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# 1NC SHELL

1. **UNIQUENESS**

**U.S. HARD POWER IS AT ITS PEAK**

**LIEBER Prof of Government @ GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY 2K10**

Robert-; TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 2010, 41.

**In the realm of "hard power," while the army and Marines have been stretched by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the fact is that no other country possesses anything like the capacity of the United States to project power around the globe. American military technology and sheer might remain unmatched -- no other country can compete in the arenas of land, sea, or air warfare.** China claims that it spends $45 billion annually on defense, but the truth comes closer to three times that figure. Still, **America's $625 billion defense budget dwarfs** even that. The latter amounts to just 4.2 percent of GDP. This contrasts with 6.6 percent at **the height of the Reagan buildup and double-digit percentages during the early and middle years of the Cold War.**

# 1NC SHELL

1. **LINK**

Military presence is CRITICAL to power-projection and hegemony – ALL potential crises require extended deployment of forces – empirically, operations without prolonged US military presence have been UTTER STRATEGIC FAILURES

Kagan and O’Hanlon 2k7 Frederick W. Kagan is a resident scholar at AEI. Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow and Sydney Stein Jr. Chair in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, 4/24/07, “The Case for Larger Ground Forces,” American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070424\_Kagan20070424.pdf

As we see, a quick review of some of the potential crises that might require the use of American military power turns up several that would demand the prolonged deployment of US forces as large as or larger than those currently in Iraq and Afghanistan, even on fairly optimistic assumptions. There are many other potential problems, including the challenges identified at the beginning of this section in Iran and North Korea. Iran, a country of nearly 70 million people, could well demand an American commitment of hundreds of thousands of soldiers in worst-case scenarios of regime collapse or regime change; force requirements of 200,000-300,000 are highly likely even in fairly optimistic scenarios for a war with Iran. The point of this assessment is not to advocate any particular approach to any of these problems. The solution would have to be tailored to fit the precise circumstances of each crisis. But this survey highlights the potential challenges ahead. At a bare minimum, these scenarios point toward a lasting floor lower than the current level of American ground forces in the future; however, for present planning, together with the ongoing strains of Iraq and Afghanistan, they argue for a larger force. In the past two decades, the majority of significant American combat operations have required the long-term deployment of US soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen long past the end of major combat. US forces remained in Panama after the 1989 operation there; they were in and around Iraq for 12 years after Operation Desert Storm; deployments continued in Bosnia for a decade after the Dayton Accords; forces were stationed in Kosovo after the 1999 attack on Slobodan Miloševi´c; and, of course, American troops have been in Afghanistan since 2001 and Iraq since 2003. The only two significant operations that did not see a prolonged post-conflict deployment were the debacle on Somalia in 1993 and the peaceful regime change in Haiti in 1994. Both were utter failures. Expanding the historical horizon only sharpens the point. Consider America’s major deployments in Germany and Japan after World War II, in Korea after 1953, and even in the former Confederate States after the Civil War. Protracted post-war deployments are more common than not, and often absolutely essential to success, especially in regime-change operations. Any responsible US national security policy must provide forces adequate to this challenge.

# 1NC SHELL

1. **IMPAX**

US Military decline leads to global wars, terrorism, and global economic collapse – a robust military is the KEY internal link to EVERY hotspot – there is NO alternative to United States hegemony that solves, ALL regional hegemonies have FAILED to ensure stability

Yetiv 2k9 Steve Yetiv is a professor of political science at Old Dominion University, Christian Science Monitor, October 27, 2009, “An American decline would undermine global security,” lexis

Norfolk, Va. The great recession, mounting debt, military burdens, overconsumption. From New York to Beijing to Paris, there is talk, sometimes jubilant in tone, that the United States is on the decline. Some have even said that it's about time. The truth is, if the US declines, who else could take on the tremendous world role? No one. Rather than jeering, the rest of the world should consider just how much the US does, and step up support for it. The security of the world is at stake. The US has played a critical role in the Persian Gulf since Britain withdrew in 1971. Without a regional protector, regional crises would cause oil prices to spike, creating economic shocks around the world. Indeed, the most serious oil shocks have come when US capability in the region was weak (consider the 1973 Arab oil embargo, the 1979 Iranian revolution, the 1980 eruption of the Iran-Iraq war). Washington's role is also critical for Middle East peace. Israel is very strong, but a strain of its national psyche remains massively insecure. If Israel were to perceive American weakness, it would compensate by refusing to make serious concessions for peace. In Asia, Washington helps preempt a dangerous arms race. Understandably, the US wants Japan to fund more of its own costly defense. A weakening America would likely cause Japan to increase defense spending well beyond its norm of 1 percent of gross domestic product. That could trigger a runaway Asian arms race that hurts world security. The world also benefits from the US-led fight against terrorism, the invasion of Iraq aside. America leads the world in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world. The US also works hard to fight nuclear proliferation. The United Nations Security Council does not want a nuclear-armed Iran. Nor do most countries in the region. If the Iran nuclear standoff ends peacefully, it will be in part because Iran fears sustained US-led pressure. US credibility and strength are crucial here, as they are in containing North Korea. Economically, Washington has promoted free trade. Since the 1947 Marshall Plan, America has run trade deficits and yielded economic benefits to others so as to bolster the global economy and stay trade wars – a critical role. Then there is the question of who will help ensure stability in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. Iran has claimed that it can protect the region, but many Arab countries and other nations don't trust it. And Arab countries have repeatedly failed to develop the military force to protect the region. Europeans currently lack the force projection and the will to do the job.

# UNIQUENESS DEBATE

**DESPITE SHORTCOMINGS, AMERICAN POWER WILL DOMINATE**

Our uniqueness evidence subsumes theirs 🡪 WE CONTROL UNIQUENESS

**SCHAKE research fellow Hoover Institution 2k9**

Kori-; MANAGING AMERICAN HEGEMONY, 2009, 3.

American success is, not surprisingly, resented by states and societies that have not found ways to preserve what they value. Societies with "better" but less popular attributes feel affronted that the accessibility of American society and culture has such broad appeal. The equation that makes the United States so successful is not difficult to discern, but difficult to put into practice, especially if societies clamor for the economic enrichment, innovation, and durable social peace of American society without wanting to endure its fractiousness, economic insecurity, and permeability. For these reasons, **despite the near-term shortcomings, American power is likely to dominate the international order for at least another half century.**

**UNITED STATES IS THE UNDISPUTED GLOBAL HEGEMON**

Few dispute the primacy of the U.S., even DOOMSAYERS concur with U.S. military might.

**CHIOZZA Prof of Political Science @ Vanderbilt University 2k9**

Giacomo-; ANTI-AMERICANISM AND THE AMERICAN WORLD ORDER, 2009, 32.

**Few** commentators, **if any, dispute the primacy of the United States in all the dimensions that define the power status of a country**: military, economic, political, and ideological. **Even the doomsayers predicting a rapid collapse of America's dominant position in the international state system concur that the United States towers over the world with its military might**, its economic wealth, its political influence, and its ideological appeal.

**WE CONTROL UNIQUENESS 🡪 NO EVIDENCE OF U.S. DECLINE**

**COONEY Prof of Political Science & International Relations @ Union U. 2k9**

Kevin-; THE RISE OF CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 2009, 50.

While many scholars may lament (or rejoice depending on one's perspective) in the seeming decline of American power, **there is no conclusive empirical evidence of American hegemonic decline. The only evidence of imminent American decline is anecdotal.** **Rather the empirical evidence would indicate that American power is still in overall ascendancy.** The American economy is currently the largest in the world (with the exception of the combined nations of the European Union). It is currently growing at 4.9 percent for the year 2007. This means that the American economy will grow by nearly $700 billion by 2007. China on the other hand is growing at the rate of 9-12 percent annually. Using the larger figure of 12 percent the Chinese economy will grow by $310 billion in 2007. Using an average growth rate of 4 percent for the United States and 10 percent for China, China will pass the United States in the year 2036. The major problem with this type of economic projection is that it is linear. The real world is not linear; there are economic ups and downs and constantly changing variables. Historically there has never been a correct 50 year linear projection of GDP for any nation.

# UNIQUENESS DEBATE (U.S. RELIANT ON MILITARY/HARD POWER)

**U.S. MAINTAINS A SUBSTANTIAL INVESTMENT IN MILITARY POWER**

The U.S. is in a league of its own representing ½ of the world’s total military spending.

**JOFFE Fellow in International Relations @ Hoover Institution 2k9**

Josef-; Stanford U.; FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sep/Oct 2009, 21-35.

The gaps become exorbitant **in the realm of military power**, where **the United States plays in a league of its own.** In 2008, it spent $607 billion on its military, **representing almost half of the world's total military spending.** The next nine states spent a total of $476 billion, and the presumptive challengers to U.S. military supremacy--China, India, Japan, and Russia--together devoted only $219 billion to their militaries. The military budget of China, the country most often touted as the world's next superpower, is less than one-seventh of the U.S. defense budget. **Even if one includes** among **potential U.S. adversaries** the 27 states of the EU, which together spend $288 billion on defense, **the United States still outweighs them all**--$607 billion compared to $507 billion.

**BANDOW Senior Fellow @ CATO INSTITUTE 2k10**

Doug-; BATTLING THE BIPARTISAN CONSENSUS FOR WAR, Mar. 15, 2010. Retrieved Apr. 5, 2010 from

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/battling-the-bipartisan-c\_b\_498681.html.

Another cost is financial. Direct military outlays this year will run over $700 billion. Iraq is ultimately likely cost $2 or $3 trillion. **Washington spends more on "defense,"** adjusted for inflation, **today than at any point during the Cold War, Korean War, and Vietnam War. The U.S. accounts for nearly half of the globe's military expenditures.**

**U.S. IS HEAVILY INVESTED IN DEFENSE/MILITARY SPENDING**

U.S. spends what the rest of the world spends on Defense COMBINED!

**RASHID Pakistani Journalist based in Lahore 2k8**

Ahmed-; DESCENT INTO CHAOS: THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAILURE OF NATION BUILDING IN PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA,

The wars after 9/11 gave the Pentagon even more power and money. In 2001 **the U.S. defense budget was** $293 billion--still **more than the aggregate budget of the next fifteen ranked countries in the world**, including all the European powers and China. In 2003 the defense budget reached $360 billion, and in 2006 it topped $427 billion, growing by a phenomenal 40 percent in the five years since 9/11. **In 2008 it reached $647 billion, by which time the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were expected to have cost more than $1 trillion. By now the U.S. defense budget was equivalent to what the entire rest of the world spent on defense.**

**U.S. DOMINATES THE GLOBE MILITARILY WITH HEAVY INVESTMENTS IN MILITARY SPENDING**

**BANDOW Senior Fellow @ CATO INSTITUTE 2k9**

Doug-; OVERSPENT AND OVEREXTENDED, Jan. 7, 2009. Retrieved Jan. 11, 2010 from www.cato.org.

**The U.S. dominates the globe militarily.** America's reach exceeds that of the Roman and British Empires at their respective heights. **The threats facing the U.S. pale compared to its capabilities.** So why is Washington spending so much on the military? The military budget is the price we pay for the nation's foreign policy. **The U.S. currently is spending nearly as much as the rest of the world. In real terms, Washington is spending more today than at any time during the Cold War, the Korean War, or the Vietnam War.**

# UNIQUENESS DEBATE (U.S. RELIANT ON MILITARY/HARD POWER)

**TALK OF HEGEMONIC SHIFT IS FALSE 🡪 U.S. MILITARY POWER IS ASCENDING**

**COONEY Prof. Political Science & International Relations @ Union University 2k9**

Kevin-; THE RISE OF CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, 2009, 38.

The **data would indicate that overall American military power** along with its economic power are not only not in decline, but rather that they **are still in ascendancy.** **The global discourse about** the "rise of China" (whether one views it positively or negatively) results in a false impression that **a hegemonic shift** is about to take place. It is not. This hegemonic shift argument **fails to account for the overall global political and economic context.**

**WE CONTROL UNIQUENESS 🡪 U.S. IS THE PREMIER MILITARY POWER**

**SCHAKE Research Fellow @ Hoover Institution 2k9**

Kori-; MANAGING AMERICAN HEGEMONY, 2009, 116-117.

By any conceivable measure, America is the world's premier military power. Whether the metric is spending, expeditionary capability, weapons technology, innovativeness, or caliber of personnel, the American military stacks up at least as well as any military in the world. Cumulatively, these advantages make it impossible that any country or organization could believe they could fight a conventional or nuclear war and defeat our military.

# UNIQUENESS DEBATE (U.S. HEGEMONY RESILIENT)

**ONLY the affirmative plan can cause a loss of American Hegemony**

Absent a CATASTROPHIC DISCONTINUITY, the world is STUCK with America as a hegemon for another forty or fifty years.

**SCHAKE Research Fellow @ HOOVER INSTITUTION 2k9**

Kori-; MANAGING AMERICAN HEGEMONY, 2009, 135.

If American advantages remain durable as globalization advances, we and the rest of **the world will be stuck with America as hegemon for another forty or fifty years.** It may not be what many states and societies want, but **absent a catastrophic discontinuity, the vectors of power will continue to deliver it.** **In fact, rather than becoming more like other states as we struggle to overcome our internal problems and other challengers rise, it may well be that America becomes more successful than, and more different from, other states.** The slope of the lines representing our power and that of other states may diverge further than at present, increasing our power relative to others.

**U.S. GLOBAL POWER IS INEVITABLE ABSENT THE AFFIRMATIVE**

U.S. RESILIENCY overcomes pessimistic analyses on present SETBACKS and DIFFICULTIES of the current administration. U.S. power is ENORMOUS and unlikely to be replaced by any other state.

**SCHAKE Research Fellow @ HOOVER INSTITUTION 2k9**

Kori-; MANAGING AMERICAN HEGEMONY, 2009, 135-136.

**Pessimistic analyses place too much weight on the present setbacks** in Iraq **and difficulties of the current administration.** **The fundamental strengths of American political culture and the American economy give us much greater resiliency than they credit.** **Other states and societies would have to be more resilient**, faster adapting, more magnetic, more capable along a wide range of political, cultural, economic, and social factors **than we are for the United States to decline.** It merits repeating that the United States came to dominate the international order as globalization advanced because the very things that make one successful domestically in America are the things that make one successful in the political, economic, and cultural milieu of a globalizing economy. **Our power is** so **enormous** because we dominate through attraction and innovation, and the elements of our power reinforce each other. **The time and transition costs are substantial for other states and societies to catch up, and their succeeding would require America's failing to adapt during prolonged competition, which is unlikely.**

**U.S. IS THE LARGEST SINGLE AGGREGATION OF MILITARY POWER**

**HAAS President of the Council on Foreign Relations 2k10**

Richard-; TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 2010, 27.

**In this world, the United States is and will long remain the largest single aggregation of power.** I**t spends more than $500 billion annually on its military -- and more than $700 billion if the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are included -- and boasts land, air, and naval forces that are the world's most capable.** Its economy, with a GDP of some $14 trillion, is the world's largest. The United States is also a major source of culture (through films and television), information, and innovation.

# LINK BOOSTER

**DESPITE PREDICITIONS, U.S. MILITARY POWER IS INEVITABLE**

Only chance of decreasing American power is a DECISION by the United States to DIMINISH its power and international influence VOLUNTARILY

**KAGAN Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2k7**

Robert-; *End of Dreams, Return of History: International Rivalry and American Leadership*; POLICY REVIEW; August/September; <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10>

These **American traditions, together with historical events beyond Americans’ control, have catapulted the United States to a position of pre-eminence in the world.** **Since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of this “unipolar” world, there has been much anticipation of the end of unipolarity and the rise of a multipolar world in which the United States is no longer the predominant power.** Not only realist theorists but others both inside and outside the United States have long argued the theoretical and practical unsustainability, not to mention undesirability, of a world with only one superpower. Mainstream realist theory has assumed that other powers must inevitably band together to balance against the superpower. Others expected the post-Cold War era to be characterized by the primacy of geoeconomics over geopolitics and foresaw a multipolar world with the economic giants of Europe, India, Japan, and China rivaling the United States. Finally, **in the wake of the Iraq War and with hostility to the United States**, as measured in public opinion polls, apparently **at an all-time high, there has been a widespread assumption that the American position in the world must finally be eroding.**

**Yet American predominance in the main categories of power persists** as a key feature of the international system. The enormous and productive American economy remains at the center of the international economic system. American democratic principles are shared by over a hundred nations. **The American military is not only the largest but the only one capable of projecting force into distant theaters.** **Chinese strategists**, who spend a great deal of time thinking about these things, **see the world not as multipolar but as characterized by “one superpower, many great powers,”** **and this configuration seems likely to persist into the future absent either a catastrophic blow to American power or a decision by the United States to diminish its power and international influence voluntarily.** [11](http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html" \l "n11)

# LINK BOOSTER

**ONLY THE AFFIRMATIVE WILL REVERSE U.S. MILITARY DOMINANCE**

Despite difficulties, the U.S. continues to EXPAND its power and military reach and shows NO SIGN of SLOWING this expansion, particularly in topic specific countries.

**KAGAN Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2k7**

Robert-; *End of Dreams, Return of History: International Rivalry and American Leadership*; POLICY REVIEW; August/September; <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10>

The world’s failure to balance against the superpower is the more striking because **the United States, notwithstanding its difficult interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, continues to expand its power and military reach and shows no sign of slowing this expansion** even after the 2008 elections. **The American defense budget has surpassed $500 billion per year, not including supplemental spending totaling over $100 billion on Iraq and Afghanistan. This level of spending is sustainable, moreover, both economically and politically.** [14](http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html" \l "n14) **As the American military budget rises, so does the number of overseas American military bases.** Since September 11, 2001, **the United States has built or expanded bases in Afghanistan**, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia; in Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in Europe; and in the Philippines, Djibouti, Oman, and Qatar. Two decades ago, **hostility to the American military presence** began forcing the United States out of the Philippines and seemed to be undermining support for American bases in Japan. Today, the Philippines is rethinking that decision, and the furor **in Japan has subsided. In places like South Korea** and Germany, **it is American plans to reduce the U.S. military presence that stir controversy, not what one would expect if there was a widespread fear or hatred of overweening American power. Overall, there is no shortage of other countries willing to host U.S. forces, a good indication that much of the world continues to tolerate and even lend support to American geopolitical primacy if only as a protection against more worrying foes.** [15](http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html" \l "n15)

**Withdrawing before Afghanistan is stable will collapse U.S. global leadership**

BBC Worldwide Monitoring, January 11, 2010, Russian expert views prospects for relations with USA, Iran, Afghanistan in 2010, http://english.taand.com/index.php?mod=article&cat=News&article=544

At that time it will become clear whether the Afghanistan model of conciliation announced by Barack Obama in November 2009 is working. If the expansion of the military presence helps the stabilization situation, plans to start withdrawing troops in 2011 may be implemented. If this does not happen, then the American forces and NATO will find themselves in a desperate position - to leave Afghanistan without at least the appearance of success will mean a serious political defeat, which Washington cannot allow.

# Link/Impact – Withdrawal Bad

Withdrawal of US military presence makes the rise of global hostile rivals INVITABLE – this triggers EVERY scenario for nuclear escalation

Friedberg and Schoenfeld 2k8 Aaron Friedberg, a professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School. Gabriel Schoenfeld, senior editor of Commentary, is a visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, N.J., “The Dangers of a Diminished America,” Wall Street Journal, Ocbtober 21, 2008, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html>

Pressures to cut defense spending, and to dodge the cost of waging two wars, already intense before this crisis, are likely to mount. Despite the success of the surge, the war in Iraq remains deeply unpopular. Precipitous withdrawal -- attractive to a sizable swath of the electorate before the financial implosion -- might well become even more popular with annual war bills running in the hundreds of billions. Protectionist sentiments are sure to grow stronger as jobs disappear in the coming slowdown. Even before our current woes, calls to save jobs by restricting imports had begun to gather support among many Democrats and some Republicans. In a prolonged recession, gale-force winds of protectionism will blow. Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. Will this be possible in the future? Meanwhile, traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying. The threat from al Qaeda and Islamic terrorist affiliates has not been extinguished. Iran and North Korea are continuing on their bellicose paths, while Pakistan and Afghanistan are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. Russia's new militancy and China's seemingly relentless rise also give cause for concern. If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability. The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity. None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures. As for our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades of anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past dynamism, Japan faces similar challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical power. What does this all mean? There is no substitute for America on the world stage. The choice we have before us is between the potentially disastrous effects of disengagement and the stiff price tag of continued American leadership.

# IMPAX-HEG GOOD-“TRY OR DIE”

It is TRY OR DIE for the NEGATIVE – hegemony is the ONLY way to solve global problems like disease, the environment, the global economy, and global wars – it is effective EVEN IF other countries backlash and balance against it

Gray 2k9 Colin, Reading University International Politics and Strategic Studies Professor, Former Advisor to US and British Gov't, National Institute for Public Policy, January 2009, "After Iraq: The Search for a Sustainable National Security," http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB902.pdf

“Hegemony-light” is a policy, not a strategy. The main reason why the United States should endeavor to remain the hegemon is the need to play the dominant role in the endless struggle to support and advance a world order broadly conducive to America’s vital interests and friendly to American values, insofar as that proves feasible. In common with the slippery concept of security, order has many dimensions, including the political, the financial-economic, the environmental-ecological, and the military-strategic. In addition, world and regional order can be upset by the consequences of health crises (HIV-AIDS, most obviously), as the Spanish Flu pandemic of 1918- 19 demonstrated.104 Also, adverse climate change, uncontrolled population growth in developing countries, and increasing resource shortages—of water, food, and energy—can and most probably will incite disorder in all major dimensions of global affairs. The United States will not be equally dominant in all aspects of global order, but its policy, strategy, and actual behavior will be either regnant or at least a major player in each of those dimensions. This is what it means to be hegemonic. The world needs leadership from some sufficient source. Although U.S. policy on global issues is often resisted, sometimes effectively, Americans nonetheless are able to help shape the global agenda and generally can exercise a potent influence on the world community’s actions. Washington frequently is annoyed and frustrated by the unwillingness of others to be led by U.S. policy choices. But Americans would be far more frustrated were they either to seek to abandon the hegemonic leadership role altogether, or to resign themselves to functioning within the straitjacket of near unanimous multilateral consent. Not much would be attempted, let alone achieved, on behalf of regional and global order. American hegemonic leadership does not mean American domination. America may be dominant, indeed it will need to be dominant in its ability to persuade, bribe, and, if necessary, coerce.

# IMPACT-HEG GOOD-TURNS THE CASE

**U.S. PREDOMINANCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS KEY TO STABILITY**

**KAGAN Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2k7**

Robert-; *End of Dreams, Return of History: International Rivalry and American Leadership*; POLICY REVIEW; August/September; <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10>

**It is** also **optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there.** **The vital interest the United States has** in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia **make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out.** Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with **the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground.**

**The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries.** **The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn ’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition**, **which** neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor **an immediate American withdrawal** from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region **is not balance and peace.** **It is further competition.** The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. **A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests.** [18](http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html" \l "n18)**And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum.** It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An **American withdrawal** from Iraq **will not return** things to “normal” or to **a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again.**

# Impact – Heg Good – Khalilzad (Long)

**US withdrawal and hegemonic decline causes AGGRESSIVE expansionism by other powers, RAMPANT proliferation of WMDs, and the ERUPTION of every global hotspot culminating in a global nuclear war**

Khalilzad 95 Zalmay, director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program at RAND & former US Ambassador to Afghanistan, "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War," Washington Quarterly, Spring 1995, lexis

What might happen to the world if the United States turned inward? Without the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), rather than cooperating with each other, the West European nations might compete with each other for domination of East-Central Europe and the Middle East. In Western and Central Europe, Germany -- especially since unification -- would be the natural leading power. Either in cooperation or competition with Russia, Germany might seek influence over the territories located between them. German efforts are likely to be aimed at filling the vacuum, stabilizing the region, and precluding its domination by rival powers. Britain and France fear such a development. Given the strength of democracy in Germany and its preoccupation with absorbing the former East Germany, European concerns about Germany appear exaggerated. But it would be a mistake to assume that U.S. withdrawal could not, in the long run, result in the renationalization of Germany's security policy. The same is also true of Japan. Given a U.S. withdrawal from the world, Japan would have to look after its own security and build up its military capabilities. China, Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia already fear Japanese hegemony. Without U.S. protection, Japan is likely to increase its military capability dramatically --to balance the growing Chinese forces and still-significant Russian forces. This could result in arms races, including the possible acquisition by Japan of nuclear weapons. Given Japanese technological prowess, to say nothing of the plutonium stockpile Japan has acquired in the development of its nuclear power industry, it could obviously become a nuclear weapon state relatively quickly, if it should so decide. It could also build long-range missiles and carrier task forces. With the shifting balance of power among Japan, China, Russia, and potential new regional powers such as India, Indonesia, and a united Korea could come significant risks of preventive or proeruptive war. Similarly, European competition for regional dominance could lead to major wars in Europe or East Asia. If the United States stayed out of such a war -- an unlikely prospect -- Europe or East Asia could become dominated by a hostile power. Such a development would threaten U.S. interests. A power that achieved such dominance would seek to exclude the United States from the area and threaten its interests-economic and political -- in the region. Besides, with the domination of Europe or East Asia, such a power might seek global hegemony and the United States would face another global Cold War and the risk of a world war even more catastrophic than the last.In the Persian Gulf, U.S. withdrawal is likely to lead to an intensified struggle for regional domination. 9 Hegemony over the Persian Gulf by either Iran or Iraq would bring the rest of the Arab Middle East under its influence and domination because of the shift in the balance of power. Israeli security problems would multiply and the peace process would be fundamentally undermined, increasing the risk of war between the Arabs and the Israelis.<continued…> The extension of instability, conflict, and hostile hegemony in East Asia, Europe, and the Persian Gulf would harm the economy of the United States even in the unlikely event that it was able to avoid involvement in major wars and conflicts. Higher oil prices would reduce the U.S. standard of living. Turmoil in Asia and Europe would force major economic readjustment in the United States, perhaps reducing U.S. exports and imports and jeopardizing U.S. investments in these regions. Given that total imports and exports are equal to a quarter of U.S. gross domestic product, the cost of necessary adjustments might be high. The higher level of turmoil in the world would also increase the likelihood of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means for their delivery. Already several rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are seeking nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. That danger would only increase if the United States withdrew from the world.The result would be a much more dangerous world in which many states possessed WMD capabilities; the likelihood of their actual use would increase accordingly. If this happened, the security of every nation in the world, including the United States, would be harmed. Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

# Impact – Heg Good – Lewis

Opposition to US Hegemony overlooks the fact that the American superpower is the ONLY force that has kept the nuclear era from going HOT, promoted UNPRECEDENTED global prosperity, and checked the spread of tyrannies in EVERY region of the globe – absence of great power wars for the last 70 YEARS empirically proves

Lewis 2k9 [James Lewis](http://www.americanthinker.com/james_lewis/), September 24, 2009, The American Thinker, “The blessings of Pax Americana, the good cop,” <http://www.americanthinker.com/2009/09/the_blessings_of_pax_americana.html>

That is the origin of Pax Americana, which has kept the peace in most of the world most of the time since 1946. Obama doesn't believe it. He is a victim of revisionist Leftists, who deliberately twist the plain and obvious facts. So Obama is historically (and therefore morally) wrong. You can't get it right if you flip the facts. We keep forgetting the most vital lessons of history. A big one is that you need a Good Cop to keep the peace. That's why we have cops on our streets. We trust them, because they are generally admirable and trustworthy. There is no international police force we can trust. What we have instead is a "superpower" -- the US -- which is supported, when push comes to shove, by all the other countries that know they can only thrive in a stable world. Obama doesn't get this, even though it's obvious. Obama believes he has a higher calling. He believes the Cold War was a result of American aggression. That is false and deluded. Guess who's amazingly naive today? After this White House gets done fixing the best health care system in the world, along with phony global warming, they are going to solve the problem of world peace once and forever. It's not comforting to have a president in charge who has absolutely no concept of history; who has in fact flipped it all upside-down. Hitler would have used nukes simply for the blood and glory, and so might Ahmadinejad today. We don't know what he is going to do when he gets a bomb, but judging by the hundreds of peaceful protesters he just had killed, raped, and tortured, who is going to gamble on the answer? I sure hope the Israelis don't. I hope the US does not, but Obama's abject bowing to medieval tyrants makes it more likely for aggressors to gamble on war. I wouldn't place a bet on the peaceful intentions of that gruesome little freak in Tehran. Can you see Obama shaking hands with A'jad after all the bloody massacres in Tehran? He would do it, too, if he didn't think we were watching. For sixty centuries most human beings have been willing to trade their freedom to buy even a little security. That's the only choice they had. The Romans seemed to be relatively good cops as long as you let them rule. That is why the Roman Empire became the ideal for Europe to this very day. Compared to the Saracens and the Huns, even European princes were relatively good cops. The British Empire was a good cop compared to the alternatives, including the indigenous Maharajas and Sultans of the Empire. The American Non-Empire --- what kind of "empire" is this, anyway? --- is far and away the best cop in world history, bringing the longest period of world peace (since 1948), the widest spread of freedom and democracy, the freest economies ever known, and as a direct result, the greatest world-wide prosperity from China to Brazil. Yes, we've seen horrific tyrannies and wars since 1948 --- but they have been local. No repeat of the Thirty Year War, of the Napoleonic mass wars, 1848, 1878, 1914, 1932, and in spite of decades of Cold War, no imperial expansion by Stalin and Mao Zedong. The Cold War stayed cold, a damned good thing. The Europeans have turned their armies into welfare programs. We were invited to rescue them when the Balkans blew up during the Clinton years. The Middle East is always on a low boil, but it never blows up. (So far.) The same goes for Asia. Koreans still hate Japan because of the horrific actions of the Japanese armies in World War Two. So do the Chinese. But they haven't come to blows. They understand that they are benefiting from the Good Cop of Pax Americana. Just let the US Navy withdraw from Asia and watch the Japanese getting a nuclear bomb, the Chinese invading Taiwan, and a new age of armed alliances emerging. Democratic governance only spread in Asia after the US victory over Japan. Before that it was tried by Sun Yat Sen and failed. Who would you like to be guarding the world instead of the United States? The UN? China or Russia? Europe? Well, let them call the UN Human Rights Commission the next time they have a problem. (That would be Iran, the Sudan, and Libya.)  For sixty years the troubles have been kept local and regional. That is an unprecedented achievement for the United States. Those facts are all around us.  Everybody knows it -- our allies, fake allies, enemies and friends. It's hard to tell who's who, but every time they get a choice between American leadership and anything else, they choose us. Then they go home and bitch about it. It's either Pax Americana, nuclear war, or tyranny.

# IMPACT-HEG GOOD-KAGAN

**U.S. HEGEMONY KEY TO CHECKING NATIONAL RIVALRIES THAT COULD GO NUCLEAR**

If the U.S. were to DIMINISH its power in regions of influence, nations would settle disputes either diplomatically but OFTEN through CONFLICT and WAR. It is DANGEROUS to UNDERESTIMATE the STABILITY provided by U.S. Hegemony

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Finally, there is the United States itself. **As a matter of national policy stretching back across numerous administrations, Democratic and Republican, liberal and conservative, Americans have insisted on preserving regional predominance** in East Asia; the Middle East; the Western Hemisphere; until recently, Europe; and now, increasingly, Central Asia. This was its goal after the Second World War, and **since the end of the Cold War**, beginning with the first Bush administration and continuing through the Clinton years, **the United States did not retract but expanded its influence** eastward across Europe and into the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. **Even as it maintains its position as the predominant global power, it is also engaged in hegemonic competitions** in these regions with China in East and Central Asia, with Iran in the Middle East and Central Asia, and with Russia in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. **The United States, too, is more of a traditional than a postmodern power, and though Americans are loath to acknowledge it, they generally prefer their global place as “No. 1” and are equally loath to relinquish it. Once having entered a region, whether for practical or idealistic reasons, they are remarkably slow to withdraw from it until they believe they have substantially transformed it in their own image.** They profess indifference to the world and claim they just want to be left alone even as they seek daily to shape the behavior of billions of people around the globe.

**The jostling for status and influence among** these **ambitious nations and would-be nations is a** second **defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying —  its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.**

**It is** easy but also **dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability.** For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. **Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian** of the waterways. **In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not.** Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible.

Such **order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power.** Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.

# A2: Heg Bad

**EVEN IF they win that a world without hegemony is good, they STILL lose – the TRANSITION to get to a world absent US hegemony would mean MASSIVE transition wars across the globe**

Brzezinski 2k5 Zbigniew was the National Security Advisor for the Carter Administration and former Professor of Foreign Policy at Johns Hopkins University, 2005, “The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership”

History is a record of change, a reminder that nothing endures indefinitely. It can also remind us, however. That some things endure for a long time, and when they disappear, the status quo ante does not reappear. So it will be with the current American global preponderance. It, too, will fade at some point, probably later than some wish and earlier than many Americans take for granted. The key question is: What will replace it? An abrupt termination of American hegemony would without doubt precipitate global chaos, in which international anarchy would be punctuated by eruptions of truly massive destructiveness. An unguided progressive decline would have a similar effect, spread out over a long time. But a gradual and controlled devolution of power could lead to an increasingly formalized global community of shared interest, with supranational arrangements increasingly assuming some of the special security roles of traditional nation-states. In any case the eventual end of American Hegemony will not involve a restoration of multipolarity among the familiar major powers that dominated world affairs for the last two centuries. Nor will it yield to another dominant hegemony that would displace the United States by assuming a similar political, military, economic, technological, and sociocultural worldwide preeminence. The familiar powers of the last century are too fatigued or too weak to assume the role the United States now plays. It is noteworthy that since 1880, in a comparative ranking of world powers (cumulatively based on their economic strength, military budgets and assets, populations, etc.), the top five slots at sequential twenty-year intervals have been shared by just seven states: the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Russia, Japan, and China. Only in the United States, however, unambiguously earned inclusion among the top five in every one of the twenty-year intervals, and the gap in the year 200 between the top-ranked United States and the rest was vastly wider than ever before. The former major European powers––Great Britain, Germany and France––are too weak to step into the breach. In the next two decades, it is quite unlikely that the European Union will become sufficiently united politically to muster the popular will to compete with the United States in the politico––military arena. Russia is no longer an imperial power, and its central challenge is to recover socioeconomically lest it lose its far eastern territories to China. Japan’s population is aging and its economy has slowed; the conventional wisdom of the 1980s that Japan is destined to be the next “superstate” now has the ring of historical irony. China, even if it succeeds in maintaining high rates of economic growth and retains its internal political stability (both are far from certain), will at best be a regional power still constrained by an impoverished population, antiquated infrastructure, and limited appeal worldwide. The same is true of India, which additionally faces uncertainties regarding its long-term national unity. Even a coalition among the above––a most unlikely prospect, given their historical conflicts and clashing territorial claims–would lack the cohesion, muscle, and energy needed to push both America off its pedestal and sustain global stability. Some leading states, in any case, would side with America if push came to shove. Indeed, any evident American decline might precipitate efforts to reinforce America’s leadership. Most important, the shared resentment of American hegemony would not dampen the clashes of interest among states. The more intense collisions––in the event of America’s decline––could spark a wildfire of regional violence, rendered all the more dangerous by the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction. The bottom line is twofold: For the next two decades, the steadying effect of American power will be indispensable to global stability, while the principal challenge to American power can come only from within––either from the repudiation of power by the American democracy itself, or from America’s global misuse of its own power.

# A2: Heg Bad

Those transition wars cause global wars culminating in extinction

Nye 90, Joseph, created the theory of “soft power,” Distinguished Service Prof and Dean, JFK School of Government, Harvard U; PhD in PoliSci, Harvard U; Asst Sec of Defense for Int’l Security Affairs; Chair, Nat’l Intelligence Council; Deputy Under Sec of State for Security Assistance (“Bound to Lead,” p. 17)

Perceptions of change in the relative power of nations are of critical importance to understanding the relationship between decline and war. One of the oldest generalizations about international politics attributes the onset of major wars to shifts in power among the leading nations. Thus Thucydides accounted for the onset of the Peloponnesian War which destroyed the power of ancient Athens. The history of the interstate system since 1500 is punctuated by severe wars in which one country struggled to surpass another as the leading state. If as Robert Gilpin argues, international politics has not changed fundamentally over the millennia,” the implications for the future are bleak. And if fears about shifting power precipitate[s] a major war in a world with 50,000 nuclear weapons, history as we know it may end.

# A2: HEGEMONY BAD

**OUR EVIDENCE SUBSUMES ALL THEIR OFFENSE – UNDER REALISM**

U.S. MUST maintain international power. DESPITE consequences, comparable to ANY PLAUSIBLE alternative in the REAL world, the unipolar system DECREASES the risk of WAR.

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Robert-; *End of Dreams, Return of History: International Rivalry and American Leadership*; POLICY REVIEW; August/September; <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10>

This is a good thing, and **it should continue to be a primary goal of American foreign policy to perpetuate this relatively benign international configuration of power.** **The unipolar order with the United States as the predominant power is unavoidably riddled with flaws and contradictions. It inspires fears and jealousies. The United States is not immune to error**, like all other nations, and because of its size and importance in the international system those errors are magnified and take on greater significance than the errors of less powerful nations. **Compared to the ideal Kantian international order**, in which all the world ’s powers would be peace-loving equals, conducting themselves wisely, prudently, and in strict obeisance to international law, **the unipolar system is both dangerous and unjust. Compared to any plausible alternative in the real world, however, it is relatively stable and less likely to produce a major war between great powers.** It is also comparatively benevolent, from a liberal perspective, for it is more conducive to the principles of economic and political liberalism that Americans and many others value.

**American predominance does not stand in the way of progress toward a better world**, therefore. **It stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world.** The choice is not between an American-dominated order and a world that looks like the European Union. The future international order will be shaped by those who have the power to shape it. The leaders of a post-American world will not meet in Brussels but in Beijing, Moscow, and Washington.

**CRITICS OF U.S. PREDOMINANCE ARE FLAWED**

Critics SUCCUMB to a basic logical fallacy that ignores how the current international order has been set by the distribution of power since WW II

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Robert-; *End of Dreams, Return of History: International Rivalry and American Leadership*; POLICY REVIEW; August/September; <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10>

People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe.

# A2: HEGEMONY BAD

**LOSS OF U.S. REGIONAL DOMINANCE OUTWEIGHS ANY RISK**

Even if the Affirmative wins a RISK of war from U.S. dominance, wars are MORE LIKELY to ERUPT if the U.S. WEAKENS or WITHDRAWS.

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The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States.

Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan.

**RETRACTION OF AMERICAN INFLUENCE AND PREDOMINANCE NOT A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE**

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Robert-; *End of Dreams, Return of History: International Rivalry and American Leadership*; POLICY REVIEW; August/September; <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10>

The alternative to American regional predominance in the Middle East and elsewhere is not a new regional stability. In an era of burgeoning nationalism, the future is likely to be one of intensified competition among nations and nationalist movements. Difficult as it may be to extend American predominance into the future, no one should imagine that a reduction of American power or a retraction of American influence and global involvement will provide an easier path.

**THE ALTERNATIVE TO U.S. HEGEMONY WOULD BE WORSE**

The alternative to U.S. hegemony is an apolar ANARCHIC new DARK AGE of endemic PLUNDER and PILLAGE and economic STAGNATION as civilizations retreat into FORTIFIED ENCLAVES.

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Nial- Prof of History @NYU Stern School of Business; FOREIGN POLICY, July/August p.online;

<http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/afp/vac.htm>

Anyone who dislikes U.S. hegemony should bear in mind that, rather than a multipolar world of competing powers, a world with no hegemon at all may be the real alternative to U.S. primacy. Apolarity could turn out to be an anarchic new Dark Age, an ear of warring empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world’s forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilizations’ retreat into a few fortified enclaves.

# A2: HEGEMONY BAD

BENEFITS OF AMERICAN HEGEMONY IN THE WORLD OUTWEIGH COSTS

American Empire has been BOLD since its inception and will lasts as long as we want it to PERSEVERE, criticism is a mere consequence of its power, how others perceive it is not the question for the world is BETTER OFF for having American Power.

THAYER Assc Prof in the Dpt of Defense and Strategic Studies @ Missouri State Univ. 2k7

Bradley A.-; *"The Case For The American Empire," American Empire: A Debate,* Published by Routledge, ISBN 0415952034, p. 41-42)

The American Empire is fully in keeping with the Founding Fathers’ dreams for America. America has never been a shrinking violet, hiding from the world. Rather, it has been a bold country, making a place for itself in international politics since its inception. The empire Americans have worked hard to create can last well into the future, but only if the American people want it to persevere. As I have argued in this chapter, the American Empire should be valued by the American people largely because of the enormous good it does for America and the honorable and goodhearted actions it undertakes for the world. It is equally true that this good is not often appreciated by the rest of the world, or sometimes even in the United States. **Despite its benefits, Americans have to recognize that they will be criticized, and that this is simply a consequence of its power.** A half a century ago, the great British historian Arnold Toynbee hit this point precisely when he wrote of American power: “The giant’s sheer size is always getting the giant into trouble with people of normal stature.”63 Toynbee writes of a Latin American diplomat who captured the point well: “When the United States sneezes, Latin America gets influenza,”64 Its actions will always have an exaggerated impact on smaller countries. And that fact alone will generate resentment and jealously from those who are weaker. No matter what, people will launch invective against the United States. Muslims will attack it as too atheistic and hedonistic; Europeans will assault it from the opposite direction, labeling the United States as too religious and crude. Mark Steyn, the witty columnist for the Daily Telegraph, wrote with great insight: Fanatical Muslims despise America because it’s all lapdancing and gay porn; the secular Europeans despise America because it’s all born-again [end page 46] Christians hung up on abortion.. ..America is also too isolationist, except when it is too imperialist. And even its imperialism is too vulgar and arriviste to appeal to real imperialists.. ..To the mullahs, America is the Great Satan, a wily seducer; to the Gaullists, America is the Great Cretin, a culture so self-evidently moronic that only stump-tooth inbred Appalachian lardbutts could possibly fall for it... .Too Christian, too Godless, too isolationist, too imperialist, too seductive, too cretinous.65 The key question for the future is not how Muslims, Europeans, or others will perceive the American Empire. Rather, it is “How should Americans want our empire to be remembered?” As one that fostered democracy in places where freedom was unknown—from Afghanistan and Iraq to Chile and Argentina to Germany and Japan. As one that developed respect for free market values and institutionalized these values in organizations like the World Trade Organization. Did it make mistakes? Of course, it did. Did Americans have to sacrifice their lives? Unfortunately, many did. But when the sun sets on the American Empire, we will acknowledge that the world was the better for having it.

# A2: Heg Bad / Unsustainable

ALL your turns are INEVITABLE – other nations will ALWAYS perceive US dominance

Drezner 2k9 Daniel W., Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School and at Tufts University, Senior Editor of The National Interest, author on foreign policy, “The False Hegemon,” http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=21858

The rest of the world certainly seems to treat America as the hegemonic power, for good or ill. According to the New York Times, Latin America is waiting for the United States to break the deadlock in Honduras. Vladimir Putin is incapable of giving a foreign-policy speech in which he does not blast American hegemony as the root of all of Russia’s ills. While Chinese officials talk tough about ending the dollar’s reign as the world’s reserve currency, its leaders also want America to solve the current economic crisis and to take the lead on global warming in the process. It’s not just foreign leaders who are obsessed with American hegemony. Last week, in an example of true hardship duty, I taught a short course in American foreign policy at the Barcelona Institute for International Studies. The students in my class represented a true cross section of nationalities: Spaniards, Germans, Brits, Estonian, Chinese, Vietnamese, Indian, Thai, Ghanaian, Kenyan, Turkish, Belgian, Mexican, Nicaraguan and, yes, even Americans. I cannot claim that my students represent a scientific cross section of non-Americans (one of them complained that I did not rely on Marxism as a structural explanation for American foreign policy). Still, by and large the students were bright, well informed about world affairs and cautiously optimistic about President Obama. That said, a persistent trend among my students was their conviction that the U.S. government was the world’s puppeteer, consciously manipulating every single event in world politics. For example, many of them were convinced that George W. Bush ordered Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili to precipitate last year’s war with Russia. The Ghanaian students wanted to know why Obama visited their country last week. The standard “promotion of good democratic governance” answer did not satisfy them. They were convinced that there had to be some deeper, potentially sinister motive to the whole enterprise. Don’t even ask what they thought about the reasons behind the war in Iraq. To be sure, the United States is a powerful actor; the government is trying to influence global events (and Americans are not immune to their own misperceptions). And good social scientists should always search for underlying causes and not take rhetoric at face value. Nevertheless, the belief in an all-powerful America hatching conspiracies left and right frequently did not jibe with the facts. For many of these students, even apparent policy mistakes were merely examples of American subterfuge. Ironically, at the moment when many Americans are questioning the future of U.S. hegemony, many non-Americans continue to believe that the U.S. government is diabolically manipulating events behind the scenes. Going forward, the persistence of anti-Americanism in the age of Obama might have nothing to do with the president, or his rhetoric or even U.S. government actions. It might, instead, have to do with the congealed habits of thought that place the United States at the epicenter of all global movings and shakings. The tragedy is that such an exaggerated perception of American power and purpose is occurring at precisely the moment when the United States will need to scale back its global ambitions. Indeed, the external perception of U.S. omnipresence will make the pursuit of a more modest U.S. foreign policy all the more difficult. The Obama administration has consciously adopted a more modest posture in the hopes of improving America’s standing abroad. If the rest of the world genuinely believes that the United States causes everything, however, then the attempt at modesty will inevitably fail.

# A2: Heg Unsustainable / Multipolarity Good

EVEN IF US hegemony is unsustainable, maintaining US power is KEY to a SMOOTH TRANSITION to multipolarity

Walton 2k7 Dale C., Lecturer in IR and Strategic Studies, U of Reading, England (“Geopolitics and the Great Powers in the Twenty-First century,” Google Books)

Although international political conditions surely will differ enormously in the coming decades from those of the middle 1940s, it would be grossly irresponsible for the United States to shrug off the burdens of great power status and return to the slumber that it once enjoyed. Almost certainly, if the United States had refused to take an active role in European politics in the middle of the twentieth century a world would have emerged in which American values would not have flourished – and even their survival on the North American continent would have been profoundly threatened. America's refusal to play a substantial role in the great power struggles of this century likely would have similarly deleterious effects. Importantly, if the United States withdraws to its hemisphere a third world war is far more likely. In a meta-region full of young, rising powers, the presence of a strategically mature superpower can be expected to have a stabilizing effect; the enormous military resources possessed by America compels would-be aggressors to consider carefully before launching a strategic adventure. Even more chillingly, as noted above, it is possible that the multipolar system could become sufficiently unbalanced that it would collapse, with a power such as China building a coalition that would allow it ultimately to emerge as the master of Eastern Eurasia and the greatest power in the world. The United States is the "court of last resort" protecting against such an eventuality. The latter possibility does not contradict the above argument that U.S. unipolarity is unsustainable – as an extra-Eurasian power lacking the ruthlessness to destroy potential great power competitors preventively, Washington simply cannot sustain unipolarity indefinitely. Nonetheless, while the emerging multi-polar system appears robust, it still should receive "care and feeding" other-wise, it is vulnerable to grossly unbalancing events, such as the creation of a very aggressive coalition dedicated to achieving Eurasian hegemony and willing, if necessary, to fight a third world war to achieve it. Most likely, such a coalition would not be able to simply bully it way to hegemony; it probably would have to fight, the result being a war enormously costly in blood, perhaps even one that would dwarf World War II in its price. If the oppressive coalition won, in turn, The multipolar system would be destroyed and the United States would face a competitor far more powerful than itself, and, in all likelihood, a world in which democracy and personal liberty would be in eclipse. In any case, it is a geopolitical imperative for the United States that no power or coalition attains hegemony in Eastern Eurasia, much less that an explicitly hostile state or coalition succeeds in doing so. If the United States is to guard its national interests successfully in this century, it is vital that it ensures that the transition from unipolarity to multipolarity occurs in as gentle a manner as possible. In this capacity, it is important to understand that the United States is in long-term relative decline, but, at the same time, to acknowledge that it has very great military, financial, and diplomatic resources at its disposal. If Washington deploys these resources wisely, it can maximize its security over the long term and minimize the probability of a great power war.

# A2: HEGEMONY UNSUSTAINABLE/MULTIPOLARITY GOOD

**CURRENT TRENDS OF NATIONAL AMBITION DO NOT PROVE MULTIPOLARITY**

The U.S. is NOT powerful enough to SUPPRESS by itself normal ambitions of nations but NONE of the large powers is in range of competing with the supowerpower for GLOBAL INFLUENCE.

**KAGAN Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2k7**

Robert-; *End of Dreams, Return of History: International Rivalry and American Leadership*; POLICY REVIEW; August/September; <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10>

If the world is marked by the persistence of unipolarity, it is nevertheless also being shaped by the reemergence of competitive national ambitions of the kind that have shaped human affairs from time immemorial. During the Cold War, this historical tendency of great powers to jostle with one another for status and influence as well as for wealth and power was largely suppressed by the two superpowers and their rigid bipolar order. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has not been powerful enough, and probably could never be powerful enough, to suppress by itself the normal ambitions of nations. This does not mean the world has returned to multipolarity, since none of the large powers is in range of competing with the superpower for global influence. Nevertheless, several large powers are now competing for regional predominance, both with the United States and with each other.

# A2: Multilateralism Good

Even if multilateralism is good, the United States STILL needs to maintain LEADERSHIP in that world to solve global problems

Yetiv 2k9 Steve Yetiv is a professor of political science at Old Dominion University, Christian Science Monitor, October 27, 2009, “An American decline would undermine global security,” lexis

Of course, the US isn't perfect. In order to merit support, it must be multilateral in a globalized world and must accommodate rising powers. Certainly, Washington needs to make sure to be consistent in consulting and enlisting other nations before it hatches big plans. And then there is the fact that asking other countries to support the US is wrapped in politics. Yet, if the rest of the world doesn't step up and support America's overburdened and undersupported shoulders, global security could diminish exponentially. Here are three examples of what other countries could do to help lift the US burden: 1. Beijing should leverage its influence with Pakistan. If China could put pressure on Pakistan to stop supporting the Afghan Taliban facing US-led forces through its intelligence services, that could be just the right amount of pressure to force Pakistan to act. Deservedly, China is becoming a great power and should start supporting major global efforts. 2. Many of America's allies play important roles in Afghanistan, but all should contribute significantly more troops, nonmilitary personnel, and money. They also have much to lose from failure in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 3. As many countries as possible should back US-led threats of tougher sanctions and the threat of force in Iran, especially given recent revelations of Iran's secret nuclear facility near Qom. At a minimum, China should cancel any existing contracts to provide Iran with gasoline – contracts that may embolden Tehran. Without serious threats, Iran will not negotiate away its nuclear option, and a military showdown will be likely. Bolstering America makes far more sense for world security in the 21st century than hoping for its decline or undermining it.

# A2: ECONOMIC COLLAPSE KILLED U.S. HEGEMONY

The financial crisis has temporarily STYMIED balancing and RESUSCITATED American global power by constraining ALL countries that wish to CHALLENGE western powers

Mead 2k9 Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Only Makes You Stronger”, February 4, 2009, Free Republic, http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2169866/posts

And yet, this relentless series of crises has not disrupted the rise of a global capitalist system, centered first on the power of the United Kingdom and then, since World War II, on the power of the United States. After more than 300 years, it seems reasonable to conclude that financial and economic crises do not, by themselves, threaten either the international capitalist system or the special role within it of leading capitalist powers like the United Kingdom and the United States. If anything, the opposite seems true--that financial crises in some way sustain Anglophone power and capitalist development. Indeed, many critics of both capitalism and the "Anglo-Saxons" who practice it so aggressively have pointed to what seems to be a perverse relationship between such crises and the consolidation of the "core" capitalist economies against the impoverished periphery. Marx noted that financial crises remorselessly crushed weaker companies, allowing the most successful and ruthless capitalists to cement their domination of the system. For dependency theorists like Raul Prebisch, crises served a similar function in the international system, helping stronger countries marginalize and impoverish developing ones. Setting aside the flaws in both these overarching theories of capitalism, this analysis of economic crises is fundamentally sound--and especially relevant to the current meltdown. Cataloguing the early losses from the financial crisis, it's hard not to conclude that the central capitalist nations will weather the storm far better than those not so central. Emerging markets have been hit harder by the financial crisis than developed ones as investors around the world seek the safe haven provided by U.S. Treasury bills, and commodity-producing economies have suffered extraordinary shocks as commodity prices crashed from their record, boom-time highs. Countries like Russia, Venezuela, and Iran, which hoped to use oil revenue to mount a serious political challenge to American power and the existing world order, face serious new constraints. Vladimir Putin, Hugo Chavez, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad must now spend less time planning big international moves and think a little bit harder about domestic stability. Far from being the last nail in America's coffin, the financial crisis may actually resuscitate U.S. power relative to its rivals

# A2: ECONOMIC COLLAPSE KILLED U.S. HEGEMONY

The global financial crisis was the final straw that revealed CRIPPLING structural problems within Russia and DEVASTATED the rise of Russia as a great power

Mead 2k9 Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Only Makes You Stronger”, February 4, 2009, Free Republic, http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2169866/posts

The biggest loser of the financial crisis thus far seems to have been Russia, a country that stormed into 2008 breathing fire and boasting of its renewed great-power status. After years of military decline, it put its strategic bombers back in the air; sent its fleet to the Caribbean; and reintroduced displays of martial power to Kremlin parades. Petrodollars filled government coffers, and political dissent at home had largely disappeared. Russia's troubles had been eased by the effective suppression of the Chechen insurgency, while America's troubles remained severe, with the U.S. military mired in two wars. When its troops invaded Georgia, Russia seemed once again to be acting like a great power--and not a very nice one. But the Georgian invasion may have been the high point of Putin's "New Russia" rather than a portent of things to come. Historically, Russian power has rested on four legs. Its immense agricultural territory made it a granary of Europe. Timber, fur, and other products gave Russia a profitable niche in world trade. Its enormous territory, stretching from the remote steppes of Asia well into Europe, brought it into the heart of continental politics. Its enormous population--as recently as 1989, greater than that of the United States--gave it awesome military potential. Today, a much-diminished Russia cannot realistically aspire to fill the shoes of czarist Russia, much less those of the Soviet Union. In Europe, the post-cold war loss of the Baltic republics, most of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and above all Ukraine has pushed Russia back to its boundaries at the time of Ivan the Terrible, leaving Russia shorn of half its population and most of its agricultural potential. Now Russia is struggling, with only partial success, simply to maintain its Soviet-era infrastructure and educational system, unable to build the base for a modern economy. Pushed from the center to the far fringes of European geography, lagging well behind Western norms in economic and social productivity, and challenged by the rising powers to its east, Russia retains only shards of the power potential that once made it a credible rival of the United States. It was in this context that the financial crisis hit last fall. The Georgia invasion itself had already spooked foreign and domestic investors into pulling their money out of Russia. That capital flight only accelerated as the price of oil and gas fell by more than two-thirds. Soon it became apparent that Russia's vaunted economic recovery rested on little more than the high price of petrochemicals. In 2007, oil, fuel, and gas exports accounted for 65 percent of Russia's export revenues. With its currency falling, its export earnings crashing, and its foreign exchange reserves melting away, an increasingly cash-strapped Russian state now faces enormous difficulties in maintaining its military spending. The assertive foreign policy propounded by Putin and Dmitry Medvedev was presented as the consequence of a rising Russia; in actuality, it was a high-stakes bluff by a ruling elite which knows that its power base continues to erode. During Bush's second term, Russia had a rare opportunity: The prices of oil and gas were rising; the United States was, apparently, bogged down in a losing war in Iraq and needed Russian help at the Security Council to deal with Iran; and the gap between Europe and the United States was wider than at any time since World War II. With the future looking bleak, Russia chose to assert itself at this moment of maximum strength. But now the Russian economy looks shakier than ever; foreign investors have lost faith in the country's legal and financial systems; Washington has drawn closer to European capitals; the United States appears headed for an honorable and timely exit from the war in Iraq; and rising European concern over Iran may enable the United States to address its nuclear program without Russian support at the United Nations. The fall in oil prices, Chavez's own political troubles at home, and the economic troubles in Cuba make the Russian fleet's presence in the Caribbean a curiosity rather than a threat of any kind. Russia has or can develop additional opportunities, perhaps in Ukraine, but its weak economic base and dismal future prospects suggest that the natural limits of its power are easily reached. The much touted "Russian renaissance" is likely to be counted a casualty of the Panic of 2008.

# A2: ECONOMIC COLLAPSE KILLED U.S. HEGEMONY

China’s rise as a global power is FAR off – a DESTABILIZED society and financial TURMOIL makes military expenditures and foreign adventures IMPOSSIBLE

Mead 2k9 Walter Russell Mead, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Only Makes You Stronger”, February 4, 2009, Free Republic, http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2169866/posts

The damage to China's position is more subtle. The crisis has not--yet--led to the nightmare scenario that China-watchers fear: a recession or slowdown producing the kind of social unrest that could challenge the government. That may still come to pass--the recent economic news from China has been consistently worse than most experts predicted--but, even if the worst case is avoided, the financial crisis has nevertheless had significant effects. For one thing, it has reminded China that its growth remains dependent on the health of the U.S. economy. For another, it has shown that China's modernization is likely to be long, dangerous, and complex rather than fast and sweet, as some assumed. In the lead-up to last summer's Beijing Olympics, talk of a Chinese bid to challenge America's global position reached fever pitch, and the inexorable rise of China is one reason why so many commentators are fretting about the "post-American era." But suggestions that China could grow at, say, 10 percent annually for the next 30 years were already looking premature before the economic downturn. (In late 2007, the World Bank slashed its estimate of China's GDP by 40 percent, citing inaccuracies in the methods used to calculate purchasing power parity.) And the financial crisis makes it certain that China's growth is likely to be much slower during some of those years. Already exports are falling, unemployment is rising, and the Shanghai stock market is down about 60 percent. At the same time, Beijing will have to devote more resources and more attention to stabilizing Chinese society, building a national health care system, providing a social security net, and caring for an aging population, which, thanks to the one-child policy, will need massive help from the government to support itself in old age. Doing so will leave China fewer resources for military build-ups and foreign adventures. As the crisis has forcefully reminded Americans, creating and regulating a functional and flexible financial system is difficult. Every other country in the world has experienced significant financial crises while building such systems, and China is unlikely to be an exception. All this means that China's rise looks increasingly like a gradual process. A deceleration in China's long-term growth rate would postpone indefinitely the date when China could emerge as a peer competitor to the United States. The present global distribution of power could be changing slowly, if at all.

# A2: ECONOMIC HEGEMONY KEY

**MILITARY HEGEMONY IS KEY TO ECONOMIC HEGEMONY**

Military Patrols assure confidence needed to proceed with economic matters and international trade.

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Michael-; TAKING SIDES: CLASHING VIEWS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 2010, 6-7.

America's services to the world also extend to economic matters and international trade. In the international economy, much of the confidence needed to proceed with transactions, and the protection that engenders this confidence, comes from the policies of the United States. For example, the U.S. Navy patrols shipping lanes in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, assuring the safe passage of commerce along the world's great trade routes. The United States also supplies the world's most frequently used currency, the U.S. dollar. Though the euro might one day supplant the dollar as the world's most popular reserve currency, that day, if it ever comes, lies far in the future.

# A2: GLOBALIZATION DECREASES NEED FOR U.S. HEG

**AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITY HAS NOT CHANGED MUCH**

The GRAND EXPECTATIONS of globalization have not absolved the U.S. of its responsibility to PREVENT a slide back into the circumstances that produced two major world wars.

**KAGAN Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2k7**

Robert-; *End of Dreams, Return of History: International Rivalry and American Leadership*; POLICY REVIEW; August/September; <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10>

**When the cold war ended, it was possible to imagine that the world had been utterly changed: the end of international competition, the end of geopolitics, the end of history. When in the first decade after the Cold War people began describing the new era of “globalization,” the common expectation was that** the phenomenon of instantaneous global communications, the free flow of goods and services, the rapid transmission of ideas and information, and **the intermingling and blending of cultures would further knit together a world that had already just patched up the great ideological and geopolitical tears of the previous century.** “Globalization” was to the late twentieth century what “sweet commerce” was to the late eighteenth — an anticipated balm for a war-weary world.

In the 1990s **serious thinkers predicted the end of wars and military confrontations among great powers. European “postmodernism” seemed to be the future: the abandonment of power politics in favor of international institutions capable of managing the disagreements among nations.** Even today, there are those who believe the world is moving along the same path as the European Union. John Ikenberry recently described the post-Cold War era, the decade of the 1990s, as a liberal paradise:

nafta, apec, and the wto signaled a strengthening of the rules and institutions of the world economy. nato was expanded and the U.S.-Japan alliance was renewed. Russia became a quasi-member of the West and China was a “strategic partner” with Washington. Clinton’s grand strategy of building post-Cold War order around expanding markets, democracy, and institutions was the triumphant embodiment of the liberal vision of international order. [22](http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html" \l "n22)

**Perhaps it was these grand expectations of a new era for humankind that helped spur the anger and outrage at American policies of the past decade. It is not that those policies are in themselves so different, or in any way out of character for the United States. It is that to too many people** in Europe and even in the United States, **they have seemed jarringly out of place in a world that was supposed to have moved on.**

As we now know, **however, both nationalism and ideology were already making their comeback in the 1990s.** Russia had ceased to be and no longer desired to be a “quasi-member” of the West, and partly because of nato enlargement. China was already on its present trajectory and had already determined that American hegemony was a threat to its ambitions. The forces of radical Islam had already begun their jihad, globalization had already caused a backlash around the world, and the juggernaut of democracy had already stalled and begun to tip precariously.

After the Second World War, another moment in history when hopes for a new kind of international order were rampant, Hans Morgenthau warned idealists against imagining that at some point “the final curtain would fall and the game of power politics would no longer be played. ” But **the world struggle** continued then, and it **continues today.** **Six decades ago American leaders believed the United States had the unique ability and the unique responsibility to use its power to prevent a slide back to the circumstances that produced two world wars and innumerable national calamities. Although much has changed since then, America ’s responsibility has not.**

# A2: TURN/ U.S. HEG LEADS TO BACKLASH

**NO RISK OF BACKLASH TO U.S. INCREASE IN HEGEMONY**

U.S. Hegemony is a stakeholder hegemony constrained by internal democracy, voice opportunities and adherence to international bodies

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G. John-the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs; *Getting Hegemony Right*; THE NATIONAL INTEREST, no.63, Spring; <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pol116/ikenberry.htm>

In May 1999 the Oxford Union debated the proposition, "Resolved, the United States is a rogue state." The resolution was ultimately defeated, but **around the world there is growing unease about a global order dominated by American power—power unprecedented, unrestrained and unpredictable.** **The unease is felt even by America’s closest allies.** "The United States of America today predominates on the economic level, the monetary level, on the technological level, and in the cultural area in the broadest sense of the word", French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine observed in a speech in Paris in early 1999. "It is not comparable, in terms of power and influence, to anything known in modern history." **European diplomats**, following Védrine’s coining of the term, **have begun calling the United States a "hyperpower."** During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States kept each other in check. Today the restraints are less evident, and **this has made American power increasingly controversial.**

This is an unexpected turn of events. Just a little over a decade ago many pundits argued that the central problem of U.S. foreign policy was the graceful management of the country’s decline. Paul Kennedy’s famous book, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, argued that the United States would go the way of all great powers—down. Japan was on the rise and Europe was awakening. World politics after the Cold War, it was widely assumed, was to be profoundly multipolar.

But the distribution of world power took a dramatic turn in America’s favor. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, the decline in ideological rivalry, lagging economic fortunes in Japan and continental Europe, growing disparities in military and technological expenditure, and America’s booming economy all intensified power disparities during the 1990s. **Today it is not decline that the United States must manage but the fear, resentment and instabilities created by a decade of rising American power.**

**A global backlash to U.S. power is not inevitable, however**, particularly if the United States remembers its own political history. **Our leaders have the ideas, means and political institutions that can allow for stable and cooperative order even in the midst of sharp and shifting asymmetries of power.** **The United States faced this problem after World War II and solved it by building what might be called a "stakeholder" hegemony. America can do it again** today. . . .Think of the United States as a giant corporation that seeks foreign investors. It is more likely to attract investors if it can demonstrate that it operates according to accepted accounting and fiduciary principles. The rule of law and the institutions of policymaking in a democracy are the political equivalent of corporate transparency and accountability. Sharp shifts in policy must ultimately be vetted within the policy process and pass muster by an array of investigatory and decision-making bodies. **Because it is a constitutional, rule-based democracy, outside states are more willing to work with the United States—or**, to return to the corporate metaphor, **to invest in ongoing partnerships.**

**This open and decentralized political process works in a second way to reduce foreign worries about American power. It creates what might be called "voice opportunities"—that is, opportunities for political access and, with it, the means for foreign governments and groups to influence the way Washington’s power is exercised.** In 1990 the political analyst Pat Choate wrote a bestseller entitled Agents of Influence, detailing the supposedly scandalous ways in which Japanese ministries and corporations were manipulating the American political process. High-priced lobbyists were advancing Tokyo’s commercial interests within the hallowed halls of the American capital and undermining the pursuit of the U.S. national interest. Today Washington is even more inundated by foreign diplomats and revolving-door lobbyists working to ensure that the interests of America’s partners are not overlooked. Looked at from the perspective of the stable functioning of America’s hegemonic order, Choate was actually describing one of the brilliant aspects of the United States as a global power. **By providing other states opportunities to play the game in Washington, they are drawn into active, ongoing partnerships that serve the long-term strategic interests of the United States.**

**A third and final element of the American order that reduces worry about power asymmetries is the web of multilateral institutions** that mark the postwar world. After World War II, the United States launched history’s most ambitious era of institution-building. The UN, IMF, World Bank, NATO, GATT and other institutions that emerged provided a more extensive rule-based structure for political and economic relations than anything seen before. **The United States had been deeply ambivalent about making permanent security commitments to other states and about allowing its political and economic policies to be dictated by intergovernmental bodies.** The Soviet menace was critical in overcoming these doubts. **Networks and political relationships were built that—paradoxically—made U.S. power both more far-reaching and durable but also more predictable and malleable.**

**In effect, the United States spun a web of institutions that connected other states to an emerging American-dominated economic and security order.** But in doing so, these institutions also bound the United States to other states and reduced—at least to some extent—Washington’s ability to engage in the arbitrary and indiscriminate exercise of power. Call it an institutional bargain. The price for the United States was a reduction in Washington’s policy autonomy, in that institutional rules and joint decision-making reduced U.S. unilateralist capacities. But what Washington got in return was worth the price. America’s partners also had their autonomy constrained, but in return were able to operate in a world where U.S. power was more restrained and reliable. . . .

From The National Interest No. 63, Spring 2001.

# A2: TURN-USE OF FORCE KILLS U.S. HEGEMONY

**U.S. USE OF FORCE IS AN ENORMOUS CONTRIBUTION TO ITS POWER**

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Kori-; MANAGING AMERICAN HEGEMONY, 2009, 86.

Most states want a very high degree of reliability that the enforcer of rules in the international order is actually willing to enforce the rules, which at the end of the day means imposing its will by force. As unpopular as the United States often is for its choices about using force, its willingness to be the guarantor of security formally for twenty-five NATO allies, South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, with more conditional offers to scores of other states, is an enormous contribution to its power in the international order.

# A2: SINO-RUSSIA COUNTERBALANCING

**SINO-RUSSIAN ATTEMPTS AT COUNTER-BALANCING FAIL**

Too many barriers exist to foster a successful counter-balance and if anything other countries HEDGE AGAINST a powerful China and Russia by seeking closer ties to Washington.

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Robert-; *End of Dreams, Return of History: International Rivalry and American Leadership*; POLICY REVIEW; August/September; <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10>

**The anticipated global balancing has for the most part not occurred. Russia and China certainly share a common and openly expressed goal of checking American hegemony.** They have created at least one institution, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, aimed at resisting American influence in Central Asia, and China is the only power in the world, other than the United States, engaged in a long-term military buildup. **But Sino-Russian hostility to American predominance has not yet produced a concerted and cooperative effort at balancing. China ’s buildup is driven at least as much by its own long-term ambitions as by a desire to balance the United States. Russia** has been using its vast reserves of oil and natural gas as a lever to compensate for the lack of military power, but it **either cannot or does not want to increase its military capability sufficiently to begin counterbalancing the United States. Overall, Russian military power remains in decline. In addition, the two powers do not trust one another. They are traditional rivals, and the rise of China inspires at least as much nervousness in Russia as it does in the United States. At the moment, moreover, China is less abrasively confrontational with the United States. Its dependence on the American market and foreign investment and its perception that the United States remains a potentially formidable adversary mitigate against an openly confrontational approach.**

In any case, **China and Russia cannot balance the United States without at least some help from Europe, Japan, India, or at least some of the other advanced, democratic nations. But those powerful players are not joining the effort.** Europe has rejected the option of making itself a counterweight to American power. This is true even among the older members of the European Union, where neither France, Germany, Italy, nor Spain proposes such counterbalancing, despite a public opinion hostile to the Bush administration. Now that the eu has expanded to include the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, who fear threats from the east, not from the west, **the prospect of a unified Europe counterbalancing the United States is practically nil. As for Japan and India, the clear trend in recent years has been toward closer strategic cooperation with the United States.**

**If anything, the most notable balancing over the past decade has been aimed not at the American superpower but at the two large powers: China and Russia.** In **Asia and the Pacific**, Japan, Australia, and even South Korea and the nations of Southeast Asia **have all engaged in “hedging” against a rising China. This has led them to seek closer relations with Washington**, especially in the case of Japan and Australia. India has also drawn closer to the United States and is clearly engaged in balancing against China. **Russia ’s efforts to increase its influence over what it regards as its “near abroad,” meanwhile, have produced tensions and negative reactions in the Baltics and other parts of Eastern Europe.** Because these nations are now members of the European Union, this has also complicated eu-Russian relations. **On balance, traditional allies of the United States in East Asia and in Europe**, while their publics may be more anti-American than in the past, nevertheless **pursue policies that reflect more concern about the powerful states in their midst than about the United States.** [12](http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html" \l "n12) **This has provided a cushion against hostile public opinion and offers a foundation on which to strengthen American relations with these countries after the departure of Bush.**

# A2: COUNTER-BALANCING (GENERIC)

## Hegemony prompts bandwagoning not counterbalancing– history is on our side.

**Thayer, 06** (Bradley A., Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, 2006, “In Defense of Primacy,” *National Interest*, Issue 86, November/December)

A remarkable fact about international politics today--in a world where American primacy is clearly and unambiguously on display--**is that countries want to align themselves with the United States**. Of course, this is not out of any sense of altruism, in most cases, but because doing so allows them to use the power of the United States for their own purposes--their own protection, or to gain greater influence. **Of 192 countries, 84 are allied with America--their security is tied to the United States through treaties and other informal arrangements--and they include almost all of the major economic and military powers. That is a ratio of almost 17 to one** (85 to five), **and a big change from the Cold War when the ratio was about 1.8 to one of states aligned with the United States versus the Soviet Union. Never before in its history has this country, or any country, had so many allies. U.S. primacy--and the bandwagoning effect--has also given us extensive influence in international politics, allowing the United States to shape the behavior of states and international institutions. Such influence comes in many forms, one of which is America's ability to create coalitions of like-minded states to free Kosovo, stabilize Afghanistan, invade Iraq or to stop proliferation** through the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Doing so allows the United States to operate with allies outside of the UN, where it can be stymied by opponents. American-led wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq stand in contrast to the UN's inability to save the people of Darfur or even to conduct any military campaign to realize the goals of its charter. **You can count with one hand countries opposed to the United States. They are the "Gang of Five": China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela.** Of course, countries like India, for example, do not agree with all policy choices made by the United States, such as toward Iran, but New Delhi is friendly to Washington. Only the "Gang of Five" may be expected to consistently resist the agenda and actions of the United States. **China is clearly the most important of these states because it is a rising great power. But even Beijing is intimidated by the United States and refrains from openly challenging U.S. power. China proclaims that it will, if necessary, resort to other mechanisms of challenging the United States, including asymmetric strategies such as targeting communication and intelligence satellites upon which the United States depends. But China may not be confident those strategies would work, and so it is likely to refrain from testing the United States directly for the foreseeable future because China's power benefits, as we shall see, from the international order U.S. primacy creates.The other states are far weaker than China. For three of the "Gang of Five" cases--Venezuela, Iran, Cuba--it is an anti-U.S. regime that is the source of the problem; the country itself is not intrinsically anti-American.**

# A2: BUSH DOCTRINE KILLED U.S. HEGEMONY

**THE IRAQ WAR NOR THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION DECREASED AMERICAN HEGEMONY**

**KAGAN Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2k7**

Robert-; *End of Dreams, Return of History: International Rivalry and American Leadership*; POLICY REVIEW; August/September; <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10>

The Iraq War has not had the effect expected by many. Although there are reasonable-sounding theories as to why America ’s position should be eroding as a result of global opposition to the war and the unpopularity of the current administration, there has been little measurable change in the actual policies of nations, other than their reluctance to assist the United States in Iraq. In 2003 those who claimed the U.S. global position was eroding pointed to electoral results in some friendly countries: the election of Schr öder in Germany, the defeat of Aznar’s party in Spain, and the election of Lula in Brazil.[13](http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html" \l "n13) But if elections are the test, other more recent votes around the world have put relatively pro-American leaders in power in Berlin, Paris, Tokyo, Canberra, and Ottawa. As for Russia and China, their hostility to the United States predates the Iraq War and, indeed, the Bush administration. Russia turned most sharply anti-American in the late 1990s partly as a consequence of nato enlargement. Both were far more upset and angered by the American intervention in Kosovo than by the invasion of Iraq. Both began complaining about American hegemonism and unilateralism and calling for a multipolar order during the Clinton years. Chinese rhetoric has been, if anything, more tempered during the Bush years, in part because the Chinese have seen September 11 and American preoccupation with terrorism as a welcome distraction from America’s other preoccupation, the “China threat.”

# A2: FOREIGN POLICY FAILURES KILL HEGEMONY

**FOREIGN POLICY FAILURES WILL NOT AFFECT U.S. PREDOMINANCE**

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Robert-; *End of Dreams, Return of History: International Rivalry and American Leadership*; POLICY REVIEW; August/September; <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/8552512.html#n10>

**Predominance is not the same thing as omnipotence. Just because the United States has more power than everyone else does not mean it can impose its will on everyone else.** American predominance in the early years after the Second World War did not prevent the North Korean invasion of the South, a communist victory in China, the Soviet acquisition of the hydrogen bomb, or the consolidation of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe — all far greater strategic setbacks than anything the United States has yet suffered or is likely to suffer in Iraq and Afghanistan. **Nor does predominance mean the United States will succeed in all its endeavors**, any more than it did six decades ago.

**By the same token, foreign policy failures do not necessarily undermine predominance.** Some have suggested that failure in Iraq would mean the end of predominance and unipolarity. But a superpower can lose a war — in Vietnam or in Iraq — without ceasing to be a superpower if the fundamental international conditions continue to support its predominance. **So long as the United States remains at the center of the international economy and the predominant military power, so long as the American public continues to support American predominance** as it has consistently for six decades, **and so long as potential challengers inspire more fear than sympathy among their neighbors, the structure of the international system should remain** as the Chinese describe it: **one superpower** and many great powers.