## \*\*Sustainability\*\*

### Multipolarity now

#### The era of unipolarity has ended- we are transitioning to a multipolar world

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Before the Great Recession’s foreshocks in fall 2007, most American security studies scholars believed that unipolarity and perforce American hegemony would be enduring features of international politics far into the future. However, in the Great Recessions aftermath, it is apparent that much has changed since 2007. Predictions of continuing unipolarity have been superseded by premonitions of American decline and geopolitical transformation. The Great Recession has had a two-fold impact. First, it highlighted the shift of global wealth and power from West to East, a trend illustrated by Chinas breathtakingly rapid rise to great power status. Second, it has raised doubts about the robustness of US primacy’s economic and financial underpinnings. This article argues that the unipolar moment is over, and the Pax Americana, the era of American ascendancy in international politics that began in 1945.is fast winding down. This article challenges the conventional wisdom among International Relations . Security Studies scholars on three counts. First, it shows that contrary to the claims of unipolar stability theorists, the distribution of power in the international system no longer is unipolar. Second, this article revisits the 1980s debate about American decline and demonstrates that the Great Recession has vindicated the so-called declinists of that decade. Finally, this article takes on the institutional lock-in argument, which holds that by strengthening the Pax Americanas legacy institutions, the United States can perpetuate the essential elements of the international order it constructed following World War II even as the material foundations of American primacy erode.

#### **Great recession makes transition inevitable**

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Some twenty years after the Cold War’s end, it now is evident that both the 1980s declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right after all. The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. The Great Recession has underscored the reality of US decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their heads in the sand and maintain otherwise. To be sure, the Great Recession itself is not the cause either of American decline or the shift in global power, both of which are the culmination of decades-long processes driven by the big, impersonal forces of history. However, it is fair to say the Great Recession has both accelerated the causal forces driving these trends and magniﬁed their impact. There are two drivers of American decline, one external and one domestic. The external driver of US decline is the emergence of new great powers in world politics and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia. In this respect, the relative decline of the United States and the end of unipolarity are linked inextricably: the rise of new great powers—especially China—is in itself the most tangible evidence of the erosion of the United States’ power. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. Domestically, the driver of change is the relative—and in some ways absolute—decline in America’s economic power, the looming ﬁscal crisis confronting the United States, and increasing doubts about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve currency status. Unipolarity’s demise marks the end of era of the post-World War II Pax Americana. When World War II ended, the United States, by virtue of its overwhelming military and economic supremacy, was incontestably the most powerful actor in the international system. Indeed, 1945 was the United States’ ﬁrst unipolar moment. The United States used its commanding, hegemonic position to construct the postwar international order—the Pax Americana—which endured for more than six decades. During the Cold War, the Pax Americana reﬂected the fact that outside the Soviet sphere, the United States was the preponderant power in the three regions of the world it cared most about: Western Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. The Pax Americana rested on the foundational pillars of US military dominance and economic leadership and was buttressed by two supporting pillars: America’s ideological appeal (‘‘soft power’’) and the framework of international institutions that the United States built after 1945. Following the Cold War’s end, the United States used its second unipolar moment to consolidate the Pax Americana by expanding both its geopolitical and ideological ambitions. In the Great Recession’s aftermath, however, the economic foundation of the Pax Americana has crumbled, and its ideational and institutional pillars have been weakened. Although the United States remains preeminent militarily, the rise of new great powers like China, coupled with US ﬁscal and economic constraints, means that over the next decade or two the United States’ military dominance will be challenged. The decline of American power means the end of US dominance in world politics and a transition to a new constellation of world power. Without the ‘‘hard’’ power (military and economic) upon which it was built, the Pax Americana is doomed to wither in the early twenty-ﬁrst century. Indeed, because of China’s great-power emergence, and the United States’ own domestic economic weaknesses, it already is withering.

#### We are no longer an economic hegemon- other markets have taken over

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The hegemon is supposed to be the lender of last resort in the international economy. The United States, however, has become the borrower of ﬁrst resort—the world’s largest debtor. When the global economy falters, the economic hegemon is supposed to take responsibility for kick-starting recovery by purchasing other nations’ goods. From World War II’s end until the Great Recession, the international economy looked to the United States as the locomotive of global economic growth. As the world’s largest market since 1945, America’s willingness to consume foreign goods has been the ﬁrewall against global economic downturns. This is not what happened during the Great Recession, however. The US economy proved too inﬁrm to lead the global economy back to health. Others—notably a rising China—had to step up to the plate to do so. The United States’ inability to galvanize global recovery demonstrates that in key respects it no longer is capable of acting as an economic hegemon. Indeed, President Barak Obama conceded as much at the April 2009 G-20 meeting in London, where he acknowledged the United States is no longer able to be the world’s consumer of last resort, and that the world needs to look to China (and India and other emerging market states) to be the motors of global recovery. Other recent examples of how relative decline and loss of economic hegemony have eroded Washington’s ‘‘agenda setting’’ capacity in international economic management include the US failure to achieve global economic re-balancing by compelling China to revalue the renminbi, and its defeat in the 2009–2010 ‘‘austerity versus stimulus’’ debate with Europe.

#### **China has risen and we have already transitioned to a multipolar world**

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The Cold War’s end stiﬂed the burgeoning late 1980s’ debate about America’s relative decline while triggering a new debate about unipolarity. In the Great Recession’s aftermath, a verdict on those debates now can be rendered. First, it turns out the declinists were right after all. The United States’ power has declined relatively. By 2014, the US share of global GDP will shrink to 18%, which is well below the ‘‘normal’’ post–World War II share of 22% to 25% (Nye 1991, 2011). Just as the 1980s declinists predicted, chronic budget and current account deﬁcits, overconsumption, undersaving, and deindustrialization have exacted their toll on the American economy. Judgment also now can be rendered on the debate between balance of power realists and unipolar stability theorists. As balance of power realists predicted, one new great power already has emerged to act as a counterweight to American power, with others waiting in the wings. In contrast to unipolar stability theorists who said unipolarity would extend well into the twenty-ﬁrst century, balance of power realists predicted that unipolarity would come to an end around 2010. Instead of looking at the trend lines fueling China’s rise and America’s decline, unipolar stability theorists were wrong because they relied on static measures of national power and failed to grasp the velocity of China’s rise. If, indeed, it has not already done so, sometime this decade—- perhaps as early as 2016—China’s GDP will surpass the United States’. No longer is China an emerging great power; it is a ‘‘risen’’ one. The debate about unipolarity is over. The balance of power realists have won. The distribution of power in international political system is shifting dramatically. The US grand strategy must respond to the emerging constellation of power. Yet, US policymakers and many security studies scholars are in thrall to a peculiar form of denialism. First, they believe the world still is unipolar even in the face of overwhelming evidence that it is not. Second, they believe that even if unipolarity were to end, there would be no real consequences for the United States because it will still be the ‘‘pivotal’’ power in international politics, and the essential features of the ‘‘liberal order’’—the Pax Americana—will remain in place even though no longer buttressed by the US economic and military power that have undergirded it since its inception after World War II. This is myopic. Hegemonic decline always has consequences. As the twenty-ﬁrst century’s second decade begins, history and multipolarity are staging a comeback. The world ﬁgures to become a much more turbulent place geopolitically than it was during the era of the Pax Americana. Accepting the reality of the Unipolar Exit—coming to grips with its own decline and the end of unipolarity symbolized by China’s rise—will be the United States’ central grand strategic preoccupation during the next ten to ﬁfteen years.

### Decline inevitable

#### Regional powers rising economically and China rising military displace hegemony

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American decline is part of a broader trend in international politics: the shift of economic power away from the Euro-Atlantic core to rising great and regional powers (what economists sometimes refer to as the ‘‘emerging market’’ nations). Among the former are China, India, and Russia. The latter category includes Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea, Brazil, and South Africa. In a May 2011 report, the World Bank predicted that six countries—China, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, and South Korea—will account for one-half of the world’s economic growth between 2011 and 2025 (Politi 2011; Rich 2011). In some respects, of course, this emergence of new great powers is less about rise than restoration. As Figure 1 indicates, in 1700 China and India were the world’s two largest economies. From their perspective—especially Beijing’s—they are merely regaining what they view as their natural, or rightful, place in the hierarchy of great powers. The ascent of new great powers is the strongest evidence of unipolarity’s end. The two most important indicators of whether new great powers are rising are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP (Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987). The evidence that the international system is rapidly becoming multipolar—and that, consequently, America’s relative power is declining—is now impossible to deny, and China is Exhibit A for the shift in the world’s center of economic and geopolitical gravity. China illustrates how, since the Cold War’s end, potential great powers have been positioning themselves to challenge the United States. To spur its economic growth, for some three decades (beginning with Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms) China took a low proﬁle in international politics and avoided confrontation with the United States and its regional neighbors. To spur its modernization as well, China integrated itself in the American-led world order. China’s self-described ‘‘peaceful rise’’ followed the script written by Deng Xiaoping: ‘‘Lie low. Hide your capabilities. Bide your time.’’ The fact that China joined the international economic order did not mean its long-term intentions were benign. Beijing’s long-term goal was not simply to get rich. It was also to become wealthy enough to acquire the military capabilities it needs to compete with the United States for regional hegemony in East Asia. 2 The Great Recession caused a dramatic shift in Beijing’s perceptions of the international balance of power. China now sees the United States in decline while simultaneously viewing itself as having risen to great-power status. China’s newly gained self-conﬁdence was evident in its 2010 foreign policy muscle-ﬂexing.

#### Objective evidence proves China’s rise- they’re dominating the world and crushing us economically

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Objective indicators conﬁrm the reality of China’s rise, and the United States’ corresponding relative decline. In 2010, China displaced the United States as the world’s leading manufacturing nation— a crown the United States had held for a century. The International Monetary Fund forecasts that China’s share of world GDP (15%) will draw nearly even with the United States (18%) by 2014 (see Figure 2). This is especially impressive given that China’s share of world GDP was only 2% in 1980 and as recently as 1995 was only 6%. Moreover, China is on course to overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy. While analysts disagree on the date when this will happen, the most recent projections by leading economic forecasters have advanced the date dramatically over what was being estimated just a few years ago. For example, in 2003 Goldman Sachs predicted that China would surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy in 2041, and in 2008, it advanced the date to 2028 (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003; O’Neill 2008). However, the most recent forecasts are now that China will pass the United States much sooner than 2028. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2009) predicts China will become the world’s largest economy in 2021; PricewaterhouseCoopers (2010) says 2020, and the Economist magazine says 2019 (World’s Biggest Economy 2010) (see Figure 3). 3 More strikingly, according to a 2011 International Monetary Fund study, in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), China will overhaul the United States in 2016. In fact, economist Arvin Subramanian of the Peterson Institute for International Economics has calculated, also using PPP, that China is already the world’s largest economy (Subramanian 2011). 4 What could be clearer proof of the United States’ relative decline than the fact that China will soon leapfrog the United States and become the world’s largest economy, if indeed it has not already done so?

#### Failure is the fate of hegemons- better transition now

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In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, a few scholars—notably Christopher Layne and Kenneth Waltz—argued that unipolarity would be a short-lived transitional phase from bipolarity to multipolarity (Layne 1993; Waltz 1993). Unipolarity, they argued, would spur the emergence of new great powers to act as counterweights to US hegemony. These unipolar pessimists also questioned the wisdom of making the preservation of US dominance in a unipolar world the overriding goal of the United States’ post-Cold War grand strategy. Pointing to a long historical record, they argued that failure is the fate of hegemons. The hegemonic bids of the Habsburgs (under Charles V and Philip II), France (under Louis XIV and Napoleon), and Germany (under Wilhelm II and Adolph Hitler) were all defeated by the resistance of countervailing alliances, and by the consequences of their own strategic overextension. In a unipolar world, the unipolar pessimists argued, the United States would not be immune from this pattern of hegemonic failure. However, from the Soviet Union’s collapse until the Great Recession, unipolar pessimism was a distinctly minority view among security studies scholars and US policymakers, and the conventional wisdom has been that unipolarity and US hegemony will last for a very long time

#### Retrenchment inevitable- we cant finance our military and are economically vulnerable

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US decline has profound implications for the future of international politics. Hegemonic stability theory holds that an open international economic system requires a single hegemonic power to perform critical military and economic tasks. Militarily, the hegemon is responsible for stabilizing key regions and for guarding the global commons (Posen 2003). Economically, the hegemon provides public goods by opening its domestic market to other states, supplying liquidity for the global economy, and providing a reserve currency (Kindelberger 1973; Gilpin 1975). As US power continues to decline over the next ten to ﬁfteen years, the United States will be progressively unable to discharge these hegemonic tasks. The United States still wields preponderant military power. However, as discussed above, in the next ten to ﬁfteen years the looming ﬁscal crisis will compel Washington to retrench strategically. As the United States’ military power diminishes, its ability to command the commons and act as a hegemonic stabilizer will be compromised. The end of the United States’ role as a military hegemon is still over horizon. However, the Great Recession has made it evident that the United States no longer is an economic hegemon. An economic hegemon is supposed to solve global economic crises, not cause them. However, it was the freezing-up of the US ﬁnancial system triggered by the sub-prime mortgage crisis that plunged the world into economic crisis.

#### Even our liberal model is being replaced- lock in strategy wont succeed because we are economically weak and China is rising militarily

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What effect will China’s rise—and unipolarity’s concomitant end—and the United States’ internal economic and ﬁscal troubles have on the Pax Americana? Not much, according to prominent scholars such as Ikenberry (2001, 2011), Zakaria (2008), and Brooks and Wohlforth (2008). They have argued that the United States can cushion itself against any future loss of hegemony by acting now to ‘‘lock in’’ the Pax Americana’s essential features—its institutions, rules, and norms—so that they outlive unipolarity. As Ikenberry puts it, the United States should act today to put in place an institutional framework ‘‘that will safeguard our interests in future decades when we will not be a unipolar power’’ (Ikenberry 2011:348). This is not a persuasive argument. First, there is a critical linkage between a great power’s military and economic standing, on the one hand, and its prestige and soft power, on the other. The ebbing of the United States’ hegemony raises the question of whether it has the authority to take the lead in reforming the post-1945 international order. The Pax Americana projected the United States’ liberal ideology abroad, and asserted its universality as the only model for political, economic, and social development. Today, however, the American model of free market, liberal democracy—which came to be known in the 1990s as the Washington consensus—is being challenged by an alternative model, the Beijing consensus (Halper 2010). Moreover, the Great Recession discredited America’s liberal model. Consequently, it is questionable whether the United States retains the credibility and legitimacy to spearhead the revamping of the international order. As Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf says, ‘‘The collapse of the western ﬁnancial system, while China’s ﬂourishes, marks a humiliating end to the ‘unipolar moment.’ As western policy makers struggle, their credibility lies broken. Who still trusts the teachers?’’ (Wolf 2009). The second reason a US lock-in strategy is unlikely to succeed is because the United States does not have the necessary economic clout to revitalize the international order. Ikenberry deﬁnes the task of securing lock-in as ‘‘renewing and rebuilding the architecture of global governance and cooperation to allow the United States to marshal resources and tackle problems along a wide an shifting spectrum of possibilities’’ (Ikenberry 2011:353) To do this, the United States will need to take the lead in providing public goods: security, economic leadership, and a nation building program of virtually global dimension to combat the ‘‘socioeconomic backwardness and failure that generate regional and international instability and conﬂict’’ (Ikenberry 2011:354, 359). At the zenith of its military and economic power after World War II, the United States had the material capacity to furnish the international system with public goods. In the Great Recession’s aftermath, however, a ﬁnancially strapped United States increasingly will be unable to be a big time provider of public goods to the international order.vThe third reason the post-World War II international order cannot be locked in is the rise of China (and other emerging great and regional powers). The lock-in argument is marred by a glaring weakness: if they perceive that the United States is declining, the incentive for China and other emerging powers is to wait a decade or two and reshape the international system themselves in a way that reﬂects their own interests, norms, and values (Jacques 2009). China and the United States have fundamental differences on what the rules of international order should be on such key issues as sovereignty, non-interference in states’ internal affairs, and the ‘‘responsibility to protect.’’ While China has integrated itself in the liberal order to propel its economic growth, it is converting wealth into hard power to challenge American geopolitical dominance. And although China is working ‘‘within the system’’ to transform the post-1945 international order, it also is laying the foundations—through embryonic institutions like the BRICs and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—for constructing an alternative world order that, over the next twenty years or so, could displace the Pax Americana. As Martin Jacques has observed, China is operating ‘‘both within and outside the existing international system while at the same time, in effect, sponsoring a new China-centric international system which will exist alongside the present system and probably slowly begin to usurp it’’ (Jacques 2009:362).

#### China is counterbalancing against the US

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Revealingly, Ikenberry makes clear this expectation when he says that the deal the United States should propose to China is for Washington ‘‘to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing’s acceptance and accommodation of Washington’s core interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia’’ (Ikenberry 2011:356). It is easy to see why the United States would want to cut such a deal but it is hard to see what’s in it for China. American hegemony is waning and China is ascending, and there is zero reason for China to accept this bargain because it aims to be the hegemon in its own region. The unfolding SinoAmerican rivalry in East Asia can be seen as an example of Dodge City syndrome (in American Western movies, one gunslinger says to the other: ‘‘This town ain’t big enough for both of us’’) or as a geopolitical example of Newtonian physics (two hegemons cannot occupy the same region at the same time). From either perspective, the dangers should be obvious: unless the United States is willing to accept China’s ascendancy in East (and Southeast) Asia, Washington and Beijing are on a collision course.

#### Unipolarity will inevitably collapse—China and Russia will take over

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The cause of US troubles, both in the short and long term, is debt: the US is borrowing massively to ﬁnance current consumption. History shows that it may take 10–30 years for the market to revive. The latest cascading stock market crash may not only portend the beginning of the end of American unipolarity but also momentous global political change. Just as the Great Depression ushered in fascism, Stalinism and, of course, the Second World War, the current ﬁnancial crisis is of sufﬁcient proportions that we should expect deep and far-reaching political repercussions. The origins of these political repercussions will likely come from the West’s old Cold War rivals, China and Russia, which are now both operating as economically successful authoritarian-capitalist great powers (see Gat 2007). Such states have been absent since the defeat of Germany and Japan in 1945, but they seem poised to make a comeback—a big comeback. Russia and China are much larger in terms of population, territory and resources than Imperial and Fascist Germany and Imperial Japan ever were or could have hoped to become.13 The return of authoritarian-capitalist great powers, therefore, represents not only a viable alternative path to modernity but, more important, the rebirth of a nondemocratic Second World—one that will directly confront the First World and compete with it in the ThirdWorld.14 There is a fundamental difference this time around, however. Whereas the old Second World operated outside of the global capitalist system, the new one is now fully integrated within the global economy with its members participating on their own terms, just as their nondemocratic-capitalist predecessors did prior to 1945.If the current global economic meltdown weakens the liberal consensus, the appeal of this alternative authoritarian-capitalist Second World will increase, especially in Asia, Latin America and Africa where support for liberal democracy is recent, incomplete and easily shaken. It is too early to tell whether nondemocratic capitalism will someday loosen liberal democracy’s hegemonic grip, let alone cast doubt on liberalism’s ultimate victory and future dominance(see Deudney and Ikenberry 2009). At this early stage, one cannot even say whether China and Russia will retain their authoritarian characters into the near future or that either or both will become truly revisionist powers in the long run. What can be said is that, if the future resembles the past, then unipolarity will eventually end and its demise will be preceded by some sort of delegitimation phase. This is one of the few things that the structure of unipolarity does seem to set in motion. But the future may not resemble the past—a subject to which I now turn.

### Defense cuts inevitable

#### US will cut defense spending to contain inflation- takes out your military might arguments

**Layne, 12** (Christopher Layne is a professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. Professor Layne has written two books and he has contributed extensively to the debates about international relations theory and American foreign policy in such scholarly and policy journals as *International Security*, *International History Review*, *Security Studies*, *Journal of Strategic Studies*,*The National Interest*, *Foreign Policy*, *The Washington Quarterly*, *World Policy Journal*, and *Orbis*. Professor Layne has been a frequent contributor to *The Atlantic*,*The New Republic*, *The Nation*, *Financial Times*, *New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*,*Washington Post*, and the *Australian*. He also is a contributing editor for *The American Conservative*. He has a PhD in political science from Berkeley, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana, International Studies Quarterly 1-11, ak)

In the coming years, the United States will have to defend the dollar by reassuring foreign lenders (read: China) both that there will be no runaway inﬂation and that it can pay its debts. This will require some combination of budget cuts, entitlements reductions, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Because exclusive reliance on the last two options could choke off growth, there will be strong pressure to slash the federal budget in order to hold down taxes and interest rates. It will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in defense expenditures (and entitlements), because, as Figure 6 shows, that is where the money is. With US defense spending currently at such high levels, domestic political pressures to make steep cuts in defense spending are bound to increase. As the Cornell international political economist Jonathan Kirshner puts it, the absolute size of US defense expenditures is ‘‘more likely to be decisive in the future when the U.S. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. When borrowing becomes more difﬁcult, and adjustment more difﬁcult to postpone, choices must be made between raising taxes, cutting non-defense spending, and cutting defense spending’’ (Kirshner 2008:431). In the spring of 2011, the Obama administration proposed to cut US defense spending by $400 million over eleven years. But that is a drop in the bucket, and cuts of a much larger magnitude almost certainly will be needed. Big defense cuts mean that during the next ten to ﬁfteen years, the United States will be compelled to scale back its overseas military commitments. This will have two consequences. First, as the United States spends less on defense, China (and other new great powers) will be able to close the military power gap with the United States. Second, the United States’ ability to act as a regional stabilizer and a guardian of the global commons will diminish. In this respect, America’s ﬁscal crisis and the dollar’s uncertain future are important drivers of American decline.

### General- Heg Unsustainable

#### Heg declining now- US won’t recover short-term and lost long-term power

Copley June 2012 (Gregory R., editor of Defense & Foreign Affairs’ Strategic Policy, Strategic Policy in an Age of Global Realignment, lexis)

3. Strategic Recovery by the US. The US will not, in 2012 or 2013, show signs of any recovery of its global strategic credibility or real strength. Its manufacturing and science and technology sectors will continue to suffer from low (even declining) productivity and difficulty in capital formation (for political reasons, primarily). A significant US recovery is not feasible in the timeframe given the present political and economic policies and impasse evident. US allies will increasingly look to their own needs while attempting to sustain their alliance relationship with the US to the extent feasible. Those outside the US alliance network, or peripheral to it, will increasingly disregard US political/diplomatic pressures, and will seek to accommodate the PRC or regional actors. The continued economic malaise of the US during 2012, even if disguised by modest nominal GDP growth, will make economic (and therefore strategic) recovery more difficult and ensure that it will take longer.¶ In any event, the fact that the US national debt exceeds the GDP hollows the dollar and thus makes meaningful recovery impossible in the short-term. The attractiveness of a low dollar value in comparison to other currencies in making US manufacturing investment more feasible than in recent years is offset by declining US workforce productivity and political constraints which penalize investment in manufacturing, or even in achieving appealing conditions for capital formation. Banks are as afraid of such investment as are manufacturing investors themselves.

#### Multipolarity coming now- primacy unsustainable

Edelman 11 (Eric, Distinguished Fellow at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, CSBA Online, “Understanding America’s Contested Primacy.” http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/10/understanding-americas-contested-primacy/1/)

In November 2008, the National Intelligence Council released Global Trends 2025 which argued that “the international system — as constructed following the Second World War — will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy, a historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing influence of non-state actors. By 2025 the international system will be a global multipolar one with gaps in national power continuing to narrow between developed and developing countries” [emphasis in original].” This conclusion represented a striking departure from the NIC’s conclusion four years earlier in Mapping the Global Future 2020 that unipolarity was likely to remain a persistent condition of the international system. Between the two reports America’s zeitgeist had clearly shifted under the impact of persistent difficulty in the counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and increased questioning of United States global leadership (at home and abroad), the seemingly inexorable rise of the newly emerging economies (suggestively labeled as the BRICs by Goldman Sachs analysts), and the global economic downturn and recession in the United States. The overall impact was the creation of a new conventional wisdom that foresees continued decline of the United States, an end to the unipolar world order that marked the post-Cold War world and a potential departure from the pursuit of US primacy that marked the foreign policies of the three presidential administrations that followed the end of the Cold War. The debate over unipolarity and continued US primacy is not merely an academic debate. Perceptions of US power will guide both American policymakers and other nations as they consider their policy options. Primacy has underpinned US grand strategy since the end of the Cold War because no other nation was able to provide the collective public goods that have upheld the security of the international system and enabled a period of dramatically increased global economic activity and prosperity. Both the United States and the global system have benefitted from that circumstance. The arguments for US decline are not new but before they harden into an unchallenged orthodoxy it would be good to carefully examine many of the key assumptions that undergird the emerging conventional wisdom. Will the undeniable relative decline of the United States, in fact, lead to the end of unipolarity? Do the BRIC countries really represent a bloc? What would multipolarity look like? How does one measure national power anyhow, and how can one measure the change in the power distribution globally? Is the rise of global competitors inevitable? What are some of the weaknesses that might hamper the would-be competitors from staying on their current favorable economic and political trajectory? Does the United States possess some underappreciated strengths that might serve as the basis for continued primacy in the international system and, if so, what steps would a prudent government take to extend that primacy into the future? The history of straight-line projections of economic growth and the rise of challengers to the dominance of the United States has not been kind to those who have previously predicted US decline. It is not necessarily the case that the United States will be caught between the end of the “unipolar moment” of post-Cold War predominance and a global multipolar world. The emerging international environment is likely to be different than either of the futures forecast by the NIC in Mapping the Global Future in 2004 or Global Trends 2025 in 2008. It would seem more likely that the relative decline of American power will still leave the United States as the most powerful actor in the international system. But the economic rise of other nations and the spread of nuclear weapons in some key regions are likely to confront the US with difficult new challenges. The revived notion of America’s decline has once again brought to the fore a question about the purposes of United States power and the value of US international primacy. Seeking to maintain America’s advantage as the prime player in the international system imposes costs on the US budget and taxpayer. It is certainly fair to ask what the United States gets from exerting the effort to remain number one. It is also worth considering what the world would look like if the United States was just one power among many, and how such perceptions might affect the strategic and policy choices national security decision-makers will face over the next twenty-odd years.

#### Heg unsustainable – multiple constraints ensure collapse and rise of alternatives

Christopher Layne, Chair in National Security at the School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, 09

[“The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?: A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009]

For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades, a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World.[15](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.layne.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f15)Global Trends 2025 is not light reading, but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. Its key geopolitical conclusion is that the U.S.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers); and economic, financial, and domestic political constraints that may erode U.S. capabilities. China, India, and possibly Russia are emerging great powers.[16](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.layne.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f16) As Global Trends 2025 points out, the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. 7). Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid.). By 2025, China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. 30). India, buoyed by its strong economic growth rate, will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid.). Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status, the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. 29).[17](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.layne.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f17)**]** Because of uncertainties about economics, energy prices, domestic governance issues, and especially demography, Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. 31–32).[18](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.layne.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f18) Between 2009 and 2025, Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million, affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. 23–24, 30). If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power, however, the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U.S. global dominance” (p. 32). Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. 32, 82). According to the NIC, in addition to relative decline, the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. U.S. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. 93). The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. 3, 8–9, 13–14). At home, economic and political constraints may undermine U.S. hegemony. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. Nevertheless, the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U.S. power. In particular, Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades, the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. Although at the time this issue went to press, the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come, China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified.[19](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.layne.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f19) **[End Page 153]** As the NIC observes, the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. Thus, “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. 12, 94, 97). Moreover, the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U.S. freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p. 97). The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic, military, and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. 93). Ultimately, although the United States will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now, it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid.).

###  Ext.: General

#### Decline is inevitable – heg is economically unsustainable

Layne, 09 – Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay", International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009, July 6th 2010, Galileo, p. 21-23) PDF

The publications reviewed in this essay examine whether the United States is in (or is headed for) relative decline.74 Brooks and Wohlforth purport to deny the possibility that America is in relative decline, but a growing number of analysts disagree.75 The long-term impact of the current economic crisis largely will determine who is right (and to be fair, Brooks and Wohlforth wrote their book before its effects became evident). Yet, even before the meltdown, longterm structural weaknesses that have been accumulating for more than three decades were causing U.S. economic power to wane.76 The warning signs with respect to U.S. decline are a looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the future of the dollar as the reserve currency, both of which are linked to the fear that after recovery, the United States will face a serious inflationary threat.77 Optimists contend that once the United States recovers, fears of a fiscal crisis will fade: the country faced a larger debt to GDP ratio after World War II, and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. The postwar era, however, was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and sustained high growth rates. The United States of 2009 is far different from the United States of 1945, however, which is why many economists believe that even in the best case, it will emerge from the current crisis with serious macroeconomic handicaps.78 Chief among these handicaps are the increase in the money supply (caused by the massive amount of dollars the Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped into circulation to rescue the economy), and the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) project the United States will incur for at least a decade.79 When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current account deficit, the entitlements overhang, and the cost of two ongoing wars, there is reason to worry about the United States’ longterm fiscal stability.80 The CBO states, “Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem.”81 If the Congressional Budget Office is right, it spells trouble ahead for the dollar. As Jonathan Kirshner noted on the eve of the meltdown, the dollar’s vulnerability “presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance.”82 The dollar’s loss of reserve currency status would undermine U.S. dominance, and recent events have magnified concerns that predated the financial and economic crisis. 83 First, the other big players in the international economy now are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous “allies” (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Because of these two factors, as Eric Helleiner notes, if the dollar experiences dramatic depreciation in the future, there is a “risk of defections generating a herd-like momentum” away from it.84

#### Heg will inevitably collapse – attempting to hold on makes the decline worse

Pape 9 (Robert A. Pape, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “The Empire Falls”, The National Interest, June 28, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20484)

Clearly, major shifts in the balance of power in the international system often lead to instability and conflict. And America’s current predicament is far more severe. This time, our relative decline of 32 percent is accompanied, not by an even-steeper decline of our near-peer competitor, but rather by a 144 percent increase in China’s relative position. Further, the rapid spread of technology and technological breakthroughs means that one great discovery does not buoy an already-strong state to decades-long predominance. And with a rising China—with raw resources of population, landmass and increasing adoption of leading technology—a true peer competitor is looming. America’s current, rapid domestic economic decline is merely accelerating our own downfall. The distinct quality of a system with only one superpower is that no other single state is powerful enough to balance against it. A true global hegemon is more powerful still—stronger than all second-ranked powers acting as members of a counterbalancing coalition seeking to contain the unipolar leader. By these standards, America’s relative decline is fundamentally changing international politics, and is fundamentally different from Russia circa 1850 and Great Britain circa 1910. In current-U.S.-dollar terms—the preferred measure of the unipolar-dominance school—the United States has already fallen far from being a global hegemon and unipolarity itself is waning, since China will soon have as much economic potential to balance the United States as did the Soviet Union during the cold war. At the beginning of the 1990s, the United States was indeed not only stronger than any other state individually, but its power relative to even the collective power of all other major states combined grew from 1990 to 2000. Although the growth was small, America almost reached the crucial threshold of 50 percent of major-power product necessary to become a true global hegemon. So it is understandable that we were lulled into a sense of security, believing we could do as we wished, whenever and wherever we wished. The instability and danger of the cold war quickly became a distant memory. Near the time of the Iraq War, it would have required virtually every major power to actively oppose the United States in order to assemble a counterbalancing coalition that could approximate America’s potential power. Under the circumstances, hard, military balancing against the United States was not a serious possibility. So, it is not surprising that major powers opted for soft-balancing measures—relying on institutional, economic and diplomatic tools to oppose American military power. And yet we are beginning to see “the conflict of history” repeat itself. Even with less relative power, in the run-up to the Iraq War, people grossly underrated the ability of Germany, France, Russia and China, along with important regional powers like Turkey, to soft balance against the United States; for instance, to use the United Nations to delay, complicate and ultimately deny the use of one-third of U.S. combat power (the Fourth Infantry Division) in the opening months of the Iraq War. This is not yet great-power war of the kind seen in centuries past, but it harkens the instability that future unilateral efforts may trigger. The balance of world power circa 2008 and 2013 shows a disturbing trend. True, the United States remains stronger than any other state individually, but its power to stand up to the collective opposition of other major powers is falling precipitously. Though these worlds depict potential power, not active counterbalancing coalitions, and this type of alliance may never form, nonetheless, American relative power is declining to the point where even subsets of major powers acting in concert could produce sufficient military power to stand a reasonable chance of successfully opposing American military policies. Indeed, if present trends continue to 2013 and beyond, China and Russia, along with any one of the other major powers, would have sufficient economic capacity to mount military opposition at least as serious as did the Soviet Union during the cold war. And it is worth remembering that the Soviet Union never had more than about half the world product of the United States, which China alone is likely to reach in the coming decade. The faults in the arguments of the unipolar-dominance school are being brought into sharp relief. The world is slowly coming into balance. Whether or not this will be another period of great-power transition coupled with an increasing risk of war will largely depend on how America can navigate its decline. Policy makers must act responsibly in this new era or risk international opposition that poses far greater costs and far greater dangers.   A COHERENT grand strategy seeks to balance a state’s economic resources and its foreign-policy commitments and to sustain that balance over time. For America, a coherent grand strategy also calls for rectifying the current imbalance between our means and our ends, adopting policies that enhance the former and modify the latter. Clearly, the United States is not the first great power to suffer long-term decline—we should learn from history. Great powers in decline seem to almost instinctively spend more on military forces in order to shore up their disintegrating strategic positions, and some like Germany go even further, shoring up their security by adopting preventive military strategies, beyond defensive alliances, to actively stop a rising competitor from becoming dominant. For declining great powers, the allure of preventive war—or lesser measures to “merely” firmly contain a rising power—has a more compelling logic than many might assume. Since Thucydides, scholars of international politics have famously argued that a declining hegemon and rising challenger must necessarily face such intense security competition that hegemonic war to retain dominance over the international system is almost a foregone conclusion. Robert Gilpin, one of the deans of realism who taught for decades at Princeton, believed that “the first and most attractive response to a society’s decline is to eliminate the source of the problem . . . [by] what we shall call a hegemonic war.” Yet, waging war just to keep another state down has turned out to be one of the great losing strategies in history. The Napoleonic Wars, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War, German aggression in World War I, and German and Japanese aggression in World War II were all driven by declining powers seeking to use war to improve their future security. All lost control of events they thought they could control. All suffered ugly defeats. All were worse-off than had they not attacked. As China rises, America must avoid this great-power trap. It would be easy to think that greater American military efforts could offset the consequences of China’s increasing power and possibly even lead to the formation of a multilateral strategy to contain China in the future. Indeed, when China’s economic star began to rise in the 1990s, numerous voices called for precisely this, noting that on current trajectories China would overtake the United States as the world’s leading economic power by 2050.8 Now, as that date draws nearer—indeed, current-dollar calculations put the crossover point closer to 2040—and with Beijing evermore dependent on imported oil for continued economic growth, one might think the case for actively containing China is all the stronger. Absent provocative military adventures by Beijing, however, U.S. military efforts to contain the rising power are most likely doomed to failure. China’s growth turns mainly on domestic issues—such as shifting the workforce from rural to urban areas—that are beyond the ability of outside powers to significantly influence. Although China’s growth also depends on external sources of oil, there is no way to exploit this vulnerability short of obviously hostile alliances (with India, Indonesia, Taiwan and Japan) and clearly aggressive military measures (controlling the sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf to Asia) that together could deny oil to China. Any efforts along these lines would likely backfire—and only exacerbate America’s problems, increasing the risk of counterbalancing. Even more insidious is the risk of overstretch. This self-reinforcing spiral escalates current spending to maintain increasingly costly military commitments, crowding out productive investment for future growth. Today, the cold-war framework of significant troop deployments to Europe, Asia and the Persian Gulf is coming unglued. We cannot afford to keep our previous promises. With American forces bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and mounting troubles in Iran and Pakistan, the United States has all but gutted its military commitments to Europe, reducing our troop levels far below the one hundred thousand of the 1990s. Nearly half have been shifted to Iraq and elsewhere. Little wonder that Russia found an opportunity to demonstrate the hollowness of the Bush administration’s plan for expanding NATO to Russia’s borders by scoring a quick and decisive military victory over Georgia that America was helpless to prevent. If a large-scale conventional war between China and Taiwan broke out in the near future, one must wonder whether America would significantly shift air and naval power away from its ongoing wars in the Middle East in order to live up to its global commitments. If the United States could not readily manage wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time, could it really wage a protracted struggle in Asia as well? And as the gap between America’s productive resources and global commitments grows, why will others pass up opportunities to take advantage of America’s overstretched grand strategy? Since the end of the cold war, American leaders have consistently claimed the ability to maintain a significant forward-leaning military presence in the three major regions of the globe and, if necessary, to wage two major regional wars at the same time. The harsh reality is that the United States no longer has the economic capacity for such an ambitious grand strategy. With 30 percent of the world’s product, the United States could imagine maintaining this hope. Nearing 20 percent, it cannot. Yet, just withdrawing American troops from Iraq is not enough to put America’s grand strategy into balance. Even assuming a fairly quick and problem-free drawdown, the risks of instability in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region are likely to remain for many years to come. Further, even under the most optimistic scenarios, America is likely to remain dependent on imported oil for decades. Together, these factors point toward the Persian Gulf remaining the most important region in American grand strategy. So, as Europe and Asia continue to be low-order priorities, Washington must think creatively and look for opportunities to make strategic trades. America needs to share the burden of regional security with its allies and continue to draw down our troop levels in Europe and Asia, even considering the attendant risks. The days when the United States could effectively solve the security problems of its allies in these regions almost on its own are coming to an end. True, spreading defense burdens more equally will not be easy and will be fraught with its own costs and risks. However, this is simply part of the price of America’s declining relative power. The key principle is for America to gain international support among regional powers like Russia and China for its vital national-security objectives by adjusting less important U.S. policies. For instance, Russia may well do more to discourage Iran’s nuclear program in return for less U.S. pressure to expand NATO to its borders. And of course America needs to develop a plan to reinvigorate the competitiveness of its economy. Recently, Harvard’s Michael Porter issued an economic blueprint to renew America’s environment for innovation. The heart of his plan is to remove the obstacles to increasing investment in science and technology. A combination of targeted tax, fiscal and education policies to stimulate more productive investment over the long haul is a sensible domestic component to America’s new grand strategy. But it would be misguided to assume that the United States could easily regain its previously dominant economic position, since the world will likely remain globally competitive. To justify postponing this restructuring of its grand strategy, America would need a firm expectation of high rates of economic growth over the next several years. There is no sign of such a burst on the horizon. Misguided efforts to extract more security from a declining economic base only divert potential resources from investment in the economy, trapping the state in an ever-worsening strategic dilemma. This approach has done little for great powers in the past, and America will likely be no exception when it comes to the inevitable costs of desperate policy making. The United States is not just declining. Unipolarity is becoming obsolete, other states are rising to counter American power and the United States is losing much of its strategic freedom. Washington must adopt more realistic foreign commitments.

#### Decline of U.S hegemony is imminent – multiple reasons

Toplin Professor of History (Emeritus), University of North Carolina 3/8/2010["Decline of a Great Power?" http://hnn.us/articles/124000.html]

Today the mood is gloomy rather than optimistic. The American economy has lost traction, and the deficit is spiraling. America’s military remains deeply engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. Against this background, words that Paul Kennedy published in 1987 appear insightful. Kennedy warned that “decision-makers in Washington must face the awkward and enduring fact that the sum total of the United States’ global interests and obligations is nowadays far larger than the country’s power to defend them all simultaneously.” Today’s conversations about overreach usually apply to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz and his co-author, Linda Bilms, describe those engagements as “The Three Trillion Dollar War.” Stiglitz and Bilms note U.S. commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan are projected to cost almost ten times the price of the first Gulf War, a third more than the Vietnam War, and twice the price of America’s participation in the First World War. News stories about military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan dominate the headlines, but there are other important examples of on-going military obligations that receive less public attention in print and on television. The United States provides almost half of all global military spending (48%). U.S. troops are presently stationed in more than 150 countries. About 90,000 U.S. military personnel remain in two peaceful nations that surrendered more than sixty years ago (there are 57,000 U.S. military personnel in Germany and 33,000 in Japan). Paul Kennedy did not argue that a great nation must pull back completely, retreat from international affairs, or become isolationist when assessing the cost of international commitments. Nor did he did claim that the decline of a great global power, such as the United States, is inevitable. He stressed, rather, that national leaders should be aware of the interaction between strategy and economics. If leaders extend a country’s reach beyond the capacity of its material resources, wrote Kennedy, “the nation will be less secure in the long term.” That message is as relevant today as it was back in 1987, when many Americans found The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers a thoughtful commentary on the lessons of history.

###  Ext.: Latin America Specific

#### Retrenching in Latin America now

Crandall 2011 (Russell, Associate Professor of International Politics at Davidson College, Principal Director for the Western Hemisphere at the U.S. Department of Defense in 2009 and Director for Andean Affairs at the National Security Council in 2010-11, The Post-American Hemisphere Subtitle: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America, Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis)

Yet over the past decade or so, the United States' willingness and ability to exert control in the region have diminished. This has occurred in part because more important issues, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have forced Latin America down the policymaking food chain. But there is also the indisputable reality that the region itself is now more confident acting on its own. For the most part, this was inevitable, given the end of external and local communist challenges and the shift to an increasingly multilateral world that had room for new powers. Latin America's greater autonomy is both a cause and a result of decreased U.S. influence.

### Unsustainable- Balancing

#### U.S. hegemony declining – China and Russia will fill in

Hunt 10 (Tam Hunt, attorney, consultant, and lecturer on Climate Change law and policy at UCBS’s Bren School of Environmental Science and Management, “Tam Hunt: The Unipolar Moment Reconsidered”, 6/20, Noozhawk, http://www.noozhawk.com/tam\_hunt/article/061810\_tam\_hunt/)

Columnist Charles Krauthammer wrote in 2004 that the predominance of U.S. power in the world after the fall of the Soviet Union was a “staggering development in history, not seen since the fall of Rome.” Krauthammer and his fellow neoconservatives famously concluded from this disparity in power that the United States needed to adopt an aggressive foreign policy agenda to enhance and continue its dominance in the “New American Century.” Tam Hunt This conclusion was the wrong lesson from history and from any reasonable and compassionate view of the desirable future arc of humanity. Rather than consolidate and expand U.S. power in the 21st century, with a mix of military, economic and cultural coercion — the neocon strategy — the United States should instead seize what is still our unique unipolar moment and work toward a truly multilateral and multipolar world. The last two centuries have been dominated by one nation — the hegemon, which comes from the Greek for “leader.” Britain was the first global hegemon, and indeed the “sun never set on the British empire.” Britain’s dominance was fueled, literally, by coal, which allowed the industrial revolution to work its magic first in Britain. This led to great economic might, which was translated into military might. With a sense of cultural superiority, the “White Man’s Burden,” the British empire was ruthless in its domination of areas of the world as far-flung as North America, India, Jamaica, Gibraltar and Australia. Britain at its peak, however, never comprised more than 10 percent of the global economy. The United States, fueled by coal and oil, which was first found in Titusville, Pa., in 1859, an expansive and ever-growing territory that spanned a whole continent, and a sense of “American exceptionalism,” was the successor to the British empire, reaching 19 percent of global economic output in 1913, at the verge of World War I, and 35 percent at the height of World War II. The United States is now about 20 percent of the global economy, its share shrinking as other nations grow rapidly. The United States’ historical wealth of oil, coal and natural gas allowed it to grow to such a dominant economic and military position that it is truly deserving of being called an empire. As a global empire, the United States spends as much on its military as the rest of the world combined. If Britain was the first global hegemon, the United States became the first hyper-hegemon. We keep about 800 military bases in 160 nations. There is no place immune from our power and, increasingly, no place immune from our surveillance. We are now expanding and enforcing our empire with increasingly inhumane robotic drone attacks in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and other countries, creating a whole new generation of bitter enemies. There are chinks in our armor, however. Clearly. The neocon agenda was made real after the 9/11 attacks, with the Bush administration launching ill-fated invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the Obama administration expanding the Afghanistan war into Pakistan. These military responses are exactly the wrong lesson to be learned from history and will do nothing in the long run to improve humanity’s lot on a limited planet. The longer-term threat to U.S. dominance is economic. The United States is by far the largest economy today, although down to a “mere” 20 percent of world economic output from its World War II peak. Economic threats loom not far over the horizon, however. China surpassed Germany as the third largest economy in the world in 2007 and will likely surpass Japan as the second largest this year. The United States remains, however, almost three times as large as China and Japan in economic terms. But China is set to surpass the United States as the leading economy in 15 to 20 years, based on Goldman Sachs projections, and by 2050 the United States and India will probably be about half the size of the Chinese economy. Goldman Sachs projections of global economic growth by 2050. With economic might comes military might. As Martin Jacques writes in When China Rules the World (2009), China is best described as a “civilization-state” because of its history as a unitary civilization in essentially the same borders for about 2,000 years and a 5,000-year cultural history going back even further. It has exercised its power beyond its borders, as a “tributary state” that collected tribute from surrounding nations without subjecting them to the same type of control that Western colonial powers perfected. Until recent decades, however, China limited its influence to East Asia. More recently, China has become increasingly aggressive in securing the resources it needs to continue its rapid double-digit growth, using its largely state-controlled companies like the China National Offshore Oil Corp. to snap up oil resources around the world. China knows full well the role that energy plays in economic growth and national power. Less discussed as a challenger to U.S. dominance is Russia. Isn’t Russia old news, with its influence minimized since the fall of the Soviet Union? Well, yes and no. Russia is projected by Goldman Sachs to be the world’s sixth largest economy in both 2025 and 2050. However, beyond “mere” GDP comparisons, Russia’s influence will be magnified in coming years because of its huge hydrocarbon resources. Russia is now the world’s largest producer of oil, surpassing Saudi Arabia. Russia produced almost 10 million barrels per day of oil in 2009, beating the Saudis by about 800,000 barrels. The United States was third, with about 8.5 million barrels per day and Iran a distant fourth. But Russia’s natural wealth goes far beyond oil. Russia is the world’s largest natural gas producer, producing more than 20 percent of the world’s demand in 2009. The United States was second and Canada a distant third. Long-term, Russia has by far the biggest natural gas reserves of any country. As the world decarbonizes, which means in the electricity sector switching to natural gas and renewables from coal, natural gas production will become an increasingly important component of national power. We’ve already seen this story unfurled in Europe over the last few years as Russia has used its natural gas supplies to exert control over neighboring countries like Ukraine and Belarus. Russia is not dominant in coal production; China is by far the biggest producer of coal. The United States is second. But China and the United States use all of their own production, and Australia and Indonesia are the largest coal exporters, so the net hydrocarbon export situation is surprisingly not changed much by looking at coal in addition to oil and natural gas. Net hydrocarbon exports of selected countries — million tons of oil equivalent. (Energy Information Administration graphic) This energy dynamic can be summed up nicely by comparing net hydrocarbon exports. This measure subtracts from total hydrocarbon production what each country consumes itself. The nearby chart, compiled with Energy Information Administration data, compares the world’s largest economies and the world’s major hydrocarbon producers. It is an interesting alternative view of what constitutes national power. It’s more difficult to predict what the future holds for this dynamic because as nations like Saudi Arabia and Russia continue to grow they consume more of their own products. The Export Land Model attempts to project how quickly major exporting nations cease to export oil due to increased domestic consumption and declining production, demonstrating how quickly net exporters can become net importers, as China did recently with coal and the United Kingdom did with oil. However, the long-term trends in heavily import-dependent nations like the United States, Japan, China, etc., are exacerbated because these countries’ hydrocarbon wealth has long since peaked and it’s all downhill moving forward. It looks, then, like China and Russia are the key U.S. competitors in coming decades. The inevitable peak in global oil and other hydrocarbon resources will further exacerbate these issues.

#### U.S. hegemony declining now – regional powers have replaced US dominance

Rogers 9 (Walters Rogers, former senior international correspondence for CNN, “America: a Superpower no more,” The Christian Science Monitor, April 8, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/0408/p09s01-coop.html)

Two American icons, General Electric and Berkshire Hathaway, lost their triple-A credit ratings. Then China, America's largest creditor, called for a new global currency to replace the dollar just weeks after it demanded Washington guarantee the safety of Beijing's nearly $1 trillion debt holdings. And that was just in March. These events are the latest warnings that our world is changing far more rapidly and profoundly than we – or our politicians – will admit. America's own triple-A rating, its superpower status, is being downgraded as rapidly as its economy. President Obama's recent acknowledgement that the US is not winning in Afghanistan is but the most obvious recognition of this jarring new reality. What was the president telling Americans? As Milton Bearden, a former top CIA analyst on Afghanistan, recently put it, "If you aren't winning, you're losing." The global landscape is littered with evidence that America's superpower status is fraying. Nuclear-armed Pakistan – arguably the world's most dangerous country – is falling apart, despite billions in US aid and support. In Iraq, despite efforts in Washington to make "the surge" appear to be a stunning US victory, analysts most familiar with the region have already declared Iran the strategic winner of the Bush administration's war against Saddam Hussein. The Iraq war has greatly empowered Iran, nurturing a new regional superpower that now seems likely to be the major architect of the new Iraq. Sadly, what was forgotten amid the Bush-era hubris was that America's edge always has been as much moral and economic as military. Officially sanctioned torture, the Abu Ghraib scandal, US invasion of a sovereign country without provocation, along with foolishly allowing radical Islamists to successfully portray the US as the enemy of the world's 1.5 billion Muslims, shattered whatever moral edge America enjoyed before 2003. Washington's uncritical support of Israel at the expense of Palestinians is perceived by much of the world as egregiously hypocritical. Consequently, America's collision course with Islam may be irreversible. Muslims believe Islam never lost the moral high ground – and they won't readily relinquish it for Western secularism. Even politically conservative journals such as The National Interest recognize something has gone wrong. Now, as a massive retrenchment of the US economy is under way, it is time to shake the mental shackles of the superpower legacy and embrace a more peripheralist agenda. That need not mean isolationism or retreat. It would still require maintaining substantial armed forces with a qualitative edge, but using them only when there is an affordable and persuasive American national interest. Iraq never fitted that description. The price tag for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wars is in the trillions. Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese military commentator, prophetically observed 2,500 years ago, "[W]hen the army marches abroad, the treasury will be emptied at home." It remains a lingering American myth that US troops and warships can go anywhere and pay any price. Not so. The modern Chinese have discovered a better way. The Washington Post reports that the Chinese went on a shopping spree recently, taking advantage of fire-sale prices to lock up global supplies of oil, minerals, and other strategic resources for their economy. That amounts to a major economic conquest – without using a single soldier. By contrast, American efforts to secure oil have looked clumsy. Iran also is achieving serious regional hegemony, without armadas, using proxy guerrilla armies to dominate its near neighbors. Its rebuffs to President Obama's recent outreach speaks to Tehran's growing confidence in its ability to manipulate its home-field advantage – stage-managing events from Afghanistan to Lebanon, all the while thumbing its nose at both the American and Israeli "superpowers." Last August's Russian invasion of Georgia was a painful reminder that Russia has what its leadership calls "privileged interests" on its periphery. Yesterday's superpowers have been replaced by regional hegemons, as the globe is being carved up into more-defensible spheres of interest. Americans need to acknowledge that war, like politics, is the art of the possible, and both have their limits. The Bush administration was unable to deliver its promised democratic remake of the Muslim Middle East. Thus, another unpleasant truth: The Western democratic model has no appeal to much of the Arab world. Nor is democracy an attractive model for huge swaths of the rest of the world, such as Russia and China. It's time to lower our geopolitical sights and end America's unrealistic crusade. We shouldn't expect "them" to want to be like "us." It took years for the US to recover its moral authority after Vietnam. It will be an even harder comeback this time.

### Unsustainable- Defense Spending

#### Heg unsustainable – excessive defense expenditures

Michael Lind (Policy Director of New America's Economic Growth Program. He is a co-founder of the New America Foundation)Autumn 2008 “ A Concert-Balance Strategy for a Multipolar World” http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/concert\_balance\_strategy\_multipolar\_world\_8468

The concert-balance strategy, while still expensive compared to neo-isolationism, would be far less costly than a US grand strategy of hegemony. Adherents of the hegemony strategy sometimes claim that the United States can easily afford to spend the huge amount of resources on the military that dissuasion and reassurance would require. But even if that were true, the American public is not likely to support permanently higher defense expenditures, once the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are concluded. Even if the problem of health care costs increasing at a rate faster than gross domestic product (GDP) is solved in the near future, the growth of the population of retirees in the United States may raise Social Security and Medicare spending by at least four percent of GDP. It seems unlikely that the American electorate will tolerate either the substantial tax increases or the substantial cuts in middleclass entitlements needed to spend four to six percent of US GDP permanently on the military, as some have proposed. In any event, the costs of the hegemony strategy, if it were seriously pursued, inevitably would rise to levels the United States could not afford if the policy of dissuasion failed and growing powers such as China chose to make their military power commensurate with their economic strength. The French International Relations Institute has predicted that by 2050 Greater China (China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) will be the world’s leading economic power, accounting for 24 percent of the international economy. North America (the United States, Canada, and Mexico) would be next, with 23 percent of world GDP.19 The US investment bank Goldman Sachs reached similar conclusions, predicting that by 2050 China will have the largest economy, followed by the United States and India. The next tier might be occupied by Russia, Brazil, and Japan, and a third tier would include Germany, Britain, and other once-mighty European economic powers. The European share of the global economy may decline from its current 22 percent, roughly comparable to that of the United States, to only 12 percent in 2050.20

#### Heg unsustainable – US defense spending

Eland 08 (Ivan Eland, senior fellow at the Independent Institute, “Back to the Future: Rediscovering America’s Foreign Policy Traditions,” Mediterranean Quarterly, http://mq.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/19/3/88.pdf)

To support the informal US worldwide empire of alliances, overseas bases, and personnel, which are used to justify and conduct frequent military interventions, the United States spends huge sums on defense compared to other nations. The United States spends on defense more than the combined security expenditures of the next sixteen highest-spending countries.8 In all, the United States accounts for 44.0 percent of the world’s defense spending,9 but only 27.5 percent of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP).10 This comparison, along with the strain that the two small wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have imposed on US forces, indicate that the informal US empire might be overstretched. Many prior empires have declined because their security spending, overseas defense commitments, and military interventions exceeded their ability to pay for them. Even the British and French empires, on the winning side of both world wars, became financially exhausted — because of fighting those wars and maintaining their vast territories — and went into decline. More recently, the Soviet Union’s empire, and even the country itself, collapsed because its giant military, Eastern European alliances, and military interventions in the developing world became too much for its dysfunctional economy to bear. Many in the United States say that the US economy is much bigger than these failed empires and that decline cannot happen here. But that is what the elites of past empires believed, too. Furthermore, over time, small differences in economic growth rates between competing countries can lead to a reordering of great powers on the world scene. Most of the United States’ economic competitors have less defense spending as a portion of GDP to be a drag on their economies. Thus, even “national greatness” conservatives should be wary of too much defense spending, excessive military commitments overseas, and unnecessary wars, such as Iraq, that sap national resources. All other forms of national power — military, technological, and cultural — derive from maintaining a healthy economy.

### Unsustainable- Soft Balancing

#### Soft balancing undermines American diplomatic channels, which facilitates anti-American coalitions and hard balancing.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 144-5

Soft balancing is a concession to the disparity in military power between the United States and other major states in today's international system.48 Soft balancing relies on diplomacy—conducted through ad hoc coalitions or through international institutions—and, rather than challenging U.S. hegemony directly, it seeks to constrain the United States and limit Washington's ability to impose its policy preferences on others. The key idea underlying soft balancing is that by coordinating their diplomacy and lending one another mutual support, soft balancers can gain outcomes vis-a-vis the United States that they could not obtain by acting separately. To date, soft balancing has taken two forms. First, the second-tier major powers have cooperated—either through informal ententes or by creating organizational structures—to rein in America's exercise of hegemonic power. Examples include periodic summit meetings (Sino-Russian, Franco-Russian, Sine-Indian-Russian) that pledge cooperation to restore multipolarity, and the Shanghai Cooperation Council, created by Moscow and Beijing to coordinate efforts to resist the intrusion of U.S. power into Central Asia.49 The second-tier major powers also engage in "binding" strategies that seek to enmesh the United States in international institutions, to ensure that it is restrained by international law and norms of permissible great power behavior. However, as the combinedefforts of France, Germany, and Russia to use the United Nations to preventthe March 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq demonstrate, binding is an ineffectivemeans of constraining U.S. hegemony (although perhaps marginally moresuccessful as a means of delegitimizing U.S. unilateral actions). This does notmean, however, that soft balancing is unimportant. After all, grand strategy isabout utilizing the key instruments of a state's power—military, economic,and diplomatic—to advance its interests and to gain security. Diplomacy invariably is an integral component of counterbalancing strategies. Thus, soft balancing's real significance is that, if states learn that they can work together diplomatically in standing up to the United States, the groundwork may belaid for future coalitions that will he able to engage effectively in hard balancing, or semi-hard balancing, against the United States.

#### U.S. preponderance is spurring soft-balancing now – these indirect efforts will turn into a hard-line counterweight unless the U.S. begins to withdraw.

Robert A. Pape (Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago) summer 2005 “soft balancing against the United States” International Security

The George W. Bush administration's national security strategy, which asserts that the United States has the right to attack and conquer sovereign countries that pose no observable threat, and to do so without international support, is one of the most aggressively unilateral U.S. postures ever taken. Recent international relations scholarship has wrongly promoted the view that the United States, as the leader of a unipolar system, can pursue such a policy without fear of serious opposition. The most consequential effect of the Bush strategy will be a fundamental transformation in how major states perceive the United States and how they react to future uses of U.S. power. Major powers are already engaging in the early stages of balancing behavior against the United States, by adopting "soft-balancing" measures that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but use international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements to delay, frustrate, and undermine U.S. policies. If the Bush administration continues to pursue aggressive unilateral military policies, increased soft balancing could establish the basis for hard balancing against the United States. To avoid this outcome, the United States should renounce the systematic use of preventive war, as well as other aggressive unilateral military policies, and return to its traditional policy governing the use of force -- a case-by-case calculation of costs and benefits.

### A2 Brooks and Wohlforth

#### Reject Brooks and Wohlforth – their analysis is based off a freeze frame of IR and doesn't into account other factors that cause hegemonic decline

Layne, 09 – Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay", International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009, July 6th 2009, Galileo, p. 15) PDF

Superficially, Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system; they do not engage the argument that, like all hegemonic systems, the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise. Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation. Over time, however, know-how, technology, and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system, which allows other states to catch up. Similarly, leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline.43 A key question is whether the early decades of the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U.S. hegemony. In this respect, the debate about unipolar stability is misleading. After all, despite their claim at the be-ginning of World Out of Balance that unipolarity is robust and that U.S. hegemony will endure well into the future, Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years, which is not very long at all.44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity; it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States, and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization.45

#### Brooks and Wolforth concede that coalitional balancing will work against the US

Jack S. Levy (Board of Governors’ Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society) and William R. Thompson (Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, former president of the International Studies Association, and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly) Summer 2010 “ Balancing on Land and at Sea Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Balancing\_on\_Land\_and\_at\_Sea.pdf

In addition, Brooks and Wohlforth’s argument that the balancing hypothesis applies only to states that are growing and threatening to achieve a position of hegemony but not to established hegemons such as the United States raises the question of why other leading states did not balance against the United States when it was a rising great power but before it established a position of primacy—perhaps in the late 1940s. If the hypothesis that great powers balance against aspiring hegemons is unconditionally valid, and if the only issue is the distribution of material capabilities, then there were plenty of opportunities for a counterbalancing coalition to form against the United States throughout the Cold War period. Instead, most of the great powers perceived that the greatest threat to their interests came from the Soviet Union, not from the United States, and they joined the United States in a defensive balancing coalition against the Soviet Union. Brooks and Wohlforth concede that even today the member states of the European Union collectively exceed the United States in gross domestic product, and the combination of the European Union, Japan, China, and Russia, reinforced by nuclear deterrence, could form an effective balancing coalition against the United States if it was seen as so threatening. Brooks and Wohlforth’s inability to provide a convincing explanation for the absence of coalition formation against the United States in the early Cold War period, when such behavior would not have been so risky, weakens their explanation for nonbalancing after the end of the Cold War.77

#### Brooks and Wohlforth concede unipolarity can only last for 20 more years and that counterbalancing is occuring

Layne, 09 Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009)

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### Multipolarity Inevitable

#### Multipolarity inevitable---collapse of the dollar, erosion of public support, and rising challengers

Layne, 09 Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009)

 For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades, a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World.15Global Trends 2025 is not light reading, but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. Its key geopolitical conclusion is that the U.S.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers); and economic, financial, and domestic political constraints that may erode U.S. capabilities. China, India, and possibly Russia are emerging great powers.16 As Global Trends 2025 points out, the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. 7). Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid.). By 2025, China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. 30). India, buoyed by its strong economic growth rate, will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid.). Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status, the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. 29).17 [End Page 152] Because of uncertainties about economics, energy prices, domestic governance issues, and especially demography, Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. 31–32).18 Between 2009 and 2025, Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million, affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. 23–24, 30). If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power, however, the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U.S. global dominance” (p. 32). Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. 32, 82). According to the NIC, in addition to relative decline, the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. U.S. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. 93). The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. 3, 8–9, 13–14). At home, economic and political constraints may undermine U.S. hegemony. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. Nevertheless, the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U.S. power. In particular, Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades, the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. Although at the time this issue went to press, the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come, China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified.19 [End Page 153] As the NIC observes, the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. Thus, “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. 12, 94, 97). Moreover, the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U.S. freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p. 97). The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic, military, and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. 93). Ultimately, although the United States will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now, it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid.).

### Transition Stable

#### Transition to multipolarity will be stable- international institutions ensure

Ikenberry 2011 (G. John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, The Future of the Liberal World Order Subtitle: Internationalism After America, Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis)

There is no longer any question: wealth and power are moving from the North and the West to the East and the South, and the old order dominated by the United States and Europe is giving way to one increasingly shared with non-Western rising states. But if the great wheel of power is turning, what kind of global political order will emerge in the aftermath? Some anxious observers argue that the world will not just look less American -- it will also look less liberal. Not only is the United States' preeminence passing away, they say, but so, too, is the open and rule-based international order that the country has championed since the 1940s. In this view, newly powerful states are beginning to advance their own ideas and agendas for global order, and a weakened United States will find it harder to defend the old system. The hallmarks of liberal internationalism -- openness and rule-based relations enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and norms such as multilateralism -- could give way to a more contested and fragmented system of blocs, spheres of influence, mercantilist networks, and regional rivalries. The fact that today's rising states are mostly large non-Western developing countries gives force to this narrative. The old liberal international order was designed and built in the West. Brazil, China, India, and other fast-emerging states have a different set of cultural, political, and economic experiences, and they see the world through their anti-imperial and anticolonial pasts. Still grappling with basic problems of development, they do not share the concerns of the advanced capitalist societies. The recent global economic slowdown has also bolstered this narrative of liberal international decline. Beginning in the United States, the crisis has tarnished the American model of liberal capitalism and raised new doubts about the ability of the United States to act as the global economic leader. For all these reasons, many observers have concluded that world politics is experiencing not just a changing of the guard but also a transition in the ideas and principles that underlie the global order. The journalist Gideon Rachman, for example, says that a cluster of liberal internationalist ideas -- such as faith in democratization, confidence in free markets, and the acceptability of U.S. military power -- are all being called into question. According to this worldview, the future of international order will be shaped above all by China, which will use its growing power and wealth to push world politics in an illiberal direction. Pointing out that China and other non-Western states have weathered the recent financial crisis better than their Western counterparts, pessimists argue that an authoritarian capitalist alternative to Western neoliberal ideas has already emerged. According to the scholar Stefan Halper, emerging-market states "are learning to combine market economics with traditional autocratic or semiautocratic politics in a process that signals an intellectual rejection of the Western economic model." But this panicked narrative misses a deeper reality: although the United States' position in the global system is changing, the liberal international order is alive and well. The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles. China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it. Indeed, today's power transition represents not the defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance. Brazil, China, and India have all become more prosperous and capable by operating inside the existing international order -- benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the newly organized G-20. Their economic success and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world politics, and they have deep interests in preserving that system. In the meantime, alternatives to an open and rule-based order have yet to crystallize. Even though the last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system -- the emergence of new powers, bitter disputes among Western allies over the United States' unipolar ambitions, and a global financial crisis and recession -- the liberal international order has no competitors. On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies for it. To be sure, as wealth and power become less concentrated in the United States' hands, the country will be less able to shape world politics. But the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive. Indeed, now may be the best time for the United States and its democratic partners to update the liberal order for a new era, ensuring that it continues to provide the benefits of security and prosperity that it has provided since the middle of the twentieth century.

#### No transition wars- rising states will integrate into international institutions- no incentives for aggression

Ikenberry 2011 (G. John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, The Future of the Liberal World Order Subtitle: Internationalism After America, Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis)

REASON FOR REASSURANCE Rising powers will discover another reason to embrace the existing global rules and institutions: doing so will reassure their neighbors as they grow more powerful. A stronger China will make neighboring states potentially less secure, especially if it acts aggressively and exhibits revisionist ambitions. Since this will trigger a balancing backlash, Beijing has incentives to signal restraint. It will find ways to do so by participating in various regional and global institutions. If China hopes to convince its neighbors that it has embarked on a "peaceful rise," it will need to become more integrated into the international order. China has already experienced a taste of such a backlash. Last year, its military made a series of provocative moves -- including naval exercises -- in the South China Sea, actions taken to support the government's claims to sovereign rights over contested islands and waters. Many of the countries disputing China's claims joined with the United States at the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July to reject Chinese bullying and reaffirm open access to Asia's waters and respect for international law. In September, a Chinese fishing trawler operating near islands administered by Japan in the East China Sea rammed into two Japanese coast guard ships. After Japanese authorities detained the trawler's crew, China responded with what one Japanese journalist described as a "diplomatic 'shock and awe' campaign," suspending ministerial-level contacts, demanding an apology, detaining several Japanese workers in China, and instituting a de facto ban on exports of rare-earth minerals to Japan. These actions -- seen as manifestations of a more bellicose and aggressive foreign policy -- pushed ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea perceptibly closer to the United States. As China's economic and military power grow, its neighbors will only become more worried about Chinese aggressiveness, and so Beijing will have reason to allay their fears. Of course, it might be that some elites in China are not interested in practicing restraint. But to the extent that China is interested in doing so, it will find itself needing to signal peaceful intentions -- redoubling its participation in existing institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, or working with the other great powers in the region to build new ones. This is, of course, precisely what the United States did in the decades after World War II. The country operated within layers of regional and global economic, political, and security institutions and constructed new ones -- thereby making itself more predictable and approachable and reducing the incentives for other states to undermine it by building countervailing coalitions. More generally, given the emerging problems of the twenty-first century, there will be growing incentives among all the great powers to embrace an open, rule-based international system. In a world of rising economic and security interdependence, the costs of not following multilateral rules and not forging cooperative ties go up. As the global economic system becomes more interdependent, all states -- even large, powerful ones -- will find it harder to ensure prosperity on their own. Growing interdependence in the realm of security is also creating a demand for multilateral rules and institutions. Both the established and the rising great powers are threatened less by mass armies marching across borders than by transnational dangers, such as terrorism, climate change, and pandemic disease. What goes on in one country -- radicalism, carbon emissions, or public health failures -- can increasingly harm another country. Intensifying economic and security interdependence are giving the United States and other powerful countries reason to seek new and more extensive forms of multilateral cooperation. Even now, as the United States engages China and other rising states, the agenda includes expanded cooperation in areas such as clean energy, environmental protection, nonproliferation, and global economic governance. The old and rising powers may disagree on how exactly this cooperation should proceed, but they all have reasons to avoid a breakdown in the multilateral order itself. So they will increasingly experiment with new and more extensive forms of liberal internationalism.

#### Transition to multipolarity will be peaceful

**Schweller, 10** (Randall Schweller is a professor of political science at Ohio State University and received his PhD from Columbia University in international relations, “Entropy and the trajectory of world politics: why polarity has become less meaningful” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 23, Number 1, March 2010/vs,ak)

Though rarely mentioned, system equilibrium can emerge without balancing or power-seeking behaviour. This should not come as a surprise; for we know that a Concert system existed during a multipolar phase, roughly between 1815 and1853. That system, however, arose from the ashes of war, the purpose of which was to defeat an aspiring hegemon before it rolled up the system. The current system, however, has already been ‘rolled up’ for all intents and purposes. So how could a balance of power be restored without deliberate balancing against the US? The answer is that uneven rates of growth among states seeking merely to get rich(wealth, not military power, security, or political inﬂuence over others) can produce a rough equivalence in capabilities among several states, none of which feel particularly threatened by each other or seek relative gains at the expense of one another. In other words, the major actors in the system are strictly egoistic, and they interact cooperatively, not competitively or strategically in a military sense, with each other. It is essentially an orthodox liberal world, in which international politics becomes a positive-sum game and the concept of equilibrium is, by deﬁnition, a Pareto optimal condition that no actor has an interest in changing (see Callinicos 2007, 546). Here, global equilibrium means maximum entropy. What has changed? Simply put, there is no longer an expectation of violent expansion among the great powers. Balance of power is built on the assumption not only that war is a legitimate instrument of statecraft (Jervis 1986, 60) but that states will settle their differences by ﬁghting. This expectation exercises a profound inﬂuence on the types of behaviours exhibited by states and the system as a whole (Lasswell 1965 [1935], chapter 3). It was not just the prospect of war that triggered the basic dynamics of past multipolar and bipolar systems. It was the anticipation that powerful states sought to and would, if given the right odds, carry out territorial conquests at each others’ expense that shaped and shoved actors in ways consistent with the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theory. Without the very real fear of Soviet expansion, why would bipolarity have compelled the US to adopt a grand strategy of containment and deterrence? Without the traditional expectations of great power war and conquest, why would the added complexity and uncertainty of multipolar systems make them unstable? Why would states form alliances in the ﬁrst place, much less worry about who aligns with whom? When war is unthinkable among the great powers,it is hard to see how polarity exerts the constraints predicted by structural balance of power theory. To the extent that this driving force of history is no longer in play, the system will experience increasing entropy.

### A/T “We’ll Always Try”\*\*

#### No, we won’t- intuitive assertions shouldn’t cut it- best studies of IR prove the US can and will successfully retrench- all their transition args are wrong

MacDonald and Parent 2011 (Paul K. and Joseph M., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, International Security, Graceful Decline?; The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment, Spring, lexis)

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists' claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so. 12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state's rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

#### Yes, applicable to US; and “lashout” thesis is wrong- prefer *studies* over assertion

MacDonald and Parent 2011 (Paul K. and Joseph M., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, International Security, Graceful Decline?; The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment, Spring, lexis)

Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two. 91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America's superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, "[N]o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia." 92 Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one's reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations.

### A/T “Public = Always Engage”

#### The public supports retrenchment

Macdonald and Parent December 2011 (Joseph M. Parent is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Paul K. MacDonald is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, The Wisdom of Retrenchment Subtitle: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward, Foreign Affairs, lexis)

Others warn that the U.S. political system is too fragmented to implement a coordinated policy of retrenchment. In this view, even if the foreign policy community unanimously subscribed to this strategy, it would be unable to outmaneuver lobbying groups and bureaucracies that favor a more activist approach. Electoral pressures reward lucrative defense contracts and chest-thumping stump speeches rather than sober appraisals of declining fortunes. Whatever leaders' preferences are, bureaucratic pressures promote conservative decisions, policy inertia, and big budgets -- none of which is likely to usher in an era of self-restraint. Despite deep partisan divides, however, Republicans and Democrats have often put aside their differences when it comes to foreign policy. After World War II, the United States did not revert to the isolationism of earlier periods: both parties backed massive programs to contain the Soviet Union. During the tempestuous 1960s, a consensus emerged in favor of détente with the Soviets. The 9/11 attacks generated bipartisan support for action against al Qaeda and its allies. Then, in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, politicians across the spectrum recognized the need to bring the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to an end. When faced with pressing foreign policy challenges, U.S. politicians generally transcend ideological divides and forge common policies, sometimes expanding the United States' global commitments and sometimes contracting them. Today, electoral pressures support a more modest approach to foreign affairs. According to a 2009 study by the Pew Research Center, 70 percent of Americans would rather the United States share global leadership than go it alone. And a 2010 study by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 79 percent of them thought the United States played the role of world policeman more than it should. Even on sacrosanct issues such as the defense budget, the public has demonstrated a willingness to consider reductions. In a 2010 study conducted by the Program for Public Consultation at the University of Maryland, 64 percent of respondents endorsed reductions in defense spending, supporting an average cut of $109 billion to the base-line defense budget. Institutional barriers to reform do remain. Yet when presidents have led, the bureaucrats have largely followed. Three successive administrations, beginning with that of Ronald Reagan, were able to tame congressional opposition and push through an ambitious realignment program that ultimately resulted in the closure of 100 military bases, saving $57 billion. In its 2010 defense budget, the Obama administration succeeded in canceling plans to acquire additional F-22 Raptors despite fierce resistance by lobbyists, members of Congress, and the air force brass. The 2010 budget also included cuts to the navy's fleet of stealth destroyers and various components of the army's next generation of manned ground vehicles. Thus, claims that retrenchment is politically impractical or improbable are unfounded. Just as a more humble foreign policy will invite neither instability nor decline, domestic political factors will not inevitably prevent timely reform. To chart a new course, U.S. policymakers need only possess foresight and will.

#### They oversimplify how democracy works- multiple interest groups and elite pressure lead to successful retrenchment

MacDonald and Parent 2011 (Paul K. and Joseph M., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, International Security, Graceful Decline?; The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment, Spring, lexis)

Although useful in many contexts, domestic constraint arguments suffer from several problems. First, domestic political theories assume that interest groups predominantly push for more expansive overseas commitments. Yet domestic interest groups possess much more complicated and nuanced preferences than is commonly assumed. For example, many domestic interest groups oppose overseas commitments, favoring expenditure on domestic programs rather than adventures abroad. Second, groups favoring assertive foreign policies do not speak with one voice or assign equal priority to all interests. Different interest groups will place different weight on particular regions, economic sectors, or types of international challenges. 34 The heterogeneity of domestic interests is critical because it opens up space for politicians to outmaneuver domestic groups and force trade-offs on unwilling lobbies. Third, domestic political theories are unclear about when domestic interests are able to hijack the policymaking process. Some studies emphasize problems with democratic states, which provide interest groups easier access to the policymaking process. In his classic study, however, Stephen Krasner finds that "again and again there are serious discrepancies between the aims of central decision-makers and those of private corporations" in which "the state has generally prevailed." 35 Others argue that it is not regime type that is crucial, but the institutional structure of a country. Spruyt emphasizes the importance of institutional veto points, which are present in both democratic and autocratic systems. 36 Although the inclusion of veto points allows a more nuanced understanding of domestic constraints, it suffers from the same problem of specifying which veto points are most significant and when they will prove decisive. Fourth, domestic political theories tend to downplay or ignore the ability of international context to inform domestic politics. Yet policymakers do not operate in a vacuum; elites react to changes in the international system. 37 Policymakers at the helm of rising powers can afford to indulge the interests of domestic lobbies with minimal consequences. Elites in rising powers have few incentives to resolve trade-offs among competing interests or veto new and unnecessary foreign adventures. In contrast, there are significant pressures on policymakers in declining great powers to put aside their parochial interests. They sit atop wasting assets, and a local defeat may easily turn into a general rout. It is precisely in periods of acute relative decline that one should expect partisan rancor and sectoral rivalry to recede.

### At: China is not a military threat

#### **China’s military is modernizing**

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That China is poised to displace the United States as the world’s largest economy has more than economic signiﬁcance. It is signiﬁcant geopolitically. The pattern of great-power rise is well established. First, China’s claims of ‘‘peaceful rise’’ notwithstanding, the emergence of new great powers in the international system has invariably been destabilizing geopolitically. The near-simultaneous emergence of the United States, Germany, and Japan as great powers in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries triggered two world wars (Layne 1993). Second, as rising great powers become wealthier, their political ambitions increase and they convert their newfound economic muscle into the military clout (Zakaria 1998). Already, China is engaged in an impressive military modernization and buildup. While China has not yet caught up to the United States’ sophisticated military technology, it clearly is narrowing the US advantage. Third, rising powers invariably seek to dominate the regions in which they are situated (Mearsheimer 2001). This means that China and the United States are on a collision course in East Asia—the region where the United States has been the incumbent hegemon since 1945, and which an increasingly powerful and assertive China sees as its own backyard. Fourth, as they rise, new great powers acquire economic and political interests abroad, and they seek to acquire the power projection capabilities to defend those interests (Zakaria 1998).

### **AT: We’ve Had Other Declinist Scares**

#### Decline is inevitable, it’s just a question of when- transition now means that changes wont be as extreme

**Layne, 12** (Christopher Layne is a professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. Professor Layne has written two books and he has contributed extensively to the debates about international relations theory and American foreign policy in such scholarly and policy journals as *International Security*, *International History Review*, *Security Studies*, *Journal of Strategic Studies*,*The National Interest*, *Foreign Policy*, *The Washington Quarterly*, *World Policy Journal*, and *Orbis*. Professor Layne has been a frequent contributor to *The Atlantic*,*The New Republic*, *The Nation*, *Financial Times*, *New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*,*Washington Post*, and the *Australian*. He also is a contributing editor for *The American Conservative*. He has a PhD in political science from Berkeley, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana, International Studies Quarterly 1-11, ak)

Contrary to the way their argument was portrayed by many of their critics, the 1980s declinists did not claim either that the United States already had declined steeply, or that it soon would undergo a rapid, catastrophic decline. Rather, they pointed to domestic and economic drivers that were in play and which, over time, would cause American economic power to decline relatively and produce a shift in global distribution of power. The declinists contended that the United States was afﬂicted by a slow—’’termite’’—decline caused by fundamental structural weaknesses in the American economy. 7 Kennedy himself was explicitly looking ahead to the effects this termite decline would have on United States’ world role in the early twenty-ﬁrst century. As he wrote, ‘‘The task facing American statesman over the next decades. .. is to recognize that broad trends are under way, and that there is a need to ‘manage’ affairs so that the relative erosion of the United States’ position takes place slowly and smoothly, and is not accelerated by policies which bring merely short-term advantage but longer-term disadvantage’’ (Kennedy 1987:534; my emphasis). When one goes back and re-reads what the 1980s declinists pinpointed as the drivers of American decline, their analyses look farsighted because the same drivers of economic decline are at the center of debate today: too much consumption and not enough savings; persistent trade and current account deﬁcits; chronic federal budget deﬁcits and a mounting national debt; and de-industrialization. Over time, 1980s declinists said, the United States’ goals of geopolitical dominance and economic prosperity would collide. Today, their warnings seem eerily prescient. Robert Gilpin’s 1987 description of America’s economic and grand strategic plight could just as easily describe the United States after the Great Recession: With a decreased rate of economic growth and a low rate of national savings, the United States was living and defending commitments far beyond its means. In order to bring its commitments and power back into balance once again, the United States would one day have to cut back further on its overseas commitments, reduce the American standard of living, or decrease domestic productive investment even more than it already had. In the meantime, American hegemony was threatened by a potentially devastating ﬁscal crisis. (Gilpin 1987:347–348) In the Great Recession’s wake—doubly so since it is far from clear that either the United States or global economies are out of the woods—the United States now is facing the dilemmas that Gilpin and the other declinists warned about. Counterfactual questions—‘‘What would have happened if?’’—are difﬁcult to answer. Nevertheless, it is useful to ask where the United States might be today had the warnings of the ‘‘declinists’’ been heeded. Perhaps the United States would have taken corrective economic and ﬁscal steps two decades ago that would have ameliorated the crisis in which it now ﬁnds itself. However, the debate about US decline ended abruptly when, in short order, the United States’ main geopolitical and economic rivals—the Soviet Union and Japan, respectively—experienced dramatic reversals of fortune. The Soviet Union unraveled, and in the early 1990s Japan’s economic bubble burst, plunging it into a cycle of deﬂation and low growth from which, two decades later, it has yet to recover. Seemingly overnight the threats to the United States’ military and economic supremacy were removed from the international chessboard. The 1990s subsequently witnessed a euphoric American triumphalism that wiped away any thoughts of US decline. On the contrary, the ‘‘unipolar moment’’ and the ‘‘end of history’’—along with the emergence of the so-called Washington consensus—seemed to conﬁrm that both America’s power and its ideology were unchallengeable in the postCold War world (Fukuyama 1989; Krauthammer 1990–1991). The Great Recession has put paid to such fantasies and put the spotlight on the domestic drivers of American decline.

## \*\*Impacts\*\*

### General Defense

#### Heg solves nothing- past two decades prove

Mearsheimer 2011 (John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, The National Interest, Imperial by Design, lexis)

One year later, Charles Krauthammer emphasized in "The Unipolar Moment" that the United States had emerged from the Cold War as by far the most powerful country on the planet.2 He urged American leaders not to be reticent about using that power "to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them." Krauthammer's advice fit neatly with Fukuyama's vision of the future: the United States should take the lead in bringing democracy to less developed countries the world over. After all, that shouldn't be an especially difficult task given that America had awesome power and the cunning of history on its side. U.S. grand strategy has followed this basic prescription for the past twenty years, mainly because most policy makers inside the Beltway have agreed with the thrust of Fukuyama's and Krauthammer's early analyses. The results, however, have been disastrous. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989, and there is no end in sight. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows, countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior; and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this problem, as is clear from James Madison's observation that "no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." Washington's pursuit of policies like assassination, rendition and torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified. To make matters worse, the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. Since the war began in March 2003, more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed, roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.7 million more have been internally displaced. Moreover, the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts, despite all the phony talk about how the "surge" has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come, in fruitless pursuit of victory. The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. Washington has worked overtime-with no success-to shut down Iran's uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. And the United States, unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. Finally, every post-Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front, and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years, as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that "looking forward 50 years, only 33 percent of Americans think the United States will continue to be the world's leading power." Clearly, the heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism.

#### Heg collapse doesn’t cause global nuclear war – conflicts would be small and managable

Richard Haas (president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April 2008 “Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?” <http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask_the_expert.html>

Does a non polar world increase or reduce the chances of another world war? Will nuclear deterrence continue to prevent a large scale conflict? Sivananda Rajaram, UK Richard Haass: I believe the chance of a world war, i.e., one involving the major powers of the day, is remote and likely to stay that way. This reflects more than anything else the absence of disputes or goals that could lead to such a conflict. Nuclear deterrence might be a contributing factor in the sense that no conceivable dispute among the major powers would justify any use of nuclear weapons, but again, I believe the fundamental reason great power relations are relatively good is that all hold a stake in sustaining an international order that supports trade and financial flows and avoids large-scale conflict. The danger in a nonpolar world is not global conflict as we feared during the Cold War but smaller but still highly costly conflicts involving terrorist groups, militias, rogue states, etc.

#### Their evidence overestimates the US’s ability to shape the international system – doesn’t contain conflict and wont shape the new multipolar system

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 176-7

A second contention advanced by proponents of American hegemony is that the United States cannot withdraw from Eurasia because a great power war there could shape the post conflict international system in ways harmful to U.S. interests. Hence, the United States "could suffer few economic losses during a war, or even benefit somewhat, and still find the postwar environment quite costly to its own trade and investment."sa This really is not an economic argument but rather an argument about the consequences of Eurasia's political and ideological, as well as economic, closure. Proponents of hegemony fear that if great power wars in Eurasia occur, they could bring to power militaristic or totalitarian regimes. Mere, several points need to be made. First, proponents of American hegemony overestimate the amount of influence that the United States has on the international system. There are numerous possible geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia. Most of these will not culminate in war, but it's a good bet that some will. But regardless of whether Eurasian great powers remain at peace, the outcomes are going to be caused more by those states' calculations of their interests than by the presence of U.S. forces in Eurasia. The United States has only limited power to affect the amount of war and peace in the international system, and whatever influence it does have is being eroded by the creeping multipolarization under way in Eurasia. Second, the possible benefits of "environment shaping" have to be weighed against the possible costs of U.S. involvement in a big Eurasian war. Finally, distilled to its essence, this argument is a restatement of the fear that U.S. security and interests inevitably will be jeopardized by a Eurasian hegemon. This threat is easily exaggerated, and manipulated, to disguise ulterior motives for U.S. military intervention in Eurasia.

#### Capability doesn’t translate into power- not translatable into force

**Schweller, 10** (Randall Schweller is a professor of political science at Ohio State University and received his PhD from Columbia University in international relations, “Entropy and the trajectory of world politics: why polarity has become less meaningful” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 23, Number 1, March 2010/vs)

On the downside, the unipole’s overwhelmingly large capability advantage does not easily translate into actual power over others. Indeed, the so-called hyperpower may have less capacity to change or influence others’ behaviour than poles in a bi- or multipolar system. The unipole’s dilemma is that the relationship between relative capabilities and relative power is not a linear one. Just as the unipolar power is largely unconstrained by the need for others, weaker powers, in turn, have less need for a polar-power patron than they would normally have under more traditional balance-of-power structures. I say ‘less need’ rather than ‘no need’ because many states still face local threats for which American protection and assistance is valuable if not necessary. Moreover, there may be other ways in which the US can be extremely helpful to states and, thereby, get influence over them. Nevertheless, leadership requires followers. If the unipole is seen as unnecessary or incompetent—here, the recent economic downturn as a result of US bank deregulation and export of toxic assets comes to mind—its leadership will be unneeded and unwanted. Obviously, nobody wants to follow an incompetent leader. What is unique about unipolarity is that lesser powers have fewer reasons than in the past to do so. Unipolarity exemplifies the problematic relationship between relative capabilities and usable power and influence. The extra resources that a unipole possesses over normal polar powers found in other structures are akin to what is called ‘useless energy’ associated with entropy. In international politics, bigger is not always better.

### \*Multipolarity Good

#### Retrenchment *now* is key to stable transition to multipolarity- only way to ensure cooperation which solves climate change, prolif, and the economy

Patrick 2010 (November/December, Stewart, Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations, Irresponsible Stakeholders? Subtitle: The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers, Foreign Affairs, lexis)

And yet Obama's engagement strategy pragmatically recognizes that addressing global problems such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, and financial instability calls for meaningful cooperation, not only with democracies but also with nondemocracies. Global governance requires collaboration among the unlike-minded. But partnership among the like-minded cannot be assumed, either. Democracy is an unreliable predictor of allegiance to U.S. interests. Some of the United States' recent diplomatic tussles have been with big emerging democracies. Brazil, under its flamboyant president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has assumed a prominent global profile thanks to its criticism of the United States' international role, ranging from the U.S. military presence in Colombia to Washington's alleged pro-Israel bias. Turkey, for decades a reliable U.S. ally, has staked out an independent posture on Middle East policy under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, abandoning its historical neutrality and making its relations with Israel contingent on the latter's policy toward Gaza CHANGE FROM WITHIN The world today is not a blank slate, as it was after World War II, when, as the Obama administration frequently notes, a farsighted generation of U.S. leaders laid the foundations of a Western liberal international order. They left many institutional products -- international and regional, formal and informal, general purpose and issue specific. Absent a cataclysm such as a world war, reallocating influence within existing bodies will be an uphill struggle. The more important the institution, the more its powerful members will resist diluting their authority within it. China and Russia, for example, oppose allowing any new permanent members to join the UN Security Council. None of the council's permanent five nations will countenance either limiting its veto power or extending that power to others. And consider the International Energy Agency. It excludes major energy consumers such as China and India, as well as major energy suppliers such as Russia. Ostensibly, the reasoning behind this is that IEA members must belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. But there is another, more self-interested explanation: voting at the IEA is weighted based on each country's share of global oil consumption in 1974, and its current members want to retain this arrangement even though oil consumption has remained essentially static in North America and Europe while increasing eight- and sixfold in China and India, respectively. Vested interests also plague ongoing debates about governance of the World Bank, the IMF, and other international financial institutions. To be sure, the shock of the recent global economic downturn has driven some degree of change. The G-20 has become the principal forum for international economic coordination, the first major adaptation in multilateral cooperation to reflect dramatic shifts in global power. The G-20 created the Financial Stability Board in April 2009 to strengthen international standards for global finance. The resources of the IMF have expanded. And the members of both the IMF and the World Bank have agreed to adjust those organizations' voting weights and quotas by several percentage points in favor of emerging-market economies. But the overall impact of these reforms is modest. This is not a global constitutional moment akin to the one 65 years ago. In any event, even more ambitious efforts to bring rising powers into existing institutions will be limited by the prospect of tradeoffs between effectiveness and legitimacy. This concern is at the core of the debates over UN Security Council expansion. As Susan Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, explained to the UN General Assembly in February 2009, "The United States believes that the long-term legitimacy and viability of the United Nations Security Council depends on its reflecting the world of the twenty-first century." At the same time, she continued, any expansion must "not diminish its effectiveness or efficiency." A larger, more inclusive Security Council could complicate U.S. efforts to garner sufficient votes for critical resolutions. Expanding existing forums can also harm consensus. This is most obvious in the shift from the G-8 -- still a cozy Western-dominated forum despite Russia's presence -- to the G-20, a much more diverse body. Given its heterogeneity, the G-20 is unlikely in the short term to become a venue for addressing sensitive security and political issues, such as Iran's nuclear program or the violence in Sudan A GRAND BARGAIN The United States has no choice but to rely on rising powers to help address today's global challenges. But it must engage these countries in a way that preserves the core of the postwar order. The political scientist G. John Ikenberry has argued that the time is ripe for an "institutional bargain": by ceding influence within multilateral frameworks while it remains dominant, the United States might lock in support from the rising powers for an international order based on the Western model. But how should the United States go about doing this? Should the rising powers be integrated quickly on the assumption that giving them a stake soon will make them responsible faster? Or would it be wiser to adopt an incremental approach, one that conditioned the rising powers' entry into the club on their demonstrated willingness to play by global rules and shoulder new burdens? Both approaches could entail frustrations. There is no guarantee that the world's rising powers will become the United States' strategic partners. Washington may want them to do more on the world stage, but it cannot control their choices and it will not always like the results of their participation. There is, of course, no common worldview among today's emerging countries. But as U.S. power declines, the rising powers will seek to test, dilute, or revise existing institutions to suit their purposes. The United States will need to decide when to stand firm, when to engage, and when simply to agree to disagree. This will likely produce ongoing debates about the appropriate boundaries of national sovereignty, the desirable balance between the state and the market, and the proper foundations of political legitimacy. During the Cold War, the United States could count on solidarity among the capitalist democracies. In the twenty-first century, the normative foundations for multilateral cooperation will be weaker. An imperfect historical parallel might be the Concert of Europe of the early 1800s. That arrangement leavened the traditional balance of power with a balance of rights, which helped bridge differences between the Western powers (France and the United Kingdom) and the authoritarian monarchies (Austria, Prussia, and Russia) of the Holy Alliance. Global cooperation today may follow a similar logic. The United States may need to pay less attention to regime type and tolerate nations in which democracy is lacking or absent. It must be attuned to nationalist sensitivities in the rising powers -- including those linked to the United States' perceived interventionism, unilateralism, or militarism -- and to the temptation of all governments to harness these grievances for their own political purposes. Accommodating new powers while retaining as much of the old order as possible will be a constant balancing act, much like the Concert of Europe was two centuries ago. Yet as Thomas Wright of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs has observed, the Obama administration has done little serious thinking about how to foster cooperation when the United States' interests diverge from those of other countries. The brief discussion of potentially clashing interests with rising powers in the National Security Strategy document of May 2010 seems too limited: "And when national interests do collide -- or countries prioritize their interests in different ways -- those nations that defy international norms or fail to meet their sovereign responsibilities will be denied the incentives that come with greater integration and collaboration with the international community." The warning clearly applies to Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela but may or may not also apply to those emerging countries that fall short of being "rogue." What if Brazil, China, or Turkey simply prioritizes its interests differently from the United States on critical issues? In this complex international reality, fixed alliances and formal organizations may count for less than shifting coalitions of interest. Fortunately, the United States is well positioned to exploit these dynamics, since it will remain for the foreseeable future the hub for most agreements that will be discussed in the G-20 and other major forums. But to make the most of this advantage, U.S. officials will need to be unsentimental about forming partnerships of convenience. They will need to convene different clubs for different purposes, balancing encompassing arrangements such as the G-20 with smaller affinity groupings such as the G-8, which permit the United States to collaborate with longtime partners that broadly share its fundamental political and economic values. Meanwhile, the United States must not allow the emerging powers to avoid contributing to global public goods. At times, these contributions might follow the notion of "common but differentiated responsibility." Adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio and incorporated into the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, this principle establishes different obligations for developed and developing countries, based on their internal capacities. But the United States should resist the promiscuous invocation by fast-growing economies of internal development constraints and insist on clear benchmarks for balancing the responsibilities of the established and the emerging powers over time. More generally, the United States must link any extension of international status, voice, and weight to the emerging powers to their concrete contributions to world stability. Reform of the increasingly outdated UN Security Council is an area in which the United States must insist on ground rules for inclusion. Any new permanent seats should be granted only to those states that make tangible efforts to foster international peace and security. Reasonable criteria for measuring such efforts could include whether a state has military (as well as civilian) capabilities that could be deployed globally or regionally on behalf of the UN; significantly supports the UN's regular and peacekeeping budgets; is willing to use enforcement tools under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, authorizing sanctions and the use of military force; is able to help broker political solutions; and has a record of conforming to and enforcing security regimes. The United States can provide incentives for aspiring states to meet Western expectations by proposing concrete benchmarks for eligibility. Any adjustment to the UN Security Council will take time. In the meantime, the United States should use the G-20 framework to anchor emerging powers such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa in the current world order and forge understandings with them on issues such as currency imbalances, climate change, peacekeeping, development cooperation, and nonproliferation. By investing the G-20 with real influence and gradually expanding its agenda, the established nations may encourage the rising powers to jettison outmoded positions held by the G-77 regarding sovereignty, nonintervention, and economic development in favor of more pragmatic policies. A dynamic G-20 would also provide a valuable testing ground for the emerging powers to demonstrate their credentials for Security Council membership. U.S. officials must make peace with incrementalism. They need to be flexible in accommodating the institutional aspirations of the emerging powers. Cooperation will arise through the gradual updating of existing multilateral architecture, ad hoc arrangements, and bargaining. Where possible, the United States should use flexible approaches not simply to sidestep international organizations but also to drive reform efforts within them. Multilateral cooperation within large groups will increasingly rest on "minilateral" agreements, that is, agreements among a subset of key states, beforehand. This is the lesson of the Copenhagen accord of December 2009, which was reached in the waning days of the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The United States brokered a last-minute deal with the so-called BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) that, even though it was nonbinding, set the stage for tangible global action to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Additional progress on climate change will depend heavily on the 17-nation Major Economies Forum -- an informal body comprised of the world's major emitters of greenhouse gases. This forum will not replace the UNFCCC, but it can galvanize progress within it. PRESERVATION THROUGH COOPERATION In the end, the biggest obstacle to integrating rising powers into the world order may come from within the United States. Making room for emerging players will require psychological adjustments on the part of U.S. officials. They will have to reevaluate the touchstones that have defined U.S. foreign policy since 1945. For more than half a century, the United States has served as the chief architect and ultimate guarantor of an open, liberal international political and economic order. This role has become embedded in U.S. political culture and national identity. But as global power becomes diffuse, the United States' long-standing habits of mind may be more limiting than helpful. By the 1960s, as former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson cruelly noted, the United Kingdom had lost an empire but not yet found a new role. The erosion of U.S. hegemony, although less stark, poses its own challenges. As the United States sheds its primacy, it will need to adopt a more inclusive form of leadership. Compromise will be the order of the day. The U.S. public may be prepared to make this shift: a comprehensive digest of recent polling data compiled by the Council on Foreign Relations and World Public Opinion suggests that Americans are willing to share the world's burdens. Yet at a minimum, multipolarity will test the assumptions of American exceptionalism. The United States has long taken an à la carte approach to its international commitments: picking and choosing among multilateral treaties, institutions, and initiatives and occasionally acting alone or opting out to preserve its sovereignty or freedom of action. But as the U.S. National Intelligence Council's report Global Trends 2025 suggests, "Such a selective approach is . . . running into trouble because those powerful enough to afford picking and choosing are growing more numerous." As today's rising powers avail themselves of the same privilege, such exceptionalism may fray the fabric of the international system. To hold the postwar order together, the United States will have to become a more consistent exemplar of multilateral cooperation.

#### Warming guarantees multiple positive feedbacks triggering extinction.

Tickell -08 (Oliver, Climate Researcher, The Gaurdian, “On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction”, 8/11http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange)

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.

#### Prolif causes extinction

Asal and Beardsley 2009 (Victor, Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Albany, and Kyle, Department of Political Science, Emory University, Winning with the Bomb, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/uploads/Beardsley-Asal\_Winning\_with\_the\_Bomb.pdf)

Conclusion Why do states proliferate? Nuclear weapons and the programs necessary to create them are expensive. They are dangerous. Other countries may attack a state while it is trying to create a nuclear arsenal and there is always the risk of a catastrophic accident. They may help generate existential threats by encouraging first strike incentives amongst a state's opponents. This paper has explored the incentives that make nuclear weapons attractive to a wide range of states despite their costly and dangerous nature. We have found that nuclear weapons provide more than prestige, they provide leverage. They are useful in coercive diplomacy, and this must be central to any explanation of why states acquire them. Since 9 August 1945 no state has used a nuclear weapon against another state, but we find evidence that the possession of nuclear weapons helps states to succeed in their confrontations with other states even when they do not “use” them. Conflict with nuclear actors carries with it a potential danger that conflict with other states simply does not have. Even though the probability of full escalation is presumably low, the evidence confirms that the immense damage from the possibility of such escalation is enough to make an opponent eager to offer concessions. Asymmetric crises allow nuclear states to use their leverage to good effect. When crises involve a severe threat – and nuclear use is not completely ruled out – the advantage that nuclear actors have is substantial. Nuclear weapons help states win concessions quickly in 25 salient conflicts. Consistent with the other papers in this issue and the editors’ introduction (Gartzke and Kroenig this issue), we report that nuclear weapons confer tangible benefits to the possessors. These benefits imply that there should be a general level of demand for nuclear weapons, which means that explanations for why so few states have actually proliferated should focus more on the supply side, as applied by Matthew Kroenig (this issue) and Matthew Fuhrmann (this issue). The findings here importantly suggest an additional reason why “proliferation begets proliferation,” in the words of George Shultz (Shultz 1984, 18). If both parties to a crisis have nuclear weapons, the advantage is effectively cancelled out. When states develop nuclear weapons, doing so may encourage their rivals to also proliferate for fear of being exploited by the shifting bargaining positions. And once the rivals proliferate, the initial proliferator no longer has much bargaining advantage. On the one hand, this dynamic adds some restraint to initial proliferation within a rivalry relationship: states fear that their arsenal will encourage their rivals to pursue nuclear weapons, which will leave them no better off (Davis 1993; Cirincione 2007). On the other hand, once proliferation has occurred, all other states that are likely to experience coercive bargaining with the new nuclear state will also want nuclear weapons. The rate of proliferation has the potential to accelerate because the desire to posses the “equalizer” will increase as the number of nuclear powers slowly rises. Our theoretical framework and empirical findings are complementary to Gartzke and Jo (this issue), who posit and find that nuclear states enjoy greater influence in the international realm. An interesting dynamic emerges when comparing the results to Rauchhaus (this issue), who finds that nuclear weapons in asymmetric dyads tend to increase the propensity for escalation. We have argued that nuclear weapons improve the bargaining leverage of the 26 possessors and tested that proposition directly. It is important to note that the factors that shape conflict initiation and escalation are not necessarily the same factors that most shape the outcome of the conflict. Even so, one explanation for why a stronger bargaining position does not necessarily produce less escalation is that escalation is a function of decisions by both sides, and even though the opponent of a nuclear state is more willing to back down, the nuclear state should be more willing to raise its demands and push for a harder bargain in order to maximize the benefits from the nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons appear to need ever-greater shares of their bargains in order to be satisfied, which helps to explain both their proclivity to win and their proclivity toward aggressive coercive diplomacy. An important implication in light of these findings is thus that even though nuclear weapon states tend to fare better at the end of their crises, this does not necessarily mean that the weapons are a net benefit for peace and stability.

#### Economic decline causes nuclear war

Mead -09 (Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. The New Republic, “Only Makes You Stronger,” February 4 2009. http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2 AD 6/30/09)

So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

###  **Ext.: Retrench Solves Everything**

#### Retrenchment’s key to solve warming and the economy- *decline* is key to reorient strategy away from military solutions

Zenko and Cohen April 2012 (MICAH ZENKO is a Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. MICHAEL A. COHEN is a Fellow at the Century Foundation, Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure Than Washington Thinks, Foreign Affairs, lexis)

None of this is to suggest that the United States should stop playing a global role; rather, it should play a different role, one that emphasizes soft power over hard power and inexpensive diplomacy and development assistance over expensive military buildups. Indeed, the most lamentable cost of unceasing threat exaggeration and a focus on military force is that the main global challenges facing the United States today are poorly resourced and given far less attention than "sexier" problems, such as war and terrorism. These include climate change, pandemic diseases, global economic instability, and transnational criminal networks -- all of which could serve as catalysts to severe and direct challenges to U.S. security interests. But these concerns are less visceral than alleged threats from terrorism and rogue nuclear states. They require long-term planning and occasionally painful solutions, and they are not constantly hyped by well-financed interest groups. As a result, they are given short shrift in national security discourse and policymaking. To avoid further distorting U.S. foreign policy and to take advantage of today's relative security and stability, policymakers need to not only respond to a 99 percent world but also solidify it. They should start by strengthening the global architecture of international institutions and norms that can promote U.S. interests and ensure that other countries share the burden of maintaining global peace and security. International institutions such as the UN (and its affiliated agencies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency), regional organizations (the African Union, the Organization of American States, the European Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), and international financial institutions can formalize and reinforce norms and rules that regulate state behavior and strengthen global cooperation, provide legitimacy for U.S. diplomatic efforts, and offer access to areas of the world that the United States cannot obtain unilaterally. American leadership must be commensurate with U.S. interests and the nature of the challenges facing the country. The United States should not take the lead on every issue or assume that every problem in the world demands a U.S. response. In the majority of cases, the United States should "lead from behind" -- or from the side, or slightly in the front -- but rarely, if ever, by itself. That approach would win broad public support. According to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs' most recent survey of U.S. public opinion on international affairs, less than ten percent of Americans want the country to "continue to be the pre-eminent world leader in solving international problems." The American people have long embraced the idea that their country should not be the world's policeman; for just as long, politicians from both parties have expressed that sentiment as a platitude. The time has come to act on that idea. If the main challenges in a 99 percent world are transnational in nature and require more development, improved public health, and enhanced law enforcement, then it is crucial that the United States maintain a sharp set of nonmilitary national security tools. American foreign policy needs fewer people who can jump out of airplanes and more who can convene roundtable discussions and lead negotiations. But owing to cuts that began in the 1970s and accelerated significantly during its reorganization in the 1990s, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been reduced to a hollow shell of its former self. In 1990, the agency had 3,500 permanent employees. Today, it has just over 2,000 staffers, and the vast majority of its budget is distributed via contractors and nongovernmental organizations. Meanwhile, with 30,000 employees and a $50 billion budget, the State Department's resources pale in comparison to those of the Pentagon, which has more than 1.6 million employees and a budget of more than $600 billion. More resources and attention must be devoted to all elements of nonmilitary state power -- not only USAID and the State Department but also the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the National Endowment for Democracy, and a host of multilateral institutions that deal with the underlying causes of localized instability and ameliorate their effects at a relatively low cost. As U.S. General John Allen recently noted, "In many respects, USAID's efforts can do as much -- over the long term -- to prevent conflict as the deterrent effect of a carrier strike group or a marine expeditionary force." Allen ought to know: he commands the 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. Upgrading the United States' national security toolbox will require reducing the size of its armed forces. In an era of relative peace and security, the U.S. military should not be the primary prism through which the country sees the world. As a fungible tool that can back up coercive threats, the U.S. military is certainly an important element of national power. However, it contributes very little to lasting solutions for 99 percent problems. And the Pentagon's enormous budget not only wastes precious resources; it also warps national security thinking and policymaking. Since the military controls the overwhelming share of the resources within the national security system, policymakers tend to perceive all challenges through the distorting lens of the armed forces and respond accordingly. This tendency is one reason the U.S. military is so big. But it is also a case of the tail wagging the dog: the vast size of the military is a major reason every challenge is seen as a threat. More than 60 years of U.S. diplomatic and military efforts have helped create a world that is freer and more secure. In the process, the United States has fostered a global environment that bolsters U.S. interests and generally accepts U.S. power and influence. The result is a world far less dangerous than ever before. The United States, in other words, has won. Now, it needs a national security strategy and an approach to foreign policy that reflect that reality.

### **Multipolarity solves war**

#### Multipolarity makes war unthinkable- deters great power aggression

**Schweller, 10** (Randall Schweller is a professor of political science at Ohio State University and received his PhD from Columbia University in international relations, “Entropy and the trajectory of world politics: why polarity has become less meaningful” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 23, Number 1, March 2010/ak)

Though rarely mentioned, system equilibrium can emerge without balancing or power-seeking behaviour. This should not come as a surprise; for we know that a Concert system existed during a multipolar phase, roughly between 1815 and1853. That system, however, arose from the ashes of war, the purpose of which was to defeat an aspiring hegemon before it rolled up the system. The current system, however, has already been ‘rolled up’ for all intents and purposes. So how could a balance of power be restored without deliberate balancing against the US? The answer is that uneven rates of growth among states seeking merely to get rich(wealth, not military power, security, or political inﬂuence over others) can produce a rough equivalence in capabilities among several states, none of which feel particularly threatened by each other or seek relative gains at the expense of one another. In other words, the major actors in the system are strictly egoistic, and they interact cooperatively, not competitively or strategically in a military sense, with each other. It is essentially an orthodox liberal world, in which international politics becomes a positive-sum game and the concept of equilibrium is, by deﬁnition, a Pareto optimal condition that no actor has an interest in changing (see Callinicos 2007, 546). Here, global equilibrium means maximum entropy. What has changed? Simply put, there is no longer an expectation of violent expansion among the great powers. Balance of power is built on the assumption not only that war is a legitimate instrument of statecraft (Jervis 1986, 60) but that states will settle their differences by ﬁghting. This expectation exercises a profound inﬂuence on the types of behaviours exhibited by states and the system as a whole (Lasswell 1965 [1935], chapter 3). It was not just the prospect of war that triggered the basic dynamics of past multipolar and bipolar systems. It was the anticipation that powerful states sought to and would, if given the right odds, carry out territorial conquests at each others’ expense that shaped and shoved actors in ways consistent with the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theory. Without the very real fear of Soviet expansion, why would bipolarity have compelled the US to adopt a grand strategy of containment and deterrence? Without the traditional expectations of great power war and conquest, why would the added complexity and uncertainty of multipolar systems make them unstable? Why would states form alliances in the ﬁrst place, much less worry about who aligns with whom? When war is unthinkable among the great powers,it is hard to see how polarity exerts the constraints predicted by structural balance of power theory. To the extent that this driving force of history is no longer in play, the system will experience increasing entropy. The current system’s ideational or social structures also seem to be pushing in the direction of greater entropy, suggesting that the world may be reaching an endpoint of sorts. This view of history is consistent with Kant’s (2005 [1795])‘perpetual peace’, Richard Rosecrance’s (1987) ‘rise of the trading state’, Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘end of history’ and, for slightly different reasons, John Ikenberry’s (2001) vision of a ‘constitutional order’ rooted in liberalism. Regarding the latter, a ‘multipolar’ constitutional order would not be all that different from the current world because: (1) constitutional orders place limits on the returns to power, so presumably a switch from unipolarity to multipolarity would not be terribly signiﬁcant; (2) the system, though multipolar, would retain the basic foundations of the American liberal order, its underlying social values would remain intact, and (3) there would be, just as today, no balancing behavior among the major powers against each other, and major power war would be virtually unthinkable. That noted, Ikenberry’s view of order is more centralized, structured and deliberate than the one I have in mind. An entropy version of Ikenberry’s order would be a watered-down, more decentralized and spontaneously generated liberal order—but one that still devalues power. Liberals are not the only ones making such claims. Several prominent realists have also acknowledged that the world has fundamentally changed to the point that, if and when unipolarity ends, we will not likely see a return to traditional great power politics among the core states. Robert Jervis (2005), for instance, stresses the unprecedented development of a Security Community among all the leading powers as the deﬁning feature of today’s world politics. The existence of this security community means not only that major power war has become unthinkable but also that bandwagoning and balancing ‘will not map on the classical form of the balance of power’ (Jervis 2005, 31). Similarly, Jonathan Kirshner (2008, 335) sees fewer prospects for great power war as a consequence of globalization. Along these lines, Fareed Zakaria (2008, 243) predicts a post-American world governed by a messy ad hoc order composed of a` la carte multilateralism and networked interactions among state and nonstate actors. The provision of international order in this future world will no longer be a matter decided solely by the political and military power held by a single hegemon or even a group of leading states.

###  **Ext.: Multipolarity Solves Warming/Air Pollution**

#### Patrick evidence says that the US ceding power is key to global cooperation on warming- that cooperation is both necessary and sufficient to solve our warming impact- also solves air pollution

Victor, Kennel and Ramanathan June 2012 (DAVID G. VICTOR is a Professor at the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego. CHARLES F. KENNEL is Distinguished Professor and Director Emeritus at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography. VEERABHADRAN RAMANATHAN is Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and Climate Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography., The Climate Threat We Can Beat, Foreign Affairs, Lexis)

As a result, total emissions of carbon dioxide, the leading long-term cause of global warming, have risen by more than 50 percent since the 1980s and are poised to rise by more than 30 percent in the next two to three decades. The ever-increasing quantity of emissions could render moot the aim that has guided international climate diplomacy for nearly a decade: preventing the global temperature from rising by more than two degrees Celsius above its preindustrial level. In fact, in the absence of significant international action, the planet is now on track to warm by at least 2.5 degrees during the current century -- and maybe even more. The known effects of this continued warming are deeply troubling: rising sea levels, a thinning Arctic icecap, extreme weather events, ocean acidification, loss of natural habitats, and many others. Perhaps even more fearsome, however, are the effects whose odds and consequences are unknown, such as the danger that melting permafrost in the Arctic could release still more gases, leading to a vicious cycle of still more warming. All these risks are rising sharply because the traditional approach to international climate diplomacy has failed. For too long, climate science and policymaking have focused almost exclusively on emissions of carbon dioxide, most of which come from burning fossil fuels. Weaning the planet off fossil fuels has proved difficult, partly because expensive and rapid shifts to new energy systems could have negative effects on the competitiveness of modern economies. What is more, carbon dioxide inconveniently remains in the atmosphere for centuries, and so even keeping carbon dioxide at current levels would require deep cuts sustained over many decades -- with economic consequences that states are unlikely to be willing to bear unless they are confident that their competitors will do the same. No permanent solution to the climate problem is feasible without tackling carbon dioxide, but the economic and geophysical realities of carbon dioxide emissions almost guarantee political gridlock. A fresh start to climate diplomacy would emphasize that carbon dioxide is not the only warming pollutant. At least 40 percent of current global warming can be blamed on four other types of pollutants: dark soot particles called black carbon, methane, lower atmospheric ozone, and industrial gases such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which are used as coolants in refrigerators. Nearly all these pollutants have life spans of just a few weeks to a decade -- much shorter than that of carbon dioxide. But although their tenure is brief, they are potent warmers. Emitting just one ton of black carbon, for example, has the same immediate effect on warming as emitting 500-2,000 tons of carbon dioxide. Because the impacts of these short-lived pollutants on the climate are severe and swift, limiting them could curb warming quickly, allowing more time for serious efforts to reduce carbon dioxide. ALIGNING INTERESTS Luckily, reducing short-lived pollutants poses fewer political hurdles than cutting carbon dioxide, for two reasons. First, existing technologies and policies, if properly applied, readily allow for deep cuts in these pollutants. Second, unlike reducing carbon dioxide, the main benefits of which arrive only after decades of costly efforts, controlling these pollutants would actually serve the immediate interests of developing countries, where pollutants such as soot and ozone damage vital crops and cause respiratory and heart diseases. A few hundred million tons of crops are lost to ozone smog every year; in India, air pollutants have decreased the production of rice by about ten million tons per year, compared with annual output in the 1980s. Globally, the inhalation of soot produced by cooking indoors already kills about two million people each year, mostly women and children living in extreme poverty. And because soot is dark, it traps heat from sunlight and thus speeds melting when it settles on mountain glaciers -- a direct threat to drinking-water supplies and agricultural lands that depend on glacier-fed river systems in China and India, such as the Ganges, the Indus, and the Yangtze. Owing to these near-term economic and public health risks, even countries that have been skittish about costly long-term efforts to regulate carbon dioxide are already proving more willing to confront short-lived pollutants. A plan to reduce short-lived pollutants would align the self-interests of the three largest polluting nations: China, India, and the United States, all of which have conspicuously failed to do much about climate change. It would also engage Europe, which has long been committed to the Kyoto Protocol but has struggled to find willing partners. The United States and a few other countries are in the early stages of building a coalition to address short-lived pollutants; China and India must find constructive ways to join. Limiting these pollutants could cut the pace of climate change in half over the next few decades. Visible success in fighting them would also restore credibility to climate-change diplomacy, which is essential for progress on the more daunting task of limiting carbon dioxide. And taken together, immediate action on short-lived pollutants and serious efforts to control carbon dioxide could achieve the goal of stopping warming at two degrees -- just barely. Still, even those combined efforts cannot reverse the warming that will inevitably occur. Thus, all countries will need to adapt to some of the effects of climate change, especially poorer countries whose economies depend heavily on agriculture and other industries that are especially sensitive to the climate. International cooperation can help these places adapt, but not principally through targets set by diplomats in New York and Geneva, or through the kinds of large-scale, expensive projects directed by wealthy countries and international organizations that have been the mainstay of climate diplomacy to date. Instead, effective adaptation will require bottom-up institution building at the local level to engage people on the frontlines of climate change, such as city planners responding to the risk of rising seas and agricultural ministries helping farmers anticipate how a changing climate will affect their crops. The next era of climate diplomacy should revolve around connecting international experts to those local officials, so that information about best practices can spread more readily.

### **Hegemony causes war**

Hegemony and increases in military power result in backlash

Fiammenghi 11 (Davide, postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Politics, Institutions, History at the University of Bologna. “The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics,” International Security, Spring 2011.) http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00037/vs)

Beyond a certain point, the gains that a state accrues from further increases in its power will start to diminish. This result stems from a structural disequilibrium between allied relations, on the one hand, and relations with enemies and neutrals, on the other. When the state’s coalition is able to effectively discourage aggression, its allies and that further increases in its power become gradually less useful. Meanwhile, the control that the major partner exercises over its allies becomes stronger. At some point, the game is no longer worth the candle for the allies: the threat posed by their enemies is relatively less significant than the threat of growing control posed by their major partner. In the meantime, neutral states begin to reflect on the costs of their neutrality, especially if one side should defeat the other, leaving them with little choice but submission. Further increases in the major partner’s power will exacerbate differences with its allies, and some will leave the alliance. The flow of defectors encourages the major power’s rivals, which acquire new energy. Neutral states realize that the moment has come to take sides. The situation eventually reaches a tipping point, where further increases in the major state’s relative power no longer compensate for the defection of its allies and the mobilization of neutral states into the enemy coalition. Further increases tilt the balance in favor of the major power’s rivals, leaving the aspiring hegemon less secure than before. A parabola nicely illustrates the relationship between power and security that I have just described. The apex of the parabola corresponds to an implicit concept in realist balance of power theory: the security threshold. This threshold represents the maximum amount of power a state can accumulate before further increases begin to reduce its security. The security threshold corresponds to the quantity of power that Waltz calls “appropriate” for a state to be secure in an anarchic international system. The concept of balancing necessarily implies that there is a maximum amount of power that a state can accumulate to achieve maximum security. Beyond that threshold, power maximization and security maximization become incompatible goals. Classical realists did not make this point explicitly, because they thought in terms of absolute, not relative, power.30 Obviously, there is no amount of absolute power that can guarantee a state’s security once and for all. The concept must be understood in a relative sense, so that it can accommodate the evolution of technology and the eventuality that an arms race could frustrate a state’s expansionist efforts.

#### Unipolarity doesn’t deter conflict, it increases entropy- multipolarity stabilizes the world

**Schweller, 10** (Randall Schweller is a professor of political science at Ohio State University and received his PhD from Columbia University in international relations, “Entropy and the trajectory of world politics: why polarity has become less meaningful” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 23, Number 1, March 2010/ak)

Consistent with entropy, unipolar dynamics are random because the structure neither constrains the choices of the unipole nor solely determines the degree of constraints on anyone else. Boundless freedom breeds randomness. Thus, the idiosyncratic beliefs of unconstrained US leaders tell us far more about recent American foreign policy choices than the structure of the international system. Moreover and as mentioned, unipolar systems have less glue to hold things together than other international structures. This is because, while capabilities are concentrated under unipolarity, power and threats are diffused throughout thesystem.7 Global politics matter only for the unipolar power, the sole actor with global reach and interests. For everyone else, all politics are local. Borrowing an old term from Morton Kaplan (1957), unipolarity is essentially subsystem dominant: regional subsystems follow their own logic and that is where the action is. Conversely, in multipolar and bipolar systems, the poles form a ruling oligarchy, interacting with each other in fairly predictable ways; for example, balancing each other through arms and allies, controlling regions through spheres of inﬂuence arrangements etc. This produces predictable state behaviours and system dynamics that govern the overall workings of international politics. This predictability can be seen in Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) notions of emulation and socialization—two processes that generate uniformity of the units and their behaviours through positive feedback mechanisms. What Waltz does not consider (but Robert Gilpin 1981 does) are the returns to scale, clustering of innovation and other processes that tend to whittle down the number of poles until only one remains standing. So far this process, which curiously began around the turn of the last century when international politics became a closed system, has worked in only one direction: from many poles to two poles to one pole. It remains to be seen whether this process can be reversed. Is this entropy? Does unipolarity represent a stable and permanent loss of variation in the system? Perhaps. If so, than the current unipolar world is even more stable than William Wohlforth (1999) realizes. As Iwill argue below, however, I believe that maximum entropy (ﬁnal equilibrium)will be reached when power capabilities diffuse to other actors and none has any incentive to move from this condition; that is, when there is equal energy among the primary units of the system (the poles). At this point, the system will have reached a very unique form of multipolarity—one that has never been seen before but whose arrival has been predicted

since the early 18th century.

#### Unipolarity doesn’t breed peace- it creates incentives for war

**Monteiro, 11** (Nuno P Monteiro is a professor of political science at Yale University and received his PhD in political science from the University of Chicago, "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful" in January 2011, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 9–40 from www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00064/vs,ak)

In contrast, the question of unipolar peacefulness has received virtually no attention. Although the past decade has witnessed a resurgence of security studies, with much scholarship on such conflict-generating issues as terrorism, preventive war, military occupation, insurgency, and nuclear proliferation, no one has systematically connected any of them to unipolarity. This silence is unjustified. The first two decades of the unipolar era have been anything but peaceful. U.S. forces have been deployed in four interstate wars: Kuwait in 1991, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan from 2001 to the present, and Iraq between 2003 and 2010. 22 In all, the United States has been at war for thirteen of the twenty-two years since the end of the Cold War. 23 Put another way, the first two decades of unipolarity, which make up less than 10 percent of U.S. history, account for more than 25 percent of the nation’s total time at war. 24 And yet, the theoretical consensus continues to be that unipolarity encourages peace. Why? To date, scholars do not have a theory of how unipolar systems operate. 25 The debate on whether, when, and how unipolarity will end (i.e., the debate on durability) has all but monopolized our attention. In this article, I provide a theory of unipolarity that focuses on the issue of unipolar peacefulness rather than durability. I argue that unipolarity creates significant conflict producing mechanisms that are likely to involve the unipole itself. Rather than assess the relative peacefulness of unipolarity vis-à-vis bipolar or multipolar systems, I identify causal pathways to war that are characteristic of a unipolar system and that have not been developed in the extant literature. To be sure, I do not question the impossibility of great power war in a unipolar world. Instead, I show how unipolar systems provide incentives for two other types of war: those pitting the sole great power against another state and those involving exclusively other states. In addition, I show that the type of conflict that occurs in a unipolar world depends on the strategy of the sole great power, of which there are three. The first two—defensive and offensive dominance—will lead to conflicts pitting the sole great power against other states. The third—disengagement—will lead to conflicts among other states. Furthermore, whereas the unipole is likely to enter unipolarity implementing a dominance strategy, over time it is possible that it will shift to disengagement. I support my theory with several empirical examples. These do not aim at systematically testing my argument, for two reasons. First, the unipolar era is too short a period to test structural mechanisms. Second, the United States has consistently implemented a strategy of dominance, limiting opportunities to test my claims on the consequences of disengagement. 26 The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. In the first section, I define the key terms used in my theory. In the second section, I review the literature on unipolarity and peace. In the third section, I lay out my theory. The next three sections discuss the three strategies of defensive dominance, offensive dominance, and disengagement and show how each can produce conflict. In the conclusion, I discuss implications for theory and policy

#### Unipolarity makes war four times more likely- statistical analyses proves

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How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity. Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is by far the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent—or more than four times higher. 47 These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful. In sum, the argument that unipolarity makes for peace is heavily weighted toward interactions among the most powerful states in the system. This should come as no surprise given that Wohlforth makes a structural argument: peace flows from the unipolar structure of international politics, not from any particular characteristic of the unipole. 49 Structural analyses of the international system are usually centered on interactions between great powers. 50 As Waltz writes, “The theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era.” 51 In the sections that follow, however, I show that in the case of unipolarity, an investigation of its peacefulness must consider potential causes of conflict beyond interactions between the most important states in the system.

### War against minor powers scenario

#### Hegemony increases the risk of war against minor powers

**Monteiro, 11** (Nuno P Monteiro is a professor of political science at Yale University and received his PhD in political science from the University of Chicago, "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful" in January 2011, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12), pp. 9–40 from www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00064/ak)

In this section, I analyze how the unipole’s strategic choices—defensive dominance, offensive dominance, or disengagement—can trigger conflict producing mechanisms between the unipole and other states, or among the latter. I take the distribution of power between the unipole and major powers as fixed. The ways in which unipolarity may be transformed into either a bipolar or a multipolar order, which may or may not lead to conflict, are beyond the scope of my argument. So are the ways in which the unipole may increase its power preponderance and become a global hegemon or an empire. Thus, my theory lays out how each of the unipole’s grand strategic choices produces conflict in the context of a unipolar structure that is at least somewhat durable. Specifically, I show how, in addition to wars between major and minor powers and to wars among the latter, two other types of war are likely to be prevalent in a unipolar world. First, and resulting from either of the dominance strategies, are wars pitting the sole great power against minor powers. Second, and stemming from a disengagement strategy, are major power wars. My theory explores the different mechanisms leading to each type of war. My theory therefore differs from Wohlforth’s in two key aspects. First, Wohlforth believes that power preponderance in a unipolar system is so marked that the expected costs of balancing are always prohibitive. Consequently, every state in the system will bandwagon with the unipole, making it impossible for the latter to be involved in wars. In contrast, I show that some states face lower costs of balancing relative to bandwagoning. They are therefore more likely to become recalcitrant minor powers, with whom the sole great power is likely to go to war even when implementing a defensive dominance strategy. Second, Wohlforth assumes that the unipole will always implement a strategy of defensive dominance: it will not engage in offensive revisionism, nor will it disengage from the world. I show how both offensive dominance and disengagement are plausible strategic options for the unipole and then extrapolate the types of conflict that each is likely to produce. Specifically, offensive dominance (like its defensive variant) is likely to pit the unipole against recalcitrant minor powers. Disengagement, for its part, brings with it the possibility of wars between major powers. The basic intuition behind my argument is straightforward. In bipolarity and multipolarity, alliance blocs allow disputes involving minor powers to be aggregated into broader great-power tensions. A dispute involving a great power and a lesser state tends to provoke a response by the latter’s great power sponsor, producing a confrontation between two great powers. 52 Likewise, disputes between lesser states often elicit the intervention of each side’s great power ally, again resulting in great power confrontation. These aggregation mechanisms, however, are not possible in unipolarity because there is no potential great power sponsor for a state threatened by the unipole—or by another state aligned with it. Thus, although unipolarity dampens great power competition, it produces competition between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers and, when the unipole disengages from the world, among major and minor powers.

#### **Unipolarity causes minor powers to proliferate and challenge hegemony**

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In an international system with more than one great power, recalcitrant minor powers would, in principle, be able to balance externally by finding a great power sponsor. In unipolarity, however, no such sponsors exist. 71 Only major powers are available, but because their survival is already guaranteed, they are likely to accommodate the unipole. And even if some do not, they are unlikely to meet a recalcitrant minor power’s security needs given that they possess only limited power-projection capabilities. 72 As such, recalcitrant minor powers must defend themselves, which puts them in a position of extreme self help. There are four characteristics common to states in this position: (1) anarchy, (2) uncertainty about other states’ intentions, (3) insufficient capabilities to deter a great power, and (4) no potential great power sponsor with whom to form a balancing coalition. The first two characteristics are common to all states in all types of polarity. The third is part of the rough-and-tumble of minor powers in any system. The fourth, however, is unique to recalcitrant minor powers in unipolarity. This dire situation places recalcitrant minor powers at risk for as long as they lack the capability to defend themselves. They depend on the goodwill of the unipole and must worry that the unipole will shift to a strategy of offensive dominance or disengagement. Recalcitrant minor powers will therefore attempt to bolster their capabilities through internal balancing. To deter an eventual attack by the unipole and bolster their chances of survival in the event deterrence fails, recalcitrant minor powers will attempt to reinforce their conventional defenses, develop the most effective asymmetric strategies possible, and, most likely in the nuclear age, try to acquire the ultimate deterrent—survivable nuclear weapons. 73 In so doing, they seek to become major powers.

#### **This incentivizes other minor powers to counterbalance- prolif spills over**

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Regardless of the causal path, a war between the unipole and a recalcitrant minor power creates a precedent for other recalcitrant minor powers to boost their own capabilities. Depending on the unipole’s overall capabilities—that is, whether it can launch a second simultaneous conflict—it may also induce other recalcitrant minor powers to accelerate their balancing process. Thus, a war against a recalcitrant minor power presents other such states with greater incentives for, and (under certain conditions) higher prospects of, assuring their survival by acquiring the necessary capabilities, including nuclear weapons.

#### **Wars against minor powers escalate to maj0r power wars**

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At the same time, and depending on the magnitude of the unipole’s power preponderance, a war against a recalcitrant minor power creates an opportunity for wars among major and minor powers—including major power wars. To the extent that the unipole’s power preponderance is limited by its engagement in the first war, its ability to manage confrontations between other states elsewhere is curtailed, increasing the chances that these will erupt into military conflicts. Therefore, even when the unipole is engaged, war remains a possibility.

#### **War between minor powers escalates**

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By putting recalcitrant minor powers in a position of extreme-self help, an offensive-dominance strategy triggers two pathways to conflict. In both cases, a deterrence breakdown leads to a preventive war. Following the first pathway: the unipole makes revisionist demands that recalcitrant minor powers are unlikely to accept peacefully, because these pose a threat to their survival. Given its preponderance of power, the unipole may decide to go to war. The second causal pathway follows a slightly more complex logic. Like its defensive version, a strategy of offensive dominance provides strong incentives for recalcitrant minor powers to balance internally. These attempts to bolster their relative power, however, are likely to lead to war with the unipole before the recalcitrant power is able to acquire additional capabilities. The reason for this outcome is that the unipole will oppose any attempt by minor powers to revise the status quo in a way that is detrimental to its interests. In addition, wars pitting a recalcitrant minor power against a unipole implementing a strategy of offensive dominance have two effects common to defensive dominance. First, they encourage other recalcitrant minor powers to redouble their balancing efforts. Second, they may make room for wars among major and minor powers.

### **Dollar Decline Scenario**

#### **The dollar is declining like crazy-**

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China’s rise is one powerful indicator of America’s relative decline. The United States’ mounting economic and ﬁscal problems—evidenced in summer 2011 by the debt ceiling debacle and Standard & Poors’ downgrading of US Treasury bonds—are another. There are two closely interconnected aspects of the United States’ domestic difﬁculties that merit special attention: the spiraling US national debt and deepening doubts about the dollar’s future role as the international economy’s reserve currency. Between now and 2025, the looming debt and dollar crises almost certainly will compel the United States to retrench strategically, and to begin scaling back its overseas military commitments. The causes of the looming US ﬁscal crisis are complex. For understanding, a good starting point is the late political scientist Arnold Wolfers’ observation that modern great powers must be both national security states and welfare states (Wolfers 1952). States must provide both guns—the military capabilities needed to defend and advance their external interests—and butter, ensuring prosperity and supplying needed public goods (education, health care, pensions). Since World War II, the United States has pretty much been able to avoid making difﬁcult ‘‘guns or butter’’ decisions precisely because of its hegemonic role in the international economy. The dollar’s role as the international system’s reserve currency allows the United States to live beyond its means in ways that other nations cannot. As long as others believe that the United States will repay its debts, and that uncontrollable inﬂation will not dilute the dollar’s value, the United States can ﬁnance its external ambitions (‘‘guns’’) and domestic social and economic programs (‘‘butter’’) by borrowing money from foreigners. As Figure 4 shows, this is what the United States has had to do since the early 1980s when it started running a chronic current account deﬁcit. As Figure 5 illustrates, the majority of US government debt is owed to foreign, not domestic, investors, and China is the United States government’s largest creditor. Following the Great Recession, it has become increasingly apparent that unless dramatic measures to reign-in federal spending are implemented, by the end of this decade there will be serious questions about the United States’ ability to repay its debts and control inﬂation. 8 The causes of mounting US indebtedness are many. One is the Great Recession, which caused the Obama administration and the Federal Reserve to inject a massive amount of dollars into the economy, in the form of stimulus spending, bail-outs, and ‘‘quantitative easing,’’ to avert a replay of the Great Depression of the 1930s. A longer-term cause is the mounting costs of entitlement programs like Medicare, Social Security, and Medicaid—costs which will escalate because of the aging of the ‘‘Baby Boomer’’ generation. Another factor is the cost of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been ﬁnanced by borrowing from abroad rather than raising taxes to pay for them. These wars have been expensive. Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel laureate in economics, and his coauthor Linda Bilmess have calculated that the ultimate direct and indirect costs of the Iraq war will amount to $3 trillion (Stiglitz and Bilmiss 2008). No similar study has as yet been done of the Afghanistan war’s costs. However, the United States currently is expending about $110–120 billion annually to ﬁght there, and ﬁscal considerations played a major role in the Obama administration’s decision to begin drawing down US forces in Afghanistan (Woodward 2010; Cooper 2011). Because of the combined costs of federal government expenditures—on stimulus, defense, Iraq and Afghanistan, and entitlements—in 2009 the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce forecast that the United States will run unsustainable annual budget deﬁcits of $1 trillion or more until at least the end of this decade, and observed that, ‘‘Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt⁄GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable ﬁscal problem’’ (CBO 2009:13). In a subsequent 2010 report, the CBO noted that if the United States stays on its current ﬁscal trajectory, the ratio of US government debt to GDP will be 100% by 2020 (CBO 2010). Economists regard a 100% debt-to-GDP ratio as critical indicator that a state will default on its ﬁnancial obligations. In an even less sanguine 2011 analysis, the International Monetary Fund forecast that the United States will hit the 100% debt-to-GDP ratio in 2016 (IMF 2011). If these estimates are correct, over the next decade the growing US national debt—and the budget deﬁcits that fuel it—could imperil the dollar by undermining foreign investors’ conﬁdence in the United States’ ability to repay its debts and keep inﬂation in check. This is important because, for the foreseeable future, the United States will depend on capital inﬂows from abroad both to ﬁnance its deﬁcit spending and private consumption and to maintain the dollar’s position as the international economic system’s reserve currency.

#### **That decline ensures your impacts – cant finance the military**

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America’s geopolitical preeminence hinges on the dollar’s reserve currency role. If the dollar loses that status, US hegemony will literally be unaffordable. The dollar’s reserve currency status has, in effect, been a very special kind of ‘‘credit card.’’ It is special because the United States does not have to earn the money to pay its bills. Rather, when the bills come due, the United States borrows funds from abroad and⁄ or prints money to pay them. The United States can get away with this and live beyond its means, spending with little restraint on maintaining its military dominance, preserving costly domestic entitlements, and indulging in conspicuous private consumption, as long as foreigners are willing to lend it money (primarily by purchasing Treasury bonds). Without the use of the ‘‘credit card’’ provided by the dollar’s reserve currency status, the United States would have to pay for its extravagant external and internal ambitions by raising taxes and interest rates, and by consuming less and saving more; or, tightening its belt and dramatically reducing its military and domestic expenditures. In other words, the United States would have to learn to live within its means. 9 As a leading expert on international economic affairs observed just before the Great Recession kicked in, the dollar’s vulnerability ‘‘presents potentially signiﬁcant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance’’ (Kirshner 2008).

#### China’s replacement of the dollar inevitable- just a question of when

**Layne, 12** (Christopher Layne is a professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. Professor Layne has written two books and he has contributed extensively to the debates about international relations theory and American foreign policy in such scholarly and policy journals as *International Security*, *International History Review*, *Security Studies*, *Journal of Strategic Studies*,*The National Interest*, *Foreign Policy*, *The Washington Quarterly*, *World Policy Journal*, and *Orbis*. Professor Layne has been a frequent contributor to *The Atlantic*,*The New Republic*, *The Nation*, *Financial Times*, *New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times*,*Washington Post*, and the *Australian*. He also is a contributing editor for *The American Conservative*. He has a PhD in political science from Berkeley, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana, International Studies Quarterly 1-11, ak)

Although doubts about the dollar’s long-term health predated the Great Recession, the events of 2007–2009 have ampliﬁed them in two key respects (Helleiner 2008; Kirshner 2008). First, the other big players in the international economy now are either geopolitical rivals like China or ambiguous ‘‘allies’’ like Europe, which has its own ambitions and no longer requires US protection from the now vanished Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China, which has vast holdings of American assets (more than $2 trillion), is worried that America’s ﬁscal incontinence will leave Beijing holding the bag with huge amounts of depreciated dollars. China’s vote of no conﬁdence in the dollar’s future is reﬂected in its calls to create a new reserve currency to replace the dollar, the renminbi’s gradual ‘‘internationalization,’’ and in the lectures China’s leaders regularly deliver telling Washington to get its ﬁscal house in order. Alarm bells about the dollar’s uncertain status now are ringing. In April 2011, Standard & Poor’s warned that in the coming years there is a one-in-three chance that the United States’ triple A credit rating could be reduced if Washington fails to solve the ﬁscal crisis—and in August 2011 S& P did downgrade the US credit rating to AA. In June 2011, the IMF said that unless the United States enacts a credible plan to reign in its annual deﬁcits and accumulating national debt, it could face a sovereign risk crisis in the next several years. In a May 2011 report, the World Bank declared that the dollar probably will lose its status as the primary reserve currency by 2025 (World Bank 2011).

### Econ

#### Defense spending kills the economy – efficiency, growth, jobs

Baker, 09 - co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). He is the author of Plunder and Blunder: The Rise and Fall of the Bubble Economy (Dean, “Massive Defense Spending Leads to Job Loss,” 11/10/09, http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/defense-spending-job-loss/)

For example, defense spending means that the government is pulling away resources from the uses determined by the market and instead using them to buy weapons and supplies and to pay for soldiers and other military personnel. In standard economic models, defense spending is a direct drain on the economy, reducing efficiency, slowing growth and costing jobs. A few years ago, the Center for Economic and Policy Research commissioned Global Insight, one of the leading economic modeling firms, to project the impact of a sustained increase in defense spending equal to 1.0 percentage point of GDP. This was roughly equal to the cost of the Iraq War. Global Insight’s model projected that after 20 years the economy would be about 0.6 percentage points smaller as a result of the additional defense spending. Slower growth would imply a loss of almost 700,000 jobs compared to a situation in which defense spending had not been increased. Construction and manufacturing were especially big job losers in the projections, losing 210,000 and 90,000 jobs, respectively. The scenario we asked Global Insight to model turned out to have vastly underestimated the increase in defense spending associated with current policy. In the most recent quarter, defense spending was equal to 5.6 percent of GDP. By comparison, before the September 11th attacks, the Congressional Budget Office projected that defense spending in 2009 would be equal to just 2.4 percent of GDP. Our post-September 11th build-up was equal to 3.2 percentage points of GDP compared to the pre-attack baseline. This means that the Global Insight projections of job loss are far too low. The impact of higher spending will not be directly proportionate in these economic models. In fact, it should be somewhat more than proportionate, but if we just multiple the Global Insight projections by 3, we would see that the long-term impact of our increased defense spending will be a reduction in GDP of 1.8 percentage points. This would correspond to roughly $250 billion in the current economy, or about $800 in lost output for every person in the country. The projected job loss from this increase in defense spending would be close to 2 million. In other words, the standard economic models that project job loss from efforts to stem global warming also project that the increase in defense spending since 2000 will cost the economy close to 2 million jobs in the long run.

#### Hegemony causes economic collapse – current economic crisis proves

Eland, 9 – Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute, Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, B.A. Iowa State University, M.B.A. in Economics and Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Washington University, (Ivan, The Independent Institute, “How the U.S. Empire Contributed to the Economic Crisis”, May 11th, http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2498)

A few—and only a few—prescient commentators have questioned whether the U.S. can sustain its informal global empire in the wake of the most severe economic crisis since World War II. And the simultaneous quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan are leading more and more opinion leaders and taxpayers to this question. But the U.S. Empire helped cause the meltdown in the first place. War has a history of causing financial and economic calamities. It does so directly by almost always causing inflation—that is, too much money chasing too few goods. During wartime, governments usually commandeer resources from the private sector into the government realm to fund the fighting. This action leaves shortages of resources to make consumer goods and their components, therefore pushing prices up. Making things worse, governments often times print money to fund the war, thus adding to the amount of money chasing the smaller number of consumer goods. Such “make-believe” wealth has funded many U.S. wars. For example, the War of 1812 had two negative effects on the U.S. financial system. First, in 1814, the federal government allowed state-chartered banks to suspend payment in gold and silver to their depositors. In other words, according Tom J. DiLorenzo in Hamilton’s Curse, the banks did not have to hold sufficient gold and silver reserves to cover their loans. This policy allowed the banks to loan the federal government more money to fight the war. The result was an annual inflation rate of 55 percent in some U.S. cities. The government took this route of expanding credit during wartime because no U.S. central bank existed at the time. Congress, correctly questioning The Bank of the United States’ constitutionality, had not renewed its charter upon expiration in 1811. But the financial turmoil caused by the war led to a second pernicious effect on the financial system—the resurrection of the bank in 1817 in the form of the Second Bank of the United States. Like the first bank and all other government central banks in the future, the second bank flooded the market with new credit. In 1818, this led to excessive real estate speculation and a consequent bubble. The bubble burst during the Panic of 1819, which was the first recession in the nation’s history. Sound familiar? Although President Andrew Jackson got rid of the second bank in the 1830s and the U.S. economy generally flourished with a freer banking system until 1913, at that time yet another central bank—this time the Federal Reserve System—rose from the ashes. We have seen that war ultimately causes the creation of both economic problems and nefarious government financial institutions that cause those difficulties. And of course, the modern day U.S. Empire also creates such economic maladies and wars that allow those institutions to wreak havoc on the economy. The Fed caused the current collapse in the real estate credit market, which has led to a more general global financial and economic meltdown, by earlier flooding the market with excess credit. That money went into real estate, thus creating an artificial bubble that eventually came crashing down in 2008. But what caused the Fed to vastly expand credit? To prevent a potential economic calamity after 9/11 and soothe jitters surrounding the risky and unneeded U.S. invasion of Iraq, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan began a series of interest rate cuts that vastly increased the money supply. According to Thomas E. Woods, Jr. in Meltdown, the interest rate cuts culminated in the extraordinary policy of lowering the federal funds rate (the rate at which banks lend to one another overnight, which usually determines other interest rates) to only one percent for an entire year (from June 2003 to June 2004). Woods notes that more money was created between 2000 and 2007 than in the rest of U.S. history. Much of this excess money ended up creating the real estate bubble that eventually caused the meltdown. Ben Bernanke, then a Fed governor, was an ardent advocate of this easy money policy, which as Fed Chairman he has continued as his solution to an economic crisis he helped create using the same measures. Of course, according to Osama bin Laden, the primary reasons for the 9/11 attacks were U.S. occupation of Muslim lands and U.S. propping up of corrupt dictators there. And the invasion of Iraq was totally unnecessary because there was never any connection between al Qaeda or the 9/11 attacks and Saddam Hussein, and even if Saddam had had biological, chemical, or even nuclear weapons, the massive U.S. nuclear arsenal would have likely deterred him from using them on the United States. So the causal arrow goes from these imperial behaviors—and blowback there from—to increases in the money supply to prevent related economic slowdown, which in turn caused even worse eventual financial and economic calamities. These may be indirect effects of empire, but they cannot be ignored. Get rid of the overseas empire because we can no longer afford it, especially when it is partly responsible for the economic distress that is making us poorer

### Prolif

#### Heg cause prolif – multipolarity will solve it

Weber et al 07 Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of California-Berkeley (Steven with Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, and Ely Ratner, Ph.D. Candidates at the University of California-Berkeley and Research Fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center, [“How Globalization Went Bad,” Foreign Policy, Issue 158, January/February,)

Axiom 3 is a story about the preferred strategies of the weak. It's a basic insight of international relations that states try to balance power. They protect themselves by joining groups that can hold a hegemonic threat at bay. But what if there is no viable group to join? In today's unipolar world, every nation from Venezuela to North Korea is looking for a way to constrain American power. But in the unipolar world, it's harder for states to join together to do that. So they turn to other means. They play a different game. Hamas, Iran, Somalia, North Korea, and Venezuela are not going to become allies anytime soon. Each is better off finding other ways to make life more difficult for Washington. Going nuclear is one way. Counterfeiting U.S. currency is another. Raising uncertainty about oil supplies is perhaps the most obvious method of all. Here's the important downside of unipolar globalization. In a world with multiple great powers, many of these threats would be less troublesome. The relatively weak states would have a choice among potential partners with which to ally, enhancing their influence. Without that more attractive choice, facilitating the dark side of globalization becomes the most effective means of constraining American power. SHARING GLOBALIZATION'S BURDEN The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United States is bearing most of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. There's effectively a market out there for proliferation, with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand, to the detriment of U.S. national security. It has become fashionable, in the wake of the Iraq war, to comment on the limits of conventional military force. But much of this analysis is overblown. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. But that doesn't matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. In Tehran, Pyongyang, and many other capitals, including Beijing, the bottom line is simple: The U.S. military could, with conventional force, end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. No country in the world can dream of challenging U.S. conventional military power. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. Before 1989, states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union's nuclear umbrella for protection. Now, they turn to people like A.Q. Khan. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. Today, it is fast becoming a necessity. North Korea is the clearest example. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. North Korea was surrounded by feuding, nuclear armed communist neighbors, it was officially at war with its southern neighbor, and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U.S. troops on its border. But, for 40 years, North Korea didn't seek nuclear weapons. It didn't need to, because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Within five years of the Soviet collapse, however, Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. North Korea's founder, Kim II Sung, barely flinched when former U.S. President Bill Clinton's administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. That brinkmanship paid off. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power, and Kim's son rules the country with an iron fist. America's conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Saddam Hussein's great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. How would things be different in a multipolar world? For starters, great powers could split the job of policing proliferation, and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases. It's often forgotten now that, during the Cold War, the only state 'with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one— nuclear weapons. Moscow simply wouldn't permit it. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran, but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. And the Russians are aiding Iran's nuclear ambitions. When push comes to shove, nonproliferation today is almost entirely America's burden.

#### Proliferation leads to nuclear war

Utgoff 02, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses., Survival, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 85–102 “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions”

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

###  Ext.: Prolif

#### Heg doesn’t solve prolif- US can only create security dilemmas that cause prolif- only cooperation in a multipolar world solves

Zbigniew Brzezinski (formerly President Carter’s National Security Advisor, counselor and trustee at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and professor of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies @ Johns Hopkins University) 2007 “Second Chance” p 103

The failure to contain nuclear proliferation in the Far East and in South Asia conveyed a sobering lesson. Short of a unilateral military action--with all its unpredictable consequences—even the world's only superpower could not by itself dissuade a country firmly determined to acquire nuclear weapons. A successful preventive effort would have required an early concentration of attention on the issue, determined and coordinated mobilization of other concerned states, and early formulation of a program including both incentives, self-restraint and costly consequences for continued pursuit of nuclear weapons. In the early, heady days of American unilateral supremacy, it was easy to ignore incipient proliferation in the belief that an intimidating response by the United States would eventually suffice to halt it. The lesson bequeathed to the Clinton administration's successor was that even given the great asymmetry of power between the United States and any would-be proliferator, the only alternative to sear was genuine international cooperation, mounted on at least a regional basis, at an early stage of the nuclear challenge.

#### Hegemony incentivizes subordinate actors to counter balance against us- causes terror, prolif and makes war inevitable

**Schweller, 10** (Randall Schweller is a professor of political science at Ohio State University and received his PhD from Columbia University in international relations, “Entropy and the trajectory of world politics: why polarity has become less meaningful” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 23, Number 1, March 2010/ak)

In addition to competing visions of global order (the discourse of resistance),subordinate actors may adopt ‘cost-imposing’ strategies (the practice of resistance)vis-a`-vis the unipolar power that fall short of balancing against it.8 There are many ways that states (weak ones included) and even non states can impose costs on a unipolar power—ranging from the mere withdrawal of goodwill to actual attacks on its soil.9 In the current world, cost-imposing strategies include diplomatic friction; foot-dragging;10 blackmail; denying US military forces access to bases;11terrorist attacks against the US; aiding, abetting and harbouring terrorist groups;voting against the US in international institutions; preventing or reversing the forward-basing of US military forces; protectionism and other coercive economic policies; conventional uses of force such as a blockade against US allies;12 threats to pivotal states that affect regional and international security (see Chase et al1996); and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among anti-Western states or groups. The important point here is that states need not catch up with the hegemon in order to impose costs on its actions, to make its life miserable (seeChristensen 2001).

### Terrorism

#### Heg causes terrorism

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(Christopher “The Peace of Illusions” (p. 190-191)

The events of 9/11 are another example of how hegemony makes the United States less secure than it would be if it followed an offshore balancing strategy. Terrorism, the RAND Corporation terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman says, is "about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and use of power to achieve political change."86 If we step back for a moment from our horror and revulsion at the events of September 11, we can see that the attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the United States by its adversaries to advance their political objectives. As Clausewitz observed, "War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object."88 September 11 represented a violent counterreaction to America's geopolitical-and cultural-hegemony. As the strategy expert Richard K. Betts presciently observed in a 1998 Foreign Affairs article: It is 'hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the United States had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam.89 U.S. hegemony fuels terrorist groups like al Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamentalism, which is a form of "blowback" against America's preponderance and its world role.90 As long as the United States maintains its global hegemony-and its concomitant preeminence in regions like the Persian Gulf-it will be the target of politically motivated terrorist groups like al Qaeda. After 9/11, many foreign policy analysts and pundits asked the question, "Why do they hate us?" This question missed the key point. No doubt, there are Islamic fundamentalists who do "hate" the United States for cultural, religious, and ideological reasons. And even leaving aside American neoconservatives' obvious relish for making it so, to some extent the war on terror inescapably has overtones of a "clash of civilizations:' Still, this isn't-and should not be allowed to become-a replay of the Crusades. Fundamentally 9/11 was about geopolitics, specifically about U.S. hegemony. The United States may be greatly reviled in some quarters of the Islamic world, but were the United States not so intimately involved in the affairs of the Middle East, it's hardly likely that this detestation would have manifested itself in something like 9/11. As Michael Scheurer, who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, puts it, "One of the greatest dangers for Americans in deciding how to confront the Islamist threat lies in continuing to believe-at the urging of senior U.S. leaders-that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think, rather than for what we do."91 It is American policies-to be precise, American hegemony-that make the United States a lightning rod for Muslim anger

#### Terrorism Causes Extinction

Sid-Ahmed, political analyst 04 (Mohamed, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, “Extinction!” August 26-September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers

###  Ext. Terrorism

#### US Heg causes interventionism, inflaming terrorism.

Layne 5-10-10(Christopher, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1995-1996, *Graceful Decline* http://amconmag.com/article/2010/may/01/00030/, 7/13/10)

With respect to Islamic terrorism, we need to keep our priorities straight. Terrorism is not the most pressing national-security threat facing the United States. Great powers can be defeated only by other great powers—not by nonstate terrorists or by minor powers. The U.S. needs to be careful not to pay more attention to Islamic terrorists than to emerging great powers. Here the Obama administration and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates are getting it wrong. Although many in the U.S. foreign-policy community—especially the counterinsurgency lobby, based at the Center for a New American Security, and the American Enterprise Institute—call for the U.S. to “win” the war on terror, there can be no decisive victory over terrorism. The trick is finding the right strategy to minimize its effects on American security. The strategy of the Bush and Obama administrations—invading and occupying Iraq and Afghanistan—is exactly the wrong approach. The U.S. is bad at counterinsurgency. Foreign occupying powers seldom are good at it, which is the main reason big powers usually lose these kinds of small wars. The U.S. also is not good at nation-building. Rather than quelling terrorism, a long-term foreign military presence in places like Iraq and Afghanistan inflames nationalism and anti-Americanism.

#### Terrorists aren’t deterred by military power because it falls out of asymmetric power calculations

Eland 08 senior fellow at the Independent Institute

(ivan, Mediterranean Quarterly Volume 19, Number 3, Summer 2008, Back to the Future: Rediscovering America’s Foreign Policy Traditions

During the Cold War, at least a plausible argument could be made for some [End Page 94] US intervention overseas to counter Soviet encroachment. But the Cold War is long over, the Soviet rival is in the dustbin of history, and the gains from interventionism have been drastically reduced while the costs have skyrocketed. The only type of attack that cannot be deterred by the US nuclear arsenal is that from terrorists — as was demonstrated on 9/11. Retaliation for US interventionism in the Arab-Muslim world is al Qaeda’s primary motive for attacking the United States. Specifically, Osama bin Laden’s biggest gripes are with US — that is, non-Muslim — occupation of Muslim lands and meddling in their politics by supporting corrupt dictators and Israel. Because conventional and nuclear military power have very little utility in stopping terrorist attacks and because the United States has an open society, with thousands of miles of borders and many possible targets, homeland security efforts will likely have only limited effect. Naturally, in the short term, the utmost effort should be made to capture or kill bin Laden and eradicate al Qaeda, but in the long term the only way to effectively deal with anti – United States terrorism is to reduce the motivation of terrorists to attack America in the first place. Poll after poll in the Muslim world indicates that Muslims like US political and economic freedoms, technology, and even culture but hate US meddling in their world. Thus, practicing military restraint, rather than interventionism, would make Americans safer at home. Protecting its citizens and property should be the first goal of any government, but the US quest for an informal global empire actually undermines this objective. Empire does not equal security — in fact, it sabotages it.

### A/T “Democracy”

#### Empirically, democracy promotion fails

Rose 01; (Richard, chair in politics at the University of Aberdeen, “Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third-Wave Democracies, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 31, No. 2, Apr., 2001, pp. 331-354, JSTOR)

A spectre is haunting contemporary studies of democratization: conventional influences, such as the introduction of free elections, have not (or at least, not yet) created political regimes that match the standards of established democracies. Within five years Samuel Huntington moved from characterizing the late twentieth century as the third wave of democratization to proclaiming The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.' Larry Diamond's global review of Developing Democracy emphasizes a growing 'gap between electoral and liberal democracy'.2 The World Movement for Democracy proclaims that its primary priority is 'deepening democracy beyond its electoral form' .3 Constructive critics of third-wave democracies are not worried about the gap between an ideal democracy and existing polyarchies that concerns Robert Dahl. Their anxieties focus on daily violations of the rule of law, corruption and unaccountable government.

#### No democratic peace – spread of democracy will increase intra-bloc conflict – their evidence doesn’t assume changes to the international system.

Erik Gartzke and Alex Weisiger, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of California San Diego and Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania, March 15, 2010, “Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace,” http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/impermanent\_012010.pdf

We can go farther in assessing implications of regime similarity in varied circumstances. As with any cue or motive for cooperation, regime type relies on the presence of a threat to ally against. When a cue becomes ubiquitous, it loses much of its informational value. The proliferation of democracy means that democracy is less of a distinguishing characteristic, even as other cues, identities, or actual determinants of preference variability tend to increase in salience. One can no longer be sure that democracies will cooperate when there is a diminishing \other." As democratization progresses, this logic implies that some democracies will form alignments that exclude other democracies, or even that some democratic coalitions will come into conflict with other democratic coalitions. Combining the affinity of regime types, the dynamic nature of natural allies, and the demand for security, we must imagine that the impact of regime type on conflict and cooperation might change over time. Initially, the scarcity of democracies in the world meant that there were few opportunities for direct conflict. Even more important, in a world full of threats, democracies had enough in common that cooperating, or at least not opposing one another, was prudent. As democracy has proliferated, however, preferred policies of democratic countries have become more diverse even as the threat from non-democracies has declined. While autocratic threats remain, many of the most powerful countries are democracies. Differences that were patched over, or overlooked, in fighting fascism and communism have now begun to surface. These differences are certainly not major or fundamental, but they appear more salient today than in the past. This process appears likely to continue in the future; nations with similar regime types but different preferences may increasingly find that they are unable to justify glossing over their differences.

#### Global Democracy Impossible

Dixon 10 [Dr. Patrick Dixon, PhD Foreign Policy, “The Truth About the War With Iraq”, http://www.globalchange.com/iraqwar.htm]

And so we find an interesting fact: those who live in democratic nations, who uphold democracy as the only honourable form of are not really true democrats after all. They have little or no interest in global democracy, in a nation of nations, in seeking the common good of the whole of humanity. And it is this single fact, more than any other, this inequality of wealth and privilege in our shrinking global village, that will make it more likely that our future is dominate by terror groups, freedom fighters, justice-seekers, hell-raisers, protestors and violent agitators.

### A/T “Deterrence/Signal of Weakness”

#### “Reputation” doesn’t matter, reducing capability actually *increases* deterrent credibility- core interests that invite response will be more defined

MacDonald and Parent 2011 (Paul K. and Joseph M., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, International Security, Graceful Decline?; The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment, Spring, lexis)

These arguments have a number of limitations. First, opponents of retrenchment exaggerate the importance of credibility in the defense of commitments. Just because a state has signaled a willingness to retreat from one commitment does not mean it will retreat from others. Studies of reputation, for example, have demonstrated a tenuous link between past behavior and current reputation. 22 The capacity to defend a commitment is as important as credibility in determining the strength of a commitment. Quantitative studies have likewise found a mixed link between previous concessions and deterrence failure. 23 The balance of power between the challenger and the defender, in contrast, is often decisive. For instance, after a series of crises over Berlin and Cuba, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan observed to his cabinet, "The fact that the Soviet Government had agreed to withdraw their missiles and their aircraft from Cuba was not evidence of weakness but of realism. . . . But Berlin was an entirely different question; not only was it of vital importance to the Soviet Government but the Russians had overwhelming conventional superiority in the area." 24 This finding supports the basic insight of retrenchment: by concentrating scarce resources, a policy of retrenchment exchanges a diffuse reputation for toughness for a concentrated capability at key points of challenge. Second, pessimists overstate the extent to which a policy of retrenchment can damage a great power's capabilities or prestige. Gilpin, in particular, assumes that a great power's commitments are on equal footing and interdependent. In practice, however, great powers make commitments of varying degrees that are functionally independent of one another. Concession in one area need not be seen as influencing a commitment in another area. 25 Far from being perceived as interdependent, great power commitments are often seen as being rivalrous, so that abandoning commitments in one area may actually bolster the strength of a commitment in another area. During the Korean War, for instance, President Harry Truman's administration explicitly backed away from total victory on the peninsula to strengthen deterrence in Europe. 26 Retreat in an area of lesser importance freed up resources and signaled a strong commitment to an area of greater significance.

### China/Asia

#### Heg makes war with China inevitable- withdrawal key

Layne June 2012 (Chris, professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, The Global Power Shift from West to East, The National Interest, lexis)

Certainly, the Chinese have not forgotten. Now Beijing aims to dominate its own East and Southeast Asian backyard, just as a rising America sought to dominate the Western Hemisphere a century and a half ago. The United States and China now are competing for supremacy in East and Southeast Asia. Washington has been the incumbent hegemon there since World War II, and many in the American foreign-policy establishment view China’s quest for regional hegemony as a threat that must be resisted. This contest for regional dominance is fueling escalating tensions and possibly could lead to war. In geopolitics, two great powers cannot simultaneously be hegemonic in the same region. Unless one of them abandons its aspirations, there is a high probability of hostilities. Flashpoints that could spark a Sino-American conflict include the unstable Korean Peninsula; the disputed status of Taiwan; competition for control of oil and other natural resources; and the burgeoning naval rivalry between the two powers. These rising tensions were underscored by a recent Brookings study by Peking University’s Wang Jisi and Kenneth Lieberthal, national-security director for Asia during the Clinton administration, based on their conversations with high-level officials in the American and Chinese governments. Wang found that underneath the visage of “mutual cooperation” that both countries project, the Chinese believe they are likely to replace the United States as the world’s leading power but Washington is working to prevent such a rise. Similarly, Lieberthal related that many American officials believe their Chinese counterparts see the U.S.-Chinese relationship in terms of a zero-sum game in the struggle for global hegemony. An instructive historical antecedent is the Anglo-German rivalry of the early twentieth century. The key lesson of that rivalry is that such great-power competition can end in one of three ways: accommodation of the rising challenger by the dominant power; retreat of the challenger; or war. The famous 1907 memo exchange between two key British Foreign Office officials—Sir Eyre Crowe and Lord Thomas Sanderson—outlined these stark choices. Crowe argued that London must uphold the Pax Britannica status quo at all costs. Either Germany would accept its place in a British-dominated world order, he averred, or Britain would have to contain Germany’s rising power, even at the risk of war. Sanderson replied that London’s refusal to accommodate the reality of Germany’s rising power was both unwise and dangerous. He suggested Germany’s leaders must view Britain “in the light of some huge giant sprawling over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes stretching in every direction, which cannot be approached without eliciting a scream.” In Beijing’s eyes today, the United States must appear as the unapproachable, globally sprawling giant.

#### Conflict with China goes nuclear

Glaser 2011 (Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Will China's Rise Lead to War? Subtitle: Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism, Foreign Affairs, March/April, lexis)

ACCOMMODATION ON TAIWAN? The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable -- particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China -- whatever they might formally agree to -- have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

###  Ext.: China

#### Heg causes war with China and Asian instability- heg forces Chinese expansionism to deter the US

Zenko and Cohen April 2012 (MICAH ZENKO is a Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. MICHAEL A. COHEN is a Fellow at the Century Foundation, Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure Than Washington Thinks, Foreign Affairs, lexis)

As the threat from transnational terrorist groups dwindles, the United States also faces few risks from other states. China is the most obvious potential rival to the United States, and there is little doubt that China's rise will pose a challenge to U.S. economic interests. Moreover, there is an unresolved debate among Chinese political and military leaders about China's proper global role, and the lack of transparency from China's senior leadership about its long-term foreign policy objectives is a cause for concern. However, the present security threat to the U.S. mainland is practically nonexistent and will remain so. Even as China tries to modernize its military, its defense spending is still approximately one-ninth that of the United States. In 2012, the Pentagon will spend roughly as much on military research and development alone as China will spend on its entire military. While China clumsily flexes its muscles in the Far East by threatening to deny access to disputed maritime resources, a recent Pentagon report noted that China's military ambitions remain dominated by "regional contingencies" and that the People's Liberation Army has made little progress in developing capabilities that "extend global reach or power projection." In the coming years, China will enlarge its regional role, but this growth will only threaten U.S. interests if Washington attempts to dominate East Asia and fails to consider China's legitimate regional interests. It is true that China's neighbors sometimes fear that China will not resolve its disputes peacefully, but this has compelled Asian countries to cooperate with the United States, maintaining bilateral alliances that together form a strong security architecture and limit China's room to maneuver. The strongest arguments made by those warning of Chinese influence revolve around economic policy. The list of complaints includes a host of Chinese policies, from intellectual property theft and currency manipulation to economic espionage and domestic subsidies. Yet none of those is likely to lead to direct conflict with the United States beyond the competition inherent in international trade, which does not produce zero-sum outcomes and is constrained by dispute-resolution mechanisms, such as those of the World Trade Organization. If anything, China's export-driven economic strategy, along with its large reserves of U.S. Treasury bonds, suggests that Beijing will continue to prefer a strong United States to a weak one.

#### ONLY decreasing US power solves conflict with China and Asian stability- war is only on the table in a world of maintaining heg

MacDonald and Parent 2011 (Paul K. and Joseph M., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, International Security, Graceful Decline?; The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment, Spring, lexis)

We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a "moderate" decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict. 98 Moreover, Washington's support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order. 99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes. 101

#### Any attempt to increase US power kills relations with China- viewed as aggressive containment

Friedberg 2011 (July/August, Aaron L., professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics, The National Interest, lexis)

But the mistrust between Washington and Beijing is not a one-way street—and with good reason. China’s current rulers do not see themselves as they once did, as the leaders of a global revolutionary movement, yet they do believe that they are engaged in an ideological struggle, albeit one in which, until very recently, they have been almost entirely on the defensive. While they regard Washington’s professions of concern for human rights and individual liberties as cynical and opportunistic, China’s leaders do not doubt that the United States is motivated by genuine ideological fervor. As seen from Beijing, Washington is a dangerous, crusading, liberal, quasi-imperialist power that will not rest until it imposes its views and its way of life on the entire planet. Anyone who does not grasp this need only read the speeches of U.S. officials, with their promises to enlarge the sphere of democracy and rid the world of tyranny. In fact, because ideology inclines the United States to be more suspicious and hostile toward China than it would be for strategic reasons alone, it also tends to reinforce Washington’s willingness to help other democracies that feel threatened by Chinese power, even if this is not what a pure realpolitik calculation of its interests might seem to demand. Thus the persistence—indeed the deepening—of American support for Taiwan during the 1990s cannot be explained without reference to the fact that the island was evolving from an authoritarian bastion of anti-Communism to a liberal democracy. Severing the last U.S. ties to Taipei would remove a major source of friction with China and a potential cause of war. Such a move might even be conceivable if Taiwan still appeared to many Americans as it did in the 1970s, as an oppressive, corrupt dictatorship. But the fact that Taiwan is now seen as a genuine (if flawed) democracy will make it extremely difficult for Washington to ever willingly cut it adrift. Having watched America topple the Soviet Union through a combination of confrontation and subversion, since the end of the Cold War China’s strategists have feared that Washington intends to do the same to them. This belief colors Beijing’s perceptions of virtually every aspect of U.S. policy toward it, from enthusiasm for economic engagement to efforts to encourage the development of China’s legal system. It also shapes the leadership’s assessments of America’s activities across Asia, which Beijing believes are aimed at encircling it with pro-U.S. democracies, and informs China’s own policies to counter that influence.

###  Yes Counterbalancing

#### China’s already challenging U.S military strength

Buxbaum, 10 Analyst @ ISN Security Watch, (Peter A., “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific”, http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-US-Hegemony-in-the-Pacific.html)

The US is developing an air-sea battle concept to counter China's military buildup. But political problems and budgetary woes could kill the program before it ever gets started. China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific, which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea, essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include anti-satellite weapons; spaced-based reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition; electromagnetic weapons; advanced fighter aircraft; unmanned aerial vehicles; advanced radar systems; and ballistic and cruise missiles. The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships," said Admiral Gary Roughead, chief of US naval operations, at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington think tank. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region. "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action, or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup," said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments, "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply, perhaps to prohibitive levels, and much sooner than many expect[...].This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States, its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it."

#### China is counter-balancing the US now

Layne, 09 – Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "The Waning of U.S.

Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay", International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009, July 6th 2010, Galileo, p. 17-18) PDF

Toward multipolarity? The ascent of new great powers would be the strongest evidence of multipolarization, and the two most important indicators of whether this is happening are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP.46 Here, there is evidence that as the NIC, Khanna, Mahbubani, and, to a point, Zakaria contend, global economic power is flowing from the United States and Europe to Asia.47 The shift of economic clout to East Asia is important because it could propel China’s ascent—thus hastening the relative decline of U.S. power—and also because emerging regional multipolarity could trigger future major power war. China, of course, is the poster child for Asia’s rise, and many analysts— including the NIC, Khanna, and (implicitly) Mahbubani and Zakaria—agree that China is the rising power most likely to challenge U.S. hegemony.48 Unsurprisingly, Brooks and Wohlforth are skeptical about China’s rise, and they dismiss the idea that China could become a viable counterweight to a hegemonic United States within any meaningful time frame.49 Their analysis, how-ever, is static. For sure, the United States still has an impressive lead in the categories they measure.50 Looking ahead, however, the trend lines appear to favor China, which already has overtaken the United States as the world’s leading manufacturer—a crown the United States wore for more than a century. 51 China also may overtake the United States in GDP in the next ten to fifteen years. In 2003 Goldman Sachs predicted that China would pass the United States in GDP by 2041, but in 2008 it revised the time frame to 2028.52 And, in early 2009, the Economist Intelligence Unit predicted that China’s GDP would surpass the United States’ in 2021.53 Empirically, then, there are indications that the unipolar era is drawing to a close, and that the coming decades could witness a power transition.54

###  A/T “China is Expansionist”

#### China’s not expansionist or violent- other regional powers contain it if it is

Nye 2010 (Joseph S., University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, The Future of American Power Subtitle: Dominance and Decline in Perspective, Foreign Affairs, November/December, lexis)

Some have argued that China aims to challenge the United States' position in East Asia and, eventually, the world. Even if this were an accurate assessment of China's current intentions (and even the Chinese themselves cannot know the views of future generations), it is doubtful that China will have the military capability to make this possible anytime soon. Moreover, Chinese leaders will have to contend with the reactions of other countries and the constraints created by China's need for external markets and resources. Too aggressive a Chinese military posture could produce a countervailing coalition among China's neighbors that would weaken both its hard and its soft power. The rise of Chinese power in Asia is contested by both India and Japan (as well as other states), and that provides a major power advantage to the United States. The U.S.-Japanese alliance and the improvement in U.S.-Indian relations mean that China cannot easily expel the Americans from Asia. From that position of strength, the United States, Japan, India, Australia, and others can engage China and provide incentives for it to play a responsible role, while hedging against the possibility of aggressive behavior as China's power grows

### Latin American Democracy

#### Retrenchment key to Latin American democracy- heg kills credibility of democratic ideals

Crandall 2011 (Russell, Associate Professor of International Politics at Davidson College, Principal Director for the Western Hemisphere at the U.S. Department of Defense in 2009 and Director for Andean Affairs at the National Security Council in 2010-11, The Post-American Hemisphere Subtitle: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America, Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis)

Ironically, moreover, Latin America's entry into a "post-hegemonic" era, a product of its own advancements, could undermine its past progress. As the balance of power in the region is redistributed, unexpected alliances and enmities could arise. Many observers have assumed that less U.S. involvement would be an inherently positive development, but that may be too optimistic. No one should underestimate the capacity of the Venezuela-led bloc of quasi-authoritarian leftist governments to stop the regional trend toward greater openness and democracy -- values that the bloc sees as representing a capitulation to the U.S.-controlled global system. Nonetheless, Latin America's emerging democratic consensus seems inevitable, and as its strategic posture finally matures, the region will be more directly responsible for its own successes and failures. Long Latin America's master, the United States must adapt to the new realities of this post-hegemonic era, lest it see its influence diminish even further. It must demonstrate an ability to quietly engage and lead when appropriate -- an approach that will allow Washington to remain actively involved in the region's affairs without acting as though it is trying to maintain its legacy of hegemony. Given how accustomed the United States is to dominating the region, this project will be harder than it sounds

#### Latin America is key to global democracy

Lowenthal 1994 (Abraham, USC Professor at the School of International Relations and President of the Pacific Council on International Policy (PCIP), Feb 14th, Americans Must Accept International Cooperation, http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/region/news/arc/lasnet/1994/0127.html)

A third significance of Latin America today is as a prime arena- together with the former Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern and Central Europe- for the core U.S. values of democratic governance and free-market economics. As both democracy and capitalism are severely challenged in the former Communist countries, the worldwide appeal and credibility of these ideas may depend importantly on whether our nearest neighbors can make them work.

#### Extinction

Diamond ‘95 (Larry, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution – “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,” wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

###  Ext.: Latin American Democracy

#### Anti-Americanism caused by hegemony undermines Latin American democracy

Foer 2006(Franklin, editor of the New Republic, The talented Mr. Chavez: a Castro-loving, Bolivar-worshipping, onetime baseball-player wannabe, Venezuela's Hugo Chavez is perhaps the world's most openly anti-American head of state. With Latin America in the midst of a leftward swing, how dangerous is he?, The Atlantic Monthly, May, lexis)

How far left will the region swing in reaction? Teodoro Petkoff, the editor of the Caracas paper Tal Cual and one of Chavez's prime adversaries, has written a book called Dos Izquierdas ("Two Lefts"). Under his taxonomy, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva represents one of these lefts, which pays lip service to Castro but adopts a more pragmatic attitude toward economics and remains committed to liberal democracy. Like European social democracy, it ultimately seeks to humanize capitalism, not destroy it--a political program that could help Latin America correct the excesses of its neoliberal experiment without entirely undermining its core economic contributions. Chavez, on the other hand, represents a more retrograde form of socialism. His belief in strong leaders over strong institutions, his preference for patronage over careful policy, and his mistrust of some of the basic elements of the capitalist system add up to disaster for government transparency, democracy, and development. Which of the two lefts will eventually win out is unclear. Most residents of Latin America still believe that market capitalism is the only system that can lead to development, and Lula is more popular than Chavez overall. But there's no doubt that Chavez's approach is winning adherents. Chavez may soon have close friends running Nicaragua, Mexico, and Peru. Argentina's Kirchner seems the junior partner in his relationship with Chavez, despite his country's bigger economy andmilitary. Chavez's protege Evo Morales has already won the Bolivian presidency, in part by following Chavez's own model of anti-American rhetoric and populist appeals. Morales has promised to decriminalize coca production and redistribute land and plans to rewrite Bolivia's constitution this summer. Even Alvaro Uribe, the president of Colombia and America's staunchest ally in South America, has appeared with Chavez in front of Simon Bolivar's home and bashed American "meddling." Chavez's performance last November at the Summit of the Americas, held in the Argentine resort of Mar del Plata, reveals why his appeals to the leaders and citizens of Latin America have been so successful. He skipped away from the awkward group photos with his fellow heads of state, and addressed a crowd of 25,000 anti-globalization activists gathered for a "counter-summit" in a soccer stadium. He wrapped his arm around Diego Maradona, one of the greatest soccer players of all time, who's probably more admired than any politician at the official proceedings. "I think we came here to bury FTAA [the Free Trade Area of the Americas]," Chavez intoned. "I brought my shovel." He was playing a clever inside-outside game: at the same time thathe huddled with leaders like Lula and Kirchner, he used the media togo over their heads and speak directly to their radical political bases. This tactic works well because most Latin American leaders stilldepend on support from their own radical parties. Their activist bases still genuflect toward Havana, and constantly lament that their presidents lack Chavez's gumption. "They live in fear of Chavez turningagainst them, because they worry that their people might not take their side," one U.S. State Department official told me. This dynamic has given Chavez the run of the Southern Hemisphere. The United States hasn't shown much deftness in tilting this fight between the two lefts toward pragmatists like Lula. Instead of acknowledging the shortcomings of Latin America's recent neoliberal experiment, it has insisted on pushing forward with the FTAA--an agreement that has little chance in the current political environment. Where Chavez constantly announces new plans to distribute cash around the region, the United States continues to cut back on its aid packages. And while the Bush administration isn't about to confront Chavez seriously, it often gives the impression that such a policy is in the works, allowing Chavez to bait the United States into verbal duels—battles that reinforce Chavez's mythological version of himself. This hardly makes him the second coming of Simon Bolivar. Nonetheless, there are unavoidable similarities between the two--including some that Chavez might not care to acknowledge. Chavez claims that his favorite book is Garcia Marquez's historical novel about Bolivar's last days, The General in His Labyrint. If this is true, he must know that Bolivar ended his life distraught and depressed. During his final years, Bolivar devolved from radical democrat to dictator. He both praised democracy as "the most sacred source" of power and proclaimed that "necessity recognizes no laws." When Gran Colombia failed after eleven years of struggle, during which Bolivar himself came to embody many of the oppressive qualities he'd originally campaigned against, he dismissed the continent as ungovernable and descended into a bitter senescence. He died and was buried in Colombia; Venezuela, whose populace had eventually turned on him, had made him an exile in his final years. Chavez, despite his love of poetry, never seems to utter one of Bolivar's most poignant fines: "Those who serve the revolution plow the sea." Historically, Latin American revolution has proved to be just as futile as Bolivar imagined. Because of its peculiar political temperament, the region has swung back and forth on a dialectical rope between socialism and authoritarianism, occasionally stopping, mid-swing, on governments that combine the worst attributes of both. But in recent decades, the region looked like it might finally transcend this pattern of manic change. Widespread adoption of liberal-democratic governance and an embrace of market capitalism seemed to bring relative prosperity and genuine stability within grasp. Chavez has the potential to disrupt this progress and revive Latin America's old political habits. According to a recent poll, only about half of the region's citizens--including minorities in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil--now believe that democracy is always the best form of government. Latin America is vulnerable, and Chavez has provided a blueprint not just for harnessing anti-Americanism but for the slow consolidation of power. Along the way, he may succeed in baiting the United States into a rhetorical fight that it can't win, and impeding its international leadership. But ultimately, the United States will not be the biggest loser in the battle Chavez is waging. It will never suffer nearly as much as the people of the continent he dreams of liberating.

###  Ext.: Latin America Impact: Non-Democracy

#### Anti-Americanism and Chavez ascendancy caused by heg accesses every impact- shatters stability globally and causes independent great power war

Coronel '7(Gustavo Coronel is a public policy expert, who was elected to the Venezuelan Congress in 1998 before it was dissolved in 1999 following the election of Hugo Chavez as president. He is the author of several books and is an advisor on the opinion and editorial content of Petroleumworld en Español. World Press – September 18th -- http://muevete.wordpress.com/ 2007/09/18/a-possible- political-scenario-for-latin-america-2007-2012/.)

Still, there is no doubt that there are strong efforts being made by some Latin American political leaders to harass the United States. If these efforts intensify and take root, Latin America could become a geopolitical hot spot in the mid-term. The starting point of the anti-U.S. Alliance. Essentially the current threats against U.S. national security originated about nine years ago with the political alliance between Fidel Castro, the Cuban dictator and Hugo Chavez, the Venezuelan strongman. This is a symbiotic relationship that has been providing Fidel Castro with money and Hugo Chavez with brains. The strategy chosen by this alliance is based on two facts and one very partial truth. The two facts are: extreme poverty and extreme inequality in the region. The very partial truth is that these two afflictions are the result of U.S. exploitation of the region’s natural resources aided by the systematic political intervention of this country in the internal affairs of the countries of the hemisphere. To blame our own misfortunes and inadequacies on someone else has been an old and proven method to gain adepts and to stir hate and xenophobia among Latin American societies. This is what Fidel Castro has done for the last forty years and this is what he has recommended to Hugo Chavez , a line of action that the Venezuelan strongman has embraced with enthusiasm. Hugo Chavez’s strategies. To do this he has been aided by significant amounts of money derived from oil exports. During the last nine years about $220 billion of oil money have entered the Venezuelan national treasury while national debt has tripled to about $65 billion. This amount of money has been mostly spent in three areas: (a), social programs of a temporary nature, really handouts, to the Venezuelan poor; (b), the acquisition of weapons; and (c), subsidies, donations and promises to Latin American countries in order to consolidate political alliances and establish political IOU’s. At least $40 billion have gone into the third category, an amount roughly equivalent to 2-3% of Venezuela’s yearly GDP during the last nine years. As a result of these strategies the Fidel Castro/Hugo Chavez axis has been able to make some progress in its political objectives of eroding the political standing of the United States in the hemisphere and, even, of gaining supporters in the U.S. political scene. By financing the presidential campaigns in several countries they have been able to help Evo Morales, Daniel Ortega and Rafael Correa win the presidencies of Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador. At the same time they saw their favored candidates Ollanta Humala, in Peru, and Andres Lopez Obrador, in Mexico lose close elections while remaining politically strong, especially Lopez Obrador. In parallel Hugo Chavez’s major injection of money into Argentina has helped President Nestor Kirchner to join the anti-U.S. club, a move for which he did not need strong incentives. This is all well known although generally perceived with indifference, sympathy, and tolerance or, even, amusement, in hemispheric political circles. Many celebrate secretly the harassment of such a strong power by smaller, weaker countries. Others are sitting on the political fence, receiving political and material benefits by playing one side against the other. Still others have a weak spot in their ideological hearts for authoritarian regimes and resent the hard sale of democracy being done by the U.S. all over the world. A few even laugh at the colorful antics of President Chavez and have a hard time taking him seriously. However, political harassment of the United States represents just one aspect in a possible wider plan. Later stages might include actual economic aggression and, even, physical action against the northern “empire”. For the time being the main efforts are directed towards the consolidation of the alliance. To do this: • Chavez is providing money to members of the Armed Forces of Bolivia and to city mayors, in order to increase political control over these important Bolivian sectors (2); • Chavez could be funneling money into Argentina to promote the candidacy of Mrs. Cristina Kirchner (3); • The aid given by Chavez to Nicaragua already amounts to about $500 million and, if he follows through in his promise, will include the financing of a $2 billion refinery; • The economic ties of Venezuela and Ecuador are increasing via the oil industry, although President Correa’s ideology already includes a significant component of resentment against the United States. • Chavez is conducting a strategy of alignment with political sectors in the United States that oppose the current government policies. For some of these sectors the desire to erode the current administration has proven greater than their love for democracy. The enemy of their enemy has become their friend (4). Almost all of these strategic initiatives by the Castro/Chavez alliance show an alternative, unfavorable outcome. • Bolivia is in the threshold of a major political crisis, due to the reluctance of important sectors of the country to roll over and play dead to Morales’s pretensions to impose the Venezuelan Constituent Assembly model that ended with the Venezuelan democracy becoming an authoritarian regime. • Mrs. Kirchner, even if she won, as it seems to be the case, might decide to go her separate ways. She has already given some indications that Argentina should not become a simple pawn of Castro/ Chavez in the struggle for hemispheric political leadership. Recent events have convinced her that Chavez’s support probably represents a kiss of death for her political future. • In Ecuador, Correa is already looking at the Bolivian political turmoil with caution, as he does not want to repeat Morales’s errors and realizes that Chavez’s success in Venezuela has been due to his deep pockets rather than his charisma. Correa does not have the money or the charisma of Chavez. • In the United States the individuals and groups that support Chavez are doing so out of personal material or political interest and have been largely rejected by public opinion. It seems improbable that the alliance of these countries, almost entirely based on money and resentment against the United States, could last for long. What if this alliance falters? The main motors of the anti-U. S alliance, Castro and Chavez, understand that this strategy of progressive political harassment of the United States might not succeed. The defeat of Lopez Obrador in Mexico robbed them of a major ally in this strategy. In power Lopez Obrador would have promoted illegal immigration into the U.S. creating numerous points of social and political conflict along the weak U.S.- Mexican border. As it stands today The United States has several ways to weaken Castro/Chavez strategies. In fact, the imminent death of Fidel Castro has practically eliminated much of the brain component of this axis. Hugo Chavez is in need of an alternative plan. The alternative is an alliance with fundamentalist groups or countries that share Hugo Chavez’s resentment against the United States. This explains the approximation of Hugo Chavez to Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Both leaders have an anti-U.S. global alliance as one of their main objectives. Their main weapon is oil or, rather, what they can do to the international oil market, in case they decided to suspend exports of this resource. Some 4 million barrels of oil per day would be out of the supply system, causing a major disruption in the world’s economy. They figure that in such a situation they have less to lose than the United States and its industrialized allies. But oil is not their only weapon. They also have a political weapon to resort to. It has to do with the concerted action of terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and FARC, assisted by violent indigenous groups such as those in Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador and socially turbulent groups like the illegal immigrants already living in the United States. By promoting the action of these groups against the United States and its Latin American and European allies these groups can do much harm to global political stability. In this scenario one the main promoters of this action would not be located in the Middle East or in the Far East but in Latin America. This would be the first time in history, as far as we can tell, that a Latin American political leader becomes a major threat to world stability.

### Russia war

**American power makes conflict with Russia more likely – any new confrontation would escalate**

**Cohen 06** Professor of Russian and Slavic Studies at New York University, Contributing Editor of *The Nation*

[Stephen F. “The New American Cold War” *The Nation*, July 10th (http://www.thenation.com/doc/20060710/cohen**)]**

If American policy and Russia's predictable countermeasures continue to develop into a full-scale cold war, several new factors could make it even more dangerous than was its predecessor. Above all, the growing presence of Western bases and US-backed governments in the former Soviet republics has moved the "front lines" of the conflict, in the alarmed words of a Moscow newspaper, from Germany to Russia's "near abroad." As a "hostile ring tightens around the Motherland," in the view of former Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov, many different Russians see a mortal threat. Putin's chief political deputy, Vladislav Surkov, for example, sees the "enemy...at the gates," and the novelist and Soviet-era dissident Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn sees the "complete encirclement of Russia and then the loss of its sovereignty." The risks of direct military conflict could therefore be greater than ever. Protesting overflights by NATO aircraft, a Russian general has already warned, "If they violate our borders, they should be shot down." Worsening the geopolitical factor are radically different American and Russian self-perceptions. By the mid-1960s the US-Soviet cold war relationship had acquired a significant degree of stability because the two superpowers, perceiving a stalemate, began to settle for political and military "parity." Today, however, the United States, the self-proclaimed "only superpower," has a far more expansive view of its international entitlements and possibilities. Moscow, on the other hand, feels weaker and more vulnerable than it did before 1991. And in that asymmetry lies the potential for a less predictable cold war relationship between the two still fully armed nuclear states. There is also a new psychological factor. Because the unfolding cold war is undeclared, it is already laden with feelings of betrayal and mistrust on both sides. Having welcomed Putin as Yeltsin's chosen successor and offered him its conception of "partnership and friendship," Washington now feels deceived by Putin's policies. According to two characteristic commentaries in the *Washington Post*, Bush had a "well-intentioned Russian policy," but "a Russian autocrat...betrayed the American's faith." Putin's Kremlin, however, has been reacting largely to a decade of broken US promises and Yeltsin's boozy compliance. Thus Putin's declaration four years ago, paraphrased on Russian radio: "The era of Russian geopolitical concessions [is] coming to an end." (Looking back, he remarked bitterly that Russia has been "constantly deceived.")

**US-Russia war is the only existential risk- causes extinction**

**Bostrom 2** (Nick, PhD Philosophy – Oxford University, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios”, Journal of Evolution and Technology, Vol. 9, March, http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html)

The unique challenge of existential risks Risks in this sixth category are a recent phenomenon. This is part of the reason why it is useful to distinguish them from other risks. We have not evolved mechanisms, either biologically or culturally, for managing such risks. Our intuitions and coping strategies have been shaped by our long experience with risks such as dangerous animals, hostile individuals or tribes, poisonous foods, automobile accidents, Chernobyl, Bhopal, volcano eruptions, earthquakes, draughts, World War I, World War II, epidemics of influenza, smallpox, black plague, and AIDS. These types of disasters have occurred many times and our cultural attitudes towards risk have been shaped by trial-and-error in managing such hazards. But tragic as such events are to the people immediately affected, in the big picture of things – from the perspective of humankind as a whole – even the worst of these catastrophes are **mere ripples** on the surface of the great sea of life. They haven’t significantly affected the total amount of human suffering or happiness or determined the long-term fate of our species. With the exception of a species-destroying comet or asteroid impact (an extremely rare occurrence), there were probably no significant existential risks in human history until the mid-twentieth century, and certainly none that it was within our power to do something about. The first manmade existential risk was the inaugural detonation of an atomic bomb. At the time, there was some concern that the explosion might start a runaway chain-reaction by “igniting” the atmosphere. Although we now know that such an outcome was physically impossible, it qualifies as an existential risk that was present at the time. For there to be a risk, given the knowledge and understanding available, it suffices that there is some subjective probability of an adverse outcome, even if it later turns out that objectively there was no chance of something bad happening. If we don’t know whether something is objectively risky or not, then it is risky in the subjective sense. The subjective sense is of course what we must base our decisions on.[[2]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn2%22%20%5Co%20%22) At any given time we must use our best current subjective estimate of what the objective risk factors are.[[3]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn3%22%20%5Co%20%22) A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as **global** and **terminal**. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[[4]](http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn4%22%20%5Co%20%22)  Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

### Russia china war

**Predominance spurs a Russia-China military alliance that ends in nuclear extinction**

**Roberts 07,** Senior Research Fellow @ the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, William E. Simon Chairin Political Economy, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Paul Craig“US Hegemony Spawns Russian-Chinese Military Alliance,”http://www.lewrockwell.com/roberts/roberts218.html)

This week the Russian and Chinese militaries are conducting a joint military exercise involving large numbers of troops and combat vehicles. The former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan, Kyrgkyzstan, and Kazakstan are participating. Other countries appear ready to join the military alliance.  This new potent military alliance is a real world response to neoconservative delusions about US hegemony. Neocons believe that the US is supreme in the world and can dictate its course. The neoconservative idiots have actually written papers, read by Russians and Chinese, about why the US must use its military superiority to assert hegemony over Russia and China.  Cynics believe that the neocons are just shills, like Bush and Cheney, for the military-security complex and are paid to restart the cold war for the sake of the profits of the armaments industry. But the fact is that the neocons actually believe their delusions about American hegemony.  Russia and China have now witnessed enough of the Bush administration’s unprovoked aggression in the world to take neocon intentions seriously. As the US has proven that it cannot occupy the Iraqi city of Baghdad despite 5 years of efforts, it most certainly cannot occupy Russia or China. That means the conflict toward which the neocons are driving will be a nuclear conflict.  In an attempt to gain the advantage in a nuclear conflict, the neocons are positioning US anti-ballistic missiles on Soviet borders in Poland and the Czech Republic. This is an idiotic provocation as the Russians can eliminate anti-ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. Neocons are people who desire war, but know nothing about it. Thus, the US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Reagan and Gorbachev ended the cold war. However, US administrations after Reagan’s have broken the agreements and understandings. The US gratuitously brought NATO and anti-ballistic missiles to Russia’s borders. The Bush regime has initiated a propaganda war against the Russian government of V. Putin.  These are gratuitous acts of aggression. Both the Russian and Chinese governments are trying to devote resources to their economic development, not to their militaries. Yet, both are being forced by America’s aggressive posture to revamp their militaries. Americans need to understand what the neocon Bush regime cannot: **a nuclear exchange between the US, Russia, and China would establish the hegemony of the cockroach**.  In a mere 6.5 years the Bush regime has destroyed the world’s good will toward the US. Today, America’s influence in the world is limited to its payments of tens of millions of dollars to bribed heads of foreign governments, such as Egypt’s and Pakistan’s. The Bush regime even thinks that as it has bought and paid for Musharraf, he will stand aside and permit Bush to make air strikes inside Pakistan. Is Bush blind to the danger that he will cause an Islamic revolution within Pakistan that will depose the US puppet and present the Middle East with an Islamic state armed with nuclear weapons?  Considering the instabilities and dangers that abound, the aggressive posture of the Bush regime goes far beyond recklessness. The Bush regime is the most irresponsibly aggressive regime the world has seen since Hitler’s.

## \*Yes Impacts\*

### Latin America

#### Latin American stability isn’t resilient- instability and war still possible

Crandall 2011 (Russell, Associate Professor of International Politics at Davidson College, Principal Director for the Western Hemisphere at the U.S. Department of Defense in 2009 and Director for Andean Affairs at the National Security Council in 2010-11, The Post-American Hemisphere Subtitle: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America, Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis)

Meanwhile, although Latin America may have entered a post-hegemonic era, that does not mean it is entirely secure. Despite all the progress, Latin America remains a region in which countries still openly threaten war with one another. Just last year, Chávez did exactly that after Bogotá accused him of giving refuge to Colombian narcoterrorists. Latin American countries' unpredictable behavior and ambivalence toward U.S. leadership will make it difficult for Washington to maintain strategic patience. After witnessing the acerbic diplomatic impasse over Honduras, when Brazil opposed U.S. plans for new presidential elections to solve the political crisis there, one might think that the region largely wants Washington to stay uninvolved. Yet the behind-the-scenes reality is that most Latin American governments actually appreciate robust U.S. attention and even leadership -- as they in fact did during the Honduran crisis. Most leaders in the region realize that Latin America and the United States share the same interests and goals, and they understand that cooperation is indispensable. They know full well that their gains remain precarious, that it could take only one economic crisis or political row to send the region spiraling back to the old days of instability. Yet whatever happens in Latin America's future, its gains and failures will be caused by its own hand.

## \*\*\* Answers to Impacts

### A/T “Asia War”

#### No war in Asia --- Economic ties

Takahashi ’97 (Takuma,- . Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies “Economic Interdependence and Security in the East Asia-Pacific Region” in “Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations”, Mike Mochizuki, ed., pg. 97)

A second difference in circumstances between East Asia and nineteenth century Europe is that now the economic costs of war far outweigh the benefits. At the same time, the benefits of pursuing economic growth through peaceful, nonaggressive means are great. Today's East Asian countries have expectations of faster future economic growth than their counterparts in Europe a century ago. The industrialization of Europe proceeded slowly. The agricultural population declined only gradually, taking more than a hundred years to fall below 20 percent of the total population.4 By contrast Japan exhausted its agricultural labor in fifty years and South Korea did so in twenty-five.5 The speed of transformation and economic growth was possible because of East Asia's access to the stock of technologies, its ability to create new technologies, and phenomenal trading opportunities. East Asian economies, especially Southeast Asian countries and the southern part of China, became major exporters of a variety of home electronic products because of the flood of foreign direct investment they received from other parts of East Asia. As these areas have acquired technologies and marketing skills, they have established their own technological development bases and marketing channels for exports. The increasing volume of East Asian trade makes a striking contrast to the growth in merchandise trade when European countries experienced their greatest military conflicts. For the period 1870 to 1913, the average annual growth rate of real world trade was 3.4 percent (3.2 percent for Europe). From 1985 to 1994 real world trade increased about 1.7 times (6 percent a year) and trade volume in the East Asian region (excluding Japan) increased almost fivefold.6 Countries that enjoy growing prosperity brought about by peaceful exchange are not about to seek prosperity by appropriating another's territory. Against the general belief that today's prosperity is generated from international trade and investment, it is unlikely that a government would start a war to seek prestige or score other gains**.**

#### Regional institutions and US military

Takahashi ’97 (Takuma,- . Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies “Economic Interdependence and Security in the East Asia-Pacific Region” in “Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations”, Mike Mochizuki, ed., pg. 105-6)

The last argument for regional stability is that the strength of territorial claims in East Asia is much weaker than in nineteenth century Europe. Before European colonial domination of the region, East Asia had not known the concept of territoriality, especially with regard to the periphery. For example, when fifty-four Ryukyuans were killed in Taiwan in 1871, an official of the Qing dynasty told a Japanese diplomat that the Taiwanese people were "outside of civilization" and so the emperor would not punish them.1O In most of East Asia, borders have been drawn according to the Western mode, but some areas remain untouched. There are at least fifteen maritime, border, or island sovereignty disputes on-going in the region. These could result from the absence of a concept of exclusive territory until recent times. Many of these disputes involve China, but at least five are among ASEAN countries.11 In any case, East Asians appear willing to subsume the issue of sovereignty, at least for territory in peripheral areas, in the expectation of joint development. Japan has been following this concept since it successfully applied to the former Soviet Union to negotiate an exclusive economic zone for fishery rights. Recently, it has become more difficult for Japan to carry out this strategy Increased nationalism has led some East Asian countries to seek; advantage over others. There have been more and more claims and counterclaims under the Law of the Sea, which divides the sovereignty· of the continental shelves. But while nationalism is fanning territorial disputes, the region has begun to develop the institutions to resolve or **control them**. China had long refused to join multilateral discussions on territorial issues. Nevertheless, through the ASEAN Regional Forum the ASEAN states persuaded it to come to the negotiating table to discuss the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands, a regional flash point because of potential deposits of minerals and oil. The cooperative framework of APEC and the **deterrent effect** of the U.S. presence help to keep China from bullying smaller countries in the region.

#### Shared values

Desker ’08 (Barry,- Dean of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies 'Why War in Asia Remains Unlikely' http://www.iiss.org/conferences/asias-strategic-challenges-in-search-of-a-common-agenda/conference-papers/fifth-session-conflict-in-asia/why-war-in-asia-remains-unlikely-barry-desker/)

Just as Western dominance in the past century led to Western ideas shaping international institutions and global values, Asian leaders and Asian thinkers will increasingly participate in and shape the global discourse, whether it is on the role of international institutions, the rules governing international trade or the doctrines which under-gird responses to humanitarian crises. An emerging Beijing Consensus is not premised on the rise of the ‘East’ and decline of the ‘West’, as sometimes seemed to be the sub-text of the earlier Asian values debate. I do not share the triumphalism of my friends Kishore Mahbubani and Tommy Koh. However, like the Asian values debate, this new debate reflects alternative philosophical traditions. The issue is the appropriate balance between the rights of the individual and those of the state. This debate will highlight the shared identity and shared values between China and the states in the region. I do not agree with those in the US who argue that Sino-US competition will result in “intense security competition with considerable potential for war” in which most of China’s neighbours “will join with the United States to contain China’s power.”[1] These shared values are likely to reduce the risk of conflict and result in regional pressure for an accommodation with China and the adoption of policies of engagement with China, rather than confrontation with an emerging China.

### A/T “Korea War”

#### North Korean war won’t escalate or go nuclear

Meyer ’03 (Carlton, Editor – G2 Military, The Mythical North Korean Threat, http://www.g2mil.com/korea.htm)

Even if North Korea employs a few crudenuclear weapons, using them would be suicidal since it would invite instant retaliation from the United States**.** North Korea lacks the technical know-how to build an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile**,** despite the hopes and lies from the National Missile Defense proponents in the USA.  North Korea's industrial production is almost zero, over two million people have starved in recent years, and millions of homeless nomads threaten internal revolution. The US military ignores this reality and retains old plans for the deployment of 450,000 GIs to help defend South Korea, even though the superior South Korean military can halt any North Korean offensive without help from a single American soldier. American forces are not even required for a counter-offensive.A North Korean attack would stall after a few intensedays and South Korean forces would soon be in position tooverrun North Korea**.** American air and naval power along with logistical and intelligence supportwould ensure the rapid collapse of the North Korean army**.**

#### North Korean conflict extremely unlikely

Meyer ’03 (Carlton, Editor – G2 Military, The Mythical North Korean Threat, http://www.g2mil.com/korea.htm)

The chance of a Korean war is extremely unlikely.  North Korean leaders realize they have no hope of success without major backing from China or Russia.  The previous South Korean President, Kim Dae Jung, encouraged peace and visited North Korea.  The two countries are reconnecting rail lines and sent a combined team to the Olympics.  Even the United States is providing $500 million dollars a year in food to the starving North Koreans.  The new South Korean President, Roh-Moo-hyun was elected on a peace platform and suggested US troops may be gone within ten years.

#### Threats of war are a negotiating tactic – no risk of escalation

Schmitt ’03 (Eric – Staff, NYT, International Herald Tribune, 3-14, Lexis)

North Korea is highly likely to step up its provocations in a bid to gain financial aid and diplomatic attention from the United States, according to the two most senior officers overseeing American military operations in South Korea. The commanders' remarks came as a senior State Department official said North Korea could produce highly enriched uranium as fuel for nuclear weapons within months, not years, much earlier than many experts believed possible. That would mean that North Korea could produce weapons-grade material from both its uranium and plutonium programs in a short period of time. "The enriched-uranium issue, which some have assumed is somewhere off in the fog of the distant future, is not," the official, James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Wednesday. "It is only probably a matter of months, not years, behind the plutonium" program, he said. The new assessment came amid a string of recent provocations by North Korea that Kelly said were intended to "blackmail" the United States and intimidate its allies into bilateral talks on the terms favorable to North Korea. In recent days, North Korea has started a nuclear reactor that could produce plutonium for nuclear weapons, conducted its first missile launching in three years and intercepted an air force reconnaissance plane in international airspace. The two senior military officers, Admiral Thomas Fargo, the commander of American forces in the Pacific, and General Leon LaPorte, the head of allied ground forces in South Korea, said North Korea would probably continue this pattern, perhaps by starting up its nuclear reprocessor, provoking an incident along the demilitarized zone or at sea, or even conducting an underground nuclear test. "It's highly likely they'll continue to politically escalate the situation," LaPorte told a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee on Wednesday. He added that the motive of North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Il, was to try to "guarantee the survival of his regime and to gain economic assistance for his failed economy." Fargo added, "I would not be surprised to see further provocations of some variety." Neither officer said there were any signs of an imminent attack by North Korean forces, and Fargo said the threat of war right now with North Korea was "low." The United States has about 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea.

### Layne prodict

#### Layne’s analysis is legit.

Walter **LeFeber**, Maria Underhill Noll Professor of History at Cornell University, **‘7**

([http://www.amazon.com/Peace-Illusions-American-Strategy-Security/dp/0801474116/ref=pd\_bbs\_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1203444192&sr=8-1](http://www.amazon.com/Peace-Illusions-American-Strategy-Security/dp/0801474116/ref%3Dpd_bbs_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1203444192&sr=8-1))

Anyone who believes U.S. foreign policy has been mainly defensive since World War II, or thinks that this policy became transformed after the 9/11 attacks, should read this superb analysis of the Bush administration's diplomacy, the central roots of which run back nearly a century to Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. With a sure grasp of both the historical facts and the theories that have driven the U.S. quest for global hegemony, Christopher Layne has made a masterful contribution to the intensifying post-Iraq-invasion debate over the course Americans are taking in their foreign policies."--Walter LaFeber, Tisch University Professor, Cornell Universit