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#### HSR is a big target – low security

Maurillo 5/5/12, Donna R. Masters Degree in Science of Transportation Management at Mineta Transportation Institute “Thesis - Quality Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Masters of Science in Transportation Management” pg 23 <http://transweb.sjsu.edu/mtiportal/education/alumni/capstones/terror-targets-high-speed-rail-vs-intercity-rail-Maurillo.pdf> [Accessed 7/9/12] {Andrew Giovanny Alvarado}

“**When a train travels at more than 200 miles per hour, there is much less time to react to emergencies**. Even with a good warning system, a high-speed train needs quite a distance to stop. **That gives it a certain amount of vulnerability**. On the other hand, high-speed rail will attract a higher-end clientele that will have to make reservations and go through a screening process. That offers more protection than inter-city rail,” he said. 7 Others, such as Politico columnist Josh Gerstein, agree that there is a definite vulnerability. He wrote, “During a town hall meeting in Tampa today, **President Barack Obama touted, as one of the benefits of high-speed rail that passengers wouldn't have to go through a security check that requires taking off their shoes... His remark got me wondering why rail security is so much more lax than airport security.** And given that Obama was announcing that the federal government plans is [sic] awarding $8 billion in stimulus money for the planning and construction of high speed rail projects, **wouldn't it be unwise to allow an Al Qaeda operative to blow up a chunk of that investment**?” 8 He goes on to say that it’s true that **terrorists seem focused on blowing up passenger planes, but anything high-profile can be a target. Any attack that would derail a train traveling more than 200 miles an hour wouldn’t be pretty**, he wrote. Journalist Michael Scott Moore harbors a few concerns, as well. He wrote, “**Simplicity is the best part of rail travel, and President Obama likes to say that American high-speed trains will involve no shoe checks. But Obama has his critics, and an expensive new high-speed line might look as tempting to an expansionist Transportation Safety Authority as to terrorists.** So the question is worth some thought.”9 Some experts also agree that HSR has special vulnerabilities. Jenkins, Butterworth, and Clair (March 2010) say that, “In addition to the publicity, body count, and disruption sought by today’s terrorists, high-speed rail is an icon of technological progress, thus adding the emotional value that terrorists seek in their targets. For these reasons, the attempted derailment [of the French TGV], although fortunately a failure for the terrorists, takes on particular significance.”10 **Therefore, it would appear that HSR could have real value as a target, especially as groups such as al Qaida continue to reach into the US to attract and train homegrown “lone wolf” terrorists – especially those who blend well with the local population – in its quest to attack Western cultural and economic symbols**.11 So, while it is entirely possible – and perhaps even probable – that terrorists or anyone else with a degree of malicious intent could attack HSR in some way, is it necessary to implement specialized security planning and policies that go beyond those of inter-city rail? To answer that question, **first we must examine the pattern of threats and incidents worldwide, and then we must determine what types of security policies and practices are already in place to address them**. Next, we must assess whether HSR brings into play any specialized conditions that may require particular types of security unique to this mode. And finally, **we must recommend the means to secure that asset**.

**Economic disaster – the public will not return**

**EC** April 26 **2012** “Economic Impact of Terrorist Attacks Fifteen Times Higher Than Previously Thought”, http://www.economiccollapse.net/economic-impact-of-terrorist-attacks-fifteen-times-higher-than-previously-thought

**The point of the study was** not to generate anxiety, according to researcher William Burns of Design Research, who co-authored the study along with researchers from the University of Oregon, the USC Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism, Brown University, Monash University and ABS Consulting. Rather, the investigators hoped **to increase awareness of the potential impact on the public** of terrorism and to highlight the importance of establishing effective risk communication as an important part of both disaster preparedness and response. Burns and his colleagues analyzed the level of residual fear likely to be generated by a dirty bomb attack and sought to determine how the public’s perception of risk would affect their willingness to return to the site of an attack to work, shop and spend leisure time. The researchers then attempted to determine the economic impact of the psychological effects of a hypothetical attack**.** The results of their efforts were published in the journal Risk Analysis as part of a special issue dedicated to risk analysis research as it applies to the economic impact of terrorist attacks and other disasters. **The research presented** in the special issue **marks a departure from traditional risk analysis attempts, which** historically **focus**ed **only on the costs associated with the initial aftermath of a disaster**. The cost of emergency, law enforcement and military response, along with the cost to evacuate and treat the injured, decontaminate and rebuild the area are traditionally combined with the immediate costs of temporary business closures to determine the economic cost of such an event. **These figures** only tell part of the story, however, and **fail to consider the** **financial impact that** often **occurs when consumers and employees are reluctant to return to the site of the disaster.** According to co-author Adam Rose, **terrorist attacks have a great**er **impact on the behavior of consumers, and therefore** on **the economy** of an attack site, than was previously believed. In general, he said, **the economic impact of a public** that is reluctant to return to the location of an attack **is 15 times greater than traditional estimates indicate.** Rose stressed that when dealing with such high figures, even efforts that make only a minor change in the way people view the risk of returning to an attack site can make a large difference in an area’s bottom line. To gauge the impact of perceived risk among the public following an attack, researchers showed participants fabricated news articles and broadcasts describing a dirty bomb attack. Then the participants were asked whether they would be willing to shop, eat out or work in the area at various intervals after the date of the mock attack. Based upon the responses, **the researchers determined that over 40 percent of consumers would be reluctant to shop or dine in the rebuilt area** after six months. They also determined that it would require a 25 percent increase in wages to lure employees back to work in the area even six months after the attack. **The problem is compounded by the fact that modern transportation allows regional economies to compete with each other**. For many consumers, identical goods and services can be accessed a short distance away from an area that is perceived to be unsafe. According to co-author James Giesecke, **even a slight change in the public’s perception** of an area’s risk **can spell economic disaster** for a city.

## Links

#### Terrorists attack high-speed rail – empirics and low security

Jenkins 10 Brian Michael [Director of the National Transportation Security Center of Excellence at the Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI), expert on terrorism and transportation] “Off the Rails” *Cargo Security International* August/September 10 accessed: 7/9/12 <http://www.cargosecurityinternational.com/_dataimages/CSIAS10MTIrail.pdf> DR

Fortunately, most of the attacks are not lethal. Fewer than 10% involve fatalities, while the median number of deliberate derailment deaths in the last decade is 12. Bombs planted on the tracks are the most common form of attack, accounting for 82% of the derailment events. Terrorists managed to derail trains with bombs in more than 30% of their attempts. Mechanical means of sabotage (removing spikes, bolts, fish plates, or portions of the rail itself) account for 14% of the events, and have succeeded in causing derailments in 76% of the cases. Mechanical sabotage, while not causing as many total fatalities as the much greater number of bombings, has also proved more lethal, causing 15 fatalities per attempt, compared to less than four fatalities per detonated bomb. Clearly, not all bombs on tracks are intended to derail a passenger train. Many are purely symbolic or harassment attacks. Still, terrorists succeeded in actually derailing a train in 38% of their attempts. In another 22% of the incidents, they clearly attempted to derail a train. The intent in the remaining 40% of the cases is not clear. A great deal of attention has, understandably, been devoted to the safety of high-speed rail systems; much less attention has been devoted to security. Most security measures address the challenge of keeping explosive devices off the trains, not as much to keeping saboteurs away from the rails – which is, admittedly, not an easy task.

#### Rail systems are uniquely vulnerable to attack

Capra 6 George S. [Chief of the Program Management Office, Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, Andrews AFB, Maryland. He earned a bachelor’s degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Colorado and a master’s degree in Strategic Studies from the Air War College at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He is licensed as a Professional Engineer in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Since entering Federal Civilian Service in 1987, he has supported the men and women of the United States Army and Air Force by serving in various positions at the installation, major command, and headquarters. Prior to attending Air War College in 2006, he served as a Base Closure and Realignment Analyst for the Office of the Air Force Civil Engineer, Headquarters Air Force, Washington, DC] “Protecting Critical Rail Infrastructure” *US Air Force Counterproliferation Ctr* December 2006 accessed: 7/9/12 <http://cpc.au.af.mil/PDF/monograph/criticalrailinfrastructure.pdf> DR

III. Rail Infrastructure Assessments What was demonstrated on September 11 is that transportation systems and assets can be misused by terrorists in ways that can be difficult to anticipate and overlooked in day-to-day efforts to ensure transportation security. . . . Given the size, scope, and ubiquity of the transportation sector, coupled with its myriad owners, operators, and users, many opportunities exist for terrorists to exploit components of transportation systems in novel ways unanticipated by those traditionally responsible for transportation security. . . . Yet terrorists are actively seeking to exploit new threat vectors that lie beyond such conventional perceptions of order.37 –Panel on Transportation, Committee on Science and Technology for Countering Terrorism, 2002 When considering the vulnerabilities of critical rail systems, the United States must imagine the unthinkable. Terrorists will look for unconventional ways to exploit rail system vulnerabilities similar to the way they exploited the airline industry in the 9/11 attacks. It is important to understand and remember the mind set of Al Qaeda and jihadist supporters. They are willing to sacrifice their lives in the acts to achieve “martyrdom” for their cause. They do not differentiate between military and civilian targets, or between men, women, and children when killing Americans. According to Bin Ladin’s fatwas, the more Americans they can kill, the greater their perceived glory. All rail systems share many of the same vulnerabilities: they are open to hijackings, and there are myriad unsecured rail cars, rail corridors, tunnels, bridges, switch gear, maintenance and storage yards, buildings, parking areas, and power, communication and surveillance systems. Freight systems can operate in a closed network where the railroads have control over the cargo as opposed to passenger systems that rely on an open system. A closed system, similar to the screening process of the airport security, is easier to protect. Once freight is screened by rail security, it remains protected by the railroads until it reaches its destination. Decisions on how much protection to provide to freight rail should be a reflection of the type and quantity of hazardous materials (HAZMAT) involved. HAZMAT loads should get priority protection. Passenger trains are harder to protect because they require an open system to allow a large number of passengers’ quick entry and exit from trains and stations. All rail systems are vulnerable to failures of other critical infrastructures like the electrical, communications, and water systems. For example, during the August 2003 blackout across the northeast, New York City’s 413 subway trains lost power and communication and stranded over 400,000 passengers.38 It took nearly three hours to evacuate all passengers.39 In addition, loss of power to over 10,000 traffic signals resulted in instant gridlock on the streets of Manhattan.40 The resulting pedestrian and vehicular traffic jam in Figure 1 shows the disruption caused by loss of rail service in a major city. On 9/11, a broken water main flooded two major transit tunnels. The pump system used to drain the tunnels was not operational due to the loss of electricity. Loss of power was also an issue for the railroads after hurricane Katrina struck. The railroad workers had to bring in generators to provide power for the signals and switches before they could restart operations. Figure 1. 59th Street Bridge Crowded with Pedestrians and Vehicles41

#### Rail is a big target for terrorism – large amount of track

Temple 7 Bob [Contributor to Group 7, think tank for Railroad Security, Quoting The GAO Report on Rail Security, The AAR Hearing on Rail Security, and The CRS Report for Congress - Passenger Rail Security: Overview of Issue] “Major Vulnerabilities to Railway Security” *Group 7*  5/8/07 accessed: 7/9/12 <http://www.personal.psu.edu/staff/r/p/rpt117/sra211/vulnerabilities.htm> DR

Major Vulnerabilities to Railway Security Looking at the past, the United States has not had many major attacks on its railways. This could lead people to falsely believe that our railways are secure. Our railways do have some levels of security, but unfortunately, there is just not enough of it where it needs to be. The object of this section is to identify the major vulnerabilities to railway security. Large Area Covered by Railroads Possibly the largest, and probably most obvious, vulnerabilities to railways is the sheer amount of railroad tracks around the country. There are over 100,000 miles of rail in the United States . The extensiveness of the infrastructure creates an infinite number of targets for terrorists (GAO Report). Since the majority of these tracks are publicly owned, large sections go entirely unmonitored. One of the major problems with this vulnerability is that it is physically impossible to monitor every inch of railroad track at any given time. It just can’t be done. This leaves hundreds of miles of railroad open for terrorist attack. Points Where Cargo Is Transferred Intermodal Another vulnerability posed to railways is at points of which cargo is transferred from one mode of transportation to the other. The issue of port and border security extends far beyond the issue of rail security, although railroads, by virtue of the facts that they carry millions of containers unloaded from or loaded onto steamships each year and move hundreds of thousands of railcars and intermodal units across the Canadian and Mexican border each year, are certainly impacted (AAR Hearing). The sheer number of cargo loaded onto trains makes it physically impossible to actually examine each freight container. This makes it extremely hard to be positive no dangerous materials have made it onto trains they shouldn’t be on. An example of this vulnerability is when cargo is taken from a cargo ship at a port and then placed on a freight train for land transportation. Even if proper railway security is in place, vulnerabilities may still arise if the security at the port allowed for possibly harmful cargo to get through its own security measures. In this case, the security of the railway is directly affected by the security of other modes of transportation such as the cargo ship and port security. Train Schedule Databases Another huge security vulnerability that must be addressed is that of databases containing schedules for shipment of sensitive materials. Schedules of what shipments are going where, and what they contain are kept of trains so that they can get to where they are going efficiently. However, if access to these databases is gained by someone who is not supposed to have that information, a huge security breach could arise. If terrorists get access to schedules for hazardous material shipments, they would be able to coordinate a terrorist attack accordingly. Access to such information would allow them to know exactly where a train will be at exactly what time. This could allow for terrorists to set explosives on a track that they know a hazardous materials shipment is going to be using. This also provides terrorists with opportunities to hijack trains in areas where they know security is lax. Train Station Lack of Security Train Station A vulnerability unique to passenger trains is that they are constantly making highly predictable scheduled stops along the way to their destination. This makes it very easy for terrorist to know exactly where a train is going to be, and how to get to it. People are free to board and exit the train at each stop along the way. Unlike in airports, there are no secure areas in which all passengers must pass through designated security stations to get to. People are free to come and go as they please, and that poses a severe problem in terms of ease of access for terrorists. The nature of this vulnerability is inherent within the design of passenger trains themselves however. Train stations require that passengers be able to quickly board and exit trains. With extensive security measures in place, such as security checkpoints that passengers must go through, passenger train companies are likely to lose business. If boarding a train became too much of a hassle, passengers would be more likely to simply drive somewhere, or take other means of transportation like a bus or plane. Ambiguity in Who Is Responsible For Security The last major vulnerability with railway security is that the United States does not have one specific agency that deals with the security of its railways. In fact, it actually has over four separate agencies working on implementing security to difference aspects of the railway system. According to the GAO Report, the Transportation Security Administration, Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Transit Administration, and the Research and Special Programs Administration are all partially responsible for railway security. This poses a problem, because with the agencies working separate of one another, the possibility for gaps in security arises. If each agency thinks that the others have already thoroughly covered a particular vulnerability, it is possible that none of them will actually put in the time and work necessary to fully secure that vulnerability. Another costly problem with not having a specific agency responsible for railway security is that certain security aspects that are completely secure may be covered multiple times by multiple agencies. On the surface this seems like a good thing, because we are positive that that aspect is entirely covered. However, if you look at the financial costs of repeate dly covering the same security aspects multiple times, it becomes obvious that a large amount of funds are wasted that could be used on securing other vulnerabilities. Major Likely Forms of Attack Aimed at Railways The major forms of attack that are likely to be aimed at railways can be narrowed down to three subgroups. The purpose of this section is to identify what constitutes an attack in each of these subgroups, as well as elaborate on possible real world implementation of each subgroup. Destruction of Trains and/or Railways Themselves In this particular subgroup, the primary objective of an attack would be to cause as much destruction and damage as possible to anyone onboard, and within the immediate vicinity of a train. This can be accomplished by in many ways. The first way I will discuss is through the use of bombs on the actual trains themselves. A bomb could be placed on either a passenger train, or a freight train carrying a number of different cargos. Due to vulnerabilities in the security of actual train stations, a terrorist could place a bomb on a train and detonate it at any point while the train is in transit to its destination. Prime targets for this type of attack would be passenger trains containing a large number of passengers, as well as trains containing shipments of hazardous materials. The latter of which would most likely be detonated while the train is close to a highly populated area, such as a major city or town. Another way that terrorists could destroy a train is through making an attack with the intent to derail the targeted train. This type of attack could be orchestrated by destroying important sections of railway along a trains designated path. An example of this would be if a terrorist destroyed a bridge along a trains path before the train would have enough time to effectively stop, resulting in a derailment. An destroying a bridge like this over a waterway could be extremely destructive if the trains cargo is hazardous and ends up seeping into the water, which would result in a massive amount of pollution or contaminated water supply. An example of the contamination of a water supply by derailment is clearly illustrated below. The railroad tracks in this picture go right around this local water supply in Altoona, PA. A derailment of a train containing toxic chemicals would be catastrophic. Attacks with the aim of derailing and/or destroying a train can also come in the form of attacks made at railroad crossings. Examples of this could be by parking large vehicles filled with explosives on a railroad crossing, or even driving a an explosive filled or large vehicle into the side of a train as it passes over a railroad crossing. If orchestrated properly, the effects could be extremely damaging to any local cities or towns if chemicals or other hazardous materials are present on the train. An attack like this on a passenger train could also cause a sever loss of life. Hi-jacking of Trains In this type of attack a train’s contents is of some value to the terrorists or criminals. These contents could include chemicals which could be used as weapons, biological weapons, or in the case of a military shipment, military weapons and supplies. This type of attack sounds like something out of a movie, but it could in fact be orchestrated in a real life scenario. With information on when and where a train containing a shipment of interest, terrorist or criminals could use the resources available to them to infiltrate trains in transit and effectively hijack them. Hijackings could be particularly effective on trains that have little or no physical security on the trains themselves. An instance of this would be if a shipment of hazardous materials was only operated by a few conductors in the front car. Once on board, hijackers could easily eliminate the few conductors’ and then have full control of the train. With control of the train, and due to the vast amount of railroad tracks around the country, the hijackers could stop the train in a deserted area and make away with their cargo of interest. Breaching Railway Databases The last form of a possible attack on railways comes in the form of breaching confidential railway databases to obtain top secret information. This type of attack can be conducted either by hacking into an electronic database housing the sensitive information, or by physically obtaining the information from an onsite source. Once the information is obtained it would be more than likely sold to or used by terrorists to conduct either the first or second type of attack mentioned previously. Breaching railway databases in the previously mentioned way can actually be thought of as a preliminary step to the first two forms of attack. The reason for this is because obtaining information on hazardous material shipments allows for terrorists to better orchestrate an attack on a target, because they will know what it is carrying and where it will be. Another type of attack that could be used involving railway databases is data alteration. If someone were to access sensitive databases they could have the ability to alter the time tables of when certain trains will be on certain tracks. A variety of vulnerabilities could arise from this. A prevalent example of this would be if someone were to make it seem as though a particular track was clear, when it actually already has a train using it. This could cause anything from head on collisions to extreme confusion as to what trains are actually where they are supposed to be.

#### HSR more attractive for terrorists than other forms of transportation

Kaiser, 2011 [Kim, (B.A. in Journalism and History from Marquette University, Senior Contributing Editor at [Mass Transit Magazine](http://www.linkedin.com/company/cygnus-business-media?trk=ppro_cprof), Editor for the Airport Improvement Magazine), “High-Speed Rail Security Needs a Different Approach than Commuter Rail”, Mass Transit, August 11, 2011, Date Accessed: July 9, 2012, [http://www.masstransitmag.com/article/10317151/high-speed-rail-security-needs-a-different-approach-than-commuter-rail JB2](http://www.masstransitmag.com/article/10317151/high-speed-rail-security-needs-a-different-approach-than-commuter-rail%20JB2)]

When terrorists attack high-speed rail systems, they seem to prefer to derail trains. When they go after non-high-speed rail systems, they more often try to detonate bombs in passenger compartments," Jenkins says. "Most attacks on high-speed rail systems target the tracks (66 percent) vs. the passenger compartment (17 percent). More attacks on non-high-speed rail systems target the passenger compartment than the tracks." He continues saying, "Terrorists choose between volume and velocity. Passenger loads on high-speed rail trains, per-car and per-train are less than slower-speed commuter or regional trains. This explains why high lethality with bombs detonated in passenger compartments is more achievable on a non-high-speed train. On the other hand, train velocity is obviously much greater on high-speed trains, making collisions or derailments a more attractive and effective choice of attack method." According to Jenkins, Bombs placed on the tracks are on average twice as lethal for high-speed rail as those placed in the passenger compartments. For non-high-speed rail, bombs in passenger compartments have proved to be more lethal than bombs on the tracks. Derailments that involve a mechanical means of sabotage can be more lethal than bombs on the track. "Technology, particularly on high-speed rail systems, will cause train operations to cease if a bomb detonates and causes catastrophic destruction prior to train arrival. Effective use of explosives, as in the Russian Nevsky Express attack in 2009, requires the detonation to be timed perfectly with a train's passage," Jenkins says. "Even in this attack, more casualties were crush and impact injuries and fatalities, occurring in the derailing rear cars (numbers 12, 13, and 14) of the train than those caused by the explosion under the ninth car." So what are the options for increasing security on high-speed rail systems? While monitoring the entirety of the track is nearly impossible, surveillance of key points is very important. Video surveillance near bridges, tunnel entrances, curves and other key points can improve the security, Jenkins says. "I remember in Bin Laden's notebook he was talking about derailing a train in the United States and he didn't specify a high-speed train but in his notebooks he mentioned derail it on a curve to try and take it off the tracks," he said

#### There are several reasons why its hard to secure HSR from Terror Attacks

Maurillo 5/5/12, Donna R. Masters Degree in Science of Transportation Management at Mineta Transportation Institute “Thesis - Quality Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Masters of Science in Transportation Management” pg 24-27 <http://transweb.sjsu.edu/mtiportal/education/alumni/capstones/terror-targets-high-speed-rail-vs-intercity-rail-Maurillo.pdf> [Accessed 7/9/12] {Andrew Giovanny Alvarado}

**Around the globe, the favored tactic is for attackers to place IEDs inside baggage holds, passenger compartments, stations, or inside the track bed under the rails.** These devices can be homemade, military grade, or commercial. All are entirely viable and effective, although none has been used recently in the US. **The RAND Corporation analyzed threats to passenger rail systems** (Wilson et al., 2007) **and noted that “there is a high threat of attacks using small explosives**; a medium threat of attacks using large explosives, small incendiary devices, or other weapons, sabotage, and hoaxes; and a low threat of attacks using large incendiaries and unconventional weapons. **We assume that these threats apply to both rail freight and passenger rail, though the vast majority of recorded attacks have been against passenger systems.**”13 Jenkins, Butterworth, and Clair (March 2010) note that **bombs were employed in 131 of the 181 events** (72.4 percent) **in the Mineta Transportation Institute’s database on terrorist attacks on rail.** **They suspect track bombs in another 18 cases** (9.9 percent), **for a total of 82.3 percent of the derailments**. Mechanical sabotage occurred in 21 cases (11.6 percent) and was suspected in six cases, for a total of 27 cases (14.9 percent). In five incidents, other sabotage methods were used.24In the same report, the authors noted that, while the number of incidents is small, terrorists achieve higher body counts per attack when they use mechanical means, such as removing bolts or track, than by using bombs.15 But that is not to say that methods are predictable and stable. The recent high- profile attacks in Mumbai targeted passengers at the station, as a two-man team sprayed bullets at the crowd, simply trying for as much slaughter as possible.16 These deaths accounted for one-third of the total, with many others at the high-profile Taj Mahal Hotel. Predictably, **as attack techniques prove to be successful, they become part of a growing manual for others to follow, shortening the planning cycle**.17 In turn, this compels security professionals to create new and better methods to harden those targets. **The ideal plan is to anticipate every conceivable terrorist plot and to build a bullet-proof security system. Not only is that impractical, it’s also impossible.** Jenkins and Butterworth (March 2010) also note “that terrorists are opportunists and are far more likely to attempt attacks that will, with high confidence, achieve a death toll of 25 to 50 than a risky, complicated operation that could kill 1,000 or more.”18 **Unlike airports, passenger rail systems are difficult to secure because they are much more open to the public, leaving them highly vulnerable because security personnel can’t possibly monitor every person, package, or activity no matter how sophisticated the screening devices. Rail systems also are difficult to secure because the schedules are usually consistent and widely publicized, and the stations have many uncontrolled access points. These systems become especially attractive because of the expensive equipment and facilities, the large number of potential victims, typical location in dense urban areas, and the economic importance.** Balancing the cost versus the payback is probably one of the most difficult challenges for security professionals.19 Another type of attack – the cyber attack – does not necessarily create high body counts, but that depends on the type of attack. Because it can disable or harm positive train control (PTC) and other digitally-based systems, a cyber attack certainly must be considered as a potential killing tool. Derailing and other disasters can be staged simply by hacking into the digital systems or introducing powerful malware. The recent Stuxnet virus, for example, was so elegantly designed that it was able to attack industrial systems and, according to Iranian officials, even enter computers of its nuclear project workers.20 However, not all hacking is aimed directly at the rail system itself. Some of it is directed toward identity theft as a means to impersonate operational staff, security officers, and others who have access to the systems’ control rooms, restricted areas, train yards, tracks, and other non-public areas. It has become relatively simple to counterfeit the digital ID cards and badges that operators have come to trust as innately secure

#### There are no security checks at railways now

Maurillo 5/5/12, Donna R. Masters Degree in Science of Transportation Management at Mineta Transportation Institute “Thesis - Quality Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Masters of Science in Transportation Management” pg 28 <http://transweb.sjsu.edu/mtiportal/education/alumni/capstones/terror-targets-high-speed-rail-vs-intercity-rail-Maurillo.pdf> [Accessed 7/9/12] {Andrew Giovanny Alvarado}

This is not to say that the threats are unknown in the halls of federal policy. Because al Qaeda and other terror groups have had spectacular success with passenger rail attacks in Europe and Asia, US lawmakers have long asked whether passenger rail security has been sufficiently addressed at home. This has become an especially vexing question following the high-profile attacks in London, Madrid, Mumbai, and Moscow. Although John S. Pistole, Administrator for the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) testified in his confirmation hearings that he would analyze whether TSA was positioning sufficient resources to protect passenger rail, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported as recently as June 2010 to Rep. John Mica (R-Fla), then ranking member of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, that TSA so far has all but abandoned its efforts to conduct those assessments.26 This is puzzling, given the continued reality of al-Qaida’s and other terrorists’ threats – and successful attacks – against transportation. (U/FOUO) While the Transportation Security Administration’s Office of Inspection (TSA-OI) assesses “with moderate confidence” that the risk of an attack to the US freight rail industry is low, it also assesses “with high confidence” that passenger trains or stations are more likely to be targeted than freight trains.

#### High Risks on Rails Now

Maurillo 5/5/12, Donna R. Masters Degree in Science of Transportation Management at Mineta Transportation Institute “Thesis - Quality Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Masters of Science in Transportation Management” pg 28-29 <http://transweb.sjsu.edu/mtiportal/education/alumni/capstones/terror-targets-high-speed-rail-vs-intercity-rail-Maurillo.pdf> [Accessed 7/9/12] {Andrew Giovanny Alvarado}

(U/FOUO) In an intelligence report dated February 28, 2011, TSA-OI “judges that al-Qa’ida (AQ), its affiliates, and other terrorists motivated by violent extremist views would be the most likely actors to target the U.S. freight rail system. This judgment is based on recent attacks against freight rail and passenger trains overseas and the recent stated goals of al-Qa’ida’s senior leadership to attack U.S. transportation.” (U/FOUO) The report also noted that “improvised explosive devices (IEDs) would be the most likely means of attack against the U.S. freight rail system.” And while there is little evidence of a terrorist threat to industrial control systems for rail, the report says that “al-Qa’ida and other violent extremist groups have a sustained interest in acquiring the skills to conduct cyber attacks. Those assessments proved accurate immediately following the killing of terror mastermind Osama bin Laden. Among the documents taken from his fortress were those that revealed an alleged plan to attack US rail transport on September 11, 2011, the tenth anniversary of the attacks on the World Trade Center. (U/FOUO) According to an FBI and DHS Joint Intelligence Bulletin, “As one option, al-Qa‘ida was looking at the possibility of tipping a train by tampering with the rails so that the train would fall off the track at either a valley or a bridge.”28 And yet, just one week after those potential plans were revealed, two security breaches were successfully carried out on the New York subway system. According to the New York Post, “Two terrifying rail security breaches occurred within hours of each other in the city yesterday – including one at the World Trade Center, where a man slipped into the PATH tunnel and walked all the way to Jersey before saying he had left a bomb in the tunnel. “That scare – and an unrelated escapade involving four ‘urban explorers’ infiltrating the under-construction Second Avenue Subway tunnel – come just days after the feds warned that al Qaeda could be targeting US trains.”

#### People will be discouraged from riding HSR because of Security Checks and will prefer alternative forms of transportation

Maurillo 5/5/12, Donna R. Masters Degree in Science of Transportation Management at Mineta Transportation Institute “Thesis - Quality Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Masters of Science in Transportation Management” pg 40-41 <http://transweb.sjsu.edu/mtiportal/education/alumni/capstones/terror-targets-high-speed-rail-vs-intercity-rail-Maurillo.pdf> [Accessed 7/9/12] {Andrew Giovanny Alvarado}

That said, how far can HSR security go? Here in the US, people expect a greater amount of personal freedom, including the freedom to go where they wish with a minimum amount of inconvenience. Because Americans own so many private cars, they have come to expect that travel is a personal right that allows them to choose the route, mode, price, speed, distance, and even their traveling companions. As general experience with Transportation Security Administration screening in airports has shown, Americans don’t like to be slowed down (even for five or 10 minutes in a security line), to have their personal effects x-rayed and searched, and especially to have their bodies touched, scanned, or viewed in any state of undress. This is perhaps the reason that one major selling point for HSR is that “you won’t have to remove your shoes.” For now, that may be true. And for now, one may expect that HSR security measures will be at an acceptable level for most travelers – that is, at a less intrusive level than for air travel. Some foreigners may find this puzzling, especially if they have experienced – directly or indirectly – the effects of terrorism on public transportation. Because of this, they have come to accept a higher level of screening when they travel, and to expect armed guards, surveillance cameras, and other means of security.A report to the US GAO says, “According to foreign rail operators, these experiences have resulted in greater acceptance of certain security practices, such as random searches, which the U.S. public may view as a violation of their civil liberties or which may discourage them from using public transportation.”40 That may be true, but at least one researcher believes that, even following an attempted attack on the TGV, the French people still want convenience and a minimum of barriers when they travel. In Terror on the TGV? The Terrorist Threat to France’s High-Speed Rail Network, Dylan Kissane of the School of International Studies at the University of South Australia, writes, “(P)assengers would no longer be able to arrive and board the train moments before departure, passengers would endure longer waits should they be taking multiple pieces of baggage aboard the train, family members will be barred from assisting elderly or disabled passengers from boarding and ticket purchasers would be required to book tickets in the name and with the photo identification of other passengers. This may encourage passengers to seek alternate transport – personal vehicle, bus or TER train – to avoid the inconvenience of the TGV network under a counter- terrorist screening regime

#### **Amtrak is an appealing target to terrorist – mass transit = maximum damage**

Homeland Security & Defense Business Council 2011 (Homeland Security & Defense Business Council, Jun 10, 2011, “Are We Ready for the Day Before Tomorrow?” <http://www.homelandcouncil.org/pdfs/digital_library_pdfs/hsdbc91011projectmasstransitsecurity.pdf> [7/9/2012])

Intermodal passenger transport hubs present another challenge to secure mass transit. These hubs are generally in large metropolitan areas where multiple means of mass transit merge, providing an extremely appealing “soft target” for terrorists due to their potential for both human and economic damage. New York’s Penn Station is the perfect example, housing an Amtrak hub, New Jersey and Long Island Railroad commuter lines, and six subway routes. Amtrak reports 500,000 passengers in this station daily and perhaps millions of daily commuters take advantage of its convenient access to speedy transport. As the aforementioned international attacks have shown, terrorist have made a conscious change in their tactics, shifting from more traditional “hard targets” to these open, intermodal hubs. Despite the variance amongst targets, i.e. size, number of people and types of transit, the components are the same: citizens accessing a geographic location on a predictable daily schedule, packed into extremely close quarters in a perfect scenario for maximum death and destruction.

## Internal Links

#### **Terrorism turns the aff**

Sanandaji 11 Tino [Tino Sanandaji is a 29 year old PhD student in Public Policy at the University of Chicago, and the Chief Economist of the free-market think tank Captus] “America Wrong Continent for High-Speed Trains” *Pacific Standard* 2/8/11 accessed: 7/9/12 <http://wallstreetpit.com/61085-america-wrong-continent-for-high-speed-trains> DR

High-Speed trains are not only expensive, they are slow when compared to air-travel. Take one of the least crazy high-speed train projects, connecting Los Angeles and San Francisco. The White House estimates are that this trip will take 2 hours 40 minutes. The same trip by commercial flight takes 1 hours 20 minutes. Even if you add an extra one hour for security check, the trip is faster by air (you also have to drive to the airport, but the same is true for trains). After the first terrorist attack against high-speed trains, the security advantage would diminish. If we really wanted to and had an extra $53 billion over, we could invest in flying faster, in making the security process more effective, or (most sensibly) improving the high-way system. Another fact Liberals ignore is that air-travel is cheaper in the U.S, costing about half per mile of what it does in Europe (perhaps due to economies of scale and higher competitiveness).

**At worse it is a solvency takeout**

**Moore 11** (A writer and travel journalist from Manhattan Beach, Calif. has been kidnapped by Somali pirates while doing research on a book about piracy., currently a hostage, 5-4-11, [Michael Scott Moore](http://www.psmag.com/author/mmoore/),“High-Speed Rail’s Weak Link Is Security” Pacific Standard, <http://www.psmag.com/politics/high-speed-rails-weak-link-is-security-30874/>, 7/9/12, CF)

**When some conservatives responded by saying surveillance cameras should also be installed in public toilets, a commissioner in charge of data protection said a move like that would be “alarming on constitutional grounds.”** A leading Green politician named Hans-Christian Ströbele said, **“It’s been proven for a long time that video surveillance of public spaces doesn’t eliminate danger.”** And that was pretty much that. The difference between America and Europe, at the moment, is that security theater carries no [political reward](http://www.psmag.com/culture-society/the-politics-of-a-european-pat-down-26572/%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) in Europe: No mainstream politician wants to inconvenience a lot of voters for security that will never be airtight. Europeans have lived with bustling, open-plan train stations for centuries; they know the odds. **In America, though, good rail travel stands to become something new and unknown — [all over again!](http://www.american-rails.com/golden-age-of-railroading.html%22%20%5Ct%20%22_blank) — and if U.S. politicians start crowing for airline-style security theater, the trains’ usefulness will vanish.**

#### HSR ideal for terrorist attacks; will cause abandonment

Rider, 2010 [Richard, (B.A. in Economics from University of North Carolina), “Terrorists will love California’s high speed rail”, North Country Times, February 11, 2010, Date Accessed: July 9, 2012, <http://open.salon.com/blog/richard_rider/2011/05/06/terrorists_will_love_californias_high_speed_rail> JB2]

On behalf of terrorists everywhere, let me say that high speed rail (HSR) is a Godsend to the Jihad (or whatever cause lights their fire). A speeding “bullet train” will be like a plane flying at ground level at (supposedly) 220 MPH. At that velocity, if the train left the blown-up track, it would be like a plane coming down. Most passengers would likely be killed. Those that weren’t killed would probably wish they HAD been killed. The graphic pictures of the horribly maimed and dead would be exactly what the terrorists long for. Terrorists will take their cue from the French and Russian partisans in WWII who blew up NAZI trains with great success. Planes are hard to bring down — not so for trains. With HSR, all a terrorist needs to do is properly place a relatively small explosive charge on the track. As a HSR bullet train comes flying up to the spot, the terrorist remotely detonates the explosive. The best part for terrorists is that one doesn’t even have to be a suicide bomber. Just set the charge, detonate it, and drive away for another bombing later. One rebuttal I’ve heard from HSR proponents is that terrorists are interested in planes only as missiles they can dive into buildings. But one has to wonder if such Pollyannas have been watching the news since 2001. Does “shoe bomber” or “underpants on fire” ring a bell? But put that aside. The 9/11 attacks cost the bad guys 20 men. How many must die to blow up a HSR train track? Zero. A California “bullet train” will carry 950 when fully loaded. Presumably that full load is the terrorists’ target. So, assuming the bad guys want to repeat the casualties of 9/11 — How many HSR trains much be demolished to kill the same number of people as 9/11? Three. With no loss of life to the terrorists. Most important, HSR is an EASY train to wreck compared to airplanes. A HSR derailment requires minimal explosives, and recycles the terrorist. And the terrorists get to pick the worst spot to plant the explosives — perhaps just before the speeding train reaches a curve, or a bridge over a river or valley. Sure, terrorists are willing to die for their cause. But any terrorist (and their bosses) would rather they cause several catastrophes before finally getting killed or caught. One such disastrous bombing will be the effective end of California’s “high speed” rail. For safety purposes, “bullet train” traffic will have to be slowed to 60-70 MPH to reduce casualties from such derailings. HSR train passenger traffic will plummet, and this useless financial choo-choo will hang around our necks for decades. The terrorists would never get three filled HSR trains to blow up at 200 MPH speed — unless they coordinated the attacks at the same time (sound familiar?). After the fatal attack(s), there would be no more HSR in CA. Just rail. Very, VERY expensive rail.

**Terrorists will attack the tracks and any collision means the whole system stops**

**Mass Transit 08/11**, “High speed rail security needs a different approach than commuter rail,” <http://www.masstransitmag.com/article/10317151/high-speed-rail-security-needs-a-different-approach-than-commuter-rail> LV

When it comes to security for high-speed rail, the approach needs to be different than that for light rail or commuter rail. The reason is simple; the approach that terrorists take is different, according to Brian Jenkins, director of the National Transportation Security Center of Excellence, Mineta Transportation Institute. "**When terrorists attack high-speed rail systems, they seem to prefer to derail trains**. When they go after non-high-speed rail systems, they more often try to detonate bombs in passenger compartments," Jenkins says. "Most attacks on high-speed rail systems target the tracks (66 percent) vs. the passenger compartment (17 percent). More attacks on non-high-speed rail systems target the passenger compartment than the tracks." He continues saying, "Terrorists choose between volume and velocity. Passenger loads on high-speed rail trains, per-car and per-train are less than slower-speed commuter or regional trains. This explains why high lethality with bombs detonated in passenger compartments is more achievable on a non-high-speed train. On the other hand**, train velocity is obviously much greater on high-speed trains, making collisions or derailments a more attractive and effective choice of attack method.**" According to Jenkins, **Bombs placed on the tracks are on average twice as lethal for high-speed rail as those placed in the passenger compartments**. For non-high-speed rail, bombs in passenger compartments have proved to be more lethal than bombs on the tracks. Derailments that involve a mechanical means of sabotage can be more lethal than bombs on the track. **"Technology, particularly on high-speed rail systems, will cause train operations to cease if a bomb detonates and causes catastrophic destruction prior to train arrival.** Effective use of explosives, as in the Russian Nevsky Express attack in 2009, requires the detonation to be timed perfectly with a train's passage," Jenkins says. "Even in this attack, more casualties were crush and impact injuries and fatalities, occurring in the derailing rear cars (numbers 12, 13, and 14) of the train than those caused by the explosion under the ninth car." So what are the options for increasing security on high-speed rail systems? While **monitoring the entirety of the track is nearly impossible**, surveillance of key points is very important. Video surveillance near bridges, tunnel entrances, curves and other key points can improve the security, Jenkins says. "I remember in Bin Laden's notebook he was talking about derailing a train in the United States and he didn't specify a high-speed train but in his notebooks he mentioned derail it on a curve to try and take it off the tracks," he says.

**One HSR crash will lead to several others**

**House of Commons Transport Committee 10/11**, “High speed rail,” <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtran/1185/1185vw.pdf>

**If, due to terrorism or mechanical failure, a train were to derail at speed onto the second line it is unlikely oncoming trains would be able to stop in time to avoid a crash**. Apparently for HS2 no time has been allowed for passenger security checks to take place**. Impact mitigation is best achieved by multiple transport systems and limiting damage as a result of ﬁre, explosion or systems sabotage. The high proﬁle nature and single route aspect of HS2 combined with the number of tunnels, extreme speed and frequency of trains are major concerns with regard to security and the impact of any failure.**

## Impacts - retaliation

Another significant terrorist attack against the U.S. would cause indiscriminate retaliation, risking world war

Schwartz-Morgan 01 (Nicole- Asst. Prof., Politics and Economics, Royal Military College of Canada,” Wild Globalization and Terrorism: Three Scenarios,” World Future Society, <http://www.wfs.org/mmmorgan.htm>)

The terrorist act can reactivate atavistic defense mechanisms which drive us to gather around clan chieftans. Nationalistic sentiment re-awakens, setting up an implacable frontier which divides "us" from "them," each group solidifying its cohesion in a rising hate/fear of the other group. (Remember Yugoslavia?) To be sure, the allies are trying for the moment to avoid the language of polarization, insisting that "this is not a war," that it is "not against Islam," "civilians will not be targeted." But the word "war" was pronounced, a word heavy with significance which forces the issue of partisanship. And it must be understood that the sentiment of partisanship, of belonging to the group, is one of the strongest of human emotions. Because the enemy has been named in the media (Islam), the situation has become emotionally volatile. Another spectacular attack, coming on top of an economic recession could easily radicalize the latent attitudes of the United States, and also of Europe, where racial prejudices are especially close to the surface and ask no more than a pretext to burst out. This is the Sarajevo syndrome: an isolated act of madness becomes the pretext for a war that is just as mad, made of ancestral rancor, measureless ambitions, and armies in search of a war. We should not be fooled by our expressions of good will and charity toward the innocent victims of this or other distant wars. It is our own comfortable circumstances which permit us these benevolent sentiments. If conditions change so that poverty and famine put the fear of starvation in our guts, the human beast will reappear. And if epidemic becomes a clear and present danger, fear will unleash hatred in the land of the free, flinging missiles indiscriminately toward any supposed havens of the unseen enemy. And on the other side, no matter how profoundly complex and differentiated Islamic nations and tribes may be, they will be forced to behave as one clan by those who see advantage in radicalizing the conflict, whether they be themselves merchants or terrorists.

Another major terrorist attack against the U.S. would cause it to precipitate a nuclear conflict

Peterson 01 John L- President, Arlington Institute, “The Next Sound You Hear,” World Future Society, <http://www.wfs.org/mmpetersen.htm>

But there seems to be a rather specific objective behind all of this. There is an end-game that these terrorists seem to have in mind, and it is not just to kill a bunch of Americans. The analysis that I read points to all of this being the Islamic radicals’ first assault in a war aimed at elevating Islam to being the major influential religion and political system in the world. How might they do that with the relatively limited resources that they have? Again, the most salient thinking that I’ve found suggests that they’d like to turn America against Islam, and vice-versa. A holy war between Islam and the West. How do you do that? Get the U.S. to overreact. Focus the unhappiness of the vast numbers of desperately poor Muslims around more high-profile injustice visited on them indiscriminately by American retaliation for the September 11 attacks. Mobilize them around a gross inequity . . . the same way that Americans (and the West) have mobilized around a great inequity. The third principle is therefore: Provoke Over-Reaction. Get the West to seemingly strike out against "Islam" — again. Give them the basis for moving their religious war into high-gear. If this is the framework for a second strike, then where should we look? We should look for places where a relatively small, sophisticated effort can produce inordinate social pain and anger. Produce an event that will cause Americans, in the fury of the aftermath, to look with hate upon every Arabic-looking person they see and strike out in vengeance. (That, of course, is the predictable way in which things work in many places on the planet.) The best of all worlds would be a nuclear counter-strike that wiped out a bunch of innocent Muslims — that would start the war for sure. Where are our vulnerabilities in this kind of scenaric world? Obviously, there is the possibility of a nuclear or biological attack, and that is where we will immediately put up our defenses.

U.S. would use tactical nuclear weapons in retaliation

Knickerbocker 01 (Brad, “Nuclear Attack a Real, if Remote, Possibility,” Christian Science Monitor)

In addition, several US lawmakers have said America should be prepared to use its tactical nuclear weapons to prevent or respond to another domestic terrorist attack. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld - repeating long-standing US military doctrine - has not ruled that out. While the former Soviet Union has been a top concern - officials there can't account for all nuclear-weapons items, and many now-jobless nuclear scientists may be susceptible to bribery - much of the focus is now on Pakistan.

## **AT: We Have Security**

#### Rail security impossible

Stoller 10 Gary [USA Today writer] “Can trains, subways be protected from terrorists?” *USA Today* 12/27/10 accessed: 7/9/12 <http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/travel/2010-12-27-railsecurity27_CV_N.htm> DR

The government's top security officials say they are upgrading subway and rail defenses against terrorist attacks throughout the country, but a USA TODAY examination finds gaping holes, including many that may not be possible to plug. The holes in security leave travelers more vulnerable on the more than 4 billion trips they take by subway and rail each year than in the sky, where airlines carried fewer than 700 million passengers from U.S. airports last year. Six terrorist plots targeting U.S. subway and rail systems have been exposed since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, and the systems remain a target, transit authorities, security experts and members of Congress agree. An alleged plot to simultaneously bomb four Washington, D.C., Metro subway stations was foiled in October, and another plot to detonate explosives in New York's subway system was averted last year. Yet, as the nation debates the federal Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) stricter screening methods at airport security checkpoints, about 15 million passengers board subway cars and trains unscreened each weekday. "Mass transit systems are much less secure than the aviation sector or certain key government buildings," says Clark Kent Ervin, the Department of Homeland Security's former inspector general. And they'll likely remain that way, USA TODAY has found in its examination of rail security, which included an analysis of the National Counterterrorism Center's incident database and interviews with Congress, federal security officials, transit authorities, rail operators, independent security experts and passengers. The nation's vast network of more than 3,200 stations and more than 20,000 miles of track combined with the impracticality and cost of screening every passenger leave U.S. subways and rails exposed to the type of terrorist attacks 22 other nations have experienced the last five years. Having a secure network ultimately is the responsibility of the TSA, which is in the Department of Homeland Security. While the agency has imposed stringent screening of air passengers at the nation's 450 commercial airports, it says it has no similar plans for rail passengers.

#### Security tanks rail and decreases ridership

Stoller 10 Gary [USA Today writer] “Can trains, subways be protected from terrorists?” *USA Today* 12/27/10 accessed: 7/9/12 <http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/travel/2010-12-27-railsecurity27_CV_N.htm> DR

"Mass transit systems in the U.S. are vast, a literal black hole," says James Carafano, a homeland security expert at The Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington think tank. "They would consume every cent we spend on homeland security, and there still would be vast vulnerabilities." Brian Jenkins, security research director for the Mineta Transportation Institute, which is funded by Congress and researches transportation policy issues, estimates that it costs $8 to $10 to screen a single passenger. "If you add that cost to a subway fare, it would destroy public transportation," Jenkins says. Screening all passengers could also slow mass transit to a crawl because most subway and rail riders travel en masse during weekday rush hours, security experts say. Many riders with a 20-minute or less commute would not accept a 20-minute or so security-screening delay and would opt for another means of transportation, Jenkins says. "One hundred percent screening of rail passengers is not realistic," he says. "You might need hundreds of thousands of screeners." Security rests in local hands TSA has devoted most of its resources to air security after the 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, leaving subway and rail security primarily to transit authorities, local governments and rail operators, including many that are not in good financial condition.

## AT: No impact to attack

**Critics don’t realize the devastation possible with HSR attacks.**

\*Warning card warrants plan unpopular

**Gerstein 10** (White House reporter for POLITICO, specializing in legal and national security issues, 1-28-10, Josh Gerstein, Politico, <http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0110/Obama_No_shoe_checks_on_highspeed_rail.html>, 7/9/12, CF)

This [post on a blog about California **high speed rail**](http://www.cahsrblog.com/2009/04/homeland-security-theater/), which scored $2.3 billion today, **boasts about the less intense security for intercity rail and argues that it's appropriate because terrorists are more likely to target a crowded urban subway.** That argument seems reasonable enough. **However, the blog's claims that "trains can’t fall out of the sky, nor can they be made to crash into buildings" aren't very persuasive suggestions that there's no real threat. It is true that Al Qaeda seems obsessed with blowing up passenger planes, but anything high profile could be a target.** **Maybe** by the time high-speed rail is built out in Florida, California or elsewhere, whole-body scanners will be in place that allow travelers to be screened for explosives or weapons without taking off their shoes. And even if a shoe-bomber got through, rail cars aren't pressurized, so that kind of attack probably wouldn't cause devastation. However, **some types of attacks could cause a derailment of a train going over 200 MPH. That wouldn't be pretty.** I get that the **lack of security-related delays is a practical advantage for rail.** It's one reason why a lot of people traveling between D.C. and New York choose the train over the plane. It's also the travelers' choice about how to balance convenience versus safety. But **the absence of security doesn't seem like a great selling point for taxpayers being asked or required to subsidize the network.**

# **Aff**

#### HSR prevents airline terrorism

Goodyear 11 [Directly quotes George Will, American newspaper columnist, journalist, and author. He is a Pulitzer Prize-winner best known for his conservative commentary on politics] “Before George Will was against high-speed rail, he was for it” *Grist* 3/4/11 accessed: 7/9/12 <http://grist.org/transportation/2011-03-04-before-george-will-was-against-high-speed-rail-he-was-for-it/> DR

In the dark days immediately after 9/11, Will seems to have had a revelation about how a certain mode of transportation could help our nation be stronger and more secure. In an Oct. 1, 2001 column syndicated in the Jewish World Review, Will recommended three steps in response to the attack that the nation had just sustained. First, buy more B-2 bombers. Second, cut corporate taxes. And third? Let Will speak for himself (emphasis mine): Third, build high-speed rail service. Two months ago this columnist wrote: “A government study concludes that for trips of 500 miles or less — a majority of flights; 40 percent are of 300 miles or less — automotive travel is as fast or faster than air travel, door to door. Columnist Robert Kuttner sensibly says that fact strengthens the case for high-speed trains. If such trains replaced air shuttles in the Boston-New York-Washington corridor, Kuttner says that would free about 60 takeoff and landing slots per hour.” Thinning air traffic in the Boston-New York-Washington air corridor has acquired new urgency. Read Malcolm Gladwell’s New Yorker essay on the deadly dialectic between the technological advances in making air travel safer and the adaptations to these advances by terrorists. “Airport-security measures,” writes Gladwell, “have simply chased out the amateurs and left the clever and the audacious.” This is why, although the number of terrorist attacks has been falling for many years, fatalities from hijackings and bombings have increased. As an Israeli terrorism expert says, “the history of attacks on commercial aviation reveals that new terrorist methods of attack have virtually never been foreseen by security authorities.” The lesson to be learned is not defeatism. Security improvements can steadily complicate terrorists’ tasks and increase the likelihood of defeating them on the ground. However, shifting more travelers away from the busiest airports to trains would reduce the number of flights that have to be protected and the number of sensitive judgments that have to be made, on the spot, quickly, about individual travelers. Congress should not adjourn without funding the nine-state Midwest Regional Rail Initiative. Now that it’s a Democratic administration advocating for rail, Will sees it not as a sensible solution for moving people from one place to another, but instead as a tool to control an unsuspecting populace:

#### Terrorism doesn’t work – France proves

Moore 11 Michael Scott [A writer and travel journalist from Manhattan Beach, Calif. has been kidnapped by Somali pirates while doing research on a book about piracy] “Terrorist Attacks on Railroads Would Be Difficult” *Pacific Standard* 5/11/11 accessed: 7/9/12 http://www.psmag.com/politics/terrorist-threat-of-wrecking-the-railroad-really-hard-31033/ DR

“He treated it like any other schoolboy might a giant train set,” Miroslaw Micor, a police spokesman in Lodz, said at the time. “But it was lucky nobody was killed.” Since the raid on Osama bin Laden’s house in Pakistan uncovered some notes about a future vision of derailed American trains, it’s worth remembering that the idea isn’t terribly new. America’s huge rail network — never mind the ambitious high-speed lines yet to be built — would be vulnerable for obvious reasons, and some critics have complained for months that Obama’s expensive high-speed rail dreams would be wide-open targets for al-Qaeda. But news outlets and politicians have overreacted, and a report from last year by the Mineta Transportation Institute gives a number of good reasons why derailment disasters are so rare. Sabotaging the switching points — the Polish kid’s method — would be more reliable, but it takes more cleverness. Mechanical sabotage of all kinds (high- and low-tech) derailed trains with 76 percent success rate in the Mineta report’s samples — but it was much more rare than setting bombs. Only 25 out of the sample of 181 derailment attempts were acts of mechanical sabotage. In 1995, an Algerian terrorist group called the Groupe Islamique Armé tried to bomb a line of the TGV, France’s high-speed rail, near Lyon. It was an attack with al-Qaeda-like aspirations. “The psychological effect of an explosion on the train would have been enormous,” the Mineta study points out. “France’s TGV was the first high-speed rail system in Europe and today remains a source of national pride.” The bomb misfired, and the suspect eventually died in a shootout with police. French officials knew the GIA wanted to cause mayhem any way it could — including hijacking an airliner meant to smash into the Eiffel Tower a few months before. But officials resisted the urge to post metal detectors at all French train stations and force millions of passengers to take off belts and shoes. Instead, they doubled the number of inspectors sweeping the rails every morning for bombs. “French authorities … emphasize the importance of deploying limited resources in ways that terrorists cannot predict, persuading them that they face a high risk of being apprehended,” write the Mineta authors. “The French also place great importance on intelligence operations to monitor the activities of groups and individuals engaged in terrorist radicalization and recruiting.” The point is that airport-style security would ruin everything good about a high-speed train, so light security lines have remained the rule with European rail. Terrorism has been a steady risk in Europe for decades, but even where authorities screen baggage — on some French, Spanish, and British high-speed lines — the wait tends to be quick.

#### HSR will have local and national security protecting rails

Maurillo 5/5/12, Donna R. Masters Degree in Science of Transportation Management at Mineta Transportation Institute “Thesis - Quality Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Masters of Science in Transportation Management” pg 38 <http://transweb.sjsu.edu/mtiportal/education/alumni/capstones/terror-targets-high-speed-rail-vs-intercity-rail-Maurillo.pdf> [Accessed 7/9/12] {Andrew Giovanny Alvarado}

As noted above, **HSR is likely an attractive target if only by virtue of its potentially iconic status. As an entirely new infrastructure, it will require billions of dollars in public and private funds, along with many years of construction**. This investment should be protected not only from the terrorist, but also from vandals, criminals, taggers, trespassers, or anyone else planning to harm the system. Why protect the system from seemingly harmless taggers and trespassers? **A condition known as “the broken window syndrome” commonly attracts harmful activity.** That is, **when graffiti or other forms of vandalism are evident, it indicates that security is lax,** at least in that geography and perhaps within the entire system. **This lack of internal control can attract others who could take more serious measures, believing that their activities will not be monitored immediately or even for some time.** Peter Guerrero and Norman Rabkin, in their testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, noted that a risk management approach to security is best. They stated that “the highest priorities emerge where threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality overlap. For example, rail infrastructure that is determined to be a critical asset, vulnerable to attack, and a likely target would be at most risk and therefore would be a higher priority for funding compared with infrastructure that was only vulnerable to attack. Does HSR fit that “first priority” profile? It most likely does for several reasons. First, HSR (including the incremental upgrades) will form a new national infrastructure. As such, **it will be subject to greater scrutiny and held to higher standards than today’s inter-city rail system. The effects of certain risks could be much greater on HSR, justifying a greater level of security.** Because of the wider geography covered by HSR, **it may require not only the standard local-area controls, but also** a larger, **national involvement with several agencies participating**. The larger distances also could affect a greater number of stakeholders with a variety of standards and practices. Therefore, HSR security may require a more equitable approach to unify those security controls.

#### Security Tech is inexpensive and feasible

Maurillo 5/5/12, Donna R. Masters Degree in Science of Transportation Management at Mineta Transportation Institute “Thesis - Quality Research Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Masters of Science in Transportation Management” pg 50 <http://transweb.sjsu.edu/mtiportal/education/alumni/capstones/terror-targets-high-speed-rail-vs-intercity-rail-Maurillo.pdf> [Accessed 7/9/12] {Andrew Giovanny Alvarado}

Despite the historically lower interest in rail security (versus air security) by government regulators, some rail operators in the US and abroad have instituted a number of security measures that have certain effectiveness. For example, many rail operators and stations do use barriers, surveillance, alarms, and inspection. These include fences, closed circuit television (CCTV), sweeper trains for periodic inspections of rails and rights-of-way, citizen awareness campaigns, manual inspections, cooperation with local law enforcement and first responders, specially-designed vending machines and trash receptacles to minimize bomb placements, random bag inspections, chemical-sniffing canines, crash avoidance systems, and other security methods. (See Figure 9.) In an article for Emergency Management magazine, author Margaret Steen suggested four avenues for taking rail security to a higher level. These include screening passengers and luggage, at least on a random basis to avoid bringing the system to a complete halt; reinforcing train windows to withstand greater force than the current standard of a .22-caliber rifle; air conditioning the locomotives [or with HSR, the operator compartment] so windows and doors need not be opened in warm weather; and involving citizens to report any suspicious behavior, packages, or other situations.51 According to a statement by JayEtta Z. Hecker, Director of Physical Infrastructure Issues, foreign operators have much that the US can learn from, although domestic operators have implemented many similar measures, such as citizen awareness, improved technology, better perimeter and access protections, and certain risk assessments. Some of these foreign controls may not be acceptable to the American traveler, however. These include covert testing to ensure employee alertness, and centralized clearinghouses on rail security technologies, such as chemical sensors. “While introducing any of these security practices into the U.S. rail system may pose political, legal, fiscal, and cultural challenges,” Ms. Hecker noted, “the practices may nevertheless warrant further examination. Ms. Hecker also noted that closed-circuit television (CCTV) was popular among the operators they interviewed, even though it was not perfect. It is not possible for personnel to monitor all places at all times, but the cameras were credited with deterring crime, helping security personnel determine how to respond to incidents, and allowing personnel to monitor certain areas if a credible threat is received or suspected. As an example, she said, “One rail operator, New Jersey Transit, had installed ‘smart’ cameras, which were programmed to alert security personnel when suspicious activity occurred, such as if a passenger left a bag in a certain location or a boat docked under a bridge. According to the New Jersey Transit officials, this technology was relatively inexpensive and not difficult to implement. Several other operators said they were interested in exploring this technology. Abroad, all 13 of the foreign rail operators we visited had CCTV systems in place.”

#### **Terrorist more attracted to non- HSR systems**

KAISER 2011 KIM KAISER August 11, 2011, Senior Contributing Editor at Mass Transit Magazine, “High-Speed Rail Security Needs a Different Approach than Commuter Rail”, <http://www.masstransitmag.com/article/10317151/high-speed-rail-security-needs-a-different-approach-than-commuter-rail> [7/9/2012])

When it comes to security for high-speed rail, the approach needs to be different than that for light rail or commuter rail. The reason is simple; the approach that terrorists take is different, according to Brian Jenkins, director of the National Transportation Security Center of Excellence, Mineta Transportation Institute."When terrorists attack high-speed rail systems, they seem to prefer to derail trains. When they go after non-high-speed rail systems, they more often try to detonate bombs in passenger compartments," Jenkins says. "Most attacks on high-speed rail systems target the tracks (66 percent) vs. the passenger compartment (17 percent). More attacks on non-high-speed rail systems target the passenger compartment than the tracks."He continues saying, "Terrorists choose between volume and velocity. Passenger loads on high-speed rail trains, per-car and per-train are less than slower-speed commuter or regional trains. This explains why high lethality with bombs detonated in passenger compartments is more achievable on a non-high-speed train. On the other hand, train velocity is obviously much greater on high-speed trains, making collisions or derailments a more attractive and effective choice of attack method.”

**HSR = low risk**

**Cruickshank 12** ([Robert Cruickshank](http://www.cahsrblog.com/author/robert-cruickshank/), 3-15-12,“Political Support for HSR Remains Strong in Bay Area”, California High Speed Rail Blog, <http://www.cahsrblog.com/2012/03/political-support-for-hsr-remains-strong-in-bay-area/>, 7/9/12, CF)

Californians For High Speed Rail’s Daniel **Krause** also was in attendance on Tuesday night and **had a great statement about risk:** Daniel Krause, co-founder and executive director, Californians for High Speed Rail: “The California **High Speed Rail** project **is absolutely essential** to California’s future, **from providing desperately needed transportation capacity to clean our air, to reducing congestion and stimulating economic activity. While opponents have been running a relentless campaign of fear,** doubt and uncertainty **to give the impression the project is too risky, in fact, there is far more risk in not moving forward. It will cost much more to expand airports and freeways to create the same amount of transportation capacity.** Additionally, borrowing costs will be offset by the requirement that any Prop 1A used must be matched by non-state source of funds, injecting billions of outside dollars into our state’s economy. It is time to set the record straight – **high-speed rail is truly the low-risk alternative**.”

**HSR will be safe – FRA strategy solves accidents.**

**DOT 09** (U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Railroad Administration,11-09 “High-Speed Passenger Rail Safety Strategy”, http://www.fra.dot.gov/downloads/safety/HSRSafetyStrategy110609.pdf, 7/9/12, CF)

**The hallmark of** world‐class, **high‐speed rail is safety. FRA believes** that railroads **conducting HSR operations in the United States can provide service as safe as, or safer than, any HSR operation being conducted elsewhere. FRA also believes that the expansion of HSR in America will yield safety benefits** for those who choose to use the service instead of driving the same distance via roads and highways. **Data published by the National Safety Council shows that, based on miles traveled, personal motor vehicle travel is 12 to 20 times more likely to result in a fatality than passenger rail travel. In anticipation of such service, and to promote public safety, FRA has developed this Strategy,** which includes: **(1) establishing safety standards and program guidance for HSR, 2 (2) applying a system safety approach to address safety concerns on specific rail lines, and (3) ensuring that railroads involved in passenger train operations can effectively and efficiently manage train emergencies.** This Strategy endeavors to achieve uniformly safe rail passenger service, regardless of speed**. Since the severity of collisions and derailments increases with speed, safety performance targets for preventive measures are tiered to become more stringent as speed increases.** Current FRA regulations include Tier I equipment safety standards for passenger trains operating at speeds up to 125 mph. **FRA established additional standards (Tier II) for highspeed trains that operate up to 150 mph. These Tier II requirements address crashworthiness, crash energy management, vehicle suspension systems, brake systems, train configurations and other elements critical for high‐speed trainsets**. The Tier II standards only impact the Amtrak Acela Service on the Northeast Corridor because Acela is currently the only Tier II application operating in the United States. Existing FRA track safety standards are comprehensive and specify track geometry and cant deficiency for FRA Classes 1 through 9 at speeds up to 200 mph. The track standards include requirements for Class 6 track (110 mph) and above for remote monitoring of carbody acceleration and truck hunting, and equipment qualification on actual routes. Appendix A provides a representation of current requirements and open issues related to track safety standards. **FRA is currently reviewing European and worldwide equipment standards and developing guidance for high‐speed trains operating at up to 220 mph. FRA is also exploring improvements and expansions to vehicle and track safety standards through rulemaking.** Currently, the agency is advancing rules that amend the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards and Track Safety Standards for high‐speed train operations and train operations at high cant deficiencies to promote the safe interaction of rail vehicles with the track over which they operate. The rulemaking would revise the safety limits for these operations and the processes to qualify them, and account for a range of vehicle types. Although this rulemaking would substantially change FRA’s regulations governing the safety of highspeed and high cant deficiency train operations, a number of the changes would codify FRA decisions affecting such operations made under current approval and waiver processes. It would therefore reduce some existing regulatory burdens while safely facilitating the broader introduction of high‐speed operations and enabling lower‐speed train operations to gain efficiencies through operation on curved track at higher cant deficiencies. **FRA will continue to promote safety and facilitate the introduction of new HSR operations.** President Obama proposes to help address our new transportation challenges by investing in an efficient HSR network of 100‐ to 600‐mile intercity corridors that connect communities across America. This vision builds on successful highway and aviation development models with a 21st century solution that focuses on a clean, energy‐efficient option (even today=s modest intercity passenger rail system consumes one‐third less energy per passenger‐mile than automobiles). FRA expects that each HSR operation will be appropriately tailored to its operating environment. The High‐Speed Rail Strategic Plan divides potential operations into four categories or generic descriptions: 3