## \*\*\*\*HEGEMONY CORE- SDI 2012\*\*\*\*

[\*\*\*HEG GOOD\*\*\* 4](#_Toc329965081)

[\*\*General Impact Classics\*\* 5](#_Toc329965082)

[Small Khalilzad 6](#_Toc329965083)

[Ferguson 7](#_Toc329965084)

[Giant Thayer 8](#_Toc329965085)

[\*\*Sustainability\*\* 11](#_Toc329965086)

[\*We’ll Always Try/No Restraint 12](#_Toc329965087)

[We’ll Always Try/No Restraint 2 13](#_Toc329965088)

[A/T “Retrench/Offshore Balance” 14](#_Toc329965089)

[A/T “Retrench Solves Warming, Etc.” 16](#_Toc329965091)

[Transition = War 17](#_Toc329965092)

[Heg Sustainable 19](#_Toc329965094)

[Ext.: Sustainable 21](#_Toc329965096)

[A/T “Defense Spending/Overstretch” 25](#_Toc329965100)

[Multipolarity Bad 26](#_Toc329965101)

[\*A/T “Balancing”\* 27](#_Toc329965102)

[General 28](#_Toc329965103)

[Europe 30](#_Toc329965104)

[Brazil/Latin America 31](#_Toc329965105)

[\*\*Impacts\*\* 32](#_Toc329965106)

[Asian Stability 33](#_Toc329965107)

[Ext.: Heg Key Asia Stability 34](#_Toc329965108)

[Democracy 35](#_Toc329965109)

[Ext.: Solves Democracy 36](#_Toc329965110)

[Deterrence 37](#_Toc329965111)

[Korea 38](#_Toc329965112)

[Prolif 39](#_Toc329965113)

[Ext.: Prolif 40](#_Toc329965114)

[Terrorism 41](#_Toc329965115)

[Winning WoT Now 42](#_Toc329965116)

[Ext.: Terrorism 43](#_Toc329965117)

[China 44](#_Toc329965118)

[Ext.: China 45](#_Toc329965119)

[China Containment Good: Democracy 46](#_Toc329965120)

[\*Soft Power\* 47](#_Toc329965121)

[Solves Latin America 48](#_Toc329965122)

[Hard Power Key to Soft Power 49](#_Toc329965123)

[\*Answers to Impacts\* 50](#_Toc329965124)

[A/T “Latin American Democracy” 51](#_Toc329965125)

[\*\*\*HEG BAD\*\*\* 52](#_Toc329965126)

[\*\*Sustainability\*\* 53](#_Toc329965127)

[General- Heg Unsustainable 54](#_Toc329965128)

[Ext.: General 56](#_Toc329965129)

[Ext.: Latin America Specific 60](#_Toc329965130)

[Unsustainable- Balancing 61](#_Toc329965131)

[Unsustainable- Defense Spending 64](#_Toc329965132)

[Unsustainable- Soft Balancing 65](#_Toc329965133)

[A2 Brooks and Wohlforth 66](#_Toc329965134)

[Multipolarity Inevitable 68](#_Toc329965135)

[Transition Stable 69](#_Toc329965136)

[A/T “We’ll Always Try”\*\* 71](#_Toc329965138)

[A/T “Public = Always Engage” 73](#_Toc329965140)

[\*\*Impacts\*\* 74](#_Toc329965141)

[General Defense 75](#_Toc329965142)

[\*Multipolarity Good 77](#_Toc329965143)

[Ext.: Retrench Solves Everything 80](#_Toc329965144)

[Ext.: Multipolarity Solves Warming/Air Pollution 81](#_Toc329965145)

[Econ 82](#_Toc329965146)

[Prolif 84](#_Toc329965147)

[Ext.: Prolif 85](#_Toc329965148)

[Terrorism 86](#_Toc329965149)

[Ext. Terrorism 87](#_Toc329965150)

[A/T “Democracy” 88](#_Toc329965151)

[A/T “Deterrence/Signal of Weakness” 89](#_Toc329965152)

[China/Asia 90](#_Toc329965153)

[Ext.: China 91](#_Toc329965154)

[Yes Counterbalancing 93](#_Toc329965155)

[A/T “China is Expansionist” 94](#_Toc329965156)

[Latin American Democracy 95](#_Toc329965157)

[Ext.: Latin American Democracy 96](#_Toc329965158)

[Ext.: Latin America Impact: Non-Democracy 97](#_Toc329965159)

[\*Yes Impacts\* 98](#_Toc329965160)

[Latin America 99](#_Toc329965161)

[\*Answers to Impacts\* 100](#_Toc329965162)

[A/T “Asia War” 101](#_Toc329965163)

[A/T “Korea War” 102](#_Toc329965164)

# \*\*\*HEG GOOD\*\*\*

## \*\*General Impact Classics\*\*

### Small Khalilzad

Extinction

Khalilzad, Rand Corporation 1995 (Zalmay Khalilzad, Spring 1995. RAND Corporation. “Losing the Moment?” The Washington Quarterly 18.2, Lexis.)

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

### Ferguson

Collapse of US hegemony causes a global power vacuum resulting in nuclear war

Ferguson 04 professor of history at New York University's Stern School of Business and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University (Niall, “A World without Power”, Foreign Policy )

Could an apolar world today produce an era reminiscent of the age of Alfred? It could, though with some important and troubling differences. Certainly, one can imagine the world's established powers—the United States, Europe, and China—retreating into their own regional spheres of influence. But what of the growing pretensions to autonomy of the supranational bodies created under U.S. leadership after the Second World War? The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (formerly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) each considers itself in some way representative of the “international community.” Surely their aspirations to global governance are fundamentally different from the spirit of the Dark Ages? Yet universal claims were also an integral part of the rhetoric of that era. All the empires claimed to rule the world; some, unaware of the existence of other civilizations, maybe even believed that they did. The reality, however, was not a global Christendom, nor an all-embracing Empire of Heaven. The reality was political fragmentation. And that is also true today. The defining characteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward to supranational institutions, but downward. With the end of states' monopoly on the means of violence and the collapse of their control over channels of communication, humanity has entered an era characterized as much by disintegration as integration. If free flows of information and of means of production empower multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations (as well as evangelistic religious cults of all denominations), the free flow of destructive technology empowers both criminal organizations and terrorist cells. These groups can operate, it seems, wherever they choose, from Hamburg to Gaza. By contrast, the writ of the international community is not global at all. It is, in fact, increasingly confined to a few Page 5 strategic cities such as Kabul and Pristina. In short, it is the nonstate actors who truly wield global power—including both the monks and the Vikings of our time. So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous—roughly 20 times more—so friction between the world's disparate “tribes” is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization—the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital—has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization—which a new Dark Age would produce—would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy—from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai—would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile**,** limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders**.** In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony— its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier—its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for**.** The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity—a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder

### Giant Thayer

US hegemony solves all problems

Thayer 06 Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University [Bradley, In Defense of Primacy, The National Interest, December (lexis)]

A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power--the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, either because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for retrenchment.1 Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests. But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy. There are two critical issues in any discussion of America's grand strategy: Can America remain the dominant state? Should it strive to do this? America can remain dominant due to its prodigious military, economic and soft power capabilities. The totality of that equation of power answers the first issue. The United States has overwhelming military capabilities and wealth in comparison to other states or likely potential alliances. Barring some disaster or tremendous folly, that will remain the case for the foreseeable future. With few exceptions, even those who advocate retrenchment acknowledge this. So the debate revolves around the desirability of maintaining American primacy. Proponents of retrenchment focus a great deal on the costs of U.S. action--but they fail to realize what is good about American primacy. The price and risks of primacy are reported in newspapers every day; the benefits that stem from it are not. A GRAND strategy of ensuring American primacy takes as its starting point the protection of the U.S. homeland and American global interests. These interests include ensuring that critical resources like oil flow around the world, that the global trade and monetary regimes flourish and that Washington's worldwide network of allies is reassured and protected. Allies are a great asset to the United States**, in part** because they shoulder some of its burdens. Thus, it is no surprise to see NATO in Afghanistan or the Australians in East Timor. In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. **Indeed,** retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. **This is because** threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. **And** when enemies must be confronted, a strategy based on primacy focuses on engaging enemies overseas, away from American soil. **Indeed,** a key tenet of the Bush Doctrine is to attack terrorists far from America's shores and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. This requires a physical, on-the-ground presence that cannot be achieved by offshore balancing. Indeed, as Barry Posen has noted, U.S. primacy is secured because America, at present, commands the "global commons"--the oceans, the world's airspace and outer space--allowing the United States to project its power far from its borders, while denying those common avenues to its enemies. As a consequence, the costs of power projection for the United States and its allies are reduced, and the robustness of the United States' conventional and strategic deterrent capabilities is increased.2 This is not an advantage that should be relinquished lightly. A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display**--is that** countries want to align themselves with the United States. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence. Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one (85 to five), and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies. U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI ). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. The quiet effectiveness of the PSI in dismantling Libya's WMD programs and unraveling the A. Q. Khan proliferation network are in sharp relief to the typically toothless attempts by the UN to halt proliferation. You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China **proclaims that it** will**, if necessary,** resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates. The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American. Indeed, a change of regime in Caracas, Tehran or Havana could very well reorient relations. THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. **Today,** American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened**, such as in Darfur,** but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.3 So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such an effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and**, one gathers from the argument**, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005**.** It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. **Now** even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.4 As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. **Indeed,** the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg.

## \*\*Sustainability\*\*

### \*We’ll Always Try/No Restraint

#### Decline makes all their turns *worse-* US will be more violent post-decline

Dupont June 2012 (Alan, professor of international security and director of the Institute for International Security and Development at the University of New South Wales in Sydney, Australia, An Asian Security Standoff, The National Interest, lexis)

What of the argument that America should accept the inevitable and share power with China as an equal? Paralleling the G-2 would be an Asia-2, allowing Beijing and Washington to divide the region into spheres of influence in much the same way as the United States and the Soviet Union managed a politically bifurcated Europe during the early part of the Cold War. While superficially appealing because it holds out the prospect of a peaceful transition to a new international order, power sharing between the United States and China is unlikely to work for two reasons. First, no U.S. administration, regardless of its political complexion, would voluntarily relinquish power to China, just as China wouldn’t if the roles were reversed. Second, China’s new great-power status is hardly untrammeled. Nor is it guaranteed to last, for the country faces formidable environmental, resource, economic and demographic challenges, not to mention a rival United States that shows no sign of lapsing into terminal decline despite its current economic travails. Sooner than it thinks, Beijing may have to confront the prospect of a resurgent Washington determined to reassert its strategic interests.

#### Even Layne agrees- the US won’t just give up

Layne June 2012 (Chris, professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, The Global Power Shift from West to East, The National Interest, lexis)

THE CONSTELLATION of world power is changing, and U.S. grand strategy will have to change with it. American elites must come to grips with the fact that the West does not enjoy a predestined supremacy in international politics that is locked into the future for an indeterminate period of time. The Euro-Atlantic world had a long run of global dominance, but it is coming to an end. The future is more likely to be shaped by the East.¶ At the same time, Pax Americana also is winding down. The United States can manage this relative decline effectively over the next couple of decades only if it first acknowledges the fundamental reality of decline. The problem is that many Americans, particularly among the elites, have embraced the notion of American exceptionalism with such fervor that they can’t discern the world transformation occurring before their eyes.

US military engagement inevitable – advocates of withdrawal aren’t even in the debate

Shalmon and Horowitz 09 (Dan, Graduate Student in the PhD Program in Political Science - International Relations at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Mike, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania- Philadelphia, Orbis, Spring)

For the near future, the United States and its military will remain heavily engaged in the world, whether through a direct footprint or over the horizon, meaning the United States has to construct a national strategy and military strategy to help achieve its goals**.** Given the ongoing financial crisis and the long-term pressure on the budget created by entitlement program outlays, it is unreasonable to assume that the United States defense budget will continue on its current upward trajectory. American defense spending, in constant dollars, has nearly doubled since 2000.45 Such increases are not sustainable. In a world of limited budgets, there are hard choices to make about where to spend defense dollars today to ensure that the United States can defeat current threats, while simultaneously ensuring long-term security and prosperity. While dollars are fungible and budgets are zero-sum, claims advanced by some COIN advocates that COIN suffers because it lacks budgetary equivalence with conventional war expenditures are a red herring.46 cont… At present, the dominant strands of defense strategy debates feature COIN advocates that wish to transform the American military to focus more on counterinsurgency and irregular wars and traditionalists who seek to return the American military to focusing exclusively on conventional wars. This debate presents a false choice. The national strategy of the United States calls for remaining actively engaged around the world, which will sometimes require using military force abroad. It is necessary, in a world of limited budgets, to move beyond the COIN v. Conventional War debate, especially because by embracing a zero-sum vision of future war, and trading one capability for the other, it makes facing the neglected threat more likely. Given uncertainty about the future security environment and the future character of war in the information age, a hedging strategy seems prudent. By optimizing different aspects of the military for different campaigns, recognizing significant differences in the types of campaigns that are most likely at different levels of intensity, investing in defense systems with applicability to both COIN and conventional campaigns, and bolstering funding for basic defense science research, the United States can ensure that it remains the leading global military power not only for this generation, but also for the next, as well.

### We’ll Always Try/No Restraint 2

#### No Risk of self restraint – its politically impossible – global engagement is inevitable

Ferguson, ’09 (Niall, American Interest, http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=335&MId=16)

So much for the American predicament. What of Posen’s alternative grand strategy based on American self-restraint? The terms he uses are themselves revealing. The United States needs to be more “reticent” about its use of military force, more “modest” about its political goals overseas, more “distant” from traditional allies, and more “stingy” in its aid policies. Good luck to the presidential candidate who laces his next foreign policy speech with those adjectives: “My fellow Americans, I want to make this great country of ours more reticent, modest, distant and stingy!” Let us, however, leave aside this quintessentially academic and operationally useless rhetoric. What exactly does Posen want the United States to do? I count six concrete recommendations. The United States should: 1) Abandon the Bush Doctrine of “preemption”, which in the case of Iraq has been a policy of preventive war. Posen argues that this applies even in cases of nuclear proliferation. By implication, he sees preventive war as an inferior option to deterrence, though he does not make clear how exactly a nuclear-armed Iran would be deterred, least of all if his second recommendation were to be implemented. 2) Reduce U.S. military presence in the Middle East (“the abode of Islam”) by abandoning “its permanent and semi-permanent land bases in Arab countries.” Posen does not say so, but he appears to imply the abandonment of all these bases, not just the ones in Iraq, but also those in, for example, Qatar. It is not clear what would be left of Central Command after such a drastic retreat. Note that this would represent a break with the policy not just of the last two Presidents, but with that of the last 12. 3) Ramp up efforts to provide relief in the wake of natural disasters, exemplified by Operation Unified Assistance after the Indian Ocean tsunami of December 26, 2004. No doubt the American military did some good in the wake of the tsunami, but Posen needs to explain why a government that so miserably bungled the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina less than a year later should be expected to be consistently effective in the wake of natural disasters. 4) Assist in humanitarian military interventions only “under reasonable guidelines” and “in coalitions, operating under some kind of regional or international political mandate.” Does Posen mean that he would favor sending American troops to Darfur at the same time as he is withdrawing them from other “abodes of Islam?” He does not say. 5) Promote not democracy abroad but “the rule of law, press freedom and the rights of collective bargaining.” Here again I am experiencing cognitive dissonance. The government that sought systematically to evade the Geneva Conventions in order to detain indefinitely and torture suspected terrorists as an upholder of the rule of law? 6) Stop offering “U.S. security guarantees and security assistance, [which] tend to relieve others of the need to do more to ensure their own security.” This is in fact the most important of all Posen’s recommendations, though he saves it until last. He envisages radical diminution of American support for other members of NATO. Over the next ten years, he writes, the United States “should gradually withdraw from all military headquarters and commands in Europe.” In the same timeframe it should “reduce U.S. government direct financial assistance to Israel to zero”, as well as reducing (though not wholly eliminating) assistance to Egypt. And it should “reconsider its security relationship with Japan”, whatever that means. Again, this represents a break with traditional policy so radical that it would impress even Noam Chomsky, to say nothing of Osama bin Laden (who would, indeed, find little here to object to). Posen, in other words, has proceeded from relatively familiar premises (the limits of American “hyperpower”) to some quite fantastic policy recommendations, which are perhaps best summed up as a cross between isolationism and humanitarianism. Only slightly less fantastic than his vision of an American military retreat from the Middle East, Europe and East Asia is Posen’s notion that it could be sold to the American electorate—just six years after they were the targets of the single largest terrorist attack in history—in the language of self-effacement. Coming from a man who wants to restart mainstream debate on American grand strategy, that is pretty rich.

All their turns are inevitable - Zero Chances of willful US restraint – we’ll inevitably be engaged globally – the only question is effectiveness

Shalmon and Horowitz 09 (Dan, Graduate Student in the PhD Program in Political Science - International Relations at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Mike, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania- Philadelphia, Orbis, Spring)

It is important to recognize at the outset two key points about United States strategy and the potential costs and benefits for the United States in a changing security environment. First, the United States is very likely to remain fully engaged in global affairs. Advocates of restraint or global withdrawal, while popular in some segments of academia, remain on the margins of policy debates in Washington D.C. This could always change, of course. However, at present, it is a given that the United States will define its interests globally and pursue a strategy that requires capable military forces able to project power around the world**.** Because ‘‘indirect’’ counter-strategies are the rational choice for actors facing a strong state’s power projection, irregular/asymmetric threats are inevitable given America’s role in the global order.24

### A/T “Retrench/Offshore Balance”

Their turns are inevitable and balancing is impossible – other nations will always perceive the US as the hegemon

Drezner 09 (Daniel W., Professor of International Politics at Tufts and a senior editor at The National Interest, 7/15/ 09, “The False Hegemon,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21858)

While the Obama administration and the American people might be content with the notion of America as just another country, this sentiment raises some uncomfortable questions. There is the factual one: is America really just one of many nations? Despite everything that has befallen the United States during this decade, the fact remains that by standard metrics—GDP, military might, cultural attraction—the United States is far and away the most powerful country in the world. This fact is so glaring that even academics are starting to acknowledge it. Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth wrote an entire book on the durability of American unipolarity. World Politics published a special issue this year on the nature of the unipolar era. The rest of the world certainly seems to treat America as the hegemonic power, for good or ill. According to the New York Times, Latin America is waiting for the United States to break the deadlock in Honduras. Vladimir Putin is incapable of giving a foreign-policy speech in which he does not blast American hegemony as the root of all of Russia’s ills. While Chinese officials talk tough about ending the dollar’s reign as the world’s reserve currency, its leaders also want America to solve the current economic crisis and to take the lead on global warming in the process. It’s not just foreign leaders who are obsessed with American hegemony. Last week, in an example of true hardship duty, I taught a short course in American foreign policy at the Barcelona Institute for International Studies. The students in my class represented a true cross section of nationalities: Spaniards, Germans, Brits, Estonian, Chinese, Vietnamese, Indian, Thai, Ghanaian, Kenyan, Turkish, Belgian, Mexican, Nicaraguan and, yes, even Americans. I cannot claim that my students represent a scientific cross section of non-Americans (one of them complained that I did not rely on Marxism as a structural explanation for American foreign policy). Still, by and large the students were bright, well informed about world affairs and cautiously optimistic about President Obama. That said, a persistent trend among my students was their conviction that the U.S. government was the world’s puppeteer, consciously manipulating every single event in world politics. For example, many of them were convinced that George W. Bush ordered Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to precipitate last year’s war with Russia. The Ghanaian students wanted to know why Obama visited their country last week. The standard “promotion of good democratic governance” answer did not satisfy them. They were convinced that there had to be some deeper, potentially sinister motive to the whole enterprise. Don’t even ask what they thought about the reasons behind the war in Iraq. To be sure, the United States is a powerful actor; the government is trying to influence global events (and Americans are not immune to their own misperceptions). And good social scientists should always search for underlying causes and not take rhetoric at face value. Nevertheless, the belief in an all-powerful America hatching conspiracies left and right frequently did not jibe with the facts. For many of these students, even apparent policy mistakes were merely examples of American subterfuge. Ironically, at the moment when many Americans are questioning the future of U.S. hegemony, many non-Americans continue to believe that the U.S. government is diabolically manipulating events behind the scenes. Going forward, the persistence of anti-Americanism in the age of Obama might have nothing to do with the president, or his rhetoric or even U.S. government actions. It might, instead, have to do with the congealed habits of thought that place the United States at the epicenter of all global movings and shakings. The tragedy is that such an exaggerated perception of American power and purpose is occurring at precisely the moment when the United States will need to scale back its global ambitions. Indeed, the external perception of U.S. omnipresence will make the pursuit of a more modest U.S. foreign policy all the more difficult. The Obama administration has consciously adopted a more modest posture in the hopes of improving America’s standing abroad. If the rest of the world genuinely believes that the United States causes everything, however, then the attempt at modesty will inevitably fail.

Offshore balancing kills US credibility and invites challenges

Thayer ‘7 (Bradley A., Associate Prof in Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies @ Missouri State U, “American Empire: A Debate”, pg. 24-25)

A large part of what makes primacy such a success is that other countries know where the United States stands, what it will defend, and that it will be involved in disputes, both great and small. Accordingly, other countries have to respect the interests of the United States or face the consequences. Offshore balancing incurs the risks of primacy without its benefits. It pledges that the United States will defend its interests with air power and sea power, but not land power. That is curious because we could defend our interests with land power but choose not to, suggesting our threat to defend is not serious, which weakens our credibility and invites challenges to the interests of the United States. Offshore balancing increases the probability of conflict for the United States. It raises the danger that the interests of the United States will be challenged not only from foes like China and Iran, but, perversely, also from countries now allied with the United States like Japan and Turkey.

### A/T “Retrench/Offshore Balancing” 2

#### “Retrenchment” means isolationism- and international institutions won’t fill in

Falke 2012 (Dr. Andreas, Chair of the Board for Foreign Policy (Lehrstuhl für Auslandswissenschaft), The Long-Term Foreign Policy Consequences of 9/11: An American Neo-Isolationism?, http://www.awen.wiso.uni-erlangen.de/team/falke/files/Consequences\_final.pdf)

Formulating Strategic Post-9/11-Wars Options Under Isolationist Pressure ¶ Thinking about a post-9/11-war neo-isolationism, one should keep in mind that the classical isolationism of the 1920s was not absolute. The U.S. did not join ¶ the League of Nations and played only a minimal role in sustaining European ¶ security arrangements, primarily by sponsoring disarmament initiatives, but it ¶ did stay involved in trying to stabilize the European economy, in restructuring ¶ German reparation payments (Herring 436-83). A shift toward isolationism faces formidable institutional and ideational obstacles. Even the Tea Party, ¶ although drawn by a strong isolationist undercurrent, focuses on flash-points of ¶ American foreign policy such as the Israel-Palestinian conflict and Iran that tie ¶ the U.S. firmly to major crisis spots in the international system. Also, ¶ internationalist institutions in the U.S. remain strong. The array of elite think ¶ tanks that promote America's involvement in the world, be it with a liberal, ¶ centrist or neo-conservative slant, the military and weapon producing industries ¶ as well as business and financial institutions that are integrated into global ¶ markets or push the globalization process, remain bulwarks against isolationism. ¶ There is a large foreign policy elite, primarily in the coastal regions, that benefit ¶ from America's global role and will resist a drift toward isolationism (Szabo). ¶ Isolationism would also have to compete with other approaches and doctrines ¶ or grand strategies. This ability depends not only on a clearer articulation of an ¶ isolationist doctrine, but also on the viability of other approaches. How do these ¶ approaches hold up? The conception of American theorists of international ¶ relations of a new post-hegemonic world order, in which the U.S. continues to ¶ be a leader, are not fully convincing. This conception is driven by the idea that ¶ the U.S. will be able to renegotiate its leadership claim within a new global ¶ order by sharing leadership positions with emerging powers under a multilateral ¶ framework (Ikenberry 279-332). But even under Obama, America's willingness ¶ to cede sovereignty and to submit to multilateral rule-making has been severely ¶ circumscribed and would require substantial economic resources and ¶ commitments that may not be forthcoming from the political system. ¶ Admittedly, the approach of intertwining American leadership claims with ¶ multilateralism has its attractions: An expansion and strengthening of ¶ multilateral regimes could be useful for the purpose of integrating emerging ¶ powers such as India and China into new regimes relating to climate change, ¶ competition for scarce resources such as energy and raw materials, protecting ¶ intellectual property rights and stabilizing failed states through assistance ¶ programs, before these powers leave their imprint on the global order. But there ¶ is no domestic support for such an approach, given the growing reluctance to ¶ cede sovereignty. In a resource-strapped era, multilateralism is only acceptable ¶ in a version of burden-sharing, which in practice would rather be burdenshifting. Other approaches such as democracy promotion coupled with nationbuilding, even without the martial undertones of the Bush administration, are ¶ hard to sustain and exhausted anyway. The same is true for the continuation of ¶ an extensive and invasive war on terror that would transcend a basic defensive ¶ posture (Haass). ¶ What remains then is really retrenchment. This implies that the U.S. takes an ¶ adaptive approach to its diminished economic means and reduces its ¶ commitments and its role as a world power to those strategic options that can ¶ pass a narrow national interest test. The U.S. would without doubt remain a ¶ major power, but with a reduced scope. The problem, however, is that the line ¶ between retrenchment and isolationism is not clearly demarcated. The process of ¶ retrenchment, once started, could get on slippery footing and easily morph into ¶ neo-isolationism should an ever narrower definition of national interest inspire ¶ the search for strategic options. The U.S. "must guard against doing too little" ¶ (Kupchan 13). This could well be the case if the economic recovery takes longer ¶ than expected, or if the approach of "rebuilding national strength" through ¶ investment in jobs, energy, education and infrastructure loses any reference to ¶ its instrumental character for renewing America's global role, and may just be ¶ what it is anyway: a domestic policy program. This could be true if these ¶ investments get in direct competition with more traditional national security ¶ expenditures and programs in terms of budgetary consolidation. The rebuilding domestic-strength-approach has zero-sum solution properties and involves ¶ serious trade-offs with national security where one side may lose out. And ¶ waiting with international commitments or the reactivation of America's global ¶ role until the domestic basis has been restored may put off a revival of a global ¶ role until it cannot be revived anymore, or at least the resumption of the old ¶ status would prove difficult and require a costly catch-up effort. This is the ¶ downside of the "rebuild-national-strength"-approach that gives isolationism an ¶ inroad, a risk that the advocates of retrenchment conveniently overlook.

### A/T “Retrench Solves Warming, Etc.”

#### Retrenchment kills international action on warming, disease and resource shortages

Beckley 2012 (Michael, PhD candidate at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Columbia, The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited, Dissertation found on google scholar)

The other potential reaction is retrenchment – the divestment of all foreign policy obligations save those linked to vital interests, defined in a narrow and national manner. Advocates of retrenchment assume, or hope, that the world will sort itself out on its own; that whatever replaces American hegemony, whether it be a return to balance-­‐of-­‐power politics or a transition to a post-­‐power paradise, will naturally maintain international order and prosperity. But order and prosperity are unnatural. They can never be presumed. When achieved, they are the result of determined action by powerful actors and, in particular, by the most powerful actor, which is, and will be for some time, the United States. Arms buildups, insecure sea-­‐lanes, and closed markets are only the most obvious risks of U.S. retrenchment. Less obvious are transnational problems, such as global warming, water scarcity, and disease, which may fester without a leader to rally collective action. Hegemony, of course, carries its own risks and costs. In particular, America’s global military presence might tempt policymakers to use force when they should choose diplomacy or inaction. If the United States abuses its power, however, it is not because it is too engaged with the world, but because its engagement lacks strategic vision. The solution is better strategy, not retrenchment.

### Transition = War

Transition from US heg causes conflict- perception of weakness spurs war- history proves

Friedberg 2011 (July/August, Aaron L., professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics, The National Interest, lexis)

THE UNITED States and the People’s Republic of China are locked in a quiet but increasingly intense struggle for power and influence, not only in Asia, but around the world. And in spite of what many earnest and well-intentioned commentators seem to believe, the nascent Sino-American rivalry is not merely the result of misperceptions or mistaken policies; it is driven instead by forces that are deeply rooted in the shifting structure of the international system and in the very different domestic political regimes of the two Pacific powers. Throughout history, relations between dominant and rising states have been uneasy—and often violent. Established powers tend to regard themselves as the defenders of an international order that they helped to create and from which they continue to benefit; rising powers feel constrained, even cheated, by the status quo and struggle against it to take what they think is rightfully theirs. Indeed, this story line, with its Shakespearean overtones of youth and age, vigor and decline, is among the oldest in recorded history. As far back as the fifth century BC the great Greek historian Thucydides began his study of the Peloponnesian War with the deceptively simple observation that the war’s deepest, truest cause was “the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” The fact that the U.S.-China relationship is competitive, then, is simply no surprise. But these countries are not just any two great powers: Since the end of the Cold War the United States has been the richest and most powerful nation in the world; China is, by contrast, the state whose capabilities have been growing most rapidly. America is still “number one,” but China is fast gaining ground. The stakes are about as high as they can get, and the potential for conflict particularly fraught. At least insofar as the dominant powers are concerned, rising states tend to be troublemakers. As a nation’s capabilities grow, its leaders generally define their interests more expansively and seek a greater degree of influence over what is going on around them. This means that those in ascendance typically attempt not only to secure their borders but also to reach out beyond them, taking steps to ensure access to markets, materials and transportation routes; to protect their citizens far from home; to defend their foreign friends and allies; to promulgate their religious or ideological beliefs; and, in general, to have what they consider to be their rightful say in the affairs of their region and of the wider world. As they begin to assert themselves, ascendant states typically feel impelled to challenge territorial boundaries, international institutions and hierarchies of prestige that were put in place when they were still relatively weak. Like Japan in the late nineteenth century, or Germany at the turn of the twentieth, rising powers want their place in the sun. This, of course, is what brings them into conflict with the established great powers—the so-called status quo states—who are the architects, principal beneficiaries and main defenders of any existing international system. The resulting clash of interests between the two sides has seldom been resolved peacefully. Recognizing the growing threat to their position, dominant powers (or a coalition of status quo states) have occasionally tried to attack and destroy a competitor before it can grow strong enough to become a threat. Others—hoping to avoid war—have taken the opposite approach: attempting to appease potential challengers, they look for ways to satisfy their demands and ambitions and seek to incorporate them peacefully into the existing international order. But however sincere, these efforts have almost always ended in failure. Sometimes the reason clearly lies in the demands of the rising state. As was true of Adolf Hitler’s Germany, an aggressor may have ambitions that are so extensive as to be impossible for the status quo powers to satisfy without effectively consigning themselves to servitude or committing national suicide. Even when the demands being made of them are less onerous, the dominant states are often either reluctant to make concessions, thereby fueling the frustrations and resentments of the rising power, or too eager to do so, feeding its ambitions and triggering a spiral of escalating demands. Successful policies of appeasement are conceivable in theory but in practice have proven devilishly difficult to implement. This is why periods of transition, when a new, ascending power begins to overtake the previously dominant state, have so often been marked by war.

US wont accept multipolar constraints – leaders wont accept multipolarity

Schwenninger 2007(directs the New America Foundation's Economic Growth Program, and the Global Middle Class Initiative. He is also the former director of the Bernard L. Schwartz Fellows Program) The United States and the Emerging Powers” http://newamerica.net/node/8639

The second problem involves the lack of multilateral and regional institutions to make a multipolar world work both in terms of international security and the world economy. The United States has accepted today’s emerging powers but without embracing the idea of a multipolar world. As a result, it has neither accepted the normative constraints on its own behavior that an orderly multipolar world requires. Nor has it offered the leadership needed to fashion new institutions to give Brazil, China, and India a greater voice in the management of world affairs. The absence of China from the G-8 and the leadership of the IMF, the principal consulting bodies regarding the world economy, and Brazil and India from the U.N. Security Council amply illustrate this gap between world realities and its institutional architecture.

### Transition = War 2

Superpower transitions necessitate global wars.

Khanna, ’09 – Director of the Global Governance Initiative at the New America Foundation (Parag, The second world: how emerging powers are redefining global competition in the twenty-first century, p. 337-338)

Even this scenario is optimistic, for superpowers are by definition willing to encroach on the turf of others—changing the world map in the process. Much as in geology, such tectonic shifts always result in earthquakes, particularly as rising powers tread on the entrenched position of the reigning hegemon.56 The sole exception was the twentieth century Anglo-American transition in which Great Britain and the United States were allies and shared a common culture—and even that took two world wars to complete.57 As the relative levels of power of the three superpowers draw closer, the temptation of the number-two to preemptively knock out the king on the hill grows, as does the lead power’s incentive to preventatively attack and weaken its ascending rival before being eclipsed.58 David Hume wrote, “It is not a great disproportion between ourselves and others which produces envy, but on the contrary, a proximity.”59 While the density of contacts among the three superpowers makes the creation of a society of states more possible than ever—all the foreign ministers have one anothers’ mobile phone numbers—the deep differences in interests among the three make forging a “culture of peace” more challenging than ever.60 China seas, hyperterrorism with nuclear weapons, an attack in the Gulf of Aden or the Straits of Malacca. The uncertain alignments of lesser but still substantial powers such as Russia, Japan, and India could also cause escalation. Furthermore, America’s foreign lenders could pull the plug to undermine its grand strategy, sparking economic turmoil, political acrimony, and military tension. War brings profit to the military-industrial complex and is always supported by the large patriotic camps on all sides. Yet the notion of a Sino-U.S. rivalry to lead the world is also premature and simplistic, for in the event of their conflict, Europe would be the winner, as capital would flee to its sanctuaries. These great tensions are being played out in the world today, as each superpower strives to attain the most advantageous position for itself, while none are powerful enough to dictate the system by itself. Global stability thus hangs between the bookends Raymond Aron identified as “peace by law” and “peace by empire,” the former toothless and the latter prone to excess.61 Historically, successive iterations of balance of power and collective security doctrines have evolved from justifying war for strategic advantage into building systems to avoid it, with the post-Napoleonic “Concert of Europe” as the first of the modern era.62 Because it followed rules, it was itself something of a societal system.\* Even where these attempts at creating a stable world order have failed—including the League of Nations after World War I—systemic learning takes place in which states (particularly democracies) internalize the lessons of the past into their institutions to prevent history from repeating itself.63 Toynbee too viewed history as progressive rather than purely cyclical, a wheel that not only turns around and around but also moves forward such that Civilization (with a big C) could become civilized.64 But did he “give too much credit to time’s arrows and not enough to time’s cycle”?65 Empires and superpowers usually promise peace but bring wars.66 The time to recognize the current revolutionary situation is now—before the next world war.67

Transition wont be smooth – the US will cling to a false unipolar reality

David P. Calleo 2009 (University Professor at The Johns Hopkins University and Dean Acheson Professor at its Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)) “Follies of Power: America’s Unipolar Fantasy” p. 4-5

It is tempting to believe that America’s recent misadventures will discredit and suppress our hegemonic longings and that, following the presidential election of 2008, a new administration will abandon them. But so long as our identity as a nation is intimately bound up with seeing ourselves as the world’s most powerful country, at the heart of a global system, hegemony is likely to remain the recurring obsession of our official imagination, the id´ee fixe of our foreign policy. America’s hegemonic ambitions have, after all, suffered severe setbacks before. Less than half a century has passed since the “lesson of Vietnam.” But that lesson faded without forcing us to abandon the old fantasies of omnipotence. The fantasies merely went into remission, until the fall of the Soviet Union provided an irresistible occasion for their return. Arguably, in its collapse, the Soviet Union proved to be a greater danger to America’s own equilibrium than in its heyday. Dysfunctional imaginations are scarcely a rarity – among individuals or among nations. “Reality” is never a clear picture that imposes itself from without. Imaginations need to collaborate. They synthesize old and new images, concepts, and ideas and fuse language with emotions – all according to the inner grammar of our minds. These synthetic constructions become our reality, our way of depicting the world in which we live. Inevitably, our imaginations present us with only a partial picture. As Walter Lippmann once put it, our imaginations create a “pseudo-environment between ourselves and the world.”2 Every individual, therefore, has his own particular vision of reality, and every nation tends to arrive at a favored collective view that differs from the favored view of other nations. When powerful and interdependent nations hold visions of the world severely at odds with one another, the world grows dangerous.

### Heg Sustainable

#### Heg is sustainable- challengers can’t make up the power differential, and trends point toward continued unipolarity

Beckley 2012 (Michael, PhD candidate at the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Columbia, The Unipolar Era: Why American Power Persists and China’s Rise Is Limited, Dissertation found on google scholar)

More important, the gap in defense spending likely understates the true military gap because U.S. economic superiority literally gives the United States “more bang for the buck” – each dollar it spends on the military produces more force than each dollar China spends. In a separate study, I found that developing countries systematically fail at warfare, regardless of the size of their defense budgets, because they lack the economic capacity to maintain, modernize, and integrate individual technologies into cohesive military systems.206 Multivariate regressions suggest that military effectiveness is determined by a country’s level of economic development, as measured by per capita income, even after controlling for numerous material, social, and political factors. As noted earlier, China’s per capita income has declined relative to that of the United States. China’s defense industry has also fallen further behind: in 2008, the U.S. share of the world conventional arms market surged to 68 percent while China’s share dropped below 1.5 percent. If history is any guide, this growing economic gap is also a growing military gap. The PLA may look increasingly respectable on paper, but its performance in battle against the United States would not necessarily be much better than that of, say, Iraq circa 1991. Indeed, an independent task force of more than thirty experts recently found “no evidence to support the notion that China will become a peer military competitor of the United States.…The military balance today and for the foreseeable future strongly favors the United States and its allies.”207 Figure 3.20: Share of World Arms Transfer Agreements, 1993-­‐2008 Source: Congressional Research Service, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2001-­‐2008, p. 71; Ibid., Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-­‐2000, p. 73. None of this should be cause for chest-­‐thumping. China can “pose problems without catching up,” compensating for its technological and organizational inferiority by utilizing asymmetric strategies, local knowledge, and a greater willingness to bear costs.208 In particular, some experts believe China’s “anti-area-­‐denial” capabilities are outpacing U.S. efforts to counter them.209 There are reasons to doubt this claim – the Pentagon is developing sophisticated countermeasures and Chinese writings may purposefully exaggerate PLA capabilities.210 There is also reason to doubt the strategic importance of China’s capabilities because the United States may be able to launch effective attacks from positions beyond the reach of Chinese missiles and submarines.211 It is certainly true, however, that the U.S. military has vulnerabilities, especially in littorals and low-­‐altitudes close to enemy territory. But this has always been the case. From 1961 to 1968 North Vietnamese and Vietcong units brought down 1,700 U.S. helicopters and aircraft with simple antiaircraft artillery and no early warning radar.212 Sixty years ago, China projected a huge army into Korea and killed tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers. Yes, weak adversaries can impose significant costs, but evidence of American vulnerability is not the same as evidence of American decline. Conclusion Change is inevitable, but it is often incremental and nonlinear. In the coming decades, China may surge out of its unimpressive condition and close the gap with the United States. Or China might continue to rise in place – steadily improving its capabilities in absolute terms while stagnating, or even declining, relative to the United States. The best that can be done is to make plans for the future on the basis of present trends. And what the trends suggest is that America’s economic, technological, and military lead over China will be an enduring feature of international relations, not a passing moment in time, but a deeply embedded material condition that will persist for the foreseeable future.

### Heg Sustainable 2

Heg is sustainable – US has dominance in all areas of power and its not going anywhere

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(Stephen and William, World Out of Balance, pg 27- 31)

“Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing,” historian Paul Kennedy observes: “I have returned to all of the comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation comes close.” Though assessments of U.S. power have changed since those words were written in 2002, they remain true. Even when capabilities are understood broadly to include economic, technological, and other wellsprings of national power, they are concentrated in the United States to a degree never before experienced in the history of the modern system of states and thus never contemplated by balance-of-power theorists. The United spends more on defense than all the other major military powers combined, and most of those powers are its allies. Its massive investments in the human, institutional, and technological requisites of military power, cumulated over many decades, make any effort to match U.S. capabilities even more daunting that the gross spending numbers imply. Military research and development (R&D) may best capture the scale of the long-term investment that give the United States a dramatic qualitative edge in military capabilities. As table 2.1 shows, in 2004 U.S. military R&D expenditures were more than six times greater than those of Germany, Japan, France, and Britain combined. By some estimates over half the military R&D expenditures in the world are American. And this disparity has been sustained for decades: over the past 30 years, for example, the United States has invested over three times more than the entire European Union on military R&D. These vast commitments have created a preeminence in military capabilities vis-à-vis all the other major powers that is unique after the seventeenth century. While other powers could contest U.S. forces near their homelands, especially over issues on which nuclear deterrence is credible, the United States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally. This capacity arises from “command of the commons” – that is, unassailable military dominance over the sea, air, and space. As Barry Posen puts it, Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the U.S global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power, including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military, and political assistance….Command of the commons provides the United States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy than any other offshore power has ever had. Posen’s study of American military primacy ratifies Kennedy’s emphasis on the historical importance of the economic foundations of national power. It is the combination of military and economic potential that sets the United States apart from its predecessors at the top of the international system. Previous leading states were either great commercial and naval powers or great military powers on land, never both. The British Empire in its heyday and the United States during the Cold War, for example, shared the world with other powers that matched or exceeded them in some areas. Even at the height of the Pax Britannica, the United Kingdom was outspent, outmanned, and outgunned by both France and Russia. Similarly, at the dawn of the Cold War the United States was dominant economically as well as in air and naval capabilities. But the Soviet Union retained overall military parity, and thanks to geography and investment in land power it had a superior ability to seize territory in Eurasia. The United States’ share of world GDP in 2006, 27.5 percent, surpassed that of any leading state in modern history, with the sole exception of its own position after 1945 (when World War II had temporarily depressed every other major economy). The size of the U.S economy means that its massive military capabilities required roughly 4 percent of its GDP in 2005, far less than the nearly 10 percent it averaged over the peak years of the Cold War, 1950-70, and the burden borne by most of the major powers of the past. As Kennedy sums up, “Being Number One at great cost is one thing; being the world’s single superpower on the cheap is astonishing.”

### Ext.: Sustainable

Trends show strengthening U.S. hegemony

Smith 2010 (Perry a retired U.S. Air Force major general, is the author of six books, including Rules and Tools for Leaders Agusta chronicle,, In a troubled world, America still has a multitude of strengths, accessed: 2/22/10, http://chronicle.augusta.com/2010-02-19/troubled-world-america-still-has-multitude-strengths?v=1266701777 DA 7/15/10)

With so much in the media that is gloom and doom, it might be useful to remind ourselves that America has many fundamental strengths. Here is a listing of some of the political, economic, technological, cultural, creative and entrepreneurial factors that define the United States today. Largest economy. At $14 trillion, our Gross National Product is the largest in the world. You must add up the three next largest -- Japan ($5.5 trillion), China ($4.5 trillion) and Germany ($ 4 trillion) -- to get to America's total. Best military. Although our services have faced many stresses since 9-11, the U.S. military excels in many ways. The only military with a genuine worldwide reach, it has more combat experience than the military of any other nation. Best alliance/coalition potential. Our ability to find coalition partners has been especially helpful to us in countering terrorism (even the Russians and Chinese assist), and in the war in Afghanistan. Best brain/talent sponge. If you live in another country, are really smart and want to get both a great education and an enlightening work experience, the United States will, in most cases, be your first choice. More and better entrepreneurs. It seems to be in our genes. Productive work force. Whereas Japan led the way in the past, recent analyses by a number of international agencies rank the United States first. Ability to bounce back from major setbacks. Just think of what we have faced in the past 70 years -- Pearl Harbor, 1941; Korea, 1950-53; Sputnik, 1957; Vietnam, 1965-1975; Watergate, 1974; the 9-11 attacks, 2001; and the Great Recession, 2007-2009. Venture capital availability. If you are German, Japanese, Chinese or Brazilian with a great idea or a new invention, finding venture capital within your own nation is very hard. Communications reach and cultural influence. Beginning in the 1940s, America has surpassed all others in reaching even the most remote parts of the world. Natural resources. America's supply of coal and natural gas is enormous. In addition, the potential of solar power is huge. Unlike northern Europe, Russia and northern China, America has a great amount of sunshine. Being windy is another American asset. The English language. For almost 100 years, English has been dominant. Computer power. Led by such corporations as Google, EMC, Cisco, IBM and Intel, America holds the top spot in gross computer power. Culture of lifetime learning. Americans have a great love of learning. A high percentage of mature Americans, often encouraged by company policies on pay and promotions, pursue college and postgraduate education. Technical colleges. These colleges are a treasure for those seeking good jobs. The CSRA has two first-rate schools, Augusta Tech and Aiken Tech. Universities. Sixty-six of the 100 top universities in the world are American. Agricultural sector. Only the Brazilians come close to the productivity of the American farmer. Contributions of philanthropies. It is not just Bill and Melinda Gates who give away money with great skill. Foundations in the CSRA help make our community a better place to live, work and enjoy our lives. Birth rate of 2.1. This ideal birth rate, combined with our ability to attract so many talented and hard working people from other nations, should ensure that we will meet the challenges of the future. Diversity. Having so many of us coming from different national, ethnic, religious and linguistic groups allows America to interact comfortably with the world's many cultures. Nanotechnology, biotechnology and genome research. America leads the world. Fundamental optimism. Americans continue to have high confidence in their ability to solve problems, as well as to get things done and done well. This probably is our greatest strength. I would like to close on a personal note. In the more than 75 years that I have had the blessing of being an American, only twice have I been pessimistic about America's future. First, in the period between the Pearl Harbor attack and the Battle of Midway (I had witnessed the attack, and in the months following I read lots of scary headlines about Wake Island, Guam, Malaya, Singapore and Bataan). Second, in 1969 when I returned from Vietnam and observed America in turmoil. In sum, sustained pessimism can create a death spiral for any organization or institution. Tough-minded realism with an overlay of optimism is the key to our future**.**

US Heg is high

Bandow 10 (Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the CATO institute. He worked as special assistant to President Reagan and editor of the political magazine Inquiry. He writes regularly for leading publications such as Fortune magazine, National Interest,Wall Street Journal, and Washington Times. He holds a J.D. from Stanford University.)

There's no other reason to hike defense spending. The U.S. dominates the world as never before. American ideals helped topple the Soviet empire. The U.S. possesses the largest and most productive economy, far outdistancing any rival, as well as undoubted military supremacy. The U.S. accounts for one-third of the world's defense outlays and has the most advanced equipment, best variety of forces and largest number of allies. Indeed, the U.S. and its friends are responsible for 80% of world defense spending. Washington's potential enemies--Cuba, Iraq, North Korea--are pathetic. Possible future rivals like China and Russia are years away from offering effective competition

### Ext.: Sustainable 2

US hegemony is sustainable – supremacy in all aspects of power and global support

Min 04 (Min Ye, expert on China, Princeton University, “The US Hegemony and Implication for China,” http://www.chinaipa.org/cpaq/v1i1/Paper\_Ye.pdf)

Clearly Waltz argued that the unipolarity in the wake of the Cold War was temporary. For one, nations rise and decline. The U.S relative power will decline and it will increasingly become difficult for it to preserve unipolarity, as Robert Gilpin argued. Furthermore, other nations will come into each other’ aid to balance against the U.S, because minor states feel safer to be with other minor states. Waltz’s prediction may not hold, however, if we consider the following aspects of U.S power. First, from the aggregate power perspective, the U.S is simply too powerful for the other nations to catch up. William Wohlforth has done a comprehensive empirical study of U.S power, and concluded that U.S has enormous supremacy in all aspects of military power and almost all aspects of economic power as well, not to mention its normative and cultural powers. He also pointed out the U.S is a “benign hegemon” and it is in the world’s benefit for its presence. Similarly, Joanne Gowa observed that allies of the U.S benefited from trading with the U.S, hence it is in the nations’ interest to have an enduring U.S hegemony. Second, alliance against the U.S is unlikely and ineffective. Stephen Walt has listed the causes for alliance formation. Alliances form not to balance the biggest power but to balance against the biggest threat. Threat, in turn, is determined by (1) aggregate power, (2) geographic proximity, (3) offensive power, and (4) aggressive intention. The U.S is distant from all major powers geographically, although the most powerful nation in the world. Clearly the U.S does not demonstrate aggressive intentions against other major powers. Hence their balancing against the U.S is unlikely. Wohlforth observed that the other major powers before they balance against the U.S face counterbalancing of their own. China was perceived as a potential balancer of the U.S in many cases. Yet, China faces counterbalancing from Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Russia, and India in the Asian continent alone. Similarly, the other major powers— Russia, Japan, India, and Europe—have more difficulties dealing with their relationships than their relations with the U.S. In belief, the American hegemon not only does not face substantial balancing but serve as a balancer against others’ balancing actions. As a result, we see more “bandwagoning” with the U.S superpower rather than “balancing”. Finally, as John Ikenberry and other scholars observed, the U.S unipolarity is a hegemony based on “constitutional order”. At the end of the World War II, alongside its supremacy in power, the U.S also established the UN, IMF, World Bank, and other institutions in dealing with weapons proliferation and managing relations with allies. U.S exercise of power was self restraint through its memberships in the international institutions. Consequently, the other nations in the world can not only benefit from this constitutional order but to an extent exercise checks on the sole superpower and feel safer even in the unipolar world.

Obama is increasing what is already the largest funding of any military in the world

Elrick 09 (John, “Politicians should heed words of past war heroes”, The Barnstorm Patriot, June 26, 2009)

In fact, as SIPRI points out, the U.S. spent seven times more on its armed forces than the second-biggest spender, China (at $84.9 billion); and more than the next 14 countries combined. U.S. military spending alone accounted for 42 percent of the total $1.46 trillion spent on arms by governments world-wide. While the growth in military spending has been ongoing for some time, it was the 71-percent growth during the presidency of George W. Bush that caused worldwide arms spending to be 45 percent greater than it was just a decade ago. It’s appropriate to ask: Are all these arms necessary and is the U.S. really all that safer after spending so much more than all the other countries combined? The evidence from around the world would suggest we are less safe. Many on the right have argued, and continue to argue, that such increases in defense spending are necessary to fight the threat of terrorism. But another former war hero from WW II, former senator from South Dakota and 1972 Democratic presidential candidate George McGovern, makes the key point that while the terrorists are a danger, they are not a military problem. As he said in his June 1 Wall Street Journal opinion piece arguing we could defend ourselves with a military budget half the current size, “the terrorist has no battleships, bombers, missiles, tanks, organized armies or heavy artillery.” No, the reason we spend so much on the military isn’t because we need to for our defense, but rather, not unlike the Drug War, the military-industrial complex has become a jobs program that must be maintained at all costs, even as it is bankrupting the country and making the world a more dangerous place. Just as the prison guard lobby in California supplanted the teachers lobby in size and clout, calling for increased spending on prisons and harsher drug crime sentences to help keep the prisons filled, there are now thousands of jobs in every congressional district that depend on that ever-increasing military budget to maintain those weapon-making jobs and keep all those military bases in the states and around the world open for business. Make no mistake, it is not just Bush and the Republicans who want to keep unnecessarily increasing spending on arms. The Democrats are just as guilty. Even President Obama has proposed an increase in the 2010 military budget that Congress approved. Of course, that didn’t satisfy Republican Sen. James Inhofe, who absurdly claimed that “President Obama is disarming America. Never before has a president so ravaged the military at a time of war.”

### Ext.: Sustainable 3

U.S. Hegemony is sustainable – The U.S. is dominant in every single sector – assumes Obama

Kreft, Senior Policy Advisor at CDU, 2009 (Heinrich Kreft, senior foreign policy advisor to the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the german bundestag, The World Today, February 2009, p. 11)

During the presidential election campaign, both Barack Obama and his Republican opponent John McCain expressed the view that the United States was and ought to remain the guarantor of international stability and the indispensable stabilising power. Against the backdrop of the present financial and economic crisis and rekindled discussion about the decline of US power, it is easy to overlook the fact that America is structurally superior to all other countries and will remain so for the foreseeable future. THE GEOGRAPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF THE UNITED States, its material resources and human capital, its military strength and economic competitiveness as well as its liberal political and economic traditions, are the ingredients of superiority. It has the capacity to heal its own wounds like no other country. STRENGTHS The US not only possesses large deposits of natural resources and vast areas of productive farmland, but also enjoys favourable medium- and long-term demographic trends. Thanks to immigration and a high birth rate, it has a young population compared to Europe, Japan, Russia as well as China. This makes the burden of providing for an ageing population far less onerous. In spite of the present crisis, the economy, which accounts for more than a quarter of the world's gross domestic product (GDP), is essentially vibrant. Over the past twenty five years, its growth has been significantly higher than Europe's and Japan's; the economy is adaptable and more innovative than any other. It is the most competitive globally, with particular strengths in crucial strategic areas such as nanotechnology and bioengineering. The US has the best universities and research institutes and trains more engineers in relation to its population than any other major economy. It invests 2.6 percent of its GDP in higher education, compared with 1.2 percent in Europe and 1.1 percent in Japan. President Barack Obama's plan for more educational investment aims to maintain this advantage also against China, which is increasing its higher education investments. In the military domain too, no other country comes close to matching the capability of the US to project its power globally. America accounts for almost half of global military spending, six times more than China, its only potential rival. Current defence spending, however, at 4.2 percent of GDP, is still far below the double-digit Cold War peak. Even if the cost of intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan runs at an annual figure of $125 billion, this is less than one per cent of GDP and hence considerably lower than the cost of the Vietnam war. In contrast to the 'hard power' of military strength, Iraq and the Guantánamo Bay and Abu Ghraib problems have severely dented the image and thereby diminished its 'soft power'. Nevertheless, the structural components of soft power remain intact, from US mass culture - the dominance of American global communications such as the internet and television - to the unfailing appeal of its universities.

### Ext.: Sustainable 4

Heg is sustainable –multipolarity is nowhere on the horizon

Brooks and Wohlforth 9 (Stephen, Professor of Government at Dartmouth, William C, Professor of Government and Chair of the Department of Government at Dartmouth, March/April 2009, “Reshaping the World Order”, EBSCO)

Only a few years ago, pundits were absorbed in debates about American “empire.” Now, the conventional wisdom is that the world is rapidly approaching the end of the unipolar system with the United States as the sole superpower. A dispassionate look at the facts shows that this view understates U.S. power as much as recent talk of empire exaggerated it. That the United States weighs more on the traditional scales of world power than has any other state in modern history is as true now as it was when the commentator Charles Krauthammer proclaimed the advent of a “unipolar moment” in these pages nearly two decades ago. The United States continues to account for about half the world’s defense spending and one-quarter of its economic output. Some of the reasons for bearishness concern public policy problems that can be fixed (expensive health care in the United States, for example), whereas many of the reasons for bullishness are more fundamental (such as the greater demographic challenges faced by the United States’ potential rivals). So why has opinion shifted so quickly from visions of empire to gloomy declinism? One reason is that the United States’ successes at the turn of the century led to irrational exuberance, thereby setting unreasonably high standards for measuring the superpower’s performance. From 1999 to 2003, seemingly easy U.S. victories in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq led some to conclude that the United States could do what no great power in history had managed before: effortlessly defeat its adversaries. It was only a matter of time before such pie-in-the-sky benchmarks proved unattainable. Subsequent difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq dashed illusions of omnipotence, but these upsets hardly displaced the United States as the world’s leading state, and there is no reason to believe that the militaries of its putative rivals would have performed any better. The United States did not cease to be a superpower when its policies in Cuba and Vietnam failed in the 1960s; bipolarity lived on for three decades. Likewise, the United States remains the sole superpower today. Another key reason for the multipolar mania is “the rise of the rest.” Impressed by the rapid economic growth of China and India, many write as if multipolarity has already returned. But such pronouncements mistake current trajectories for final outcomes—a common strategic error with deep psychological roots. The greatest concern in the Cold War, for example, came not from the Soviet Union’s actually attaining parity with the United States but from the expectation that it would do so in the future. Veterans of that era recall how the launch of Sputnik in 1957 fed the perception that Soviet power was growing rapidly, leading some policymakers and analysts to start acting as if the Soviet Union were already as powerful as the United States. A state that is rising should not be confused with one that has risen, just as a state that is declining should not be written off as having already declined. China is generally seen as the country best positioned to emerge as a superpower challenger to the United States. Yet depending on how one measures GDP, China’s economy is between 20 percent and 43 percent the size of the United States’. More dramatic is the difference in GDP per capita, for which all measures show China’s as being less than 10 percent of the United States’. Absent a 1930s-style depression that spares potential U.S. rivals, the United States will not be replaced as the sole superpower for a very long time. Real multipolarity—an international system of three or more evenly matched powers—is nowhere on the horizon. Relative power between states shifts slowly. This tendency to conflate trends with outcomes is often driven by the examination in isolation of certain components of state power. If the habit during the Cold War was to focus on military power, the recent trend has been to single out economic output. No declinist tract is complete without a passage noting that although the United States may remain a military superpower, economic multipolarity is, or soon will be, the order of the day. Much as highlighting the Soviet Union’s military power meant overlooking the country’s economic and technological feet of clay, examining only economic output means putting on blinders. In 1991, Japan’s economy was two-thirds the size of the United States’, which, according to the current popular metric, would mean that with the Soviet Union’s demise, the world shifted from bipolarity to, well, bipolarity. Such a partial assessment of power will produce no more accurate an analysis today. Nor will giving in to apprehension about the growing importance of nonstate actors. The National Intelligence Council’s report Global Trends 2025 grabbed headlines by forecasting the coming multipolarity, anticipating a power shift as much to nonstate actors as to fast-growing countries. But nonstate actors are nothing new—compare the scale and scope of today’s pirates off the Somali coast with those of their eighteenth-century predecessors or the political power of today’s multinational corporations with that of such behemoths as the British East India Company—and projections of their rise may well be as much hype as reflections of reality. And even if the power of nonstate actors is rising, this should only increase the incentives for interstate cooperation; nonstate threats do not affect just the United States. Most nonstate actors’ behavior, moreover, still revolves around influencing the decisions of states. Nongovernmental organizations typically focus on trying to get states to change their policies, and the same is true of most terrorists.

### A/T “Defense Spending/Overstretch”

Heg sustainable - military presence and spending

Kagan, 07 – Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136)

The world’s failure to balance against the superpower is the more striking because the United States, notwithstanding its difficult interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, continues to expand its power and military reach and shows no sign of slowing this expansion even after the 2008 elections. The American defense budget has surpassed $500 billion per year, not including supplemental spending totaling over $100 billion on Iraq and Afghanistan. This level of spending is sustainable, moreover, both economically and politically. 14 As the American military budget rises, so does the number of overseas American military bases. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has built or expanded bases in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia; in Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in Europe; and in the Philippines, Djibouti, Oman, and Qatar. Two decades ago, hostility to the American military presence began forcing the United States out of the Philippines and seemed to be undermining support for American bases in Japan. Today, the Philippines is rethinking that decision, and the furor in Japan has subsided. In places like South Korea and Germany, it is American plans to reduce the U.S. military presence that stir controversy, not what one would expect if there was a widespread fear or hatred of overweening American power. Overall, there is no shortage of other countries willing to host U.S. forces, a good indication that much of the world continues to tolerate and even lend support to American geopolitical primacy if only as a protection against more worrying foes. 15

### Multipolarity Bad

Multipolarity causes great power war and kills cooperation on every important issue

Patrick 2010 (November/December, Stewart, Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations, Irresponsible Stakeholders? Subtitle: The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers, Foreign Affairs, lexis)

MULTIPOLARITY WITHOUT MULTILATERALISM The world remains more Hobbesian than the White House cares to admit. Global interdependence is increasing, but fundamental interests still collide and strategic rivalries persist. The Obama administration appears to regard the decline of U.S. hegemony with equanimity, anticipating that shared national interests and mutual security dilemmas will permit the established and the emerging powers to pursue collective goals, such as arresting nuclear proliferation, mitigating climate change, combating terrorism, and preserving an open, liberal international economic system. But it has left a darker scenario unexplored: What if the new global order leads to an era of multipolarity without multilateralism? On balance, the diffusion of power is likely to exacerbate the strategic rivalry between the established and the emerging powers, and among the emerging powers themselves. The world's major nations, after all, are playing more than one game. They may cooperate on financial reform or antiterrorism but also may compete vigorously for market share, strategic resources, political influence, and military advantage. The question for the United States is how to manage relationships with rising powers that contain elements of both partnership and rivalry. Consider U.S.-Chinese relations. The Obama administration seeks "strategic reassurance" about China's intentions in East Asia -- that is, indications from Beijing that it will not imperil the security of its neighbors or challenge existing U.S. alliances as it increases its global role. Although China has economic incentives not to rock the boat in the near term, the United States' and China's long-term objectives may be less compatible. The United States wants a stable balance of power in East Asia, a region that China seeks to dominate. It also wants China to become a pluralist democracy -- something the Chinese Communist Party presumably opposes. Rivalry among the emerging powers may also complicate multilateral cooperation. This is most obvious between China and India, which share a disputed border extending over 2,000 miles, compete for regional influence and natural resources, and remain acutely sensitive to changes in their relative military capabilities. China's cultivation of India's neighbors is making New Delhi afraid of strategic encirclement, and maritime competition between the two powers is increasing in the Indian Ocean. Finally, even on those issues on which the basic interests of the established and the emerging powers align -- terrorism, climate change, nuclear proliferation, or global financial stability -- these states' priorities may differ. The issue of North Korea is an obvious example. Both the United States and China want the North Korean nuclear program eliminated. But whereas Washington places a high priority on this objective, Beijing seeks above all to preserve cordial relations with Pyongyang. It fears the anarchy of a failed state on its borders and would rather maintain the status quo than see the Korean Peninsula reunified under a democratic government that might prove hostile to Chinese interests. Beijing had these motives in mind when it ensured that a UN Security Council resolution in July addressing the sinking of a South Korean naval vessel earlier this year offered only a tepid condemnation, failing to indict by name the obvious perpetrator, North Korea.

## \*A/T “Balancing”\*

### General

No counterbalancing- bandwagoning is more likely- maintaining the power gap key to prevent challengers

Fiammenghi 2011 (Davide, postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Politics, Institutions, History at the University of Bologna, The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics; A Neorealist Synthesis, International Security, Spring, lexis)

In principle, the absolute security threshold should not pose the same problem because of the logical limits in determining it. Ideally, the absolute threshold should represent 50 percent of the capabilities in the system, because at this level the sum of all the forces opposing the aspiring hegemon is insufficient to successfully balance it. Still, it is useful to consider William Wohlforth's admonition: "If balancing were the frictionless, costless activity assumed in some balance-of-power theories, then the unipolar power would need more than 50 percent of the capabilities in the great power system to stave off a counterpoise. . . . But such expectations miss the fact that alliance politics always impose costs." 59 It is therefore reasonable to assume that the absolute security threshold is around 45 percent of the military capabilities in the system. This is the figure William Thompson suggests in describing a near-unipolar system. 60 In this light, the absence of balancing against the United States today appears less puzzling. The United States has already moved beyond the absolute threshold, making balancing futile. 61 Levy and Thompson raise the important question of why other states failed to balance against the United States when it was a rising power but not yet a hegemon. 62 Part of the answer lies in the United States' unusual path to primacy. For decades, the Soviet Union maintained a rough balance with the United States. 63 U.S. primacy resulted from the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union. It may be an exaggeration to suggest that the United States became a hegemon by accident, but the outcome was not planned. 64 The extraordinarily wide gap in capabilities created by the fall of the Soviet Union left other states with little choice but to acquiesce. Countries such as China, Iran, Russia, and Syria, or even Brazil and Pakistan, may not like U.S. primacy, but they lack the capabilities to challenge it. 65 Meanwhile, other countries benefiting from U.S. primacy appear not to be worried about it. The next section considers hegemonic strategies that can soften opposition.

No balancing – US lead is insurmountable and is growing

Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. 19

As illustrated in table 2.1, the United States is by far the largest military spender and has actually increased its share of world military spending in the last twenty years. Moreover, the United States’ lead over its nearest competitor is actually stronger in the security arena than it was in 1988. The Soviet Union was the closest rival in 1988, accounting for 18 percent of the world total, whereas China, the country with the second largest share today, only accounts for 5 percent of the world total. Counting coalitions as potential balancers, the euro area still accounts for a lower share today than did the Soviet Union in 1988. The European Union, on the other hand, accounts for a larger share than did the Soviet Union in 1988. But the European Union’s share does not amount to even half of the United States’ share of the world total. Without even throwing the technological sophistication of American weaponry (or the collective action problems that many states confront when deciding to act in the national interest) into the balance, it is clear that the United States is peerless in the security sphere and has strengthened its lead in the last two decades. Because of the superiority of American military power, and other states’ dependence on it for effective action, the United States faces very few constraints in the security arena. The 2003 invasion of Iraq is a case in point but there are plenty of other examples. As I will also show in chapter 6, there are also economic advantages associated with this privileged position in the security field. Although some question the utility of armed force, few will contest that the United States is in a league of its own when it comes to security affairs. But what about the economic realm? The real test is whether the United States still towers over other countries economically, and is able to reap economic benefits as a result of its hegemonic position. This is the claim that is likely to be the most carefully scrutinized.

No counter-balancing – no country or group of countries can challenge the US

Kagan, 07 – Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136)

The anticipated global balancing has for the most part not occurred. Russia and China certainly share a common and openly expressed goal of checking American hegemony. They have created at least one institution, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, aimed at resisting American influence in Central Asia, and China is the only power in the world, other than the United States, engaged in a long-term military buildup. But Sino-Russian hostility to American predominance has not yet produced a concerted and cooperative effort at balancing. China ’s buildup is driven at least as much by its own long-term ambitions as by a desire to balance the United States. Russia has been using its vast reserves of oil and natural gas as a lever to compensate for the lack of military power, but it either cannot or does not want to increase its military capability sufficiently to begin counterbalancing the United States. Overall, Russian military power remains in decline. In addition, the two powers do not trust one another. They are traditional rivals, and the rise of China inspires at least as much nervousness in Russia as it does in the United States. At the moment, moreover, China is less abrasively confrontational with the United States. Its dependence on the American market and foreign investment and its perception that the United States remains a potentially formidable adversary mitigate against an openly confrontational approach. In any case, China and Russia cannot balance the United States without at least some help from Europe, Japan, India, or at least some of the other advanced, democratic nations. But those powerful players are not joining the effort. Europe has rejected the option of making itself a counterweight to American power. This is true even among the older members of the European Union, where neither France, Germany, Italy, nor Spain proposes such counterbalancing, despite a public opinion hostile to the Bush administration. Now that the eu has expanded to include the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, who fear threats from the east, not from the west, the prospect of a unified Europe counterbalancing the United States is practically nil. As for Japan and India, the clear trend in recent years has been toward closer strategic cooperation with the United States. If anything, the most notable balancing over the past decade has been aimed not at the American superpower but at the two large powers: China and Russia. In Asia and the Pacific, Japan, Australia, and even South Korea and the nations of Southeast Asia have all engaged in “hedging” against a rising China. This has led them to seek closer relations with Washington, especially in the case of Japan and Australia. India has also drawn closer to the United States and is clearly engaged in balancing against China. Russia ’s efforts to increase its influence over what it regards as its “near abroad,” meanwhile, have produced tensions and negative reactions in the Baltics and other parts of Eastern Europe. Because these nations are now members of the European Union, this has also complicated eu-Russian relations. On balance, traditional allies of the United States in East Asia and in Europe, while their publics may be more anti-American than in the past, nevertheless pursue policies that reflect more concern about the powerful states in their midst than about the United States. 12 This has provided a cushion against hostile public opinion and offers a foundation on which to strengthen American relations with these countries after the departure of Bush.

### Europe

#### Europe can’t balance- economy’s wrecked and no military

Copley June 2012 (Gregory R., editor of Defense & Foreign Affairs’ Strategic Policy, Strategic Policy in an Age of Global Realignment, lexis)

4. EU/Eurozone Prospects. The May 2012 French Presidential elections meant that, more than ever, Germany -- to all intents -- is Europe, strategically speaking. France no longer has the capacity to challenge, or balance, Germany in the eurozone. However, the unwillingness of eurozone leaders Germany and France to decouple economic and financial issues within the currency zone will continue to extract a growing cost on the Continental European economies. This, potentially coupled with a plateauing of demand from the PRC and India (among others) for German manufactured goods, could bring the eurozone to a further period of stagnation. The option of a break-up of the eurozone, and the reversion to national currencies by some euro states (such as Greece, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal [the PIIGS states], etc.) may be dampened by the fact that such a move may not address the underlying fiscal structures. But tempers are clearly fraying within the EU, and moves toward the creation of Europe as a nation-state have slowed commensurately, even as Germany calls for greater integration as the antidote. Indeed, the desire for EU unity seems mainly driven by German fears of a return to 19th and 20th century nationalism and its potential to generate military competitiveness on the Continent. Claims that this fear is no longer a factor in German and French desires to sustain the eurozone miss the visceral underpinning of Franco-German policy in this regard. In the meantime, EU strategic projection has also come, in relative terms, to a standstill, and those EU and other European states active in the Coalition war in Afghanistan are anxious to withdraw from that engagement and to reduce military costs as rapidly as possible. All that this will do will be to further reduce the EU's diplomatic influence on Turkey, the Middle East, Africa, and on global issues. Italy, which no longer has a democratically-elected government, is the bellweather of how European economies are being driven into decline.

### Brazil/Latin America

Latin American countries can’t balance the US- regional opponents and domestic corruption prevent

Crandall 2011 (Russell, Associate Professor of International Politics at Davidson College, Principal Director for the Western Hemisphere at the U.S. Department of Defense in 2009 and Director for Andean Affairs at the National Security Council in 2010-11, The Post-American Hemisphere Subtitle: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America, Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis)

On August 18, 2010, a Venezuelan drug trafficker named Walid Makled was arrested in Colombia. U.S. officials accused him of shipping ten tons of cocaine a month to the United States, and they made a formal extradition request to try him in New York. Although the Venezuelan government had also made an extradition request for crimes Makled allegedly committed in Venezuela, senior U.S. diplomats were confident that the Colombian government would add him to the list of hundreds of suspects it had already turned over to U.S. judicial authorities in recent years. So it came as a surprise when Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos announced in November that he had promised Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez that Makled would be extradited to Venezuela, not the United States. Colombia, Washington's closest ally in South America, appeared to be unveiling a new strategic calculus, one that gave less weight to its relationship with Washington. What made the decision all the more unexpected is that the U.S. government still provides Colombia with upward of $500 million annually in development and security assistance, making Colombia one of the world's top recipients of U.S. aid. For the United States in Latin America today, apparently, $500 million just does not buy what it used to. Across the region in recent years, the United States has seen its influence decline. Latin American countries are increasingly looking for solutions among themselves, forming their own regional organizations that exclude the United States and seeking friends and opportunities outside of Washington's orbit. Some U.S. allies are even reconsidering their belief in the primacy of relations with the United States. Much of this has to do with the end of the Cold War, a conflict that turned Latin America into a battleground between U.S. and Soviet proxies. Washington has also made a series of mistakes in the years since then, arrogantly issuing ultimatums that made it even harder to get what it wanted in Latin America. At the same time as U.S. influence has diminished, Latin America's own capabilities have grown. The region has entered into an era of unprecedented economic, political, and diplomatic success. Most visibly, Brazil has emerged as an economic powerhouse, attracting foreign investment with an economy that grew 7.5 percent last year. (Regionwide, average GDP growth last year was 5.6 percent.) Regular free elections and vibrant civil societies are now commonplace in Latin America, and the region's diplomats are more visible and confident in global forums than ever before. After decades on the receiving end of lectures from Washington and Brussels, Latin American leaders are eager to advertise their recent gains. Santos has been known to tell visiting foreign counterparts that this will be "Latin America's century." Although star performers such as Brazil and Chile have recently surged ahead, Latin America has yet to realize its full collective diplomatic and political capacity. The problems that have plagued the region in the past -- income inequality, a lack of law and order, illicit trafficking networks -- still exist, threatening to derail its hard-earned successes. Guatemala, to take just one example, not only ranks among the world's poorest countries; it also has one of the highest homicide rates in the world, with 6,000 people murdered each year in a population of only 13 million. Ironically, moreover, Latin America's entry into a "post-hegemonic" era, a product of its own advancements, could undermine its past progress. As the balance of power in the region is redistributed, unexpected alliances and enmities could arise. Many observers have assumed that less U.S. involvement would be an inherently positive development, but that may be too optimistic. No one should underestimate the capacity of the Venezuela-led bloc of quasi-authoritarian leftist governments to stop the regional trend toward greater openness and democracy -- values that the bloc sees as representing a capitulation to the U.S.-controlled global system.

Multiple regional powers constrain Brazil

Crandall 2011 (Russell, Associate Professor of International Politics at Davidson College, Principal Director for the Western Hemisphere at the U.S. Department of Defense in 2009 and Director for Andean Affairs at the National Security Council in 2010-11, The Post-American Hemisphere Subtitle: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America, Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis)

Latin America's economic growth and political stability are driving an unprecedented power shift within the region. Countries are reassessing their interests and alliances, and the more confident among them are flexing their muscles. Instead of looking to Washington for guidance, Latin American countries are increasingly working among themselves to conduct diplomacy, pursue shared objectives, and, at times, even spark new rivalries. Brazil's emergence as a serious power is a direct result of the increasing absence of U.S. influence in the region. Sensing an opportunity to gain the regional stature that has long eluded it, the country has begun to act more assertively. But complicating Brazil's power play is the reaction from its fellow Latin American nations. Colombian, Mexican, and Peruvian officials, among others, talk privately about their dislike of Brazil's arrogant diplomacy. In some quarters, Brazil's responses to developments such as Chávez's ongoing assault on Venezuela's democracy and even the 2009 coup in Honduras have undermined its credibility as a serious leader. (Brasília's reluctance to speak out for hemispheric democracy is particularly inexcusable for a government that includes many officials who suffered under the successive military regimes of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.) Many Latin American officials quietly reveal that they are not eager to see Brazil replace the United States as the hemisphere's hegemon. As one diplomat recently put it, "The new imperialists have arrived, and they speak Portuguese."

## \*\*Impacts\*\*

### Asian Stability

Primacy is the lynchpin of Asian stability—decline risks war, deterrence breakdowns, and prolif

Lieber 2005 – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, page 158)

Parallels between America’s role in East Asia and its involvements in Europe might seem far-fetched. Asia’s geography and history are enormously different, there is no regional organization in any way comparable to the European Union, the area is not a zone of peace, conflict among its leading states remains a potential risk, and there is nothing remotely resembling NATO as a formal multilateral alliance binding the United States to the region’s security and the regional states to one another. Yet, as in Europe, the United States plays a unique stabilizing role in Asia that no other country or organization is capable of playing. Far from being a source of tension or instability, this presence tends to reduce competition among regional powers and to deter armed conflict. Disengagement, as urged by some critics of American primacy, would probably lead to more dangerous competition or power-balancing among the principal countries of Asia as well as to a more unstable security environment and the spread of nuclear weapons. As a consequence, even China acquiesces in America’s regional role despite the fact that it is the one country with the long-term potential to emerge as a true major power competitor.

Global nuclear war – most probable scenario

Jonathan S. Landay (national security and intelligence correspondent for the Contra Costa Times) March 10, 2000, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, “Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts” Lexis

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. And Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster." In an effort to cool the region's tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel Berger all will hopscotch Asia's capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. And while Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

### Ext.: Heg Key Asia Stability

#### *Increasing* heg is key to Asian stability- retrenchment creates a power vacuum and kills US-China relations

Indyk, Lieberthal and O’Hanlon June 2012 (MARTIN S. INDYK is Vice President and Director of the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution. KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL is Director of the John L. Thornton China Center and Senior Fellow in Foreign Policy and Global Economy and Development at the Brookings Institution. MICHAEL E. O'HANLON is Senior Fellow and Director of Research for Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, Scoring Obama's Foreign Policy: A Progressive Pragmatist Tries to Bend History, Foreign Affairs, lexis)

ASIA RISING Obama came to power envisioning a foreign policy based on three pillars: a changed relationship with the rising powers in Asia, particularly China; a transformed relationship between the United States and the Muslim world in which cooperation replaced conflict; and reinvigorated progress toward nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament. Even as his election was making history, however, the financial collapse made economic crisis management the new president's top priority in domestic and foreign policy -- and limited his options in both. Arguably the most difficult steps to avert a catastrophe (such as the passage of the Troubled Asset Relief Program and actions to make possible the rescue of key financial institutions) were taken at the end of George W. Bush's term. But Obama still had to determine which institutions to save and take other steps to arrest the economy's free fall and stimulate growth. This had profound implications for Obama's foreign policy, making quick collective action with other powerful economies essential. The administration worked with countries both in and beyond the traditional g-8 club of major powers, turning to the larger but still fledgling g-20, in which all the emerging economic powers are represented. In the end, the danger of each country's acting to protect its own economy at the expense of others was largely avoided, demonstrating a surprising degree of collaborative common sense about shared interests. But the United States' role in precipitating the crisis through the popularization of dubious financial instruments severely tarnished the Washington-consensus model of deregulated markets, reduced deficits, and liberalized trade. A president less open to soothing the international community might have become a lightning rod for global frustrations, and Obama deserves more credit than he commonly receives for avoiding this outcome and helping keep a catastrophe at bay. This same crisis had the result of accelerating perceptions of Beijing's economic rise and Washington's relative decline, something that would complicate U.S.-Chinese relations during Obama's second year in office and pose a broader management challenge for his foreign policy. From the beginning, the new administration sought more active engagement with Asia, trying to improve U.S. ties with friends and allies and cooperating with China on bilateral, regional, and global issues. The Obama team accepted that China's relative importance in the world was growing and that the United States could no longer exercise the degree of leverage that it had previously. Despite concentrated attention, however, the administration's efforts to work more closely with China have not gone smoothly. A major deterioration in relations has been avoided, reflecting the underlying maturity of U.S.-Chinese relations and the long-standing desire of both countries' leaders to keep disagreements within bounds. Regular high-level meetings have created strong incentives for stabilizing relations and articulating areas of cooperation, but subsequent implementation of the intentions expressed at these meetings has often fallen short. One of the administration's major goals has been to have China become a responsible player in the current liberal international order, one that accepts the system's basic goals and rules and contributes to their overall success. However, the administration has found that China's rapid rise in global standing has created enhanced expectations too quickly for Beijing to absorb. Although China is now a major factor in global issues, it still views itself as a developing country whose obligation is first of all to grow its economy, not to take on global responsibilities. Perhaps the greatest policy failure for both countries has been the inability to mitigate distrust over each other's long-term intentions. Almost every American policy is seen by most in Beijing as part of a sophisticated conspiracy to frustrate China's rise. Washington, meanwhile, has increasingly been disconcerted by these Chinese views and concerned that Beijing seeks to use its economic and growing military power in Asia to achieve both diplomatic and security advantages at the United States' expense. Washington is also well aware that almost every other country in Asia wants the United States to help counterbalance the growing Chinese pressures, but not at the cost of making them choose between the two giants. Obama's resulting "strategic pivot" to Asia, announced last November, was an attempt to generate confidence in the United States' future leadership role in the region, something many there had begun to doubt. This is a sophisticated, regionally integrated economic, diplomatic, and security strategy, but its full implementation will require disciplined administration management and convincing evidence of the United States' economic resurgence. The strategy of rebalancing toward Asia thus makes sense but risks creating expectations that Washington will not be able to meet while feeding Chinese suspicions, which could lead to a far more irascible U.S.-Chinese relationship. U.S. officials must act adroitly both at home and in Asia in order to realize the strategic benefits they have set in motion instead of generating greater distrust and tension.

### Democracy

Heg promotes democracy

Thayer 6 (Bradley A., Prof of Defense and Strategic Studies @ Missouri State University, “In Defense of Primacy.,” National Interest; Nov/Dec2006 Issue 86, p32-37)

Throughout history, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism: Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.( n3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States.

Democracy solves extinction

Diamond 95 (Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990S, 1995, p. http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam\_rpt.html)

Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments.

### Ext.: Solves Democracy

Heg promotes democracy

Lieber ‘5 [Robert J., Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century, p. 49-50]

This aspiration embodied deep-seated themes within American history and evoked long-standing beliefs about foreign policy. In particular, the idea that the exercise of American power goes hand in hand with the promotion of democratic principles can be found in the policy pronouncements of U.S. Presidents from Woodrow Wilson to John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton (whose 1993 inaugural address proclaimed, "Our hopes, our hearts, our hands, are with those on every continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America's cause"). This combination of values reflects both a belief in universal ideals ("The United States," the NSS declares, "must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere") and a judgment that promoting these principles abroad not only benefits citizens of other countries, but also increases U.S. national security by making foreign conflicts less likely because democracies are unlikely to attack one another. The National Security Strategy committed the United States to "actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world." This objective was driven by the belief that the fundamental cause of radical Islamic terrorism lies in the absence of democracy, the prevalence of authoritarianism, and the lack of freedom and opportunity in the Arab world. In the past, this idea might have been dismissed as political rhetoric. But after September 11, even the United Nations in its 2002 Arab Human Development Report and in subsequent reports in 2003 and 2005, defined the problem similarly and called for the extension of representative institutions and basic human freedoms to the Muslim Middle East. A Bush speech to the National Endowment for Democracy in November 2003 provided an elaboration that was both moral and strategic in its commitment to democratization, while criticizing half a century of policies that had failed to make this a priority: "Sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom in the Middle East did nothing to make us safe, because in the long run stability cannot be purchased at the expense of liberty."

Heg key to democracy promotion

Thayer, 07 – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., American Empire, Routledge, pages 42-3)

The American Empire gives the United States the ability to spread its form of government, democracy, and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Using American power to spread democracy can be a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as for the United States. This is because democracies are more likely to align themselves with the United States and be sympathetic to its worldview. In addition, there is a chance—small as it may be—that once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of conflict will be reduced further. Natan Sharansky makes the argument that once Arabs are governed democratically, they will not wish to continue the conflict against Israel.58 This idea has had a big effect on President George W. Bush. He has said that Sharansky’s worldview “is part of my presidential DNA.”59

### Deterrence

Heg collapse emboldens rogues – it signals weakness

Thayer, 06 – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., “In Defense of Primacy,” National Interest, November/December, Lexis)

In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from

Causes global wars that escalate – perception is key

Victor Davis Hanson (Senior Fellow in Residence in Classics and Military History @ Hoover Institution, Stanford University) December 2009 “Change, Weakness, Disaster, Obama: Answers from Victor Davis Hanson,” http://www.resistnet.com/group/oregon/forum/topics/change-weakness-disaster-obama/showLastReply

Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to see who’s going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There’s an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. India’s borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when. BC: Can Obama get any more mileage from his perpetually played “I’m not George W. Bush” card or is that card past its expiration date? Dr. Hanson: Two considerations: 1) It’s hard (in addition to being shameless), after a year, for any president to keep scapegoating a prior administration. 2) I think he will drop the reset/“Bush did it” throat-clearing soon, as his polls continue to stay below 50 percent. In other words, it seems to be a losing trope, poll-wise. Americans hate whining and blame-gaming. So the apologies and bows don’t go over well here at home; one more will be really toxic, politically speaking. Most are starting to see that our relations with Britain, Italy, Germany, or France are no better under Obama — and probably worse — than during the Bush administration.

### Korea

Hegemony is key to stabilize Korea and prevent regional arms races

Lieber 2005 – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 164-166)

On the Korean peninsula, in one of the world’s most dangerous and most heavily armed regions, the American military commitment has deterred North Korea from seeking to invade the South. Paradoxically, even while they engage in their most important mutual contacts in half a century, the leaders of the two Koreas have called for the United States to remain on the peninsula. In the words of the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, as quoted by former South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, “We are surrounded by big powers – Russia, Japan and China – so the United States must continue to stay for stability and peace in East Asia.”18 At the same time, there are risks that the United States could be drawn into a major military conflict in Korea. Though Pyongyang has at times been willing to negotiate with the United States, its strategy has habitually combined bargaining, deception, and blackmail. Notably, in the case of the October 1994 Agreed Framework, the North agreed to freeze its existing nuclear facilities, and Washington undertook to assist it in obtaining two new proliferation-resistant light water reactors for producing electrical power (mainly financed by South Korea and Japan) and in the interim to provide heavy fuel oil for free. However, within months of signing the agreement – and some seven years before President Bush labeled the regime as part of the “axis of evil” – North Korea began violating its terms by secretly constructing plants for the production of highly enriched uranium. In October 2002, the North privately admitted to U.S. diplomats the existence of this program, and in 2003 it forced the removal of outside inspectors, renounced its signature on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, unsealed 8,000 fuel rods and proclaimed that it would reprocess the nuclear material in them, and announced that it possessed nuclear weapons. For more than a decade, North Korea thus has seemed determined both to negotiate for major concessions from the United States and others in the form of aid and security guarantees and to continue with its nuclear weapons program.19 America faces dangerous choices in dealing with North Korea, but it does not do so in isolation. Because of shared concerns over the North’s behavior and the dangers a nuclear North Korea would pose, four strong regional neighbors – China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia – have been inclined to cooperate with the United States in six-party negotiations with Pyongyang. The relationships among these countries and with Washington have been complicated and often difficult, and China has sometimes been unhelpful, but all of them would face adverse security consequences from an unrestrained North Korean nuclear program. Based on past experience it is widely assumed that North Korean weapons and technology would be sold abroad and that a perilous regional nuclear arms race would erupt, with Japan and possibly South Korea going nuclear to deter Pyongyang,20 China reacting by increasing its own nuclear weapons deployment, India expanding its arsenal in response to China, Pakistan seeking to keep up with India, Iran accelerating its nuclear ambitions, and other countries such as Taiwan attempting to acquire nuclear weapons as well.21 The South Korean case also provides evidence of why countries in the region continue to favor the American presence. In December 2002, South Korea elected a new president, Roh Moo-hyun, representing a new generation of democratic, affluent, and educated voters with little or no memory of the Korean War half a century ago. Roh came to office having pledged to deemphasize the long-standing relationship with the United States and to seek closer ties with North Korea. Anti– United States demonstrations in February 2003 seemed to suggest a shift in public sentiment as well. But Roh and his supporters ultimately found themselves closing ranks with America. North Korea’s intransigence and its nuclear program provided strong motivation, as did Washington’s mid-2003 unveiling of plans for realignment and rebalancing of its forces in Korea and East Asia. In February 2004, in an act that symbolized its solidarity with the United States, the South Korean government agreed to dispatch 3,000 troops to Northern Iraq, and the National Assembly approved the measure by a three-to-one margin.22 A few months later, in June 2004, when Washington announced that one-third of the 37,000 American troops stationed in Korea would be withdrawn and the remainder repositioned to bases less vulnerable to a sudden North Korean attack across the demilitarized zone, the South Korean President, political leaders, and media responded with concern. Anxious about any sign of a weakened U.S. presence, the Seoul government gained Washington’s agreement that the drawdown would take place gradually and would not be completed until 2008. Reactions to this change in American deployment showed how much the U.S. presence is still desired. The realignment plan provided for a smaller and less intrusive “footprint” and one more appropriate to a democratic South Korean society that had chafed at a conspicuous foreign presence and a large base in the very heart of Seoul. The changes also modernized the foundation for a sustained American regional role by shifting to more flexible force structures with emphasis on high-tech weaponry and long-range precision strikes.

Lash-out and nuclear extinction

Africa News 1999 (10-25, Lexis)

Lusaka - If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and probably reduce earth to a huge smouldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in Far East Asia. Ever since the end of the savage three-year Korean war in the early 1950s, military tension between the hard-line communist north and the American backed South Korea has remained dangerously high. In fact the Koreas are technically still at war. A foreign visitor to either Pyongyong in the North or Seoul in South Korea will quickly notice that the divided country is always on maximum alert for any eventuality. North Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has never forgiven the US for coming to the aid of South Korea during the Korean war. She still regards the US as an occupation force in South Korea and wholly to blame for the non-reunification of the country. North Korean media constantly churns out a tirade of attacks on "imperialist" America and its "running dog" South Korea. The DPRK is one of the most secretive countries in the world where a visitor is given the impression that the people's hatred for the US is absolute while the love for their government is total. Whether this is really so, it is extremely difficult to conclude. In the DPRK, a visitor is never given a chance to speak to ordinary Koreans about the politics of their country. No visitor moves around alone without government escort. The American government argues that its presence in South Korea was because of the constant danger of an invasion from the north. America has vast economic interests in South Korea. She points out that the north has dug numerous tunnels along the demilitarised zone as part of the invasion plans. She also accuses the north of violating South Korean territorial waters. Early this year, a small North Korean submarine was caught in South Korean waters after getting entangled in fishing nets. Both the Americans and South Koreans claim the submarine was on a military spying mission. However, the intension of the alleged intrusion will probably never be known because the craft's crew were all found with fatal gunshot wounds to their heads in what has been described as suicide pact to hide the truth of the mission. The US mistrust of the north's intentions is so deep that it is no secret that today Washington has the largest concentration of soldiers and weaponry of all descriptions in south Korea than anywhere else in the World, apart from America itself. Some of the armada that was deployed in the recent bombing of Iraq and in Operation Desert Storm against the same country following its invasion of Kuwait was from the fleet permanently stationed on the Korean Peninsula. It is true too that at the moment the North/South Korean border is the most fortified in the world. The border line is littered with anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles and is constantly patrolled by warplanes from both sides. It is common knowledge that America also keeps an eye on any military movement or build-up in the north through spy satellites. The DPRK is said to have an estimated one million soldiers and a huge arsenal of various weapons. Although the DPRK regards herself as a developing country, she can however be classified as a super-power in terms of military might. The DPRK is capable of producing medium and long-range missiles. Last year, for example, she test-fired a medium range missile over Japan, an action that greatly shook and alarmed the US, Japan and South Korea. The DPRK says the projectile was a satellite. There have also been fears that she was planning to test another ballistic missile capable of reaching North America. Naturally, the world is anxious that military tension on the Korean Peninsula must be defused to avoid an apocalypse on earth. It is therefore significant that the American government announced a few days ago that it was moving towards normalising relations with North Korea

### Prolif

Heg solves prolif

Brookes 08 Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation. He is also a member of the congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (Peter, Heritage, Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might, November 24, 2008

The United States military has also been a central player in the attempts to halt weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and ballistic missile proliferation. In 2003, President Bush created the Prolifera­tion Security Initiative (PSI), an initiative to counter the spread of WMD and their delivery systems throughout the world. The U.S. military's capabili­ties help put teeth in the PSI, a voluntary, multilat­eral organization of 90-plus nations which uses national laws and joint military operations to fight proliferation. While many of the PSI's efforts aren't made pub­lic due to the potential for revealing sensitive intel­ligence sources and methods, some operations do make their way to the media. For instance, accord­ing to the U.S. State Department, the PSI stopped exports to Iran's missile program and heavy water- related equipment to Tehran's nuclear program, which many believe is actually a nuclear weapons program. In the same vein, the United States is also devel­oping the world's most prodigious-ever ballistic missile defense system to protect the American homeland, its deployed troops, allies, and friends, including Europe. While missile defense has its crit­ics, it may provide the best answer to the spread of ballistic missiles and the unconventional payloads, including the WMD, they may carry. Unfortunately, the missile and WMD prolifera­tion trend is not positive. For instance, 10 years ago, there were only six nuclear weapons states. Today there are nine members of the once-exclusive nucle­ar weapons club, with Iran perhaps knocking at the door. Twenty-five years ago, nine countries had bal­listic missiles. Today, there are 28 countries with ballistic missile arsenals of varying degrees. This defensive system will not only provide deter­rence to the use of these weapons, but also provide policymakers with a greater range of options in pre­venting or responding to such attacks, whether from a state or non-state actor**.** Perhaps General Trey Obering, the Director of the Missile Defense Agency, said it best when describing the value of missile defense in countering the grow­ing threat of WMD and delivery system prolifera­tion: "I believe that one of the reasons we've seen the proliferation of these missiles in the past is that there has historically been no defense against them."

Prolif causes nuclear war – deterrence fails

Lieber 07 Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University (Robert J. "Persistent Primacy and the Future of the American Era", APSA Paper 2007)

In addition to the threat posed by radical Islamist ideology and terrorism, the proliferation of nuclear weapons could become an increasingly dangerous source of instability and conflict. Over the longer term, and coupled with the spread of missile technology, there is a likelihood that the U.S. will be more exposed to this danger. Not only might the technology, materials or weapons themselves be diverted into the hand of terrorist groups willing to pay almost any price to acquire them, but the spread of these weapons carries with it the possibility of devastating regional wars. In assessing nuclear proliferation risks in the late-Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, in North Korea, and in Iran, some have asserted that deterrence and containment, which seemed to work during the Cold War, would be sufficient to protect the national interests of the U.S. and those of close all[ies.](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/2/1/1/0/5/pages211058/apsa07_proceeding_211058-8.html) Such views are altogether too complacent. The U.S.–Soviet nuclear balance took two decades to become relatively stable and on at least one occasion, the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, the parties came to the nuclear brink. Moreover, stable deterrence requires assured second strike capability, the knowledge that whichever side suffered an initial nuclear attack would have the capacity to retaliate by inflicting unacceptable damage upon the attacker, and the assumption that one’s adversary is a value-maximizing rational actor. A robust nuclear balance is difficult to achieve, and in the process of developing a nuclear arsenal, a country embroiled in an intense regional crisis may become the target of a disarming first strike or, on the other hand, may be driven by a use-it-or-lose it calculation. Even though American territory may not be at immediate risk within the next five to seven years, its interests, bases and allies surely might be. And control by rational actors in new or recent members of the nuclear club is by no means a foregone conclusion. The late Saddam Hussein had shown himself to be reckless and prone to reject outside information that differed from what he wished to hear. And Iranian President Ahmadinejad has expressed beliefs that suggest an erratic grip on reality or that call into question his own judgment. For example, he has invoked the return of the twelfth or hidden Imam, embraced conspiracy theories about 9/11, fostered Holocaust denial, and called for Israel to be wiped off the map

### Ext.: Prolif

Hege key to solve Prolif

Mandelbaum ‘5 [Michael, Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World’s Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 39-41]

American forces remained in Europe and East Asia because the countries located in these two regions wanted them there, even if they did not always say so clearly or even explicitly. They wanted them there because the American presence offered the assurance that these regions would remain free of war and, in the case of Europe, free of the costly preparations for war that had marked the twentieth century. The American military presence was in both cases a confidence-building measure, and if that presence were with-drawn, the countries in both regions would feel less confident that no threat to their security would appear. They would, in all likelihood, take steps to compensate for the absence of these forces. Those steps would surely not include war, at least not in the first instance. Instead, since the American forces serve as a hedge against uncertainty, some of the countries of East Asia and Europe might well seek to replace them with another source of hedging. A leading candidate for that role would be nuclear weapons of their own.9 The possession of nuclear weapons equips their owner with a certain leverage, a geopolitical weight that, unless somehow counterbalanced, can confer a political advantage in dealing with countries lacking them. Like the relationship between employer and employee, the one between a nuclear-weapon state and a non-nuclear-weapon state has inequality built into it, no matter how friendly that relationship may be. During the Cold War, the American military presence, and the guarantee of protection by the mighty nuclear arsenal of the United States that came with it, neutralized the nuclear weapons that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China accumulated. Russia and China retain nuclear stock-piles in the wake of the Cold War, and with the end of the American military presence in their regions, several of their non-nuclear neighbors—Germany, Poland, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, for example—might feel the need to off-set those stockpiles with nuclear forces of their own. Perhaps the process of replacing American nuclear armaments with those of other countries, if this should take place, would occur smoothly, with Europe and East Asia remaining peaceful throughout the transition. But this is not what most of the world believes. To the contrary, the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not already have them is widely considered to be the single greatest threat to international tranquillity in the twenty-first century. The United States has made the prevention of nuclear proliferation one of its most important foreign policies, and its efforts to this end constitute, like reassurance, a service to the other members of the international system.

Heg solves proliferation in the hands of allies, rogue states, and terrorist groups

Mandelbaum ‘5 [Michael, Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins – The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World’s Government in the Twenty-First Century, p. 189-191]

The greatest threat to their security that the members of the international system did face in the new century, one that the United States had devoted considerable resources and political capital to containing and that a serious reduction in the American global rule would certainly aggravate, was the spread of nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation poses three related dangers. The first is that, in the absence of an American nuclear guarantee, major countries in Europe and Asia will feel the need to acquire their own nuclear armaments. If the United States withdrew from Europe and East Asia, Germany might come to consider it imprudent to deal with a nuclear-armed Russia, and Japan with a nuclear-armed China, without nuclear arms of their own. They would seek these weapons in order to avoid an imbalance in power that might work to their disadvantage. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by such affluent, democratic, peaceful countries would not, by itself, trigger a war. It could, however, trigger arms races similar to the one between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It would surely make Europe and East Asia less comfortable places, and relations among the countries of these regions more suspicious, than was the case at the outset of the twenty-first century. The spread of nuclear weapons poses a second danger, which the United States exerted itself to thwart to the extent of threatening a war in North Korea and actually waging one in Iraq and that the recession of American power would increase: the possession of nuclear armaments by "rogue" states, countries governed by regimes at odds with their neighbors and hostile to prevailing international norms. A nuclear-armed Iraq, an unlikely development after the over-throw of Saddam Hussein's regime, or a nuclear-armed Iran, a far more plausible prospect, would make the international relations of the Persian Gulf far more dangerous. That in turn would threaten virtually every country in the world because so much of the oil on which they all depend comes from that region.' A nuclear-armed North Korea would similarly change the international relations of East Asia for the worse. Especially if the United States withdrew from the region, South Korea and Japan, and perhaps ultimately Tai-wan, might well decide to equip themselves with nuclear weapons of their own. A North Korean nuclear arsenal would pose yet a third threat: nuclear weapons in the hands of a terrorist group such as al Qaeda. Lacking the infrastructure of a sovereign state, a terrorist organization probably could not construct a nuclear weapon itself. But it could purchase either a full-fledged nuclear explosive or nuclear material that could form the basis for a device that, while not actually exploding, could spew poisonous radiation over populated areas, killing or infecting many thousands of people.' Nuclear materials are potentially available for purchase not only in North Korea but elsewhere as well.

### Terrorism

Heg solves terrorism

Walt 02 professor of international affairs at Harvard (Stephen, “American Primacy” http://www.nwc .navy.mil/press/review/2002/spring/art1-sp2.htm))

Perhaps the most obvious reason why states seek primacy—and why the United States benefits from its current position—is that international politics is a dangerous business. Being wealthier and stronger than other states does not guarantee that a state will survive, of course, and it cannot insulate a state from all outside pressures. But the strongest state is more likely to escape serious harm than weaker ones are, and it will be better equipped to resist the pressures that arise. Because the United States is so powerful, and because its society is so wealthy, it has ample resources to devote to whatever problems it may face in the future. At the beginning of the Cold War, for example, its power enabled the United States to help rebuild Europe and Japan, to assist them in developing stable democratic orders, and to subsidize the emergence of an open international economic order.7 The United States was also able to deploy powerful armed forces in Europe and Asia as effective deterrents to Soviet expansion.  When the strategic importance of the Persian Gulf increased in the late 1970s, the United States created its Rapid Deployment Force in order to deter threats to the West’s oil supplies; in 1990–91 it used these capabilities to liberate Kuwait. Also, when the United States was attacked by the Al-Qaeda terrorist network in September 2001, it had the wherewithal to oust the network’s Taliban hosts and to compel broad international support for its campaign to eradicate Al-Qaeda itself. It would have been much harder to do any of these things if the United States had been weaker. **Today**, U.S. primacy helps deter potential challenges to American interests in virtually every part of the world. Few countries or nonstate groups want to invite the “focused enmity” of the United States **(to use William Wohlforth’s apt phrase),** and countries and groups that have done so **(such as Libya, Iraq, Serbia, or the Taliban)** have paid a considerable price. **As discussed below, U.S. dominance does provoke opposition in a number of places, but** anti-American elements are forced to rely on covert or indirect strategies **(such as terrorist bombings)** that do not seriously threaten America’s dominant position. Were American power to decline significantly, **however**, groups opposed to U.S. interests would probably be emboldened and overt challenges would be more likely.

#### Terrorism Causes Extinction

Sid-Ahmed, political analyst 04 (Mohamed, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, “Extinction!” August 26-September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

### Winning WoT Now

#### We’re winning the War on Terror now

Zenko and Cohen April 2012 (MICAH ZENKO is a Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. MICHAEL A. COHEN is a Fellow at the Century Foundation, Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure Than Washington Thinks, Foreign Affairs, lexis)

None of this is meant to suggest that the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems confronting the country are manageable and pose minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Americans. None of them -- separately or in combination -- justifies the alarmist rhetoric of policymakers and politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world. Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has been hyped more. Considering the horrors of that day, that is not surprising. But the result has been a level of fear that is completely out of proportion to both the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the United States' vulnerability. On 9/11, al Qaeda got tragically lucky. Since then, the United States has been preparing for the one percent chance (and likely even less) that it might get lucky again. But al Qaeda lost its safe haven after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and further military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts have decimated the organization, which has essentially lost whatever ability it once had to seriously threaten the United States. According to U.S. officials, al Qaeda's leadership has been reduced to two top lieutenants: Ayman al-Zawahiri and his second-in-command, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Panetta has even said that the defeat of al Qaeda is "within reach." The near collapse of the original al Qaeda organization is one reason why, in the decade since 9/11, the U.S. homeland has not suffered any large-scale terrorist assaults. All subsequent attempts have failed or been thwarted, owing in part to the incompetence of their perpetrators. Although there are undoubtedly still some terrorists who wish to kill Americans, their dreams will likely continue to be frustrated by their own limitations and by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and its allies.

### Ext.: Terrorism

US hegemony solves terrorism – their evidence reflects too narrow a view of hegemony

Mendelsohn 09 (Barak Mendelsohn, assistant professor of political science, “Combating Jihadism: American Hegemony and Interstate Cooperation in the War,” University of Chicago Press, pg 220)

The actions of hegemony, too, are critical to success in defeating the al Qaeda-led jihadi movement. Contrary to accusations that U.S. policies in the aftermath of 9/11 have been unilateralist and have reflected malignant and parochial intentions, this book has emphasized the positive role of American hegemony in the war on terrorism. The hegemon sets the agenda, provides resources, and in its leadership maintains focus on the target. That states have taken on this tremendous enterprise should be attributed first and foremost to the working of hegemony. Without it, success would become even more elusive. Charges leveled at the United States reflect a narrow view of hegemony that leads to an oversimplification of its working and conceals significant aspects of U.S. policy in the framework of the war on terrorism. This book has demonstrated how the United States, even under the Bush administration, has been engaged in multilateralism to a much greater extent than is generally assumed.

US hegemony is key to the fight against terrorism – no unilateral conflicts

Mendelsohn 09 (Barak Mendelsohn, assistant professor of political science, “Combating Jihadism: American Hegemony and Interstate Cooperation in the War,” University of Chicago Press, pg 3)

The encompassing picture of the war on terrorism presented in this book also brings to light the multifaceted nature of U.S. actions. Detailing spheres of action that typically do not get the same attention as the violent face of counterterrorism, this study shows that allegations directed at the United States overstate its unilateralist inclinations, In fact, U.S. hegemony has been orchestrating a multilateral effort against the jihadi movement. Unilateral action taken by the United States in the war on terrorism is often consistent with the war’s grand design, which sets general parameters but largely maintains states’ freedom of action. Nevertheless, even the hegemon is sometimes tempted to breach the boundaries of legitimate action set by the international society. When it does, cooperation falters: the society’s members demonstrate an inclination to protect the system from the jihadi threat, but also to restrain U.S. hegemony when its actions are incompatible with the society’s constitutive ideas. Secondary powers, in particular, serve as corrective agents, helping to produce a system of checks and balances.

Heg solves terrorism - deterrence

Thayer, 07 – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., American Empire, Routledge, page 16)

Another critical question is not simply how much the United States spends on defense but what benefits it receives from its spending: “Is the money spent worth it?” the benefits of American military power are considerable, and I will elaborate on five of them. First, and most importantly, the American people are protected from invasion and attack. The horrific attacks of 9/11 are—mercifully—an aberration. The men and women of the U.S. military and intelligence community do an outstanding job deterring aggression against the United States. Second, American interests abroad are protected. U.S. military power allows Washington to defeat its enemies overseas. For example, the United States has made the decision to attack terrorists far from America’s shores, and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. Its military power also gives Washington the power to protect its interests abroad by deterring attacks against America’s interests or coercing potential or actual opponents. In international politics, coercion means dissuading an opponent from actions America does not want it to do or to do something that it wants done. For example, the United States wanted Libya to give up the weapons of mass destruction capabilities it pos-sessed or was developing. As Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said, “I think the reason Mu’ammar Qadhai agreed to give up his weapons of mass destruction was because he saw what happened to Saddam Hussein.”21

### China

Heg prevents China-Taiwan war

Brookes 08 – Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at The Heritage Foundation. He is also a member of the congressional U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (Peter, Heritage, Why the World Still Needs America's Military Might, November 24, 2008)

We know that China is undergoing a major mil­itary buildup, especially involving its power projec­tion forces--i.e., air force, navy, and ballistic missile forces, all aimed at Taiwan. Indeed, today Beijing has the world's third largest defense budget and the world's fastest growing peacetime defense budget, growing at over 10 percent per year for over a decade. It increased its defense budget nearly 18 percent annually over the past two years. I would daresay that military tensions across the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait between Taiwan and China would be much greater today if not for an implied commitment on the part of the United States to prevent a change in the political status quo via military means. China hasn't renounced the use of force against its neighbor and rival, Taiwan, a vibrant, free-market democracy. It is believed by many analysts that absent American military might, China would quickly unite Taiwan with the main­land under force of arms. In general, the system of military alliances in Asia that the United States maintains provides the basis for stability in the Pacific, since the region has failed to develop an overarching security architecture such as that found in Europe in NATO.

Conflict with China goes nuclear

Glaser 2011 (Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Will China's Rise Lead to War? Subtitle: Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism, Foreign Affairs, March/April, lexis)

ACCOMMODATION ON TAIWAN? The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable -- particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China -- whatever they might formally agree to -- have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

### Ext.: China

China will attempt to dislodge US heg- public and elite pressure

Friedberg 2011 (July/August, Aaron L., professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics, The National Interest, lexis)

WHILE THEY are careful not to say so directly, China’s current rulers seem intent on establishing their country as the preponderant power in East Asia, and perhaps in Asia writ large. The goal is to make China the strongest and most influential nation in its neighborhood: a country capable of deterring attacks and threats; resolving disputes over territory and resources according to its preferences; coercing or persuading others to accede to its wishes on issues ranging from trade and investment to alliance and third-party basing arrangements to the treatment of ethnic Chinese populations; and, at least in some cases, affecting the character and composition of their governments. Beijing may not seek conquest or direct physical control over its surroundings, but, despite repeated claims to the contrary, it does seek a form of regional hegemony. Such ambitions hardly make China unique. Throughout history, there has been a strong correlation between the rapid growth of a state’s wealth and potential power, the geographic scope of its interests, the intensity and variety of the perceived threats to those interests, and the desire to expand military capabilities and exert greater influence in order to defend them. Growth tends to encourage expansion, which leads to insecurity, which feeds the desire for more power. This pattern is well established in the modern age. Looking back over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Samuel Huntington finds that ““every other major power, Britain and France, Germany and Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union, has engaged in outward expansion, assertion, and imperialism coincidental with or immediately following the years in which it went through rapid industrialization and economic growth.”” As for China, Huntington concludes, “no reason exists to think that the acquisition of economic and military power will not have comparable effects” on its policies. Of course the past behavior of other states is suggestive, but it is hardly a definitive guide to the future. Just because other powers have acted in certain ways does not necessarily mean that China will do the same. Perhaps, in a world of global markets and nuclear weapons, the fears and ambitions that motivated previous rising powers are no longer as potent. Perhaps China’s leaders have learned from history that overly assertive rising powers typically stir resentment and opposition. But China is not just any rising power, and its history provides an additional reason for believing that it will seek some form of regional preponderance. It is a nation with a long and proud past as the leading center of East Asian civilization and a more recent and less glorious experience of domination and humiliation at the hands of foreign invaders. As a number of historians have recently pointed out, China is not so much “rising” as it is returning to the position of regional preeminence that it once held and which its leaders and many of its people still regard as natural and appropriate. The desire to reestablish a Sino-centric system would be consistent with what journalist Martin Jacques describes as ““an overwhelming assumption on the part of the Chinese that their natural position lies at the epicentre of East Asia, that their civilization has no equals in the region, and that their rightful position, as bestowed by history, will at some point be restored in the future.”” Conservative scholar Yan Xuetong puts the matter succinctly: the Chinese people are proud of their country’s glorious past and believe its fall from preeminence to be “a historical mistake which they should correct.” If anything, the “century of humiliation” during which China was weak and vulnerable adds urgency to its pursuit of power. For a nation with China’s history, regaining a position of unchallengeable strength is not seen as simply a matter of pride but rather as an essential precondition for continued growth, security and, quite possibly, survival.

Only stronger heg can deter war

Friedberg 2011 (July/August, Aaron L., professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics, The National Interest, lexis)

For as long as China continues to be governed as it is today, its growing strength will pose a deepening challenge to American interests. If they want to deter aggression, discourage coercion and preserve a plural, open order, Washington and its friends and allies are going to have to work harder, and to cooperate more closely, in order to maintain a favorable balance of regional power. In the long run, the United States can learn to live with a democratic China as the dominant power in East Asia, much as Great Britain came to accept America as the preponderant power in the Western Hemisphere. Until that day, Washington and Beijing are going to remain locked in an increasingly intense struggle for mastery in Asia.

### China Containment Good: Democracy

Containing China is key to global democracy- Chinese heg emboldens authoritarians and delegitimizes democratic reform

Friedberg 2011 (July/August, Aaron L., professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics, The National Interest, lexis)

As China emerges onto the world stage it is becoming a source of inspiration and material support for embattled authoritarians in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America as well as Asia—antidemocratic holdouts who looked to be headed for the garbage heap of history after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Americans may have long believed that growth requires freedom of choice in the economic realm (which is presumed to lead ineluctably to the expansion of political liberties), but, at least for now, the mainland has successfully blended authoritarian rule with market-driven economics. If it comes to be seen as offering an alternative model for development, China’s continued growth under authoritarian rule could complicate and slow America’s long-standing efforts to promote the spread of liberal political institutions around the world. Fear that the United States has regime change on the brain is also playing an increasing role in the crafting of China’s policies toward countries in other parts of the world. If the United States can pressure and perhaps depose the current leaders of Venezuela, Zimbabwe and Iran, it may be emboldened in its efforts to do something similar to China. By helping those regimes survive, Beijing wins friends and allies for future struggles, weakens the perception that democracy is on the march and deflects some of America’s prodigious energies away from itself. Washington’s efforts to isolate, coerce and possibly undermine dictatorial “rogue” states (such as Iran and North Korea) have already been complicated, if not defeated, by Beijing’s willingness to engage with them. At the same time, of course, China’s actions also heighten concern in Washington about its motivations and intentions, thereby adding more fuel to the competitive fire.

Democracy solves extinction

Diamond 95 (Larry Diamond, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990S, 1995, p. http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam\_rpt.html)

Nuclear, chemical and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments.

## \*Soft Power\*

### Solves Latin America

Soft power key to Latin American stability/democracy

Crandall 2011 (Russell, Associate Professor of International Politics at Davidson College, Principal Director for the Western Hemisphere at the U.S. Department of Defense in 2009 and Director for Andean Affairs at the National Security Council in 2010-11, The Post-American Hemisphere Subtitle: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America, Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis)

LETTING GO OF LATIN AMERICA In his first term, U.S. President George W. Bush adopted a heavy-handed, unilateral approach to Latin America, attempting to force governments there to approve the U.S. invasion of Iraq and ensure U.S. soldiers' exemption from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. This strategy backfired, and many governments, including traditional U.S. partners such as Chile and Mexico, refused. So in his second term, Bush attempted a more conciliatory approach, for instance, cultivating a personal relationship with the leftist Lula. But it was too little, too late; Chávez and other radicals still played up Bush's reputation as a bully. After Obama took office, however, it became much harder to use the U.S.-bashing strategy. In April 2009, at the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad, Obama tried to put his imprimatur on Washington's Latin America policy, emphasizing mutual respect and outlining a vision of equal partnerships and joint responsibility. His deferential yet serious style quickly put the most conspiratorial anti-U.S. critics, such as Chávez, Morales, and Ortega, on the defensive -- where they have remained ever since. The United States' enhanced image should not be dismissed as a mere public relations victory; rather, it is indispensable to restoring Washington's influence in Latin America, since it makes it easier for willing governments to cooperate with Washington on shared priorities without appearing to be subservient to the old hegemon. Obama's approach to the region can be seen as a more concerted continuation of the one Bush adopted in his second term, emphasizing responsibility as a prerequisite for cooperation and leadership -- an implicit call for Latin America to solve its own problems. Other than focusing on Mexico's drug violence, the Obama administration has not made Latin America a priority. This may not be so bad: a little breathing room is appropriate, given the region's current stability.

### Hard Power Key to Soft Power

#### Hard power is key to soft power

Layne June 2012 (Chris, professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, The Global Power Shift from West to East, The National Interest, lexis)

Further, there is a critical linkage between a great power’s military and economic standing, on the one hand, and its prestige, soft power and agenda-setting capacity, on the other. As the hard-power foundations of Pax Americana erode, so too will the U.S. capacity to shape the international order through influence, example and largesse. This is particularly true of America in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession. At the zenith of its military and economic power after World War II, the United States possessed the material capacity to furnish the international system with abundant financial assistance designed to maintain economic and political stability. Now, this capacity is much diminished.

## \*Answers to Impacts\*

### A/T “Latin American Democracy”

US leadership key to democracy- regional powers won’t promote democracy

Crandall 2011 (Russell, Associate Professor of International Politics at Davidson College, Principal Director for the Western Hemisphere at the U.S. Department of Defense in 2009 and Director for Andean Affairs at the National Security Council in 2010-11, The Post-American Hemisphere Subtitle: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America, Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis)

Thus far, the Chávez-led spoilers have been enabled by their more democratic counterparts. Although the democratic leaders enjoy the benefits of elections, a free press, and other signs of democratic vigor in their own countries, they are unwilling to confront other governments that undermine such rights. Many of the otherwise impressive leftist democratic governments in the region, such as those of former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet and Lula, have been wary of raising the subject, especially regarding Cuba and Venezuela. These leaders and others like them have been reluctant to speak out because they still share some sort of revolutionary solidarity with Chávez and the Castros and they remain overly sensitive to concerns about violating another nation's sovereignty.

Latin American democracy is resilient and leftist turns are moderate

Crandall 2011 (Russell, Associate Professor of International Politics at Davidson College, Principal Director for the Western Hemisphere at the U.S. Department of Defense in 2009 and Director for Andean Affairs at the National Security Council in 2010-11, The Post-American Hemisphere Subtitle: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America, Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis)

In recent years, however, Latin America's growth has begun to translate into more prosperous and developed societies. In countries as disparate as Brazil, Mexico, and Peru, the benefits of democracy and open markets are now finally beginning to trickle down to a citizenry that had lost faith in elected governments. This socioeconomic prosperity, in turn, is legitimizing the democratic system -- a sort of virtuous cycle in a region more accustomed to vicious ones. Despite what the fiery rhetoric of leaders such as Chávez might indicate, in today's climate, Latin Americans want results, not blame. Armed revolution is now dead in the region that was once its cradle. In its stead, the region now has a new brand of leaders who have taken office through the ballot box and have striven to provide education, security, and opportunities for their constituents. Human capital and economic competitiveness, not rote anticapitalist slogans, are what occupy the thoughts of these politicians. They point proudly to the fact that 40 million Latin Americans were lifted out of poverty between 2002 and 2008, a feat accomplished largely through innovative and homegrown social programs. It has long been said that when the United States catches a cold, Latin America catches the flu. This has certainly been true in the economic realm, where jitters in the U.S. economy could quickly undermine Latin America's chronically weak financial and fiscal fundamentals. But during the recent global economic crisis, Latin America remained relatively unscathed. At the time, many predicted that Latin American governments -- especially leftist ones suspected of being more predisposed to fiscal profligacy -- would turn to the seductive tonic of populism. But leftist governments in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, to name a few, responded to the crisis with prudence. They refused to abandon market-friendly policies such as flexible exchange rates, independent central banks, and fiscal restraint. Some countries, such as Brazil and Peru, even continued to grow at almost China-like rates.

# \*\*\*HEG BAD\*\*\*

## \*\*Sustainability\*\*

### General- Heg Unsustainable

#### Heg declining now- US won’t recover short-term and lost long-term power

Copley June 2012 (Gregory R., editor of Defense & Foreign Affairs’ Strategic Policy, Strategic Policy in an Age of Global Realignment, lexis)

3. Strategic Recovery by the US. The US will not, in 2012 or 2013, show signs of any recovery of its global strategic credibility or real strength. Its manufacturing and science and technology sectors will continue to suffer from low (even declining) productivity and difficulty in capital formation (for political reasons, primarily). A significant US recovery is not feasible in the timeframe given the present political and economic policies and impasse evident. US allies will increasingly look to their own needs while attempting to sustain their alliance relationship with the US to the extent feasible. Those outside the US alliance network, or peripheral to it, will increasingly disregard US political/diplomatic pressures, and will seek to accommodate the PRC or regional actors. The continued economic malaise of the US during 2012, even if disguised by modest nominal GDP growth, will make economic (and therefore strategic) recovery more difficult and ensure that it will take longer.¶ In any event, the fact that the US national debt exceeds the GDP hollows the dollar and thus makes meaningful recovery impossible in the short-term. The attractiveness of a low dollar value in comparison to other currencies in making US manufacturing investment more feasible than in recent years is offset by declining US workforce productivity and political constraints which penalize investment in manufacturing, or even in achieving appealing conditions for capital formation. Banks are as afraid of such investment as are manufacturing investors themselves.

Multipolarity coming now- primacy unsustainable

Edelman 11 (Eric, Distinguished Fellow at Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, CSBA Online, “Understanding America’s Contested Primacy.” http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/10/understanding-americas-contested-primacy/1/)

In November 2008, the National Intelligence Council released Global Trends 2025 which argued that “the international system — as constructed following the Second World War — will be almost unrecognizable by 2025 owing to the rise of emerging powers, a globalizing economy, a historic transfer of relative wealth and economic power from West to East, and the growing influence of non-state actors. By 2025 the international system will be a global multipolar one with gaps in national power continuing to narrow between developed and developing countries” [emphasis in original].” This conclusion represented a striking departure from the NIC’s conclusion four years earlier in Mapping the Global Future 2020 that unipolarity was likely to remain a persistent condition of the international system. Between the two reports America’s zeitgeist had clearly shifted under the impact of persistent difficulty in the counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and increased questioning of United States global leadership (at home and abroad), the seemingly inexorable rise of the newly emerging economies (suggestively labeled as the BRICs by Goldman Sachs analysts), and the global economic downturn and recession in the United States. The overall impact was the creation of a new conventional wisdom that foresees continued decline of the United States, an end to the unipolar world order that marked the post-Cold War world and a potential departure from the pursuit of US primacy that marked the foreign policies of the three presidential administrations that followed the end of the Cold War. The debate over unipolarity and continued US primacy is not merely an academic debate. Perceptions of US power will guide both American policymakers and other nations as they consider their policy options. Primacy has underpinned US grand strategy since the end of the Cold War because no other nation was able to provide the collective public goods that have upheld the security of the international system and enabled a period of dramatically increased global economic activity and prosperity. Both the United States and the global system have benefitted from that circumstance. The arguments for US decline are not new but before they harden into an unchallenged orthodoxy it would be good to carefully examine many of the key assumptions that undergird the emerging conventional wisdom. Will the undeniable relative decline of the United States, in fact, lead to the end of unipolarity? Do the BRIC countries really represent a bloc? What would multipolarity look like? How does one measure national power anyhow, and how can one measure the change in the power distribution globally? Is the rise of global competitors inevitable? What are some of the weaknesses that might hamper the would-be competitors from staying on their current favorable economic and political trajectory? Does the United States possess some underappreciated strengths that might serve as the basis for continued primacy in the international system and, if so, what steps would a prudent government take to extend that primacy into the future? The history of straight-line projections of economic growth and the rise of challengers to the dominance of the United States has not been kind to those who have previously predicted US decline. It is not necessarily the case that the United States will be caught between the end of the “unipolar moment” of post-Cold War predominance and a global multipolar world. The emerging international environment is likely to be different than either of the futures forecast by the NIC in Mapping the Global Future in 2004 or Global Trends 2025 in 2008. It would seem more likely that the relative decline of American power will still leave the United States as the most powerful actor in the international system. But the economic rise of other nations and the spread of nuclear weapons in some key regions are likely to confront the US with difficult new challenges. The revived notion of America’s decline has once again brought to the fore a question about the purposes of United States power and the value of US international primacy. Seeking to maintain America’s advantage as the prime player in the international system imposes costs on the US budget and taxpayer. It is certainly fair to ask what the United States gets from exerting the effort to remain number one. It is also worth considering what the world would look like if the United States was just one power among many, and how such perceptions might affect the strategic and policy choices national security decision-makers will face over the next twenty-odd years.

Heg unsustainable – multiple constraints ensure collapse and rise of alternatives

Christopher Layne, Chair in National Security at the School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, 09

[“The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?: A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009]

For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades, a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World.[15](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.layne.html" \l "f15)Global Trends 2025 is not light reading, but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. Its key geopolitical conclusion is that the U.S.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers); and economic, financial, and domestic political constraints that may erode U.S. capabilities. China, India, and possibly Russia are emerging great powers.[16](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.layne.html" \l "f16) As Global Trends 2025 points out, the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. 7). Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid.). By 2025, China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. 30). India, buoyed by its strong economic growth rate, will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid.). Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status, the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. 29).[17](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.layne.html" \l "f17)**]** Because of uncertainties about economics, energy prices, domestic governance issues, and especially demography, Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. 31–32).[18](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.layne.html" \l "f18) Between 2009 and 2025, Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million, affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. 23–24, 30). If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power, however, the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U.S. global dominance” (p. 32). Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. 32, 82). According to the NIC, in addition to relative decline, the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. U.S. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. 93). The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. 3, 8–9, 13–14). At home, economic and political constraints may undermine U.S. hegemony. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. Nevertheless, the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U.S. power. In particular, Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades, the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. Although at the time this issue went to press, the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come, China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified.[19](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.layne.html" \l "f19) **[End Page 153]** As the NIC observes, the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. Thus, “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. 12, 94, 97). Moreover, the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U.S. freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p. 97). The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic, military, and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. 93). Ultimately, although the United States will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now, it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid.).

### Ext.: General

Decline is inevitable – heg is economically unsustainable

Layne, 09 – Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay", International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009, July 6th 2010, Galileo, p. 21-23) PDF

The publications reviewed in this essay examine whether the United States is in (or is headed for) relative decline.74 Brooks and Wohlforth purport to deny the possibility that America is in relative decline, but a growing number of analysts disagree.75 The long-term impact of the current economic crisis largely will determine who is right (and to be fair, Brooks and Wohlforth wrote their book before its effects became evident). Yet, even before the meltdown, longterm structural weaknesses that have been accumulating for more than three decades were causing U.S. economic power to wane.76 The warning signs with respect to U.S. decline are a looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the future of the dollar as the reserve currency, both of which are linked to the fear that after recovery, the United States will face a serious inflationary threat.77 Optimists contend that once the United States recovers, fears of a fiscal crisis will fade: the country faced a larger debt to GDP ratio after World War II, and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. The postwar era, however, was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and sustained high growth rates. The United States of 2009 is far different from the United States of 1945, however, which is why many economists believe that even in the best case, it will emerge from the current crisis with serious macroeconomic handicaps.78 Chief among these handicaps are the increase in the money supply (caused by the massive amount of dollars the Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped into circulation to rescue the economy), and the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) project the United States will incur for at least a decade.79 When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current account deficit, the entitlements overhang, and the cost of two ongoing wars, there is reason to worry about the United States’ longterm fiscal stability.80 The CBO states, “Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem.”81 If the Congressional Budget Office is right, it spells trouble ahead for the dollar. As Jonathan Kirshner noted on the eve of the meltdown, the dollar’s vulnerability “presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance.”82 The dollar’s loss of reserve currency status would undermine U.S. dominance, and recent events have magnified concerns that predated the financial and economic crisis. 83 First, the other big players in the international economy now are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous “allies” (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Because of these two factors, as Eric Helleiner notes, if the dollar experiences dramatic depreciation in the future, there is a “risk of defections generating a herd-like momentum” away from it.84

Heg will inevitably collapse – attempting to hold on makes the decline worse

Pape 9 (Robert A. Pape, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “The Empire Falls”, The National Interest, June 28, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20484)

Clearly, major shifts in the balance of power in the international system often lead to instability and conflict. And America’s current predicament is far more severe. This time, our relative decline of 32 percent is accompanied, not by an even-steeper decline of our near-peer competitor, but rather by a 144 percent increase in China’s relative position. Further, the rapid spread of technology and technological breakthroughs means that one great discovery does not buoy an already-strong state to decades-long predominance. And with a rising China—with raw resources of population, landmass and increasing adoption of leading technology—a true peer competitor is looming. America’s current, rapid domestic economic decline is merely accelerating our own downfall. The distinct quality of a system with only one superpower is that no other single state is powerful enough to balance against it. A true global hegemon is more powerful still—stronger than all second-ranked powers acting as members of a counterbalancing coalition seeking to contain the unipolar leader. By these standards, America’s relative decline is fundamentally changing international politics, and is fundamentally different from Russia circa 1850 and Great Britain circa 1910. In current-U.S.-dollar terms—the preferred measure of the unipolar-dominance school—the United States has already fallen far from being a global hegemon and unipolarity itself is waning, since China will soon have as much economic potential to balance the United States as did the Soviet Union during the cold war. At the beginning of the 1990s, the United States was indeed not only stronger than any other state individually, but its power relative to even the collective power of all other major states combined grew from 1990 to 2000. Although the growth was small, America almost reached the crucial threshold of 50 percent of major-power product necessary to become a true global hegemon. So it is understandable that we were lulled into a sense of security, believing we could do as we wished, whenever and wherever we wished. The instability and danger of the cold war quickly became a distant memory. Near the time of the Iraq War, it would have required virtually every major power to actively oppose the United States in order to assemble a counterbalancing coalition that could approximate America’s potential power. Under the circumstances, hard, military balancing against the United States was not a serious possibility. So, it is not surprising that major powers opted for soft-balancing measures—relying on institutional, economic and diplomatic tools to oppose American military power. And yet we are beginning to see “the conflict of history” repeat itself. Even with less relative power, in the run-up to the Iraq War, people grossly underrated the ability of Germany, France, Russia and China, along with important regional powers like Turkey, to soft balance against the United States; for instance, to use the United Nations to delay, complicate and ultimately deny the use of one-third of U.S. combat power (the Fourth Infantry Division) in the opening months of the Iraq War. This is not yet great-power war of the kind seen in centuries past, but it harkens the instability that future unilateral efforts may trigger. The balance of world power circa 2008 and 2013 shows a disturbing trend. True, the United States remains stronger than any other state individually, but its power to stand up to the collective opposition of other major powers is falling precipitously. Though these worlds depict potential power, not active counterbalancing coalitions, and this type of alliance may never form, nonetheless, American relative power is declining to the point where even subsets of major powers acting in concert could produce sufficient military power to stand a reasonable chance of successfully opposing American military policies. Indeed, if present trends continue to 2013 and beyond, China and Russia, along with any one of the other major powers, would have sufficient economic capacity to mount military opposition at least as serious as did the Soviet Union during the cold war. And it is worth remembering that the Soviet Union never had more than about half the world product of the United States, which China alone is likely to reach in the coming decade. The faults in the arguments of the unipolar-dominance school are being brought into sharp relief. The world is slowly coming into balance. Whether or not this will be another period of great-power transition coupled with an increasing risk of war will largely depend on how America can navigate its decline. Policy makers must act responsibly in this new era or risk international opposition that poses far greater costs and far greater dangers.   A COHERENT grand strategy seeks to balance a state’s economic resources and its foreign-policy commitments and to sustain that balance over time. For America, a coherent grand strategy also calls for rectifying the current imbalance between our means and our ends, adopting policies that enhance the former and modify the latter. Clearly, the United States is not the first great power to suffer long-term decline—we should learn from history. Great powers in decline seem to almost instinctively spend more on military forces in order to shore up their disintegrating strategic positions, and some like Germany go even further, shoring up their security by adopting preventive military strategies, beyond defensive alliances, to actively stop a rising competitor from becoming dominant. For declining great powers, the allure of preventive war—or lesser measures to “merely” firmly contain a rising power—has a more compelling logic than many might assume. Since Thucydides, scholars of international politics have famously argued that a declining hegemon and rising challenger must necessarily face such intense security competition that hegemonic war to retain dominance over the international system is almost a foregone conclusion. Robert Gilpin, one of the deans of realism who taught for decades at Princeton, believed that “the first and most attractive response to a society’s decline is to eliminate the source of the problem . . . [by] what we shall call a hegemonic war.” Yet, waging war just to keep another state down has turned out to be one of the great losing strategies in history. The Napoleonic Wars, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War, German aggression in World War I, and German and Japanese aggression in World War II were all driven by declining powers seeking to use war to improve their future security. All lost control of events they thought they could control. All suffered ugly defeats. All were worse-off than had they not attacked. As China rises, America must avoid this great-power trap. It would be easy to think that greater American military efforts could offset the consequences of China’s increasing power and possibly even lead to the formation of a multilateral strategy to contain China in the future. Indeed, when China’s economic star began to rise in the 1990s, numerous voices called for precisely this, noting that on current trajectories China would overtake the United States as the world’s leading economic power by 2050.8 Now, as that date draws nearer—indeed, current-dollar calculations put the crossover point closer to 2040—and with Beijing evermore dependent on imported oil for continued economic growth, one might think the case for actively containing China is all the stronger. Absent provocative military adventures by Beijing, however, U.S. military efforts to contain the rising power are most likely doomed to failure. China’s growth turns mainly on domestic issues—such as shifting the workforce from rural to urban areas—that are beyond the ability of outside powers to significantly influence. Although China’s growth also depends on external sources of oil, there is no way to exploit this vulnerability short of obviously hostile alliances (with India, Indonesia, Taiwan and Japan) and clearly aggressive military measures (controlling the sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf to Asia) that together could deny oil to China. Any efforts along these lines would likely backfire—and only exacerbate America’s problems, increasing the risk of counterbalancing. Even more insidious is the risk of overstretch. This self-reinforcing spiral escalates current spending to maintain increasingly costly military commitments, crowding out productive investment for future growth. Today, the cold-war framework of significant troop deployments to Europe, Asia and the Persian Gulf is coming unglued. We cannot afford to keep our previous promises. With American forces bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and mounting troubles in Iran and Pakistan, the United States has all but gutted its military commitments to Europe, reducing our troop levels far below the one hundred thousand of the 1990s. Nearly half have been shifted to Iraq and elsewhere. Little wonder that Russia found an opportunity to demonstrate the hollowness of the Bush administration’s plan for expanding NATO to Russia’s borders by scoring a quick and decisive military victory over Georgia that America was helpless to prevent. If a large-scale conventional war between China and Taiwan broke out in the near future, one must wonder whether America would significantly shift air and naval power away from its ongoing wars in the Middle East in order to live up to its global commitments. If the United States could not readily manage wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time, could it really wage a protracted struggle in Asia as well? And as the gap between America’s productive resources and global commitments grows, why will others pass up opportunities to take advantage of America’s overstretched grand strategy? Since the end of the cold war, American leaders have consistently claimed the ability to maintain a significant forward-leaning military presence in the three major regions of the globe and, if necessary, to wage two major regional wars at the same time. The harsh reality is that the United States no longer has the economic capacity for such an ambitious grand strategy. With 30 percent of the world’s product, the United States could imagine maintaining this hope. Nearing 20 percent, it cannot. Yet, just withdrawing American troops from Iraq is not enough to put America’s grand strategy into balance. Even assuming a fairly quick and problem-free drawdown, the risks of instability in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region are likely to remain for many years to come. Further, even under the most optimistic scenarios, America is likely to remain dependent on imported oil for decades. Together, these factors point toward the Persian Gulf remaining the most important region in American grand strategy. So, as Europe and Asia continue to be low-order priorities, Washington must think creatively and look for opportunities to make strategic trades. America needs to share the burden of regional security with its allies and continue to draw down our troop levels in Europe and Asia, even considering the attendant risks. The days when the United States could effectively solve the security problems of its allies in these regions almost on its own are coming to an end. True, spreading defense burdens more equally will not be easy and will be fraught with its own costs and risks. However, this is simply part of the price of America’s declining relative power. The key principle is for America to gain international support among regional powers like Russia and China for its vital national-security objectives by adjusting less important U.S. policies. For instance, Russia may well do more to discourage Iran’s nuclear program in return for less U.S. pressure to expand NATO to its borders. And of course America needs to develop a plan to reinvigorate the competitiveness of its economy. Recently, Harvard’s Michael Porter issued an economic blueprint to renew America’s environment for innovation. The heart of his plan is to remove the obstacles to increasing investment in science and technology. A combination of targeted tax, fiscal and education policies to stimulate more productive investment over the long haul is a sensible domestic component to America’s new grand strategy. But it would be misguided to assume that the United States could easily regain its previously dominant economic position, since the world will likely remain globally competitive. To justify postponing this restructuring of its grand strategy, America would need a firm expectation of high rates of economic growth over the next several years. There is no sign of such a burst on the horizon. Misguided efforts to extract more security from a declining economic base only divert potential resources from investment in the economy, trapping the state in an ever-worsening strategic dilemma. This approach has done little for great powers in the past, and America will likely be no exception when it comes to the inevitable costs of desperate policy making. The United States is not just declining. Unipolarity is becoming obsolete, other states are rising to counter American power and the United States is losing much of its strategic freedom. Washington must adopt more realistic foreign commitments.

Decline of U.S hegemony is imminent – multiple reasons

Toplin Professor of History (Emeritus), University of North Carolina 3/8/2010["Decline of a Great Power?" http://hnn.us/articles/124000.html]

Today the mood is gloomy rather than optimistic. The American economy has lost traction, and the deficit is spiraling. America’s military remains deeply engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. Against this background, words that Paul Kennedy published in 1987 appear insightful. Kennedy warned that “decision-makers in Washington must face the awkward and enduring fact that the sum total of the United States’ global interests and obligations is nowadays far larger than the country’s power to defend them all simultaneously.” Today’s conversations about overreach usually apply to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz and his co-author, Linda Bilms, describe those engagements as “The Three Trillion Dollar War.” Stiglitz and Bilms note U.S. commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan are projected to cost almost ten times the price of the first Gulf War, a third more than the Vietnam War, and twice the price of America’s participation in the First World War. News stories about military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan dominate the headlines, but there are other important examples of on-going military obligations that receive less public attention in print and on television. The United States provides almost half of all global military spending (48%). U.S. troops are presently stationed in more than 150 countries. About 90,000 U.S. military personnel remain in two peaceful nations that surrendered more than sixty years ago (there are 57,000 U.S. military personnel in Germany and 33,000 in Japan). Paul Kennedy did not argue that a great nation must pull back completely, retreat from international affairs, or become isolationist when assessing the cost of international commitments. Nor did he did claim that the decline of a great global power, such as the United States, is inevitable. He stressed, rather, that national leaders should be aware of the interaction between strategy and economics. If leaders extend a country’s reach beyond the capacity of its material resources, wrote Kennedy, “the nation will be less secure in the long term.” That message is as relevant today as it was back in 1987, when many Americans found The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers a thoughtful commentary on the lessons of history.

### Ext.: Latin America Specific

Retrenching in Latin America now

Crandall 2011 (Russell, Associate Professor of International Politics at Davidson College, Principal Director for the Western Hemisphere at the U.S. Department of Defense in 2009 and Director for Andean Affairs at the National Security Council in 2010-11, The Post-American Hemisphere Subtitle: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America, Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis)

Yet over the past decade or so, the United States' willingness and ability to exert control in the region have diminished. This has occurred in part because more important issues, including the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, have forced Latin America down the policymaking food chain. But there is also the indisputable reality that the region itself is now more confident acting on its own. For the most part, this was inevitable, given the end of external and local communist challenges and the shift to an increasingly multilateral world that had room for new powers. Latin America's greater autonomy is both a cause and a result of decreased U.S. influence.

### Unsustainable- Balancing

U.S. hegemony declining – China and Russia will fill in

Hunt 10 (Tam Hunt, attorney, consultant, and lecturer on Climate Change law and policy at UCBS’s Bren School of Environmental Science and Management, “Tam Hunt: The Unipolar Moment Reconsidered”, 6/20, Noozhawk, http://www.noozhawk.com/tam\_hunt/article/061810\_tam\_hunt/)

Columnist Charles Krauthammer wrote in 2004 that the predominance of U.S. power in the world after the fall of the Soviet Union was a “staggering development in history, not seen since the fall of Rome.” Krauthammer and his fellow neoconservatives famously concluded from this disparity in power that the United States needed to adopt an aggressive foreign policy agenda to enhance and continue its dominance in the “New American Century.” Tam Hunt This conclusion was the wrong lesson from history and from any reasonable and compassionate view of the desirable future arc of humanity. Rather than consolidate and expand U.S. power in the 21st century, with a mix of military, economic and cultural coercion — the neocon strategy — the United States should instead seize what is still our unique unipolar moment and work toward a truly multilateral and multipolar world. The last two centuries have been dominated by one nation — the hegemon, which comes from the Greek for “leader.” Britain was the first global hegemon, and indeed the “sun never set on the British empire.” Britain’s dominance was fueled, literally, by coal, which allowed the industrial revolution to work its magic first in Britain. This led to great economic might, which was translated into military might. With a sense of cultural superiority, the “White Man’s Burden,” the British empire was ruthless in its domination of areas of the world as far-flung as North America, India, Jamaica, Gibraltar and Australia. Britain at its peak, however, never comprised more than 10 percent of the global economy. The United States, fueled by coal and oil, which was first found in Titusville, Pa., in 1859, an expansive and ever-growing territory that spanned a whole continent, and a sense of “American exceptionalism,” was the successor to the British empire, reaching 19 percent of global economic output in 1913, at the verge of World War I, and 35 percent at the height of World War II. The United States is now about 20 percent of the global economy, its share shrinking as other nations grow rapidly. The United States’ historical wealth of oil, coal and natural gas allowed it to grow to such a dominant economic and military position that it is truly deserving of being called an empire. As a global empire, the United States spends as much on its military as the rest of the world combined. If Britain was the first global hegemon, the United States became the first hyper-hegemon. We keep about 800 military bases in 160 nations. There is no place immune from our power and, increasingly, no place immune from our surveillance. We are now expanding and enforcing our empire with increasingly inhumane robotic drone attacks in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and other countries, creating a whole new generation of bitter enemies. There are chinks in our armor, however. Clearly. The neocon agenda was made real after the 9/11 attacks, with the Bush administration launching ill-fated invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the Obama administration expanding the Afghanistan war into Pakistan. These military responses are exactly the wrong lesson to be learned from history and will do nothing in the long run to improve humanity’s lot on a limited planet. The longer-term threat to U.S. dominance is economic. The United States is by far the largest economy today, although down to a “mere” 20 percent of world economic output from its World War II peak. Economic threats loom not far over the horizon, however. China surpassed Germany as the third largest economy in the world in 2007 and will likely surpass Japan as the second largest this year. The United States remains, however, almost three times as large as China and Japan in economic terms. But China is set to surpass the United States as the leading economy in 15 to 20 years, based on Goldman Sachs projections, and by 2050 the United States and India will probably be about half the size of the Chinese economy. Goldman Sachs projections of global economic growth by 2050. With economic might comes military might. As Martin Jacques writes in When China Rules the World (2009), China is best described as a “civilization-state” because of its history as a unitary civilization in essentially the same borders for about 2,000 years and a 5,000-year cultural history going back even further. It has exercised its power beyond its borders, as a “tributary state” that collected tribute from surrounding nations without subjecting them to the same type of control that Western colonial powers perfected. Until recent decades, however, China limited its influence to East Asia. More recently, China has become increasingly aggressive in securing the resources it needs to continue its rapid double-digit growth, using its largely state-controlled companies like the China National Offshore Oil Corp. to snap up oil resources around the world. China knows full well the role that energy plays in economic growth and national power. Less discussed as a challenger to U.S. dominance is Russia. Isn’t Russia old news, with its influence minimized since the fall of the Soviet Union? Well, yes and no. Russia is projected by Goldman Sachs to be the world’s sixth largest economy in both 2025 and 2050. However, beyond “mere” GDP comparisons, Russia’s influence will be magnified in coming years because of its huge hydrocarbon resources. Russia is now the world’s largest producer of oil, surpassing Saudi Arabia. Russia produced almost 10 million barrels per day of oil in 2009, beating the Saudis by about 800,000 barrels. The United States was third, with about 8.5 million barrels per day and Iran a distant fourth. But Russia’s natural wealth goes far beyond oil. Russia is the world’s largest natural gas producer, producing more than 20 percent of the world’s demand in 2009. The United States was second and Canada a distant third. Long-term, Russia has by far the biggest natural gas reserves of any country. As the world decarbonizes, which means in the electricity sector switching to natural gas and renewables from coal, natural gas production will become an increasingly important component of national power. We’ve already seen this story unfurled in Europe over the last few years as Russia has used its natural gas supplies to exert control over neighboring countries like Ukraine and Belarus. Russia is not dominant in coal production; China is by far the biggest producer of coal. The United States is second. But China and the United States use all of their own production, and Australia and Indonesia are the largest coal exporters, so the net hydrocarbon export situation is surprisingly not changed much by looking at coal in addition to oil and natural gas. Net hydrocarbon exports of selected countries — million tons of oil equivalent. (Energy Information Administration graphic) This energy dynamic can be summed up nicely by comparing net hydrocarbon exports. This measure subtracts from total hydrocarbon production what each country consumes itself. The nearby chart, compiled with Energy Information Administration data, compares the world’s largest economies and the world’s major hydrocarbon producers. It is an interesting alternative view of what constitutes national power. It’s more difficult to predict what the future holds for this dynamic because as nations like Saudi Arabia and Russia continue to grow they consume more of their own products. The Export Land Model attempts to project how quickly major exporting nations cease to export oil due to increased domestic consumption and declining production, demonstrating how quickly net exporters can become net importers, as China did recently with coal and the United Kingdom did with oil. However, the long-term trends in heavily import-dependent nations like the United States, Japan, China, etc., are exacerbated because these countries’ hydrocarbon wealth has long since peaked and it’s all downhill moving forward. It looks, then, like China and Russia are the key U.S. competitors in coming decades. The inevitable peak in global oil and other hydrocarbon resources will further exacerbate these issues.

U.S. hegemony declining now – regional powers have replaced US dominance

Rogers 9 (Walters Rogers, former senior international correspondence for CNN, “America: a Superpower no more,” The Christian Science Monitor, April 8, http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/0408/p09s01-coop.html)

Two American icons, General Electric and Berkshire Hathaway, lost their triple-A credit ratings. Then China, America's largest creditor, called for a new global currency to replace the dollar just weeks after it demanded Washington guarantee the safety of Beijing's nearly $1 trillion debt holdings. And that was just in March. These events are the latest warnings that our world is changing far more rapidly and profoundly than we – or our politicians – will admit. America's own triple-A rating, its superpower status, is being downgraded as rapidly as its economy. President Obama's recent acknowledgement that the US is not winning in Afghanistan is but the most obvious recognition of this jarring new reality. What was the president telling Americans? As Milton Bearden, a former top CIA analyst on Afghanistan, recently put it, "If you aren't winning, you're losing." The global landscape is littered with evidence that America's superpower status is fraying. Nuclear-armed Pakistan – arguably the world's most dangerous country – is falling apart, despite billions in US aid and support. In Iraq, despite efforts in Washington to make "the surge" appear to be a stunning US victory, analysts most familiar with the region have already declared Iran the strategic winner of the Bush administration's war against Saddam Hussein. The Iraq war has greatly empowered Iran, nurturing a new regional superpower that now seems likely to be the major architect of the new Iraq. Sadly, what was forgotten amid the Bush-era hubris was that America's edge always has been as much moral and economic as military. Officially sanctioned torture, the Abu Ghraib scandal, US invasion of a sovereign country without provocation, along with foolishly allowing radical Islamists to successfully portray the US as the enemy of the world's 1.5 billion Muslims, shattered whatever moral edge America enjoyed before 2003. Washington's uncritical support of Israel at the expense of Palestinians is perceived by much of the world as egregiously hypocritical. Consequently, America's collision course with Islam may be irreversible. Muslims believe Islam never lost the moral high ground – and they won't readily relinquish it for Western secularism. Even politically conservative journals such as The National Interest recognize something has gone wrong. Now, as a massive retrenchment of the US economy is under way, it is time to shake the mental shackles of the superpower legacy and embrace a more peripheralist agenda. That need not mean isolationism or retreat. It would still require maintaining substantial armed forces with a qualitative edge, but using them only when there is an affordable and persuasive American national interest. Iraq never fitted that description. The price tag for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wars is in the trillions. Sun Tzu, the ancient Chinese military commentator, prophetically observed 2,500 years ago, "[W]hen the army marches abroad, the treasury will be emptied at home." It remains a lingering American myth that US troops and warships can go anywhere and pay any price. Not so. The modern Chinese have discovered a better way. The Washington Post reports that the Chinese went on a shopping spree recently, taking advantage of fire-sale prices to lock up global supplies of oil, minerals, and other strategic resources for their economy. That amounts to a major economic conquest – without using a single soldier. By contrast, American efforts to secure oil have looked clumsy. Iran also is achieving serious regional hegemony, without armadas, using proxy guerrilla armies to dominate its near neighbors. Its rebuffs to President Obama's recent outreach speaks to Tehran's growing confidence in its ability to manipulate its home-field advantage – stage-managing events from Afghanistan to Lebanon, all the while thumbing its nose at both the American and Israeli "superpowers." Last August's Russian invasion of Georgia was a painful reminder that Russia has what its leadership calls "privileged interests" on its periphery. Yesterday's superpowers have been replaced by regional hegemons, as the globe is being carved up into more-defensible spheres of interest. Americans need to acknowledge that war, like politics, is the art of the possible, and both have their limits. The Bush administration was unable to deliver its promised democratic remake of the Muslim Middle East. Thus, another unpleasant truth: The Western democratic model has no appeal to much of the Arab world. Nor is democracy an attractive model for huge swaths of the rest of the world, such as Russia and China. It's time to lower our geopolitical sights and end America's unrealistic crusade. We shouldn't expect "them" to want to be like "us." It took years for the US to recover its moral authority after Vietnam. It will be an even harder comeback this time.

### Unsustainable- Defense Spending

Heg unsustainable – excessive defense expenditures

Michael Lind (Policy Director of New America's Economic Growth Program. He is a co-founder of the New America Foundation)Autumn 2008 “ A Concert-Balance Strategy for a Multipolar World” http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/concert\_balance\_strategy\_multipolar\_world\_8468

The concert-balance strategy, while still expensive compared to neo-isolationism, would be far less costly than a US grand strategy of hegemony. Adherents of the hegemony strategy sometimes claim that the United States can easily afford to spend the huge amount of resources on the military that dissuasion and reassurance would require. But even if that were true, the American public is not likely to support permanently higher defense expenditures, once the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are concluded. Even if the problem of health care costs increasing at a rate faster than gross domestic product (GDP) is solved in the near future, the growth of the population of retirees in the United States may raise Social Security and Medicare spending by at least four percent of GDP. It seems unlikely that the American electorate will tolerate either the substantial tax increases or the substantial cuts in middleclass entitlements needed to spend four to six percent of US GDP permanently on the military, as some have proposed. In any event, the costs of the hegemony strategy, if it were seriously pursued, inevitably would rise to levels the United States could not afford if the policy of dissuasion failed and growing powers such as China chose to make their military power commensurate with their economic strength. The French International Relations Institute has predicted that by 2050 Greater China (China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) will be the world’s leading economic power, accounting for 24 percent of the international economy. North America (the United States, Canada, and Mexico) would be next, with 23 percent of world GDP.19 The US investment bank Goldman Sachs reached similar conclusions, predicting that by 2050 China will have the largest economy, followed by the United States and India. The next tier might be occupied by Russia, Brazil, and Japan, and a third tier would include Germany, Britain, and other once-mighty European economic powers. The European share of the global economy may decline from its current 22 percent, roughly comparable to that of the United States, to only 12 percent in 2050.20

Heg unsustainable – US defense spending

Eland 08 (Ivan Eland, senior fellow at the Independent Institute, “Back to the Future: Rediscovering America’s Foreign Policy Traditions,” Mediterranean Quarterly, http://mq.dukejournals.org/cgi/reprint/19/3/88.pdf)

To support the informal US worldwide empire of alliances, overseas bases, and personnel, which are used to justify and conduct frequent military interventions, the United States spends huge sums on defense compared to other nations. The United States spends on defense more than the combined security expenditures of the next sixteen highest-spending countries.8 In all, the United States accounts for 44.0 percent of the world’s defense spending,9 but only 27.5 percent of the world’s gross domestic product (GDP).10 This comparison, along with the strain that the two small wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have imposed on US forces, indicate that the informal US empire might be overstretched. Many prior empires have declined because their security spending, overseas defense commitments, and military interventions exceeded their ability to pay for them. Even the British and French empires, on the winning side of both world wars, became financially exhausted — because of fighting those wars and maintaining their vast territories — and went into decline. More recently, the Soviet Union’s empire, and even the country itself, collapsed because its giant military, Eastern European alliances, and military interventions in the developing world became too much for its dysfunctional economy to bear. Many in the United States say that the US economy is much bigger than these failed empires and that decline cannot happen here. But that is what the elites of past empires believed, too. Furthermore, over time, small differences in economic growth rates between competing countries can lead to a reordering of great powers on the world scene. Most of the United States’ economic competitors have less defense spending as a portion of GDP to be a drag on their economies. Thus, even “national greatness” conservatives should be wary of too much defense spending, excessive military commitments overseas, and unnecessary wars, such as Iraq, that sap national resources. All other forms of national power — military, technological, and cultural — derive from maintaining a healthy economy.

### Unsustainable- Soft Balancing

Soft balancing undermines American diplomatic channels, which facilitates anti-American coalitions and hard balancing.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 144-5

Soft balancing is a concession to the disparity in military power between the United States and other major states in today's international system.48 Soft balancing relies on diplomacy—conducted through ad hoc coalitions or through international institutions—and, rather than challenging U.S. hegemony directly, it seeks to constrain the United States and limit Washington's ability to impose its policy preferences on others. The key idea underlying soft balancing is that by coordinating their diplomacy and lending one another mutual support, soft balancers can gain outcomes vis-a-vis the United States that they could not obtain by acting separately. To date, soft balancing has taken two forms. First, the second-tier major powers have cooperated—either through informal ententes or by creating organizational structures—to rein in America's exercise of hegemonic power. Examples include periodic summit meetings (Sino-Russian, Franco-Russian, Sine-Indian-Russian) that pledge cooperation to restore multipolarity, and the Shanghai Cooperation Council, created by Moscow and Beijing to coordinate efforts to resist the intrusion of U.S. power into Central Asia.49 The second-tier major powers also engage in "binding" strategies that seek to enmesh the United States in international institutions, to ensure that it is restrained by international law and norms of permissible great power behavior. However, as the combinedefforts of France, Germany, and Russia to use the United Nations to preventthe March 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq demonstrate, binding is an ineffectivemeans of constraining U.S. hegemony (although perhaps marginally moresuccessful as a means of delegitimizing U.S. unilateral actions). This does notmean, however, that soft balancing is unimportant. After all, grand strategy isabout utilizing the key instruments of a state's power—military, economic,and diplomatic—to advance its interests and to gain security. Diplomacy invariably is an integral component of counterbalancing strategies. Thus, soft balancing's real significance is that, if states learn that they can work together diplomatically in standing up to the United States, the groundwork may belaid for future coalitions that will he able to engage effectively in hard balancing, or semi-hard balancing, against the United States.

U.S. preponderance is spurring soft-balancing now – these indirect efforts will turn into a hard-line counterweight unless the U.S. begins to withdraw.

Robert A. Pape (Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago) summer 2005 “soft balancing against the United States” International Security

The George W. Bush administration's national security strategy, which asserts that the United States has the right to attack and conquer sovereign countries that pose no observable threat, and to do so without international support, is one of the most aggressively unilateral U.S. postures ever taken. Recent international relations scholarship has wrongly promoted the view that the United States, as the leader of a unipolar system, can pursue such a policy without fear of serious opposition. The most consequential effect of the Bush strategy will be a fundamental transformation in how major states perceive the United States and how they react to future uses of U.S. power. Major powers are already engaging in the early stages of balancing behavior against the United States, by adopting "soft-balancing" measures that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but use international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements to delay, frustrate, and undermine U.S. policies. If the Bush administration continues to pursue aggressive unilateral military policies, increased soft balancing could establish the basis for hard balancing against the United States. To avoid this outcome, the United States should renounce the systematic use of preventive war, as well as other aggressive unilateral military policies, and return to its traditional policy governing the use of force -- a case-by-case calculation of costs and benefits.

### A2 Brooks and Wohlforth

Reject Brooks and Wohlforth – their analysis is based off a freeze frame of IR and doesn't into account other factors that cause hegemonic decline

Layne, 09 – Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay", International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009, July 6th 2009, Galileo, p. 15) PDF

Superficially, Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system; they do not engage the argument that, like all hegemonic systems, the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise. Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation. Over time, however, know-how, technology, and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system, which allows other states to catch up. Similarly, leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline.43 A key question is whether the early decades of the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U.S. hegemony. In this respect, the debate about unipolar stability is misleading. After all, despite their claim at the be-ginning of World Out of Balance that unipolarity is robust and that U.S. hegemony will endure well into the future, Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years, which is not very long at all.44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity; it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States, and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization.45

Brooks and Wolforth concede that coalitional balancing will work against the US

Jack S. Levy (Board of Governors’ Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society) and William R. Thompson (Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, former president of the International Studies Association, and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly) Summer 2010 “ Balancing on Land and at Sea Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Balancing\_on\_Land\_and\_at\_Sea.pdf

In addition, Brooks and Wohlforth’s argument that the balancing hypothesis applies only to states that are growing and threatening to achieve a position of hegemony but not to established hegemons such as the United States raises the question of why other leading states did not balance against the United States when it was a rising great power but before it established a position of primacy—perhaps in the late 1940s. If the hypothesis that great powers balance against aspiring hegemons is unconditionally valid, and if the only issue is the distribution of material capabilities, then there were plenty of opportunities for a counterbalancing coalition to form against the United States throughout the Cold War period. Instead, most of the great powers perceived that the greatest threat to their interests came from the Soviet Union, not from the United States, and they joined the United States in a defensive balancing coalition against the Soviet Union. Brooks and Wohlforth concede that even today the member states of the European Union collectively exceed the United States in gross domestic product, and the combination of the European Union, Japan, China, and Russia, reinforced by nuclear deterrence, could form an effective balancing coalition against the United States if it was seen as so threatening. Brooks and Wohlforth’s inability to provide a convincing explanation for the absence of coalition formation against the United States in the early Cold War period, when such behavior would not have been so risky, weakens their explanation for nonbalancing after the end of the Cold War.77

Brooks and Wohlforth concede unipolarity can only last for 20 more years and that counterbalancing is occuring

Layne, 09 Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009)

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### Multipolarity Inevitable

Multipolarity inevitable---collapse of the dollar, erosion of public support, and rising challengers

Layne, 09 Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009)

For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades, a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World.15Global Trends 2025 is not light reading, but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. Its key geopolitical conclusion is that the U.S.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers); and economic, financial, and domestic political constraints that may erode U.S. capabilities. China, India, and possibly Russia are emerging great powers.16 As Global Trends 2025 points out, the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. 7). Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid.). By 2025, China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. 30). India, buoyed by its strong economic growth rate, will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid.). Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status, the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. 29).17 [End Page 152] Because of uncertainties about economics, energy prices, domestic governance issues, and especially demography, Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. 31–32).18 Between 2009 and 2025, Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million, affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. 23–24, 30). If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power, however, the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U.S. global dominance” (p. 32). Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. 32, 82). According to the NIC, in addition to relative decline, the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. U.S. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. 93). The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. 3, 8–9, 13–14). At home, economic and political constraints may undermine U.S. hegemony. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. Nevertheless, the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U.S. power. In particular, Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades, the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. Although at the time this issue went to press, the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come, China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified.19 [End Page 153] As the NIC observes, the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. Thus, “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. 12, 94, 97). Moreover, the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U.S. freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p. 97). The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic, military, and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. 93). Ultimately, although the United States will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now, it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid.).

### Transition Stable

Transition to multipolarity will be stable- international institutions ensure

Ikenberry 2011 (G. John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, The Future of the Liberal World Order Subtitle: Internationalism After America, Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis)

There is no longer any question: wealth and power are moving from the North and the West to the East and the South, and the old order dominated by the United States and Europe is giving way to one increasingly shared with non-Western rising states. But if the great wheel of power is turning, what kind of global political order will emerge in the aftermath? Some anxious observers argue that the world will not just look less American -- it will also look less liberal. Not only is the United States' preeminence passing away, they say, but so, too, is the open and rule-based international order that the country has championed since the 1940s. In this view, newly powerful states are beginning to advance their own ideas and agendas for global order, and a weakened United States will find it harder to defend the old system. The hallmarks of liberal internationalism -- openness and rule-based relations enshrined in institutions such as the United Nations and norms such as multilateralism -- could give way to a more contested and fragmented system of blocs, spheres of influence, mercantilist networks, and regional rivalries. The fact that today's rising states are mostly large non-Western developing countries gives force to this narrative. The old liberal international order was designed and built in the West. Brazil, China, India, and other fast-emerging states have a different set of cultural, political, and economic experiences, and they see the world through their anti-imperial and anticolonial pasts. Still grappling with basic problems of development, they do not share the concerns of the advanced capitalist societies. The recent global economic slowdown has also bolstered this narrative of liberal international decline. Beginning in the United States, the crisis has tarnished the American model of liberal capitalism and raised new doubts about the ability of the United States to act as the global economic leader. For all these reasons, many observers have concluded that world politics is experiencing not just a changing of the guard but also a transition in the ideas and principles that underlie the global order. The journalist Gideon Rachman, for example, says that a cluster of liberal internationalist ideas -- such as faith in democratization, confidence in free markets, and the acceptability of U.S. military power -- are all being called into question. According to this worldview, the future of international order will be shaped above all by China, which will use its growing power and wealth to push world politics in an illiberal direction. Pointing out that China and other non-Western states have weathered the recent financial crisis better than their Western counterparts, pessimists argue that an authoritarian capitalist alternative to Western neoliberal ideas has already emerged. According to the scholar Stefan Halper, emerging-market states "are learning to combine market economics with traditional autocratic or semiautocratic politics in a process that signals an intellectual rejection of the Western economic model." But this panicked narrative misses a deeper reality: although the United States' position in the global system is changing, the liberal international order is alive and well. The struggle over international order today is not about fundamental principles. China and other emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles of the liberal international order; they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it. Indeed, today's power transition represents not the defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance. Brazil, China, and India have all become more prosperous and capable by operating inside the existing international order -- benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the newly organized G-20. Their economic success and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world politics, and they have deep interests in preserving that system. In the meantime, alternatives to an open and rule-based order have yet to crystallize. Even though the last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system -- the emergence of new powers, bitter disputes among Western allies over the United States' unipolar ambitions, and a global financial crisis and recession -- the liberal international order has no competitors. On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies for it. To be sure, as wealth and power become less concentrated in the United States' hands, the country will be less able to shape world politics. But the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive. Indeed, now may be the best time for the United States and its democratic partners to update the liberal order for a new era, ensuring that it continues to provide the benefits of security and prosperity that it has provided since the middle of the twentieth century.

### Transition Stable 2

No transition wars- rising states will integrate into international institutions- no incentives for aggression

Ikenberry 2011 (G. John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, The Future of the Liberal World Order Subtitle: Internationalism After America, Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis)

REASON FOR REASSURANCE Rising powers will discover another reason to embrace the existing global rules and institutions: doing so will reassure their neighbors as they grow more powerful. A stronger China will make neighboring states potentially less secure, especially if it acts aggressively and exhibits revisionist ambitions. Since this will trigger a balancing backlash, Beijing has incentives to signal restraint. It will find ways to do so by participating in various regional and global institutions. If China hopes to convince its neighbors that it has embarked on a "peaceful rise," it will need to become more integrated into the international order. China has already experienced a taste of such a backlash. Last year, its military made a series of provocative moves -- including naval exercises -- in the South China Sea, actions taken to support the government's claims to sovereign rights over contested islands and waters. Many of the countries disputing China's claims joined with the United States at the Regional Forum of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in July to reject Chinese bullying and reaffirm open access to Asia's waters and respect for international law. In September, a Chinese fishing trawler operating near islands administered by Japan in the East China Sea rammed into two Japanese coast guard ships. After Japanese authorities detained the trawler's crew, China responded with what one Japanese journalist described as a "diplomatic 'shock and awe' campaign," suspending ministerial-level contacts, demanding an apology, detaining several Japanese workers in China, and instituting a de facto ban on exports of rare-earth minerals to Japan. These actions -- seen as manifestations of a more bellicose and aggressive foreign policy -- pushed ASEAN, Japan, and South Korea perceptibly closer to the United States. As China's economic and military power grow, its neighbors will only become more worried about Chinese aggressiveness, and so Beijing will have reason to allay their fears. Of course, it might be that some elites in China are not interested in practicing restraint. But to the extent that China is interested in doing so, it will find itself needing to signal peaceful intentions -- redoubling its participation in existing institutions, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit, or working with the other great powers in the region to build new ones. This is, of course, precisely what the United States did in the decades after World War II. The country operated within layers of regional and global economic, political, and security institutions and constructed new ones -- thereby making itself more predictable and approachable and reducing the incentives for other states to undermine it by building countervailing coalitions. More generally, given the emerging problems of the twenty-first century, there will be growing incentives among all the great powers to embrace an open, rule-based international system. In a world of rising economic and security interdependence, the costs of not following multilateral rules and not forging cooperative ties go up. As the global economic system becomes more interdependent, all states -- even large, powerful ones -- will find it harder to ensure prosperity on their own. Growing interdependence in the realm of security is also creating a demand for multilateral rules and institutions. Both the established and the rising great powers are threatened less by mass armies marching across borders than by transnational dangers, such as terrorism, climate change, and pandemic disease. What goes on in one country -- radicalism, carbon emissions, or public health failures -- can increasingly harm another country. Intensifying economic and security interdependence are giving the United States and other powerful countries reason to seek new and more extensive forms of multilateral cooperation. Even now, as the United States engages China and other rising states, the agenda includes expanded cooperation in areas such as clean energy, environmental protection, nonproliferation, and global economic governance. The old and rising powers may disagree on how exactly this cooperation should proceed, but they all have reasons to avoid a breakdown in the multilateral order itself. So they will increasingly experiment with new and more extensive forms of liberal internationalism.

### A/T “We’ll Always Try”\*\*

No, we won’t- intuitive assertions shouldn’t cut it- best studies of IR prove the US can and will successfully retrench- all their transition args are wrong

MacDonald and Parent 2011 (Paul K. and Joseph M., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, International Security, Graceful Decline?; The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment, Spring, lexis)

In this article, we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists. To date there has been neither a comprehensive study of great power retrenchment nor a study that lays out the case for retrenchment as a practical or probable policy. This article fills these gaps by systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, we challenge the retrenchment pessimists' claim that domestic or international constraints inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench. In fact, when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers, peaceful retrenchment is the most common response, even over short time spans. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies or adversaries, draw down their military obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, great powers retrench for the same reason they expand: the rigors of great power politics compel them to do so. 12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but necessity is the mother of invention, and declining great powers face powerful incentives to contract their interests in a prompt and proportionate manner. Knowing only a state's rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that great powers facing acute decline are less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes. Faced with diminishing resources, great powers moderate their foreign policy ambitions and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value. Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions of critics, retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation. Great powers are able to rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, retrenchment can be successful. States that retrench often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

### A/T “We’ll Always Try” 2

Yes, applicable to US; and “lashout” thesis is wrong- prefer *studies* over assertion

MacDonald and Parent 2011 (Paul K. and Joseph M., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, International Security, Graceful Decline?; The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment, Spring, lexis)

Implications for Sino-U.S. Relations Our findings are directly relevant to what appears to be an impending great power transition between China and the United States. Estimates of economic performance vary, but most observers expect Chinese GDP to surpass U.S. GDP sometime in the next decade or two. 91 This prospect has generated considerable concern. Many scholars foresee major conflict during a Sino-U.S. ordinal transition. Echoing Gilpin and Copeland, John Mearsheimer sees the crux of the issue as irreconcilable goals: China wants to be America's superior and the United States wants no peer competitors. In his words, "[N]o amount of goodwill can ameliorate the intense security competition that sets in when an aspiring hegemon appears in Eurasia." 92 Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one's reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conflict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations.

### A/T “Public = Always Engage”

#### The public supports retrenchment

Macdonald and Parent December 2011 (Joseph M. Parent is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Paul K. MacDonald is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College, The Wisdom of Retrenchment Subtitle: America Must Cut Back to Move Forward, Foreign Affairs, lexis)

Others warn that the U.S. political system is too fragmented to implement a coordinated policy of retrenchment. In this view, even if the foreign policy community unanimously subscribed to this strategy, it would be unable to outmaneuver lobbying groups and bureaucracies that favor a more activist approach. Electoral pressures reward lucrative defense contracts and chest-thumping stump speeches rather than sober appraisals of declining fortunes. Whatever leaders' preferences are, bureaucratic pressures promote conservative decisions, policy inertia, and big budgets -- none of which is likely to usher in an era of self-restraint. Despite deep partisan divides, however, Republicans and Democrats have often put aside their differences when it comes to foreign policy. After World War II, the United States did not revert to the isolationism of earlier periods: both parties backed massive programs to contain the Soviet Union. During the tempestuous 1960s, a consensus emerged in favor of détente with the Soviets. The 9/11 attacks generated bipartisan support for action against al Qaeda and its allies. Then, in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008, politicians across the spectrum recognized the need to bring the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to an end. When faced with pressing foreign policy challenges, U.S. politicians generally transcend ideological divides and forge common policies, sometimes expanding the United States' global commitments and sometimes contracting them. Today, electoral pressures support a more modest approach to foreign affairs. According to a 2009 study by the Pew Research Center, 70 percent of Americans would rather the United States share global leadership than go it alone. And a 2010 study by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 79 percent of them thought the United States played the role of world policeman more than it should. Even on sacrosanct issues such as the defense budget, the public has demonstrated a willingness to consider reductions. In a 2010 study conducted by the Program for Public Consultation at the University of Maryland, 64 percent of respondents endorsed reductions in defense spending, supporting an average cut of $109 billion to the base-line defense budget. Institutional barriers to reform do remain. Yet when presidents have led, the bureaucrats have largely followed. Three successive administrations, beginning with that of Ronald Reagan, were able to tame congressional opposition and push through an ambitious realignment program that ultimately resulted in the closure of 100 military bases, saving $57 billion. In its 2010 defense budget, the Obama administration succeeded in canceling plans to acquire additional F-22 Raptors despite fierce resistance by lobbyists, members of Congress, and the air force brass. The 2010 budget also included cuts to the navy's fleet of stealth destroyers and various components of the army's next generation of manned ground vehicles. Thus, claims that retrenchment is politically impractical or improbable are unfounded. Just as a more humble foreign policy will invite neither instability nor decline, domestic political factors will not inevitably prevent timely reform. To chart a new course, U.S. policymakers need only possess foresight and will.

They oversimplify how democracy works- multiple interest groups and elite pressure lead to successful retrenchment

MacDonald and Parent 2011 (Paul K. and Joseph M., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, International Security, Graceful Decline?; The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment, Spring, lexis)

Although useful in many contexts, domestic constraint arguments suffer from several problems. First, domestic political theories assume that interest groups predominantly push for more expansive overseas commitments. Yet domestic interest groups possess much more complicated and nuanced preferences than is commonly assumed. For example, many domestic interest groups oppose overseas commitments, favoring expenditure on domestic programs rather than adventures abroad. Second, groups favoring assertive foreign policies do not speak with one voice or assign equal priority to all interests. Different interest groups will place different weight on particular regions, economic sectors, or types of international challenges. 34 The heterogeneity of domestic interests is critical because it opens up space for politicians to outmaneuver domestic groups and force trade-offs on unwilling lobbies. Third, domestic political theories are unclear about when domestic interests are able to hijack the policymaking process. Some studies emphasize problems with democratic states, which provide interest groups easier access to the policymaking process. In his classic study, however, Stephen Krasner finds that "again and again there are serious discrepancies between the aims of central decision-makers and those of private corporations" in which "the state has generally prevailed." 35 Others argue that it is not regime type that is crucial, but the institutional structure of a country. Spruyt emphasizes the importance of institutional veto points, which are present in both democratic and autocratic systems. 36 Although the inclusion of veto points allows a more nuanced understanding of domestic constraints, it suffers from the same problem of specifying which veto points are most significant and when they will prove decisive. Fourth, domestic political theories tend to downplay or ignore the ability of international context to inform domestic politics. Yet policymakers do not operate in a vacuum; elites react to changes in the international system. 37 Policymakers at the helm of rising powers can afford to indulge the interests of domestic lobbies with minimal consequences. Elites in rising powers have few incentives to resolve trade-offs among competing interests or veto new and unnecessary foreign adventures. In contrast, there are significant pressures on policymakers in declining great powers to put aside their parochial interests. They sit atop wasting assets, and a local defeat may easily turn into a general rout. It is precisely in periods of acute relative decline that one should expect partisan rancor and sectoral rivalry to recede.

## \*\*Impacts\*\*

### General Defense

Heg solves nothing- past two decades prove

Mearsheimer 2011 (John J., R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, The National Interest, Imperial by Design, lexis)

One year later, Charles Krauthammer emphasized in "The Unipolar Moment" that the United States had emerged from the Cold War as by far the most powerful country on the planet.2 He urged American leaders not to be reticent about using that power "to lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and being prepared to enforce them." Krauthammer's advice fit neatly with Fukuyama's vision of the future: the United States should take the lead in bringing democracy to less developed countries the world over. After all, that shouldn't be an especially difficult task given that America had awesome power and the cunning of history on its side. U.S. grand strategy has followed this basic prescription for the past twenty years, mainly because most policy makers inside the Beltway have agreed with the thrust of Fukuyama's and Krauthammer's early analyses. The results, however, have been disastrous. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989, and there is no end in sight. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows, countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior; and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this problem, as is clear from James Madison's observation that "no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare." Washington's pursuit of policies like assassination, rendition and torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified. To make matters worse, the United States is now engaged in protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that have so far cost well over a trillion dollars and resulted in around forty-seven thousand American casualties. The pain and suffering inflicted on Iraq has been enormous. Since the war began in March 2003, more than one hundred thousand Iraqi civilians have been killed, roughly 2 million Iraqis have left the country and 1.7 million more have been internally displaced. Moreover, the American military is not going to win either one of these conflicts, despite all the phony talk about how the "surge" has worked in Iraq and how a similar strategy can produce another miracle in Afghanistan. We may well be stuck in both quagmires for years to come, in fruitless pursuit of victory. The United States has also been unable to solve three other major foreign-policy problems. Washington has worked overtime-with no success-to shut down Iran's uranium-enrichment capability for fear that it might lead to Tehran acquiring nuclear weapons. And the United States, unable to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place, now seems incapable of compelling Pyongyang to give them up. Finally, every post-Cold War administration has tried and failed to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; all indicators are that this problem will deteriorate further as the West Bank and Gaza are incorporated into a Greater Israel. The unpleasant truth is that the United States is in a world of trouble today on the foreign-policy front, and this state of affairs is only likely to get worse in the next few years, as Afghanistan and Iraq unravel and the blame game escalates to poisonous levels. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a recent Chicago Council on Global Affairs survey found that "looking forward 50 years, only 33 percent of Americans think the United States will continue to be the world's leading power." Clearly, the heady days of the early 1990s have given way to a pronounced pessimism.

Heg collapse doesn’t cause global nuclear war – conflicts would be small and managable

Richard Haas (president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April 2008 “Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?” <http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask_the_expert.html>

Does a non polar world increase or reduce the chances of another world war? Will nuclear deterrence continue to prevent a large scale conflict? Sivananda Rajaram, UK Richard Haass: I believe the chance of a world war, i.e., one involving the major powers of the day, is remote and likely to stay that way. This reflects more than anything else the absence of disputes or goals that could lead to such a conflict. Nuclear deterrence might be a contributing factor in the sense that no conceivable dispute among the major powers would justify any use of nuclear weapons, but again, I believe the fundamental reason great power relations are relatively good is that all hold a stake in sustaining an international order that supports trade and financial flows and avoids large-scale conflict. The danger in a nonpolar world is not global conflict as we feared during the Cold War but smaller but still highly costly conflicts involving terrorist groups, militias, rogue states, etc.

Their evidence overestimates the US’s ability to shape the international system – doesn’t contain conflict and wont shape the new multipolar system

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 176-7

A second contention advanced by proponents of American hegemony is that the United States cannot withdraw from Eurasia because a great power war there could shape the post conflict international system in ways harmful to U.S. interests. Hence, the United States "could suffer few economic losses during a war, or even benefit somewhat, and still find the postwar environment quite costly to its own trade and investment."sa This really is not an economic argument but rather an argument about the consequences of Eurasia's political and ideological, as well as economic, closure. Proponents of hegemony fear that if great power wars in Eurasia occur, they could bring to power militaristic or totalitarian regimes. Mere, several points need to be made. First, proponents of American hegemony overestimate the amount of influence that the United States has on the international system. There are numerous possible geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia. Most of these will not culminate in war, but it's a good bet that some will. But regardless of whether Eurasian great powers remain at peace, the outcomes are going to be caused more by those states' calculations of their interests than by the presence of U.S. forces in Eurasia. The United States has only limited power to affect the amount of war and peace in the international system, and whatever influence it does have is being eroded by the creeping multipolarization under way in Eurasia. Second, the possible benefits of "environment shaping" have to be weighed against the possible costs of U.S. involvement in a big Eurasian war. Finally, distilled to its essence, this argument is a restatement of the fear that U.S. security and interests inevitably will be jeopardized by a Eurasian hegemon. This threat is easily exaggerated, and manipulated, to disguise ulterior motives for U.S. military intervention in Eurasia.

### \*Multipolarity Good

Retrenchment *now* is key to stable transition to multipolarity- only way to ensure cooperation which solves climate change, prolif, and the economy

Patrick 2010 (November/December, Stewart, Senior Fellow and Director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations, Irresponsible Stakeholders? Subtitle: The Difficulty of Integrating Rising Powers, Foreign Affairs, lexis)

And yet Obama's engagement strategy pragmatically recognizes that addressing global problems such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, and financial instability calls for meaningful cooperation, not only with democracies but also with nondemocracies. Global governance requires collaboration among the unlike-minded. But partnership among the like-minded cannot be assumed, either. Democracy is an unreliable predictor of allegiance to U.S. interests. Some of the United States' recent diplomatic tussles have been with big emerging democracies. Brazil, under its flamboyant president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has assumed a prominent global profile thanks to its criticism of the United States' international role, ranging from the U.S. military presence in Colombia to Washington's alleged pro-Israel bias. Turkey, for decades a reliable U.S. ally, has staked out an independent posture on Middle East policy under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, abandoning its historical neutrality and making its relations with Israel contingent on the latter's policy toward Gaza CHANGE FROM WITHIN The world today is not a blank slate, as it was after World War II, when, as the Obama administration frequently notes, a farsighted generation of U.S. leaders laid the foundations of a Western liberal international order. They left many institutional products -- international and regional, formal and informal, general purpose and issue specific. Absent a cataclysm such as a world war, reallocating influence within existing bodies will be an uphill struggle. The more important the institution, the more its powerful members will resist diluting their authority within it. China and Russia, for example, oppose allowing any new permanent members to join the UN Security Council. None of the council's permanent five nations will countenance either limiting its veto power or extending that power to others. And consider the International Energy Agency. It excludes major energy consumers such as China and India, as well as major energy suppliers such as Russia. Ostensibly, the reasoning behind this is that IEA members must belong to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. But there is another, more self-interested explanation: voting at the IEA is weighted based on each country's share of global oil consumption in 1974, and its current members want to retain this arrangement even though oil consumption has remained essentially static in North America and Europe while increasing eight- and sixfold in China and India, respectively. Vested interests also plague ongoing debates about governance of the World Bank, the IMF, and other international financial institutions. To be sure, the shock of the recent global economic downturn has driven some degree of change. The G-20 has become the principal forum for international economic coordination, the first major adaptation in multilateral cooperation to reflect dramatic shifts in global power. The G-20 created the Financial Stability Board in April 2009 to strengthen international standards for global finance. The resources of the IMF have expanded. And the members of both the IMF and the World Bank have agreed to adjust those organizations' voting weights and quotas by several percentage points in favor of emerging-market economies. But the overall impact of these reforms is modest. This is not a global constitutional moment akin to the one 65 years ago. In any event, even more ambitious efforts to bring rising powers into existing institutions will be limited by the prospect of tradeoffs between effectiveness and legitimacy. This concern is at the core of the debates over UN Security Council expansion. As Susan Rice, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, explained to the UN General Assembly in February 2009, "The United States believes that the long-term legitimacy and viability of the United Nations Security Council depends on its reflecting the world of the twenty-first century." At the same time, she continued, any expansion must "not diminish its effectiveness or efficiency." A larger, more inclusive Security Council could complicate U.S. efforts to garner sufficient votes for critical resolutions. Expanding existing forums can also harm consensus. This is most obvious in the shift from the G-8 -- still a cozy Western-dominated forum despite Russia's presence -- to the G-20, a much more diverse body. Given its heterogeneity, the G-20 is unlikely in the short term to become a venue for addressing sensitive security and political issues, such as Iran's nuclear program or the violence in Sudan A GRAND BARGAIN The United States has no choice but to rely on rising powers to help address today's global challenges. But it must engage these countries in a way that preserves the core of the postwar order. The political scientist G. John Ikenberry has argued that the time is ripe for an "institutional bargain": by ceding influence within multilateral frameworks while it remains dominant, the United States might lock in support from the rising powers for an international order based on the Western model. But how should the United States go about doing this? Should the rising powers be integrated quickly on the assumption that giving them a stake soon will make them responsible faster? Or would it be wiser to adopt an incremental approach, one that conditioned the rising powers' entry into the club on their demonstrated willingness to play by global rules and shoulder new burdens? Both approaches could entail frustrations. There is no guarantee that the world's rising powers will become the United States' strategic partners. Washington may want them to do more on the world stage, but it cannot control their choices and it will not always like the results of their participation. There is, of course, no common worldview among today's emerging countries. But as U.S. power declines, the rising powers will seek to test, dilute, or revise existing institutions to suit their purposes. The United States will need to decide when to stand firm, when to engage, and when simply to agree to disagree. This will likely produce ongoing debates about the appropriate boundaries of national sovereignty, the desirable balance between the state and the market, and the proper foundations of political legitimacy. During the Cold War, the United States could count on solidarity among the capitalist democracies. In the twenty-first century, the normative foundations for multilateral cooperation will be weaker. An imperfect historical parallel might be the Concert of Europe of the early 1800s. That arrangement leavened the traditional balance of power with a balance of rights, which helped bridge differences between the Western powers (France and the United Kingdom) and the authoritarian monarchies (Austria, Prussia, and Russia) of the Holy Alliance. Global cooperation today may follow a similar logic. The United States may need to pay less attention to regime type and tolerate nations in which democracy is lacking or absent. It must be attuned to nationalist sensitivities in the rising powers -- including those linked to the United States' perceived interventionism, unilateralism, or militarism -- and to the temptation of all governments to harness these grievances for their own political purposes. Accommodating new powers while retaining as much of the old order as possible will be a constant balancing act, much like the Concert of Europe was two centuries ago. Yet as Thomas Wright of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs has observed, the Obama administration has done little serious thinking about how to foster cooperation when the United States' interests diverge from those of other countries. The brief discussion of potentially clashing interests with rising powers in the National Security Strategy document of May 2010 seems too limited: "And when national interests do collide -- or countries prioritize their interests in different ways -- those nations that defy international norms or fail to meet their sovereign responsibilities will be denied the incentives that come with greater integration and collaboration with the international community." The warning clearly applies to Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela but may or may not also apply to those emerging countries that fall short of being "rogue." What if Brazil, China, or Turkey simply prioritizes its interests differently from the United States on critical issues? In this complex international reality, fixed alliances and formal organizations may count for less than shifting coalitions of interest. Fortunately, the United States is well positioned to exploit these dynamics, since it will remain for the foreseeable future the hub for most agreements that will be discussed in the G-20 and other major forums. But to make the most of this advantage, U.S. officials will need to be unsentimental about forming partnerships of convenience. They will need to convene different clubs for different purposes, balancing encompassing arrangements such as the G-20 with smaller affinity groupings such as the G-8, which permit the United States to collaborate with longtime partners that broadly share its fundamental political and economic values. Meanwhile, the United States must not allow the emerging powers to avoid contributing to global public goods. At times, these contributions might follow the notion of "common but differentiated responsibility." Adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio and incorporated into the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, this principle establishes different obligations for developed and developing countries, based on their internal capacities. But the United States should resist the promiscuous invocation by fast-growing economies of internal development constraints and insist on clear benchmarks for balancing the responsibilities of the established and the emerging powers over time. More generally, the United States must link any extension of international status, voice, and weight to the emerging powers to their concrete contributions to world stability. Reform of the increasingly outdated UN Security Council is an area in which the United States must insist on ground rules for inclusion. Any new permanent seats should be granted only to those states that make tangible efforts to foster international peace and security. Reasonable criteria for measuring such efforts could include whether a state has military (as well as civilian) capabilities that could be deployed globally or regionally on behalf of the UN; significantly supports the UN's regular and peacekeeping budgets; is willing to use enforcement tools under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, authorizing sanctions and the use of military force; is able to help broker political solutions; and has a record of conforming to and enforcing security regimes. The United States can provide incentives for aspiring states to meet Western expectations by proposing concrete benchmarks for eligibility. Any adjustment to the UN Security Council will take time. In the meantime, the United States should use the G-20 framework to anchor emerging powers such as Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, and South Africa in the current world order and forge understandings with them on issues such as currency imbalances, climate change, peacekeeping, development cooperation, and nonproliferation. By investing the G-20 with real influence and gradually expanding its agenda, the established nations may encourage the rising powers to jettison outmoded positions held by the G-77 regarding sovereignty, nonintervention, and economic development in favor of more pragmatic policies. A dynamic G-20 would also provide a valuable testing ground for the emerging powers to demonstrate their credentials for Security Council membership. U.S. officials must make peace with incrementalism. They need to be flexible in accommodating the institutional aspirations of the emerging powers. Cooperation will arise through the gradual updating of existing multilateral architecture, ad hoc arrangements, and bargaining. Where possible, the United States should use flexible approaches not simply to sidestep international organizations but also to drive reform efforts within them. Multilateral cooperation within large groups will increasingly rest on "minilateral" agreements, that is, agreements among a subset of key states, beforehand. This is the lesson of the Copenhagen accord of December 2009, which was reached in the waning days of the 15th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The United States brokered a last-minute deal with the so-called BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China) that, even though it was nonbinding, set the stage for tangible global action to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Additional progress on climate change will depend heavily on the 17-nation Major Economies Forum -- an informal body comprised of the world's major emitters of greenhouse gases. This forum will not replace the UNFCCC, but it can galvanize progress within it. PRESERVATION THROUGH COOPERATION In the end, the biggest obstacle to integrating rising powers into the world order may come from within the United States. Making room for emerging players will require psychological adjustments on the part of U.S. officials. They will have to reevaluate the touchstones that have defined U.S. foreign policy since 1945. For more than half a century, the United States has served as the chief architect and ultimate guarantor of an open, liberal international political and economic order. This role has become embedded in U.S. political culture and national identity. But as global power becomes diffuse, the United States' long-standing habits of mind may be more limiting than helpful. By the 1960s, as former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson cruelly noted, the United Kingdom had lost an empire but not yet found a new role. The erosion of U.S. hegemony, although less stark, poses its own challenges. As the United States sheds its primacy, it will need to adopt a more inclusive form of leadership. Compromise will be the order of the day. The U.S. public may be prepared to make this shift: a comprehensive digest of recent polling data compiled by the Council on Foreign Relations and World Public Opinion suggests that Americans are willing to share the world's burdens. Yet at a minimum, multipolarity will test the assumptions of American exceptionalism. The United States has long taken an à la carte approach to its international commitments: picking and choosing among multilateral treaties, institutions, and initiatives and occasionally acting alone or opting out to preserve its sovereignty or freedom of action. But as the U.S. National Intelligence Council's report Global Trends 2025 suggests, "Such a selective approach is . . . running into trouble because those powerful enough to afford picking and choosing are growing more numerous." As today's rising powers avail themselves of the same privilege, such exceptionalism may fray the fabric of the international system. To hold the postwar order together, the United States will have to become a more consistent exemplar of multilateral cooperation.

Warming guarantees multiple positive feedbacks triggering extinction.

Tickell -08 (Oliver, Climate Researcher, The Gaurdian, “On a planet 4C hotter, all we can prepare for is extinction”, 8/11http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/aug/11/climatechange)

We need to get prepared for four degrees of global warming, Bob Watson told the Guardian last week. At first sight this looks like wise counsel from the climate science adviser to Defra. But the idea that we could adapt to a 4C rise is absurd and dangerous. Global warming on this scale would be a catastrophe that would mean, in the immortal words that Chief Seattle probably never spoke, "the end of living and the beginning of survival" for humankind. Or perhaps the beginning of our extinction. The collapse of the polar ice caps would become inevitable, bringing long-term sea level rises of 70-80 metres. All the world's coastal plains would be lost, complete with ports, cities, transport and industrial infrastructure, and much of the world's most productive farmland. The world's geography would be transformed much as it was at the end of the last ice age, when sea levels rose by about 120 metres to create the Channel, the North Sea and Cardigan Bay out of dry land. Weather would become extreme and unpredictable, with more frequent and severe droughts, floods and hurricanes. The Earth's carrying capacity would be hugely reduced. Billions would undoubtedly die. Watson's call was supported by the government's former chief scientific adviser, Sir David King, who warned that "if we get to a four-degree rise it is quite possible that we would begin to see a runaway increase". This is a remarkable understatement. The climate system is already experiencing significant feedbacks, notably the summer melting of the Arctic sea ice. The more the ice melts, the more sunshine is absorbed by the sea, and the more the Arctic warms. And as the Arctic warms, the release of billions of tonnes of methane – a greenhouse gas 70 times stronger than carbon dioxide over 20 years – captured under melting permafrost is already under way. To see how far this process could go, look 55.5m years to the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, when a global temperature increase of 6C coincided with the release of about 5,000 gigatonnes of carbon into the atmosphere, both as CO2 and as methane from bogs and seabed sediments. Lush subtropical forests grew in polar regions, and sea levels rose to 100m higher than today. It appears that an initial warming pulse triggered other warming processes. Many scientists warn that this historical event may be analogous to the present: the warming caused by human emissions could propel us towards a similar hothouse Earth.

Prolif causes extinction

Asal and Beardsley 2009 (Victor, Department of Political Science, State University of New York, Albany, and Kyle, Department of Political Science, Emory University, Winning with the Bomb, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/uploads/Beardsley-Asal\_Winning\_with\_the\_Bomb.pdf)

Conclusion Why do states proliferate? Nuclear weapons and the programs necessary to create them are expensive. They are dangerous. Other countries may attack a state while it is trying to create a nuclear arsenal and there is always the risk of a catastrophic accident. They may help generate existential threats by encouraging first strike incentives amongst a state's opponents. This paper has explored the incentives that make nuclear weapons attractive to a wide range of states despite their costly and dangerous nature. We have found that nuclear weapons provide more than prestige, they provide leverage. They are useful in coercive diplomacy, and this must be central to any explanation of why states acquire them. Since 9 August 1945 no state has used a nuclear weapon against another state, but we find evidence that the possession of nuclear weapons helps states to succeed in their confrontations with other states even when they do not “use” them. Conflict with nuclear actors carries with it a potential danger that conflict with other states simply does not have. Even though the probability of full escalation is presumably low, the evidence confirms that the immense damage from the possibility of such escalation is enough to make an opponent eager to offer concessions. Asymmetric crises allow nuclear states to use their leverage to good effect. When crises involve a severe threat – and nuclear use is not completely ruled out – the advantage that nuclear actors have is substantial. Nuclear weapons help states win concessions quickly in 25 salient conflicts. Consistent with the other papers in this issue and the editors’ introduction (Gartzke and Kroenig this issue), we report that nuclear weapons confer tangible benefits to the possessors. These benefits imply that there should be a general level of demand for nuclear weapons, which means that explanations for why so few states have actually proliferated should focus more on the supply side, as applied by Matthew Kroenig (this issue) and Matthew Fuhrmann (this issue). The findings here importantly suggest an additional reason why “proliferation begets proliferation,” in the words of George Shultz (Shultz 1984, 18). If both parties to a crisis have nuclear weapons, the advantage is effectively cancelled out. When states develop nuclear weapons, doing so may encourage their rivals to also proliferate for fear of being exploited by the shifting bargaining positions. And once the rivals proliferate, the initial proliferator no longer has much bargaining advantage. On the one hand, this dynamic adds some restraint to initial proliferation within a rivalry relationship: states fear that their arsenal will encourage their rivals to pursue nuclear weapons, which will leave them no better off (Davis 1993; Cirincione 2007). On the other hand, once proliferation has occurred, all other states that are likely to experience coercive bargaining with the new nuclear state will also want nuclear weapons. The rate of proliferation has the potential to accelerate because the desire to posses the “equalizer” will increase as the number of nuclear powers slowly rises. Our theoretical framework and empirical findings are complementary to Gartzke and Jo (this issue), who posit and find that nuclear states enjoy greater influence in the international realm. An interesting dynamic emerges when comparing the results to Rauchhaus (this issue), who finds that nuclear weapons in asymmetric dyads tend to increase the propensity for escalation. We have argued that nuclear weapons improve the bargaining leverage of the 26 possessors and tested that proposition directly. It is important to note that the factors that shape conflict initiation and escalation are not necessarily the same factors that most shape the outcome of the conflict. Even so, one explanation for why a stronger bargaining position does not necessarily produce less escalation is that escalation is a function of decisions by both sides, and even though the opponent of a nuclear state is more willing to back down, the nuclear state should be more willing to raise its demands and push for a harder bargain in order to maximize the benefits from the nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons appear to need ever-greater shares of their bargains in order to be satisfied, which helps to explain both their proclivity to win and their proclivity toward aggressive coercive diplomacy. An important implication in light of these findings is thus that even though nuclear weapon states tend to fare better at the end of their crises, this does not necessarily mean that the weapons are a net benefit for peace and stability.

Economic decline causes nuclear war

Mead -09 (Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. The New Republic, “Only Makes You Stronger,” February 4 2009. http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2 AD 6/30/09)

So far, such half-hearted experiments not only have failed to work; they have left the societies that have tried them in a progressively worse position, farther behind the front-runners as time goes by. Argentina has lost ground to Chile; Russian development has fallen farther behind that of the Baltic states and Central Europe. Frequently, the crisis has weakened the power of the merchants, industrialists, financiers, and professionals who want to develop a liberal capitalist society integrated into the world. Crisis can also strengthen the hand of religious extremists, populist radicals, or authoritarian traditionalists who are determined to resist liberal capitalist society for a variety of reasons. Meanwhile, the companies and banks based in these societies are often less established and more vulnerable to the consequences of a financial crisis than more established firms in wealthier societies. As a result, developing countries and countries where capitalism has relatively recent and shallow roots tend to suffer greater economic and political damage when crisis strikes--as, inevitably, it does. And, consequently, financial crises often reinforce rather than challenge the global distribution of power and wealth. This may be happening yet again. None of which means that we can just sit back and enjoy the recession. History may suggest that financial crises actually help capitalist great powers maintain their leads--but it has other, less reassuring messages as well. If financial crises have been a normal part of life during the 300-year rise of the liberal capitalist system under the Anglophone powers, so has war. The wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession; the Seven Years War; the American Revolution; the Napoleonic Wars; the two World Wars; the cold war: The list of wars is almost as long as the list of financial crises. Bad economic times can breed wars. Europe was a pretty peaceful place in 1928, but the Depression poisoned German public opinion and helped bring Adolf Hitler to power. If the current crisis turns into a depression, what rough beasts might start slouching toward Moscow, Karachi, Beijing, or New Delhi to be born? The United States may not, yet, decline, but, if we can't get the world economy back on track, we may still have to fight.

### Ext.: Retrench Solves Everything

#### Retrenchment’s key to solve warming and the economy- *decline* is key to reorient strategy away from military solutions

Zenko and Cohen April 2012 (MICAH ZENKO is a Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. MICHAEL A. COHEN is a Fellow at the Century Foundation, Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure Than Washington Thinks, Foreign Affairs, lexis)

None of this is to suggest that the United States should stop playing a global role; rather, it should play a different role, one that emphasizes soft power over hard power and inexpensive diplomacy and development assistance over expensive military buildups. Indeed, the most lamentable cost of unceasing threat exaggeration and a focus on military force is that the main global challenges facing the United States today are poorly resourced and given far less attention than "sexier" problems, such as war and terrorism. These include climate change, pandemic diseases, global economic instability, and transnational criminal networks -- all of which could serve as catalysts to severe and direct challenges to U.S. security interests. But these concerns are less visceral than alleged threats from terrorism and rogue nuclear states. They require long-term planning and occasionally painful solutions, and they are not constantly hyped by well-financed interest groups. As a result, they are given short shrift in national security discourse and policymaking. To avoid further distorting U.S. foreign policy and to take advantage of today's relative security and stability, policymakers need to not only respond to a 99 percent world but also solidify it. They should start by strengthening the global architecture of international institutions and norms that can promote U.S. interests and ensure that other countries share the burden of maintaining global peace and security. International institutions such as the UN (and its affiliated agencies, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency), regional organizations (the African Union, the Organization of American States, the European Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations), and international financial institutions can formalize and reinforce norms and rules that regulate state behavior and strengthen global cooperation, provide legitimacy for U.S. diplomatic efforts, and offer access to areas of the world that the United States cannot obtain unilaterally. American leadership must be commensurate with U.S. interests and the nature of the challenges facing the country. The United States should not take the lead on every issue or assume that every problem in the world demands a U.S. response. In the majority of cases, the United States should "lead from behind" -- or from the side, or slightly in the front -- but rarely, if ever, by itself. That approach would win broad public support. According to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs' most recent survey of U.S. public opinion on international affairs, less than ten percent of Americans want the country to "continue to be the pre-eminent world leader in solving international problems." The American people have long embraced the idea that their country should not be the world's policeman; for just as long, politicians from both parties have expressed that sentiment as a platitude. The time has come to act on that idea. If the main challenges in a 99 percent world are transnational in nature and require more development, improved public health, and enhanced law enforcement, then it is crucial that the United States maintain a sharp set of nonmilitary national security tools. American foreign policy needs fewer people who can jump out of airplanes and more who can convene roundtable discussions and lead negotiations. But owing to cuts that began in the 1970s and accelerated significantly during its reorganization in the 1990s, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been reduced to a hollow shell of its former self. In 1990, the agency had 3,500 permanent employees. Today, it has just over 2,000 staffers, and the vast majority of its budget is distributed via contractors and nongovernmental organizations. Meanwhile, with 30,000 employees and a $50 billion budget, the State Department's resources pale in comparison to those of the Pentagon, which has more than 1.6 million employees and a budget of more than $600 billion. More resources and attention must be devoted to all elements of nonmilitary state power -- not only USAID and the State Department but also the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the National Endowment for Democracy, and a host of multilateral institutions that deal with the underlying causes of localized instability and ameliorate their effects at a relatively low cost. As U.S. General John Allen recently noted, "In many respects, USAID's efforts can do as much -- over the long term -- to prevent conflict as the deterrent effect of a carrier strike group or a marine expeditionary force." Allen ought to know: he commands the 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. Upgrading the United States' national security toolbox will require reducing the size of its armed forces. In an era of relative peace and security, the U.S. military should not be the primary prism through which the country sees the world. As a fungible tool that can back up coercive threats, the U.S. military is certainly an important element of national power. However, it contributes very little to lasting solutions for 99 percent problems. And the Pentagon's enormous budget not only wastes precious resources; it also warps national security thinking and policymaking. Since the military controls the overwhelming share of the resources within the national security system, policymakers tend to perceive all challenges through the distorting lens of the armed forces and respond accordingly. This tendency is one reason the U.S. military is so big. But it is also a case of the tail wagging the dog: the vast size of the military is a major reason every challenge is seen as a threat. More than 60 years of U.S. diplomatic and military efforts have helped create a world that is freer and more secure. In the process, the United States has fostered a global environment that bolsters U.S. interests and generally accepts U.S. power and influence. The result is a world far less dangerous than ever before. The United States, in other words, has won. Now, it needs a national security strategy and an approach to foreign policy that reflect that reality.

### Ext.: Multipolarity Solves Warming/Air Pollution

#### Patrick evidence says that the US ceding power is key to global cooperation on warming- that cooperation is both necessary and sufficient to solve our warming impact- also solves air pollution

Victor, Kennel and Ramanathan June 2012 (DAVID G. VICTOR is a Professor at the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego. CHARLES F. KENNEL is Distinguished Professor and Director Emeritus at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography. VEERABHADRAN RAMANATHAN is Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and Climate Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography., The Climate Threat We Can Beat, Foreign Affairs, Lexis)

As a result, total emissions of carbon dioxide, the leading long-term cause of global warming, have risen by more than 50 percent since the 1980s and are poised to rise by more than 30 percent in the next two to three decades. The ever-increasing quantity of emissions could render moot the aim that has guided international climate diplomacy for nearly a decade: preventing the global temperature from rising by more than two degrees Celsius above its preindustrial level. In fact, in the absence of significant international action, the planet is now on track to warm by at least 2.5 degrees during the current century -- and maybe even more. The known effects of this continued warming are deeply troubling: rising sea levels, a thinning Arctic icecap, extreme weather events, ocean acidification, loss of natural habitats, and many others. Perhaps even more fearsome, however, are the effects whose odds and consequences are unknown, such as the danger that melting permafrost in the Arctic could release still more gases, leading to a vicious cycle of still more warming. All these risks are rising sharply because the traditional approach to international climate diplomacy has failed. For too long, climate science and policymaking have focused almost exclusively on emissions of carbon dioxide, most of which come from burning fossil fuels. Weaning the planet off fossil fuels has proved difficult, partly because expensive and rapid shifts to new energy systems could have negative effects on the competitiveness of modern economies. What is more, carbon dioxide inconveniently remains in the atmosphere for centuries, and so even keeping carbon dioxide at current levels would require deep cuts sustained over many decades -- with economic consequences that states are unlikely to be willing to bear unless they are confident that their competitors will do the same. No permanent solution to the climate problem is feasible without tackling carbon dioxide, but the economic and geophysical realities of carbon dioxide emissions almost guarantee political gridlock. A fresh start to climate diplomacy would emphasize that carbon dioxide is not the only warming pollutant. At least 40 percent of current global warming can be blamed on four other types of pollutants: dark soot particles called black carbon, methane, lower atmospheric ozone, and industrial gases such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), which are used as coolants in refrigerators. Nearly all these pollutants have life spans of just a few weeks to a decade -- much shorter than that of carbon dioxide. But although their tenure is brief, they are potent warmers. Emitting just one ton of black carbon, for example, has the same immediate effect on warming as emitting 500-2,000 tons of carbon dioxide. Because the impacts of these short-lived pollutants on the climate are severe and swift, limiting them could curb warming quickly, allowing more time for serious efforts to reduce carbon dioxide. ALIGNING INTERESTS Luckily, reducing short-lived pollutants poses fewer political hurdles than cutting carbon dioxide, for two reasons. First, existing technologies and policies, if properly applied, readily allow for deep cuts in these pollutants. Second, unlike reducing carbon dioxide, the main benefits of which arrive only after decades of costly efforts, controlling these pollutants would actually serve the immediate interests of developing countries, where pollutants such as soot and ozone damage vital crops and cause respiratory and heart diseases. A few hundred million tons of crops are lost to ozone smog every year; in India, air pollutants have decreased the production of rice by about ten million tons per year, compared with annual output in the 1980s. Globally, the inhalation of soot produced by cooking indoors already kills about two million people each year, mostly women and children living in extreme poverty. And because soot is dark, it traps heat from sunlight and thus speeds melting when it settles on mountain glaciers -- a direct threat to drinking-water supplies and agricultural lands that depend on glacier-fed river systems in China and India, such as the Ganges, the Indus, and the Yangtze. Owing to these near-term economic and public health risks, even countries that have been skittish about costly long-term efforts to regulate carbon dioxide are already proving more willing to confront short-lived pollutants. A plan to reduce short-lived pollutants would align the self-interests of the three largest polluting nations: China, India, and the United States, all of which have conspicuously failed to do much about climate change. It would also engage Europe, which has long been committed to the Kyoto Protocol but has struggled to find willing partners. The United States and a few other countries are in the early stages of building a coalition to address short-lived pollutants; China and India must find constructive ways to join. Limiting these pollutants could cut the pace of climate change in half over the next few decades. Visible success in fighting them would also restore credibility to climate-change diplomacy, which is essential for progress on the more daunting task of limiting carbon dioxide. And taken together, immediate action on short-lived pollutants and serious efforts to control carbon dioxide could achieve the goal of stopping warming at two degrees -- just barely. Still, even those combined efforts cannot reverse the warming that will inevitably occur. Thus, all countries will need to adapt to some of the effects of climate change, especially poorer countries whose economies depend heavily on agriculture and other industries that are especially sensitive to the climate. International cooperation can help these places adapt, but not principally through targets set by diplomats in New York and Geneva, or through the kinds of large-scale, expensive projects directed by wealthy countries and international organizations that have been the mainstay of climate diplomacy to date. Instead, effective adaptation will require bottom-up institution building at the local level to engage people on the frontlines of climate change, such as city planners responding to the risk of rising seas and agricultural ministries helping farmers anticipate how a changing climate will affect their crops. The next era of climate diplomacy should revolve around connecting international experts to those local officials, so that information about best practices can spread more readily.

### Econ

Defense spending kills the economy – efficiency, growth, jobs

Baker, 09 - co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR). He is the author of Plunder and Blunder: The Rise and Fall of the Bubble Economy (Dean, “Massive Defense Spending Leads to Job Loss,” 11/10/09, http://www.cepr.net/index.php/op-eds-&-columns/op-eds-&-columns/defense-spending-job-loss/)

For example, defense spending means that the government is pulling away resources from the uses determined by the market and instead using them to buy weapons and supplies and to pay for soldiers and other military personnel. In standard economic models, defense spending is a direct drain on the economy, reducing efficiency, slowing growth and costing jobs. A few years ago, the Center for Economic and Policy Research commissioned Global Insight, one of the leading economic modeling firms, to project the impact of a sustained increase in defense spending equal to 1.0 percentage point of GDP. This was roughly equal to the cost of the Iraq War. Global Insight’s model projected that after 20 years the economy would be about 0.6 percentage points smaller as a result of the additional defense spending. Slower growth would imply a loss of almost 700,000 jobs compared to a situation in which defense spending had not been increased. Construction and manufacturing were especially big job losers in the projections, losing 210,000 and 90,000 jobs, respectively. The scenario we asked Global Insight to model turned out to have vastly underestimated the increase in defense spending associated with current policy. In the most recent quarter, defense spending was equal to 5.6 percent of GDP. By comparison, before the September 11th attacks, the Congressional Budget Office projected that defense spending in 2009 would be equal to just 2.4 percent of GDP. Our post-September 11th build-up was equal to 3.2 percentage points of GDP compared to the pre-attack baseline. This means that the Global Insight projections of job loss are far too low. The impact of higher spending will not be directly proportionate in these economic models. In fact, it should be somewhat more than proportionate, but if we just multiple the Global Insight projections by 3, we would see that the long-term impact of our increased defense spending will be a reduction in GDP of 1.8 percentage points. This would correspond to roughly $250 billion in the current economy, or about $800 in lost output for every person in the country. The projected job loss from this increase in defense spending would be close to 2 million. In other words, the standard economic models that project job loss from efforts to stem global warming also project that the increase in defense spending since 2000 will cost the economy close to 2 million jobs in the long run.

Hegemony causes economic collapse – current economic crisis proves

Eland, 9 – Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute, Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, B.A. Iowa State University, M.B.A. in Economics and Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Washington University, (Ivan, The Independent Institute, “How the U.S. Empire Contributed to the Economic Crisis”, May 11th, http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2498)

A few—and only a few—prescient commentators have questioned whether the U.S. can sustain its informal global empire in the wake of the most severe economic crisis since World War II. And the simultaneous quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan are leading more and more opinion leaders and taxpayers to this question. But the U.S. Empire helped cause the meltdown in the first place. War has a history of causing financial and economic calamities. It does so directly by almost always causing inflation—that is, too much money chasing too few goods. During wartime, governments usually commandeer resources from the private sector into the government realm to fund the fighting. This action leaves shortages of resources to make consumer goods and their components, therefore pushing prices up. Making things worse, governments often times print money to fund the war, thus adding to the amount of money chasing the smaller number of consumer goods. Such “make-believe” wealth has funded many U.S. wars. For example, the War of 1812 had two negative effects on the U.S. financial system. First, in 1814, the federal government allowed state-chartered banks to suspend payment in gold and silver to their depositors. In other words, according Tom J. DiLorenzo in Hamilton’s Curse, the banks did not have to hold sufficient gold and silver reserves to cover their loans. This policy allowed the banks to loan the federal government more money to fight the war. The result was an annual inflation rate of 55 percent in some U.S. cities. The government took this route of expanding credit during wartime because no U.S. central bank existed at the time. Congress, correctly questioning The Bank of the United States’ constitutionality, had not renewed its charter upon expiration in 1811. But the financial turmoil caused by the war led to a second pernicious effect on the financial system—the resurrection of the bank in 1817 in the form of the Second Bank of the United States. Like the first bank and all other government central banks in the future, the second bank flooded the market with new credit. In 1818, this led to excessive real estate speculation and a consequent bubble. The bubble burst during the Panic of 1819, which was the first recession in the nation’s history. Sound familiar? Although President Andrew Jackson got rid of the second bank in the 1830s and the U.S. economy generally flourished with a freer banking system until 1913, at that time yet another central bank—this time the Federal Reserve System—rose from the ashes. We have seen that war ultimately causes the creation of both economic problems and nefarious government financial institutions that cause those difficulties. And of course, the modern day U.S. Empire also creates such economic maladies and wars that allow those institutions to wreak havoc on the economy. The Fed caused the current collapse in the real estate credit market, which has led to a more general global financial and economic meltdown, by earlier flooding the market with excess credit. That money went into real estate, thus creating an artificial bubble that eventually came crashing down in 2008. But what caused the Fed to vastly expand credit? To prevent a potential economic calamity after 9/11 and soothe jitters surrounding the risky and unneeded U.S. invasion of Iraq, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan began a series of interest rate cuts that vastly increased the money supply. According to Thomas E. Woods, Jr. in Meltdown, the interest rate cuts culminated in the extraordinary policy of lowering the federal funds rate (the rate at which banks lend to one another overnight, which usually determines other interest rates) to only one percent for an entire year (from June 2003 to June 2004). Woods notes that more money was created between 2000 and 2007 than in the rest of U.S. history. Much of this excess money ended up creating the real estate bubble that eventually caused the meltdown. Ben Bernanke, then a Fed governor, was an ardent advocate of this easy money policy, which as Fed Chairman he has continued as his solution to an economic crisis he helped create using the same measures. Of course, according to Osama bin Laden, the primary reasons for the 9/11 attacks were U.S. occupation of Muslim lands and U.S. propping up of corrupt dictators there. And the invasion of Iraq was totally unnecessary because there was never any connection between al Qaeda or the 9/11 attacks and Saddam Hussein, and even if Saddam had had biological, chemical, or even nuclear weapons, the massive U.S. nuclear arsenal would have likely deterred him from using them on the United States. So the causal arrow goes from these imperial behaviors—and blowback there from—to increases in the money supply to prevent related economic slowdown, which in turn caused even worse eventual financial and economic calamities. These may be indirect effects of empire, but they cannot be ignored. Get rid of the overseas empire because we can no longer afford it, especially when it is partly responsible for the economic distress that is making us poorer.

### Prolif

Heg cause prolif – multipolarity will solve it

Weber et al 07 Professor of Political Science and Director of the Institute for International Studies at the University of California-Berkeley (Steven with Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, and Ely Ratner, Ph.D. Candidates at the University of California-Berkeley and Research Fellows at its New Era Foreign Policy Center, [“How Globalization Went Bad,” Foreign Policy, Issue 158, January/February,)

Axiom 3 is a story about the preferred strategies of the weak. It's a basic insight of international relations that states try to balance power. They protect themselves by joining groups that can hold a hegemonic threat at bay. But what if there is no viable group to join? In today's unipolar world, every nation from Venezuela to North Korea is looking for a way to constrain American power. But in the unipolar world, it's harder for states to join together to do that. So they turn to other means. They play a different game. Hamas, Iran, Somalia, North Korea, and Venezuela are not going to become allies anytime soon. Each is better off finding other ways to make life more difficult for Washington. Going nuclear is one way. Counterfeiting U.S. currency is another. Raising uncertainty about oil supplies is perhaps the most obvious method of all. Here's the important downside of unipolar globalization. In a world with multiple great powers, many of these threats would be less troublesome. The relatively weak states would have a choice among potential partners with which to ally, enhancing their influence. Without that more attractive choice, facilitating the dark side of globalization becomes the most effective means of constraining American power. SHARING GLOBALIZATION'S BURDEN The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United States is bearing most of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. There's effectively a market out there for proliferation, with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand, to the detriment of U.S. national security. It has become fashionable, in the wake of the Iraq war, to comment on the limits of conventional military force. But much of this analysis is overblown. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. But that doesn't matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. In Tehran, Pyongyang, and many other capitals, including Beijing, the bottom line is simple: The U.S. military could, with conventional force, end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. No country in the world can dream of challenging U.S. conventional military power. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. Before 1989, states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union's nuclear umbrella for protection. Now, they turn to people like A.Q. Khan. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. Today, it is fast becoming a necessity. North Korea is the clearest example. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. North Korea was surrounded by feuding, nuclear armed communist neighbors, it was officially at war with its southern neighbor, and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U.S. troops on its border. But, for 40 years, North Korea didn't seek nuclear weapons. It didn't need to, because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Within five years of the Soviet collapse, however, Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. North Korea's founder, Kim II Sung, barely flinched when former U.S. President Bill Clinton's administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. That brinkmanship paid off. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power, and Kim's son rules the country with an iron fist. America's conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Saddam Hussein's great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place. How would things be different in a multipolar world? For starters, great powers could split the job of policing proliferation, and even collaborate on some particularly hard cases. It's often forgotten now that, during the Cold War, the only state 'with a tougher nonproliferation policy than the United States was the Soviet Union. Not a single country that had a formal alliance with Moscow ever became a nuclear power. The Eastern bloc was full of countries with advanced technological capabilities in every area except one— nuclear weapons. Moscow simply wouldn't permit it. But today we see the uneven and inadequate level of effort that non-superpowers devote to stopping proliferation. The Europeans dangle carrots at Iran, but they are unwilling to consider serious sticks. The Chinese refuse to admit that there is a problem. And the Russians are aiding Iran's nuclear ambitions. When push comes to shove, nonproliferation today is almost entirely America's burden.

Proliferation leads to nuclear war

Utgoff 02, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses., Survival, vol. 44, no. 2, Summer 2002, pp. 85–102 “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions”

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

### Ext.: Prolif

Heg doesn’t solve prolif- US can only create security dilemmas that cause prolif- only cooperation in a multipolar world solves

Zbigniew Brzezinski (formerly President Carter’s National Security Advisor, counselor and trustee at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and professor of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies @ Johns Hopkins University) 2007 “Second Chance” p 103

The failure to contain nuclear proliferation in the Far East and in South Asia conveyed a sobering lesson. Short of a unilateral military action--with all its unpredictable consequences—even the world's only superpower could not by itself dissuade a country firmly determined to acquire nuclear weapons. A successful preventive effort would have required an early concentration of attention on the issue, determined and coordinated mobilization of other concerned states, and early formulation of a program including both incentives, self-restraint and costly consequences for continued pursuit of nuclear weapons. In the early, heady days of American unilateral supremacy, it was easy to ignore incipient proliferation in the belief that an intimidating response by the United States would eventually suffice to halt it. The lesson bequeathed to the Clinton administration's successor was that even given the great asymmetry of power between the United States and any would-be proliferator, the only alternative to sear was genuine international cooperation, mounted on at least a regional basis, at an early stage of the nuclear challenge.

### Terrorism

Heg causes terrorism

Layne 06 Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service, Texas A&M University

(Christopher “The Peace of Illusions” (p. 190-191)

The events of 9/11 are another example of how hegemony makes the United States less secure than it would be if it followed an offshore balancing strategy. Terrorism, the RAND Corporation terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman says, is "about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and use of power to achieve political change."86 If we step back for a moment from our horror and revulsion at the events of September 11, we can see that the attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the United States by its adversaries to advance their political objectives. As Clausewitz observed, "War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object."88 September 11 represented a violent counterreaction to America's geopolitical-and cultural-hegemony. As the strategy expert Richard K. Betts presciently observed in a 1998 Foreign Affairs article: It is 'hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the United States had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam.89 U.S. hegemony fuels terrorist groups like al Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamentalism, which is a form of "blowback" against America's preponderance and its world role.90 As long as the United States maintains its global hegemony-and its concomitant preeminence in regions like the Persian Gulf-it will be the target of politically motivated terrorist groups like al Qaeda. After 9/11, many foreign policy analysts and pundits asked the question, "Why do they hate us?" This question missed the key point. No doubt, there are Islamic fundamentalists who do "hate" the United States for cultural, religious, and ideological reasons. And even leaving aside American neoconservatives' obvious relish for making it so, to some extent the war on terror inescapably has overtones of a "clash of civilizations:' Still, this isn't-and should not be allowed to become-a replay of the Crusades. Fundamentally 9/11 was about geopolitics, specifically about U.S. hegemony. The United States may be greatly reviled in some quarters of the Islamic world, but were the United States not so intimately involved in the affairs of the Middle East, it's hardly likely that this detestation would have manifested itself in something like 9/11. As Michael Scheurer, who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda, puts it, "One of the greatest dangers for Americans in deciding how to confront the Islamist threat lies in continuing to believe-at the urging of senior U.S. leaders-that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think, rather than for what we do."91 It is American policies-to be precise, American hegemony-that make the United States a lightning rod for Muslim anger

#### Terrorism Causes Extinction

Sid-Ahmed, political analyst 04 (Mohamed, Managing Editor for Al-Ahali, “Extinction!” August 26-September 1, Issue no. 705, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

### Ext. Terrorism

US Heg causes interventionism, inflaming terrorism.

Layne 5-10-10(Christopher, Former Research Fellow, International Security Program, 1995-1996, *Graceful Decline* http://amconmag.com/article/2010/may/01/00030/, 7/13/10)

With respect to Islamic terrorism, we need to keep our priorities straight. Terrorism is not the most pressing national-security threat facing the United States. Great powers can be defeated only by other great powers—not by nonstate terrorists or by minor powers. The U.S. needs to be careful not to pay more attention to Islamic terrorists than to emerging great powers. Here the Obama administration and Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates are getting it wrong. Although many in the U.S. foreign-policy community—especially the counterinsurgency lobby, based at the Center for a New American Security, and the American Enterprise Institute—call for the U.S. to “win” the war on terror, there can be no decisive victory over terrorism. The trick is finding the right strategy to minimize its effects on American security. The strategy of the Bush and Obama administrations—invading and occupying Iraq and Afghanistan—is exactly the wrong approach. The U.S. is bad at counterinsurgency. Foreign occupying powers seldom are good at it, which is the main reason big powers usually lose these kinds of small wars. The U.S. also is not good at nation-building. Rather than quelling terrorism, a long-term foreign military presence in places like Iraq and Afghanistan inflames nationalism and anti-Americanism.

Terrorists aren’t deterred by military power because it falls out of asymmetric power calculations

Eland 08 senior fellow at the Independent Institute

(ivan, Mediterranean Quarterly Volume 19, Number 3, Summer 2008, Back to the Future: Rediscovering America’s Foreign Policy Traditions

During the Cold War, at least a plausible argument could be made for some [End Page 94] US intervention overseas to counter Soviet encroachment. But the Cold War is long over, the Soviet rival is in the dustbin of history, and the gains from interventionism have been drastically reduced while the costs have skyrocketed. The only type of attack that cannot be deterred by the US nuclear arsenal is that from terrorists — as was demonstrated on 9/11. Retaliation for US interventionism in the Arab-Muslim world is al Qaeda’s primary motive for attacking the United States. Specifically, Osama bin Laden’s biggest gripes are with US — that is, non-Muslim — occupation of Muslim lands and meddling in their politics by supporting corrupt dictators and Israel. Because conventional and nuclear military power have very little utility in stopping terrorist attacks and because the United States has an open society, with thousands of miles of borders and many possible targets, homeland security efforts will likely have only limited effect. Naturally, in the short term, the utmost effort should be made to capture or kill bin Laden and eradicate al Qaeda, but in the long term the only way to effectively deal with anti – United States terrorism is to reduce the motivation of terrorists to attack America in the first place. Poll after poll in the Muslim world indicates that Muslims like US political and economic freedoms, technology, and even culture but hate US meddling in their world. Thus, practicing military restraint, rather than interventionism, would make Americans safer at home. Protecting its citizens and property should be the first goal of any government, but the US quest for an informal global empire actually undermines this objective. Empire does not equal security — in fact, it sabotages it.

### A/T “Democracy”

Empirically, democracy promotion fails

Rose 01; (Richard, chair in politics at the University of Aberdeen, “Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third-Wave Democracies, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 31, No. 2, Apr., 2001, pp. 331-354, JSTOR)

A spectre is haunting contemporary studies of democratization: conventional influences, such as the introduction of free elections, have not (or at least, not yet) created political regimes that match the standards of established democracies. Within five years Samuel Huntington moved from characterizing the late twentieth century as the third wave of democratization to proclaiming The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order.' Larry Diamond's global review of Developing Democracy emphasizes a growing 'gap between electoral and liberal democracy'.2 The World Movement for Democracy proclaims that its primary priority is 'deepening democracy beyond its electoral form' .3 Constructive critics of third-wave democracies are not worried about the gap between an ideal democracy and existing polyarchies that concerns Robert Dahl. Their anxieties focus on daily violations of the rule of law, corruption and unaccountable government.

No democratic peace – spread of democracy will increase intra-bloc conflict – their evidence doesn’t assume changes to the international system.

Erik Gartzke and Alex Weisiger, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of California San Diego and Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania, March 15, 2010, “Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace,” http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/impermanent\_012010.pdf

We can go farther in assessing implications of regime similarity in varied circumstances. As with any cue or motive for cooperation, regime type relies on the presence of a threat to ally against. When a cue becomes ubiquitous, it loses much of its informational value. The proliferation of democracy means that democracy is less of a distinguishing characteristic, even as other cues, identities, or actual determinants of preference variability tend to increase in salience. One can no longer be sure that democracies will cooperate when there is a diminishing \other." As democratization progresses, this logic implies that some democracies will form alignments that exclude other democracies, or even that some democratic coalitions will come into conflict with other democratic coalitions. Combining the affinity of regime types, the dynamic nature of natural allies, and the demand for security, we must imagine that the impact of regime type on conflict and cooperation might change over time. Initially, the scarcity of democracies in the world meant that there were few opportunities for direct conflict. Even more important, in a world full of threats, democracies had enough in common that cooperating, or at least not opposing one another, was prudent. As democracy has proliferated, however, preferred policies of democratic countries have become more diverse even as the threat from non-democracies has declined. While autocratic threats remain, many of the most powerful countries are democracies. Differences that were patched over, or overlooked, in fighting fascism and communism have now begun to surface. These differences are certainly not major or fundamental, but they appear more salient today than in the past. This process appears likely to continue in the future; nations with similar regime types but different preferences may increasingly find that they are unable to justify glossing over their differences.

Global Democracy Impossible

Dixon 10 [Dr. Patrick Dixon, PhD Foreign Policy, “The Truth About the War With Iraq”, http://www.globalchange.com/iraqwar.htm]

And so we find an interesting fact: those who live in democratic nations, who uphold democracy as the only honourable form of are not really true democrats after all. They have little or no interest in global democracy, in a nation of nations, in seeking the common good of the whole of humanity. And it is this single fact, more than any other, this inequality of wealth and privilege in our shrinking global village, that will make it more likely that our future is dominate by terror groups, freedom fighters, justice-seekers, hell-raisers, protestors and violent agitators.

### A/T “Deterrence/Signal of Weakness”

“Reputation” doesn’t matter, reducing capability actually *increases* deterrent credibility- core interests that invite response will be more defined

MacDonald and Parent 2011 (Paul K. and Joseph M., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, International Security, Graceful Decline?; The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment, Spring, lexis)

These arguments have a number of limitations. First, opponents of retrenchment exaggerate the importance of credibility in the defense of commitments. Just because a state has signaled a willingness to retreat from one commitment does not mean it will retreat from others. Studies of reputation, for example, have demonstrated a tenuous link between past behavior and current reputation. 22 The capacity to defend a commitment is as important as credibility in determining the strength of a commitment. Quantitative studies have likewise found a mixed link between previous concessions and deterrence failure. 23 The balance of power between the challenger and the defender, in contrast, is often decisive. For instance, after a series of crises over Berlin and Cuba, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan observed to his cabinet, "The fact that the Soviet Government had agreed to withdraw their missiles and their aircraft from Cuba was not evidence of weakness but of realism. . . . But Berlin was an entirely different question; not only was it of vital importance to the Soviet Government but the Russians had overwhelming conventional superiority in the area." 24 This finding supports the basic insight of retrenchment: by concentrating scarce resources, a policy of retrenchment exchanges a diffuse reputation for toughness for a concentrated capability at key points of challenge. Second, pessimists overstate the extent to which a policy of retrenchment can damage a great power's capabilities or prestige. Gilpin, in particular, assumes that a great power's commitments are on equal footing and interdependent. In practice, however, great powers make commitments of varying degrees that are functionally independent of one another. Concession in one area need not be seen as influencing a commitment in another area. 25 Far from being perceived as interdependent, great power commitments are often seen as being rivalrous, so that abandoning commitments in one area may actually bolster the strength of a commitment in another area. During the Korean War, for instance, President Harry Truman's administration explicitly backed away from total victory on the peninsula to strengthen deterrence in Europe. 26 Retreat in an area of lesser importance freed up resources and signaled a strong commitment to an area of greater significance.

### China/Asia

#### Heg makes war with China inevitable- withdrawal key

Layne June 2012 (Chris, professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A & M University’s George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service, The Global Power Shift from West to East, The National Interest, lexis)

Certainly, the Chinese have not forgotten. Now Beijing aims to dominate its own East and Southeast Asian backyard, just as a rising America sought to dominate the Western Hemisphere a century and a half ago. The United States and China now are competing for supremacy in East and Southeast Asia. Washington has been the incumbent hegemon there since World War II, and many in the American foreign-policy establishment view China’s quest for regional hegemony as a threat that must be resisted. This contest for regional dominance is fueling escalating tensions and possibly could lead to war. In geopolitics, two great powers cannot simultaneously be hegemonic in the same region. Unless one of them abandons its aspirations, there is a high probability of hostilities. Flashpoints that could spark a Sino-American conflict include the unstable Korean Peninsula; the disputed status of Taiwan; competition for control of oil and other natural resources; and the burgeoning naval rivalry between the two powers. These rising tensions were underscored by a recent Brookings study by Peking University’s Wang Jisi and Kenneth Lieberthal, national-security director for Asia during the Clinton administration, based on their conversations with high-level officials in the American and Chinese governments. Wang found that underneath the visage of “mutual cooperation” that both countries project, the Chinese believe they are likely to replace the United States as the world’s leading power but Washington is working to prevent such a rise. Similarly, Lieberthal related that many American officials believe their Chinese counterparts see the U.S.-Chinese relationship in terms of a zero-sum game in the struggle for global hegemony. An instructive historical antecedent is the Anglo-German rivalry of the early twentieth century. The key lesson of that rivalry is that such great-power competition can end in one of three ways: accommodation of the rising challenger by the dominant power; retreat of the challenger; or war. The famous 1907 memo exchange between two key British Foreign Office officials—Sir Eyre Crowe and Lord Thomas Sanderson—outlined these stark choices. Crowe argued that London must uphold the Pax Britannica status quo at all costs. Either Germany would accept its place in a British-dominated world order, he averred, or Britain would have to contain Germany’s rising power, even at the risk of war. Sanderson replied that London’s refusal to accommodate the reality of Germany’s rising power was both unwise and dangerous. He suggested Germany’s leaders must view Britain “in the light of some huge giant sprawling over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes stretching in every direction, which cannot be approached without eliciting a scream.” In Beijing’s eyes today, the United States must appear as the unapproachable, globally sprawling giant.

Conflict with China goes nuclear

Glaser 2011 (Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Will China's Rise Lead to War? Subtitle: Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism, Foreign Affairs, March/April, lexis)

ACCOMMODATION ON TAIWAN? The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable -- particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China -- whatever they might formally agree to -- have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea. A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them. Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

### Ext.: China

#### Heg causes war with China and Asian instability- heg forces Chinese expansionism to deter the US

Zenko and Cohen April 2012 (MICAH ZENKO is a Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations. MICHAEL A. COHEN is a Fellow at the Century Foundation, Clear and Present Safety: The United States Is More Secure Than Washington Thinks, Foreign Affairs, lexis)

As the threat from transnational terrorist groups dwindles, the United States also faces few risks from other states. China is the most obvious potential rival to the United States, and there is little doubt that China's rise will pose a challenge to U.S. economic interests. Moreover, there is an unresolved debate among Chinese political and military leaders about China's proper global role, and the lack of transparency from China's senior leadership about its long-term foreign policy objectives is a cause for concern. However, the present security threat to the U.S. mainland is practically nonexistent and will remain so. Even as China tries to modernize its military, its defense spending is still approximately one-ninth that of the United States. In 2012, the Pentagon will spend roughly as much on military research and development alone as China will spend on its entire military. While China clumsily flexes its muscles in the Far East by threatening to deny access to disputed maritime resources, a recent Pentagon report noted that China's military ambitions remain dominated by "regional contingencies" and that the People's Liberation Army has made little progress in developing capabilities that "extend global reach or power projection." In the coming years, China will enlarge its regional role, but this growth will only threaten U.S. interests if Washington attempts to dominate East Asia and fails to consider China's legitimate regional interests. It is true that China's neighbors sometimes fear that China will not resolve its disputes peacefully, but this has compelled Asian countries to cooperate with the United States, maintaining bilateral alliances that together form a strong security architecture and limit China's room to maneuver. The strongest arguments made by those warning of Chinese influence revolve around economic policy. The list of complaints includes a host of Chinese policies, from intellectual property theft and currency manipulation to economic espionage and domestic subsidies. Yet none of those is likely to lead to direct conflict with the United States beyond the competition inherent in international trade, which does not produce zero-sum outcomes and is constrained by dispute-resolution mechanisms, such as those of the World Trade Organization. If anything, China's export-driven economic strategy, along with its large reserves of U.S. Treasury bonds, suggests that Beijing will continue to prefer a strong United States to a weak one.

Any attempt to increase US power kills relations with China- viewed as aggressive containment

Friedberg 2011 (July/August, Aaron L., professor of politics and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics, The National Interest, lexis)

But the mistrust between Washington and Beijing is not a one-way street—and with good reason. China’s current rulers do not see themselves as they once did, as the leaders of a global revolutionary movement, yet they do believe that they are engaged in an ideological struggle, albeit one in which, until very recently, they have been almost entirely on the defensive. While they regard Washington’s professions of concern for human rights and individual liberties as cynical and opportunistic, China’s leaders do not doubt that the United States is motivated by genuine ideological fervor. As seen from Beijing, Washington is a dangerous, crusading, liberal, quasi-imperialist power that will not rest until it imposes its views and its way of life on the entire planet. Anyone who does not grasp this need only read the speeches of U.S. officials, with their promises to enlarge the sphere of democracy and rid the world of tyranny. In fact, because ideology inclines the United States to be more suspicious and hostile toward China than it would be for strategic reasons alone, it also tends to reinforce Washington’s willingness to help other democracies that feel threatened by Chinese power, even if this is not what a pure realpolitik calculation of its interests might seem to demand. Thus the persistence—indeed the deepening—of American support for Taiwan during the 1990s cannot be explained without reference to the fact that the island was evolving from an authoritarian bastion of anti-Communism to a liberal democracy. Severing the last U.S. ties to Taipei would remove a major source of friction with China and a potential cause of war. Such a move might even be conceivable if Taiwan still appeared to many Americans as it did in the 1970s, as an oppressive, corrupt dictatorship. But the fact that Taiwan is now seen as a genuine (if flawed) democracy will make it extremely difficult for Washington to ever willingly cut it adrift. Having watched America topple the Soviet Union through a combination of confrontation and subversion, since the end of the Cold War China’s strategists have feared that Washington intends to do the same to them. This belief colors Beijing’s perceptions of virtually every aspect of U.S. policy toward it, from enthusiasm for economic engagement to efforts to encourage the development of China’s legal system. It also shapes the leadership’s assessments of America’s activities across Asia, which Beijing believes are aimed at encircling it with pro-U.S. democracies, and informs China’s own policies to counter that influence.

ONLY decreasing US power solves conflict with China and Asian stability- war is only on the table in a world of maintaining heg

MacDonald and Parent 2011 (Paul K. and Joseph M., Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, International Security, Graceful Decline?; The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment, Spring, lexis)

We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the Anglo-American transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a "moderate" decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict. 98 Moreover, Washington's support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order. 99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes. 101

### Yes Counterbalancing

China’s already challenging U.S military strength

Buxbaum, 10 Analyst @ ISN Security Watch, (Peter A., “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific”, http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-US-Hegemony-in-the-Pacific.html)

The US is developing an air-sea battle concept to counter China's military buildup. But political problems and budgetary woes could kill the program before it ever gets started. China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific, which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea, essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include anti-satellite weapons; spaced-based reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition; electromagnetic weapons; advanced fighter aircraft; unmanned aerial vehicles; advanced radar systems; and ballistic and cruise missiles. The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships," said Admiral Gary Roughead, chief of US naval operations, at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington think tank. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region. "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action, or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup," said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments, "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply, perhaps to prohibitive levels, and much sooner than many expect[...].This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States, its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it."

China is counter-balancing the US now

Layne, 09 – Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "The Waning of U.S.

Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay", International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009, July 6th 2010, Galileo, p. 17-18) PDF

Toward multipolarity? The ascent of new great powers would be the strongest evidence of multipolarization, and the two most important indicators of whether this is happening are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP.46 Here, there is evidence that as the NIC, Khanna, Mahbubani, and, to a point, Zakaria contend, global economic power is flowing from the United States and Europe to Asia.47 The shift of economic clout to East Asia is important because it could propel China’s ascent—thus hastening the relative decline of U.S. power—and also because emerging regional multipolarity could trigger future major power war. China, of course, is the poster child for Asia’s rise, and many analysts— including the NIC, Khanna, and (implicitly) Mahbubani and Zakaria—agree that China is the rising power most likely to challenge U.S. hegemony.48 Unsurprisingly, Brooks and Wohlforth are skeptical about China’s rise, and they dismiss the idea that China could become a viable counterweight to a hegemonic United States within any meaningful time frame.49 Their analysis, how-ever, is static. For sure, the United States still has an impressive lead in the categories they measure.50 Looking ahead, however, the trend lines appear to favor China, which already has overtaken the United States as the world’s leading manufacturer—a crown the United States wore for more than a century. 51 China also may overtake the United States in GDP in the next ten to fifteen years. In 2003 Goldman Sachs predicted that China would pass the United States in GDP by 2041, but in 2008 it revised the time frame to 2028.52 And, in early 2009, the Economist Intelligence Unit predicted that China’s GDP would surpass the United States’ in 2021.53 Empirically, then, there are indications that the unipolar era is drawing to a close, and that the coming decades could witness a power transition.54

### A/T “China is Expansionist”

China’s not expansionist or violent- other regional powers contain it if it is

Nye 2010 (Joseph S., University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University, The Future of American Power Subtitle: Dominance and Decline in Perspective, Foreign Affairs, November/December, lexis)

Some have argued that China aims to challenge the United States' position in East Asia and, eventually, the world. Even if this were an accurate assessment of China's current intentions (and even the Chinese themselves cannot know the views of future generations), it is doubtful that China will have the military capability to make this possible anytime soon. Moreover, Chinese leaders will have to contend with the reactions of other countries and the constraints created by China's need for external markets and resources. Too aggressive a Chinese military posture could produce a countervailing coalition among China's neighbors that would weaken both its hard and its soft power. The rise of Chinese power in Asia is contested by both India and Japan (as well as other states), and that provides a major power advantage to the United States. The U.S.-Japanese alliance and the improvement in U.S.-Indian relations mean that China cannot easily expel the Americans from Asia. From that position of strength, the United States, Japan, India, Australia, and others can engage China and provide incentives for it to play a responsible role, while hedging against the possibility of aggressive behavior as China's power grows

### Latin American Democracy

Retrenchment key to Latin American democracy- heg kills credibility of democratic ideals

Crandall 2011 (Russell, Associate Professor of International Politics at Davidson College, Principal Director for the Western Hemisphere at the U.S. Department of Defense in 2009 and Director for Andean Affairs at the National Security Council in 2010-11, The Post-American Hemisphere Subtitle: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America, Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis)

Ironically, moreover, Latin America's entry into a "post-hegemonic" era, a product of its own advancements, could undermine its past progress. As the balance of power in the region is redistributed, unexpected alliances and enmities could arise. Many observers have assumed that less U.S. involvement would be an inherently positive development, but that may be too optimistic. No one should underestimate the capacity of the Venezuela-led bloc of quasi-authoritarian leftist governments to stop the regional trend toward greater openness and democracy -- values that the bloc sees as representing a capitulation to the U.S.-controlled global system. Nonetheless, Latin America's emerging democratic consensus seems inevitable, and as its strategic posture finally matures, the region will be more directly responsible for its own successes and failures. Long Latin America's master, the United States must adapt to the new realities of this post-hegemonic era, lest it see its influence diminish even further. It must demonstrate an ability to quietly engage and lead when appropriate -- an approach that will allow Washington to remain actively involved in the region's affairs without acting as though it is trying to maintain its legacy of hegemony. Given how accustomed the United States is to dominating the region, this project will be harder than it sounds

Latin America is key to global democracy

Lowenthal 1994 (Abraham, USC Professor at the School of International Relations and President of the Pacific Council on International Policy (PCIP), Feb 14th, Americans Must Accept International Cooperation, http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/region/news/arc/lasnet/1994/0127.html)

A third significance of Latin America today is as a prime arena- together with the former Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern and Central Europe- for the core U.S. values of democratic governance and free-market economics. As both democracy and capitalism are severely challenged in the former Communist countries, the worldwide appeal and credibility of these ideas may depend importantly on whether our nearest neighbors can make them work.

Extinction

Diamond ‘95 (Larry, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution – “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,” wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/di/1.htm)

This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness. LESSONS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

### Ext.: Latin American Democracy

Anti-Americanism caused by hegemony undermines Latin American democracy

Foer 2006(Franklin, editor of the New Republic, The talented Mr. Chavez: a Castro-loving, Bolivar-worshipping, onetime baseball-player wannabe, Venezuela's Hugo Chavez is perhaps the world's most openly anti-American head of state. With Latin America in the midst of a leftward swing, how dangerous is he?, The Atlantic Monthly, May, lexis)

How far left will the region swing in reaction? Teodoro Petkoff, the editor of the Caracas paper Tal Cual and one of Chavez's prime adversaries, has written a book called Dos Izquierdas ("Two Lefts"). Under his taxonomy, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva represents one of these lefts, which pays lip service to Castro but adopts a more pragmatic attitude toward economics and remains committed to liberal democracy. Like European social democracy, it ultimately seeks to humanize capitalism, not destroy it--a political program that could help Latin America correct the excesses of its neoliberal experiment without entirely undermining its core economic contributions. Chavez, on the other hand, represents a more retrograde form of socialism. His belief in strong leaders over strong institutions, his preference for patronage over careful policy, and his mistrust of some of the basic elements of the capitalist system add up to disaster for government transparency, democracy, and development. Which of the two lefts will eventually win out is unclear. Most residents of Latin America still believe that market capitalism is the only system that can lead to development, and Lula is more popular than Chavez overall. But there's no doubt that Chavez's approach is winning adherents. Chavez may soon have close friends running Nicaragua, Mexico, and Peru. Argentina's Kirchner seems the junior partner in his relationship with Chavez, despite his country's bigger economy andmilitary. Chavez's protege Evo Morales has already won the Bolivian presidency, in part by following Chavez's own model of anti-American rhetoric and populist appeals. Morales has promised to decriminalize coca production and redistribute land and plans to rewrite Bolivia's constitution this summer. Even Alvaro Uribe, the president of Colombia and America's staunchest ally in South America, has appeared with Chavez in front of Simon Bolivar's home and bashed American "meddling." Chavez's performance last November at the Summit of the Americas, held in the Argentine resort of Mar del Plata, reveals why his appeals to the leaders and citizens of Latin America have been so successful. He skipped away from the awkward group photos with his fellow heads of state, and addressed a crowd of 25,000 anti-globalization activists gathered for a "counter-summit" in a soccer stadium. He wrapped his arm around Diego Maradona, one of the greatest soccer players of all time, who's probably more admired than any politician at the official proceedings. "I think we came here to bury FTAA [the Free Trade Area of the Americas]," Chavez intoned. "I brought my shovel." He was playing a clever inside-outside game: at the same time thathe huddled with leaders like Lula and Kirchner, he used the media togo over their heads and speak directly to their radical political bases. This tactic works well because most Latin American leaders stilldepend on support from their own radical parties. Their activist bases still genuflect toward Havana, and constantly lament that their presidents lack Chavez's gumption. "They live in fear of Chavez turningagainst them, because they worry that their people might not take their side," one U.S. State Department official told me. This dynamic has given Chavez the run of the Southern Hemisphere. The United States hasn't shown much deftness in tilting this fight between the two lefts toward pragmatists like Lula. Instead of acknowledging the shortcomings of Latin America's recent neoliberal experiment, it has insisted on pushing forward with the FTAA--an agreement that has little chance in the current political environment. Where Chavez constantly announces new plans to distribute cash around the region, the United States continues to cut back on its aid packages. And while the Bush administration isn't about to confront Chavez seriously, it often gives the impression that such a policy is in the works, allowing Chavez to bait the United States into verbal duels—battles that reinforce Chavez's mythological version of himself. This hardly makes him the second coming of Simon Bolivar. Nonetheless, there are unavoidable similarities between the two--including some that Chavez might not care to acknowledge. Chavez claims that his favorite book is Garcia Marquez's historical novel about Bolivar's last days, The General in His Labyrint. If this is true, he must know that Bolivar ended his life distraught and depressed. During his final years, Bolivar devolved from radical democrat to dictator. He both praised democracy as "the most sacred source" of power and proclaimed that "necessity recognizes no laws." When Gran Colombia failed after eleven years of struggle, during which Bolivar himself came to embody many of the oppressive qualities he'd originally campaigned against, he dismissed the continent as ungovernable and descended into a bitter senescence. He died and was buried in Colombia; Venezuela, whose populace had eventually turned on him, had made him an exile in his final years. Chavez, despite his love of poetry, never seems to utter one of Bolivar's most poignant fines: "Those who serve the revolution plow the sea." Historically, Latin American revolution has proved to be just as futile as Bolivar imagined. Because of its peculiar political temperament, the region has swung back and forth on a dialectical rope between socialism and authoritarianism, occasionally stopping, mid-swing, on governments that combine the worst attributes of both. But in recent decades, the region looked like it might finally transcend this pattern of manic change. Widespread adoption of liberal-democratic governance and an embrace of market capitalism seemed to bring relative prosperity and genuine stability within grasp. Chavez has the potential to disrupt this progress and revive Latin America's old political habits. According to a recent poll, only about half of the region's citizens--including minorities in Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil--now believe that democracy is always the best form of government. Latin America is vulnerable, and Chavez has provided a blueprint not just for harnessing anti-Americanism but for the slow consolidation of power. Along the way, he may succeed in baiting the United States into a rhetorical fight that it can't win, and impeding its international leadership. But ultimately, the United States will not be the biggest loser in the battle Chavez is waging. It will never suffer nearly as much as the people of the continent he dreams of liberating.

### Ext.: Latin America Impact: Non-Democracy

Anti-Americanism and Chavez ascendancy caused by heg accesses every impact- shatters stability globally and causes independent great power war

Coronel '7(Gustavo Coronel is a public policy expert, who was elected to the Venezuelan Congress in 1998 before it was dissolved in 1999 following the election of Hugo Chavez as president. He is the author of several books and is an advisor on the opinion and editorial content of Petroleumworld en Español. World Press – September 18th -- http://muevete.wordpress.com/ 2007/09/18/a-possible- political-scenario-for-latin-america-2007-2012/.)

Still, there is no doubt that there are strong efforts being made by some Latin American political leaders to harass the United States. If these efforts intensify and take root, Latin America could become a geopolitical hot spot in the mid-term. The starting point of the anti-U.S. Alliance. Essentially the current threats against U.S. national security originated about nine years ago with the political alliance between Fidel Castro, the Cuban dictator and Hugo Chavez, the Venezuelan strongman. This is a symbiotic relationship that has been providing Fidel Castro with money and Hugo Chavez with brains. The strategy chosen by this alliance is based on two facts and one very partial truth. The two facts are: extreme poverty and extreme inequality in the region. The very partial truth is that these two afflictions are the result of U.S. exploitation of the region’s natural resources aided by the systematic political intervention of this country in the internal affairs of the countries of the hemisphere. To blame our own misfortunes and inadequacies on someone else has been an old and proven method to gain adepts and to stir hate and xenophobia among Latin American societies. This is what Fidel Castro has done for the last forty years and this is what he has recommended to Hugo Chavez , a line of action that the Venezuelan strongman has embraced with enthusiasm. Hugo Chavez’s strategies. To do this he has been aided by significant amounts of money derived from oil exports. During the last nine years about $220 billion of oil money have entered the Venezuelan national treasury while national debt has tripled to about $65 billion. This amount of money has been mostly spent in three areas: (a), social programs of a temporary nature, really handouts, to the Venezuelan poor; (b), the acquisition of weapons; and (c), subsidies, donations and promises to Latin American countries in order to consolidate political alliances and establish political IOU’s. At least $40 billion have gone into the third category, an amount roughly equivalent to 2-3% of Venezuela’s yearly GDP during the last nine years. As a result of these strategies the Fidel Castro/Hugo Chavez axis has been able to make some progress in its political objectives of eroding the political standing of the United States in the hemisphere and, even, of gaining supporters in the U.S. political scene. By financing the presidential campaigns in several countries they have been able to help Evo Morales, Daniel Ortega and Rafael Correa win the presidencies of Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador. At the same time they saw their favored candidates Ollanta Humala, in Peru, and Andres Lopez Obrador, in Mexico lose close elections while remaining politically strong, especially Lopez Obrador. In parallel Hugo Chavez’s major injection of money into Argentina has helped President Nestor Kirchner to join the anti-U.S. club, a move for which he did not need strong incentives. This is all well known although generally perceived with indifference, sympathy, and tolerance or, even, amusement, in hemispheric political circles. Many celebrate secretly the harassment of such a strong power by smaller, weaker countries. Others are sitting on the political fence, receiving political and material benefits by playing one side against the other. Still others have a weak spot in their ideological hearts for authoritarian regimes and resent the hard sale of democracy being done by the U.S. all over the world. A few even laugh at the colorful antics of President Chavez and have a hard time taking him seriously. However, political harassment of the United States represents just one aspect in a possible wider plan. Later stages might include actual economic aggression and, even, physical action against the northern “empire”. For the time being the main efforts are directed towards the consolidation of the alliance. To do this: • Chavez is providing money to members of the Armed Forces of Bolivia and to city mayors, in order to increase political control over these important Bolivian sectors (2); • Chavez could be funneling money into Argentina to promote the candidacy of Mrs. Cristina Kirchner (3); • The aid given by Chavez to Nicaragua already amounts to about $500 million and, if he follows through in his promise, will include the financing of a $2 billion refinery; • The economic ties of Venezuela and Ecuador are increasing via the oil industry, although President Correa’s ideology already includes a significant component of resentment against the United States. • Chavez is conducting a strategy of alignment with political sectors in the United States that oppose the current government policies. For some of these sectors the desire to erode the current administration has proven greater than their love for democracy. The enemy of their enemy has become their friend (4). Almost all of these strategic initiatives by the Castro/Chavez alliance show an alternative, unfavorable outcome. • Bolivia is in the threshold of a major political crisis, due to the reluctance of important sectors of the country to roll over and play dead to Morales’s pretensions to impose the Venezuelan Constituent Assembly model that ended with the Venezuelan democracy becoming an authoritarian regime. • Mrs. Kirchner, even if she won, as it seems to be the case, might decide to go her separate ways. She has already given some indications that Argentina should not become a simple pawn of Castro/ Chavez in the struggle for hemispheric political leadership. Recent events have convinced her that Chavez’s support probably represents a kiss of death for her political future. • In Ecuador, Correa is already looking at the Bolivian political turmoil with caution, as he does not want to repeat Morales’s errors and realizes that Chavez’s success in Venezuela has been due to his deep pockets rather than his charisma. Correa does not have the money or the charisma of Chavez. • In the United States the individuals and groups that support Chavez are doing so out of personal material or political interest and have been largely rejected by public opinion. It seems improbable that the alliance of these countries, almost entirely based on money and resentment against the United States, could last for long. What if this alliance falters? The main motors of the anti-U. S alliance, Castro and Chavez, understand that this strategy of progressive political harassment of the United States might not succeed. The defeat of Lopez Obrador in Mexico robbed them of a major ally in this strategy. In power Lopez Obrador would have promoted illegal immigration into the U.S. creating numerous points of social and political conflict along the weak U.S.- Mexican border. As it stands today The United States has several ways to weaken Castro/Chavez strategies. In fact, the imminent death of Fidel Castro has practically eliminated much of the brain component of this axis. Hugo Chavez is in need of an alternative plan. The alternative is an alliance with fundamentalist groups or countries that share Hugo Chavez’s resentment against the United States. This explains the approximation of Hugo Chavez to Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Both leaders have an anti-U.S. global alliance as one of their main objectives. Their main weapon is oil or, rather, what they can do to the international oil market, in case they decided to suspend exports of this resource. Some 4 million barrels of oil per day would be out of the supply system, causing a major disruption in the world’s economy. They figure that in such a situation they have less to lose than the United States and its industrialized allies. But oil is not their only weapon. They also have a political weapon to resort to. It has to do with the concerted action of terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and FARC, assisted by violent indigenous groups such as those in Bolivia, Peru and Ecuador and socially turbulent groups like the illegal immigrants already living in the United States. By promoting the action of these groups against the United States and its Latin American and European allies these groups can do much harm to global political stability. In this scenario one the main promoters of this action would not be located in the Middle East or in the Far East but in Latin America. This would be the first time in history, as far as we can tell, that a Latin American political leader becomes a major threat to world stability.

## \*Yes Impacts\*

### Latin America

Latin American stability isn’t resilient- instability and war still possible

Crandall 2011 (Russell, Associate Professor of International Politics at Davidson College, Principal Director for the Western Hemisphere at the U.S. Department of Defense in 2009 and Director for Andean Affairs at the National Security Council in 2010-11, The Post-American Hemisphere Subtitle: Power and Politics in an Autonomous Latin America, Foreign Affairs, May/June, lexis)

Meanwhile, although Latin America may have entered a post-hegemonic era, that does not mean it is entirely secure. Despite all the progress, Latin America remains a region in which countries still openly threaten war with one another. Just last year, Chávez did exactly that after Bogotá accused him of giving refuge to Colombian narcoterrorists. Latin American countries' unpredictable behavior and ambivalence toward U.S. leadership will make it difficult for Washington to maintain strategic patience. After witnessing the acerbic diplomatic impasse over Honduras, when Brazil opposed U.S. plans for new presidential elections to solve the political crisis there, one might think that the region largely wants Washington to stay uninvolved. Yet the behind-the-scenes reality is that most Latin American governments actually appreciate robust U.S. attention and even leadership -- as they in fact did during the Honduran crisis. Most leaders in the region realize that Latin America and the United States share the same interests and goals, and they understand that cooperation is indispensable. They know full well that their gains remain precarious, that it could take only one economic crisis or political row to send the region spiraling back to the old days of instability. Yet whatever happens in Latin America's future, its gains and failures will be caused by its own hand.

## \*Answers to Impacts\*

### A/T “Asia War”

No war in Asia --- Economic ties

Takahashi ’97 (Takuma,- . Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies “Economic Interdependence and Security in the East Asia-Pacific Region” in “Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations”, Mike Mochizuki, ed., pg. 97)

A second difference in circumstances between East Asia and nineteenth century Europe is that now the economic costs of war far outweigh the benefits. At the same time, the benefits of pursuing economic growth through peaceful, nonaggressive means are great. Today's East Asian countries have expectations of faster future economic growth than their counterparts in Europe a century ago. The industrialization of Europe proceeded slowly. The agricultural population declined only gradually, taking more than a hundred years to fall below 20 percent of the total population.4 By contrast Japan exhausted its agricultural labor in fifty years and South Korea did so in twenty-five.5 The speed of transformation and economic growth was possible because of East Asia's access to the stock of technologies, its ability to create new technologies, and phenomenal trading opportunities. East Asian economies, especially Southeast Asian countries and the southern part of China, became major exporters of a variety of home electronic products because of the flood of foreign direct investment they received from other parts of East Asia. As these areas have acquired technologies and marketing skills, they have established their own technological development bases and marketing channels for exports. The increasing volume of East Asian trade makes a striking contrast to the growth in merchandise trade when European countries experienced their greatest military conflicts. For the period 1870 to 1913, the average annual growth rate of real world trade was 3.4 percent (3.2 percent for Europe). From 1985 to 1994 real world trade increased about 1.7 times (6 percent a year) and trade volume in the East Asian region (excluding Japan) increased almost fivefold.6 Countries that enjoy growing prosperity brought about by peaceful exchange are not about to seek prosperity by appropriating another's territory. Against the general belief that today's prosperity is generated from international trade and investment, it is unlikely that a government would start a war to seek prestige or score other gains**.**

Regional institutions and US military

Takahashi ’97 (Takuma,- . Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies “Economic Interdependence and Security in the East Asia-Pacific Region” in “Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations”, Mike Mochizuki, ed., pg. 105-6)

The last argument for regional stability is that the strength of territorial claims in East Asia is much weaker than in nineteenth century Europe. Before European colonial domination of the region, East Asia had not known the concept of territoriality, especially with regard to the periphery. For example, when fifty-four Ryukyuans were killed in Taiwan in 1871, an official of the Qing dynasty told a Japanese diplomat that the Taiwanese people were "outside of civilization" and so the emperor would not punish them.1O In most of East Asia, borders have been drawn according to the Western mode, but some areas remain untouched. There are at least fifteen maritime, border, or island sovereignty disputes on-going in the region. These could result from the absence of a concept of exclusive territory until recent times. Many of these disputes involve China, but at least five are among ASEAN countries.11 In any case, East Asians appear willing to subsume the issue of sovereignty, at least for territory in peripheral areas, in the expectation of joint development. Japan has been following this concept since it successfully applied to the former Soviet Union to negotiate an exclusive economic zone for fishery rights. Recently, it has become more difficult for Japan to carry out this strategy Increased nationalism has led some East Asian countries to seek; advantage over others. There have been more and more claims and counterclaims under the Law of the Sea, which divides the sovereignty· of the continental shelves. But while nationalism is fanning territorial disputes, the region has begun to develop the institutions to resolve or **control them**. China had long refused to join multilateral discussions on territorial issues. Nevertheless, through the ASEAN Regional Forum the ASEAN states persuaded it to come to the negotiating table to discuss the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands, a regional flash point because of potential deposits of minerals and oil. The cooperative framework of APEC and the **deterrent effect** of the U.S. presence help to keep China from bullying smaller countries in the region.

Shared values

Desker ’08 (Barry,- Dean of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies 'Why War in Asia Remains Unlikely' http://www.iiss.org/conferences/asias-strategic-challenges-in-search-of-a-common-agenda/conference-papers/fifth-session-conflict-in-asia/why-war-in-asia-remains-unlikely-barry-desker/)

Just as Western dominance in the past century led to Western ideas shaping international institutions and global values, Asian leaders and Asian thinkers will increasingly participate in and shape the global discourse, whether it is on the role of international institutions, the rules governing international trade or the doctrines which under-gird responses to humanitarian crises. An emerging Beijing Consensus is not premised on the rise of the ‘East’ and decline of the ‘West’, as sometimes seemed to be the sub-text of the earlier Asian values debate. I do not share the triumphalism of my friends Kishore Mahbubani and Tommy Koh. However, like the Asian values debate, this new debate reflects alternative philosophical traditions. The issue is the appropriate balance between the rights of the individual and those of the state. This debate will highlight the shared identity and shared values between China and the states in the region. I do not agree with those in the US who argue that Sino-US competition will result in “intense security competition with considerable potential for war” in which most of China’s neighbours “will join with the United States to contain China’s power.”[1] These shared values are likely to reduce the risk of conflict and result in regional pressure for an accommodation with China and the adoption of policies of engagement with China, rather than confrontation with an emerging China.

### A/T “Korea War”

North Korean war won’t escalate or go nuclear

Meyer ’03 (Carlton, Editor – G2 Military, The Mythical North Korean Threat, http://www.g2mil.com/korea.htm)

Even if North Korea employs **a few crude** nuclear weapons, using them would be suicidal since it would invite instant retaliation from the United States**.** North Korea lacks the technical know-how to build an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile**, despite the hopes and lies from the National Missile Defense proponents in the USA.  North Korea's industrial production is almost zero, over two million people have starved in recent years, and millions of homeless nomads threaten internal revolution. The US military ignores this reality and retains old plans for the deployment of 450,000 GIs to help defend South Korea, even though the superior South Korean military can halt any North Korean offensive without help from a single American soldier. American forces are not even required for a counter-offensive.** A North Korean attack would stall after a few **intense** days and South Korean forces would soon **be in position to** overrun North Korea**.** American air and naval power **along with logistical and intelligence support** would ensure the rapid collapse of the North Korean army**.**

North Korean conflict extremely unlikely

Meyer ’03 (Carlton, Editor – G2 Military, The Mythical North Korean Threat, http://www.g2mil.com/korea.htm)

The chance of a Korean war is extremely unlikely.  North Korean leaders realize they have no hope of success without major backing from China or Russia.  The previous South Korean President, Kim Dae Jung, encouraged peace and visited North Korea.  The two countries are reconnecting rail lines and sent a combined team to the Olympics.  Even the United States is providing $500 million dollars a year in food to the starving North Koreans.  The new South Korean President, Roh-Moo-hyun was elected on a peace platform and suggested US troops may be gone within ten years.

Threats of war are a negotiating tactic – no risk of escalation

Schmitt ’03 (Eric – Staff, NYT, International Herald Tribune, 3-14, Lexis)

North Korea is highly likely to step up its provocations in a bid to gain financial aid and diplomatic attention from the United States, according to the two most senior officers overseeing American military operations in South Korea. The commanders' remarks came as a senior State Department official said North Korea could produce highly enriched uranium as fuel for nuclear weapons within months, not years, much earlier than many experts believed possible. That would mean that North Korea could produce weapons-grade material from both its uranium and plutonium programs in a short period of time. "The enriched-uranium issue, which some have assumed is somewhere off in the fog of the distant future, is not," the official, James Kelly, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Wednesday. "It is only probably a matter of months, not years, behind the plutonium" program, he said. The new assessment came amid a string of recent provocations by North Korea that Kelly said were intended to "blackmail" the United States and intimidate its allies into bilateral talks on the terms favorable to North Korea. In recent days, North Korea has started a nuclear reactor that could produce plutonium for nuclear weapons, conducted its first missile launching in three years and intercepted an air force reconnaissance plane in international airspace. The two senior military officers, Admiral Thomas Fargo, the commander of American forces in the Pacific, and General Leon LaPorte, the head of allied ground forces in South Korea, said North Korea would probably continue this pattern, perhaps by starting up its nuclear reprocessor, provoking an incident along the demilitarized zone or at sea, or even conducting an underground nuclear test. "It's highly likely they'll continue to politically escalate the situation," LaPorte told a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee on Wednesday. He added that the motive of North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Il, was to try to "guarantee the survival of his regime and to gain economic assistance for his failed economy." Fargo added, "I would not be surprised to see further provocations of some variety." Neither officer said there were any signs of an imminent attack by North Korean forces, and Fargo said the threat of war right now with North Korea was "low." The United States has about 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea.