# HEGEMONY STUFFZ

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# Misc

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### Prolif Bad

#### Accidental nuclear war outweighs all other risks – smaller state’s arsenals are inherently unsafe

**Maass 10** Richard Maass, working for his Ph. D. in political science at Notre dame University, and currently teaches classes there on International Relations. 2010 “Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony” http://www.hamilton.edu/documents//levitt-center/Maass\_article.pdf

Regime stability in both these proliferating and existing nuclear states constitutes a major international security issue. Command and control issues (meaning nuclear arsenals’ vulnerability to accidental and unauthorized use) cause special concerns. If the assumptions of rational framework theory don’t hold, it “raises doubts about whether any state can build a large nuclear arsenal that is completely secure from accident” (Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg. 73). Emerging nuclear states often lack the financial resources needed to produce safe weapons designs. The international community’s non-proliferation posture also strongly inhibits the ability to conduct full-scale nuclear weapons tests, preventing the development of effective and safe designs. Combined with the domestic instability present in many proliferating states, this lack of testing makes accidental detonations become extremely plausible. Domestic stability is critical, as “political unrest can increase the risk of nuclear weapons accidents by encouraging unsafe transportation, or testing operations”(Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg. 82). During China’s Cultural Revolution, Marshal Nie Rongzhen launched a test missile eight hundred kilometers across China, armed with a live nuclear warhead, to display the successes of its nuclear program (Sagan and Waltz, 2003, pg. 82). Nie’s decision shows that newly proliferating states may determine their actual behavior by the illogical objectives of military organizations within those states. The parochial interests of these military organizations may not coincide with national interest, and so lead to accidental uses of nuclear weapons. This further degrades deterrence measures despite rational state interests to the contrary.

#### Middle East prolif leads to nuclear war - kills hegemony

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Nuclear proliferation decreases the United States’ military strength relative to other nations as they develop nuclear arsenals, creating a paradox of “weak state power”(Ae-Park, 2001, pg. 451). Essentially, nuclear weapons place states on a level playing field, producing an equalizing effect. Relatively weaker nations “favor nuclearization as a way of leveling the playing field” (Trachtenberg, 2002, pg. 152). In regions vital to U.S. political affairs, proliferation escalates political tensions, potentially decreasing U.S. influence. In the Middle East, increased friction among Arabic states with unstable U.S. relations would severely inhibit the United States’ access to the region’s oil resources. The U.S. Department of Defense stated the following sentiment to this effect in its 2001 report “Proliferation: Threat and Response”: U.S. goals in the Middle East and Africa include securing a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace…building and maintaining security arrangements that assure the stability of the Gulf region and unimpeded commercial access to its petroleum reserves…In this volatile region, the proliferation of [nuclear] weapons and the means of delivering them poses a significant challenge to the ability of the United States to achieve these goals (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2001, pg. 33).Post World War II, the U.S. maintains a military presence in the Middle East to ensure access to petroleum reserves. Proliferation constitutes a pressing threat to regional stability as Gulf states compete to control critical oil supplies in order to further their political and military objectives. The spread of nuclear weapons would escalate conflict tensions and increase the will to confront the United States and threaten its regional interests. States, such as Iran, recognize they cannot conventionally match U.S. military power and thus seek alternative means to combat the U.S., in an effort to offset their own relative weakness (US Department of Defense, 2001, pg.1).

#### Asian prolif turns hegemony

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Nuclear weapons’ equalizing effect makes them increasingly appealing as an asymmetrical means to counter the United States’ conventional military superiority. North Korea currently pursues a controversial nuclear program to combat power disparities with the United States and other major powers in the Far East, such as China and Japan. North Korea’s proliferation is perhaps the most threatening of all, in terms of U.S. interests, for several reasons. A nuclear North Korea poses a major threat as a supplier of nuclear technology. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, North Korea already grosses an average of $580 million annually from missile sales to northern Africa and the Middle East, making it the single largest exporter worldwide (CIA, 2003, pg. 56). Should Pyongyang obtain nuclear weapons, it would become a major exporter of nuclear technologies. The emergence of new nuclear states in both northeast Asia and the Middle East, as a product of North Korean exports, would drastically exacerbate regional instability, seriously inhibiting U.S. influence and reducing the non-proliferation regime’s efficiency. Unstable regimes in these newly proliferated states establish a major threat not only to the U.S., but to global security. These regimes become prime sources for radical militant and terrorist groups to obtain nuclear weapons. Most alarmingly, if North Korea goes nuclear, other states in the region may question their own security and decide to follow suit. Dick Cheney stated the following regarding North Korea’s proliferation on Meet the Press on March 16, 2003: A nuclear-armed North Korea…will probably set off an arms race in that part of the world, and others, perhaps Japan, for example, may be forced to consider whether they want to readdress the nuclear question (Cheney, 2003). Despite Cheney’s questionable record on political forecasts, he rightly acknowledges that North Korea’s proliferation may force other countries to pursue their own nuclear programs. Japan’s civilian stockpile of weapon-grade plutonium could plausibly be converted to hundreds of nuclear warheads in a matter of months or even weeks (Cirincione, 2007, pg. 105). If Japan were to go nuclear, South Korea would likely follow due to a security imperative, despite U.S. countermeasures. The resulting proliferation of northeast Asia erodes U.S. interests and assets; U.S. businesses currently conduct more than $500 billion in transactions in the region and have invested another $150 billion (US Department of Defense, 2001, pg.7). Proliferation of northeast Asian states jeopardizes U.S. economic affairs and reduces the United States’ ability to use its leverage as an international hegemon, due to the relative bargaining power those states gain through the possession of nuclear weapons,

### AT: Prolif Good

#### Nuclear deterrence theory is wrong – there’s only a risk conflict and accidental nuclear war

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Ultimately an assumption, rational deterrence theory lacks any empirically tested evidence. Nuclear proliferation exponentially increases the possibility of non-proliferation regime collapse and nuclear conflict, reducing all states’ relative power. Nuclear peace theory seems plausible, but like any mathematical model it may only marginally apply to world politics and the dynamics of nuclear proliferation, due to the fact that “international security is not reducible to the theory of mathematical games” (Bracken, 2002, pg. 403). Rather, the spread of nuclear weapons exponentially decreases the stability of regional and global politics by intensifying regional rivalries and political tensions, both of which may potentially catalyze a nuclear catastrophe. Frustrated with a lack of results through conventional conflict, desperate states may look to nuclear arsenals as a source of absolute resolution for any given conflict. The use of nuclear weapons, even in a limited theater, could plausibly trigger chain reactions rippling across the globe. With their interests and sovereignty threatened, other nuclear states will eventually use their own weapons in an effort to ensure national security. President Kennedy warned of the danger of nuclear proliferation in 1963: I ask you to stop and think for a moment what it would mean to have nuclear weapons in so many hands, in the hands of countries…there would be no rest for anyone then, no stability, no real security…there would only be the increased chance of accidental war, and an increased necessity for the great powers to involve themselves in what otherwise would be local conflicts (Cirincione, 2007, pg. 103). Proliferation decreases the relative security of all states not only through the possibility of direct conflict, but also by threatening foreign and domestic interests. As the sole international hegemon, the U.S. seeks to use its power to insure its security and influence international politics in a way that reflects its own interests and values (Huntington, 1993, pg. 70). In addition to creating a direct security threat, further proliferation jeopardizes the United States’ ability to project its primacy and promote its interests internationally.

### Terror Defense

#### Terrorism isn’t an existential threat – the government has blown it out of proportion and makes the problem worse

**Mearsheimer 11** John J. Mearsheimer, the “R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago” Jan/Feb 2011 “Imperial By Design” http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0059.pdf

Finally, the ability of terrorists to strike the American homeland has been blown out of all proportion. In the nine years since 9/11, government officials and terrorist experts have issued countless warnings that another major attack on American soil is probable—even imminent. But this is simply not the case. 3 The only attempts we have seen are a few failed solo attacks by individuals with links to al-Qaeda like the “shoe bomber,” who attempted to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami in December 2001, and the “underwear bomber,” who tried to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit in December 2009. So, **we do have a terrorism problem, but it is hardly an existential threat. In fact, it is a minor threat**. Perhaps the scope of the challenge is best captured by Ohio State political scientist John Mueller’s telling comment that “the number of Americans killed by international terrorism since the late 1960s . . . is about the same as the number killed over the same period by lightning, or by accident-causing deer, or by severe allergic reactions to peanuts.” One might argue that there has been no attack on American soil since 9/11 because the gwot has been a great success. But that claim is undermined by the fact that alQaeda was trying hard to strike the United States in the decade before 9/11, when there was no gwot, and it succeeded only once. In February 1993, al-Qaeda exploded a truck bomb in a garage below the World Trade Center, killing six people. More than eight years passed before the group struck that same building complex for the second time. None of this is to deny that 9/11 was a spectacular success for the terrorists, but it was no Pearl Harbor, which launched the United States into battles against Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany, two truly dangerous adversaries. Roughly 50 million people—the majority of them civilians— died in that conflict. It is absurd to compare al-Qaeda with Germany and Japan, or to liken the gwot to a world war. This conspicuous threat inflation has hurt the American effort to neutralize al-Qaeda. By foolishly widening the scope of the terrorism problem, Washington has ended up picking fights with terrorist groups and countries that otherwise had no interest in attacking the United States, and in some cases were willing to help us thwart al-Qaeda. Enlarging the target set has also led American policy makers to take their eyes off our main adversary. Furthermore, defining the terrorist threat so broadly, coupled with the constant warnings about looming attacks that might be even more deadly than 9/11, has led U.S. leaders to wage war all around the globe and to think of this struggle as lasting for generations. This is exactly the wrong formula for dealing with our terrorism problem. We should instead focus our attention wholly on al-Qaeda and any other group that targets the United States, and we should treat the threat as a law-enforcement problem rather than a military one that requires us to engage in largescale wars the world over. Specifically, we should rely mainly on intelligence, police work, carefully selected covert operations and close cooperation with allies to neutralize the likes of al-Qaeda.

### Econ Decline Turns Heg

#### Further economic decline causes a violent transition away from hegemony

**Kupchan 11** Charles A. Kupchan, professor of international affairs at Georgetown University and senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations for US. Foreign policy, July 2011 “Grand strategy and power transitions” http://asp.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/Kupchan.%20Grand%20Strat%20and%20Power%20Formatted%20PDF.pdf

An alternative pathway to conflict could entail the impact of unforeseen economic shocks on Chinese and U.S. grand strategy. As the inter-war period amply demonstrated, economic duress can cause both strategic excess and the converse – dangerous under-balancing. China, the United States, and the broader international community seem to have handled reasonably well the “Great Recession” of 2008-2010, avoiding the steep and enduring declines in economic performance of the sort that produced strategic dysfunction during the 1930s. At least to some extent, the international community seems to have learned the lessons of the 1930s and avoided the sauve qui peut attitudes that fragmented the collective staying power of the status quo states during the inter-war period. Nonetheless, the potential for future economic shocks to complicate the coming power transition remains very real.

# Hegemony Good

## Solves War

### 1AC Liberalism/MultiPol Bad

#### Heg is good

**Kagan 12**, Robert, senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution [“Why the World Needs America,” February 11th, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203646004577213262856669448.html>]

With the outbreak of World War I, the age of settled peace and advancing liberalism—of European civilization approaching its pinnacle—collapsed into an age of hyper-nationalism, despotism and economic calamity. The once-promising spread of democracy and liberalism halted and then reversed course, leaving a handful of outnumbered and besieged democracies living nervously in the shadow of fascist and totalitarian neighbors. The collapse of the British and European orders in the 20th century did not produce a new dark age—though if Nazi Germany and imperial Japan had prevailed, it might have—but the horrific conflict that it produced was, in its own way, just as devastating. Would the end of the present American-dominated order have less dire consequences? A surprising number of American intellectuals, politicians and policy makers greet the prospect with equanimity. There is a general sense that the end of the era of American pre-eminence, if and when it comes, need not mean the end of the present international order, with its widespread freedom, unprecedented global prosperity (even amid the current economic crisis) and absence of war among the great powers. American power may diminish, the political scientist G. John Ikenberry argues, but "the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive." The commentator Fareed Zakaria believes that even as the balance shifts against the U.S., rising powers like China "will continue to live within the framework of the current international system." And there are elements across the political spectrum—Republicans who call for retrenchment, Democrats who put their faith in international law and institutions—who don't imagine that a "post-American world" would look very different from the American world. If all of this sounds too good to be true, it is. The present world order was largely shaped by American power and reflects American interests and preferences. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other nations, the world order will change to suit their interests and preferences. Nor can we assume that all the great powers in a post-American world would agree on the benefits of preserving the present order, or have the capacity to preserve it, even if they wanted to. Take the issue of democracy. For several decades, the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the great-power autocracies. Both Beijing and Moscow already protect dictators like Syria's Bashar al-Assad. If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. The balance in a new, multipolar world might be more favorable to democracy if some of the rising democracies—Brazil, India, Turkey, South Africa—picked up the slack from a declining U.S. Yet not all of them have the desire or the capacity to do it. What about the economic order of free markets and free trade? People assume that China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. Unfortunately, they might not be able to help themselves. The creation and survival of a liberal economic order has depended, historically, on great powers that are both willing and able to support open trade and free markets, often with naval power. If a declining America is unable to maintain its long-standing hegemony on the high seas, would other nations take on the burdens and the expense of sustaining navies to fill in the gaps? Even if they did, would this produce an open global commons—or rising tension? China and India are building bigger navies, but the result so far has been greater competition, not greater security. As Mohan Malik has noted in this newspaper, their "maritime rivalry could spill into the open in a decade or two," when India deploys an aircraft carrier in the Pacific Ocean and China deploys one in the Indian Ocean. The move from American-dominated oceans to collective policing by several great powers could be a recipe for competition and conflict rather than for a liberal economic order. And do the Chinese really value an open economic system? The Chinese economy soon may become the largest in the world, but it will be far from the richest. Its size is a product of the country's enormous population, but in per capita terms, China remains relatively poor. The U.S., Germany and Japan have a per capita GDP of over $40,000. China's is a little over $4,000, putting it at the same level as Angola, Algeria and Belize. Even if optimistic forecasts are correct, China's per capita GDP by 2030 would still only be half that of the U.S., putting it roughly where Slovenia and Greece are today. Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open international economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power that it brings. They might kill the goose that lays the golden eggs because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive. Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great powers for the better part of six decades? Would it survive in a post-American world? Most commentators who welcome this scenario imagine that American predominance would be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But multipolar systems have historically been neither particularly stable nor particularly peaceful. Rough parity among powerful nations is a source of uncertainty that leads to **miscalculation**. Conflicts erupt as a result of fluctuations in the delicate power equation. War among the great powers was a common, if not constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity from the 16th to the 18th centuries, culminating in the series of enormously destructive Europe-wide wars that followed the French Revolution and ended with Napoleon's defeat in 1815. The 19th century was notable for two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated by major conflicts. The Crimean War (1853-1856) was a mini-world war involving well over a million Russian, French, British and Turkish troops, as well as forces from nine other nations; it produced almost a half-million dead combatants and many more wounded. In the Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), the two nations together fielded close to two million troops, of whom nearly a half-million were killed or wounded. The peace that followed these conflicts was characterized by increasing tension and competition, numerous war scares and massive increases in armaments on both land and sea. Its climax was World War I, the most destructive and deadly conflict that mankind had known up to that point. As the political scientist Robert W. Tucker has observed, "Such stability and moderation as the balance brought rested ultimately on the threat or use of force. War remained the essential means for maintaining the balance of power." There is little reason to believe that a return to multipolarity in the 21st century would bring greater peace and stability than it has in the past. The era of American predominance has shown that **there is no better recipe for** great-power **peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand**. President Bill Clinton left office believing that the key task for America was to "create the world we would like to live in when we are no longer the world's only superpower," to prepare for "a time when we would have to share the stage." It is an eminently sensible-sounding proposal. But can it be done? For particularly in matters of security, the rules and institutions of international order rarely survive the decline of the nations that erected them. They are like scaffolding around a building: They don't hold the building up; the building holds them up. Many foreign-policy experts see the present international order as the inevitable result of human progress, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of government—forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. Americans certainly like to believe that our preferred order survives because it is right and just—not only for us but for everyone. We assume that the triumph of democracy is the triumph of a better idea, and the victory of market capitalism is the victory of a better system, and that both are irreversible. That is why Francis Fukuyama's thesis about "the end of history" was so attractive at the end of the Cold War and retains its appeal even now, after it has been discredited by events. The idea of inevitable evolution means that there is no requirement to impose a decent order. It will merely happen. But international order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others—in America's case, the domination of free-market and democratic principles, together with an international system that supports them. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. There was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. No divine providence or unfolding Hegelian dialectic required the triumph of democracy and capitalism, and there is no guarantee that their success will outlast the powerful nations that have fought for them. Democratic progress and liberal economics have been and can be reversed and undone. The ancient democracies of Greece and the republics of Rome and Venice all fell to more powerful forces or through their own failings. The evolving liberal economic order of Europe collapsed in the 1920s and 1930s. The better idea doesn't have to win just because it is a better idea. It requires great powers to champion it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms that American power has supported will decline, too. Or more likely, if history is a guide, they may collapse altogether as we make a transition to another kind of world order, or to disorder. We may discover then that the U.S. was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but **chaos and catastrophe**—which is what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.

### 2AC Liberalism

#### Statistical evidence proves

**Owen 11** John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 [www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/)

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and men dacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about mutually assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in international war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in civil wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon.

### 2AC History

#### History proves hegemony solves war

**Drezner 05** [Daniel, Gregg Easterbrook, Associate Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, “War, and the dangers of extrapolation,” may 25]

Daily explosions in Iraq, massacres in Sudan, the Koreas smakestaring at each other through artillery barrels, a Hobbesian war of all against all in eastern Congo--combat plagues human society as it has, perhaps, since our distant forebears realized that a tree limb could be used as a club. But here is something you would never guess from watching the news: War has entered a cycle of decline. Combat in Iraq and in a few other places is an exception to a significant global trend that has gone nearly unnoticed--namely that, for about 15 years, there have been steadily fewer armed conflicts worldwide. In fact, it is possible that a person's chance of dying because of war has, in the last decade or more, become the lowest in human history. Is Easterbrook right? He has a few more paragraphs on the numbers: The University of Maryland studies find the number of wars and armed conflicts worldwide peaked in 1991 at 51, which may represent the most wars happening simultaneously at any point in history. Since 1991, the number has fallen steadily. There were 26 armed conflicts in 2000 and 25 in 2002, even after the Al Qaeda attack on the United States and the U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan. By 2004, Marshall and Gurr's latest study shows, the number of armed conflicts in the world had declined to 20, even after the invasion of Iraq. All told, there were less than half as many wars in 2004 as there were in 1991. Marshall and Gurr also have a second ranking, gauging the magnitude of fighting. This section of the report is more subjective. Everyone agrees that the worst moment for human conflict was World War II; but how to rank, say, the current separatist fighting in Indonesia versus, say, the Algerian war of independence is more speculative. Nevertheless, the Peace and Conflict studies name 1991 as the peak post-World War II year for totality of global fighting, giving that year a ranking of 179 on a scale that rates the extent and destructiveness of combat. By 2000, in spite of war in the Balkans and genocide in Rwanda, the number had fallen to 97; by 2002 to 81; and, at the end of 2004, it stood at 65. This suggests the extent andintensity of global combat is now less than half what it was 15 years ago. Easterbrook spends the rest of the essay postulating the causes of this -- the decline in great power war, the spread of democracies, the growth of economic interdependence, and even the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations. Easterbrook makes a lot of good points -- most people are genuinely shocked when they are told that even in a post-9/11 climate, there has been a steady and persistent decline in wars and deaths from wars. That said, what bothers me in the piece is what Easterbrook leaves out. First, he neglects to mention the biggest reason for why war is on the decline -- there's a global hegemon called the United States right now. Easterbrook acknowledges that "the most powerful factor must be the end of the cold war" but he doesn't understand why it's the most powerful factor. Elsewhere in the piece he talks about the growing comity among the great powers, without discussing the elephant in the room: the reason the "great powers" get along is that the United States is much, much more powerful than anyone else. If you quantify power only by relative military capabilities, the U.S. is a great power, there are maybe ten or so middle powers, and then there are a lot of mosquitoes.[If the U.S. is so powerful, why can't it subdue the Iraqi insurgency?--ed. Power is a relative measure -- the U.S. might be having difficulties, but no other country in the world would have fewer problems.] Joshua Goldstein, who knows a thing or two about this phenomenon, made this clear in a Christian Science Monitor op-ed three years ago: We probably owe this lull to the end of the cold war, and to a unipolar world order with a single superpower to impose its will in places like Kuwait, Serbia, and Afghanistan. The emerging world order is not exactly benign – Sept. 11 comes to mind – and Pax Americana delivers neither justice nor harmony to the corners of the earth. But a unipolar world is inherently more peaceful than the bipolar one where two superpowers fueled rival armies around the world. The long-delayed "peace dividend" has arrived, like a tax refund check long lost in the mail. The difference in language between Goldstein and Easterbrook highlights my second problem with "The End of War?" Goldstein rightly refers to the past fifteen years as a "lull" -- a temporary reduction in war and war-related death. The flip side of U.S. hegemony being responsible for the reduction of armed conflict is what would happen if U.S. hegemony were to ever fade away. Easterbrook focuses on the trends that suggest an ever-decreasing amount of armed conflict -- and I hope he's right. But I'm enough of a realist to know that if the U.S. should find its primacy challenged by, say, a really populous non-democratic country on the other side of the Pacific Ocean, all best about the utility of economic interdependence, U.N. peacekeeping, and the spread of democracy are right out the window. UPDATE: To respond to a few thoughts posted by the commenters: 1) To spell things out a bit more clearly -- U.S. hegemony important to the reduction of conflict in two ways. First, U.S. power can act as a powerful if imperfect constraint on pairs of enduring rivals (Greece-Turkey, India-Pakistan) that contemplate war on a regular basis. It can't stop every conflict, but it can blunt a lot of them. Second, and more important to Easterbrook's thesis, U.S. supremacy in conventional military affairs prevents other middle-range states -- China, Russia, India, Great Britain, France, etc. -- from challenging the U.S. or each other in a war. It would be suicide for anyone to fight a war with the U.S., and if any of these countries waged a war with each other, the prospect of U.S. intervention would be equally daunting. 2) Many commenters think what's important is the number of casualties, not the number of wars. This is tricky, however, because of the changing nature of warfighting and medical science. Compared to, say, World War II, wars now have far less of an effect on civilian populations. Furthermore, more people survive combat injuries because of improvements in medicine. These are both salutory trends, but I dunno if that means that war as a tool of statecraft is over -- if anything, it makes the use of force potentially more attractive, because of the minimization of spillover effects.

### 2AC Multipol Bad

#### Unipolarity generates much less incentive for war than multipolarity- only our evidence is comparative

Wohlforth 9(William C. Wohlforth, professor of government at Dartmouth College, January 2009, “UNIPOLARITY, STATUSCOMPETITION, AND GREAT POWER WAR”, p. 28-30) //ZA

To most observers, moreover, satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the status quo among today’s great powers appear to be driven by factors having little or nothing to do with the system’s polarity. “For most scholars,” writes Robert Jervis, “the fundamental cause of war is international anarchy, compounded by the security dilemma. These forces press hardest on the leading powers because while they may be able to guarantee the security of others, no one can provide this escape from the state of nature for them.” But for today’s leading powers anarchy induced security problems appear to be ameliorated by nuclear deterrence, the spread of democracy, the declining beneﬁts of conquest, and changing collective ideas, among other factors. In combination, these factors appear to moderate insecurity and resulting clashes over the status quo, which most scholars believe drive states to war. Mainstream theories of war thus seem irrelevant to what Jervis terms an “era of leading power peace.” The upshot is a near scholarly consensus that unipolarity’s consequences for great power conﬂict are indeterminate and that a power shift resulting in a return to bipolarity or multipolarity will not raise the specter of great power war. This article questions the consensus on two counts. First, I show that it depends crucially on a dubious assumption about human motivation. Prominent theories of war are based on the assumption that people are mainly motivated by the instrumental pursuit of tangible ends such as physical security and material prosperity.

This is why such theories seem irrelevant to interactions among great powers in an international environment that diminishes the utility of war for the pursuit of such ends. Yet we know that people are motivated by a great many noninstrumental motives, not least by concerns regarding their social status. 3 As John Harsanyi noted, “Apart from economic payoffs, social status (social rank) seems to be the most important incentive and motivating force of social behavior.”4 This proposition rests on much firmer scientific ground now than when Harsanyi expressed it a generation ago, as cumulating research shows that humans appear to be hardwired for sensitivity to status and that relative standing is a powerful and independent motivator of behavior.5 [End Page 29] Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. 6 Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is. Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.7 “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”8 While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum.9

#### **Also ensures the escalation of war – WWI proves**

Christensen and Snyder 11(Thomas J. Christensen, senior fellow at Brookings Institute, professor of politics and international affairs and co-director of the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program at Princeton University, Jack L. Snyder, Professor of International Relations at Columbia University, May 9, 2011, “Multipolarity, Perceptions, and the Tragedy of 1914”, International Studies Quarterly) //ZA

To explain chain-ganging, we combined two separate variables, one structural and the other perceptual (Tierney only allows us the latter). The structural variable—multipolarity (as opposed to bipolarity)—means that great powers seek allies and fear isolation because any group of two or more other great powers can threaten the security of an isolated state. Perceptions enter the picture because the degree to which one state views its own security as directly tied to the near-term security of a real or potential ally depends on strategic threat perceptions about the efficacy of offensive aggression by the opposing alliance. In worlds in which attackers are believed to have the advantage (offense dominance) and initial victories are predicted to snowball into greater strategic advantages for the attacker, states tend to ally more tightly so that, when conflict occurs (for whatever reasons), allies on both sides quickly enter the fray out of the fear that their indispensable allies might be eliminated quickly, leaving them far more vulnerable. Multipolarity and perceived offense dominance combine, we argue, to explain why European states were so quick to escalate in the fateful summer of 1914. We contrast this to Europe in the late 1930s, a period in which an objectively much more pressing and serious threat was allowed to spread because of the relatively lethargic initial response of the members of the future anti-fascist coalition. There we argue that belief in defensive advantage and predictions of a long and attritional war in which attackers would be worn down by defenders led various states to try to pass the buck of opposing Hitler early to other potential or actual allies. Just as we have no “chain-ganging theory” for the outbreak of war in 1914, we have no “buck-passing theory” for the outbreak of war in 1938–1940. Our theory instead is designed to explain when buck-passing and chain-ganging are most likely to occur in conflict-ridden environments. In terms of the history of the period leading up to World War I covered by Tierney, we see no problem, in principle, in distinguishing between types of actors as more or less aggressive. But even for Tierney’s purpose of explaining the initial outbreak of conflict, which differs from our own in our article, it is important to recognize how multipolarity and beliefs about offensive efficacy affected the behavior of both Tierney’s “hawkish” and “dovish” regimes. Despite aggressive German diplomacy and military policy, Germany’s overall strategic optimism was not as unalloyed as Tierney portrays it. Rather than simply egging Austria-Hungary on, and there was plenty of that, Berlin also balked briefly on the brink of war with its “halt in Belgrade” proposal, an eleventh-hour initiative to keep the peace once it was clear that not only France, but also Great Britain, could line up on Russia’s side in a European War. This proposal was, however, rejected by Austria-Hungary and eventually by Germany itself in part because once mobilization of the future combatants, including Russia, had begun, losing the military initiative was considered too risky in the world we describe.

### Exts – Escalation

#### **Conflict escalates globally in a system of multipolarity- WWI proves**

Christensen and Snyder 11(Thomas J. Christensen, senior fellow at Brookings Institute, professor of politics and international affairs and co-director of the Princeton-Harvard China and the World Program at Princeton University, Jack L. Snyder, Professor of International Relations at Columbia University, May 9, 2011, “Multipolarity, Perceptions, and the Tragedy of 1914”, International Studies Quarterly) //ZA

Unfortunately, wars break out all too frequently. Fortunately, global conflagrations like World Wars I and II are much more rare. Our article is not about the outbreak of conflict. It is about how small conflicts in multipolarity can escalate into global ones and how aggressors in multipolar settings can be left unchecked until only a global struggle can stop them. World War I is the flagship example of the former. If we exclude strategic misperceptions in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and France as motivators for action in any explanation of the war and its alliance dynamics, we are left with a history of events that begs the crucial questions. Tierney states matter-of-factly that by 1914 the “interests of both Germany and Austria-Hungary in war had come into alignment,” but never explains why. He also states that Germany restrained Austria in 1912–1913 because the “situation was not optimal for war.” When did it become optimal? 1914? Exactly how, at that time, did launching a war that would lead to the destruction of Austria-Hungary and the amputation of German territories serve the interests of either state? If the issue was purely countering Russia in the Balkans, why start the war by attacking France? Looking at the other camp, was France wise to egg Russia on to adopt a tough policy toward Austria-Hungary when it paid such a dear price in the ensuing war? That is not to mention the Russian state itself, which would fall to a revolution by war’s end. Simply labeling the European states hawks or doves fails to explain this enormous human tragedy. Our original article was one attempt to provide such an explanation.

### Exts – Causes War

#### Heg decline prompts other countries to attack

**Kagan 12 –** senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution (Robert “The world America Made”)

One of the main causes of war throughout history has been a rough parity of power that leaves nations in doubt about who is stronger. Rough parity creates uncertainty about which power might prevail in war, which leads to a complex interaction of probes and posturing between the contending powers that greatly increase the likelihood of a genuine test to discover which is actually the more powerful. Wars tend to break out as a result of large-scale shifts in the power equation, when the upward trajectory of a rising power comes close to intersecting the downward trajectory of a declining power. The great miracle of the Cold War was that the United States and the Soviet Union never decided to test their relative strength, though there were times when they came dangerously close. There is no better recipe for great-power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand. And it is no coincidence that scholars began talking about the impossibility of great-power conﬂict after the Cold War, when the United States suddenly enjoyed such a vast military superiority over every other potential challenger. Were that superiority to erode, the return of great-power competition would make great-power war more likely again.

#### **Multipolarity establishes competition for power- the stratified hierarchy of unipolarity solves conflict**

Wohlforth 9(William C. Wohlforth, professor of government at Dartmouth College, January 2009, “UNIPOLARITY, STATUSCOMPETITION, AND GREAT POWER WAR”, p. 28-30) //ZA

When applied to the setting of great power politics, these propositions suggest that the nature and intensity of status competition will be influenced by the nature of the polarity that characterizes the system. Multipolarity implies a flat hierarchy in which no state is unambiguously number one. Under such a setting, the theory predicts status inconsistency and intense pressure on each state to resolve it in a way that reflects favorably on itself. In this sense, all states are presumptively revisionist in that the absence of a settled hierarchy provides incentives to establish one. But the theory expects the process of establishing a hierarchy to be prone to conflict: any state would be expected to prefer a status quo under which there are no unambiguous superiors to any other state’s successful bid for primacy. Thus, an order in which one’s own state is number one is preferred to the status quo, which is preferred to any order in which another state is number one. The expected result will be periodic bids for primacy, resisted by other great powers.37 For its part, bipolarity, with only two states in a material position to claim primacy, implies a somewhat more stratified hierarchy that is less prone to ambiguity. Each superpower would be expected to see the other as the main relevant out-group, while second-tier major powers would compare themselves to either or both of them. Given the two poles’ clear material preponderance, second-tier major powers would not be expected to experience status dissonance and dissatisfaction, and, to the extent they did, the odds would favor their adoption of strategies of social creativity instead of conflict. For their part, the poles would be expected to seek to establish a hierarchy: each would obviously prefer to be number one, but absent that each would also prefer an ambiguous status quo in which neither is dominant to an order in which it is unambiguously outranked by the other. Unipolarity implies the most stratified hierarchy, presenting the starkest contrast to the other two polar types. The intensity of the competition over status in either a bipolar or a multipolar system might [End Page 40] vary depending on how evenly the key dimensions of state capability are distributed—a multipolar system populated by states with very even capabilities portfolios might be less prone to status competition than a bipolar system in which the two poles possess very dissimilar portfolios. But unipolarity, by definition, is characterized by one state possessing unambiguous preponderance in all relevant dimensions. The unipole provides the relevant out-group comparison for all other great powers, yet its material preponderance renders improbable identity-maintenance strategies of social competition. While second-tier states would be expected to seek favorable comparisons with the unipole, they would also be expected to reconcile themselves to a relatively clear status ordering or to engage in strategies of social creativity.

#### **A dominant power empirically checks back conflict- multipolarity leads to competition and only makes great power war more likely**

Wohlforth 9(William C. Wohlforth, professor of government at Dartmouth College, January 2009, “UNIPOLARITY, STATUSCOMPETITION, AND GREAT POWER WAR”, p. 56-57) //ZA

The evidence suggests that narrow and asymmetrical capabilities gaps foster status competition even among states relatively confident of their basic territorial security for the reasons identified in social identity theory and theories of status competition. Broad patterns of evidence are consistent with this expectation, suggesting that unipolarity shapes strategies of identity maintenance in ways that dampen status conflict. The implication is that unipolarity helps explain low levels of military competition and conflict among major powers after 1991 and that a return to bipolarity or multipolarity would increase the likelihood of such conflict. This has been a preliminary exercise. The evidence for the hypotheses explored here is hardly conclusive, but it is sufficiently suggestive to warrant further refinement and testing, all the more so given [End Page 56] the importance of the question at stake. If status matters in the way the theory discussed here suggests, then the widespread view that the rise of a peer competitor and the shift back to a bipolar or multipolar structure present readily surmountable policy challenges is suspect. Most scholars agree with Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke’s argument: “[S]hould a satisfied state undergo a power transition and catch up with dominant power, there is little or no expectation of war.” 81 Given that today’s rising powers have every material reason to like the status quo, many observers are optimistic that the rise of peer competitors can be readily managed by fashioning an order that accommodates their material interests. Yet it is far harder to manage competition for status than for most material things. While diplomatic efforts to manage status competition seem easy under unipolarity, theory and evidence suggest that it could present much greater challenges as the system moves back to bipolarity or multipolarity. When status is seen as a positional good, efforts to craft negotiated bargains about status contests face long odds. And this positionality problem is particularly acute concerning the very issue unipolarity solves: primacy. The route back to bipolarity or multipolarity is thus fraught with danger. With two or more plausible claimants to primacy, positional competition and the potential for major power war could once again form the backdrop of world politics. [End Page 57]

### AT: Offshore Balancing

#### Heg is the anchor of global stability that solves every scenario for nuclear war and solidifies the world economy – offshore balancing can’t solve

**Kagan 11** – Robert, Senior Fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution (January 24, 2011, “The Price of Power,” http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power\_533696.html?page=3)

Others have. For decades “realist” analysts have called for a strategy of “offshore balancing.” Instead of the United States providing security in East Asia and the Persian Gulf, it would withdraw its forces from Japan, South Korea, and the Middle East and let the nations in those regions balance one another. If the balance broke down and war erupted, the United States would then intervene militarily until balance was restored. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf, for instance, Christopher Layne has long proposed “passing the mantle of regional stabilizer” to a consortium of “Russia, China, Iran, and India.” In East Asia offshore balancing would mean letting China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and others manage their own problems, without U.S. involvement—again, until the balance broke down and war erupted, at which point the United States would provide assistance to restore the balance and then, if necessary, intervene with its own forces to restore peace and stability. Before examining whether this would be a wise strategy, it is important to understand that this really is the only genuine alternative to the one the United States has pursued for the past 65 years. To their credit, Layne and others who support the concept of offshore balancing have eschewed halfway measures and airy assurances that we can do more with less, which are likely recipes for disaster. They recognize that either the United States is actively involved in providing security and stability in regions beyond the Western Hemisphere, which means maintaining a robust presence in those regions, or it is not. Layne and others are frank in calling for an end to the global security strategy developed in the aftermath of World War II, perpetuated through the Cold War, and continued by four successive post-Cold War administrations. At the same time, it is not surprising that none of those administrations embraced offshore balancing as a strategy. The idea of relying on Russia, China, and Iran to jointly “stabilize” the Middle East and Persian Gulf will not strike many as an attractive proposition. Nor is U.S. withdrawal from East Asia and the Pacific likely to have a stabilizing effect on that region. The prospects of a war on the Korean Peninsula would increase. Japan and other nations in the region would face the choice of succumbing to Chinese hegemony or taking unilateral steps for self-defense, which in Japan’s case would mean the rapid creation of a formidable nuclear arsenal. Layne and other offshore balancing enthusiasts, like John Mearsheimer, point to two notable occasions when the United States allegedly practiced this strategy. One was the Iran-Iraq war, where the United States supported Iraq for years against Iran in the hope that the two would balance and weaken each other. The other was American policy in the 1920s and 1930s, when the United States allowed the great European powers to balance one another, occasionally providing economic aid, or military aid, as in the Lend-Lease program of assistance to Great Britain once war broke out. Whether this was really American strategy in that era is open for debate—most would argue the United States in this era was trying to stay out of war not as part of a considered strategic judgment but as an end in itself. Even if the United States had been pursuing offshore balancing in the first decades of the 20th century, however, would we really call that strategy a success? The United States wound up intervening with millions of troops, first in Europe, and then in Asia and Europe simultaneously, in the two most dreadful wars in human history. It was with the memory of those two wars in mind, and in the belief that American strategy in those interwar years had been mistaken, that American statesmen during and after World War II determined on the new global strategy that the United States has pursued ever since. Under Franklin Roosevelt, and then under the leadership of Harry Truman and Dean Acheson, American leaders determined that the safest course was to build “situations of strength” (Acheson’s phrase) in strategic locations around the world, to build a “preponderance of power,” and to create an international system with American power at its center. They left substantial numbers of troops in East Asia and in Europe and built a globe-girdling system of naval and air bases to enable the rapid projection of force to strategically important parts of the world. They did not do this on a lark or out of a yearning for global dominion. They simply rejected the offshore balancing strategy, and they did so because they believed it had led to great, destructive wars in the past and would likely do so again. They believed their new global strategy was more likely to deter major war and therefore be less destructive and less expensive in the long run. Subsequent administrations, from both parties and with often differing perspectives on the proper course in many areas of foreign policy, have all agreed on this core strategic approach. From the beginning this strategy was assailed as too ambitious and too expensive. At the dawn of the Cold War, Walter Lippmann railed against Truman’s containment strategy as suffering from an unsustainable gap between ends and means that would bankrupt the United States and exhaust its power. Decades later, in the waning years of the Cold War, Paul Kennedy warned of “imperial overstretch,” arguing that American decline was inevitable “if the trends in national indebtedness, low productivity increases, [etc.]” were allowed to continue at the same time as “massive American commitments of men, money and materials are made in different parts of the globe.” Today, we are once again being told that this global strategy needs to give way to a more restrained and modest approach, even though the indebtedness crisis that we face in coming years is not caused by the present, largely successful global strategy. Of course it is precisely the success of that strategy that is taken for granted. The enormous benefits that this strategy has provided, including the financial benefits, somehow never appear on the ledger. They should. We might begin by asking about the global security order that the United States has sustained since Word War II—the prevention of major war, the support of an open trading system, and promotion of the liberal principles of free markets and free government. How much is that order worth? What would be the cost of its collapse or transformation into another type of order? Whatever the nature of the current economic difficulties, the past six decades have seen a greater increase in global prosperity than any time in human history. Hundreds of millions have been lifted out of poverty. Once-backward nations have become economic dynamos. And the American economy, though suffering ups and downs throughout this period, has on the whole benefited immensely from this international order. One price of this success has been maintaining a sufficient military capacity to provide the essential security underpinnings of this order. But has the price not been worth it? In the first half of the 20th century, the United States found itself engaged in two world wars. In the second half, this global American strategy helped produce a peaceful end to the great-power struggle of the Cold War and then 20 more years of great-power peace. Looked at coldly, simply in terms of dollars and cents, the benefits of that strategy far outweigh the costs. The danger, as always, is that we don’t even realize the benefits our strategic choices have provided. Many assume that the world has simply become more peaceful, that great-power conflict has become impossible, that nations have learned that military force has little utility, that economic power is what counts. This belief in progress and the perfectibility of humankind and the institutions of international order is always alluring to Americans and Europeans and other children of the Enlightenment. It was the prevalent belief in the decade before World War I, in the first years after World War II, and in those heady days after the Cold War when people spoke of the “end of history.” It is always tempting to believe that the international order the United States built and sustained with its power can exist in the absence of that power, or at least with much less of it. This is the hidden assumption of those who call for a change in American strategy: that the United States can stop playing its role and yet all the benefits that came from that role will keep pouring in. This is a great if recurring illusion, the idea that you can pull a leg out from under a table and the table will not fall over.

### AT: Peaceful China Rise

#### China rise means the transition won’t be peaceful – ideology, distrust, and a narrowing power gap

**Keck 11** Zachary Keck, co-editor of the e-International Relations website, based on *A Contest for Supremacy* by Aaron L. Friedman, former assistant to the Vice President on US national security and the head of foreign policy planning, August 23 2011 “Review – A Contest for Supremacy” http://www.e-ir.info/2011/08/23/review-a-contest-for-supremacy/

With regards to power, Friedberg notes that hegemonic transitions have historically almost always led to dramatic upheavals. [v] This is troublesome given that China has been steadily advancing its economic and military power across Asia over the preceding decade at a time when the United States was distracted by events in the Middle East. This has resulted in the initially large power gap that existed between the two countries at the end of the Cold War shrinking considerably in the ensuing two decades.  With Washington’s budgetary problems and, in Friedberg’s opinion, inability to grasp the magnitude of the China threat, the power gap is almost certain to continue narrowing in the years ahead. Additionally, Friedberg notes-citing his Princeton colleague Thomas Christensen [vi]-geography allows China to challenge the United States’ position in the Asia-Pacific without equaling it in power. This is especially true if China is effective in asymmetric warfare.

The competitive tendencies that power considerations generate are further exacerbated by the different ideologies that underpin the political systems in China and the United States, according to Friedberg. In the past, I have been fairly critical of Friedberg’s emphasis on ideology in analyzing U.S.-Sino relations. [vii] In this book, however, I found some of these arguments more compelling because Friedberg is more precise and thorough in explaining the particular ways in which ideology contributes to the strategic competition between Beijing and Washington. The first ideological effect Friedberg notes is one that democratic peace theorists have long made; namely, that tension between non-democracies and democracies is inevitable because the latter group is unable to trust authoritative states given their inherent secrecy and their willingness to violently exploit their own people. The opaque decision-making and domestic repression of Authoritative regimes leads Democratic governments to conclude that they can never be truly certain of the Authoritative states’ capabilities and peaceful intentions. Friedberg’s second and more interesting point is that Chinese policymakers will never trust the United States and its democratic allies because Beijing believes their ultimate goal is to bring about Revolutionary political change in China. Interestingly, Friedberg doesn’t dispute Beijing’s assessment; in fact he embraces wholeheartedly: “Stripped of diplomatic niceties, the ultimate aim of the American strategy is to hasten a revolution, albeit a peaceful one, that will sweep away China’s one-party authoritarian state and leave a liberal democracy in its place (184).” This is true of Western Hawks as well as Doves that advocate engaging with China. As Friedberg prudently notes, Western policymakers who advocate engaging with China usually defend this policy by arguing that this is the best way to facilitate political reform in Beijing. Although this may be appealing to the American public, it inevitably creates distrust and angst towards the United States among the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, whose wealth, power and very possibly their lives all depend on the preventing this outcome. Friedberg is far less convincing when arguing that were China to become an established liberal democracy, the contest for supremacy would not exist or at least be significantly less severe. To support this claim Friedberg appeals to vague and familiar arguments. For instance, he argues that “a liberal democratic China will have little cause to fear its democratic counterparts, still less to use force against them (51).” Similarly, the democratic states will have less reason to see a democratic China as a threat and therefore it will be easier to cooperate with it in reaching negotiated settlements to inevitable disputes. This is all very possible but highly abstract. Furthermore, elsewhere in the book Friedberg makes a convincing case that the changing balance of power alone is a strong factor pushing Washington and its allies towards greater competition with China. It’s unclear how China becoming a democracy would resolve the tensions power cause, especially when Friedberg freely admits that a democratic China could very well likely remain assertive and nationalistic. [viii] Ultimately, then, it seems that the ideological gap heightens the rivalry between China and the United States, but it’s not clear that the rivalry wouldn’t continue to exist if it wasn’t present.

### it just solves everything

#### Heg solves everything

**Kagan 11** – Robert, Senior Fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution (January 24, 2011, “The Price of Power,” <http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/price-power_533696.html?page=3>)

Today the international situation is also one of high risk. • The terrorists who would like to kill Americans on U.S. soil constantly search for safe havens from which to plan and carry out their attacks. American military actions in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and elsewhere make it harder for them to strike and are a large part of the reason why for almost a decade there has been no repetition of September 11. To the degree that we limit our ability to deny them safe haven, we increase the chances they will succeed. • A**merican forces deployed in East Asia and the Western Pacific have for decades prevented the outbreak of major war, provided stability, and kept open international trading routes, making possible an unprecedented era of growth and prosperity for Asians and Americans alik**e. Now the United States faces a new challenge and potential threat from a rising China which seeks eventually to push the U.S. military’s area of operations back to Hawaii and exercise hegemony over the world’s most rapidly growing economies. Meanwhile, a nuclear-armed North Korea threatens war with South Korea and fires ballistic missiles over Japan that will someday be capable of reaching the west coast of the United States. Democratic nations in the region, worried that the United States may be losing influence, turn to Washington for reassurance that the U.S. security guarantee remains firm. If the United States cannot provide that assurance because it is cutting back its military capabilities, they will have to choose between accepting Chinese dominance and striking out on their own, possibly by building nuclear weapons. In the Middle East, Iran seeks to build its own nuclear arsenal, supports armed radical Islamic groups in Lebanon and Palestine, and has linked up with anti-American dictatorships in the Western Hemisphere. The prospects of new instability in the region grow every day as a decrepit regime in Egypt clings to power, crushes all moderate opposition, and drives the Muslim Brotherhood into the streets. A nuclear-armed Pakistan seems to be ever on the brink of collapse into anarchy and radicalism. Turkey, once an ally, now seems bent on an increasingly anti-American Islamist course. The prospect of war between Hezbollah and Israel grows, and with it the possibility of war between Israel and Syria and possibly Iran. There, too, nations in the region increasingly look to Washington for reassurance, and if they decide the United States cannot be relied upon they will have to decide whether to succumb to Iranian influence or build their own nuclear weapons to resist it.

## Scenarios

### 2AC Warming Impact

#### The US is the leader of the global climate change regime- a transition to multipolarity makes warming inevitable

Timmons 11(J. Timmons Roberts, Director of the Center for Environmental Studies at Brown University, Professor of Sociology and Environmental Studies, May 5, 2011 “Multipolarity and the new world (dis)order: US hegemonic decline and the fragmentation of the global climate regime”) //ZA

In this section I expand on how justice positions of negotiating blocs fragmented at the Copenhagen talks (2009), and in the preparatory meetings in Bonn in 2010 leading to the 16th Conference of the Parties in Cancun (2010), illustrating the multipolarity of the new world (dis)order. In climate negotiations, there have always been more formalized and less rigid groups that bargain for representation of their interests in the targeted agreement. Of course a few nations try to stand on their own, but even the US frequently joins in statements by the so-called “Umbrella Group” of Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, and the US. The Umbrella Group developed from an earlier grouping called JUSSCANNZ (pronounced “juice-cans”) – consisting of Japan, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand. The other major bargaining blocs are the EU and the “Group of 77 and China”, the bloc of developing nations now numbering 134 nations (see also Bodansky (2010) and Christoff, 2010). In earlier years, most alignments into negotiating blocs could be understood by reference to the responsibility of nations and their ease or difficulty in reducing or eliminating their use of fossil fuels (what we might call “mitigation-side fairness”). This can, for example, explain the historical gap between the European Union and the US-Canada-Australia bloc (the “carboniferous capitalism” of Dalby and Paterson 2008 – cited in Paterson, 2009): these nations have vaster land areas, extensive urban forms, and coal reserves. These blocs were built also along the dimension of capability, which can be understood in the climate negotiations as national wealth and membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development – the club of the world's wealthy nations. This factor aligned closely with bonds of solidarity, among Southern nations of the G-77 who stuck together for years in the negotiations due to their common identity as excluded from the league of wealthy nations (Roberts and Parks, 2007). Emerging and strengthening in climate negotiations in the past few years has been a vulnerability dimension, which has created a whole new set of adaptation- and finance-side fairness demands, especially from low-lying nations and, more recently, those facing the loss of glacial water supplies. We are seeing the insurgence of new radical climate justice arguments from civil society groups and especially ALBA, the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean, led by Venezuela and Bolivia, who reject carbon trading in the next round of a climate treaty.5

BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), previously the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China);

• The LDCs (Least Developed Countries, 45 of the world's poorest nations, mostly in Africa);

• The African Group;

• OPEC (Oil Producing and Exporting Countries);

• Arab States (mostly in OPEC but some not);

• AOSIS (Association of Small Island States, which also includes Bangladesh and some countries not in the G-77, totaling 42 member states and observers)6;

• SIDS (Small Island Developing States – different membership than AOSIS);

• ALBA, the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean – including Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Honduras, Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines;

• The Central American Integration System (SICA);

• The Group of Mountain Landlocked Developing Countries, which includes Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikstan7;

• The “Environmental Integrity Group” (EIG), consisting of Mexico, Liechtenstein, Monaco the Republic of Korea, and Switzerland – the only group crossing OECD/non-OECD lines, attempting to play a brokering role between the EU and the G-77;

• CACAM (Central Asia, Caucasus, Albania, and Moldova); and

•The Coalition of Rainforest Nations, a group founded in 2007 to bargain for REDD, the plan to pay developing countries to protect standing rainforests.

The point here is not to focus on the content of these groups’ negotiating positions, but rather to highlight the extent to which the negotiations are fragmenting, as even small nations can now closely tailor their statements in the negotiations to their national interests along all four dimensions described above. A single omnibus bargaining unit like the G-77 and China has proven unable to reflect these kinds of specific and multi-dimensional concerns. However that bloc does still play a key role coordinating how developing nations negotiate on foundational issues, and they have been meeting twice a day during intense negotiation times (see Appendix 1). In the next section I shift to the other end of the spectrum: to the failure of leadership in the North, with the US's economic insecurity leading to an unwillingness to lead climate negotiations, and the EU experiencing both a weakening internal consensus on climate action and a collapse in its external bargaining strength. This suggests that the stalemate on climate is but one symptom of a wider change taking place in the world, as hegemonic power shifts to the East and South.

#### Warming causes extinction

**EAN 12** (The, EurActiv Network, EU political news network providing policy information and current events throughout several countries in 15 languages, citing the Royal Society’s findings, 3-20-12, “EU Climate Broker: World Faces 4 Degrees of Warming,” <http://www.euractiv.com/climate-environment/eu-climate-broker-world-faces-4-degrees-warming-news-511586>) GZ

Existential risk A report by the Royal Society last year found that with planetary warming of four degrees or more, the limits for human and environmental adaptation “are likely to be exceeded in many parts of the world”. The London-based Royal Society report estimated that at four degrees of global warming, half the world’s current agricultural land would become unusable, sea levels would rise by up to two metres, and around 40% of the world’s species would become extinct. Meanwhile droughts and wildfires would ravage the globe. “The ecosystem services upon which human livelihoods depend would not be preserved,” the authors contended. “I would be interested to hear from the US and Japan what they intend to bring to the table in the negotiations this year to at least start bridging that gap [between two and four degrees],” Runge-Metzger said.

### Exts – Solves Warming

#### **Decline in hegemony means US is incapable of taking steps towards solving warming**

Timmons 11(J. Timmons Roberts, Director of the Center for Environmental Studies at Brown University, Professor of Sociology and Environmental Studies, May 5, 2011 “Multipolarity and the new world (dis)order: US hegemonic decline and the fragmentation of the global climate regime”) //ZA

Observing many years of turmoil in negotiations over global nations’ response to climate change, leading ever further away from principles and practice of climate justice, one is tempted to chalk it up to stubbornness on the part of a few selfish nations: the US and Saudi Arabia most obviously and for the longest time, but Canada might be put in this group, and also one could say China and India, for different reasons. Poor leadership by the Danish Presidency at Copenhagen was clearly a factor, as deft leadership by Mexico in Cancun confirmed. The list could go on. Certainly short-sighted selfishness has been a major factor in creating our current dire situation on climate change, but I argue here that the roots of failure to reach consensus on a global response to climate change lie in the global economic structure and its current phase of restructuring. Many nations in the global South remain frustrated that in spite of many decades of promises and striving that they face persistent inequality and stalled economic development. In the case of the US, its pigheadedness in negotiations might be seen as having been driven by insecurity in a shifting global political economy about its ability to provide jobs for its workers in the future where all sorts of work is moving to China and India. Giovanni Arrighi and Beverly Silver point us to two central parts of that dynamic. First, while developing nations may be industrializing, the majority of citizens in those nations are not getting rich (or even getting to global middle class status in GDP/capita terms) in the process ( [Arrighi and Silver, 2001], [Arrighi et al., 2003] and [Arrighi et al., 2005]). This happens because lower-profit parts of the product cycle are offshored to those countries, with owners looking for cheap labor havens.13 This persistent and growing inequality between and within nations exacerbates the frustration of many in the developing world about their stalled prosperity, which also dampens their enthusiasm about limiting their future growth – an issue we’ve discussed at length elsewhere ( [Roberts and Parks, 2007] and [Parks and Roberts, 2010]). The current article therefore begins to address two major gaps in our previous work, which was more focused on explaining non-cooperation by developing countries. Those gaps are (1) explaining fragmentation in the global South, and (2) the roots of resistance by the US Senate and executive branch to a meaningful and binding climate treaty. For two decades now, the US has been the bull in the china shop of climate negotiations – repeatedly smashing any small progress that was being delicately arranged. It has not been alone in wrecking the negotiations, but its intransigence has provided a shield behind which many other nations can conveniently hide. The US government's unwillingness to take active steps to address this looming global crisis is exactly the kind of failure of leadership that Arrighi and Silver describe among hegemons in the “autumns” of their decline. This has been true since the Genoese, Dutch, and British rode waves of boom and bust over the past centuries. In the current case it's fairly simple: US fear of job loss to China lay behind the July 1997 Byrd-Hagel Resolution that arguably sunk the Kyoto Protocol, tying the Clinton administration's hands the summer before the COP 3 in that Japanese city. That resolution read that the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol … which would mandate new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions … unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period, or would result in serious harm to the economy of the United States (US Senate, July 25, 1997).

### 2AC Solves Prolif

### Exts – Solves Prolif

#### Empirics prove that heg solves prolif

**Reed 10** (Alexander April 14th the role of technology denial in non proliferation. http://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553565/reedAlexander.pdf?sequence=1)

As noted in the previous chapter, the security driver for proliferation was present in four of the cases studied. Efforts, whether direct or indirect, to eliminate the security driver often led to nonproliferation success. South Korea’s decision to abandon its nuclear weapons program stemmed largely from the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations’ decisions to maintain US troops in South Korea. The changing security landscape in the late 1980s also helped to eliminate South Africa’s motivations for nuclear weapons possession. By the late 1980s, South Africa no longer perceived the Soviet Union as an existential threat, and a cease-fire in Angola led to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from southern Africa. While not directly linked to nonproliferation, United States and Western efforts aimed at containing the Soviet Union and winning the Cold War thus played a role in eliminating South Africa’s proliferation motivations

#### Hegemony also ensures that proliferation never spills over

**Fay 11** (Matt December 15. “The Historical Uncertainty of Middle Eastern Nuclear Proliferation” <http://hegemonicobsessions.com/?p=672>)

More recent examples exist as well.  Seoul is arguably under greater threat from North Korea’s existing nuclear weapons than Saudi Arabia is from Iran’s non-existent arsenal.  Yet both South Korea and Japan continue to forgo developing nuclear weapons of their own in favor U.S. security guarantees—despite numerous provocations from Pyongyang.  This is not an endorsement of the further expansion of U.S. extended deterrence, but it does beg the question of why a nonproliferation strategy that has been reasonably successful in Asia—where the rogue state in question is also backed by a patron powerful enough to complicate American efforts—**is doomed to failure** in the Middle East where Iran is isolated and the United States is still largely ascendant.

#### Prolif causes extinction

**Roberts 99** (Brad Roberts, researcher at the Institute for Defense Analysis, Chair of the Research Advisory Council for Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1999, “Viewpoint: Proliferation and Nonproliferation in the 1990s: Looking for the Right Lessons,” <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol06/64/robert64.pdf>)

This brings us then to the question of what is at stake in the effort to combat proliferation. There are two standard answers to the question of what’s at stake: human lives, and stability. NBC weapons are weapons of mass destruction—all of them, though in different ways. The most deadly of these weapons systems can kill millions—and much more quickly than conventional weaponry (though it too is capable of killing millions). A regional war employing mass destruction as a matter of course could cause suffering and death unknown in human experience. Such a war would cast a harsh light on the argument now in vogue that landmines, small arms, even machetes in the hands of drunk young men are the real weapons of mass destruction. Strictly from the perspective of limiting the effects of war, then, the world community has an interest in preventing the emergence of an international system in which the possession and use of NBC weapons is accepted as normal and customary. The stability argument relates to the unintended consequences associated with acquiring weapons of mass destruction. It focuses on the weapons-acquiring state and its neighbors and the risk of war that grows among them, including both preemptive and accidental wars. Although it is an old truism that proliferation is destabilizing, it is not always true—not where the acquisition of strategic leverage is essential to preservation of a balance of power that deters conflict and that is used to create the conditions of a more enduring peace. But those circumstances have proven remarkably rare. Instead, the risks associated with the competitive acquisition of strategic capabilities have typically been seen to outweigh the perceived benefits to states that have considered nuclear weapons acquisition. Argentina and Brazil, for example, like Sweden and Australia before them, have gotten out of the nuclear weapons business because they see no reason to live at the nuclear brink even if living there is within their reach. But the standard answers don’t really take us very far into this problem any more. To grasp the full stake requires a broader notion of stability—and an appreciation of the particular historical moment in which we find ourselves. It is an accident of history that the diffusion of dual-use capabilities is coterminous with the end of the Cold War. That diffusion means that we are moving irreversibly into an international system in which the wildfire-like spread of weapons is a real possibility. The end of the Cold War has brought with it great volatility in the relations of major and minor powers in the international system. What then is at stake? In response to some catalytic event, entire regions could rapidly cross the threshold from latent to extant weapons capability, and from covert to overt postures, a process that would be highly competitive and risky, and which likely would spill over wherever the divides among regions are not tidy. This would sorely test Ken Waltz’s familiar old heresy that “more may be better”7—indeed, even Waltz assumed proliferation would be stabilizing only if it is gradual, and warned against the rapid spread of weapons to multiple states. At the very least, this would fuel NBC terrorism, as a general proliferation of NBC weaponry would likely erode the constraints that heretofore have inhibited states from sponsoring terrorist use of these capabilities. Given its global stature and media culture, America would be a likely target of some of these terrorist actions. What kind of catalytic event might cause such wildfirelike proliferation? The possibilities are not numerous and thus we should not be too pessimistic, although history usually surprises. One catalyst could be a major civil war in a large country in which NBC weapons are used. Another catalyst might be a crisis in which NBC weapons are used to call into question the credibility of US security guarantees. Such a crisis would have farreaching consequences, both within and beyond any particular region. If the threat of the use of such weapons is sufficient to dissuade the United States from reversing an act of aggression, or if their use is successful in defeating a US military operation, there would be hell to pay. How, for example, would Japan respond to a US decision not to seek to reverse NBC-backed aggression on the Korean peninsula? How might NATO partners respond to a collapse of US credibility in East AsiaThis stake isn’t just America’s stake. Any country whose security depends to some extent on a regional or global order guaranteed by Washington has a stake in preventing such wildfire-like proliferation. This is truest of America’s closest security partners, but it is true of the many small and medium-sized states that depend, to some degree, on collective mechanisms for their security. It seems reasonable to expect that many of these states would respond to a loss of US credibility and to the fear of greater regional instability by moving up the latency curve. If they were also to cross the threshold to weapons production, the international system would have a hard time coping. It seems likely that such proliferation would cause the collapse of nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms. This, in turn, would precipitate a broader crisis of confidence in the other institutions of multilateral political and economic activity that depend on some modicum of global stability and cooperation to function. The consequences could be very far-reaching. These international mechanisms and institutions have been a primary means of giving order to an anarchic international system. The United States, in particular, has found them useful for exercising influence and power. What’s at stake, then, is the international order built up over the last half century—the multilateral institutions of economic and security governance, the patterns of cooperation among states, and the expectations of a more orderly future. This is an order that the United States played a central role in creating and sustaining. It is built largely on American-style liberal political and economic values. It is run by and through formal and informal institutions that operate according to rules Washington helped formulate. This is an order backed by US security guarantees in those regions where the threat of interstate war remains real and system-threatening—and more generally by collective security principles safeguarded at the United Nations by the United States, among others. Were it to unravel, the world would change fundamentally. Would such a crisis actually play out in this way? A catalytic event might well have the opposite effect to the one described here: it could well galvanize the international community into strengthening the institutions of multilateral cooperation, assuming that the United States is willing and able to reenergize its commitment to their leadership. Let us hope so. Moreover, there may be no such catalytic event. Instead, and in the absence of reinvigorated leadership of the antiproliferation effort, we may see something more subtle but no less destructive, and that is a growing number of states that move up the latency curve without also formally abandoning their treaty obligations, creating a dangerously misleading fiction in the form of an extant legal regime with little or no impact on the behavior of states. But let us also set aside the complacent assumption that the current distribution of NBC assets is somehow fixed in perpetuity—or that a radical erosion of the current order would not have serious consequences. Among many US policymakers and analysts, there is still great resistance to the notion that the collapse of the antiproliferation project would have far-reaching implications. Most analysts seem to believe that international politics would then proceed much as they do today. Perhaps some partial collapse would have this effect— some further loss of credibility of one or two instruments of arms control, for example, might not actually precipitate the collapse of the treaty regime. But if wildfirelike proliferation somehow comes to pass, it seems likely that a lot would be up for grabs in international politics. Basic relations of power would be in great flux. New coalitions would form, with new forms of competition among those seeking to lead them. American influence abroad could be eclipsed—and quite rapidly. Americans might like to believe that, in such a world, they could retreat into a Fortress America. Whether others would allow us this luxury is very much an open question, especially if America’s retreat occasions some particular pain on their part that motivates them to seek revenge.

### 2AC North Korea

#### US military presence deters North Korean action

**Saxby 11** (Josh “After the Chenoan: Engagement or Containment? What is the most effective approach for the United States Foreign Policy when considering North Korea’s nuclear ambitions?” <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-winter-11/josh-saxby.pdf>)

The very fact that the US maintains a military presence on the Korean Peninsula is enough for Kang to be convinced that with a continued US effort to force international sanctions through the UN, containment will maintain the status quo and deter the DPRK from any military action. Indeed, there is some support for Kang from other academics. Baldwin advocates a similar approach to Kang and argues in his article ‗The Power of Positive Sanctions‘ (1971) that constructive sanctions will achieve the desired result and maintain the balance of power. In Baldwin‘s work he frames the idea that Nation A (for the sake of argument the US) needs to promise Nation B (the DPRK) rewards in order to achieve its policy goals (Baldwin 1971: 23), ‗A nation using promises need not expect compliance, but it has an incentive to do so. The point is that A‘s responsibilities and planning processes are different when he uses promises rather than threats.‘ (Baldwin 1971: 28). This makes for an interesting analysis of the North Korean situation. However, many would baulk at the idea of offering promises to the regime of the DPRK, not least the US. Indeed, acknowledges this fact but he supports his hypothesis with the fact that threats and negative sanctions only serve to alienate the aggressor state and preserve the tough stance of the Nation A (the US). Kang argues that ‗clearly America has reason to mistrust the North. But North Korea also mistrusts the U.S.‘ (2003: 320), Baldwin would explain this by saying that the threatening way in which the US conducts its foreign policy towards the DPRK particularly during the Bush Jnr Administration (Rozman 2007), which has yielded few results, is enough evidence to try positive sanctions

#### Korean war goes nuclear

**STRATFOR 10** (5/26/10, “North Korea, South Korea: The Military Balance on the Peninsula,” <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100526_north_korea_south_korea_military_balance_peninsula>)

Managing Escalation But no one, of course, is interested in another war on the Korean Peninsula. Both sides will posture, but at the end of the day, neither benefits from a major outbreak of hostilities. And despite the specter of North Korean troops streaming under the DMZ through tunnels and wreaking havoc behind the lines in the south (a scenario for which there has undoubtedly been significant preparation), neither side has any intention of invading the other. So the real issue is the potential for escalation — or an accident that could precipitate escalation — that would be beyond the control of Pyongyang or Seoul. With both sides on high alert, both adhering to their own national (and contradictory) definitions of where disputed boundaries lie and with rules of engagement loosened, the potential for sudden and rapid escalation is quite real. Indeed, North Korea’s navy, though sizable on paper, is largely a hollow shell of old, laid-up vessels. What remains are small fast attack craft and submarines — mostly Sang-O “Shark” class boats and midget submersibles. These vessels are best employed in the cluttered littoral environment to bring asymmetric tactics to bear — not unlike those Iran has prepared for use in the Strait of Hormuz. These kinds of vessels and tactics — including, especially, the deployment of naval mines — are poorly controlled when dispersed in a crisis and are often impossible to recall. For nearly 40 years, tensions on the Korean Peninsula were managed within the context of the wider Cold War. During that time it was feared that a second Korean War could all too easily escalate into and a thermonuclear World War III, so both Pyongyang and Seoul were being heavily managed from their respective corners. In fact, USFK was long designed to ensure that South Korea could not independently provoke that war and drag the Americans into it, which for much of the Cold War period was of far greater concern to Washington than North Korea attacking southward. Today, those constraints no longer exist. There are certainly still constraints — neither the United States nor China wants war on the peninsula. But current tensions arTe quickly escalating to a level unprecedented in the post-Cold War period, and the constraints that do exist have never been tested in the way they might be if the situation escalates much further.

### Exts – North Korea

#### Heg deters north Korea

**Saxby 11** (Josh “After the Chenoan: Engagement or Containment? What is the most effective approach for the United States Foreign Policy when considering North Korea’s nuclear ambitions?” <http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/ug-winter-11/josh-saxby.pdf>)

Neo-Conservatives and committed Realists would argue that on past experience, negotiating with the DPRK is simply not at option; why negotiate when their behaviour is so aggressive and unpredictable? Kang (2003) would certainly argue that deterrence has worked for fifty years so why change the approach? The answer to these two questions is obvious, increased isolation and containment would only escalate the chance of a more dangerous nuclear threat from the DPRK due to it being left unchecked; certainly any move to return US nuclear weapons to the peninsula would be seen as a threat to its national security

### 2AC Trade

#### US primacy on the oceans maintain free trade- decline in heg would cause tensions

**Kagan 12 –** senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution (Robert “The world America Made”)

One key element of the liberal economic order over the past two centuries has been control of the seas. Today, although we live in a digital age, goods are not beamed through the ether. Much of the world’s oil and gas, raw materials, ores and minerals, and food and grain still travel by ship, which means that free trade still requires open trade routes on the high seas. Yet throughout history, shipping lanes have often become victims of international crises and conﬂicts, as nations have sought to control waterways and deny access to adversaries. The United States went to war twice—in 1812 and in 1917— partly in response to efforts by other great powers to blockade American trade in wartime. Since World War II, the United States has used its dominance of the oceans to keep trade routes open for everyone, even during periods of conﬂict. But it is not enough to have an interest in free trade. Today, Portugal and Singapore have an interest in free trade and open oceans. but they lack the capacity to keep trade routes open. Only the United States has had both the will and the ability to preserve freedom of the seas. Indeed, it has done so largely by itself, policing the world’s oceans with its dominant navy with only minor assistance from other powers, while other trading nations, from Germany to Iapan, from Brazil to India, from Russia to China, have been content to be “free riders.” This has been one of America’s most important contributions to the present liberal world order. But what would happen if the United States ceased to carry this burden? If American decline means anything, it would have to mean an end to this hegemony on the high seas. Would today’s free riders decide to take on the burdens and the expense of sustaining navies that could take over some of the tasks now handled by the Americans? And even if they did, would this actually produce an open global commons, or would it produce competition and tension? For as it happens, both China and India are increasing their naval capabilities. This has produced not greater security but a growing strategic competition between them in both the Indian Ocean and, increasingly, the South China Sea. The fact that China is trying to use its growing naval power not to open but to close international waters offers a glimpse into a future where the U.S. Navy is no longer dominant.

#### Heg decline overseas will cripple the international free trade system

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The move from American-dominated ocean ways to a collective policing by multiple great powers—even if it occurred—might turn out to be a formula for competition and conﬂict rather than a bolstering of the liberal economic order. In the nineteenth century, British naval dominance undergirded peace and global free trade, except in times of war, when Britain itself closed the avenues of trade to its enemies and their trading partners. When the world’s navies became more equal—with the rise of not only the German navy but also those of Japan and the United States—both peace and the international free-trade system became imperiled. Historically, a liberal economic order has ﬂourished under only one set of conditions—a great power with a globally dominant navy and a profound interest in a free-trade, free-market international system, the situation that existed in the latter half of the nineteenth century under British naval supremacy, and again after World War II, under American naval supremacy. The multipolar eras that preceded British supremacy and that existed between the two world wars, prior to American naval supremacy, did not give rise to liberal economic orders. Even if one sets aside the problem of who will police the commons, it is not clear that the great powers in a new, multipolar era would be able to sustain a free-market, free-trade international system, even if they wanted to. They might kill the goose inadvertently, despite their dependence on it, simply because of the nature of their own political and economic systems.

#### Trade solves great power war

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Our more globalized world has also yielded a “peace dividend.” It may not be obvious when our daily news cycles are dominated by horrific images from the Gaza Strip, Afghanistan and Libya, but our more globalized world has somehow become a more peaceful world. The number of civil and international wars has dropped sharply in the past 15 years, along with battle deaths. The reasons behind the retreat of war are complex, but again the spread of trade and globalization have played a key role. Trade has been seen as a friend of peace for centuries. In the 19th century, British statesman Richard Cobden pursued free trade as a way not only to bring more affordable bread to English workers but also to promote peace with Britain’s neighbors. He negotiated the Cobden-Chevalier free trade agreement with France in 1860 that helped to cement an enduring alliance between two countries that had been bitter enemies for centuries. In the 20th century, President Franklin Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull, championed lower trade barriers as a way to promote peaceful commerce and reduce international tensions. Hull had witnessed first-hand the economic nationalism and retribution after World War I. Hull believed that “unhampered trade dovetail[s] with peace; high tariffs, trade barriers and unfair economic competition, with war.” Hull was awarded the 1945 Nobel Prize for Peace, in part because of his work to promote global trade. Free trade and globalization have promoted peace in three main ways. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend towards democracy, and democracies tend not to pick fights with each other. A second and even more potent way that trade has promoted peace is by raising the cost of war. As national economies become more intertwined, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means the loss of human lives and tax dollars, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. Trade and economic integration has helped to keep the peace in Europe for more than 60 years. More recently, deepening economic ties between Mainland China and Taiwan are drawing those two governments closer together and helping to keep the peace. Leaders on both sides of the Taiwan Straight seem to understand that reckless nationalism would jeopardize the dramatic economic progress that region has enjoyed. A third reason why free trade promotes peace is because it has reduced the spoils of war. Trade allows nations to acquire wealth through production and exchange rather than conquest of territory and resources. As economies develop, wealth is increasingly measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Such assets cannot be easily seized by armies. In contrast, hard assets such as minerals and farmland are becoming relatively less important in high-tech, service economies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by freely trading what they can produce best at home. The world today is harvesting the peaceful fruit of expanding trade. The first half of the 20th century was marred by two devastating wars among the great powers of Europe. In the ashes of World War II, the United States helped found the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1947, the precursor to the WTO that helped to spur trade between the United States and its major trading partners. As a condition to Marshall Plan aid, the U.S. government also insisted that the continental European powers, France, Germany, and Italy, eliminate trade barriers between themselves in what was to become the European Common Market. One purpose of the common market was to spur economic development, of course, but just as importantly, it was meant to tie the Europeans together economically. With six decades of hindsight, the plan must be considered a spectacular success. The notion of another major war between France, Germany and another Western European powers is unimaginable. Compared to past eras, our time is one of relative world peace. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of armed conflicts around the world has dropped sharply in the past two decades. Virtually all the conflicts today are civil and guerilla wars. The spectacle of two governments sending armies off to fight in the battlefield has become rare. In the decade from 1998 through 2007, only three actual wars were fought between states: Eritrea-Ethopia in 1998-2000, India-Pakistan in 1998-2003, and the United States-Iraq in 2003. From 2004 through 2007, no two nations were at war with one another. Civil wars have ended or at least ebbed in Aceh (in Indonesia), Angola, Burundi, Congo, Liberia, Nepal, Timor-Leste and Sierra Leone. Coming to the same conclusion is the Human Security Centre at the University of British Colombia in Canada. In a 2005 report, it documented a sharp decline in the number of armed conflicts, genocides and refugee numbers in the past 20 years. The average number of deaths per conflict has fallen from 38,000 in 1950 to 600 in 2002. Most armed conflicts in the world now take place in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the only form of political violence that has worsened in recent years is international terrorism. Many causes lie behind the good news – the end of the Cold War, the spread of democracy, and peacekeeping efforts by major powers among them – but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role in promoting world peace. In a chapter from the 2005 Economic Freedom of the World Report, Dr. Erik Gartzke of Columbia University compared the propensity of countries to engage in wars to their level of economic freedom. He came to the conclusion that economic freedom, including the freedom to trade, significantly decreases the probability that a country will experience a military dispute with another country. Through econometric analysis, he found that, “Making economies freer translates into making countries more peaceful. At the extremes, the least free states are about 14 times as conflict prone as the most free. A 2006 study for the institute for the Study of Labor in Bonn, Germany, found the same pacific effect of trade and globalization. Authors Solomon Polachek and Carlos Seiglie found that “trading nations cooperate more and fight less.” In fact, a doubling of trade reduces the probability that a country will be involved in a conflict by 20 percent. Trade was the most important channel for peace, they found, but investment flows also had a positive effect. A democratic form of government also proved to be a force for peace, but primarily because democracies trade more. All this helps explain why the world’s two most conflict-prone regions – the Arab Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa – are also the world’s two least globally and economically integrated regions. Terrorism does not spring from poverty, but from ideological fervor and political and economic frustration. If we want to blunt the appeal of radical ideology to the next generation of Muslim children coming of age, we can help create more economic opportunity in those societies by encouraging more trade and investment ties with the West. The U.S. initiative to enact free trade agreements with certain Muslim countries, such as Morocco, Jordan, Bahrain and Oman, represent small steps in the right direction. An even more effective policy would be to unilaterally open Western markets to products made and grown in Muslim countries. A young man or woman with a real job at an export-oriented factory making overcoats in Jordan or shorts in Egypt is less vulnerable to the appeal of an Al-Qaida recruiter. Of course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace or inoculation against terrorism, anymore than they guarantee democracy and civil liberty. Hot-blooded nationalism and ideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. Any relationship involving human beings will be messy and non-linear. There will always be exceptions and outliers in such complex relationships involving economies and governments. But deeper trade and investment ties among nations have made it more likely that democracy and civil liberties will take root, and less likely those gains will be destroyed by civil conflict and war.

### 2AC Democracy

#### America promotes democracy

**Kagan 12 –** senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution (Robert “The world America Made”)

The United States, in fact, **played a critical role in making the explosion of democracy possible**. This was not because Americans pursued a consistent policy of promoting democracy around the world. They didn’t. At various times throughout the Cold War, American policy often supported dictatorships as part of the battle against communism or simply out of indifference. It even permitted and at times encouraged the overthrow of democratic regimes deemed unreliable—Mossadegh in Iran in 1953, Árbenz in Guatemala in 1954, and Allende in Chile in 1973. At times American foreign policy was almost hostile to democracy. Richard Nixon regarded it as “not necessarily the best form of government for people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.”2’ Nor, when the United States did support democracy, was it purely out of fealty to principle. Often it was for strategic reasons. Reagan officials came to believe that democratic governments might actually be better than autocracies at fending off communist insurgencies, for instance. And often it was a reaction to popular local demands that compelled the United States to make a choice it would otherwise have preferred not to make, between supporting an unpopular and possibly faltering dictatorship and “getting on the side of the people.” Ronald Reagan would likely have preferred to support the dictatorship of Ferdinand Marcos in the 1980s had he not been confronted by Filipino “people power.” In only a few cases—such as George H. W. Bush’s 1989 invasion of Panama and Bill Clinton’s 1994 intervention in Haiti—did the United States seek a change of regime primarily out of devotion to democratic principles. Beginning in the mid-1970s, however, the general inclination of the United States did begin to shift toward a more critical view of dictatorship. The U.S. Congress, led by human rights advocates, began to condition or cut off American aid to authoritarian allies, which had the effect of weakening their hold on power. In the Helsinki Accords of 1975, a reference to human rights issues raised greater attention to the cause of dissidents and other opponents of dictatorship in the Eastern bloc. President Jimmy Carter focused attention on the human rights practices of the Soviet Union as well as on right-wing governments in Latin America and elsewhere. American international information services such as the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty put greater emphasis on democracy and human rights in their programming. The Reagan administration, after first trying to roll back Carter’s human rights agenda, eventually embraced it and made the promotion of democracy part of its stated policy. Even during this period, American policy was far from consistent. Many allied dictatorships, especially in the Middle East, were not only tolerated but actively supported with American economic and military aid. But the net effect of the shift in American policy, joined with the efforts of Europe, was significant.

#### Democracy solves extinction

**Diamond 95-** senior fellow at the Hoover institution, prof of political science at Stanford (Larry, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,” http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm//MGD)

OTHER THREATS This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

### 2AC Western Unity

#### **US lead key to Russian reform and western unity**

Brzezinski 12 (Zbigniew, US National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter, Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, scholar at CSIS, "Balancing the East, Upgrading the West: U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Upheaval," Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2012, Vol. 91 Issue 1 pp. 97-104, ProQuest SL)

As the United States and Europe seek to enlarge the West, Russia itself will have to evolve in order to become more closely linked with the eu. Its leadership will have to face the fact that Russia's future will be uncertain if it remains a relatively empty and underdeveloped space between the rich West and the dynamic East. This will not change even if Russia entices some Central Asian states to join Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's quaint idea of a Eurasian Union. Also, although a significant portion of the Russian public is ahead of its government in favoring eumembership, most Russians are unaware of how exacting many of the qualifying standards for membership are, especially with regard to democratic reform. The process of the eu and Russia coming closer is likely to stall occasionally and then lurch forward again, progressing in stages and including transitional arrangements. To the extent possible, it should proceed simultaneously on the social, economic, political, and security levels. One can envisage more and more opportunities for social interactions, increasingly similar legal and constitutional arrangements, joint security exercises between nato and the Russian military, and new institutions for coordinating policy within a continually expanding West, all resulting in Russia's increasing readiness for eventual membership in the eu. It is not unrealistic to imagine a larger configuration of the West emerging after 2025. In the course of the next several decades, Russia could embark on a comprehensive law-based democratic transformation compatible with both eu and nato standards, and Turkey could become a full member of the eu, putting both countries on their way to integration with the transatlantic community. But even before that occurs, a deepening geopolitical community of interest could arise among the United States, Europe (including Turkey), and Russia. Since any westward gravitation by Russia would likely be preceded and encouraged by closer ties between Ukraine and the eu, the institutional seat for a collective consultative organ (or perhaps initially for an expanded Council of Europe) could be located in Kiev, the ancient capital of Kievan Rus, whose location would be symbolic of the West's renewed vitality and enlarging scope. If the United States does not promote the emergence of an enlarged West, dire consequences could follow: historical resentments could come back to life, new conflicts of interest could arise, and shortsighted competitive partnerships could take shape. Russia could exploit its energy assets and, emboldened by Western disunity, seek to quickly absorb Ukraine, reawakening its own imperial ambitions and contributing to greater international disarray. With the eu passive, individual European states, in search of greater commercial opportunities, could then seek their own accommodations with Russia. One can envisage a scenario in which economic self-interest leads Germany or Italy, for example, to develop a special relationship with Russia. France and the United Kingdom could then draw closer while viewing Germany askance, with Poland and the Baltic states desperately pleading for additional U.S. security guarantees. The result would be not a new and more vital West but rather a progressively splintering and increasingly pessimistic West.

#### **That’s key to solve Chinese war and miscalc**

Brzezinski 12 (Zbigniew, US National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter, Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, scholar at CSIS, "Balancing the East, Upgrading the West: U.S. Grand Strategy in an Age of Upheaval," Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2012, Vol. 91 Issue 1 pp. 97-104, ProQuest SL)

Such a disunited West would not be able to compete with China for global relevance. So far, China has not articulated an ideological dogma that would make its recent performance appear universally applicable, and the United States has been careful not to make ideology the central focus of its relations with China. Wisely, both Washington and Beijing have embraced the concept of a "constructive partnership" in global affairs, and the United States, although critical of China's violations of human rights, has been careful not to stigmatize the Chinese socioeconomic system as a whole. But if an anxious United States and an overconfident China were to slide into increasing political hostility, it is more than likely that both countries would face off in a mutually destructive ideological conflict. Washington would argue that Beijing's success is based on tyranny and is damaging to the United States' economic well-being; Beijing, meanwhile, would interpret that U.S. message as an attempt to undermine and possibly even fragment the Chinese system. At the same time, China would stress its successful rejection of Western supremacy, appealing to those in the developing world who already subscribe to a historical narrative highly hostile to the West in general and to the United States in particular. Such a scenario would be damaging and counterproductive for both countries. Hence, intelligent self-interest should prompt the United States and China to exercise ideological self-restraint, resisting the temptation to universalize the distinctive features of their respective socioeconomic systems and to demonize each other. The U.S. role in Asia should be that of regional balancer, replicating the role played by the United Kingdom in intra-European politics during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The United States can and should help Asian states avoid a struggle for regional domination by mediating conflicts and offsetting power imbalances among potential rivals. In doing so, it should respect China's special historic and geopolitical role in maintaining stability on the Far Eastern mainland. Engaging with China in a dialogue regarding regional stability would not only help reduce the possibility of U.S.-Chinese conflicts but also diminish the probability of miscalculation between China and Japan, or China and India, and even at some point between China and Russia over the resources and independent status of the Central Asian states. Thus, the United States' balancing engagement in Asia is ultimately in China's interest, as well.

### 2AC Russian Expansionism

#### US contains Russian aggression- Other countries want US protection

**Kagan 12 –** senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution (Robert “The world America Made”)

What role the United States played in hastening the collapse of the Soviet system will always be a subject of contention. Undoubtedly, it played some role, both in containing the Soviet empire militarily and in out performing it economically and technologically. Nor was the turn to democracy throughout eastern Europe primarily America’s doing. The peoples of the former Warsaw Pact nations had long yearned for liberation from the Soviet Union, which also meant liberation from communism. They wanted to join the rest of Europe, which offered an economic and social model that was even more attractive than that of the United States. That they uniformly chose democratic forms of government, however, was not simply the aspiration for freedom or comfort. It also reﬂected the desires of eastern and central European peoples to place themselves under the American security umbrella. The strategic, the economic, the political, and the ideological were thus inseparable. Those nations that wanted to be part of NATO, and later the European Union, knew they stood no chance if they did not present democratic credentials. These democratic transitions, which turned the third wave into a democratic tsunami, need not have occurred had the world been conﬁgured differently. The fact that a democratic, united, and prosperous western Europe was even there as a powerful magnet to its eastern neighbors was due to American actions after World War I.

#### Russian expansionism causes nuclear war

**Cohen 96** ( Ariel, PhD, Heritage founation, BACKGROUNDER n. 1065, January 25, 1996,

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1065.cfm>)

Much is at stake in Eurasia for the U.S. and its allies. Attempts to restore its empire will doom Russia's transition to a democracy and free-market economy. The ongoing war in Chechnya alone has cost Russia $6 billion to date (equal to Russia's IMF and World Bank loans for 1995). Moreover, it has extracted a tremendous price from Russian society. The wars which would be required to restore the Russian empire would prove much more costly not just for Russia and the region, but for peace, world stability, and security. As the former Soviet arsenals are spread throughout the NIS, these conflicts may escalate to include the use of weapons of mass destruction. Scenarios including unauthorized missile launches are especially threatening. Moreover, if successful, a reconstituted Russian empire would become a major destabilizing influence both in Eurasia and throughout the world. It would endanger not only Russia's neighbors, but also the U.S. and its allies in Europe and the Middle East. And, of course, a neo-imperialist Russia could imperil the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf.15

### **Exts – Russian Expansionism**

**And we have specific scenarios:**

#### **Belarus**

Brzezinski 12 (Zbigniew, US National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter, Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, scholar at CSIS, Jan/Feb 2012, "8 Geopolitically Endangered Species," www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/8\_geopolitically\_endangered\_species?page=0,7 SL)

4. BELARUS Twenty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, Europe's last dictatorship remains politically and economically dependent on Russia. One-third of its exports go to Russia, on which it is almost entirely reliant for its energy needs. At the same time, President Aleksandr Lukashenko's 17-year dictatorship has stood in the way of any meaningful relations with the West. Consequently, a marked American decline would give Russia a virtually risk-free opportunity to reabsorb Belarus. At stake: The security of neighboring Baltic states, especially Latvia.

#### **Ukraine**

Brzezinski 12 (Zbigniew, US National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter, Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, scholar at CSIS, Jan/Feb 2012, "8 Geopolitically Endangered Species," www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/8\_geopolitically\_endangered\_species?page=0,7 SL)

5. UKRAINE Kiev's relationship with Moscow has been as prone to tension as its relationship with the West has been prone to indecision. In 2005, 2007, and 2009, Russia either threatened to or did stop oil and natural gas from flowing to Ukraine. More recently, President Viktor Yanukovych was pressured to extend Russia's lease of a naval base at the Ukrainian Black Sea port of Sevastopol for another 25 years in exchange for preferential pricing of Russian energy deliveries to Ukraine. The Kremlin continues to press Ukraine to join a "common economic space" with Russia, while gradually stripping Ukraine of direct control over its major industrial assets through mergers and takeovers by Russian firms. With America in decline, Europe would be less willing and able to reach out and incorporate Ukraine into an expanding Western community, leaving Ukraine more vulnerable to Russian designs. At stake: The renewal of Russian imperial ambitions.

#### **Georgia**

Brzezinski 12 (Zbigniew, US National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter, Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, scholar at CSIS, Jan/Feb 2012, "8 Geopolitically Endangered Species," www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/8\_geopolitically\_endangered\_species?page=0,7 SL)

With the decline of America's global preeminence, weaker countries will be more susceptible to the assertive influence of major regional powers. India and China are rising, Russia is increasingly imperially minded, and the Middle East is growing ever more unstable. The potential for regional conflict in the absence of an internationally active America is real. Get ready for a global reality characterized by the survival of the strongest. 1. GEORGIA American decline would leave this tiny Caucasian state vulnerable to Russian political intimidation and military aggression. The United States has provided Georgia with $3 billion in aid since 1991 -- $1 billion of that since its 2008 war with Russia. America's decline would put new limitations on U.S. capabilities, and could by itself stir Russian desires to reclaim its old sphere of influence. What's more, once-and-future Russian President Vladimir Putin harbors an intense personal hatred toward Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. At stake: Russian domination of the southern energy corridor to Europe, possibly leading to more pressure on Europe to accommodate Moscow's political agenda; a domino effect on Azerbaijan.

### 2AC Taiwan War

#### Heg solves taiwan war

Brzezinski 12 (Zbigniew, US National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter, Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, scholar at CSIS, Jan/Feb 2012, "8 Geopolitically Endangered Species," www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/8\_geopolitically\_endangered\_species?page=0,7 SL)

2. TAIWAN Since 1972, the United States has formally accepted the mainland's "one China" formula while maintaining that neither side shall alter the status quo by force. Beijing, however, reserves the right to use force, which allows Washington to justify its continued arms sales to Taiwan. In recent years, Taiwan and China have been improving their relationship. America's decline, however, would increase Taiwan's vulnerability, leaving decision-makers in Taipei more susceptible to direct Chinese pressure and the sheer attraction of an economically successful China. That, at the least, could speed up the timetable for cross-strait reunification, but on unequal terms favoring the mainland. At stake: Risk of a serious collision with China.

#### War over Taiwan goes nuclear

**Glaser**, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs – George Washington University, ‘**11**

(Charles, “Will China’s Rise Lead to War?” *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 9 Iss. 2, March/April)

THE PROSPECTS for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable--particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China--whatever they might formally agree to--have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

### 2AC Afghanistan

#### **Heg solves Afghanistan instability y**

Brzezinski 12 (Zbigniew, US National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter, Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, scholar at CSIS, Jan/Feb 2012, "8 Geopolitically Endangered Species," www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/8\_geopolitically\_endangered\_species?page=0,7 SL)

6. AFGHANISTAN Devastated by nine years of brutal warfare waged by the Soviet Union, ignored by the West for a decade after the Soviet withdrawal, mismanaged by the medieval Taliban, and let down by 10 years of halfhearted U.S. military operations and sporadic economic assistance, Afghanistan is in shambles. With 40 percent unemployment and ranking 215th globally in per capita GDP, it has little economic output beyond its illegal narcotics trade. A rapid U.S. troop disengagement brought on by war fatigue or the early effects of American decline would most likely result in internal disintegration and an external power play among nearby states for influence in Afghanistan. In the absence of an effective, stable government in Kabul, the country would be dominated by rival warlords. Pakistan and India would more assertively compete for influence in Afghanistan -- with Iran also probably involved. At stake: The re-emergence of the Taliban; a proxy war between India and Pakistan; a haven for international terrorism.

#### Afghanistan instability causes nuclear war

Stephen John **Morgan 7**, Former member of the British Labour Party Executive Committee & a political psychologist, researcher into Chaos/Complexity Theory, "Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!?", http://www.electricarticles.com/display.aspx?id=639

Although disliked and despised in many quarters, the Taliban could not advance without the support or acquiescence of parts of the population, especially in the south. In particular, the Taliban is drawing on backing from the Pashtun tribes from whom they originate. The southern and eastern areas have been totally out of government control since 2001. Moreover, not only have they not benefited at all from the Allied occupation, but it is increasingly clear that with a few small centres of exception, all of the country outside Kabul has seen little improvement in its circumstances. The conditions for unrest are ripe and the Taliban is filling the vacuum. The Break-Up of Afghanistan? However, the Taliban is unlikely to win much support outside of the powerful Pashtun tribes. Although they make up a majority of the nation, they are concentrated in the south and east. Among the other key minorities, such as Tajiks and Uzbeks, who control the north they have no chance of making new inroads. They will fight the Taliban and fight hard, but their loyalty to the NATO and US forces is tenuous to say the least. The Northern Alliance originally liberated Kabul from the Taliban without Allied ground support. The Northern Alliance are fierce fighters, veterans of the war of liberation against the Soviets and the Afghanistan civil war. Mobilized they count for a much stronger adversary than the NATO and US forces. It is possible that, while they won’t fight for the current government or coalition forces, they will certainly resist any new Taliban rule. They may decide to withdraw to their areas in the north and west of the country. This would leave the Allied forces with few social reserves, excepting a frightened and unstable urban population in Kabul, much like what happened to the Soviets. Squeezed by facing fierce fighting in Helmund and other provinces, and, at the same time, harried by a complementary tactic of Al Qaeda-style urban terrorism in Kabul, sooner or later, a “Saigon-style” evacuation of US and Allied forces could be on the cards. The net result could be the break-up and partition of Afghanistan into a northern and western area and a southern and eastern area, which would include the two key cities of Kandahar and, the capital Kabul. « Pastunistan?» The Taliban themselves, however may decide not to take on the Northern Alliance and fighting may concentrate on creating a border between the two areas, about which the two sides may reach an agreement regardless of US and Allied plans or preferences. The Taliban may claim the name Afghanistan or might opt for “Pashtunistan” – a long-standing, though intermittent demand of the Pashtuns, within Afghanistan and especially along the ungovernable border regions inside Pakistan. It could not be ruled out that the Taliban could be aiming to lead a break away of the Pakistani Pashtuns to form a 30 million strong greater Pashtun state, encompassing some 18 million Pakistani Pashtuns and 12 Afghan Pashtuns. Although the Pashtuns are more closely linked to tribal and clan loyalty, there exists a strong latent embryo of a Pashtun national consciousness and the idea of an independent Pashtunistan state has been raised regularly in the past with regard to the disputed territories common to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The area was cut in two by the “Durand Line”, a totally artificial border between created by British Imperialism in the 19th century. It has been a question bedevilling relations between the Afghanistan and Pakistan throughout their history, and with India before Partition. It has been an untreated, festering wound which has lead to sporadic wars and border clashes between the two countries and occasional upsurges in movements for Pashtun independence. In fact, is this what lies behind the current policy of appeasement President Musharraf of Pakistan towards the Pashtun tribes in along the Frontiers and his armistice with North Waziristan last year? Is he attempting to avoid further alienating Pashtun tribes there and head–off a potential separatist movement in Pakistan, which could develop from the Taliban’s offensive across the border in Afghanistan? Trying to subdue the frontier lands has proven costly and unpopular for Musharraf. In effect, he faces exactly the same problems as the US and Allies in Afghanistan or Iraq. Indeed, fighting Pashtun tribes has cost him double the number of troops as the US has lost in Iraq. Evidently, he could not win and has settled instead for an attempted political solution. When he agreed the policy of appeasement and virtual self-rule for North Waziristan last year, President Musharraf stated clearly that he is acting first and foremost to protect the interests of Pakistan. While there was outrageous in Kabul, his deal with the Pashtuns is essentially an effort to firewall his country against civil war and disintegration. In his own words, what he fears most is, the « Talibanistation » of the whole Pashtun people, which he warns could inflame the already fierce fundamentalist and other separatist movement across his entire country. He does not want to open the door for any backdraft from the Afghan war to engulf Pakistan. Musharraf faces the nationalist struggle in Kashmir, an insurgency in Balochistan, unrest in the Sindh, and growing terrorist bombings in the main cities. There is also a large Shiite population and clashes between Sunnis and Shias are regular. Moreover, fundamentalist support in his own Armed Forces and Intelligence Services is extremely strong. So much so that analyst consider it likely that the Army and Secret Service is protecting, not only top Taliban leaders, but Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda central leadership thought to be entrenched in the same Pakistani borderlands. For the same reasons, he has not captured or killed Bin Laden and the Al Qaeda leadership. Returning from the frontier provinces with Bin Laden’s severed head would be a trophy that would cost him his own head in Pakistan. At best he takes the occasional risk of giving a nod and a wink to a US incursion, but even then at the peril of the chagrin of the people and his own military and secret service. The Break-Up of Pakistan? Musharraf probably hopes that by giving de facto autonomy to the Taliban and Pashtun leaders now with a virtual free hand for cross border operations into Afghanistan, he will undercut any future upsurge in support for a break-away independent Pashtunistan state or a “Peoples’ War” of the Pashtun populace as a whole, as he himself described it. However events may prove him sorely wrong. Indeed, his policy could completely backfire upon him. As the war intensifies, he has no guarantees that the current autonomy may yet burgeon into a separatist movement. Appetite comes with eating, as they say. Moreover, should the Taliban fail to re-conquer al of Afghanistan, as looks likely, but captures at least half of the country, then a Taliban Pashtun caliphate could be established which would act as a magnet to separatist Pashtuns in Pakistan. Then, the likely break up of Afghanistan along ethnic lines, could, indeed, lead the way to the break up of Pakistan, as well. Strong centrifugal forces have always bedevilled the stability and unity of Pakistan, and, in the context of the new world situation, the country could be faced with civil wars and popular fundamentalist uprisings, probably including a military-fundamentalist coup d’état. Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations. The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast. Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could not be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a "Pandora's box" for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US. What is at stake in "the half-forgotten war" in Afghanistan is far greater than that in Iraq. But America's capacities for controlling the situation are extremely restricted. Might it be, in the end, they are also forced to accept President Musharraf's unspoken slogan of «Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!

### 2AC Pakistan

#### **Solves Pakistani instability**

Brzezinski 12 (Zbigniew, US National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter, Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, scholar at CSIS, Jan/Feb 2012, "8 Geopolitically Endangered Species," www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/8\_geopolitically\_endangered\_species?page=0,7 SL)

7. PAKISTAN Although Islamabad is armed with 21st-century nuclear weapons and held together by a professional late 20th-century army, the majority of Pakistan is still pre-modern, rural, and largely defined by regional and tribal identities. Conflict with India defines Pakistan's sense of national identity, while the forcible division of Kashmir sustains a shared and profound antipathy. Pakistan's political instability is its greatest vulnerability, and a decline in U.S. power would reduce America's ability to aid Pakistan's consolidation and development. Pakistan could then transform into a state run by the military, a radical Islamic state, a state that combined both military and Islamic rule, or a "state" with no centralized government at all. At stake: Nuclear warlordism; a militant Islamic, anti-Western, nuclear-armed government similar to Iran's; regional instability in Central Asia, with violence potentially spreading to China, India, and Russia.

#### Pakistani instability results in Indo-Pak nuclear war

**Morgan 2007** (Stephen John, Former Member of British Labour Party Executive Committee; political psychologist; researcher of Chaos/Complexity Theory, “Better another Taliban Afghanistan, than a Taliban NUCLEAR Pakistan!?” <http://www.electricarticles.com/display.aspx?id=639>)

Fundamentalism is deeply rooted in Pakistan society. The fact that in the year following 9/11, the most popular name given to male children born that year was “Osama” (not a Pakistani name) is a small indication of the mood. Given the weakening base of the traditional, secular opposition parties, conditions would be ripe for a coup d’état by the fundamentalist wing of the Army and ISI, leaning on the radicalised masses to take power. Some form of radical, military Islamic regime, where legal powers would shift to Islamic courts and forms of shira law would be likely. Although, even then, this might not take place outside of a protracted crisis of upheaval and civil war conditions, mixing fundamentalist movements with nationalist uprisings and sectarian violence between the Sunni and minority Shia populations.  The nightmare that is now Iraq would take on gothic proportions across the continent. The prophesy of an arc of civil war over Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq would spread to south Asia, stretching from Pakistan to Palestine, through Afghanistan into Iraq and up to the Mediterranean coast.  Undoubtedly, this would also spill over into India both with regards to the Muslim community and Kashmir. Border clashes, terrorist attacks, sectarian pogroms and insurgency would break out. A new war, and possibly nuclear war, between Pakistan and India could no be ruled out. Atomic Al Qaeda Should Pakistan break down completely, a Taliban-style government with strong Al Qaeda influence is a real possibility. Such deep chaos would, of course, open a “Pandora's box” for the region and the world. With the possibility of unstable clerical and military fundamentalist elements being in control of the Pakistan nuclear arsenal, not only their use against India, but Israel becomes a possibility, as well as the acquisition of nuclear and other deadly weapons secrets by Al Qaeda. Invading Pakistan would not be an option for America. Therefore a nuclear war would now again become a real strategic possibility. This would bring a shift in the tectonic plates of global relations. It could usher in a new Cold War with China and Russia pitted against the US.

#### Indopak war goes nuclear

**Pitt, 9**- a New York Times and internationally bestselling author of two books: "War on Iraq: What Team Bush Doesn't Want You to Know" and "The Greatest Sedition Is Silence."

**(5/8/09, William, “Unstable Pakistan Threatens the World,”** http://www.arabamericannews.com/news/index.php?mod=article&cat=commentary&article=2183)

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But a suicide bomber in Pakistan rammed a car packed with explosives into a jeep filled with troops today, killing five and wounding as many as 21, including several children who were waiting for a ride to school. Residents of the region where the attack took place are fleeing in terror as gunfire rings out around them, and government forces have been unable to quell the violence. Two regional government officials were beheaded by militants in retaliation for the killing of other militants by government forces. As familiar as this sounds, it did not take place where we have come to expect such terrible events. This, unfortunately, is a whole new ballgame. It is part of another conflict that is brewing, one which puts what is happening in Iraq and Afghanistan in deep shade, and which represents a grave and growing threat to us all. Pakistan is now trembling on the edge of violent chaos, and is doing so with nuclear weapons in its hip pocket, right in the middle of one of the most dangerous neighborhoods in the world.The situation in brief: Pakistan for years has been a nation in turmoil, run by a shaky government supported by a corrupted system, dominated by a blatantly criminal security service, and threatened by a large fundamentalist Islamic population with deep ties to the Taliban in Afghanistan. All this is piled atop an ongoing standoff with neighboring India that has been the center of political gravity in the region for more than half a century. The fact that Pakistan, and India, and Russia, and China all possess nuclear weapons and share the same space means any ongoing or escalating violence over there has the real potential to crack open the very gates of Hell itself. Recently, the Taliban made a military push into the northwest Pakistani region around the Swat Valley. According to a recent Reuters report: The (Pakistani) army deployed troops in Swat in October 2007 and used artillery and gunship helicopters to reassert control. But insecurity mounted after a civilian government came to power last year and tried to reach a negotiated settlement. A peace accord fell apart in May 2008. After that, hundreds — including soldiers, militants and civilians — died in battles. Militants unleashed a reign of terror, killing and beheading politicians, singers, soldiers and opponents. They banned female education and destroyed nearly 200 girls' schools. About 1,200 people were killed since late 2007 and 250,000 to 500,000 fled, leaving the militants in virtual control. Pakistan offered on February 16 to introduce Islamic law in the Swat valley and neighboring areas in a bid to take the steam out of the insurgency. The militants announced an indefinite cease-fire after the army said it was halting operations in the region. President Asif Ali Zardari signed a regulation imposing sharia in the area last month. But the Taliban refused to give up their guns and pushed into Buner and another district adjacent to Swat, intent on spreading their rule. The United States, already embroiled in a war against Taliban forces in Afghanistan, must now face the possibility that **Pakistan could collapse** under the mounting threat of Taliban forces there. Military and diplomatic advisers to President Obama, uncertain how best to proceed, now face one of the great nightmare scenarios of our time. "Recent militant gains in Pakistan," reported The New York Times on Monday, "have so alarmed the White House that the national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, described the situation as 'one of the very most serious problems we face.'" "Security was deteriorating rapidly," reported The Washington Post on Monday, "particularly in the mountains along the Afghan border that harbor al-Qaeda and the Taliban, intelligence chiefs reported, and there were signs that those groups were working with indigenous extremists in Pakistan's populous Punjabi heartland. The Pakistani government was mired in political bickering. The army, still fixated on its historical adversary India, remained ill-equipped and unwilling to throw its full weight into the counterinsurgency fight. But despite the threat the intelligence conveyed, Obama has only limited options for dealing with it. Anti-American feeling in Pakistan is high, and a U.S. combat presence is prohibited. The United States is fighting Pakistan-based extremists by proxy, through an army over which it has little control, in alliance with a government in which it has little confidence." It is believed Pakistan is currently in possession of between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons. Because Pakistan's stability is threatened by the wide swath of its population that shares ethnic, cultural and religious connections to the fundamentalist Islamic populace of Afghanistan, fears over what could happen to those nuclear weapons if the Pakistani government collapses are very real. "As the insurgency of the Taliban and Al Qaeda spreads in Pakistan," reported the Times last week, "senior American officials say they are increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities for Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including the potential for militants to snatch a weapon in transport or to insert sympathizers into laboratories or fuel-production facilities. In public, the administration has only hinted at those concerns, repeating the formulation that the Bush administration used: that it has faith in the Pakistani Army. But that cooperation, according to officials who would not speak for attribution because of the sensitivity surrounding the exchanges between Washington and Islamabad, has been sharply limited when the subject has turned to the vulnerabilities in the Pakistani nuclear infrastructure." "The prospect of turmoil in Pakistan sends shivers up the spinesof those U.S. officials charged with keeping tabs on foreign nuclear weapons," reported Time Magazine last month. "Pakistan is thought to possess about 100 — the U.S. isn't sure of the total, and may not know where all of them are. Still, if Pakistan collapses, the U.S. military is primed to enter the country and secure as many of those weapons as it can, according to U.S. officials. Pakistani officials insist their personnel safeguards are stringent, but a sleeper cell could cause big trouble, U.S. officials say." In other words, a shaky Pakistan spells trouble for everyone, especially if America loses the footrace to secure those weapons in the event of the worst-case scenario. If Pakistani militants ever succeed in toppling the government, several very dangerous events could happen at once. Nuclear-armed India could be galvanized into military action of some kind, as could nuclear-armed China or nuclear-armed Russia. If the Pakistani government does fall, and all those Pakistani nukes are not immediately accounted for and secured, the specter (or reality) of loose nukes falling into the hands of terrorist organizations could place the **entire world on a collision course with unimaginable disaster**. We have all been paying a great deal of attention to Iraq and Afghanistan, and rightly so. The developing situation in Pakistan, however, needs to be placed immediately on the front burner. The Obama administration appears to be gravely serious about addressing the situation. So should we all.

### 2AC Middle East

#### **Solves middle east war**

Brzezinski 12 (Zbigniew, US National Security Advisor to Jimmy Carter, Professor of American Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, scholar at CSIS, Jan/Feb 2012, "8 Geopolitically Endangered Species," www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/8\_geopolitically\_endangered\_species?page=0,7 SL)

8. ISRAEL and the GREATER MIDDLE EAST America's decline would set in motion tectonic shifts undermining the political stability of the entire Middle East. All states in the region remain vulnerable to varying degrees of internal populist pressures, social unrest, and religious fundamentalism, as seen by the events of early 2011. If America's decline were to occur with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still unresolved, the failure to implement a mutually acceptable two-state solution would further inflame the region's political atmosphere. Regional hostility to Israel would then intensify. Perceived American weakness would at some point tempt the more powerful states in the region, notably Iran or Israel, to preempt anticipated dangers. And jockeying for tactical advantage could precipitate eruptions by Hamas or Hezbollah, which could then escalate into wider and bloodier military encounters. Weak entities such as Lebanon and Palestine would pay an especially high price in civilian deaths. Even worse, such conflicts could rise to truly horrific levels through strikes and counterstrikes between Iran and Israel. At stake: Direct Israeli or U.S. confrontation with Iran; a rising tide of Islamic radicalism and extremism; a worldwide energy crisis; vulnerability of America's Persian Gulf allies.

#### Middle Eastern war goes nuclear and draws in great powers

Herbert I. **London 10**, President Emeritus of Hudson Institute, “The Coming Crisis in the Middle East”, June 23, <http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=7101&pubType=HI_Opeds>

The gathering storm in the Middle East is gaining momentum. War clouds are on the horizon and like conditions prior to World War I all it takes for explosive action to commence is a trigger. Turkey’s provocative flotilla - often described in Orwellian terms as a humanitarian mission - has set in motion a flurry of diplomatic activity, but if the Iranians send escort vessels for the next round of Turkish ships, it could present a casus belli. It is also instructive that Syria is playing a dangerous game with both missile deployment and rearming Hezbollah. According to most public accounts Hezbollah is sitting on 40,000 long, medium and short range missiles and Syrian territory has served as a conduit for military material from Iran since the end of the 2006 Lebanon War. Should Syria move its own scuds to Lebanon or deploy its troops as reinforcement for Hezbollah, a wider regional war with Israel could not be contained. In the backdrop is an Iran with sufficient fissionable material to produce a couple of nuclear weapons. It will take some time to weaponize missiles, but the road to that goal is synchronized in green lights since neither diplomacy nor diluted sanctions can convince Iran to change course. Iran is poised to be the hegemon in the Middle East. It is increasingly considered the “strong horse” as American forces incrementally retreat from the region. Even Iraq, ironically, may depend on Iranian ties in order to maintain internal stability. From Qatar to Afghanistan all political eyes are on Iran. For Sunni nations like Egypt and Saudi Arabia regional strategic vision is a combination of deal making to offset the Iranian Shia advantage and attempting to buy or develop nuclear weapons as a counter weight to Iranian ambition. However, both of these governments are in a precarious state. Should either fall, all bets are off in the Middle East neighborhood. It has long been said that the Sunni “tent” must stand on two legs, if one, falls, the tent collapses. Should that tent collapse and should Iran take advantage of that calamity, it could incite a Sunni-Shia war. Or feeling its oats and no longer dissuaded by an escalation scenario with nuclear weapons in tow, war against Israel is a distinct possibility. However, implausible it may seem at the moment, the possible annihilation of Israel and the prospect of a second holocaust could lead to a nuclear exchange. The only wild card that can change this slide into warfare is an active United States’ policy. Yet curiously, the U.S. is engaged in both an emotional and physical retreat from the region. Despite rhetoric which suggests an Iran with nuclear weapons is intolerable, it has done nothing to forestall that eventual outcome. Despite the investment in blood and treasure to allow a stable government to emerge in Iraq, the anticipated withdrawal of U.S. forces has prompted President Maliki to travel to Tehran on a regular basis. And despite historic links to Israel that gave the U.S. leverage in the region and a democratic ally, the Obama administration treats Israel as a national security albatross that must be disposed of as soon as possible. As a consequence, the U.S. is perceived in the region as the “weak horse,” the one that is dangerous to ride. In every Middle East capital the words “unreliable and United States” are linked. Those seeking a moderate course of action are now in a distinct minority. A political vacuum is emerging, one that is not sustainable and one the Iranian leadership looks to with imperial exhilaration. It is no longer a question of whether war will occur, but rather when it will occur and where it will break out. There are many triggers to ignite the explosion, but not many scenarios for containment. Could it be a regional war in which Egypt and Saudi Arabia watch from the sidelines, but secretly wish for Israeli victory? Or is this a war in which there aren’t victors, only devastation? Moreover, should war break out, what does the U.S. do? This is a description far more dire than any in the last century and, even if some believe my view is overly pessimistic, Arab and Jew, Persian and Egyptian, Muslim and Maronite tend to believe in its veracity. That is a truly bad sign.

## AT: Heg Bad

### 2AC Cling to Heg Inev

#### Even anti-hegemonic authors agree that the u.s. will never accept anything less than total domination

**Mearsheimer 11** John J. Mearsheimer, the “R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago” Jan/Feb 2011 “Imperial By Design” http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0059.pdf

The downward spiral the United States has taken was anything but inevitable. Washington has always had a choice in how to approach grand strategy. One popular option among some libertarians is isolationism. This approach is based on the assumption that there is no region outside the Western Hemisphere that is strategically important enough to justify expending American blood and treasure. Isolationists believe that the United States is remarkably secure because it is separated from all of the world’s great powers by two giant moats—the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans— and on top of that it has had nuclear weapons—the ultimate deterrent—since 1945. But in truth, **there is really no chance that Washington will adopt this policy**, though the United States had strong isolationist tendencies until World War II. For since then, an internationalist activism, fostered by the likes of the Rockefeller Foundation, has thoroughly delegitimized this approach. American policy makers have come to believe the country should be militarily involved on the world stage. Yet though no mainstream politician would dare advocate isolationism at this point, the rationale for this grand strategy shows just how safe the United States is. This means, among other things, that it will always be a challenge to motivate the U.S. public to want to run the world and especially to fight wars of choice in distant places. Offshore balancing, which was America’s traditional grand strategy for most of its history, is but another option. Predicated on the belief that there are three regions of the world that are strategically important to the United States—Europe, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf—it sees the United States’ principle goal as making sure no country dominates any of these areas as it dominates the Western Hemisphere. This is to ensure that dangerous rivals in other regions are forced to concentrate their attention on great powers in their own backyards rather than be free to interfere in America’s. The best way to achieve that end is to rely on local powers to counter aspiring regional hegemons and otherwise keep U.S. military forces over the horizon. But if that proves impossible, American troops come from offshore to help do the job, and then leave once the potential hegemon is checked. Selective engagement also assumes that Europe, Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf are the only areas of the world where the United States should be willing to deploy its military might. It is a more ambitious strategy than offshore balancing in that it calls for permanently stationing U.S. troops in those regions to help maintain peace. For selective engagers, it is not enough just to thwart aspiring hegemons. It is also necessary to prevent war in those key regions, either because upheaval will damage our economy or because we will eventually get dragged into the fight in any case. An American presence is also said to be valuable for limiting nuclear proliferation. But none of these strategies call for Washington to spread democracy around the globe—especially through war. The root cause of America’s troubles is that it adopted a flawed grand strategy after the Cold War. From the Clinton administration on, the United States **rejected all these other avenues, instead pursuing global dominance**, or what might alternatively be called global hegemony, which was not just doomed to fail, but likely to backfire in dangerous ways if it relied too heavily on military force to achieve its ambitious agenda. Global dominance has two broad objectives: maintaining American primacy, which means making sure that the United States remains the most powerful state in the international system; and spreading democracy across the globe, in effect, making the world over in America’s image. The underlying belief is that new liberal democracies will be peacefully inclined and pro-American, so the more the better. Of course, this means that Washington must care a lot about every country’s politics. With global dominance, no serious attempt is made to prioritize U.S. interests, because they are virtually limitless. This grand strategy is “imperial” at its core; its proponents believe that the United States has the right as well as the responsibility to interfere in the politics of other countries. One would think that such arrogance might alienate other states, but most American policy makers of the early nineties and beyond were confident that would not happen, instead believing that other countries—save for so-called rogue states like Iran and North Korea—would see the United States as a benign hegemon serving their own interests.

### AT: China War Turn

#### The current hegemonic structure of power checks back any risk of China-war or balancing

Van Ness 2 (Peter Van Ness, Contemporary China Centre and Department of International Relations, School of International, Political & Strategic Studies at Australian National University, February 2002, “Hegemony, not anarchy: why China and Japan are not balancing US unipolar power.”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, p. 132-133) //ZA

Despite this consensus about the predominance of US power, much contemporary international relations scholarship fails to take into account the pervasive influence of US structural power. Realists and neorealists, for example, continue to assume that the character of the global system is best understood as anarchic, and that the security policies of major powers, as a result, will inevitably be designed on the basis of self-help strategies. New contenders, they insist, will inevitably emerge to challenge US unipolar power. Kenneth Waltz, for one, argues that realism ‘remains the basic theory of international politics’, but contrary to realist expectations, none of his major candidates to be the next great power (the European Union, China, Japan and Russia) have thus far sought to balance US power. His conclusion nonetheless is that, given the existence of anarchy, they must do so in the future as a part of ‘the all-but-inevitable movement from unipolarity to multipolarity’ that is taking place in Asia (Waltz, 2000, pp. 32, 41). The failure of major powers to balance US power ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union constitutes a major anomaly in the realist interpretation. Critiquing Waltz’s argument, this essay will make the case that the United States today plays a hegemonic role in different ways in different parts of the world. Contrasting my understanding with Waltz’s interpretation, but focusing on East Asia as he has suggested, I will specifically address the question of why neither China nor Japan has chosen to balance the power of the United States. I want to show that Chinese and Japanese reluctance to balance American power can be better explained by alternative understandings of the structure of the global system, based on concepts of hegemony and globalization. 2 I will argue that China and Japan, both in different ways strategic dependents of the United States, devise their national security policies to deal with a world that is not, for them, characterized by anarchy. Instead, they perceive a hierarchical world environment, structured in terms of a combination of US military-strategic hegemony and a globalized economic interdependence. They devise strategies based on the perceived benefits/costs of participation in that system, as compared with opting out of it. Each of the two countries has the capability to reject dependency on the United States, but neither is even close to doing so. Japan’s leaders can no more conceive of a world without the US security commitment (Soeya, 1998) than China can consider opting out of the global capitalist market and returning to the Maoist economic strategy of self-reliance. Moreover, both have recent, unhappy experiences of attempting to balance against the United States (Japan in alliance with Germany during the Second World War, and China during the first two decades of the Maoist period); each paid a heavy price for doing so.

#### No risk of a Chinese challenge to hegemony

Clark 11(Ian Clark, E. H. Carr Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, January 19, 2011 “China and the United States: a succession of hegemonies?”, p. 28) //ZA

A detailed review of US primacy, and its potential erosion, has not been the immediate concern of this article: there have been writings aplenty on primacy, and the supposed power transitions that relate to it. Rather, the aim has been to establish a viable account of hegemony, and what is entailed by a hegemonic succession. Future projections of material power, in any event, have been notoriously unreliable, as previous predictions of the decline of the United States in the 1970s and 1980s amply demonstrated. Similarly, projections of China’s future role, based on simple extrapolations from its current rate of economic growth, are bound to deceive. Above all, China faces a complex array of severe domestic problems that will dominate its policy priorities for many decades to come, and it is wholly speculative to assess the nature of its likely international contributions beyond those concerns. For that reason, the occurrence of a power transition— but in the absence of a hegemonic succession—could yield the worst of both worlds. This is Mandelbaum’s worry: that the alternative to a leading US role may not be ‘better’, but ‘less’, global governance. 116 These reflections warn against any temptation to plot future legitimacy dynamics, as if they straightforwardly track material shifts in power. In the literature on China’s rise, accounts of so-called hegemonic succession have actually been about no more than an embryonic power transition, and rest upon narrowly materialist accounts. Martin Wight was right to warn against an exclusive focus on the ‘mechanics’, and to insist that attraction and influence are not ‘exactly correlated to mass and weight’. Serious questions are properly being asked about the US capacity to sustain its role in the future. At the same time, there are equally pertinent questions about whether China is yet able to convey an appealing international purpose that, in Wight’s words, would support a ‘common interest’, promote ‘real values’, and promise ‘real benefit’ for all. The future positions of these two states will be shaped, not simply by transitions in material power, but just as importantly by the potential to develop an institution of hegemony, resting upon widespread international consent. If this is to be achieved at all, then, in the foreseeable future, it is much more likely to be collective in form than to represent a succession of hegemonies.

### AT: Layne

#### **Layne’s call for retrenchment would risk global instability- American can and should maintain primacy**

Thayer 6 – (Bradley A. Thayer, associate professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University, December 2006, “In Defense of Primacy”, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdlink?vinst=PROD&fmt=3&startpage=-1&vname=PQD&RQT=309&did=1169401821&scaling=FULL&vtype=PQD&rqt=309&TS=1341345116&clientId=17822) //ZA

A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power-the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, either because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for retrenchment. Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests. But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action but they fail to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States, in part because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats.

#### Layne’s claims are unsubstantiated – his off-shore balancing strategy is vague at best and offers no alternative to hegemony

Schmitt 7(Gary Schmitt, director of the Program on Advanced Strategic Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, Mar 12, 2007,“Pax Americana”, <http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdlink?vinst=PROD&fmt=3&startpage=-1&vname=PQD&RQT=309&did=1231118311&scaling=FULL&vtype=PQD&rqt=309&TS=1341345448&clientId=17822>) //ZA

American Empire concludes with brief responses by Thayer and Layne to each other's arguments, flushing out their original positions and critiques. Specialists in the field of international security will quibble that Thayer and Layne's two grand strategies are not the sum total of grand strategies available to the American "empire." Nor will they be satisfied with the somewhat loose way in which the term "empire" is used by both authors. That both authors admit the United States is not an empire in the traditional sense seems to suggest that it isn't, in fact, an empire: Hegemony and empire are not one and the same, although admittedly their attributes can at times overlap. That said, the book does provide plenty of material for thought and, more important, debate. The biggest problem, however, lies in Christopher Layne's dyspeptic analysis of current policy opponents, Rather than taking the opposing argument as seriously as Thayer takes his, Layne resorts to unsubstantiated claims about "neocons," the White House lying, and small cabals (the socalled "Blue Team") trying to foment a "preventive" war with China. Similarly, his dismissal of the democratic peace theory is equally over-the-top. Even if one thinks that the theory is, at times, oversold, to claim that it has absolutely no merits is bound to leave most readers with the sense that there is as much anger as argument in the case Layne is making. An additional problem, perhaps tied to the way the book is structured, is that Layne spends the vast majority of his time criticizing the argument for primacy, without giving the reader much of a handle on his own preferred strategy's particulars. As a result, we don't know whether his model of "offshore balancing" is more British in style-that is, fairly active in playing the decisive power broker among the other competing states-or more passive in content-a la the United States in the 1920s and '30s. If the former, a key problem with the strategy is that it requires a far more calculating style of statecraft than the United States has ever engaged in before. And even if we had Henry Kissinger upon Henry Kissinger to cany it out, would the American public really be willing to let its government play this version of international politics-shifting partners based on power relations-rather than the character of the states themselves? Surely, the disappearance of the United States as security guarantor is likely to lead to more competition among states and the creation of a more chaotic and fluid international environment. Britain had a hard enough time playing this role hi its day, and found itself in numerous conflicts in any case. If the latter, the passive "off-shore balancing" approach leads to the question of whether such a strategy results in the United States addressing a security problem at a time when it may be far more difficult to deal with. Layne's bet, at least in the case of Iran and China today, is that if the United States would only get out of the way, other powers would naturally begin to meet their challenge. Possibly. But doing so might create an even more destabilizing competition among neighbors, or lead those same neighbors to accept China or Iran's new hegemony, fueling their ambitions rather than lessening them. The history of international relations suggests that most great crises are the result of not addressing more minor ones initially. As Thayer argues, it is probably less costly to deal with these issues when one is in a better position to do so than to wait for them to become full-blown security problems. And speaking of money: Layne's argument about looming imperial overstretch is itself a stretch. Even with all the problems in Iraq, a war in Afghanistan, and an emerging hedging strategy vis-à-vis China, the defense burden is still barely over 4 percent of the country's gross domestic product. The United States has certainly had far higher defense burdens in the past, while still retaining its status as the world's economic juggernaut. There may be plenty of reasons to worry about the country's economy, but "guns over butter" is hardly one of them. Moreover, while pulling back from a forward-leaning defense strategy would undoubtedly save money, offshore balancing would still require the United States to have a major military establishment in reserve if it wanted to be capable of being a decisive player in a game of great power balancing. Is the $100 billion or so saved-or, rather, spent by Congress on "bridges to nowhere"-really worth the loss in I global influence that comes from adopting Layne's strategy?

#### **Hegemony is not correlated strictly on economics- there’s too many variables Layne ignores**

Wohlforth 12(William C. Wohlforth, professor of government at Dartmouth College, March 2012, “How Not to Evaluate Theories”, International Studies Quarterly, <http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=WC&aulast=Wohlforth&atitle=Unipolarity,+status+competition,+and+great+power+war&title=World+politics&volume=61&issue=01&date=2009&spage=28&issn=0043-8871>) //ZA

A core problem is that the measurement approach in Layne’s essay runs afoul of widely accepted principles in the very literature of which Layne is a part—principles he endorsed in earlier work. Is it wise to measure the distribution of capabilities exclusively by reference to economic variables? In the past, Layne himself (1993: notes 1 and 2) warned against doing just this, quoting Kenneth Waltz’s admonition that “the military, economic and other capabilities of nations cannot be sectored and separately weighed. States are not placed in the top rank because they excel in one way or another.” Is aggregate GDP measured in purchasing power parity terms really the best indicator of states’ relative economic position? Significantly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Layne’s data source, warns against using purchasing power parity (PPP) this way.1 Moreover, according to the data Layne presents, by that measure China far outstripped Britain in 1870, a period his 1993 article coded as unipolar with Britain as the unipole. Does it make sense to proclaim the end of unipolarity without presenting any data on military capabilities, without mentioning technology, without assessing innovative capacity, and without considering geography? Again, the answer that unambiguously emerges from Layne’s earlier highly regarded work on measuring power is “no.”2 Space constraints preclude a fulsome dissection of the complex issue of measuring the distribution of capabilities. But given the issue’s importance, Layne ought to have provided reasons for departing so significantly from the standard approach that has been used for decades in the literature.

#### No shift to multipolarity- Layne confuses his arbitrary predictions with actual events, there’s no balancing

Wohlforth 12(William C. Wohlforth, professor of government at Dartmouth College, March 2012, “How Not to Evaluate Theories”, International Studies Quarterly, <http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=WC&aulast=Wohlforth&atitle=Unipolarity,+status+competition,+and+great+power+war&title=World+politics&volume=61&issue=01&date=2009&spage=28&issn=0043-8871>) //ZA

For nearly 20 years, Layne, Kenneth Waltz, and other balance-of-power realists have proclaimed multipolarity’s imminent return. They have been crystal clear in identifying balancing as the chief causal mechanism that would produce this outcome. Their argument attracted so much attention in large part because it was simple and appeared to flow logically from their theory: “overwhelming power repels and leads others to try to balance against it” (Waltz 2000:28). As Layne (1993:92) stressed, “balancing has especially strong explanatory power in accounting for the [fact] that unipolarity tends to be short-lived …” He predicted that “Unipolarity will stimulate the emergence of eligible states as great powers, [and will] cause other states to balance against the United States” (Layne 1993:51). Waltz (1997:915) agreed: “Some of the weaker states in the system will … act to restore a balance and move the system back to bi- or multipolarity.” In all of the many papers they wrote on the subject, Layne and Waltz consistently claimed to see balancing processes already under way. “Multipolarity is developing before our eyes,”Waltz (1997:915) wrote. “To all but the myopic, it can already be seen on the horizon. Moreover, it is emerging in according with the balancing imperative” (Waltz 1997:915). In my 1999 article, I argued that Layne, Waltz, and other realists were using a theory whose scope conditions did not obtain (Wohlforth 1999). Their theory predicts reactions to a rising power that might attain preponderance, not responses to a state whose preponderance is already firmly established. Even if one accepted the veracity of the whole Waltzian project, I argued, a properly specified theory predicted that unipolarity would be peaceful and durable: peaceful because two key causes for great-power war—systemic balancing and counterhegemonic rivalry—were absent (cf. Monteiro 2012) and durable because the speedy route to equilibrium—balancing—was for all practical purposes not in the cards. My arguments for why balancing was so unlikely came straight from standard realist theory. In a nutshell, the size and comprehensiveness of the capabilities gap meant contenders had a long way to go, and unipolarity’s geography (America’s offshore location, the contenders for peer status all clustered in or around Eurasia) meant that local balancing was likely to impede internal or external efforts to restore systemic equilibrium. Now Layne claims that events verify his arguments. But his essay provides no evidence that balancing has played any causal role, for good reason. As Stephen Brooks and I have shown in detail (Brooks and Wohlforth 2005, 2008), there simply is no such evidence. It is not just that we see no real balancing: military spending by great powers is at historical lows as a percentage of GDP, and the main alliance formation since 1991 has been the expansion and tightening of US alliances, while China has continued to have only one reliable ally over this entire period: North Korea. Digging deeply into the strategic interactions of contemporary major powers, we found no evidence of more subtle observable implications of balancing dynamics and strong evidence that an important cause of their absence was indeed the high costs of balancing in a unipolar system. What happened? This debate started out being tractable empirically because we all specified observable causal mechanisms, not just predicted outcomes. With time, however, the balance-of-power realists have placed decreasing emphasis on balancing as a cause of structural change to the point that it practically disappears, as in Layne’s current essay. The claim then appears to be that any shift toward a less concentrated distribution of capabilities, whatever the cause, validates the theory. Campbell Craig (2011) puts the bottom line well: The absence of traditional military balancing against the US since the end of the Cold War, a fact of international life that almost no one now denies, poses a major problem for balance-of-power Realists, who argue that major powers are destined to build up their own military forces, and/or create formal military alliances, in order to balance against a dominant state. Prominent structural realists have predicted . . . balancing behaviour since the early 1990s, but it hasn’t happened yet . . . [B]alance-of power Realists must show why major powers have not shown any indication of balancing so far over two decades, indisputably a long time in the context of modern international history… . Otherwise, [they] are forced simply to assert that a new polar system will emerge, someday, simply because that is how international politics operates. This, as any student of social science knows, is an unfalsifiable argument.

#### **Layne has no clear mechanism for describing how economic decline is a result of unipolarity or how it could lead to multipolarity**

Wohlforth 12(William C. Wohlforth, professor of government at Dartmouth College, March 2012, “How Not to Evaluate Theories”, International Studies Quarterly, http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=WC&aulast=Wohlforth&atitle=Unipolarity,+status+competition,+and+great+power+war&title=World+politics&volume=61&issue=01&date=2009&spage=28&issn=0043-8871) //ZA

International Relations (IR) scholars often cite complex events as bearing on the veracity of their theories without doing the careful work to establish the connection between the causes of the event and the causal mechanisms implied by the theory (Wohlforth 1998). The debate over unipolarity’s durability is a case in point. Needless to say, this is an important question and IR scholars should engage it. But we need to be clear about the mechanisms of systemic change that are exogenous to the international system, those that are somehow connected to the system but are unrelated to unipolarity, and those that might actually be linked to the unipolar distribution of capabilities. Unless I missed something, Layne’s theory is about how unipolarity generates systemic forces that work for a rapid return of bi- or multipolarity. Much of Layne’s essay, by contrast, is about economics, primarily the shift in global GDP shares. As I noted earlier, Layne is certainly correct that the financial crisis and “great recession” accelerated China’s relative economic rise. But he provides no argument or evidence to show that the unipolar distribution of capabilities stimulated, prompted, influenced, or affected this change in any way. As William Thompson (2006:17) observed, Layne never explains “why uneven growth should be viewed as a function of unbalanced power.” The causes of economic growth are exogenous to the theories under discussion, so fast or slower-than-expected economic growth of China, the United States, or any other country has no bearing on the veracity of those theories. Even if we were to accept Layne’s claim that a new polar structure has emerged, it would have little to do with arguments he advanced about unipolarity. Indeed, Layne provides no argument or evidence that clearly links the financial collapse, great recession, and consequent ballooning of the US budget deficit to the international system at all (at least, as scholars of international security construe it). I am not aware of any study that shows a connection between any US security commitment and the causes of the economic downturn. The downturn might affect the United States’ willingness to sustain defense spending at 4–5% of GDP and may even prompt Washington to reevaluate some of its security commitments (though Layne probably exaggerates the magnitude), but that does not mean that defense spending or security commitments caused the downturn in the first place. Exogenously generated economic changes do not validate the balance-of-power realists’ arguments. The same goes for China’s rise. In 1999, I concluded that because balancing was not in the cards, “the fate of unipolarity depends on the relative rates of growth and innovation of the main powers.” I stressed that “Social science lacks a theory that can predict the rise and fall of great powers” (Wohlforth 1999:32). My best guess was that, because growth tends to slow as countries get rich, the rate at which China would close the gap would slow with time. I based this not on my theory or any other IR theory but on the standard Solow growth theory in economics, backed up by large-N statistical tests. I agree with Eichengreen, Park, and Shin (2011) that this theory and empirical law probably apply to China. But this assessment concerns mechanisms that are exogenous to theoretical propositions about how a unipolar system works. If China violates the economists’ law of declining growth and continues to surge at 10% annually even as it approaches developed country levels of per capita GDP, then economic theory is implicated, not any proposition I or Layne advanced about unipolarity. If the economists are right, and China slows down, then this is another instance of their theory, not mine. The same goes for many other phenomena that might slow China’s rise, such domestic political instability. Their occurrence would prolong unipolarity, but would not make Layne’s arguments about how unipolarity works any less true or mine more true.

#### Layne is in no place to make predictions based on economic trends- he’s an IR theorist, not an economist

Wohlforth 12(William C. Wohlforth, professor of government at Dartmouth College, March 2012, “How Not to Evaluate Theories”, International Studies Quarterly, http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=WC&aulast=Wohlforth&atitle=Unipolarity,+status+competition,+and+great+power+war&title=World+politics&volume=61&issue=01&date=2009&spage=28&issn=0043-8871) //ZA

Theory evaluation is not the only reason to be clear about exogenous vs. endogenous mechanisms. There is a pragmatic side to this as well. Layne and I are scholars of international security, not experts in economic growth, international finance, or Chinese politics. When the debate begins to feature arguments about the US dollar as a reserve currency, for example, or highly detailed conjectures about the Chinese political economy or system of governance, we need to be aware that we have strayed a long way from the core propositions derived from the theories under discussion. These propositions concern states, the measurement of power, security, geopolitics, historical comparisons—the sorts of things IR scholars have been working on for decades and are best able to evaluate. I view these propositions as most central to the debate. And, as I have noted, the propositions of this type that I helped develop have withstood rigorous empirical tests, while those propounded by the balance-of-power realists have not.

#### Layne leaves too many questions open and his essays lack true basis

Wohlforth 12(William C. Wohlforth, professor of government at Dartmouth College, March 2012, “How Not to Evaluate Theories”, International Studies Quarterly, http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=WC&aulast=Wohlforth&atitle=Unipolarity,+status+competition,+and+great+power+war&title=World+politics&volume=61&issue=01&date=2009&spage=28&issn=0043-8871) //ZA

Though I view Layne’s essay as hyperbolic, it, nonetheless, underscores important challenges to neorealist-style analyses of contemporary international politics (for example, Wagner 1993, 2007; Wendt 2000; Buzan 2004; Legro 2011). By how much does the United States have to decline for the system’s operating dynamics to shift fundamentally? To what degree are the properties attributed to unipolarity a function of the United States’ specific security commitments to Europe and Asia as opposed to its latent capacity to act? These challenges become more relevant the less self-evident a given polar structure is. Addressing them surely will require consistent measures, clear definitions, falsifiable arguments, and clarity about causal mechanisms. So, the very economic shifts Layne documents put a premium on the kind of analytical clarity his essay lacks.

### AT: Montiero

#### Monteiro concludes that multipolarity and bipolarity fails and leads to miscalc- unipolarity is still the best solution

Monteiro 12(Nuno P. Monteiro, Professor of Political Science at Yale University, Winter 2012, “Unrest Assured”, Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful, http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx\_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx\_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr\_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft\_val\_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Unrest+Assured%3A+Why+Unipolarity+Is+Not+Peaceful&rft.jtitle=International+Security&rft.au=Nuno+P+Monteiro&rft.date=2011-01-01&rft.pub=MIT+Press+Journals&rft.issn=0162-2889&rft.volume=36&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=9&rft.externalDocID=2570831251) //ZA

The remaining regions will be either bipolar or multipolar. No consensus exists on their comparative peacefulness.103 In fact, there are plausible causal mechanisms accounting for conflict in both types of system. One can therefore expect that both bipolar and multipolar regions will feature significant levels of conflict—involving minor and major powers—when left on their own. Specifically, the literature notes two causes of conflict in bipolar systems. Each can be adapted to bipolar regions. First, with only two regional powers, there are no opportunities for regional external balancing, making deterrence less likely to succeed in case of a regional imbalance of power. Second, major powers in bipolar regions are focused on each other, which increases tensions and the odds of conflict. Both are good reasons to expect conflict in bipolar regions left alone by the unipole. The literature also discusses four causes of conflict in multipolarity. Each can be adapted to a multipolar region. First, with three or more regional powers, there is a high likelihood of competition that can eventually lead to conflict. Second, the regional distribution of power is less likely to be balanced before alliances are made. Imbalances of power are more likely to generate predatory conflicts, with two or more states ganging up on another. Third, regional multipolarity increases the potential for miscalculations about relative power, which, in turn, raise the odds of conflict. Finally, multipolar regions present ample opportunities for buck-passing, making balancing more difficult.

### AT: Ikenberry

#### **Ikenberry concludes aff – unipolarity checks back any risk of conflict and is preferable to any alternative**

Ikenberry 9(G. John Ikenberry, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, January 2009, “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences”, p. 22-23, <http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.ikenberry.html>) //ZA

Two major theoretical traditions deal with causes of war in ways that may relate to system structure: neorealism and power transition theory. Applying these in the context of unipolarity yields the general proposition that military conflicts involving the unipole and other major powers (that is, great power wars) are less likely in unipolar systems than in either bipolar or multipolar systems. According to neorealist theory, bipolarity is less war prone than multipolarity because each superpower knows that only the other can threaten it, realizes that it cannot pass the buck to third parties, and recognizes it can balance accretions to the other’s capabilities by internal rather than external means. Bipolarity blocks or at least complicates three common paths to war in neorealism: uncertainty, free riding, and fear of allied defection. The first and second operated during the 1930s and the third operated prior to World War I. By the same logic, unipolarity is even less war prone: none of these causal mechanisms is relevant to a unipole’s interactions with other great powers. Power transition and hegemonic theories predict that major war involving the leading state and a challenger becomes more likely as their relative capabilities approach parity.39 Under unipolarity, parity is beyond the reach of a would-be challenger, so this mechanism does not operate. In any event, many scholars question whether these traditional theories of war remain relevant in a world in which the declining benefits of conquest, nuclear deterrence among most major powers, the spread of democracy, and changing collective norms and ideas reduce the probability of major war among great powers to a historically low level.40 The absence of major conflicts among the great powers may thus be overdetermined or have little to do with unipolarity. Wohlforth develops an alternative theoretical framework for assessing the consequences of unipolarity for great power conflict, one that focuses on status or prestige seeking as opposed to security as the core preference for major states. From a diverse theoretical literature he derives a single hypothesis on the relationship between unipolar capability [End Page 22] distributions and great power conflict. He tests it in the current international system and historically, and he derives further implications for relationships between the unipole and secondary states. He supplies theoretical reasons and initial empirical support for the proposition that unipolarity itself helps to explain low levels of militarized interactions among great powers since 1991. The same logic and evidence, however, suggest that the route back to bipolarity or multipolarity may be more prone to great power conflict than many scholars now suppose.

## Sustainable

### 2AC Sustainable

#### Heg is durable – status quo conditions of accommodation and nuclear peace sustain unipolarity

**Monteiro 11** - Nuno P., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University (June 13, 2011, “BALANCING ACT WHY UNIPOLARITY MAY BE DURABLE,” <http://www.nunomonteiro.org/wp-content/uploads/Nuno-Monteiro-Balancing-Act-20110613.pdf>)

What is, then, wrong with the argument that unipolarity is indeed durable? Why are primacists not right? If the impact of the nuclear revolution on the structure of international politics reduces the salience of survival concerns for major powers, then unipolarity should necessarily last. 44 This should settle the debate on unipolar durability in favor of primacist views. Not so fast. Survival is indeed the first goal of states and, therefore, nuclear weapons, by guaranteeing state survival, eliminate the need for major powers to balance against a unipole. But states do not care only about survival. Economic growth is also important for states, for at least two reasons. First, states care about economic growth as an end in itself. 45 One of the primary raisons d’être of the state is, after all, the well-being of its citizens, defined largely in terms of material wealth. Second, and more importantly for the purposes of this paper, states care about economic growth also for security reasons. If a major power is prevented from continuing to grow economically, then its future security may be imperiled. Nothing ensures xthat nuclear weapons will continue to guarantee survival indefinitely. A major technological breakthrough, such as comprehensive missile defense, might erode the deterring effect of a survivable nuclear arsenal. Major powers therefore have strong incentives not to fall behind in economic terms. But this pursuit of wealth is subordinated to survival concerns. In other words, I expect major powers to pursue wealth only once the goal of state survival is fully ensured and in ways that do not undermine it. To borrow a concept from John Rawls, this means that survival has ‘lexical priority’ over all other state aims, including wealth creation. 46 What does this mean for balancing and, consequently, for the durability of a unipolar world? In the previous section, I introduced a revised logic of balancing focused exclusively on the goal of state survival. It is now time to expand it to account for the secondary goal of economic growth. This means that (2’) must be revised to include not only threats to state survival but also to their economic growth. In the expanded logic, then, states will (3’) balance against concentrated power to the extent that it threatens both these goals. Consequently, states will now balance until they minimize (4’’) both threats to their survival and to their economic growth. The expanded logic goes like this (with italics indicating change from the revised version above): 1) States care first and foremost about their own survival and only pursue other goals, such as wealth, to the extent they do not threaten survival; 2’’) An unmatched concentration of power in one state may threaten the survival of others as well as their pursuit of economic growth; 3’) To the extent that it does, other states will balance against concentrated power; 4’’) Threats to survival and to economic growth may be minimized short of amassing as much or more power than any other state; 5’) Balancing efforts will therefore not necessarily lead to shifts in the systemic balance-of-power; 6’) As a result, unmatched concentrations of power in one state may be longlasting. The result (6’) is the same. But the conditions of possibility for an unmatched concentration of power in one state to be long-lasting have changed. Now, the durability of unipolarity depends, beyond major powers’ guaranteed survival, on a second factor: the presence of international conditions that make the continuation of their economic growth possible. The absence of such conditions, by endangering the long-term ability of the state to maintain its deterrent capability, ultimately places the survival of the state at risk. Therefore, major powers have a strong incentive to balance against a unipole that is -- purposely or not -- containing their economic growth. This extends the conditions of possibility of a durable unipolar world from the structural to the strategic level. In a nutshell, if a major power’s economic growth is constrained by the unipole’s strategy then that major power has incentives to continue to balance against the unipole beyond the point at which nuclear weapons ensure its immediate survival. In sum, a strategy of containment on the part of the unipole, by constraining the economic growth of major powers, will lead the latter to balance, converting their latent capabilities into military power. Containment, therefore, leads major powers to balance beyond the point at which their immediate survival is guaranteed, up to the point at which they effect a shift in the systemic balance of power, bringing about the end of unipolarity. A strategy of accommodation, on the contrary, allows major powers to continue their economic growth, thus guaranteeing that their immediate ability to secure their own survival will not be eroded over time. By doing so, accommodation takes away the incentives major powers might have to balance beyond the point at which their immediate survival is guaranteed. Consequently, a strategy of accommodation -- when implemented under conditions in which survival may be guaranteed even in the absence of a systemic balance of power -- makes unipolarity durable.V. EMPIRICAL IMPLICATIONS AND ILLUSTRATION This section extracts empirical implications from my theory and tests the argument against the evolving empirical record. My “qualified durability” argument yields two empirical implications for contemporary world politics. First, for as long as the United States pursues a strategy of economic accommodation, major powers, all of which today possess a survivable nuclear arsenal, should not pursue further balancing against the United States. Second, in case the United States shifts towards a strategy of containment, major powers should initiate a balancing effort, increasing the rate at which they convert their latent power into military capabilities and pooling those capabilities together through the formation of alliances, eventually shifting the systemic balance of power and putting an end to unipolarity.

### Exts – Sustainable

#### We aren’t in decline – their authors are pessimists

**Mardell 7/5** (Mark Mardell, North American editor for BBC, citing Robert Kagan, 7-5-12, “Is the US Caught in the Slow Lane?,” <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-18713267>) GZ

Robert Kagan, author of The World America Made, says that the world would be a different - a worse place - without a strong America. But he feels the worries about decline have been overdone. "I think at any time when you have a deep economic recession, which the US has been in, people tend to get pessimistic. The US has repeatedly gone through periods of declinism, concern that other countries were passing it, whether it was Japan, the Soviet Union, and now China. "But I think if you look at it analytically and from a historical perspective I don't think there is any reason to think America really is in decline. "Now people have a mythical sense of the past, today people say the US can't get what it really wants anymore, can't tell other countries what to do, it doesn't seem to be able to solve the Middle East peace crisis and my answer is: when could it? When did the United States have all this power? "American influence is always more limited than people think. Nevertheless, America is still the most influential power in the world today." Kagan says that part of the problem is that people lump together America's challengers abroad as the Brics. He argues a rising Brazil or India is not a threat to America, and the focus is really China. He says the rise of that country has actually made others in the region need America more. "I subscribe to the theory that what goes up must come down and eventually the US will lose influence, I just am not convinced we're there yet. "I'm not saying there is nothing to worry about, the US has significant fiscal problems that it has to address and we have not addressed it so far and I hope in the future we will. But the idea that the Americans are worried about the state of the country is deep in the DNA. "You can look at practically every 10 or 20 years throughout American history, there's been this sense of loss, of something lost, of a decline. Eventually it'll be right, I just don't think its right now." At the racetrack a gleaming red car, which had been flying a large stars and stripes out of a back window is at the back of the pack, overtaken by all the others. It eventually has to limp off the track and give up the game. That is not going to happen to America. Even if decline in relative power is inevitable, it has such economic influence and military might that it will look and feel strong for decades to come.

### AT: Russia

#### Russia can’t challenge heg.

**Bradley ’11-** former military member with combat experience in Iraq and time in Europe- background is in national security and has remained in the field since separating from the military after eight years of service- political science major with strong interests in American politics, history, economics, and foreign policy(3/5/11, Jason, Big Peace, “Russia Will Not and Cannot Challenge US Hegemony”, <http://bigpeace.com/jbradley/2011/03/05/russia-will-not-and-cannot-challenge-us-hegemony/>, je)

Fellow contributor here, Jim Hanson, beat me to the punch on Russia’s military buildup. While true they are making efforts to modernize their military, mostly comprised of old Soviet era equipment, they still have a lot of making up to do. Even under the most optimistic of circumstances, Russian military clout would still leave a lot to be desired, at least compared to the US. What is clear, at least for the foreseeable future, is **a resurgent Russia set to challenge US hegemony just isn’t in its future.** The Russian Federation’s ascension from the Cold War has operated paradoxically. It is not a nation state (in the European sense) but has strong currents of nationalism running through the mainstream of life, entertainment, politics, and education. It projects itself as modern, democratic, and Western but distinctly Russian therefore often putting it at odds with the Western nations. Yet it has steadily veered towards reimperialization, struggles with implementing a market economy, shown no use for political pluralism, and autocratic control from the Kremlin increases each year, with each passing election. Relations between the US and Russia have reached different points of and hot and cold over the years since the Cold War ended. They seemed to have worsened in the last months of George W Bush’s presidency. Some have tried to make it easy to speculate that an extension of the Cold War resumed when the US placed American missiles in the Czech Republic and Poland. Likewise, they made easy to entertain the Cold War entered a re-icing stage when Russia invaded Georgia. The Russian-Georgia war could be viewed as a turn for the worse in the US-Russian confrontation. And the Russian victory plus the will to use military force in its region, tipped the balance to Russia. This is fanciful thinking. Russia does not possess the superpower qualities needed in order to align the world back in a bipolar arrangement, as was the case during the Cold War. Nor is it able to operate and deploy globally to such an extent as to significantly undermine America’s long-term interests or force it to reallocate resources away from fighting terrorism in the Middle East. Instead, Russia exists on the periphery of Europe with a few basic goals: Sovereignty, reclaiming some of its geopolitical clout, oil production, nuclear non-proliferation, and counter-terrorism. As is always dominant in international relations, Russia has sought domestic strength and stability through its oil supply and used its leverage in natural resources as a political weapon. Between 1998 and 2006, the price of oil rose from $15 to $70 per barrel creating huge cash surpluses. When the price of oil plummeted, the vulnerabilities of Russia’s economy were apparent. While it is true that Russia is the main oil and natural gas supplier in Europe, with some future estimates predicting it could possibly export 70 percent to the region, it appears these estimates could be flawed. Partly the reason why Russia is exporting so much oil in recent years is because it started at the bottom after the Soviet collapsed. In other words, Russia climbed so high because of how far it had fallen. Since then, however, it has discovered no new oil, relies on old wells, and allows little foreign investment for industry growth. As a result, oil exports have declined since 2008. Russia’s oil exports seem to have peaked at least for the time being. Even more troubling perhaps is Russia’s demographic crisis. Russia’s population has lost 7 million people since 1992; death rates outnumber birth rates by a quarter million. “In the last 40 years the death rate for men between 15 and 64 years of age has jumped by an average of 50 percent” (J. McHugh, 2008). Conclusion These are not the qualities of a robust nation destined to challenge US hegemony. Instead, Russia resents the US policy of full spectrum dominance and nuclear supremacy, because of which **Russia finds itself unable to compete**. All the old Cold War relics simply add theater to a very basic international relations scenario. A stronger power is preventing a weaker one from doing what it wants. Nonetheless, there is real apprehension on the part of Russia from perceived encirclement by NATO, a growing number of American military bases throughout the world, and American missiles. The simple truth is that the Cold War did indeed end with the collapse of the Soviet Empire and Russia is not likely to fill the role as new Cold War nemesis. Neither though does it have to be a partner with the US or the West. “Until recently, Russia saw itself as Pluto in the Western Solar system, very far from the center but still fundamentally a part of it. Now it has left that orbit entirely: Russia’s leaders have given up on becoming part of the West and have started creating their own Moscow-centered system” (D. Trenin, 2007). In the eyes of Russia, the missile shield project is about America establishing nuclear primacy. With American missiles in the region, American military armaments going to Georgia, and high tech experimental missile defense satellites into space, Russia has lost the capability to counter a nuclear first strike. Russia finds its considerable nuclear arsenal vulnerable if not obsolete. By greatly reducing Russia’s threat of nuclear strike, the US has essentially eliminated “mutually assured destruction (MAD). MAD of course was viewed as the ultimate equilibrium in the nuclear standoff during the Cold War. American nuclear primacy, however, swung the equilibrium decidedly in the favor of America leaving Russia out in the cold. It is no mystery as to why Russia feels exposed to possible hostility from the U.S. and NATO over its expansion. In view of this, Russia can become more aggressive, obstruct international cooperation, and exert its influence in places that are possible. It can even increase its military posture and become more Moscow-centric. For example, Russia announced this year it will continue its military modernization and buildup that started in 2008. Reportedly, Russia is willing to spend an estimated $600 to 700 billion over ten years to move away from its Soviet era weaponry. This equates to roughly 5 percent of Russia’s estimated gross domestic product. In comparison, the US on the other hand makes up roughly 47 percent of the world’s total military spending! At such a reduced state and under an insurmountable disadvantage, militarily and economically speaking, today’s Russia and the world it finds itself in pales in comparison to yesterday’s Soviet Union and the bygone Cold War era. Therefore, at no time in the foreseeable future can Russia rise to the status of the former Soviet Union, realign the world back into a bipolar arrangement, and hope to challenge the US across the globe.

# Hegemony Bad

## War

### 1NC War

#### Accepting decline is key – hegemony ensures conflicts that will inevitably cause America’s own demise – a transition to multipolarity is key

Layne 6(Christopher Layne, Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, at Texas A&M University’s George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited”, The Coming of the United States' Unipolar Moment, p 40-41, 2006, <http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=The+Unipolar+Illusion+Revisited&rft.jtitle=International+Security&rft.au=Christopher+Layne&rft.date=2006-01-01&rft.pub=MIT+Press+Journals&rft.issn=0162-2889&rft.volume=31&rft.issue=2&rft.spage=7&rft.externalDocID=1174852781>) //ZA

At bottom, multilateral offshore balancing does not address the United States' "hegemony problem," which is not caused by U.S. unilateralism. The real problem is that too often the United States acts unwisely (or, as in the case of Iraq, foolishly)—something it just as easily can do multilaterally as unilaterally. Although some analysts blame the George W. Bush administration for the United States' hegemony problem, the facts suggest otherwise. Concerns about unchecked U.S. power in a unipolar world first were voiced almost simultaneously with the Soviet Union's collapse. And it was during the Clinton administration that U.S. officials first acknowledged in so many words that America had a hegemony problem. The United States has a hegemony problem because it wields hegemonic power. To reduce the fear of U.S. power, the United States must accept some reduction in its relative hard power by adopting a multipolar—and essentially unilateral—offshore balancing strategy that accommodates the rise of new great powers. 130 It also must rein in the scope of its extravagant ambitions to shape the international system in accordance with its Wilsonian ideology. The United States does not need to be an extraregional hegemon to be secure. Its quest for hegemony is driven instead by an ideational, deterritorialized conception of security divorced from the traditional metrics of great power grand strategy: the distribution of power in the international system and geography. 131 Thus, to reduce others' concerns about its power, the United States must practice self-restraint (which is different from choosing to be constrained by others by adopting a multilateral approach to grand strategy). An America [End Page 40] that has the wisdom and prudence to contain itself is less likely to be feared than one that begs the rest of the world to stop it before it expands hegemonically again. If the United States fails to adopt an offshore balancing strategy based on multipolarity and military and ideological self-restraint, it probably will, at some point, have to fight to uphold its primacy, which is a potentially dangerous strategy. Maintaining U.S. hegemony is a game that no longer is worth the candle, especially given that U.S. primacy may already be in the early stages of erosion. Paradoxically, attempting to sustain U.S. primacy may well hasten its end by stimulating more intensive efforts to balance against the United States, thus causing the United States to become imperially overstretched and involving it in unnecessary wars that will reduce its power. Rather than risking these outcomes, the United States should begin to retrench strategically and capitalize on the advantages accruing to insular great powers in multipolar systems. Unilateral offshore balancing, indeed, is America's next grand strategy.

### 2NC Heg = War

#### No risk of restraint – unipoalrity promotes irrational threat construction that guarantees war

Ikenberry 9(G. John Ikenberry, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, January 2009, “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences”, <http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.ikenberry.html>) //ZA

Political scientists have placed greater emphasis on the impact of regime type on foreign policy than on how changes in the relative international position of a country affect the role domestic politics play in its foreign policy.32 Nonetheless, conventional wisdom during the cold war suggested that the bipolar structure had a double disciplining effect on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The external threat disciplined American society, leading interest groups and the public generally to defer to central decision makers on the definition of national interest and how best to achieve it. Domestic politics stopped at the “water’s edge” because the international stakes were so high. The cold war constrained American decision makers as well, forcing them to exercise caution in the international arena and to assure that public opinion or interest groups did not capture or derail foreign policy for parochial reasons. Under unipolarity, the double disciplining effect is no longer operative, with neither publics nor central decision makers as constrained as in a bipolar context. The consequent impact of domestic politics on foreign policy will depend in part on which party is more inclined to take the initiative: central decision makers or societal actors. One hypothesis is that under unipolarity the line between domestic and foreign policy will blur and domestic politics will no longer stop at the [End Page 17] water’s edge. With less at stake in foreign policy, it is harder for leaders to discipline societal actors and easier for societal actors to capture aspects of the foreign policy agenda to suit their parochial needs. The likely results are a less coherent foreign policy and a tendency for the state to underperform in the international arena, missing opportunities to exercise influence commensurate with its preponderant capabilities. A second hypothesis is that central decision makers will exploit the lack of constraint to manipulate a public—one that no longer has clear guiding principles in foreign policy—to respond to a wide array of possible threats and opportunities. As Jervis suggests, for the unipole threats may be nowhere—or everywhere.

#### Empirics prove – a hegemonic strategy can only lead to more violence and conflict

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From terrorism let us now turn to war. There is no doubt at all that hegemony uses war to extend and expand its power. Recent examples provide the evidence. The U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 enabled the superpower to plant its flag in that country, and, at the same time, to extend its influence over Central Asia—a region of the world where Russia still carries some weight and which China eyes with some interest. Apart from American bases in a couple of Central Asian republics, its geopolitical presence in the oil rich region also means that it is capable of exercising some control over the export of that commodity. This has enhanced its hegemonic power both regionally and globally.5 Similarly, the U.S.’s conquest of Iraq in 2003 was designed to strengthen its dominant position in the world’s largest oil exporting region. Iraq itself has the second largest oil reserves in the Middle East. It is also blessed with an abundance of water—a fact of some significance since the Middle East, according to some analysts, may be one of those areas that could well witness conflicts over water in the future. Besides, Iraq is strategically located, with Syria, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia as its immediate neighbors. Going to war in Iraq had another motive. It was to oust President Saddam Hussein and to destroy the Baathist government because Saddam was a staunch opponent of Israel. Weakening and eliminating governments and people’s movements in the Middle East that regard Israel as a morally and politically illegitimate entity has been central to U.S. foreign policy for almost four decades now. Given Iraq’s oil wealth and its scientific military infrastructure, it was potentially a formidable foe of the U.S.’s closest ally and partner in the Middle East. This is why Saddam had to be crushed—for Israel’s sake.6 Deploying the U.S.’s massive military might serve to secure its hegemonic power and to assist its allies to enhance their strength which is at the core of the agenda of the Bush Administration as defined by the “neo-cons.” Even before George W. Bush assumed the presidency in early 2001, the neo-cons like Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, John Bolton, and Lewis “Scooter” Libby among others, in association with Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, were already planning and plotting to use U.S. fire power to re-shape the politics of the Middle East in order to reinforce its grip over the region’s oil and to fortify Israel’s position.7. Crippling the democratically elected Hamas in Palestine and trying to replace it with a leadership that is subservient to Israel’s interest, attempting to eliminate an autonomous movement like Hizbullah in Lebanon with the aim of bolstering a weak pro-U.S. regime in Beirut, targeting the independent-minded government in Damascus, and most of all, manipulating the nuclear issue to prepare the ground for some sort of military action against an Iran that refuses to bow to the U.S. and Israel—apart from the Iraq war— are all part-and-parcel of the neo-cons’ elaborate agenda for establishing total hegemony over the Middle East as a prerequisite for global hegemony. After five years, some commentators are convinced that the agenda is in tatters. The people’s resistance to the U.S. led occupation of Iraq compounded by the unrelenting Sunni Shiite violence, the continuing popularity of Hamas in spite of the immense suffering that the masses have had to endure, Israel’s failure to defeat Hizbullah in the thirty-four day Lebanon war and the latter’s success in forging a multi-confessional coalition against the Beirut government,8 and Iran’s expanding geopolitical significance in the region due to an extent to the emergence of a Shiite-dominated regime in Baghdad brought about ironically by the U.S. occupation, have separately and collectively helped to thwart the neo-cons’ grand design. The neo-cons have also been checkmated by the situation in the U.S. itself. A majority of Americans are now opposed to their country’s involvement in Iraq and want their soldiers to come home quickly. The failure of the neo-con agenda in the Middle East shows that war and violence are not necessarily the most effective instruments for establishing hegemony. Indeed, their defeat testifies to the limits of hard power in reshaping political realities. The American leadership has forgotten that war, as the ultimate expression of hard power, has not helped the U.S. to acquire hegemony in the post-second world war decades. The U.S. debacle in Vietnam in the late sixties and early seventies offers irrefutable proof of the folly of the hard power approach.

#### Stabilization theory is nonsense – unipolarity encourages asymmetric backlash and war

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\*note – do not read with the china stuff

After decades of nuclear brinkmanship, Americans felt profound relief when the Cold War ended. The Soviet Union’s collapse in 1989 transformed the world almost overnight from a battleground between two global giants — a bipolar world, in scholarly parlance — to a unipolar world, in which the United States outstripped all other powers. In foreign policy circles, it was taken for granted that this dominance was good for America. Experts merely differed over how long the “unipolar moment” could last, or how big a peace dividend America could expect. Some even argued that the end of the arms race between Moscow and Washington had eliminated the threat of world war. Now, however, with a few decades of experience to study, a young international relations theorist at Yale University has proposed a provocative new view: American dominance has destabilized the world in new ways, and the United States is no better off in the wake of the Cold War. In fact, he says, a world with a single superpower and a crowded second tier of distant competitors encourages, rather than discourages, violent conflict–not just among the also-rans, but even involving the single great power itself. In a paper that appeared in the most recent issue of the influential journal International Security, political scientist Nuno P. Monteiro lays out his case. America, he points out, has been at war for 13 of the 22 years since the end of the Cold War, about double the proportion of time it spent at war during the previous two centuries. “I’m trying to debunk the idea that a world with one great power is better,” he said in an interview. “If you don’t have one problem, you have another.” Sure, Monteiro says, the risk of apocalyptic war has decreased, since there’s no military equal to America’s that could engage it in mutually assured destruction. But, he argues, the lethal, expensive wars in the Persian Gulf, the Balkans, and Afghanistan have proved a major drain on the country. Even worse, Monteiro claims, America’s position as a dominant power, unbalanced by any other alpha states actually exacerbates dangerous tensions rather than relieving them. Prickly states that Monteiro calls “recalcitrant minor powers” (think Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan), whose interests or regime types clash with the lone superpower, will have an incentive to provoke a conflict. Even if they are likely to lose, the fight may be worth it, since concession will mean defeat as well. This is the logic by which North Korea and Pakistan both acquired nuclear weapons, even during the era of American global dominance, and by which Iraq and Afghanistan preferred to fight rather than surrender to invading Americans. Of course, few Americans long for the old days of an arms race, possible nuclear war, and the threat of Soviet troops and missiles pointed at America and its allies. Fans of unipolarity in the foreign policy world think that the advantages of being the sole superpower far outweigh the drawbacks — a few regional conflicts and insurgencies are a fair price to pay for eliminating the threat of global war. But Monteiro says that critics exaggerate the distinctions between the wars of today and yesteryear, and many top thinkers in the world of security policy are finding his argument persuasive. If he’s right, it means that the most optimistic version of the post-Cold War era — a “pax Americana” in which the surviving superpower can genuinely enjoy its ascendancy — was always illusory. In the short term, a dominant United States should expect an endless slate of violent challenges from weak powers. And in the longer term, it means that Washington shouldn’t worry too much about rising powers like China or Russia or the European Union; America might even be better off with a rival powerful enough to provide a balance. You could call it the curse of plenty: Too much power attracts countless challenges, whereas a world in which power is split among several superstates might just offer a paradoxical stability.

#### Every strategy under unipolarity causes conflict

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My theory therefore differs from Wohlforth’s in two key aspects. First, Wohlforth believes that power preponderance in a unipolar system is so marked that the expected costs of balancing are always prohibitive. Consequently, every state in the system will bandwagon with the unipole, making it impossible for the latter to be involved in wars. In contrast, I show that some states face lower costs of balancing relative to bandwagoning. They are therefore more likely to become recalcitrant minor powers, with whom the sole great power is likely to go to war even when implementing a defensive dominance strategy. Second, Wohlforth assumes that the unipole will always implement a strategy of defensive dominance: it will not engage in offensive revisionism, nor will it disengage from the world. I show how both offensive dominance and disengagement are plausible strategic options for the unipole and then extrapolate the types of conflict that each is likely to produce. Specifically, offensive dominance (like its defensive variant) is likely to pit the unipole against recalcitrant minor powers. Disengagement, for its part, brings with it the possibility of wars between major powers. The basic intuition behind my argument is straightforward. In bipolarity and multipolarity, alliance blocs allow disputes involving minor powers to be aggregated into broader great-power tensions. A dispute involving a great power and a lesser state tends to provoke a response by the latter’s great power sponsor, producing a confrontation between two great powers. 52 Likewise, disputes between lesser states often elicit the intervention of each side’s great power ally, again resulting in great power confrontation. These aggregation mechanisms, however, are not possible in unipolarity because there is no potential great power sponsor for a state threatened by the unipole—or by another state aligned with it. Thus, although unipolarity dampens great power competition, it produces competition between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers and, when the unipole disengages from the world, among major and minor powers. An emerging unipole is likely to implement a (defensive or offensive) dominance strategy, for two reasons. First is geopolitical inertia. Unipolarity is likely preceded by either bipolarity or multipolarity, both of which foster alliances with major and minor powers. 53 These alliances are likely to carry on into a unipolar world. As a result, an emerging unipole is likely to continue to engage in international affairs, at least through a strategy of defensive dominance—as reflected in the metaphors of a global policeman or night watchman often used to describe U.S. strategy throughout the 1990s. Second, a temptation to reengineer the system may lead the unipole to opt for a strategy of offensive dominance. Unipolarity minimizes structural constraints on grand strategy, and the unipole is likely to see in offensive dominance an opportunity to extract maximum benefits from its preponderance of power. 54 These two reasons support dominance—be it defensive or offensive—as the strategy of choice for a unipole in a newly born unipolar system. 55 After an initial period of dominance, however, the unipole may move toward a disengagement strategy. Two incentives may encourage such a shift. First, the wars into which either dominance strategy is likely to drag the unipole may overextend its capabilities. The unipole will increasingly see disengagement as allowing it to replenish its power. Second, the costs of such wars will rise cumulatively over time, possibly leading to the gradual emergence of domestic opposition to the unipole’s chosen strategy. My argument is not that the unipolar structure of the system predetermines such a shift, but rather that the maintenance of a dominance strategy is not predetermined by unipolarity either. Furthermore, the unipole does not need to follow one of these strategies globally. It could pursue offensive dominance in one region, defensive dominance in another, and disengagement from yet another. For instance, between 1990 and 2001, the United States implemented a strategy of defensive dominance everywhere except in Africa, from which it largely disengaged after withdrawing from Somalia in 1994. Between late 2001 and 2005, when the Bush Doctrine was in full force, the United States shifted to an offensive dominance strategy in the Middle East, toppling regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, while maintaining its defensive dominance in Europe and East Asia and remaining largely disengaged from Africa. 56 This diversity of strategic options available to the unipole highlights the predictive limits of structural theory. Waltz famously argued that a theory of international politics, not being a theory of foreign policy, was ill equipped to predict how particular states would act. 57 As other scholars have noted, “Polarity is at best a necessary part of an explanation rather than a sufficient explanation.” 58 A full causal account of any conflict would have to take into consideration, beyond structural incentives, the unit-level decisions that lead to a breakdown in the bargaining process. Accordingly, my theory does not predict which states will become involved in conflicts in a unipolar world. Structures, however, provide incentives. In Waltz’s formulation, they “shape and shove.” 59 Thus, a unipolar structure makes some states more prone to involvement in conflicts and encourages certain paths toward war. The path taken depends on the unipole’s strategy. The extant view on unipolar peace presupposes that the unipole will consistently implement a strategy of defensive dominance. The next section shows how this strategy is likely to generate significant conflict.

### 2NC Heg Strats = War

**Montiero isolates all three strategies a hegemon can take – all three lead to war:**

#### First: Defensive dominance leads to war – uncertainty leads to balancing and challenging the status quo

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A unipole carrying out a defensive-dominance strategy will seek to preserve all three aspects of the status quo: maintaining the territorial boundaries and international political alignments of all other states, as well as freezing the global distribution of power. 60 This strategy can lead to conflict in two ways, both of which stem from uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. First, not knowing the extent of the unipole’s determination to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance may spur some minor powers to develop their capabilities. Second, uncertainty about the degree to which the unipole will oppose small changes to the status quo may lead some minor powers to attempt them. In both cases, the opposition of the unipole to these actions is likely to lead to war. In this section, I lay out these two pathways to conflict and then illustrate them with historical examples. To be sure, states can never be certain of other states’ intentions. 61 There are a couple of reasons, however, why this uncertainty increases in unipolarity, even when the unipole appears to be determined to maintain the status quo. First, other states cannot be certain that the unipole will always pursue non-revisionist goals. This is particularly problematic because unipolarity minimizes the structural constraints on the unipole’s grand strategy. As Waltz writes, “Even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint, and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behavior. The absence of serious threats to American security gives the United States wide latitude in making foreign policy choices.” 62 Second, unipolarity takes away the principal tool through which minor powers in bipolar and multipolar systems deal with uncertainty about great power intentions—alliances with other great powers. Whereas in these other systems minor powers can, in principle, attenuate the effects of uncertainty about great power intentions through external balancing, in a unipolar world no great power sponsor is present by definition. In effect, the systemic imbalance of power magnifies uncertainty about the unipole’s intentions. 63

#### Second: Offensive Dominance makes conflict and proliferation inevitable – ensures backlash and states will advance their own capabilities

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A unipole carrying out an offensive-dominance strategy wants to revise the status quo in its favor by acquiring more territory, by favorably changing the alignment of other states, or by altering the distribution of power in its own benefit—or some combination of these. Territorial conquest, which is the most ambitious goal of an offensive dominance strategy, is a daunting task in an age of nationalism and is thus likely to be rare. 89 Efforts to alter the international alignments of other states or the balance of power can be pursued through soft power and persuasion, but this is unlikely to prove sufficient, and the unipole may decide to use force. 90 By putting recalcitrant minor powers in a position of extreme-self help, an offensive-dominance strategy triggers two pathways to conflict. In both cases, a deterrence breakdown leads to a preventive war. Following the first pathway: the unipole makes revisionist demands that recalcitrant minor powers are unlikely to accept peacefully, because these pose a threat to their survival. Given its preponderance of power, the unipole may decide to go to war. The second causal pathway follows a slightly more complex logic. Like its defensive version, a strategy of offensive dominance provides strong incentives for recalcitrant minor powers to balance internally. These attempts to bolster their relative power, however, are likely to lead to war with the unipole before the recalcitrant power is able to acquire additional capabilities. The reason for this outcome is that the unipole will oppose any attempt by minor powers to revise the status quo in a way that is detrimental to its interests. In addition, wars pitting a recalcitrant minor power against a unipole implementing a strategy of offensive dominance have two effects common to defensive dominance. First, they encourage other recalcitrant minor powers to redouble their balancing efforts. Second, they may make room for wars among major and minor powers. Reacting to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States adopted a strategy of offensive dominance in the Middle East. Although this short period has produced only a slim empirical record that can be harnessed to support my theory, the mechanisms I posit can best be seen at work in the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The United States’ goal was to revise Iraq’s international alignment and decrease its relative power by installing an accommodating regime in Baghdad and ending Saddam’s putative weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. 91 In the end, no WMD were found after the invasion. 92 Still, Saddam had possessed a nuclear program, which he stopped only grudgingly when UN-imposed sanctions in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War made it impossible to acquire the materials and technology needed for a nuclear deterrent. 93 Indeed, the possibility of Iraq acquiring nuclear weapons, which Washington was convinced would soon become a reality, featured prominently in the George W. Bush administration’s argument for going to war. 94 Although confronted with an imminent invasion, Saddam refused to back down. His rationale seems to have been based on his estimate that, first, France or Russia would intercede on Iraq’s behalf, preventing war and, second, if that failed, Iraqi forces would be capable of increasing the military costs for the United States to the point at which American public opinion would force Washington to back down. 95 None of this happened. China, France, and Russia—all major powers—did oppose UN authorization to use force against Iraq, but when the United States displayed an unequivocal determination to invade anyway, no major power did much to stop it. 96 Ultimately, U.S.-led coalition troops toppled Saddam’s regime in three weeks, and major military operations ended within a month of the invasion date. The Iraq War also led other recalcitrant minor powers to accelerate their proliferation attempts. Having been identified by President Bush, alongside Iraq, as members of the “axis of evil,” Iran and North Korea were particularly quick to respond. 97 A mere two weeks after the fall of Baghdad, Pyongyang officials informed their American counterparts that North Korea possessed nuclear weapons, making the country immune to any U.S. attempts to depose its regime. 98 Iran, too, has ramped up its nuclear program since 2002 and is likely to continue pursuing a nuclear capability while trying to avoid preventive action by the United States. 99 Unfortunately for the prospects of peace, it is also likely the United States will oppose this development and, if necessary, resort to the use of force. 100

#### Third: Disengagement causes regional escalatory conflicts if it succeeds and wars against the US directly if it doesn’t

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Disengagement requires the unipole to avoid interfering with the balance of power in regions other than its own. (The unipole cannot disengage from its own region.) Such a strategy decreases tensions between the unipole and other states, making wars involving the unipole less likely, but it also makes room for conflicts among competing major and minor powers. Given the great-power vacuum created by a disengaged unipole, each region beyond the unipole’s can be treated as a small-scale quasi system unto itself. The regions from which the unipole disengages are, in effect, insulated from the global mechanisms of conflict created directly by a unipolar structure. These regions can be unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar. Interaction between major powers in each of them will be governed by the dynamics that regulate great power interaction in unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar systems. Unipolar regions beyond the unipole’s own should be rare. Even a disengaged unipole is likely to feel threatened by the emergence of a regional hegemon in another major region of the globe. (In fact, such a regional hegemon rising in an important region would qualify as a peer competitor, reestablishing the systemic balance of power and putting an end to unipolarity.) It is possible, however, that in peripheral areas of the globe regional unipolarity would emerge without upsetting a disengaged unipole. I call this situation “nested unipolarity.” 101 In a nested unipolar region from which the global unipole nonetheless remains disengaged, conflict-producing dynamics will emerge, along the lines of those described above in the sections about strategies of offensive and defensive dominance. Given uncertainty about its intentions, a strategy of defensive dominance on the part of a regional hegemon will also trigger pathways to conflict in the region. 102 Similarly, a regional unipolar power that pursues a strategy of offensive dominance should generate regionally the same conflict-producing mechanisms that were described above at the global level. The remaining regions will be either bipolar or multipolar. No consensus exists on their comparative peacefulness. 103 In fact, there are plausible causal mechanisms accounting for conflict in both types of system. One can therefore expect that both bipolar and multipolar regions will feature significant levels of conflict—involving minor and major powers—when left on their own. Specifically, the literature notes two causes of conflict in bipolar systems. Each can be adapted to bipolar regions. First, with only two regional powers, there are no opportunities for regional external balancing, making deterrence less likely to succeed in case of a regional imbalance of power. Second, major powers in bipolar regions are focused on each other, which increases tensions and the odds of conflict. Both are good reasons to expect conflict in bipolar regions left alone by the unipole. The literature also discusses four causes of conflict in multipolarity. Each can be adapted to a multipolar region. First, with three or more regional powers, there is a high likelihood of competition that can eventually lead to conflict. Second, the regional distribution of power is less likely to be balanced before alliances are made. Imbalances of power are more likely to generate predatory conflicts, with two or more states ganging up on another. Third, regional multipolarity increases the potential for miscalculations about relative power, which, in turn, raise the odds of conflict. Finally, multipolar regions present ample opportunities for buck-passing, making balancing more difficult. 104 Besides facilitating conflict among major and minor powers in other regions, disengagement will yield peace for the unipole only if two requirements are fulfilled. First, the unipole must disengage from all regions beyond its own. Second, it must disengage completely from each of these regions. Disengagement must be global because dominance in one region leads to the emergence of recalcitrant minor powers. In addition, this would alert minor powers in other regions to the dangers of extreme self-help. In the absence of a pure disengagement strategy at the global level, therefore, potential recalcitrant minor powers everywhere are likely to act as if the unipole were engaged in their region, and will thus take actions that bolster their chances of survival vis-à-vis a potentially threatening unipole. Disengagement must also be complete because even defensive dominance places recalcitrant minor powers in a situation of extreme self-help. Disengagement thus requires the unipole to extract itself completely from military alliances, withdraw its security guarantees to others, recall forward-deployed forces, and so on. Limited, or selective, engagement is likely to trigger the same type of conflict (though through different causal mechanisms) as complete offensive dominance. 105 Failure to meet these two conditions effectively turns the unipole’s strategy into a form of defensive dominance, albeit a selective one. Incomplete disengagement decreases the predictability of the unipole’s future behavior, leading recalcitrant minor powers to behave as if the unipole remained engaged and, therefore, threatening to their survival. Disengagement, then, while always producing regional wars, staves off wars involving the unipole only if it is implemented as a pure strategy. A mixed strategy—a form of dominance limited either in its regional scope or in the means involved—is likely to compound the problems of disengagement with those of dominance. In sum, **disengagement opens the door to regional competition, leading to wars involving both minor and major powers. If incomplete, disengagement will also result in wars involving the unipole**, similar to the ones described in the previous two sections. The United States has not pursued a strategy of global disengagement since the end of the Cold War in 1989. Scholars therefore have no empirical record against which to test the conflict-producing mechanisms resulting from a disengagement strategy. Foreign policy analysts, however, have written about the potentially devastating effects of a disengaged United States. Stephen Rosen argues that U.S. disengagement would lead to nuclear proliferation and arms races in Asia and the Middle East. He concludes that the alternatives to American empire would be even less appealing. 106 Fareed Zakaria writes that disengagement would produce “a world in which problems fester and the buck is endlessly passed, until problems explode.” 107 Similarly, Michael Mandelbaum writes that U.S. disengagement “would deprive the international system of one of its principal safety features, which keeps countries from smashing into each other.” 108 Niall Ferguson calls this situation “apolarity” and describes “an anarchic new Dark Age; an era of . . . civilization’s retreat into a few fortified enclaves.” 109 Robert Lieber, with more detail but no less gloom-and-doom, describes the potential consequences of U.S. disengagement as follows: In Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would have strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons—which they have the technological capacity to do quite quickly. Instability and regional competition could also escalate, not only between India and Pakistan, but also in Southeast Asia involving Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and possibly the Philippines. Risks in the Middle East would be likely to increase, with regional competition among the major countries of the Gulf region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) as well as Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Major regional wars, eventually involving the use of weapons of mass destruction plus human suffering on a vast scale, floods of refugees, economic disruption, and risks to oil supplies are all readily conceivable. 110 U.S. policymakers understand this logic, too. American forces are stationed around the world following what Josef Joffe calls the “pacifier logic,” according to which only the presence of forces external to the region can stave off acute security competition, which could eventually lead to conflict. This logic underpins U.S. security guarantees in Asia (to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) as well as in Europe and the Middle East.

### AT: Solves War

#### Statistics prove that unipolarity is the most war-prone system

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How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity. Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is by far the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent—or more than four times higher. These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful. In sum, the argument that unipolarity makes for peace is heavily weighted toward interactions among the most powerful states in the system. This should come as no surprise given that Wohlforth makes a structural argument: peace flows from the unipolar structure of international politics, not from any particular characteristic of the unipole. Structural analyses of the international system are usually centered on interactions between great powers. As Waltz writes, “The theory, like the story, of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era.” In the sections that follow, however, I show that in the case of unipolarity, an investigation of its peacefulness must consider potential causes of conflict beyond interactions between the most important states in the system.

## Prolif

### 1NC Prolif

#### Unipolarity causes nuclear balancing – multipolarity is the only way to ensure security

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In an international system with more than one great power, recalcitrant minor powers would, in principle, be able to balance externally by finding a great power sponsor. 70 In unipolarity, however, no such sponsors exist. 71 Only major powers are available, but because their survival is already guaranteed, they are likely to accommodate the unipole. And even if some do not, they are unlikely to meet a recalcitrant minor power’s security needs given that they possess only limited power-projection capabilities. 72 As such, recalcitrant minor powers must defend themselves, which puts them in a position of extreme self-help. There are four characteristics common to states in this position: (1) anarchy, (2) uncertainty about other states’ intentions, (3) insufficient capabilities to deter a great power, and (4) no potential great power sponsor with whom to form a balancing coalition. The first two characteristics are common to all states in all types of polarity. The third is part of the rough-and-tumble of minor powers in any system. The fourth, however, is unique to recalcitrant minor powers in unipolarity. This dire situation places recalcitrant minor powers at risk for as long as they lack the capability to defend themselves. They depend on the goodwill of the unipole and must worry that the unipole will shift to a strategy of offensive dominance or disengagement. Recalcitrant minor powers will therefore attempt to bolster their capabilities through internal balancing. To deter an eventual attack by the unipole and bolster their chances of survival in the event deterrence fails, recalcitrant minor powers will attempt to reinforce their conventional defenses, develop the most effective asymmetric strategies possible, and, most likely in the nuclear age, try to acquire the ultimate deterrent—survivable nuclear weapons. 73 In so doing, they seek to become major powers.

#### Prolif causes extinction

**Roberts 99** (Brad Roberts, researcher at the Institute for Defense Analysis, Chair of the Research Advisory Council for Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1999, “Viewpoint: Proliferation and Nonproliferation in the 1990s: Looking for the Right Lessons,” <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol06/64/robert64.pdf>)

This brings us then to the question of what is at stake in the effort to combat proliferation. There are two standard answers to the question of what’s at stake: human lives, and stability. NBC weapons are weapons of mass destruction—all of them, though in different ways. The most deadly of these weapons systems can kill millions—and much more quickly than conventional weaponry (though it too is capable of killing millions). A regional war employing mass destruction as a matter of course could cause suffering and death unknown in human experience. Such a war would cast a harsh light on the argument now in vogue that landmines, small arms, even machetes in the hands of drunk young men are the real weapons of mass destruction. Strictly from the perspective of limiting the effects of war, then, the world community has an interest in preventing the emergence of an international system in which the possession and use of NBC weapons is accepted as normal and customary. The stability argument relates to the unintended consequences associated with acquiring weapons of mass destruction. It focuses on the weapons-acquiring state and its neighbors and the risk of war that grows among them, including both preemptive and accidental wars. Although it is an old truism that proliferation is destabilizing, it is not always true—not where the acquisition of strategic leverage is essential to preservation of a balance of power that deters conflict and that is used to create the conditions of a more enduring peace. But those circumstances have proven remarkably rare. Instead, the risks associated with the competitive acquisition of strategic capabilities have typically been seen to outweigh the perceived benefits to states that have considered nuclear weapons acquisition. Argentina and Brazil, for example, like Sweden and Australia before them, have gotten out of the nuclear weapons business because they see no reason to live at the nuclear brink even if living there is within their reach. But the standard answers don’t really take us very far into this problem any more. To grasp the full stake requires a broader notion of stability—and an appreciation of the particular historical moment in which we find ourselves. It is an accident of history that the diffusion of dual-use capabilities is coterminous with the end of the Cold War. That diffusion means that we are moving irreversibly into an international system in which the wildfire-like spread of weapons is a real possibility. The end of the Cold War has brought with it great volatility in the relations of major and minor powers in the international system. What then is at stake? In response to some catalytic event, entire regions could rapidly cross the threshold from latent to extant weapons capability, and from covert to overt postures, a process that would be highly competitive and risky, and which likely would spill over wherever the divides among regions are not tidy. This would sorely test Ken Waltz’s familiar old heresy that “more may be better”7—indeed, even Waltz assumed proliferation would be stabilizing only if it is gradual, and warned against the rapid spread of weapons to multiple states. At the very least, this would fuel NBC terrorism, as a general proliferation of NBC weaponry would likely erode the constraints that heretofore have inhibited states from sponsoring terrorist use of these capabilities. Given its global stature and media culture, America would be a likely target of some of these terrorist actions. What kind of catalytic event might cause such wildfirelike proliferation? The possibilities are not numerous and thus we should not be too pessimistic, although history usually surprises. One catalyst could be a major civil war in a large country in which NBC weapons are used. Another catalyst might be a crisis in which NBC weapons are used to call into question the credibility of US security guarantees. Such a crisis would have farreaching consequences, both within and beyond any particular region. If the threat of the use of such weapons is sufficient to dissuade the United States from reversing an act of aggression, or if their use is successful in defeating a US military operation, there would be hell to pay. How, for example, would Japan respond to a US decision not to seek to reverse NBC-backed aggression on the Korean peninsula? How might NATO partners respond to a collapse of US credibility in East AsiaThis stake isn’t just America’s stake. Any country whose security depends to some extent on a regional or global order guaranteed by Washington has a stake in preventing such wildfire-like proliferation. This is truest of America’s closest security partners, but it is true of the many small and medium-sized states that depend, to some degree, on collective mechanisms for their security. It seems reasonable to expect that many of these states would respond to a loss of US credibility and to the fear of greater regional instability by moving up the latency curve. If they were also to cross the threshold to weapons production, the international system would have a hard time coping. It seems likely that such proliferation would cause the collapse of nonproliferation and arms control mechanisms. This, in turn, would precipitate a broader crisis of confidence in the other institutions of multilateral political and economic activity that depend on some modicum of global stability and cooperation to function. The consequences could be very far-reaching. These international mechanisms and institutions have been a primary means of giving order to an anarchic international system. The United States, in particular, has found them useful for exercising influence and power. What’s at stake, then, is the international order built up over the last half century—the multilateral institutions of economic and security governance, the patterns of cooperation among states, and the expectations of a more orderly future. This is an order that the United States played a central role in creating and sustaining. It is built largely on American-style liberal political and economic values. It is run by and through formal and informal institutions that operate according to rules Washington helped formulate. This is an order backed by US security guarantees in those regions where the threat of interstate war remains real and system-threatening—and more generally by collective security principles safeguarded at the United Nations by the United States, among others. Were it to unravel, the world would change fundamentally. Would such a crisis actually play out in this way? A catalytic event might well have the opposite effect to the one described here: it could well galvanize the international community into strengthening the institutions of multilateral cooperation, assuming that the United States is willing and able to reenergize its commitment to their leadership. Let us hope so. Moreover, there may be no such catalytic event. Instead, and in the absence of reinvigorated leadership of the antiproliferation effort, we may see something more subtle but no less destructive, and that is a growing number of states that move up the latency curve without also formally abandoning their treaty obligations, creating a dangerously misleading fiction in the form of an extant legal regime with little or no impact on the behavior of states. But let us also set aside the complacent assumption that the current distribution of NBC assets is somehow fixed in perpetuity—or that a radical erosion of the current order would not have serious consequences. Among many US policymakers and analysts, there is still great resistance to the notion that the collapse of the antiproliferation project would have far-reaching implications. Most analysts seem to believe that international politics would then proceed much as they do today. Perhaps some partial collapse would have this effect— some further loss of credibility of one or two instruments of arms control, for example, might not actually precipitate the collapse of the treaty regime. But if wildfirelike proliferation somehow comes to pass, it seems likely that a lot would be up for grabs in international politics. Basic relations of power would be in great flux. New coalitions would form, with new forms of competition among those seeking to lead them. American influence abroad could be eclipsed—and quite rapidly. Americans might like to believe that, in such a world, they could retreat into a Fortress America. Whether others would allow us this luxury is very much an open question, especially if America’s retreat occasions some particular pain on their part that motivates them to seek revenge.

### 2NC ‘Overview’ Card

#### Proliferation turns hegemony – it decreases the power of the u.s. and ensures preventative wars that further magnify proliferation and backlash

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Defensive dominance, however, also gives the unipole reason to oppose any such revisions to the status quo. First, such revisions decrease the benefits of systemic leadership and limit the unipole’s ability to convert its relative power advantage into favorable outcomes. In the case of nuclear weapons, this limitation is all but irreversible, virtually guaranteeing the **recalcitrant regime immunity against any attempt to coerce or overthrow it**. Second, proliferation has the potential to produce regional instability, raising the risk of arms races. These would force the unipole to increase defense spending or **accept a narrower overall relative power advantage.** Third, proliferation would lead to the emergence of a recalcitrant major power that could become the harbinger of an unwanted large-scale balancing attempt. The unipole is therefore likely to demand that recalcitrant minor powers not revise the status quo. The latter, however, will want to resist such demands because of the threat they pose to those states’ security. 74 Whereas fighting over such demands would probably lead to defeat, conceding to them peacefully would bring the undesired outcome with certainty. A preventive war is therefore likely to ensue. In the second causal path to war, recalcitrant minor powers test the limits of the status quo by making small revisions—be they territorial conquests, altered international alignments, or an increase in relative power—evocative of Thomas Schelling’s famous “salami tactics.” 75 The unipole may not, however, accept these revisions, and instead demand their reversal. For a variety of reasons, including incomplete information, commitment problems, and the need for the minor power to establish a reputation for toughness, such demands may not be heeded. As a result, war between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers emerges as a distinct possibility. 76 Regardless of the causal path, a war between the unipole and a recalcitrant minor power creates a precedent for other recalcitrant minor powers to boost their own capabilities. Depending on the unipole’s overall capabilities—that is, whether it can launch a second simultaneous conflict—it may also induce other recalcitrant minor powers to accelerate their balancing process. Thus, a war against a recalcitrant minor power presents other such states with greater incentives for, and (under certain conditions) higher prospects of, assuring their survival by acquiring the necessary capabilities, including nuclear weapons.

### 2NC Heg = Prolif

#### North Korea and Iran prove the turn

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In the absence of a great power sponsor and uncertain of U.S. intentions, Iran and North Korea—both recalcitrant minor powers—have made considerable efforts to bolster their relative power by developing a nuclear capability. Unsurprisingly, the United States has consistently opposed their efforts, but has so far been unable to persuade either to desist. The North Korean nuclear program dates to the 1960s, but most of the nuclear development was conducted in a world with a status quo unipole. 85 Throughout the 1990s and into the early 2000s, North Korea sought to elude U.S. opposition without ever crossing the nuclear threshold. The North Korean regime seemed to have understood that the United States would view an explicit move toward a nuclear breakout as an extreme provocation and raise the possibility of a preventive war. When the United States shifted to a strategy of offensive dominance in late 2001, however, Pyongyang wasted little time in acquiring its nuclear deterrent. Iran, too, pursued a nuclear program throughout the 1990s. 86 The Iranian nuclear program, started in the 1950s, gained new impetus with the end of the Cold War as the result of a confluence of factors: the 1989 replacement of an antinuclear supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, with a pronuclear Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; the discovery of Iraq’s covert nuclear program during the 1991 Gulf War; and, above all, an increased U.S. presence in the region following that war. 87 A decade later, the expansion of Iran’s nuclear program prompted the State Department to proclaim, “We believe Iran’s true intent is to develop the capability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons.” 88 Iran’s nuclear program continued throughout the period in which the United States shifted toward a strategy of offensive dominance, to which I turn next.

#### Heg causes proliferation – other states want to gain the ultimate deterrent

**Mearsheimer 11** John J. Mearsheimer, the “R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago” Jan/Feb 2011 “Imperial By Design” http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0059.pdf

If all of this were not enough, global dominance, especially the Bush administration’s penchant for big-stick diplomacy, negatively affects nuclear proliferation as well. The United States is deeply committed to making sure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear arsenal and that North Korea gives up its atomic weapons, but the strategy we have employed is likely to have the opposite effect. The main reason that a country acquires nuclear weapons is that they are the ultimate deterrent. It is extremely unlikely that any state would attack the homeland of a nuclear-armed adversary because of the fear that it would prompt nuclear retaliation. Therefore, any country that feels threatened by a dangerous rival has good reason to want a survivable nuclear deterrent. This basic logic explains why the United States and the Soviet Union built formidable stockpiles during the Cold War. It also explains why Israel acquired atomic weapons and refuses to give them up. All of this tells you that when the United States places Iran, Iraq and North Korea on the “axis of evil” and threatens them with military force, it gives those countries a powerful incentive to acquire a nuclear deterrent. The Bush administration, for example, would not have invaded Iraq in March 2003 if Saddam had an atomic arsenal because the Iraqi leader probably would have used it, since he almost certainly was going to die anyway. It is not clear whether Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons today, but given that the United States and Israel frequently hint that they might attack it nevertheless, the regime has good reason to want a deterrent to protect itself. Similarly, Pyongyang would be foolish to give up its nuclear capability in the absence of some sort of rapprochement with Washington. And there is no good reason to think that spreading democracy would counter proliferation either. After all, five of the nine nuclear-armed states are democracies (Britain, France, India, Israel and the United States), and two others (Pakistan and Russia) are borderline democracies that retain significant authoritarian features. In short, the Bush administration’s fondness for threatening to attack adversaries (oftentimes with the additional agenda of forced democratization) encouraged nuclear proliferation. The best way for the United States to maximize the prospects of halting or at least slowing down the spread of nuclear weapons would be to stop threatening other countries because that gives them a compelling reason to acquire the ultimate deterrent. But as long as America’s leaders remain committed to global dominance, they are likely to resist this advice and keep threatening states that will not follow Washington’s orders.

### AT: Allied Prolif

#### Forward defense is a Cold War relic – doesn’t solve

Parent and McDonald 11 (Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Miami, Paul, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, "The Wisdom of Retrenchment," Foreign Affairs Vol. 90 No. 6, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136510/joseph-m-parent-and-paul-k-macdonald/the-wisdom-of-retrenchment SL)

Nor is there good evidence that reducing Washington's overseas commitments would lead friends and rivals to question its credibility. Despite some glum prophecies, the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from western Europe after the Cold War neither doomed NATO nor discredited the United States. Similar reductions in U.S. military forces and the forces' repositioning in South Korea have improved the sometimes tense relationship between Washington and Seoul. Calls for Japan to assume a greater defense burden have likewise resulted in deeper integration of U.S. and Japanese forces. Faith in forward defenses is a holdover from the Cold War, rooted in visions of implacable adversaries and falling dominoes. It is ill suited to contemporary world politics, where balancing coalitions are notably absent and ideological disputes remarkably mild.

#### **Anti-American sentiment from unipolarity delegitimizes security commitments**

Maher 10(Richard Maher, Ph.D. in Political Science at Brown University, November 12, 2010,“The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World”, http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=R&aulast=Maher&atitle=The+paradox+of+American+unipolarity:+Why+the+United+States+may+be+better+off+in+a+post-unipolar+world&id=doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2010.10.003&title=Orbis+(Philadelphia)&volume=55&issue=1&date=2011&spage=53&issn=0030-4387) //ZA

Multiple factors give rise to anti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in the missteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one's own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace it with a government much more friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itself when— and under what conditions—military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of the world had a particular animus for George W. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a “war” on terrorism and the division of the world between good and evil. With populations around the world mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen—let alone barely contemplated—such feelings of anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation. It is counterintuitive to think that America's unprecedented power decreases its allies’ dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America's allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy. A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could change that, making these allies more dependent on the United States for their security. Russia's reemergence could unnerve America's European allies, just as China's continued ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades. New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create incentives for America's allies to reduce the disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce their security relationships with the United States.

**Hegemony triggers allied proliferation – empirics prove**

**Maddock 10** Shane J. Maddock, Professor of History at Stonehill College, Ph. D. in U.S. History at University of Connecticut, “Nuclear Apartheid: Why Nonproliferation has failed” August 25 2010 http://www.stonehill.edu/x22161.xml

Throughout the nuclear age, the United States has squandered opportunities to forge cooperative ventures to halt proliferation. Americans have remained infatuated with unilateral and technological solutions to the atomic threat. And they have repeatedly attempted to preserve U.S. nuclear hegemony by undercutting their own professed commitment to nuclear nondissemination. A paradoxical equation derived from this practice. American hegemony, combined with arrogance and a Hobbesian worldview, catalyzed nuclear nationalism in other states and helped break the bonds of Washington's influence. Taught by the superpowers that nuclear weapons equal political power and that warheads prevent wars, other states built the bomb when they could afford to. Other nations also chose military strength over cooperation and in the process diminished Washington's and Moscow's relative power in the international system. The persistence of a hegemonic version of American ideology and culture, rooted in beliefs about American exceptionalism, race, gender and technological utopianism, has continued to spawn nonproliferation failures. At the dawn of the nuclear age, Albert Einstein hoped that the menace of nuclear weapons would "intimidate the human race into bringing order into its international affairs." Einstein's wish remains unfulfilled because entrenched nationalist ideas protected and promulgated by the nuclear guardians blocked any of the new thinking needed to transcend the atomic age.

**Extended deterrence is dead – their turn should have been triggered – at worst, extended deterrence only further encourages rogue prolif**

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Some have argued that nuclear deterrence is not failing, as it is for deterring big events – national survival, for instance. This claim may never be proven, as no state on this planet would initiate a nuclear strike against America (North Korea and Iran would not, even if they could), not because they are deterred but because they have no need. America's long-standing nuclear deterrence posture, including extended deterrence, has three assumptions of circumstances: if American territory, its overseas military presence or allies are attacked by a non-nuclear rival in an alliance with a nuclear power, the US would resort to first use of nuclear weapons. But even given extended nuclear deterrence, who really believes that the US would shoot a nuclear weapon unconditionally in defence of an ally if that ally was being attacked by a non-nuclear rival that is in alliance with a nuclear weapons state? The US, after long domestic debate, has officially ended this policy and this type of extended nuclear deterrence. The Obama Administration's Nuclear Posture Review of 2010 stated clearly that the US would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons NPT members, if they meet the NPT requirement (Iran could be an exception). This is a much commended, progressive nuclear policy, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in international politics. There is a dilemma: the more the US stresses deterrence and extended deterrence, the more its allies could feel assured and less likely to pursue their own nukes, but the more likely some other countries would feel the importance of nuclear weapons and their associated deterrence and therefore seek their own nuclear path. Everyone has to weigh the balance between security due to the nuclear umbrella and insecurity due to nuclear proliferation. Obama's policy has obviously reduced the role of nuclear weapons in America's national security, so as to create a situation more conducive to nonproliferation. Obviously this has an impact on extended nuclear deterrence — the US now is clear that it would not protect its allies with nuclear weapons against non-nuclear attack, possibly with Iran as an exception. Its current nuclear doctrine has deviated from traditional extended nuclear deterrence — if an aforementioned non-nuclear state rival now brings harm to America or its ally, as long as it is in good standing with the NPT, the US has promised not to retaliate with nuclear weapons. This may sound frustrating to some but one has to remember that every coin has two sides – America wants to bring more security to itself and its allies in an age of proliferation. It has to commit less to its nuclear umbrella and to its friends, though it could still assure its allies through other means in the future. Whether one likes such a change or not, this is the Obama position. So how we can say nuclear extended deterrence has not declined?

### AT: Bandwagoning

#### Even if most states bandwagon – the structure of the system ensure that some backlash

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Faced with this uncertainty, other states have two options. First, they can accommodate the unipole and minimize the chances of conflict but at the price of their external autonomy. 64 Accommodation is less risky for major powers because they can guarantee their own survival, and they stand to benefit greatly from being part of the unipolar system. 65 Major powers are therefore unlikely to attempt to revise the status quo. Minor powers are also likely to accommodate the unipole, in an attempt to avoid entering a confrontation with a preponderant power. Thus, most states will accommodate the unipole because, as Wohlforth points out, the power differential rests in its favor. 66 Accommodation, however, entails greater risks for minor powers because their survival is not assured if the unipole should turn against them. Thus **some of them are likely to implement a second strategic option—resisting the unipole**. The structure of the international system does not entirely determine whether or not a minor power accommodates the unipole. Still, structure conditions the likelihood of accommodation in two ways. To begin, a necessary part of a strategy of dominance is the creation of alliances or informal security commitments with regional powers. Such regional powers, however, are likely to have experienced conflict with, or a grievance toward, at least some of its neighboring minor powers. The latter are more likely to adopt a recalcitrant posture. Additionally, by narrowing their opportunities for regional integration and security maximization, the unipole’s interference with the regional balance of power is likely to lower the value of the status quo for these minor powers. 67 As the literature on the “value of peace” shows, countries that attribute a low value to the status quo are more risk acceptant. This argument helps explain, for example, Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 and Syria’s and Egypt’s decision to attack Israel in 1973. 68 In both cases, aggressor states knew that their capabilities were significantly weaker than those of their targets. They were nonetheless willing to run the risk of launching attacks because they found the prewar status quo unacceptable. 69 Thus, for these states**, the costs of balancing were lower relative to those of bandwagoning**

### AT: No Balancing

#### Unipolar dominance results in asymmetric backlash

**Schweller and Pu 11** (Randall L Schweller, professor of political science at Ohio State University, PhD from Colombia University, director of the Mershon Center’s Series on National Security at Ohio State University, recipient of the John M Olin post-doctoral fellowship in National Security at the Center for International Affairs, Xiaoyu Pu, PhD candidate in political science at Ohio State University, Summer 2011, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of the International Order in an Era of US Decline,” published in International Security, volume 36, number 1) GZ

In addition to their competing visions of global order (the discourse of resistance), subordinate actors may adopt “cost-imposing” strategies (the practice of resistance) vis-à-vis the unipolar power that fall short of balancing against it.27 States (weak ones included) and even nonstates can impose costs on a unipolar power in a variety of ways, ranging from the mere withdrawal of goodwill to actual attacks on its soil. In the current world, cost-imposing strategies include engaging in diplomatic friction or foot-dragging;28 denying U.S. military forces access to bases;29 launching terrorist attacks against the United States; aiding, abetting, and harboring terrorist groups; voting against the United States in international institutions; preventing or reversing the forwardbasing of U.S. military forces; pursuing protectionism and other coercive economic policies; engaging in conventional uses of force such as blockades against U.S. allies;30 making threats against pivotal states that affect regional and international security;31 and proliferating weapons of mass destruction among anti-Western states or groups. Therefore, in the delegitimation and deconcentration phase, the discourse of resistance and the practice of resistance are mutually sustaining.

## China

### 1NC China

#### **Attempts to maintain hegemonic dominance over China makes war inevitable**

Layne 8(Christopher Layne, Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, at Texas A&M University’s George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, January 2008, “China's Challenge to US Hegemony”, Current History, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdlink?vinst=PROD&fmt=3&startpage=-1&vname=PQD&did=1415391761&scaling=FULL&pmid=28519&vtype=PQD&fileinfoindex=%2Fshare3%2Fpqimage%2Fpqirs103v%2F201207011534%2F34723%2F884%2Fout.pdf&source=%24source&rqt=309&TS=1341171275&clientId=17822) //ZA

China's rise affects the United States because of what international relations scholars call the "power transition" effect: Throughout the history of the modern international state system, ascending powers have always challenged the position of the dominant (hegemonic) power in the international system-and these challenges have usually culminated in war. Notwithstanding Beijing's talk about a "peaceful rise," an ascending China inevitably will challenge the geopolitical equilibrium in East Asia. The doctrine of peaceful rise thus is a reassurance strategy employed by Beijing in an attempt to allay others' fears of growing Chinese power and to forestall the United States from acting preventively during the dangerous transition period when China is catching up to the United States. Does this mean that the United States and China are on a collision course that will lead to a war in the next decade or two? Not necessarily. What happens in Sino-American relations largely depends on what strategy Washington chooses to adopt toward China. If the United States tries to maintain its current dominance in East Asia, Sino-American conflict is virtually certain, because US grand strategy has incorporated the logic of anticipatory violence as an instrument for maintaining American primacy. For a declining hegemon, "strangling the baby in the crib" by attacking a rising challenger preventively-that is, while the hegemon still holds the upper hand militarily-has always been a tempting strategic option.

Global nuclear war
Hunkovic 9 (Lee J, American Military University, 2009, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America”, <http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf>)

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

### 2NC African Wars Impact

#### A US-China transition war would result in proxy wars in Africa

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Africa is thus a vital foreign interest for the Chinese and must be for the United States; access to its mineral and petroleum wealth is crucial to the survival of each. 57 Although the US and Chinese economies are tightly interconnected, the nonrenewable nature of these assets means competition will remain a zero-sum game. Nearly all African states have been independent entities for less than 50 years; consolidating robust do­ mestic state institutions and stable governments remains problematic. 58 Studies have shown that weak governments are often prime targets for civil conflicts that prove costly to control. 59 Many African nations possess both strategic resources and weak regimes, making them vulnerable to internal conflict and thus valuable candidates for assistance from China or the United States to help settle their domestic grievances. With access to African resources of vital strategic interest to each side, competition could likely occur by proxy via diplomatic, economic, or military assistance to one (or both) of the parties involved. Realist claims that focusing on third-world issues is misplaced are thus fallacious; war in a future US-China bipolar system remains as costly as it was during the Cold War. Because of the fragile nature of many African regimes, domestic grievances are more prone to result in conlict; US and Chinese strategic interests will dictate an intrusive foreign policy to be both prudent and vital. US-Sino proxy conlicts over control of African resources will likely become necessary if these great powers are to sustain their national security postures, especially in terms of strategic defense. 60 What does this mean for the future of US grand and military strategy, foreign policy prescriptions, future defense acquisition priorities, and military doctrine and training?

#### Nuclear war

**Deutsch 02** – Founder of Rabid Tiger Project (Political Risk Consulting and Research Firm focusing on Russia and Eastern Europe) [Jeffrey, “SETTING THE STAGE FOR WORLD WAR III,” Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Nov 18, http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n9.html]

The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to "national" borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. We've got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and don't need any "help," thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.

### 2NC Heg = China War

#### Attempting to preserve hegemony makes US-Sino war inevitable – we have empirics on our side

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Certainly, the Chinese have not forgotten. Now Beijing aims to dominate its own East and Southeast Asian backyard, just as a rising America sought to dominate the Western Hemisphere a century and a half ago. The United States and China now are competing for supremacy in East and Southeast Asia. Washington has been the incumbent hegemon there since World War II, and many in the American foreign-policy establishment view China's quest for regional hegemony as a threat that must be resisted. This contest for regional dominance is fueling escalating tensions and possibly could lead to war. In geopolitics, two great powers cannot simultaneously be hegemonic in the same region. Unless one of them abandons its aspirations, there is a high probability of hostilities. Flashpoints that could spark a Sino-American conflict include the unstable Korean Peninsula; the disputed status of Taiwan; competition for control of oil and other natural resources; and the burgeoning naval rivalry between the two powers. These rising tensions were underscored by a recent Brookings study by Peking University's Wang Jisi and Kenneth Lieberthal, national-security director for Asia during the Clinton administration, based on their conversations with high-level officials in the American and Chinese governments. Wang found that underneath the visage of "mutual cooperation" that both countries project, the Chinese believe they are likely to replace the United States as the world's leading power but Washington is working to prevent such a rise. Similarly, Lieberthal related that many American officials believe their Chinese counterparts see the U.S.-Chinese relationship in terms of a zero-sum game in the struggle for global hegemony. An instructive historical antecedent is the Anglo-German rivalry of the early twentieth century. The key lesson of that rivalry is that such great-power competition can end in one of three ways: accommodation of the rising challenger by the dominant power; retreat of the challenger; or war. The famous 1907 memo exchange between two key British Foreign Office officials--Sir Eyre Crowe and Lord Thomas Sanderson--outlined these stark choices. Crowe argued that London must uphold the *Pax Britannica* status quo at all costs. Either Germany would accept its place in a British-dominated world order, he averred, or Britain would have to contain Germany's rising power, even at the risk of war. Sanderson replied that London's refusal to accommodate the reality of Germany's rising power was both unwise and dangerous. He suggested Germany's leaders must view Britain "in the light of some huge giant sprawling over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes stretching in every direction, which cannot be approached without eliciting a scream." In Beijing's eyes today, the United States must appear as the unapproachable, globally sprawling giant.

#### China’s rise as an economic superpower proves decline has come – accepting retrenchment is crucial to avoiding US-China war

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American decline is part of a broader trend in international politics: the shift of economic power away from the Euro-Atlantic core to rising great and regional powers (what economists sometimes refer to as the ‘‘emerging market’’ nations). Among the former are China, India, and Russia. The latter category includes Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea, Brazil, and South Africa. In a May 2011 report, the World Bank predicted that six countries—China, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, and South Korea—will account for one-half of the world’s economic growth between 2011 and 2025 (Politi 2011; Rich 2011). In some respects, of course, this emergence of new great powers is less about rise than restoration. As Figure 1 indicates, in 1700 China and India were the world’s two largest economies. From their perspective—especially Beijing’s—they are merely regaining what they view as their natural, or rightful, place in the hierarchy of great powers. The ascent of new great powers is the strongest evidence of unipolarity’s end. The two most important indicators of whether new great powers are rising are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP (Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987). The evidence that the international system is rapidly becoming multipolar—and that, consequently, America’s relative power is declining—is now impossible to deny, and China is Exhibit A for the shift in the world’s center of economic and geopolitical gravity. China illustrates how, since the Cold War’s end, potential great powers have been positioning themselves to challenge the United States. To spur its economic growth, for some three decades (beginning with Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms) China took a low proﬁle in international politics and avoided confrontation with the United States and its regional neighbors. To spur its modernization as well, China integrated itself in the American-led world order. China’s self-described ‘‘peaceful rise’’ followed the script written by Deng Xiaoping: ‘‘Lie low. Hide your capabilities. Bide your time.’’ The fact that China joined the international economic order did not mean its long-term intentions were benign. Beijing’s long-term goal was not simply to get rich. It was also to become wealthy enough to acquire the military capabilities it needs to compete with the United States for regional hegemony in East Asia. 2 The Great Recession caused a dramatic shift in Beijing’s perceptions of the international balance of power. China now sees the United States in decline while simultaneously viewing itself as having risen to great-power status. China’s newly gained self-conﬁdence was evident in its 2010 foreign policy muscle-ﬂexing. Objective indicators conﬁrm the reality of China’s rise, and the United States’ corresponding relative decline. In 2010, China displaced the United States as the world’s leading manufacturing nation— a crown the United States had held for a century. The International Monetary Fund forecasts that China’s share of world GDP (15%) will draw nearly even with the United States (18%) by 2014 (see Figure 2). This is especially impressive given that China’s share of world GDP was only 2% in 1980 and as recently as 1995 was only 6%. Moreover, China is on course to overtake the United States as the world’s largest economy. While analysts disagree on the date when this will happen, the most recent projections by leading economic forecasters have advanced the date dramatically over what was being estimated just a few years ago. For example, in 2003 Goldman Sachs predicted that China would surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy in 2041, and in 2008, it advanced the date to 2028 (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003; O’Neill 2008). However, the most recent forecasts are now that China will pass the United States much sooner than 2028. The Economist Intelligence Unit (2009) predicts China will become the world’s largest economy in 2021; PricewaterhouseCoopers (2010) says 2020, and the Economist magazine says 2019 (World’s Biggest Economy 2010) (see Figure 3). 3 More strikingly, according to a 2011 International Monetary Fund study, in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), China will overhaul the United States in 2016. In fact, economist Arvin Subramanian of the Peterson Institute for International Economics has calculated, also using PPP, that China is already the world’s largest economy (Subramanian 2011). 4 What could be clearer proof of the United States’ relative decline than the fact that China will soon leapfrog the United States and become the world’s largest economy, if indeed it has not already done so? That China is poised to displace the United States as the world’s largest economy has more than economic signiﬁcance. It is signiﬁcant geopolitically. The pattern of great-power rise is well established. First, China’s claims of ‘‘peaceful rise’’ notwithstanding, the emergence of new great powers in the international system has invariably been destabilizing geopolitically. The near-simultaneous emergence of the United States, Germany, and Japan as great powers in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries triggered two world wars (Layne 1993). Second, as rising great powers become wealthier, their political ambitions increase and they convert their newfound economic muscle into the military clout (Zakaria 1998). Already, China is engaged in an impressive military modernization and buildup. While China has not yet caught up to the United States’ sophisticated military technology, it clearly is narrowing the US advantage. Third, rising powers invariably seek to dominate the regions in which they are situated (Mearsheimer 2001). This means that China and the United States are on a collision course in East Asia—the region where the United States has been the incumbent hegemon since 1945, and which an increasingly powerful and assertive China sees as its own backyard. Fourth, as they rise, new great powers acquire economic and political interests abroad, and they seek to acquire the power projection capabilities to defend those interests (Zakaria 1998).

#### China is hedging against the US is the status quo – it will spark a war in Asia absent US retrenchment

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The first way, China is hedging against the US is through engagement policies, in order to stabilize bilateral economic relations and security tensions and to broaden areas of cooperation (Medeiros, 2005, p.10). Since 9/11, Beijing has been expanding bilateral counterterrorism and nonproliferation cooperation; it has been making concessions to resolve economic disagreements – as illustrated by the 2006 US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue – and has assumed a more active role in the resolution of the North Korea Nuclear Crisis. China’s key role in the Six Party Talks is a relevant example of Chinese commitment to soothe its relations with the US. The second way of this hedging strategy is first through internal balancing (Waltz, 1979, p. 132-133) which occurs when states grow their own capabilities by increasing economic growth and military spending. Since the 1990s, China’s military modernization efforts, at a time when Beijing was greatly worried that Taiwan was moving rapidly away from reunification, demonstrates this. This strategy is best seen in the People Liberation Army’s focus on acquiring advanced naval, airborne, missile and command and control capabilities for area denial, precision strike and information dominance. This modernization is aimed at complicating US military operations in the East Asian littoral and at imposing greater costs on US naval and air force assets in a conflict over Taiwan (Medeiros, 2005, p. 34). Beijing is alsohedging against the Washington by enhancing its diplomatic representation and its security ties with other Asian countries. This strategy can be related to soft balancing defined as: Measures that do not directly challenge US military preponderance but use international institutions, economic statecraft and diplomatic arrangement to delay, frustrate and undermine US policies (Pape, 2005, p7) In this way, China’s embrace of Asian multilateral organizations such as ASEAN is designed to create norms and structures with the result of limiting American involvement in regional security affairs. ASEAN + 3 looks particularly worrisome precisely because it includes U.S. allies and security partners -Japan, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand- but excludes the United States. Moreover, since the 1990’s, China has made continuous efforts to cultivate economic and security partners in Southeast Asia, reassuring states that China’s rise presents economic opportunities and does not represent a threat for the region (Medeiros, p. 11). Finally, Friedberg’s diagnosis arguing that the Asia Pacific region was ‘ripe for rivalry’ (1993, p.5) is more relevant today than ever. This reality can be seen in the willingness of China on one hand and the US and Japan on the other, to pursue balance of powers strategies in which China plays a central role. Peking still faces huge social challenges, but it is not inclined to passively accept American hegemony along its borders. The country has chosen a hedging strategy as “a manifestation of security dilemma dynamics at work in a globalized world characterized by deep economic interdependence and the need for multilateral security cooperation” (Medeiros, 2005, p.2).

### AT: Peaceful Rise

#### China rise inevitable- it’s only a question of the US taking a policy of hegemonic aggression, or accepting it

Layne 8(Christopher Layne, Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, at Texas A&M University’s George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, January 2008, “China's Challenge to US Hegemony”, Current History, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdlink?vinst=PROD&fmt=3&startpage=-1&vname=PQD&did=1415391761&scaling=FULL&pmid=28519&vtype=PQD&fileinfoindex=%2Fshare3%2Fpqimage%2Fpqirs103v%2F201207011534%2F34723%2F884%2Fout.pdf&source=%24source&rqt=309&TS=1341171275&clientId=17822) //ZA

"If the United States tries to maintain its current dominance in East Asia, SinoAmerican conflict is virtually certain. ..." The Soviet Union's collapse transformed the bipolar cold war international system into a "unipolar" system dominated by the United States. During the 1990s, the us foreign policy community engaged in lively debate about whether America's post-cold war hegemony could be sustained over the long haul or was merely a "unipolar moment." More than 15 years after the cold war's end, it is obvious that American hegemony has been more than momentary. Indeed, the prevailing view among policy makers and foreign policy scholars today is that America's economic, military, and technological advantages are so great that it will be a long time before us dominance can be challenged. There is mounting evidence, however, that this view is mistaken, and that, in fact, the era of American hegemony is drawing to a close right before our eyes. The rise of China is the biggest reason for this. Notwithstanding Washington's current preoccupation with the Middle East, in the coming decades China's great power emergence will be the paramount issue of grand strategy facing the United States. Whether China will undergo a "peaceful rise"-as Beijing claims-is doubtful. Historically, the emergence of new poles of power in the international system has been geopolitically destabilizing. For example, the rise of Germany, the United States, and Japan at the end of the nineteenth century contributed to the international political frictions that culminated in two world wars. There is no reason to believe that China's rise will be an exception. However, while it is certainly true that China's rise will cause geopolitical turmoil, a Sino-American war is not inevitable. Whether such a conflict occurs will hinge more on Washington's strategic choices than on Beijing's. From the mid-1980s through the late 1990s China's economy grew at a rate of approximately percent a year. From the late 1990s until 2005 its economy grew at 8 percent to 9 percent annually. In 2006 China's annual growth rate was above percent, as it is projected to be for 2007. China's phenomenal economic growth is driving its emergence as a great power-and this is a familiar pattern in international politics. The economic power of states grows at different rates, which means that some states are always gaining power and some are losing power relative to others. As Paul Kennedy demonstrated in his 1987 book The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, time and again these relative economic shifts have "heralded the rise of new great powers which one day would have a decisive impact on the military/territorial order." The leadership in Beijing understands the link between economic strength and geopolitical weight. It realizes that, if China can continue to sustain near-double digit growth rates in the early decades of this century, it will surpass the United States as the world's largest economy (measured by gross domestic product). Because of this astonishing economic growth, China is, as journalist James Kynge has put it (with a nod to Napoleon), truly shaking the world both economically and geopolitically. Studies by the US Central Intelligence Agency and others have projected that China will be a first-rate military power and will rival America in global power by 2020.

## Economy

### 1NC US Econ

#### Hegemony is the biggest internal link into economic decline- the US can no longer afford to be an empire

Bandow 10(Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, former special assistant to President Reagan, J.D. from Stanford University, April 19, 2010, “Bankrupt Empire”, <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/bankrupt-empire>) //ZA

The United States government is effectively bankrupt. Washington no longer can afford to micromanage the world. International social engineering is a dubious venture under the best of circumstances. It is folly to attempt while drowning in red ink. Traditional military threats against America have largely disappeared. There's no more Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, Maoist China is distant history and Washington is allied with virtually every industrialized state. As Colin Powell famously put it while Chairman of the Joint Chiefs: "I'm running out of enemies. . . . I'm down to Kim Il-Sung and Castro." However, the United States continues to act as the globe's 911 number. Unfortunately, a hyperactive foreign policy requires a big military. America accounts for roughly half of global military outlays. In real terms Washington spends more on "defense" today than it during the Cold War, Korean War and Vietnam War. If Uncle Sam was a real person, he would declare bankruptcy. U.S. military expenditures are extraordinary by any measure. My Cato Institute colleagues Chris Preble and Charles Zakaib recently compared American and European military outlays. U.S. expenditures have been trending upward and now approach five percent of GDP. In contrast, European outlays have consistently fallen as a percentage of GDP, to an average of less than two percent. The difference is even starker when comparing per capita GDP military expenditures. The U.S. is around $2,200. Most European states fall well below $1,000. Adding in non-Pentagon defense spending — Homeland Security, Veterans Affairs, and Department of Energy (nuclear weapons) — yields American military outlays of $835.1 billion in 2008, which represented 5.9 percent of GDP and $2,700 per capita. Max Boot of the Council on Foreign Relations worries that the increased financial obligations (forget unrealistic estimates about cutting the deficit) resulting from health-care legislation will preclude maintaining such oversize expenditures in the future, thereby threatening America's "global standing." He asks: Who will "police the sea lanes, stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combat terrorism, respond to genocide and other unconscionable human rights violations, and deter rogue states from aggression?" Of course, nobody is threatening to close the sea lanes these days. Washington has found it hard to stop nuclear proliferation without initiating war, yet promiscuous U.S. military intervention creates a powerful incentive for nations to seek nuclear weapons. Armored divisions and carrier groups aren't useful in confronting terrorists. Iraq demonstrates how the brutality of war often is more inhumane than the depredations of dictators. And there are lots of other nations capable of deterring rogue states. The United States should not attempt to do everything even if it could afford to do so. But it can't. When it comes to the federal Treasury, there's nothing there. If Uncle Sam was a real person, he would declare bankruptcy. The current national debt is $12.7 trillion. The Congressional Budget Office figures that current policy — unrealistically assuming no new spending increases — will run up $10 trillion in deficits over the coming decade. But more spending — a lot more spending — is on the way. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac remain as active as ever, underwriting $5.4 trillion worth of mortgages while running up additional losses. The Federal Housing Administration's portfolio of insured mortgages continues to rise along with defaults. Exposure for Ginnie Mae, which issues guaranteed mortgage-backed securities, also is jumping skyward. The FDIC shut down a record 140 banks last year and is running low on cash. Last year the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation figured its fund was running a $34 billion deficit. Federal pensions are underfunded by $1 trillion. State and local retirement funds are short about $3 trillion. Outlays for the Iraq war will persist decades after the troops return as the government cares for seriously injured military personnel; total expenditures will hit $2 trillion or more. Extending and expanding the war in Afghanistan will further bloat federal outlays. Worst of all, last year the combined Social Security/Medicare unfunded liability was estimated to be $107 trillion. Social Security, originally expected to go negative in 2016, will spend more than it collects this year, and the "trust fund" is an accounting fiction. Medicaid, a joint federal-state program, also is breaking budgets. At their current growth rate, CBO says that by 2050 these three programs alone will consume virtually the entire federal budget. Uncle Sam's current net liabilities exceed Americans' net worth. Yet the debt-to-GDP ratio will continue rising and could eventually hit World War II levels. Net interest is expected to more than quadruple to $840 billion annually by 2020. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke says: "It's not something that is ten years away. It affects the markets currently." In March, Treasury notes commanded a yield of 3.5 basis points higher than those for Warren Buffett's Berkshire Hathaway. Moody's recently threatened to downgrade federal debt: "Although AAA governments benefit from an unusual degree of balance sheet flexibility, that flexibility is not infinite." In 2008, Tom Lemmon of Moody's warned: "The underlying credit rating of the U.S. government faces the risk of downgrading in the next ten years if solutions are not found to our growing Medicare and Social Security unfunded obligations." This is all without counting a dollar of increased federal spending due to federalizing American medicine. The United States faces a fiscal crisis. If America's survival was at stake, extraordinary military expenditures would still be justified. But not to protect other nations, especially prosperous and populous states well able to defend themselves. Boot warns: "it will be increasingly hard to be globocop and nanny state at the same time." America should be neither. The issue is not just money. The Constitution envisions a limited government focused on defending Americans, not transforming the rest of the world. Moreover, if Washington continues to act as globocop, America's friends and allies will never have an incentive to do more. The United States will be a world power for decades. But it can no afford to act as if it is the only power. America must begin the process of becoming a normal nation with a normal foreign policy.

#### Economic collapse causes great power wars that go nuclear

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Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism. One symptom that makes such a scenario plausible has become visible. Many commentators have identified anger or anxiety as a common driver of the Tea Party movement in the United States and the rise of xenophobic parties in Europe, perhaps stemming from a self-perception of decline. Anger (directed towards the neo-colonialist or pro-Israeli West or – especially recently – domestic authoritarian regimes) has also been associated with grievances in the Middle East, following the failure of earlier reformist and secular movements. 10 Despite relative popular optimism, anger can also be detected in Asia, hand in hand with chauvinism and a sense of lack of appropriate recognition by others, stemming from a self-perception of rising influence and power.

### 2NC Heg = US Econ Collapse

#### Hegemony risks collapse of the US economy- multipolarity would be much less costly

Maher 10(Richard Maher, Ph.D. in Political Science at Brown University, November 12, 2010,“The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World”, http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=R&aulast=Maher&atitle=The+paradox+of+American+unipolarity:+Why+the+United+States+may+be+better+off+in+a+post-unipolar+world&id=doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2010.10.003&title=Orbis+(Philadelphia)&volume=55&issue=1&date=2011&spage=53&issn=0030-4387) //ZA

As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating—one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law—has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe—such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008—the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good—a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries—in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia—continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India-Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The only way to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically decreases its share. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States—maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used.

### 1NC Global Econ

#### Unipolarity prioritizes the economic concerns of the dominant power over all else- that destabilizes the international economy and order

Ikenberry 9(G. John Ikenberry, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, January 2009, “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences”, <http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.ikenberry.html>) //ZA

How might the shift from a bipolar to a unipolar system affect the inclination of the now singularly dominant state to provide international public goods? Two hypotheses arise, with contradictory behavioral expectations. First, we might expect a unipole to take on an even greater responsibility for the provision of international public goods. The capabilities of a unipole relative to other major states are greater than those of either dominant power in a bipolar structure. The unipole’s incentive should be stronger as well, since it now has the opportunity to influence international outcomes globally, not just in its [End Page 14] particular subsystem. We should expect the unipole to try to “lock in” a durable international order that reflects its interests and values.27 A second hypothesis, however, suggests the opposite. We should expect a unipolar power to underproduce public goods despite its preponderant capabilities. The fact that it is unthreatened by peer competitors and relatively unconstrained by other states creates incentives for the unipole to pursue more parochial interests even at the expense of a stable international order. The fact that it is extraordinarily powerful means that the unipole will be more inclined to force adjustment costs on others, rather than bear disproportionate burdens itself. Two of the contributions below address these issues. Michael Mastanduno’s analysis of the global political economy shows that the dominant state will be both system maker and privilege taker—it will seek simultaneously to provide public goods and to exploit its advantageous structural position for parochial gain. It enlists the cooperation of other states and seeks, with varying degrees of success, to force adjustment burdens upon them. Jervis suggests that because the unipole has wide discretion in determining the nature and the extent of the goods provided, its efforts are likely to be perceived by less powerful states as hypocritical attempts to mask the actual pursuit of private goods.

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### AT: Link Turns

#### Staving off decline wrecks the global economy

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The United States still wields preponderant military power. However, as discussed above, in the next ten to ﬁfteen years the looming ﬁscal crisis will compel Washington to retrench strategically. As the United States’ military power diminishes, its ability to command the commons and act as a hegemonic stabilizer will be compromised. The end of the United States’ role as a military hegemon is still over horizon. However, the Great Recession has made it evident that the United States no longer is an economic hegemon. An economic hegemon is supposed to solve global economic crises, not cause them. However, it was the freezing-up of the US ﬁnancial system triggered by the sub-prime mortgage crisis that plunged the world into economic crisis. The hegemon is supposed to be the lender of last resort in the international economy. The United States, however, has become the borrower of ﬁrst resort—the world’s largest debtor. When the global economy falters, the economic hegemon is supposed to take responsibility for kick-starting recovery by purchasing other nations’ goods. From World War II’s end until the Great Recession, the international economy looked to the United States as the locomotive of global economic growth. As the world’s largest market since 1945, America’s willingness to consume foreign goods has been the ﬁrewall against global economic downturns. This is not what happened during the Great Recession, however. The US economy proved too inﬁrm to lead the global economy back to health. Others—notably a rising China—had to step up to the plate to do so. The United States’ inability to galvanize global recovery demonstrates that in key respects it no longer is capable of acting as an economic hegemon. Indeed, President Barak Obama conceded as much at the April 2009 G-20 meeting in London, where he acknowledged the United States is no longer able to be the world’s consumer of last resort, and that the world needs to look to China (and India and other emerging market states) to be the motors of global recovery. Other recent examples of how relative decline and loss of economic hegemony have eroded Washington’s ‘‘agenda setting’’ capacity in international economic management include the US failure to achieve global economic re-balancing by compelling China to revalue the renminbi, and its defeat in the 2009–2010 ‘‘austerity versus stimulus’’ debate with Europe.

## Terrorism

### 1NC Terror

#### U.S. hegemony causes terrorism – without it, organizations like Al Qaeda wouldn’t exist

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Al-Qaeda, the world’s most notorious terrorist network, was, in a sense, a response to the most obvious manifestation of global hegemony, namely, military power. As soon as the United States had established a military base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1991, immediately after the Kuwait War, the alQaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, announced to the world that he would attack Dhahran. He considered the establishment of an “infidel” military base in Islam’s holiest land—Saudi Arabia, where Islam’s two holiest cities, Mecca and Media, are situated—an act of sacrilege.1 In June 1996, al-Qaeda was allegedly involved in a bomb attack upon the base, killing 19 American airmen and wounding 250 others. Two years later, al-Qaeda targeted U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. This was followed by the 2000 assault on a U.S. warship, the USS Cole, off the coast of Yemen. The climax was of course the infamous 9-11 episode when al-Qaeda operatives allegedly smashed aircrafts into the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Almost three thousand men and women were massacred in those horrendous tragedies on the eleventh of September 2001. There is no need to emphasize that the WTC was a symbol of U.S.’s global economic power while the Pentagon represented its global military might. After 9-11, U.S. global hegemony continued to provoke al-Qaeda and other terrorist outfits. Since the U.S. and its allies had invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 in order to oust the Taliban regime that was protecting Osama, the invasion became the justification for further terrorist attacks. The Bali bombings of October 2002, purportedly carried out by a group affiliated with al-Qaeda, the Jemaah Islamiyyah, were primarily to avenge the Afghan invasion. Then in March 2003, the U.S. and its allies embarked upon a second military invasion. This time the target was Iraq. One year after Iraq was conquered, al-Qaeda struck again; it was responsible for a dastardly carnage at a Madrid railway station. The unconcealed aim was to compel the Spanish government to withdraw its soldiers from the U.S. led force in Iraq. Al-Qaeda succeeded in its objective. If we reflect upon al-Qaeda attacks, it is obvious that the military, political, and economic dimensions of U.S. hegemony figure prominently on its radar screen. It is seldom acknowledged, however, that the cultural dimension of hegemony has also been a consideration. For instance, during their trial, a couple of the Bali bombers inveighed against Western cultural imperialism and how it was destroying the identity and integrity of indigenous communities. By arguing that hegemony in all its manifestations breeds terrorism, we are in no way condoning terrorism. Al-Qaeda’s deliberate targeting of noncombatants and civilians in general—in East Africa, on 9-11, in Bali, in Madrid—has been condemned by right-thinking people everywhere. Leading Muslim theologians and scholars have not only denounced al-Qaeda’s misdeeds from a humanitarian perspective, but have also castigated Osama and his underlings as men who have shamelessly violated the essence of Islamic teachings.2 Nonetheless, if we fail to recognize how hegemony— control and dominance over people—leads to acts of terror, we will be no better than the proverbial ostrich that buries its head in the sand. There is perhaps another interesting aspect to hegemony and terrorism that is not widely acknowledged. Al-Qaeda, which now claims to be fighting U.S. hegemony, in fact owes its origin to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which helped to arm and fund the outfit as part of the resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the eighties. It served U.S. interests to create and sustain organizations like al-Qaeda since the U.S. was determined to defeat the Soviet Union at all costs.3 Indeed, the utter failure of the Soviet Army to maintain its grip upon Afghanistan—at least 20,000 of its soldiers were killed—was one of the more important reasons for the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. What this implies is that since al-Qaeda had also contributed to the Soviet demise, it would not be wrong to hold it partially responsible for the emergence of the U.S. as the world’s sole hegemonic power. It may be appropriate at this point to ask: if American hegemony comes to an end, will al-Qaeda terrorism also cease to exist? Without American hegemony, al-Qaeda will lose much of its constituency. That segment of the Muslim population that applauds Osama because he is prepared to stand up to the arrogance of hegemonic power will disappear immediately. Besides, it will be more difficult for al-Qaeda to recruit its operatives. In this regard, it is the U.S. led occupation of Iraq—more than any other event—that has accelerated al-Qaeda’s recruitment drive! Having said that, we must nonetheless concede that even without U.S. hegemony, al-Qaeda may still be around. It nurses a foolish dream of establishing a global Islamic Caliphate based upon its doctrinaire Wahabist ideology—an ideology that dichotomizes the world into pure Muslims and impure infidels, deprives women of their dignity, subscribes to a bigoted, punitive concept of law, and has no qualms about employing violence in pursuit of its atavistic goals.4

#### Nuclear terrorism is an existential threat – it could escalate to nuclear war with Russia and China

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A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed, there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues,and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow, although it must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier)Washington might decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims is the “Chechen insurgents’ … long-standing interest in all things nuclear.”42 American pressure on that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide. There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither “for us or against us”) might it also suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly) the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables. Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russia’s use of nuclear weapons, including outside Russia’s traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The phrase “how dare they tell us what to do” immediately springs to mind. Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear restraint.

### 2NC Heg = Terror

**Heg causes terror – offshore balancing is key to solve**

**Mearsheimer 11** John J. Mearsheimer, the “R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago” Jan/Feb 2011 “Imperial By Design” http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0059.pdf

Specifically, offshore balancing is the best grand strategy for ameliorating our terrorism problem. Placing American troops in the Arab and Muslim world is a major cause of terrorist attacks against the United States, as University of Chicago professor Robert Pape’s research shows. Remember what happened after President Ronald Reagan sent marines into Beirut in 1982? A suicide bomber blew up their barracks the following year, killing 241 service members. Reagan had the good sense to quickly pull the remaining marines out of Lebanon and keep them offshore. And it is worth noting that the perpetrators of this act did not pursue us after we withdrew. Reagan’s decision was neither surprising nor controversial, because the United States had an offshore-balancing strategy in the Middle East during this period. Washington relied on Iraq to contain Iran during the 1980s, and kept the rapid-deployment force—which was built to intervene in the Gulf if the local balance of power collapsed—at the ready should it be needed. This was smart policy. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the United States, once again acting as an offshore balancer, moved large numbers of troops into Saudi Arabia to liberate Kuwait. After the war was won and victory was consolidated, those troops should have been pulled out of the region. But that did not happen. Rather, Bill Clinton adopted a policy of dual containment—checking both Iran and Iraq instead of letting them check one another. And lest we forget, the resulting presence of U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia was one of the main reasons that Osama bin Laden declared war on the United States. The Bush administration simply made a bad situation even worse. Sending the U.S. military into countries in the Arab and Muslim world is helping to cause our terrorism problem, not solve it. The best way to fix this situation is to follow Ronald Reagan’s example and pull all American troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq, then deploy them over the horizon as part of an offshore-balancing strategy. To be sure, the terrorist challenge would not completely disappear if the United States went back to offshore balancing, but it would be an important step forward.

## Multipolarity Good

### Solves War

#### Attempts to maintain hegemony make conflict inevitable- a peaceful transition to multipolarity would provide stable international order

Maher 10(Richard Maher, Ph.D. in Political Science at Brown University, November 12, 2010,“The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World”, http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=R&aulast=Maher&atitle=The+paradox+of+American+unipolarity:+Why+the+United+States+may+be+better+off+in+a+post-unipolar+world&id=doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2010.10.003&title=Orbis+(Philadelphia)&volume=55&issue=1&date=2011&spage=53&issn=0030-4387) //ZA

The United States should start planning now for the inevitable decline of its preeminent position in world politics. By taking steps now, the United States will be able to position itself to exercise maximum influence beyond its era of preponderance. This will be America's fourth attempt at world order. The first, following World War I and the creation of the League of Nations, was a disaster. The second and third, coming in 1945 and 1989-1991, respectively, should be considered significant achievements of U.S. foreign policy and of creating world order. This fourth attempt at world order will go a long way in determining the basic shape and character of world politics and international history for the twenty-first century. The most fundamental necessity for the United States is to create a stable political order that is likely to endure, and that provides for stable relations among the great powers. The United States and other global stakeholders must prevent a return to the 1930s, an era defined by open trade conflict, power competition, and intense nationalism. Fortunately, the United States is in a good position to do this. The global political order that now exists is largely of American creation. Moreover, its forward presence in Europe and East Asia will likely persist for decades to come, ensuring that the United States will remain a major player in these regions. The disparity in military power between the United States and the rest of the world is profound, and this gap will not close in the next several decades at least. In creating a new global political order for twenty-first century world politics, the United States will have to rely on both the realist and liberal traditions of American foreign policy, which will include deterrence and power balancing, but also using international institutions to shape other countries’ preferences and interests.

## Offshore Balancing Good

### Solves Transition War

#### The status quo is transitioning to offshore balancing which solves terrorism and smoothes the transition

**Layne 12** (Christopher Layne, PhD in political science from the University of California at Berkeley, JD from the University of Southern California Law Center, LLM in international law from the University of Virginia Law School, Mary Julia and George R Jordan professor of international affairs at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, research fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute, former associate professor of international studies at the University of Miami, former fellow in the Center for Social Theory and Comparative History at the University of California Los Angeles, former fellow at the CATO Institute, former fellow at the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California, former MacArthur Foundation fellow in global security, former visiting professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, former research fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School at Harvard University, former member of the professional staff at the Arroyo Center at the California Institute of Technology, former foreign policy analyst for NATO, 1-27-12, “The (Almost) Triumph of Offshore Balancing,” <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/almost-triumph-offshore-balancing-6405>) GZ

Although cloaked in the reassuring boilerplate about American military preeminence and global leadership, in reality the Obama administration’s new Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) is the first step in the United States’ adjustment to the end of the *Pax Americana*—the sixty-year period of dominance that began in 1945. As the Pentagon document says—without spelling out the long-term grand-strategic implications—the United States is facing “an inflection point.” In plain English, a profound power shift in international politics is taking place, which compels a rethinking of the U.S. world role. The DSG is a response to two drivers. First, the United States is in economic decline and will face a serious fiscal crisis by the end of this decade. As President Obama said, the DSG reflects the need to “put our fiscal house in order here at home and renew our long-term economic strength.” The best indicators of U.S. decline are its GDP relative to potential competitors and its share of world manufacturing output. China’s manufacturing output has now edged past that of the United States and accounts for just over 18 or 19 percent of world manufacturing output. With respect to GDP, virtually all leading economic forecasters agree that, measured by market-exchange rates, China’s aggregate GDP will exceed that of the United States by the end of the current decade. Measured by purchasing-power parity, some leading economists believe China already is the world’s number-one economy. Clearly, China is on the verge of overtaking the United States economically. At the end of this decade, when the ratio of U.S. government debt to GDP is likely to exceed the danger zone of 100 percent, the United States will face a severe fiscal crisis. In a June 2011 report, the Congressional Budget Office warned that unless Washington drastically slashes expenditures—including on entitlements and defense—and raises taxes, it is headed for a fiscal train wreck. Moreover, concerns about future inflation and America’s ability to repay its debts could imperil the U.S. dollar’s reserve-currency status. That currency status allows the United States to avoid difficult “guns-or-butter” trade-offs and live well beyond its means while enjoying entitlements at home and geopolitical preponderance abroad. But that works only so long as foreigners are willing to lend the United States money. Speculation is now commonplace about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve-currency status. It would have been unheard of just a few years ago. The second driver behind the new Pentagon strategy is the shift in global wealth and power from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia. As new great powers such as China and, eventually, India emerge, important regional powers such as Russia, Japan, Turkey, Korea, South Africa and Brazil will assume more prominent roles in international politics. Thus, the post-Cold War “unipolar moment,” when the United States commanded the global stage as the “sole remaining superpower,” will be replaced by a multipolar international system. The *Economist* recently projected that China’s defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. By the middle or end of the next decade, China will be positioned to shape a new international order based on the rules and norms that it prefers—and, perhaps, to provide the international economy with a new reserve currency. Two terms not found in the DSG are “decline” and “imperial overstretch” (the latter coined by the historian Paul Kennedy to describe the consequences when a great power’s economic resources can’t support its external ambitions). But, although President Obama and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta may not admit it, the DSG is the first move in what figures to be a dramatic strategic retrenchment by the United States over the next two decades. This retrenchment will push to the fore a new U.S. grand strategy—offshore balancing. In a 1997 article in *International Security*, I argued that offshore balancing would displace America’s primacy strategy because it would prove difficult to sustain U.S. primacy in the face of emerging new powers and the erosion of U.S. economic dominance. Even in 1997, it was foreseeable that as U.S. advantages eroded, there would be strong pressures for the United States to bring its commitments into line with its shrinking economic base. This would require scaling back the U.S. military presence abroad; setting clear strategic priorities; devolving the primary responsibility for maintaining security in Europe and East Asia to regional actors; and significantly reducing the size of the U.S. military. Subsequent to that article, offshore balancing has been embraced by other leading American thinkers, including John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Barry Posen, Christopher Preble and Robert Pape. To be sure, the proponents of offshore balancing have differing ideas about its specifics. But they all agree that offshore balancing is based on a common set of core strategic principles. ● Fiscal and economic constraints require that the United States set strategic priorities. Accordingly, the country should withdraw or downsize its forces in Europe and the Middle East and concentrate is military power in East Asia. ● America’s comparative strategic advantages rest on naval and air power, not on sending land armies to fight ground wars in Eurasia. Thus the United States should opt for the strategic precepts of Alfred Thayer Mahan (the primacy of air and sea power) over those of Sir Halford Mackinder (the primacy of land power). Offshore balancing is a strategy of burden shifting, not burden sharing. It is based on getting other states to do more for their security so the United States can do less. ● By reducing its geopolitical and military footprint on the ground in the Middle East, the United States can reduce the incidence of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism directed against it. Islamic terrorism is a push back against U.S. dominance and policies in the region and against on-the-ground forces in the region. The one vital U.S. interest there—safeguarding the free flow of Persian Gult oil—can be ensured largely by naval and air power. ● The United States must avoid future large-scale nation-building exercises like those in Iraq and Afghanistan and refrain from fighting wars for the purpose of attaining regime change. Several of these points are incorporated in the new DSG. For example, the new strategy document declares that the United States “will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.” The document also states the United States will “rebalance [its] military investment in Europe” and that the American military posture on the Continent must “evolve.” (The Pentagon’s recent decision to cut U.S. ground forces in Europe from four brigades to two is an example of this “evolution.”) Finally, implicitly rejecting the post-9/11 American focus on counterinsurgency, the strategy document says that with the end of the Iraq war and the winding down of the conflict in Afghanistan, “U.S. forces will no longer be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.” The DSG reflects the reality that offshore balancing has jumped from the cloistered walls of academe to the real world of Washington policy making. In recent years the U.S. Navy, the Joint Staff and the National Intelligence Council all have shown interest in offshore balancing as an alternative to primacy. Indeed, in his February 2011 West Point speech, then defense secretary Robert Gates made two key points that expressed a clear strategic preference for Mahan over Mackinder. First, he said that “the most plausible, high-end scenarios for the U.S. military are primarily naval and air engagements—whether in Asia, the Persian Gulf, or elsewhere.” Second—with an eye on the brewing debate about intervention in Libya—he declared that “any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it.” In plain English, no more Eurasian land wars. The subsequent Libyan intervention bore the hallmarks of offshore balancing: The United States refused to commit ground forces and shifted the burden of military heavy lifting to the Europeans. Still, within the DSG document there is an uneasy tension between the recognition that economic constraints increasingly will impinge on the U.S. strategic posture and the assertion that America’s global interests and military role must remain undiminished. This reflects a deeper intellectual dissonance within the foreign-policy establishment, which is reluctant to accept the reality of American decline. In August 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proclaimed a “New American Moment;” reaffirmed the U.S. responsibility to lead the world; and laid out an ambitious U.S. global agenda. More recently, Mitt Romney, a leading contender for the Republican presidential nomination, declared that the twenty-first century “must be an American century” and that “America is not destined to be one of several equally balanced global powers.” These views are echoed by foreign-policy scholars who refuse to acknowledge the reality of decline or embrace a theory of “painless decline” whereby *Pax Americana’s* norms and institutions will survive any American retrenchment. But, American “exceptionalism” notwithstanding, the United States is not exempt from the historical pattern of great-power decline. The country needs to adjust to the world of 2025 when China will be the number-one economy and spending more on defense than any other nation. Effective strategic retrenchment is about more than just cutting the defense budget; it also means redefining America’s interests and external ambitions. Hegemonic decline is never painless. As the twenty-first century’s second decade begins, history and multipolarity are staging a comeback. The central strategic preoccupation of the United States during the next two decades will be its own decline and China’s rise.

### Exts – Solves War

#### A transition to offshore balancing solves

**Layne 12** (Christopher Layne, PhD in political science from the University of California at Berkeley, JD from the University of Southern California Law Center, LLM in international law from the University of Virginia Law School, Mary Julia and George R Jordan professor of international affairs at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, research fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute, former associate professor of international studies at the University of Miami, former fellow in the Center for Social Theory and Comparative History at the University of California Los Angeles, former fellow at the CATO Institute, former fellow at the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California, former MacArthur Foundation fellow in global security, former visiting professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, former research fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School at Harvard University, former member of the professional staff at the Arroyo Center at the California Institute of Technology, former foreign policy analyst for NATO, 4-26-12, “The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline became Inevitable,” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-western-decline-became-inevitable/256388/2/) GZ

The United States has a legacy commitment to global stability, and that poses a particular challenge to the waning hegemon as it seeks to fulfill its commitment with dwindling resources. The fundamental challenge for the United States as it faces the future is closing the "Lippmann gap," named for journalist Walter Lippmann. This means bringing America's commitments into balance with the resources available to support them while creating a surplus of power in reserve. To do this, the country will need to establish new strategic priorities and accept the inevitability that some commitments will need to be reduced because it no longer can afford them. These national imperatives will force the United States to craft some kind of foreign-policy approach that falls under the rubric of "offshore balancing"--directing American power and influence toward maintaining a balance of power in key strategic regions of the world. This concept--first articulated by this writer in a 1997 article in the journal International Security--has gained increasing attention over the past decade or so as other prominent geopolitical scholars, including John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Robert Pape, Barry Posen and Andrew Bacevich, have embraced this approach. Although there are shades of difference among proponents of offshore balancing in terms of how they define the strategy, all of their formulations share core concepts in common. First, it assumes the United States will have to reduce its presence in some regions and develop commitment priorities. Europe and the Middle East are viewed as less important than they once were, with East Asia rising in strategic concern. Second, as the United States scales back its military presence abroad, other states need to step up to the challenge of maintaining stability in key regions. Offshore balancing, thus, is a strategy of devolving security responsibilities to others. Its goal is burden shifting, not burden sharing. Only when the United States makes clear that it will do less--in Europe, for example--will others do more to foster stability in their own regions. Third, the concept relies on naval and air power while eschewing land power as much as possible. This is designed to maximize America's comparative strategic advantages--standoff, precision-strike weapons; command-and-control capabilities; and superiority in intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance. After all, fighting land wars in Eurasia is not what the United States does best. Fourth, the concept avoids Wilsonian crusades in foreign policy, "nation-building" initiatives and imperial impulses. Not only does Washington have a long record of failure in such adventures, but they are also expensive. In an age of domestic austerity, the United States cannot afford the luxury of participating in overseas engagements that contribute little to its security and can actually pose added security problems. Finally, offshore balancing would reduce the heavy American geopolitical footprint caused by U.S. boots on the ground in the Middle East--the backlash effect of which is to fuel Islamic extremism. An over-the-horizon U.S. military posture in the region thus would reduce the terrorist threat while still safeguarding the flow of Persian Gulf oil. During the next two decades, the United States will face some difficult choices between bad outcomes and worse ones. But such decisions could determine whether America will manage a graceful decline that conserves as much power and global stability as possible. A more ominous possibility is a precipitous power collapse that reduces U.S. global influence dramatically. In any event, Americans will have to adjust to the new order, accepting the loss of some elements of national life they had taken for granted. In an age of austerity, national resources will be limited, and competition for them will be intense. If the country wants to do more at home, it will have to do less abroad. It may have to choose between attempting to preserve American hegemony or repairing the U.S. economy and maintaining the country's social safety net. The Constellation of world power is changing, and U.S. grand strategy will have to change with it. American elites must come to grips with the fact that the West does not enjoy a predestined supremacy in international politics that is locked into the future for an indeterminate period of time. The Euro-Atlantic world had a long run of global dominance, but it is coming to an end. The future is more likely to be shaped by the East. At the same time, *Pax Americana* also is winding down. The United States can manage this relative decline effectively over the next couple of decades only if it first acknowledges the fundamental reality of decline. The problem is that many Americans, particularly among the elites, have embraced the notion of American exceptionalism with such fervor that they can't discern the world transformation occurring before their eyes.

### Solves China War

#### Offshore balancing solves China war comparatively better than an imperialist hegemonic strategy

**Mearsheimer 11** John J. Mearsheimer, the “R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago” Jan/Feb 2011 “Imperial By Design” http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0059.pdf

Of course, America would check China’s rise even if it were pursuing global dominance. Offshore balancing, however, is better suited to the task. For starters, attempting to dominate the globe encourages the United States to fight wars all around the world, which not only wears down its military in peripheral conflicts, but also makes it difficult to concentrate its forces against China. This is why Beijing should hope that the American military remains heavily involved in Afghanistan and Iraq for many years to come. Offshore balancing, on the other hand, is committed to staying out of fights in the periphery and concentrating instead on truly serious threats. Another virtue of offshore balancing is its emphasis on getting other countries to assume the burden of containing an aspiring regional hegemon. Global dominators, in contrast, see the United States as the indispensable nation that must do almost all of the heavy lifting to make containment work. But this is not a smart strategy because the human and economic price of checking a powerful adversary can be great, especially if war breaks out. It almost always makes good sense to get other countries to pay as many of those costs as possible while preserving one’s own power. The United States will have to play a key role in countering China, because its Asian neighbors are not strong enough to do it by themselves, but an America no longer weakened by unnecessary foreign intervention will be far more capable of checking Beijing’s ambitions. Offshore balancing costs considerably less money than does global dominance, allowing America to better prepare for the true threats it faces. This is in good part because this strategy avoids occupying and governing countries in the developing world and therefore does not require large armies trained for counterinsurgency. Global dominators naturally think that the United States is destined to fight more wars like Afghanistan and Iraq, making it essential that we do counterinsurgency right the next time. This is foolish thinking, as both of those undertakings were unnecessary and unwinnable. Washington should go to great lengths to avoid similar future conflicts, which would allow for sharp reductions in the size of the army and marine corps. Instead, future budgets should privilege the air force and especially the navy, because they are the key services for dealing with a rising China. The overarching goal, however, should be to take a big slice out of the defense budget to help reduce our soaring deficit and pay for important domestic programs. Offshore balancing is simply the best grand strategy for dealing with al-Qaeda, nuclear proliferators like North Korea and the potential threat from China.

### Exts – Solves China War

#### Only an off-shore balancing strategy solves US-China war over Taiwan- pursuit of hegemony makes conflict inevitable

Layne 8**(**Christopher Layne, Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, at Texas A&M University’s George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, January 2008, “China's Challenge to US Hegemony”, Current History, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdlink?vinst=PROD&fmt=3&startpage=-1&vname=PQD&did=1415391761&scaling=FULL&pmid=28519&vtype=PQD&fileinfoindex=%2Fshare3%2Fpqimage%2Fpqirs103v%2F201207011534%2F34723%2F884%2Fout.pdf&source=%24source&rqt=309&TS=1341171275&clientId=17822) //ZA

Washington, however, faces perhaps a last chance to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in ensuring that Chinese power is contained in East Asia but without running the risk of an armed clash with Beijing. This strategy is "offshore balancing," a concept that is finding increasing favor with a group of influential American scholars in the field of security studies. According to this strategy, the United States should deploy military power abroad only in the face of direct threats to vital American interests. The strategy recognizes that Washington need not (and in fact cannot) directly control vast parts of the globe, that it is better off setting priorities based on clear national interests and relying on local actors to uphold regional balances of power. The idea of offshore balancing is to husband national power for maximum effectiveness while minimizing perceptions that this power represents a threat. As an onshore balancer in East Asia, the United States would embrace a new set of policies regarding Sino-American economic relations, political liberalization in China, the defense of Taiwan, and America's strategic posture in the region. An offshore balancing strategy would require the United States to approach economic relations with China based on a policy of strategic trade rather than free trade. A strategic trade policy would seek to curtail the flow of high technology and direct investment from the United States to China. It also would require a shift in current US trade policy to drastically reduce the bilateral trade deficit, which is a de facto American subsidy of the very economic growth that is fueling China's great power emergence. Second, the United States would abandon its efforts to effectuate political liberalization in China. This policy is a form of gratuitous eye-poking. Because the United States lacks sufficient leverage to transform China domestically, the primary effect of trying to force liberalization on China is to inflame Sino-American relations. An offshore balancing strategy also would require a new US stance on Taiwan, a powder-keg issue because China is committed to national reunification and would regard a Taiwanese declaration of independence as a casus belli. If US policy fails to prevent a showdown between China and Taiwan, the odds are that America will be drawn into the conflict because of its current East Asia strategy. There would be strong domestic political pressure in favor of US intervention. Beyond the arguments that Chinese military action against Taiwan would constitute aggression and undermine US interests in a stable world order, powerful incentives for intervention would also arise from ideological antipathy toward China, concerns for maintaining US "credibility," and support for a democratic Taiwan in a conflict with authoritarian China. Notwithstanding these arguments, which are underpinned by a national security discourse that favors American hegemony, the issues at stake in a possible showdown between China and Taiwan simply would not justify the risks and costs of US intervention. Regardless of the rationale invoked, the contention that the United States should go to war to prevent Beijing from using force to achieve reunification with Taiwan (or in response to a unilateral declaration of independence by Taipei) amounts to nothing more than a veiled argument for fighting a "preventive" war against a rising China.

An off-shore balancing strategy towards China checks back US-Sino war and promotes regionalism

Layne 8(Christopher Layne, Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, at Texas A&M University’s George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, January 2008, “China's Challenge to US Hegemony”, Current History, http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdlink?vinst=PROD&fmt=3&startpage=-1&vname=PQD&did=1415391761&scaling=FULL&pmid=28519&vtype=PQD&fileinfoindex=%2Fshare3%2Fpqimage%2Fpqirs103v%2F201207011534%2F34723%2F884%2Fout.pdf&source=%24source&rqt=309&TS=1341171275&clientId=17822) //ZA

The final element of a US offshore balancing strategy would be the devolution from the United States to the major powers in Asia of the responsibility for containing China. An offshore balancing strategy would rely on the balance-of-power dynamics of a twenty-first century multipolar global order to prevent China from dominating East Asia. The other major powers in Asia-Japan, Russia, and India-have a much more immediate interest in stopping a rising China in their midst than does the United States. In a multipolar system, the question is not whether balancing will occur, but which state or states will do the heavy lifting. Because the United States is geographically distant from China-and protected both by the expanse of the Pacific Ocean and by its own formidable military (including nuclear) capabilities-the United States has the option of staying out of East Asian security rivalries (at least initially) and forcing Beijing's neighbors to assume the risks and costs of stopping China from attaining regional hegemony. Because its air and naval power is based on long-range strike capabilities, the United States can keep its forces in an over the-horizon posture with respect to East Asia and limit itself to a backstopping role in the unlikely event that the regional balance of power falters. It is hardly surprising-indeed, it parallels in many ways America's own emergence as a great power-that China, the largest and potentially most powerful state in Asia, is seeking a more assertive political, military, and economic role in the region, and even challenging America's present dominance in East Asia. However, this poses no direct threat to US security. Japan, India, and Russia, on the other hand, are worried about the implications of China's rapid ascendance for their security. They should bear the responsibility of balancing against Chinese power. An incipient drift toward multipolarity-which is the prerequisite for the United States to adopt an offshore balancing strategy-is already apparent in East Asia. Driven by fears of US abandonment in a future East Asian crisis, Japan has embarked on a buildup of its military capabilities and has even hinted that it is thinking about acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, the past several years have seen a significant escalation in tensions between China and Japan, fueled both by nationalism and by disputes over control of the South China and East China seas (which may contain large energy deposits). From the standpoint of offshore balancing, Japan's military buildup in response to its fear of China is a good thing if it leads to Japan's reemergence as an independent geopolitical actor. However, Japan's military resurgence is not so good (for the United States) if it takes place under the aegis of the US-Japan security alliance, and if the United States remains in the front lines of the forces containing China. Under those conditions, the United States could find itself ensnared in an Asian conflict; its alliance with Japan risks dragging it into a war with China in which American strategic interests would not be engaged. The idea of an offshore balancing strategy is to get the United States out of China's crosshairs, not to allow it to remain a target because of its present security commitments to allies in the region. The wisdom of risking war with China to maintain US hegemony in East Asia is all the more doubtful because America's predominance in the region is ebbing in any event. One indication of this is that US economic supremacy in East Asia is waning as China rises. China is emerging as the motor of the region's economic growth. While the United States has been preoccupied with Iraq, Iran, and the so-called war on terrorism, China has used its burgeoning economic power to extend its political influence throughout East and Southeast Asia. Indeed, most of the smaller states in Southeast Asia are gradually slipping into Beijing's political orbit because their own prosperity is ever more closely tied to their relations with China. America's strategy of trying to uphold the geopolitical status quo in East Asia clashes with the ambitions of a rising China, which has its own ideas about how East Asia's political and security order should be organized. If the United States puts itself in the forefront of those trying to contain China, the potential for future tension-or worse-in Sino-American relations can only increase. By pulling back from its hegemonic role in East Asia and adopting an offshore balancing strategy, the United States could better preserve its relative power and strategic influence. It could stand on the sidelines while that region's great powers enervate themselves by engaging in security competitions.

### Solves Prolif

#### Offshore balancing is the best strategy to solve prolif

**Mearsheimer 11** John J. Mearsheimer, the “R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago” Jan/Feb 2011 “Imperial By Design” http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0059.pdf

Offshore balancing is also a better policy than global dominance for combating nuclear proliferation. It has two main virtues. It calls for using military force in only three regions of the world, and even then, only as a matter of last resort. America would still carry a big stick with offshore balancing but would wield it much more discreetly than it does now. As a result, the United States would be less threatening to other countries, which would lessen their need to acquire atomic weapons to protect themselves from a U.S. attack. Furthermore, because offshore balancing calls for Washington to help local powers contain aspiring regional hegemons in Northeast Asia, Europe and the Gulf, there is no reason that it cannot extend its nuclear umbrella over its allies in those areas, thus diminishing their need to have their own deterrents. Certainly, the strategy is not perfect: some allies will want their own nuclear weapons out of fear that the United States might not be there for them in a future crisis; and some of America’s adversaries will still have powerful incentives to acquire a nuclear arsenal. But all things considered, offshore balancing is still better than global dominance for keeping proliferation in check.

## Answers To

### AT: No Transition

#### Decline forces a transition to offshore balancing and multilateralism

**He 10** (Kai He, assistant professor of political science at Utah State University, postdoctoral fellow in the Princeton-Harvard China and the World program at Princeton University, Bradley fellow of the Lynda and Harry Bradley Foundation, 5-21-10, “The Hegemon’s Choice between Power and Security: Explaining US Policy Toward Asia after the Cold War,” published in Review of International Studies, volume 36) GZ

When US policymakers perceive a declining hegemony in that the power gap between the hegemon and others is narrowed rather than widened, US policymakers begin to change their hierarchic view of the international system. The rapid decline of relative power causes US policymakers to worry about security imposed by anarchy even though the US may remain the most powerful state in the system during the process of decline. Offshore balancing and multilateralism, therefore, become two possible policy options for the US to maximise its security under anarchy. The possible budget constraints during US decline may lead to military withdrawals from overseas bases. In addition, the US becomes more willing to pay the initial ‘lock-in’ price of multilateral institutions in order to constrain other states’ behaviour for its own security. US foreign policy towards Asia preliminarily supports the power-perception hegemonic model. When President George H. W. Bush came to power, the US faced ‘dual deﬁcits’ even though the US won the Cold War and became the hegemon by default in the early 1990s. The domestic economic difficulty imposed a declining, or at least uncertain, hegemony to the Bush administration. Consequently, Bush had to withdraw troops from Asia and conducted a reluctant offshore balancing strategy in the early 1990s. Although the US still claimed to keep its commitments to Asian allies, the US words with the sword became unreliable at best. During President Clinton’s first tenure, how to revive US economy became the first priority of the administration. The perception of a declining hegemon did not totally fade until the middle of the 1990s when the US economy gradually came out of the recession. Multilateral institutions, especially APEC, became Clinton’s diplomatic weapon to open Asia’s market and boost US economy. In addition, the US also endorsed the ARF initiated by the ASEAN states in order to retain its eroding political and military influence after the strategic retreats in the early 1990s.

### AT: Cling

#### Realsim proves that states will retrench – overextension of resources forces a shift

Parent and McDonald 11 (Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Miami, Paul, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, "Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment," [International Security](http://www.belfercenter.org/is/), volume 35, issue 4, pages 7-44, Spring 2011, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ISEC_a_00034-MacDonald_proof2.pdf> SL)

We advance the neorealist argument that states, competing for security in anarchy, respond with rough rationality to their environment.38 They do this be-cause, in the competitive arena of world politics, inert or improvident great powers receive negative feedback until they are disabused of their delusions or replaced at the top rungs by more sensible states. Great powers that do not react with agility and alacrity to a lower position are unlikely to last in the unforgiving game of power politics. Rivals will be quick to detect and exploit incompetence. The underlying logic of this behavior is solvency. States, like firms, tend to go bankrupt when they budget blithely and live beyond their means. When ends are too ambitious for available means—a situation sometimes called the “Lippmann gap”39—states are overextended and open to predation. To avoid insolvency, states adopt retrenching policies as a way to gain breathing room, regroup, and retard if not reverse their decline. In the long term, decline is inevitable, but in the short term it is anything but. States can improve their relative growth by imitating the practices of lead states. And, like firms, states are capable of recovery if they make astute adjustments. Reorganization requires some combination of resources and time, which states can generate by paring back military expenditures, avoiding costly conflicts, and shifting burdens onto others. The alternatives— resignation to continual decline, disregard of risks, unbalanced ends and means—are worse. Negative feedback drives this process, if states rationally adjust their commitments in response to decline. What matters most in explaining the extent of retrenchment is not geography, leadership, or regime type; the most important factor is the rate of decline relative to other great powers. Consequently, our central hypothesis is that declining power generates prompt and proportionate declines in grand strategic interests. We do not claim that all states retrench rationally all the time. What we claim is that great powers prudently scale back their grand strategic interests when they experience acute relative decline because they feel their power ebbing.

### AT: Cling Inev – Public

#### Reductions popular – presidential lead solves opposition

Parent and McDonald 11 (Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Miami, Paul, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, "The Wisdom of Retrenchment," Foreign Affairs Vol. 90 No. 6, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136510/joseph-m-parent-and-paul-k-macdonald/the-wisdom-of-retrenchment SL)

Today, electoral pressures support a more modest approach to foreign affairs. According to a 2009 study by the Pew Research Center, 70 percent of Americans would rather the United States share global leadership than go it alone. And a 2010 study by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 79 percent of them thought the United States played the role of world policeman more than it should. Even on sacrosanct issues such as the defense budget, the public has demonstrated a willingness to consider reductions. In a 2010 study conducted by the Program for Public Consultation at the University of Maryland, 64 percent of respondents endorsed reductions in defense spending, supporting an average cut of $109 billion to the base-line defense budget. Institutional barriers to reform do remain. Yet when presidents have led, the bureaucrats have largely followed. Three successive administrations, beginning with that of Ronald Reagan, were able to tame congressional opposition and push through an ambitious realignment program that ultimately resulted in the closure of 100 military bases, saving $57 billion. In its 2010 defense budget, the Obama administration succeeded in canceling plans to acquire additional F-22 Raptors despite fierce resistance by lobbyists, members of Congress, and the air force brass. The 2010 budget also included cuts to the navy's fleet of stealth destroyers and various components of the army's next generation of manned ground vehicles. Thus, claims that retrenchment is politically impractical or improbable are unfounded. Just as a more humble foreign policy will invite neither instability nor decline, domestic political factors will not inevitably prevent timely reform. To chart a new course, U.S. policymakers need only possess foresight and will.

###  AT: Domestic Politics = Cling

#### Nope

Parent and McDonald 11 (Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Miami, Paul, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, "Graceful Decline? The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment," [International Security](http://www.belfercenter.org/is/), volume 35, issue 4, pages 7-44, Spring 2011, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/ISEC_a_00034-MacDonald_proof2.pdf> SL)

For Gilpin and Copeland, retrenchment is a policy that states should avoid. Other pessimists, however, argue that retrenchment can be an attractive policy but that domestic political processes intervene to impede states from adopting it. There are various versions of this argument. Aaron Friedberg argues that domestic political fragmentation inhibits the ability of countries to assess their relative power position accurately and to respond rationally in periods of transition. In the case of Great Britain in the late nineteenth century, Friedberg highlights how divisions among foreign policy bureaucracies and disagreements among decisionmakers resulted in an uncoordinated, incremental policy response to British weakness.30 Similarly, in a series of works Paul Kennedy contends that states have difficulty retrenching because of domestic constraints, such as entrenched social welfare spending and sclerotic domestic economic institutions.31 Hendrik Spruyt likewise argues that states in which interest groups such as the military, settler lobbies, or sectoral economic groups dominate will find it more difficult to abandon territorial commitments. In particular, in institutional settings with multiple “veto points,” motivated interest groups will prevent politicians from abandoning colonial possessions, even those that impose heavy economic and strategic burdens.32 Others argue that cultural or ideational factors can sideline great power policies such as retrenchment.33 Although useful in many contexts, domestic constraint arguments suffer from several problems. First, domestic political theories assume that interest groups predominantly push for more expansive overseas commitments. Yet domestic interest groups possess much more complicated and nuanced preferences than is commonly assumed. For example, many domestic interest groups oppose overseas commitments, favoring expenditure on domestic programs rather than adventures abroad. Second, groups favoring assertive foreign policies do not speak with one voice or assign equal priority to all interests. Different interest groups will place different weight on particular regions, economic sectors, or types of international challenges.34 The heterogeneity of domestic interests is critical because it opens up space for politicians to outmaneuver domestic groups and force trade-offs on unwilling lobbies. Third, domestic political theories are unclear about when domestic interests are able to hijack the policymaking process. Some studies emphasize problems with democratic states, which provide interest groups easier access to the policymaking process. In his classic study, however, Stephen Krasner ªnds that “again and again there are serious discrepancies between the aims of central decision-makers and those of private corporations” in which “the state has generally prevailed.”35 Others argue that it is not regime type that is crucial, but the institutional structure of a country. Spruyt emphasizes the importance of institutional veto points, which are present in both democratic and autocratic systems.36 Although the inclusion of veto points allows a more nuanced understanding of domestic constraints, it suffers from the same problem of specifying which veto points are most significant and when they will prove decisive. Fourth, domestic political theories tend to downplay or ignore the ability of international context to inform domestic politics. Yet policymakers do not op-erate in a vacuum; elites react to changes in the international system.37 Policymakers at the helm of rising powers can afford to indulge the interests of domestic lobbies with minimal consequences. Elites in rising powers have few incentives to resolve trade-offs among competing interests or veto new and unnecessary foreign adventures. In contrast, there are significant pressures on policymakers in declining great powers to put aside their parochial interests. They sit atop wasting assets, and a local defeat may easily turn into a general rout. It is precisely in periods of acute relative decline that one should expect partisan rancor and sectoral rivalry to recede.

# Hegemony Defense

## Unsustainable

### Economy

#### We control uniqueness – American hegemony is over

**Layne 12** (Christopher Layne, PhD in political science from the University of California at Berkeley, JD from the University of Southern California Law Center, LLM in international law from the University of Virginia Law School, Mary Julia and George R Jordan professor of international affairs at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, research fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute, former associate professor of international studies at the University of Miami, former fellow in the Center for Social Theory and Comparative History at the University of California Los Angeles, former fellow at the CATO Institute, former fellow at the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California, former MacArthur Foundation fellow in global security, former visiting professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, former research fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School at Harvard University, former member of the professional staff at the Arroyo Center at the California Institute of Technology, former foreign policy analyst for NATO, 2012, “This Time it’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana,” <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00704.x/pdf>, published in International Studies Quarterly, volume 56) GZ

In the Great Recession’s aftermath, it is apparent that much has changed since 2007. Predictions of continuing unipolarity have been superseded by premonitions of American decline and geopolitical transformation. The Great Recession has had a twofold impact. First, it highlighted the shift of global wealth—and power—from West to East, a trend illustrated by China’s breathtakingly rapid rise to greatpower status. Second, it has raised doubts about the robustness of the economic and financial underpinnings of the United States’ primacy. In this article, I argue that the ‘‘unipolar moment’’ is over, and the Pax Americana—the era of American ascendancy in international politics that began in 1945—is fast winding down. I challenge the conventional wisdom among International Relations/security studies scholars on three counts. First, I show that, contrary to the claims of unipolar stability theorists, the distribution of power in the international system no longer is unipolar. Second, I revisit the 1980s’ debate about American decline and demonstrate that the Great Recession has vindicated the so-called declinists of that decade. Finally, I take on the ‘‘institutional lock-in’’ argument, which holds that by strengthening the Pax Americana’s legacy institutions, the United States can perpetuate the essential elements of the international order it constructed following World War II even as the material foundations of American primacy erode. This article unfolds as follows. First, I discuss the competing claims made since the early 1990s by balance-of-power theorists and proponents of unipolar stability about how long the post–Cold War unipolar distribution of power in the international system would last. Second, I look at how the rise of China has undercut the claims of unipolar stability theory. Third, I look at the economic and fiscal drivers of American decline. Fourth, I ask whether the Pax Americana can outlive the US hegemony on which it was based. The Soviet Union’s implosion transformed the bipolar Cold War international system into a unipolar system in which the United States—as senior US ofﬁcials never tired of pointing out—was the ‘‘sole remaining superpower.’’ Unipolarity objectively described the post–Cold War distribution of power in the international system. At the same time, preserving the United States’ hegemonic role in a unipolar world has been the overriding grand strategic objective of every post-Cold War administration from George H. W. Bush’s to Barack Obama’s. Since the Cold War’s end, US security studies scholars have been preoccupied by unipolarity and have debated its implications. This debate has focused on two key questions: ‘‘How long will unipolarity last?’’ and ‘‘Is the maintenance of hegemony a wise grand strategy for the United States?’’ In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, a few scholars—notably Christopher Layne and Kenneth Waltz—argued that unipolarity would be a short-lived transitional phase from bipolarity to multipolarity (Layne 1993; Waltz 1993). Unipolarity, they argued, would spur the emergence of new great powers to act as counterweights to US hegemony. These unipolar pessimists also questioned the wisdom of making the preservation of US dominance in a unipolar world the overriding goal of the United States’ post-Cold War grand strategy. Pointing to a long historical record, they argued that failure is the fate of hegemons. The hegemonic bids of the Habsburgs (under Charles V and Philip II), France (under Louis XIV and Napoleon), and Germany (under Wilhelm II and Adolph Hitler) were all defeated by the resistance of countervailing alliances, and by the consequences of their own strategic overextension. In a unipolar world, the unipolar pessimists argued, the United States would not be immune from this pattern of hegemonic failure. However, from the Soviet Union’s collapse until the Great Recession, unipolar pessimism was a distinctly minority view among security studies scholars and US policymakers, and the conventional wisdom has been that unipolarity and US hegemony will last for a very long time. Unipolar optimists have maintained, and still do, that the United States will buck the historical trend of hegemonic failure for two reasons. First, they say, the magnitude of US power precludes other states from balancing against its hegemony. Simply put, unipolar optimists assert that the military and economic power gap between the United States and its nearest rivals is insurmountable, so wide that no state can hope to close it (Wohlforth 1999, 2002). Second, they argue that because US hegemony is ‘‘benevolent,’’ there is no reason why other states would want to balance against the United States. The argument for US benevolence has three prongs. One is that other states have strong incentives to align with American power because they derive important security and economic beneﬁts from US hegemony (Brooks and Wohlforth 2002, 2008). The second, essentially a balance-of-threat argument, is that by practicing self-restraint, demonstrating sensitivity for others’ interests, and acting through multilateral institutions, the United States can allay others’ fears that it will use its hegemonic power for self-aggrandizing purposes (Mastanduno 1997; Walt 1997, 2005). The third prong is that the United States’ ‘‘soft power’’—the attractiveness of its ideology and culture—draws others into its orbit (Nye 2002). From the Unipolar Moment to the Unipolar Exit Some twenty years after the Cold War’s end, it now is evident that both the 1980s declinists and the unipolar pessimists were right after all. The Unipolar Era has ended and the Unipolar Exit has begun. The Great Recession has underscored the reality of US decline, and only ‘‘denialists’’ can now bury their heads in the sand and maintain otherwise. To be sure, the Great Recession itself is not the cause either of American decline or the shift in global power, both of which are the culmination of decades-long processes driven by the big, impersonal forces of history. However, it is fair to say the Great Recession has both accelerated the causal forces driving these trends and magniﬁed their impact. There are two drivers of American decline, one external and one domestic. The external driver of US decline is the emergence of new great powers in world politics and the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the EuroAtlantic area to Asia. In this respect, the relative decline of the United States and the end of unipolarity are linked inextricably: the rise of new great powers—especially China—is in itself the most tangible evidence of the erosion of the United States’ power. China’s rise signals unipolarity’s end. Domestically, the driver of change is the relative—and in some ways absolute—decline in America’s economic power, the looming ﬁscal crisis confronting the United States, and increasing doubts about the dollar’s long-term hold on reserve currency status. Unipolarity’s demise marks the end of era of the post-World War II Pax Americana. When World War II ended, the United States, by virtue of its overwhelming military and economic supremacy, was incontestably the most powerful actor in the international system. Indeed, 1945 was the United States’first unipolar moment. The United States used its commanding, hegemonic position to construct the postwar international order—the Pax Americana—which endured for more than six decades. During the Cold War, the Pax Americana reflected the fact that outside the Soviet sphere, the United States was the preponderant power in the three regions of the world it cared most about: Western Europe, East Asia, and the Persian Gulf. The Pax Americana rested on the foundational pillars of US military dominance and economic leadership and was buttressed by two supporting pillars: America’s ideological appeal (“soft power”) and the framework of international institutions that the United States built after 1945. Following the Cold War’s end, the United States used its second unipolar moment to consolidate the Pax Americana by expanding both its geopolitical and ideological ambitions. In the Great Recession’s aftermath, however, the economic foundation of the *Pax Americana* has crumbled, and its ideational and institutional pillars have been weakened. Although the United States remains preeminent militarily, the rise of new great powers like China, coupled with US fiscal and economic constraints, means that over the next decade or two the United States’ military dominance will be challenged. The decline of American power means the end of US dominance in world politics and a transition to a new constellation of world power. Without the “hard” power (military and economic) upon which it was built, the *Pax Americana* is doomed to wither in the early twenty-first century. Indeed, because of China’s great-power emergence, and the United States’ own domestic economic weaknesses, it already is withering.

#### Decline is inevitable – economics and population rates

**Roggeveen 11** (Sam Roggeveen, senior strategic analyst in Australia’s Office of National Assessments, MA in politics from La Trobe Universtiy, has experience in arms control in Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs, former intelligence analyst in the Defense Intelligence Organisation, 3-16-11, “America Should be Aware of its Own Decline,” <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/03/america-should-be-aware-of-its-own-decline/72549/>) GZ

The reason it is especially important now for Americans to recognize the societal dimension of international life is that America is in decline. That's not a statement of opinion and is not intended to suggest that America's current economic malaise is permanent, because that probably isn't the case. But no matter how strongly the U.S. bounces back, it is a mature economy and unlikely ever to match China's growth rates. China also has a much larger population, so it can overtake the American economy even while its citizens remain much poorer; by some measures, China is already the world's largest economy. If you're thinking America has previously faced down a peer competitor (the Soviet Union) and won handsomely, keep in mind that China is already a much larger economic force that Soviet Russia ever was, and that China is not done yet. Nor is India, or Indonesia. In fact, the "great convergence" between developed and developing economies is the economic and strategic story of our age.

#### Collapse of US hegemony inevitable- economic decline ensures decline in military power and an end to unipolarity

Layne 11 (Christopher Layne, Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, at Texas A&M University’s George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, March 28, 2011, “Bye bye, Miss American Pie”, The European Magazine, <http://theeuropean-magazine.com/223-layne-christopher/231-pax-americana>) //ZA

The epoch of American hegemony is drawing to a close. Evidence of America’s relative decline is omnipresent. According to the Economist, China will surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy in 2019. The U.S. relative power decline will affect international politics in coming decades: the likelihood of great power security competitions – and even war – will increase; the current era of “globalization” will end; and the post-1945 Pax Americana will be replaced by a new international order that reflects the interests of China and the other emerging great powers. American primacy’s end is result of history’s big, impersonal forces compounded by the United States’ own self-defeating policies. Externally, the impact of these big historical forces is reflected in the emergence of new great powers like China and India which is being driven by the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro-Atlantic area to Asia. China’s economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States’ over the last two decades and continues to do so. U.S. decline reflects its own economic troubles. Optimists contend that current worries about decline will fade once the U.S. recovers from the recession. After all, they say, the U.S. faced a larger debt/GDP ratio after World War II, and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. But the post-war era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and sustained high growth rates. Those days are gone forever. The United States of 2011 are different from 1945. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis facing a grave fiscal crisis. The looming fiscal results from the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the U.S. will incur for at least a decade. When these are bundled with the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security) and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about United States’ long-term fiscal stability – and the role of the dollar. The dollar’s vulnerability is the United States’ real geopolitical Achilles’ heel because the dollar’s role as the international economy’s reserve currency role underpins U.S. primacy. If the dollar loses that status America’s hegemony literally will be unaffordable. In coming years the U.S. will be pressured to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require fiscal self-discipline through a combination of tax increases and big spending cuts. Meaningful cuts in federal spending mean deep reductions in defense expenditures because discretionary non-defense – domestic – spending accounts for only about 20% of annual federal outlays. Faced with these hard choices, Americans may contract hegemony fatigue. If so, the U.S. will be compelled to retrench strategically and the Pax Americana will end. The current international order is based on the economic and security structures that the U.S. created after World War II. The entire fabric of world order that the United States established after 1945 – the Pax Americana – rested on the foundation of U.S. military and economic preponderance. The decline of American power means the end of U.S. dominance in world politics and the beginning of the transition to a new constellation of world power. Indeed, the Pax Americana is already is crumbling in slow motion.

#### **Decline in hegemony inevitable- other countries are catching up economically and militarily**

Layne 9 (Christopher Layne, Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security, at Texas A&M University’s George H.W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, Summer 2009, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?”, International Security, Volume 34, Number 1, p. 151-152, p.<http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.layne.html>) //ZA

For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades, a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. 15 Global Trends 2025 is not light reading, but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. Its key geopolitical conclusion is that the U.S.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers); and economic, financial, and domestic political constraints that may erode U.S. capabilities. China, India, and possibly Russia are emerging great powers.16 As Global Trends 2025 points out, the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. 7). Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid.). By 2025, China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. 30). India, buoyed by its strong economic growth rate, will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid.). Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status, the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. 29).17 [End Page 152] Because of uncertainties about economics, energy prices, domestic governance issues, and especially demography, Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. 31–32).18 Between 2009 and 2025, Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million, affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. 23–24, 30). If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power, however, the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U.S. global dominance” (p. 32). Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. 32, 82). According to the NIC, in addition to relative decline, the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. U.S. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. 93). The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. 3, 8–9, 13–14). At home, economic and political constraints may undermine U.S. hegemony.

#### Decline inevitable – fiscal waste and tech threats

Parent and McDonald 11 (Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Miami, Paul, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, "The Wisdom of Retrenchment," Foreign Affairs Vol. 90 No. 6, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136510/joseph-m-parent-and-paul-k-macdonald/the-wisdom-of-retrenchment SL)

POWER IS multifaceted and difficult to measure, but the metrics that matter most over the long term are a country's military capability and economic strength relative to rivals. Using those benchmarks, there is a strong case to be made that although U.S. decline is real, its rate is modest. The United States invests more in its military manpower and hardware than all other countries combined. As the political scientist Barry Posen argues, this has allowed it to exercise "command of the commons." With its vast fleet of attack submarines and aircraft carriers, the United States controls the seas-even those that are not its territorial waters and those outside its exclusive economic zone. Its fighter aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles give it unrivaled air superiority. And its dominance of outer space and cyberspace is almost as impressive. But the United States' return on its military investment is falling. Manpower and technology costs are increasing rapidly. The Government Accountability Office reports that since the end of the Cold War, funding for weapons acquisition has increased by 57 percent while the average acquisition cost has increased by 120 percent. According to the Congressional Research Service, between 1999 and 2005, the real cost of supporting an active-duty service member grew by33 percent. Meanwhile, the benefits of unrestricted defense spending have not kept up with the costs. As Gates put it, U.S. defense institutions have become "accustomed to the post-9/11 decade's worth of 'no questions asked' funding requests," encouraging a culture of waste and inefficiency he described as "a semi-feudal system-an amalgam of fiefdoms without centralized mechanisms to allocate resources." The trend of the last decade is disturbing: as military spending soared, U.S. success abroad sagged. To be clear, the United States continues to field the best-armed, most skilled military in the world. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have bent, but not broken, the allvolunteer force, and the burden of maintaining this formidable force is not unacceptably onerous. The proposed $553 billion base-line defense budget for 2012 represents just 15 percent of the federal budget and less than five percent of GDP. (To put that figure in perspective, consider that the proposed 2012 budget for Social Security spending tops $760 billion.) Yet current trends will make it harder for the United States to continue to purchase hegemony as easily as it has in the past. Changes in military tactics and technology are eroding the United States' advantages. The proliferation of antiship cruise missiles makes it harder for the U.S. Navy to operate near adversaries' shores. Advanced surface-to-air missiles likewise raise the cost of maintaining U.S. air superiority in hostile theaters. Nationalist and tribal insurgencies, fueled by a brisk small-arms trade, have proved difficult to combat with conventional ground forces. U.S. defense dominance is getting more expensive at a moment when it is becoming less expensive for other states and actors to challenge the sole superpower. Beyond these challenges to the country's military dominance, a weakened economic condition is contributing to the decline of U.S. power. The U.S. economy remains the largest in the world, yet its position is in jeopardy. Between 1999 and 2009, the U.S. share of global GDP (measured in terms of purchasing power parity) fell from 23 percent to 20 percent, whereas China's share of global GDP jumped from seven percent to 13 percent. Should this trend continue, China's economic output will surpass the United States'by 2016. China already consumes more energy than the United States, and calls are growing louder to replace the dollar as the international reserve currency with a basket of currencies that would include the euro and the yuan.

### BRIC

#### BRIC rise makes decline inevitable

**Yeisley 11** (Mark O Yeisley, PhD in international relations from Duke University, MA in strategy, operational art and science, BS in atmospheric science, assistant professor of international relations at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, lieutenant colonel in the US Air Force, Winter 2011, “Bipolarity, Proxy Wars, and the Rise of China,” <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/winter/yeisley.pdf>, published in Strategic Studies Quarterly) GZ

The so-called BRIC states—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—arguably possess the potential to rise to great-power status at some future point, yet only China has both the capability and the will to do so in the near term. There is strong rationale for singling out China as the next US peer competitor. This US-Sino competition will result in a new bipolar inter­ national regime and lead to resurgence in subnational proxy conlict, as both states compete for future access to scarce strategic resources, primarily in the African region. China’s economy has exploded in recent years, surpassing Japan to be­ come the world’s second largest economy (behind the United States) in the second quarter of 2010. 34 his gap is likely to decrease in the ongoing eco­ nomic crisis; US growth remains sluggish, while China’s is again 9 percent per annum. China has embarked on an ambitious program of military modernization, acquiring advanced ofensive and defensive capabilities, 35 while US deficits are likely to result in reductions in defense expenditures, further decreasing the military capabilities gap. 36 China’s economic and military might, coupled with its large population, point to its emergence as both a great power and a US peer competitor in the near future.

### Proilf/Irrational Actors

#### Heg Decline is inevitable – prolif and irrational actors

**Maass 10** Richard Maass, working for his Ph. D. in political science at Notre dame University, and currently teaches classes there on International Relations. 2010 “Nuclear Proliferation and Declining U.S. Hegemony” http://www.hamilton.edu/documents//levitt-center/Maass\_article.pdf

On August 29, 1949, The Soviet Union successfully tested its first nuclear fission bomb, signaling the end of U.S. hegemony in the international arena. On September 11 2001, the world’s single most powerful nation watched in awe as the very symbols of its prosperity fell to rubble in the streets of New York City. The United States undisputedly “has a greater share of world power than any other country in history” (Brooks and Wolforth, 2008, pg. 2). Yet even a global hegemon is ultimately fallible and vulnerable to rash acts of violence as it conducts itself in a rational manner and assumes the same from other states. Conventional strategic thought and military action no longer prevail in an era of increased globalization. Developing states and irrational actors play increasingly influential roles in the international arena. Beginning with the U.S.S.R. in 1949, nuclear proliferation has exponentially increased states’ relative military capabilities as well as global levels of political instability. Through ideas such as nuclear peace theory, liberal political scholars developed several models under which nuclear weapons not only maintain but increase global tranquility. These philosophies assume rationality on the part of political actors in an increasingly irrational world plagued by terrorism, despotic totalitarianism, geo-political instability and failed international institutionalism. Realistically, “proliferation of nuclear [weapons]…constitutes a threat to international peace and security” (UN Security Council, 2006, pg. 1). Nuclear security threats arise in four forms: the threat of existing arsenals, the emergence of new nuclear states, the collapse of international non-proliferation regimes and the rise of nuclear terrorism. Due to their asymmetric destabilizing and equalizing effects, nuclear weapons erode the unipolarity of the international system by balancing political actors’ relative military power and security. In the face of this inevitable nuclear proliferation and its effects on relative power, the United States must accept a position of declining hegemony.

### Multipolarity now

#### Transition to multipolarity is coming now

**Bandyopandhyay 12** (Dr. Lopamudra Bandyopandhyay, PhD in international relations from Jadavpur University at Kolkata, BA in political science from Presidency College in Kolkata, fellow at the Global India Foundation, 2-23-12, “A New Emerging World Order: Whither Realpolitik?,” <http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/A%20NEW%20EMERGING%20WORLD%20ORDER%5B1%5D.pdf>) GZ

World orders are seldom monolithic in structure or linear in their composition. They evolve with the evolution of politics and often shelter nuances of realpolitik. World orders during the course of history have given rise to interplay of diplomacy, nationalism, political aspirations and individual ambitions. The world has throughout the advancement of mankind witnessed with both hope and trepidation the gradual rise of “new world orders” eclipsing the antiquated ones in the sands of human history. During the course of the twentieth century, the list of the world's great powers was predictably short: the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and northwestern Europe. The twenty-first century promises to be different. China and India are emerging as economic and political heavyweights: China holds over a trillion dollars in hard currency reserves, India's information technology sector is growing by leaps and bounds, and both countries, already recognised nuclear powers, are developing blue-water navies. Further, the BRIC countries i are also on the threshold of a major economic advancement. Such consummate growth is opening the way for a multipolar era in world politics. However, the course of realpolitik must be deliberated upon as the trajectory of world politics gradually swings, quite akin to a pendulum deciphering time, from the vantage point of a unipolar world to that of a multipolar world. On which course is realpolitik destined to traverse in this new world order? And which course will the river of power, ambition and nationalist chauvinism take in its journey towards the ocean of inimitable grandeur and success? These questions need to be deliberated upon with great certitude and understanding. A Probable Composition of the New Emerging World Order World order being the chimera that it is; there is a need for an in-depth understanding of its vicissitudes. Where is world politics poised today? What are the major changes that have liberated or alternatively assailed the same? What have we witnessed during the past couple of years that should necessitate an investigation into the shades of a changing world order? The world is changing. The transformation is rather rapid. Continents are trying to carve out transnational economic zones across the globe. Over the past two years, the world’s biggest economies have grappled with the threat of a new Great Depression. During the course of 2011, it became clear that the global economic crisis had also soured international politics. Political malaise is linked to economic crisis. Twenty years of excellent times and global economic integration, after the end of the Cold War, had profound political effects. They created a “win-win world” which ensured that all the major powers had reason to be satisfied. The United States was enjoying its “unipolar moment”; the European Union was expanding and prospering; China and India felt themselves becoming wealthier and more powerful. Ii But the global economic crisis has changed the logic of international relations. Both as individuals and as a nation, Americans have begun to question whether the new world order that emerged after the Cold War still favours the United States. The rise of China is increasingly associated with employment crises for ordinary Americans and a challenge to American power. The European Union is also in a defensive mood - with protectionist and anti-immigration sentiment on the rise and tensions between nations that have adopted the European single currency. While the Latin American nations are gradually settling down to happier democratic set ups, the Middle East, newly liberated from dictatorial regimes is still struggling to find its foothold in world politics. BRIC is important for the near future and Germany has woken up in its attempts to increase its influence over the euro-zone economy. The East remains a veritable storehouse for further diplomatic and economic discoveries with India not only emerging as a global player, but also attempting to counter China economically in the long run. Multipolarism has thus become the new game that is being played on the chess board of international politics. In all probability, the new world order would see China poised against a group of nations. It may also witness the rise of newer organisations with affiliations to developing countries pitted against larger economic bodies such as the EU and the ASEAN.

### Power Shifts Now

#### Power is shifting to the East – their authors are in denial

**Layne 12** (Christopher Layne, PhD in political science from the University of California at Berkeley, JD from the University of Southern California Law Center, LLM in international law from the University of Virginia Law School, Mary Julia and George R Jordan professor of international affairs at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, research fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute, former associate professor of international studies at the University of Miami, former fellow in the Center for Social Theory and Comparative History at the University of California Los Angeles, former fellow at the CATO Institute, former fellow at the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California, former MacArthur Foundation fellow in global security, former visiting professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, former research fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School at Harvard University, former member of the professional staff at the Arroyo Center at the California Institute of Technology, former foreign policy analyst for NATO, 4-26-12, “The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline became Inevitable,” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-western-decline-became-inevitable/256388/) GZ

When great powers begin to experience erosion in their global standing, their leaders inevitably strike a pose of denial. At the dawn of the twentieth century, as British leaders dimly discerned such an erosion in their country's global dominance, the great diplomat Lord Salisbury issued a gloomy rumination that captured at once both the inevitability of decline and the denial of it. "Whatever happens will be for the worse," he declared. "Therefore it is our interest that as little should happen as possible." Of course, one element of decline was the country's diminishing ability to influence how much or how little actually happened. We are seeing a similar phenomenon today in America, where the topic of decline stirs discomfort in national leaders. In September 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proclaimed a "new American Moment" that would "lay the foundations for lasting American leadership for decades to come." A year and a half later, President Obama declared in his State of the Union speech: "Anyone who tells you that America is in decline . . . doesn't know what they're talking about." A position paper from Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney stated flatly that he "rejects the philosophy of decline in all of its variants." And former U.S. ambassador to China and one-time GOP presidential candidate Jon Huntsman pronounced decline to be simply "un-American." Such protestations, however, cannot forestall real-world developments that collectively are challenging the post-1945 international order, often called *Pax Americana*, in which the United States employed its overwhelming power to shape and direct global events. That era of American dominance is drawing to a close as the country's relative power declines, along with its ability to manage global economics and security. This does not mean the United States will go the way of Great Britain during the first half of the twentieth century. As Harvard's Stephen Walt wrote in this magazine last year, it is more accurate to say the "American Era" is nearing its end. For now, and for some time to come, the United States will remain primus inter pares--the strongest of the major world powers--though it is uncertain whether it can maintain that position over the next twenty years. Regardless, America's power and influence over the international political system will diminish markedly from what it was at the apogee of *Pax Americana*. That was the Old Order, forged through the momentous events of World War I, the Great Depression and World War II. Now that Old Order of nearly seven decades' duration is fading from the scene. It is natural that U.S. leaders would want to deny it--or feel they must finesse it when talking to the American people. But the real questions for America and its leaders are: What will replace the Old Order? How can Washington protect its interests in the new global era? And how much international disruption will attend the transition from the old to the new? The signs of the emerging new world order are many. First, there is China's astonishingly rapid rise to great-power status, both militarily and economically. In the economic realm, the International Monetary Fund forecasts that China's share of world GDP (15 percent) will draw nearly even with the U.S. share (18 percent) by 2014. (The U.S. share at the end of World War II was nearly 50 percent.) This is particularly startling given that China's share of world GDP was only 2 percent in 1980 and 6 percent as recently as 1995. Moreover, China is on course to overtake the United States as the world's largest economy (measured by market exchange rate) sometime this decade. And, as argued by economists like Arvind Subramanian, measured by purchasing-power parity, China's GDP may already be greater than that of the United States. Until the late 1960s, the United States was the world's dominant manufacturing power. Today, it has become essentially a rentier economy, while China is the world's leading manufacturing nation. A study recently reported in the *Financial Times* indicates that 58 percent of total income in America now comes from dividends and interest payments. Since the Cold War's end, America's military superiority has functioned as an entry barrier designed to prevent emerging powers from challenging the United States where its interests are paramount. But the country's ability to maintain this barrier faces resistance at both ends. First, the deepening financial crisis will compel retrenchment, and the United States will be increasingly less able to invest in its military. Second, as ascending powers such as China become wealthier, their military expenditures will expand. *The Economist* recently projected that China's defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. Thus, over the next decade or so a feedback loop will be at work, whereby internal constraints on U.S. global activity will help fuel a shift in the distribution of power, and this in turn will magnify the effects of America's fiscal and strategic overstretch. With interests throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the Caucasus--not to mention the role of guarding the world's sea-lanes and protecting U.S. citizens from Islamist terrorists--a strategically overextended United States inevitably will need to retrench. Further, there is a critical linkage between a great power's military and economic standing, on the one hand, and its prestige, soft power and agenda-setting capacity, on the other. As the hard-power foundations of *Pax Americana* erode, so too will the U.S. capacity to shape the international order through influence, example and largesse. This is particularly true of America in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession. At the zenith of its military and economic power after World War II, the United States possessed the material capacity to furnish the international system with abundant financial assistance designed to maintain economic and political stability. Now, this capacity is much diminished. All of this will unleash growing challenges to the Old Order from ambitious regional powers such as China, Brazil, India, Russia, Turkey and Indonesia. Given America's relative loss of standing, emerging powers will feel increasingly emboldened to test and probe the current order with an eye toward reshaping the international system in ways that reflect their own interests, norms and values. This is particularly true of China, which has emerged from its "century of humiliation" at the hands of the West to finally achieve great-power status. It is a leap to think that Beijing will now embrace a role as "responsible stakeholder" in an international order built by the United States and designed to privilege American interests, norms and values. These profound developments raise big questions about where the world is headed and America's role in the transition and beyond. Managing the transition will be the paramount strategic challenge for the United States over the next two decades. In thinking about where we might be headed, it is helpful to take a look backward--not just over the past seventy years but far back into the past. That is because the transition in progress represents more than just the end of the post-1945 era of American global dominance. It also represents the end of the era of Western dominance over world events that began roughly 500 years ago. During this half millennium of world history, the West's global position remained secure, and most big, global developments were represented by intracivilizational power shifts. Now, however, as the international system's economic and geopolitical center of gravity migrates from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia, we are seeing the beginnings of an intercivilizational power shift. The significance of this development cannot be overemphasized.

### Isolationism Now

#### Economic trends make isolationism inevitable in the status quo

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China’s rise is one powerful indicator of America’s relative decline. The United States’ mounting economic and ﬁscal problems—evidenced in summer 2011 by the debt ceiling debacle and Standard & Poors’ downgrading of US Treasury bonds—are another. There are two closely interconnected aspects of the United States’ domestic difﬁculties that merit special attention: the spiraling US national debt and deepening doubts about the dollar’s future role as the international economy’s reserve currency. Between now and 2025, the looming debt and dollar crises almost certainly will compel the United States to retrench strategically, and to begin scaling back its overseas military commitments. The causes of the looming US ﬁscal crisis are complex. For understanding, a good starting point is the late political scientist Arnold Wolfers’ observation that modern great powers must be both national security states and welfare states (Wolfers 1952). States must provide both guns—the military capabilities needed to defend and advance their external interests—and butter, ensuring prosperity and supplying needed public goods (education, health care, pensions). Since World War II, the United States has pretty much been able to avoid making difﬁcult ‘‘guns or butter’’ decisions precisely because of its hegemonic role in the international economy. The dollar’s role as the international system’s reserve currency allows the United States to live beyond its means in ways that other nations cannot. As long as others believe that the United States will repay its debts, and that uncontrollable inﬂation will not dilute the dollar’s value, the United States can ﬁnance its external ambitions (‘‘guns’’) and domestic social and economic programs (‘‘butter’’) by borrowing money from foreigners. As Figure 4 shows, this is what the United States has had to do since the early 1980s when it started running a chronic current account deﬁcit. As Figure 5 illustrates, the majority of US government debt is owed to foreign, not domestic, investors, and China is the United States government’s largest creditor. Following the Great Recession, it has become increasingly apparent that unless dramatic measures to reign-in federal spending are implemented, by the end of this decade there will be serious questions about the United States’ ability to repay its debts and control inﬂation. 8 The causes of mounting US indebtedness are many. One is the Great Recession, which caused the Obama administration and the Federal Reserve to inject a massive amount of dollars into the economy, in the form of stimulus spending, bail-outs, and ‘‘quantitative easing,’’ to avert a replay of the Great Depression of the 1930s. A longer-term cause is the mounting costs of entitlement programs like Medicare, Social Security, and Medicaid—costs which will escalate because of the aging of the ‘‘Baby Boomer’’ generation. Another factor is the cost of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been ﬁnanced by borrowing from abroad rather than raising taxes to pay for them. These wars have been expensive. Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel laureate in economics, and his coauthor Linda Bilmess have calculated that the ultimate direct and indirect costs of the Iraq war will amount to $3 trillion (Stiglitz and Bilmiss 2008). No similar study has as yet been done of the Afghanistan war’s costs. However, the United States currently is expending about $110–120 billion annually to ﬁght there, and ﬁscal considerations played a major role in the Obama administration’s decision to begin drawing down US forces in Afghanistan (Woodward 2010; Cooper 2011). Because of the combined costs of federal government expenditures—on stimulus, defense, Iraq and Afghanistan, and entitlements—in 2009 the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce forecast that the United States will run unsustainable annual budget deﬁcits of $1 trillion or more until at least the end of this decade, and observed that, ‘‘Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable ﬁscal problem’’ (CBO 2009:13). In a subsequent 2010 report, the CBO noted that if the United States stays on its current ﬁscal trajectory, the ratio of US government debt to GDP will be 100% by 2020 (CBO 2010). Economists regard a 100% debt-to-GDP ratio as critical indicator that a state will default on its ﬁnancial obligations. In an even less sanguine 2011 analysis, the International Monetary Fund forecast that the United States will hit the 100% debt-to-GDP ratio in 2016 (IMF 2011). If these estimates are correct, over the next decade the growing US national debt—and the budget deﬁcits that fuel it—could imperil the dollar by undermining foreign investors’ conﬁdence in the United States’ ability to repay its debts and keep inﬂation in check. This is important because, for the foreseeable future, the United States will depend on capital inﬂows from abroad both to ﬁnance its deﬁcit spending and private consumption and to maintain the dollar’s position as the international economic system’s reserve currency. America’s geopolitical preeminence hinges on the dollar’s reserve currency role. If the dollar loses that status, US hegemony will literally be unaffordable. The dollar’s reserve currency status has, in effect, been a very special kind of ‘‘credit card.’’ It is special because the United States does not have to earn the money to pay its bills. Rather, when the bills come due, the United States borrows funds from abroad and/ or prints money to pay them. The United States can get away with this and live beyond its means, spending with little restraint on maintaining its military dominance, preserving costly domestic entitlements, and indulging in conspicuous private consumption, as long as foreigners are willing to lend it money (primarily by purchasing Treasury bonds). Without the use of the ‘‘credit card’’ provided by the dollar’s reserve currency status, the United States would have to pay for its extravagant external and internal ambitions by raising taxes and interest rates, and by consuming less and saving more; or, tightening its belt and dramatically reducing its military and domestic expenditures. In other words, the United States would have to learn to live within its means. 9 As a leading expert on international economic affairs observed just before the Great Recession kicked in, the dollar’s vulnerability ‘‘presents potentially signiﬁcant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance’’ (Kirshner 2008). Although doubts about the dollar’s long-term health predated the Great Recession, the events of 2007–2009 have ampliﬁed them in two key respects (Helleiner 2008; Kirshner 2008). First, the other big players in the international economy now are either geopolitical rivals like China or ambiguous ‘‘allies’’ like Europe, which has its own ambitions and no longer requires US protection from the now vanished Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China, which has vast holdings of American assets (more than $2 trillion), is worried that America’s ﬁscal incontinence will leave Beijing holding the bag with huge amounts of depreciated dollars. China’s vote of no conﬁdence in the dollar’s future is reﬂected in its calls to create a new reserve currency to replace the dollar, the renminbi’s gradual ‘‘internationalization,’’ and in the lectures China’s leaders regularly deliver telling Washington to get its ﬁscal house in order. Alarm bells about the dollar’s uncertain status now are ringing. In April 2011, Standard & Poor’s warned that in the coming years there is a one-in-three chance that the United States’ triple A credit rating could be reduced if Washington fails to solve the ﬁscal crisis—and in August 2011 S& P did downgrade the US credit rating to AA. In June 2011, the IMF said that unless the United States enacts a credible plan to reign in its annual deﬁcits and accumulating national debt, it could face a sovereign risk crisis in the next several years. In a May 2011 report, the World Bank declared that the dollar probably will lose its status as the primary reserve currency by 2025 (World Bank 2011). In the coming years, the United States will have to defend the dollar by reassuring foreign lenders (read: China) both that there will be no runaway inﬂation and that it can pay its debts. This will require some combination of budget cuts, entitlements reductions, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Because exclusive reliance on the last two options could choke off growth, there will be strong pressure to slash the federal budget in order to hold down taxes and interest rates. It will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in defense expenditures (and entitlements), because, as Figure 6 shows, that is where the money is. With US defense spending currently at such high levels, domestic political pressures to make steep cuts in defense spending are bound to increase. As the Cornell international political economist Jonathan Kirshner puts it, the absolute size of US defense expenditures is ‘‘more likely to be decisive in the future when the U.S. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. When borrowing becomes more difﬁcult, and adjustment more difﬁcult to postpone, choices must be made between raising taxes, cutting non-defense spending, and cutting defense spending’’ (Kirshner 2008:431). In the spring of 2011, the Obama administration proposed to cut US defense spending by $400 million over eleven years. But that is a drop in the bucket, and cuts of a much larger magnitude almost certainly will be needed. 10 Big defense cuts mean that during the next ten to ﬁfteen years, the United States will be compelled to scale back its overseas military commitments. This will have two consequences. First, as the United States spends less on defense, China (and other new great powers) will be able to close the military power gap with the United States. Second, the United States’ ability to act as a regional stabilizer and a guardian of the global commons will diminish. In this respect, America’s ﬁscal crisis and the dollar’s uncertain future are important drivers of American decline.

## General

### AT: Solves War

#### **Hegemony doesn’t check back conflict- states still oppose US primacy**

Maher 10(Richard Maher, Ph.D. in Political Science at Brown University, November 12, 2010,“The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World”, http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=R&aulast=Maher&atitle=The+paradox+of+American+unipolarity:+Why+the+United+States+may+be+better+off+in+a+post-unipolar+world&id=doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2010.10.003&title=Orbis+(Philadelphia)&volume=55&issue=1&date=2011&spage=53&issn=0030-4387) //ZA

The other way to think about power is the ability to realize one's own preferences or preferred outcomes, or the ability to influence other actors—usually other states but not always—to do what you want them to do. When we think of power this way, we realize that the United States’ vast resources alone often are not sufficient to realize its preferred ends. There is no perfect correlation between the resources at one's command and the ability to realize preferred outcomes. Perhaps no other period of world politics in recent memory represents this discrepancy more acutely than today. U.S. capabilities dwarf those of any other state. Politically, diplomatically, and economically the United States remains in a preeminent position. While it hardly gets everything it wants, no other country can match U.S. influence in these realms. At the same time, from Iran, to North Korea, Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan, not to mention Russia and China, the United States is seemingly not getting its way on issues central to its interests. More states are unafraid to challenge the United States (if only at the margins), ignore its blandishments, or seek to decrease their reliance or dependence on American security guarantees.

#### Even if hegemony could solve in the past – influence is down and it cant solve now

**Walt 12** (Stephen M Walt, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, PhD in political science from the University of California at Berkeley, BA in international relations from Stanford University, co-editor of the Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, co-chair of the editorial board of International Security, member of the editorial boards of Foreign Policy, Security Studies, Journal of Cold War Studies, and International Security, fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, resident associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, guest scholar at the Brookings Institute, 1-26-12, “Whether or not the US is Declining is the Wrong Question,” <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/26/asking_the_wrong_question_about_the_us_and_china>) GZ

Instead, the real issue is whether developments at home and overseas are making it harder for the United States to exercise the kind of dominant influence that it did for much of the latter half of the 20th century. The United States had a larger share of global GDP in the 1940s and 1950s, and it wasn't running enormous budget deficits. The United States was seen as a reliable defender of human rights, and its support for decolonization after World War II had won it many friends in the developing world. It also had good relations with a variety of monarchies and dictatorships, which it justified as part of the struggle against communism. These features allowed the United States to create and lead combined economic, security and political orders in virtually every corner of the world, except for the portions directly controlled by our communist rivals. And the U.S. and its allies eventually won that struggle too, driving the USSR into exhaustion and watching the triumph of market economies and more participatory forms of government throughout the former communist world. The United States remains very powerful -- especially when compared with some putative opponents like Iran -- but its capacity to lead security and economic orders in every corner of the world has been diminished by failures in Iraq (and eventually, Afghanistan), by the burden of debt accumulated over the past decade, by the economic melt-down in 2007-2008, and by the emergence of somewhat stronger and independent actors in Brazil, Turkey, India, and elsewhere. One might also point to eroding national infrastructure and an educational system that impresses hardly anyone. Moreover, five decades of misguided policies have badly tarnished America's image in many parts of the world, and especially in the Middle East and Central Asia. The erosion of authoritarian rule in the Arab world will force new governments to pay more attention to popular sentiment -- which is generally hostile to the broad thrust of U.S. policy in the region -- and the United States will be less able to rely on close relations with tame monarchs or military dictators henceforth. If it the United States remains far and away the world's strongest state, its ability to get its way in world affairs is declining.

###  AT: Their Cards

#### Hegemony does not solve war – it’ impossible to prove hegemony is the cause of peace

**Preble 6/28** (Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in history from Temple University, former professor of history at St Cloud University and Temple University, 6-28-12, “The Critique of Pure Kagan,” <http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/the-critique-pure-kagan-7061>) GZ

Kagan returns to both this theme and Adams’s quote in *The World America Made*. America’s conception of itself as the reluctant sheriff, unwilling to go out in search of trouble but willing to defend the town only when called upon, “bears no relation to reality,” he explains. “Americans have used force dozens of times, and rarely because they had no choice.” But the world is too complex to be policed by a single global sheriff, and it need not be. Instead, the many beneficiaries of the current order should contribute to the preservation of that order at a level, and in a manner, that is consistent with their interests. By that standard, the United States would retain military power that was at least three or four times greater than that of its closest rivals, but it would no longer presume to be responsible for countries that can take care of themselves. Americans must learn to embrace their relative security and face down their lingering fears. Until they do so, the fear of the unknown works in Kagan’s favor. It is difficult to disentangle the many different factors that have contributed to relative peace and security over the past half century, and it is impossible to know what would have happened in a world without America. The future is even more inscrutable. In this latest book, Kagan surveys all the explanations for what may have contributed to global peace and prosperity—including the spread of democracy, liberal economics, nuclear weapons, and evolving global norms against violence and war—and returns to his refrain from sixteen years earlier. “American hegemony,” he and Kristol wrote in 1996, “is the only reliable defense against a breakdown of peace and international order.” Fast-forward to 2012, and nothing, it seems, has changed: *There can be no world order without power to preserve it, to shape its norms, uphold its institutions, defend the sinews of its economic system, and keep the peace. . . . If the United States begins to look like a less reliable defender of the present order, that order will begin to unravel.* He didn’t prove that case before, and he doesn’t now.

###  AT: Deterrence

#### Heg can no longer deter conflict

**Layne 11** (Christopher Layne, PhD in political science from the University of California at Berkeley, JD from the University of Southern California Law Center, LLM in international law from the University of Virginia Law School, Mary Julia and George R Jordan professor of international affairs at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, research fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute, former associate professor of international studies at the University of Miami, former fellow in the Center for Social Theory and Comparative History at the University of California Los Angeles, former fellow at the CATO Institute, former fellow at the Center for International Studies at the University of Southern California, former MacArthur Foundation fellow in global security, former visiting professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, former research fellow at the Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School at Harvard University, former member of the professional staff at the Arroyo Center at the California Institute of Technology, former foreign policy analyst for NATO, 3-28-11, “Bye bye, Miss American Pie,” <http://theeuropean-magazine.com/223-layne-christopher/231-pax-americana>)

International politics is in a period of transition, no longer unipolar, not yet multipolar and evidence of America’s relative decline is omnipresent. The current era of globalization will end and the Pax Americana will be replaced by a new international order, reflecting the interests of emerging powers like China and India. The epoch of American hegemony is drawing to a close. Evidence of America’s relative decline is omnipresent. According to the Economist, China will surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy in 2019. The U.S. relative power decline will affect international politics in coming decades: the likelihood of great power security competitions – and even war – will increase; the current era of “globalization” will end; and the post-1945 Pax Americana will be replaced by a new international order that reflects the interests of China and the other emerging great powers. American primacy’s end is result of history’s big, impersonal forces compounded by the United States’ own self-defeating policies. Externally, the impact of these big historical forces is reflected in the emergence of new great powers like China and India which is being driven by the unprecedented shift in the center of global economic power from the Euro-Atlantic area to Asia. China’s economy has been growing much more rapidly than the United States’ over the last two decades and continues to do so. The US decline reflects its own economic troubles U.S. decline reflects its own economic troubles. Optimists contend that current worries about decline will fade once the U.S. recovers from the recession. After all, they say, the U.S. faced a larger debt/GDPratio after World War II, and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. But the post-war era was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and sustained high growth rates. Those days are gone forever. The United States of 2011 are different from 1945. Even in the best case, the United States will emerge from the current crisis facing a grave fiscal crisis. The looming fiscal results from the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the U.S. will incur for at least a decade. When these are bundled with the entitlements overhang (the unfunded future liabilities of Medicare and Social Security) and the cost of the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is reason to worry about United States’ long-term fiscal stability – and the role of the dollar. The dollar’s vulnerability is the United States’ real geopolitical Achilles’ heel because the dollar’s role as the international economy’s reserve currency role underpins U.S. primacy. If the dollar loses that status America’s hegemony literally will be unaffordable. In coming years the U.S. will be pressured to defend the dollar by preventing runaway inflation. This will require fiscal self-discipline through a combination of tax increases and big spending cuts. Meaningful cuts in federal spending mean deep reductions in defense expenditures because discretionary non-defense – domestic – spending accounts for only about 20% of annual federal outlays. Faced with these hard choices, Americans may contract hegemony fatigue. If so, the U.S. will be compelled to retrench strategically and the Pax Americana will end. The Pax Americana is already crumbling in slow motion The current international order is based on the economic and security structures that the U.S. created after World War II. The entire fabric of world order that the United States established after 1945 – the Pax Americana – rested on the foundation of U.S. military and economic preponderance. The decline of American power means the end of U.S. dominance in world politics and the beginning of the transition to a new constellation of world power. Indeed, the Pax Americana is already is crumbling in slow motion.

###  AT: Asian War

#### We can no longer contain East Asia

**Ward 12** (Alex Ward, MA candidate in international relations at the University of Durham, BA in geography, writer for the foreign policy association, writer for E-International Relations, contributor at the New Political Centre, 3-23-12, “Is the USA still the Indispensable Power in East Asia,” <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/23/is-the-usa-still-the-indispensible-power-in-east-asia/>) GZ

In November 2011, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the US was “more committed than ever” to a forward presence in East Asia (Clinton, 2011: npn), illustrating the centrality of the region in post-Bush foreign policy interests. Indeed, since WW2, the US has maintained a certain degree of preponderance in the region that has ensured some degree of regional stability, namely though its role as an extraregional balancer and through the stabilizing effect of its hub-and-spoke system of bilateral military alliances (Goh, 2005). The notion of US indispensability can be further interrogated by hegemonic stability theory, which outlines the need for a regional hegemon in promoting stability and emphasises its role in preventing the neorealist assumption of an unstable multipolarity (Snidal, 1985: 614). Accordingly, it is useful to frame the debate through the lens of polarity, as different polar systems have different implications for the contours of the regional system. According to Kupchan (1998: 40) “America’s preponderance [...] will not last indefinitely”. A potential decline in US pre-eminence in East Asia has established the conditions of possibility for “a different regional ordered centered on Chinese rather than American power” (Beeson, 2006: 552), largely due to, amongst other things, the increased ideational purchase that China enjoys through its regional development of smart power. A greater challenge to US primacy in the region however, lies in “glimmerings of security multilateralism” (Ikenberry, 2004: 363) that serve to recalibrate not only the role of the US in Asia but its entire regional security architecture altogether. This shift embodies the notion of peaceful multipolarity, underpinned by mutuality, engagement and interdependence that has largely excluded the participation of outsiders, particularly the US. The formation of such organizations as ASEAN+3 under the rubric of a departure from the American ‘Asia Pacific’ toward an exclusive ‘East Asia’ is symptomatic of a wider decline in US primacy, hinting towards a more multipolar, less asymmetrical strategic order.

###  AT: Russia War

#### Retrenchment solves – allies check Russia

Parent and McDonald 11 (Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Miami, Paul, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, "The Wisdom of Retrenchment," Foreign Affairs Vol. 90 No. 6, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136510/joseph-m-parent-and-paul-k-macdonald/the-wisdom-of-retrenchment SL)

To IMPLEMENT a retrenchment policy, the United States would have to take three main steps: reduce its global military footprint, change the size and composition of the U.S. military, and use the resulting "retrenchment dividend" to foster economic recovery at home. First, the United States must reconsider its forward deployments. The top priority should be to deter aggression against its main economic partners in Europe and Asia. This task is not especially burdensome; there are few credible threats to U.S. allies in these regions, and these states need little help from the United States. Although Russia continues to meddle in its near abroad and has employed oil and gas embargoes to coerce its immediate neighbors, western Europe's resources are more than sufficient to counter an assertive Russia. A more autonomous Europe would take some time to develop a coherent security and defense policy and would not always see events through the same lens as Washington. But reducing Europe's dependence on the United States would create a strong incentive for European states to spend more on defense, modernize their forces, and better integrate their policies and capabilities. U.S. forces in the European theater could safely be reduced by 40-50 percent without compromising European security. Asia is also ready for a decreased U.S. military presence, and Washington should begin gradually withdrawing its troops. Although China has embarked on an ambitious policy of military modernization and engages in periodic saber rattling in the South China Sea, its ability to project power remains limited. Japan and South Korea are already shouldering greater defense burdens than they were during the Cold War. India, the Philippines, and Vietnam are eager to forge strategic partnerships with the United States. Given the shared interest in promoting regional security, these ties could be sustained through bilateral political and economic agreements, instead of the indefinite deployments and open-ended commitments of the Cold War.

###  AT: China War

#### Retrenchment solves – allies check China

Parent and McDonald 11 (Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Miami, Paul, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, "The Wisdom of Retrenchment," Foreign Affairs Vol. 90 No. 6, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136510/joseph-m-parent-and-paul-k-macdonald/the-wisdom-of-retrenchment SL)

In the event that China becomes domineering, U.S. allies on its borders will act as a natural early warning system and a first line of defense, as well as provide logistical hubs and financial support for any necessary U.S. responses. Yet such a state of affairs is hardly inevitable. For now, there are many less expensive alternatives that can strengthen the current line of defense, such as technology transfers, arms sales, and diplomatic mediation. Defending the territorial integrity of Japan and South Korea and preventing Chinese or North Korean adventurism demands rapid-response forces with strong reserves, not the 30,000 soldiers currently stationed in each country. Phasing out 20 percent of those forces while repositioning others to Guam or Hawaii would achieve the same results more efficiently. Reducing these overseas commitments would produce significant savings. A bipartisan task force report published in 2010 by the Project on Defense Alternatives estimated that the demobilization of 50,000 active-duty soldiers in Europe and Asia alone could save as much as $12 billion a year. Shrinking the U.S. footprint would also generate indirect savings in the form of decreased personnel, maintenance, and equipment costs.

### AT: Liberalism

#### **Liberal institutions and norms left by the US will still survive post-hegemonic collapse- that checks back conflict**

Maher 10(Richard Maher, Ph.D. in Political Science at Brown University, November 12, 2010,“The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World”, http://dl2af5jf3e.scholar.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?sid=google&auinit=R&aulast=Maher&atitle=The+paradox+of+American+unipolarity:+Why+the+United+States+may+be+better+off+in+a+post-unipolar+world&id=doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2010.10.003&title=Orbis+(Philadelphia)&volume=55&issue=1&date=2011&spage=53&issn=0030-4387) //ZA

The United States should seek to ensure that the global rules, institutions, and norms that it took the lead in creating—which reflect basic American preferences and interests, thus constituting an important element of American power—outlive American preeminence. We know that institutions acquire a certain “stickiness” that allow them to exist long after the features or forces at the time of their creation give way to a new landscape of global politics. The transaction costs of creating a whole new international—or even regional—institutional architecture that would compete with the American post-World War II vintage would be enormous. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and World Trade Organization (WTO), all reflect basic American preferences for an open trading system and, with a few exceptions, have near-universal membership and overwhelming legitimacy. Even states with which the United States has significant political, economic, or diplomatic disagreement—China, Russia, and Iran—have strongly desired membership in these “Made in USA” institutions. Shifts in the global balance of power will be reflected in these institutions—such as the decision at the September 2009 Pittsburgh G-20 summit to increase China's voting weight in the IMF by five percentage points, largely at the expense of European countries such as Britain and France. Yet these institutions, if their evolution is managed with deftness and skill, will disproportionately benefit the United States long after the demise of its unparalleled position in world politics. In this sense, the United States will be able to “lock in” a durable international order that will continue to reflect its own basic interests and values. Importantly, the United States should seek to use its vast power in the broad interest of the world, not simply for its own narrow or parochial interests. During the second half of the twentieth century the United States pursued its own interests but also served the interests of the world more broadly. And there was intense global demand for the collective goods and services the United States provided. The United States, along with Great Britain, are history's only two examples of liberal empires. Rather than an act of altruism, this will improve America's strategic position. States and societies that are prosperous and stable are less likely to display aggressive or antagonistic behavior in their foreign policies. There are things the United States can do that would hasten the end of American preeminence, and acting in a seemingly arbitrary, capricious, and unilateral manner is one of them. The more the rest of the world views the American-made world as legitimate, and as serving their own interests, the less likely they will be to seek to challenge or even transform it.

### AT: Transition Wars

**Decline is smooth**

**Preble 6/28** (Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in history from Temple University, former professor of history at St Cloud University and Temple University, 6-28-12, “The Critique of Pure Kagan,” <http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/the-critique-pure-kagan-7061>) GZ

The world is both more complicated and more durable than Kagan imagines. The United States does not need to police the globe in order to maintain a level of security that prior generations would envy. Neither does the survival of liberal democracy, market capitalism and basic human rights hinge on U.S. power, contrary to Kagan’s assertions. Americans need not shelter wealthy, stable allies against threats they are capable of handling on their own. Americans should not fear power in the hands of others, particularly those countries and peoples that share common interests and values. Finally, precisely because the United States is so secure, it is difficult to sustain public support for global engagement without resorting to fearmongering and threat inflation. Indeed, when Americans are presented with an accurate assessment of the nation’s power relative to others and shown how U.S. foreign policy has contributed to a vast and growing disparity between what we spend and what others spend on national security—the very state of affairs that Kagan celebrates—they grow even less supportive.

#### Retrenchment allows focused strategy, decreases flashpoints

Parent and McDonald 11 (Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Miami, Paul, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, "The Wisdom of Retrenchment," Foreign Affairs Vol. 90 No. 6, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136510/joseph-m-parent-and-paul-k-macdonald/the-wisdom-of-retrenchment SL)

EVEN IF a policy of retrenchment were possible to implement, would it work? The historical record suggests it would. Since 1870, there have been 18 cases in which a great power slipped in the rankings, as measured by its GDP relative to those of other great powers. Fifteen of those declining powers implemented some form of retrenchment. Far from inviting aggression, this policy resulted in those states' being more likely to avoid militarized disputes and to recover their former rank than the three declining great powers that did not adopt retrenchment: France in the 188os, Germany in the 1930s, and Japan in the 199os. Those states never recovered their former positions, unlike almost half of the 15 states that did retrench, including, for example, Russia in the i88os and the United Kingdom in the first decade of the twentieth century. Retrenchment works in several ways. One is by shifting commitments and resources from peripheral to core interests and preserving investments in the most valuable geographic and functional areas. This can help pare back the number of potential flashpoints with emerging adversaries by decreasing the odds of accidental clashes, as well as reducing the incentives of regional powers to respond confrontationally. Whereas primacy forces a state to defend a vast and brittle perimeter, a policy of retrenchment allows it to respond to significant threats at the times and in the places of its choosing. Conflict does not become entirely elective, as threats to core interests still must be met. But for the United States, retrenchment would reduce the overall burden of defense, as well as the danger of becoming bogged down in a marginal morass. It would also encourage U.S. allies to assume more responsibility for collective security. Such burden sharing would be more equitable for U.S. taxpayers, who today shoulder a disproportionate load in securing the world. Every year, according to Christopher Preble of the Cato Institute, they pay an average of $2,065 each in taxes to cover the cost of national defense, compared with $i,ooo for Britons, $430 for Germans, and $340 for Japanese. Despite spending far less on defense, the United States' traditional allies have little trouble protecting their vital interests. No state credibly threatens the territorial integrity of either western European countries or Japan, and U.S. allies do not need independent powerprojection capabilities to protect their homelands. NATO'S intervention in Libya has been flawed in many respects, but it has demonstrated that European member states are capable of conducting complex military operations with the United States playing a secondary role. Going forward, U.S. retrenchment would compel U.S. allies to improve their existing capabilities and bear the costs of their altruistic impulses. The United States and its allies have basically the same goals: democracy, stability, and trade. But the United States is in the awkward position of both being spread too thin around the globe and irritating many states by its presence on, or near, their soil. Delegating some of its responsibilities to allies would permit the U.S. government to focus more on critical objectives, such as ensuring a stable and prosperous economy. Regional partners, who have a greater stake in and knowledge of local challenges, can take on more responsibility. With increased input from others and a less invasive presence, retrenchment would also allow the United States to restore some luster to its leadership.

**The theory of transition wars is false – globalization and interdependency ensure heg decline will be peaceful**

**Jian-Shu 2007** Cui Jian-Shu, faculty at Washington University and member of the Department of International Strategy at the PLA Institute of International Relations, “Cyclical Logic in the Transition of Hegemony: Modelski’s Long Cycle Theory in International Relations and its Weakness” http://faculty.washington.edu/modelski/Cyclicallogic.htm

Whatever the correctness of Modelski’s five cycles, we note that the description of the five global wars is far from being accurate. In terms of scale, only the wars against Germany, that is, the two world wars, are global while all the other four wars are regional or local: The Italian War started by the French King Charles VIII in 1494 was restricted to Mediterranean states. What is more important, Portugal was not a major participant in the Italian Wars, not to mention in its conclusion. In the Spanish War (1581-1608), the United Provinces of Netherlands sought independence from Spanish rule, and no hegemony is noticed. The Thirty Years' War (1618–1648), which was ignored intentionally by Modelski to justify himself, however, is a widely acknowledged hegemonic war. The wars in Europe to prevent Louis XIV’s hegemony over continental Europe (1688-1713) were also far from being global, or even European, since another great war broke out in Europe at the same time, i.e. the Great North War between Russia and Sweden. The Wars against France (1792-11815), which involved most of the European powers doubtlessly, were on the whole European, but the greatest winner was Russia instead of Britain: postwar Russia not only spread fear among continental nations like Austria, Prussia and France but also was envied by Britain. It is obvious that the “world leader” in Modelski’s terms requires modification, and “system leader” sounds more reasonable; “global war” should be renamed as “systematic war”. Only in this way could modern international political history of five centuries before World War II be explained clearly. If the fact that the system leader is mislabeled as world leader and systematic war as global war in the long cycle theory is merely a flaw, projecting the future of the international system on the basis of global war is a serious mistake. [30] Regarding war as a standard of hegemony does work for traditional political reality indeed. After summarizing European history of the struggle for ‘mastery’ from 1848 to1918, Taylor defined hegemony, meaningfully, as “a power, as its name implies, is an organization for power and organization of wars. It may have other objectives——its citizens’ benefit or ruler’s honor, but the fundamental test for its identity is its capacity for war.” [31] Leopold von Ranke, the famous German historian, assumed in his “On Great Powers” that a great power is capable of defending against all the other powers — even if they were united, it would not be defeated. [32] Nevertheless, any political phenomenon is the product of its own era. With the appearance of nuclear weapons, development of military technology and globalization, the destructive power of humans has increased exponentially. Meanwhile, the interdependence of nations is unprecedented. In this case, standard of evaluating powers with military force might be inaccurate.  Since World War II, our military technology has skyrocketed. The researchers observe that the theoretical lethality index of sword and spear in the cold weapon era was 23 while that of a high altitude nuclear explosion in the megaton range surges to 695 385 000. [33] As such, the cost of war has risen so significantly with the growth of military technology that war has become a “luxury” for the poor and backward nations and even the powers are wary of war. In the 1980s, U.S. President Reagan and General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Gorbachev announced in a meeting that there could be no winners in a nuclear war and that powers should not wage wars. [34] Though these are words of good will, they do reflect technological development and the will of common people, to some extent. To predict the next cycle of global war based on Modelski’s long cycle theory is nothing but to predict realization of Kant’s “perpetual peace of the graveyard”. In addition, the contemporary era is characterized by globalization, not only of trade and finance but also of production, which exerts a potentially revolutionary influence on international politics. As Thomas L. Friedman, a journalist of *The* *New York Times* pointed out in a book on globalization, the drive of present international system revolution has undergone fundamental change; the approach of “heavily relying on the past and predicting future merely on the basis of the past” does not work any more because globalization has turned the world into an “overall dominant international system which shapes domestic and foreign affairs in every state”.[35]   No matter whether we agree with Friedman or not, we have to admit that to investigate international society from the perspective of macro-diplomatic history, the rules of the game of international politics are undergoing tremendous change: while “all the states in the world keep on competition, today’s game differs dramatically from colony acquisition in 1900s. What they pursue today is social and economic benefits. Thus they have to cooperate with each other and abide by international rules…(today’s major powers in the world) usually seek profit by means of international organization rather than gunboat”.[36] Progress in military technology, and globalization decrease significantly the probability of global war, but that does not suggest that the international system dominated by America will never change. On the contrary, the absolute law of international economic development imbalance will become more prominent with development of globalization. The present international system ruled by USA will shift from balance to imbalance and undergo change eventually, but the change will not follow the long cycle theory, in which the traditional model of global war is established on the basis of human experience. Instead, **international system will undergo change in the model of peaceful transformation or else small-scale and low intensity war**. After all, survival interests are supreme for a state.

###  AT: China Transition

#### China rise will be peaceful – no transition war

**Jian-Shu 2007** Cui Jian-Shu, faculty at Washington University and member of the Department of International Strategy at the PLA Institute of International Relations, “Cyclical Logic in the Transition of Hegemony: Modelski’s Long Cycle Theory in International Relations and its Weakness” http://faculty.washington.edu/modelski/Cyclicallogic.htm

Having now investigated five centuries of events in international political history, we draw the following conclusions: all the four fundamental assumptions in Modelski’s long cycle theory in international relations have weaknesses, even serious mistakes. In particular, with the revolution in military technology and further development of globalization, the predictive function of Modelski’s long cycle theory diminishes greatly.  An interpretation of the prospects for China’s rise and for the relations between China and America, the only super power in the world, in the perspective of long cycle theory would be misleading.  Although China is not a sea power in Modelski’s terms, it is a continental, mixed, sea-land power with an independent geographical structure.  With the double advantage of abundant land resources and convenient maritime transportation, China will rise inevitably. In addition, differing from France and the second German Empire in history, the rising China, instead of dominating the international system in place of America, adopts an international strategic notion of advocating multipolarity that is approved by the majority of the world and conforms to the historical trend [54]. Of course, with an increasing CNP (Comprehensive National Power) and transformation into sea power, it is natural that Chinese sea power rise worries American and other Western strategists. The strategic situation with neighboring powers means that China cannot blindly pursue sea power. Besides, the background of Chinese sea power rise is globalization rather than colonization. Just as Ni Lexiong has claimed “Globalization, the unprecedented factor…will probably introduce new ideas in modern sea power notions. Now that all the nations can only survive on the basis of global economic integration, their military efforts including their sea power strategies will share the same object——to maintain global economic integration. The historic moment suggests that perpetual peace of (humanity is irreversible and that Mahan’s sea power theory will quit the historical stage in the near future.” [55] The words could be viewed as his criticism of Modelski’s long cycle theory and a proper comment on the background of strategic peaceful development in China.

### AT: Wholforth

#### Wohlforth ignores key facets of the international system to propose his hegemonic theories

**Monteiro 12** “Nuno P. Monteiro is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, where he teaches International Relations theory, security studies, and the philosophical foundations of the study of politics. He earned a Licentiate’s degree in International Relations from the University of Minho (1997), an M.A. degree in Political Theory and Science from the Catholic University of Portugal (2003), and A.M. and Ph.D. degrees in Political Science from the University of Chicago (2004/09). Dr. Monteiro’s research focuses on great-power politics, power transitions, nuclear proliferation, preventive war, deterrence, and the role of philosophy-of-science arguments in the production of scientific knowledge in IR. His commentary on these topics has appeared in the *Guardian*, *Foreign Affairs*, *The National Interest*, *Project Syndicate*, and the *USA Today* and been featured in the media, including radio (*e.g.*, BBC) and print (*e.g.*, the *Boston Globe*). Dr. Monteiro is a research fellow at Yale’s Whitney and Betty MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies and a member of the Scientific Council of the*Portuguese International Relations Institute* (IPRI). His research has appeared in *International Security* and *International Theory*.” Winter 2011/2012“Unrest Assured – why unipolarity is not peaceful” http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00064

Clearly, great power war is impossible in a unipolar world. In Wohlforth’s famous formulation: “Two states measured up in 1990. One is gone. No new pole has appeared: 2 - 1 = 1.” 41 Furthermore, by arguing that unipolarity precludes hegemonic rivalries, Wohlforth makes no room for wars between the sole great power and major powers. These are, according to him, the two main reasons why a unipolar world is peaceful. Unipolarity, he writes, “means the absence of two big problems that bedeviled the statesmen of past epochs: hegemonic rivalry and balance-of-power politics among major powers.” 42 I agree with Wohlforth on these two points, but they are only part of the picture. Granted, the absence of great power wars is an important contribution toward peace, but great power competition—and the conflict it might engender—would signal the emergence of one or more peer competitors to the unipole, and thus indicate that a transition to a bipolar or multipolar system was already under way. In this sense, great power conflict should be discussed within the context of unipolar durability, not unipolar peace. Indeed, including this subject in discussions of unipolar peacefulness parallels the mistakes made in the debate about the Cold War bipolar system. Then, arguments about how the two superpowers were unlikely to fight each other were often taken to mean that the system was peaceful. This thinking ignored the possibility of wars between a superpower and a lesser state, as well as armed conflicts among two or more lesser states, often acting as great power proxies. 43 In addition, Wohlforth claims that wars among major powers are unlikely, because the unipole will prevent conflict from erupting among important states. He writes, “The sole pole’s power advantages matter only to the degree that it is engaged, and it is most likely to be engaged in politics among the other major powers. 44 I agree that if the unipole were to pursue a strategy of defensive dominance, major power wars would be unlikely. Yet, there is no compelling reason to expect that it will always follow such a course. Should the unipole decide to disengage, as Wohlforth implies, major power wars would be possible. At the same time, Wohlforth argues that the unipole’s power preponderance makes the expected costs of balancing prohibitive, leading minor powers to bandwagon. This is his explanation for the absence of wars between the sole great power and minor powers. But, as I show, the costs of balancing relative to bandwagoning vary among minor powers. So Wohlforth’s argument underplays the likelihood of this type of war. Finally, Wohlforth’s argument does not exclude all kinds of war. Although power preponderance allows the unipole to manage conflicts globally, this argument is not meant to apply to relations between major and minor powers, or among the latter. As Wohlforth explains, his argument “applies with less force to potential security competition between regional powers, or between a second-tier state and a lesser power with which the system leader lacks close ties.” 45 Despite this caveat, Wohlforth does not fully explore the consequences of potential conflict between major and minor powers or among the latter for his view that unipolarity leads to peace.

### AT: Lieber

#### Lieber uses a flawed method

**Keohane 12** (Robert O Keohane, professor of political science at Princeton University, PhD from Harvard University, recipient of the Harvard Centennial Medal, July/August 2012, “Hegemony and After: Knowns and Unknowns in the Debate Over Decline,” published by Foreign Affairs, volume 91, issue 4) GZ

Lieber's book largely agrees with Kagan's, arguing that "the maintenance of [the United States'] leading [international] role matters greatly. The alternative would . . . be a more disorderly and dangerous world." Power and Willpower in the American Future documents the many erroneous statements about American decline by commentators such as the historian Paul Kennedy (who argued in 1987 that the United States suffered from "imperial overstretch") and even Henry Kissinger (who wrote in 1961 that "the United States cannot afford another decline like that which has characterized the past decade and a half "). Lieber provides useful data on the relative economic production of major countries and gives both his predecessors and his intellectual opponents due credit for their contributions. In the end, however, the flaws in Lieber's arguments are similar to those in Kagan's. He, too, dismisses multilateralism as generally ineffective, emphasizing its failures while paying less attention to its successes, whether in peacekeeping, trade, or nonproliferation. He slights NATO’s operations in Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011, for example, arguing that the former exhibited "military and tactical limitations" and pointing out that "stronger and more decisive initial attacks" might have brought quicker success in the latter. Even if valid, surely these critiques are relatively minor compared to the results achieved, with high international legitimacy, in both cases. But Lieber has difficulty admitting that such episodes should be counted as evidence for multilateralism rather than against it. In a previous book, Lieber offered a robust defense of and rationale for the foreign policy approach of the George W. Bush administration, including making a case for preventive war. One might have hoped that in this successor volume he would have revisited such issues and subjected the practical track record of unbridled unilateralism to the same sort of withering scrutiny he gives to multilateralism, but such self-reflection is not to be found here. (Nor is it present in Kagan's book, for that matter, where it would have been equally welcome.)

### AT: Thayer

#### **Thayer is wrong- primacy is incapable of solving all conflict**

Schmitt 7(Gary Schmitt, director of the Program on Advanced Strategic Studies at the American Enterprise Institute, Mar 12, 2007,“Pax Americana”, <http://proquest.umi.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/pqdlink?vinst=PROD&fmt=3&startpage=-1&vname=PQD&RQT=309&did=1231118311&scaling=FULL&vtype=PQD&rqt=309&TS=1341345448&clientId=17822>) //ZA

As someone who has been called a neoconservative, I suppose one would expect me to read Thayer's argument in a more friendly light-which I do. Nevertheless, his presentation suffers from its own problems. First, in response to Layne's argument that Iraq has been an unmitgated disaster, Thayer tries too hard to put a happy face on the problem. The reality is, a strategy of primacy doesn't rest on success in Iraq. It may tell us how prepared or unprepared we are as a government for that role, but it doesn't necessarily vitiate the strategy's general validity. That said, having a strategy dedicated to maintaining primacy does, in fact, put a premium on preemption-not necessarily or even primarily military preemption, but certainly a strong impetus to use all the tools of statecraft to shape both the security environment and other states' behavior. As such, it is an inherently active and somewhat openended strategy that requires heading off challenges before they become threatening ones. Obviously, that can lead to misjudgments about what really needs doing and what only appears to need doing. But that is less a problem-since it is no less a problem for those who want to engage in balance-of-power politics than the fact that the American public is not especially willing to dedicate significant treasure or blood to deal with threats that are over the horizon. As someone who argued that there was a remarkable strategic opportunity available to the United States and its democratic allies in the wake of the Soviet empire's collapse, I can honestly say that, until the attacks of 9/11, the post-Cold War public was hardly seized with a determination to make the most of that opportunity. So, while Layne's preferred strategy of sitting above the world's fray is not likely to fit well with the universalistic character of American liberalism, Thayer's problem is sustaining his strategy in the face of the other side of American liberalism, with its decided focus on the pursuit of happiness. Contrary to what Layne imagines, the issue of sustainability is not one of material resources, or even the rise of great power competitors supposedly generated as a response to U.S. primacy. As Thayer notes, America has never been more powerful, and never has a country been able to call so many of the nations of the world friends or allies. No, the real issue is public will and the quality of leadership necessary to sustain that will in the face of both difficulties, and the enervating consequences of primacy's own success.

### AT: Kagan

#### Kagan’s analysis is super flawed

**Keohane 12** (Robert O Keohane, professor of political science at Princeton University, PhD from Harvard University, recipient of the Harvard Centennial Medal, July/August 2012, “Hegemony and After: Knowns and Unknowns in the Debate Over Decline,” published by Foreign Affairs, volume 91, issue 4) GZ

General readers might not realize how conventional this interpretation of world politics is, since Kagan strikes a pose of embattled iconoclasm, ignoring most of the major authors who developed the case-such as E. H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz-and claiming to refute other scholars with whom he supposedly disagrees, such as G. John Ikenberry and Joseph Nye. Unfortunately, Kagan's method of disagreement is unconvincing. When he raises an opposing claim, he almost never provides data or even systematic evidence; instead, he relies on a counterassertion with a few carefully selected examples. More annoying, he typically overstates the argument in question, stripping it of its original nuance, before claiming to refute it. One of his favorite rhetorical tactics is to assert that his opponents think some trend is "inevitable" or "irreversible"- the dominance of the American-led liberal order, the rise of democracy, the end of major war. Another is to suggest that his targets believe in "multipolar harmony." But two of the most basic propositions of contemporary international relations, certainly accepted by all the writers he dismisses, are that world politics is a realm of inherent uncertainty and that it is characterized by a natural absence of harmony. Since practically everybody knows that nothing in world politics is inevitable and harmony is virtually nonexistent, attributing the opposite beliefs to one's opponents assures one of victory in a mock combat. It is precisely because international discord is the norm, in fact, that theorists and practitioners spend so much time and effort trying to figure out how to generate and sustain cooperation. Many well-informed commentators view the multilateral institutions that have emerged from all this work as providing important supports for the contemporary world order. They point to the roles of UN peacekeeping operations in fostering security, the World Bank in promoting development, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in enhancing financial stability, the World Trade Organization in fostering commerce, and NATO and the European Union in helping achieve unprecedented peace and unity across an entire continent. Kagan scoffs, arguing that other states accept U.S. dominance not because it has been embedded in such frameworks but because they approve of American values and goals and believe they may need American power down the road. He disparages the United Nations; ignores un peacekeeping, the World Bank, and the IMF; and is dismissive of the European Union. But his rejection of the value of institutions is based largely on one sentence, worth quoting in full as an example of his style of argumentation: "All efforts to hand off the maintenance of order and security to an international body with greater authority than the nations within it, or to rely on nations to abide by international rules, regardless of their power to flout them, have failed." Yet Kagan does not mention the fact that the un Security Council has always operated with the possibility of vetoes by any of the five permanent members- showing that there was never any effort to endow it with authority above those states-nor does he note the extensive literature that explores how states use the un and other multilateral institutions to pursue their interests, rather than "hand[ing] off " power to them. This is less serious debate than the tossing of cherry bombs at straw men. The World America Made thus combines a conventional and often sensible analysis of world politics and modern U.S. foreign policy with tendentious criticism of supposedly competing arguments that few, if any, authors actually make. Kagan does not engage in serious analysis of how much military power the United States needs to maintain its central leadership role, in alliance with other democracies, in a stable world order, or of how what Nye has called "softpower" can contribute, in conjunction with "hard" material power, to U.S. influence.

#### **Kagan is just a fear-mongering neoconservative- his interventionist strategy only recreates conflict and risks economic collapse, off-shore balancing is the true solution**

Logan 11(Justin Logan, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, master's degree in international relations from the University of Chicago and a bachelor's degree in international relations from American University, April 2011, “Best defense: beltway brigadier Robert Kagan is all wrong”, http://go.galegroup.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/ps/i.do?action=interpret&id=GALE%7CA281565143&v=2.1&u=lom\_umichanna&it=r&p=AONE&sw=w&authCount=1) //ZA

WASHINGTON'S BIPARTISAN foreign-policy elite is worried. Neocons, liberal interventionists, and conservative hawks are all fretting about the specter of "isolationism" in the Tea Party. Facing a plucky band of freshmen congressmen who have expressed few clear views about the defense budget, the new chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Howard P. "Buck" McKeon, has pledged that he is going to "educate" new members on the need to keep military spending right where it is. McKeon promises he "will not support any measures that stress our forces and jeopardize the lives of our men and women in uniform"--except, presumably, America's wars. Into this fray steps Robert Kagan with a sprawling cover story in the Weekly Standard defending America's "benevolent global hegemony" and urging increased military spending. You have to give it to Kagan: he's taken on a tough task. With the country mired in two treadmill-style wars, staring down red ink as far as the eye can see, and increasing numbers of Americans realizing our real problems are here at home, arguing for keeping military spending turned up to 11 is a challenge. His argument centers on three claims. First, Kagan alleges that America faces a dire threat environment in which a more restrained strategy would only amplify the dangers. Second, he argues that cutting military spending can't solve our fiscal dilemma. And finally, he asserts that America simply cannot change its grand strategy, for we have always been interventionists. Each claim is wrong: America could make substantial changes to its grand strategy that would save hundreds of billions of dollars per year without endangering our national security. Kagan correctly points out that the only way to save real money on the military is to ask it to do fewer things. But because America faces an "elevated risk of terrorist attack" and an "increasingly dangerous international environment," he thinks strategic restraint would be perilous. This song is getting old, especially coming from Kagan. In May 2000, he and William Kristol warned of the "emerging dangers" in China, Russia, Iraq, Serbia, and North Korea, saying that these problems were "proving more troubling" than the two had expected in their famous Foreign Affairs article in 1996. In retrospect, of course, the tone that was tellingly missing from this chorus of alarm bells was Afghanistan and al-Qaeda, the one true threat to the United States at that time. Eleven years later, just how bad is the threat environment? Is the United States militarily insecure by any reasonable historical measure? Is our sovereignty in doubt, like the nations of Central Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries? Or how does America's threat environment compare to that of, say, present-day Israel--or present-day Iran? Kagan defines dangerous down. In fact, the United States is the most secure great power in modern history. The U.S. will remain for years the world's largest economy. It accounts for nearly half of the planet's military spending. (Add in allies with a formal treaty commitment to America and the figure is closer to 70 percent.) We possess near ideal geography, with two weak, friendly neighbors to the north and south and two large moats to the west and east. America bristles with nuclear weapons. The threat of territorial conquest is zero. Since the 9/11 attacks, Kagan has had an easier time threat-mongering, using terrorism as the justification for our towering military spending and activist grand strategy. But given his history of crying wolf, it is no surprise that he's inflating this threat, too. That's particularly problematic, given that terrorist's best weapon is our tendency to overreact and score own-goals, like the war in Iraq. Only a tiny fraction of U.S. military spending has anything to do with terrorism. Virginia class submarines and V-22 Ospreys kill few terrorists. Even the large ground forces needed to sustain nation-building projects in Muslim countries have little counterterrorism utility, serving to make us targets of terrorism rather than preventing it, as political scientist Robert Pape has argued. Washington could easily scale back its overseas ambitions and save significant money in the process. To his credit, Kagan acknowledges that an entire school of thinkers--academic realists--has consistently offered a fundamentally different vision of American strategy since the end of the Cold War. Scholars like Eugene Gholz, Christopher Layne, John Mearsheimer, and Barry Posen have argued for a strategy of "offshore balancing" that would allow the United States to reduce military expenditures without compromising security. These academics have suggested offloading responsibility for defending Europe to the Europeans and promoting stable balances of power in other regions, while retaining the world's most powerful military as a hedge against unexpected trouble. Where another great power threatened to establish dominance in its region, the United States could intervene swiftly to restore the balance of power. If the United States stopped providing security for wealthy clients like the European Union countries, Japan, South Korea, and Israel, they would orient their foreign policies away from free-riding on American taxpayers and toward defending themselves. Kagan implies that these powers might instead collapse: If the United States pulled in its horns, East Asian powers would "have to choose between accepting Chinese dominance and striking out on their own, possibly by building nuclear weapons." Middle Eastern countries removed from the American security umbrella would face similar decisions with respect to Iran. Missing from Kagan's analysis is a shred of empathy for the states in question. Given the geography, history, and possible threats in question, these countries' decisions to surrender or balance are remarkably easy choices to make. Nor does his claim jibe with international relations scholarship or history, both of which show that states tend to balance against threats rather than band-wagon with them. The disconnect between the academy and the Beltway foreign-policy community could hardly be starker. Forty-five years ago, Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser sketched what they termed the "economic theory of alliances." They explained that when several countries join together to protect a shared interest, smaller members have an incentive to free ride in the presence of a much larger, wealthier partner. Once the large, wealthy partner has stated its own vital interest in the objective--in this example, security--smaller countries believe that the larger contributor will pay for the goal itself even in the absence of "fair" contributions from the other partners. The basic insight has stood the test of time. Ignoring this reality, Washington blindly subsidizes allies' domestic welfare programs by allowing them to channel resources away from self-defense. There are many terms that could describe this phenomenon, but "fiscal responsibility" is not one of them. Kagan would not merely hold military spending constant. He wants more. As he points out, given the sweeping ambition of American strategy, fulfilling our commitments indefinitely would require "almost certainly more than current force levels." But he offers no suggestions on how to right-size our forces. Thus his argument collapses into a case for continuing a strategy that Kagan admits is insolvent. One suspects that political reality prevented Kagan from openly proposing large increases in military spending. But he ignores that same constraint in suggesting that elected officials can slash domestic entitlements like Medicare and Social Security to solve long-term budgetary shortfalls. In attempting to cordon off military expenditures, Kagan protests that the real source of American debt is our entitlement system, implying that deficit hawks should target those programs. But even Republicans prefer cutting military spending to tinkering with Medicare or Social Security. A January poll from CBS News and the New York Times asked, "if you had to choose one, which would you be willing to change in order to cut government spending?" Among Republicans, 42 percent said the military, 31 percent said Medicare, 17 percent said Social Security, and 10 percent stated no opinion. Republicans on Capitol Hill recognize these preferences, which explains the charade where they preen before media cameras and claim that they will get tough on the deficit by cutting ... foreign aid and earmarks. Political reality says that progress on the debt means putting military spending, which has nearly doubled in the last decade, on the table. Kagan instead engages in creative mathematics, claiming that immediate withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan combined with "cutting all the waste Gates can find" as well as several weapons systems "would still not produce a 10 percent decrease in overall defense spending." False. America is spending roughly $120 billion per year in Afghanistan alone, and military expenditures including the wars fall between $700 billion and $750 billion. My Cato Institute colleagues Benjamin Friedman and Christopher Preble recently unveiled a detailed plan for strategic change that would allow cuts of at least $1.2 trillion in military spending over the next 10 years. That would not fix the long-term fiscal shortfall, but it would help. Perhaps the strangest aspect of Kagan's argument is his claim that although "almost every war or intervention the United States has engaged in throughout its history has been optional," America is destined to pursue a grand strategy oriented toward global intervention. Kagan presents the history of American foreign policy since 1898 as one of almost constant foreign intervention and implies that America's "wars of choice" are its destiny. Wars can be either choices or destiny, but they cannot be both. Still, this is a tantalizingly provocative argument, one that brings Kagan close to revisionist diplomatic historians like Charles Beard, William Appleman Williams, William O. Walker III, and Richard Immerman. (Of course, these scholars see America's tendency to intervene as a bug; Kagan views it as a feature.) But if the United States is likely to follow an activist grand strategy for the foreseeable future, this is closely related to the behavior of prominent public intellectuals like Kagan himself. The marketplace of ideas about American strategy is, from the vantage point of the interested citizen, a monopoly. Kagan's C.V. represents the phenomenon well. A columnist at the Washington Post, a veteran of the neoconservative Project for a New American Century and Weekly Standard as well as the liberal interventionist Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who is now at the Brookings Institution, Kagan is the embodiment of the Beltway foreignpolicy establishment. If enough people with those credentials amended their views on America's grand strategy, it could change. There are more prominent hawks in Washington named Kagan than there are prominent critics of the status quo in this town. Despite the superficially vicious battles between foreign-policy elites in Washington, these fights generally take place between the 7- and 10-yard lines of one half of the field. Critics in the academy rarely make their way into public discussion. To suggest that the Beltway debate represents genuinely conflicting views of strategy does a disservice to the notion of a "marketplace of ideas." Ironically, by acknowledging an informed opposition, Kagan himself shows the way toward changing American strategy. It lies in opening up the foreign-policy debate, above all in Washington itself.

#### Kagan ignores modern factors which disprove stabilization and prove decline

**Preble 6/28** (Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in history from Temple University, former professor of history at St Cloud University and Temple University, 6-28-12, “The Critique of Pure Kagan,” <http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/the-critique-pure-kagan-7061>) GZ

Kagan correctly argues that the United States could afford to shoulder the burdens of defending others. The costs of U.S. foreign policy are neither insurmountable nor unprecedented. But his case that we should do so is marred by games he plays with statistics in a transparent bid to strengthen his argument. For example, citing figures compiled by the Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Service, he argues that the U.S. share of global GDP “has held remarkably steady, not only over the past decade, but over the past four decades.” In fact, the U.S. share of global GDP is declining, though modestly. The USDA data set clearly shows that the U.S. share of global output peaked during the post–Cold War period at 28.38 percent in 1999 and has since fallen to 25.48 percent. During that same period, China’s share rose from 3.44 percent to just over 8 percent. A different data set prepared by the International Monetary Fund paints a more vivid picture of America’s relative decline. From a post–Cold War era peak of 32.1 percent in 2001, the U.S. share of global GDP had fallen to 21.7 percent by 2011 and was projected to fall to 21 percent by 2017. More telling still are the statistics showing how the U.S. share of global military spending has risen from less than 30 percent at the end of the Cold War to nearly 48 percent today. Per capita spending exhibits a similar trend. According to data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ annual reports, *The Military Balance*, in 2010 Americans spent 71 percent more (in inflation-adjusted terms) on national security than they did in 1998, whereas other countries have either increased spending only slightly or reduced their spending in real terms over that same period. Taken together, these trends undermine Kagan’s contention that U.S. military spending has not grown more burdensome for American taxpayers. Still, as a purely economic matter, such spending isn’t unsustainable. The U.S. federal debt and deficit don’t require Americans to adopt a more restrained foreign policy. An age of austerity in Washington, should it ever come to pass, would not necessarily translate into a smaller military with fewer missions. But such a shift would be wise on its merits. A world order that was less dependent on U.S. military power would likely result in a greater number of countries with more military capability and a greater willingness to use it. Most Americans, contrary to Kagan’s claims, would welcome this if it meant a more manageable burden for America. Kagan asserts that despite “their misgivings, most Americans have also developed a degree of satisfaction in their special role.” Yet polling data show precisely the opposite: most Americans want desperately for others to shoulder the burdens of defending themselves and their interests. For example, 79 percent of voters told pollster Scott Rasmussen that we spend too much money defending others; a mere 4 percent think we don’t spend enough. A CNN survey last year found that just one in four Americans relished the United States’ being the world’s “policeman,” and a separate Rasmussen poll concluded that a mere 11 percent of likely voters support that mission. But Kagan and other advocates of U.S. benevolent global hegemony contend Americans must play this role of global policeman. It would be irresponsible, they say, to stake the future of the present world order on the supposition that other countries would assume some of the burdens of global governance that Americans shed. Kagan assumes other countries would not because they have not done so since at least the end of the Cold War. But this ignores the extent to which U.S. foreign policy—Kagan’s foreign policy—has discouraged them from doing so, a point he regularly celebrates. He points especially to Germany and Japan, whose choices not to rearm after World War II were heavily influenced by Washington. “Had the American variable been absent,” he concludes, “the outcome would have been different.” This expansive global role that Kagan champions may have made sense during the early days of the Cold War, when the countries of Western Europe and East Asia were shattered and we were confronting a common enemy. But the world has changed. The strategy Kagan advocates has needlessly and unfairly burdened Americans with the costs of maintaining global peace, and it could—and should—have been altered long ago. Yet if Robert Kagan has his way, it never will be.

**Kagan’s theories rely on flawed and rigged analysis**

**Preble 6/28** (Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in history from Temple University, former professor of history at St Cloud University and Temple University, 6-28-12, “The Critique of Pure Kagan,” <http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/the-critique-pure-kagan-7061>) GZ

KAGAN’S FLAWED analysis begins with a fundamental misconception about the international system and the relations of states within it. His worldview perceives two types of countries: those that are congenitally incapable of dealing with urgent security challenges on their borders or in their respective regions; and a crafty, rapacious few who are forever scheming to intimidate, disrupt or simply devour the hapless and the helpless. Within this dichotomy, however, is a third sort of country, the only one of its kind. The United States enjoys a privileged place in the world order, explains Kagan. Its power is unthreatening because it is relatively distant from others. And, according to Kagan, the costs of this power are easily borne by the wealthiest country in the world. Kagan’s world order “is as fragile as it is unique,” and “preserving [it] requires constant American leadership and constant American commitment.” The message today is consistent with that from sixteen years ago when he and William Kristol first made the case for what they called “benevolent global hegemony.” In other respects, however, the story that emerges from *The World America Made* is subtly different. Anticipating a rising tide of pessimism and gloominess within the American electorate, Kagan at times resorts to the tone of a pep talk. Whereas he once highlighted the “present dangers” confronting the United States (in a volume coedited with Kristol, published in 2000), he now says the world today isn’t as dangerous as it once was—during the Cold War, for example, or at other periods in American history. Looking ahead, he says, China has its own set of problems, is unlikely to make a bid for regional hegemony and is unlikely to succeed if it tries. Likewise, we shouldn’t be overly frightened by China’s growing economic power, Kagan explains, which will lag well behind that of the United States for years. Other global challenges are more modest still. The object of these relatively optimistic assessments is to convince Americans that they can manage to hold on to their position of global dominance for many years without bankrupting themselves financially or exhausting themselves emotionally. This line of argument cuts against Kagan’s other claims, however, both in this volume and elsewhere, that the United States should spend even more on its military and that Washington should use this military more often, and in more places, than it has in the recent past. In other critical ways, Kagan’s assessment of global politics has remained remarkably consistent, even if the tone of this current volume is slightly less alarmist. In the past, he has argued that the world would collapse into a brutal, Hobbesian hell if the U.S. military were smaller and fought in fewer wars or if the U.S. government were less inclined to extend security guarantees to other countries. Today, he merely suggests such a scenario is possible and warns it would be foolish to gamble on the outcome. Kagan’s too-casual rejection of any reasonable alternative to American hegemony reveals the crucial flaw in his reasoning, however, given that he predicts we might not be afforded a choice in the future. If the United States can’t sustain its current posture indefinitely, a wiser long-term grand strategy would set about—preferably now—easing the difficult and sometimes dangerous transitions that often characterize major power shifts. Rather than continuing to discourage other countries from tending to their security affairs, the United States should welcome such behavior. Kagan’s reassuring tone—about China’s unique vulnerabilities, for example—actually buttresses that competing point of view. After all, if a distant, distracted hegemon like the United States can manage the challenge posed by China, and if it can do so while preventing wars and unrest in several other regions simultaneously, then Asian nations would be at least equally capable of accomplishing the same task given that they will be focused solely on their own security primarily in just that one region.

**Hegemonic stabilization theory is non-falsifiable**

**Preble 6/28** (Christopher Preble, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, PhD in history from Temple University, former professor of history at St Cloud University and Temple University, 6-28-12, “The Critique of Pure Kagan,” <http://nationalinterest.org/bookreview/the-critique-pure-kagan-7061>) GZ

KAGAN REFUSES to consider this possibility. He writes that the “most important features of today’s world—the great spread of democracy, the prosperity, the prolonged great-power peace—have depended directly and indirectly on power and influence exercised by the United States.” It follows, therefore, that the world would become considerably less democratic, less prosperous and less peaceful if the United States were to withdraw militarily from Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Of course, he can’t actually prove either claim to be true, and he concedes as much. Instead, he bases his case on a particular set of beliefs about how the world works and about the United States’ unique characteristics within that system. Kagan asserts that the world requires a single, order-inducing hegemon to enforce the rules of the game and that America must perform this role because its global economic interests demand it. He also believes that the United States has a special obligation, deriving from its heritage as a “dangerous nation,” to spread democracy and human rights. What’s more, America’s military might is the essential ingredient that leads to its international influence. The spread of democracy and market capitalism, Kagan claims, is made possible by U.S. power but would retreat before autocracy and mercantilism if that power were seen to be waning. The attractiveness of America’s culture, economics and political system—the vaunted “soft power” in Joseph Nye’s telling—is fleeting and would dissipate if Americans were to commit what Kagan calls “preemptive superpower suicide.” How other nations respond to U.S. power also follows a familiar pattern. In Kagan’s telling, allies will bandwagon with us if we are committed to defending them but bolt like frightened racehorses at the first sign of trouble. Would-be challengers will back down in the face of U.S. power but rush to exploit opportunities for conquest if Uncle Sam exhibits any hesitation or self-doubt. And Kagan simply dismisses any suggestion that other countries might chafe at American dominance or fear American power. His ideas represent something close to the reigning orthodoxy in Washington today and for the past two decades. Inside the Beltway, there is broad, bipartisan agreement on the basic parameters of U.S. foreign policy that Kagan spells out. This consensus contends that the burden of proof is on those who argue against the status quo. The United States and the world have enjoyed an unprecedented stretch of security and prosperity; it would be the height of folly, the foreign-policy establishment asserts, to upend the current structure on the assumption that an alternative approach would represent any improvement. But such arguments combine the most elementary of post hoc fallacies with unwarranted assumptions and idle speculation. Correlation does not prove causation. There are many factors that could explain the relative peace of the past half century. Kagan surveys them all—including economic interdependence, evolving norms governing the use of force and the existence of nuclear weapons—and concludes that U.S. power is the only decisive one. But, once again, he concedes that he cannot prove it.

#### Kagan is wrong – retrenchment solves imperial overstretch

Parent and McDonald 11 (Joseph, Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Miami, Paul, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, "The Wisdom of Retrenchment," Foreign Affairs Vol. 90 No. 6, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136510/joseph-m-parent-and-paul-k-macdonald/the-wisdom-of-retrenchment SL)

DESPITE THE erosion of U.S. military and economic dominance, many observers warn that a rapid departure from the current approach to foreign policy would be disastrous. The historian Robert Kagan cautions that "a reduction in defense spending . . . would unnerve American allies and undercut efforts to gain greater cooperation." The journalist Robert Kaplan even more apocalyptically warns that "lessening [the United States'] engagement with the world would have devastating consequences for humanity." But these defenders of the status quo confuse retrenchment with appeasement or isolationism. A prudent reduction of the United States' overseas commitments would not prevent the country from countering dangerous threats and engaging with friends and allies. Indeed, such reductions would grant the country greater strategic flexibility and free resources to promote long-term growth. A somewhat more compelling concern raised by opponents of retrenchment is that the policy might undermine deterrence. Reducing the defense budget or repositioning forces would make the United States look weak and embolden upstarts, they argue. "The very signaling of such an aloof intention may encourage regional bullies," Kaplan worries. This anxiety is rooted in the assumption that the best barrier to adventurism by adversaries is forward defenses-the deployment of military assets in large bases near enemy borders, which serve as tripwires or, to some eyes, a Great Wall of America. There are many problems with this position. For starters, the policies that have gotten the United States in trouble in recent years have been activist, not passive or defensive. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq alienated important U.S. allies, such as Germany and Turkey, and increased Iran's regional power. NATO's expansion eastward has strained the alliance and intensified Russia's ambitions in Georgia and Ukraine. More generally, U.S. forward deployments are no longer the main barrier to great-power land grabs. Taking and holding territory is more expensive than it once was, and great powers have little incentive or interest in expanding further. The United States' chief allies have developed the wherewithal to defend their territorial boundaries and deter restive neighbors. Of course, retrenchment might tempt reckless rivals to pursue unexpected or incautious policies, as states sometimes do. Should that occur, however, U.S. superiority in conventional arms and its power-projection capabilities would assure the option of quick U.S. intervention. Outcomes of that sort would be costly, but the risks of retrenchment must be compared to the risks of the status quo. In difficult financial circumstances, the United States must prioritize. The biggest menace to a superpower is not the possibility of belated entry into a regional crisis; it is the temptation of imperial overstretch. That is exactly the trap into which opponents of the United States, such as al Qaeda, want it to fall.