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Counterterror Bad—Terrorism

**Counterterrorism fails- increases resentment- can’t address the root cause of terror**

Armed Forces Journal 8 [“The counterterrorism paradox”. Written by Brian Burton. 2008.

<http://www.afji.com/2008/06/3483209/>]

Put the terrorist threat in perspective Almost seven years after the 9/11 attacks, the primary military manifestations of America’s global war on terrorism are the seemingly interminable campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet there is little evidence that these operations are doing much to reduce the international terrorist threat to America’s homeland, people and interests. International terrorism cannot be neutralized through large-scale employment of armed forces. What these wars have demonstrated is that the U.S. does not possess a clear understanding of the threat environment, nor does it have an effective overall strategy or appropriate military forces to mitigate this threat. America faces a threat that is globally diffuse and adaptable. It is, therefore, necessary for the U.S. to adopt a subtler strategy that enlists the aid of allies around the world, and develop similarly subtle forces to counter terrorist groups abroad. The U.S. is in the paradoxical situation in which al-Qaida-type international terrorism is the most direct security threat, but this threat is less significant in strategic military terms. It is essential to keep this threat in perspective. The Soviet Union, armed with thousands upon thousands of nuclear weapons, presented an existential danger to the U.S. Although terrorists clearly have the potential to kill U.S. citizens in large numbers and disrupt American prosperity through low-technology but innovative and highly effective means, the damage that they can inflict is orders of magnitude less than that which the Soviet Union posed or some hypothetical future peer competitor would pose. That is not to understate the destruction that terrorists can cause or the importance of countering international terrorism. The proliferation of modern communications and weapons technologies has placed increasingly destructive capabilities at the disposal of more people worldwide, ensuring that the potential for terrorist attacks capable of killing hundreds or thousands will be an enduring threat to American society. Given that the basic responsibility of the U.S. government is to protect American citizens’ rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, deterring and countering terrorist attacks must be a priority in any U.S. defense strategy. However, the terrorist threat is not one that can be deterred or countered in the conventional sense. Threatening states can be contained through networks of security alliances with other states; in war, their infrastructure can be targeted for destruction and their military forces defeated by superior arms. State leaders generally have something valuable to lose, such as their own political power, should they to go to war and be defeated, rendering challenging other states or alliances of states with significant military capabilities an unattractive option. But when facing al-Qaida, an amorphous clandestine network of extremist individuals with a predilection for suicidal attacks on American and allied citizens, none of these conditions exist. Al-Qaida usually resides close to civilian populations that either are acquiescent or openly sympathetic to the terrorist cause, and within states that lack the capacity to confront the problem. The U.S.-led overthrow of the Taliban regime and elimination of terrorist bases in Afghanistan in 2001 was a defeat for the main terrorist threat facing the country, but a July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) found that al-Qaida has “protected or regenerated key elements of its [U.S.] homeland attack capability, including: a safe haven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and key leaders.” That is problematic enough, but al-Qaida and other terrorist groups increasingly may not need even this minimal infrastructure. As the same NIE states, “globalization trends and recent technological advances will continue to enable even small numbers of alienated people to ... mobilize resources to attack — all without requiring a centralized terrorist organization, training camp, or leader.” Groups with aspirations to attack Americans or their allies may be increasingly formed via online communication and information-sharing. The U.S. intelligence community assessed in 2006 that “the global jihadist movement is decentralized ... and is becoming more diffuse” as “self-radicalized cells” sprout independently in European countries’ Muslim diaspora populations to carry out attacks such as the bombings of transportation systems in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005. As former CIA officer Marc Sageman describes, the new generation of radical Islamist terrorists has not “been trained in terrorist camps” and probably has no direct links to al-Qaida Central. Rather, they are self-recruited, “self-financed and self-trained” individuals already living in Western countries who “form fluid, informal networks” through the Internet, a phenomenon known as “leaderless jihad.” These diffuse cells may be too small and unsophisticated to perpetrate such a complicated action as happened on Sept. 11, 2001, but they have already demonstrated the ability to carry out effective attacks. Therefore, although the most lethal terrorist threat may be hiding in the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan and needs bases to develop effectively, the more immediate threat lies within America’s most capable allies in Western Europe. In the face of this danger, America’s military operations since 2001 have failed to adequately address the problem and in some ways have actually been counterproductive. Afghanistan was handled well early on, with special operations forces and covert operatives linking with local friendly forces to defeat the Taliban and target al-Qaida bases with significant help from precision strikes by U.S. warplanes. The invasion of Iraq was of questionable value mainly because there was little evidence to suggest that Saddam Hussein’s regime was a significant supporter of al-Qaida or other terrorists directly threatening America. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military became deeply involved in nation-building and counterinsurgency roles aimed at rebuilding these countries into strong allied states capable of combating terrorism. The strategic objective of these campaigns has been akin to Thomas P.M. Barnett’s recommendation in “The Pentagon’s New Map” that the U.S. can best defend itself from international terrorism by shrinking the world’s “Non-Integrating Gap” — the countries of the world that are cut off from globalization’s benefits of good governance and high standards of living and, thus, are apt to become breeding grounds for terrorists. Through military intervention in “Gap” countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq, Barnett’s strategy assumes, the U.S. can help reintegrate them into the prosperous modern world order and thereby prevent them from producing or harboring terrorists. THE WEALTHY TERRORIST This strategic vision has some merit, but it overlooks three key problems. First, terrorists are not necessarily products of political oppression or poor living standards in the Third World. Many of al-Qaida’s leaders and operators are from reasonably privileged or well-to-do backgrounds and have experienced life and education in America or Europe. Secondly, although there is clearly the potential for terrorist havens in failed states around the world, al-Qaida-associated terrorist cells are capable of operating clandestinely in well-developed countries without supporting bases. Finally, large-scale military interventions as advocated by Barnett and practiced by the U.S. military generate resentments that help fuel international terrorism. According to U.S. intelligence in 2006, the “Iraq conflict has become the ‘cause celebre’ for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement.” The increased U.S. military presence in the Middle East in direct combat roles confirms terrorist narratives of an American war on Islam and generates popular sympathies in the Muslim world for their cause. This state of affairs puts U.S. policymakers in a very difficult position. On the one hand, there is a need to prevent the establishment of terrorist safe havens in ungoverned parts of the globe and to eliminate key terrorist leaders such as Osama bin Laden who most likely are hiding in those ungoverned regions. On the other hand, military actions in failed states do little to counter or prevent attacks by diffuse Western-grown cells, and visible uses of military force to “shrink the Gap” inflame popular resentments that inspire potential terrorists. The best way to approach the challenge of countering international terrorist groups is a lower-profile global strategy focused on cultivating strong alliances with foreign governments and their security forces and then working with and through them.

Counterterror Bad—Terrorism

Counterterrorism fails- increased likelihood of retaliation- turns case

Mahan and Griset 2

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Many terrorist experts and policymakers endorse the concept that a strong offense is the best defense, but some warn that the US is partially responsible for the heightened terrorist threat the world faces. According to the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board (1997), “historical data show a strong correlation between US involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the US” (p. 15). Eland (1998) further examines the correlations noted by the Defense Science board and concludes that American military intervention in foreign countries inevitably led terrorists to retaliate against the US. It is not American pop culture, depravity, or materialism that provokes terrorism, Eland argues; instead, it is America’s exercise of its military overseas.

Counterterrorism fails- increases recruits, undermines credibility

Richardson 6 **[**Louise Richardson, Executive Dean, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University. The Journal of the ACS Issue Groups. “Restoration, Education, and Coordination: Three Principles to Guide U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts Over the Next Five Years”. November 11, 2006.

http://www.acslaw.org/files/Restoration-Education-Coordination.pdf]

As we approach the seventh anniversary of the attacks of 9/11, the evidence of the failure of United States counterterrorism policy accumulates daily. True, we have not been attacked at home since then, though whether this is due to actions our government has taken or because our adversaries have lacked the capacity to attack us, we simply do not know. We do not, in fact, know whether the estimated $58 billion a year the United States (“U.S.”) is spending on Homeland Security is making our homeland more secure. We do know, or rather, there is compelling evidence that the foreign policy our government has followed in the name of counterterrorism has served to swell the ranks of our adversaries and thereby undermine our nation’s security. In considering the counterterrorism experience of other democracies, one general observation stands out: governments improve the efficacy of their policies over time. The British, Indian, Italian and Peruvian governments, for example, each learned from the early mistakes they made against the Irish Republican Army (“IRA”), Sikh terrorists, the Red Brigades and the Shining Path respectively, and each significantly improved the effectiveness of its counterterrorism policies. The very mixed record of U.S. early counterterrorism policies suggests that there might be an openness to new approaches here too. The record is mixed because, like other democratic governments before us, we have been unable to translate military strength into victory against terrorism. We have waged two wars at a cost of over four thousand American lives, and tens of thousands of non-American lives, yet we have not captured the perpetrators of the 9/11 attack. We have damaged our reputation and undermined our influence overseas while winning recruits for our adversaries. Public confidence in the ability of our government to improve its practices, however, was severely shaken by the thoroughly mishandled response to hurricane Katrina, which occurred only a few years after the U.S. invested billions in homeland security measures and disaster response preparedness. That natural disaster exposed rampant incompetence, confusion, lack of coordination, planning and follow-through, raising serious questions about our ability to handle the repercussions of another terrorist attack.

Counterterror Bad—Lead to Drones

Relying on a lighter footprint means UAVs become necessary

Anderson 10 (Kenneth Anderson 2-18-2010, law professor at Washington College of Law, American University, Washington DC, and a member of the Hoover Task Force on National Security and Law, blogs on topics related to international laws of war, international law, related human rights topics, international NGOs, and the theory of the just war. :The Obama Administration’s Contrasting On-Defense, On-Offense Response to Terrorism” Accessed 8-1-2010)

No matter what turn national security strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan takes, or wherever else jihadist terrorist might regroup or form, drone strikes will be increasingly relied upon as a weapon. If the administration seriously doubles down on counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, UAV strikes against leadership hiding out in Pakistan becomes ever more important. That’s quite apart from attacking Pakistani Taliban intent on destabilizing Pakistan as well. On the other hand, if the administration moves to the “light footprint” that Vice-President Biden urged, or even exit from the ground war, UAVs become ever more crucial as the over-the-horizon mechanism for projecting discrete but implacable force. The same, but more so, in dealing with terrorist groups in other ungoverned places in the world. Drones permit the US to go directly after terrorists, rather than having to fight through whole countries to reach them with boots on the ground – attacks directly against the terrorists and their leadership. Maybe that’s not enough to win. Maybe “light-footprint” counterterrorism via drones turns out to be the latest mistake in the perennial effort to find a way to win a war through strategic airpower. Yet even if the strategy is instead serious counterinsurgency on the ground (denial of the territory where the terrorists find safe-haven, rather than simply attacks against the terrorists) drones will still be increasingly important. Counterinsurgency strategy will still seek to attack terrorists directly even while clearing and holding territory. The upshot? No matter what direction the US moves strategically, drones will be an increasingly part of the “on-offense” part of that. This will become only more so over time, if the US gradually permits itself to develop and operationalize ever smaller, less detectable, more discriminate, more “sensor-laden,” and more individually lethal, remote-piloted UAVs.

Drones fit the strategic needs of counterterrorism, guaranteeing their use

Joshi 10 (Shashank Joshi 2010, doctoral student of international relations at the Department of Government, Harvard University. He writes about international security, military affairs, and Indian foreign policy. Has worked for the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in Moscow, Citigroup in New York, and the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London. “Droning on: The American Bolt From The Blue”. Accessed 8-1-2010)

Unmanned flight appears to have a bright future. European contractors now enable smaller countries to use surveillance drones, and the wider trend towards the privatisation of defence functions indicates this will flourish. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) emphasis on information-enabled warfare is likely to see it expand its fleet, whose size is underreported today. And drones' low cost and apparent effectiveness accords with growing calls for the US to adopt a 'light footprint' in its efforts against terrorism, allowing a withdrawal of troops and a focus on the attrition of command structures from afar. As the US grows increasingly impatient with the Pakistani military inaction against, or connivance with, the spectrum of militants in the border regions, they have threatened to expand attacks outside the tribal areas to Balochistan, almost certainly the home of the Afghan Taliban.

Counterterrorism is an increase in reliance on drones, Special Forces operations, training, and other surgical tactics

Peter Baker and Elisabeth Bumiller are journalists for the New York Times. September 22, 2009. “Obama Considers Strategy Shift in Afghan War.” <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/world/asia/23policy.html?_r=4> (free registration required) mrs

Among the alternatives being presented to Mr. Obama is Mr. Biden’s suggestion to revamp the strategy altogether. Instead of increasing troops, officials said, Mr. Biden proposed scaling back the overall American military presence. Rather than trying to protect the Afghan population from the Taliban, American forces would concentrate on strikes against Qaeda cells, primarily in Pakistan, using special forces, Predator missile attacks and other surgical tactics. The Americans would accelerate training of Afghan forces and provide support as they took the lead against the Taliban. But the emphasis would shift to Pakistan. Mr. Biden has often said that the United States spends something like $30 in Afghanistan for every $1 in Pakistan, even though in his view the main threat to American national security interests is in Pakistan. Mr. Obama rejected Mr. Biden’s approach in March, and it is not clear that it has more traction this time. But the fact that it is on the table again speaks to the breadth of the administration’s review and the evolving views inside the White House of what has worked in the region and what has not. In recent days, officials have expressed satisfaction with the results of their cooperation with Pakistan in hunting down Qaeda figures in the unforgiving border lands. A shift from a counterinsurgency strategy to a focus on counterterrorism would turn the administration’s current theory on its head. The strategy Mr. Obama adopted in March concluded that to defeat Al Qaeda, the United States needed to keep the Taliban from returning to power in Afghanistan and making it a haven once again for Osama bin Laden’s network. Mr. Biden’s position questions that assumption.

Counterterror Bad- Intelligence

Counterterrorism fails- cannot generate intelligence

Crowley 9

Michael Crowley, senior editor at The New Republic- lead national security and foreign policy writer. “Riedel: Counterterrorism Won’t Work”. September 28, 2009. <http://www.tnr.com/blog/the-plank/riedel-counterterrorism-wont-work>

Former CIA man Bruce Riedel, who chaired Obama's (first) Afghanistan strategy review earlier this year, writing with co-author Michael O'Hanlon, [warns against](http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2009/09/column-why-we-cant-go-small-in-afghanistan.html) what you might call the [Biden strategy](http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/hawk-down). The fundamental reason that a counterterrorism-focused strategy fails is that it cannot generate good intelligence. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban know not to use their cellphones and satellite phones today, so our spy satellites are of little use in finding extremists. We need information from unmanned low-altitude aircraft and, even more, from people on the ground who speak the language and know the comings and goings of locals. But our Afghan friends who might be inclined to help us with such information would be intimidated by insurgent and terrorist forces into silence — or killed if they cooperated — because we would lack the ability to protect them under a counterterrorism approach.

Counterterror Bad--Pakistan

Reliance on only counterterror destabilizes Pakistan, kills intelligence-gathering, weakens US base security, increases reliance on drone strikes, and feeds anti-American propaganda

Bill Roggio is the editor-in-chief of the Long War Journal, has been an embedded journalist in Iraq and Afghanistan for several years, is the President of Public Media, Incorporated, and presents regularly at Army Training Schools. September 24, 2009. “Counterterrorism at the expense of counterinsurgency will doom Afghanistan and Pakistan: US officials.” http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/09/reliance\_of\_countert.php. mrs

US military and intelligence officials are concerned that a proposed alternative plan to ramp up cross-border attacks in Pakistan and rapidly build the Afghan security forces in lieu of a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy may take hold and lead to a catastrophic failure in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This alternative strategy, which was proposed by Vice President Joe Biden and reported in The New York Times, calls for reducing the US military mission in Afghanistan and ramping up airstrikes and covert raids against the al Qaeda in Pakistan’s tribal areas. "Rather than trying to protect the Afghan population from the Taliban, American forces would concentrate on strikes against al Qaeda cells, primarily in Pakistan, using special forces, Predator missile attacks and other surgical tactics," The New York Times reported. "The Americans would accelerate training of Afghan forces and provide support as they took the lead against the Taliban. But the emphasis would shift to Pakistan." But US military and intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal warned that a strict focus on a counterterrorism mission concentrating on al Qaeda's leaders in Pakistan would cede the ground in Afghanistan to both the Taliban and al Qaeda and would have only a limited impact on al Qaeda's leadership. A ramped up program of cross-border strikes into Pakistan would also likely lead to the destabilization of Pakistan's government and a possible revolt within the Pakistani military and intelligence services. And, a strategy that focuses heavily on counterterrorism tactics such as unmanned strikes and night raids would only play into the propaganda message of al Qaeda and the Taliban. Strong links between al Qaeda and the Taliban will provide safe havens US officials have warned that focusing on al Qaeda while ignoring the Taliban in both Pakistan and Afghanistan underestimates the close relationships between the groups. "The theory that al Qaeda will not seek shelter with the Afghan Taliban ignores the very lessons we have learned since the Sept. 11 attacks," a US military intelligence official who focuses on al Qaeda and the Taliban told The Long War Journal. "If anything, the relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda has strengthened, not weakened, over the past few years." The relationship between the Haqqani Network and al Qaeda is cited as the prime example of the increased linkage between the Taliban and al Qaeda. Siraj Haqqani, the military commander of the Haqqani Network, which operates in eastern Afghanistan and in Pakistan's tribal agency of North Waziristan, has close ties to both Mullah Omar and Osama bin Laden. He has recruited both foreign and local fighters to serve as suicide bombers and has employed them against Afghan and Coalition forces. Mullah Sangeen Zadran, a senior Haqqani Network military commander, recently said the relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban is strong. Sangeen made the statement in an interview with As Sahab, al Qaeda's propaganda arm. According to Sangeen: "All praise is for Allah, Al-Qaeda and Taliban all are Muslims and we are united by the brotherhood of Islam. We do not see any difference between Taliban and Al Qaeda, for we all belong to the religion of Islam. Sheikh Osama has pledged allegiance to Amir Al-Mumineen (Mullah Muhammad Omar) and has reassured his leadership again and again. There is no difference between us, for we are united by Islam and the Sharia governs us. Just as the infidels are one people, so are the Muslims, and they will never succeed in disuniting the Mujahideen, saying that there is Al- Qaeda and Taliban, and that Al-Qaeda are terrorists and extremists. They use many such words, but by the Grace of Allah, it will not affect our brotherly relationship. Now they are also trying to disunite the Taliban, saying that there are two wings, one extremist and another moderate. However, the truth is that we are all one and are united by Islam." The close ties between the Haqqani Network and al Qaeda were highlighted in General Stanley McChrystal's assessment on Afghanistan, which was leaked to The Washington Post. According to McChrystal, the Haqqanis' territories in Khost, Paktika, and Paktia provinces are ripe for al Qaeda camps. "Al Qaeda's links with HQN [Haqqani Network] have grown, suggesting that expanded HQN control could create a favorable environment for AQAM [al Qaeda and allied movements] to re-establish safe-havens in Afghanistan," according to the McChrystal assessment. Withdrawing into bases to conduct raids and Predator/Reaper airstrikes in Pakistan would only allow al Qaeda to prosper in Afghanistan. "If we pull back, the Afghan military will not be able to hold ground, and the Taliban, the Haqqanis, HIG [Gulbuddin Hekmartyr's Hizb-i-Islami faction], and smaller groups will take the ground in much of the South and East, and even in areas in the West and North," a senior US military intelligence official told The Long War Journal. "Once we lose that ground, our access to local intel is hampered," the official said. "We have no doubt al Qaeda and the Taliban will reestablish dominance in short order. The very security of the bases used to conduct the strikes in Pakistan would be in jeopardy.” "There are already Taliban safe havens in many areas in Afghanistan, and al Qaeda trainers and advisers, and even some paramilitary units from Brigade 055 are in Afghanistan," the official continued, referring to one of the brigades of al Qaeda's paramilitary Shadow Army based along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Pakistani pushback A pullback of Coalition forces would also create an incentive for the Pakistani military and intelligence services to revitalize their support for the Taliban, officials say. "The Pakistanis have long believed we will pull back, that our will to ride out the storm in Afghanistan is weak, and they've kept some Taliban groups in reserve for just that day," one official said. "Pakistan will want to fill the political and security vacuum in Afghanistan with its historic allies: the Taliban," an official said. "The concept of strategic depth has not been tossed aside by the Pakistanis; it has merely been shelved until we in the US and NATO lose our will," a military officer said, referring to Pakistan's strategy to back the Taliban as a reserve force against its traditional enemy, India, as well as a way to keep India from exercising influence in Afghanistan. Destabilization in Pakistan An increase in Predator and Reaper strikes in Pakistan's border areas will also have a negative impact on relations with Pakistan, and might potentially destabilize the Pakistani government. "Powerful, anti-American elements within the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment may revolt against an increase in US strikes inside Pakistan," a senior intelligence official said. "There is much distaste for the strikes as is, and increasing the frequency of strikes while putting US troops on the ground inside Pakistan would be a red line for some." "The Pakistani military might be able to look the other way from the unmanned strikes, as they currently do, but drastically increasing the strikes along with the addition of US Special Operations Forces regularly entering the country would not be accepted for long," the official continued. "Just look at the uproar last September's raid in South Waziristan caused. The Pakistanis closed the Khyber Pass in protest." The Pakistani government has played a double game when it comes to US airstrikes in the tribal areas, which highlights the political sensitivities over the issue. The government officially condemns the strikes while privately approving them, and has tasked the military to provide intelligence on terror groups in the tribal areas. At least one US Predator base has been identified in Pakistan's southwestern province of Baluchistan. But to this day, US intelligence officials believe powerful elements within Pakistan’s Inter Service Intelligence agency are tipping off al Qaeda and the Taliban on strikes when they are able to. US officials are also certain that a stepped up US ground campaign in Pakistan's tribal areas will force al Qaeda and allied groups to disperse to other areas in Pakistan, including in Baluchistan, Punjab, the Northwest Frontier Province, and Kashmir, all with the aid of elements within the military and intelligence services. "This would be their revenge," one official said. "And what next? Would we launch airstrikes in the heart of the Punjab, or against Muridke?" the official continued, referring to the vast Lashkar-e-Taiba complex near Lahore. Al Qaeda and the Lashkar-e-Taiba are closely allied in Pakistan. Over-reliance on cross border strikes aids Taliban propaganda An over-reliance on airstrikes and covert raids would also play into the Taliban and al Qaeda's propaganda message, officials say. "Look at how airstrikes in Afghanistan are used against us; we'd only feed that machine," a military intelligence official said. "Not only does al Qaeda and the Taliban use the attacks to falsely claim we intentionally target civilians, they say the US is too afraid to match them on the ground," the official continued, noting that a pullback would only help fortify this propaganda message.

Counterterror Bad- Human Rights/ Credibility

**Counterterrorism fails- undermines international human rights standards and kills cooperation, breeds resentment, increases recruitment, turns credibility**

**Roth 4**

Kenneth Roth – Executive Director, Human Rights Watch. Published by Princeton University. “Counterterrorism and Human Rights: An Essential Alliance”. December 12-14, 2004.

<http://www.l20.org/publications/9_iY_wmd_roth.pdf>

Common wisdom in some circles has it that in fighting terrorism, security and human rights are inevitably opposed – a zero sum game in which one must be sacrificed to advance the other. Embracing this understanding, many of those leading the campaign against terrorism have been reluctant to allow human rights standards to constrain their efforts. However, that approach is dangerously short-sighted and counterproductive. It undermines the U.N.-created standards that outlaw terrorism, fosters the repressive conditions that give rise to terrorist violence, and breeds resentment that discourages international cooperation and facilitates terrorist recruitment. Fighting terrorism while ignoring human rights is not only wrong; it is self-defeating. An effective counterterrorism policy will see human rights not as an inconvenient impediment but as an essential ally. The approach of the United States illustrates the problem. Washington is hardly the only offender when it comes to ignoring human rights in the name of fighting terrorism. Others, to name just a few, include the United Kingdom, Russia, China, Israel, Uzbekistan, Malaysia, and Zimbabwe. Particularly since September 11, many governments have found that a convenient way to fend off international scrutiny of abusive practices is to wave the anti-terrorism banner, whether in a genuine effort to defeat terrorism or as a pretext to quash dissent or separatist sentiment. Yet as the leader of the campaign against terrorism and the sole superpower, Washington’s conduct sets the dominant tone of the counterterrorism effort. That tone has been generally hostile to the limits imposed by international human rights and humanitarian law. For example, the United States has refused to apply the Geneva Conventions to the Guantánamo detainees or to act in conformity with these legal requirements; threatened to try some of those detainees before substandard military commissions; detained suspects far from any traditional battlefield as alleged “enemy combatants” with the asserted power to hold them indefinitely without charge, trial, or access to counsel; employed “stress and duress” interrogation techniques and other forms of coercive interrogation that constitute at least prohibited “cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment”; seized suspects in other countries despite the objection of local courts that convincing evidence of criminality had not been provided; and “rendered” detainees for interrogation to governments that practice systematic torture with at best flimsy, unenforceable diplomatic assurances against the suspects’ mistreatment. Perhaps because of these rights transgressions, the United States has been hostile to efforts to enforce rights in the counterterrorism context. It initially opposed a resolution at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights insisting that the campaign against terrorism be waged consistently with international human rights and humanitarian law; fought to avoid any formal obligation for the U.N. Security Council’s Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) to abide by human rights constraints or to develop the capacity to address human rights concerns; opposed a new U.N. inspection mechanism to prevent torture; and launched a series of attacks on the International Criminal Court. Because the United States is so influential, these actions, and others, have profoundly challenged the international system of human rights. That system has been applied to countless nations not only in periods of stability and calm but also when they are facing security threats. For the United States, now facing its own security threat, to set those standards aside does profound harm to this body of international law. The many governments around the world who have seized on their own “war against terrorism” to violate basic rights shows how dangerously contagious this exceptionalism can be. This disregard for human rights has also been devastating to U.S. standing in the world and, as a result, to the success of the campaign against terrorism. The global outpouring of sympathy for the United States that followed the September 11 attacks has been replaced by growing resentment of Washington. In part that resentment is the product of U.S. unilateralism and high-handedness. In part it is because of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and its unquestioning support of Israeli abusive practices. But in significant part it is the result of Washington’s hypocritical unwillingness to be bound by the same international standards to which it has long held others. That resentment has harmed the campaign against terrorism in several distinct ways: First, this violation of human rights undermines the very international standards that explain why terrorism is wrong. Given the horrors of terrorism, it is too easy to forget that many people accept terrorism as sometimes necessary to advance a given political agenda. That acceptance is reflected in the failure of the international community, despite decades of efforts, to arrive at an agreed definition of terrorism (although the recent high-level panel report on global threats may portend the emergence of a common understanding). In the absence of a clearly agreed definition, international human rights and humanitarian law provides the clearest norms for explaining that deliberate attacks on civilians are always unlawful, whether in times of peace or war, and regardless of the political cause. To flout that law in the name of fighting terrorism is thus to weaken the only existing standards that might convince people that terrorism is always wrong. Put another way, terrorists believe that the ends justify the means, that their political or social vision justifies the deliberate taking of civilian lives in violation of the most basic human rights norms. To fight terrorism without regard to the constraints of human rights is to endorse that warped logic. Second, neglecting human rights helps to create the political and social conditions that give rise to terrorism. There is obviously no single recipe for generating terrorists and much debate about the key ingredients that when added to extremist ideology create a violent mix. Some point to poverty, and certainly economic grievances play a role. Others point to failed states, and certainly the existence of lawless terrain is useful for facilitating meetings and establishing training facilities. But the key ingredient is often political repression – the absence of avenues for peaceful political change. That is, terrorists do not seem to be the poorest of the poor; many are well educated and come from reasonably affluent backgrounds. And helpful as lawless enclaves are for training purposes, terrorists have proven capable of hatching plots in the midst of advanced modern societies. Rather, what most terrorists seem to have in common is a political or social goal that they are unable to advance through an open political system. Most people, when faced with this predicament, will simply return home in frustration and, at least temporarily, abandon their political or social quest. But some minority of them will become open to recruitment by the terrorists. An effective counterterrorism strategy will confront this political frustration by encouraging open political cultures where grievances can be pursued peacefully. Such a strategy would promote healthy civil societies and accountable governments, complete with an independent press, unfettered political parties, a range of citizens organizations, and periodic, competitive elections – in short, a political culture built on respect for a broad range of human rights. By contrast, when human rights are ignored or suppressed in the name of fighting terrorism, it leads to authoritarian governments and stultified civil society – the political environment that is most likely to give rise to terrorist violence. Accepting authoritarianism in the name of short-term assistance in fighting terrorism, as the global counterterrorism effort seems to be doing, is thus likely to be profoundly counterproductive over the long run. Third, ignoring human rights as part of the fight against terrorism is likely to breed resentment that undermines international cooperation. The people whose cooperation is most important to defeat terrorism are the people who live in countries that are generating terrorists. They are needed to report suspicious activities and to dissuade would-be terrorists from embarking on a path of violence. Yet these individuals are also the most likely to identify with the victims of a counterterrorism strategy that ignores human rights. When they see their compatriots detained in violation of the Geneva Conventions at Guantánamo, subjected to “stress and duress” interrogation techniques at Bagram air base in Afghanistan, or mistreated by an authoritarian government whose repression is overlooked or even encouraged in the name of fighting terrorism, they are less likely to lend their support to the counterterrorism effort. Again, the advantage of ignoring human rights proves short-lived. Finally, that same resentment facilitates terrorist recruitment. As in the case of those unable to pursue grievances through an open political system, most of those who resent counterterrorism efforts waged in violation of human rights will grudgingly swallow their resentment and do nothing more. But of greatest concern are the relative handful of people whose resentment will open them to recruitment by the terrorists – the “swing vote.” Presumably, this swing vote represents a small percentage of the public, but even a small percentage when spread over a large population can yield substantial numbers. And it takes very few confirmed terrorists to wreak large-scale death and destruction. Winning the hearts and minds of this swing vote is essential to the success of the counterterrorism effort. But that requires taking the moral high ground. It requires a counterterrorist strategy that scrupulously and transparently respects international standards.

Counterterror Bad—Human Rights/Credibility

Counterinsurgency maintains proportionality, prevents civilian casualties, and preserves human rights

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One of the “most important” activities is establishing governance structures because effective governance will address social problems better than externally provided services.162 Developing governance includes establishing or strengthening local, regional, and national departments and agencies, creating a justice system, and working to secure fundamental human rights.163 Ensuring fair and transparent political processes enables self-government and provides a non-violent path for political expression. Guaranteeing a fair system of justice grants legitimacy to the state’s more coer-cive actions. In some cases, these systems may not exist or function and counterinsurgents will need to “establish legal procedures and systems to deal with captured insurgents and common criminals.”164 Economic and infrastructure development is also necessary to counterinsurgency because an effective economy gives the popula-tion a stake in society. Poor economic conditions provide an opportunity for insurgents’ false promises to gain active and passive sup-porters.165

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In counterinsurgency, the military side of the proportionality balancing test is thus handicapped by the fact that any attack may cause backlash.243 As a result, counterinsurgency might interpret proportionality not as military benefits versus humanitarian costs but rather as a cost-benefit analysis, in which humanitarian and strategic interests operate on both sides of the scale and incorpo-rate direct and indirect effects. Most important, military action ap-pears both as a cost and a benefit, not just as a benefit: killing civil-ians and even legitimate targets might be costly in terms of winning over the population if it could result in substantial backlash. Coun-terinsurgency’s proportionality test therefore places a thumb on the scale against military action. As a result, proportionality in counterinsurgency is likely to be far more humanitarian in its ori-entation than was proportionality in conventional warfare.

Counterterror Bad – Libya Proves

Counterterrorist strategies empirically increase terrorism – Libya proves

Lum et al. ‘6 [Cynthia Lum, assistant professor in the Department of Criminology, Law and Society at George Mason University, Deputy Director of the Research Program on Evidence-Based Policing at the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy at George Mason University, former Assistant Professor in the College of Criminal Justice at Northeastern. University; Leslie W. Kennedy, Professor and former Dean in the School of Criminal Justice at Rutgers University, former Professor of Sociology at the University of Alberta, former Director of the Population Research Laboratory at the University of Alberta, former Coordinator of the Center for Criminological Research at the University of Alberta; Allison J. Sherley, Ph.D. student at the School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University; January 2006, “The Effectiveness of Counter-terrorism Strategies: A Campbell Systematic Review,” Rutgers University Center on Public Security, http://www.rutgerscps.org/publications/Lum\_Terrorism\_Review.pdf]

We discovered that one often-researched event was the United States’ 1986 attack on Libya after Libya’s involvement in the bombing of the LaBelle Discotheque in West Berlin. While some have incorrectly reported the effects of the raid as reducing terrorism (see Prunckun and Mohr, 1997), it is generally believed that this raid increased terrorist attacks, at least in the short run (see Silke, 2005). Again, Enders and his colleagues discovered an interesting nuance in these effects. The findings indicated in Figure 7 point to the short run effects of the attack on Libya (the short run distinction is suggested by the authors themselves, as unlike metal detectors, the attacks on Libya were not sustained over the time series) as well as Israeli retaliatory strikes on Palestinians. Figure 7 generally shows that the attack on Libya resulted in a statistically significant increase in the number of terrorist attacks in the short run, with a weighted effect size of 15.33 events, with a 95% confidence interval of {3.46, 27.2}. However, Figure 7 also shows that the Libyan attack affected non-casualty events, threats and miscellaneous bombings more so than “resource utilizing” (Enders et al., 1990) attacks such as hijackings, hostage events, and events which lead to death or wounded individuals. Additionally, the specific retaliations researched seemed to increase attacks on the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel.

Counterterror Bad—Iraq Proves

Counterterrorism is bad- torture in Iraq proves

Mahan and Griset 2 [Pamala L. Griset, Associate professor in the dept. of criminal justice and legal studies at the University of Central Florida. PHD in criminal justice from the State University in Albany, New York. Employed as a deputy commissioner at the New York state divisions of criminal justices services. Assistant to the New York state director of criminal justice. Sue Mahan, Associate professor in Criminal Justice program at the University of Central Florida. PHD in sociology from the University of Missouri. “Terrorism in Perspective”. October 2002.]

Many unintended and unwanted consequences resulted from the occupation of Iraq. For example, the practice of torture, although widely condemned in the past by most nations, is now considered by some a necessary component of a successful counterterrorism strategy. Because “torture has been recognized as a most profound violation of human dignity,” it appears that the “US executive branch has been attempting to reduce the scope of what is meant by torture and degrading treatment, as well as to define a category of detainees who can be subject to coercive methods of interrogation (Foot, 2006, pp. 132-133). Images of the torture and sadistic treatment of prisoners in Abu Ghraib, a US-run prison in Iraq, horrified much of the world. In the US detention facility at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, prisoners from around the world have been housed for prolonged period without access to lawyers, without formal charges, and with few human rights.

Counterinsurgency is a vital prerequisite to counterterrorism

**Guardiano 7/30** (John Guardiano is a writer and analyst who focuses on political, military, and public-policy issues7/30/10, " How We Must Fight ", http://www.frumforum.com/how-we-must-fight)

and run in Afghanistan well before the mission there is complete. We’re in Afghanistan for one express purpose: al Qaeda, [which is a] threat to the United States. Al Qaeda: it exists in those mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan. “We are not there to nation-build. We’re not out there deciding we’re gonna turn this into a Jeffersonian democracy and build that country. We made it clear, we’re not there for 10 years. We are there to defeat al Qaeda, which is a clear and present danger to the United States, [and to stop it from] operating out of that area.” The problem with Biden’s statement is that nation-building is a necessary and integral part of the U.S. military’s counterinsurgency strategy; and counterinsurgencies typically take a long time to fight and to win. Indeed, according to General McChrystal’s predecessor, Gen. David McKiernan, counterinsurgencies typically take some 14 years to prosecute. Moreover, despite what conservative critics like Ralph Peters say, nation-building isn’t some liberal do-gooder project that we do because it makes us feel good. We nation-build because before we can leave Afghanistan, we need indigenous Afghan security forces and governmental entities to whom we can entrust authority and responsibility. Biden’s comments are extremely disconcerting because they show that he is fundamentally at odds with the U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan. The question is: does the Vice President speak for the commander-in-chief? I say this because in a counterinsurgency, the objective is not to kill your way to victory. That’s simply not feasible, as General Petraeus himself has acknowledged. The objective, instead, is to secure the population and isolate the enemy. Because when the enemy is isolated and deprived of his means of support within the population, he ceases to be factor. Thus we nation-build. We build schools, hospitals and indigenous local governing bodies. We build security forces and tribal and municipal councils. We build basic infrastructure — roads, irrigation networks, water and sewage treatment plants et al. And we build-up — and buck-up — our allies: those Afghans who are risking life and limb to work with us so as to free their country from the savage grip of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The problem with Biden’s so-called counterterrorism strategy is that it won’t work: because the fundamental problem in Afghanistan is political, not military. The country lacks adequate security and effective governance. And the only way to remedy this problem is to wage a classic (and necessarily long-term) counterinsurgency campaign to restore adequate security and at least a minimal level of effective governance. Afghanistan is simply too geographically complex and diffuse, too decentralized and unwieldy, and too populated and tribal to think that killing a select group of bad guys there will neutralize its terrorist threat. Of course, as the American Enterprise Institute’s Frederick W. Kagan, has observed, the U.S. military learned this lesson in Iraq: Perhaps the most important lesson of Iraq that is transportable to Afghanistan is this: It is impossible to conduct effective counterterrorism operations (i.e., targeting terrorist networks with precise attacks on key leadership nodes) in a fragile state without conducting effective counterinsurgency operations (i.e., protecting the population and using economic and political programs to build support for the government and resistance to insurgents and terrorists).

Iraq proves: counterterrorism failed and counterinsurgency solved

**Guardiano 7/30** (John Guardiano is a writer and analyst who focuses on political, military, and public-policy issues7/30/10, " How We Must Fight ", http://www.frumforum.com/how-we-must-fight)

In fact, Kagan notes, a counterterrorism policy was tried in Iraq in 2006, before the surge, and it failed miserably. U.S. Special Forces teams had complete freedom to act against al-Qaeda in Iraq, supported by around 150,000 regular U.S. troops, Iraqi military and police forces of several hundred thousand, and liberal airpower. We killed scores of key terrorist leaders, including the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, in June 2006. But terrorist strength, violence, and control only increased over the course of that year. It was not until units already on the ground applied a new approach—a counterinsurgency approach—and received reinforcements that we were able to defeat al-Qaeda in Iraq (even without killing its new leader).

**Counterterror Bad – Statistics Irrelevant**

Even if they win that counterterrorism kills terrorists, that’s not a reason they should win for 3 reasons – inaccuracy of statistical evaluation, backlash from attacks, and the random nature of terrorism

Spencer ‘6 [Alexander Spencer, Teaching Fellow and Ph.D. Candidate at the Department of International Relations, Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, October 2006, “Teaching Fellow and Ph.D. Candidate at the Department of International Relations, Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich”, UNISCI (Unit on International Security and Cooperation) Discussion Papers, No. 12, http://redalyc.uaemex.mx/redalyc/pdf/767/76701212.pdf]

Similarly, when considering for example the terrorist ‘body count’ as an indicator of an effective counter-terrorism measure, one has to keep in mind that the overall size of a terrorist group is often unknown and many of those captured or killed are low-level recruits who can be replaced easily. Even, when one is able to eliminate two-thirds of the top leadership, the rank and file of the group may grow, and as a result decentralise and become more resilient. Indeed, a terrorist group that loses members to arrest or targeted killings may actually increase in overall size if the crackdown generates a backlash. For example, the Provisional IRA capitalised on indiscriminate British crackdown to gain recruits.41 Raphael Perl points out that “[i]n a western, science-and-technology-oriented society, many feel that if a problem can be quantified, it can be solved".42 However, measuring terrorism with numbers or statistics is to a certain extent contradictory. Statistics are supposed to give an insight into general trends and patterns. However, the rare, random-like and uneven nature of terrorism and the fluctuation of incidents run counter to the idea of trends and pattems, something that might have been realised by the US government when it renamed its annual publication Patterns of Global Terrorism to Country Reports on Terrorism. Although governments often proclaim the effectiveness of their policies in the absence of further attacks and it may seem logical consider a decrease in terrorist activity as an indicator of effective counter-terrorism, the asymmetric non-linear nature of terrorism, which aims to surprise it victims, can mean that terrorists are biding their time and preparing for a bigger more devastating attack. If a large attack happens in one country, as was the case with 9/11, the Madrid and London bombings, "although there have been none of that magnitude in preceding or later years, a time series based on the number of incidents is of little value.”43

COIN Good--

COIN is essential to maintain low unnecessary casualties while maintaining the right to self defense

David H. Petraeus and James F. Amos are Lieutenant General, U.S. Army and Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps, respectively. December 2006 “COUNTERINSURGENCY FM 3-24.” www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf . mrs

In a COIN environment, it is vital for commanders to adopt appropriate and measured levels of force and apply that force precisely so that it accomplishes the mission without causing unnecessary loss of life or suffering. Normally, counterinsurgents can use escalation of force/force continuum procedures to minimize potential loss of life. These procedures are especially appropriate during convoy operations and at checkpoints and roadblocks. Escalation of force (Army)/force continuum (Marine Corps) refers to using lesser means of force when such use is likely to achieve the desired effects and Soldiers and Marines can do so without endangering themselves, others, or mission accomplishment. Escalation of force/force continuum procedures do not limit the right of self-defense, including the use of deadly force when such force is necessary to defend against a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. Commanders ensure that their Soldiers and Marines are properly trained in such procedures and, more importantly, in methods of shaping situations so that small-unit leaders have to make fewer split-second, life-or-death decisions.

Counterterror Bad – K Link

Counterterrorist discourse is rooted an anti-Muslim agenda that portrays Muslims as a threat to our national security – that turns the case

MPAC ‘4 [Muslim Public Affairs Council, 12/31/04, “Counterproductive Counterterrorism: How Anti-Islamic Rhetoric is Impeding America's Homeland Security,” http://mpac.org/bucket\_downloads/%5BMPAC%5D%20Counterproductive%20Counterterrorism.pdf]

In order to enhance the security of our country, it is necessary to expose the vocal minority of Americans who continue to exploit the tragedy of September 11 to advance their pre-existing anti-Muslim agenda. MPAC presents this case study on Steve Emerson with the purpose of rebutting anti-Islamic rhetoric so that the vital voice of American Muslims can be included within counterterrorism discourse. Several myths abound regarding the role of American Muslims in counterterrorism policy, the most prominent and problematic of which paints the American Muslim community as a threat to America's national security. In fact, the American Muslim community is an asset to law enforcement in their shared goal to root out terrorism and extremism. The source of suspicion of American Muslims stems from false accusations of American Muslim organizations. One representation of that scapegoating is Steve Emerson's 2003 book "American Jihad."

Using counter-terrorism efforts that only blame the Other 🡺 inevitable terrorism

van Dijk 04

[Teun A. van Dijk, professor of discourse studies at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, and editor of Discourse & Society, 2004, Terrorism, sexism, racism and other lethal –isms., http://www.discourses.org/UnpublishedArticles/Terrorism,%20sexism,%20racism%20and%20other%20lethal%20-isms.htm]

In sum, if our response to the terrible reality of terrorism continues to be a combination of ‘male’, militarist counter-terrorism, and ‘western’ racism and ethnicism, which simply target and blame the convenient Others, instead of examining and dealing with the deeper causes of terrorism, then we may be sure that terrorism will not be vanquished, but only exacerbated.

Counterterror Bad – K Link

Counterterrorist strategy and rhetoric depend on falsely painting Muslims as a threat to our national security

MPAC ‘4 [Muslim Public Affairs Council, 12/31/04, “Counterproductive Counterterrorism: How Anti-Islamic Rhetoric is Impeding America's Homeland Security,” http://mpac.org/bucket\_downloads/%5BMPAC%5D%20Counterproductive%20Counterterrorism.pdf]

The premise of American Jihad, as stated by author Steven Emerson, is that “it is a certainty that terrorists, already living among us, will continue to pursue their destructive agenda.”23 In this grand conspiracy theory, sophisticated, stateside mafia-like Muslim groups have been brazenly funding terrorist activities, infiltrating universities, recruiting killers, plotting attacks and waiting for the signal to launch a worldwide “jihad.” The effect of such rhetoric in both Jihad in America (the PBS documentary) and American Jihad (the book) is a direct threat to American Muslims. In practice, Emerson uses the word “terrorist” the way Sen. Joseph McCarthy used to use the word “Communist”. It is no wonder, then, that one reviewer of his book would conclude that, “Many Muslim advocatory groups are actually organizations for money laundering, recruiting, and pamphleteering. The organizations also target moderate or non-radical Muslims, both inside and outside the United States, for harassment or worse.”24 Emerson’s lack of education prohibits him from deciphering legitimate American Muslim organizations from real and potentially deadly threats posed by actual terrorists.

Counterterror Bad—Gender Links

The deadly –isms in today’s society stem from the roots of masculine aggression – and counter-terrorism and militarism are just another example

van Dijk 04

[Teun A. van Dijk, professor of discourse studies at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, and editor of Discourse & Society, 2004, Terrorism, sexism, racism and other lethal –isms., http://www.discourses.org/UnpublishedArticles/Terrorism,%20sexism,%20racism%20and%20other%20lethal%20-isms.htm]

There are many deadly –isms that continue to afflict humanity. The oldest, most pernicious and deadliest of all is sexism: Many thousands of women are killed each year by their male (ex) partners, and millions of women are daily harassed, beaten or discriminated against by their husbands, friends, bosses or simply by male dominated society at large. Whatever other dangerous –isms we discuss, we should always be keenly aware that undoubtedly the worst enemy of humankind in general, and of women in particular, is the kind of masculinity that is the cause of this kind of daily repression and killings. Closely related to this form of male dominance is the –ism that also has plagued humanity for millennia and that is the cause of arms, armies, wars and repression until today: militarism. When we sometimes have the illusion to live in a post-modern world, the reality of primitive male power abuse, combined in lethal militarism and vicious sexism, should perhaps remind us of the fact that we are still living in pre-modernism. Perhaps less obviously and openly a threat to humankind is the kind of –ism that has become the dominant ideology of our time: neoliberalism: What is defended as the unlimited freedom and the blessings of the ‘market’ in fact is causing the misery, the poverty and death due to starvation and avoidable diseases of millions of women, men and children all over the world. Some would argue that also socially insensitive neoliberalism has been especially promoted by men, and that competition at any price is another form of aggressive masculinity. On a less extensive scale, but sometimes no less deadly when engaged in by extremists, we witness the aggression and the killings by militant groups of nationalists around the globe, and not only in Northern Ireland, Spain or Kashmir. What may be rooted in legitimate claims for autonomy or independence may thus be distorted by those few (again, mostly men) who have the illusion they can realize their aims by violence that cannot be excused as a form of legitimate defense. That aggressive extremism is lethal has become most spectacularly evident on September 11, 1991, and March 11, 2004, in the USA and Spain, respectively, as well as in many other cities of the world. Much more than any of the other deadly –isms mentioned above, it is terrorism that has provoked the most hostile reaction from those in power, also because they are the ones who are politically targeted or held ransom, even when mostly innocent people are killed in terrorist attacks. We also have witnessed that upon the instigation of the USA the prevailing response to terrorism has been counter-terrorism and militarism, thus leading to a spiral of killings or other ‘collateral damage’ with no end in sight. Again, some would again suggest that even when women may be involved such nationalist or religious extremism, the related forms of terrorism, counter-terrorism and militarism are largely part of the same major problem: masculine aggression.

Counter-terrorism efforts use masculine gender roles 🡺 more violence

CNSNews 09

[Adam Brickely, reporter for CNSNews.com, 10/20/09, U.N. Report Says Counterterrorism Measures 'Risk Unduly Penalizing Transgender Persons', http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/55739]

The report also takes aim at perceived gender roles, suggesting that counter-terror practices involving both sexes be reevaluated due to their basis in traditional perceptions of gender. One passage, beginning on page 13, says that “the United Kingdom anti-radicalization initiatives seeking to include Muslim women as counter-terrorism agents on the basis of their position ‘at the heart not only of their communities but also of their families,’ may reinforce stereotypical gender norms about roles of women within the family.” “Instead,” Scheinin writes, “participation should be grounded on principles of gender equality, recognizing the unique gendered impacts of both terrorism and counter-terrorism measures.” Scheinin also slams the use of women’s rights as a justification for counter-terror operations, writing on page 14 that “counter-terrorism measures that are characterized as being a fight for women’s rights (such as the United States portrayal of its “war on terror” in Afghanistan in 2001) should be closely scrutinized, to ensure that they are not misinformed by gender-cultural stereotypes and are actually responsive to the concerns of women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals in local contexts.” The use of masculine gender roles in counterterrorism draws Scheinin’s ire on page 18, where he writes that “techniques that seek to evoke feelings of emasculation in detainees or suspected terrorists may hinder the fight against terrorism by provoking hyper-masculine responses that include acceptance or advocacy of violence.”

Counterterror Bad – Gender Link

War rhetoric and counterterrorist strategy in Afghanistan create human rights violations against women, embolden gender violence, and turn the case by diverting funds away from addressing the conditions that create terrorism and gender inequality

UN General Assembly ‘9 [United Nations General Assembly, 8/3/09, “Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while

countering terrorism,” http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Resources/UN/un\_prothrffcounterterror\_aug2009.pdf]

23. Those subject to gender-based abuses are often caught between targeting by terrorist groups and the State’s counter-terrorism measures that may fail to prevent, investigate, prosecute or punish these acts and may also perpetrate new human rights violations with impunity. This squeezing effect is present for example, in Algeria, where women have been arrested and detained as potential terrorists after they report sexual violence and humiliation by armed Islamists.23 In Nepal, the counter-insurgency campaign that was defined with reference to terrorism was characterized by attacks on meti (effeminate males or transgender persons) by both sides, with reports that the Maoists were abducting meti24 and the police were taking advantage of the counter-terrorism environment to attack meti as part of a “cleansing” of Nepali society.25 A recent report by Amnesty International exemplifies the extent to which women may be targeted by all entities, noting that in Iraq, “crimes specifically aimed at women and girls, including rape, have been committed by members of Islamist armed groups, militias, Iraqi government forces, foreign soldiers within the US-led Multinational Force, and staff of foreign private military security contractors. Most of these crimes have been committed with impunity”.26 The gender dimensions of these abuses are explicit: “Women and girls are being attacked in the street by men with different political agendas but who all want to impose veiling, gender segregation and discrimination”.27 When States fail to prevent, investigate and punish gender-based violence by government actors or terrorist groups they embolden such attacks and legitimatize gender inequality. 24. These abuses on the basis of gender are amplified through war rhetoric (such as with the “war on terror”) and increased militarization in countering terrorism. It is well documented that utilizing conflict or war rhetoric serves to stereotype, marginalize and profile those who challenge or fall outside the boundaries of predetermined gender roles, including women’s human rights defenders.28 In addition, the privileging of a militarized response to terrorism has meant that funds to combat terrorism have been diverted from addressing the socio-economic conditions that may be conducive to terrorism,29 such as those involving gender inequalities. 25. Militarized internal conflicts (e.g., in Colombia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Nepal) that utilize a counter-terrorism framework also disproportionately impact women and children, who, for example, constitute the vast majority of the internally displaced.30 In this respect, the Special Rapporteur reiterates that measures framed with reference to counter-terrorism have had significant economic, social and cultural rights impacts on women. For example, evictions and house demolitions used to target or collectively punish communities and other measures that have lead to displacement, have deprived women of basic necessities, including adequate food, access to health services and education.31 Additionally, the Special Rapporteur reiterates that in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan, military action, armed insurgency and terrorist acts have created a security situation that hampers the delivery of even the most basic humanitarian assistance,32 with particularly detrimental effects for the enjoyment of human rights by women.33 The situation of women in Iraq discussed above also demonstrates the dangers present when private contractors are used in armed operations carried out in the context of countering insurgencies or terrorism; these risks are also evidenced by the role of private contractors in unlawful gender-specific interrogation techniques and trafficking (see sections K and M of the present report).

Counterterror Bad – Gender Link

Governments exploit vagueness in counterterrorist strategy to justify oppression of women

UN General Assembly ‘9 [United Nations General Assembly, 8/3/09, “Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while

countering terrorism,” http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Resources/UN/un\_prothrffcounterterror\_aug2009.pdf]

27. The breadth of Governments’ counter-terrorism measures have resulted in significant gender-based human rights violations. In many instances, Governments have used vague and broad definitions of “terrorism” to punish those who do not conform to traditional gender roles and to suppress social movements that seek gender equality in the protection of human rights. For example, Governments have alleged terrorism links to justify the arrest and persecution of “suspected ‘homosexuals’”35 and regularly accuse women’s human rights defenders of being members of terrorist groups.36 As well as being discriminatory, the latter criminalizes activities that are protected by the guarantees of freedom of opinion, expression and association in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights37 and exposes women’s human rights defenders to gender-specific forms of abuse and harassment at the hands of government.38 28. The Special Rapporteur is also concerned that the use of counter-terrorism laws to suppress indigenous groups’ claims for economic, social and cultural rights has particular adverse impacts for women within those communities.39 In the Philippines, for example, the militarization associated with counter-terrorism measures has exposed women to rape and sexual assault by the armed forces;40 caused forced separation of women from their families because they are accused of New Peoples’ Army membership; and involved arbitrary killings of indigenous women leaders.41 This and the above examples demonstrate the extensive human rights violations that ensue when Governments apply counter-terrorism measures and laws to activities that do not constitute terrorism.

Counterterror Bad – Gender Link / Alt Solvency

Adopting a gendered perspective is critical to combating terrorism, but counter-terrorism only exacerbates gender inequality – their link turns are false

UN General Assembly ‘9 [United Nations General Assembly, 8/3/09, “Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while

countering terrorism,” http://www.peacewomen.org/assets/file/Resources/UN/un\_prothrffcounterterror\_aug2009.pdf]

32. While Governments are required to ensure the right to gender equality and non-discrimination as ends in themselves, a gender perspective is also integral to combating conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 60/288 includes the following non-exhaustive list of conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism: “prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, lack of the rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization and lack of good governance”. 33. International human rights law, through instruments such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and guarantees of non-discrimination and equality between sexes in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, recognizes that problems of discrimination, political exclusion and socio-economic marginalization cannot be solved without a gender perspective. Similarly, to stop dehumanizing victims of terrorism, Governments should remedy the gender inequality that makes women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals the targets of terrorism (see sect. B above) and ensure that victims of terrorism receive support, including by repealing discriminatory barriers (e.g., unequal inheritance laws) that frustrate assistance. Additionally, in implementing reparations programmes for victims of terrorism, States should utilize the opportunity to ensure that reparations programmes actually further gender equality.55 34. The Special Rapporteur notes, however, that counter-terrorism strategies that link the fight against terrorism to the promotion of gender equality do not automatically result in de facto or substantive equality as required under international human rights law. For example, the United Kingdom anti-radicalization initiatives seeking to include Muslim women as counter-terrorism agents on the basis of their position “at the heart not only of their communities but also of their families”,56 may reinforce stereotypical gender norms about roles of women within the family. Instead, participation should be grounded on principles of gender equality, recognizing the unique gendered impacts of both terrorism and counter-terrorism measures. Additionally, counter-terrorism measures that are characterized as being a fight for women’s rights (such as the United States portrayal of its “war on terror” in Afghanistan in 2001)57 should be closely scrutinized, to ensure that they are not misinformed by gender-cultural stereotypes and are actually responsive to the concerns of women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals in local contexts. 35. Indeed, such counter-terrorism strategies that portray human rights and gender equality as alien to local contexts may actually have the unintended consequence of silencing those working on gender issues within their own communities by aligning those voices with foreign influence or even those perceived to be the “enemy”. This may also exacerbate the susceptibility these actors already have to attacks by local government and non-government actors under the guise of protecting “tradition” or “culture”. Because both counter-terrorism and terrorism agendas co-opt discourses and debates over women’s rights,58 this marginalization of those voices who understand the realities of gender inequality on the ground — women, those working within feminist perspectives that are responsive to local contexts, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex individuals — is a significant barrier to the full realization of human rights and should be reversed.

**Counterterror Bad – Gender Link / Turns Case**

Counterterror strategies involve gender-based discriminatory interrogation techniques that hinder solvency by provoking violent response

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44. Counter-terrorism laws and measures that sanction discriminatory interrogation techniques against male and female terrorism suspects are also often in clear violation of the international law prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Rape and other forms of gender-based violence are used in many cases as a form of torture against detained female terrorism suspects.85 As part of its “war on terror”, the United States and its private contractors have employed interrogation techniques on male Muslim detainees in Iraq and elsewhere aimed at exploiting perceived notions of male Muslim homophobia (e.g., forced piling of naked male detainees, rape, and forced homosexual acts with other detainees) and inducing feelings of emasculation in detainees (e.g., enforced nudity, forced wearing of women’s underwear, smearing of fake menstrual blood on detainees).86 In some instances, the U.S. Department of Defence has used female service members to administer some of these gendered techniques on male detainees in an effort to heighten the perceived degrading aspects of such abuse.87 45. The Special Rapporteur stresses that homophobia and gender-based discrimination can never be justified as legitimate tools in counter-terrorism. Additionally, techniques that seek to evoke feelings of emasculation in detainees or suspected terrorists may hinder the fight against terrorism by provoking hyper-masculine responses that include acceptance or advocacy of violence.

**Counterterror Bad – Gender Link**

Counterterrorist strategies portrays women solely as victims of terrorism – that re-entrenches discrimination and prevents the U.S. from finding female terrorists or stopping terrorism

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46. While women are victims of terrorism and counter-terrorism measures, they may also be volitional actors in both terrorist entities and counter-terrorism measures. The Special Rapporteur reiterates that ignoring women as potential terrorists undermines the ability of counter-terrorism measures to identify terrorism suspects88 and may serve to promote the recruitment of female terrorists.89 Additionally, the failure to gather empirical data on why women become members of particular organizations at particular times circumscribes the effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures aimed at their reintegration. For example, in the violence in Colombia (often characterized in reference to terrorism),90 gender is critical to: understanding the recruitment of women and girls by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and other illegal armed actors;91 their treatment within the organizations; and the particular reintegration challenges that the Government must meet to ensure that the cycle of violence is not repeated.92 Reintegration schemes that rely solely on gender stereotypes of women as victims or that exclude women from benefits provided to male ex-combatants93 are discriminatory and fail to stem terrorism.

Counterterrorism Bad – State/Epistemology Link

The discourse and language of the war on terror are artificially constructed to legitimize the war and silence any forms of knowledge that challenge state power

Jackson ‘5 [Richard Jackson, lecturer in Government and International Politics in the School of Social Sciences at the University of Manchester, senior adviser to the Concord Coalition, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where he directs the where he directs the Global Aging Initiative, 2005, “Security, Democracy, and the Rhetoric of Counter-Terrorism,” *Democracy and Security*, 1:147-171, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/IMG/pdf/langage\_guerreauterrorisme-2.pdf]

The aim of the analysis was to uncover the primary discursive constructions at the heart of the “war on terrorism,” to examine the ways in which the language of counter-terrorism has been produced, deployed, and reproduced in public political rhetoric, and to assess the effects of the discourse on democratic politics. The central argument is fairly simple. The language of the “war on terrorism” is not a neutral or objective reflection of policy debates and the realities of terrorism and counter-terrorism. Rather, it is a very carefully and deliberately constructed—but ultimately, artificial—discourse that was specifically designed to make the war seem reasonable, responsible, and “good,” as well as to silence any forms of knowledge or counter-argument that would challenge the exercise of state power. More than merely public relations, “public diplomacy,” or propaganda then, the effects of this discourse are to normalize, legitimize, and in a sense, actualize its institutional practice. More importantly, the discourse of the “war on terrorism”, as it is presently constructed, poses severe challenges to the healthy functioning of democratic society.

**Counterterror Bad – Epistemology/Dichotomy Link**

The discourse surrounding the war on terror silences everything other than official narratives about the war and builds an artificial dichotomy between “good” Americans and “bad” terrorists while constructing the threat of terrorism

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The primary constructions of the administration’s public discourse revolve around four main themes. First, and foundationally, the events of September 11, 2001 had to be discursively constructed and assigned a particular set of meanings; they did not “speak for themselves.” Rather, the interpretation of “9–11” came to be fixed by the official discourse in such a way that it only had meaning in the context of certain officially accepted narratives. Second, the discourse constructed or re-affirmed new identities for both the victims— innocent, heroic and good Americans—, and the villains of the morality play—the evil, barbarous, and inhuman terrorists. Third, a central feature of the discourse involved the construction of the threat and danger of terrorism, which was re-made as immanent and catastrophic to democracy, freedom, civilization, and the American way of life; that is, it was reconstructed as a danger on the scale of Nazism and Communism. A fourth important aspect of the discourse involved the attempt to legitimize and normalize the quintessential “good war”—a popular narrative in American society and political discourse—as the primary response to these acts of terrorism (or “war”).

**Counterterror Bad – K Link**

War on terror rhetoric constructs Americans and terrorists as “good” and “evil,” and this identification of terrorists as the “other” reifies the state and justifies its actions –this portrayal of terrorists as “immoral” frees counter-terrorism from the need to be moral in dealing with terrorists

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The realm of foreign policy, and particularly foreign adversaries, is enormously significant for “writing” identities.27 Foreign policy is critical for maintaining internal/external boundaries, and war (as a special form of foreign policy) plays a central role in maintaining the domains of inside/outside, foreign/ domestic, self/other. This is no less true for the “war on terrorism,” which as we have suggested, is constructed largely in an epideictic rhetorical mode, rather than a deliberative mode.28 Bush makes appeals that attempt to unify the community and amplify its virtues; national character rather than national deliberation determine its actions. In fact, it has been argued that the very concept of the political self is based on the identification of the “enemy”; in other words, the enemy terrorist in the “war on terrorism” acts as the “enabling other” of the state—its negative justification.29 More than just identity maintenance then, the discourse of self and other in the rhetoric of counter-terrorism co-constitutes the political; it permits the state as practice. Perhaps the most important feature of the construction of identity in this discourse is the ubiquitous use of a rhetorical trope of “good and evil.” Deeply embedded in American rhetorical traditions and religious life (as well as being a sub-plot of the “civilization-barbarism” meta-narrative), this language essentializes the terrorists as both satanic and morally corrupt. On September 11, Bush stated that “Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature”;30 in subsequent texts, he frequently refers to terrorists as “the evil ones,” and “evildoers.” These are theological terms, deployed largely for a Southern conservative audience, but also appealing to popular entertainment understandings of “good guys” and “bad guys.” As such, it is a demonological move in which the terrorists are individually and collectively marked as “cruel,” “mad”, and driven by “hate”; perhaps inadvertently, it also supernaturalizes them. In this agent/act ratio, the character of the terrorists precedes their actions: the terrorists did what they did because it is in their nature to do so—they murdered because that is what evil, demonic terrorists do.31 It is a powerful discourse, and an act of demagoguery, which de-contextualizes and de-historicizes the actions of the terrorists, emptying them of any political content, while simultaneously de-humanizing them. After all, there can be no deeper explanation for such acts, and there can be no reasoning or compromising with evil; the only right response is exorcism and purification. At the same time, the radical evil argument32 is a long used strategy of silencing liberal dissent: from Leo Strauss and Reinhold Neibuhr to Ronald Reagan, liberals have been charged with lacking both a realistic sense of human evil and the moral courage to confront it. In an extension of re-making the attackers as demons, they are also scripted as inhuman or non-human. Bush speaks of the “curse of terrorism that is upon the face of the earth,”33 while Colin Powell refers to “the scourge of terrorism.” 34 This medical metaphor is restated more explicitly by Rumsfeld: “We share the belief that terrorism is a cancer on the human condition.”35 Bush in turn, speaks of the danger to the body politic posed by “terrorist parasites who threaten their countries and our own.”36 In this construction, the terrorist is remade as a dangerous organism that makes its host ill; they hide interiorly, drawing on the lifeblood of their unsuspecting hosts and spreading poison. This particular language is actually a precursor to the disciplinary idea of “the enemy within”; they are the new “reds under the bed.” Of course, such “an evil and inhuman group of men”37—these “faceless enemies of human dignity”38— are undeserving of our sympathy or protection. While it would be wrong to treat an enemy soldier inhumanely, or torture a criminal suspect, the same cannot be said for a parasite, a cancer, a curse. If the enemy is removed from the moral realm of human community, then by extension, actions towards them cannot be judged on moral terms. This is extremely liberating for a government fighting a hidden enemy, as it means that those government agencies that practice the “black arts” can be unleashed with impunity. However, as if it were not enough to strip the enemy of all human features, the discourse also goes on to write them as fundamentally “alien” and “foreign.” As John Ashcroft states: Today I’m announcing several steps that we’re taking to enhance our ability to protect the United States from the threat of terrorist aliens. [ . . . ] The Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force that Mr. McCraw will lead will ensure that federal agencies coordinate their efforts to bar from the United States all aliens who meet any of the following criteria: aliens who are representatives, members or supporters of terrorist organizations; aliens who are suspected of engaging in terrorist activity; or aliens who provide material support to terrorist activity.39 This designation of “alien terrorists” in particular, is the ultimate expression of “otherness” and is designed to clearly demarcate the boundaries between the inside and the outside, between those who belong to the community and those outside of it. In other words, not only are the terrorists disqualified from the domain of our community, they are disqualified from humanity itself. In a society immersed in the movie mythology of Invasion of the Body Snatchers, Alien, Independence Day, and The X-Files, the meanings of the term “alien terrorist” oscillate between “extra-terrestrial parasite” and “foreign enemy” without a hint of irony. After all, alien invasion movies are cultural metaphors for the fear of foreign invasion. Anthropologically, the trope of the evil/cancerous/ alien terrorist “monster”—the mode of composing social relations among terms—is actually the cultural projection of the tabooed “wild man” figure of the Western imagination.40 That is, rooted in the fundamental need to control dangerous behavior, taboos function to locate, identify, and segregate transgressions and dangers. In the absence of the (old) barbarians and the “red menace,” terrorism now fulfills these functions to a tee. On the other side of the identity coin, Americans are simultaneously constructed as being the polar opposite of the terrorist nature. The first major discursive inscription of the American character comes early on at the Prayer and Remembrance Day service on September 14, 2001. At this symbolically charged and constitutive pageant, Bush says: In this trial, we have been reminded, and the world has seen, that our fellow Americans are generous and kind, resourceful and brave. We see our national character in rescuers working past exhaustion; in long lines of blood donors; in thousands of citizens who have asked to work and serve in any way possible. And we have seen our national character in eloquent acts of sacrifice. [ . . . ] In these acts, and in many others, Americans showed a deep commitment to one another, and an abiding love for our country. Today, we feel what Franklin Roosevelt called the warm courage of national unity. This is a unity of every faith, and every background.41 In other words, Bush is constructing a new world of clearly demarcated characters: where terrorists are cruel, “the American people” are generous and kind; where terrorists are hateful, Americans are loving; where terrorists are cowardly, Americans are brave and heroic; and where terrorists hide and run, Americans are united. This highlighting and amplification is necessary to inscribe the essential qualities of insiders and outsiders, and plays through a movie-based mode of the simple opposites of “good guys and bad guys.”

Counterterror Bad – Gender Link

Counter-terrorist discourse paints men as heroes and women as victims, and it portrays violence caused by the war on terror as necessary collateral damage

Johnstone ‘9 [Rachel Lorna Johnstone, Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Akureyri, Iceland, “Unlikely Bedfellows: Feminist Theory and the War on Terror,” Chicago-Kent Journal of International & Comparative Law, Spring 2009, http://www.kentlaw.edu/jicl/articles/spring2009/Johnstone\_unlikely\_bedfellows\_2009.pdf]

Finally, the discourse of the “War on Terror” itself revealed a perceived need for the state to define its masculinity in the aftermath of attack. This required painting men as heroes and women as victims. 211 Chinkin and Charlesworth described the media responses in the immediate aftermath in which women featured as heavenly rewards for terrorists or as victims of the attack, preferably widows of murdered men, rather than the women who themselves worked daily in the twin towers or in the rescue services.212 Women in the armed services and firefighting teams were conspicuous by their invisibility. 213 Women in Afghanistan are depicted as victims of a brutal Taliban, requiring rescue by heroic (Western) men – though not political participation.214 The suffering women endure under the airpower of those same Western forces and the hardship encountered as essential services are put beyond their use are unfortunate “collateral damage” — a sacrifice for their greater long-term good.215 Susan Faludi’s 2007 investigative retrospect of the media in the aftermath of 9/11 provides thorough confirmation of the Australians’ early impressions.216 In such times, a feminist perspective of the state that seeks women’s empowerment and equal participation in the public sphere is unlikely to find favor.217

Counterterror Bad – Gender/Dichotomy Link

Counter-terrorism strategies in Afghanistan reify public/private dichotomies, actively exclude women from negotiations, and don’t intervene to end gender violence

Johnstone ‘9 [Rachel Lorna Johnstone, Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Akureyri, Iceland, “Unlikely Bedfellows: Feminist Theory and the War on Terror,” Chicago-Kent Journal of International & Comparative Law, Spring 2009, http://www.kentlaw.edu/jicl/articles/spring2009/Johnstone\_unlikely\_bedfellows\_2009.pdf]

Hand in hand with the liberalization of the market in the post-intervention economies comes the further reification of the public/private dichotomies long criticized by feminists in Western democracies, as women (and violence against them) are considered non-political. Women are effectively excluded from positions of governance in Afghanistan and Iraq, and similarly have been largely excluded in negotiations between competing factions.207 The (male) self-declared leaders are presumed to speak for all and women’s rights become a matter of relative cultural values.208 This is self-determination of a highly selective “self.” Violence against women qua women is considered a matter of domestic law, and when domestic process fails to take it seriously, no questions are raised by the state’s allies about the legitimacy of the government or its sovereign inviolability.209 Despite changes in the language of state responsibility, little has changed for women since the “liberation” of Kuwait from the oppressive Iraqi invader in 1991, after which Kuwaiti women remained disenfranchised from the electoral process and foreign women found themselves targets of sexual violence by Kuwaiti men, often ostensibly under color of state authority.210

Counterterror Bad – K Link

Counterterrorist discourse attempts to construct terrorism as a threat in order to stifle dissent, even though terrorism is a relatively small problem

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As David Campbell has shown, discourses of danger and foreign threat have been integral in constituting and disciplining American identity as practiced through its foreign policy.43 Collectivities, especially those as disparate and diverse as America, are often only unified by an external threat or danger; in this sense, threat creation can be functional to political life. Historically, the American government has relied on the discourse of threat and danger on numerous occasions: the “red scares” of the native Americans who threatened the spread of peaceful civilization along the Western frontier, the workers’ unrest at the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, and the threat to the American way of life during the cold war; the threat of “rogue states” like Libya, Panama, Iran, North Korea, and Iraq; and the threats posed by the drug trade, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and now of course, terrorism. These discourses of danger are scripted for the purposes of maintaining inside/ outside, self/other boundaries—they write American identity—and for enforcing unity on an unruly and (dis)United States. Of course, there are other more mundane political functions for constructing fear and moral panic: provoking and allaying anxiety to maintain quiescence, de-legitimizing dissent, elevating the status of security actors, diverting scarce resources into ideologically driven political projects, distracting the public from more complex and pressing social ills.44 This is not to say that terrorism poses no real threat; the dangers can plainly be seen in the images of falling bodies and the piles of rubble. Rather, it is to point out that dangers are those facets of social life interpreted as threats (in one sense, dangers do not exist objectively, independent of perception), and what is interpreted as posing a threat may not always correspond to the realities of the actual risk of harm. Illegal narcotics, for example, pose less of a risk than the abuse of legal drugs, but a “war on drugs” makes it otherwise. Similarly, the “war on terrorism” is a multi-billion dollar exercise to protect Americans from a danger that, excluding the September 11, 2001 attacks, killed less people per year over several decades than bee stings and lightening strikes. Even in 2001, America’s worst year of terrorist deaths, the casualties from terrorism were still vastly outnumbered by deaths from auto-related accidents, gun crimes, alcohol and tobacco-related illnesses, suicides, and a large number of diseases like influenza, cancer, and heart disease. Globally, terrorism, which kills a few thousand per year, pales into insignificance next to the 40,000 people who die every day from hunger, the half a million people who die every year from small wars, the 150,000 annual deaths from increased diseases caused by global warming,45 and the millions who die from AIDS. And yet, the whole world is caught up in the global “war on terrorism” whose costs so far run into the hundreds of billions. In a world of multiple threats, many of which pose a far greater risk to individual safety, the fact that terrorism is widely seen as posing the greatest and most immediate threat is due to the deliberate construction of a discourse of danger.