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AT: War Impacts

Empirically Denied

EMPERICALLY DENIED, THE U.S. ECONOMY HAS EXPERIENCED MANY ECONOMIC CRASHES WITHOUT THE IMPACTS

Gordon 08

 [John Steele Gordon](http://www.american.com/author_search?Creator=John%20Steele%20Gordon) Wednesday, October 22, 2008 Journal of the American enterprise institute John Steele Gordon is one of America's leading historians, specializing in business and financial history. A full-time writer for the last nineteen years, Gordon's articles have been published in, among others, Forbes, Forbes FYI, Worth, The New York Times Book Review, The New York Times's and The Wall Street Journal's Op-Ed pages, and The Washington Post's Book World and Outlook Panics and Politics

 <http://www.american.com/archive/2008/october-10-08/panics-and-politics> d.a. 7-15-10

**Will** the current **financial crisis spur a major political realignment? If history is any guide, the answer is probably no. America has experienced recurrent financial meltdowns since its birth** in the late 18th century. Indeed, **there were severe credit crunches and Wall Street collapses in** 1792, 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, 1907, 1929, **1987, and** now **2008**. Most of **these panics have not been followed by seismic political shifts**. To be sure, President Martin Van Buren, who took office a month before the stock market crash of 1837, lost badly when he ran for reelection in the depression year of 1840. But Van Buren was an unpopular and ineffective president, and his defeat did not signal a realignment.

Empirically denied – 11 times

-This one isn’t bad, relatively

Ecommerce Journal 8

December, The U.S. economy is now well into its 11th postwar recession, http://www.ecommerce-journal.com/articles/11618\_the\_u\_s\_economy\_is\_now\_well\_into\_its\_11th\_postwar\_recession

The National Bureau of Economic [Research](http://www.ecommerce-journal.com/tags/research) has finally confirmed what the real world has known for at least a year: The [U.S. economy](http://www.ecommerce-journal.com/tags/u_s_economy) is now well into its 11th postwar [recession](http://www.ecommerce-journal.com/tags/recession)**.** Although the bureau says that it takes anywhere from six to 18 months to determine that a peak in economic activity has been reached, this one has taken longer than its four immediate predecessors.  The bureau says that the latest [business](http://www.ecommerce-journal.com/tags/business) [cycle](http://www.ecommerce-journal.com/tags/cycle) peak was reached a year ago, in December 2007.  By contrast, the March 2001 peak was announced eight months later, while the July 1990 peak was determined within nine months. The July 1981 peak was set six months after the [fact](http://www.ecommerce-journal.com/tags/fact), while it took only five months to establish that a peak was reached in January 1980.  To be fair, some members of the bureau's Business Cycle Dating Committee have felt for several months that the [economy](http://www.ecommerce-journal.com/tags/economy) was in a recession. However, they have deferred to the collective judgment of the committee, which was not reached until Friday.  The next question is, Who cares? The answer: Anyone who is interested in forecasting. This means economists, [investors](http://www.ecommerce-journal.com/tags/investors), policymakers and business people, just to name four categories.  By dating the beginning and end of recessions, comparisons can be made with the previous downturns in order to determine the odds of a further decline. And while different recessions have different causes, such comparisons can be useful.  For example, the shortest postwar recession lasted only six months, while the longest was 16 months. The average, according to the bureau, is 10 months in length.  At 11 months, the current recession is already longer than average, and rapidly closing in on the two longest recessions: 1973-75 and 1981-82.  If the latest recession does no more than equal these two, then it could be over as early as the end of April. However, given the way the data are unfolding and the causes of this particular [downturn](http://www.ecommerce-journal.com/tags/downturn), this seems a bit optimistic.  Most economists figure that the economy will decline at least until the middle of [2009](http://www.ecommerce-journal.com/tags/2009). That would make this recession the longest of the postwar era, at 18 months in length. Some think it could be even longer than that.  But as unique as the current recession might seem, what also is different is how quickly both monetary and fiscal policies have been marshaled to cushion this downturn.

Empirically Denied

EMPERICALLY DENIED, THE GLOBAL ECONOMY CRASHED IN 07

Banerji & Dua 10

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Synchronisation of Recessions in Major Developed and Emerging Economies

Sage

**With the US economy experiencing its worst post-War recession beginning**

December **2007, the global economy experienced the most synchronised recession**

**on record**. The breadth and depth of this remarkably concerted global recession

was a reflection of increased globalisation and strong global interdependence

amongst economies, in terms of both their financial interconnections and trade

linkages. The trade linkages, in fact, greatly amplified the transmission of the

global recession to export-oriented economies due to declines in consumer

demand the world over, but especially in major developed economies such as the

US and Japan. The simultaneity of the worldwide downturns due to the trade

linkages was further exacerbated by a financial market crisis that not only led to

a severe abatement of trade flows but also resulted in major financial imbalances.

The upshot was that **the economies of virtually all major developed countries**

**shrunk rapidly, along with many export-dependent developing economies.**

**This includes China, which experienced its worst downturn in nearly two**

**decades,** with over 20 million migrant workers reportedly having lost jobs by

late-2008. India too experienced a sharp slowdown in the midst of the severe global recession.

Empirically Denied

CLAIMS THAT ECONOMIC COLLAPSE WILL TRIGGER CATASTROPHIC IMPACTS ARE EMPERICALLY FALSE

Naim 10

Moises Naim – Editor in Chief of Foreign Policy Magazine Foreign Policy Online | [JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2010](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/issues/177/contents/)

 <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/04/it_didnt_happen?page=full> d.a. 7-15-10

Just **a few months ago, the consensus among influential thinkers was that the economic crisis would unleash a wave of geopolitical plagues. Xenophobic outbursts, civil wars, collapsing currencies, protectionism, international conflicts**, and street riots were only some of the dire consequences expected by the experts.

**It didn't happen. Although the crash did cause severe economic damage** and widespread human suffering, and though the world did change in important ways for the worse -- the International Monetary Fund, for example, estimates that the global economy's new and permanent trajectory is a 10 percent lower rate of GDP growth than before the crisis -- **the scary predictions** for the most part **failed to materialize**. Sadly, the same experts who failed to foresee the economic crisis were also blindsided by the speed of the recovery. More than a year into the crisis, we now know just how off they were. From telling us about the imminent collapse of the international financial system to prophecies of a 10-year recession, here are six of the most common predictions about the crisis that have been proven wrong:

The international financial system will collapse. It didn't. As Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac crashed, as Citigroup and many other pillars of the financial system teetered on the brink, and as stock markets everywhere entered into free fall, the wise men predicted a total system meltdown. The economy has "fallen off a cliff," warned investment guru Warren Buffett. Fellow financial wizard George Soros agreed, noting the world economy was on "life support," calling the turbulence more severe than during the Great Depression, and comparing the situation to the demise of the Soviet Union. The natural corollary of such doomsday scenarios was the possibility that depositors would lose access to the funds in their bank accounts. From there to visions of martial law imposed to control street protests and the looting of bank offices was just an easy step for thousands of Internet-fueled conspiracy theorists. Even today, the financial system is still frail, banks are still failing, credit is scarce, and risks abound. But the financial system is working, and the perception that it is too unsafe to use or that it can suddenly crash out of existence has largely dissipated.

The economic crisis will last for at least two years and maybe even a decade. It didn't. By fall of 2009, the economies of the United States, Europe, and Japan had begun to grow again, and many of the largest developing economies, such as China, India, and Brazil, were growing at an even faster pace. This was surely a far cry from the doom-laden -- and widely echoed -- prophecies of economist Nouriel Roubini. In late 2008 he warned that radical governmental actions at best would prevent "what will now be an ugly and nasty two-year recession and financial crisis from turning into a systemic meltdown and a decade-long economic depression." Roubini was far from the only pessimist. "The danger," warned Harvard University's Kenneth Rogoff, another distinguished economist, in the fall of 2008, "is that instead of having a few bad years, we'll have another lost decade." It turned out that radical policy reactions were far more effective than anyone had expected in shortening the life of the recession.

The U.S. dollar will crash. It didn't. Instead, the American currency's value increased 20 percent between July 2008 and March 2009, at the height of the crisis. At first, investors from around the world sought refuge in the U.S. dollar. Then, as the U.S. government bailed out troubled companies and stimulated the economy with aggressive public spending, the U.S. fiscal deficit skyrocketed and anxieties about a dollar devaluation mounted. By the second half of 2009, the U.S. currency had lost value. But devaluation has not turned out to be the catastrophic crash predicted by the pessimists. Rather, as Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf noted, "The dollar's correction is not just natural; it is helpful. It will lower the risk of deflation in the U.S. and facilitate the correction of the global 'imbalances' that helped cause the crisis."

Protectionism will surge. It didn't. Trade flows did drop dramatically in late 2008 and early 2009, but they started to grow again in the second half of 2009 as economies recovered. Pascal Lamy, director-general of the World Trade Organization, had warned that the global financial crisis was bound to lead to surges in protectionism as governments sought to blame foreigners for their problems. "That is exactly what happened in the 1930s when [protectionism] was the virus that spread the crisis all over the place," he said in October 2008, echoing a widely held sentiment among trade experts. And it is true that many governments dabbled in protectionism, including not only the U.S. Congress's much-derided "Buy American" provision, but also measures such as increased tariffs or import restrictions imposed in 17 of the G-20 countries. Yet one year later, a report from the European Union concluded that "a widespread and systemic escalation of protectionism has been prevented." The protectionist temptation is always there, and a meaningful increase in trade barriers cannot be ruled out. But it has not happened yet.

The crisis in rich countries will drag down developing ones. It didn't. As the economies of America and Europe screeched to a halt during the nightmarish first quarter of 2009, China's economy accelerated, part of a broader trend in which emerging markets fared better through the crisis than the world's most advanced economies. As the rich countries entered a deep recession and the woes of the U.S. financial market affected banking systems everywhere, the idea that emerging economies could "decouple" from the advanced ones was widely mocked.

But decouple they did. Some emerging economies relied on their domestic markets, others on exports to other growing countries (China, for example, displaced the United States last year as Brazil's top export market). Still others had ample foreign reserves, low exposure to toxic financial assets, or, like Chile, had taken measures in anticipation of an eventual global slowdown. Not all developing countries managed to escape the worst of the crisis -- and many, such as Mexico and Iran, were deeply hurt -- but many others managed to avoid the fate of the advanced economies.

Violent political turmoil will become more common. It didn't. Electorates did punish governments for the economic hard times. But this was mostly in Europe and mostly peaceful and democratic. "**There will be blood," prophesied Harvard historian Niall Ferguson last spring. "A crisis of this magnitude is bound to increase political [conflict] ... It is bound to destabilize some countries**. It will cause civil wars to break out that have been dormant. **It will topple governments that were moderate and bring in governments that are extreme. These things are pretty predictable."**

**No, it turns out: They aren't**.

Theory Wrong

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| http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/images/dot.clear.gif | THE THEORY THAT COUNTRIES GO TO WAR TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM ECONOMIC CRISES IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE RESEARCHOneal & Tir 2006John R. Oneal is Associate Professor and Director of International Studies at the University of Alabama. Jaroslav Tir is Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Georgia Does the Diversionary Use of Force Threaten the Democratic Peace? Assessing the Effect of Economic Growth on Interstate Conflict, 1921–2001  |

[International Studies Quarterly](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/journal/117984904/home) [Volume 50, Issue 4](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/journal/118569738/issue), Pages 755-779 Wiley interscience

**It has long been suggested that a state's leader might seek to divert attention from domestic problems with a foreign adventure**. Lenin argued that the tsar hoped World War I would delay reforms in Russia, and Germany's readiness to fight in 1914 has been attributed to the government's desire to forestall democratization ([Taylor 1954](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/cgi-bin/fulltext/118569740/main.html%2Cftx_abs#b126)). Diversionary theory is often derived from sociological studies of group dynamics ([Simmel 1898; Coser 1956](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/cgi-bin/fulltext/118569740/main.html%2Cftx_abs#b116)), which indicate that groups become more cohesive in response to conflict with outsiders if internal divisions are not too deep. **There have been several periods of intense research on diversionary theory** since the 1960s, **but** **little evidence has emerged that such uses of force are common, despite the theory's intuitive appeal** and the plausibility of historical accounts of particular conflicts. Early work by [Rummel (1963)](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/cgi-bin/fulltext/118569740/main.html%2Cftx_abs#b111) and [Tanter (1966)](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/cgi-bin/fulltext/118569740/main.html%2Cftx_abs#b127) considered whether domestic unrest (e.g., riots, revolutions, and civil wars) is correlated with interstate conflict. [Rummel (1963](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/cgi-bin/fulltext/118569740/main.html%2Cftx_abs#b111):24) concluded, however, that "foreign conflict behavior is generally and completely unrelated to domestic conflict behavior" in both democratic and autocratic countries. In the subsequent decade, [Zinnes and Wilkenfeld (1971)](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/cgi-bin/fulltext/118569740/main.html%2Cftx_abs#b131) sought to differentiate the effects of various types of internal disorder on the propensity of particular types of governments to externalize conflict; but again, no consistent pattern of relations was uncovered. As a participant in these investigations concluded, "**seldom has so much common sense in theory found so little support in practice"** ([James 1987](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/cgi-bin/fulltext/118569740/main.html%2Cftx_abs#b57):22), a judgment shared by others ([Stohl 1980; Zinnes 1980; Levy 1989; Gelpi 1997](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/cgi-bin/fulltext/118569740/main.html%2Cftx_abs#b123)).[1](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/cgi-bin/fulltext/118569740/main.html%2Cftx_abs#fn1)

Theory Wrong

**WHILE THE AFF AUTHORS MAY CLAIM THAT ECONOMIC DECLINE CAUSES WAR STUDIES PROVE THEM WRONG**

MILLER 01

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Peace Magazine [Jan-Mar 2001](http://archive.peacemagazine.org/searchdate.php?q=v17n1&Submit=Search), page 8 D.A. 7-15-10

<http://archive.peacemagazine.org/v17n1p08.htm> Poverty: A Cause of War?

Economic Crises?

**Some scholars have argued that it is not poverty, as such, that contributes to the support for armed conflict, but rather some catalyst, such as an economic crisis. However, a study by** Minxin **Pei and** Ariel **Adesnik shows that this hypothesis lacks merit. After studying 93 episodes of economic crisis in 22 countries** in Latin American and Asia **since World War II, they concluded that much of the conventional thinking about the political impact of economic crisis is wrong:**

**"The severity of economic crisis** - as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - **bore no relationship to the collapse of regimes** ... **or** (in democratic states, rarely) **to an outbreak of violence**... In the cases of dictatorships and semi-democracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another)."

ON BALANCE WAR IS MORE LIKELY WHEN THE U.S. ECONOMY IS STRONG

Oneal & Tir 2006

John R. Oneal is Associate Professor and Director of International Studies at the University of Alabama. Jaroslav Tir is Assistant Professor in Political Science at the University of Georgia Does the Diversionary Use of Force Threaten the Democratic Peace? Assessing the Effect of Economic Growth on Interstate Conflict, 1921–2001 [International Studies Quarterly](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/journal/117984904/home) [Volume 50, Issue 4](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/journal/118569738/issue), Pages 755-779 Wiley interscience

Our analyses of five prominent, powerful democracies raise further doubts about the substantive importance of diversionary uses of force. Military action for political reasons is most feasible for the leaders of powerful democracies. Most previous research has focused on the United States, at least in part, for this reason, but **the United States has been significantly more likely to initiate conflict when its economy was strong, not weak**. The evidence regarding Britain is inconclusive, while India and France have also exhibited behavior inconsistent with theoretical expectations. Only Israeli leaders seem to have been susceptible to diversionary pressures ([Barzilai and Russett 1990; Spracher and DeRouen 2002](http://www3.interscience.wiley.com.www2.lib.ku.edu:2048/cgi-bin/fulltext/118569740/main.html%2Cftx_abs#b6)). Thus, **there is little evidence** in this important subset of cases **that military force is used to divert attention away from a poor economy**.

Cooperation Solves

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IS A MORE LIKELY RESPONSE TO CRISES THAN DIVERSIONARY WARS

Fravel 10

The Limits of Diversion: Rethinking Internal and External Conflict

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[Security Studies](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dt713636712), Volume [19](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dt713636712~tab%3Dissueslist~branches%3D19#v19), Issue [2](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~db%3Dall~content%3Dg922643054) May 2010 , pages 307 - 341 Informaworld

The diversionary hypothesis offers one of the most powerful alternatives to rationalist explanations of war based on the state as a unitary actor. Strong empirical support for diversion would identify a more complete set of causal mechanisms underlying international conflict. **The cases investigated in this article, however, raise doubts about the strength of the diversionary hypothesis** as well as the empirical validity of arguments based on diversionary mechanisms, such as Mansfield and Snyder's theory about democratization and war.[126](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a922422929&fulltext=713240928#FN0126) In Argentina and Turkey, the hypothesis fails to pass two most likely tests. In neither case was domestic unrest a necessary condition for the use of force as proponents of diversionary theory must demonstrate. Instead, external security challenges and bargaining over disputed territory better explain Argentine and Turkish decision making. The historical record, including leadership statements and reasoning, offers stronger evidence for a standard realist model and the dynamics of coercive diplomacy. Drawing definitive conclusions about diversion from just two cases is impossible. Nevertheless, the modified most likely research design used in this article weakens confidence in the strength of diversionary arguments. **Diversion as a principal or primary source of some conflicts may be much less frequent than scholars assert**. These two episodes should be among the easiest cases for diversion to explain. Not only did embattled leaders escalate disputes into crises and then use force, but scholars have also viewed these cases as being best explained by diversionary mechanisms. If diversion cannot account for these decisions, it is unclear what the hypothesis can in fact explain. My findings have several implications for the literature on diversionary war theory. At the most general level of analysis, the lack of support for the diversion hypothesis in Argentina and Turkey complements those quantitative studies of diversion that do not identify a systematic and significant relationship between domestic politics and aggressive foreign policies, including the use of force.[127](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a922422929&fulltext=713240928#FN0127) In addition, the modified most likely research design used in this article raises questions about those quantitative studies that do provide empirical support for diversion because it demonstrates that despite the presence of domestic unrest, the underlying causal mechanisms of diversion may not account for the decisions to use force. The lack of support for diversion raises a simple but important question: why is diversion less frequent than commonly believed, despite its plausible intuition? Although further research is required, several factors should be considered. First, the rally effect that leaders enjoy from an international crisis is generally brief in duration and unlikely to change permanently a public's overall satisfaction with its leaders.[128](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a922422929&fulltext=713240928#FN0128) George H. W. Bush, for example, lost his reelection bid after successful prosecution of the 1991 Gulf War. Winston Churchill fared no better after the Allied victory in World War II.[129](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a922422929&fulltext=713240928#FN0129) Leaders have little reason to conclude that a short-term rally will address what are usually structural sources of domestic dissatisfaction. Second, a selection effect may prevent embattled leaders from choosing diversion. Diversionary action should produce the largest rally effect against the most powerful target because such action would reflect a leader's skills through coercing a superior opponent. At the same time, leaders should often be deterred from challenging stronger targets, as the imbalance of military forces increases the risk of defeat and thus the probability of losing office at home. Although the odds of victory increase when targeting weaker states, success should have a much more muted effect on domestic support, if any, because victory would have been expected.[130](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a922422929&fulltext=713240928#FN0130) Third, weak or **embattled leaders can choose from a wide range of policy options to strengthen their standing at home.** Although scholars such as Gelpi and Oakes have noted that embattled leaders can choose repression or economic development in addition to diversionary action, the range of options is even greater and carries less risk than the failure of diversion. Weak **leaders can** also **seek to deepen cooperation with other states if they believe it will strengthen their position at home**. Other **studies**, for example, **have demonstrated that political unrest facilitated dtente among the superpowers in the early 1970s, China's concessions in its many territorial disputes, support for international financial liberalization, and the formation of regional organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Gulf Cooperation Council**.[131](http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a922422929&fulltext=713240928#FN0131)

Economic Collapse reduces risk of war

ECONOMIC COLLAPSE EMPERICALLY HAS REDUCED THE RISK OF WAR BY REDUCING MILITARY SPENDING AND IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN COUNTRIES

Apps 10

Peter Apps, Political Risk Correspondent for Reuters, Reuters “Crisis fuels unrest, crime, but war risk eases” [http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49123220100608 d.a. 7-15-10](http://in.reuters.com/article/idINIndia-49123220100608%20d.a.%207-15-10)

The global financial crisis has made the world less peaceful by fuelling crime and civil unrest, a worldwide study showed on Tuesday, but the risk of outright armed conflict appears to be falling. The 2010 Global Peace Index -- which examines several dozen indicators from the crime rate to defence spending, conflicts with neighbouring states and respect for human rights -- showed an overall reduction in the level of peacefulness. The key drivers were a five percent rise in homicide, more violent demonstrations and a perceived greater fear of crime. "We have seen what looks like a direct impact from the crisis," Steve Killelea, the Australian entrepreneur behind the index, told Reuters. "At least some unrest is probably unavoidable but the important thing is to target measures to keep it to a minimum." That could mean ensuring any economic pain was equitably shared across society, he said, to maintain social cohesion. Perhaps as a result of the more cash-strapped times, defence spending as a percentage of gross domestic product was down to its lowest in four years with countries also showing generally better relations with their neighbours. "In most areas of the world, war risk seems to be declining," he said. "That is very important." The index is compiled by the Institute for Economics and Peace based on data From the Economist Intelligence Unit. They estimate violence costs the global economy $7 trillion a year. A 25 percent reduction in violence would save about $1.7 trillion a year, enough to pay off Greece's debt, fund the United Nations millennium development goals and pay for the European Union to reach its 2020 climate and carbon targets. "There are such clear economic benefits to peace and it is something investors are now looking at much more closely," he said, adding that some were using the index alongside the World Bank governance indicators and other key rating systems to inform investment decisions. NEW ZEALAND "MOST PEACEABLE" The struggling euro zone economies of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain showed a particular rise in unrest risks, while Africa and the Middle East were the only two regions to have become safer since the survey began in 2007. Africa had seen a drastic fall in the number of armed conflicts and an improvement in relations between neighbours, he said, overshadowing the impact of greater crime. Better ratings for the Middle East and North Africa came primarily from improving relations between nations.

Economic Collapse reduces risk of war

INTERNATIONAL WARS THAT RISK NUCLEAR EXCHANGE ARE MORE LIKELY WHEN THE ECONOMY IS GROWING

Edwards 03

George Edwards, Chief Executive Officer of Economic Miracles Limited [http://economicmiracles.org/inv\_cred\_&\_cult\_diversity.htm. d.a. 7-5-10](http://economicmiracles.org/inv_cred_%26_cult_diversity.htm.%20d.a.%207-5-10)

But investment credit has a potential downside of massive proportions. Rapidly **growing economies tend to breed leaders who are more confident, more aggressive, more war mongering.  The military resources of the state are more deadly at higher levels of economic development. International conflict and war are more likely to arise on the upswing** of the Kondratieff cycle. We are now entering the sixth Kondratieff cycle since the industrial revolution, and **hot international military conflicts between minor powers in which both sides have the atomic bomb, such as the India-Pakistan conflict, are occurring for the first time in history**.

AN ECONOMIC DOWNTURN REDUCES THE RISK OF WAR

BOEHMER 07

Charles R. Boehmer. "The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict" Politics and Policy 35.4 (2007): 774-809. Available at: <http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/8> Assistant Professor of Political Science at

The University of Texas at El Paso. D.A. 7-15-10

**A people suffering from economic hardship may become pessimistic**

**and such sentiments may hamper a state’s leadership regime**. If a state

becomes involved in a dispute that escalates, especially if it turns

fatal, it could undermine the government. It would seem that prior

perceptions of a government’s leadership could produce doubt to a

populace unless the nature of a foreign threat is clear. In times of

economic prosperity, the leadership enjoys increased popular support.

**As society becomes more pessimistic and cynical, the leader’s political**

**opposition is better able to detach the support away from the leader’s**

**policies. Consequently, if an opportunity for military conflict occurs**

**during a period of economic stagnation, factions or parties in the**

**domestic arena may be more able to resist the initiation of military**

**conflicts,** or at least increase audience costs of policy failure (Fearon

1994). It is even questionable that a rally effect occurs so automatically,

especially in a general sample of states.

Economic Collapse reduces risk of war

THE RISK OF LARGE SCALE WAR IS FAR MORE LIKELY DURING PERIODS OF GROWTH THAN DURING ECONOMIC DOWNTURNS

BENNETT AND STAM 03

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Allan C. Stam is Associate Professor in the Government Department at Dartmouth College. The Behavioral Origins of War

[http://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/0472098446-ch5.pdf D.A](http://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/0472098446-ch5.pdf%20%20%20D.A). 7-15-10

Consistent with Goldstein’s arguments, **we find periods of** system wide economic **growth associated with increased risks of disputes escalating to** all levels of disputes, including those involving the use of force and **large-scale war**. In table 5.16, we see that across all conflict categories, the increases of risk are generally of similar magnitude, **with a 40 to 100 percent increase in the odds of conflict involving force during periods of economic upswing compared to periods of downswing**. Only the probability of having disputes without the use of any force appears to drop slightly. A somewhat discouraging finding is that the associated **increase in risk appears strongest for disputes escalating to war, where the risk of such conflicts appears to be 80 to 100 percent higher than the baseline risk of war.**

These results stand in contrast to debates in the 1980s and early 1990s over relative versus absolute gains. Regime theorists such as Krasner and Keohane argued that states, when concerned with absolute, (as opposed to relative) gains, would be less conflict prone. This set off a long running debate about the nature of states’s preferences, which in the end devolved to a discussion of whether there was really any distinction between the two, with the most rigorous theoretical analysis demonstrating that even absolute gains could only be measured in some context, a relative one (Powell, 1991). Our results suggest that **there is something of a Faustian trade-off between economic gains and the likelihood of war. During periods of sustained economic growth** throughout the system, periods of absolute gains for all (or most) states, **the incidence of war increases** and rather **dramatically** so.

Economic Collapse reduces risk of war

LEADERS ARE LESS LIKELY TO START WAR DURING AN ECONOMIC COLLAPSE

BOEHMER 07

Charles R. Boehmer. "The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict" Politics and Policy 35.4 (2007): 774-809. Available at: <http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/8> Assistant Professor of Political Science at

The University of Texas at El Paso. D.A. 7-15-10

All leaders depend on a constituency of some sort (Bueno de

Mesquita *et al*. 1999) and always face potential opposition to their

policies (Hagan 1994; Heldt 1999; Miller 1995, 1999; Richards *et al*.

1993). In democratic systems, opposition parties may seek to exploit

foreign policies that they will argue are not in the best interest of the

nation, resulting in higher constraints on such executives relative to

their authoritarian counterparts. However, **during times of economic**

**prosperity,** society is less likely to be influenced by the rhetoric of parties

and factions that stand in opposition to the leader. Assuming that

**popularity ratings are higher than would be the case during economic**

**recession or depression, leaders should be more apt to initiate or join**

**foreign military actions**. Economic growth should reduce societal

resistance to conflict. **This may seem like a counterintuitive proposition**

**that people who are relatively better off and happy during periods of**

**prosperity would allow leaders to opt for foreign conflicts. However,**

**people may become more nationalistic during times of prosperity and**

**more optimistic that success could be achieved in foreign conflicts**.

Accordingly, Blainey (1988) claims that anything that increases

optimism and state strength should be thought of as causes of war. It is

plausible that **this effect heightens the risk of interstate conflict** by

reducing constraints placed on executives. For example, would the

Clinton Administration have been able to commit U.S. troops to

conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo—areas where U.S. interests were

debatable—without stauncher Republican resistance in Congress, if the

economy had not experienced prolonged prosperity and economic

growth?

Economic Collapse reduces risk of war

LARGE SCALE WARS ARE LESS LIKELY IN AN ECONOMIC DOWNTURN

BOEHMER 07

Charles R. Boehmer. "The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict" Politics and Policy 35.4 (2007): 774-809. Available at: <http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/8> Assistant Professor of Political Science at

The University of Texas at El Paso. D.A. 7-15-10

The theory presented earlier predicts that **lower rates of growth**

**suppress participation in foreign conflicts, particularly concerning**

**conflict initiation and escalation to combat. To sustain combat, states**

**need to be militarily prepared and not open up a second front when**

**they are already fighting, or may fear, domestic opposition**. A good

example would be when the various Afghani resistance fighters

expelled the Soviet Union from their territory, but the Taliban

crumbled when it had to face the combined forces of the United States

and Northern Alliance insurrection. Yet the coefficient for GDP

growth and MID initiations was negative but insignificant. However,

considering that there are many reasons why states fight, **the logic**

presented earlier **should hold especially in regard to the risk of**

**participating in more severe conflicts**. Threats to use military force

may be safe to make and may be made with both external and internal

actors in mind, but in the end may remain mere cheap talk that does

not risk escalation if there is a chance to back down. Chiozza **and**

**Goemans** (2004b) **found that secure leaders were more likely to**

**become involved in war than insecure leaders, supporting the theory**

**and evidence presented here. We should find that leaders who face**

**domestic opposition and a poorly performing economy shy away from**

**situations that could escalate to combat** if doing so would compromise

their ability to retain power.

Economic Collapse reduces risk of war

ECONOMIC DOWNTURN MAKES WAR LESS LIKELY

BOEHMER 07

Charles R. Boehmer. "The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict" Politics and Policy 35.4 (2007): 774-809. Available at: <http://works.bepress.com/charles_boehmer/8> Assistant Professor of Political Science at

The University of Texas at El Paso. D.A. 7-15-10

Still, the results here show a more complex picture that partly

contradicts aspects of diversionary theory. First, the odds are actually

higher that states with domestic problems will be a target of foreign

aggression than they would be an aggressor. This finding suggests

predatory behavior on the part of other states. Moreover, **leaders**

**facing domestic problems associated with domestic conflict and poor**

**economic growth avoid foreign conflicts that entail the loss of life.**

**Instead, states are more likely to become involved in such violent**

**disputes when economic growth is high and state leaders and their**

**regimes appear secure**, meaning they face manageable levels of internal

protest and rebellion.

**No causality – economic decline doesn’t cause war**

Ferguson 6

Niall, Professor of History @ Harvard, The Next War of the World, *Foreign Affairs* 85.5, Proquest

There are many unsatisfactory explanations for why the twentieth century was so destructive. One is the assertion that the availability of more powerful weapons caused bloodier conflicts. But there is no correlation between the sophistication of military technology and the lethality of conflict. Some of the worst violence of the century -- the genocides in Cambodia in the 1970s and central Africa in the 1990s, for instance -- was perpetrated with the crudest of weapons: rifles, axes, machetes, and knives. Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

Economic Decline Does Not Cause Terrorism

Economic Collapse Empirically Does Not Spur Terrorism

Pipes 02

 Daniel Pipes is director of the Middle East Forum and a prize-winning columnist

God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam? National Interest Winter 2002 d.a. 7-15-10

 <http://www.danielpipes.org/104/god-and-mammon-does-poverty-cause-militant-islam>.

Third, **poverty does not generate militant Islam. There are many very poor Muslim states but few of them have become centers of militant Islam-not Bangladesh, not Yemen, and not Niger**. As an American specialist rightly notes, "economic despair, the oft-cited source of political Islam's power, is familiar to the Middle East"; if militant Islam is connected to poverty, why was it not a stronger force in years and centuries past, when the region was poorer than it is today?

Fourth, **a declining economy does not generate militant Islam. The 1997 crash in Indonesia and Malaysia did not spur a large turn toward militant Islam. Iranian incomes have gone down by half or more since the Islamic Republic came to power in 1979; yet, far from increasing support for the regime's militant Islamic ideology, impoverishment has caused a massive alienation from Islam. Iraqis have experienced an even more precipitous drop in living standards**: Abbas Alnasrawi estimates that per capita income has plummeted by nearly 90 percent since 1980, returning it to where it was in the 1940s. While the country has witnessed an increase in personal piety, **militant Islam has not surged**, nor is it the leading expression of anti-regime sentiments.

Noting these patterns, at least a few observers have drawn the correct conclusion. The outspoken Algerian secularist, Saïd Sadi, flatly rejects the thesis that poverty spurs militant Islam: "I do not adhere to this view that it is widespread unemployment and poverty which produce terrorism." Likewise, Amayreh finds that militant Islam "is not a product or by-product of poverty."

Economic Downturns Do Not Cause Terrorism

Pipes 02

 Daniel Pipes is director of the Middle East Forum and a prize-winning columnist

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 <http://www.danielpipes.org/104/god-and-mammon-does-poverty-cause-militant-islam>.

The events of September 11 have intensified a long-standing debate: What causes Muslims to turn to militant Islam? Some analysts have noted the poverty of Afghanistan and concluded that herein lay the problem. Jessica Stern of Harvard University wrote that the United States "can no longer afford to allow states to fail." If it does not devote a much higher priority to health, education and economic development abroad, she writes, "new Osamas will continue to arise." Susan Sachs of the New York Times observes: "Predictably, the disappointed youth of Egypt and Saudi Arabia turn to religion for comfort." More colorfully, others have advocated bombarding Afghanistan with foodstuffs not along with but instead of explosives.

Behind these analyses lies **an assumption that socioeconomic distress drives Muslims to extremism. The evidence, however, does not support this expectation. Militant Islam** (or Islamism) **is not a response to poverty or impoverishment; not only are Bangladesh and Iraq not hotbeds of militant Islam, but militant Islam has often surged in countries experiencing rapid economic growth. The factors that cause militant Islam to decline or flourish appear to have more to do with issues of identity than with economics**.

**Economic Decline Does Not Cause Terrorism**

**Increased Poverty Does Not Cause Terrorism**

Wessel 07

David Wessel, Wall Street Journal reporter Wall Street Journal 07

[http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118358989440157536.html d.a. 7-15-10](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118358989440157536.html%20d.a.%207-15-10)

But **the conventional wisdom that poverty breeds terrorism is backed by surprisingly little hard evidence. "The evidence is nearly unanimous in rejecting either material deprivation or inadequate education as an important cause of support for terrorism or of participation in terrorist activities**," Mr. Krueger asserts. **The 9/11 Commission stated flatly: Terrorism is not caused by poverty**. So what is the cause? Suppression of civil liberties and political rights, Mr. Krueger hypothesizes. "When nonviolent means of protest are curtailed," he says, "malcontents appear to be more likely to turn to terrorist tactics." Which -- ironically, given that Mr. Krueger is no fan of the president's actual policies at home or abroad -- is close to Mr. Bush's rhetoric: "Liberty has got the capacity to change enemies into allies."

**Poverty Does Not Cause Terrorism**

Hutcheon 06

[Sunday Herald, The](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4156/), [Feb 19, 2006](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4156/is_20060219/) [Paul Hutcheon](http://findarticles.com/p/search/?qa=Paul%20Hutcheon) reporter

US policy, not poverty, 'is cause of terrorism' TERROR: THE MOTIVE

<http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4156/is_20060219/ai_n16158178/> d.a. 7-15-10

A LEADING US academic will challenge the establishment this week when he makes the controversial claim that **poverty is not the root cause of international terrorism.** Alan **Krueger, professor of economics and public affairs at Princeton** University, will say **suicide bombers tend to come from middle-class families**. He will also argue that terrorism is directly motivated by US policy decisions. Krueger's arguments will be made in a prestigious three-part lecture series at the London School of Economics, beginning on Tuesday. The former member of the Clinton administration will present **new research** on the "causes and consequences" of terrorism, which he says have been misunderstood. One of his main findings **disputes the supposed link between deprivation and terrorism**. "One point I'm going to make is that the popular stereotype, from Tony Blair on down, seems to be that poverty is the root cause of terrorism. That is a very questionable presumption. The evidence doesn't point in that direction, " he told the Sunday Herald. Krueger reached the conclusion by sampling members of Hezbollah and looking at the biographies of suicide bombers in Israel. "Overwhelmingly they were from well-off families, " he said. He said his model is relevant to al-Qaeda (whose leader Osama bin Laden came from a wealthy family and whose main ally was a doctor) and the 9/11 attacks on New York. "It fits very well. Fifteen of the 9/11 hijackers were middle-class or from high-income classes." Krueger also applied his findings to the London Tube and bus bombings last July. "My vibe on the people who carried out the suicide attacks was that they were not from struggling families." He argues that **terrorists, instead of coming primarily from poor states, tend to hail from oppressive regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. This, he says, shows that terrorists tend to be motivated by fanaticism, not poverty**. "In most cases [a suicide bomber] is not someone who has nothing to live for, but someone who desperately believes in a cause."

Economic Decline Does Not Cause Terrorism

Growth leads to nuclear terrorism

Finlay 08

Brian D. Finlay, Senior Associate, Henry L. Stimson Center, NUCLEAR TERRORISM: US Policies to Reduce The Threat of Nuclear Terror, September 2008, http://www.ploughshares.org/sites/default/files/resources/200809\_partnershipforasecureamerica\_nuclearterrorism.pdf

There is also sufficient evidence to suggest that terrorists’ pursuit of nuclear weapons and technologies is being facilitated by the global economy. Globalization, technological innovation, the ease of international communication and transport, free trade, financial liberalization, and the advent of the “virtual world” all collided with the end of the Cold War to challenge the authority of countries to prevent proliferation. In such an environment, nuclear technology and bomb-grade materials are becoming increasingly susceptible to acquisition and transport.

Those Economically Well Off Are More Likely to turn to Terrorism

Pipes 02

 Daniel Pipes is director of the Middle East Forum and a prize-winning columnist

God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam? National Interest Winter 2002 d.a. 7-15-10

 <http://www.danielpipes.org/104/god-and-mammon-does-poverty-cause-militant-islam>.

But **the empirical record evinces little correlation between economics and militant Islam. Aggregate measures of wealth and economic trends fall flat as predictors of where militant Islam will be strong and where not. On the level of individuals, too, conventional wisdom points to militant Islam attracting the poor, the alienated and the marginal-but research finds precisely the opposite to be true. To the extent that economic factors explain who becomes Islamist, they point to the fairly well off, not the poor**.

Economic Decline Good For Environment

Only an economic decline can promote environmental sustainability

Trainer 7

Ted, Lecturer @ South Wales University in Australia, Renewable Energy Cannot Sustain A Consumer Society, SpringerLink

The reason why we have an environment problem is simply because there is far too much producing and consuming going on. (For a detailed argument see Trainer, 1998.) Our way of life involves the consumption of huge amounts of materials. More than 20 tonnes of new resources are used by each American every year. To produce one tonne of materials can involve processing 15 tonnes of water, earth or air. (For gold the multiple is 350,000 to 1.) All this must be taken from nature and most of it is immediately dumped back as waste and pollution. One of the most serious environmental problems is the extinction of plant and animal species. This is due to the destruction of habitats. Remember our footprint; if all 9 billion people soon to live on earth were to have rich-world “living stan- dards”, humans would have to use about ten times all the productive land on the planet. Clearly our resource-intensive lifestyles, which require so much land and so many resources, are the basic cause of the loss of habitats and the extinction of species. Most green and sustainability rhetoric totally fails to grasp the significance of this magnitude, proceeding as if it is possible to make manufacturing and lifestyles and the economy sustainable without any need to reduce the volume of production and consumption, “living standards”, or the GDP. It ignores the glaring fact that perhaps 90% cuts in resource use are required and these cannot possibly be made without phasing out most industrial activity, trade, travel and commerce...without, in other words, extreme and historically unprecedented social change

Growth Makes Environmental Collapse Inevitable

Hamilton 3

Clive, Professor of Public Ethics, Growth Fetish, Questia

It is commonplace to observe that the current pattern of material consumption is environmentally unsustainable. We hear statements along the lines that if everyone in the world were to consume as much as the average consumer in the rich countries we would require four planets the size of Earth. For the most part, the general public's reaction to declarations by scientists and environmental activists that the expansion of the economy cannot be sustained physically is one of short-lived alarm followed by passivity, as if the problems are too overwhelming to dwell on. The implication of the unsustainability of material consumption levels—that we may need to transform our ways of living—challenges some of the most fundamental beliefs about how we live and how the future will unfold, a world view in which continued growth is assumed. The political aspirations of environmentalism are hamstrung by growth fetishism: however much people may agree that we need to change our lifestyles so that we tread more lightly on Earth, when put to the test most people go cold. The attachments appear too strong. In contrast, socialist revolutionaries had an easier task because they promised better material living standards for the mass of ordinary people.

**Economic Decline Good for Environment**

**Decline solves warming – investment – downturn causes a weed-out and allows re-investment in green energy**

AFP 8

9/18, Economic downturn 'a chance to invest' in green energy: Gore, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5jG0UqOyZ\_VSEN1i8jCsCzwhQr6uA

The global economic downturn and the crisis in the US financial markets offers the chance for investment in green energy, former US vice-president Al Gore said Thursday. Central banks have thrown billions of dollars at the global credit storm, which has seen stock markets plunge and scalped big banks exposed to the ongoing effects of last year's collapse of the US sub-prime mortgage market. Speaking via satellite-link at the launch of Live Earth India concert, where proceeds will go to solar energy projects, the environmental campaigner said the world was at a turning point. Asked by AFP whether the financial crisis would mean less money for projects to cut greenhouse gases blamed for global warming, Gore said the time was now right to stimulate the right kinds of investment to kickstart economies. "In the United States, the largest amount of debt has been pulled up because of the purchase of foreign oil," he told a news conference. "We need to substitute renewable sources of energy -- solar energy, wind energy and others -- in place of the very expensive and dirty oil and coal that's contributing to the debt crisis and the general financial crisis. "It (the global financial slump) is in some ways a great opportunity for us to have these technologies before us... to revive economies." Gore, who with the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change won the Nobel Peace Prize last year, said renewable energy projects would create jobs, "stimulating the economy in the right way."

**Decline solves warming - oil investments - downturn deters investment into environmentally risky projects – solves warming**

Klare 8

Michael, 10/20, How the Economic Crisis Will Affect the Environment, Online

The good news is that economic hard times will cause people to drive less, fly less, and otherwise consume less energy, thus lowering expectations for greenhouse-gas emissions. According to the [most recent projections](http://www.manufacturing.net/News-IEA-Slashes-08-09-Oil-Demand-Forecasts.aspx) from the International Energy Agency (IEA) in Paris, global oil demand in 2008 will be 240,000 barrels per day less than in its earlier predictions, and 440,000 barrels per day less than in its predictions for 2009. Many experts believe, moreover, that demand will drop even further in the weeks and months ahead as the economic crisis deepens and consumers around the world cut back on their travel and energy use -- and the less oil consumed, the less CO2 emitted. As petroleum consumption declines, the price of oil is also likely to drop -- thereby discouraging investment in many costly and environmental hazardous energy projects. Already, the price of oil has plunged by nearly half over the past three months, from $140 to $70 a barrel, and some experts see prices going even lower. Fifty dollars a barrel "is now within the realm of possibilities," [according to](http://www.forbes.com/feeds/ap/2008/10/15/ap5558845.html) oil analyst Stephen Schork. At these prices, it may no longer be profitable to advance some of the more technologically challenging energy projects with a significant environmental risk, such as the development of Canadian tar sands or Rocky Mountain shale oil. These projects might make economic sense when oil is $80 per barrel or more -- despite strong objections from environmentalists -- but won't attract support from investors when the price of oil slips much below this level.

**Economic Decline Good for Warming**

Economic Decline Is Key to Slowing Global Warming

Owen 09

David Owen is a staff writer for The New Yorker and the author of a dozen books March 30, 2009 New Yorker Economy vs.Environment

[http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2009/03/30/090330taco\_talk\_owen d.a](http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2009/03/30/090330taco_talk_owen%20d.a). 7-15-10

So far, **the most effective way for a Kyoto signatory to cut its carbon output has been to suffer a well-timed industrial implosion, as Russia did** after the collapse of the Soviet Union, **in** 19**91**. The Kyoto benchmark year is 1990, when the smokestacks of the Soviet military-industrial complex were still blackening the skies, so when Vladimir Putin ratified the protocol, in 2004, Russia was already certain to meet its goal for 2012. The countries with the best emissions-reduction records—Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, and the Czech Republic—were all parts of the Soviet empire and therefore look good for the same reason. The United States didn’t ratify the Kyoto Protocol, but Canada did, and its experience is suggestive because its economy and per-capita oil consumption are similar to ours. Its Kyoto target is a six-per-cent reduction from 1990 levels. By 2006, however, despite the expenditure of billions of dollars on climate initiatives, its greenhouse-gas output had increased to a hundred and twenty-two per cent of the goal, and the environment minister described the Kyoto target as “impossible.” The explanation for Canada’s difficulties isn’t complicated: the world’s principal source of man-made greenhouse gases has always been prosperity. **The recession makes that relationship easy to see: shuttered factories don’t spew carbon dioxide; the unemployed drive fewer miles and turn down their furnaces, air-conditioners, and swimming-pool heaters; struggling corporations and families cut back on air travel; even affluent people buy less throwaway junk. Gasoline consumption in the United States fell almost six per cent in 2008. That was the result not of a sudden greening of the American consciousness but of the rapid rise in the price of oil during the first half of the year, followed by the full efflorescence of the current economic mess**. The world’s financial and energy crises are connected, and they are similar because credit and fossil fuels are forms of leverage: oil, coal, and natural gas are multipliers of labor in much the same way that credit is a multiplier of wealth. Human history is the history of our ascent up what the naturalist Loren Eiseley called “the heat ladder”: coal bested firewood as an amplifier of productivity, and oil and natural gas bested coal. Fossil fuels have enabled us to leverage the strength of our bodies, and we are borrowing against the world’s dwindling store of inexpensive energy in the same way that we borrowed against the illusory equity in our homes. Moreover, American dependence on fossil fuels isn’t going to end any time soon: solar panels and wind turbines provided only about a half per cent of total U.S. energy consumption in 2007, and they don’t work when the sun isn’t shining or the wind isn’t blowing. Replacing oil is going to require more than determination.

Economic decline slows global warming

Owen 09

David Owen is a staff writer for The New Yorker and the author of a dozen books March 30, 2009 New Yorker Economy vs.Environment

[http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2009/03/30/090330taco\_talk\_owen d.a](http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2009/03/30/090330taco_talk_owen%20d.a). 7-15-10

One beneficial consequence of **the** ongoing **global economic crisis** is that it has **put** a little **time back on the carbon clock**. **Because the climate damage done by greenhouse gases is cumulative, the emissions decrease attributable to the recession has given the world a bit more room to devise a plan that might actually work**. The prospects for a meaningful worldwide climate agreement probably improved last November, with the election of Barack Obama, but his commitments to economic recovery and carbon reduction—to bringing the country out of recession while also reducing U.S. greenhouse emissions to seventeen per cent of their 2005 level by 2050—don’t pull in the same direction. Creating “green jobs,” a key component of the agenda, is different from creating new jobs, since green jobs, if they’re truly green, displace non-green jobs—wind-turbine mechanics instead of oil-rig roughnecks—probably a zero-sum game, as far as employment is concerned. The ultimate success or failure of Obama’s program, and of the measures that will be introduced in Copenhagen this year, will depend on our willingness, once the global economy is no longer teetering, to accept policies that will seem to be nudging us back toward the abyss.

**Economic Decline Good for Warming**

ECONOMIC DECLINE IS SLOWING WARMING

Hood 09

Marlowe Hood (AFP) –Marlowe Hood, a writer living in New York. A visiting scholar at Columbia University's East Asia Institute d.a. 7-15-10

[http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hfyWeEve4ccKSImFxtXOMfI7DvVg New Yorker 10-6-09](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hfyWeEve4ccKSImFxtXOMfI7DvVg%20New%20Yorker%2010-6-09)

**The global economic crisis will slash carbon emissions** in 2009, **opening a narrow opportunity to take decisive action on global warming**, the International Energy Agency said Tuesday. **The predicted three percent fall in energy-related CO2 pollution compared with a year earlier would be the steepest drop in 40** years, chief IEA economist Fatih Birol said at a press conference in Bangkok. The global carbon output up to now has on average grown three percent annually, he added. Birol said **this silver-lining drop in carbon pollution was a "unique window of opportunity" for the world to put itself on a path to limit the increase in global temperatures to two degrees** Celsius (3.6 degrees Fahrenheit), **the scientific threshold for dangerous global warming. The recession-driven fall would lead to CO2 emissions in 2020 being five percent lower than the IEA forecast from just a year ago, even if no further action is taken to curb global warming**, he added.

Economic decline solves warming

Kambas 8

Michelle, 10/17, Economic woes may give planet a breather, <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE4966A220081007>

A slowdown in the world economy may give the planet a breather from the excessively high carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions responsible for climate change, a Nobel Prize winning scientist said on Tuesday. Atmospheric scientist Paul J Crutzen, who has in the past floated the possibility of blitzing the stratosphere with sulfur particles to cool the earth, said clouds gathering over the world economy could ease the earth's environmental burden. Slower economic growth worldwide could help slow growth of carbon dioxide emissions and trigger more careful use of energy resources, though the global economic turmoil may also divert focus from efforts to counter climate change, said Crutzen, winner of the 1995 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for his work on the depletion of the ozone layer. "It's a cruel thing to say ... but if we are looking at a slowdown in the economy, there will be less fossil fuels burning, so for the climate it could be an advantage," Crutzen told Reuters in an interview. "We could have a much slower increase of CO2 emissions in the atmosphere ... people will start saving (on energy use) ... but things may get worse if there is less money available for research and that would be serious." CO2 emissions, released by the burning of fossil fuels in power stations, factories, homes and vehicles, are growing at almost 3.0 percent a year. The U.N. Panel on Climate Change estimates that world temperatures may rise by between 1.8 and 4.0 degrees Celsius (3.2-7.2 degrees Fahrenheit) this century. The Group of Eight industrial nations agreed in July to a goal of halving world emissions by 2050.