# Hegemony Impacts Good/Bad

## HEG Good

### Russia

#### Russia won’t try to challenge US heg

Wohlforth 99 (William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth, PhD in Political Schience from Yale University; “The Stability of a Unipolar World”; International Security, Volume 24, Number 1; Summer 1999)

Third, the current unipolarity is not only peaceful but durable. 11 It is already a decade old, and if Washington plays its cards right, it may last as long as bipolarity. For many decades, no state is likely to be in a position to take on the United States in any of the underlying elements of power. And, as an offshore power separated by two oceans from all other major states, the United States can retain its advantages without risking a counterbalance. The current candidates for polar status (Japan, China, Germany, and Russia) are not so lucky. Efforts on their part to increase their power or ally with other dissatisªed states are likely to spark local counterbalances well before they can create a global equipoise to U.S. power.

#### Russia’s former attempt at gaining heg was a failure – they won’t try again

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The key is that regional and second-tier competition should not be confused with balancing to restructure the system toward multipolarity. If the analysis so far is right, any existing second-tier state that tries such balancing should quickly learn the errors of its ways. This is indeed the fate that befell the two powers that tried (hesitantly, to be sure) to counterbalance: Russia and China. Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov’s restless “multipolar diplomacy” had run out of steam well before Russia’s ªnancial collapse. And Russia’s catastrophic decline also derailed China’s efforts at creating some kind of counterpoise to the United States. As Avery Goldstein shows, the costs of Beijing’s “multipolar diplomacy” dramatically outweighed the beneªts. Russia was weak and getting weaker, while the United States held the economic and security cards. Even fairly careful Chinese moves produced indications of a strong local counterbalancing reaction before they showed any promise of increased autonomy vis-à-vis Washington. As a result, the Chinese rethought their approach in 1996 and made a concerted effort to be a “responsible partner” of the Americans. 63

### Democracy

#### Democracy is only possible because of hegemony

Cho 03 (Chansoo Cho, writer at Asian Perspective, the social sciences journal of world/comparative politics of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies at Kyungnam University; “Hegemony and the Variety of Democratic Institutions: Executive-Legislative Relations and US Foreign Economic Policy Change”; Asian Perspective, Volume 27, Number 2, 2003, pp. 5-32)

The cold war created a favorable condition for U.S. hegemony over the liberal economic subsystem that became part of the bipolar international system. Since the world was being divided along the fault line of ideologies and partially regime types, the United States could connect the defense of democracy with its role as a liberal leader.6\* The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were the prime examples of the "trade-security linkage." Trade liberalization was recognized as an indispensable weapon against the spread of international communism. The trade-security linkage made easier the compromise between the Republican-dominated Congress and the Democratic executive over trade bills, including the extension of the RTAA. The Republicans avoided a frontal attack on the RTAA, while the executive did not ignore the congressional concerns about peril points and the independent Tariff Commission.65

### Human Rights

#### US heg solves for human rights

Prato 9 (Michael V. Prato, First Lieutenant of the US Marine Corps; “The Need for American Hegemony”; February 20, 2009)

America decided that its benignity would be extended to the rest of the world through the protection of Western interests and assurance of free trade. With the resurgence of worldwide terrorism, the U.S. eventually found itself as the sole guarantor of human rights and dignity for oppressed people. This new role benefitted the entire world.

### Economy

#### US heg keeps economy high

Prato 9 (Michael V. Prato, First Lieutenant of the US Marine Corps; “The Need for American Hegemony”; February 20, 2009)

The world is safer and more prosperous because of U.S. hegemony. The free world enjoys unprecedented economic prosperity while starvation and poverty continue to decline. Furthermore, the “amicus populi romani,” 39 still call upon the U.S. during times of distress. They require U.S. hegemony for their own self-interests as well as to foster good relations with the world’s superpower. 40 Therefore, the U.S. must exercise benevolent global hegemony, unilaterally if necessary, to ensure its security and maintain global peace and prosperity.

#### Heg protects free-market economy

Prato 9 (Michael V. Prato, First Lieutenant of the US Marine Corps; “The Need for American Hegemony”; February 20, 2009)

Certainly, the United States has been prudent in its application of force. Its decision to repulse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was directly linked to international dependence on free-flowing oil from the Middle East. The global market economy depends heavily on the accessibility of world commodities and consequently compels the U.S. to safeguard free and fair trade globally. Hence, the protection of American trade interests and free-market capitalism around the world remains a primary focus of U.S. foreign policy. The National Security Strategy of the United States verifies this commitment. The National Security Strategy pledges to promote peace and economic prosperity through the exportation of democracy, market capitalism, and the use of force when necessary. 6

### Global war

#### Hegemony solves global war

Thayer 06 (Bradley A. Thayer, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota; “In Defense of Primacy”; http://nationalinterest.org/article/in-defense-of-primacy-1300; November 10, 2006)

A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power-the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, either because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for retrenchment.1 Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests. But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy.

### Poverty

#### US heg decreases poverty

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### Terrorism

#### US heg deters terrorism alone

Prato 9 (Michael V. Prato, First Lieutenant of the US Marine Corps; “The Need for American Hegemony”; February 20, 2009)

Frankly, most nations do not desire multipolarity. The reluctance of foreign powers to increase their world presence speaks to this end. 26 Consider the limited European contribution to the Global War on Terror. Europe’s lack of participation creates a global need for American hegemony since the U.S. is willing to provide a last line of defense for many countries. In fact, American “unipolarity, managed benignly, is far more likely to keep the peace.” 27 Of course, the concept of benignity is subjective.

### China

#### China won’t try to challenge US heg

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#### China has too many problems before it can try to gain heg

Wohlforth 99 (William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth, PhD in Political Schience from Yale University; “The Stability of a Unipolar World”; International Security, Volume 24, Number 1; Summer 1999)

As a poor country, China has a much greater chance of maintaining sustained high growth rates. With its large population making for large gross economic output, projections based on extrapolating 8 percent yearly growth in GDP have China passing the United States early in the twenty-ªrst century. 55 But these numbers must be used with care. After all, China’s huge population probably gave it a larger economy than Britain in the nineteenth century. 56 The current belief in a looming power transition between the United States and China resembles pre–World War I beliefs about rising Russian power. It assumes that population and rapid growth compensate for technological backwardness. China’s economic and military modernization has a much longer road to travel than its gross economic output suggests. 57 And managing the political and social challenges presented by rapid growth in an overpopulated country governed by an authoritarian regime is a formidable task. By any measure, the political challenges that lie athwart Beijing’s path to polar status are much more substantial than those that may block Washington’s efforts to maintain its position. Three decades is probably a better bet than one.

#### China’s former attempt at gaining heg was a failure – they won’t try again

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The key is that regional and second-tier competition should not be confused with balancing to restructure the system toward multipolarity. If the analysis so far is right, any existing second-tier state that tries such balancing should quickly learn the errors of its ways. This is indeed the fate that befell the two powers that tried (hesitantly, to be sure) to counterbalance: Russia and China. Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov’s restless “multipolar diplomacy” had run out of steam well before Russia’s ªnancial collapse. And Russia’s catastrophic decline also derailed China’s efforts at creating some kind of counterpoise to the United States. As Avery Goldstein shows, the costs of Beijing’s “multipolar diplomacy” dramatically outweighed the beneªts. Russia was weak and getting weaker, while the United States held the economic and security cards. Even fairly careful Chinese moves produced indications of a strong local counterbalancing reaction before they showed any promise of increased autonomy vis-à-vis Washington. As a result, the Chinese rethought their approach in 1996 and made a concerted effort to be a “responsible partner” of the Americans. 63

#### US hegemony deters rising China

Kagan 12 (Robert Kagan, American historian, author and foreign policy commentator at the Brookings Institution; “Not Fade Away: The myth of American decline”; The New Republic; <http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism/>; January 11, 2012)

Today, in the case of China, the situation is reversed. Although China is and will be much richer, and will wield greater economic influence in the world than the Soviet Union ever did, its geostrategic position is more difficult. World War II left China in a comparatively weak position from which it has been working hard to recover ever since. Several of its neighbors are strong nations with close ties to the United States. It will have a hard time becoming a regional hegemon so long as Taiwan remains independent and strategically tied to the United States, and so long as strong regional powers such as Japan, Korea, and Australia continue to host American troops and bases. China would need at least a few allies to have any chance of pushing the United States out of its strongholds in the western Pacific, but right now it is the United States that has the allies. It is the United States that has its troops deployed in forward bases. It is the United States that currently enjoys naval predominance in the key waters and waterways through which China must trade. Altogether, China’s task as a rising great power, which is to push the United States out of its present position, is much harder than America’s task, which is only to hold on to what it has.

### Middle East

#### US heg k/t stable Middle East

Posen 6 (Barry R. Posen, Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and the director of MIT’s Security Studies Program; “A Nuclear-Armed Iran: A Difficult But Not Impossible Policy Problem”; A Century Foundation Report; The Century Foundation; 2006)

The United States also has more traditional economic interests in the Gulf, which also are connected to security interests. Much of the world’s internationally traded oil comes from the Gulf, so the United States is interested in the free flow of oil from the region. It also wishes to ensure that the oil resources not come under the control of hostile powers that might use it as a coercive lever. And finally, the United States wants to assure that the earnings from oil exports not end up in mischievous hands. These concerns generate a broad security agenda—including the defense of oil routes, the prevention of the conquest of any oil state by another, and watchful oversight of the internal politics of certain countries to ensure that dangerous elements not come to power. U.S. strategists may also believe that U.S. hegemony in the Gulf region gives them some leverage over oil exports, and thus increases U.S. power in other parts of the world. For all these reasons, the United States must maintain a very large military presence, and remain the predominant military power in the Gulf region. This brief assessment of Iranian and U.S. goals suggests that these two powers are destined to be in an intensely competitive relationship. Each has cards to play in this competition. Iran knows the region well, has an excellent geographic position, and may be able to find support in Shiite Arab populations in neighboring countries. Though economically and militarily weak compared to the United States, it is the strongest power in the Gulf, and has proven itself capable of mobilizing very large ground forces. The United States has a giant economy and the world’s most advanced military. The United States also has two potential political advantages. Historically, most states consider large proximate land powers such as Iran to be more dangerous to them than distant sea powers such as the United States. And, Iran—an Islamic country, with potential Shia domestic allies in many gulf states—poses a more credible threat of domestic destabilization than does the U.S. rhetoric of democratization. However powerful and assertive the United States may be, neighboring Iran poses at least as great a threat—and perhaps a greater threat. Hence, despite the present diplomatic ill effects of its mistakes in Iraq, over time the United States is likely to prove the more attractive ally to most states in the region.

### Heg sustainable

#### Heg is good and sustainable

Ye 05 (Min Ye, PhD Candidate at Princeton University; “The US Hegemony and Implication for China”; January 31, 2005)

First, from the aggregate power perspective, the U.S is simply too powerful for the other nations to catch up. William Wohlforth has done a comprehensive empirical study of U.S power, and concluded that U.S has enormous supremacy in all aspects of military power and almost all aspects of economic power as well, not to mention its normative and cultural powers. He also pointed out the U.S is a “benign hegemon” and it is in the world’s benefit for its presence. Similarly, Joanne Gowa observed that allies of the U.S benefited from trading with the U.S, hence it is in the nations’ interest to have an enduring U.S hegemony. Second, alliance against the U.S is unlikely and ineffective. Stephen Walt has listed the causes for alliance formation. Alliances form not to balance the biggest power but to balance against the biggest threat. Threat, in turn, is determined by (1) aggregate power, (2) geographic proximity, (3) offensive power, and (4) aggressive intention. The U.S is distant from all major powers geographically, although the most powerful nation in the world. Clearly the U.S does not demonstrate aggressive intentions against other major powers. Hence their balancing against the U.S is unlikely. Wohlforth observed that the other major powers before they balance against the U.S face counterbalancing of their own. China was perceived as a potential balancer of the U.S in many cases. Yet, China faces counterbalancing from Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Russia, and India in the Asian continent alone. Similarly, the other major powers—Russia, Japan, India, and Europe—have more difficulties dealing with their relationships than their relations with the U.S. In belief, the American hegemon not only does not face substantial balancing but serve as a balancer against others’ balancing actions. As a result, we see more “bandwagoning” with the U.S superpower rather than “balancing”. Finally, as John Ikenberry and other scholars observed, the U.S unipolarity is a hegemony based on “constitutional order”. At the end of the World War II, alongside its supremacy in power, the U.S also established the UN, IMF, World Bank, and other institutions in dealing with weapons proliferation and managing relations with allies. U.S exercise of power was self restraint through its memberships in the international institutions. Consequently, the other nations in the world can not only benefit from this constitutional order but to an extent exercise checks on the sole superpower and feel safer even in the unipolar world.

## HEG Bad

### **US-China War**

#### **Hegemony causes US-China War**

Layne 08 (Christopher Layne, B.A. from USC, J.D. from USC Law Center, LL.M. University of Virginia Law School, Ph.D. in Political Science from UC Berkely, Diploma in Historical Studies Corpus Christi College from University of Cambridge, Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, International Relations theorist; “China’s Challenge to US Hegemony”; 2008; http://acme.highpoint.edu/~msetzler/IR/IRreadingsbank/chinauscontain.ch08.6.pdf)

China’s rise affects the United States because of what international relations scholars call the “power transition” effect: Throughout the history of the modern international state system, ascending powers have always challenged the position of the dominant (hegemonic) power in the international system—and these challenges have usually culminated in war. Notwithstanding Beijing’s talk about a “peaceful rise,” an ascending China inevitably will challenge the geopolitical equilibrium in East Asia. The doctrine of peaceful rise thus is a reassurance strategy employed by Beijing in an attempt to allay others’ fears of growing Chinese power and to forestall the United States from acting preventively during the dangerous transition period when China is catching up to the United States. Does this mean that the United States and China are on a collision course that will lead to a war in the next decade or two? Not necessarily. What happens in Sino-American relations largely depends on what strategy Washington chooses to adopt toward China. If the United States tries to maintain its current dominance in East Asia, Sino-American conflict is virtually certain, because US grand strategy has incorporated the logic of anticipatory violence as an instrument for maintaining American primacy. For a declining hegemon, “strangling the baby in the crib” by attacking a rising challenger preventively—that is, while the hegemon still holds the upper hand militarily—has always been a tempting strategic option.

#### Hegemony uses India to balance China

Ward 3/23 (Alex Ward, Interim Assistant to the Senior Vice President, Director of Studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg Chair at Council on Foreign Relations; “Is the USA Still the Indispensible Power in East Asia?”; 3/23/2012; <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/23/is-the-usa-still-the-indispensible-power-in-east-asia/>)

As a response to the spectre of a Chinese regional order, Washington has reiterated its ambitions to “secure [US] interests and advance [US] values” (Clinton, 2011: npn). In November 2011, America attended the East Asia Summit for the first time, perhaps signifying a revitalized pursuit of multilateral integration. This notwithstanding, Washington’s primary regional agenda has been to facilitate “the ascent of friendly Asian centres of power that will constrain any Chinese bid for hegemony” (Twining, 2007: 80). Washington has developed new bilateral partnerships with Indonesia, Vietnam and most notably India, which according to Clinton (2011: npn) “will be one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century”. In particular, the fostering of India as a regional counterweight to China could serve to retain Washington’s role as the region’s decisive strategic player, in an “asymmetrically multipolar Asian security order” (Twining, 2007: 91).

#### Indo-Sino balancing risks nuclear conflict and Asian proliferation

Sullivan and Maza 10(Sullivan, research fellow and program manager at the American Enterprise Institute's Center for Defense Studies; Mazza, senior research associate at AEI; “The Next Nuclear Arms Race” ; 9/27/10; <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703384204575509163717438530.html>)

India and Pakistan are the two countries most likely to engage in nuclear war, or so goes the common wisdom. Yet if recent events are any indication, the world's most vigorous nuclear competition may well erupt between Asia's two giants: India and China. Both countries already house significant and growing arsenals. China is estimated to have approximately 450 warheads; India, roughly 100. Though intensifying as of late, Sino-Indian nuclear competition has a long history: India's pursuit of a weapons program in the 1960s was triggered in part by China's initial nuclear tests, and the two have eyed one another's arsenals with mounting concern ever since. The competition intensified in 2007, when China began to upgrade missile facilities near Tibet, placing targets in northern India within range of its forces. Yet the stakes have been raised yet again in recent months. Indian defense minister A.K. Antony announced last month that the military will soon incorporate into its arsenal a new intermediate-range missile, the Agni-III, which is capable of reaching all of China's major cities. Delhi is also reportedly considering redeploying survivable, medium-range Agni-IIs to its northeastern border. And just last month, India shifted a squadron of Su-30MKI fighters to a base just 150 kilometers from the disputed Sino-Indian border. An Indian Air Force official told Defense News these nuclear-armed planes could operate deep within China with midflight refueling. For its part, China continues to enhance the quality, quantity and delivery systems of its nuclear forces. The Pentagon reported last month that the People's Liberation Army has replaced older, vulnerable ballistic missiles deployed in Western China with modern, survivable ones; this transition has taken place over the last four years. China's Hainan Island naval base houses new, nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines and affords those boats easy access to the Indian Ocean. China's military is also developing a new, longer range submarine-launched ballistic missile which will allow its subs to strike targets throughout India from the secure confines of the South China Sea. No single event has stoked this rise in tensions. China, already concerned about India's growing strength and its desire to play a greater role in Asia, is even less enthused about the burgeoning strategic partnership between Delhi and Washington. While Beijing has learned to live with American forces on its eastern periphery, the possibility of an intimate U.S.-India military relationship has generated fears of encirclement. The ongoing Sino-Indian border dispute, as well as India's position astride China's key maritime shipping lanes, has made the prospect of a Washington-Delhi axis appear particularly troubling. View Full Image Associated Press India's surface-to-surface missile Agni-II launches off Wheelers island in Orissa state, India, on May 17, 2010. India likewise feels encircled by China's so-called "string of pearls"—a series of Chinese-built, ostensibly commercial port facilities in the Bay of Bengal, Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. Beijing's military ties to Pakistan, interference in the Kashmir dispute and references to Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian state, as "Southern Tibet" have done little to reassure New Delhi of Chinese intentions. The rapid growth of China's conventional military might in recent years—between 2000 and 2009, China's military spending more than tripled—and the lack of clarity as to its intentions, has spurred India to pursue its own military modernization. These shifts in India's and China's nuclear force postures thus represent only the latest and most serious efforts to constrain and convey dissatisfaction with the other's perceived regional ambitions. But they are more troubling than conventional redeployments. First, these developments suggest that neither country has confidence in the other's "no first use" policy. India has good reason for concern: The number of missions attributed to China's deterrent—responding to nuclear attacks, deterring conventional attacks against nuclear assets, providing Beijing freedom from nuclear coercion and otherwise "reinforcing China's great power status"—were enough to make the authors of the Pentagon's annual report on China's military power last year question the country's commitment to its "no first use" policy. India, for its part, relies on its nuclear forces to offset gaps and imbalances between its conventional military capabilities and those of China. Second, there is a point at which efforts to enhance deterrence can foster an arms race. Any attempt on the part of China to increase its own defenses necessarily weakens, or is perceived to weaken, the security of India, thus spurring further defense build-ups; the opposite is true as well. Shifts in nuclear force posture can be particularly disruptive, and have been known to precipitate crises. Upon the discovery of Soviet efforts to deploy missiles to Cuba in 1962, for example, the U.S. responded militarily with a naval "quarantine" of the island, bringing Washington and Moscow as close as they have ever come to a nuclear war. Finally, the redeployments of India's and China's nuclear forces suggest that there is deep-seated and growing discord between the two Asian giants. This is troubling news for a region whose future peace and prosperity depends heavily on continued comity between Delhi and Beijing. It is only a matter of time before the China-India military competition begins to affect neighboring states. China's nuclear force modernization, for instance, stands to threaten not only India, but also Korea, Japan and other U.S. partners in Asia. A dramatic defense buildup in India, meanwhile, will no doubt leave Pakistan feeling less secure. Tensions are unlikely to ease any time soon. The two countries appear much closer to the brink of an all-out arms race than they do to any resolution of their differences. While each profits from the other's economic growth, it is that very growth—which finances military modernization and which is so dependent on potentially vulnerable overseas trade—that creates the conditions for heightened insecurity.

#### Hegemony leads to US-China War

Freeman 2/23 (Chas Freeman, chairman of Projects International, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs and U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; “The China Bluff”; 2/23/12; <http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/the-china-bluff-6561>)

What sort of relationship do we want with the emerging giant that is China? The choice is not entirely ours, of course. China will have a lot to say about it. To the extent we pay attention to the views of allies like Japan, so will they. But we do have choices, and their consequences are sufficiently portentous to suggest that they should be made after due reflection, rather than as the result of strategic inertia. Right now, the military-strategic choice we’ve made is clear. We are determined to try to sustain the global supremacy handed to us by Russia’s involuntary default on its Cold War contest with us. In the Asia-Pacific region, this means "full-spectrum dominance" up to China’s twelve-mile limit. In effect, having assumed the mission of defending the global commons against all comers, we have decided to treat the globe beyond the borders of Russia and China as an American sphere of influence in which we hold sway and all others defer to our views of what is and is not permissible. This is a pretty ambitious posture on our part. China’s defense buildup is explicitly designed to counter it. China has made it clear that it will not tolerate the threat to its security represented by a foreign military presence at its gates when these foreign forces are engaged in activities designed to probe Chinese defenses and choreograph a way to penetrate them. There’s no reason to assume that China is any less serious about this than we would be if faced with similarly provocative naval and air operations along our frontiers. So, quite aside from our on-again, off-again mutual posturing over the issue of Taiwan's relationship to the rest of China, we and the Chinese are currently headed for some sort of escalating military confrontation. At the same time, most Americans recognize that our own prosperity is closely linked to continued economic development in China. In recent years, China has been our fastest growing export market. It is also our largest source of manufactured imports, including many of the high-tech items we take pride in having designed but do not make. And we know we have to work with China to address the common problems of mankind. So our future prosperity has come to depend on economic interdependence with a nation we are also setting ourselves up to do battle with. And, at the same time, we hope to cooperate with that nation to assure good global governance. Pardon me if I perceive a contradiction or two in this China policy. It looks to me more like the vector of competing political impulses than the outcome of rational decisionmaking.

#### China is hard balancing against the US - modernizing military and asymmetric capabilities

Yuan-Kang 2010 (Wang Yuan-Kang, Western Michigan University, Journal of African and Asian Studies; “China’s Response to the Unipolar World: The Strategic Logic of Peaceful Development”; Sage; 2012)

China’s military modernization fits into the concept of hard (internal) balancing, an area that has aroused the most concerns in the region. On 4 March 2009, China announced that its defense budget was 480.686 billion RMB ($70 billion), a 14.9 percent rise over the previous year (Xinhua, 2009). Official defense expenditures have been on a double-digit increase every year since the end of the Cold War. A Pentagon analysis reveals that China’s officially disclosed defense budget from the period of 1996 to 2008 grew at an average of 12.9 percent in real terms, outpacing the rate of GDP growth at 9.6 percent (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2009: 31). This analysis is consistent with the consensus among China watchers that the country’s defense spending since the 1990s has increased at a rate that ‘substantially exceeds’ economic growth (Lieberthal, 2007: 34). However, because of the PLA’s lack of transparency, the number for actual defense spending is usually two to three times above the official figure, making China the third largest military spender in the world. These figures, however, should be interpreted with caution. Chinese defense expenditures, though rising, remain a fraction of the US defense budget, which stood at $515.4 billion in 2009. China’s official defense budget accounts for about 1.4 percent of its GDP; when adjusted for extra-budgetary revenue allocated to the PLA, China spends roughly the same percentage of GDP as the US does on defense, which stands at about 3–5 percent (Goldstein, 2005; Shambaugh, 2002). In contrast, the former Soviet Union spent as much as 20 percent of its GDP on defense. Chinese leaders recognize ‘the danger of investing too much in military modernization too early in its own development process’ (Lampton, 2008: 76). An all-out effort to increase China’s military capabilities would not only provoke a counterbalancing effort by neighbors but also risk distorting its economic structure, as the Soviet Union did. Much of China’s military buildup is geared toward balancing American power, particularly in a conflict over Taiwan. Such a balancing motive is evident in the PLA’s acquisition of advanced air, naval, and missile capabilities to achieve local access denial. Beijing has intensified efforts to procure the military capabilities to deter Taiwan from declaring de jure independence and to counter US efforts to assist Taiwan should conflict erupt. The PLA has demonstrated capacity to interdict US satellite communications by successfully testing a direct ascent, anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in January 2007. Chinese submarines and surface warships were able to maneuver in close proximity to US aircraft carriers without being detected. These advances could adversely affect US ability to respond rapidly in a Taiwan crisis (Swaine, 2008). The long-term effects of the PLA’s increased capabilities, however, go beyond the Taiwan Strait. After all, military capabilities in the Taiwan theater can be reconfigured for other contingencies. In an interview in March 2005, General Wen Zongren, then-Political Commissar of the Academy of Military Science, laid out a strategic (not nationalistic) view of why China must acquire Taiwan: controlling the island will thwart foreign efforts to blockade China. ‘[T]o rise suddenly, China must pass through oceans and go out of the oceans in its future development’ (quoted in Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005: 12). Beijing has begun to place ‘a greater emphasis on acquiring more ambitious power projection capabilities beyond Taiwan’ (Swaine, 2008: 78). The Chinese navy is developing capabilities to project power to protect China’s increasingly global interests (Lee, 2008).

The PLA’s modernization will likely take a long time. To deal with American military forces in the short run and to compensate for China’s technological gap, Chinese military experts have turned to asymmetric warfare (Lee, 2008). Such a strategy seeks to develop innovative use of existing technologies and weapon systems in order to ‘level the playing field’ against a technologically superior opponent (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2009: 16–17). Elements of China’s asymmetric warfare include counterspace systems, cyber-warfare against civilian and military networks, attacks on financial infrastructure, information operations, and Three Warfares (psychological, media, and legal). Through these innovative strategies and tactics, the PLA hopes to deliver the ‘assassin’s mace’ (shashoujian) to paralyze the superior opponents. The goal of an asymmetric strategy is not to directly confront US global preponderance or to defeat the US, but ‘to develop politically useful capabilities to punish American forces if they were to intervene in a conflict of great interest to China’ (Christensen, 2001: 9). According to the 2009 Pentagon’s annual report to Congress on the PRC’s military power, China’s efforts to modernize its military have made ‘considerable progress’. The PLA has strengthened capabilities in both deterrence and strategic strike, improved anti-access/area-denial capabilities, positioned itself to contest electromagnetic dominance in future campaigns, and shifted the military balance in the Taiwan Strait to Beijing’s favor (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2009: VII–VIII). The PLA Navy has reportedly doubled the number of long-distance submarine patrols in 2008 (Sainsbury and Stewart, 2009). Of late, Chinese military officials have publicly spoken about the possibility of acquiring aircraft carriers as well as greater power projection capabilities. Such increased assertiveness appears to correlate with China’s rising power.

### Generic War

#### Hegemony leads proliferation and counterbalancing – turns case

Schweller and Xiaoyu 2011 (Randall L. Schweller, Professor of Political Science and Director of the Mershon Center's Series on National Security Studies at Ohio State University; Pu Xiaoyu, doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at Ohio State University; “After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline”; 2011; Project Muse)

In addition to their competing visions of global order (the discourse of resistance), subordinate actors may adopt "cost-imposing" strategies (the practice of resistance) vis-à-vis the unipolar power that fall short of balancing against it.27 States (weak ones included) and even nonstates can impose costs on a unipolar power in a variety of ways, ranging from the mere withdrawal of goodwill to actual attacks on its soil. In the current world, cost-imposing strategies include engaging in diplomatic friction or foot-dragging;28 denying U.S. military forces access to bases;29 launching terrorist attacks against the United States; aiding, abetting, and harboring terrorist groups; voting against the United States in international institutions; preventing or reversing the forward-basing of U.S. military forces; pursuing protectionism and other coercive economic policies; engaging in conventional uses of force such as blockades against U.S. allies;30 making threats against pivotal states that affect regional [End Page 48] and international security;31 and proliferating weapons of mass destruction among anti-Western states or groups. Therefore, in the delegitimation and deconcentration phase, the discourse of resistance and the practice of resistance are mutually sustaining.

#### Hegemony leads to pre-emptive strikes – causes extinction

BBC 06 (“North Korean paper decries US pursuit of ‘preemptive nuclear strike” ;Minju Choson; February 15, 2006; Lexis Nexus)

In the "Review Report," the US Department of Defence decided to target "terrorist groups and rouge countries" as its basic goal of defence strategies and military operations. It is a well-known fact to the world that those called "rogue countries" by the United States is actually the anti-imperialist independent countries, which stand in the way of the US realization of world domination. The United States has unreasonably stigmatized the anti-imperialist independent countries as "rogue countries" and manifested its attempt for preemptive strike. From this perspective, it is very clear what the purposes of the military operation against "rouge countries" are, which have been raved by the United States. In one word, the cunning purpose is that the United States desires to achieve international hegemony by putting in place its attempt for preemptive strike against the anti-imperialist independent countries. Without minding global peace and stability at all, the United States is crazy about a nuclear war with blood-shot eyes, and this is bringing a new nuclear threat to the earth minute by minute. If this is left untreated, the peace and stability of the world as well as the existence of humanity itself will be put at risk.

### Proliferation

####  **Hegemony causes Proliferation – dooms Obama’s current peace efforts**

Linden 09 (Harry van der Linden, Butler University; “Barack Obama, Resort to Force, and U.S. Military Hegemony”; 2009; College of Liberal Arts & Sciences Scholarship and Professional Work from the Liberal Art and Sciences; http://www.cerritos.edu/tstolze/Van%20der%20Linden%20on%20Obama.pdf)

The Obama administration might fare a bit better in terms of the elimination of weapon systems aimed at global military power projection. Obama favors investment in weapons and their support systems that sustain America’s “naval dominance“ and its “global reach in the air,” such as unmanned aerial vehicles and the KC-X air-refueling aircrafts, but at least the Bush administration endeavor to weaponize space is rejected and more serious efforts toward the elimination of nuclear weapons might be expected.15 Obama explicitly endorses the proposal of George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, and Sam Nunn to work toward a nuclear-free world, including such steps as reducing the American and Russian arsenals and creating safer launching protocols for nuclear weapons. However, Obama shares their failure to see that U.S. military hegemony is a cause of nuclear proliferation and that ending this hegemony might be a necessary condition for halting this proliferation in its tracks and moving toward a gradual global abolition of nuclear weapons. Skeptics may even see their plea for the abolition of nuclear weapons as an attempt to prevent that the spread of nuclear weapons among some countries in the South will restrain U.S. military hegemony.16

#### Hegemony leads to Proliferation in Asia and the Middle East - restricts our ability to exercise influence

Deudney et. al 2011 (Daniel Deudney, associate professor of Political Science at John’s Hopkins University; Michael Mastanduno, Professor of Government and Dean of Faculty at Dartmouth College; G. John Ikenberry, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University; William Wolforth, the Daniel Webster Professor at Dartmouth College, Department of Government; “Unipolarity and nuclear weapons”; *International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity*; pg. 305-306; 2011)

Unipolarity and hegemony can also stimulate proliferation. From the beginning, proliferation has been motivated by the effort of states to check American power and influence. Soviet and Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons was certainly motivated by this goal. States and regimes which perceive themselves to be threatened or potentially threatened by American unipolarity and hegemony continue to find nuclear weapons and appealing means to check American influence and intimidation. The nuclear acquisition efforts of North Korea, Libya, Iraq, and Iran all appear to be motivated, at least in significant part, by the desire to establish a restraint on American power. In some of these cases, the desire to deter American military power is rooted in agendas of regional revisionism. In others it appears based on fears that the United States would intervene to overthrow the regime. To the extent the liberal hegemonic state attempts to coercively impose its preferred domestic regime type of democracy upon non-democratic states, such states have a heightened incentive to acquire nuclear weapons. Other more diffuse features of the liberal hegemonic order, particularly its expansive trade and travel opportunities, may also facilitate access to nuclear weapons. And as more states become wealthier and technologically sophisticated due to the growth of world trade facilitated by the liberal economic order, their ability to acquire nuclear weapons grows as well. Shaped by these inhibitions and incentives, proliferation has slowly but surely occurred, and it has largely been to the disadvantage of the unipolar state. While there would be more proliferation without a unipolar hegemonic state, the proliferation which is most likely to occur next diminishes the power and influence and role of unipolar hegemonic state. States that are revisionists in the regions in which the extended American alliance system operations (Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East) have significant incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. To the extent such proliferation occurs, it reduces the conventional military superiority which the United States has acquired at such great cost. Nuclear proliferation will thus further narrow the usable influence which a unipolar state can derive from its preponderance of non-nuclear power. Furthermore, proliferation may seriously raise the cost of the extended American alliance system. The presence of extensive American conventional forces in these unsettled regions means that US forces become targets at greater risk of devastating attacks. A nuclear attack on a major American base (Guam, Diego Garcia, etc.) or a capital naval asset (particularly large aircraft carriers) would produce many thousand American casualties.

### Terrorism

Hegemony causes terrorism – it’s a self-reinforcing cycle. Al-Qaeda proves.

Muzaffar 07 (Chandra Muzaffar, Director of the Centre for Civilization Dialogue at the University of Malaya, Noordin Sopiee Professor of Global Studies at the Science University of Malaysia in Penang; “Hegemony, Terrorism, and War – Is Democracy the Antidote”; Pg 361; 2007; http://static7.userland.com/ulvs1-j/gems/wlr/08muzaffar.pdf)

Al-Qaeda, the world’s most notorious terrorist network, was, in a sense, a response to the most obvious manifestation of global hegemony, namely, military power. As soon as the United States had established a military base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, in 1991, immediately after the Kuwait War, the al- Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, announced to the world that he would attack Dhahran. He considered the establishment of an “infidel” military base in Islam’s holiest land—Saudi Arabia, where Islam’s two holiest cities, Mecca and Media, are situated—an act of sacrilege.1 In June 1996, al-Qaeda was allegedly involved in a bomb attack upon the base, killing 19 American airmen and wounding 250 others. Two years later, al-Qaeda targeted U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. This was followed by the 2000 assault on a U.S. warship, the USS Cole, off the coast of Yemen. The climax was of course the infamous 9-11 episode when al-Qaeda operatives allegedly smashed aircrafts into the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Almost three thousand men and women were massacred in those horrendous tragedies on the eleventh of September 2001. There is no need to emphasize that the WTC was a symbol of U.S.’s global economic power while the Pentagon represented its global military might. After 9-11, U.S. global hegemony continued to provoke al-Qaeda and other terrorist outfits. Since the U.S. and its allies had invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 in order to oust the Taliban regime that was protecting Osama, the invasion became the justification for further terrorist attacks. The Bali bombings of October 2002, purportedly carried out by a group affiliated with al-Qaeda, the Jemaah Islamiyyah, were primarily to avenge the Afghan invasion. Then in March 2003, the U.S. and its allies embarked upon a second military invasion. This time the target was Iraq. One year after Iraq was conquered, al-Qaeda struck again; it was responsible for a dastardly carnage at a Madrid railway station. The unconcealed aim was to compel the Spanish government to withdraw its soldiers from the U.S. led force in Iraq. Al-Qaeda succeeded in its objective. If we reflect upon al-Qaeda attacks, it is obvious that the military, political, and economic dimensions of U.S. hegemony figure prominently on its radar screen. It is seldom acknowledged, however, that the cultural dimension of hegemony has also been a consideration. For instance, during their trial, a couple of the Bali bombers inveighed against Western cultural imperialism and how it was destroying the identity and integrity of indigenous communities. By arguing that hegemony in all its manifestations breeds terrorism, we are in no way condoning terrorism. Al-Qaeda’s deliberate targeting of non- combatants and civilians in general—in East Africa, on 9-11, in Bali, in Madrid—has been condemned by right-thinking people everywhere. Leading Muslim theologians and scholars have not only denounced al-Qaeda’s misdeeds from a humanitarian perspective, but have also castigated Osama and his underlings as men who have shamelessly violated the essence of Islamic teachings.2 Nonetheless, if we fail to recognize how hegemony— control and dominance over people—leads to acts of terror, we will be no better than the proverbial ostrich that buries its head in the sand. There is perhaps another interesting aspect to hegemony and terrorism that is not widely acknowledged. Al-Qaeda, which now claims to be fighting U.S. hegemony, in fact owes its origin to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which helped to arm and fund the outfit as part of the resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the eighties. It served U.S. interests to create and sustain organizations like al-Qaeda since the U.S. was determined to defeat the Soviet Union at all costs.3 Indeed, the utter failure of the Soviet Army to maintain its grip upon Afghanistan—at least 20,000 of its soldiers were killed—was one of the more important reasons for the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. What this implies is that since al-Qaeda had also contributed to the Soviet demise, it would not be wrong to hold it partially responsible for the emergence of the U.S. as the world’s sole hegemonic power.

#### **American Primacy is the root cause of terrorism – explanations that include poverty are flawed**

Caraley 02 (Demetrios James Caraley, Editor; “September 11, Terrorist Attacks, and U.S. Foreign Policy”; Published by the Academy of Political Science; 2002; http://books.google.com/books?id=xMCGStzPzooC&pg=PA49&lpg=PA49&dq=%22American+primacy%22+poverty&source=bl&ots=MJWe63JPqV&sig=fl2UPffhEYGmHGlV2DJ0DBVKbvQ&hl=en&sa=X&ei=nj8UUO\_oHYbErQGp1YH4CA&ved=0CFYQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=%22American%20primacy%22%20poverty&f=false)

Most likely America will see neither absolute victory nor abject failure in the war against terror. Then how long will a campaign of attrition last and stay popular? If the United States wants a strategy to cut the roots of terrorism, rather than just the branches, will American power be used effectively against the roots? Perhaps, but probably not. This depends of course on which of many possible root causes are at issue. Ironically, one problem is that American primacy itself is one of those roots. A common assertion is that Third World poverty generates terrorism. While this must certainly be a contributing cause in many cases, there is little evidence that it is either a necessary or sufficient condition. Fundamentalist madrassas might not be full to overflowing if young Muslims had ample opportunities to make money, but the fifteen Saudis who hijacked the flights on September 11 were from one of the most affluent of Muslim countries. No U.S. policy could ever hope to make most incubators of terrorism less poor than Saudi Arabia. Iran, the biggest state sponsor of anti-American terrorism, is also better off than most Muslim countries. Poverty is endemic in the Third World, but terrorism is not. Even if endemic poverty were the cause, the solution would not be obvious. Globalization generates stratification, creating winners and losers, as efficient societies with capitalist cultures move ahead and others fall behind, or as elite enclaves in some societies prosper while the masses stagnate. Moreover, even vastly increased U.S. development assistance would be spread thin if all poor countries are assumed to be incubators of terrorism. And what are the odds that U.S. intervention with economic aid would significantly reduce poverty? Successes in prompting dramatic economic development by outside assistance in the Third World have occurred, but they are the exception more than the rule. The mast virulent anti-American terrorist threats, however, do not emerge randomly in poor societies. They grow out of a few regions and are concentrated overwhelmingly in a few religiously motivated groups. These reflect political causes—ideological, nationalist, or transnational cultural impulses to militant mobilization—more than economic causes. Economic development in an area where the political and religious impulses remain unresolved could serve to improve the resource base for terrorism rather than undercut it. A strategy of terrorism is most likely to flow from the coincidence of two conditions: intense political grievance and gross imbalance of power. Either one without the other is likely to produce either peace or conventional war. Peace is probable if power is imbalanced but grievance is modest: the weaker party is likely to live with the grievance. In that situation, conventional use of force appears to offer no hope of victory, while the righteous indignation is not great enough to overcome normal inhibitions against murderous tactics. Conventional war is probable if grievance is intense but power is more evenly balanced, since successful use of respectable forms of force appears possible.'2 tinder American primacy, candidates for terrorism suffer from grossly inferior power by definition. This should focus attention on the political causes of their grievance.

#### **Economic motivations leads to conflicts like Iran and Iraq – collapses alliances and increases terrorism**

Iseri 07 (Emre Iseri, Ph.D. Candidate at the School of Politics, International Relations and the Environment, Keele University, U.K.; “Neo-Gramsican Analysis of US Hegemony”; 2007; http://www.in-spire.org/archive/Previous/ei02062007\_Neo-Gramscian\_US\_Hegemony.pdf)

Tensions in the region that are publicly made to seem as only security matters are in fact also economic. In “Déjà vu – The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction This Time in Iran”, Bulent Gokay notes that the justification for U.S. pressure to condemn Iran for alleged weapons of mass destruction closely follows those given in the days before the invasion of Iraq, and that neither effort was supported by evidence. The real motive, according to Gokay is economic. As he notes, “Iran is about to commit a far greater offence than Saddam Hussein’s conversion to the Euro for Iraq’s oil exports in 2000. The plan is not just to sell oil for Euros, but also to create an exchange market for all interested parties, oil producers as well as those customers, to trade oil for Euros.”34 Taken together, Iran’s support for organizations that oppose U.S. policies and practices, such as Hizbullah, the national oil development agenda, and the dialogue between Russia, China, and Iran directed at excluding the U.S. from the region, Iran’s initiative to create a Euro- based trading market for oil may be the last straw for U.S. policymaking elites. Yet, it is unclear whether U.S. diplomatic and military pressure can reverse the situation, or whether the current U.S. strategy in Iraq will succeed in protecting U.S. interests. The ambiguities and risks in Iraq pose a great dilemma for the U.S., which Paul Starr summarizes as: When the dust clears over Baghdad, we will likely find ourselves no safer from terrorism than before, but our alliances will be battered and our true enemies will be more convinced than ever that what they need to prevent themselves from becoming another Iraq is a real nuclear arsenal. If this war is easy, it may be no indication of what’s in store in the future.

### Iran

#### Hegemony leads to Iranian proliferation

Layne 07(Christopher Layne, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University; 2007; “American Empire: A Debate”; http://books.google.com/books?id=YgE-1HjR70sC&printsec=frontcover&dq=American+Empire:+A+Debate&source=bl&ots=Iip\_lPOW84&sig=OXjJ683LnQEaXN3R2QGWGEld9bU&hl=en&sa=X&ei=FoURULX0E4a2rQG\_mYDQDA&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=American%20Empire%3A%20A%20Debate&f=false)

The very notion that undeterrable “rogue states” exist is the second questionable assumption on which the administration’s strategy is based. In an important article in the Winter 2004/2005 issue of International Security, Francis Gavin points out that the post-9/11 era is not the first time that American policy-makers have believed that the United States faced a lethal threat from rogue states. During the 1950s and early 1960s, for example, the People’s Republic of China was perceived by Washington in very much the same way as it perceived Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, or, currently, Iran. Under the leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong, the Chinese Communist Party imposed harsh repression on China and killed millions of Chinese citizens. Moreover, Beijing—which had entered the Korean War in 1950, menaced Taiwan, gone to war with India in 1962, and seemingly was poised to intervene in Vietnam—was viewed (wrongly) as an aggressive state. For Washington, Mao’s China was the poster child of a rogue state, and during the Johnson administration the United States seriously considered launching a preventive war to destroy China’s embryonic nuclear program. In many ways, Mao was seen by U.S. policy-makers as the Saddam Hussein of his time. Moreover**, like Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad— who has made outrageous comments denying the Holocaust and threatening Israel’s destruction—Mao also suffered from diarrhea of the mouth**. Indeed, Mao arguably was even more afflicted because he trivialized the consequences of nuclear war. Thus—before China became a nuclear power (1964)—Mao’s rhetoric cavalierly embraced the possibility of nuclear war. “If the worse came to worst and half of mankind died,” Mao said, “the other half would remain while imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist.” Once China actually became a nuclear power, however, where nuclear weapons were concerned both its rhetoric and its policy quickly became circumspect and responsible. In fact, a mere five years after the Johnson administration pondered the possibility of striking China preventively, the United States and China were engaged in secret negotiations that, in 1972, culminated in President Richard Nixon’s trip to Beijing and Sino–American cooperation to contain the Soviet Union. The United States’ experience with China illustrates an important point: the reasons states acquire nuclear weapons are primarily to gain security and, secondarily, to enhance their prestige. This certainly was true of China, which believed its security was threatened by the United States and by the Soviet Union. It is also true of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and today’s Iran. As Gavin writes, “In some ways, the Kennedy and Johnson administration’s early analysis of China mirrors the Bush administration’s public portrayal of Iraq in the lead-up to the war. Insofar as Iraq was surrounded by potential nuclear adversaries (Iran and Israel) and threatened by regime change by the most powerful country in the world, Saddam Hussein’s desire to develop nuclear weapons may be seen as understandable.” The same can be said for Iran, which is ringed by U.S. conventional forces in neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq and in the Persian Gulf, and which also is the target of the Bush II administration’s policy of regime change and democratization**. Tehran may be paranoid, but in the United States—and Israel—it has real enemies. It is Iran’s fear for its security that drives its quest to obtain nuclear weapons**.

#### **Hegemony emboldens Iran – underlying cause of proliferation and Israeli conflict**

Hadar 07 (Leon Hadar, Ph.D. of Philosophy from the School of International Service at American University, Recipient of the Special Award for “Outstanding Scholarship”, Research Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, Certificate from the Middle East Institute at Columbia University, Master of Science from the School of Journalism at Columbia University, Recipient of the Henry Taylor Award for Journalism, Master of Social Services from the Communication Institute at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, B.A. in Political Science and International Relations from Hebrew University in Jerusalem, ; “The War on Terror Ended… And the Winner was not the United States”; March 22, 2007; http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article\_id=14180)

On one level, on the “democratic” side of the democratic empire in the Middle East, the Bush administration launched a revolutionary process that brought to power, and played into the hands of, the more radical, anti-American players in the region: Iran and her alliance of Shiite groups in Iraq and Lebanon, as well as Hamas in Palestine and, by extension, the Muslim Brotherhood in the rest of the Arab-Sunni world. On another level, on the “imperial” side of the democratic empire in the Middle East, the Americans moved aggressively to strengthen their hegemony in the region directly (Iraq), indirectly (Lebanon), and through proxies (Israel). They attempted to build up an international coalition to contain and isolate Iran and force her to give up her ambition to develop nuclear-weapons capability, and adopted a similarly punitive approach to Damascus while trying to oust Hamas from power. “Was it surprising,” I asked, “that this mishmash of idealistic democracy-promotion crusades and a unipolar approach aimed at establishing U.S. hegemony in the Middle East ended up producing an ad hoc, informal coalition of anti-American players, who were emboldened thanks to Washington’s policies and who are now trying to challenge U.S. power?” Iran, whose leaders sensed that she was gradually becoming a regional power, and an isolated and angry Syrian regime decided in 2006 to utilize their proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas, to deliver an indirect blow to American power by making aggressive moves against an American proxy, Israel. Indeed, it was in that geopolitical and regional context that one must place the killing and kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers on Israel’s borders with Gaza and Lebanon that led to the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. The goal of this action was to demonstrate that, against the backdrop of the U.S. quagmire in Iraq and the increasing influence of Iran, Washington would find it difficult to maintain the status quo in the region. And that is exactly what happened. The Bush administration had given Israel a green light to attack Hezbollah, hoping that Israeli military power would succeed in defeating Hezbollah and Hamas and leave the Americans in a position to counterbalance Iran’s growing power. Instead, by launching missile attacks against targets in Israel, including Haifa, and resisting an Israeli ground invasion of southern Lebanon, Hezbollah demonstrated its growing military and political power, while the Israeli air bombardment of Lebanon only produced more anti-American sentiments in the Middle East. “Ironically, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice explained to me and other reporters, who had traveled with her to Lebanon as she was trying to defuse the crisis, that the scenes of death, destruction, and human misery from Beirut, Haifa, and Gaza are—get this!—‘birth pangs of a new Middle East,’” I recalled.

#### **US hegemony fails at protecting Israel**

Hadar 08 (Leon Hadar, Ph.D. of Philosophy from the School of International Service at American University, Recipient of the Special Award for “Outstanding Scholarship”, Research Fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, Certificate from the Middle East Institute at Columbia University, Master of Science from the School of Journalism at Columbia University, Recipient of the Henry Taylor Award for Journalism, Master of Social Services from the Communication Institute at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, B.A. in Political Science and International Relations from Hebrew University in Jerusalem; “Who lost the Middle East? The collapse of the neoconservative-led US-Israeli hegemonic project”; 2008- most recent citation; http://www.cato.org/pubs/articles/hadar-who-lost-middle-east.pdf)

But Israel, as Ha’aretz columnist Doron Rosenblum put it, “was not established in order to be a spearhead against global Islam, or in order to serve as an alert squad for the Western world.” Moreover, the neoconservative paradigm would make Israel a modern-day crusader state, an outlet of a global power whose political, economic, and military headquarters are on the other side of the world. America’s commitment to the security of the Israeli “province” would always remain uncertain and fragile, reflecting changes in the balance of power in Washington and the shifting dynamics of US politics and economics.35 At the same time, the Israel–Hezbollah war demonstrated to Americans once again that the interests of Israel—a small Middle Eastern power focused on maintaining its security—were not necessarily compatible with those of the US, a superpower with broad global interests that require co-operation with the leading Arab and Muslim states. In fact, taking into consideration the constraints on their relationship, Washington has never established a formal military alliance with Israel—whose status remains that of a client state that needs US military support in order to preserve its margin of security while occasionally providing assistance to its American patron. And as in the case of any other client state, Washington should ensure that the Israeli tail doesn’t wag the American dog by drawing it into unnecessary and costly ventures. In short, if Israel continued to be limited in its ability to provide security services to the US, American hegemony cannot make the Middle East safe for Israel. Indeed, Israelis were beginning to understand that taking a path toward a peaceful co-existence with the Palesti- nians and their other neighbors in the next generations could advance the long-term interests of both Israel and the US.

#### Hegemony makes conflict with Iran inevitable.

Layne 07 (Christopher Layne, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University; 2007; “American Empire: A Debate”; http://books.google.com/books?id=YgE-1HjR70sC&printsec=frontcover&dq=American+Empire:+A+Debate&source=bl&ots=Iip\_lPOW84&sig=OXjJ683LnQEaXN3R2QGWGEld9bU&hl=en&sa=X&ei=FoURULX0E4a2rQG\_mYDQDA&ved=0CC8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=American%20Empire%3A%20A%20Debate&f=false)

Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire, the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion's share of the headlines—is Tehran's evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. Washington's policy, as President George W. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nuclear-armed Iran is "intolerable." Beyond nuclear weapons, however, there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation. Chief among these is Iraq. Recently, Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq's recently elected government. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis, concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. In a real sense, however, Iran's nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America's ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. These are reflected in current U.S. grand strategy—which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine's three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action; determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East; and gaining U.S. dominance over that region. In this respect, it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre-invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy. The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct.

#### Conflict draws in China and Russia - extinction

Jan 06 (Abid Ullah Jan, Creater of No Community Left Behind, Winner of Community Builder of the Year Award in Ottowa, Community Safety Leader; Recipient of Heroes Among us Award, February 20, 2006; “Why American will Reap Iran What it Doesn’t Expect”; http://mathaba.net/0\_index.shtml?x=528456)

Many analysts believe that an attack on Iran will turn into a World War because the Iranian government has a long-range strategy for "asymmetrical" warfare that will disrupt the flow of oil and challenge American interests around the world. Certainly, if one is facing an implacable enemy that is committed to "regime change" there is no reason to hold back on doing what is necessary to defeat that adversary. However, the main reason for escalation of the conflict will be exactly the assumption on the part of the United States, Israel and Britain that Iran cannot respond with nuclear weapons. At a time when nuclear material—including red mercury and different forms of Uranium—were flowing in the streets of Pakistan, a high ranking Pakistani official, working in the Iranian consulate, told this writer that Iran is obtaining smuggled nuclear material from its field commanders in Afghanistan. It was well before the nuclear testing by India and Pakistan took place. Keeping this fact in mind, it is simply naïve to assume that the United States or Israel will launch an un-provoked war of aggression on Iran, and Iran will remain a sitting duck and not retaliate with what it must have refined and retooled since mid-nineties.[3] Even if we assume that the Iranian government purchased nuclear material without any intention of putting it to use, it is highly unlikely that it will still let this material gather dust while it is being openly and seriously threatened by the United States and Israel. If scientists in Germany and the United States could work to develop nuclear weapons from scratch during the World War II, how long will it take a nation pushed against the wall and with all the ingredients available to put something workable together and retaliate with a bang? So, the practical chances of Iran’s retaliation with a nuclear weapon in the face of a war of aggression imposed on it are far more than the theoretical assumptions that Iranian Intelligence will plan covert operations which will be carried out in the event of an unprovoked attack on their facilities. It is true that a nuclear response from Iran would mean a definite suicide when looked in perspective of the nuclear power of the United States and Iran. But it also doesn’t make any sense that the United States would keep bombing Iran, the way it has planned, into the Stone Age, yet despite being able to respond, Iran will simply turn the other cheek. This chain of inevitable reactions will in fact lead a wider conflagration that the warlords in Washington and Tel Aviv have not even imagined. Emboldened by their adventures in Afghanistan and Iraq, and deluded by the IAEA conclusion that Iraq has no nuclear weapons, the warlords are set to go into a war that will definitely lead to massive bloodshed in the Middle East and the downfall of the United States as we see it. Despite Bush and company’s claims that the world is not the same after 9/11, the world remained more or less the same after 9/11. However, their world will surely turn upside down with their miscalculation of going into a third war of aggression in five years. The Russian and Chinese stakes in this issue cannot be ignored altogether. Attacking Iran would prove too much for Russia and China. Russia has snubbed Washington by announcing it would go ahead and honor a $700 million contract to arm Iran with surface-to-air missiles, slated to guard Iran's nuclear facilities. And after being burned when the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority invalidated Hussein-era oil deals, China has snapped up strategic energy contracts across the world, including in Latin America, Canada and Iran. It can be assumed that both China and Russia will not sit idly by and watch Iran being annihilated by the United States. If Iran is attacked with lethal force, it will retaliate with the utmost force available at its disposal; that much is certain. Remembering my discussion 9 year ago with a well informed source who was working for the Iranian government, I am pretty sure that the utmost force in the hands of Iran definitely includes nuclear weapons. One of the signs for that is the confidence with which the Iranian government responds to US threats. Iranian leaders have acted responsibly and reasonably so far. It is always the mistake of extremists to misjudge the behavior of reasonable men. The Iranians tried to avoid purchasing nuclear material from the Pakistani black market to avoid arousing unnecessary suspicion. They kept their nuclear program limited to energy production. It is the United States and its allies which are provoking it into reaction. As a result, it has been a mistake of reasonable men in Iran to mistake the behavior of extremists in Washington and not getting out of NPT or testing a few nuclear devices to balance its power against its enemies. Many analysts are predicting that attack on Iran will be provoked because a majority of Americans are not in favor of a new war. Although setting up a pre-text for domestic support cannot be ruled out, one can say with certainty from the track record of Bush and company that they will hardly bother to engineer another terrorist attack.[4] In the fits of madness, they have already made themselves believe that they have enough justification to wage a war or aggression on Iran. The Washington Times has already started beating war drums and promoting "policy experts" who believe the US must go alone if needed (Feb 6, 2006).[5] Irrespective of any pretext and going alone or in a coalition of barbarians, the signs tell us that the warlords are not going to relinquish their totalitarian dreams. It is very unfortunate on their part that they are putting their hands in hornet nest where they may get stung with nuclear weapons. Their retaliation, for sure, will lead to total disaster. A disaster, far worse than what the title "World War 3" can convey.

### Economy

#### Hegemony collapses the Economy

Eland 09  **(**Ivan Eland, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace and Liberty at the Independent Institute, Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, B.A. from Iowa State University, M.B.A. in Economics and Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Washington University; The Independent Institute, “How the U.S. Empire Contributed to the Economic Crisis”; May 11,2009; http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2498)

A few—and only a few—prescient commentators have questioned whether the U.S. can sustain its informal global empire in the wake of the most severe economic crisis since World War II. And the simultaneous quagmires in Iraq and Afghanistan are leading more and more opinion leaders and taxpayers to this question. But the U.S. Empire helped cause the meltdown in the first place. War has a history of causing financial and economic calamities. It does so directly by almost always causing inflation—that is, too much money chasing too few goods. During wartime, governments usually commandeer resources from the private sector into the government realm to fund the fighting. This action leaves shortages of resources to make consumer goods and their components, therefore pushing prices up. Making things worse, governments often times print money to fund the war, thus adding to the amount of money chasing the smaller number of consumer goods. Such “make-believe” wealth has funded many U.S. wars. For example, the War of 1812 had two negative effects on the U.S. financial system. First, in 1814, the federal government allowed state-chartered banks to suspend payment in gold and silver to their depositors. In other words, according Tom J. DiLorenzo in Hamilton’s Curse, the banks did not have to hold sufficient gold and silver reserves to cover their loans. This policy allowed the banks to loan the federal government more money to fight the war. The result was an annual inflation rate of 55 percent in some U.S. cities. The government took this route of expanding credit during wartime because no U.S. central bank existed at the time. Congress, correctly questioning The Bank of the United States’ constitutionality, had not renewed its charter upon expiration in 1811. But the financial turmoil caused by the war led to a second pernicious effect on the financial system—the resurrection of the bank in 1817 in the form of the Second Bank of the United States. Like the first bank and all other government central banks in the future, the second bank flooded the market with new credit. In 1818, this led to excessive real estate speculation and a consequent bubble. The bubble burst during the Panic of 1819, which was the first recession in the nation’s history. Sound familiar? Although President Andrew Jackson got rid of the second bank in the 1830s and the U.S. economy generally flourished with a freer banking system until 1913, at that time yet another central bank—this time the Federal Reserve System—rose from the ashes. We have seen that war ultimately causes the creation of both economic problems and nefarious government financial institutions that cause those difficulties. And of course, the modern day U.S. Empire also creates such economic maladies and wars that allow those institutions to wreak havoc on the economy. The Fed caused the current collapse in the real estate credit market, which has led to a more general global financial and economic meltdown, by earlier flooding the market with excess credit. That money went into real estate, thus creating an artificial bubble that eventually came crashing down in 2008. But what caused the Fed to vastly expand credit? To prevent a potential economic calamity after 9/11 and soothe jitters surrounding the risky and unneeded U.S. invasion of Iraq, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan began a series of interest rate cuts that vastly increased the money supply. According to Thomas E. Woods, Jr. in Meltdown, the interest rate cuts culminated in the extraordinary policy of lowering the federal funds rate (the rate at which banks lend to one another overnight, which usually determines other interest rates) to only one percent for an entire year (from June 2003 to June 2004). Woods notes that more money was created between 2000 and 2007 than in the rest of U.S. history. Much of this excess money ended up creating the real estate bubble that eventually caused the meltdown. Ben Bernanke, then a Fed governor, was an ardent advocate of this easy money policy, which as Fed Chairman he has continued as his solution to an economic crisis he helped create using the same measures. Of course, according to Osama bin Laden, the primary reasons for the 9/11 attacks were U.S. occupation of Muslim lands and U.S. propping up of corrupt dictators there. And the invasion of Iraq was totally unnecessary because there was never any connection between al Qaeda or the 9/11 attacks and Saddam Hussein, and even if Saddam had had biological, chemical, or even nuclear weapons, the massive U.S. nuclear arsenal would have likely deterred him from using them on the United States. So the causal arrow goes from these imperial behaviors—and blowback there from—to increases in the money supply to prevent related economic slowdown, which in turn caused even worse eventual financial and economic calamities. These may be indirect effects of empire, but they cannot be ignored. Get rid of the overseas empire because we can no longer afford it, especially when it is partly responsible for the economic distress that is making us poorer.

#### **Stops economic growth and holds back the potential of the US economy.**

Layne 06 (Christopher Layne, Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service; Texas A&M University; 2006;“The Peace of Illusions”; pg 177; Google Books).

Advocates of hegemony (and selective engagement) also seem to have a peculiar understanding of international economics and convey the impression that international trade and investment will come to a grinding halt if the United States abandons its current grand strategy—or if a Eurasian great power war occurs. This is not true, however. If the United States abandons its current grand strategic role as the protector of international economic openness, international economic intercourse will not stop, even in time of great power war.110 If the United States were to adopt an offshore balancing grand strategy, its own and global markets would adapt to the new political and strategic environment. Finns and investors would reassess the risks of overseas trade and investment, and over time investment and trade flows would shift in response to these calculations. Instead of being diminished, international trade and investment would be diverted to more geopolitically secure regions, and these "safe havens"—especially the United States—would be the beneficiaries. Finally, the assumption that a Eurasia dominated by a hegemon would be closed economically to the United States is dubious. AEurasian hegemon would have a stake in its own economic well-being (bothfor strategic and domestic political reasons), and it would be most unlikely to hive itself off completely from international trade

### **Democracy**

#### **Democracy promotion fails – ignores ideological differences and ensures conflict**

Adnan 12 (Mubeen Adnan, University of the Punjab, Lahore; “U.S. Hegemony: Gap between U.S. and the Muslim World”; South Asian Studies; A Research Journal of South Asian Studies; Volume 27, No. 1, January-June 2012; pp. 207-220; http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/csas/PDF/13%20Mubeen%20Adnan\_January-June%202012.pdf)

The focus of this research is on the U.S. in the West and the Muslim world as a whole. The ideological aspirations gradually growing into a wider conflict, mainly exaggerated by the publication of materials deemed offensive by Muslims and deemed expression of free thought by the U.S.. Under these conditions, it’s the need of the time to encourage mutual respect and understanding between social, cultural and religious values of each group is important for bridging the gap between the ideology and humanity. The theory of a clash of civilization is used in both the West and in Muslim World in order to show the reasons of volatile relations between them. According to this school of thought, the fundamental differences in ideologies and political and cultural norms are the basic reasons of conflict. But an other school of thought which is against it says that basic differences in attitudes towards gender equality and social liberalization are the causes of gap/ conflict between West and the Muslim World. “Although nearly the entire world plays lip service to democracy, there is still no global consensus on the self-expression values, such as social tolerance, gender equality, freedom of speech and interpersonal trust that are crucial to democracy. Today these divergent values constitute the real clash between societies and the West” (Ronald & Norris: 2003). However, it is there that the cultural values, religious doctrines and economic policies do play an important role in defining relations between the U.S and the Muslims.

#### No democratic peace – **spread** of democracy will increase intra-bloc conflict – their evidence doesn’t assume changes to the international system.

Gartzke and Weisiger 10 (Erik Gartzke; Alex Weisiger, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of California San Diego, Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania; March 15, 2010; “Permanent Friends? Dynamic Difference and the Democratic Peace,”; http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/papers/impermanent\_012010.pdf)

We can go farther in assessing implications of regime similarity in varied circumstances. As with any cue or motive for cooperation, regime type relies on the presence of a threat to ally against. When a cue becomes ubiquitous, it loses much of its informational value. The proliferation of democracy means that democracy is less of a distinguishing characteristic, even as other cues, identities, or actual determinants of preference variability tend to increase in salience. One can no longer be sure that democracies will cooperate when there is a diminishing \other." As democratization progresses, this logic implies that some democracies will form alignments that exclude other democracies, or even that some democratic coalitions will come into conflict with other democratic coalitions. Combining the affinity of regime types, the dynamic nature of natural allies, and the demand for security, we must imagine that the impact of regime type on conflict and cooperation might change over time. Initially, the scarcity of democracies in the world meant that there were few opportunities for direct conflict. Even more important, in a world full of threats, democracies had enough in common that cooperating, or at least not opposing one another, was prudent. As democracy has proliferated, however, preferred policies of democratic countries have become more diverse even as the threat from non-democracies has declined. While autocratic threats remain, many of the most powerful countries are democracies. Differences that were patched over, or overlooked, in fighting fascism and communism have now begun to surface. These differences are certainly not major or fundamental, but they appear more salient today than in the past. This process appears likely to continue in the future; nations with similar regime types but different preferences may increasingly find that they are unable to justify glossing over their differences.

#### Global Democracy Impossible

Dixon 10 (Patrick Dixon, PhD in Foreign Policy; “The Truth About the War With Iraq”; http://www.globalchange.com/iraqwar.htm)

And so we find an interesting fact: those who live in democratic nations, who uphold democracy as the only honourable form of are not really true democrats after all. They have little or no interest in global democracy, in a nation of nations, in seeking the common good of the whole of humanity. And it is this single fact, more than any other, this inequality of wealth and privilege in our shrinking global village, that will make it more likely that our future is dominate by terror groups, freedom fighters, justice-seekers, hell-raisers, protestors and violent agitators.

### Russian Relations

US Hegemony hurts US-Russia relations

Press TV 09 (Press TV; “Medvedev lashes out at US hegemony”; September 15, 2009; http://edition.presstv.ir/detail/106209.html)

Russia's President has slammed America's global dominance saying all nations have the right to remark on the policies of a state whose actions affect the world. Speaking at the opening of a global security conference in the central Russian city of Yaroslavl on Monday, Dmitry Medvedev said those problems of one country, have the potential to lead to international conflict. "This happens immediately and incompetence and reluctance to solve one's own problems inflict damage not only to your country but to a huge number of other countries," he added. The Russian president also lashed out at what he thought the "ill-thought-out" policies of a country that led to the global financial melt down. Medvedev did not refer to the United States by name but the target of his comments was clear. His remarks came shortly before the US President Barack Obama delivered a key speech in New York, where he described the global economic crisis as Washington and Wall Street's "collective failure". Earlier in March the Kremlin had suggested that the international community should have a say when the world's richest countries make decisions with global implications. Medvedev's comments further developed those ideas, attacking efforts by any party to advance what he called "utopian projects of global supremacy … 'Global Caliphate' or 'Benevolent Hegemony'". There can be no "high-flown justification for military adventures, suppression of rights and freedoms -- of any illegal activities," he stressed. The Russian leader also took aim at US criticism of Russia's domestic political situation, insisting that Russia was committed to democracy but would not necessarily pursue it in ways prescribed by other states.

#### Hegemony sparks US-Russian nuclear war

Chomsky 03 (Noam Chomsky, Institute Professor emeritus of linguistics and philosophy at MIT; “Failed States.”; Pages 14-16; http://books.google.com/books?id=xLVl8x0S66MC&printsec=frontcover&dq=chomsky+failed+states&source=bl&ots=Up2qstY-n4&sig=bqBuVZematZcaaVayWFTO0Edu9w&hl=en&sa=X&ei=3MgSUIHgIcWsrQHEgoG4BA&ved=0CDAQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=chomsky%20failed%20states&f=false)

The probability of “apocalypse soon” cannot be realistically estimated, but it is surely too high for any sane person to contemplate with equanimity. While speculation is pointless, reaction to the “stark and dreadful and inescapable” choice Einstein and Russell described definitely is not. On the contrary, reaction is urgent, particularly in the United States, because of Washington’s primary role in accelerating the race to destruction by extending its historically unique military dominance. “The chances of an accidental, mistaken or unauthorized nuclear attack might be increasing,” warns former senator Sam Nunn, who has played a leading role in efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear war. “We are running an unnecessary risk of an Armageddon of our own making,” Nunn observes, as a result of policy choices that leave “America’s survival” dependent on “the accuracy of Russia’s warning systems and its command and control.” Nunn is referring to the sharp expansion of US military programs, which tilt the strategic balance in ways that make “Russia more likely to launch upon warning of an attack, without waiting to see if the warning is accurate.” The threat is enhanced by the fact that “the Russian early warning system is in serious disrepair and more likely to give a false warning of incoming missiles. US reliance on “the high-alert, hair-trigger nuclear posture… allows missiles to be launched within minutes,” forcing “our leaders to decide almost instantly whether to launch nuclear weapons once they have warning of an attack, robbing them of the time they may need to gather data, exchange information, gain perspective, discover an error and avoid a catastrophic mistake.” The risk extends beyond Russia – and also China if it pursues the same course. Strategic Bruce Blair observes that “the early warning and control problems plaguing Pakistan, India and other nuclear proliferators are even more acute.” Another serious concern, discussed in technical literature well before 9/11, is that nuclear weapons may sooner or later fall into the hands of terrorist groups, who might use these and other weapons of mass destruction with lethal effect. Those prospects are being advanced by Bush administration planners, who do not consider terrorism a high priority, as they regularly demonstrate. Their aggressive militarism has not only led Russia to expand significantly its offensive capacities, including more lethal nuclear weapons and delivery systems, but is also inducing the Russian military to transfer nuclear weapons constantly across Russia’s vast territory to counter mounting US threats. Washington planners are surely aware that Chechen rebels, who had already stolen radioactive materials from nuclear waste plants and power stations, have been casing “the railway system and special trains designed for shipping nuclear weapons across Russia.” Blair warns that “this perpetual motion [within Russia] creates a serious vulnerability, because transportation is the Achilles’ heel of nuclear weapons security,” ranking in danger right alongside maintaining strategic nuclear forces on hair-trigger alert. He estimates that every day “many hundreds of Russian nuclear weapons are moving around the countryside.” Theft of one nuclear bomb “could spell eventual disaster for an American city, [but this] is not the worst-case scenario stemming from nuclear gamesmanship.” More ominously, “the seizure of a ready-to-fire strategic long range nuclear missile or a group of missiles capable of delivering bombs to targets thousands of miles away could be apocalyptic for entire nations.” Another major threat is that terrorist hackers might break into military communication networks and transmit launch orders for missiles armed with hundreds of nuclear warheads – no fantasy, as the Pentagon learned a few years ago when serious defects were discovered in its safeguards, requiring new instructions for Trident submarine launch crews. Systems in other countries are much less reliable. All of this constitutes “an accident waiting to happen,” Blair writes; an accident that could be apocalyptic.

### Human Rights

#### **Hegemony bad for human rights – the national security state violates human liberty**

Mearsheimer 10 (John J. R. Wendell Harrison Mearsheimer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, Recipient of the Harrison Distinguished Service Award, on the Advisory Council of The National Interest; December 16, 2010; “Imperial by Design”; <http://nationalinterest.org/print/article/imperial-by-design-4576>)

U.S. grand strategy has followed this basic prescription for the past twenty years, mainly because most policy makers inside the Beltway have agreed with the thrust of Fukuyama’s and Krauthammer’s early analyses. The results, however, have been disastrous. The United States has been at war for a startling two out of every three years since 1989, and there is no end in sight. As anyone with a rudimentary knowledge of world events knows, countries that continuously fight wars invariably build powerful national-security bureaucracies that undermine civil liberties and make it difficult to hold leaders accountable for their behavior; and they invariably end up adopting ruthless policies normally associated with brutal dictators. The Founding Fathers understood this problem, as is clear from James Madison’s observation that “no nation can preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare.” Washington’s pursuit of policies like assassination, rendition and torture over the past decade, not to mention the weakening of the rule of law at home, shows that their fears were justified

### Poverty

#### Hegemony and its economic manifestations causes poverty by reinforcing the East-West Rich-Poor divide

Portes 97 (Alejandro Portes; “Neoliberalism and the Sociology of Development: Emerging Trends and Unanticipated Facts”; Population and Development Review, Vol. 23, No. 2; Jun. 1997; pp 229-259; http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2137545.pdf?acceptTC=true)

With its theoretical roots firmly planted in Marxist political economy, dependency writings brushed aside all considerations of values and ideas and placed the blame for third world poverty squarely at the door of multinational corporations and their parent governments. Much of this literature documented how long-term capital flows from the West, instead of helping to develop peripheral countries, produced economic stagnation and social inequality in them. From this perspective, demographic features of third world societies, such as lower life expectancy and high fertility, were direct consequences of their external subordination (Amin 1974). Higher fertility, in particular,represented a functional adaptation of impoverished ruralpopulations to external insecurities, rather than being an autonomous cause of underdevelopment. Dependency theory correctly predicted the growing global hegemony of multinational corporations and international capitalist institutions. Indeed, at no time during the last half-century have peripheral countries, such as those of Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia, been so thoroughly dependent as they are today on external capital inflows and on the economic guidance of international finance organiza- tions (Castells and Lasema 1989; Portes and Kincaid 1989).

## 2AC/1NC Hegemony Defense

### 1. Heg fails – it’s ineffective at maintaining U.S. interests

Layne, 6 – Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, (Christopher, Financial Times" America cannot rely on power alone," August 24th, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/f7bb5fb2-330c-11db-87ac-0000779e2340.html)

Hegemony, however, is not omnipotence. There are several reasons why the US can successfully apply its power to some objectives but not to others.

First, the US is better at deterrence - preventing other states from attacking the US or its allies militarily - than it is at "compellence"- using its power coercively to force other states to adopt policies that run counter to their preferences and to act in accordance with Washington's dictates. The fact that compellence is difficult explains why the US has been unsuccessful in persuading Iran and North Korea to give up their nuclear weapons programmes.

Second - as the Iraq morass illustrates - in "asymmetric" conflicts such as insurgencies, outside forces are at a big political and psychological disadvantage notwithstanding their superiority in conventional military power over indigenous fighters. The US should have learnt from its own Ã‚Â­experience in Vietnam (or the French experiences in Indochina and Algeria) that there are good reasons why big states lose small wars (as Professor Andrew Mack of the University of British Columbia put it in a widely cited article).

In these wars, the balance of motivation invariably lies with the insurgents who, instead of needing to prevail militarily, need only to survive and prolong the conflict sufficiently to chip away at the outside power's political will. As counter-insurgent wars drag on, and the costs rise, political debate in the external power inevitably focuses on why it should continue to expend blood and treasure in a war that is not vital to security. Also, in such conflicts, occupying powers invariably find themselves on the wrong side of one of the most powerful forces in international politics: nationalism. In Iraq and Afghanistan, Washington's ability to attain its objectives is also limited by the religious and cultural divides separating the Islamic world from the west.

Third, America's own ideological militancy, rooted in the Wilsonian tradition of liberal internationalism, hamstrings the effectiveness of US diplomacy by dividing the world neatly into good guys and bad guys - or, as the Bush administration would have it, between "good" and "evil". One reason why the US has failed in the Middle East is because of its refusal to engage in direct diplomacy with Syria and Iran - both of which have important stakes in the outcome of security issues in the Middle East, including those involving Israel's relations with the Palestinians and with Hizbollah in Lebanon.

Ending evil may be a worthy ambition for ministers of the cloth, but it is a foolish one for ministers of state. There is much more to diplomacy than simply talking to one's friends. The art of diplomacy lies in dealing with those who are rivals and adversaries, and finding ways of resolving outstanding differences. By preferring regime change to diplomatic engagement with "evil" states such as Iran and Syria, the US has tied its own hands in exercising hegemonic power to resolve - or at least ameliorate - the conflicts in the Middle East.

Finally, America's hegemonic power often seems illusory because it is applied to unattainable objectives such as nation-building and promotion of democracy. US neo-conservatives and liberal imperialists alike seem to think that the world is a piece of clay and that the US can mould other nations and cultures in its own image. It is naive to think that America's democratic values can be transplanted to flourish in countries that have no indigenous democratic tradition and that lack the social, economic and political foundations on which America's domestic political system rests. Although the US has failed repeatedly in such efforts, it keeps trying - most recently in Iraq (and Afghanistan). In both countries it is failing yet again.

Although the US remains dominant in international politics, its power is not infinite. What is needed in Washington is the wisdom to differentiate between those foreign policy goals that are attainable and those that are not. The US must be careful not to overreach itself, and Washington needs to understand that a wise grand strategy must balance ends and means, and distinguish between desirable objectives and attainable ones. If the US is to be perceived as powerful rather than powerless, it must refrain from intervening abroad in pursuit of unrealisable goals, and will have to learn that the intricacies of international politics cannot be reduced to a simplistic Manichean struggle between good and evil.

### 2. The transition to multipolarity is inevitable – There will be a fundamental redistribution of power

Financial Times, 09 (Quentin Peel, The World in 2009, “Risks rise in shift to a Multipolar World”, January 27th, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c76ec956-ec79-11dd-a534-0000779fd2AC.html)

If the consequences of a prolonged economic recession are unpredictable, the “multipolar” look of the future world order seems most likely. Apart from the US and China, one pole in the world will be Europe. That could aggravate transatlantic tensions. Japan, India, Russia and Brazil are all likely to be players at the top table. Less certain will be the influence of individual countries in the Middle East, Africa and the rest of Latin America.

The Group of Seven (G7) leading industrialised nations, and G8 including Russia, are likely to be early casualties of the economic crisis. Without China and India at the table, older industrialised nations cannot handle the global crisis. Some sort of new structure of global governance will be essential to reflect redistribution of power, and provide a form of guidance and regulation.

It will not be an easy transition, nor a soft landing. “Historically, emerging multipolar systems have been more unstable than bipolar or unipolar ones,” the NIC report says. “Despite the recent financial volatility...we do not believe that we are headed toward a complete breakdown of the international system, as occurred in 1914-18 when an earlier phase of globalisation came to a halt. However, the next 20 years of transition...are fraught with risks.”

### 3. US no longer has the ability to maintain forward deployments around the globe – economic capacity prevents

Pape, 9 – Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago (Robert, National Interest Online, “Empire Falls,” January 22nd, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20484)

Today, the cold-war framework of significant troop deployments to Europe, Asia and the Persian Gulf is coming unglued. We cannot afford to keep our previous promises. With American forces bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and mounting troubles in Iran and Pakistan, the United States has all but gutted its military commitments to Europe, reducing our troop levels far below the one hundred thousand of the 1990s. Nearly half have been shifted to Iraq and elsewhere. Little wonder that Russia found an opportunity to demonstrate the hollowness of the Bush administration’s plan for expanding NATO to Russia’s borders by scoring a quick and decisive military victory over Georgia that America was helpless to prevent. If a large-scale conventional war between China and Taiwan broke out in the near future, one must wonder whether America would significantly shift air and naval power away from its ongoing wars in the Middle East in order to live up to its global commitments. If the United States could not readily manage wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time, could it really wage a protracted struggle in Asia as well? And as the gap between America’s productive resources and global commitments grows, why will others pass up opportunities to take advantage of America’s overstretched grand strategy?

Since the end of the cold war, American leaders have consistently claimed the ability to maintain a significant forward-leaning military presence in the three major regions of the globe and, if necessary, to wage two major regional wars at the same time. The harsh reality is that the United States no longer has the economic capacity for such an ambitious grand strategy. With 30 percent of the world’s product, the United States could imagine maintaining this hope. Nearing 20 percent, it cannot.

### 4. No impact to the transition – international order accommodates rising powers and nuclear weapons prevent war

Ikenberry 08 professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University (John, The Rise of China and the Future of the West Can the Liberal System Survive?, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb)

Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon -- will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order. That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely -- eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join. This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order -- if managed properly -- will live on.

## Ext 1. Limited Influence

### US power has eroded – US has limited influence and its security guarantees are no longer credible

Kato 08 bureau chief of the American General Bureau of the *Asahi Shimbun*. (Yoichi, Return from 9/11 PTSD to Global Leader, The Washington Quarterly, Volume 31, Number 4, Autumn 2008

The execution of the Iraq war, and of the broader war on terrorism for that matter, has damaged Washington's capacity for leadership to a great extent. The most damaging aspect is the notion that the United States bullies the world to meet its own interests while disregarding those of other states or regions. The administration has become a prisoner to the newly emergent threats that it faces. It is therefore encouraging to see the emergence of a new strategic discussion within the United States that recognizes the fact that nonstate actors such as al Qaeda "do not pose an existential threat" to the United States.[4](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu:2048/journals/washington_quarterly/v031/31.4.kato.html#f4) Al Qaeda rejects the expansion of U.S. values, especially in the Middle East, and has proven that it can inflict enormous pain on the United States and its friends and allies and disrupt regions and the globe through terrorist attacks. Yet, it possesses neither the strategic vision nor the capability to topple the existing world order and U.S. predominance. Overreactions based [**End Page 167]** on the overestimation of such threats were the fundamental reasons underlying the failure of the current U.S. strategy. A calm and objective reassessment of the threats and challenges must be the first step toward restoration of the U.S. reputation. Moreover, the challenges facing the United States do not come only from Islamic extremism or the Middle East. Various challenges in the Asia-Pacific region, especially the rise of China, must also be addressed. The failure of the Iraq war and the war on terrorism has had an enormous impact on U.S. standing in the Asia Pacific. It has reduced U.S. influence among the policy elites and the general publics of nations throughout the region. The United States is now often perceived as a not-so-capable and sometimes insecure country despite its powerful hard-power economic and military assets.

## Ext 4. No Transition Wars

### Multipolarity solves and the transition will be peaceful – resource scarcity and shared threats create incentives for cooperation

Nowak 08 spokesman of the executive board of the Alfred Herrhausen Society, the international forum of Deutsche Bank.

(Wolfgang, RISE OF THE REST The Challenges of the New World Order, 10/02/2008)

Who are the decisive powers in this new world order? The United States, Russia, India, China, Brazil and the European Union surely count among them. Interestingly, these countries are growing ever closer together. The current financial crisis has shown how deep their ties have already become. Other similarities are likewise revealing. With the exception of Europe, each of these countries contains within it aspects of the so-called first, second and third worlds. In the megalopolis Mumbai, for example, Asia’s largest slum sits adjacent a thriving economic hub. A person driving across Russia encounters areas of both staggering wealth and miserable poverty. Even in the United States, the richest country in the world, some of its population struggles to earn a decent living. These countries are neither enemies of one another, nor are they friends; they are "frenemies," competitors for the world’s scarce resources. These countries assure their people that they can shape the coming global order and provide for their future welfare, but their respective visions of the future can differ greatly. A potential "clash of futures" looms on the horizon of the multipolar world. Not all "frenemies" are democracies in the Western sense. The successes of Singapore and China, as well as of the Gulf states, prove that states need not be democratic to guarantee their people a high standard of living. But, that need not be cause for pessimism. Within the new nondemocratic world powers, productive elites are replacing parasitic elites. Where the former get the upper hand, they produce a system more free and just than the one they inherited. Their goal is to develop the economy and correct social inequalities. They know that where there are slums there will be "failing cities" and "failing states." New alliances that set countries against one another will not be able to solve the challenges of the 21st century. New forms of international cooperation, consultation, and compromise will have to play a central role in a multipolar world. It is absurd that Italy belongs to the G-8, but not China or Brazil. And what sort of meaning can a global security council have when India, Brazil, and the European Union are left out, while France and Great Britain are permanent members? Needed are new forms of international governance: in a world with diminishing resources and accelerating climate change, states might be tempted to pursue their own interests in order to gain short-term advantages. The challenge will be to devise a new international framework and an organized balance of interests. Only a common future -- "change through rapprochement" not a "clash of futures" -- can bring us further. Certainly, the past ten years provide much cause for pessimism. In order for the next ten years to be a success, we will need to be fortified by a credible, if skeptical, optimism.

## No Great Power Wars

### Great power war is obsolete – cooperation is more likely than competition

Deudney and Ikenberry 09Professor of Political Sceince at Johns Hopkins and Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University (Daniel and John, The Myth of the Autocratic Revival :Why Liberal Democracy Will Prevail, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb)

This bleak outlook is based on an exaggeration of recent developments and ignores powerful countervailing factors and forces. Indeed, contrary to what the revivalists describe, the most striking features of the contemporary international landscape are the intensification of economic globalization, thickening institutions, and shared problems of interdependence. The overall structure of the international system today is quite unlike that of the nineteenth century. Compared to older orders, the contemporary liberal-centered international order provides a set of constraints and opportunities -- of pushes and pulls -- that reduce the likelihood of severe conflict while creating strong imperatives for cooperative problem solving. Those invoking the nineteenth century as a model for the twenty-first also fail to acknowledge the extent to which war as a path to conflict resolution and great-power expansion has becomelargely obsolete**.** Most important, nuclear weapons have transformed great-power war from a routine feature of international politics into an exercise in national suicide. With all of the great powers possessing nuclear weapons and ample means to rapidly expand their deterrent forces, warfare among these states has truly become an option of last resort. The prospect of such great losses has instilled in the great powers a level of caution and restraint that effectively precludes major revisionist efforts. Furthermore, the diffusion of small arms and the near universality of nationalism have severely limited the ability of great powers to conquer and occupy territory inhabited by resisting populations (as Algeria, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and now Iraq have demonstrated). Unlike during the days of empire building in the nineteenth century, states today cannot translate great asymmetries of power into effective territorial control; at most, they can hope for loose hegemonic relationships that require them to give something in return. Also unlike in the nineteenth century, today the density of trade, investment, and production networks across international borders raises even more the costs of war. A Chinese invasion of Taiwan, to take one of the most plausible cases of a future interstate war, would pose for the Chinese communist regime daunting economic costs, both domestic and international. Taken together, these changes in the economy of violence mean that the international system is far more primed for peace than the autocratic revivalists acknowledge. The autocratic revival thesis neglects other key features of the international system as well. In the nineteenth century, rising states faced an international environment in which they could reasonably expect to translate their growing clout into geopolitical changes that would benefit themselves. But in the twenty-first century, the status quo is much more difficult to overturn. Simple comparisons between China and the United States with regard to aggregate economic size and capability do not reflect the fact that the United States does not stand alone but rather is the head of a coalition of liberal capitalist states in Europe and East Asia whose aggregate assets far exceed those of China or even of a coalition of autocratic states. Moreover, potentially revisionist autocratic states, most notably China and Russia, are already substantial players and stakeholders in an ensemble of global institutions that make up the status quo, not least the UN Security Council (in which they have permanent seats and veto power). Many other global institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, are configured in such a way that rising states can increase their voice only by buying into the institutions. The pathway to modernity for rising states is not outside and against the status quo but rather inside and through the flexible and accommodating institutions of the liberal international order. The fact that these autocracies are capitalist has profound implications for the nature of their international interests that point toward integration and accommodation in the future. The domestic viability of these regimes hinges on their ability to sustain high economic growth rates, which in turn is crucially dependent on international trade and investment; today's autocracies may be illiberal, but they remain fundamentally dependent on a liberal international capitalist system. It is not surprising that China made major domestic changes in order to join the WTO or that Russia is seeking to do so now. The dependence of autocratic capitalist states on foreign trade and investment means that they have a fundamental interest in maintaining an open, rule-based economic system. (Although these autocratic states do pursue bilateral trade and investment deals, particularly in energy and raw materials, this does not obviate their more basic dependence on and commitment to the WTO order.) In the case of China, because of its extensive dependence on industrial exports, the WTO may act as a vital bulwark against protectionist tendencies in importing states. Given their position in this system, which so serves their interests, the autocratic states are unlikely to become champions of an alternative global or regional economic order, let alone spoilers intent on seriously damaging the existing one. The prospects for revisionist behavior on the part of the capitalist autocracies are further reduced by the large and growing social networks across international borders. Not only have these states joined the world economy, but their people -- particularly upwardly mobile and educated elites -- have increasingly joined the world community. In large and growing numbers, citizens of autocratic capitalist states are participating in a sprawling array of transnational educational, business, and avocational networks. As individuals are socialized into the values and orientations of these networks, stark "us versus them" cleavages become more difficult to generate and sustain. As the Harvard political scientist Alastair Iain Johnston has argued, China's ruling elite has also been socialized, as its foreign policy establishment has internalized the norms and practices of the international diplomatic community. China, far from cultivating causes for territorial dispute with its neighbors, has instead sought to resolve numerous historically inherited border conflicts, acting like a satisfied status quo state. These social and diplomatic processes and developments suggest that there are strong tendencies toward normalization operating here. Finally, there is an emerging set of global problems stemming from industrialism and economic globalization that will create common interests across states regardless of regime type. Autocratic China is as dependent on imported oil as are democratic Europe, India, Japan, and the United States, suggesting an alignment of interests against petroleum-exporting autocracies, such as Iran and Russia. These states share a common interest in price stability and supply security that could form the basis for a revitalization of the International Energy Agency, the consumer association created during the oil turmoil of the 1970s. The emergence of global warming and climate change as significant problems also suggests possibilities for alignments and cooperative ventures cutting across the autocratic-democratic divide. Like the United States, China is not only a major contributor to greenhouse gas accumulation but also likely to be a major victim of climate-induced desertification and coastal flooding. Its rapid industrialization and consequent pollution means that China, like other developed countries, will increasingly need to import technologies and innovative solutions for environmental management. Resource scarcity and environmental deterioration pose global threats that no state will be able to solve alone, thus placing a further premium on political integration and cooperative institution building. Analogies between the nineteenth century and the twenty-first are based on a severe mischaracterization of the actual conditions of the new era. The **declining utility** of war, the thickening of international transactions and institutions, and emerging resource and environmental interdependencies together undercut scenarios of international conflict and instability based on autocratic-democratic rivalry and autocratic revisionism. In fact, the conditions of the twenty-first century point to the renewed value of international integration and cooperation.

## Heg Inevitable 1NC

### Heg is sustainable – US has dominance in all areas of power and its not going anywhere

Brooks and Wohlforth 08Associate Professor of Government in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College and Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government (Stephen and William, World Out of Balance, pg 27- 31)

“Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing,” historian Paul Kennedy observes: “I have returned to all of the comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation comes close.” Though assessments of U.S. power have changed since those words were written in 2002, they remain true. Even when capabilities are understood broadly to include economic, technological, and other wellsprings of national power, they are concentrated in the United States to a degree never before experienced in the history of the modern system of states and thus never contemplated by balance-of-power theorists. The United spends more on defense than all the other major military powers combined, and most of those powers are its allies. Its massive investments in the human, institutional, and technological requisites of military power, cumulated over many decades, make any effort to match U.S. capabilities even more daunting that the gross spending numbers imply. Military research and development (R&D) may best capture the scale of the long-term investment that give the United States a dramatic qualitative edge in military capabilities. As table 2.1 shows, in 2004 U.S. military R&D expenditures were more than six times greater than those of Germany, Japan, France, and Britain combined. By some estimates over half the military R&D expenditures in the world are American. And this disparity has been sustained for decades: over the past 30 years, for example, the United States has invested over three times more than the entire European Union on military R&D. These vast commitments have created a preeminence in military capabilities vis-à-vis all the other major powers that is unique after the seventeenth century. While other powers could contest U.S. forces near their homelands, especially over issues on which nuclear deterrence is credible, the United States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally. This capacity arises from “command of the commons” – that is, unassailable military dominance over the sea, air, and space. As Barry Posen puts it, Command of the commons is the key military enabler of the U.S global power position. It allows the United States to exploit more fully other sources of power, including its own economic and military might as well as the economic and military might of its allies. Command of the commons also helps the United States to weaken its adversaries, by restricting their access to economic, military, and political assistance….Command of the commons provides the United States with more useful military potential for a hegemonic foreign policy than any other offshore power has ever had. Posen’s study of American military primacy ratifies Kennedy’s emphasis on the historical importance of the economic foundations of national power. It is the combination of military and economic potential that sets the United States apart from its predecessors at the top of the international system. Previous leading states were either great commercial and naval powers or great military powers on land, never both. The British Empire in its heyday and the United States during the Cold War, for example, shared the world with other powers that matched or exceeded them in some areas. Even at the height of the Pax Britannica, the United Kingdom was outspent, outmanned, and outgunned by both France and Russia. Similarly, at the dawn of the Cold War the United States was dominant economically as well as in air and naval capabilities. But the Soviet Union retained overall military parity, and thanks to geography and investment in land power it had a superior ability to seize territory in Eurasia. The United States’ share of world GDP in 2006, 27.5 percent, surpassed that of any leading state in modern history, with the sole exception of its own position after 1945 (when World War II had temporarily depressed every other major economy). The size of the U.S economy means that its massive military capabilities required roughly 4 percent of its GDP in 2005, far less than the nearly 10 percent it averaged over the peak years of the Cold War, 1950-70, and the burden borne by most of the major powers of the past. As Kennedy sums up, “Being Number One at great cost is one thing; being the world’s single superpower on the cheap is astonishing.”

## Heg Dead – 1NC

### Heg is over

Omestad 08Former Associate Editor of Foreign Policy, Winner of the Edwin M. Hood Award for Diplomatic Journalism

(Thomas, Is America Really on the Decline? US News and World Report, 10/29)

This time, however, might not turn out as well for America, some analysts worry, because the trends eroding America's pre-eminence run deeper. "It's not simply that we've run into a rough patch, shaking our self-confidence," warns Andrew Bacevich, an international affairs specialist at Boston University and author of this year's The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism. "It's different this time." That there is some sort of big change is widely accepted, even mainstream. Defense Secretary Robert Gates now speaks of a "multipolar world." In its 2007 annual survey, the International Institute for Strategic Studies referred to "the profound loss of authority suffered by the United States since its invasion of Iraq." Diminished dominance. Yet more troubling was the vista painted by Thomas Fingar, the U.S. intelligence community's top analyst. Foreshadowing a conclusion of a coming report called "Global Trends 2025," he said in September that "American dominance will be much diminished over this period of time" and "will erode at an accelerating pace with the partial exception of the military." In future competition, he added, the military will be "the least significant" factor. Fingar labeled U.S. pre-eminence since World War II a "truly anomalous situation." Indeed, shifts in economic and military power--played out slowly, over decades and centuries--are the norm, as Yale historian Paul Kennedy pointed out in his 1988 work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Some analysts conclude that if the reality of America's power position has changed, so must American attitudes. "We should disenthrall ourselves from the idea that the well-being and security of the United States can only be attained by seeking to maintain primacy," says Bacevich. In any case, the new financial shock is rattling a load-bearing pillar of American strength--its role as global financial superpower, including its privileged position as issuer of the world's favored reserve currency, the U.S. dollar. The dollar's special role has been critically important. It allows the federal government to affordably cover budget and current account deficits. The Feds are selling about half the new national debt to foreign investors, including governments like China's and sovereign wealth funds like those in Abu Dhabi and Kuwait. That has bridged the yawning U.S. fiscal gap, financing, in effect, global military activities and domestic spending without sparking inflation or driving up the interest cost of such monumental borrowing. It has also allowed Americans to maintain a notoriously low net savings rate. Critics point to the hazards inherent in racking up some $10 trillion in public debt--exacerbated now by fresh doubts over American solvency. Says historian Kennedy, "The crisis will confirm in the minds of Asians not to be so fiscally dependent on Uncle Sam." Those foreign investors, suggests Chas. W. Freeman Jr., a former U.S. diplomat in China and Saudi Arabia and president of the Middle East Policy Council, will conclude, "We're not going to finance your improvidence indefinitely." One other vulnerability also looms larger than in the past: energy imports. When Jimmy Carter was urging energy conservation in 1980, the United States imported 37 percent of oil consumed; last year, it was 58 percent. Something else is different about the current debate over U.S. decline. Without any contraction of its daunting military firepower or the size of its economy, other nations are bound to assume more influential positions. The world geopolitical map is being redrawn: Several powers are rising, some rapidly. China takes top billing on the list. Back when economic reforms began in 1978, China contributed but 1 percent of the world's GDP and its trade. Last year, it reached 5 percent of world GDP and 8 percent of trade. China's growth has hummed along at nearly 10 percent annually--for three decades. That is three times the global average. China's "peaceful rise," as officials call the strategy, aims to restore China to the status it had enjoyed for many centuries: the world's largest economy. A recent Goldman Sachs report has bumped up the time by which China's economy is expected to surpass America's in size to 2027. China's growth is fueling a rapid expansion of military capabilities and, in effect, promoting a model competing with that of the United States--authoritarian capitalism. At the same time, India, the world's most populous democratic state, has also found a surer path to prosperity that is broadening its influence and enabling a military buildup. Along with the economic recovery of Japan and the growth of what used to be called the "tigers" of South Korea and Southeast Asia, predictions of a "Pacific century" or an Asian one look more plausible. Asia is returning to its historical norms, Kishore Mahbubani, dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, argues in his book The New Asian Hemisphere. "The era of Western domination has run its course," he writes. There are shifts elsewhere, too. The once slumbering giant of South America, Brazil, is overcoming its past weaknesses. Russia is undergoing a resurgence of uncertain duration, courtesy of massive sales of oil and natural gas. Its invasion of neighboring Georgia and support for separatist regions there may mark a new period of strategic challenges to the West. Meanwhile, the European Union, in fits and starts, continues to evolve into a more coherent force in global affairs that, as a 27-nation collective, already presents the world's largest economy. Biggest loser. The world's energy suppliers--especially those along the Persian Gulf--are also gaining strength. Flynt Leverett, director of the New America Foundation's Geopolitics of Energy Initiative, calls the flood of money from oil consumers to producers "arguably the greatest transfer of wealth from one group of countries to another." The "big loser," he says, is the United States. The Gulf Arab states, as a group, may emerge as the world's most important investor. As well, Iran and its regional ambitions will get plenty of sustenance. But the rise of other powers doesn't tell the whole geopolitical story. They are forging connections without U.S. involvement and, in some cases, with the likely aim of blunting U.S. influence. The maneuvering reflects the sort of games nations have virtually always played. When one country's overweening power ignites concern, some of the others search for ways to counterbalance it. That can happen frontally, through political-military alliances or, more gingerly, in a nonconfrontational mode dubbed "soft balancing." For instance, Russia, China, and the four Central Asian states have formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a group with a decidedly non-U.S. approach to world affairs--no hectoring about human rights and democracy there. And though the United States, with its tight alliances, is East Asia's leading protecting power, it is not part of a new regional grouping that is becoming more influential. China is reaching deeply into Africa, the Middle East, and even Latin America with trade deals, energy investments, and aid with few strings attached. Russia, too, is using arms sales and energy commerce to revive old connections in the developing world. Its outreach, especially in Latin America, appeals to left-leaning governments aloof from Washington. For the first time since the Cold War, a Russian naval fleet is heading into Latin American waters for exercises with Venezuela. Parag Khanna, an analyst with the New America Foundation, sees the unipolar moment giving way to a different global game. In The Second World: Empires and Influence in the New Global Order, he predicts a "geopolitical marketplace" in which developing countries are courted by and align flexibly with one of the new "Big Three": the United States, the European Union, and China. Others anticipate an even more complex diffusion of global power. Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations and a former Bush administration official, argues that the new era will devolve into "nonpolarity," in which nation-states lose influence and a fractious assortment of nonstate players wield more clout. These include a variety of regional and global organizations, nongovernmental groups, foundations, multinational corporations, and even unsavory militias, drug cartels, and terrorist networks. The erosion of U.S. global standing--at least in the eyes of the world--has been hastened by a foreign policy routinely portrayed overseas as one of arrogance and hubris. The charge of U.S. unilateralism--stoked above all by a costly and unresolved war of choice in Iraq--has fortified a troubling caricature of America as a militaristic and hypocritical behemoth that frittered away the outpouring of global goodwill after 9/11. The damage to America's reputation has weakened its "soft power"--the attractiveness abroad of its society and politics. Reports of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo and what many see as encroachments on America's civil liberties in the name of fighting terrorism have taken a toll. It was, seemingly, with some glee that the German magazine Der Spiegel ran a cover story this fall titled "The Price of Arrogance" and depicting the Statue of Liberty with its flame extinguished. The world supply of deference to the lone superpower is flagging--a likely drag on the next presidency. The go-it-alone instincts of the Bush administration--though tempered in its second term--came into play on issues from climate change to international justice to arms control. Old allies felt a cool wind from Washington. Grand ambitions for a democratic Middle East went unfulfilled. The Americans championed the war on terrorism with a "with us or against us" zeal. Fairly or not, friends and foes alike saw a lecturing, moralistic American style of leadership. It sat badly. "We exited the Cold War with amazing prestige and an automatic followership," says Freeman. "Nobody will charge a hill with us anymore." There have been other body blows to American prestige. The inability to bring closure to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (especially the lengthy bungling of the Iraq occupation), the initial feeble response to Hurricane Katrina, and the regulatory laxity and greed that underlie this year's financial crisis all served to cloud the picture of American pre-eminence. Chinese students are questioning whether they should study American-style business. Mahbubani, the Singaporean analyst and former diplomat, marvels at "a new level of incompetence in America that is puzzling the world."

# Heg Dead – Fiscal Overstretch

## Spending overstretch and increases in operational costs ensure the demise of American power and military presence

Flournoy and Brimley 08 president and cofounder of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and a former principal deputy assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton administration and a fellow at CNAS (Michele and Shawn, The Defense Inheritance: Challenges and Choices for the Next Pentagon Team The Washington Quarterly Volume 31, Number 4, Autumn 2008)

The next president will simultaneously face enormous budgetary pressures due to slowing economic growth; the spiraling costs of mandatory spending programs such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid as baby boomers begin to retire; and growing public and congressional intolerance for increases in the federal deficit.[17](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu:2048/journals/washington_quarterly/v031/31.4.flournoy.html%22%20%5Cl%20%22f17) Because defense expenditures represent about one-half of U.S. discretionary spending, it will likely be in the crosshairs of those looking to cut federal spending to pay for entitlements, cut the deficit, or both. Additionally, alarm bells are ringing throughout the U.S. defense community as the realization sinks in that the Defense Department is facing the makings of a "perfect storm." Runaway operations and maintenance costs due to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; soaring personnel obligations; enormous reset, recapitalization, and modernization needs; intentional growth in the size of the Army and Marine Corps; and the eventual decline of wartime supplemental spending will all combine to require the Pentagon and Congress to make some very difficult choices.[18](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu:2048/journals/washington_quarterly/v031/31.4.flournoy.html#f18) Defense procurement expert John Christie points out that "[g]rowth rates for unit costs of major weapons systems are greater than those for total defense procurement, total defense spending, and the gross domestic product." If these historic trends are not addressed, he argues, U.S. armed forces will eventually cease to be "a significant influence in world events because of shrinking force structure."[19](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu:2048/journals/washington_quarterly/v031/31.4.flournoy.html#f19) Put another way, the Pentagon risks its very relevance by continuing to spend more and more acquisition dollars for fewer and fewer systems. To take but three examples, the costs of the Army's "Future Combat Systems" family of armored vehicles have escalated 54 percent to $131 billion since its inception; the Air Force's F-22A Raptor tactical fighter unit costs have escalated 177 percent while the number to be purchased has decreased by 71 percent; and before the recent decision to cut the program, the Navy had underestimated the cost of its planned purchase of 10 advanced DDG-1000 [End Page 62] destroyers by 60 percent, from $17.4 billion to $28 billion.[20](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy-remote.galib.uga.edu:2048/journals/washington_quarterly/v031/31.4.flournoy.html#f20) The Defense Department cannot afford to continue hemorrhaging taxpayer dollars because of its broken acquisition system.

## Heg Dead – Dollar

### Hegemony has collapsed – Failing dollar proves

Hedges, 09 – Senior Fellow at the Nation Institute, Lecturer in the Council of the humanities, Anschutz Distinguished Fellow at Princeton University, 2002 Pulitzer Prize Winner, B.A. Colgate University, M.S. Harvard University (Chris, TruthDig, “The American Empire is Bankrupt,” June 14th, 2009, http://www.truthdig.com/report/page2/20090614\_the\_american\_empire\_is\_bankrupt/)

This week marks the end of the dollar’s reign as the world’s reserve currency. It marks the start of a terrible period of economic and political decline in the United States. And it signals the last gasp of the American imperium. That’s over. It is not coming back. And what is to come will be very, very painful.

Barack Obama, and the criminal class on Wall Street, aided by a corporate media that continues to peddle fatuous gossip and trash talk as news while we endure the greatest economic crisis in our history, may have fooled us, but the rest of the world knows we are bankrupt. And these nations are damned if they are going to continue to prop up an inflated dollar and sustain the massive federal budget deficits, swollen to over $2 trillion, which fund America’s imperial expansion in Eurasia and our system of casino capitalism. They have us by the throat. They are about to squeeze.

There are meetings being held Monday and Tuesday in Yekaterinburg, Russia, (formerly Sverdlovsk) among Chinese President Hu Jintao, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and other top officials of the six-nation Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The United States, which asked to attend, was denied admittance. Watch what happens there carefully. The gathering is, in the words of economist Michael Hudson, “the most important meeting of the 21st century so far.”

It is the first formal step by our major trading partners to replace the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. If they succeed, the dollar will dramatically plummet in value, the cost of imports, including oil, will skyrocket, interest rates will climb and jobs will hemorrhage at a rate that will make the last few months look like boom times. State and federal services will be reduced or shut down for lack of funds. The United States will begin to resemble the Weimar Republic or Zimbabwe. Obama, endowed by many with the qualities of a savior, will suddenly look pitiful, inept and weak. And the rage that has kindled a handful of shootings and hate crimes in the past few weeks will engulf vast segments of a disenfranchised and bewildered working and middle class. The people of this class will demand vengeance, radical change, order and moral renewal, which an array of proto-fascists, from the Christian right to the goons who disseminate hate talk on Fox News, will assure the country they will impose.

### The U.S. no longer has a lead in competitiveness – countries are not investing in the dollar.

Hudson, 09 – President of the Institute for the Study of Long-Term Economic Trends, Wall Street Financial Analyst, Distinguished Research Professor at the University of Missouri, Kansas City (Michael, Global Research, “De-Dollarization: Dismantling America’s Financial-Military Empire,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=13969)

For starters, the six SCO countries and BRIC countries intend to trade in their own currencies so as to get the benefit of mutual credit that the United States until now has monopolized for itself. Toward this end, China has struck bilateral deals with Argentina and Brazil to denominate their trade in renminbi rather than the dollar, sterling or euros,3 and two weeks ago China reached an agreement with Malaysia to denominate trade between the two countries in renminbi.[4] Former Prime Minister Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad explained to me in January that as a Muslim country, Malaysia wants to avoid doing anything that would facilitate US military action against Islamic countries, including Palestine. The nation has too many dollar assets as it is, his colleagues explained. Central bank governor Zhou Xiaochuan of the People's Bank of China wrote an official statement on its website that the goal is now to create a reserve currency “that is disconnected from individual nations.”5 This is the aim of the discussions in Yekaterinburg.

## Heg Dead – Dollar

### The Unipolar era is over – De-dollarization

Hudson, 09 – President of the Institute for the Study of Long-Term Economic Trends, Wall Street Financial Analyst, Distinguished Research Professor at the University of Missouri, Kansas City (Michael, Global Research, “De-Dollarization: Dismantling America’s Financial-Military Empire,” http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=13969)

An era therefore is coming to an end. In the face of continued US overspending, de-dollarization threatens to force countries to return to the kind of dual exchange rates common between World Wars I and II: one exchange rate for commodity trade, another for capital movements and investments, at least from dollar-area economies.

Even without capital controls, the nations meeting at Yekaterinburg are taking steps to avoid being the unwilling recipients of yet more dollars. Seeing that US global hegemony cannot continue without spending power that they themselves supply, governments are attempting to hasten what Chalmers Johnson has called “the sorrows of empire” in his book by that name – the bankruptcy of the US financial-military world order. If China, Russia and their non-aligned allies have their way, the United States will no longer live off the savings of others (in the form of its own recycled dollars) nor have the money for unlimited military expenditures and adventures. US officials wanted to attend the Yekaterinburg meeting as observers. They were told No. It is a word that Americans will hear much more in the future.

## Heg Dead – Military Weakness

### Hegemony is dead – overambitious military goals and economic weakness

Pape, 9 – Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago

(Robert, National Interest Online, “Empire Falls,” January 22nd, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=20484)

AMERICA IS in unprecedented decline. The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War, growing government debt, increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today’s world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. If present trends continue, we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony.

Since the cold war, the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments, seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood—the Americas—but also in Europe and Asia, along with the oil-rich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources, but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo. The Bush administration has not just continued America’s traditional grand strategy, but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time—waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America’s military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia itself.

For nearly two decades, those convinced of U.S. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others, virtually discounting the possibility that Germany, France, Russia, China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power. From public intellectuals like Charles Krauthammer and Niall Ferguson to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Kagan, even to academicians like Dartmouth’s William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks, all believe the principal feature of the post-cold-war world is the unchallengeable dominance of American power. The United States is not just the sole superpower in the unipolar-dominance school’s world, but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to American interests. This is simply no longer realistic.

For the past eight years, our policies have been based on these flawed arguments, while the ultimate foundation of American power—the relative superiority of the U.S. economy in the world—has been in decline since early on in the Bush administration. There is also good reason to think that, without deliberate action, the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time. To be sure, the period of U.S. relative decline has been, thus far, fairly short. A healthy appreciation of our situation by American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate, if not rectify, further decline in the foreseeable future. Still, America’s shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U.S. grand strategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America’s global position from accelerating.

Although the immediate problems of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda’s new sanctuary in western Pakistan, Iran’s continued nuclear program and Russia’s recent military adventure in Georgia are high-priority issues, solutions to each of them individually and all of them collectively will be heavily influenced by America’s reduced power position in the world. Most important, America’s declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end, that major powers will increasingly have the strength to balance against U.S. policies they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreign-policy choices. Like so many great powers that have come and gone before, our own hubris may be our downfall.

## Heg Unsustainable – 1NC

### Heg will inevitably collapse – attempting to hold on makes the decline worse

Pape 09 professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago (Robert, Empire Falls, National Interest, 1/22)

Clearly, major shifts in the balance of power in the international system often lead to instability and conflict. And America’s current predicament is far more severe. This time, our relative decline of 32 percent is accompanied, not by an even-steeper decline of our near-peer competitor, but rather by a 144 percent increase in China’s relative position. Further, the rapid spread of technology and technological breakthroughs means that one great discovery does not buoy an already-strong state to decades-long predominance. And with a rising China—with raw resources of population, landmass and increasing adoption of leading technology—a true peer competitor is looming. America’s current, rapid domestic economic decline is merely accelerating our own downfall. The distinct quality of a system with only one superpower is that no other single state is powerful enough to balance against it. A true global hegemon is more powerful still—stronger than all second-ranked powers acting as members of a counterbalancing coalition seeking to contain the unipolar leader. By these standards, America’s relative decline is fundamentally changing international politics, and is fundamentally different from Russia circa 1850 and Great Britain circa 1910. In current-U.S.-dollar terms—the preferred measure of the unipolar-dominance school—the United States has already fallen far from being a global hegemon and unipolarity itself is waning, since China will soon have as much economic potential to balance the United States as did the Soviet Union during the cold war. At the beginning of the 1990s, the United States was indeed not only stronger than any other state individually, but its power relative to even the collective power of all other major states combined grew from 1990 to 2000. Although the growth was small, America almost reached the crucial threshold of 50 percent of major-power product necessary to become a true global hegemon. So it is understandable that we were lulled into a sense of security, believing we could do as we wished, whenever and wherever we wished. The instability and danger of the cold war quickly became a distant memory. Near the time of the Iraq War, it would have required virtually every major power to actively oppose the United States in order to assemble a counterbalancing coalition that could approximate America’s potential power. Under the circumstances, hard, military balancing against the United States was not a serious possibility. So, it is not surprising that major powers opted for soft-balancing measures—relying on institutional, economic and diplomatic tools to oppose American military power. And yet we are beginning to see “the conflict of history” repeat itself. Even with less relative power, in the run-up to the Iraq War, people grossly underrated the ability of Germany, France, Russia and China, along with important regional powers like Turkey, to soft balance against the United States; for instance, to use the United Nations to delay, complicate and ultimately deny the use of one-third of U.S. combat power (the Fourth Infantry Division) in the opening months of the Iraq War. This is not yet great-power war of the kind seen in centuries past, but it harkens the instability that future unilateral efforts may trigger. The balance of world power circa 2008 and 2013 shows a disturbing trend. True, the United States remains stronger than any other state individually, but its power to stand up to the collective opposition of other major powers is falling precipitously. Though these worlds depict potential power, not active counterbalancing coalitions, and this type of alliance may never form, nonetheless, American relative power is declining to the point where even subsets of major powers acting in concert could produce sufficient military power to stand a reasonable chance of successfully opposing American military policies. Indeed, if present trends continue to 2013 and beyond, China and Russia, along with any one of the other major powers, would have sufficient economic capacity to mount military opposition at least as serious as did the Soviet Union during the cold war. And it is worth remembering that the Soviet Union never had more than about half the world product of the United States, which China alone is likely to reach in the coming decade. The faults in the arguments of the unipolar-dominance school are being brought into sharp relief. The world is slowly coming into balance. Whether or not this will be another period of great-power transition coupled with an increasing risk of war will largely depend on how America can navigate its decline. Policy makers must act responsibly in this new era or risk international opposition that poses far greater costs and far greater dangers.   A COHERENT grand strategy seeks to balance a state’s economic resources and its foreign-policy commitments and to sustain that balance over time. For America, a coherent grand strategy also calls for rectifying the current imbalance between our means and our ends, adopting policies that enhance the former and modify the latter. Clearly, the United States is not the first great power to suffer long-term decline—we should learn from history. Great powers in decline seem to almost instinctively spend more on military forces in order to shore up their disintegrating strategic positions, and some like Germany go even further, shoring up their security by adopting preventive military strategies, beyond defensive alliances, to actively stop a rising competitor from becoming dominant. For declining great powers, the allure of preventive war—or lesser measures to “merely” firmly contain a rising power—has a more compelling logic than many might assume. Since Thucydides, scholars of international politics have famously argued that a declining hegemon and rising challenger must necessarily face such intense security competition that hegemonic war to retain dominance over the international system is almost a foregone conclusion. Robert Gilpin, one of the deans of realism who taught for decades at Princeton, believed that “the first and most attractive response to a society’s decline is to eliminate the source of the problem . . . [by] what we shall call a hegemonic war.” Yet, waging war just to keep another state down has turned out to be one of the great losing strategies in history. The Napoleonic Wars, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War, German aggression in World War I, and German and Japanese aggression in World War II were all driven by declining powers seeking to use war to improve their future security. All lost control of events they thought they could control. All suffered ugly defeats. All were worse-off than had they not attacked. As China rises, America must avoid this great-power trap. It would be easy to think that greater American military efforts could offset the consequences of China’s increasing power and possibly even lead to the formation of a multilateral strategy to contain China in the future. Indeed, when China’s economic star began to rise in the 1990s, numerous voices called for precisely this, noting that on current trajectories China would overtake the United States as the world’s leading economic power by 2050.8 Now, as that date draws nearer—indeed, current-dollar calculations put the crossover point closer to 2040—and with Beijing evermore dependent on imported oil for continued economic growth, one might think the case for actively containing China is all the stronger. Absent provocative military adventures by Beijing, however, U.S. military efforts to contain the rising power are most likely doomed to failure. China’s growth turns mainly on domestic issues—such as shifting the workforce from rural to urban areas—that are beyond the ability of outside powers to significantly influence. Although China’s growth also depends on external sources of oil, there is no way to exploit this vulnerability short of obviously hostile alliances (with India, Indonesia, Taiwan and Japan) and clearly aggressive military measures (controlling the sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf to Asia) that together could deny oil to China. Any efforts along these lines would likely backfire—and only exacerbate America’s problems, increasing the risk of counterbalancing. Even more insidious is the risk of overstretch. This self-reinforcing spiral escalates current spending to maintain increasingly costly military commitments, crowding out productive investment for future growth. Today, the cold-war framework of significant troop deployments to Europe, Asia and the Persian Gulf is coming unglued. We cannot afford to keep our previous promises. With American forces bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and mounting troubles in Iran and Pakistan, the United States has all but gutted its military commitments to Europe, reducing our troop levels far below the one hundred thousand of the 1990s. Nearly half have been shifted to Iraq and elsewhere. Little wonder that Russia found an opportunity to demonstrate the hollowness of the Bush administration’s plan for expanding NATO to Russia’s borders by scoring a quick and decisive military victory over Georgia that America was helpless to prevent. If a large-scale conventional war between China and Taiwan broke out in the near future, one must wonder whether America would significantly shift air and naval power away from its ongoing wars in the Middle East in order to live up to its global commitments. If the United States could not readily manage wars in Iraq and Afghanistan at the same time, could it really wage a protracted struggle in Asia as well? And as the gap between America’s productive resources and global commitments grows, why will others pass up opportunities to take advantage of America’s overstretched grand strategy? Since the end of the cold war, American leaders have consistently claimed the ability to maintain a significant forward-leaning military presence in the three major regions of the globe and, if necessary, to wage two major regional wars at the same time. The harsh reality is that the United States no longer has the economic capacity for such an ambitious grand strategy. With 30 percent of the world’s product, the United States could imagine maintaining this hope. Nearing 20 percent, it cannot. Yet, just withdrawing American troops from Iraq is not enough to put America’s grand strategy into balance. Even assuming a fairly quick and problem-free drawdown, the risks of instability in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region are likely to remain for many years to come. Further, even under the most optimistic scenarios, America is likely to remain dependent on imported oil for decades. Together, these factors point toward the Persian Gulf remaining the most important region in American grand strategy. So, as Europe and Asia continue to be low-order priorities, Washington must think creatively and look for opportunities to make strategic trades. America needs to share the burden of regional security with its allies and continue to draw down our troop levels in Europe and Asia, even considering the attendant risks. The days when the United States could effectively solve the security problems of its allies in these regions almost on its own are coming to an end. True, spreading defense burdens more equally will not be easy and will be fraught with its own costs and risks. However, this is simply part of the price of America’s declining relative power. The key principle is for America to gain international support among regional powers like Russia and China for its vital national-security objectives by adjusting less important U.S. policies. For instance, Russia may well do more to discourage Iran’s nuclear program in return for less U.S. pressure to expand NATO to its borders. And of course America needs to develop a plan to reinvigorate the competitiveness of its economy. Recently, Harvard’s Michael Porter issued an economic blueprint to renew America’s environment for innovation. The heart of his plan is to remove the obstacles to increasing investment in science and technology. A combination of targeted tax, fiscal and education policies to stimulate more productive investment over the long haul is a sensible domestic component to America’s new grand strategy. But it would be misguided to assume that the United States could easily regain its previously dominant economic position, since the world will likely remain globally competitive. To justify postponing this restructuring of its grand strategy, America would need a firm expectation of high rates of economic growth over the next several years. There is no sign of such a burst on the horizon. Misguided efforts to extract more security from a declining economic base only divert potential resources from investment in the economy, trapping the state in an ever-worsening strategic dilemma. This approach has done little for great powers in the past, and America will likely be no exception when it comes to the inevitable costs of desperate policy making. The United States is not just declining. Unipolarity is becoming obsolete**,** other states are rising to counter American power and the United States is losing much of its strategic freedom. Washington must adopt more realistic foreign commitments.

## Ext. Heg Unsustainable

### Heg is unsustainable – stats prove

Pape 09 professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago (Robert, Empire Falls, National Interest, 1/22)

THE EROSION of the underpinnings of U.S. power is the result of uneven rates of economic growth between America, China and other states in the world. Despite all the pro-economy talk from the Bush administration, the fact is that since 2000, U.S. growth rates are down almost 50 percent from the Clinton years. This trajectory is almost sure to be revised further downward as the consequences of the financial crisis in fall 2008 become manifest. As Table 3 shows, over the past two decades, the average rate of U.S. growth has fallen considerably, from nearly 4 percent annually during the Clinton years to just over 2 percent per year under Bush. At the same time, China has sustained a consistently high rate of growth of 10 percent per year—a truly stunning performance. Russia has also turned its economic trajectory around, from year after year of losses in the 1990s to significant annual gains since 2000. Worse, America’s decline was well under way before the economic downturn, which is likely to only further weaken U.S. power. As the most recent growth estimates (November 2008) by the IMF make clear, although all major countries are suffering economically, China and Russia are expected to continue growing at a substantially greater rate than the United States. True, the United States has not lost its position as the most innovative country in the world, with more patents each year than in all other countries combined. However, the ability to diffuse new technology—to turn chalkboard ideas into mass-produced applications—has been spreading rapidly across many parts of the globe, and with it the ultimate sources of state power—productive capacities. America is losing its overwhelming technological dominance in the leading industries of the knowledge economy. In past eras—the “age of iron” and the “age of steel”—leading states retained their technological advantages for many decades.4 As Fareed Zakaria describes in his recent book, The Post-American World, technology and knowledge diffuse more quickly today, and their rapid global diffusion is a profound factor driving down America’s power compared to other countries. For instance, although the United States remains well ahead of China on many indicators of leading technology on a per capita basis, this grossly under-weights the size of the knowledge economy in China compared to America. Whereas in 2000, the United States had three times the computer sales, five times the internet users and forty times the broadband subscribers as China, in 2008, the Chinese have caught or nearly caught up with Americans in every category in the aggregate.5 The fact that the United States remains ahead of China on a per capita basis does matter—it means that China, with more than four times the U.S. population, can create many more knowledge workers in the future. So, how much is U.S. decline due to the global diffusion of technology, U.S. economic weaknesses under Bush or China’s superior economic performance? Although precise answers are not possible, one can gain a rough weighting of the factors behind America’s shrinking share of world production by asking a few simple counterfactual questions of the data. What would happen if we assumed that the United States grew during the Bush years at the same rate as during Clinton’s? What would have happened had the world continued on its same trajectory, but we assume China did not grow at such an astounding rate? Of course, these are merely thought experiments, which leave out all manner of technical problems like “interaction effects.” Still, these back-of-the-envelope approximations serve as useful starting points. The answers are pretty straightforward. Had the American economy grown at the (Clinton) rate of 3.7 percent per year from 2000 to 2008 instead of the (Bush) rate of 2.2 percent, the United States would have had a bigger economy in absolute terms and would have lost less power relative to others. Assuming the rest of the world continued at its actual rate of growth, America’s share of world product in 2008 would h;ave risen to 25.2 percent instead of its actual 23.1 percent.6 When compared to the share of gross world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008—7.7 percent—the assumed marginal gain of 2.1 percent of world product amounts to some 27 percent of the U.S. decline. How much does China matter? Imagine the extreme case—that China had not grown, and the United States and the rest of the world continued along their actual path of economic growth since 2000. If so, America’s share of world product in 2008 would be 24.3 percent, or 1.2 percent more than today. When compared to the share of world product lost by the United States from 2000 to 2008—7.7 percent—the assumed marginal gain of 1.2 percent of world product accounts for about 15 percent of the U.S. decline. These estimates suggest that roughly a quarter of America’s relative decline is due to U.S. economic weaknesses (spending on the Iraq War, tax cuts, current-account deficits, etc.), a sixth to China’s superior performance and just over half to the spread of technology to the rest of the world. In other words, self-inflicted wounds of the Bush years significantly exacerbated America’s decline, both by making the decline steeper and faster and crowding out productive investment that could have stimulated innovation to improve matters. All of this has led to one of the most significant declines of any state since the mid-nineteenth century. And when one examines past declines and their consequences, it becomes clear both that the U.S. fall is remarkable and that dangerous instability in the international system may lie ahead. If we end up believing in the wishful thinking of unipolar dominance forever, the costs could be far higher than a simple percentage drop in share of world product.   THE UNITED States has always prided itself on exceptionalism, and the U.S. downfall is indeed extraordinary. Something fundamental has changed. America’s relative decline since 2000 of some 30 percent represents a far greater loss of relative power in a shorter time than any power shift among European great powers from roughly the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War II. It is one of the largest relative declines in modern history. Indeed, in size, it is clearly surpassed by only one other great-power decline, the unexpected internal collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991