expires in September. The Security Council said Thursday it will meet Monday to discuss Darfur. El-Bashir has called for the session be postponed, according to the United Nations. Khartoum also has refused an invitation to send an envoy to the United Nations to discuss U.N. intervention. Frazer said she hopes the council will muster enough political will to pass the resolution by the end of the month. She said it would be possible to "re-hat" about 5,200 of the African Union forces under a U.N. command before October 1. El-Bashir has offered to send 10,000 of his own troops to stem the violence, an action Frazer labeled an "offensive." "We've done that before," she said. "It led to 2 million people displaced, 200,000 people killed." "The government of Sudan should see that this is a failed strategy," she said.

## Counterplan Solves Better Than Satellites

### Knowledge gathering is the wrong focus – action is key

UNITAR 7 [United Nations Institute for Training and Research, New York, Seminar Report, “UNITAR Peace and Security Series: Preventing Genocide,” http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Summary\_Report\_with\_contacts.pdf]

It was suggested that desk officers in DPA’s regional divisions should have good knowledge of the countries that they monitor, as well as the means to travel and engage with people directly. They should also be tasked with doing regular risk assessments.

Initiatives at the regional and sub-regional level provide good examples in this regard. The OSCE High Commissioner for the Protection of National Minorities links information gathering, analysis and pro-active engagement with the potential conflict parties during visits and direct talks in the country in crisis. Another good practice is the CEWARN early warning system established by the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), an organization of seven countries at the Horn of Africa. Thanks to its multi- stakeholder approach, relying on field representatives and local committees, and the engagement of civil society organizations and academic institutions in the information gathering, analysis and formulation of response options, the mechanism contributes to confidence-building between governments, civil society and local actors. This bottom-up approach is likely to produce more field-appropriate responses and provides authorities with greater legitimacy to take action. However, while the system has developed a solid understanding of sub-regional conflict patterns, including correlations with natural disasters, which allows governments to intervene proactively, Ambassador Abdelrahim Khalid, who spoke on behalf of CEWARN, mentioned that the response capacity of the system is still underdeveloped.

The quest for better analysis should not supplant or prevent the passage to action. A lot is already known about causes of conflict and also about solutions. We do not need perfect knowledge to act. Action requires a comparison of risks and calculation of the chances for success. It also requires a great deal of judgment. Sending up information that hints at genocide is not an easy task in most administrations, including the UN, because of the enormous responsibility involved.