\*\*\*\*GIFT K/TURN\*\*\*\*

Gifts are intrinsically linked to their giver and create a system of exchange based on an implicit expectation of reciprocity

R. L. Stirrat, an anthropologist who teaches at the University of Sussex, and Heiko Henkel studied history in Hamburg and [anthropology](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcfba9797652cee8146a6e6e1a9537fc&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzk-zSkAW&_md5=cdb814f025a380ae15e750654fbad657) in Copenhagen and Sussex, currently working on the anthropology of development, especially on genealogies of the concept of participation in Western development discourse, November 1997, “THE ROLE OF NGOs: CHARITY AND EMPOWERMENT: The Development Gift: The Problem of Reciprocity in the NGO World”, 554 Annals 66, http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?\_m=fcfba9797652cee8146a6e6e1a9537fc&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&\_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&\_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzk-zSkAW&\_md5=cdb814f025a380ae15e750654fbad657

Any anthropological discussion of the role of the gift inevitably leads one back to Marcel Mauss and his work, *Essai sur le don*, first published in 1924. **[8](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcfba9797652cee8146a6e6e1a9537fc&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzk-zSkAW&_md5=cdb814f025a380ae15e750654fbad657" \l "n8" \t "_self)** Mauss was primarily concerned with the nature of the gift (or prestations, as he labeled them) in "archaic" or "primitive" societies. Referring to a wide range of ethnographic and historical material, Mauss argued that gift giving has to be seen in the context of systems of exchange that involve obligations to give, to receive, and to repay. The potlatch is perhaps the best known and most powerful example of Mauss's analysis of the gift. By giving away, ostensibly without any expectation of return, or even by destroying large amounts of highly valuable objects, North American chiefs (as representatives of wider social groups) accumulated symbolic capital. Mauss pointed out that there was no direct or immediate reciprocity involving material goods but, rather, that to counter the accumulated symbolic capital of the giver, other chiefs and clans had to give away or destroy even more valuable goods at the next potlatch. In other examples, Mauss reinterpreted the Malinowskian reading of gift giving in Melanesia. Whereas Malinowski saw *kula* exchange as an essentially dyadic relationship involving the exchange of symbolically equivalent goods, Mauss again focused on the social dimension of exchange and showed that there was a chain of giving that went far beyond  **[\*71]**  the two persons immediately involved. Furthermore, he argued that what was being given was never totally divorced from the giver and thus what was being given symbolically (or spiritually) linked everyone involved in the processes of exchange. To make this point, Mauss quoted a Maori informant:Let us suppose that you possess a certain article (*taonga*) and that you give me this article. You give it to me without setting a price on it. We strike no bargain about it. Now, I give this article to a third person who, after a certain lapse of time, decides to give me something as a payment in return. He makes a present to me of something (*taonga*). Now, this (*taonga*) that he gives me is the spirit (*hau*) of the (*taonga*) that I received from you and that I had given to him. The (*taonga*) that I received for these (*taonga*) (which came from you) must be returned to you. It would not be fair on my part to keep these (*taonga*) for myself, whether they were desirable or undesirable. I must give them to you because they are a *hau* of the (*taonga*) that you gave me. **[9](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcfba9797652cee8146a6e6e1a9537fc&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzk-zSkAW&_md5=cdb814f025a380ae15e750654fbad657" \l "n9" \t "_self)** More generally, Mauss argued that in archaic societies there was an obligation to give, to receive, and to repay and that even when gifts were given without thought of return, as in the potlatch, there was an implicit expectation of reciprocity. Gifts were part of "systems of total services," **[10](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcfba9797652cee8146a6e6e1a9537fc&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzk-zSkAW&_md5=cdb814f025a380ae15e750654fbad657" \l "n10" \t "_self)** as they embodied a wide range of meanings and thus had to be seen as religious, economic, political, and social all at once, both creating and transforming social relations. Within such a context, he argued that primitive exchange was both "interested" and "disinterested." **[11](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcfba9797652cee8146a6e6e1a9537fc&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzk-zSkAW&_md5=cdb814f025a380ae15e750654fbad657" \l "n11" \t "_self)**

Gifts only reaffirm the system of differences between the giver and the receiver—the act of giving relies on the inferiority of the poor, the starving, and the powerless

R. L. Stirrat, an anthropologist who teaches at the University of Sussex, and Heiko Henkel studied history in Hamburg and [anthropology](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcfba9797652cee8146a6e6e1a9537fc&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzk-zSkAW&_md5=cdb814f025a380ae15e750654fbad657) in Copenhagen and Sussex, currently working on the anthropology of development, especially on genealogies of the concept of participation in Western development discourse, November 1997, “THE ROLE OF NGOs: CHARITY AND EMPOWERMENT: The Development Gift: The Problem of Reciprocity in the NGO World”, 554 Annals 66, http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?\_m=fcfba9797652cee8146a6e6e1a9537fc&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&\_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&\_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzk-zSkAW&\_md5=cdb814f025a380ae15e750654fbad657

Yet it is difficult to argue that relationships founded on and materialized through gifts can lead to a denial of difference. Admittedly, the giver may feel a certain sense of identity with the ultimate receiver, but it is doubtful if that feeling is reciprocated, and the evidence on the experience of partnerships would appear to support such doubt. Gifts, like charity, do not lead easily to identification but, rather, to a reaffirmation of difference. The logic of the journey of the development gift is of a set of relationships between different entities, the relationships in part defining those entities and at the same time being defined by them. Furthermore, there is a very pragmatic sense in which difference is essential if the flow of gifts is to continue. The poor, the starving, the powerless are essential if the giving is to continue. Thus while, on the one hand, altruism and the pure gift to the development NGO may be founded on universalistic ideals about the unity of humanity, on the other, it is motivated and maintained by a recognition of difference. In the end, this could be seen as no more than a recognition that the surplus that is available for the giving of gifts is the product of precisely the same system of production, exchange, and distribution that produces the poor who receive these gifts.

The plan’s attempt at compensation or repayment creates an asymmetrical system of exchange and accountability

R. L. Stirrat, an anthropologist who teaches at the University of Sussex, and Heiko Henkel studied history in Hamburg and [anthropology](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcfba9797652cee8146a6e6e1a9537fc&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzk-zSkAW&_md5=cdb814f025a380ae15e750654fbad657) in Copenhagen and Sussex, currently working on the anthropology of development, especially on genealogies of the concept of participation in Western development discourse, November 1997, “THE ROLE OF NGOs: CHARITY AND EMPOWERMENT: The Development Gift: The Problem of Reciprocity in the NGO World”, 554 Annals 66, http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?\_m=fcfba9797652cee8146a6e6e1a9537fc&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&\_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&\_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzk-zSkAW&\_md5=cdb814f025a380ae15e750654fbad657

There are various ways in which the implications of this asymmetry are dealt with. From the point of view of the receivers, the nature of the gift can be radically reinterpreted. Thus some argue that today's gifts are simply repayments for past exploitation, a sort of delayed compensation. Others present it in more pragmatic terms: that these transfers are not gifts but payment for work performed--in other words, contracts. Indeed, there is a continual effort to reinterpret transfers in such a way that the asymmetry of the situation is denied or at least neutralized. Yet, for all that both parties may wish to deny it, there is an indissolubly asymmetrical relationship between the partners. At the most basic level, the donating NGOs choose their partners and are unlikely to choose partners whose aims do not approximate their own. In practice, the agenda is set by the donors, not the receivers, and the receivers are accountable to the donors for the assistance they receive. For all the rhetoric of "transparency" and "shared decision making," donors continue to exercise power, and not just in the last resort. [20](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=fcfba9797652cee8146a6e6e1a9537fc&csvc=le&cform=byCitation&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVzk-zSkAW&_md5=cdb814f025a380ae15e750654fbad657" \l "n20" \t "_self) Partnership thus embodies the most ambiguous point in the chain of relationships between donor and receiver. Such ambiguity is, in a sense, inherent in the whole process of exchange, for here the contradictory elements become most apparent: what starts off as a free, disinterested gift becomes part of a system of interested exchange.

Giving legitimizes hierarchies and often justifies the use of violence

Maurice Godelier, one of the most influential names in French [anthropology](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anthropology), Directeur d'études at the [École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89cole_des_Hautes_%C3%89tudes_en_Sciences_Sociales), 1999, “The Enigma of the Gift”, p. 12-3, accessed through googlebooks

The act of giving seems to create simultaneously a twofold rela- tionship between giver and receiver. A relationship of solidarity because the giver shares what he has, or what he is, with the receiver; and a relationship of superiority because the one who receives the gift and accepts it places himself in the debt of the one who has given it, thereby becoming indebted to the giver and to a certain extent becoming his “dependant,” at least for as long as he has not “given back” what he was given. Giving thus seems to establish a difference and an inequality of status between donor and recipient, which can in certain instances become a hierarchy: if this hierarchy already exists, then the gift expresses and legitimizes it. Two opposite movements are thus con- tained in a single act. The gift decreases the distance between the protagonists because it is a form of sharing, and it increases the social distance between them because one is now indebted to the other. It is easy to see the formidable array of maneuvers and strat- egies virtually contained in the practice of gift-giving, and the gamut of contradictory interests that can be served. By its very nature, gift- giving is an ambivalent practice which brings together or is capable of bringing together opposing emotions and forces. It can be, simultaneously or successively, an act of generosity or of violence; in the latter case, however, the violence is disguised as a disinterested gesture, since it is committed by means of and in the form of sharing. The giving of gifts may ward off direct violence or physical, mate- rial, and social subordination, but it may also stand in their stead. And there are countless examples of societies where individuals unable to repay their debts are forced to sell themselves or their chil- dren into slavery, ending up as the property, the “possession” of those who had bestowed gifts on them. From this it is clear that, of the two components (sharing and debt), of the two movements con- tained and combined in gift-giving, it is the second (the distancing) which probably has the greater impact on social life when it is orga- nized around various forms of competition for access to wealth, power, knowledge, or ritual. ,

It is also clear that the very duality and ambivalence involved in gift-giving create the ideal conditions for it to ﬂourish in societies which operate primarily on the principle of the production and maintenance of personal relationships between the individuals and groups that comprise the society: relations of kinship, production, power, and so forth. From the standpoint of comparative sociology, these conditions can be expected to prevail in societies without castes, ranked classes, or a state to govem them. In such societies, gifts are exchanged between protagonists who enjoyed a potentially or genuinely equivalent social rank before the gift. And that is precisely what we assumed in the “textbook case” we have just analyzed. Alternatively, in societies based on rank, caste, or class, gift- giving, while widespread, necessarily takes on different forms and meanings, depending on whether it is practiced between persons of equivalent rank or condition (which brings us back to the preceding example) or between persons of radically different status. In the latter case, gifts have a different meaning according to whether the giver is of inferior rank to the receiver or vice versa. Here I would like to note a point to which I will return later: giving to a superior does not necessarily imply that the recipient is a human being. In all societies - whether or not they are divided into ranks, castes, or classes - humans make gifts to beings they regard as their superiors: divinities, nature spirits, spirits of the dead. People pray to them, make offerings, and sometimes even “sacriﬁce” possessions, or a life. This is the famous “fourth obligation” that constitutes gift- exchange, which Mauss mentioned without going into further detail and which was generally forgotten in subsequent discussions. And yet it is the articulation between his “Essai sur le don” (1925) and his “Essai sur la nature et la fonction du sacriﬁce” (1899), written and published in collaboration with Henri Hubert. Having made these remarks, I will now argue that, in analyzing a gift, what- ever it may be, one needs to consider the relationship that existed between the giver and the receiver before the former made a gift to the latter.

Giving is symbolic domination and naturalizes the inequality between the donor and recipient

 Tomohisa Hattori, Department of Political Science, Lehman College, 2001, Reconceptualizing Foreign Aid Review of International Political Economy, 8:4, 633-660

 Giving is an especially effective practice of symbolic domination in Bourdieu’s view because it involves the allocation of material goods that are in many cases needed or desired by recipients. In extending a gift, a donor transforms his or her status in the relationship from the dominant to the generous. In accepting such a gift (i.e. one that cannot be reciprocated), a recipient acquiesces in the social order that produced it: in other words, he or she becomes grateful (1990: 98–111). It is this active complicity on the part of the recipient that gives the practice of unreciprocated giving its social power. Clarifying Sahlins’s observation above, what begins as a simple euphemization of a social hierarchy can become an active misrecognition over time, eventually naturalizing the material inequality between donor and recipient as the normal order of things.

\*\*\*\*MORALITY\*\*\*\*

MORALITY GOOD

Morality claims are inevitable and impossible to abolish

Garner 7 (Richard Garner, PhD, 22 August 2007, Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2007) 10:499–513 “Abolishing Morality,” acc via summon/springer //nimo)

The call to abolish morality is rarely heard, but often rejected, which is not surprising because, on the face of it, abolishing morality seems like a horrible idea, one that would lead to massive suffering and disaster. But would it? Or is it possible that, as a few “abolitionists” have argued, morality is responsible for more suffering than it prevents? Difficult as it was, and remains, to abolish slavery, hunger, and torture, abolishing morality would be more difficult still. We can’t legislate it out of existence, eliminate its cause, or condemn morality as itself immoral. Morality is embedded in our language and in our vision of ourselves and our place in the world in a way that, we must hope, slavery, hunger, and torture are not. There is nothing that morality may not touch, and no side of any dispute that it cannot be called upon to support. But apart from its familiarity and its apparent usefulness, the main reason why most people would reject the call to stop speaking and acting as if there are moral truths about what is good, bad, right and wrong is that they believe that there are such truths. To convince someone to abolish or abandon morality, you must first get them to stop believing in moral properties, facts, and truths. You must get them to become moral anti-realists, but, as we shall see, even that is not enough.

Discourse ethics and universal morals are intertwined with human rights and democracy

Apel 7 (Prof. Dr. Karl-Otto Apel is Professor Emeritus at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany, and one of Europe’s leading moral and social theorists, January 2007, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 66, No. 1, “Discourse Ethics, Democracy, and International Law,” acc via summon //nimo)

IN THE PRECEDING SECTION, I have suggested that the legislative func- tion of democracy is internally related to the foundation of positive law and that this internal relation can itself be grounded by the transcendental-pragmatic foundation of discourse ethics, namely, by recourse to the rational process of legitimating norms by building consensus within an ideal discourse community. Just such a process provides validity for these norms. But more importantly, this rational process is already presupposed by anyone who is engaged in serious argumentation. Further, the fact that there is some internal connection between democracy and discourse ethics is widely rec- ognized in our day. In many cases this acknowledgment even seems to make it easier, especially for Anglo-American philosophers, to understand discourse ethics, since it apparently helps them to ignore or overlook the transcendental-pragmatic foundation of discourse ethics.11 But in my view, it is precisely this situation, in which the transcendental-pragmatic foundation is ignored, that constitutes a crucial problem for any clear understanding of the internal relation- ship between democracy and law. This problem becomes apparent when anyone tries to understand the validity-claim and function of human rights—i.e., the claim that while specific norms are created for an individual community, they must also function according to a universalized agreement on basic human rights in order to be valid—only on the precondition of this internal connection between positive law and democracy. Let me elucidate this problem by refor- mulating it as a question.

Universal morals is a cornerstone of democracy

Apel 7 (Prof. Dr. Karl-Otto Apel is Professor Emeritus at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt, Germany, and one of Europe’s leading moral and social theorists, January 2007, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 66, No. 1, “Discourse Ethics, Democracy, and International Law,” acc via summon //nimo)

Thus it turns out, I suggest, that the internal relationship between universal law (including human rights) and democracy, although it is not one of identity (as I have tried to show in the preceding case against Habermas), is indeed strong enough to exclude all known alternatives. It is interesting to see that Rawls, in his later account in the book The Law of Peoples, eventually must confirm this. For he admits in some places that “respectable hierarchical peoples” are not “completely just,”35 and that by tolerating them “within the limits of certain conditions, we could hope, in the long run, to open up for these peoples a development towards the status of ‘liberal democracies.’ ”36

MORALITY BAD

All global crises are caused by singular moralites – a common moral currency solves

Greene 2 (Joshua David Greene, John and Ruth Hazel Associate Professor of the Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, 11/2002, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, “The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It, A Dissertation Presented To The Faculty Of Princeton University In Candidacy For The Degree Of Doctor Of Philosophy,” http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/Greene-Dissertation.pdf //nimo)

What are the biggest problems we humans face? The list of overlapping topics looks something like this: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the destruction of the environment, ethnopolitical conflict, terrorism, overpopulation, infectious disease, hunger, and malnutrition. What these problems have in common is that they are preventable by, if not directly caused by, human choice. Solving these problems requires compromise, but these compromises have, for the most part, yet to be made. Why? Is it just selfishness? Do people simply not care? That may be the case for some, but I’m convinced that most people and most leaders care about the future of the world and believe they are doing what is right. The problem, of course, is that everyone has a different conception of what is right, of what is required of themselves and of others. When different people’s respective visions for the future fail to dovetail, well-meaning people throw up their hands and say, “What can I do? They leave me no choice.” The looming problems named above are all variations on Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, and the problem that is the subject of this essay, the problem of transcending common sense morality, is the mother of all commons problems. Once again, commons problems have two kinds of solutions: political and moral. Since World War I, globally minded people have dreamed of a political solution to the world’s most pressing problems in the form of a world government. Perhaps a single coalition will take over the world by force and from its position of unprecedented power impose upon humanity some much-needed discipline. This is unlikely to happen, and were the world to be united by force the cure would probably be as bad as the disease. More likely, the nations of the world will have to choose to surrender their powers voluntarily. And that means that the favored political solution to our global woes is ultimately a moral solution, one that must be enacted voluntarily. Could that happen? Not as long as the people of the world lack a common framework for resolving differences across ideological divides. High minded words such as “rights,” “freedom,” and “justice” are not enough because these words mean different things to different people. We need a common currency for moral exchange, a mutually agreeable system that can resolve moral questions rather than begging them. But we will never have such a system so long as people hold fast to their moral intuitions, taking them to be messengers of moral truth. We must understand where our intuitions come from and why they vary so widely. Once again, we are saddled with a Stone Age moral psychology that is appropriate to life in small, homogeneous communities in which all members share roughly the same moral outlook. Our minds trick us into thinking that we are absolutely right and that they are absolutely wrong because, once upon a time, this was a useful way to think. It is no more, though it remains natural as ever. We love our respective moral senses. They are as much a part of us as anything. But if we are to live together in the world we have created for ourselves, so unlike the one in which our ancestors evolved, we must know when to trust our moral senses and when to ignore them.

Moral focus precludes the possibility of cooperation and makes conflicts worse

Greene 2 (Joshua David Greene, John and Ruth Hazel Associate Professor of the Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, 11/2002, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, “The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It, A Dissertation Presented To The Faculty Of Princeton University In Candidacy For The Degree Of Doctor Of Philosophy,” http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/Greene-Dissertation.pdf //nimo)

In this essay I argue that ordinary moral thought and language is, while very natural, highly counterproductive and that as a result we would be wise to change the way we think and talk about moral matters. First, I argue on metaphysical grounds against moral realism, the view according to which there are first order moral truths. Second, I draw on principles of moral psychology, cognitive science, and evolutionary theory to explain why moral realism appears to be true even though it is not. I then argue, based on the picture of moral psychology developed herein, that realist moral language and thought promotes misunderstanding and exacerbates conflict. I consider a number of standard views concerning the practical implications of moral anti-realism and reject them. I then sketch and defend a set of alternative revisionist proposals for improving moral discourse, chief among them the elimination of realist moral language, especially deontological language, and the promotion of an anti-realist utilitarian framework for discussing moral issues of public concern. I emphasize the importance of revising our moral practices, suggesting that our entrenched modes of moral thought may be responsible for our failure to solve a number of global social problems.

Singular morality is outdated – prevents us from working together to solve multiple extinction scenarios

Greene 2 (Joshua David Greene, John and Ruth Hazel Associate Professor of the Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, 11/2002, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, “The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It, A Dissertation Presented To The Faculty Of Princeton University In Candidacy For The Degree Of Doctor Of Philosophy,” http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/Greene-Dissertation.pdf //nimo)

This essay is an attack on common sense—moral common sense, in particular. Mounting evidence suggests that our sense2 of right and wrong is a finely honed product of natural selection (Wright, 1994). We think about moral matters as we do in large part because our kind of moral thinking, in the heads of our prehistoric ancestors, enabled them to reproduce more effectively than their competitors, leaving us, their descendants, to inherit their world. But the world they left us is radically different from the world we now inhabit, and, as a result, what was biologically advantageous for them may prove disastrous for us. At the risk of being overly dramatic, I propose that the fate of humankind will turn on our ability, or inability, to transcend the common sense morality we inherited from our ancestors. The great global problems of our time—the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the disruption of the environment, etc.—can only be solved through cooperation and compromise among people with radically different moral outlooks. And this, I believe, is unlikely to happen so long as the people of the world hold fast to their respective versions of moral common sense.

Morality claims makes decisions impossible and mobilizes violence

Garner 7 (Richard Garner, PhD, 22 August 2007, Ethic Theory Moral Prac (2007) 10:499–513 “Abolishing Morality,” acc via summon/springer //nimo)

Morality inflames disputes because moralizing an issue tends to excite and confuse the parties involved. If we hope to resolve conflicts by arriving at a compromise, our task will be easier if moral disagreements are seen as partial conflicts of interest “without the embroidery of rights and moral justification.” (Mackie 1980, p. 154) The controversy over abortion would not be nearly as intractable as it has become if the fiction of moral rights had not been appropriated by both sides. If the issue is not moralized, Roe v. Wade looks like a sensible compromise between two extreme positions, but when the right to life is set against the right to choose, neither side can yield without violating morality. A human embryo is what it is, but someone who insists on describing it with morally loaded terms like ‘person’ or ‘innocent human baby’ leaves no room for compromise over issues like abortion or embryonic stem cell research. How can anyone compromise with someone they see as wanting to murder babies? Not only does the moral overlay inflame disputes and make compromise difficult, the lack of an actual truth of the matter opens the game to everyone. Every possible moral value and argument can be met by an equal and opposing value or argument. The moral overlay adds an entire level of controversy to any dispute, and it introduces unanswerable questions that usurp the original question, which is always some practical question about what to do or support. This “moral turn” guarantees that the participants will be distracted from the real issue, and that the disagreement will flounder in rhetoric, confusion, or metaethics. The dangers of the moral overlay are far worse than Mackie thought. The second problem Mackie found with the moral overlay is that the addition of moral overtones to a practice “will tend to stabilize whatever differential advantages the various parties initially have.” (Mackie 1980, p. 154) Property laws are made by those with property, and when the laws are given a moral defense, so are the inequalities. Then “the moral overtones of the duty of allegiance, with the associated concepts of loyalty, patriotism, and the like” can be used to condemn reformers as traitors and critics as criminals, and to facilitate the misuse of power. (Mackie 1980, p. 155) In fairness to the moralist and the moral fictionalist, it should be admitted, as Mackie did, that moral principles can also be called upon to protect us from the abuse of the powerful. But these principles only protect us if those with the power to abuse us accept the idea of morality and are moved by it. It is likely that they do accept morality and that they are moved by it when it tells them what they want to hear; but it is also likely that they will never accept a moral directive as authentic if it threatens to deprive them of any property or privilege they cherish. Mackie’s third point was that “without morality there might, indeed, be more small-scale fighting; but war as we know it, organized on a national or an international scale, would be impossible.” (Mackie 1980, p. 155) Mackie did not explain why he thought that without morality we would not have global or international wars. Perhaps he was thinking that we need the extra fictional power of morality to mobilize against a nation of strangers, but not against our neighbors, who always give us concrete causes for annoyance. He had no way of knowing that the threat from terrorists with weapons of mass destruction would eclipse the threat of global war at the start of the 21st Century, nor could he have predicted the damage one or a few individuals might bring about in the name of morality. The truth seems to be that morality is invariably called upon to underwrite the actions of both sides of any violent conflict, large, medium, or small, and this does seem to be a reason for thinking that we might be better off without it.

Singular morality is barren and should be rejected – plurality is the only path to true morality

Bauman 98 (Zygmunt Bauman, Professor Emeritus of Sociology at University of Leeds, 1998, The European Journal of Development Research, Volume 10, Issue 2, “On Universal Morality and the Morality of Universalism,” http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09578819808426713#preview //nimo)

Choosing the form of humanity for others is an exercise in power, not morality. But declaring neutrality regarding that form whether it was willingly chosen or surrendered to for the lack of choice, is a symptom of callousness, not the moral stance. It is caring that the others have what is necessary to make their choices freely which lies at the very heart of morality. Plurality is the starting point and the end point of moral engagement with the Other. Thanks to plurality, partners may confront each other as moral subjects and so enter a dialogue in which their common presence in the world they share can be negotiated without putting the rights of any one of them in jeopardy. But contrary to Jürgen Habermas, the purpose, the horizon of that negotiation is not a consensus which would put an end to that plurality which prompted the moral engagement in the first place, but making the plurality of human ways more secure and so preserving and reproducing the conditions of the dialogue, the conditions of morality. Yet (and this is why Habermas’s protestations against ‘distorted communication‘ must be carefully heeded) moral engagement would be barren, were it conﬁned to dialogue without making sure that the participants of the dialogue are indeed free to choose the form of life which sets them apart from the others. In the present world we are far from having made sure that freedom is the property of all; and the deepening polarisation of access to the means needed to exercise freedom of choice and of the rights to mobility shows that we are not coming closer to that situation. In the world which has no other resource to rely on in its struggle to improve on its own morality except the moral responsibility of free agents, the active promotion of the universality of free self-assertion is the crucial and the most urgent of moral precepts.

Morality claims preclude conflict resolution

Greene 2 (Joshua David Greene, John and Ruth Hazel Associate Professor of the Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, 11/2002, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, “The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It, A Dissertation Presented To The Faculty Of Princeton University In Candidacy For The Degree Of Doctor Of Philosophy,” http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/Greene-Dissertation.pdf //nimo)

And what is so terrible about thinking that some actions are objectively wrong? Isn’t it good that we take torturing animals to be objectively wrong? I agree with common sense moralists that in this case, and others like it, the attribution of objective wrongness is harmless. However, a general tendency to think in terms of objective right and wrong is, I believe, quite problematic for two reasons. First, and less important, it’s simply mistaken. Contrary to common sense, moral realism is false. In Chapter 2 I will attempt to explain why it’s false, and in Chapter 3 I will draw on recent work in moral psychology to explain why it nevertheless strikes most people as true. Second, and more important, I propose that moral realism makes it difficult for people with different values to get along with one another because people who have practical disagreements are less willing to compromise if each of them thinks she has the Moral Truth on her side. In Chapter 4 I will explain in more detail how moral realism, given the nature of moral psychology and the present state of the world, gets us into trouble. I will then advance my proposal for avoiding this trouble, a view I call revisionism, by which I advocate the elimination of moral realism from our moral thought and language. Finally, In Chapter 5 I will explore some of the practical implications and intricacies of revisionism, including its implications for moral philosophy, moral discourse, and the resolution of moral conflicts great and small.

\*\*\*\*UTIL\*\*\*\*

UTIL GOOD

Utilitarianism is the only way to frame decisions including multiple moralities – singular moralities are counterproductive

Greene 2 (Joshua David Greene, John and Ruth Hazel Associate Professor of the Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, 11/2002, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, “The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It, A Dissertation Presented To The Faculty Of Princeton University In Candidacy For The Degree Of Doctor Of Philosophy,” http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/Greene-Dissertation.pdf //nimo)

The evolutionary perspective makes one curious about and receptive to information concerning moral psychology. The projectivist account of realist psychology and phenomenology helps clear away lingering realist doubts, and the social intuitionist account of moral development explains why moral disagreement is so frustrating and recalcitrant. Further reflection on the nature of moral psychology and its likely effects in our present context suggest that moral1 language and thought are not only unnecessary but counterproductive, and thus getting rid of them starts to seem like an appealing idea. At the same time, an understanding of moral intuition and the rejection of moral realism make deontological line-drawing seem artificial and make consequentialism more appealing by default. The suggestion that utilitarian concerns are recognized as legitimate across moral divides and that therefore utilitarianism is a shareable moral framework furthers its appeal.

Even if utilitarianism is flawed, it’s the best way to evaluate policy decisions

Greene 2 (Joshua David Greene, John and Ruth Hazel Associate Professor of the Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, 11/2002, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, “The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It, A Dissertation Presented To The Faculty Of Princeton University In Candidacy For The Degree Of Doctor Of Philosophy,” http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/Greene-Dissertation.pdf //nimo)

With some trepidation, and like many who have come before me,27 I will defend a utilitarian approach to morality, but in a non-standard way.28 I do not claim that utilitarianism is true or correct. Nor do I claim that it is somehow built into or presupposed by our moral concepts or language (Hare, 1981). (In other words I reject both the realist-cognitivist and expressivist versions of utilitarianism.) Nor do I recommend a utilitarian approach to every domain of moral life. Instead, I modestly recommend utilitarianism as a public standard29 for evaluating actions and policies, as a meta-policy that is likely to meet the needs of people who have come to terms with the metaphysical, psychological, sociological, and evolutionary truth about morality. Utilitarianism, I claim, follows not logically from the truth about morality, but psychologically. It’s what you’re likely to want once you know the truth.30 This, of course, is an empirical claim, but given the dearth of psychologically and metaphysically informed moral thinkers to serve as subjects, my speculations will have to suffice for now. In the last section I explained why deontological talk is likely to fail in a psychologically informed, anti-realist environment. Once we’ve put some distance between ourselves and our intuitions, once we know where our intuitions come from and understand that they are not messengers of moral truth, drawing deontological moral lines and expecting others whose inclinations are otherwise to respect those lines just seems silly. And with deontology and the realism it reflects discredited, the utilitarian approach is, I claim, simply what’s left. Nearly everyone is a utilitarian to some extent. Nearly everyone agrees that all other things being equal raising someone’s level of happiness, either your own or someone else’s, is a good thing, and that lowering someone’s happiness is a bad thing.31 More specifically, utilitarian harms and benefits matter to everyone, and in the same general way, thus making them a badly needed common currency for moral exchange. As noted above, pro-choice liberals can acknowledge that restricting abortion rights would have some good effects, just as pro-life conservatives can acknowledge that keeping abortion legal would have some good effects. They may disagree about the balance of these harms and benefits and about what other considerations are important, but when they talk about harms and benefits in terms of human happiness and suffering, they are speaking to and not past each other.32

Utilitarianism is inevitable regardless of attempts to reject it

Greene 2 (Joshua David Greene, John and Ruth Hazel Associate Professor of the Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, 11/2002, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, “The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It, A Dissertation Presented To The Faculty Of Princeton University In Candidacy For The Degree Of Doctor Of Philosophy,” http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/Greene-Dissertation.pdf //nimo)

Some people who talk of balancing rights may think there is an algorithm for deciding which rights take priority over which. If that’s what we mean by “balancing rights,” then we are wise to shun this sort of talk. Attempting to solve moral problems using a complex deontological algorithm is dogmatism at its most esoteric, but dogmatism all the same. However, it’s likely that when some people talk about “balancing competing rights and obligations” they are already thinking like consequentialists in spite of their use of deontological language. Once again, what deontological language does best is express the thoughts of people struck by strong, emotional moral intuitions: “It doesn’t matter that you can save five people by pushing him to his death. To do this would be a violation of his rights!”19 That is why angry protesters say things like, “Animals Have Rights, Too!” rather than, “Animal Testing: The Harms Outweigh the Benefits!” Once again, rights talk captures the apparent clarity of the issue and absoluteness of the answer. But sometimes rights talk persists long after the sense of clarity and absoluteness has faded. One thinks, for example, of the thousands of children whose lives are saved by drugs that were tested on animals and the “rights” of those children. One finds oneself balancing the “rights” on both sides by asking how many rabbit lives one is willing to sacrifice in order to save one human life, and so on, and at the end of the day one’s underlying thought is as thoroughly consequentialist as can be, despite the deontological gloss. And what’s wrong with that? Nothing, except for the fact that the deontological gloss adds nothing and furthers the myth that there really are “rights,” etc. Best to drop it. When deontological talk gets sophisticated, the thought it represents is either dogmatic in an esoteric sort of way or covertly consequentialist.

Utilitarian calculus makes for better decision-making and better society

Labukt 9 (Ivar Labukt, University of Bergen, Norway, 4/3/2009, Politics Philosophy Economics 2009 8: 201, “Rawls on the practicability of utilitarianism,” http://ppe.sagepub.com/content/8/2/201 //nimo)

Of course, the political decision-making processes in western democracies are far from perfect. There is, however, reason to believe that utilitarians would be able to take some further steps towards a harmonious society. They can do so in (at least) two different ways. First, they can simply refrain from discussing certain fundamental and potentially divisive political questions. Utilitarians usually justify the need for a certain permanence in the basic structure of society by the need human beings have for security and predictability, but I see no good reason why they could not also justify tentatively removing certain questions from the political agenda by the need for efficient and non-disruptive decision- making. As Rawls points out (in a slightly different context), it is a good idea to ‘simplify political and social questions so that the resulting balance of justice, made possible by the greater consensus, outweighs what might have been lost by ignoring certain potentially relevant aspects of moral situations’.21 Now (lest John Stuart Mill should start turning in his grave) I do not mean to suggest that it should be made illegal to discuss certain issues or proposals in public. All I am saying is that a good utilitarian would consider the effect his political actions have on politics itself. Perhaps he thinks that the benefits of some drastic change in the basic structure of society, such as the introduction of a completely new tax system, would marginally outweigh the costs of diminished predictability and feeling of security. It would still not be a good idea to start a campaign for this cause if it can only be successful through a bitter political struggle that leads to fragmentation, suspicion, and hostility. Major political changes should only be actively promoted if they have the potential to win fairly general support or if the benefits that would result from them are so substantial that they outweigh the incurred political costs. A second way of reducing the level of political tension is to adopt rules for how public arguments are to be formulated and defended. In fact, Rawls insists that such ‘guidelines of inquiry’ constitute an essential part of his ideal of public reason.22 The people in the original position are, therefore, asked to agree not only on basic principles of justice, but also on ‘the principles of reasoning and the rules of evidence in the light of which citizens are to decide whether the princi- ples of justice apply, when and how far they are satisfied, and which laws and policies best fulfil them in existing social conditions’.23 There is, of course, a limit to how helpful and informative general principles of this kind can be, but they should at least be able to exclude the most obviously speculative or self- serving utilitarian arguments.

Utilitarianism wouldn't be oppressive or exploitive – their claim is based on fallacious theoretical models

Labukt 9 (Ivar Labukt, University of Bergen, Norway, 4/3/2009, Politics Philosophy Economics 2009 8: 201, “Rawls on the practicability of utilitarianism,” http://ppe.sagepub.com/content/8/2/201 //nimo)

The most obvious problem with Rawls’s criticism is that he never tries to demonstrate that there is a significant probability that the sequence of events he describes would actually occur. Clearly, systematically exploiting, oppressing, or neglecting certain minorities in order to promote the general welfare is a theo- retical possibility for a utilitarian. (Just about anything is a theoretical possibility for a utilitarian.) This might be relevant for an assessment of the moral implica- tions of utilitarianism, but when it comes to the question of whether it would work in real life, a critic must obviously point to real possibilities and not just theoretical ones. So how likely is it that following the principle of utility would lead to the kind of scenarios Rawls describes? Certainly, the picture of a utilitarian society he draws (or rather suggests) is quite different from the one utilitarians themselves have envisaged. All the great classical utilitarians have considered the provision of basic rights and liberties the cornerstone of a happy society.36 More recently, Richard B. Brandt has used the diminishing marginal utility of money to argue for principles for the distribution of economic goods that are just as egalitarian as Rawls’s difference principle.37 Generally speaking, being exploited or sup- pressed has a major negative impact on people’s level of well-being, while exploiting or suppressing others is at best simply a convenience. Rawls himself thinks that sustaining a way of organizing society through ‘the oppressive use of state powers’ not only brings immediate suffering to the oppressed, but also ‘offi- cial crimes and . . . inevitable brutality and cruelty, followed by the corruption of religion, philosophy and science’.38 If this is right, and to some extent it certainly is, then how could extensive suppression of the population ever be a sensible utilitarian policy?39

All ethics require utilitarian thinking

Buckle 5 (Dr Stephen Buckle, Senior Lecturer, Philosophy, Plunkett Centre for Ethics, School of Philosophy, Australian Catholic University, 2005, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics (2005) 26: 175–194, “PETER SINGER’S ARGUMENT FOR UTILITARIANISM,” via summon //nimo)

Plainly, this is a form of utilitarianism – it is, in fact, preference utilitarianism – so Singer concludes that the onus of proof falls on those who wish to go ‘beyond’ utilitarianism. The utilitarian view ‘is a minimal one, a first base that we reach by universalizing self-inter- ested decision-making’. Therefore, ‘we cannot, if we are to think ethically, refuse to take this step’.15 The basic sequence of the argu- ment is thus as follows: we begin with a natural attitude of self- interest; we universalize across all the individual self-interests in a population, thereby extending our narrow regard for our own interests into an equal regard for the interests of all. Our natural desire to get what we desire is thus transformed into the desire to bring about (as much as possible of) what everyone desires – what- ever they happen to desire, since all desires are equal. This is utili- tarianism – specifically, preference utilitarianism – and so ‘the utilitarian position is a minimal one, a first base’ for ethical thinking. Universalizing is necessary for ethics, and universalizing brings us to preference-utilitarianism. So it is a position that must be arrived at, and also a position deviations from which must be justified.16 Singer’s view can be summed up, then, by describing utilitarianism as the ‘default setting’ of ethical thinking.

Util is morally sound – their morals are just as suspect

Labukt 9 (Ivar Labukt, University of Bergen, Norway, 4/3/2009, Politics Philosophy Economics 2009 8: 201, “Rawls on the practicability of utilitarianism,” http://ppe.sagepub.com/content/8/2/201 //nimo)

However, I cannot see any reason for believing that utilitarianism should be more vulnerable to the threat of amoralism than other political doctrines. Rawls thinks that a sense of justice ultimately arises ‘from the manifest intention of other persons to act for our good’, and promotion of well-being is, after all, the very idea behind utilitarianism.29 Utilitarians are fond of pointing out that their doctrine can be seen as a natural extension of our sympathy for other people, so that the utilitarian ‘never has to sacrifice himself to an Impersonal Law, but always for some being or beings with whom he has at least some degree of fellow feeling’.30 It is undeniable that the notion of making other sentient creatures happy (or at least less miserable) has great moral appeal.

\*\*A2: Rawls

Rawls’ arguments are false, exaggerated and warrantless

Labukt 9 (Ivar Labukt, University of Bergen, Norway, 4/3/2009, Politics Philosophy Economics 2009 8: 201, “Rawls on the practicability of utilitarianism,” http://ppe.sagepub.com/content/8/2/201 //nimo)

I have attempted to show that Rawls’s objections to the feasibility of utilitarian- ism are either exaggerated or mistaken. Some of my disagreement with Rawls has been mainly empirical; this is the case with the discussions of the extent of disagreement in utilitarian politics (Section 3) and the difference in conducive- ness to well-being between Kantian and utilitarian moral self-respect (Section 5.3). While I think it is reasonably clear that Rawls’s empirical conjectures are not satisfactorily backed by arguments, I do not think it is equally clear that they are wrong. My own claims are to be understood as estimates that may have to be revised when better knowledge is available. However, some of Rawls’s objections against the practicability of utilitarian- ism can, in my opinion, be rebutted by philosophical arguments alone. In fact, this is true of the two objections that Rawls himself seems to find most impor- tant: the accusations that utilitarian society would be troubled by social instabil- ity (Section 4) and loss of non-moral self-respect (Sections 5.1 and 5.2). Or so I have argued, at any rate.

UTIL BAD

Utilitarianism is dehumanizing and logically wrong

Cleveland 2k (Paul A. Cleveland, PhD, is Professor of Business Administration and Economics at Birmingham-Southern College, Fall 200, Journal of Private Enterprise, 16, 1 “Economic Behavior: An Inherent Problem With Utilitarianism,” ProQuest //nimo)

Therefore, any theory of human behavior that is based upon a closed naturalistic view of the world is itself self-referentially absurd when it is pressed to its logical conclusion. Since utility analysis is necessarily attached to such a view, it is doomed because it is essentially dehumanizing and abandons logical and rational thought. As such, this view cannot provide us with the necessary anchor upon which to base our study. For this reason, much of human behavior cannot be explained within the context of the theory. This follows because the very essence of what it means to be human mitigates against such a naturalistic perspective of the universe. This is the case because economic modeling begins by assuming that individuals are utility maximizers. As a result, mathematical analysis requires that individual utility functions be held ﬁxed. The upshot of this assumption is the implicit notion that behavior is determined within the conﬁnes of a mathematical model. If that were true, all human action is purely mechanical rather than the result of thought and reflection. While most economists recognize this limitation, as a practical matter, it is very easy to ignore it in the pursuit of one's research. As a result, it is necessary for economists to take great care in extending our discussions of human behavior to account for the evolution of individual values. In examining this issue, Jennifer Roback Morse notes that human preferences are not ﬁxed and are readily changed. In a lecture she gave on the subject, she argued her case in the following fashion: [A] deterministic view of the human person cannot reckon with the reality of human freedom, the possibility of genuine choice, nor the reality of the personal will. The claim that we can change an economic outcome by altering the constraints depends on the preferences of the person static. With given preferences, we economists can predict how changes in constraints will change outcomes. In effect, we treat the person as a stimulus-response machine. When ordinary people think of "choice" they usually mean more than responding to incentives. They usually mean that a person has made some decision about what to value, about what to consider a cost or beneﬁt about what really gives them satisfaction. And choice of this kind, is exactly what is absent from the economists' model using static preferences (Morse, 1997). She goes on to point out that by trying to subsume all human behavior into the context of utility analysis, economists are actually undermining the very concept of human freedom and choice and are leaving the study worse for wear. She notes that nothing need be sacriﬁced of price theory as long as the clear limitations of its usefulness in describing human action are recognized. Rather, such an acknowledgment would open the door for the consideration of the whole process by which individual preferences are initially formed and how they are reshaped over time, if human beings are free to choose in a legitimate sense of the phrase, then it is clear that individuals really do use their powers of reason and observation to devise and enact plans which aim at reaping the beneﬁts of perceived economic opportunities. It is also clear that this behavior is more than a deterministic response to some outside stimulus. This kind of behavior is missing from utility theory.

Utilitarianism must be rejected – infinitarian paralysis proves all decisions mean nothing

Bostrom 11 (Nick Bostrom, Professor and Faculty of Philosophy, Oxford University, 2011, Analysis and Metaphysics, Vol. 10 (2011): pp. 9-59, “INFINITE ETHICS,” via summon //nimo)

Is the world canonically infinite or not? Recent cosmological evidence suggests that the world is probably infinite.1 Moreover, if the totality of physical existence is indeed infinite, in the kind of way that modern cosmology suggests it is, then it contains an infinite number of galaxies, stars, and planets. If there are an infinite number of planets then there is, with probability one, an infinite number of people.2 Infinitely many of these people are happy, infinitely many are unhappy. Likewise for other local properties that are plausible candidates for having value, pertaining to person-states, lives, or entire societies, ecosystems, or civilizations—there are infinitely many democratic states, and infinitely many that are ruled by despots, etc. It therefore appears likely that the actual world is canonically infinite. We do not know for sure that we live in a canonically infinite world. Contemporary cosmology is in considerable flux, so its conclusions should be regarded as tentative. But it is definitely not reasonable, in light of the evidence we currently possess, to assume that we do not live in a canonically infinite world. And that is sufficient for the predicament to arise. Any ethical theory that fails to cope with this likely empirical contingency must be rejected. We should not accept an ethical theory which, conditional on our current best scientific guesses about the size and nature of the cosmos, implies that it is ethically indifferent whether we cause or prevent another holocaust.3 1.2. Which theories are threatened? Infinitarian paralysis threatens a wide range of popular ethical theories. Consider, to begin with, hedonistic utilitarianism, which in its classical formulation states that you ought to do that which maximizes the total amount of pleasure and minimizes the total amount of pain in the world. If pleasure and pain are already infinite, then all possible actions you could take would be morally on a par according to this criterion, for none of them would make any difference to the total amount of pleasure or pain. Endorsing this form of utilitarianism commits one to the view that, conditional on the world being canonically infinite, ending world hunger and causing a famine are ethically equivalent options. It is not the case that you ought to do one rather than the other. The threat is not limited to hedonistic utilitarianism. Utilitarian theories that have a broader conception of the good—happiness, preference-satisfaction, virtue, beauty- appreciation, or some objective list of ingredients that make for a good life—face the same problem. So, too, does average utilitarianism, mixed total/average utilitarianism, and prioritarian views that place a premium on the well-being of the worst off. In a canonically infinite world, average utility and most weighted utility measures are just as imperturbable by human agency as is the simple sum of utility.

Utilitarian society is unfeasible and would ultimately fail

Labukt 9 (Ivar Labukt, University of Bergen, Norway, 4/3/2009, Politics Philosophy Economics 2009 8: 201, “Rawls on the practicability of utilitarianism,” http://ppe.sagepub.com/content/8/2/201 //nimo)

First, it is conceivable that citizens of a utilitarian society simply will not care about moral principles at all, and only act in ways that promote their own inter- ests. They might accept that utilitarianism gives the correct account of our social duties, but lack the desire to fulfil these duties. Of course, one can try to bring about a convergence between individual and public interests by introducing various rewards and sanctions, but as I mentioned in Section 2 it is highly unlikely that a utilitarian society would be successful without its inhabitants sym- pathizing to some degree with their government and fellow citizens. Rawls puts great emphasis on the need for conceptions of justice to be able to instil a ‘sense of justice’ among citizens – an ability to see what the conception demands and a desire to act accordingly. If it turned out that utilitarianism was not able to do this, that bringing people to understand and accept the principle of utility through socialization and education would be impossible or very difficult, this would clearly constitute a serious problem for the practicability of utilitarianism.

**Extinction doesn’t outweigh everything—the quest for survival shouldn’t be allowed to destroy other** values

**CALLAHAN 1973** (Daniel, institute of Society and Ethics, The Tyranny of Survival, p. 91-3)

The value of survival could not be so readily abused were it not for its evocative power. But abused it has been. In the name of survival, all manner of social and political evils have been committed against the rights of individuals, including the right to life. The purported threat of Communist domination has for over two decades fueled the drive of militarists for ever-larger defense budgets, no matter what the cost to other social needs. During World War II, native Japanese-Americans were herded, without due process of law, to detention camps. This policy was later upheld by the Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States (1944) in the general context that a threat to national security can justify acts otherwise blatantly unjustifiable. The survival of the Aryan race was one of the official legitimations of Nazism. Under the banner of survival, the government of South Africa imposes a ruthless apartheid, heedless of the most elementary human rights. The Vietnamese war has seen one of the greatest of the many absurdities tolerated in the name of survival: the destruction of villages in order to save them. But it is not only in a political setting that survival has been evoked as a final and unarguable value. The main rationale B. F. Skinner offers in Beyond Freedom and Dignity for the controlled and conditioned society is the need for survival. For Jacques Monod, in Chance and Necessity, survival requires that we overthrow almost every known religious, ethical and political system. In genetics, the survival of the gene pool has been put forward as sufficient grounds for a forceful prohibition of bearers of offensive genetic traits from marrying and bearing children. Some have even suggested that we do the cause of survival no good by our misguided medical efforts to find means by which those suffering from such common genetically based diseases as diabetes can live a normal life, and thus procreate even more diabetics. In the field of population and environment, one can do no better than to cite Paul Ehrlich, whose works have shown a high dedication to survival, and in its holy name a willingness to contemplate governmentally enforced abortions and a denial of food to surviving populations of nations which have not enacted population-control policies. For all these reasons it is possible to counterpoise over against the need for survival a "tyranny of survival." There seems to be no imaginable evil which some group is not willing to inflict on another for sake of survival, no rights, liberties or dignities which it is not ready to suppress. It is easy, of course, to recognize the danger when survival is falsely and manipulatively invoked. Dictators never talk about their aggressions, but only about the need to defend the fatherland to save it from destruction at the hands of its enemies. But my point goes deeper than that. It is directed even at a legitimate concern for survival, when that concern is allowed to reach an intensity which would ignore, suppress or destroy other fundamental human rights and values. The potential tyranny survival as value is that it is capable, if not treated sanely, of wiping out all other values. Survival can become an obsession and a disease, provoking a destructive singlemindedness that will stop at nothing. We come here to the fundamental moral dilemma. If, both biologically and psychologically, the need for survival is basic to man, and if survival is the precondition for any and all human achievements, and if no other rights make much sense without the premise of a right to life—then how will it be possible to honor and act upon the need for survival without, in the process, destroying everything in human beings which makes them worthy of survival. To put it more strongly, if the price of survival is human degradation, then there is no moral reason why an effort should be made to ensure that survival. It would be the Pyrrhic victory to end all Pyrrhic victories.

Utilitarianism is morally repugnant

Greene 2 (Joshua David Greene, John and Ruth Hazel Associate Professor of the Social Sciences, Department of Psychology, Harvard University, 11/2002, Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, “The Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Truth About Morality And What To Do About It, A Dissertation Presented To The Faculty Of Princeton University In Candidacy For The Degree Of Doctor Of Philosophy,” http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/~jgreene/GreeneWJH/Greene-Dissertation.pdf //nimo)

To a connoisseur of normative moral theories, nothing says “outmoded and ridiculous” quite like utilitarianism. This view is so widely reviled because it has something for everyone to hate. If you love honesty, you can hate utilitarianism for telling you to lie. If you think that life is sacred, you can hate utilitarianism for telling you to kill the dying, the sick, the unborn, and even the newborn, and on top of that you can hate it for telling you in the same breath that you may not be allowed to eat meat (Singer, 1979). If you think it reasonable to provide a nice life for yourself and your family, you can hate utilitarianism for telling you to give up nearly everything you’ve got to provide for total strangers (Singer, 1972; Unger, 1996), including your own life, should a peculiar monster with a taste for human flesh have a sufficiently strong desire to eat you (Nozick, 1974). If you hate doing awful things to people, you can hate utilitarianism for telling you to kidnap people and steal their organs (Thomson, 1986). If you see the attainment of a high quality of life for all of humanity as a reasonable goal, you can hate utilitarianism for suggesting that a world full people whose lives are barely worth living may be an even better goal (Parfit, 1984). If you love equality, you can hate utilitarianism for making the downtrodden worse off in order to make the well off even better off (Rawls, 1971). If it’s important to you that your experiences be genuine, you can hate utilitarianism for telling you that no matter how good your life is, you would be better off with your brain hooked up to a machine that gives you unnaturally pleasant artificial experiences. No matter what you value most, your values will eventually conflict with the utilitarian’s principle of greatest good and, if he has his way, be crushed by it.26 Utilitarianism is a philosophy that only... well, only a utilitarian could love.

\*\*\*\*Consequentialism\*\*\*

CONSEQUENTIALISM GOOD

**Policy makers must view impacts in a consequentialist framework**

**Harris, 94** (Owen Spring 1994; Editor of National Interest – Journal of International affairs and diplomacy; “Power of Civilizations” Via Questia)

Performance is the test. Asked directly by a Western interviewer, "In principle, do you believe in one standard of human rights and free expression?", Lee immediately answers, "Look, it is not a matter of principle but of practice." This might appear to represent a simple and rather crude pragmatism. But in its context it might also be interpreted as an appreciation of the fundamental point made by Max Weber that, in politics, it is "the ethic of responsibility" rather than "the ethic of absolute ends" that is appropriate. While an individual is free to treat human rights as absolute, to be observed whatever the cost, governments must always weigh consequences and the competing claims of other ends. So once they enter the realm of politics, human rights have to take their place in a hierarchy of interests, including such basic things as national security and the promotion of prosperity. Their place in that hierarchy will vary with circumstances, but no responsible government will ever be able to put them always at the top and treat them as inviolable and over-riding. The cost of implementing and promoting them will always have to be considered.Lee's answer might also be compared to Edmund Burke's conclusions on how England should govern its colonies, as expressed in his Letter to the Sheriffs of the City of Bristol in 1777:|I~t was our duty, in all soberness, to conform our government to the character and circumstances of the several people who composed this mighty and strangely diversified mass. I never was wild enough to conceive that one method would serve for the whole, that the natives of Hindostan and those of Virginia could be ordered in the same manner, or that the Cutchery court and the grand jury of Salem could be regulated on a similar plan. I was persuaded that government was a practical thing made for the happiness of mankind, and not to furnish out a spectacle of uniformity to gratify the schemes of visionary politicians.

**Once an action enters the policy realm we must use a Consequentialist approach, this is necessary to minimize suffering and conflict.**

**Murray in 97,**

(Professor of Political Theory at the University of Edinburgh, [Alastair J. H., *Reconstructing Realism: between Power Politics and Cosmopolitan Ethics*, p. 110]

Weber emphasised that, while the 'absolute ethic of the gospel' must be taken seriously, it is inadequate to the tasks of evaluation presented by politics. Against this 'ethic of ultimate ends' — Gesinnung — he therefore proposed the 'ethic of responsibility' — Verantwortung. First, whilst the former dictates only the purity of intentions and pays no attention to consequences, the ethic of responsibility commands acknowledgement of the divergence between intention and result. Its adherent 'does not feel in a position to burden others with the results of his **[or her]** own actions so far as he was able to foresee them; he will say: these results are ascribed to my action'. Second, the 'ethic of ultimate ends' is incapable of dealing adequately with the moral dilemma presented by the necessity of using evil means to achieve moral ends: Everything that is striven for through political action operating with violent means and following an ethic of responsibility endangers the 'salvation of the soul.' If, however, one chases after the ultimate good in a war of beliefs, following a pure ethic of absolute ends, then the goals may be changed and discredited for generations, because responsibility for consequences is lacking. The 'ethic of responsibility', on the other hand, can accommodate this paradox and limit the employment of such means, because it accepts responsibility for the consequences which they imply. Thus, Weber maintains that only the ethic of responsibility can cope with the 'inner tension' between the 'demon of politics' and 'the god of love'. 9 The realists followed this conception closely in their formulation of a political ethic.10 This influence is particularly clear in Morgenthau.11 In terms of the first element of this conception, the rejection of a purely deontological ethic, Morgenthau echoed Weber's formulation, arguing that: the political actor has, beyond the general moral duties, a special moral responsibility to act wisely ... The individual, acting on his own behalf, may act unwisely without moral reproach as long as the consequences of his inexpedient action concern only [her or] himself. What is done in the political sphere by its very nature concerns others who must suffer from unwise action. What is here done with good intentions but unwisely and hence with disastrous results is morally defective; for it violates the ethics of responsibility to which all action affecting others, and hence political action par excellence, is subject.12

**Moral rights and wrongs are based on consequences**

**Johnson, 85**(Conrad D. Johnson, 'The Authority of the Moral Agent', Journal of Philosophy 82, No 8

(August 1985), pp. 391

If we follow the usual deontological conception, there are also well-known difficulties. If it is simply wrong to kill the innocent, the wrongness must in some wav be connected to the consequences. That an innocent person is killed must be a consequence that has some important bearing on the wrongness of the action; else why be so concerned about the killing of an innocent? Further, if it is wrong in certain cases for the agent to weigh the consequences in deciding whether to kill or to break a promise, it is hard to deny that this has some connection to the consequences. Following one line of thought, it is consequentialist considerations of mistrust that stand behind such restrictions on what the agent may take into account.3 But then again it is hard to deal with that rare case in which the agent can truly claim that his judgement about the consequences is accurate, or, in that last resort of the philosophical thought experiment, has been verified by the Infallible Optimizer

**Consequences come first for governments—that’s the most logical standard**

**Harries,** editor of National Interest, **1994** (Owen, The National Interest, Spring, p. 11)

Performance is the test. Asked directly by a Western interviewer, "In principle, do you believe in one standard of human rights and free expression?", Lee immediately answers, "Look, it is not a matter of principle but of practice." This might appear to represent a simple and rather crude pragmatism. But in its context it might also be interpreted as an appreciation of the fundamental point made by Max Weber that, in politics, it is "the ethic of responsibility" rather than "the ethic of absolute ends" that is appropriate. While an individual is free to treat human rights as absolute, to be observed whatever the cost. Governments must weigh consequences and the competing claims of other ends. So once the enter the realm of politics, human rights have to take their place in a hierarchy of interests, including such basic things as national security and the promotion of prosperity

**Outcome of the plan is the most significant consideration**

[Jeffrey C. **Isaac**, Prof of Poly Sci & director of the center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life @ Indiana University, “Ends, Means, and Politics, Dissent Vol. 49 Issue 2 pg. 32-38, EBSCO, **2002**

Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics— as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and **(**3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; itis equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

**Consequentialism is the best approach for threats**

**Cowen 2004**

(Tyler Cowen, Department of Economics George Mason University “ The epistemic Problem does not refute consequentialism”November2,2004 http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&q=cache:JYKgDUM8xOcJ:www.gmu.edu/jbc/Tyler/Epistemic2.pdf+%22nuclear+attack+on+Manhattan%22+cowen&hl=en&gl=us]

Let us start with a simple example, namely a suicide bomber who seeks to detonate a nuclear device in midtown Manhattan. Obviously we would seek to stop the bomber, or If we stop the bomber, we know that in the short run we will save millions of lives, avoid a massive tragedy, and protect the long-term strength, prosperity, and freedom of the United States. Reasonable moral people, regardless of the details of their meta-ethical stances, should not argue against stopping the bomber. No matter how hard we try to stop the bomber, we are not, a priori, committed to a very definite view of how effective prevention will turn out in the long run. After all, stopping the bomber will reshuffle future genetic identities, and may imply the birth of a future Hitler. Even trying to stop the bomber, with no guarantee of success, will remix the future in similar fashion. Still, we can see a significant net welfare improvement in the short run, while facing radical generic uncertainty about the future in any case. Furthermore, if we can stop the bomber, our long-run welfare estimates will likely show some improvement. The bomb going off could lead to subsequent attacks on other major cities, the emboldening of terrorists, or perhaps broader panics. There would be a new and very real doorway toward general collapse of the world. While the more distant future is remixed radically, we should not rationally believe that some new positive option has been created to counterbalance the current destruction and the new possible negatives. To put it simply, it is difficult to see the violent destruction of Manhattan as on net, in ex ante terms, favoring either the short-term or long-term prospects of the world. We can of course imagine possible scenarios where such destruction works out for the better ex post; perhaps, for instance, the explosion leads to a subsequent disarmament or anti-proliferation advances. But we would not breathe a sigh of relief on hearing the news of the destruction for the first time. Even if the long-run expected value is impossible to estimate, we need only some probability that the relevant time horizon is indeed short (perhaps a destructive asteroid will strike the earth). This will tip the consequentialist balance against a nuclear attack on Manhattan.

**Policy must be viewed through a consequentialist framework**

**Jefferey Friedman,** Political Science at Bernard University**, 97**, "What's Wrong with Libertarianism," Critical Review, Volume: 3, pg 458-459

On the one hand, the reclamation of the Enlightenment legacy can lead in far more directions than the political—science path I have suggested. It is surely important to launch anthropological, economic, historical, sociological, and psychological investigations of the preconditions of human happiness. And post-libertarian cultural historians and critics are uniquely positioned to analyze the unstated assumptions that take the place of the requisite knowledge in determining democratic attitudes. A prime candidate would seem to be the overwhelming focus on intentions as markers for the desirability of a policy. If a policy is well intended, this is usually taken to be a decisive consideration in its favor**.** This heuristic might explain the moralism that observers since Tocqueville have noticed afflicts democratic cultures. To date, this phenomenon is relatively unexplored. Analogous opportunities for insightful postlibertarian research can be found across the spectrum of political behavior. What is nationalism, for example, if not a device that helps an ignorant public navigate the murky waters of politics by applying a simple “us-versus-them” test to any proposed policy? Pursuit of these possibilities, however, must be accompanied by awareness of the degeneration of postwar skepticism into libertarian ideology. If the post-libertarian social scientist yields to the hope of re-establishing through consequentialist research the antigovernment politics that has until now been sustained by libertarian ideology; she will only recreate the conditions that have served to retard serious empirical inquiry. It is fashionable to call for political engagement by scholars and to deny the possibility that one can easily isolate one’s work from one’s political sympathies. But difficulty is no excuse for failing to try. Libertarians have even less of an excuse than most, since, having for so long accused the intellectual mainstream of bias and insulation from refutation, they should understand better than anyone the importance of subverting one’s own natural intellectual complacency with the constant reminder that one might be wrong. The only remedy for the sloppiness that has plagued libertarian scholarship is to become one’s own harshest critic. This means thinking deeply and skeptically about one’s politics and its premises and, if one has libertarian sympathies, directing one’s scholarship not at vindicating them, but at finding out if they are mistaken**.**

### **CONSEQUENTIALISM BAD**

**It’s impossible to evaluate moral action based on consequentialism**

Smart, professor of philosophy at the U. of Adelaide, 1973, “Utilitarianism For and Against”, p. 82

No one can hold that everything, of whatever category, that has value, has it in virtue of its consequences. If thatwere so, one would just go one for ever, and there would be an obviously hopeless regress. That regresswould be hopeless, even if one takes the view, which is not an absurd view, that although mean set themselves ends and work towards them, it is very often not really the supposed end, but the effort towards which they set the value that they travel, not really in order to arrive (for as soon as they have arrived they set out for somewhere else), but rather they choose somewhere to arrive, in order to travel. Even on that view, not everything wouldhave consequential value; what would have non-consequential value would in fact be traveling, even though people had to think of traveling as having the consequential value, and something else – the destination – the non-consequential value.