# \*\*\*Heg Good\*\*\*

## \*\*\*Impacts\*\*\*

[Khalilzad 1995 6](#_Toc266795971)

[Leiber 2005 8](#_Toc266795972)

[Ferguson 2004 9](#_Toc266795973)

[Thayer 2006 10](#_Toc266795974)

[Kagan 2007 11](#_Toc266795975)

[Knowles 2009 12](#_Toc266795976)

[Heg Solves War 13](#_Toc266795977)

[Heg De-escalates Conflict 14](#_Toc266795978)

[Hotspot Escalation Mod 16](#_Toc266795980)

[Heg Solves Hotspot Escalation 17](#_Toc266795981)

[Genocide Mod 18](#_Toc266795982)

[Emboldened Rogues Mod 19](#_Toc266795983)

[Peace Process Mod 20](#_Toc266795984)

[Heg Solves Peace Process 21](#_Toc266795985)

[A2 Israel Support = Root of Backlash 22](#_Toc266795986)

[Asian Stability Mod 23](#_Toc266795987)

[Korea Mod 24](#_Toc266795988)

[NATO Mod 25](#_Toc266795989)

[Air/Space Power Mod 26](#_Toc266795990)

[Europe Mod 27](#_Toc266795991)

[Europe War Draw US In 28](#_Toc266795992)

[Economy Mod 29](#_Toc266795993)

[Heg Key to Economy 30](#_Toc266795994)

[Terrorism Mod 32](#_Toc266795995)

[Heg Solves Terrorism 33](#_Toc266795996)

[A2 Heg = Backlash 34](#_Toc266795997)

[Democracy Mod 35](#_Toc266795998)

[Prez Powers Mod 36](#_Toc266795999)

[A2 Heg Causes Prolif 37](#_Toc266796000)

## \*\*\*Balancing\*\*\*

[A2 Balancing – Must Reads 38](#_Toc266796001)

[A2 Balancing – Flawed Methods 40](#_Toc266796003)

[A2 Balancing - Generic 41](#_Toc266796004)

[A2 Balancing – Distinction Cards 47](#_Toc266796010)

[A2 Balance of Power Theory = Balancing 48](#_Toc266796011)

[A2 Balancing – Iraq War 49](#_Toc266796012)

[No Balancing – Free-riding 50](#_Toc266796013)

[A2 Russia/China Axis 51](#_Toc266796014)

[A2 China 52](#_Toc266796015)

[A2 China Rise Violent 54](#_Toc266796017)

[A2 Chinese Defense Spending 55](#_Toc266796018)

[A2 Russia 56](#_Toc266796019)

[A2 Russia – Georgia Conflict 57](#_Toc266796020)

[A2 EU 58](#_Toc266796021)

[A2 India 63](#_Toc266796026)

[A2 Japan 64](#_Toc266796027)

[A2 BRIC 65](#_Toc266796028)

[A2 International Institutions 66](#_Toc266796029)

[A2 Soft Balancing 67](#_Toc266796030)

[A2 Soft Balancing 68](#_Toc266796031)

[A2 Soft Balancing 69](#_Toc266796032)

[A2 Soft Balancing – Emperically Denied 70](#_Toc266796033)

[A2 Resentment 71](#_Toc266796034)

[A2 Offshore Balancing 72](#_Toc266796035)

[Prefer Our Ev 73](#_Toc266796036)

## \*\*\*Sustainability\*\*\*

[Heg Sustainable – Must Reads - Long 74](#_Toc266796037)

[Heg Sustainable – Must Reads - Short 78](#_Toc266796041)

[Heg Sustainable – Distinction Cards 80](#_Toc266796042)

[Heg Sustainable – Generic 81](#_Toc266796043)

[A2 Heg Unsustainable – Generic 87](#_Toc266796049)

[Heg Sustainable – Defense Spending 88](#_Toc266796050)

[Heg Sustainable – Interdependence 90](#_Toc266796052)

[Heg Sustainable – Overlapping Incentives 91](#_Toc266796053)

[Heg Sustainable – Military Power 92](#_Toc266796054)

[Heg Sustainable – Naval Power 93](#_Toc266796055)

[Heg Sustainable – Latent Power 94](#_Toc266796056)

[Heg Sustainable – Demographics 95](#_Toc266796057)

[A2 Heg Unsustainable – Demographics 98](#_Toc266796060)

[A2 Heg Unsustainable - Trade Deficit 99](#_Toc266796061)

[A2 Heg Unsustainable – Dollar Collapse 100](#_Toc266796062)

[A2 Heg Unsustainable – Dollar Collapse 101](#_Toc266796063)

[A2 Heg Unsustainable – Economics 102](#_Toc266796064)

[A2 Heg Unsustainable –Globalization 103](#_Toc266796065)

[Unsustainability Indict 104](#_Toc266796066)

## \*\*\*Transition\*\*\*

[Transition Violent – Generic 105](#_Toc266796067)

[Transition Violent – We’ll Go Down In Flames 106](#_Toc266796068)

[Maintaining Heg Key to Smooth Transition 107](#_Toc266796069)

[Multipolarity = War 108](#_Toc266796070)

[Multipolarity = War 109](#_Toc266796071)

[Multipoarity = War – Distinction Card 110](#_Toc266796072)

[Unipolarity Solves War – Must Read 111](#_Toc266796073)

[Unipolarity Solves War – Generic 112](#_Toc266796074)

[Your Authors = Ideologically Driven 114](#_Toc266796075)

[Your Authors = Cherry-Pick Data 115](#_Toc266796076)

## \*\*\*A2 Critiques\*\*\*

[A2 Heg/Security K 118](#_Toc266796078)

[A2 Enemy Creation 120](#_Toc266796080)

[A2 Method First 121](#_Toc266796081)

[A2 Method First 122](#_Toc266796082)

[Prefer Our Impacts 123](#_Toc266796083)

[Alt Doesn’t Solve 124](#_Toc266796084)

# \*\*\*Heg Bad\*\*\*

[Heg Bad Frontline 125](#_Toc266796085)

## \*\*\*Impacts\*\*\*

[Heg Causes Nuclear War – Alliances 127](#_Toc266796087)

[A2 Heg Causes War 128](#_Toc266796088)

[Pre-emption Mod 129](#_Toc266796089)

[Terrorism Mod 130](#_Toc266796090)

[Heg = Terrorism 131](#_Toc266796091)

[Heg = Terrorism 132](#_Toc266796092)

[A2 Heg solves terror 133](#_Toc266796093)

[China Mod 134](#_Toc266796094)

[Taiwan Mod 135](#_Toc266796095)

[Space Mod 136](#_Toc266796096)

[Korea Mod 137](#_Toc266796097)

[Iraq Instability Mod 138](#_Toc266796098)

[Iran Mod 139](#_Toc266796099)

[Prolif Mod 140](#_Toc266796100)

[A2 Heg Solves Prolif 141](#_Toc266796101)

[Russia Mod 142](#_Toc266796102)

[Disease Mod 143](#_Toc266796103)

[A2 Heg Solves Peace Process 144](#_Toc266796104)

## \*\*\*Balancing\*\*\*

[Balancing Now – Generic 145](#_Toc266796105)

[Balancing Now – Obama Weakness 147](#_Toc266796107)

[Balancing Now – EU 148](#_Toc266796108)

[Balancing Now - China 149](#_Toc266796109)

[Balancing Now - Russia/China Axis 151](#_Toc266796111)

[Soft Balancing Now 152](#_Toc266796112)

[A2 Brooks and Wohlforth 154](#_Toc266796114)

[A2 Brooks and Wohlforth 155](#_Toc266796115)

## \*\*\*Sustainability\*\*\*

[Heg Unsustainable – Must Read 158](#_Toc266796117)

[Heg Unsustainable – Imperial Overstretch 160](#_Toc266796119)

[Heg Unsustainable – Economic Openess 161](#_Toc266796120)

[Heg Unsustainable – Excessive Defense Spending 162](#_Toc266796121)

[Heg Unsustainable – Debt/Deficit 163](#_Toc266796122)

[Heg Unsustainable – Demographics 165](#_Toc266796124)

[Heg Unsustainable – Economic Crisis 166](#_Toc266796125)

[Heg Unsustainable - Iran 167](#_Toc266796126)

[Heg Unsustainable – Laundry List 168](#_Toc266796127)

[Heg Unsustainable – Middle Powers 171](#_Toc266796130)

[Heg Unsustainable – Obama Weakness 172](#_Toc266796131)

[Heg Unsustainable – Transitioning Away From Military Power 173](#_Toc266796132)

[Heg Unsustainable – Iraq/WOT 174](#_Toc266796133)

## \*\*\*Transition\*\*\*

[A2 We Need to Shape the Multipolar system 175](#_Toc266796134)

[Multipolarity Inevitable – Must Reads 176](#_Toc266796135)

[Multipolarity Inevitable – Generic 179](#_Toc266796138)

[Multipolarity Inevitable – Domestic Constrainsts 181](#_Toc266796140)

[Multipolarity Inevitable – Economic Blocs 182](#_Toc266796141)

[Multipolarity Solves War 183](#_Toc266796142)

[Withdrawal = Smooth 184](#_Toc266796143)

[A2 We’ll Cling to Power 185](#_Toc266796144)

[A2 Transitions Historically Violent 186](#_Toc266796145)

[US Will Over-Rely on Heg 187](#_Toc266796146)

## \*\*\*Links\*\*\*

[Military Presence Key to Heg 188](#_Toc266796147)

[Prolif Kills Heg 189](#_Toc266796148)

[Growth Key to Heg 190](#_Toc266796149)

[Demo Promo Key to Heg 191](#_Toc266796150)

# Khalilzad 1995

## Just as reference for how much better newer cards are than this old, decrepit excuse for a piece of evidence

## U.S. hegemony solves nuclear war.

Zalmay Khalilzad (Dep. Secretary of Defense) Spring 1995 The Washington Quarterly

A world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and receptive to American values--democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, renegade states, and low level conflicts. Finally, US leadership would help preclude the rise of another global rival, enabling the US and the world to avoid another cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange.

# Leiber 2005

## Heg collapse causes global nuclear conflict – ensures the US is drawn back in

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 53-54, WEA)

Withdrawal from foreign commitments might seem to be a means of evading hostility toward the United States, but the consequences would almost certainly be harmful both to regional stability and to U.S. national interests. Although Europe would almost certainly not see the return to competitive balancing among regional powers (i.e., competition and even military rivalry between France and Germany) of the kind that some realist scholars of international relations have predicted,21 elsewhere the dangers could increase. In Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would have strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons – which they have the technological capacity to do quite quickly. Instability and regional competition could also escalate, not only between India and Pakistan, but also in Southeast Asia involving Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and possibly the Philippines. Risks in the Middle East would be likely to increase, with regional competition among the major countries of the Gulf region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) as well as Egypt, Syria, and Israel. Major regional wars, eventually involving the use of **weapons of mass destruction** plus human suffering on a vast scale, floods of refugees, economic disruption, and risks to oil supplies are all readily conceivable. Based on past experience, the United States would almost certainly be drawn back into these areas, whether to defend friendly states, to cope with a humanitarian catastrophe, or to prevent a hostile power from dominating an entire region. Steven Peter Rosen has thus fittingly observed, “If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.”22 Similarly, Niall Ferguson has added that those who dislike American predominance ought to bear in mind that **the alternative may not be a world of competing great powers, but one with no hegemon at all**. Ferguson’s warning may be hyperbolic, but it hints at the perils that the absence of a dominant power, “apolarity,” could bring “an anarchic new Dark Age of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world’s forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization’s retreat into a few fortified enclaves.”23

# Ferguson 2004

## U.S.withdrawal would leave behind a power vacuum, spurring terrorism, economic turmoil and multiple nuclear wars.

Niall Ferguson, July/August 2004 “A World Without Power,” FOREIGN POLICY Issue 143

So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous-roughly 20 times more--so friction between the world's disparate "tribes" is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization--which a new Dark Age would produce--would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of aids and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.

# Thayer 2006

## Heg key to de-escalate conflict and prevent great power war – multiple internal links

Bradley A. Thayer, November/December, 2006 “In Defense of Primacy,” NATIONAL INTEREST Issue 86

THROUGHOUT HISTORY, peace and stability have been great benefits of an era where there was a dominant power--Rome, Britain or the United States today. Scholars and statesmen have long recognized the irenic effect of power on the anarchic world of international politics. Everything we think of when we consider the current international order--free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization--is directly linked to U.S. power. Retrenchment proponents seem to think that the current system can be maintained without the current amount of U.S. power behind it. In that they are dead wrong and need to be reminded of one of history's most significant lessons: Appalling things happen when international orders collapse. The Dark Ages followed Rome's collapse. Hitler succeeded the order established at Versailles. Without U.S. power, the liberal order created by the United States will end just as assuredly. As country and western great Ral Donner sang: "You don't know what you've got (until you lose it)." Consequently, it is important to note what those good things are. In addition to ensuring the security of the United States and its allies, American primacy within the international system causes many positive outcomes for Washington and the world. The first has been a more peaceful world. During the Cold War, U.S. leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, American primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships aligned--between Greece and Turkey, Israel and Egypt, South Korea and Japan, India and Pakistan, Indonesia and Australia. This is not to say it fulfills Woodrow Wilson's vision of ending all war. Wars still occur where Washington's interests are not seriously threatened, such as in Darfur, but a Pax Americana does reduce war's likelihood, particularly war's worst form: great power wars. Second, American power gives the United States the ability to spread democracy and other elements of its ideology of liberalism: Doing so is a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as the United States because, as John Owen noted on these pages in the Spring 2006 issue, liberal democracies are more likely to align with the United States and be sympathetic to the American worldview.( n3) So, spreading democracy helps maintain U.S. primacy. In addition, once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of any type of conflict is significantly reduced. This is not because democracies do not have clashing interests. Indeed they do. Rather, it is because they are more open, more transparent and more likely to want to resolve things amicably in concurrence with U.S. leadership. And so, in general, democratic states are good for their citizens as well as for advancing the interests of the United States. Critics have faulted the Bush Administration for attempting to spread democracy in the Middle East, labeling such aft effort a modern form of tilting at windmills. It is the obligation of Bush's critics to explain why :democracy is good enough for Western states but not for the rest, and, one gathers from the argument, should not even be attempted. Of course, whether democracy in the Middle East will have a peaceful or stabilizing influence on America's interests in the short run is open to question. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in a critical October 2004 election, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. The first free elections were held in Iraq in January 2005. It was the military power of the United States that put Iraq on the path to democracy. Washington fostered democratic governments in Europe, Latin America, Asia and the Caucasus. Now even the Middle East is increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Algeria, Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt. By all accounts, the march of democracy has been impressive. Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess. Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the economic network comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat and researcher at the World Bank, who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India. Abandoning the positions of his youth, Lal now recognizes that the only way to bring relief to desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the adoption of free market economic policies and globalization, which are facilitated through American primacy.( n4) As a witness to the failed alternative economic systems, Lal is one of the strongest academic proponents of American primacy due to the economic prosperity it provides. Fourth and finally, the United States, in seeking primacy, has been willing to use its power not only to advance its interests but to promote the welfare of people all over the globe. The United States is the earth's leading source of positive externalities for the world. The U.S. military has participated in over fifty operations since the end of the Cold War--and most of those missions have been humanitarian in nature. Indeed, the U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"--it serves, de facto, as the world's police, the global paramedic and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, drought, volcanic eruption, typhoon or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra, killing some 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. Washington followed up with a large contribution of aid and deployed the U.S. military to South and Southeast Asia for many months to help with the aftermath of the disaster. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort. No other force possesses the communications capabilities or global logistical reach of the U.S. military. In fact, UN peacekeeping operations depend on the United States to supply UN forces. American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74 000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United States humanitarian missions are the equivalent of a blitzkrieg.

# Kagan 2007

## Hegemony key to de-escalate conflict – collapse causes multiple hotspots to escalate – causes global nuclear war

Robert Kagan (Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund) 2007 “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.It is easy but also dangerous to underestimate the role the United States plays in providing a measure of stability in the world even as it also disrupts stability. For instance, the United States is the dominant naval power everywhere, such that other nations cannot compete with it even in their home waters. They either happily or grudgingly allow the United States Navy to be the guarantor of international waterways and trade routes, of international access to markets and raw materials such as oil. Even when the United States engages in a war, it is able to play its role as guardian of the waterways. In a more genuinely multipolar world, however, it would not. Nations would compete for naval dominance at least in their own regions and possibly beyond. Conflict between nations would involve struggles on the oceans as well as on land. Armed embargos, of the kind used in World War i and other major conflicts, would disrupt trade flows in a way that is now impossible. Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war. People who believe greater equality among nations would be preferable to the present American predominance often succumb to a basic logical fallacy. They believe the order the world enjoys today exists independently of American power. They imagine that in a world where American power was diminished, the aspects of international order that they like would remain in place. But that ’s not the way it works. International order does not rest on ideas and institutions. It is shaped by configurations of power. The international order we know today reflects the distribution of power in the world since World War ii, and especially since the end of the Cold War. A different configuration of power, a multipolar world in which the poles were Russia, China, the United States, India, and Europe, would produce its own kind of order, with different rules and norms reflecting the interests of the powerful states that would have a hand in shaping it. Would that international order be an improvement? Perhaps for Beijing and Moscow it would. But it is doubtful that it would suit the tastes of enlightenment liberals in the United States and Europe. The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States. Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan. In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in under unfavorable circumstances. It is also optimistic to imagine that a retrenchment of the American position in the Middle East and the assumption of a more passive, “offshore” role would lead to greater stability there. The vital interest the United States has in access to oil and the role it plays in keeping access open to other nations in Europe and Asia make it unlikely that American leaders could or would stand back and hope for the best while the powers in the region battle it out. Nor would a more “even-handed” policy toward Israel, which some see as the magic key to unlocking peace, stability, and comity in the Middle East, obviate the need to come to Israel ’s aid if its security became threatened. That commitment, paired with the American commitment to protect strategic oil supplies for most of the world, practically ensures a heavy American military presence in the region, both on the seas and on the ground. The subtraction of American power from any region would not end conflict but would simply change the equation. In the Middle East, competition for influence among powers both inside and outside the region has raged for at least two centuries. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism doesn ’t change this. It only adds a new and more threatening dimension to the competition, which neither a sudden end to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians nor an immediate American withdrawal from Iraq would change. The alternative to American predominance in the region is not balance and peace. It is further competition. The region and the states within it remain relatively weak. A diminution of American influence would not be followed by a diminution of other external influences. One could expect deeper involvement by both China and Russia, if only to secure their interests. 18 And one could also expect the more powerful states of the region, particularly Iran, to expand and fill the vacuum. It is doubtful that any American administration would voluntarily take actions that could shift the balance of power in the Middle East further toward Russia, China, or Iran. The world hasn ’t changed that much. An American withdrawal from Iraq will not return things to “normal” or to a new kind of stability in the region. It will produce a new instability, one likely to draw the United States back in again.

# Knowles 2009

## Hegemony is sustainable and solves global war – there is no alternative

Robert Knowles (Assistant Professor – New York University School of Law) 2009 “american hegemony and the foreign affairs constitution” Arizona State Law Journal, Vol. 41 Lexis

First, the "hybrid" hegemonic model assumes that the goal of U.S. foreign affairs should be the preservation of American hegemony, which is more stable, more peaceful, and better for America's security and prosperity, than the alternatives. If the United States were to withdraw from its global leadership role, no other nation would be capable of taking its place. 378 The result would be radical instability and a greater risk of major war. 379 In addition, the United States would no longer benefit from the public goods it had formerly produced; as the largest consumer, it would suffer the most. Second, the hegemonic model assumes that American hegemony is unusually stable and durable. 380 As noted above, other nations have many incentives to continue to tolerate the current order. 381 And although other nations or groups of nations - China, the European Union, and India are often mentioned - may eventually overtake the United States in certain areas, such as manufacturing, the U.S. will remain dominant in most measures of capability for decades. According to 2007 estimates, the U.S. economy was projected to be twice the size of China's in 2025. 382 The U.S. accounted for half of the world's military spending in 2007 and holds enormous advantages in defense technology that far outstrip would-be competitors. 383 Predictions of American decline are not new, and they have thus far proved premature. 384

# Heg Solves War

## Heg solves great power wars - it’s key to peace

**Thayer, 07** – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., American Empire, Routledge, page 42)

Peace, like good health, is not often noticed, but certainly is missed when absent. Throughout history, peace and stability have been a major benefit of empires. In fact, pax Romana in Latin means the Roman peace, or the stabil-ity brought about by the Roman Empire. Rome’s power was so overwhelming that no one could challenge it successfully for hundreds of years. The result was stability within the Roman Empire. Where Rome conquered, peace, law, order, education, a common language, and much else followed. That was true of the British Empire (pax Britannica) too.

So it is with the United States today. Peace and stability are major benefits of the American Empire. The fact that America is so powerful actually reduces the likelihood of major war. Scholars of international politics have found that the presence of a dominant state in international politics actually reduces the likelihood of war because weaker states, including even great powers, know that it is unlikely that they could challenge the dominant state and win. They may resort to other mechanisms or tactics to challenge the dominant coun-try, but are unlikely to do so directly. This means that there will be no wars between great powers. At least, not until a challenger (certainly China) thinks it can overthrow the dominant state (the United States). But there will be intense security competition—both China and the United States will watch each other closely, with their intelligence communities increasingly focused on each other, their diplomats striving to ensure that countries around the world do not align with the other, and their militaries seeing the other as their principal threat. This is not unusual in international politics but, in fact, is its “normal” condition. Americans may not pay much attention to it until a crisis occurs. But right now states are competing with one another. This is because international politics does not sleep; it never takes a rest.

## Hegemonic decline ensures global instability and war

**Thayer, 06** – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., “In Defense of Primacy,” National Interest, November/December, Lexis)

A grand strategy based on American primacy means ensuring the United States stays the world's number one power--the diplomatic, economic and military leader. Those arguing against primacy claim that the United States should retrench, either because the United States lacks the power to maintain its primacy and should withdraw from its global commitments, or because the maintenance of primacy will lead the United States into the trap of "imperial overstretch." In the previous issue of The National Interest, Christopher Layne warned of these dangers of primacy and called for retrenchment.1

Those arguing for a grand strategy of retrenchment are a diverse lot. They include isolationists, who want no foreign military commitments; selective engagers, who want U.S. military commitments to centers of economic might; and offshore balancers, who want a modified form of selective engagement that would have the United States abandon its landpower presence abroad in favor of relying on airpower and seapower to defend its interests.

But retrenchment, in any of its guises, must be avoided. If the United States adopted such a strategy, it would be a profound strategic mistake that would lead to far greater instability and war in the world, imperil American security and deny the United States and its allies the benefits of primacy.

# Heg De-escalates Conflict

## Heg is sustainable and will de-escalate all scenarios for nuclear conflict

**Joffe 09** Josef, Senior Fellow at Stanford's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, ("The Default Power Subtitle: The False Prophecy of America's Decline", Foreign Affairs, Oct 2009)   
And yet, for all the anti-Americanism that has coursed through western Europe, the Islamic world, and Latin America in recent years, the United States has remained the world's dominant power. When it adopted a hands-off policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict in the early years of the Bush administration, no other state could fill the vacuum. And when it decided to reengage in the peace process in Annapolis in 2007, everybody showed up; no other government could have mustered that much convening power. Nor could any other nation have harnessed the global coalition that has been fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. The six-party talks with North Korea were orchestrated by the United States; on the other hand, the three-party talks with Iran -- led by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom -- could not put a stop to Iran's nuclear ambitions. The moral is that either the United States takes care of the heavy lifting or nobody does. And this is the concise definition of a default power. Nor can the rest truly constrain U.S. might. France, Germany, and Russia tried to do so in the run-up to the second Iraq war, in 2003, but ultimately could not stop the U.S. behemoth. In a grudging homage to U.S. power, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder helped the war effort by granting the United States basing and overflight rights and agreeing to guard U.S. installations in the country to free up U.S. forces for duty in Iraq. More recently, in 2008, it was the United Kingdom and the United States -- rather than the G-20 -- that took the lead in battling the global financial crisis, with massive stimulus measures and injections of liquidity. The speed with which Barack Obama captured hearts and minds around the world after his election in November 2008 represented a rare moment in the annals of the great powers -- a moment of relief at having a U.S. president who made it possible for the world to love his country again. Of course, the United States will not get its way always or everywhere, nor will worldwide affection for Obama translate into a surfeit of U.S. influence. The default power is still an überpower, and other states will seek to balance against it. China and Russia, for example, protect Iran and North Korea from painful UN sanctions. Meanwhile, China and the United States hold each other hostage in a state of M-MAD, or "monetary mutual assured destruction." China cannot unload hundreds of billions of dollars' worth of U.S. Treasury bills without destroying the dollar and its trade surplus, which created its hoard in the first place. Nor can Washington force Beijing to give up on its predatory trade and exchange-rate policies without suffering monetary retaliation. But financial deterrence does not a new default power make. The economic storm that hit the United States in 2008 has triggered a tsunami in China, which has cut its growth rate in half -- although six percent is still a lot better than the negative growth suffered by much of the West. And like the world's other aspiring powers, China lacks the legitimacy that transforms muscle into leadership. The Obama administration grasps this enduring essence of world politics -- it adds kindness to clout, amicability to hard assets. Take Obama's overtures to the Muslim world, outlined first in his inaugural address and then more fully in his speech in Cairo in June. Prince Obama needs no advice from Machiavelli, who famously counseled that it is best to be both loved and feared. By flattering the Islamic world and widening the distance between Israel and the United States, the Obama administration hopes to improve its chances of forging a Sunni Arab alliance against Iran. Forgoing the use of force against Iran's and North Korea's nuclear armaments may be more than just an act of prudence, especially when the costs of war -- say, retaliation by Iran against tanker traffic in the Persian Gulf or a North Korean attack on South Korea -- loom larger than the risks of proliferation down the road. What cannot be averted might just as well be turned into a diplomatic advantage. Tehran's and Pyongyang's unchecked nuclear ambitions may well facilitate U.S.-led coalition building against them. A default power always gains stature when the demand for its services soars. The default power does what others cannot or will not do. It underwrites Europe's security against a resurgent Russia -- which is why U.S. troops remain welcome there even 20 years after Moscow's capitulation in the Cold War. It helps the Europeans take care of local malefactors, such as former Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. It chastises whoever reaches for mastery over the Middle East, thus the United States helped Iraq in its war against Iran between 1980 and 1988 and then defanged it in 1991 and again in 2003. Only the default power has the power to harness a coalition against Iran, the new pretender in the Middle East. It guarantees the survival of Israel, but at the same time, the Palestinians and the Saudis look to the United States for leverage against Jerusalem. Is it possible to imagine China, Europe, or Russia as a more persuasive mediator? No, because only the United States can insure both the Arabs and the Israelis against the consequences of misplaced credulity. In the new Great Game, the United States offers itself as a silent partner against Russian attempts to restore sway over its former satrapies, and it leads the renewed battle against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, signaling ever so softly that it will sequester Pakistan's nuclear weapons if chaos widens into collapse. At the same time, only the United States can rein in both India and Pakistan and protect each against the other. The United States has drawn India into its orbit, and in doing so it has added to the

[Continued on Next Page, No Text Deleted]

# Heg De-escalates Conflict

[Continued From Previous Page, No Text Deleted]

informal balance against China. Dreams of Asia Rising must pay respect to a strategic reality centered on the United States as the underwriter of regional security. Whether Vietnam or Japan, South Korea or Australia -- all of Asia counts on the United States to keep China on its best behavior and Japan from going nuclear. Gainsayers will still dramatize China's growth rates as a harbinger of a grand power shift. The facts and figures and the story of the resistible rise of previous contenders should give pause to those who either cheer or fear the United States' abdication. Linearity is not a good predictor. Imperial powers have regularly succumbed to the ebb and flow of power, although in the United Kingdom's case, that took 300 years. How long will the United States' luck last? Addicted to constant reinvention, it should not fall prey to the rigor mortis that overwhelmed the Ottoman, Austrian, Russian, and Soviet empires. As the twenty-first century unfolds, the United States will be younger and more dynamic than its competitors. And as a liberal empire, it can work the international system with fewer costs than yesterday's behemoths, which depended on territorial possessions and had to conduct endless wars against natives and rivals. A Tyrannosaurus rex faces costlier resistance than the bumbling bull that is the United States. A final point to ponder: Who would actually want to live in a world dominated by China, India, Japan, Russia, or even Europe, which for all its enormous appeal cannot take care of its own backyard? Not even those who have been trading in glee and gloom decade after decade would prefer any of them to take over as housekeeper of the world.

# Hotspot Escalation Mod

## Diminished influence increases the risk of war between China and Taiwan, Russia and Georgia, India and Pakistan, Iran and Israel, as well as Mid East and Asian instability

**Kagan, 07** – Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136)

The current order, of course, is not only far from perfect but also offers no guarantee against major conflict among the world ’s great powers. Even under the umbrella of unipolarity, regional conflicts involving the large powers may erupt. War could erupt between China and Taiwan and draw in both the United States and Japan. War could erupt between Russia and Georgia, forcing the United States and its European allies to decide whether to intervene or suffer the consequences of a Russian victory. Conflict between India and Pakistan remains possible, as does conflict between Iran and Israel or other Middle Eastern states. These, too, could draw in other great powers, including the United States.

Such conflicts may be unavoidable no matter what policies the United States pursues. But they are more likely to erupt if the United States weakens or withdraws from its positions of regional dominance. This is especially true in East Asia, where most nations agree that a reliable American power has a stabilizing and pacific effect on the region. That is certainly the view of most of China ’s neighbors. But even China, which seeks gradually to supplant the United States as the dominant power in the region, faces the dilemma that an American withdrawal could unleash an ambitious, independent, nationalist Japan.

**These go nuclear**

**Kagan, 07** – Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136)

The jostling for status and influence among these ambitious nations and would-be nations is a second defining feature of the new post-Cold War international system. Nationalism in all its forms is back, if it ever went away, and so is international competition for power, influence, honor, and status. American predominance prevents these rivalries from intensifying — its regional as well as its global predominance. Were the United States to diminish its influence in the regions where it is currently the strongest power, the other nations would settle disputes as great and lesser powers have done in the past: sometimes through diplomacy and accommodation but often through confrontation and wars of varying scope, intensity, and destructiveness. One novel aspect of such a multipolar world is that most of these powers would possess nuclear weapons. That could make wars between them less likely, or it could simply make them more catastrophic.

# Heg Solves Hotspot Escalation

## Outweighs—dozens of nuclear flashpoints are ready to erupt absent American leadership

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 163-164, WEA)

The countries of Asia are emerging for the first time in modern history as a regional cluster of strong, relatively prosperous and independent states. But will the 21st century see them increasingly engaged in the type of strategic rivalry previously experienced in Europe?15 In this light, the American presence in Asia significantly mitigates the security dilemmas that would otherwise exist. With its military deployments and a major political and diplomatic presence, the United States provides both deterrence and reassurance. In key respects, and despite obvious differences of geography and history, this resembles America’s presence in Europe over the past six decades. There, Europe’s “American pacifier”16 resolved the insecurities that Western Europe’s major states had long had vis-a-vis one another. With the United States bound to Europe’s security through its deployment of troops and leadership of NATO, and with Germany, France, Italy, Britain, and others securely embedded within the alliance, each of the European powers no longer had to prepare for or seek alliances to ensure their security, especially against a future resurgent Germany whose power had destabilized the continent after 1871 and caused two devastating world wars. In short, the American role largely eliminated the security dilemma for the countries of Western Europe. In Asia, even more than in Europe, no international organization or institution can offer the kind of reassurance the United States provides nor have a comparable impact in reducing competition among regional powers. Despite the successes of Asian regional bodies in playing larger economic and political roles, no one realistically looks to APEC, ARF, or any other regional actor to cope with major security threats.17 Moreover, **potential conflicts in Asia are at least as dangerous as those in the Middle East and far more so than in Europe.** They include the China-Taiwan issue, North Korea’s nuclear program and the threat its huge conventional forces pose to South Korea, the nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan and their conflict over the disputed territory of Kashmir, instability in Pakistan, terrorism within countries such as the Philippines and Indonesia, increasing strains in the relationship between Japan and China, and a series of flashpoints involving China and its other neighbors. It is thus important to consider the major Asian cases individually.

## Heg solves multiple wars gobally

**Thayer, 07** – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., American Empire, Routledge, page 108)

The fourth critical fact to consider is that the security provided by the power of the United States creates stability in international politics. That is vitally important for the world, but easily forgotten. Harvard professor Joseph Nye often compares the security provided by the United States to oxygen. If it were taken away, a person would think of nothing else. If the security and sta-bility provided by the United States were taken away, most countries would be much worse of, and arms races, vicious security competition, and wars would result. It would be a world without NATO or other key U.S. alliances. We can imagine easily conflict between traditional rivals like Greece and Turkey, Syria and Israel, India and Pakistan, Taiwan and China, Russia and Georgia, Hungary and Romania, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and an intense arms race between China and Japan. In that world, the breakup of Yugoslavia would have been a far bloodier affair that might have escalated to become another European war. In contrast to what might occur absent U.S.

# Genocide Mod

## Primacy fills in for powerless institutions—key to solve genocide and mass violence globally

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 51-52, WEA)

The United States possesses the military and economic means to act assertively on a global basis, but should it do so, and if so, how? In short, if the United States conducts itself in this way, will the world be safer and more stable, and is such a role in America’s national interest? Here, the anarchy problem is especially pertinent. The capacity of the United Nations to act, especially in coping with the most urgent and deadly problems, is severely limited, and in this sense, the demand for “global governance” far exceeds the supply. Since its inception in 1945, there have only been two occasions (Korea in 1950 and Kuwait in 1991) when the U.N. Security Council authorized the use of force, and in both instances the bulk of the forces were provided by the United States. In the most serious cases, especially those involving international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic cleansing, civil war, and mass murder, if America does not take the lead, no other country or organization is willing or able to respond effectively. The deadly cases of Bosnia (1991–95) and Rwanda (1994) make this clear. In their own way, so did the demonstrations by the people of Liberia calling for American intervention to save them from the ravages of predatory militias in a failed state. And the weakness of the international reaction to ethnic cleansing, rape, and widespread killing in the Darfur region of Western Sudan provides a more recent example.

## Makes extinction invevitable

Kenneth J. Campbell, assistant professor of political science and international relations at the University of Delaware, 2001, Genocide and the Global Village, p. 15-16

Regardless of where or on how small a scale it begins, the crime of genocide is the complete ideological repudiation of, and a direct murderous assault upon, the prevailing liberal international order. Genocide is fundamentally incompatible with, and destructive of an open, tolerant, democratic, free market international order. As genocide scholar Herbert Hirsch has explained: The unwillingness of the world community to take action to end genocide and political massacres is not only immoral but also impractical. [W]ithout some semblance of stability, commerce, travel, and the international and intranational interchange of goods and information are subjected to severe disruptions. Where genocide is permitted to proliferate, the liberal international order cannot long survive. No group will be safe; every group will wonder when they will be next. Left unchecked, genocide threatens to destroy whatever security, democracy, and prosperity exists in the present international system. As Roger Smith notes: Even the most powerful nations—those armed with nuclear weapons—may end up in struggles that will lead (accidentally, intentionally, insanely) to the ultimate genocide in which they destroy not only each other, but [humankind] mankind itself, sewing the fate of the earth forever with a final genocidal effort. In this sense, genocide is a grave threat to the very fabric of the international system and must be stopped, even at some risk to lives and treasure. The preservation and growth of the present liberal international order is a *vital* interest for all of its members—states as well as non-states—whether or not those members recognize and accept the reality of that objective interest. Nation states, as the principal members of the present international order, are the only authoritative holders of violent enforcement powers. Non-state actors, though increasing in power relative to states, still do not possess the military force, or the democratic authority to use military force, which is necessary to stop determined perpetrators of mass murder. Consequently, nation-states have a special responsibility to prevent, suppress, and punish all malicious assaults on the fundamental integrity of the prevailing international order.

# Emboldened Rogues Mod

## Heg collapse emboldens rogues – it signals weakness

**Thayer, 06** – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., “In Defense of Primacy,” National Interest, November/December, Lexis)

In contrast, a strategy based on retrenchment will not be able to achieve these fundamental objectives of the United States. Indeed, retrenchment will make the United States less secure than the present grand strategy of primacy. This is because threats will exist no matter what role America chooses to play in international politics. Washington cannot call a "time out", and it cannot hide from threats. Whether they are terrorists, rogue states or rising powers, history shows that threats must be confronted. Simply by declaring that the United States is "going home", thus abandoning its commitments or making unconvincing half-pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect American wishes to retreat. To make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true of the anarchic world of international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats that confront the United States, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from

## Causes global wars that escalate – perception is key

Victor Davis Hanson (Senior Fellow in Residence in Classics and Military History @ Hoover Institution, Stanford University) December 2009 “Change, Weakness, Disaster, Obama: Answers from Victor Davis Hanson,” http://www.resistnet.com/group/oregon/forum/topics/change-weakness-disaster-obama/showLastReply

Dr. Hanson: Obama is one bow and one apology away from a circus. The world can understand a kowtow gaffe to some Saudi royals, but not as part of a deliberate pattern. Ditto the mea culpas. Much of diplomacy rests on public perceptions, however trivial. We are now in a great waiting game, as regional hegemons, wishing to redraw the existing landscape — whether China, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, etc. — are just waiting to see who’s going to be the first to try Obama — and whether Obama really will be as tenuous as they expect. If he slips once, it will be 1979 redux, when we saw the rise of radical Islam, the Iranian hostage mess, the communist inroads in Central America, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, etc. BC: With what country then — Venezuela, Russia, Iran, etc. — do you believe his global repositioning will cause the most damage? Dr. Hanson: I think all three. I would expect, in the next three years, Iran to get the bomb and begin to threaten ever so insidiously its Gulf neighborhood; Venezuela will probably cook up some scheme to do a punitive border raid into Colombia to apprise South America that U.S. friendship and values are liabilities; and Russia will continue its energy bullying of Eastern Europe, while insidiously pressuring autonomous former republics to get back in line with some sort of new Russian autocratic commonwealth. There’s an outside shot that North Korea might do something really stupid near the 38th parallel and China will ratchet up the pressure on Taiwan. India’s borders with both Pakistan and China will heat up. I think we got off the back of the tiger and now no one quite knows whom it will bite or when. BC: Can Obama get any more mileage from his perpetually played “I’m not George W. Bush” card or is that card past its expiration date? Dr. Hanson: Two considerations: 1) It’s hard (in addition to being shameless), after a year, for any president to keep scapegoating a prior administration. 2) I think he will drop the reset/“Bush did it” throat-clearing soon, as his polls continue to stay below 50 percent. In other words, it seems to be a losing trope, poll-wise. Americans hate whining and blame-gaming. So the apologies and bows don’t go over well here at home; one more will be really toxic, politically speaking. Most are starting to see that our relations with Britain, Italy, Germany, or France are no better under Obama — and probably worse — than during the Bush administration.

# Peace Process Mod

## Only heg solves a permanent Israel-Palestine solution

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 152-154, WEA)

There can be no doubt that the United States has played an indispensable role in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict and that it is the only effective broker or mediator between the two sides. American diplomats and Presidents helped to negotiate cease-fire and disengagement agreements in the successive wars, hosted the Camp David talks of 1977 that led to peace between Israel and Egypt, provided economic aid to the former belligerents, and stationed troops in the Sinai to monitor compliance. Under President Clinton, the United States provided the venue for the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Agreement in 1993, acted as indispensable intermediary during the rest of the decade, and led negotiations in the year 2000 that came close to ending the conflict. Following the collapse of those efforts and the coming to office of the Bush administration in January 2001, there was widespread criticism of the United States for its ostensible inaction. However, the administration repeatedly sought to halt the violence and renew the peace talks through a series of measures, including the Mitchell and Tenet Plans. In June 2002, President Bush took a groundbreaking step by calling for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within three years, but conditioned this on the Palestinians achieving new leadership not compromised by corruption and terror. In 2003, together with the U.N., E.U., and Russia, a group known as the “Quartet,” his administration co-sponsored a new “road map” for peace. Despite a lesser degree of diplomatic engagement than had been the case in earlier years, there was a fundamental coherence to Bush policies, including the insistence that no progress could be made with Arafat, that Israel had the right to fight terrorism, that Arab neighbors needed to play a constructive role, and that Europeans should use their influence and financial incentives to discourage corruption and authoritarianism. In the meantime the United States would stand ready to facilitate peace once the necessary local conditions began to emerge. With the death of Arafat, followed by genuinely free elections in Gaza and the West Bank in January 2005, progress toward deescalating the conflict and establishing a viable peace process reemerged. The Israel government of Prime Minister Sharon and the Palestinian Authority under President Mahmoud Abbas swiftly agreed on a ceasefire and direct negotiations. Egypt and Jordan joined in this effort and returned their ambassadors to Tel Aviv, andWashington made clear its strong support for Israel’s disengagement from Gaza and for steps to strengthen the newly elected and relatively pragmatic Palestine leader. Daunting obstacles remained, including ensuring a lasting halt to terrorism, improving the living conditions of Palestinians, and grappling with difficult final status issues (borders, right of return, settlements, Jerusalem, security), but the logic of American policies was largely vindicated by these events. Again and again during the past half-century it has been painfully clear that only the United States has the ability to serve as an effective interlocutor between Israel and its Arab adversaries. This is a direct result of not just America’s power, but especially its long-standing ties with Israel. Other world actors lack sufficient weight, are seen by Israel as tilting toward their adversaries, or – in the case of the U.N. – so dominated by the weight of the Arab and non-aligned voting blocs in the General Assembly as to be biased against the Jewish state. **Any resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is inconceivable without Washington’s leadership.** All the same, peace requires that each of the belligerents be prepared for a lasting peace. In assessing the failure of the peace talks that took place in the year 2000, Dennis Ross, America’s leading negotiator under three Presidents, later observed that although there was some blame on all sides, the tragic failure had stemmed primarily from Yasir Arafat’s ultimate unwillingness to end the conflict.54Although America’s role makes it the target of intense criticism within the Arab world, the problems plaguing the region occur largely independent of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The political, economic, and social difficulties of the Middle East would only secondarily be affected by a Palestinian solution. And some of the worst problems would be totally unaffected, for example, ethnic cleansing and murder in the Darfur region of Western Sudan, misrule by the mullahs in Iran, the treatment of women in Saudi Arabia, or the Islamists’ obsession with overturning existing regimes and imposing puritanical Muslim rule throughout the region. Insofar as Iraq is concerned, the IsraeliPalestine conflict was irrelevant to Saddam’s invasions of Iran (1980) and Kuwait (1990), his regional ambitions, weapons programs, and defiance of the U.N., his use of chemical weapons against Iranians and Kurds, his era of brutal Ba’athist rule, and his murder of at least 400,000 Iraqis.

## Global Nuclear war

Kamal Nawash (immigration lawyer and legal director of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee) 2009 “ Israel/Palestine Conflict May Lead to Nuclear War” http://www.freemuslims.org/news.php?id=4240

Surprise, surprise, once again the Palestinian/Israeli conflict spirals out of control. However, this particular battle has produced circumstantial evidence that the conflict has become more dangerous than ever before. Unless a permanent solution is found soon, the violence may increase in severity until the conflict ends tragically. In the latest fighting, Israel has bombed the HAMAS controlled city of Gaza for the stated reason of neutralizing HAMAS and stopping them from firing rockets into Southern Israel. As of the date of this article, approximately 800 Palestinians and 10 Israelis have been killed. HAMAS' stated reasons for firing the rockets is to end the siege of Gaza by Israel which HAMAS alleges is preventing the free movement of people and goods and causing a humanitarian crisis. Israel denies the existence of a humanitarian crisis and refuses to end the siege of Gaza unless HAMAS recognizes Israel or is out power. In general, what makes the Palestinian/Israeli conflict so dangerous is that half the world, (three billion people (Jews, Christians & Muslims)) are emotionally, historically and religiously attached to the land known as Israel/Palestine. This fact was demonstrated in the last few days as demonstrations erupted in more than 95 countries around the world. Moreover, due to the affordability of satellite TV, in even the most underdeveloped countries, billions of interested people are exposed to 24 hour graphic coverage of this latest battle in Gaza. Western News stations like BBC and CNN no longer have a monopoly on reporting news. Many Middle Eastern TV stations have surpassed the reach of BBC, CNN and other western media. As to graphic images, dozens of news stations like Aljazeera have been broadcasting live and prerecorded graphic images of Palestinian babies blown up into pieces by the Israeli military. One particular gruesome scene that was played over and over again was that of a three year old little girl with her heart protruding out of her body after a bomb fell on her house. Another station, Al Alam, repeated the scene of four dead babies who were placed next to each other in the same refrigerator of a morgue because of the large number of dead in Gaza. The graphic and often emotional coverage of this latest battle is inspiring the fury of the masses which in turn are putting enormous pressure on their governments to join the fight on the side of the Palestinians. This conflict is much more dangerous than most people realize. For example, Egypt is receiving so much negative media coverage for not opening its border with Gaza that People throughout the Arab and Muslim world started calling for the overthrow of the Egyptian government and demonstrators attacked Egyptian embassies in several countries. The pressure on Egypt is so intense and ruthless that a shaken Egyptian president was forced to hold two press conferences to explain his government's position and to distance Egypt from Israel. Similarly, the friendly nation of Jordan came under so much pressure for not breaking diplomatic relations with Israel that King Abdullah held a publicity stunt in which he was seen donating blood for the people of Gaza and for the first time in recent memory he referred to Israel as the Enemy. Even the Saudi government was not immune from attacks and calls for the overthrow of the Saudi government. Media outlets repeated scenes of demonstrators burning the effigy of the King of Saudi Arabia with the Israeli flag wrapped around him for hundreds of millions of people to see. Saudi Arabia is perceived as a secret ally of Israel in the desire to destroy HAMAS and the refusal of the Saudi government to allow demonstrations against Israel only reinforced this belief. Whatever the truth, the Saudi government was so shaken by the attacks against it and the constant portrayal of the Saudi King rapped in the Israeli flag that the official Saudi media began publicizing Saudi efforts to raise money for the people of Gaza. The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is becoming extremely dangerous and can only be described as a ticking NUCLEAR BOMB. Currently, only Israel has nuclear weapons in the Middle East. But Iran may also go nuclear and if that happens the Arabs will try to do the same. Without a doubt, there is no conflict on earth that has the same global impact as the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. Because of the potential for global instability, the entire world must do all it can to bring peace between the Palestinians and Israelis. The question is can this conflict be solved after many wars failed to end the conflict? The answer is YES but time is running out.

# Heg Solves Peace Process

## Heg collapse destroys US influence over the Arab-Israeli conflict

Richard Haas (president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April 2008 “Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?” http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask\_the\_expert.html

How will the Israeli-Arab conflict be affected by a shift from a unipolar world? What could be the main differences (in that particular issue) between a multipolar and prior bipolar scene (roughly US vs. USSR)? Enrique Fleischmann, Barcelona Richard Haass: In a nonpolar world, the ability of the United States to shape the greater Middle East will be reduced. Other entities, including local states (Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iraq, Syria), militias, terrorist groups, political parties and movements, sovereign wealth funds, etc., will all have influence of their own and reduce what it is the United States or any outside power can accomplish. That said, the United States will retain considerable influence in the region, although less than it has enjoyed in recent decades.

# A2 Israel Support = Root of Backlash

## Israel support not root cause of backlash

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 154-155, WEA)

For their part, the most important jihadist movements arose for reasons having little to do with Israel. The ideological godfather of modern Islamist holy war, Sayid Qutb, whose ideas later influenced al-Qaeda, spent the years 1948–51 in the United States. There he developed a deep rage against what he saw as American decadence, and he did so well before America and Israel had established their close military, political, and economic relationship. Al-Qaeda itself grew out of the Afghan mujahadeen of the late 1980s, which had waged a bitter guerrilla war against the Soviet occupation. Israel was irrelevant to that struggle, and when Osama bin Laden did make the Jewish state a target, he added it opportunistically to an already crowded list, including the American presence in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, the Russians in Chechnya, India in Kashmir, and the oppression of Muslims in the Balkans. Bin Laden viewed Israel as secondary to America, which he described as the “head of the snake.”

## Israel not root cause

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 181-182, WEA)

Prior to September 11, the most deadly terrorist attacks or attempted attacks on American targets took place not during periods of acute Arab-Israeli violence but when the peace process was in full flower. For example, in January 1995, when Israel had turned over control of Gaza and most of the West Bank, including almost all of the local population, to the Palestinian Authority and when optimism about resolution of the conflict was at its peak, al-Qaeda planned to blow up as many as twelve American wide-bodied aircraft over the Pacific in a plot that was interrupted by a chance event in the Philippines.12 Other attacks, including those against the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, also took place while expectations still ran high for a settlement of the conflict. In addition, for half a century, the United States has been the indispensable catalyst and intermediary for almost every one of the negotiations and agreements reached between Israel and its Arab adversaries.

# Asian Stability Mod

## Primacy is the lynchpin of Asian stability—decline risks war, deterrence breakdowns, and prolif

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, page 158, WEA)

Parallels between America’s role in East Asia and its involvements in Europe might seem far-fetched. Asia’s geography and history are enormously different, there is no regional organization in any way comparable to the European Union, the area is not a zone of peace, conflict among its leading states remains a potential risk, and there is nothing remotely resembling NATO as a formal multilateral alliance binding the United States to the region’s security and the regional states to one another. Yet, as in Europe, **the United States plays a unique stabilizing role in Asia that no other country or organization is capable of playing**. Far from being a source of tension or instability, this presence tends to reduce competition among regional powers and to deter armed conflict. Disengagement, as urged by some critics of American primacy, would probably lead to more dangerous competition or power-balancing among the principal countries of Asia as well as to a more unstable security environment and the spread of nuclear weapons. As a consequence, even China acquiesces in America’s regional role despite the fact that it is the one country with the long-term potential to emerge as a true major power competitor.

## Global nuclear war – most probable scenario

Jonathan S. Landay (national security and intelligence correspondent for the Contra Costa Times) March 10, 2000, Knight Ridder/Tribune News Service, “Top administration officials warn stakes for U.S. are high in Asian conflicts” Lexis

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy and even start a nuclear war. India, Pakistan and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. And Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe. "Nowhere else on Earth are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile," said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. "We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential disaster." In an effort to cool the region's tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel Berger all will hopscotch Asia's capitals this month. For America, the stakes could hardly be higher. There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would instantly become embroiled if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. And while Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime. In addition, globalization has made a stable Asia with its massive markets, cheap labor, exports and resources indispensable to the U.S. economy. Numerous U.S. firms and millions of American jobs depend on trade with Asia that totaled $600 billion last year, according to the Commerce Department.

# Korea Mod

## Hegemony is key to stabilize Korea and prevent regional arms races

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 164-166, WEA)

On the Korean peninsula, in one of the world’s most dangerous and most heavily armed regions, the American military commitment has deterred North Korea from seeking to invade the South. Paradoxically, even while they engage in their most important mutual contacts in half a century, the leaders of the two Koreas have called for the United States to remain on the peninsula. In the words of the North Korean leader, Kim Jong Il, as quoted by former South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, “We are surrounded by big powers – Russia, Japan and China – so the United States must continue to stay for stability and peace in East Asia.”18 At the same time, there are risks that the United States could be drawn into a major military conflict in Korea. Though Pyongyang has at times been willing to negotiate with the United States, its strategy has habitually combined bargaining, deception, and blackmail. Notably, in the case of the October 1994 Agreed Framework, the North agreed to freeze its existing nuclear facilities, and Washington undertook to assist it in obtaining two new proliferation-resistant light water reactors for producing electrical power (mainly financed by South Korea and Japan) and in the interim to provide heavy fuel oil for free. However, within months of signing the agreement – and some seven years before President Bush labeled the regime as part of the “axis of evil” – North Korea began violating its terms by secretly constructing plants for the production of highly enriched uranium. In October 2002, the North privately admitted to U.S. diplomats the existence of this program, and in 2003 it forced the removal of outside inspectors, renounced its signature on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, unsealed 8,000 fuel rods and proclaimed that it would reprocess the nuclear material in them, and announced that it possessed nuclear weapons. For more than a decade, North Korea thus has seemed determined both to negotiate for major concessions from the United States and others in the form of aid and security guarantees and to continue with its nuclear weapons program.19 America faces dangerous choices in dealing with North Korea, but it does not do so in isolation. Because of shared concerns over the North’s behavior and the dangers a nuclear North Korea would pose, four strong regional neighbors – China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia – have been inclined to cooperate with the United States in six-party negotiations with Pyongyang. The relationships among these countries and with Washington have been complicated and often difficult, and China has sometimes been unhelpful, but all of them would face adverse security consequences from an unrestrained North Korean nuclear program. Based on past experience it is widely assumed that North Korean weapons and technology would be sold abroad and that a perilous regional nuclear arms race would erupt, with Japan and possibly South Korea going nuclear to deter Pyongyang,20 China reacting by increasing its own nuclear weapons deployment, India expanding its arsenal in response to China, Pakistan seeking to keep up with India, Iran accelerating its nuclear ambitions, and other countries such as Taiwan attempting to acquire nuclear weapons as well.21 The South Korean case also provides evidence of why countries in the region continue to favor the American presence. In December 2002, South Korea elected a new president, Roh Moo-hyun, representing a new generation of democratic, affluent, and educated voters with little or no memory of the Korean War half a century ago. Roh came to office having pledged to deemphasize the long-standing relationship with the United States and to seek closer ties with North Korea. Anti– United States demonstrations in February 2003 seemed to suggest a shift in public sentiment as well. But Roh and his supporters ultimately found themselves closing ranks with America. North Korea’s intransigence and its nuclear program provided strong motivation, as did Washington’s mid-2003 unveiling of plans for realignment and rebalancing of its forces in Korea and East Asia. In February 2004, in an act that symbolized its solidarity with the United States, the South Korean government agreed to dispatch 3,000 troops to Northern Iraq, and the National Assembly approved the measure by a three-to-one margin.22 A few months later, in June 2004, when Washington announced that one-third of the 37,000 American troops stationed in Korea would be withdrawn and the remainder repositioned to bases less vulnerable to a sudden North Korean attack across the demilitarized zone, the South Korean President, political leaders, and media responded with concern. Anxious about any sign of a weakened U.S. presence, the Seoul government gained Washington’s agreement that the drawdown would take place gradually and would not be completed until 2008. Reactions to this change in American deployment showed how much the U.S. presence is still desired. The realignment plan provided for a smaller and less intrusive “footprint” and one more appropriate to a democratic South Korean society that had chafed at a conspicuous foreign presence and a large base in the very heart of Seoul. The changes also modernized the foundation for a sustained American regional role by shifting to more flexible force structures with emphasis on high-tech weaponry and long-range precision strikes.

## Lash-out and nuclear extinction

Africa News 1999 (10-25, Lexis)

Lusaka - If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and probably reduce earth to a huge smouldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in Far East Asia. Ever since the end of the savage three-year Korean war in the early 1950s, military tension between the hard-line communist north and the American backed South Korea has remained dangerously high. In fact the Koreas are technically still at war. A foreign visitor to either Pyongyong in the North or Seoul in South Korea will quickly notice that the divided country is always on maximum alert for any eventuality. North Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has never forgiven the US for coming to the aid of South Korea during the Korean war. She still regards the US as an occupation force in South Korea and wholly to blame for the non-reunification of the country. North Korean media constantly churns out a tirade of attacks on "imperialist" America and its "running dog" South Korea. The DPRK is one of the most secretive countries in the world where a visitor is given the impression that the people's hatred for the US is absolute while the love for their government is total. Whether this is really so, it is extremely difficult to conclude. In the DPRK, a visitor is never given a chance to speak to ordinary Koreans about the politics of their country. No visitor moves around alone without government escort. The American government argues that its presence in South Korea was because of the constant danger of an invasion from the north. America has vast economic interests in South Korea. She points out that the north has dug numerous tunnels along the demilitarised zone as part of the invasion plans. She also accuses the north of violating South Korean territorial waters. Early this year, a small North Korean submarine was caught in South Korean waters after getting entangled in fishing nets. Both the Americans and South Koreans claim the submarine was on a military spying mission. However, the intension of the alleged intrusion will probably never be known because the craft's crew were all found with fatal gunshot wounds to their heads in what has been described as suicide pact to hide the truth of the mission. The US mistrust of the north's intentions is so deep that it is no secret that today Washington has the largest concentration of soldiers and weaponry of all descriptions in south Korea than anywhere else in the World, apart from America itself. Some of the armada that was deployed in the recent bombing of Iraq and in Operation Desert Storm against the same country following its invasion of Kuwait was from the fleet permanently stationed on the Korean Peninsula. It is true too that at the moment the North/South Korean border is the most fortified in the world. The border line is littered with anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles and is constantly patrolled by warplanes from both sides. It is common knowledge that America also keeps an eye on any military movement or build-up in the north through spy satellites. The DPRK is said to have an estimated one million soldiers and a huge arsenal of various weapons. Although the DPRK regards herself as a developing country, she can however be classified as a super-power in terms of military might. The DPRK is capable of producing medium and long-range missiles. Last year, for example, she test-fired a medium range missile over Japan, an action that greatly shook and alarmed the US, Japan and South Korea. The DPRK says the projectile was a satellite. There have also been fears that she was planning to test another ballistic missile capable of reaching North America. Naturally, the world is anxious that military tension on the Korean Peninsula must be defused to avoid an apocalypse on earth. It is therefore significant that the American government announced a few days ago that it was moving towards normalising relations with North Korea

# NATO Mod

## Heg key to the NATO alliance

**Thayer, 07** – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., American Empire, Routledge, page 108)

What is more, many of the allies of the United States have become more dependent on the United States for their security than during the Cold War. For many years now, most NATO countries have only spent a fraction of their budget on defense, and it is not transparent how they would defend them-selves if not for the United States did not. Only six of the twenty-ive members of NATO (not counting the United States) are spending 2 percent or more of their GDP on defense, while nineteen spend less than 2 percent. Such a low level of defense spending is possible only because of the security provided by the United States.

## Collapse of NATO causes immediate instability that escalates to global nuclear war

**O’Sullivan, 98** – Editor of the National Review and Founder of the New Atlantic (John, American Spectator, June)

Some of those ideas--notably, dissolution and "standing pat"--were never likely to be implemented. Quite apart from the sociological law that says organizations never go out of business even if their main aim has been achieved (the only exception being a slightly ominous one, the Committee for the Free World, which Midge Decter closed down after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact), NATO's essential aim has not been permanently achieved. True, the Soviet threat is gone; but a nuclear-armed and potentially unstable Russia is still in the game; a major conflict has just been fought in the very Balkans which sparked the First World War; and there are a number of potential wars and civil wars lurking in such regions as the Tyrol, the Basque country, Northern Ireland (not yet finally settled), Corsica, Belgium, Kosovo, and Eastern Europe and the Balkans generally where, it is said, " every England has its Ireland, and every Ireland its Ulster." If none of these seems to threaten the European peace very urgently at present, that is in part because the existence of NATO makes any such threat futile and even counter-productive. No nation or would-be nation wants to take NATO on. And if not NATO, what? There are international bodies which could mediate some of the lesser conflicts: the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe is explicitly given that responsibility, and the European Union is always itching to show it can play a Big Power role. But neither body has the military heft or the prestige to deter or repress serious strife. The OSCE is a collective security organization, and as Henry Kissinger said of a similar body: "When all participants agree, there is no need for it; when they split, it is useless." And the EU only made itself look ridiculous when it attempted to halt the Bosnian conflict in its relatively early stages when a decisive intervention might have succeeded. As for dealing with a revived Russian threat, there is no military alliance in sight other than NATO that could do the job. In a sense, NATO today is Europe's defense. Except for the American forces, Western armies can no longer play an independent military role. They are wedded to NATO structures and dependent on NATO, especially American, technology. (As a French general admitted in the Gulf War: "The Americans are our eyes and ears.") If NATO were to dissolve--even if it were to be replaced by some European collective defense organization such as a beefed-up Western European Union--it would invite chaos as every irredentist faction sought to profit from the sudden absence of the main guarantor of European stability.

# Air/Space Power Mod

## Heg key to air and space power

**Thayer, 07** – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., American Empire, Routledge, page 16)

Fourth, as political scientist Barry Posen has argued, military power gives the United States control over the global “commons,” the command of the sea, air, and space, that allows it effectively to project its power far from its borders while denying those areas to other countries if it so chooses.22 That is significant because the sea lanes, airspace, and space act as a major force multiplier for the United States, allowing Washington to exploit better its own economic and military resources and those of its allies while at the same time hindering its enemies. For example, control of the world’s oceans provides the United States with the ability to move heavy forces to trouble spots such as the Persian Gulf or Korea and ensure that key resources, like oil, may travel to world markets. Com-mand of space gives the United States control of the ultimate “high ground.” The United States owns about half of the approximately three hundred active satellites in the Earth’s orbit. Its intelligence satellites allow it to spy on the rest of the world; its navigation satellites guide its forces; and its communications satellites give Washington the ability to command forces worldwide.

## Air and space power solve multiple nuclear wars in Asia

**Khalilzad and Lesser, 98** (Zalmay, Permanent United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Ian, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, “Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century,” http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR897/MR897.chap3.pdf)

The first key implication derived from the analysis of trends in Asia suggests that American air and space power will continue to remain critical for conventional and unconventional deterrence in Asia. This argument is justified by the fact that several sub-regions of the continent still harbor the potential for full-scale conventional war. This potential is most conspicuously on the Korean peninsula and to a lesser degree, in South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the South China Sea. In some of these areas such as Korea and the Persian Gulf, the United States has clear treaty obligations and therefore has pre-planned the use of air power should contingencies arise. U.S. Air Force assets could also be called upon for operations in some of these other areas. In almost all these cases, US airpower would be at the forefront of an American politico-military response because (a) of the vast distances on the Asian continent; (b) the diverse range of operational platforms available to the U.S. Air Force, a capability unmatched by any other country or service, (c) the possible unavailability of naval assets in close proximity, particularly in the context of surprise contingencies; and (d) the heavy payload that can be carried by U.S. Air Force platforms. These platforms can exploit speed, reach, and high operating tempos to sustain continual operations until the political objectives are secured. The entire range of warfighting capability—fighters, bombers, electronic warfare (EW), suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD), combat support platforms such as AWACS and J-STARS and tankers—are relevant in the Asia-Pacific region, because many of the regional contingencies will involve large, fairly modern, conventional forces, most of which are built around large land armies, as is the case in Korea, China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan and the Persian Gulf. In addition to conventional combat, the demands of unconventional deterrence will increasingly confront the U.S. Air Force in Asia. The Korean peninsula, China, and the Indian subcontinent are already arenas of WMD proliferation. While emergent nuclear capabilities continue to receive the most public attention, chemical and biological warfare threats will progressively become future problems. The delivery systems in the region are increasing in range and diversity. China already targets the continental United States with ballistic missiles. North Korea can threaten northeast Asia with existing Scud-class theater ballistic missiles. India will acquire the capability to produce ICBM-class delivery vehicles, and both China and India will acquire long-range cruise missiles during the time frames examined in this report. The second key implication derived from the analysis of trends in Asia suggests that airand spacepower will function as a vital rapid reaction force in a breaking crisis. Current guidance tasks the Air Force to prepare for two major regional conflicts that could break out in the Persian Gulf and on the Korean peninsula. In other areas of Asia, however, such as the Indian subcontinent, the South China Sea, Southeast Asia, and Myanmar, the United States has no treaty obligations requiring it to commit the use of its military forces. But as past experience has shown, American policymakers have regularly displayed the disconcerting habit of discovering strategic interests in parts of the world previously neglected after conflicts have already broken out. Mindful of this trend, it would behoove U.S. Air Force planners to prudently plan for regional contingencies in nontraditional areas of interest, because naval and air power will of necessity be the primary instruments constituting the American response. Such responses would be necessitated by three general classes of contingencies. The first involves the politico-military collapse of a key regional actor, as might occur in the case of North Korea, Myanmar, Indonesia, or Pakistan. The second involves acute politicalmilitary crises that have a potential for rapid escalation, as may occur in the Taiwan Strait, the Spratlys, the Indian subcontinent, or on the Korean peninsula. The third involves cases of prolonged domestic instability that may have either spillover or contagion effects, as in China, Indonesia, Myanmar, or North Korea.

# Europe Mod

## Heg key to European stability - the impact is World War 3

**Kagan, 07** – Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136)

Such order as exists in the world rests not merely on the goodwill of peoples but on a foundation provided by American power. Even the European Union, that great geopolitical miracle, owes its founding to American power, for without it the European nations after World War ii would never have felt secure enough to reintegrate Germany. Most Europeans recoil at the thought, but even today Europe ’s stability depends on the guarantee, however distant and one hopes unnecessary, that the United States could step in to check any dangerous development on the continent. In a genuinely multipolar world, that would not be possible without renewing the danger of world war.

## Goes nuclear

Charles L **Glaser** (Professor of Public Policy at University of Chicago) **1993** International Security, Summer, p. 8-9

However, although the lack of an imminent Soviet threat eliminates the most obvious danger, U.S. security has not been entirely separated from the future of Western Europe. The ending of the Cold War has brought many benefits, but has not eliminated the possibility of major power war, especially since such a war could grow out of a smaller conflict in the East. And, although nuclear weapons have greatly reduced the threat that a European hegemon would pose to U.S. security, a sound case nevertheless remains that a European war could threaten U.S. security. The United States could be drawn into such a war, even if strict security considerations suggested it should stay out. A major power war could escalate to a nuclear war that, especially if the United States joins, could include attacks against the American homeland. Thus, the United States should not be unconcerned about Europe’s future.

# Europe War Draw US In

## This draws in Russia and the US

**Kagan, 07** – Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136)

In Europe, too, the departure of the United States from the scene — even if it remained the world’s most powerful nation — could be destabilizing. It could tempt Russia to an even more overbearing and potentially forceful approach to unruly nations on its periphery. Although some realist theorists seem to imagine that the disappearance of the Soviet Union put an end to the possibility of confrontation between Russia and the West, and therefore to the need for a permanent American role in Europe, history suggests that conflicts in Europe involving Russia are possible even without Soviet communism. If the United States withdrew from Europe — if it adopted what some call a strategy of “offshore balancing” — this could in time increase the likelihood of conflict involving Russia and its near neighbors, which could in turn draw the United States back in

# Economy Mod

## Hegemonic decline brings the economy down with it - the impact is nuclear war

**Friedberg and Schoenfeld, 08** (Aaron, Professor of Politics and International Relations at Princeton, Gabriel, Visiting Scholar at the Witherspoon Institute, “The Dangers of a Diminished America,” Wall Street Journal, October 21, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122455074012352571.html)

If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk.

In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability.

The aftershocks of the financial crisis will almost certainly rock our principal strategic competitors even harder than they will rock us. The dramatic free fall of the Russian stock market has demonstrated the fragility of a state whose economic performance hinges on high oil prices, now driven down by the global slowdown. China is perhaps even more fragile, its economic growth depending heavily on foreign investment and access to foreign markets. Both will now be constricted, inflicting economic pain and perhaps even sparking unrest in a country where political legitimacy rests on progress in the long march to prosperity.

None of this is good news if the authoritarian leaders of these countries seek to divert attention from internal travails with external adventures.

As for our democratic friends, the present crisis comes when many European nations are struggling to deal with decades of anemic growth, sclerotic governance and an impending demographic crisis. Despite its past dynamism, Japan faces similar challenges. India is still in the early stages of its emergence as a world economic and geopolitical power.

What does this all mean? There is no substitute for America on the world stage. The choice we have before us is between the potentially

# Heg Key to Economy

## Heg key to the economy

**Thayer, 06** – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., “In Defense of Primacy,” National Interest, November/December, Lexis)

Third, along with the growth in the number of democratic states around the world has been the growth of the global economy. With its allies, the United States has labored to create an economically liberal worldwide network characterized by free trade and commerce, respect for international property rights, and mobility of capital and labor markets. The economic stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly the poorest states in the Third World. The United States created this network not out of altruism but for the benefit and the economic well-being of America. This economic order forces American industries to be competitive, maximizes efficiencies and growth, and benefits defense as well because the size of the economy makes the defense burden manageable. Economic spin-offs foster the development of military technology, helping to ensure military prowess.

# Terrorism Mod

## Heg solves nuclear terrorism, which causes US retaliation

**Kagan, 07** – Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136)

Throughout all these efforts, whose success is by no means guaranteed and certainly not any time soon, the United States and others will have to persist in fighting what is, in fact, quite accurately called “the war on terrorism.” Now and probably for the coming decades, organized terrorist groups will seek to strike at the United States, and at modernity itself, when and where they can. This war will not and cannot be the totality of America ’s worldwide strategy. It can be only a piece of it. But given the high stakes, it must be prosecuted ruthlessly, effectively, and for as long as the threat persists. This will sometimes require military interventions when, as in Afghanistan, states either cannot or will not deny the terrorists a base. That aspect of the “war on terror” is certainly not going away. One need only contemplate the American popular response should a terrorist group explode a nuclear weapon on American soil. No president of any party or ideological coloration will be able to resist the demands of the American people for retaliation and revenge, and not only against the terrorists but against any nation that aided or harbored them. Nor, one suspects, will the American people disapprove when a president takes preemptive action to forestall such a possibility — assuming the action is not bungled.

The United States will not have many eager partners in this fight. For although in the struggle between modernization and tradition, the United States, Russia, China, Europe, and the other great powers are roughly on the same side, the things that divide them from each other — the competing national ambitions and ideological differences — will inevitably blunt their ability or their willingness to cooperate in the military aspects of a fight against radical Islamic terrorism. Europeans have been and will continue to be less than enthusiastic about what they emphatically do not call “the war on terror.” And it will be tempting for Russian and Chinese leaders to enjoy the spectacle of the United States bogged down in a fight with al Qaeda and other violent Islamist groups in the Middle East, just as it is tempting to let American power in that region be checked by a nuclear-armed Iran. Unfortunately, the willingness of the autocrats in Moscow and Beijing to run interference for their fellow autocrats in Pyongyang, Tehran, and Khartoum increases the chance that the connection between terrorists and nuclear weapons will eventually be made.

## The impact is extinction

**Sid-Ahmed, 04** – Al-Ahram political analyst (Mohamed, “Extinction!,” Al Ahram Weekly, No. 705, August/September 1, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive.

But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

# Heg Solves Terrorism

## Heg solves terrorism - deterrence

**Thayer, 07** – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., American Empire, Routledge, page 16)

Another critical question is not simply how much the United States spends on defense but what benefits it receives from its spending: “Is the money spent worth it?” the benefits of American military power are considerable, and I will elaborate on five of them. First, and most importantly, the American people are protected from invasion and attack. The horrific attacks of 9/11 are—mercifully—an aberration. The men and women of the U.S. military and intelligence community do an outstanding job deterring aggression against the United States.

Second, American interests abroad are protected. U.S. military power allows Washington to defeat its enemies overseas. For example, the United States has made the decision to attack terrorists far from America’s shores, and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. Its military power also gives Washington the power to protect its interests abroad by deterring attacks against America’s interests or coercing potential or actual opponents. In international politics, coercion means dissuading an opponent from actions America does not want it to do or to do something that it wants done. For example, the United States wanted Libya to give up the weapons of mass destruction capabilities it pos-sessed or was developing. As Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said, “I think the reason Mu’ammar Qadhai agreed to give up his weapons of mass destruction was because he saw what happened to Saddam Hussein.”21

## Heg solves terrorism - hearts and minds

**Thayer, 06** – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., “In Defense of Primacy,” National Interest, November/December, Lexis)

American generosity has done more to help the United States fight the War on Terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian public opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of America. Two years after the disaster, and in poll after poll, Indonesians still have overwhelmingly positive views of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving three million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the War on Terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States also provided financial aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the munificence of the United States, it left a lasting impression about America. For the first time since 9/11, polls of Pakistani opinion have found that more people are favorable toward the United States than unfavorable, while support for Al-Qaeda dropped to its lowest level. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well-spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the War on Terror. When people in the Muslim world witness the U.S. military conducting a humanitarian mission, there is a clearly positive impact on Muslim opinion of the United States. As the War on Terror is a war of ideas and opinion as much as military action, for the United

# A2 Heg = Backlash

## Heg not root cause of backlash

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 121-123, WEA)

Elsewhere, although American policies and practices can be a source of resentment, and primacy can readily translate into bruised feelings about the exercise of American power, the predominant sources of anti-Americanism are deep-seated and structural and are only secondarily due to specific policies. This was especially evident in the aftermath of September 11, and a statement by sixty leading American scholars made a telling point when it observed the way in which bin Laden and the attackers directed their hatred against the United States itself rather than make any specific policy demands: . . . the killing was done for its own sake. The leader of Al Qaeda described the “blessed strikes” of September 11 as blows against America, “the head of world infidelity.” Clearly, then, our attackers despise not just our government, but our overall society, our entire way of living. Fundamentally, their grievance concerns not only what our leaders do, but also who we are.68 The Anglo-Indian author, Salman Rushdie, himself a target of a fatwa calling for his death as punishment for supposed blasphemy, captures this phenomenon when he writes that even if a Middle East peace settlement between Israelis and Palestinians were achieved, anti-Americanism would be likely to continue unabated.69 This animosity toward America is driven by several mechanisms: the desire of authoritarian regimes to deflect criticism away from their own corrupt rule, the agendas of virulently anti-modernist movements that paradoxically can now utilize television and the Internet to disseminate their views, and widespread frustration and alienation. Yet Islamic radicalism is by no means dominant, and it remains contested within these societies, not least (as Afghanistan under Taliban rule demonstrated) because its anti-rational, theocratic, and misogynist values do not provide a viable option for successfully confronting the tasks of modernization. Moreover, hostility to the United States is not universal, and America’s successful exercise of power may sometimes actually discourage opposition.70 In parts of the Muslim world, modernist views have surfaced to contest the radical Islamist vision. In at least some cases, journalists, intellectuals, and government leaders condemned the 9/11 attacks, spoke out against extremism and the search for scapegoats, and challenged the notion that returning to practices of the distant past can solve practical problems of society and economy. Thus, as a former Libyan Prime Minister has observed, “Perhaps most of the things we complain of . . . stem from our own flaws.”71 Similarly, following the July 2004 release of the 9/11 Commission Report, the former dean of the Faculty of Islamic Law at the University of Qatar wrote an article calling on Arabs to recant their conspiracy theories about the September 11 attacks and to apologize for spreading theses ideas: Why won’t we take the opportunity of the appearance of the 9-11 Commission’s report to ponder why destructive violence and a culture of destruction have taken root in our society? Why won’t we take this opportunity to reconsider our educational system, our curricula, including the religious, media, and cultural discourse that causes our youth to live in a constant tension with the world?72 Ultimately, **the root causes of fanaticism and cultural backlash lie not within the United States** and the West but inside the foreign societies themselves. Culture is both a mode of self and group expression and a source of upheaval and contestation. There is less a “clash of civilizations” than a clash within civilizations. Outsiders can take steps to encourage moderate elements within these societies, but much more depends on developments inside the countries concerned. The outcome of this competition may ultimately shape whether globalization itself continues or instead is violently overturned, much as the guns of August 1914 touched off a world war and reversed a century’s trend of increasing openness, integration, and interdependence.

# Democracy Mod

## Heg key to democracy promotion

**Thayer, 07** – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., American Empire, Routledge, pages 42-3)

The American Empire gives the United States the ability to spread its form of government, democracy, and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Using American power to spread democracy can be a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as for the United States. This is because democracies are more likely to align themselves with the United States and be sympathetic to its worldview. In addition, there is a chance—small as it may be—that once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of conflict will be reduced further. Natan Sharansky makes the argument that once Arabs are governed democratically, they will not wish to continue the conflict against Israel.58 This idea has had a big effect on President George W. Bush. He has said that Sharansky’s worldview “is part of my presidential DNA.”59

## Global nuclear war

Joshua Muravchik (Resident Scholar at the AEI) 2001 “Democracy and Nuclear Peace” July 14, http://www.npec-web.org/Syllabus/Muravchik.pdf, Date Accessed 7/29/2006)

That this momentum has slackened somewhat since its pinnacle in 1989, destined to be remembered as one of the most revolutionary years in all history, was inevitable. So many peoples were swept up in the democratic tide that there was certain to be some backsliding. Most countries' democratic evolution has included some fits and starts rather than a smooth progression. So it must be for the world as a whole. Nonetheless, the overall trend remains powerful and clear. Despite the backsliding, the number and proportion of democracies stands higher today than ever before. This progress offers a source of hope for enduring nuclear peace. The danger of nuclear war was radically reduced almost overnight when Russia abandoned Communism and turned to democracy. For other ominous corners of the world, we may be in a kind of race between the emergence or growth of nuclear arsenals and the advent of democratization. If this is so, the greatest cause for worry may rest with the Moslem Middle East where nuclear arsenals do not yet exist but where the prospects for democracy may be still more remote.

# Prez Powers Mod

## Hegemony key to prez powers

David P. Calleo (University Professor at The Johns Hopkins University and Dean Acheson Professor at its Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)) 2009 “Follies of Power: America’s Unipolar Fantasy” p. 152

Building and exerting American global power adds extra strains on the federal system. Almost inevitably it means enhancing presidential power at home. By the same reasoning, sustaining outsized presidential power relies on maintaining an overbearing prominence for security and foreign policy issues in American politics. In other words, there exists for America a symbiosis between world hegemony and presidential primacy. Conversely, too little conflict in the world seems to threaten presidential power at home. In the last decades of the twentieth century, for example, d´etente and ending the Cold War, both which reduced America’s overseas preoccupations, also seriously undermined the presidency and, with it, the stability of the federal system. All three presidencies caught in this process – those of Reagan, the first Bush, and Clinton – found themselves seriously challenged by Congress and the courts. After several presidencies adrift in d´etente, the “War on Terror” allowed the second Bush administration to reassert the old bipolar global model with unprecedented extensions of presidential power – the “unitary executive,” the right to arrest arbitrarily and imprison indefinitely without trial, the official use and defense of torture – ideas and practices that draw their inspiration from another age. The constitutionalist tradition, however, remains deeply planted in American political culture. States still find imaginative ways to resist or bypass federal encroachment and there are recurring campaigns to cut the presidency down to size. Nevertheless America’s huge global military establishment weighs ever more heavily on its constitution. It remains to be seen what new balance will be struck after the elections of 2008. The Congressional elections of 2006 suggested that a countervailing reaction was building against presidential power. But the election of 2008 may well mean a rehabilitation of that power. In any event, without a determined effort to contain the country’s external role, little change can probably be expected in the long-standing drift toward presidential federalism.

## Nuclear war

J.R. Paul (Professor of Law at University of Connecticut) July 1998 “The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and Executive Agreements”, California Law Review

Whatever the complexity of causes that led to the Cold War - ideology, economics, power politics, Stalin's personality, Soviet intrigue, or American ineptitude - the tension of the bipolar order seemed real, immutable, and threatening to the U.S. public. The broad consensus of U.S. leadership held that the immediacy of the nuclear threat, the need for covert operations and intelligence gathering, and the complexity of U.S. relations with both democracies and dictatorships made it impractical to engage in congressional debate and oversight of foreign policy-making. The eighteenth-century Constitution did not permit a rapid response to twentieth-century foreign aggression. The reality of transcontinental ballistic missiles collapsed the real time for decision-making to a matter of minutes. Faced with the apparent choice between the risk of nuclear annihilation or amending the constitutional process for policy-making, the preference for a powerful executive was clear. Early in the Cold War one skeptic of executive power, C.C. Rossiter, acknowledged that the steady increase in executive power is unquestionably a cause for worry, but so, too, is the steady increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the president has been called upon by the American people to solve in their behalf. They still have more to fear from the ravages of depression, rebellion, and especially atomic war than they do from whatever decisive actions may issue from the White House in an attempt to put any such future crises to rout.... It is not too much to say that the destiny of this nation in the Atomic Age will rest in the capacity of the Presidency as an institution of constitutional dictatorship. The call for executive leadership in the face of international crisis came not only from members of the executive branch, but also from members of Congress, academics, and legal commentators. Reviewing the history of this period, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported at the height of the Vietnam War, our country has come far toward the concentration in its national executive of unchecked power over foreign relations, particularly over the disposition and use of the Armed Forces. So far has this process advanced that in the committee's view, it is no longer accurate to characterize our government, in matters of foreign relations, as one of separated powers checked and balanced, against each other.... In the committee's view, the continuing series of Cold War crises and the perceived need to expedite decision-making in the nuclear age led to a concentration of power in the executive: Since 1940 crisis has been chronic and, coming as something new in our experience, has given rise to a tendency toward anxious expediency in our response to it. The natural expedient - natural because of the real or seeming need for speed - has been executive action.... Perceiving, and sometimes exaggerating, the need for prompt action, and lacking traditional guidelines for the making of decisions in an emergency, we have tended to think principally of what needed to be done and little, if at all, of the means of doing it.

# A2 Heg Causes Prolif

## Heg collapse causes wild-fire proliferation

Stephen Peter Rosen (PhD from Harvard University in 1979 and is currently the Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of National Security and Military Affairs in the Department of Government, Harvard University) Spring 2003 “An Empire, If you Can Keep It,” The National Interest, , LN Academic, UK: Fisher

Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure and, in the most probable post-imperial world, would revert to the logic of self-help in which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also be very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.

# A2 Balancing – Must Reads

## No counter-balancing – no country or group of countries can challenge the US

**Kagan, 07** – Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136)

The anticipated global balancing has for the most part not occurred. Russia and China certainly share a common and openly expressed goal of checking American hegemony. They have created at least one institution, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, aimed at resisting American influence in Central Asia, and China is the only power in the world, other than the United States, engaged in a long-term military buildup. But Sino-Russian hostility to American predominance has not yet produced a concerted and cooperative effort at balancing. China ’s buildup is driven at least as much by its own long-term ambitions as by a desire to balance the United States. Russia has been using its vast reserves of oil and natural gas as a lever to compensate for the lack of military power, but it either cannot or does not want to increase its military capability sufficiently to begin counterbalancing the United States. Overall, Russian military power remains in decline. In addition, the two powers do not trust one another. They are traditional rivals, and the rise of China inspires at least as much nervousness in Russia as it does in the United States. At the moment, moreover, China is less abrasively confrontational with the United States. Its dependence on the American market and foreign investment and its perception that the United States remains a potentially formidable adversary mitigate against an openly confrontational approach. In any case, China and Russia cannot balance the United States without at least some help from Europe, Japan, India, or at least some of the other advanced, democratic nations. But those powerful players are not joining the effort. Europe has rejected the option of making itself a counterweight to American power. This is true even among the older members of the European Union, where neither France, Germany, Italy, nor Spain proposes such counterbalancing, despite a public opinion hostile to the Bush administration. Now that the eu has expanded to include the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, who fear threats from the east, not from the west, the prospect of a unified Europe counterbalancing the United States is practically nil. As for Japan and India, the clear trend in recent years has been toward closer strategic cooperation with the United States. If anything, the most notable balancing over the past decade has been aimed not at the American superpower but at the two large powers: China and Russia. In Asia and the Pacific, Japan, Australia, and even South Korea and the nations of Southeast Asia have all engaged in “hedging” against a rising China. This has led them to seek closer relations with Washington, especially in the case of Japan and Australia. India has also drawn closer to the United States and is clearly engaged in balancing against China. Russia ’s efforts to increase its influence over what it regards as its “near abroad,” meanwhile, have produced tensions and negative reactions in the Baltics and other parts of Eastern Europe. Because these nations are now members of the European Union, this has also complicated eu-Russian relations. On balance, traditional allies of the United States in East Asia and in Europe, while their publics may be more anti-American than in the past, nevertheless pursue policies that reflect more concern about the powerful states in their midst than about the United States. 12 This has provided a cushion against hostile public opinion and offers a foundation on which to strengthen American relations with these countries after the departure of Bush.

# A2 Balancing – Must Reads

## No balancing – US lead is insurmountable and is growing

Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. 19

As illustrated in table 2.1, the United States is by far the largest military spender and has actually increased its share of world military spending in the last twenty years. Moreover, the United States’ lead over its nearest competitor is actually stronger in the security arena than it was in 1988. The Soviet Union was the closest rival in 1988, accounting for 18 percent of the world total, whereas China, the country with the second largest share today, only accounts for 5 percent of the world total. Counting coalitions as potential balancers, the euro area still accounts for a lower share today than did the Soviet Union in 1988. The European Union, on the other hand, accounts for a larger share than did the Soviet Union in 1988. But the European Union’s share does not amount to even half of the United States’ share of the world total. Without even throwing the technological sophistication of American weaponry (or the collective action problems that many states confront when deciding to act in the national interest) into the balance, it is clear that the United States is peerless in the security sphere and has strengthened its lead in the last two decades. Because of the superiority of American military power, and other states’ dependence on it for effective action, the United States faces very few constraints in the security arena. The 2003 invasion of Iraq is a case in point but there are plenty of other examples. As I will also show in chapter 6, there are also economic advantages associated with this privileged position in the security field. Although some question the utility of armed force, few will contest that the United States is in a league of its own when it comes to security affairs. But what about the economic realm? The real test is whether the United States still towers over other countries economically, and is able to reap economic benefits as a result of its hegemonic position. This is the claim that is likely to be the most carefully scrutinized.

# A2 Balancing – Flawed Methods

## **Projections of potential challengers are flawed and dependent on single indicators**

Wohlforth 7 - Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and Chair of the Department of Government (Spring 2007, William, "Unipolar stability: the rules of power analysis," Harvard International Review 29.1, p.44, Academic OneFile)

When analysts forecast the coming of multipolarity, they often talk of how the rising BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) will alter the global balance of power. If we carefully examine the numbers, what drives most of these projections is China. And if examined even more closely, we will likely see that one indicator alone is being used to project China's rise: the growth of its gross domestic product (GDP). China's global clout will certainly rise with the relative size of its economy. But economic size is only one indicator of power, and it can be a misleading one. When a huge number of poor people are gathered together in one country, they can create a large economy that is much less capable of generating power than the raw numbers would suggest. After all, India is estimated to have had a much larger economy than the British Isles when it was colonized in the nineteenth century. Studies of national power in the post-industrial age find that what matters most today is not just economic size, but wealth and technological development. Indeed, even if China's overall GDP did come to equal that of the United States, its per-capita GDP would still be only one-quarter that of the United States. Current projections of China's economic rise may well be overstated. Iraq aside, what is most responsible for the virtual shift to multipolarity is not a word but an acronym: PPP. PPP stands for the "purchasing power parity" estimate of countries' exchange rates--the size of their economies in dollar terms. Although the prices of many manufactured products tend to be equalized by international trade, the price of labor is not, and therefore labor-intensive products and services tend to be relatively cheap in poor counties. PPP corrects for this discontinuity by using prices for a locally selected basket of goods to adjust the exchange rate for converting local currency into dollars. As University of Pennsylvania professor Avery Goldstein notes, "the World Bank's decision in 1994 to shift to a PPP estimate for China's economy was crucial in propelling perceptions of that country's imminent rise to great power status." Economists universally agree that, properly applied, this method provides better estimates of comparative living standards. But forecasts about China's rise should not be based on predictions of its living standards. They should discuss China's presence as a great power in international politics--its ability to use money to purchase goods and influence matters abroad. PPP clearly exaggerates this sort of power. No one knows how much to discount the PPP numbers for the purposes of making comparisons of national power. What is certain, economist Albert Keidel notes, is that one should not "use projections of national accounting growth rates from a PPP base. This common practice seriously inflates estimates of China's future economic size--exaggerating the speed with which China's economy will overtake that of the United States in total size." Projections must take into account the fact that growth will cause prices to converge with international norms, and thus the PPP to converge with the market exchange rate. Using such a methodology, Keidel estimates that it will take until 2050 for China's total economic size to equal the United States. National power is a complex phenomenon. We all know that relying on one simple indicator of power is not a good idea. Yet research by political scientists, psychologists, and historians continues to demonstrate that decisionmakers and analysts tend to break this basic rule. Projections of China's rise are a case in point. Even setting aside the manifold challenges that this country faces on the road to superpowerdom--including a looming demographic crisis, a shaky financial system, and the political challenges inherent in a capitalist country ruled by a communist party--extrapolating its rise based on GDP and PPP estimates of its current size is a dubious analytical exercise.

# A2 Balancing - Generic

## No balancing – gap in military power, geography, unipolarity and no empirical basis for balancing

Craig, 09 – Professor of International Relations at the University of Southampton, Author (Campbell, "American power preponderance and the nuclear revolution", Review of International Studies, Volume 35, January 8th 2009, June 29th 2010, p. 3-4, KONTOPOULOS) PDF

Reacting to this theoretical crisis, William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks have developed a new theory, ‘Power Preponderance’, that provides a deep Realist explanation of unipolarity. Power Preponderance contends that balancing is not occurring because the US has achieved hegemonic domination over the system, making such a policy a losing proposition to any nation that might try it.8 Brooks and Wohlforth list three main reasons for this development. First, the gap in military power between the US and any potential rival has passed, or is approaching, the threshold where balancing becomes a practical impossibility. Rival states look at the distance between themselves and the US and conclude that it will be impossible to catch up. Second, geography reduces the threat potential rivals feel from American power, magnifies the rivalries among themselves, and causes them to worry that an attempt to contend with American power will only antagonise their neighbours. Third, the US emerged suddenly after the end of the Cold War as a unipolar hegemon fait accompli, rather than a revisionist state aiming to overturn and take over the system. Rivals that might otherwise have been caught up in a race with the US for preponderance are now inclined to reconcile themselves to the American-led status quo.9 In addition, a history of international politics that looks beyond the past few centuries of Europe reveals clearly that balance-of-power systems are unusual.10 Most international systems throughout world history were hegemonic and unipolar, rather than balanced; the European balance-of-power system, Wohlforth and several co-authors show, was highly exceptional, dependent upon the emergence of several large states on a contiguous continent.11 Why, then, should large states then be expected to balance against the US today, when it is not waging war against them, is separated from them by great oceans, wields far greater relative power than did even the greatest of European and Asian states – and when balancing is the exception in international history rather than the rule?

# A2 Balancing - Generic

## No motive—shared interests and lack of aggression cut off the will to balance

**Lieber and Alexander 2005** – \*Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and the Nanovic Institute for European Studies, \*\*Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia (Keir and Gerard, “Waiting for balancing”, http://people.virginia.edu/~ga8h/Waiting-for-Balancing.pdf, WEA)

The major powers are not balancing against the United States because of the nature of U.S. grand strategy in the post–September 11 world. There is no doubt that this strategy is ambitious, assertive, and backed by tremendous offensive military capability. But it is also highly selective and not broadly threatening. Specifically, the United States is focusing these means on the greatest threats to its interests—that is, the threats emanating from nuclear proliferator states and global terrorist organizations. Other major powers are not balancing U.S. power because they want the United States to succeed in defeating these shared threats or are ambivalent yet understand they are not in its crosshairs. In many cases, the diplomatic friction identified by proponents of the concept of soft balancing instead reflects disagreement about tactics, not goals, which is nothing new in history.

To be sure, our analysis cannot claim to rule out other theories of great power behavior that also do not expect balancing against the United States. Whether the United States is not seen as a threat worth balancing because of shared interests in nonproliferation and the war on terror (as we argue), because of geography and capability limitations that render U.S. global hegemony impossible (as some offensive realists argue), or because transnational democratic values, binding international institutions, and economic interdependence obviate the need to balance (as many liberals argue) is a task for further theorizing and empirical analysis. Nor are we claiming that balancing against the United States will never happen. Rather, there is no persuasive evidence that U.S. policy is provoking the kind of balancing behavior that the Bush administration’s critics suggest. In the meantime, analysts should continue to use credible indicators of balancing behavior in their search for signs that U.S. strategy is having a counterproductive effect on U.S. security. Below we discuss why the United States is not seen by other major powers as a threat worth balancing. Next we argue that the impact of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq on international relations has been exaggerated and needs to be seen in a broader context that reveals far more cooperation with the United States than many analysts acknowledge. Finally, we note that something akin to balancing is taking place among would-be nuclear proliferators and Islamist extremists, which makes sense given that these are the threats targeted by the United States.

The United States’ Focused Enmity

Great powers seek to organize the world according to their own preferences, looking for opportunities to expand and consolidate their economic and military power positions. Our analysis does not assume that the United States is an exception. It can fairly be seen to be pursuing a hegemonic grand strategy and has repeatedly acted in ways that undermine notions of deeply rooted shared values and interests. U.S. objectives and the current world order, however, are unusual in several respects. First, unlike previous states with preponderant power, the United States has little incentive to seek to physically control foreign territory. It is secure from foreign invasion and apparently sees little benefit in launching costly wars to obtain additional material resources. Moreover, the bulk of the current international order suits the United States well. Democracy is ascendant, foreign markets continue to liberalize, and no major revisionist powers seem poised to challenge U.S. primacy.

This does not mean that the United States is a status quo power, as typically defined. The United States seeks to further expand and consolidate its power position even if not through territorial conquest. Rather, U.S. leaders aim to bolster their power by promoting economic growth, spending lavishly on military forces and research and development, and dissuading the rise of any peer competitor on the international stage. Just as important, the confluence of the proliferation of WMD and the rise of Islamist radicalism poses an acute danger to U.S. interests. This means that U.S. grand strategy targets its assertive enmity only at circumscribed quarters, ones that do not include other great powers.

The great powers, as well as most other states, either share the U.S. interest in eliminating the threats from terrorism and WMD or do not feel that they have a significant direct stake in the matter. Regardless, they understand that the United States does not have offensive designs on them. Consistent with this proposition, the United States has improved its relations with almost all of the major powers in the post–September 11 world. This is in no small part because these governments—not to mention those in key countries in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, such as Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia— are willing partners in the war on terror because they see Islamist radicalism as a genuine threat to them as well. U.S. relations with China, India, and Russia, in particular, are better than ever in large part because these countries similarly have acute reasons to fear transnational Islamist terrorist groups. The EU’s official grand strategy echoes that of the United States. The 2003 European security strategy document, which appeared months after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, identifies terrorism by religious extremists and the proliferation of WMD as the two greatest threats to European security. In language familiar to students of the Bush administration, it declares that Europe’s “most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction.” 60 It is thus not surprising that the major European states, including France and Germany, are partners of the United States in the Proliferation Security Initiative.

Certain EU members are not engaged in as wide an array of policies toward these threats as the United States and other of its allies. European criticism of the Iraq war is the preeminent example. But sharp differences over tactics should not be confused with disagreement over broad goals. After all, comparable disagreements, as well as incentives to free ride on U.S. efforts, were common among several West European states during the Cold War when they nonetheless shared with their allies the goal of containing the Soviet Union.61 In neither word nor deed, then, do these states manifest the degree or nature of disagreement contained in the images of strategic rivalry on which balancing claims are based. Some other countries are bystanders. As discussed above, free-riding and differences over tactics form part of the explanation for this behavior. And some of these states simply feel less threatened by terrorist organizations and WMD proliferators than the United States and others do. The decision of these states to remain on the sidelines, however, and not seek opportunities to balance, is crucial. There is no good evidence that these states feel threatened by U.S. grand strategy.

In brief, other great powers appear to lack the motivation to compete strategically with the United States under current conditions. Other major powers might prefer a more generally constrained America or, to be sure, a world where the United States was not as dominant, but this yearning is a long way from active cooperation to undermine U.S. power or goals.

# A2 Balancing - Generic

## No balancers – their theories are flawed

Craig, 09 – Professor of International Relations at the University of Southampton, Author (Campbell, "American power preponderance and the nuclear revolution", Review of International Studies, Volume 35, January 8th 2009, June 29th 2010, p. 1-3, KONTOPOULOS) PDF

The persistence of American unipolar predominance in the international system since the end of the Cold War has caused a rupture in the American school of Realist international relations (IR) theory. The neorealist school founded by Kenneth Waltz, which has dominated Realist theorising about international politics since the 1970s, predicts that international systems revert sooner or later to a balance-of-power dynamic, a process which can only be prevented by the abolition of anarchical great-power politics, that is the formation of a world state.1 Yet the ongoing failure of potential rivals to the US, such as China, Russia, or the EU to develop military capabilities that come anywhere close to those of the US seems to have defied this prediction. Despite the apparently radical imbalance of the international political system, smaller states are not trying to build up their military power to match that of the US or forming formal alliance systems to oppose it, even though no world state has emerged to put an end to the interstate anarchy that Realists believe characterises international relations.2 The absence of balancing against the US constitutes a serious anomaly for neorealist theory. In his famous history of scientific theorising, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn demonstrated how scholarly communities respond to anomalies that seem clearly to defy their core theoretical predictions. Leading theorists, wedded to the standard interpretations that allow them to dominate their field, tend first to deny that the anomaly exists; it is a ‘blip’, an unimportant or transient factor. Then, as the salience of the anomaly becomes undeniable, they redefine or shift their theoretical expectations, so as to contend that the anomaly can indeed be explained by their original theory even if their earlier writings ruled it out. Finally, a band of younger scholars, less invested professionally in the old theory, develops a new interpretation that not only explains the anomaly, but places it at its theoretical centre. This new theoretical interpretation supersedes the old one and becomes the new ‘paradigm’ for successive inquiry.3 Kuhn’s account of paradigm shifts seems uncannily to describe what is happening to American Realist IR theory today. Initially, structural Realists sought to deny that unipolarity was enduring or important, and predicted its quick demise. Waltz, John Mearsheimer, and Christopher Layne all predicted in the early 1990s that Germany, Japan, or perhaps another state would soon emerge to contend with the US for great power. More recently, many structural Realists have acknowledged the existence of unipolarity, or at least have acknowledged the absence of traditional balancing against the US, but have altered standard definitions of balancing behaviour in order to reconcile this with balance-of-power theory. For example, Mearsheimer now contends that the pursuit of small deterrent nuclear arsenals by states like North Korea and Iran constitutes balancing behaviour, and that China and Russia are already great powers, even though their military and economic capabilities are well behind those of the US, and their technological capabilities are decades behind.4 Alternatively, Robert Pape, T. S. Paul, and Stephen Walt concede that traditional balancing is not occurring, but argue nevertheless that rivals to the US are engaging in ‘soft balancing’, using diplomatic and economic means to counter American power rather than military buildup or formal alliances.5 Both of these arguments clearly diverge from the definition of great-power balancing offered by Kenneth Waltz before the end of the Cold War. Waltz argued that great powers must achieve military capabilities comparable to their great-power rivals, which he defined as not simply brute military force but also ‘the ability to exploit military technology on a large scale and at the scientific frontiers’.6 Realists are free to question this definition; the key is that it was not challenged before the end of the Cold War and the rise of sustained unipolarity. As Kuhn would have predicted, the new definitions have only been introduced in response to the anomaly.7

# A2 Balancing – Generic

## No counterbalancing – no rival can fill in

David P. Calleo (University Professor at The Johns Hopkins University and Dean Acheson Professor at its Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)) 2009 “Follies of Power: America’s Unipolar Fantasy”p. 149

Deflating America’s hegemonic pretensions does not, in itself, produce a convincing rival. If the United States cannot be the world’s unipolar hegemon, surely no one else can either. Any other nation would have even more limited prospects. Eventually, several great powers may be able to challenge anyone else’s global dominance. China, for example, might grow strong enough, even by itself, to prevent American hegemony in Asia. Nevertheless, China would still be very far – culturally, diplomatically, militarily, or economically – from being able to impose its own global or perhaps even regional supremacy. Nor is anyone else likely to possess the universal appeal, or the intellectual, military, diplomatic, or economic means to play a global hegemonic role. Arguably, the most plausible alternative to America would be Europe, which has a still living history of global domination and now has potential resources that, in theory, rival those of the United States. But to bid for global hegemony, Europe would have to focus its power and centralize its own governance – in other words, transform itself into a centralized federation like the United States. Europe probably will move in this direction but nevertheless stop far short of where the U.S. is today.

## No country or international organization comes close to balancing US heg

**Thayer, 06** – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., “In Defense of Primacy,” National Interest, November/December, Lexis)

THERE IS no other state, group of states or international organization that can provide these global benefits. None even comes close. The United Nations cannot because it is riven with conflicts and major cleavages that divide the international body time and again on matters great and trivial. Thus it lacks the ability to speak with one voice on salient issues and to act as a unified force once a decision is reached. The EU has similar problems. Does anyone expect Russia or China to take up these responsibilities? They may have the desire, but they do not have the capabilities. Let's face it: for the time being, American primacy remains humanity's only practical hope of solving the world's ills.

# A2 Balancing - Generic

## **No evidence of balancing – too many incentivize to maintain unipolarity for other countries**

Lieber 9 - Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University (March 2009, Robert J., "Persistent primacy and the future of the American era," International Politics, Vol. 46, Iss. 2-3, pg. 119)

Despite expectations that a period of unipolarity would trigger balancing behavior or that French-German-Russian opposition to the American-led intervention in Iraq would stimulate the formation of such a coalition, effective balancing against the United States has yet to occur. President Jacques Chirac and Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder could not speak for all their EU partners, and it is worth recalling that in the early months of 2003, on the eve of the American-led coalition intervention against Saddam Hussein, some two-thirds of the member governments of both the EU and NATO supported the Bush administration's decision. 3 Despite arguments about 'soft-balancing', not only has balancing not occurred, but also principal European leaders have either maintained (as in the case of Britain) or reasserted (Germany and France) pragmatic Atlanticist policies, and five of the largest EU member states (that is, all except Spain) are currently governed by avowedly Atlanticist presidents or prime ministers. 4 And for its part, the EU has not distanced itself from the United States let alone emerged as a strategic competitor. 5 There are good reasons for this long-term continuity, including shared interests and values as well as the inability of the EU member countries to create a military force with sufficient funding, advanced military technology, power projection and the unity of command that would enable it to play the kind of role in the security realm that Europe's size, population and wealth would otherwise dictate. Other major powers have actually tightened their bonds with Washington, especially in Asia, where anxiety about the rise of China has shaped behavior. For example, India in June 2005 signed a 10-year defense pact ('New Framework of the US-India Defense Relationship.'). In addition, it successfully concluded an historic agreement on nuclear technology with Washington. Japan has developed closer ties with the United States than at any time in the past, especially in the realm of defense. The Philippines, after having ousted the United States from its longtime air and naval bases there, recently welcomed a return naval visit, and Vietnam, Indonesia, Singapore and others also have leaned more toward than away from America. Despite a rise in expressions of anti-Americanism as indicated in opinion polls (and more reflective of disagreement with Bush administration policies than rejection of America itself), it would be a mistake to assume that the world has turned against the United States. Indeed, wide-spread positive reactions to Barack Obama's election suggest otherwise. As for the leading authoritarian capitalist powers, Russia has adopted a much more critical and assertive stance, but the financial crisis has impacted Moscow in ways that are likely to encourage restraint. Russia's currency, banking, credit sectors and commitments by foreign investors have been very significantly affected, and with world oil prices having dropped by two-thirds between the summer and autumn of 2008, the Putin regime is likely to have less latitude than when it was flush with oil revenues. For its part, China, despite its booming economy and rapidly modernizing armed forces, has yet to take an overtly antagonistic position toward the United States. Its huge domestic export sector has been seriously affected by changes in the world economy and Beijing has urged greater cooperation with the United States and other countries to address the impact of the financial crisis. Although a major balancing coalition against the United States has not taken shape, the incoming Obama administration faces formidable challenges. Though Moscow and Beijing have not formed an alliance against Washington, not least because of their mutual distrust, both have acted to support regional states that pose significant problems for the United States. For example, Russia has engaged in talks about the sale of advanced anti-aircraft missile systems to Iran and Syria, and has been discussing a major weapons sale to Venezuela and an air defense system for Cuba. And neither Russia nor China is likely to accede to Western urging for truly effective measures against Iran's nuclear program or Sudan's depredations in Darfur. National power itself by no means guarantees the achievement of desired outcomes. Nuclear proliferation constitutes a severe and growing menace. Iran, Venezuela and Syria have proved difficult to influence or coerce. The war in Afghanistan has no end in sight, and the willingness and ability of NATO allies to provide sufficient numbers of effective troops remains limited. American forces are likely to disengage gradually from Iraq as its government gains greater authority and local forces assume more of the responsibility for security throughout the country. During the 2008 election campaign, candidate Obama committed himself to a more rapid drawdown than the Bush administration or candidate McCain preferred. Nonetheless, the Obama administration is likely to find that redeployment will take considerable time, especially if American military commanders caution against the consequences of a too rapid withdrawal, and this will constrain its ability to put more emphasis on Afghanistan, where the Taliban has become an increasing threat and al-Qaeda has reestablished itself in the tribal areas of Western Pakistan and the adjacent border regions. Meanwhile, despite the desirability of progress toward a meaningful agreement, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains unresolvable in the absence of a coherent Palestinian leadership with the capacity and authority to act on behalf of its population as well as the will to end terrorism and to work toward a two-state solution and a durable peace. In sum, the international environment in which the United States finds itself is one in which there are both stubborn and lethal threats. Multilateral and international mechanisms for responding to these perils can be effective, but they are difficult to achieve. Meanwhile, in the absence of an effective counterbalance, America maintains a position of primacy. The extent to which it can continue to do so is, however, as much or more dependent on internal and domestic considerations as it is on the difficulties it faces abroad.

# A2 Balancing - Generic

## **No risk of balancing – empirically analysis proves**

Lieber and Alexander 5 - \*Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame AND \*\*Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia (Summer 2005, Keir A. and Gerard, "Waiting for Balancing; Why the World is Not Pushing Back," International Security)

Major powers have not engaged in traditional balancing against the United States since the September 11 terrorist attacks and the lead-up to the Iraq war, either in the form of domestic military mobilization, antihegemonic alliances, or the laying-down of diplomatic red lines. Indeed, several major powers, including those best positioned to mobilize coercive resources, are continuing to reduce, rather than augment, their levels of resource mobilization. This evidence runs counter to ad hoc predictions and international relations scholarship that would lead one to expect such balancing under current conditions. In that sense, this finding has implications not simply for current policymaking but also for ongoing scholarly consideration of competing international relations theories and the plausibility of their underlying assumptions. Current trends also do not confirm recent claims of soft balancing against the United States. And when these trends are placed in historical perspective, it is unclear whether the categories of behaviors labeled "soft balancing" can (ever) be rigorously distinguished from the types of diplomatic friction routine to virtually all periods of history, even between allies. Indeed, some of the behavior currently labeled "soft balancing" is the same behavior that occurred in earlier periods when, it is generally agreed, the United States was not being balanced against. The lack of an underlying motivation to compete strategically with the United States under current conditions, not the lack of latent power potentialities, best explains this lack of balancing behavior, whether hard or soft. This is the case, in turn, because most states are not threatened by a post-September 11 U.S. foreign policy that is, despite commentary to the contrary, highly selective in its use of force and multilateralist in many regards. In sum, the salient dynamic in international politics today does not concern the way that major powers are responding to the United States' preponderance of power but instead concerns the relationship between the United States (and its allies), on the one hand, and terrorists and nuclear proliferators, on the other. So long as that remains the case, anything akin to balancing behavior is likely only among the narrowly circumscribed list of states and nonstate groups that are directly threatened by the United States.

# A2 Balancing – Distinction Cards

## Research on elite perceptions proves even if people have the incentive, motive, and resources to balance they will defer

William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

Research on the elite perceptions and discourse in Russia, China, India, Europe, and Japan reveals that there is a strong interest in a favorable status comparison vis-à-vis out-groups and that the United States looms large as a comparison group, but in no capital is there evidence of the kind of status dissonance that characterized, for example, Moscow in the mid-twentieth century or St. Petersburg in the mid-nineteenth.71 Resentment of the U.S. role is evident, especially in Russia and China, but the operative assessment is that the capabilities gap precludes a competitive identity-maintenance strategy vis-à-vis the United States. Indeed, both countries attempted competitive strategies in the 1990s but reversed course as the evidence accumulated that their efforts had been counterproductive.

## Even if you are right that statistically countries can balance the US – American political elites have already convinced rising powers that the unipolarity is inevitable

Sherle Schwenninger (directs the New America Foundation's Economic Growth Program, and the Global Middle Class Initiative. He is also the former director of the Bernard L. Schwartz Fellows Program) 2007 “ The United States and the Emerging Powers” http://newamerica.net/node/8639

In short, the emerging powers of China, India, and Brazil have allowed American political elites to maintain the quiet fiction of a unipolar world, despite Iraq and even as they have begun to herald a multipolar world. The only immediate danger to this pattern of accommodation would be the electoral success of the John McCain wing of the neoconservatives. This group favors both a redoubling of American military efforts in the Middle East and a tougher stance toward Russia and China, which it sees as undemocratic and too soft on Iran. The question is whether corporate America would be willing to lend its support to such a self-destructive overextension of American foreign policy. Probably not, and despite his militarism, McCain is not inclined to run or govern as an economic populist who would challenge the international investment and trade preferences of American companies. He therefore may be forced to curb some of his hostility toward China but at the expense of relations with Russia, which would face the blunt of more aggressive McCain foreign policy. Similarly, in spite of the growing appeal of populist Democrats who want tougher action on U.S.-China trade issues, the leading Democrat candidates are not likely to buck corporate America’s love affair with China, India, and Brazil. Again, Russia, despite its oil, is another story in part because it has chosen a more nationalist economic development strategy less open to foreign investment. Thus, in both cases, Wall Street’s acronym the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) is likely to be shorted to become the BICs (Brazil, India, and China).

# A2 Balance of Power Theory = Balancing

## **Balancing doesn’t have to occur for the theory to be true**

Jervis 9 - Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Affairs at Columbia University, previously an assistant professor of government at Harvard University (January 2009, "Unipolarity: A Structural Perspective," World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1)

If the most pressing question about the bipolar system that emerged after World War II was whether it would lead to superpower war, the obvious question today is whether unipolarity will last.41 One position is that it will not, that following balance of power reasoning others will unite to contest American dominance.42 But while balance of power theory argues that states will unite in the face of a potential hegemon, it does not speak to what to expect once unipolarity is established. It makes sense for states to join together even in the face of the collective goods problem if they think that doing so can contain or defeat the would-be unipole, but once there is a dominant state the chances of unseating it are much less. Balance theory tells us that states will do what appears effective in order to protect their positions; it does not lead us to expect them to adopt policies that are costly and futile. In the wake of the Bush’s reelection, France’s Chirac declared: “It is evident that Europe, now more than ever, must strengthen its unity and dynamism when faced with this great world power.” Britain’s Blair replied, however, that “[t]here’s a new reality, so let’s work with that reality,” rather than remain in “a state of denial.”43 If Blair’s reasoning prevails, a countervailing coalition will not form, and its absence would not contradict balance of power theory. What is equally crucial is that balance of power dynamics arise in the context of the use, threat, and fear of force. But as we have seen, the leading powers now form a security community. The incentives to try to overturn unipolarity are much less when states do not fear that the superpower will invade them or greatly diminish their sovereignty. Indeed, if they believe that the unipole will provide a degree of order and public goods and that rivalry would be destabilizing, they may actively support unipolarity.44 While self-interest may underlie the Bush [End Page 207] administration’s argument that the rise of any other country or group of countries to challenge the U.S. would lead to conflict if it failed and to instability if it succeeded, the claim may be correct and/or may be seen as such by many other countries. The record of bipolarity and multipolarity is not attractive, and while I have argued that the forces now conducive to peace and cooperation among the major powers would remain if the system were not unipolar, cautious men and women might not opt to run the experiment.45

# A2 Balancing – Iraq War

## Iraq hasn’t prompted balancing

**Singh 2008** – Professor, School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London (Robert, International Politics, Vol. 45, Iss. 5, “The exceptional empire”, ProQuest, WEA)

Third, and despite Iraq, America's extensive network of global alliances remains formidably impressive. As Bradley Thayer observes, 'Far from there being a backlash against the United States, there is worldwide bandwagoning with it' (Layne and Thayer, 2007, 106-107). Of 192 nations in the world, Thayer identified only five as 'opposed' to America: China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Eighty-four states are US allies, comprising most major economic and military powers, including 25 members of NATO, 14 major non-NATO allies, 19 Rio Pact members, seven Caribbean Regional Security System members, 13 members of the Iraq coalition not in the other categories, along with Afghanistan, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan and Tunisia. A ratio of 17 to 1 (84 to 5) represents a rather positive outcome for the world's primary power. The brute reality remains that most countries wish to align with the US, actively do so, and benefit directly from its security guarantees, open markets and international trade. Even -- especially -- in relation to rising powers such as China and India, national interests typically point in the direction of either actively supporting or passively acquiescing in the American-led international system rather than challenging it. Iraq was an aberration, not a norm, in this regard. Simply put, there has been no hard balancing against Washington of consequence since the end of the Cold War. Despite the setting-up of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Sino-Russian hostility to the US has not produced a concerted balancing effort, limited as it is by mutual distrust and suspicion, traditional great power rivalry, divergent capacities and strategic goals and -- in Beijing's case -- dependence on the critical US market for its exports and growth. Such hard balancing as has occurred has been aimed not at Washington but Moscow and Beijing: by, respectively, East European and other EU states and Japan, Australia, India and South Korea. America may be unloved in parts of the world, if opinion surveys are to be believed. But it is not generally opposed.

**Heg is durable—overcomes every countervailing factor**

**Lieber 2008** – professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown (Robert, World Affairs Journal, “Falling upwards: Declinism, the box set”, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Summer/full-Lieber.html, WEA)

Not surprisingly, given all this, few global problems can be solved, let alone managed, absent a significant American commitment. The United States, as Michael Mandelbaum has put it, remains the world’s principal provider of public goods. This can mean, variously, leadership, political backing, financial or diplomatic assistance, logistics, intelligence, or the use of military assets for tasks ranging from disaster relief to combat support. In many instances, and particularly in urgent and dire cases such as the Balkan crises, the choice boils down to this: either the United States will act or no one will. Other countries understand the unique nature of American power—if not wholly selfless, not entirely selfish, either—and its role in underpinning global stability and maintaining a decent world order. This helps to explain why Europe, India, Japan and much of East Asia, and important countries of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America have no use for schemes to balance against the United States. Most would rather do business with America or be shielded by it. In the end, then, this country’s structural advantages matter much more than economic cycles, trade imbalances, or surging and receding tides of anti-Americanism. These advantages include America’s size, wealth, human and material resources, military strength, competitiveness, and liberal political and economic traditions, but also a remarkable flexibility, dynamism, and capacity for reinvention. Neither the rise of important regional powers, nor a globalized world economy, nor “imperial overstretch,” nor domestic weaknesses seem likely to negate these advantages in ways the declinists anticipate, often with a fervor that makes their diagnoses and prescriptions resemble a species of wish fulfillment. Over the years, America’s staying power has been regularly and chronically underestimated—by condescending French and British statesmen in the nineteenth century, by German, Japanese, and Soviet militarists in the twentieth, and by homegrown prophets of doom today. The critiques come and go. The object of their contempt never does.

# No Balancing – Free-riding

## Too many barriers to balancing against the United States

**Walt ‘9** (Stephen M., [professor](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Professor) of [international affairs](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_relations) at [Harvard University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_University)'s [John F. Kennedy School of Government](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_F._Kennedy_School_of_Government), “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics - Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009, pp. 86-120, AM)

Even if other states now worry about the unipole’s dominant power position, the condition of unipolarity also creates greater obstacles to the formation of an effective balancing coalition. When one state is far stronger than the others, it takes a larger coalition to balance it, and assembling such a coalition entails larger transaction costs and more daunting dilemmas of collective action. In particular, each member of the countervailing coalition will face greater incentives to free ride or pass the buck, unless it is clear that the unipolar power threatens all of them more or less equally and they are able to develop both a high degree of trust and some way to share the costs and risks fairly. Moreover, even if a balancing coalition begins to emerge, the unipole can try to thwart it by adopting a divide-and-conquer strategy: punishing states that join the opposition while rewarding those that remain aloof or support the unipole instead. These structural obstacles would exist regardless of who the single superpower was, but a counterhegemonic alliance against the United States faces an additional nonstructural barrier. The United States is the sole great power in the Western hemisphere, while the other major powers are all located on the Eurasian landmass. As a result, these states tend to worry more about each other; furthermore, many have seen the United States as the perfect ally against some nearby threat. Accordingly, they are even less likely to join a coalition against the United States, even if U.S. power is substantially greater. Assembling a vast counter-American coalition would require considerable diplomatic virtuosity and would probably arise only if the United States began to pose a genuine existential threat. It is unlikely to do so, however, in part because this same geographic isolation dampens American concerns about potential Eurasian rivals.[30](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.walt.html" \l "f30) America’s geopolitical isolation has been an advantage throughout its history, and it remains an important asset today.[31](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/world_politics/v061/61.1.walt.html" \l "f31)

# A2 Russia/China Axis

## Russia and China can't counter-balance the US

**Brose, 09** – Senior Editor at Foreign Policy (Christian, "Managing American Hegemony", Hoover Institution, Interview, 2009, No. 3, June 29th 2010, http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/5577, KONTOPOULOS)

**\*Quoting Kori N. Schake – Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution and Distinguished Professor of International Security Studies at the United States Military Academy at West Point, Worked on the National Security council, Policy Planning Staff at the Department of State, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Staff**

Of course, other states could conceivably find new paths to power: melding authoritarian societies with market economies, discovering essential resources, banding together to damage American interests. Azar Gat has argued in his work on authoritarian capitalism that Russia and China are doing so, but I’m not yet persuaded. Russia is trending in very dangerous directions, but they are unsuccessful directions, as international reaction to their invasion of Georgia last summer demonstrates. China looks to me to be trending more positively. And a prosperous, confident China does not necessarily diminish American power, as the postwar success of Germany and Japan illustrates.

**China and Russia won’t prematurely balance against the US.**

**Brown, Bromley, and Athreye, ’04** – \*William Brown, psychologist, \*Simon Bromley, Simon Bromley joined The Open University in 1999, after teaching and research at the University of Leeds. He is currently Associate Dean (Curriculum Planning) in the Faculty of Social Sciences. \*Suma Athreye, Professor of International Strategy. Her research focuses on internationalisation and its impact on technology entrepreneurship (Ordering the international: history, change and transformation, p. 166)

In short, both China and Russia, perhaps like France and Germany in Europe, envisage a long and complicated struggle between US efforts to preserve its Unipolar moment and their desire to hasten the transition to a multipolar world, in which the major powers fashion some kind of agreed regional division of labour among themselves, while working in concert on truly global issues. Nonetheless, until such a situation evolves, neither has anything to gain from directly antagonizing the USA. Nor are they likely to forge an alliance hostile to US interests. China and Russia share a long border that constitutes a zone of potential instability and there is scant prospect that either will trust the other to guarantee its security. Moreover, it is far from clear how they could gain from establishing closer links with one another than they have with Washington.

# A2 China

## China won’t challenge us—by the time they have will or ability, reform will change their calculus

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 171-172, WEA)

Despite the muscle flexing directed at Taiwan and Japan, the newer and more highly educated “fourth generation” Chinese Communist Party leadership of Hu Jintao has tended to downplay great power confrontation with the United States in order to continue to pursue development and modernization. China has an enormous stake in American trade and investment, and a serious conflict would have drastic consequences at a time when the country continues to undergo a wrenching transformation of its economy and society. China’s trade (exports plus imports) with the United States in 2004 amounted to $179 billion,32 dwarfing the $20 billion in trade with Russia, and not surprisingly the Chinese have been reluctant to jeopardize their relationship with America. Beijing thus has its own practical reasons for not seeking to challenge the pivotal U.S. role in East Asia and for avoiding major disruptions in its external environment. While it is conceivable that an economically powerful China could ultimately emerge as a revisionist power and seek to challenge the U.S. position of unipolar primacy, it is also possible that China’s economic development, social change, integration with the world economy, and own self-interest could facilitate both a liberalizing political transition and sustained cooperative relations with the United States.33 Paradoxically, improvement in U.S.-China ties has also been a consequence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The Bush administration welcomed Beijing’s cooperation in the war on terror, and this enabled China to cooperate in ways that did not make it appear subservient to the superpower. China also found good reasons of its own for cooperation with the United States in facing the problem of North Korea. For its part, Washington supported China in its ongoing conflict with Uigur separatists in Sinjiang province, while downplaying other areas of disagreement, including human rights. Nonetheless, tensions remain evident in other areas, as, for, example, over Iran’s nuclear program. China has courted Tehran as an important energy supplier and has opposed American efforts to bring the issue of Iran’s nuclear program to the U.N. Security Council

## China doesn’t have the weapons and regional alliances aren’t a threat

Welch and Shevchenko, 10 – \*Professor of Political Science at UCLA and \*\*Assistant Professor of Political Science at California State University, Fullerton (\*Deborah and \*\*Alexei, "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy", International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4, Spring 2010, June 292010, p. 24-25, KONTOPOULOS) PDF

Against this backdrop of mutual recognition of status, there is little evidence that China is engaging in social competition with the United States. Some observers have suggested that China is using regional multilateral organizations to undermine U.S influence and alliance systems in Asia.131 On the other hand, these regional bodies are informal, consensus based, and impose no commitments. Most members also want to maintain good relations with the United States.132 China has increased its defense budget by double digits over the past two decades, but its military acquisitions and spending levels do not indicate that it aspires to be a peer competitor with the United States. China’s military acquisitions (submarines, fighter aircraft, and surface-to-air missiles) appear to be aimed at deterring Taiwan from declaring independence and at deterring, delaying, or denying U.S. support for the island. China does not have global power projection capabilities, as indicated by its lack of aircraft carriers or long-range bombers.133

# A2 China

## China’s inhibited by too many domestic factors to challenge us

**Singh 2008** – Professor, School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London (Robert, International Politics, Vol. 45, Iss. 5, “The exceptional empire”, ProQuest, WEA)

But, like the EU, China's continued rise is not inevitable. Some analysts assume that, with a military that does not approximate America's and an overarching interest in economic growth, Beijing's dominant incentive is to avoid conflict. As the appeal of communism ebbs still further into the distance, however, the attraction of nationalism as a last unifying force suggests potential dangers and conflict, not least given the salience of on-going territorial disputes with Japan, Russia, India and Vietnam. The possibility of war over Taiwan is also a constant (Bush and O'Hanlon, 2007). The likelihood that China, Japan and India expend more energies and resources preoccupied with their own rivalry, rather than in challenging or constraining the US, is one accorded too little attention by proponents of American decline (Emmott, 2008). Asia is as much divided against itself as against the West or America. In addition, an aging population, an acute gender imbalance caused by the 'one child' policy, declining birth rates, corruption, high energy costs, epidemics like SARS and HIV/AIDS, and the fragility of its financial system together pose major challenges to the Chinese state and society. A simple linear rise in Beijing's geo-political heft is possible but far from foreordained.

# A2 China Rise Violent

## China’s rise is overstated

**Nye 2008** – PhD, Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (Joseph, “War, peace and hegemony in a globalized world”, pages 39-40, edited by Chandra Chari – founder/editor of The Book Review, WEA)

We should be skeptical, however, about drawing conclusions solely from historical analogies. It is important to remember that, by 1900, Germany had surpassed Britain in industrial power, and the Kaiser was pursuing an adventurous, globally oriented foreign policy that was bound to bring about a clash with other great powers. In contrast, China lags far behind the United States economically, and has focused its policies primarily on its region and on its economic development, and its official communist ideology holds little appeal. Nonetheless, the rise of China recalls Thucydides’ warning that belief in the inevitability of conflict can become one of its main causes. Each side, believing it will end up at war with the other, makes reasonable military preparations which then are read by the other side as confirmation of its worst fears. In fact, the ‘rise of China’ is a misnomer. ‘Re-emergence’ would be more accurate, since by size and history the Middle Kingdom has long been a major power in East Asia. Technically and economically, China was the world’s leader (though without global reach) from 500 to 1500. Only in the last half millennium was it overtaken by Europe and America. The Asian Development Bank has calculated that, in 1820, at the beginning of the industrial age, Asia made up an estimated three-fifths of world product. By 1940, this fell to one-fifth, even though the region was home to three-fifths of world population. Rapid economic growth has brought that back to two-fifths today, and the Bank speculates that Asia could return to its historical levels by 2025.14 Asia, of course, includes Japan, India, Korea, and others, but China will eventually play the largest role. Its high annual growth rates of 8 to 9 percent led to a remarkable tripling of its GNP in the last two decades of the twentieth century. This pragmatic economic performance, along with its Confucian culture, enhanced China’s soft power in the region. Nonetheless, China has a long way to go, and faces many obstacles to its development. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the American economy was about eight-times the size of China’s as measured by official exchange rates. Projecting current growth rates for each country, the American economy would still be roughly three-times the size of the Chinese economy in 2025. If one uses purchasing power parities for comparison (a doubtful procedure when measuring power rather than welfare), and assumes the American economy grows at a low 2 percent rate and China at 6 percent, the two economies could become equal in size sometime in the 2020s. Even so, the two economies would be equivalent in size, but not equal in composition. China would still have a vast underdeveloped sector. Even under these assumptions, China would not equal the United States in per capita income until sometime late in the century. In terms of political power, per capita income provides a more accurate measure of the sophistication of an economy. Even with its impressive growth, China remains a long way from equality. And since the United States is unlikely to be standing still during that period, China is a long way from posing the kind of challenge to American preponderance that the Kaiser’s Germany posed when it passed Britain at the beginning of the last century. Moreover, linear projections of economic growth trends can be misleading. Countries tend to pick the low-hanging fruit as they benefit from imported technologies in the early stages of economic take-off, and growth rates generally slow as economies reach higher levels of development. In addition, the Chinese economy faces serious obstacles of transition, from inefficient state owned enterprises, a shaky financial system, and inadequate infrastructure. Growing inequality, massive internal migration, an inadequate social safety net, corruption, and inadequate institutions could foster political instability. Coping with greatly increasing flows of information at a time when restrictions can hinder economic growth presents a sharp dilemma for Chinese leaders. Politics has a way of confounding economic projections.

## Rise of China and Asia will be peaceful

**Layne,** 0**9** Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009)

As Mahbubani sees it, the West should welcome Asia’s rise because Asia represents a culture of peace (pp. 78–79). In particular, he asserts, China truly is committed to a “peaceful rise” (pp. 84, 173). In contrast to Zakaria, Mahbubani believes that Asia’s soft power has far more appeal than that of the United States because Asia enjoys more “true freedom” than the West. Arguing [End Page 156] that the West inappropriately defines freedom in absolute rather than relative terms, he defines human freedom as including freedom from want, freedom of security (i.e., the absence of political instability), freedom to choose one’s employment, and freedom to think (pp. 133–140).27 Using China as an illustration, Mahbubani argues that today’s Asians enjoy these freedoms in far greater abundance than ever before in their history.28 Mahbubani’s bottom line is that Asia is a juggernaut that the West should accommodate; otherwise it risks being steamrollered. “The time to restructure the world order has come,” he writes, “We should do it now” (p. 235). Given what he terms the “incompetence” of the United States and the European Union (EU) as global leaders, the West should start by democratizing global governance to accommodate Asia’s increased clout (pp. 235–237).29 International institutions—the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank—should be revamped to reflect the emerging distribution of power in Asia’s favor. “The West knows,” Mahbubani claims, “that the amount of political and economic space it occupies in the world is shrinking. The logical consequence is that the Western domination of several global institutions will have to diminish—not a prospect that many Western countries will relish” (p. 242). Mahbubani, however, clearly relishes the West’s decline. Global leadership, he says, historically is provided by emerging powers—today, China—and the West had better adjust to this transition (pp. 237–238). Perhaps so. But whether the West should welcome Asia’s rise, as Mahbubani urges, is an open question.

# A2 Chinese Defense Spending

## Chinese defense spending has nothing to do with heg and isn’t threatening

**Lieber and Alexander 2005** – \*Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and the Nanovic Institute for European Studies, \*\*Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia (Keir and Gerard, “Waiting for balancing”, http://people.virginia.edu/~ga8h/Waiting-for-Balancing.pdf, WEA)

China, on the other hand, is engaged in a strategic military buildup. Although military expenditures are notoriously difficult to calculate for that country, the best estimates suggest that China has slightly increased its share of defense spending in recent years (see Table 3). This buildup, however, has been going on for decades, that is, long before September 11 and the Bush administration’s subsequent strategic response.31 Moreover, the growth in Chi- nese conventional capabilities is primarily driven by the Taiwan problem: in the short term, China needs to maintain the status quo and prevent Taiwan from acquiring the relative power necessary to achieve full independence; in the long term, China seeks unification of Taiwan with the mainland. China clearly would like to enhance its relative power vis-à-vis the United States and may well have a long-term strategy to balance U.S. power in the future.32 But China’s defense buildup is not new, nor is it as ambitious and assertive as it should be if the United States posed a direct threat that required internal balancing. (For example, the Chinese strategic nuclear modernization program is often mentioned in the course of discussions of Chinese balancing behavior, but the Chinese arsenal is about the same size as it was a decade ago.33 Moreover, even if China is able to deploy new missiles in the next few years, it is not clear whether it will possess a survivable nuclear retaliatory capability vis-à- vis the United States.) Thus, China’s defense buildup is not a persuasive indicator of internal balancing against the post–September 11 United States specifically.

In sum, rather than the United States’ post–September 11 policies inducing a noticeable shift in the military expenditures of other countries, the latters’ spending patterns are instead characterized by a striking degree of continuity before and after this supposed pivot point in U.S. grand strategy.

# A2 Russia

## Concessions prove the rivalry between the US and Russia is over

Welch and Shevchenko, 10 – \*Professor of Political Science at UCLA and \*\*Assistant Professor of Political Science at California State University, Fullerton (\*Deborah and \*\*Alexei, "Status Seekers: Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy", International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4, Spring 2010, June 29th 2010, p. 27, KONTOPOULOS) PDF

In addition to accepting U.S. bases in Central Asia, Putin made several unilateral concessions indicating that the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and Russia was over,142 evidence that he was following a social creativity strategy. He withdrew from a large Russian electronic intelligence gathering and military base in Cuba and a naval base in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. Putin reacted mildly to the U.S. withdrawal from the Antiballistic Missile treaty—one of the few remaining symbols of Russian equality—calling it a “mistake” because it would hurt arms control, not because it would damage Russian security. Putin adopted a softer position toward admission of the Baltic states to NATO. He accepted the creation of the NATO-Russia Council as a vehicle for cooperation, although it did not give Russia a vote. Finally, he accepted a strategic arms reduction treaty that allowed the United States to store dismantled warheads.143

**Russia faces too many domestic constraints to balance**

**Lieber 2008** – professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown (Robert, World Affairs Journal, “Falling upwards: Declinism, the box set”, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Summer/full-Lieber.html, WEA)

Farther East, and despite its economic recovery and the restoration of central power under Putin, Russia remains overwhelmingly dependent on the current boom in energy and commodity prices—and correspondingly vulnerable in the event of their decline. The country suffers from pervasive corruption, with a ranking from Transparency International that puts it at 121 among 163 countries in this category. Its population, already less than half that of the U.S. **and plagued with alcoholism**, chronic violence, a decrepit health-care system, and a male life expectancy of fewer than 60 years of age (lower than that of Bangladesh), shrinks by some half a million people per year. And its army, while bidding for attention and resources, remains weak and in disarray. As The Economist recently summarized Putin’s Russia, it has become one of the most “criminalized, corrupt and bureaucratized countries in the world.” True, the Putin regime plays to its domestic base with strident nationalism and xenophobia. In doing so, it has actively opposed and occasionally subverted American policies on some issues while providing a degree of cooperation on others. Instances of the former include opposition to NATO enlargement and to the stationing of anti-missile systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, the use of oil and gas resources as leverage against neighboring countries, overt and covert pressure against former Soviet Republics, and arms sales to Syria and Iran. Yet Moscow grudgingly collaborates where it has shared concerns, as with North Korea and combating terrorism. Russia presents a problem for the United States, but its erratic behavior, its priorities at home, and its own internal decline put it well short of being a major power challenger.

# A2 Russia – Georgia Conflict

## Russia still isn’t competing with the US

**Larson et al, 10** Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and Alexei Shevchenko is Assistant Professor of Political Science at California State University, Fullerton, (Deborah Welch, “Chinese and Russian Responses to U.S. Primacy”, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international\_security/v034/34.4.larson.html#back

Despite its incursion into Georgia, Russia has not returned to a full-fledged social competition strategy. Russia's emphasis on having a sphere of privileged interest might appear to reflect geopolitical motives. Nevertheless, Putin's goal is to restore both Russia's status as a global great power, one that is treated as an equal partner, and its position as a regional superpower, rather than compete with the United States for global preeminence.169 Having predominant interests in nearby states is part of the identity of a great power, as in the U.S. Monroe Doctrine. A policy of geopolitical competition would entail forming a coalition of anti-American states such as Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Venezuela, while emphasizing relations with China and other Asian states, as advocated by Russian Eurasianists.170 Consistent with social creativity, Russia pursues a high diplomatic profile, proposing a European security conference and hosting summits with the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.171 The question is whether Russia can be induced to seek prestige by exercising more responsibility for global stability. Continued indifference to Russia's great power aspirations will encourage Russian elites' sense of injury and humiliation, possibly leading to further conflict, especially in the Caucasus.

# A2 EU

**EU is screwed – No chance they balance – multiple constraints**

**Singh 2008** – Professor, School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London (Robert, International Politics, Vol. 45, Iss. 5, “The exceptional empire”, ProQuest, WEA)

Aside from its elusiveness currently, however, this multipolar vision also has grievous normative problems. Prior balances of great powers have rarely been either stable or benign (think of the years preceding WWI and during the 1920s and 1930s leading to WWII). Even were some new concert of major powers to be thrashed out, however, it is doubtful that such a set of rival powers would resolve the humanitarian crises, ethnic cleansing, genocides, failed states and Islamist movements that together threaten the contemporary international system. At least as pointedly, the main potential rival powers to the US are themselves inhibited by all manner of problems ranging from energy needs and environmental decay to the threat of pandemics, acute socio-economic inequalities and demographic stresses. In each, the internal tensions and strains of social, economic and political change may be as likely to retard as to advance the various emerging powers' routes to great or superpower status. The EU, for example, faces acute demographic problems that deeply complicate the still unresolved institutional and political dilemmas shaping its development. Generous welfare spending, inflexible labour markets, a rapidly aging workforce, a diminishing tax base, a declining fertility ratio and the problems of a growing but alienated Muslim population pose powerful hindrances to sustaining positive growth rates. However large its economy, the EU likewise remains a relatively minor global actor: In the near future, the European Union (**EU) will be a structurally-crippled geopolitical actor**. It has expanded too fast and speaks in 23 tongues. Too much of the leaders' time is spent on discussing how Europe should make its decisions. The patchwork accords reached under the German presidency in June 2007 have not solved the fundamental problem. **It would only be a mild exaggeration to say that the perpetual European discussions on seating arrangement are akin to re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic**. The geopolitical environment around Europe has worsened while the EU has focused inwards: it faces a more troubled environment in North Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and even vis-a -vis Russia. This is a pretty dismal record. (Mahbubani, 2007, 203-204)

## EU can’t balance—trends don’t overcome the structural reality

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 53-54, WEA)

Notwithstanding a long list of disputes and numerous predictions of political divorce, it remains premature to write the epitaph for the European-American partnership. Despite its historic expansion, the E.U. is not about to emerge as a formidable superpower, let alone take on the role of balancer against the United States. The enlarged E.U. lacks sufficient central authority and the military capacity for an effective common defense policy. In addition, a community of twenty-five countries now includes member states from Eastern Europe, whose history provides strong motivation for maintaining close ties with the United States. This perspective was evident in the support of the ten governments of the Vilnius group for American policy toward Iraq. Indeed, the intra-European divide over Iraq policy provided evidence that the member states of the E.U. will not reach a consensus on balancing against the United States. Moreover, domestic politics, economic problems, and the demographic profile of aging populations are much more likely to produce reductions in defense spending than the increases that would be required to provide the E.U. with the military capability of a major world power. In sum, Europe’s lack of unanimity on foreign and security policy, the inability to provide for its own security, and shared interests in trans-Atlantic economic cooperation and institutions require a continuing partnership with America. Moreover, despite what Freud called the narcissism of small differences, the legacy of common values remains fundamental. Europe has neither the will nor the capability for a real break, and the interests of the United States work against a divorce as well. Nonetheless, the sources of disagreement are deepseated and have been increasing, and they deserve close attention.

# A2 EU

## Even if they balance they can’t lead—governance style means no genuine leadership so links to our impacts

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 75-76, WEA)

European critics of the United States sometimes convey the impression that the E.U. countries are far more altruistic and cooperative in their global relationships and in helping other countries to develop. However, the E.U., along with America and Japan, shares a pattern of protecting domestic agriculture in ways that are harmful not only to consumers and taxpayers, but also to agricultural exporters in the developing world who find it harder to compete against these subsidized products. Indeed, the E.U.’s agricultural protectionism has been especially egregious (a tribute to the political effectiveness of French farmers), and Oxfam, the international aid organization, reports that the E.U. has higher barriers to imports from the developing world than any other large industrial economy.29 On many of these issues, the domestic structure of European economies and political systems makes cooperation harder, not only with the United States but with other countries as well. Historically high levels of unemployment, demographic pressures from an aging population, and rising costs to maintain generous social services and pension benefits, coupled with relatively higher taxes and rigidities in the mobility of labor and in regulatory policies, tend to undercut Europe’s competitiveness with America and Asia. These conditions foster restrictive economic and trade policies and thus greater friction with the United States and other countries. In addition, European parliamentary systems, with the exception of Britain, mostly produce coalition governments that are seriously constrained by the demands of their component groups.

# A2 EU

## Europe can’t supplant us

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 83-88, WEA)

Another serious obstacle to a common E.U. foreign policy is that differences among the member countries have sometimes been as great as those between Europe and the United States. Political differences, such as those on Iraq, are not new. For example, in May 1991, responding to the increasing turmoil in Yugoslavia and the unwillingness of the United States to intervene in another crisis in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, the president of the European Council, foreign minister Jacques Poos of Luxembourg, proclaimed that “the hour of Europe has dawned.”39 But a lack of political agreement and of capability left the E.U. unable to act effectively, thus compounding Yugoslavia’s tragedy. Kosovo was another case in point, with Britain more assertive than the United States in advocating the use of force, while Greece (historically sympathetic to the Serbs) opposed the action. The expansion of the EU widens these differences even as it adds to the number of countries supportive of close ties with the United States. The Czech Republic, Hungary, and especially Poland have painful historical memories of their treatment at the hands of their powerful neighbors, Germany and Russia, and they have good reason to look to the United States for credible security guarantees. The Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have even stronger motivation. After signing a statement supporting the U.S. use of force against Iraq, these countries found themselves the target of intense pressure from France. President Chirac uttered the condescending words “Ce n’est pas tr`es bien ´el`eve”40 (“This does not show good upbringing”), and implied that East European dissent could adversely affect their pending E.U. membership. As another example, Lithuania complained that France had failed to consult it during delicate E.U. negotiations over Russian transit access to the territorial enclave of Kaliningrad.41 These incidents illustrate a larger point about the conduct not only of France but of other leading member states of the E.U. For all their rhetorical embrace of European solidarity, fidelity to multilateralism, and commitment to international institutions and laws, when they believe their national interests are at stake, they are capable of acting unilaterally, regardless of these stated principles. France’s protection of its agricultural interests, its refusal to allow the import of British beef despite E.U. clearance, its arm-twisting of the East Europeans, and its indulgent position on Iraqi sanctions in the years from 1992 to 2001 (not entirely unrelated to Iraq’s large debts for purchases of French arms) are cases in point. But France is not alone, and whether in dealing with terrorism, national security, powerful domestic lobbies, or sensitive matters of national sovereignty, Britain, Germany, Italy, Spain, and others have been capable of acting with lesser regard for lofty ideals.42 As an example, Chancellor Schroeder actively sought a permanent U.N. Security Council seat for Germany without regard to E.U. priorities. Moreover, in the face of stubborn economic problems, including lagging growth rates and historically high levels of unemployment, France and Germany, as well as a number of other smaller countries, have defied the E.U.’s limit on domestic budget deficits. These countries incurred deficits that broke the E.U.-imposed ceiling of 3 percent of GDP. Indeed, Germany exceeded that limit in the years from 2002 through 2005, even though its own government had played a major role in writing the rules for the E.U.’s “stability pact,” created to coincide with adoption of the euro. Even if the countries of the E.U. were to find themselves in complete policy agreement and to relinquish sovereignty concerns, their incapacity remains a stubborn obstacle to the emergence of a credible European defense. In the aftermath of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States devotes more than $400 billion annually to defense. In absolute terms this dwarfs the spending of all likely competitors combined, yet it amounts to just 4 percent of GDP, a figure well below the 6.6 percent peak during the Reagan buildup of the mid-1980s and much less than the double-digit levels of the early Cold War years. In contrast, the twenty-five countries of the E.U. spend just 55 percent of the U.S. figure,43 yet even that amount gives them far less capability because the effort is divided among separate national defense budgets and much is wasted in duplication. Europe has more men and women in uniform than the United States, yet its large forces (many of them reliant on conscripts) are mostly more suited to traditional land warfare than to the specialized foreign interventions and high-technology weaponry characteristic of 21st-century conflict. Until recently, the capabilities have remained remarkably limited. For example, in the Kosovo crisis of 1999, despite the Europeans having nearly two million men and women in uniform, it took “an heroic effort” (in the words of the British Foreign Secretary) merely to deploy 2 percent of them as part of a peace-keeping force.44 In contrast, as manifested in a series of stunningly successful military campaigns (Kuwait, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq), the United States has capabilities that no other country can match. In material terms, the E.U. does have the ability to organize a significant and effective defense. The creation of a new European Defense Agency (EDA) for the purpose of coordinating military research and spending reflects the aspiration to improve capabilities and prepare for global security threats. Nonetheless, the EDA is a very modest undertaking, and the structure of the E.U.’s political institutions, differences among its twenty-five member countries, demographic and financial constraints, and the weight of competing budget priorities largely work against fundamental change.

# A2 EU

## EU can’t fill in and they know it

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 88-90, WEA)

Given its limitations in foreign and defense policy, Europe has fundamental reasons to rely on America as a hedge against future threats. Though Russia appears considerably less chaotic than in the immediate aftermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union, even its future behavior cannot be assured. Important parts of the old USSR remain troubled, and the long-term stability of the central Asian republics (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan), the Caucasus (Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan), and the large East European Republics (Ukraine, Belarus) appears far from certain. Elsewhere, instability throughout parts of the former Yugoslavia, internal problems within the countries of the southern Mediterranean, and dangers stemming from the Middle East and Persian Gulf all represent potential risks. Upheaval along the European continent’s eastern or southern periphery, whether from economic collapse, ethnic conflict, or interstate war, also could send waves of refugees flooding into Europe. As evident in the cases of Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea, the actual or potential diffusion of weapons of mass destruction, including missile technology and nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, poses significant dangers for Europe. While these threats are more diffuse and conjectural than the Soviet threat during the Cold War, they are not negligible and provide a reason for European countries to retain their alliance with the United States as a form of insurance. Consistent with these concerns, the E.U. heads of state and government in December 2003 endorsed a European Security Strategy based on a proposal by Javier Solana, their High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, for facing five security threats: terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflict, failed states, and organized crime. Although the European Council deleted a reference in the original Solana strategy paper implying support for the preemptive use of force, it did retain language referring to robust intervention, preventive engagement, and a crucial role for the United States (“Acting together, the EU and the U.S. can be a formidable force for good in the world”).49 Closely connected to Europe’s need for an American security partnership is the fact of U.S. primacy. Only the United States possesses the means to project power abroad in a decisive and compelling manner. Since the end of the ColdWar, American might has been apparent both when it was deployed (as in Kuwait in 1990–91, Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2002, and Iraq in 2003) and when it was absent (Rwanda in 1994, Bosnia prior to 1995, Darfur). With time, the relative margin of U.S. power vis-a-vis other actors appears to be increasing rather than decreasing. Not only does the United States possess the ability to move large forces by sea and air across great distances on a timely basis, but it also enjoys wide advantages in precision-guided munitions, stealth technology, satellite communication, command, and control, and the whole panoply of forces and technologies needed to prevail in the air and on the modern battlefield.

# A2 EU

## Europe lacks the will to follow through

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 92-93, WEA)

Could Europe and the United States nonetheless one day come to an irreversible parting of the ways and even become great power antagonists? Momentous events often arrive by surprise, so the question deserves attention. In essence, a fundamental rupture would require the combination of two elements. One of these is capability, the capacity of Europe to act as a great power opponent of the United States. The other is will – that is, whether Europeans or Americans desire this to happen and seek to bring it about. Despite the rhetoric of conflict, neither of these elements now exists nor seems likely, but under what conditions could they ultimately occur? In terms of capability, the E.U. would need to achieve an unprecedented breakthrough in which member countries did not just talk about relinquishing fundamental political sovereignty, but actually did so. But the existing ability of each of the twenty-five members to exercise a veto necessarily limits E.U. foreign policy. In contrast, a true European federation, a United States of Europe, would possess the institutional prerequisites for acting as a single great power in defense and foreign policy. Even then, the E.U. countries would also need to make the politically difficult decision to allocate scarce resources in order to build a powerful military and to choose competition rather than partnership with the United States. French leaders have tended to favor such a course of action, but theirs is not the prevailing view. Could these changes ever take place? Theoretically, the answer is yes, though the likelihood remains remote. Some scholars of international relations and history argue that reaction to America’s extraordinary predominance will lead to such an outcome, but for the combination of reasons cited above, there is little reason to anticipate such a transformation. Motivation and will also are key. Were the Europeans to find themselves facing some unprecedented threat to their survival in circumstances where the United States was no longer able or willing to provide security, then the political impetus for Europe to provide its own security could emerge. On the other hand, the alternative of E.U. political fragmentation or breakdown cannot be ruled out, either. By itself, a growing European-American divergence in values and beliefs of the kind to which Robert Kagan and others have pointed is unlikely to sustain this kind of change. Instead, a steadily worsening climate of political dispute that finally reached a breaking point on both sides of the Atlantic would have to occur, and with it a collapse in either the will or ability of the United States to sustain its own world role, for example, in reaction to a military quagmire or some devastating series of attacks on a scale far greater than those of September 11.

# A2 India

## India won’t counterbalance because they need us

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 172-173, WEA)

The American regional commitment in Asia also provides reassurance to India vis-a-vis China, with which the memory of a brief but bitter border war in 1962 still lingers. In recent years, India’s relations with the United States have improved significantly, and there is no sign of India seeking to join with others in balancing against American primacy. Moreover, as a consequence of 9/11, the United States has become increasingly engaged in South Asia, not only in the war against terrorism but in the effort to dampen conflict between India and Pakistan. Leaders of India, along with those of Pakistan, have been remarkably explicit in expressing their desire for continuing American engagement in the region. India, which for half a century had emphasized its neutrality yet had done so in ways that typically brought it closer to the Soviet Union than to the United States and which had equipped its military with Soviet weapons, has in recent years clearly tilted toward Washington. As an Indian author has observed, “New Delhi has transacted more political business with Washington in the last four years than in the previous four decades.”34 Moreover, in the aftermath of 9/11 and the successful U.S. military campaign to oust the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the Indian Foreign Minister observed, “I don’t think America can give up its Central Asia presence now,”35 and he expressed his preference that American forces remain in Pakistan indefinitely in order to stabilize that country. For his part, the Pakistani President, General Pervez Musharraf, made clear his view that U.S. air power should remain in Afghanistan as a coercive force and the key to peace there, adding that “the U.S. presence in the region must remain as long as it is needed.”36

# A2 Japan

## Japan is not counter-balancing America.

John M. Owen IV, Assistant Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia, 2002 “Transnational Liberalism and U.S. Primacy,” INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 26.3 (2002) 117-152

Neither is Japan counterbalancing the United States. Its aggregate military spending remains around 1 percent of its gross national product. It is increasing its ability to defend itself against missile attacks by building four space surveillance satellites and developing theater missile defense. These policies, however, are clearly in reaction to the North Korean launch of a Taepo-Dong missile over Japan in August 1998. Japan's TMD initiative was at the prodding of the United States itself and is a joint U.S.-Japanese venture. 44 Indeed, far from attempting to form any anti-U.S. alliance, Tokyo renewed the 1960 U.S.-Japanese security treaty in 1997. The Japanese Diet has yet to approve all of the [End Page 130] details of the new treaty, but the chances of repudiation appear nil. 45 Despite increasing domestic political costs, successive governments have continued to favor the presence of four U.S. naval bases on Japanese territory. 46 Japanese and West European relative acquiescence to U.S. power is caused in part by the predominance of liberalism in these societies. Along with North America, Western Europe and Japan are the most liberal areas of the world. Although these countries have antiliberal elements, such as ultranationalists and communists, all are liberal democracies overwhelmingly dominated by liberal elites. To varying degrees their governments often criticize U.S. internal and external policies, even to the point where they sound anti-American. Yet elites in most of these countries do not appear to fear that the United States will use its massive power against them. Many even indirectly support U.S. primacy by asserting that in today's world military power matters little, thereby absolving their countries of the need to counterbalance.

# A2 BRIC

## BRIC wont balance the US

Joseph Nye (former US Assistant Secretary of Defense, is a professor at Harvard University) May 2010 “What’s in a BRIC?” http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nye82/English

Brazil, like the other BRICs, also faces a serious number of problems. It ranks 75th out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s corruption perceptions index (compared to 79th for China, 84th for India, and 146th for Russia). The World Economic Forum ranks Brazil 56th among 133 countries in terms of economic competitiveness (compared to 29th for China, 49th for India, and 63rd for Russia). Poverty and inequality remain serious problems. Brazil’s Gini coefficient is .57 (1.0 is perfect inequality, with one person receiving all income), compared to .45 for the United States, .42 for China, .37 for India and .42 for Russia. So, how seriously should analysts take the term BRIC? As an indicator of economic opportunity, they should welcome it, though it would make more sense if Indonesia replaced Russia. In political terms, China, India, and Russia are competitors for power in Asia, and Brazil and India have been hurt by China’s undervalued currency. Thus, BRIC is not likely to become a serious political organization of like-minded states.

# A2 International Institutions

## Institutions suck—empirics, capability, people expect us to act

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 4-5, WEA)

Second, as much as we might wish for more effective means of cooperation in addressing common problems, the reality of the United Nations and of other international institutions is that on the most urgent and deadly problems, they are mostly incapable of acting or inadequate to the task. The U.N.’s decision-making structure and institutional weaknesses, the makeup of the Security Council, failures in Bosnia (1991–95) and Rwanda (1994), the massive corruption of the oil-for-food program, the ability of terrorists to drive the organization out of Iraq with one blow,12 and the feckless response to crimes against humanity in the Darfur region of Sudan are evidence of these grave shortcomings. Nor does the European Union, let alone weaker regional bodies such as the Arab League, African Union, or Organization of American States, have much capacity to deal with the deadliest threats. The U.N. has a significant role to play, not least in burden-sharing and in contributing to the perceived legitimacy of collective action, but its weaknesses remain a fundamental constraint. As Stanley Hoffmann, of Harvard’s Center for European Studies, has observed, the U.N. and other international organizations “are increasingly important as sources of legitimacy and stabilizing forces, but often mismanaged and devoid of adequate means.”13 Third, in an international system with no true central authority and the United States as the preponderant power, other countries will continue to look to us for leadership. In this anarchic and unipolar system, if America does not take action on the most dangerous perils, no one else is likely to have the capacity or the will to do so.14 Yet, in view of U.S. primacy, it is not surprising that the onus for action falls on its shoulders and that others may be tempted to act as free riders or “buck-passers” in a situation where security is a collective good.

# A2 Soft Balancing

## Ignore soft balancing—it’s not driven by hegemony

**Brooks and Wohlforth 2005** – professors of government at Dartmouth (Stephen and William, International Security, 30:1, “Hard times for soft balancing”, EBSCO, WEA)

How does one identify soft balancing? The answer matters greatly for both policy and theory, yet it remains elusive because soft-balancing proponents have not supplied the conceptual tools to distinguish behavior that is an outgrowth of the systemic balancing imperative from what we might call “unipolar politics as usual.” Crucially missing from the literature is sufficient recognition that other explanations besides soft balancing exist for state actions that constrain the United States. As a result, analysts tend to treat nearly any behavior that complicates U.S. foreign policy as soft balancing. We remove this bias by setting out four alternative explanations. economic interest States may undertake actions that hamper the conduct of U.S. foreign policy not principally because they wish to do so, but rather to advance economic gains, either for the state as a whole or for powerful interest groups or business lobbies. A government’s interest in fostering economic growth or obtaining revenue for itself or its constituents may be unrelated to the presence of a hegemon on the horizon or the potential security threat it poses. regional security concerns States routinely pursue policies to enhance local security that are unrelated to constraining U.S. hegemony. For a variety of reasons, there is a greater demand for regional policy coordination than existed in the past: a vast increase in the number of states; a consequent increase in the overall number of weak or failed states; and the rise of transnational security challenges such as organized crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, and refugee flows. Major powers frequently face incentives to enhance their capabilities—often through collaboration with other regional states—in response to these local or regional concerns. These efforts may result in shifts in relative power—and perhaps in reduced U.S. freedom of action—even if constraining U.S. **hegemony is not an important driver of them**. policy disputes and bargaining Other states may undertake actions that constrain the United States not in response to the security threat presented by U.S. hegemony, but rather because they sincerely disagree with specific U.S. policies. Governments may resist a given U.S. policy because they are convinced that it is ill suited to the problem at hand or otherwise inappropriate, and not because they think it directly threatens their security or that opposition to it will reduce U.S. power over the long term. If so, then soft balancing is a misnomer, for the behavior concerned is unrelated to maximizing security under anarchy by checking a dangerous systemic concentration of power. In short, other **states may push back against specific U.S. policies** (pushing back because they disagree) **and not against U.S. power in general** (pushing back because they fear or wish to challenge U.S. hegemony). Given the reasonable expectation of future policy differences on various issues, and therefore the expectation of future policy bargaining, it follows that states may take actions intended to increase, or at least maintain, bargaining leverage over the long term. This is where policy bargaining takes forms that most closely resemble what analysts mean by soft balancing. As we show below, there are crucial analytical differences between long-term bargaining enhancement strategies and real soft balancing.

# A2 Soft Balancing

## No soft balancing

**Brooks and Wohlforth 2005** – professors of government at Dartmouth (Stephen and William, International Security, 30:1, “Hard times for soft balancing”, EBSCO, WEA)

To the degree that these other four explanations account for actions that constrain U.S. foreign policy, the soft-balancing argument is weakened. It would be surprising to find no evidence consistent with the soft-balancing explanation. Just as unlikely would be evidence that soft balancing is the only explanation in play—even though the concept’s proponents essentially imply just such an expectation by failing to consider alternatives. The real issue is relative salience. Determining the strength of the various explanations, however, is no easy task. The key cases of soft balancing are quite recent, so reliable inside information can be scarce. The chief putative soft-balancing powers—France, Russia, and China—are also not known for the transparency of their executive decisionmaking. And public rhetoric presents difficult analytical challenges. A government with a sincere interest in soft balancing may not want to advertise it. At the same time, all four other dynamics may generate balancing rhetoric from policymakers, creating prima facie evidence for a soft-balancing explanation. Leaders motivated chiefly by domestic political considerations are hardly likely to say so; they may detect domestic political advantage in touting the balancing element even if countering the threat from U.S. power is not the real issue. In turn, leaders who have sincere policy differences with the United States may talk up balancing to help build a coalition to increase their bargaining leverage. Being seen by Washington as a potential soft-balancer has risks, to be sure, but it also holds out the promise of magnifying one’s bargaining influence and the significance of any concessions one might make. Governments that pursue relative economic advantages for themselves or their constituents may find it convenient to cloak the policy in high-minded talk about checking U.S. power. And the United States is so prominent on the global stage that it can potentially serve as a convenient focal point for other states that seek to cooperate on regional security issues. States will likely have strong disagreements on the specifics of how to cooperate at the regional level; a public stance against U.S. policies may be one issue they can agree on. Balancing rhetoric can thus be a useful rallying point for stimulating regional cooperation. Balancing talk, moreover, is often as cheap as it is useful. A state can rationally be expected to address an issue only to the degree that it has the capability to do so. Actors and observers expect France to play a far more substantial role in resolving an issue in the Balkans than in North Korea, and vice versa for China. Yet because of the United States’ globe-girdling capabilities, critical U.S. involvement is likely to be expected in both cases. This illustrates the immense gap between the set of issues the United States might rationally be expected to address seriously and the corresponding issue sets of the other great powers. As a result, there is a range of issues over which they can take positions without expecting to be compelled to bear the costs of their resolution. Ultimately, **rhetoric is a poor indicator of the salience of soft balancing**. Perhaps recognizing these challenges, proponents of the soft-balancing concept frequently place more emphasis on its portents for the future than on its contemporary significance. For the argument to be taken seriously, however, there must be evidence for its current explanatory value.17 Otherwise, soft balancing is not an explanation but an expectation: a mere reassertion of the well-known, neorealist prediction of the return of multipolarity that has been advanced since 1990, which is also typically formulated in an unfalsifiable manner.18

# A2 Soft Balancing

## They have no empirical support for balancing

**Brooks and Wohlforth 2005** – professors of government at Dartmouth (Stephen and William, International Security, 30:1, “Hard times for soft balancing”, EBSCO, WEA)

This article shows that the soft-balancing argument has no traction. The only reason some analysts have concluded otherwise is because they have failed to consider alternative explanations. If it were reasonable to equate soft balancing with great power policy bargaining, then balancing would figure as a contributor, but not a driver, in at least the Iraq case. As we have demonstrated, however, there are critical analytical costs to equating these two phenomena. Once the distinction between soft balancing and bargaining is recognized, the strict conclusion is that soft balancing plays no discernable role in any of the four cases we examine. None of this should be interpreted to mean that Washington can safely ignore the views of the other major powers. The further one looks beyond the immediate short term, the clearer the issues become—among them, the environment, weapons of mass destruction, disease, migration, and the stability of the global economy. The United States cannot effectively address these issues on its own; all of them will require repeated dealings with many partners over many years. It is also clear that other states can take actions that end up constraining the United States, sometimes significantly. These constraint actions, however, are not an outgrowth of balance of power dynamics and cannot be explained by the soft-balancing amendment to that theory. The current practice of using balance of power concepts to describe and explain this behavior is costly in theoretical and policy terms. With regard to theory, the widespread tendency to shoehorn policy disputes and bargaining dynamics into a simplistic balancing narrative has the effect of generating unwarranted support for balance of power theory. Our analysis demonstrates that **even though other states sometimes undertake actions that constrain the United States**, and occasionally use balancing language to describe these efforts, **such behavior does not validate balance of power theory**. In a unipolar world, soft balancing can be seen as the first observable implication that the world works the way balance of power theory expects it to. There is no empirical basis for the soft-balancing argument, and hence any effort to invoke it as a means of buttressing balance of power theory is fruitless. Where should scholarly research go from here? The soft-balancing argument rose to prominence only in the past several years and has not yet been fully fleshed out theoretically. One option that might seem appealing would be to develop the theoretical logic of the argument further, as Robert Pape has done in a recent analysis.70 Although we certainly understand the appeal of trying to explain the constraint actions of other states with a parsimonious, generalizable theory, these advantages of the soft-balancing argument in no way make up for its lack of explanatory power—even in cases that soft-balancing proponents have highlighted to try to forward their argument. Although it is bound to disappoint those who have sought to rework balance of power theory to accommodate a world without hard balancing, this result is not surprising. Balance of power theory was developed to explain the behavior of states in systems with two or more poles in which war among the great powers was an ever-present danger. Neither of those conditions applies today: the international system is unipolar, and the likelihood of war among the great powers has receded because of a host of factors, some of which are highlighted by realism (such as the geographic location of the United States and nuclear weapons) and others of which are emphasized by nonrealist theories (such as economic globalization and democracy).71 Analysts would be wise to invest their talents in investigating the novel dynamics of great power bargaining in today’s unipolar system rather than seeking to stretch old analytical concepts that were created to deal with the bipolar and multipolar systems of the past.72

# A2 Soft Balancing – Emperically Denied

## Soft balancing barely scratched US power project

**Paul ‘5** (T.V., James McGill Professor of International Relations at McGill University, Montreal, Canada. He has published eight books including Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, coedited with James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann, “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” *International Security* 30.1 (2005) 46-71 AM)

Still, opposition to the U.S.-led invasion by second-tier major powers and their allies did not result in hard balancing against the United States. The coordination of diplomatic positions at the UN and in other forums (e.g., NATO and the EU), as well as summit diplomacy involving national leaders, were the main soft-balancing tactics used by the principal second-ranking powers. These efforts did not prevent the United States from launching the offensive, but they did help to reduce the legitimacy of the U.S. military action. They also made it more difficult for the United States to gain peacekeeping forces from other countries, as they demanded UN approval before dispatching their troops. Thus, in the case of Iraq, U.S. power has been partially constrained by the soft-balancing efforts of second-tier major powers. The less-than-successful outcome of the war and the growing insurgency against the occupation make it increasingly unlikely that, at least in the short term, the United States will undertake similar regime-changing military actions against Iran, another regional challenger pursuing nuclear weapons and a member of President Bush's "axis of evil." Despite the opposition of France, Germany, and Russia, the United States invaded Iraq using overwhelming force and toppled the regime of Saddam Hussein within three weeks of the start of major combat operations. After the war, the three states continued their opposition by challenging U.S. efforts to gain UN support for the stabilization of the country and the legitimization of the occupation. Their soft-balancing efforts culminated in a partial victory in June 2004, when the United States agreed to adopt UN resolution 1546/2004, which returned partial sovereignty to the Iraqi government and took away some U.S. powers in the day-to-day running of the country, except in security matters. The unanimous approval of the resolution was the result of diplomatic bargaining among the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Russia. According to the resolution, the U.S.-led coalition agreed to end its occupation of Iraq before June 30, 2004, when an interim Iraqi government would assume responsibility for, among other things, the "convening of a national conference reflecting the diversity of Iraqi society, [and the] holding of direct democratic elections to a transitional national assembly, no later than 31 January 2005." This transitional government will draft a permanent constitution leading to a democratically elected government by December 31, 2005.[69](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v030/30.1paul.html" \l "FOOT69)

**Soft balancing is a cheap cover-up for no balancing—there’s no conceptual integrity or link to primacy**

**Lieber and Alexander 2005** – \*Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, Fellow at the Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies and the Nanovic Institute for European Studies, \*\*Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia (Keir and Gerard, “Waiting for balancing”, http://people.virginia.edu/~ga8h/Waiting-for-Balancing.pdf, WEA)

Distinguishing Soft Balancing from Traditional Diplomatic FrictionThere is a second, more important, reason to be skeptical of soft-balancing claims. The criteria they offer for detecting the presence of soft balancing are conceptually flawed. Walt defines soft balancing as “conscious coordination of diplomatic action in order to obtain outcomes contrary to U.S. preferences, outcomes that could not be gained if the balancers did not give each other some degree of mutual support.”57 This and other accounts are problematic in a crucial way. Conceptually, seeking outcomes that a state (such as the United States) does not prefer does not necessarily or convincingly reveal a desire to balance that state geostrategically. For example, one trading partner often seeks outcomes that the other does not prefer, without balancing being relevant to the discussion. Thus, empirically, the types of events used to operationalize definitions such as Walt’s do not clearly establish the crucial claim of soft-balancing theorists: states’ desires to balance the United States. Widespread anti-Americanism can be present (and currently seems to be) without that fact persuasively revealing impulses to balance the United States. The events used to detect the presence of soft balancing are so typical in history that they are not, and perhaps cannot be, distinguished from routine diplomatic friction between countries, even between allies. Traditional balancing criteria are useful because they can reasonably, though surely not perfectly, help distinguish between real balancing behavior and policies or diplomatic actions that may look and sound like an effort to check the power of the dominant state but that in actuality reflect only cheap talk, domestic politics, other international goals not related to balances of power, or the resentment of particular leaders. The current formulation of the concept of soft balancing is not distinguished from such behavior. Even if the predictions were correct, they would not unambiguously or even persuasively reveal balancing behavior, soft or otherwise.

Our criticism is validated by the long list of events from 1945 to 2001 that are directly comparable to those that are today coded as soft balancing. These events include diplomatic maneuvering by U.S. allies and nonaligned countries against the United States in international institutions (particularly the UN), economic statecraft aimed against the United States, resistance to U.S. military basing, criticism of U.S. military interventions, and waves of antiAmericanism.

# A2 Resentment

## Anger is inevitable – maintaining hegemony is necessary to prevent actual backlash.

Christopher Ross, special coordinator for public diplomacy and public affairs at the Department of State, Washington Quarterly, Spring, 2002

Although the wording of recriminations varies -- ranging from hegemony to multilateralism to cultural imperialism -- the United States, as the world's dominant power, will inevitably be accused of heavy-handedness and arrogance. It will inform and influence public opinion effectively only if it changes the paradigm of the past and establishes a two-way approach that builds credible dialogue. To arrive there, the United States should experiment and take a few chances, developing programs that encourage two-way engagement with the people it seeks to influence. Some efforts may fail, but others will succeed; the U.S. government can use those successes to shape a sustained future effort. Terrorism has changed the way people think about public diplomacy. Today, no serious observer can deny the link between perceptions of the United States and the country's national security. Some of those perceptions range far beyond U.S. control. Some of them, however, depend on how the United States talks to the world. All the pieces matter: the U.S. policy message itself, the channels of communication the United States selects, the tone of voice in which it speaks, and its familiarity with the environment in which it is speaking. The United States will never persuade its sworn enemies. The surprisingly muted reaction to the quick U.S. military success in Afghanistan, however, suggests that more people might be able to be persuaded than we originally thought. Certainly, most people will back a winner. The United States is winning and, because it is resolute, it will continue to win.

# A2 Offshore Balancing

## Offshore balancing is comparatively more dangerous than hegemony.

Bradley A. Thayer (Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University) 2007 American Empire: A Debate, “Reply to Christopher Layne” p 104

Layne does not illuminate the risks associated with his preferred grand strategy of offshore balancing principally because those risks far outweigh any gain. Abandoning primacy in favor of offshore balancing would entail enormous dangers for the United States and its allies. Most importantly, it would cause the United States to abandon its dominant position in favor of inferiority for the first time in a century. Offshore balancing is a radical break with American tradition, statecraft, and policies which have allowed the United States first, to defeat four peer competitors—Germany, Italy, Japan, and the Soviet Union in World War It and the Cold War; second, by peaceful means, to replace the previously dominant state—Great Britain; and third, to win greater security for the American people and their allies.

## Offshore balancing would sever alliances, causing global proliferation and coalitions against America.

Bradley A. Thayer (Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University) 2007 American Empire: A Debate, “Reply to Christopher Layne” p 109

If the United States adopted offshore balancing, many of those allies would terminate their relationship with the United States. They would be forced to increase their own armaments, acquire nuclear weapons, and perhaps ally against the United States, even aiming their nuclear weapons at the United States. In those circumstances, the United States would be far less secure and much worse off than it is now. That might be the future if the United States changed its grand strategy. To be sure, at present the United States is a great ally. It is rich and powerful, with many allies all over the world. It wields enormous influence in international institutions as well. When a global problem arises, countries turn to the United States to solve it. When you reflect on all the countries who have been hegemons, the United States is the most accommodating and helpful the world has seen. That is a weighty point and must be emphasized—too frequently, it is not. The United States is so for many reasons, including its democratic ideology, the good-natured qualities of the American people, and geography; and the United States is far away from the EurAsian and African landmasses, which makes it a more attractive ally for a typical country in EurAsia—say, Poland or Turkey—since the United States must be invited in comparison to a great power like Russia. If Warsaw or Ankara were to invite the Russians in, they may never leave, and they might incorporate Poland or Turkey into Russia. There is no danger of that with the United States. And this simple fact alone helps us enormously in our relations with the rest of the world.

# Prefer Our Ev

## Prefer our ev, our arguments are empirically proven and supported by statistical analysis

**Levy and Thompson, 10** – \*Board of Governors’ Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society, \*\*Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, former president of the International Studies Association, and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly (\*Jack S., William R., "Balancing on Land and at Sea", International Security, Vol. 35, No. 1, Summer 2010, July 6th 2010, Galileo, p. 35-36, KONTOPOULOS) PDF

Our argument and our empirical findings have important implications for contemporary debates about balancing behavior. The absence of a great power balancing coalition against the United States is not the puzzle that some have claimed it to be, but it is consistent with **at least five centuries of behavior in the global system.** This is not to say that balancing coalitions never form against leading maritime or global powers, only that the threshold for balancing is both higher and different. We can certainly imagine the United States behaving in such a way as to threaten the interests of other great powers and eventually to provoke a balancing coalition, but the trigger would have to involve specific behavior that threatens other great powers, **not the fact of U.S. power.** Whereas dominant continental powers are inherently threatening because of their power and system-induced uncertainties regarding their intentions, the threat from predominant global powers to other great powers emerges primarily from their behavior and from what that signals about their intentions.

# Heg Sustainable – Must Reads - Long

## **U.S. will maintain hegemony – every indicator points our way**

Kagan 8 - senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (11/1/08, Robert, "Robert Kagan: Make no mistake America is thriving," The Independent)

Is Barack Obama the candidate of American decline? To hear some of his supporters among the foreign policy punditry, you'd think he was. Francis Fukuyama says he supports Obama because he believes Obama would be better at "managing" American decline than John McCain. Fareed Zakaria writes encomiums to Obama's "realism", by which he means Obama's acquiescence to the "post-American world". Obama, it should be said, has done little to deserve the praise of these declinists. His view of America's future, at least as expressed in this campaign, has been appropriately optimistic, which is why he is doing well in the polls. If he sounded anything like Zakaria and Fukuyama say he does, he would be out of business by now. One hopes that whoever wins will quickly dismiss all this faddish declinism. It seems to come along every 10 years or so. In the late 1970s, the foreign policy establishment was seized with what Cyrus Vance called the limits of our power". In the late 1980s, the scholar Paul Kennedy predicted the imminent collapse of American power due to "imperial overstretch". In the late 1990s, Samuel P Huntington warned of American isolation as the "lonely superpower". Now we have the "post-American world". Yet the evidence of American decline is weak. Yes, as Zakaria notes, the world's largest ferris wheel is in Singapore and the largest casino in Macau. But by more serious measures of power, the United States is not in decline, not even relative to other powers. Its share of the global economy last year was about 21 per cent, compared with about 23 per cent in 1990, 22 per cent in 1980 and 24 per cent in 1960. Although the United States is suffering a financial crisis, so is every other major economy. If the past is any guide, the adaptable American economy will be the first to come out of recession and may actually find its position in the global economy enhanced. Meanwhile, American military power is unmatched. While the Chinese and Russian militaries are both growing, America's is growing, too, and continues to outpace them technologically. Russian and Chinese power is growing relative to their neighbours and their regions, which will pose strategic problems, but that is because American allies, especially in Europe, have systematically neglected their defences. America's image is certainly damaged, as measured by global polls, but the practical effects of this are far from clear. Is America's image today worse than it was in the 1960s and early 1970s, with the Vietnam War; the Watts riots; the My Lai massacre; the assassinations of John F Kennedy, Martin Luther King and Bobby Kennedy; and Watergate? Does anyone recall that millions of anti-American protesters took to the streets in Europe in those years? Today, despite the polls, President George Bush has managed to restore closer relations with allies in Europe and Asia, and the next president will be able to improve them even further. Realist theorists have consistently predicted for the past two decades that the world would "balance" against the United States. But nations such as India are drawing closer to America, and if any balancing is occurring, it is against China, Russia and Iran. Sober analysts such as Richard Haass acknowledge that the United States remains "the single most powerful entity in the world". But he warns, "The United States cannot dominate, much less dictate, and expect that others will follow." That is true. But when was it not? Was there ever a time when the United States could dominate, dictate and always have its way? Many declinists imagine a mythical past when the world danced to America's tune. Nostalgia swells for the wondrous American-dominated era after the Second World War, but between 1945 and 1965 the United States suffered one calamity after another. The "loss" of China to communism; the North Korean invasion of South Korea; the Soviet testing of a hydrogen bomb; the stirrings of post-colonial nationalism in Indochina – each proved a strategic setback of the first order. And each was beyond America's power to control or even to manage successfully. No event in the past decade, with the exception of 11 September, can match the scale of damage to America's position in the world. Many would say, "But what about Iraq?" Yet even in the Middle East, where America's image has suffered most as a result of that war, there has been no fundamental strategic realignment. Long-time American allies remain allies, and Iraq, which was once an adversary, is now an ally. Contrast this with the strategic setbacks the United States suffered during the Cold War. In the 1950s and 1960s, the pan-Arab nationalist movement swept out pro-American governments and opened the door to unprecedented Soviet involvement, including a quasi-alliance between Moscow and the Egypt of Gamal Abdel Nasser, as well as with Syria. In 1979, the central pillar of American strategy toppled when the pro-American Shah of Iran was overthrown by Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution. That produced a fundamental shift in the strategic balance from which the United States is still suffering. Nothing similar has occurred as a result of the Iraq war. So perhaps a little perspective is in order. The danger of today's declinism is not that it is true but that the next president will act as if it is. The good news is that I doubt either nominee really will. And I'm confident the American people would take a dim view if he tried.

# Heg Sustainable – Must Reads - Long

## U.S. hegemony is sustainable – multiple reasons

Singh 8 - School of Politics and Sociology at Birkbeck College, University of London (September 2008, Robert, "The Exceptional Empire: Why the United States Will Not Decline -- Again," International Politics, Vol. 45, Iss. 5, Pg. 571)

But despite Iraq, anti-Americanism and more, on the key dimensions of hard and soft power, Washington's exceptional empire remains remarkably robust in terms of its preponderant power. There remain five reasons to step back from current US woes and to treat the 'new declinism' with a degree of caution. First, in spite of Iraq and the immense stresses that the occupation has imposed on its volunteer personnel and National Guard units since 2003, the US military remains far and away the world's largest and best, unique in its capacity to project force rapidly around the globe and peerless in its superiority in conventional warfare and command of the global commons. The official annual US defence budget is now well in excess of $500 billion, excluding the supplemental appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan (over $100 billion). The global presence of US overseas bases, personnel and bilateral training programmes is without precedent. At just over 4% of US GDP, not only is such a budget much lower in proportionate terms than during the Reagan build-up of the 1980s (still less the Cold War's height under Truman and Eisenhower) but it is also sustainable in economic and political terms over the long haul. Indeed, one important consequence of Iraq has been to consolidate a broad bipartisan consensus in Washington endorsing the further expansion of the US Army and Marine Corps by a minimum of 6% over current personnel levels and a substantial year-on-year increase in the Pentagon budget into the 2010s. In 2008, serious presidential candidates competed not for 'peace dividends', as in 1992, but as to exactly how much more needed to be devoted to defence to wage the global war on terror effectively. 1 The ramifications of this military supremacy and its underlying political consensus are profound. Not only does further expansion of the armed forces increase even more America's singular capacity to meet rising global security challenges (whether 'hard' or 'soft') but it also augurs a multiplier effect on the existing technical and logistical superiority of the US military. In the context of competing powers that are either cutting or not increasing their defence budgets and military personnel or that, as in China's case, are increasing them at a steady but comparatively modest level, the fact of American military supremacy through the 2010s remains unchallenged. There has never existed a nation-state with such preponderant global military power at such low financial cost. Second, but related, while serious concerns about 'overstretch' now exist among the uniformed military and mainstream Democrats and Republicans alike, there is minimal prospect of US forces being required to mount another major occupying war in the mode of Iraq. The challenges confronting America that plausibly will demand military action during the next decade -- from the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands and possible 'failed states' in both, through Iran's nuclear programme to Chinese threats to Taiwan -- are serious and urgent, but they do not point to an 'Iraq Mk II'. Moreover, although they have mostly turned against the Iraq war, it is difficult to depict Americans as exhibiting a new 'post-Iraq' pacifism. Even in the midst of the worst of the Iraq occupation in 2006, Americans of both parties evinced more belief in the utility and justice of military force than did Europeans, by decisive margins (Kagan, 2006a). Among critics of Bush, the most forceful case against Iraq was not a pacifist opposition to war in principle but rather the pragmatic case that the invasion was a distraction from the war that the US should have been completing emphatically in Afghanistan. History confirms that a 'defeat-phobic' American public is not synonymous with a peaceful one. America consistently remains true to its historical pedigree, as more a 'dangerous nation' than a docile one (Kagan, 2006b). Less than one decade after peace was reached on the Korean peninsula in 1953, for example, a Democratic president, John F. Kennedy, initiated America's prolonged and costly commitment to Vietnam. Five decades after the respective conclusions of their wars, tens of thousands of US troops remained in Germany, Japan and South Korea. Five years after America's first and worst military defeat in south-east Asia, Americans elected Ronald Reagan to the presidency to restore and reassert US strength against an 'evil empire'. More recently, no nation has gone to war so frequently in such a short time frame as the US since the Cold War's conclusion. Between 1989 and 2003, America engaged in military interventions nine times: in Panama in 1989, Somalia in 1992-1993, Haiti in 1994, Bosnia in 1995-1996, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq three times (1991, 1998, 2003) -- an average of one major action every 18 months (Daalder and Kagan, 2007, 1). It is therefore difficult to herald the Iraq war -- whatever its ultimate course -as the last major US conflict of the early 21st century. The likelihood is not whether there will be further US military interventions after Bush but rather where, when and how. Moreover, such wars will likely continue to be waged through 'coalitions of the willing' rather than through formalized multilateral organizations, the limits of which Afghanistan now attests to in addition to Kosovo previously. The costs of military action in a unipolar world, and the incentives towards it, are mightily different from the bipolar Cold War. Beyond this, the superiority of US forces and technology -- with a growing 'interoperability gap' even with Washington's closest allies -- ensures that a unilateralism of necessity, not choice, is now a fact of life for many American military interventions. Whether or not the war on terror provides a macro-securitization paradigm comparable to the Cold War, the historical record is not one that suggests that the US will indefinitely refrain from violence in support of its interests and ideals. Third, and despite Iraq, America's extensive network of global alliances remains formidably impressive. As Bradley Thayer observes, 'Far from there being a backlash against the United States, there is worldwide bandwagoning with it' (Layne and Thayer, 2007, 106-107). Of 192 nations in the world, Thayer identified only five as 'opposed' to America: China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Eighty-four states are US allies, comprising most major economic and military powers, including 25 members of NATO, 14 major non-NATO allies, 19 Rio Pact members, seven Caribbean Regional Security System members, 13 members of the Iraq coalition not in the other categories, along with Afghanistan, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan and Tunisia. A ratio of 17 to 1 (84 to 5) represents

[Continued on Next Page – No Text Deleted]

# Heg Sustainable – Must Reads - Long

[Continued From Previous Page – No Text Deleted]

a rather positive outcome for the world's primary power. The brute reality remains that most countries wish to align with the US, actively do so, and benefit directly from its security guarantees, open markets and international trade. Even -- especially -- in relation to rising powers such as China and India, national interests typically point in the direction of either actively supporting or passively acquiescing in the American-led international system rather than challenging it. Iraq was an aberration, not a norm, in this regard. Simply put, there has been no hard balancing against Washington of consequence since the end of the Cold War. Despite the setting-up of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, Sino-Russian hostility to the US has not produced a concerted balancing effort, limited as it is by mutual distrust and suspicion, traditional great power rivalry, divergent capacities and strategic goals and -- in Beijing's case -- dependence on the critical US market for its exports and growth. Such hard balancing as has occurred has been aimed not at Washington but Moscow and Beijing: by, respectively, East European and other EU states and Japan, Australia, India and South Korea. America may be unloved in parts of the world, if opinion surveys are to be believed. But it is not generally opposed. Fourth, contrary to Cox's claim, it is not the case that American economic indicators are universally and intractably negative. Not only is the US the world's largest (estimates vary between 20 and 30% of world GDP) and most efficient economy but also the dollar remains the world's reserve currency despite the euro's rise. The Bush years have seen America continue to experience historically low levels of inflation, unemployment and interest rates and -- until this year -- strong rates of growth. The twin deficits of the federal budget (at some $250 billion) and current account (6% of GDP) do make the US the world's leading debtor, as it was previously at the end of Reagan's two terms as president. But the economic health of both China and Japan relies heavily on their continuing to purchase dollars and securities based on the dollar to keep their currencies weak and the US market for their exports strong. The US economy remains huge, robust and the world's most productive, competitive and innovative (not least in information technology), just as its research institutes and universities dominate those of other nations. American takeovers cause a tremendous productivity advantage over non-American alternatives for firms outside the US 'as if the invisible hand of the American marketplace were somehow passing along a secret handshake to these firms' (Van Reenen *et al.* , 2007). America's strength rests on the fundamental soundness, openness and innovative energy of its dynamic economy. Consequently, as the end of the first decade of the 21st century approaches, the enormous, productive and flexible US economy remains central to the international economic system, the dominant source of its operating rules, and the best positioned to take advantage of coming changes precisely because it is so consistently adept at adjusting. Fifth, if these hard power resources of the US remain potent, those propelling the rise of its potential rivals are by no means clear, coherent or reliable. Much of the commentary on America's principal competitors effectively assumes their linear rise and an inevitable disharmony with US interests (and ideals) accompanying a concomitant erosion of American predominance. But such assumptions are not necessarily well founded.

# Heg Sustainable – Must Reads – Long

## **U.S. hegemony is sustainable – your authors underestimate longetivy and exaggerate decline**

Omestad 8 (10/29/08, Thomas, "Is America Really On the Decline?" U.S. News and World Report)

There have been other body blows to American prestige. The inability to bring closure to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (especially the lengthy bungling of the Iraq occupation), the initial feeble response to Hurricane Katrina, and the regulatory laxity and greed that underlie this year's financial crisis all served to cloud the picture of American pre-eminence. Chinese students are questioning whether they should study American-style business. Mahbubani, the Singaporean analyst and former diplomat, marvels at "a new level of incompetence in America that is puzzling the world." And yet, for all the deflating news, the time-tested ability of American society to assess and overcome problems should interject caution about proclaiming the American century over and done with. The restorative capacity of America, reasons Thérèse Delpech, a leading French strategic thinker, "is constantly underestimated abroad and even sometimes at home." Those who contend American decline is being exaggerated—or not happening—say that the unipolar moment was never destined to last and that the degree of deference actually accorded to Washington in happier days was never as much as is portrayed. Take, for instance, the disfavor visited on the United States because of its racial segregation and bigotry and a polarizing war in Vietnam. Nor are doubts about American competence a new factor. Blunders, errors of judgment, the warping of policy by partisan politics, and intemperate rhetoric all are recurring features of U.S. policymaking; nevertheless, American leadership persists. "The U.S. is no good at foreign policy," asserts Walter Russell Mead, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World. He likens the robustness of America's global standing to the muddling through of the comic bumbler Mr. Magoo. "The Bush administration has danced with the world in the worst way," Mead says—but the damage is mostly reversible. "The fundamentals of America's power position in the world," he says, "are probably as strong as they were in 2001." Rising to the occasion. Further, the current credit crash follows in a long tradition of occasional panics and meltdowns in both the British Empire and the United States. "Those crises haven't sunk us in 300 years," reasons Mead. "We seem to find a way to manage them." Skeptics of U.S. decline believe that other weaknesses are exaggerated and that the U.S. economy remains central. Says George Schwab, president of the New York-based National Committee on American Foreign Policy, "When Wall Street coughs, the rest of the world catches a cold." No other currency, including the euro and the Chinese renminbi, is yet ready to replace the dollar. The economic burdens of leadership are said to be manageable. U.S. defense expenditures today equal 4.2 percent of the nation's GDP, compared with 9 percent in the Vietnam War. Nor, in general, should the rise of others stir angst, say the anti-declinists. It reflects, by contrast, the near globalization of the U.S.-initiated postwar system, whose very openness should accommodate the peaceful rise of newer powers. "It was American strategy to see them get stronger," says Robert Kagan, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment and author of The Return of History and the End of Dreams. The interdependence woven into the existing system creates mutual vulnerabilities that might deter efforts to weaken the United States directly. John Bruton, the European Union ambassador in Washington, says, "If the West goes into decline, so do they." U.S. policy aims to make China a "responsible stakeholder." If China were to sell off its trove of U.S. public debt, it would undercut the value of its own assets. More likely, Beijing sees buying treasury bills as both a goodinvestment and a way to balance a relationship in which it has to sell to the American market to make its long climb out of poverty. "The Asians are not happy about America being so weakened," says Mahbubani. The anti-declinists, meanwhile, also count America's demographics as a key source of vigor. Through its acceptance of immigration and its higher birthrates, America's population is projected not only to grow but to avoid taking on the aging profiles of China, Russia, and Western Europe. Russia's population is shrinking by 720,000 people per year—hardly the way to great-power status. China is also graying quickly, in part because of its one-child policy. They both face underdevelopment in their vast countrysides, ethnic tensions, environmental constraints, and the perhaps inevitable return of political pressures for democratic change. Neither country will find that its path to restored greatness is clear and smooth. Nor, in the end, is America without geopolitical options. It has forged a strategic tie to the South Asian giant of India that reflects democratic and multicultural affinities. But it is also a de facto hedge against the strengthening of still-authoritarian China. U.S. strategists welcome a closer relationship with moderate Brazil, in part as more hedging, this time against anti-U.S. leaders in Latin America. Bush and a new set of more pro-American European leaders have been setting aside scraps over Iraq and other issues, and East European countries are looking to Washington for reassurance against a more assertive Russia. In East Asia, the United States remains the ultimate balancer to China. "We are still the glue that holds things together, despite the opinion polls," reckons Kagan. Few doubt that America's global position will experience "relative shifts," to use the diplomatic language of State's Cohen. But, he insists, "there is no other country's hand I'd rather play." Says a senior U.N. diplomat, "Bet against America at your peril." Even so, in the 21st century, it might be prudent to spread a few wagers on others as well.

# Heg Sustainable – Must Reads - Short

## The US can continue its dominance well into the future

**Thayer, 07** – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., American Empire, Routledge, page 12)

The United States has the ability to dominate the world because it has prodi-gious military capability, economic might, and soft power. The United States dominates the world today, but will it be able to do so in the future? The answer is yes, for the foreseeable future—the next thirty to forty years.17 Indeed, it may exist for much longer. I would not be surprised to see American dominance last much longer and, indeed, anticipate that it will. But there is simply too much uncertainty about events far in the future to make reliable predictions. In this section of the chapter, I explain why the United States has the abil-ity to dominate the world for the predictable future, if it has the will to do so. There are two critical questions that serve as the foundation for this debate: “Can America dominate international politics?” and “Should America domi-nate international politics?”

## Heg sustainable – doomsayers are wrong

Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “ America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. 1-2

The United States has been the most powerful country in the world for more than sixty years. Throughout this period, it has had the world’s largest economy and the world’s most important currency. For most of this time, it had the world’s most powerful military as well – and its military supremacy today is beyond question. We are truly in an era of US hegemony, a unipolar moment, a Pax Americana, which has enabled Americans to enjoy the highest standard of living in human history. Is this privileged position being undercut by serial trade deficits? The pessimists are growing more numerous by the day. They see the country’s spendthrift ways as a disaster waiting to happen. They warn that the cavernous gap in merchandise trade, well above 6 percent in 2006, is an ominous sign of competitive slippage. In 2008, the liabilities acquired to finance the shortfall in exports reached an amazing 29 percent of GDP. A falling dollar, military overstretch, the rise of the euro, the rise of China, and progressively deeper integration in East Asia are among the factors that many believe herald the imminent decline of American hegemony. In my view, the doomsayers are mistaken. I argue that American hegemony is stable and sustainable. While the United States certainly does face a number of challenges, an analysis of the linkages between trade, money, and security shows that American power is robust. This book is a story about why and how American hegemony works, and what other states would have to do to emulate or, on other grounds, thwart, America’s power base. As I will show, the United States benefits from running persistent trade deficits as a result of its special position in the international system. I will argue that any comparably situated country would choose to pursue the same cyclical deficit policy as the one encouraged by the US government. A series of size advantages cut across trade, money, and security: the size of the American market, the role of the dollar, and American military power interact to make a trade deficit policy rewarding and buffer the United States from the extreme consequences that a sustained deficit policy would otherwise have.

## Your evidence is exaggerated

Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “ America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. 3-4

We have seen erroneous predictions of American decline before. In the 1970s, the combination of high inflation, high interest rates, high unemployment, the Vietnam War, political and military challenges from China and the Soviet Union, and the economic rise of Japan led to eerily similar forecasts. Pessimists then, as today, underestimated the longevity of American power. The main reason the United States has continued to occupy a unique place in the international system is because a sufficient number of major and lesser powers have a strong interest in maintaining America at the top of the hierarchy. To bring America down would take a deliberate, coordinated strategy on the part of others and this is simply not plausible. As much as the United States benefits from the space it has carved out for itself in the current world order, its ability to reap unequal gains will remain unless and until allies start to incur heavy losses under American dominance. Even that, by itself, will not be sufficient to sink American hegemony. A strong alternative to American rule will have to come into view for things to fundamentally change. At present, no credible alternative is in sight. The United States is not invincible but its dominance is currently steady. Those who are inclined to think that American hegemony will persist – at least for a while – tend to dwell on the claim that the United States is providing a range of public goods to the benefit of all at its own expense. This is a chimera. The United States is self-interested, not altruistic. The illusion of benevolence has meant that very little attention has been given to uncovering the mechanism through which the United States gains disproportionately from supplying a large open market, the world’s reserve currency, and a military machine capable of stoking or foiling deadly disputes. This book exposes the mechanism through which the United States reaps unequal gains and shows that the current world system, and the distribution of power that supports it, has built-in stabilizers that strengthen American power following bouts of decline. Although all dominant powers must eventually decline, I will show that the downward progression need not be linear when mutually reinforcing tendencies across various power dimensions are at play. Specifically, I will demonstrate how the United States’ reserve currency status produces disproportionate commercial gains; how commercial power gives added flexibility in monetary affairs; and, finally, how military preponderance creates advantages in both monetary and trade affairs.

# Heg Sustainable – Distinction Cards

## Even if they win collapse inevitable – we should retain hegemony as long as possible

**Thayer, 07** – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., American Empire, Routledge, page 105)

Knowing that American hegemony will end someday does not mean that we should welcome or facilitate its demise; rather the reverse. The United States should labor to maintain hegemony as long as possible—just as know-ing that you will die someday does not keep you from planning your future and living today. You strive to live as long as possible although you realize that it is inevitable that you will die. Like good health, Americans and most of the world should welcome American primacy and work to preserve it as long as possible.

## We don’t have to win total dominance in every realm – Just that we do most of the time

Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. 11-2

In this book, I understand American hegemony as being broadly beneficial and especially beneficial for the United States. To be sure, my claim is not that the United States comes out ahead in every imaginable situation but that it benefits disproportionately most of the time, and as a direct result of structural advantages. The challenge for me is to devise appropriate measures for disproportionality and to uncover the mechanism through which the United States promotes its interests. While the United States has declined relative to some states, and it is inevitable that it will one day lose its dominant position, its ability to extract unequal gains implies that the shape of its power curve is a lot more irregular than the debate about its superpower status suggests.

## The hegemonic declines that your evidence is talking about are small – these kinds of declines activate American power

Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” 51-3

In today’s debate on American decline redux, scholars continue to assume a substitute relation between economic and political power. Bacevich, for instance, sees the United States as a global enforcer that uses new advanced means to practice old-style gunboat diplomacy, a development he laments and sees as more or less irreversible.48 Ferguson the mores and practices in other countries is seen as especially devastating for its dominance. While Mann too sees the United States as a “military giant,” he does not think military power is of much use, and disparagingly calls it an economic “backseat driver.”50 Mann clearly sees the United States as a power in decline. In two books, Chalmers Johnson describes the proliferation of American bases around the world, the resentment they create, and how it might provoke decline.51 The French analyst Emmanuel Todd indicts the United States for outright banditry, “the mugging of Europeans by Wall Street,” but does not believe the United States has the military wherewithal to ensure that it can continue to reap disproportionate economic benefits, or that it is capable of the kind of political (non-discriminatory) rule that attracts dependable followers.52 Not everyone has been convinced that the United States has declined in any meaningful way. As several authors have pointed out, the relative ascendancy of Europe and Japan was not only to be expected, but an explicit aim of American policy after the war.53 Critics charged that those who believed that the United States had declined in significant ways had failed to grasp important changes in the international economy and the prominent role played by multi-national corporations. 54 To appreciate the full extent of America’s reach one had to take into account the functioning of the world economy, the vitality of the American economy, the diversity of its population, and its military preponderance. Samuel Huntington was particularly prescient in identifying what kept America on top and in spelling out challenges to its lead position. He saw the country’s multi-dimensional power base as difficult for others to replicate and understood that the dynamism of the American economy would take a blow if consumer overstretch got out of hand, even though he believed that the most serious challenge to American power would come from a coalition of European states.55 While Huntington correctly perceived that America’s preeminence is anchored across a wide range of issue-areas, he did not connect these different sources of power. In elaborating an alternative way of thinking about the hegemon’s power arc, I show how various forms of power mutually reinforce one another as the hegemon travels up and down the power ladder. As I have already suggested, the consequences of relative decline are potentially favorable to the hegemon and can in some circumstances activate power

# Heg Sustainable – Generic

## Heg sustainable – multiple reasons

**Kagan, 07** – Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136)

These American traditions, together with historical events beyond Americans’ control, have catapulted the United States to a position of pre-eminence in the world. Since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of this “unipolar” world, there has been much anticipation of the end of unipolarity and the rise of a multipolar world in which the United States is no longer the predominant power. Not only realist theorists but others both inside and outside the United States have long argued the theoretical and practical unsustainability, not to mention undesirability, of a world with only one superpower. Mainstream realist theory has assumed that other powers must inevitably band together to balance against the superpower. Others expected the post-Cold War era to be characterized by the primacy of geoeconomics over geopolitics and foresaw a multipolar world with the economic giants of Europe, India, Japan, and China rivaling the United States. Finally, in the wake of the Iraq War and with hostility to the United States, as measured in public opinion polls, apparently at an all-time high, there has been a widespread assumption that the American position in the world must finally be eroding.

Yet American predominance in the main categories of power persists as a key feature of the international system. The enormous and productive American economy remains at the center of the international economic system. American democratic principles are shared by over a hundred nations. The American military is not only the largest but the only one capable of projecting force into distant theaters. Chinese strategists, who spend a great deal of time thinking about these things, see the world not as multipolar but as characterized by “one superpower, many great powers,” and this configuration seems likely to persist into the future absent either a catastrophic blow to American power or a decision by the United States to diminish its power and international influence voluntarily. 11

## Hegemony sustainable – no alternative

**Gray, 09** – Professor of International Politics and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading in England, Worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in England, Hudson Institute, Founder of the Defense-Oriented Think Tank: National Institute for Public Policy, Graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford (Colin S., "AFTER IRAQ: THE SEARCH FOR A SUSTAINABLE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY", Strategic Studies Institute, January 2009, June 29th 2010, p. 5-6, KONTOPOULOS) PDF

The long list of U.S. problems in Afghanistan and Iraq should not be misinterpreted. It would be a mistake to conclude that: (1) the United States should cease to act hegemonically; (2) U.S. values (i.e., culture) are flawed, for Americans and some others; (3) the U.S. armed forces have been demonstrably incompetent. A more sensible interpretation of events would be the following: (1) the United States is the only candidate for contemporary hegemon, and world order needs a hegemon willing and able to serve as world policeman, even one that makes some policy errors9; (2) in major respects U.S. culture is highly attractive, which is fortunate since it is not easily alterable, but it does need to be advertised and applied with care and restraint abroad; (3) Americans have become very competent at warfighting, but that prowess has not extended across the whole of the conflict spectrum. In common with all great powers in the past, the United States has to learn to cope with occasional policy failure. Failure through human error or sheer incompetence, friction, and bad luck should not be mistaken for precipitate decline. Too many commentators today are proclaiming the end of American hegemony. It is true that there are visible 6 trends hostile to U.S. hegemony, the well-announced “rise of “ China and India, and one day, just possibly, the EU/Europe, and even a long-delayed Japan and Brazil. But for the time being and for many years to come, the United States will be the hegemon. This is to say that it will be the global leader, certainly the most important player, in any matter of grave significance for international security. This will be what one might call a default reality. It is, and will be, a consequence of conscious American choice and effort. Also, U.S. leadership, notwithstanding the exception of its behavior towards Iraq, will rest upon a base provided by broad global consent, albeit not always of an enthusiastic kind.

# Heg Sustainable – Generic

## **Despite claims of decline, the United States still has multiple advantages that will sustain its leadership**

Slaughter 9 - Dean of Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University (February 2009, Anne, "America's Edge: Power in the Networked Century," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Iss. 1; pg. 94, ProQuest)

The twentieth-century world was, at least in terms of geopolitics, a billiard-ball world, described by the political scientist Arnold Wolfers as a system of self-contained states colliding with one another. The results of these collisions were determined by military and economic power. This world still exists today: Russia invades Georgia, Iran seeks nuclear weapons, the United States strengthens its ties with India as a hedge against a rising China. This is what Fareed Zakaria, the editor of Newsweek International, has dubbed "the post-American world," in which the rise of new global powers inevitably means the relative decline of U.S. influence. The emerging networked world of the twenty-first century, however, exists above the state, below the state, and through the state. In this world, the state with the most connections will be the central player, able to set the global agenda and unlock innovation and sustainable growth. Here, the United States has a clear and sustainable edge. THE HORIZON OF HOPE THE UNITED STATES' advantage is rooted in demography, geography, and culture. The United States has a relatively small population, only 20-30 percent of the size of China's or India's. Having fewer people will make it much easier for the United States to develop and profit from new energy technologies. At the same time, the heterogeneity of the U.S. population will allow Washington to extend its global reach. To this end, the United States should see its immigrants as living links back to their home countries and encourage a two-way flow of people, products, and ideas. The United States is the anchor of the Atlantic hemisphere, a broadly defined area that includes Africa, the Americas, and Europe. The leading countries in the Atlantic hemisphere are more peaceful, stable, and economically diversified than those in the Asian hemisphere. At the same time, however, the United States is a pivotal power, able to profit simultaneously from its position in the Atlantic hemisphere and from its deep ties to the Asian hemisphere. The Atlantic and Pacific Oceans have long protected the United States from invasion and political interference. Soon, they will shield it from conflicts brought about by climate change, just as they are already reducing the amount of pollutants that head its way. The United States has a relatively horizontal social structure - albeit one that has become more hierarchical with the growth of income inequality - as well as a culture of entrepreneurship and innovation. These traits are great advantages in a global economy increasingly driven by networked clusters of the world's most creative people. On January 20, 2009, Barack Obama will set about restoring the moral authority of the United States. The networked world provides a hopeful horizon. In this world, with the right policies, immigrants can be a source of jobs rather than a drain on resources, able to link their new home with markets and suppliers in their old homes. Businesses in the United States can orchestrate global networks of producers and suppliers. Consumers can buy locally, from revived local agricultural and customized small-business economies, and at the same time globally, from anywhere that can advertise online. The United States has the potential to be the most innovative and dynamic society anywhere in the world.

# Heg Sustainable – Generic

## **US hegemony is sustainable – US will shift strategy to prevent decline**

Tellis 8 - senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, previous senior adviser to the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, previous senior policy analyst at the RAND Corporation, author (2008, Ashley J., "Preserving Hegemony: The Strategic Tasks Facing the United States," GLOBAL ASIA)

The US experience of hegemony in global politics is still very young. Although the United States entered the international system as a great power early in the twentieth century, its systemic impact was not felt until World War II and, soon thereafter, its power was constrained by the presence of another competitor, the Soviet Union. Only after the demise of this challenger in 1991 has the United States been liberated in the exercise of its hegemonic power but — as has become quite evident in the past two decades — this application of power, although potent in its impact when well exercised, is also beset by important limitations. In any event, the now significant, century-long, involvement of the United States in international politics as a great power tends to obscure the reality of how short its hegemonic phase has actually been thus far. This hegemony is by no means fated to end any time soon, however, given that the United States remains predominant by most conventional indicators of national power. The character of the United States’ hegemonic behavior in the future will thus remain an issue of concern both within the domestic polity and internationally. Yet the juvenescence of the United State’s “unipolar moment,” combined with the disorientation produced by the September 11 attacks, ought to restrain any premature generalization that the imperial activism begun by the Clinton administration, and which the Bush administration took to its most spirited apotheosis, would in some way come to define the permanent norm of US behavior in the global system. In all probability, it is much more likely that the limitations on power witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq will produce a more phlegmatic and accommodating United States over the longer term, despite the fact that the traditional US pursuit of dominance — understood as the quest to maintain a preponderance of power, neutralize threatening challengers, and protect freedom of action, goals that go back to the foundations of the republic — is unlikely to be extinguished any time soon. Precisely because the desire for dominance is likely to remain a permanent feature of US geopolitical ambitions — even though how it is exercised will certainly change in comparison to the Bush years — the central task facing the next administration will still pertain fundamentally to the issue of US power. This concern manifests itself through the triune challenges of: redefining the United States’ role in the world, renewing the foundations of US strength, and recovering the legitimacy of US actions. In other words, the next administration faces the central task of clarifying the character of US hegemony, reinvigorating the material foundations of its power, and securing international support for its policies. The challenge of comprehensively strengthening US power at this juncture, when the United States is still in the early phase of its unipolar role in global politics, arises importantly from the fact that the hegemony it has enjoyed since 1991 represents a “prize” deriving from victory in intense geopolitical competition with another great power. The historical record suggests that international politics can be unkind to such victors over the long term. A careful scrutiny of the hegemonic cycles since 1494 confirms quite clearly that power transitions at the core of the global system often occur because successes in systemic struggles — of which the Cold War is but one example — can irreparably weaken otherwise victorious hegemonies. The annals of the past actually corroborate the surprising proposition that no rising challenger, however capable, has ever succeeded, at least thus far, in supplanting any prevailing hegemony through cold or hot war. Over the centuries, Spain, France, Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union all tried in different ways but failed.

# Heg Sustainable – Generic

## **U.S. hegemony is sustainable - Multiple reasons**

Lieber 9 - Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University (March 2009, Robert J., "Persistent primacy and the future of the American era," International Politics, Vol. 46, Iss. 2-3, pg. 119)

In general, effective alternatives to the role played by the United States tend to be inadequate or absent altogether, and neither the UN, nor other international bodies such as the EU, the African Union, the Arab League or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations offer an effective substitute. As Robert Kagan has observed, 'American predominance does not stand in the way of progress toward a better world.... It stands in the way of regression toward a more dangerous world' (Kagan, 2007). In short, on the demand side, there is an ample need for America's active engagement. What then about the supply side? The domestic costs and complications are evident but need to be weighed in context. The long-term reality of external threats creates a motivation for engagement abroad, as does the possibility of future attacks on the US homeland. During the 2008 presidential campaign, and despite a heated domestic political climate and sharp disagreement about Iraq and the foreign policy of the Bush administration, none of the leading candidates of either party called for dramatic retrenchment. In addition, they largely concurred on the need to increase the size of the armed forces. Indeed, and unlike the Vietnam era, popular support for the troops has been widespread, even among many critics of the Iraq war. Constraints on the capacity of adversaries also need to be taken into account. Russia under Putin has put pressure on its immediate neighbors and seeks to rebuild its armed forces, but Moscow's ability to regain the superpower status of the former Soviet Union remains limited. The Russian armed forces remain mostly in weakened condition, the total population is half that of the USSR and declining by 700 000 per year, male life expectancy is barely 60 years of age, the economy is overwhelmingly dependent on revenues from oil and natural gas and thus vulnerable to softening world market prices. The long-term stability of its crony capitalism and increasingly authoritarian political system is uncertain. China, despite extraordinary economic growth and modernization, will continue to depend on rapid expansion of trade and the absorption of vast numbers of people moving from the countryside to the cities. It may well become a major military challenger of the United States, first regionally and even globally, but only over the very long term. Demography also works to the advantage of the United States. Most other powerful states, including China and Russia as well as Germany and Japan, face the significant aging of their populations. Although the United States needs to finance the costs of an aging population, this demographic shift is occurring to a lesser extent and more slowly than among its competitors. Mark Haas argues that these factors in global aging 'will be a potent force for the continuation of US power dominance, both economic and military' (Haas, 2007, p. 113). Finally, the United States benefits from two other unique attributes, flexibility and adaptability. Time and again, America has faced daunting challenges and made mistakes, yet it has possessed the inventiveness and societal flexibility to adjust and respond successfully. Despite obvious problems, not least the global financial crisis, there is reason to believe that America's adaptive capacity will allow it to respond to future requirements and threats. None of this assures the maintenance of its world role, but the domestic underpinnings to support this engagement remain relatively robust. Thus for the foreseeable future, US primacy is likely to be sustainable. America's own national interest - and the fortunes of a global liberal democratic order - depend on it.

## **U.S. hegemony is sustainable – our relative lead is huge**

Singh 8 - School of Politics and Sociology at Birkbeck College, University of London (September 2008, Robert, "The Exceptional Empire: Why the United States Will Not Decline -- Again," International Politics, Vol. 45, Iss. 5, Pg. 571)

The US continues to defy history and theory. America's global predominance in hard and soft power remains fundamentally intact. That does not translate into omnipotence. Important limits exist to US power. Nor, as we have seen since 2001, does predominance promise an error-free foreign policy. But, as one leading historian of empire recently argued, American power 'on almost any criterion...now transcends the limits of empire that we have observed in force since the early fifteenth century' (Darwin, 2008, 485). No other major power is currently in range of competing with the US for global influence, nor is any likely to become so for a generation. Each -- whether strategic competitor or partner -- faces powerful internal weaknesses and external threats at least as significant as those facing the US. Moreover, for all their apparent differences and partisan rivalries, mainstream Democrats and Republicans are committed to strategies -- however distinct in tone, emphases and symbolism -- to preserve and enhance US primacy. As such, whatever new or old clothes the next emperor dons after January 20, 2009, he will continue to preside over the indispensable nation and an exceptional 'empire of liberty'. And just as the academic debate about American decline is again on the rise, it may as rapidly recede once more.

# Heg Sustainable – Generic

## **U.S hegemony is sustainable – institutional foundation prevents challengers**

Odom 7 - Lt. General, United States Army and Adjunct Professor of Political Science (Dec 2007, William E., "American Hegemony: How to Use It, How to Lose It," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 151, Iss. 4, pg. 404)

The Nobel laureate economist Douglass North has demonstrated that governance by rule-based, third-party enforcement actually lowers transaction costs for business and makes long-term economic growth possible. That is why the United Nations, NATO, the WTO, and others reduce the price to America for managing this unique international system. Liberal institutions, therefore, are the key source of American power, both at home and abroad. Not democracy, although it becomes an indispensable component of constitutional regimes. The states within this system today produce 70 percent of the world's gross product with 17 percent of the world's population. That figure alone gives us a real sense of how much more productive power can be generated by liberal institutions than by any other kind of institution. It also shows that the main obstacle to peace and prosperity in those countries outside the American empire is not money. It is the shortage of constitutional government. No amount of economic aid will either compensate for, or produce, that kind of government. In fact, most economic aid makes it less likely that poor countries will achieve effective government. Unfortunately, no one knows precisely how to create liberal institutions. Their emergence is highly problematic and rare; moreover, most of them have arisen after periods of violence that led to compromise among the elites and to a deal to abide by rules. At the same time, violence has far more often thrown countries off the track to a compromise. The record to date suggests that ethnic, racial, and sectarian fragmentation in a country makes a constitutional breakthrough virtually impossible. It also suggests that most political cultures outside of the traditional Western world are highly resistant to the idea of a "contract state" and inalienable civil rights. Japan, Turkey, South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore stand out as huge exceptions, not fully constitutional in all cases, but certainly close to it. This evidence suggests that few additional countries will soon become constitutional and able to sustain long-term growth. China, India, and Russia are not good prospects. All three may prosper for a while, but not in the long run unless they can create domestic liberal institutions. That is why rising challengers cannot destroy the American empire. Only its leader can do that, by throwing away our primacy.

# Heg Sustainable – Generic

## US hegemony is guaranteed

Friedman 10 (George, Founder and CEO of STRATFOR, the World’s Leading Private Intelligence and Forecasting Company, Media Expert, “The Next 100 Years,” January, Originally Published January 27th 2009, p.4)

Standing at the beginning of the twenty-first century, we need to identify the single pivotal event for this century, the equivalent of German unification for the twentieth century. After the debris of the European empire is cleared away, as well as what’s left of the Soviet Union, one power remains standing and overwhelmingly powerful. That power is the United States. Certainly, as is usually the case, the United States currently appears to be making a mess of things around the world. But it’s important not to be too confused by the passing chaos. The United States is economically, militarily, and politically the most powerful country in the world, and there is no real challenger to that power. Like the Spanish-American War, a hundred years from now the war between the United States and the radical Islamists will be little remembered regardless of the prevailing sentiment of this time. Ever since the Civil War, the United States has been on an extraordinary economic surge. It has turned from a marginal developing nation into an economy bigger than the next four countries combined. Militarily, it has gone from being an insignificant force to dominating the globe. Politically, the United States touches virtually everything, sometimes internationally and sometimes simply because of its presence. As you read this book, it will seem that it is America-centric, written from an American point of view. That may be true, but the argument I’m making is that the world does, in fact, pivot around the United States. This is not only due to American power. It also has to do with a fundamental shift in the way the world works. For the past five hundred years, Europe was the center of the international system, its empires creating a single global system for the first time in human history. The main highway to Europe was the North Atlantic. Whoever controlled the North Atlantic controlled access to Europe - and Europe’s access to the world. The basic geography of global politics was locked into place. Then, in the early 1980s, something remarkable happened. For the first time in history, transpacific trade equaled Trans Atlantic trade. With Europe reduced to a collection of secondary powers after World War II, and shift in trade patterns, the North Atlantic was no longer the single key to anything. Now whatever country controlled both the North Atlantic and the Pacific could control, if it wished, the world’s trading system, and therefore the global economy. In the twenty-first century, any national located on both oceans has a tremendous advantage. Given the cost of building naval power, and the huge cost of deploying it around the world, the power native to both oceans became the preeminent actor in the intentional system for the same reasons that Britain dominated the nineteenth century: it loved on the sea it had to control. In this way, North America has replaced Europe as the center of gravity in the world, and whoever dominated North America is virtually assured of being the dominant global power. For the twenty-first century, at least, that will be the United States.

# A2 Heg Unsustainable – Generic

## Heg sustainable

**Kagan, 07** – Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136)

These American traditions, together with historical events beyond Americans’ control, have catapulted the United States to a position of pre-eminence in the world. Since the end of the Cold War and the emergence of this “unipolar” world, there has been much anticipation of the end of unipolarity and the rise of a multipolar world in which the United States is no longer the predominant power. Not only realist theorists but others both inside and outside the United States have long argued the theoretical and practical unsustainability, not to mention undesirability, of a world with only one superpower. Mainstream realist theory has assumed that other powers must inevitably band together to balance against the superpower. Others expected the post-Cold War era to be characterized by the primacy of geoeconomics over geopolitics and foresaw a multipolar world with the economic giants of Europe, India, Japan, and China rivaling the United States. Finally, in the wake of the Iraq War and with hostility to the United States, as measured in public opinion polls, apparently at an all-time high, there has been a widespread assumption that the American position in the world must finally be eroding.

Yet American predominance in the main categories of power persists as a key feature of the international system. The enormous and productive American economy remains at the center of the international economic system. American democratic principles are shared by over a hundred nations. The American military is not only the largest but the only one capable of projecting force into distant theaters. Chinese strategists, who spend a great deal of time thinking about these things, see the world not as multipolar but as characterized by “one superpower, many great powers,” and this configuration seems likely to persist into the future absent either a catastrophic blow to American power or a decision by the United States to diminish its power and international influence voluntarily. 11

# Heg Sustainable – Defense Spending

## Heg sustainable - military presence and spending

**Kagan, 07** – Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund (Robert, “End of Dreams, Return of History,” Hoover Institution, No. 144, August/September, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policy-review/article/6136)

The world’s failure to balance against the superpower is the more striking because the United States, notwithstanding its difficult interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, continues to expand its power and military reach and shows no sign of slowing this expansion even after the 2008 elections. The American defense budget has surpassed $500 billion per year, not including supplemental spending totaling over $100 billion on Iraq and Afghanistan. This level of spending is sustainable, moreover, both economically and politically. 14 As the American military budget rises, so does the number of overseas American military bases. Since September 11, 2001, the United States has built or expanded bases in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in Central Asia; in Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania in Europe; and in the Philippines, Djibouti, Oman, and Qatar. Two decades ago, hostility to the American military presence began forcing the United States out of the Philippines and seemed to be undermining support for American bases in Japan. Today, the Philippines is rethinking that decision, and the furor in Japan has subsided. In places like South Korea and Germany, it is American plans to reduce the U.S. military presence that stir controversy, not what one would expect if there was a widespread fear or hatred of overweening American power. Overall, there is no shortage of other countries willing to host U.S. forces, a good indication that much of the world continues to tolerate and even lend support to American geopolitical primacy if only as a protection against more worrying foes. 15

# Heg Sustainable – Defense Spending

## **Increased spending on military personnel guarantees the continuation of U.S. primacy**

Haas 7 - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University (Summer 2007, Mark L., "A Geriatric Peace? The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations," International Security)

The crowding out of military and economic development spending for increased care for the elderly is not the only way in which social aging is likely to affect global power distributions. Social aging is likely to push militaries to spend more on personnel and less on other areas, including weapons development and procurement. This is important because no nation will be able to challenge U.S. military dominance without the ability to wage highly technologically sophisticated warfare. [97](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote97) When states are forced to spend more of their military budgets on personnel than on research, development, and weapons procurement, the odds of continued U.S. military primacy increase substantially. The oldest of the great powers are already devoting significantly more resources to military personnel than to weapons purchases and research. Over the last ten years, both France and Germany have dedicated nearly 60 percent of their military budgets to personnel, which is almost double the proportion in the U.S. budget. Germany spends nearly 4 times as much on personnel as on weapons procurement, France, Japan, and Russia roughly 2.5 times more. The United States, in contrast, dedicates only 1.29 times more money to personnel than to weapons purchases (see Table SOURCES: Sources for NATO powers and Russia: NATO, "Table 5: Distribution of Total Defence Expenditures by Category," NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence (Brussels: Defence Policy and Planning Division, 2005), p. 9, http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05-161.pdf. Sources for Japan: "Defense Budget Slips 1% to 4.86 Trillion Yen," Japan Times, December 21, 2004; and Japan Defense Agency, "Defense: Let's Consider It--To Maintain Peace" (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2004), p. 12,http://www.mod.go.jp/e/index\_.htm. Source for China: People's Republic of China, "Chapter IV: Defense Expenditure and Defense Assets," White Paper on National Defense, 2004,http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/natdef2004.html. Source for India: GlobalSecurity.org, "Military Budget," http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/budget.htm.NOTE: Figures for France, Germany, India, United Kingdom, and United States are for 2005. (For India, I substitute "revenue expenditures" for personnel costs and "capital expenditures" for weapons purchases. These categories are more comprehensive than desired, but the bulk of the expenditures in each are for personnel and weapons costs, respectively.) Figures for Japan and Russia are from 2004. Figures for China are from 2003. Social aging is a key cause of increasing military personnel costs for two main reasons. First, as societies age, more people exit the workforce than enter it. Increasing numbers of retirees in relation to new workers are likely to create labor shortages relative to previous levels of employment. The result of this trend will be increased competition among businesses and organizations--including the military--to hire workers. Consequently, if states' militaries want to be able to attract and keep the best employees in vital areas of operation--especially those in high-technology fields who usually have the most employment options and can command high salaries in the private sector--they are going to have to pay more to do so. If militaries do not increase their outlays for personnel, their effectiveness will diminish. A 2006 report endorsed by EU defense ministers made precisely these points. The report states that "the aging of Europe's people will lead to fierce competition for young and skilled workers," which will "inevitably" lead to rising military personnel per capita costs if European forces are to remain effective. [99](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote99) Similarly, to keep military salaries on par with wages in its expanding economy, China (even though its armed forces are conscripted) has had to raise military wages sharply in recent years (an 84 percent increase for officers and a 92 percent increase for soldiers from 1992 to 2002). In fact, according to the Chinese government, rising personnel expenses are the most important factor behind the growth of the Chinese defense budget in the last decade. [100](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote100) A second factor that is increasing states' military personnel costs at the expense of weapons procurement is the aging of the militaries themselves. The great powers' pension obligations to retired military personnel are considerable. In Russia's 2006 budget, more than 130.5 billion rubles, or more than 12 percent of total defense-related expenditures, were dedicated to military pensions. This figure represents roughly 35.5 billion rubles more than was spent on weapons purchases, and approximately 37.6 billion rubles more than on military research and development. [101](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote101) Twenty-two percent of France's defense budget goes to pensions. [102](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote102) According to China's government, rising pension costs are the second most important reason for increases in military spending in the last decade (after pay increases for active personnel). [103](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote103) Even India, despite having the youngest population of all the great powers, currently spends almost 15 percent of its defense budget on pensions. [104](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote104) Growing pension costs for military retirees are important for international power relationships because these expenditures, which are not one-time costs but ones that governments will have to pay every year for many decades, do nothing to increase states' power-projection capabilities. Every dollar spent on retirees is one less dollar that can be spent on weapons, research, or active personnel. Consequently, every dollar spent in this area by the other great powers increases the likelihood of the continuation of U.S. primacy.

# Heg Sustainable – Interdependence

## **U.S. leadership possible**

Slaughter 9 - Dean of Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University (February 2009, Anne, "America's Edge: Power in the Networked Century," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Iss. 1; pg. 94, ProQuest)

MORE PEOPLE, MORE PROBLEMS

IN THIS CENTURY, global power will increasingly be defined by connections-who is connected to whom and for what purposes. Of course, the world will still contain conflict. Networks can be as malign and deadly as they can be productive and beneficial. In addition, the gap between those who are connected to global networks and those who are excluded from them will sharply multiply existing inequities.

But on the whole, the positive effects of networks will greatly outweigh the negative. Imagine, for example, a U.S. economy powered by green technology and green infrastructure. Communities of American immigrants from Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East will share this new generation of products and services with villages and cities in their home countries. Innovation will flow in both directions. In the United States, universities will be able to offer courses in truly global classrooms, relying on their international students and faculty to connect with educational institutions abroad through travel, the Internet, and videoconferencing. Artists of all kinds will sit at the intersection of culture, learning, and creative energy. U.S. diplomats and other U.S. government officials will receive instant updates on events occurring around the world. They will be connected to their counterparts abroad, able to quickly coordinate preventive and problem-solving actions with a range of private and civic actors. The global landscape will resemble that of the Obama campaign, in which a vast network brought in millions of dollars in donations, motivated millions of volunteers, and mobilized millions of voters.

In a networked world, the United States has the potential to be the most connected country; it will also be connected to other power centers that are themselves widely connected. If it pursues the right policies, the United States has the capacity and the cultural capital to reinvent itself. It need not see itself as locked in a global struggle with other great powers; rather, it should view itself as a central player in an integrated world. In the twenty-first century, the United States' exceptional capacity for connection, rather than splendid isolation or hegemonic domination, will renew its power and restore its global purpose.

# Heg Sustainable – Overlapping Incentives

## Heg is sustainable – hegemons cooperate with others to achieve overlapping incentives

Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. 56

American hegemony, and the order it generates, is surprisingly stable. What makes the system stable is the hegemon’s interest in achieving disproportionate gains through international cooperation and other Great Powers’ interest in achieving gains above what they can achieve through unilateral action. A benevolent hegemon would not seek disproportionate benefits whereas an exploitative hegemon uses force to seek disproportionate benefits, and risks turning allies into balancers and adversaries. There is at present no prospect of this. Pax Americana persists, despite a gradual increase in American exceptionalism and a rising sense that the United States no longer carries the burden of underwriting global order in a manner commensurate with its size and role. This shifts our focus from the question of whether collective action will take place to how different forms of cooperation are connected (bilateral and multilateral) and how the gains from multilateral cooperation are distributed. In the following chapters we will see how this theoretical proposition rhymes with collaboration in the trade area (chapter 4), in monetary and financial affairs (chapter 5), and in the security field (chapter 6), and we also examine where today’s collective action to circumvent American power might take us (chapter 7). Will it lead us to a new world order or right back to the American-centered system in which we live?

# Heg Sustainable – Military Power

## Hegemony sustainable – even if the US power declines our lead is insurmountable

Richard Haas (president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April 2008 “Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?” http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask\_the\_expert.html

US military power far outmatches all other states - the US Navy is approximately the same size as the next 17 largest combined and far more technologically advanced. With 20%+ of global GDP, the US economy remains the world’s largest and is likely to remain so for at least the next 20 years-maybe longer given the magnitude of problems facing China. Given the sheer magnitude of its Hard Power and the likely support of many Allies will the US really fade from being the unipolar power and be ranked alongside diverse centres, from corporations to drug cartels and religious movements to media outlets in a non-polar world? Andy Trends, Oxford Richard Haass: The United States will continue to grow in absolute power and remain the world’s strongest and wealthiest state for the forseeable future. But it will decline somewhat in power relative to others, especially in the economic realm. More important, the United States will encounter increasing difficulty in translating its power into influence given the emergence of other power centers, the hallmark of a nonpolar world. The challenge for US foreign policy will be to enlist others (not just states) in setting rules and establishing arrangements that will help order the modern world and tame the dark aspects of globalization.

# Heg Sustainable – Naval Power

## The US is different – its dominant sea power prevents balancing – comprehensive historical studies prove

Jack S. Levy (Board of Governors’ Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society) and William R. Thompson (Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, former president of the International Studies Association, and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly) Summer 2010 “ Balancing on Land and at Sea Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Balancing_on_Land_and_at_Sea.pdf>

Contrary to traditional balance of power theory and its argument that states tend to balance against the strongest power in the system, particularly if that lead state is increasing in strength, hypothesis 1 predicts that there is no strong tendency for great powers to balance against the leading sea power in the system, even if it is signiªcantly increasing in strength. As the marginal frequencies in the right column of table 3 indicate, great power alliances have formed against the lead sea power in 88 cases out of a total of 544 possible opportuni ties, or about 16 percent of the time. This is strong evidence in support of H1 about the absence of a systematic tendency toward balancing against the leading sea power. In marked contrast, great power alliances formed against the leading land power in Europe about 43 percent of the time over the same time period.67 This comparison provides strong support for H1’s implication that great powers are signiªcantly less likely to balance against the leading global sea power than against the leading European land power.

# Heg Sustainable – Latent Power

## **Predictions of unsustainable primacy fail to take into account latent power**

Wohlforth 7 - Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and Chair of the Department of Government (Spring 2007, William, "Unipolar stability: the rules of power analysis," Harvard International Review 29.1, p.44, Academic OneFile)

US military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits are high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways by borrowing from abroad--notably from the Chinese government. These developments have prompted many analysts to warn that the United States suffers from "imperial overstretch." And if US power is overstretched now, the argument goes, unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with this argument is that it fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One must be careful to take into account both the level of resources that can be mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize them. And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged. Yale historian Paul Kennedy coined the term "imperial overstretch" to describe the situation in which a state's actual and latent capabilities cannot possibly match its foreign policy commitments. This situation should be contrasted with what might be termed "self-inflicted overstretch"--a situation in which a state lacks the sufficient resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has untapped latent power and readily available policy choices that it can use to draw on this power. This is arguably the situation that the United States is in today. But the US government has not attempted to extract more resources from its population to meet its foreign policy commitments. Instead, it has moved strongly in the opposite direction by slashing personal and corporate tax rates. Although it is fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and claims to be fighting a global "war" on terrorism, the United States is not acting like a country under intense international pressure. Aside from the volunteer servicemen and women and their families, US citizens have not been asked to make sacrifices for the sake of national prosperity and security. The country could clearly devote a greater proportion of its economy to military spending: today it spends only about 4 percent of its GDP on the military, as compared to 7 to 14 percent during the peak years of the Cold War. It could also spend its military budget more efficiently, shifting resources from expensive weapons systems to boots on the ground. Even more radically, it could reinstitute military conscription, shifting resources from pay and benefits to training and equipping more soldiers. On the economic front, it could raise taxes in a number of ways, notably on fossil fuels, to put its fiscal house back in order. No one knows for sure what would happen if a US president undertook such drastic measures, but there is nothing in economics, political science, or history to suggest that such policies would be any less likely to succeed than China is to continue to grow rapidly for decades. Most of those who study US politics would argue that the likelihood and potential success of such power-generating policies depends on public support, which is a function of the public's perception of a threat. And as unnerving as terrorism is, there is nothing like the threat of another hostile power rising up in opposition to the United States for mobilizing public support. With latent power in the picture, it becomes clear that unipolarity might have more built-in self-reinforcing mechanisms than many analysts realize. It is often noted that the rise of a peer competitor to the United States might be thwarted by the counterbalancing actions of neighboring powers. For example, China's rise might push India and Japan closer to the United States--indeed, this has already happened to some extent. There is also the strong possibility that a peer rival that comes to be seen as a threat would create strong incentives for the United States to end its self-inflicted overstretch and tap potentially large wellsprings of latent power.

**Latent power checks**

**Singh 2008** – Professor, School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London (Robert, International Politics, Vol. 45, Iss. 5, “The exceptional empire”, ProQuest, WEA)

Finally, latent power -- the degree to which resources can be mobilized by a government -- should not be overlooked in assessing American predominance. Despite Bush's declaration of a global war on terror, it has been the US military rather than America that has been at war since 9/11. Americans at large have neither been requested nor required to make serious material sacrifices to secure the homeland or assist the offensive struggle against radical Islam abroad. After two wars during which taxes were cut rather than raised, the overall tax burden remains low, the armed forces -- while strained -- remain exclusively volunteer and the many American fatalities and casualties in Iraq do not compare in either absolute or relative terms to those of Vietnam or Korea previously, let alone to WWII. The costs that America's imperial role has imposed on ordinary Americans have been consequential but not nearly so burdensome as to prompt a domestic revolt against the Pax Americana . At least as important, America possesses ample reserves with which to defend its global role and primacy, if required.

# Heg Sustainable – Demographics

## **U.S. hegemony is sustainable – global aging provides a unique advantage**

Haas 7 - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University (Summer 2007, Mark L., "A Geriatric Peace? The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations," International Security)

Global population aging will influence U.S. foreign policies in five major ways in coming decades. First, this phenomenon will be a potent force for the continuation of U.S. power dominance, both economic and military. Aging populations are likely to result in the slowdown of states' economic growth at the same time that governments face substantial pressure to pay for massive new expenditures for elderly care. This double economic dilemma will create such an austere fiscal environment that the other great powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States' huge power lead. Investments designed to improve overall economic growth and purchases of military weaponry will be crowded out. Compounding these difficulties, although the United States is growing older, it is doing so to a lesser extent and less quickly than all the other great powers. Consequently, the economic and fiscal costs for the United States created by social aging (although staggering, especially for health care) will be significantly lower for it than for potential competitors. Global aging is therefore not only likely to extend U.S. hegemony (because the other major powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States' economic and military power lead), but deepen it as these others states are likely to fall even farther behind the United States. Thus despite much recent discussion in the international relations literature and some policymaking circles about the likelihood of China (and to a lesser extent the European Union) balancing U.S. power in coming decades, the realities of social aging and its economic and military effects make such an outcome unlikely. [6](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277921935683&returnToKey=20_T9657885901&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.141506.23549559515" \l "fnote6) Second, global aging increases the likelihood of continued peaceful relations between the United States and the other great powers. Studies have shown that the probability of international conflict grows when either the dominant country anticipates a power transition in favor of a rising state or states, or when such a transition actually takes place. [7](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277921935683&returnToKey=20_T9657885901&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.141506.23549559515" \l "fnote7) By adding substantial support to the continuation of U.S. hegemony, global aging works against either outcome from transpiring. An aging world therefore decreases the probability that either hot or cold wars will develop between the United States and the other great powers. Third, the effects of global aging will likely increase the United States' unilateral foreign policy tendencies. The aging problem in the other great powers is so severe that these states will have tremendous difficulty maintaining the extent of their international commitments. Consequently, when the United States engages in major international undertakings in the future, the other major actors in the system will be able to offer less help than they can today. Fourth, although the United States is in better demographic shape than the other great powers, it, too, will confront massive new costs created by its own aging population. As a result, it will most likely be unable to maintain its current international position. Thus while the United States will be even more secure from great power rivalry than it is today, it (and its allies) will be less able to realize other key international objectives, including preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), funding nation building, engaging in military humanitarian interventions, and mitigating the effects of local security problems. Global aging, in short, is likely to result in a great power "geriatric peace," but this same phenomenon may threaten other important U.S. international interests, including by facilitating international conflict in non-great power relations. Fifth, as the costs created by the United States' aging population grow, the saliency of neo-isolationist or "offshore balancing" grand strategies is likely to increase. [8](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1277921935683&returnToKey=20_T9657885901&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.141506.23549559515" \l "fnote8) In a time of fiscal austerity brought on by social aging, these strategies are likely to become more compelling because they mesh with the need to reduce spending. An aging world therefore increases the likelihood that the United States will withdraw from the international system even more than budget constraints dictate.

# Heg Sustainable – Demographics

## **Global aging will sustain U.S. hegemony**

Haas 7 - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University (Summer 2007, Mark L., "A Geriatric Peace? The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations," International Security)

Global Aging and the Continuation of U.S. Primacy Population aging in the great powers will be a potent force for the prolongation of U.S. power dominance in the twenty-first century for three principal reasons. First, the massive costs and probable slowdowns in economic growth created by aging populations will inhibit the other major powers from increasing military expenditures anywhere close to matching U.S. defense spending; these factors are even likely to push many of these states to reduce their military expenditures from current levels. Second, with aging populations and shrinking workforces, the other great powers will have to spend increasing percentages of their defense budgets on personnel costs and military pensions at the expense of purchasing the most technologically sophisticated weaponry. The more money that states spend on military personnel and pensions as opposed to weapons, the lower the likelihood will be of these countries challenging U.S. military dominance. [44](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote44) The third factor reinforces both of the previous points. Although the U.S. population is aging, it is doing so to a lesser extent and less quickly than those of the other great powers (even India's population, though it will remain younger than that of the United States for the first half of the twenty-first century, is aging significantly faster than the U.S. population). As a result, the pressures pushing for the crowding out of military spending in favor of elderly care and the increasing substitution of labor for capital within defense budgets will be considerably smaller for the United States than for potential great power competitors, to the great benefit of its relative power position in coming decades. In 2005 the United States spent more than $478 billion on defense. This figure was nearly $290 billion more than the next largest military spender (China), and roughly equal to the combined military spending of China, France, India, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom. [45](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote45) Global aging significantly decreases the likelihood of potential competitors closing this huge spending gap. The principal contention of this section is that there is likely to be a strong negative relationship between the magnitude of a state's aging crisis (the independent variable) and the level of its military expenditures (the dependent variable). With aging populations, governments will be under such pressure to pay for massive new expenditures for the elderly (and most likely in the context of slowing economic growth) that all other discretionary spending will likely be affected. High levels of aging crisis, at a minimum, are likely to be a powerful force inhibiting states from significantly increasing defense spending and, at a maximum, will tend to result in reductions in existing levels of military expenditures. [46](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote46)

## Demographically, the U.S. has fiscal advantage compared to other potential powers

Haas 7 - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University (Summer 2007, Mark L., "A Geriatric Peace? The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations," International Security)

There are only four principal ways to pay for the massive new expenditures required by states' aging populations: increased taxation, deficit spending, reductions in benefits (including raising the retirement age), and spending cuts in other areas. [22](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote22) None of these solutions offers an easy way out of the monumental fiscal challenge that the governments of these states will face in coming years. Paying for hundreds of billions of dollars of new expenditures by raising taxes will not only be challenging politically, but perhaps self-defeating as large tax increases may suppress economic activity and thus governmental revenue. Paying for new social expenditures through additional taxation will prove particularly problematic for France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, where the tax burdens are already high (more than 30 percent of GDP). [23](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote23) Deficit spending is also not a viable option to pay for the growing needs of the elderly, especially in the long run. First, the funds needed to care for the aged over the next thirty years are greater than the entire savings of the Group of Eight states. [24](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote24) Funding all projected old-age benefits by deficit spending would, as a result, consume all of the developed world's savings. Second, if the costs of social aging are paid for by deficit spending, the great powers will relatively quickly exceed a debt-to-GDP ratio of 150 percent, which until recently is roughly the highest level any developed country has reached in peacetime. [25](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote25) (For context, the United States' public debt accrued during World War II was 125 percent of GDP; Britain's was 200 percent). [26](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote26) Such high levels of debt, especially when they are occurring throughout the developed world and will continue for many decades, are likely to have significant negative economic consequences, most notably a major rise in interest rates and the consequent crowding out of investment. [27](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote27) Solving the fiscal challenge created by social aging through benefit reductions will also most likely prove extremely difficult. Surveys conducted in 2005 have reported that 58 percent of U.S. workers older than 55 have accumulated less than $100,000 in savings. [28](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote28) The situation is even worse in Europe, where 56 percent of all households claim to have virtually no savings. [29](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote29) Seniors in China, India, and Russia are even less financially independent. A key implication of these low savings rates is that retirees are heavily dependent on their governments to maintain reasonable standards of living and health care. [30](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote30) In both France and Germany, for example, more than 60 percent of senior citizens' after-tax income comes from governmental spending of some variety. Among industrialized great powers, the U.S. government in 2000 provided the smallest percentage of income for the elderly, but even this number was nearly 35 percent. [31](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote31) Moreover, a significant percentage of the elderly in these developed states would be pushed into poverty if their governments cut benefits spending by only 10 percent. In both France and Germany, a 10 percent reduction in benefits would increase poverty rolls among the elderly by more than 5 percent. [32](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote32)

# Heg Sustainable – Demographics

## **Most threatening challengers will be crippled by aging crisis**

Haas 7 - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University (Summer 2007, Mark L., "A Geriatric Peace? The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations," International Security)

Based on the criteria elaborated in the previous paragraph, six of the eight great powers in coming decades will confront massive challenges created by their aging populations: China, France, Germany, India, Japan, and Russia. Five of these six states satisfy at least five of the eight criteria for identifying a high level of crisis. France and Germany meet seven, Russia and China six. India satisfies only four of these criteria, but scores so poorly in three of them (seniors' dependence on government, expected increases in elderly obligations, and current per capita GDP) that it merits inclusion into the high-crisis category. I begin my analysis with the aging problems in China, which is the state most frequently mentioned as a likely balancer of the United States. Of all the great powers, China will face particularly severe fiscal challenges due to demographic trends. These challenges will begin to hit with substantial force in only ten to fifteen years, when China's large postwar baby boom generation begins to reach retirement age. Rising longevity in China and the "one child policy," which has helped lower China's fertility to a current rate of 1.7, have made China a rapidly aging society. By 2050 China's median age is predicted to be nearly 45, which will be one of the oldest in the world (the oldest country in the world today, Japan, has a median age of just under 43). [47](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote47) The ratio of working-age adults to elderly will shrink from just under 10 in 2000 to 2.5 by 2050. [48](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote48) China today has roughly 100 million citizens over the age of 65. In only twenty years, this number will double. Roughly thirty years from now, it is expected to triple. [49](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote49) In relation to the other great powers, which had the benefit of achieving high levels of GDP per capita before growing old, China is particularly unprepared for the effects of social aging. Despite China's very high levels of economic growth since the 1990s, it will become the first country to grow old before becoming an advanced industrial state. Consequently, China will find it even more difficult to pay for its obligations to the elderly than will the industrialized great powers. [50](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote50) China's work-retirement system beginning in the 1950s under Mao Zedong followed the Soviet model: workers in state-owned companies were promised fairly generous retirement benefits but received low wages. [51](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote51) As a result, most Chinese workers did not earn enough to accrue sufficient private savings to finance their retirements. Nearly 80 percent of Chinese urban households with individuals aged 55 and over today have less than one year of income saved, and only 5 percent have more than two years of income in savings. [52](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote52)Consequently, according to one expert on this subject, "the majority of the people in the People's Republic of China [will] be obliged to rely heavily on social security pensions after retirement." [53](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote53) Over the decades, however, the Chinese government, however, has set aside little money to pay for these obligations. Three-quarters of all Chinese workers are without any pension coverage, yet independent estimates have found a potential shortfall between China's governmental obligations to the elderly and saved assets to be as much as 150 percent of GDP (this is in addition to existing debt, which currently stands at nearly 30 percent of GDP). [54](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote54) China has traditionally relied on the family unit to provide for elderly care in lieu of adequate public and private resources. Increasing rates of divorce, urbanization (and related migration), [55](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote55) and female workforce participation will, however, place significant strain on this tradition. Decreasing family size will prove especially problematic for preserving elderly welfare within the context of the family. Demographers refer to a rapidly growing "4-2-1" phenomenon in China, in which one child is responsible for caring for two parents and four grandparents. [56](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote56) Given these facts, within fifteen years China's leaders will be faced with a difficult choice: allow growing levels of poverty within an exploding elderly population, or provide the resources necessary to avoid this situation. The Chinese government's assumption of the unfunded pension liabilities of state-owned enterprises reveals the political and moral pressure working for the latter outcome. This pressure to significantly expand and deepen China's welfare system will only grow as its aging crisis becomes increasingly acute in the decades to come. In this context, the crowding out of military and other discretionary expenditures will be likely. In the next forty years, India will confront many of the same challenges that China will in this period. Although India will remain the youngest of all the great powers through the midpoint of this century, it is aging much faster than any of these other states. By 2050 India's median age is predicted to increase by 15.3 years from that in 2000 (23.4 years), which is a larger increase than in any other great power (and by a very wide margin in all cases except China). [57](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote57) At century's midpoint, India will possess more than 236 million people over 65, making it the second-oldest country in the world in this category, trailing only China. India today has more than 58 million people above this age, which is more than twice as many seniors in Japan and more than 1.5 times as many in the United States. At the same time that India is aging rapidly, it is the least prepared of all the great powers to pay for the costs of elderly care (with the possible exception of China). A high majority of Indian seniors have little savings and consequently need substantial aid to maintain basic levels of health and welfare. [58](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote58) Surveys have consistently found that more than half of all elderly Indians are "fully dependent" on others for their economic well-being, and another 15 percent are "partially dependent." [59](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote59) Consistent with these numbers, 73 percent of all seniors in India are below or just above the poverty line. [60](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote60) Despite the great vulnerability of the elderly in India, almost no monies have been set aside for social welfare programs. [61](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote61) As poorly funded as India's elderly care system is today, this situation will only worsen in coming decades as the number of seniors, in both absolute numbers and as a percentage of the population, balloons. Like China, India will grow old before becoming rich. A generation before the median ages in the European powers and Japan were over 35, these states' GDPs per capita were $6,000-$8,000 (at 2000 prices and exchange rates). [62](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote62) In roughly one generation from now, India will age to this level, but its GDP per capita in 2005 was only $720 (China's was only $1,740). [63](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote63) Even if India's economy grows at a robust rate of 5.5 percent per year for the next thirty years, it will be approaching the age levels of many of the great powers today, but with "income levels almost an order of magnitude lower than those of Japan in the mid-1980s" (i.e., roughly twenty years before Japan's aging crisis became acute). [64](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote64) In sum, in roughly forty years India will possess large numbers of poor, vulnerable seniors, but it will lack the resources necessary to address this problem without substantial sacrifice. Like China, India will be faced with a choice: allow very high levels of poverty among its seniors, or divert resources toward preventing this outcome by significantly expanding its welfare system. To the extent that India's leaders opt for this latter choice, the likelihood of India being able to increase significantly military spending is low. China and India do, however, benefit from one major advantage in relation to many of the other great powers. Unlike Japan, Germany, France, and Russia, both countries will have several decades before they will be directly confronted with the full burdens of their aging populations. China's working-age population (ages 15 to 64), for example, will not peak until 2015, after which it is predicted to steadily decline. India will not become "officially" an aging society (based on the United Nations' definition of at least 10 percent of a state's population over the age of 60) until 2020. [65](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1278168754261&returnToKey=20_T9673953233&parent=docview&target=results_DocumentContent&tokenKey=rsh-20.811748.1508202943" \l "fnote65) These time lags are potentially important because they create windows during which China and India do not immediately face the trade-off between spending on the elderly or for defense. Significant increases in military spending in these states in these years are, as a result, more likely than in subsequent ones. The argument that currently younger states such as China and India have time to balance the United States before their aging problems become fiscally overwhelming ignores, however, the fact that power is relative. To balance the United States, competitors must not only spend significantly more money on their militaries than they do presently, but spend significantly more than the United States will in coming decades. The United States' fairly advantageous demographic position, though, makes the likelihood of such an outcome low. Moreover, each year that goes by in which the United States' military lead remains roughly the same increases the odds of the continuation of U.S. hegemony. The closer that potential balancers of the United States come to experiencing the full effects of their aging crises, the more likely crowding out of military spending in favor of geriatric care will occur, and the more likely U.S primacy will continue.

# A2 Heg Unsustainable – Demographics

## **U.S. has multiple advantages in sustaining leadership**

Slaughter 9 - Dean of Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University (February 2009, Anne, "America's Edge: Power in the Networked Century," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Iss. 1; pg. 94, ProQuest)

MORE PEOPLE, MORE PROBLEMS

DEMOGRAPHY is often cited as the chief factor behind the relative decline of the West. China and India make up over a third of the world's population, while Europe and Japan are actually shrinking and the United States is suddenly a relatively small nation of 300 million. This argument, however, rests largely on assumptions formed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Throughout most of human history, territory and population translated into military and economic power. Military power depended on the number of soldiers a state could put into the field, the amount of territory an enemy had to cross to conquer it, and the economy's ability to supply the state's army. Population size mattered for economic power because without trade a state needed a domestic market large enough for manufacturers and merchants to thrive. With trade, however, small mercantile nations such as the Netherlands and Portugal were able to punch far above their weight. In the nineteenth century, to increase their power, small countries expanded their territory through colonization. But by the twentieth century, as political unrest in the colonial world grew, the advantages of trading rather than ruling became increasingly clear. Although the United States and the Soviet Union, two great continental powers, dominated the second half of the twentieth century, the countries that grew the richest were often the smallest. In 2007, the ten countries with the highest per capita gdps all had populations smaller than that of New York City, with one notable exception: the United States. In the twenty-first century, less is more. Domestic markets must be big enough to allow national firms to obtain a foothold so as to withstand international competition (although such markets can be obtained through free-trade areas and economic unions). But beyond this minimum, if trade barriers are low and transportation and communication are cheap, then size will be more of a burden than a benefit. When both markets and production are global, then productive members of every society will generate income across multiple societies. Business managers in one country can generate value by orchestrating a global and disparate network of researchers, designers, manufacturers, marketers, and distributors. It will remain the responsibility of government, however, to provide for the less productive members of society, namely, the elderly, the young, the disabled, and the unemployed - think of them as national overhead costs. From this perspective, the 300 million citizens in the United States look much more manageable than the more than a billion in China or India. A shrinking population can actually act as a catalyst for innovation. In China, the answer to many problems is simply to throw people at them - both because people are the most available commodity and because the Chinese government needs to provide as many jobs as possible. In Japan, by contrast, the answer is to innovate. Nintendo, the Kyoto-based gaming giant, is bringing much of its manufacturing back to Japan from China and other parts of Asia. How can it possibly compete using high-cost Japanese labor? It will not have to - its new factories are almost entirely automated, with only a handful of highly skilled employees needed to run them. This approach uses less energy, costs less, and guarantees a higher standard of living for the Japanese population. As the priority shifts from economic growth to sustainable growth, the formula of fewer people plus better and greener technology will look increasingly attractive. Finally, size carries its own set of political challenges. Over the past four centuries, the arrow of history has pointed in the direction of national self-determination. Empires and multiethnic countries have steadily divided and subdivided into smaller units so that nations, or dominant ethnic groups, could govern themselves. Ninety years after Woodrow Wilson laid out his vision of self-determination for the Balkan states, the process continues in Kosovo. In many ways, the breakup of the Soviet Union was another round of the decolonization and self-determination movement that began in the 1940s. It continues today with the conflicts over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as with the potential for conflict on the Crimean Peninsula and in eastern Ukraine. Much of China's 5,000-year history has been a saga of the country's splitting apart and being welded back together. The Chinese government, like the Indian government, legitimately fears that current pockets of instability could quickly translate into multiple secessionist movements. The United States faces no threats to its essential unity, which has been forged by a political and cultural ideology of unity amid diversity. The principal alternative to this ideology is the solution employed by the European Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in which individual states come together as larger economic and, gradually, quasi-political units. The most promising dimension of recent Chinese politics has been its adoption of a version of this solution with regard to Hong Kong and Macao - and one day Beijing may apply this model to Taiwan. The United States benefits not only from its limited population but also from who makes up that population. It has long attracted the world's most entrepreneurial, creative, and determined individuals. A vast mixing of cultures has created an atmosphere for a fruitful cross-fertilization and innovation. These arguments still hold. In San Francisco, for instance, a new municipal telephone help line advertises that it can talk with callers in over 150 languages. This diversity, and the creativity that it produces, is visible everywhere: in Hollywood movies, in American music, and at U.S. universities. At Princeton University this past fall, five of the six student award winners for the highest grade point averages had come from abroad: from China, Germany, Moldova, Slovenia, and Turkey. In the nineteenth- and twentieth-century era of nation-states, the United States absorbed its immigrants and molded them into Americans, thereby creating the national cohesion necessary to build military and economic strength. Today, diversity in the United States means something more. Immigrant communities flourish not only in large cities but also in smaller towns and rural areas. A mosaic has replaced the melting pot, and, more than ever, immigrants connect their new communities to their countries of origin. Along the southern border of the United States, for instance, immigration experts talk about "transnational communities," about clusters of families in the United States linked with the villages of Mexico and Central America. Now, where you are from means where you can, and do, go back to and whom you know and trust enough to network with. Consider, for example, how valuable the overseas Chinese community has been to China. Alan Wang, a former student of mine, was born in China, moved to Australia with his family at the age of 12, and went to college and law school there. He later came to the United States to pursue a graduate degree at Harvard. For a while, he practiced law with a large British firm in London, and then moved to its Shanghai office. When I asked him how he identified himself, he replied, "overseas Chinese." Millions of people similar to Wang have spread out from China throughout Southeast Asia, Australia, the United States, and Canada, creating trading and networking opportunities for people in all those places. Similarly, the United States must learn to think of its ethnic communities as the source of future generations of "overseas Americans." Already, young Chinese Americans and Indian Americans are heading back to their parents' homelands to seek opportunity and make their fortunes. Soon, the children of U.S. immigrants from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East will follow a similar path and return to their ethnic homelands, at least for a time. The key to succeeding in a networked economy is being able to harvest the best ideas and innovations from the widest array of sources. In this regard, the United States is plugged into all corners of the global brain.

# A2 Heg Unsustainable - Trade Deficit

## Trade deficit wont cause heg collapse

Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “ America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. 5

In sketching my argument, I will show that the United States gains both materially and in terms of policy autonomy from running persistent deficits because of its multi-purpose power base. It gains economically by absorbing more capital and goods from the rest of the world and through capital and exchange rate gains on the international investment position (IIP).2 It also gains in terms of policy autonomy. Because foreigners have a wide range of incentives to invest in dollardenominated assets (in the United States) and, when necessary, help soft-land the economy, the United States can adjust imbalances over a longer time horizon. The gain in policy flexibility means it can adjust imbalances using its preferred policy instruments, and that its ‘policy error’ threshold is higher than it is for other countries. Therefore, it can more easily avoid the kind of shock therapy that is normally associated with a consistent pattern of trade deficits and high external liabilities.

# A2 Heg Unsustainable – Dollar Collapse

## **Hegemony is sustainable – the dollar will continue to be strong – no other power can economically fill in**

Evans-Pritchard 9 (10/21/09, Ambrose, "Dollar hegemony for another century," The Telegraph, http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/finance/ambroseevans-pritchard/100001459/dollar-hegemony-for-another-century/)

Let me stick my neck out. The dollar will still be the world’s dominant reserve currency in 2030, sharing a degree of leadership in uneasy condominium with the Chinese yuan. It will then regain much of its hegemonic status as the 21st century unfolds. It may indeed end the century even stronger than it was at the start. The aging crisis in Asia — and indeed the outright demographic implosion in Japan and China, not to mention China’s water crisis — will soon be obvious to everybody. Talk of Oriental supremacy will start to sound overblown at first, and then preposterous. Japan is about to go bankrupt. It is on the cusp of a fiscal crisis that will change perceptions of Asia dramatically. The IMF says gross public debt will reach 218pc of GDP this year. This is compounding very fast. It will be 246pc in 2014. The Hatoyama government is spending as if there is no tomorrow. It plans to issue ¥50 trillion or $550bn in fresh bonds. I have no idea when this will spiral out of control. It could take another two or three years. It could start next week. Yes, I know that Japan has been borrowing merrily at ever lower rates for 20 years without the sky falling. The 10-year yield is 1.3pc. What happens when it rises to global levels of 3pc to 4pc? People made the same sort of arguments about the global boom before it suddenly tipped over. This blog does not attempt market timing, nor does it offer investment advice. But I am absolutely certain that pundits consigning the dollar to its death have missed an even more dramatic currency and debt story in Japan. The yen will top ¥200 to the dollar before this is over. Jim O’Neill from Goldman Sachs has already begun to hint at this. Apologies to readers who feel confused about my view on the dollar.[I have written a string of NEWS pieces](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/ambroseevans_pritchard/) over recent weeks quoting the currency experts and Asian officials slamming America, or exploring the[dollar demise thesis](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/5586543/Is-this-the-death-of-the-dollar.html). People assume that I share these views. I do not. Furthermore, I suspect that at least some of China’s grumbling about the dollar slide over recent months has been a ruse to lower the yuan (pegged to the dollar of course) against the euro, yen, and even sterling. The goal is to protect export margins. (Surely premier Wen Jiabao knows that China’s $1.6 trillion or so invested in US bonds is a sunk cost. Forget about it. The holdings are the consequence of their own currency manipulation in the first place.) The fact that Asian central banks are accumulating $600bn or more a year in reserves by running huge trade surpluses is proof enough that their (mostly rigged) currencies are undervalued by 30pc to 40pc against the West. To that extent, I agree entirely with HSBC currency guru David Bloom that this is untenable. If these countries continue to resist currency appreciation they will overheat and succumb to asset bubbles — if they haven’t already in China. Where I am less sure is that this will necessarily be resolved by a falling dollar. The evidence so far is that Asia will put off the day of adjustment as long as possible because they are addicted to mercantilist export strategies — and export oligarchs control the political systems (bar Japan). In which case they will lose competitive edge the old-fashioned way, by wage inflation for year after year until the world comes back into alignment. If so, the dollar will not fall at all. It may rise. Nor do I really agree that this is in essence a story of the two sick sisters: Britain and the US. They are certainly sick. But as readers know, I think much of Europe is equally sick — Spain, Italy, Greece, Ireland, the Baltics, are even sicker — even if the lag-times are longer. [The IMF keeps telling us that Europe has failed to come clean on its bank losses](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/6339144/German-Wise-Men-fear-credit-crunch-in-2010.html). Germany’s BaFin regulator says the same thing. Are they wrong? It all has echoes of the early 1930s when the Anglo-Saxons were crushed in the first two to three years, and the French bloc was crushed over the subsequent three years. What goes around, comes around. Charles Dumas from Lombard Street Research says Washington must be chuckling as the weak dollar gives it time to rebuild America’s industrial core. The “inflationistas” — ie, those convinced that the dollar is being debauched despite the fact that core inflation in the US is falling and that the M3 money supply is contracting — are playing straight into the hands of the United States. Nobel Laureate Gary Becker told me a few weeks ago that America’ spectacular gains in productivity – growing at a trend rate of 2.25pc to 2.5pc — is laying the foundation for a much stronger US recovery in the long-term than most people seem to realize. Compare that with 0pc to 1pc for the eurozone. In Italy it is negative. The UN expects America to add roughly 100m people by 2050, keeping its age balance in relatively good shape through a mix of immigration and a healthy fertility rate — now 2.12 live births per woman, still above replacement level. This compares to: Taiwan (1.13), Korea (1.2), Japan (1.22), Ukraine (1.25), Poland (1.27), Spain (1.3), Italy (1.3), Russia (1.4), Germany (1.41), China (1.77), Britain (1.96), and France (1.98). Some of this data may be slightly out of date, but the picture remains valid. Professor Becker said a collapsing birth rate is extremely hard to reverse, and the cultural effects are insidious. Old societies are status quo. They are slow to embrace new technologies. Young minds are the source of hi-tech invention. The EU is fully aware of the danger. “What is at risk in the medium to long run is nothing less than the sustainability of the society Europe has built and the viability of its civilisation,” said an EU report (initially suppressed) by former Dutch premier Wim Kok as long ago as 2004. Nothing has been done since despite endless warnings from the Commission. China’s work force will peak in absolute terms in six years, and then go into sharp decline. I have no idea how people square this with claims that China will soon replace the US as world hegemon. The stark reality is that China will hit a Japanese-style demographic crunch before it becomes rich. Sheer size will give it weight. But mastery? Of course, if the US were stupid enough to enact the 10-year spending plans projected by the White House — with a deficit of $1.9 trillion in 2019 on Congressional Budget Office estimates — the country will be ruined. I do not think America has so far lost its senses that it will commit suicide in this fashion. In any case, the bond markets will react long before we get there. They will force a change in policy. That change will imply higher US savings, and less import growth. The export surplus powers that live off America’s market are going to take it on the chin. At the end of the day, America is a unified nation forged by wars, under the rule of law, with a (largely) unifying language and patriotic creed, and one of the oldest and most deeply-rooted democracies in the world. As the Supreme Court demonstrated during Watergate, it can break presidents who violate the law. It is often stated that a currency reflects the strength of an economy over time. Actually, it reflects the strength of a society. Who really thinks that Europe’s old-aged home is a better bet than America, even if they can hold the euro together as the gap widens further between Germania and Club Med? Or thinks that China’s half-reformed Communist regime is ready for global leadership. Remember the little girl in a red dress with pigtails who `lip-synched’ the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics? Believe what you will.

# A2 Heg Unsustainable – Dollar Collapse

## People wont abandon the dollar

Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. 28

First, despite recurrent trade deficits to the tune of 7 percent of GDP, foreign investors have not fled the dollar to the extent typical of countries running up substantial and sustained deficits, and when financial crisis fell upon the world economy, foreign investors actually fled to the dollar. Import expansion has also supplied American negotiators with a bargaining chip – the ability to offer access to a huge market – in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and conclude trade agreements that for the most part reflect American interests. Although, consistent with my claim that American dominance is just as contingent upon the relative size between other actors as on its size relative to other actors, there is variation across different periods.

# A2 Heg Unsustainable – Economics

## **US hegemony is sustainable – economic crises cannot cause decline**

Lieber 9 - Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University (March 2009, Robert J., "Persistent primacy and the future of the American era," International Politics, Vol. 46, Iss. 2-3, pg. 119)

The extraordinary financial crisis that has impacted the United States, Europe, large parts of Asia and much of the rest of the world has provided the impetus for renewed predictions of America's demise as the preeminent global power. Of course, present problems are very serious and the financial crisis is the worst to hit the United States and Europe since the great depression began some 80 years ago. The impact on real estate, banking, insurance, credit, the stock market and overall business activity is quite severe, and a painful recession is already underway. Yet by themselves, these developments do not mean that America will somehow collapse, let alone see some other country assume the unique role it has played in world affairs. Arguably, the impact of the crisis upon the US economy is actually less than for the major European powers. For example, the $700 billion bailout for financial firms approved by Congress amounts to about 5 per cent of the country's annual gross domestic product, significantly less as a percentage than the burdens borne by many countries. In addition, while the exchange rate of the euro declined sharply in the early months of the crisis, as did the British pound, the Russian ruble and many other currencies, the dollar rose sharply in value as foreign investors sought a safe haven for their funds. (Among the other G-8 currencies, only the Japanese yen experienced a substantial rise.) The United States will eventually surmount the present crisis, the excesses that helped to cause it will be corrected, and despite painful costs of adjustment, its economy and financial systems will sooner or later resume a more normal pattern of activity and growth. The new Obama administration will continue and even intensify cooperation with other leading countries in efforts to reform the international economic and financial systems. These may or may not produce a new 'Bretton Woods' system, but agreements will be reached and the United States necessarily will play a central role in this effort.

**Recession is irrelevant—we control every sector and everyone needs us**

**Singh 2008** – Professor, School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London (Robert, International Politics, Vol. 45, Iss. 5, “The exceptional empire”, ProQuest, WEA)

Fourth, contrary to Cox's claim, it is not the case that American economic indicators are universally and intractably negative. Not only is the US the world's largest (estimates vary between 20 and 30% of world GDP) and most efficient economy but also the dollar remains the world's reserve currency despite the euro's rise. The Bush years have seen America continue to experience historically low levels of inflation, unemployment and interest rates and -- until this year -- strong rates of growth. The twin deficits of the federal budget (at some $250 billion) and current account (6% of GDP) do make the US the world's leading debtor, as it was previously at the end of Reagan's two terms as president. But the economic health of both China and Japan relies heavily on their continuing to purchase dollars and securities based on the dollar to keep their currencies weak and the US market for their exports strong. The US economy remains huge, robust and the world's most productive, competitive and innovative (not least in information technology), just as its research institutes and universities dominate those of other nations. American takeovers cause a tremendous productivity advantage over non-American alternatives for firms outside the US 'as if the invisible hand of the American marketplace were somehow passing along a secret handshake to these firms' (Van Reenen et al. , 2007). America's strength rests on the fundamental soundness, openness and innovative energy of its dynamic economy. Consequently, as the end of the first decade of the 21st century approaches, the enormous, productive and flexible US economy remains central to the international economic system, the dominant source of its operating rules, and the best positioned to take advantage of coming changes precisely because it is so consistently adept at adjusting.

Fifth, if these hard power resources of the US remain potent, those propelling the rise of its potential rivals are by no means clear, coherent or reliable. Much of the commentary on America's principal competitors effectively assumes their linear rise and an inevitable disharmony with US interests (and ideals) accompanying a concomitant erosion of American predominance. But such assumptions are not necessarily well founded.

# A2 Heg Unsustainable –Globalization

**Globalization and rising prosperity don’t hurt us—they can only bolster heg**

**Ahrari 2008** – professor of Security Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center of Security Studies (5/20, Ehsan, Asia Times, “The mythical post-American era”, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/JE20Ad01.html, WEA)

One can develop scenarios of irreversibility of the economic progress of China and India. But such scenarios must take into consideration the domestic milieu of both countries, which are characterized by large degrees of corruption, nepotism, religious tension (India), and ethnic tension (China), and most importantly, the acute absence of modern civilian infrastructure. However, one frequently misses (or ignores) those facts when one studies the subject of the rise of those countries in the coming decades from abroad. One tends to be impressed by repeating the frequently quoted statistics related to various aspects of their economic growth. However, when one visits those countries, one is overwhelmed with the "Third World" nature of their polities. This phrase describes corruption, inefficiencies, acute environmental pollution, casual attention to general hygienic conditions, and the unrelenting prevalence of illiteracy and poverty. Those are not characteristics that would make one highly optimistic about predicting the unimpeded rise of either China or India as great powers. But why, one wonders, is the subject of "post-Americanism" becoming so popular in the world? Kishore Mahbubani, the dean of the Singapore-based Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, develops a thoughtful thesis of a power shift from the West to the East in his latest book, The New Asian Hemisphere. Newsweek International editor Fareed Zakaria talks about the post-American world in his latest book of the same title. But the theses of both books, approximately described, prove the success of Western ideas, such as modernization, rationalization of governance, and globalization, etc. In fact, Zakaria states that the chief challenge for the US is not that it is a fundamentally weak economy, "But that it has developed a highly dysfunctional politics." The suggestion of political inertia has been identified as a problem, and it is, indeed, becoming increasingly serious. However, no one presents any one idea that is typically Chinese, Indian or Eastern in origin. If these ideas are regarded as engines of the rise of China and India as great powers in the coming decades, then why is it that those very ideas are not going to help the United States to maintain its dominance? It is certainly true that China and India have created vibrant economies. However, there is no reason to believe there have emerged assorted irreversible structural dysfunctionalities that are pushing the US economy relentlessly toward permanent decline. The current signs of economic recession may have a lot to do with the George W Bush administration's misguided war-related expenditures in Iraq. But that phenomenon may either disappear, or may undergo radical mutations in the aftermath of the forthcoming US presidential elections. The forces of globalization may be reducing the "developmental gap" between the US and China, the US and India, and China and India. However, they do not necessarily force one to conclude that the US has become a declining power.

# Unsustainability Indict

## Prefer our evidence – your evidence is just a historically inaccurate academic fad – hegemony will prevail

**Kaplan** 0**8** Senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (George, “A Gentler Hegemony”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/16/AR2008121602480.html)

Declinism is in the air. The latest conventional wisdom is that the combination of the disastrous Iraq war, the military and economic rise of Asia, and the steep recession in the West has chastened America, ending its period of dominance in world affairs. It is time for us to be humble. There is a lot of truth to this, but it goes too far. For decline itself -- as a concept -- is overrated. Britain's Royal Navy went into relative decline beginning in the 1890s, even as Great Britain remained powerful enough to help save the West in two world wars over the next half-century. The proper analogy may be the Indian Mutiny in 1857 and 1858, after the orientalists and other pragmatists in the British power structure, who wanted to leave traditional India as it was, lost sway to Evangelical and Utilitarian reformers who wanted to more forcefully Christianize India -- to make it in a values sense more like England. The reformers were good people: They helped abolish the slave trade and tried to do the same with the hideous practice of widow-burning. But their attempts to bring the fruits of Western civilization, virtuous as they were, to a far-off corner of the world played a role in a violent revolt against imperial authority. Yet the debacle did not signal the end of the British Empire, which expanded for nearly another century. Rather, it signaled a transition away from an ad hoc imperium fired occasionally by an ill-disciplined lust to impose its values abroad -- and to a calmer, more pragmatic and soldiering empire built on trade, education and technology. That is akin to where we are now, post-Iraq: calmer, more pragmatic and with a military -- especially a Navy -- that, while in relative decline, is still far superior to any other on Earth. Near the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy had almost 600 ships; it is down to 280. But in aggregate tonnage that is still more than the next 17 navies combined. Our military secures the global commons to the benefit of all nations. Without the U.S. Navy, the seas would be unsafe for merchant shipping, which, in an era of globalization, accounts for 90 percent of world trade. We may not be able to control events on land in the Middle East, but our Navy and Air Force control all entry and exit points to the region. The multinational anti-piracy patrols that have taken shape in the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden have done so under the aegis of the U.S. Navy. Sure the economic crisis will affect shipbuilding, meaning the decline in the number of our ships will continue, and there will come a point where quantity affects quality. But this will be an exceedingly gradual transition, which we will assuage by leveraging naval allies such as India and Japan. Then there are the dozens of training deployments around the world that the U.S. military, particularly Army Special Forces, conducts in any given week. We are all over Africa, Asia and Latin America with these small missions that increase America's diplomatic throw-weight without running the risk of getting us bogged down. Aside from Iraq and Afghanistan, our military posture around the world is generally light, lethal and highly mobile. We have been quietly reducing land forces in South Korea while compensating with a more effective air and naval presence. In Colombia, platoon-size numbers of Green Berets have been instrumental in fighting narco-terrorists; in Algeria, such training teams have helped improve our relationship with that formerly radical Arab country. Such stripped-down American military deployments garner no headlines, but they are a formula that works. The Marines, after becoming virtually desert forces since 2001, will return to their expeditionary roots aboard amphibious ships in the Greater Indian Ocean and Western Pacific. American military power is not going away. But instead of being in-your-face, it will lurk just over the horizon. And that will make all the difference. In sum, we may no longer be at Charles Krauthammer's "Unipolar Moment," but neither have we become Sweden. Declinism of the sort being preached will go immediately out of fashion at the world's next humanitarian catastrophe, when the very people enraged at the U.S. military because of Iraq will demand that it lead a coalition to save lives. We might have intervened in Darfur had we not been bogged down in Iraq; after Cyclone Nargis, our ships would have provided large-scale relief, had Burma's military government allowed them to proceed. As world population rises, and with vast urban areas with tottering infrastructures in the most environmentally and seismically fragile zones, the opportunities for U.S. military-led disaster relief will be legion. The American military remains a force for good, a fact that will become self-evident in the crises to come.

# Transition Violent – Generic

## Superpower transitions necessitate global wars.

**Khanna, ’09** – Director of the Global Governance Initiative at the New America Foundation (Parag, *The second world: how emerging powers are redefining global competition in the twenty-first century*, p. 337-338)

Even this scenario is optimistic, for superpowers are by definition willing to encroach on the turf of others—changing the world map in the process. Much as in geology, such tectonic shifts always result in earthquakes, particularly as rising powers tread on the entrenched position of the reigning hegemon.56 The sole exception was the twentieth century Anglo-American transition in which Great Britain and the United States were allies and shared a common culture—and even that took two world wars to complete.57 As the relative levels of power of the three superpowers draw closer, the temptation of the number-two to preemptively knock out the king on the hill grows, as does the lead power’s incentive to preventatively attack and weaken its ascending rival before being eclipsed.58 David Hume wrote, “It is not a great disproportion between ourselves and others which produces envy, but on the contrary, a proximity.”59 While the density of contacts among the three superpowers makes the creation of a society of states more possible than ever—all the foreign ministers have one anothers’ mobile phone numbers—the deep differences in interests among the three make forging a “culture of peace” more challenging than ever.60 China seas, hyperterrorism with nuclear weapons, an attack in the Gulf of Aden or the Straits of Malacca. The uncertain alignments of lesser but still substantial powers such as Russia, Japan, and India could also cause escalation. Furthermore, America’s foreign lenders could pull the plug to undermine its grand strategy, sparking economic turmoil, political acrimony, and military tension. War brings profit to the military-industrial complex and is always supported by the large patriotic camps on all sides. Yet the notion of a Sino-U.S. rivalry to lead the world is also premature and simplistic, for in the event of their conflict, Europe would be the winner, as capital would flee to its sanctuaries. These great tensions are being played out in the world today, as each superpower strives to attain the most advantageous position for itself, while none are powerful enough to dictate the system by itself. Global stability thus hangs between the bookends Raymond Aron identified as “peace by law” and “peace by empire,” the former toothless and the latter prone to excess.61 Historically, successive iterations of balance of power and collective security doctrines have evolved from justifying war for strategic advantage into building systems to avoid it, with the post-Napoleonic “Concert of Europe” as the first of the modern era.62 Because it followed rules, it was itself something of a societal system.\* Even where these attempts at creating a stable world order have failed—including the League of Nations after World War I—systemic learning takes place in which states (particularly democracies) internalize the lessons of the past into their institutions to prevent history from repeating itself.63 Toynbee too viewed history as progressive rather than purely cyclical, a wheel that not only turns around and around but also moves forward such that Civilization (with a big C) could become civilized.64 But did he “give too much credit to time’s arrows and not enough to time’s cycle”?65 Empires and superpowers usually promise peace but bring wars.66 The time to recognize the current revolutionary situation is now—before the next world war.67

# Transition Violent – We’ll Go Down In Flames

## Transition wont be smooth – the US will cling to a false unipolar reality

David P. Calleo (University Professor at The Johns Hopkins University and Dean Acheson Professor at its Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS)) 2009 “Follies of Power: America’s Unipolar Fantasy” p. 4-5

It is tempting to believe that America’s recent misadventures will discredit and suppress our hegemonic longings and that, following the presidential election of 2008, a new administration will abandon them. But so long as our identity as a nation is intimately bound up with seeing ourselves as the world’s most powerful country, at the heart of a global system, hegemony is likely to remain the recurring obsession of our official imagination, the id´ee fixe of our foreign policy. America’s hegemonic ambitions have, after all, suffered severe setbacks before. Less than half a century has passed since the “lesson of Vietnam.” But that lesson faded without forcing us to abandon the old fantasies of omnipotence. The fantasies merely went into remission, until the fall of the Soviet Union provided an irresistible occasion for their return. Arguably, in its collapse, the Soviet Union proved to be a greater danger to America’s own equilibrium than in its heyday. Dysfunctional imaginations are scarcely a rarity – among individuals or among nations. “Reality” is never a clear picture that imposes itself from without. Imaginations need to collaborate. They synthesize old and new images, concepts, and ideas and fuse language with emotions – all according to the inner grammar of our minds. These synthetic constructions become our reality, our way of depicting the world in which we live. Inevitably, our imaginations present us with only a partial picture. As Walter Lippmann once put it, our imaginations create a “pseudo-environment between ourselves and the world.”2 Every individual, therefore, has his own particular vision of reality, and every nation tends to arrive at a favored collective view that differs from the favored view of other nations. When powerful and interdependent nations hold visions of the world severely at odds with one another, the world grows dangerous.

## US wont accept multipolar constraints – leaders wont accept multipolarity

Sherle Schwenninger (directs the New America Foundation's Economic Growth Program, and the Global Middle Class Initiative. He is also the former director of the Bernard L. Schwartz Fellows Program) 2007 “ The United States and the Emerging Powers” http://newamerica.net/node/8639

The second problem involves the lack of multilateral and regional institutions to make a multipolar world work both in terms of international security and the world economy. The United States has accepted today’s emerging powers but without embracing the idea of a multipolar world. As a result, it has neither accepted the normative constraints on its own behavior that an orderly multipolar world requires. Nor has it offered the leadership needed to fashion new institutions to give Brazil, China, and India a greater voice in the management of world affairs. The absence of China from the G-8 and the leadership of the IMF, the principal consulting bodies regarding the world economy, and Brazil and India from the U.N. Security Council amply illustrate this gap between world realities and its institutional architecture.

# Maintaining Heg Key to Smooth Transition

**Even if multipolarity is inevitable – US hegemony still key – US must remain the at the top to shape the new international system favorably – we still access our impacts**

**Kaplan** 0**8** Senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security (George, “A Gentler Hegemony”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/16/AR2008121602480.html)

Of course we are entering a more multipolar world. The only economic growth over the next year or two will come from developing nations, notably India and China. But there are other realities, too. We should not underestimate the diplomatic and moral leverage created by the combination of the world's most expeditionary military and a new president who will boast high approval ratings at home and around the world. No power but the United States has the wherewithal to orchestrate an Israeli-Palestinian peace deal, and our intervention in Iraq has not changed that fact. Everyone hates the word, but the United States is still a hegemon of sorts, able to pivotally influence the world from a position of moral strength. Yet American hegemony post-Iraq will be as changed as Britain's was after the Indian Mutiny. It will be a more benign and temperate version of what transpired in recent years. Henceforth, we will shape coalitions rather than act on our own. For that, after all, is the essence of a long and elegant decline: to pass responsibility on to like-minded others as their own capacities rise.

## Even if heg isn’t good – maintaining flexibility to adapt is key to solve violent transtion

Richard Haas (president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April 2008 “Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?” http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask\_the\_expert.html

Given that the global population is expected to rise to approximately 9bn by mid-century, how will the tension between resource scarcity (of water, hydrocarbons, food etc.) and interdependence (trade, financial markets etc.) be resolved? Will a non-polar world be capable of reforming global institutions, such as the UN, to tackle the likely crises? Andy, Swindon Richard Haass: History always involves tension between forces of integration and forces of friction or disorder. What gives any era its character is the balance between these forces. The nature of the nonpolar era will in large part depend on how successful governments and others are at adapting existing institutions or building new ones to deal with the defining issues of this era, some of which will stem from resource scarcity and many of which will stem from globalization.

# Multipolarity = War

## Multipolarity causes conflicts – even if they have no material reason to fight

William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

Most scholars hold that the consequences of unipolarity for great power conflict are indeterminate and that a power shift resulting in a return to bipolarity or multipolarity will not raise the specter of great power war. This article calls into question the core assumptions underlying the consensus: (1) that people are mainly motivated by the instrumental pursuit of tangible ends such as physical security and material prosperity and (2) that major powers’ satisfaction with the status quo is relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. In fact, it is known that people are motivated powerfully by a noninstrumental concern for relative status, and there is strong empirical evidence linking the salience of those concerns to distributions of resources. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. Building on research in psychology and sociology, the author argues that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is. Unipolarity thus augurs for great power peace, and a shift back to bipolarity or multipolarity raises the probability of war even among great powers with little material cause to fight.

## Multipolarity incentivizes great power conflict – only unipolarity can solve – prefer our analysis, its based in more scientifically validated methods

William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

The upshot is a near scholarly consensus that unpolarity’s consequences for great power conflict are indeterminate and that a power shift resulting in a return to bipolarity or multipolarity will not raise the specter of great power war. This article questions the consensus on two counts. First, I show that it depends crucially on a dubious assumption about human motivation. Prominent theories of war are based on the assumption that people are mainly motivated by the instrumental pursuit of tangible ends such as physical security and material prosperity. This is why such theories seem irrelevant to interactions among great powers in an international environment that diminishes the utility of war for the pursuit of such ends. Yet we know that people are motivated by a great many noninstrumental motives, not least by concerns regarding their social status. 3 As John Harsanyi noted, “Apart from economic payoffs, social status (social rank) seems to be the most important incentive and motivating force of social behavior.”4 This proposition rests on much firmer scientific ground now than when Harsanyi expressed it a generation ago, as cumulating research shows that humans appear to be hardwired for sensitivity to status and that relative standing is a powerful and independent motivator of behavior.5 [End Page 29] Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. 6 Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is. Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.7 “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”8 While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum.9

# Multipolarity = War

## Multipolarity causes conflict – unipolarity solves

William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

Multipolarity implies a flat hierarchy in which no state is unambiguously number one. Under such a setting, the theory predicts status inconsistency and intense pressure on each state to resolve it in a way that reflects favorably on itself. In this sense, all states are presumptively revisionist in that the absence of a settled hierarchy provides incentives to establish one. But the theory expects the process of establishing a hierarchy to be prone to conflict: any state would be expected to prefer a status quo under which there are no unambiguous superiors to any other state’s successful bid for primacy. Thus, an order in which one’s own state is number one is preferred to the status quo, which is preferred to any order in which another state is number one. The expected result will be periodic bids for primacy, resisted by other great powers.37 For its part, bipolarity, with only two states in a material position to claim primacy, implies a somewhat more stratified hierarchy that is less prone to ambiguity. Each superpower would be expected to see the other as the main relevant out-group, while second-tier major powers would compare themselves to either or both of them. Given the two poles’ clear material preponderance, second-tier major powers would not be expected to experience status dissonance and dissatisfaction, and, to the extent they did, the odds would favor their adoption of strategies of social creativity instead of conflict. For their part, the poles would be expected to seek to establish a hierarchy: each would obviously prefer to be number one, but absent that each would also prefer an ambiguous status quo in which neither is dominant to an order in which it is unambiguously outranked by the other. Unipolarity implies the most stratified hierarchy, presenting the starkest contrast to the other two polar types. The intensity of the competition over status in either a bipolar or a multipolar system might [End Page 40] vary depending on how evenly the key dimensions of state capability are distributed—a multipolar system populated by states with very even capabilities portfolios might be less prone to status competition than a bipolar system in which the two poles possess very dissimilar portfolios. But unipolarity, by definition, is characterized by one state possessing unambiguous preponderance in all relevant dimensions. The unipole provides the relevant out-group comparison for all other great powers, yet its material preponderance renders improbable identity-maintenance strategies of social competition. While second-tier states would be expected to seek favorable comparisons with the unipole, they would also be expected to reconcile themselves to a relatively clear status ordering or to engage in strategies of social creativity.

**Too little power is worse than too much—multipolarity risks nuclear war**

**Nye 2008** – PhD, Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (Joseph, “War, peace and hegemony in a globalized world”, page 37, edited by Chandra Chari – founder/editor of The Book Review, WEA)

Many realists extol the virtues of the classic nineteenth-century European balance of power in which constantly shifting coalitions contained the ambitions of any especially aggressive power. They urge the United States to rediscover the virtues of a multipolar balance of power at the global level today. French President Jacques Chirac has often appealed for a return to multipolarity. But whether such multipolarity would be good or bad for the world is debatable. **War was the constant companion** and crucial instrument **of the multipolar balance** of power. Rote adherence to the balance of power and multipolarity may prove to be a dangerous approach to global governance in a world where **war could turn nuclear**, or where the major new threats come from transnational terrorism. Many regions of the world and periods in history have seen stability when one power has been pre-eminent. As the historian Niall Ferguson has warned, in a disorderly world people may find that the problem in the future is too little American power rather than too much.4

# Multipoarity = War – Distinction Card

## None of your evidence assumes status based conflicts – unipolarity uniquely dampens conflict escalation – multipolarity causes multiple great power conflicts

William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

The evidence suggests that narrow and asymmetrical capabilities gaps foster status competition even among states relatively confident of their basic territorial security for the reasons identified in social identity theory and theories of status competition. Broad patterns of evidence are consistent with this expectation, suggesting that unipolarity shapes strategies of identity maintenance in ways that dampen status conflict. The implication is that unipolarity helps explain low levels of military competition and conflict among major powers after 1991 and that a return to bipolarity or multipolarity would increase the likelihood of such conflict. This has been a preliminary exercise. The evidence for the hypotheses explored here is hardly conclusive, but it is sufficiently suggestive to warrant further refinement and testing, all the more so given [End Page 56] the importance of the question at stake. If status matters in the way the theory discussed here suggests, then the widespread view that the rise of a peer competitor and the shift back to a bipolar or multipolar structure present readily surmountable policy challenges is suspect. Most scholars agree with Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke’s argument: “[S]hould a satisfied state undergo a power transition and catch up with dominant power, there is little or no expectation of war.” 81 Given that today’s rising powers have every material reason to like the status quo, many observers are optimistic that the rise of peer competitors can be readily managed by fashioning an order that accommodates their material interests. Yet it is far harder to manage competition for status than for most material things. While diplomatic efforts to manage status competition seem easy under unipolarity, theory and evidence suggest that it could present much greater challenges as the system moves back to bipolarity or multipolarity. When status is seen as a positional good, efforts to craft negotiated bargains about status contests face long odds. And this positionality problem is particularly acute concerning the very issue unipolarity solves: primacy. The route back to bipolarity or multipolarity is thus fraught with danger. With two or more plausible claimants to primacy, positional competition and the potential for major power war could once again form the backdrop of world politics. [End Page 57]

# Unipolarity Solves War – Must Read

## Social status drives hegemonic conflict – comprehensive empirical studies conclude that only unipolarity can influence the likelihood of confclit – historical conflicts were all predicted by this theory

William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

Despite increasingly compelling findings concerning the importance of status seeking in human behavior, research on its connection to war waned some three decades ago.38 Yet empirical studies of the relationship between both systemic and dyadic capabilities distributions and war have continued to cumulate. If the relationships implied by the status theory run afoul of well-established patterns or general historical findings, then there is little reason to continue investigating them. The clearest empirical implication of the theory is that status competition is unlikely to cause great power military conflict in unipolar systems. If status competition is an important contributory cause of great power war, then, ceteris paribus, unipolar systems should be markedly less war-prone than bipolar or multipolar systems. And this appears to be the case. As Daniel Geller notes in a review of the empirical literature: “The only polar structure that appears to influence conflict probability is unipolarity.”39 In addition, a larger number of studies at the dyadic level support the related expectation that narrow capabilities gaps and ambiguous or unstable capabilities hierarchies increase the probability of war.40 [End Page 41] These studies are based entirely on post-sixteenth-century European history, and most are limited to the post-1815 period covered by the standard data sets. Though the systems coded as unipolar, near-unipolar, and hegemonic are all marked by a high concentration of capabilities in a single state, these studies operationalize unipolarity in a variety of ways, often very differently from the definition adopted here. An ongoing collaborative project looking at ancient interstate systems over the course of two thousand years suggests that historical systems that come closest to the definition of unipolarity used here exhibit precisely the behavioral properties implied by the theory. 41 As David C. Kang’s research shows, the East Asian system between 1300 and 1900 was an unusually stratified unipolar structure, with an economic and militarily dominant China interacting with a small number of geographically proximate, clearly weaker East Asian states.42 Status politics existed, but actors were channeled by elaborate cultural understandings and interstate practices into clearly recognized ranks. Warfare was exceedingly rare, and the major outbreaks occurred precisely when the theory would predict: when China’s capabilities waned, reducing the clarity of the underlying material hierarchy and increasing status dissonance for lesser powers. Much more research is needed, but initial exploration of other arguably unipolar systems—for example, Rome, Assyria, the Amarna system—appears consistent with the hypothesis.43

# Unipolarity Solves War – Generic

## Great power competition is motivated by ambiguous hierarchies of power – the clear unipolar hierarchy is key deter and de-escalate conflict

William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

Status is a social, psychological, and cultural phenomenon. Its expression appears endlessly varied; it is thus little wonder that the few international relations scholars who have focused on it are more struck by its variability and diversity than by its susceptibility to generalization. 34 Yet if sit captures important dynamics of human behavior, and if people seek to translate resources into status, then the distribution of capabilities will affect the likelihood of status competition in predictable ways. Recall that theory, research, and experimental results suggest that relative status concerns will come to the fore when status hierarchy is ambiguous and that people will tend to compare the states with which they identify to similar but higher-ranked states.35 Dissatisfaction arises not from dominance itself but from a dominance that [End Page 38] appears to rest on ambiguous foundations. Thus, status competition is unlikely in cases of clear hierarchies in which the relevant comparison out-groups for each actor are unambiguously dominant materially. Applied to international politics, this begins to suggest the conditions conducive to status competition. For conflict to occur, one state must select another state as a relevant comparison that leaves it dissatisfied with its status; it must then choose an identity-maintenance strategy in response that brings it into conflict with another state that is also willing to fight for its position. This set of beliefs and strategies is most likely to be found when states are relatively evenly matched in capabilities. The more closely matched actors are materially, the more likely they are to experience uncertainty about relative rank. When actors start receiving mixed signals—some indicating that they belong in a higher rank while others reaffirm their present rank—they experience status inconsistency and face incentives to resolve the uncertainty. When lower-ranked actors experience such inconsistency, they will use higher-ranked actors as referents. Since both high- and low-status actors are biased toward higher status, uncertainty fosters conflict as the same evidence feeds contradictory expectations and claims. When the relevant out-group is unambiguously dominant materially, however, status inconsistency is less likely. More certain of their relative rank, subordinate actors are less likely to face the ambiguity that drives status competition. And even if they do, their relative weakness makes strategies of social competition an unlikely response. Given limited material wherewithal, either acquiescence or strategies of social creativity are more plausible responses, neither of which leads to military conflict.

# Your Authors = Ideologically Driven

## Prefer our authors—your cards are ideological and overblown

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, page vii, WEA)

In recent years a lopsided and often unedifying debate has been taking place. Criticism of America’s world role has been characterized by rhetorical excess, partisan acrimony, and ideologically driven assessments that fail to weigh the lethality of the threat we face in the post-9/11 world, the limits of international institutions, and the longterm implications for American strategy and policy. These shortcomings are evident not only in the policy and academic worlds in the United States, but even more so in Europe. Sterile debates about “empire,” ad hominem denunciations of the Bush administration, ritual incantations about multilateralism, and an acrimonious climate of blame and counterblame over Iraq are rampant (a veritable reductio ad Iraqum). Conversely, on the part of those more favorable toward recent American policy, there has been some keen dissection of opposing arguments but also a substantial amount of stridency, partisanship, and self-satisfaction. The recent past has demonstrated that problems of policy implementation and flawed diplomacy matter a great deal. It is also clear that American predominance or hegemony in itself can trigger resentment and even hostility. But legitimate expressions of concern about the exercise of American power ought not to make us lose sight of what can happen in the absence of such power. This is something often lost in the volley of charges and countercharges over Iraq, over flaws in American intelligence, and in relation to the dangers or virtues of primacy and preemption.

**Your evidence is just pop-academia – prefer our ev over their ideological hyperbole**

**Lieber 2008** – professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown (Robert, World Affairs Journal, “Falling upwards: Declinism, the box set”, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Summer/full-Lieber.html, WEA)

By the early 1980s, declinism had become a form of historical chic. In 1987, David Calleo’s Beyond American Hegemony summoned the U.S. to come to terms with a more pluralistic world. In the same year, Paul Kennedy published what at the time was greeted as the summa theologica of the declinist movement—The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, in which the author implied that the cycle of rise and decline experienced in the past by the empires of Spain and Great Britain could now be discerned in the “imperial overstretch” of the United States. But Kennedy had bought in at the top: within two years of his pessimistic prediction, the Cold War ended with the Soviet Union in collapse, the Japanese economic miracle entering a trough of its own, and U.S. competitiveness and job creation far outpacing its European and Asian competitors.

**Theories of America’s obsolescence aspire to the status of science**. But cycles of declinism tend to have a political subtext and, however impeccable the historical methodology that generates them seems to be, they often function as ideology by other means. During the 1980s, for instance, these critiques mostly emanated from the left and focused on Reaganomics and the defense buildup. By contrast, in the Clinton era, right-of-center and realist warnings were directed against the notion of America as an “indispensable nation” whose writ required it to nation-build and spread human rights. Likewise, much of today’s resurgent declinism is propelled not only by arguments over real-world events, but also by a fierce reaction against the Bush presidency—a reaction tainted by partisanship, hyperbole, ahistoricism, and a misunderstanding of the fundamentals that underpin the robustness and staying power of the United States.

# Your Authors = Cherry-Pick Data

## Declinists cherry pick data and exaggerate bad news

**Lieber 2008** – professor of government and international affairs at Georgetown (Robert, World Affairs Journal, “Falling upwards: Declinism, the box set”, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2008-Summer/full-Lieber.html, WEA)

Not surprisingly, the declinist outlook carries with it policy prescriptions—yearnings, really—that a fading superpower will exit center stage gracefully. Earnest liberal internationalists such as Anne-Marie Slaughter and John Ikenberry admonish Washington to show far more deference and even subservience to world opinion and to work in concert with, and on behalf of, the global community. Indeed, for some declinists, the U.S. has become a sort of genteel version of a rogue nation. The portrait is often tinged with partisan politics. Merely as a result of a change in administration, two former National Security Council staffers, Nina Hachigian and Mona Sutphen, write in The Next American Century, a solipsistic recounting of the Clinton years, their halcyon days in government bureaucracy were exchanged for a condition of “America on one side, the rest of the world on the other.” A broader critique assigns responsibility for America’s overstretch to the entire post-Cold War era. On this count, authors and public intellectuals loosely associated with the realist tradition, such as Christopher Layne and Dimitri Simes, indict not only neoconservatives, who are said to have engineered the Bush Doctrine, but also liberal internationalists, whom they depict as emboldening neoconservatives with their own enthusiasms for humanitarian intervention, nation-building, and democracy promotion. Still others look inward for the cause of America’s demise. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger has complained about the effect of ethnic groups on U.S. foreign policy and questioned whether the Constitution itself contains the seeds of America’s decline. Similarly, James Kurth has pointed to multiculturalism and the pollution of pop culture as the culprits, while Samuel Huntington, who writes that “Cultural America is under siege,” sees America’s fabric frayed by racial, ethnic, and cultural diversity. Much of the case, however, wilts under close analysis, relying as it does overwhelmingly on transient or reversible indicators. (Comparing America’s share of the global economy in the late 1940s with its share today, for example, gives a skewed result for the simple reason that much of the rest of the world was in ruins sixty years ago). **Declinism gains much of its power from cherry-picking among daily reports of bad news** and from the assumption that those who defend this country’s basic strength have blinkered themselves to the Hegelian logic behind America’s weakening. As with the pessimistic intellectual troughs that followed the Depression, Vietnam, and the stagflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s, there is a tendency among declinists to over-extrapolate from a momentous but singular event—in this case, the Iraq War, whose wake propels many of their gloomy forecasts.

# Your Authors = Cherry-Pick Data

## Critiques of primacy are simplistic whining—they only focus on one side and warp analysis

**Lieber 2005** – PhD from Harvard, Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown, former consultant to the State Department and for National Intelligence Estimates (Robert, “The American Era”, pages 13-15, WEA)

American and European analysts have offered various critiques of recent U.S. grand strategy.5 Many of them characterize doctrines of primacy and preemption as ill advised and counterproductive, exacerbating the threats we face, alienating foreign leaders and publics, and isolating America from its erstwhile allies and others whose support we need to safeguard our security and tackle urgent global problems. The critics maintain that the unilateralism evident in the war on terror and the use of force in Iraq without the agreement of the United Nations break with half a century of multilateral cooperation and American commitment to institutions and alliances that we helped to create. Many also condemn as simplistic the labeling of countries or groups as “evil,” and they consider the goal of fostering democracy throughout the Middle East as overreaching. They argue that recent U.S. policies not only exhibit hubris but risk over-extension and are already galvanizing opposition to American power, especially through “soft balancing” (i.e., collaboration among other countries to oppose the United States through means other than direct military confrontation). We cannot pursue our own security and global interests, the argument goes, unless we mend our ways, return to habits of multilateral cooperation, and reintegrate ourselves within the expanding array of international institutions and agreements that represent a nascent form of global governance. Although widely shared, **such critiques stand on a shaky foundation**. To begin with, they imply that the previous half-century was a halcyon era of multilateral cooperation among allies. But the Cold War years were marked by a long series of often bitter disputes, which were kept within bounds largely by the shared sense of Soviet threat.6 Moreover, at the end of the Cold War, the administration of President George H.W. Bush pushed for immediate German unification without engaging in a process of consensus-building with major allies and “respectful give-and-take.” In the words of an experienced diplomatic observer, the United States “opposed the major European powers (other than Germany, of course), ignored their views, got its way, and gave them almost nothing in return.”7 In turn, during the post–Cold War decade of the 1990s and Bill Clinton’s presidency, a number of major frictions with allies had already become apparent. They included, for example, bitter differences over NATO’s response to ethnic conflict in Bosnia, and an inability to agree on a treaty to ban anti-personnel land mines, on terms for the International Criminal Court, and on the Kyoto Protocol on global warming. Moreover, French opposition to American predominance was increasingly evident. It was in 1999 that Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine uttered his widely quoted complaint about American “hyperpuissance.” In recent years, much of the criticism has focused on the character and personalities of the Bush administration as the primary cause of European-American discord. However, that emphasis undervalues the structural dimension of the problem, especially the reality of America’s unprecedented power and the inevitable foreign resentments that arise in reaction to it.8 Nor is the idea that we can rejuvenate the Atlantic partnership by agreeing to a European veto over American policy likely to be feasible or desirable. It is hard to imagine that even a hypothetical John Kerry presidency would have been willing to cede such control. Policy critics also tend to adopt a reductio ad Iraqum. As important as the war in Iraq and the subsequent insurgency have been, they are not the sum total of foreign policy, and exclusive focus on them can distort one’s perspective. Not only are there other issues and regions to be considered, but the standard critique of policy implies that, apart from Britain’s Tony Blair, America has become almost totally isolated in its Iraq policy. In reality, more than half of the governments of Europe originally endorsed or supported the U.S. position in the months leading up to the Iraq war, and some of the differences within Europe were as important as those between Europe and the United States. By the time sovereignty was restored to an interim Iraqi government, sixteen of the twenty-six NATO countries had at least token contingents of soldiers in Iraq.9 In addition, the wider war on terror has seen close cooperation in intelligence and security (with exemplary U.S.-French collaboration) not only between European and American agencies but in other regions as well.

# A2 Heg/Security K

## Our advantage is not based on myopic security discourse – the 1ac understands hegemonic structures as being influenced by social status – not the drive for security

William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

Mainstream theories generally posit that states come to blows over an international status quo only when it has implications for their security or material well-being. The guiding assumption is that a state’s satisfaction [End Page 34] with its place in the existing order is a function of the material costs and benefits implied by that status.24 By that assumption, once a state’s status in an international order ceases to affect its material wellbeing, its relative standing will have no bearing on decisions for war or peace. But the assumption is undermined by cumulative research in disciplines ranging from neuroscience and evolutionary biology to economics, anthropology, sociology, and psychology that human beings are powerfully motivated by the desire for favorable social status comparisons. This research suggests that the preference for status is a basic disposition rather than merely a strategy for attaining other goals.25 People often seek tangibles not so much because of the welfare or security they bring but because of the social status they confer. Under certain conditions, the search for status will cause people to behave in ways that directly contradict their material interest in security and/or prosperity.

## History is on our side – every single hegemonic war can be explained noninstrumental rationality – great powers don’t act based on strict cost benefit security calculations

William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

In each paradigmatic case of hegemonic war, the claims of the rising power are hard to reduce to instrumental adjustment of the status quo. In R. Ned Lebow’s reading, for example, Thucydides’ account tells us that the rise of Athens posed unacceptable threats not to the security or welfare of Sparta but rather to its identity as leader of the Greek world, which was an important cause of the Spartan assembly’s vote for war.11 The issues that inspired Louis XIV’s and Napoleon’s dissatisfaction with the status quo were many and varied, but most accounts accord [End Page 31] independent importance to the drive for a position of unparalleled primacy. In these and other hegemonic struggles among leading states in post-Westphalian Europe, the rising challenger’s dissatisfaction is often difficult to connect to the material costs and benefits of the status quo, and much contemporary evidence revolves around issues of recognition and status.12

## Competition for social status is the main driver for human behavior -

William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

Both theory and evidence demonstrate convincingly that competition for status is a driver of human behavior, and social identity theory and related literatures suggest the conditions under which it might come to the fore in great power relations. Both the systemic and dyadic findings presented in large-N studies are broadly consistent with the theory, but they are also consistent with power transition and other rationalist theories of hegemonic war. [End Page 42]

# A2 Heg/Security K

## History concludes aff – theories based in security have zero historical evidence, conflict arises because conflicts over social status – your K is academically bankrupt

William Wohlforth (professor of government at Dartmouth College) 2009 “ Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War”Project Muse

Archives regarding this war have long been open and the historiography is vast.50 What the documents say could not be clearer: the [End Page 45] war was about status.51 The issue at stake became whether Russia could obtain rights in the Ottoman Empire that the other powers lacked. The diplomats understood well that framing the issue as one of status made war likely, and they did everything they could in the slow run-up to military hostilities to engineer solutions that separated the issues on the ground from matters of rank. But no proposed solution (eleven were attempted) promised a resolution of the Russians’ status dissonance. The draft compromises accepted by Russia yielded on all points—except they included language that, however vaguely, codified Russia’s rights vis-à-vis its coreligionists that the tsar and his ministers had demanded at the outset. For Russia, these clauses symbolized the restoration of the status quo ante. For Turkey, France, and Britain, they implied a dramatic increase in Russia’s status unwarranted by any increase in its capabilities. Nicholas escalated the situation to what he called “a crisis of coercion” in order to eliminate a perceived threat to his empire’s identity as second to none, including Britain.52 Confident of Russia’s material power, dismissive of the salience of British sea power, and ignorant of the military implications of the industrial revolution, he expected London to acquiesce.53 But Britain’s cabinet saw the tsar’s demand as an unwarranted presumption considering their assessment of Russia’s real capabilities. Accepting that demand meant accepting a degradation in Britain’s own position. The more the Russians sensed a refusal to acknowledge their status, the more strident they became; and the more they insisted on tangible signs of recognition, the more the British supported France and the Turks, the less willing the latter were to compromise, and the greater the status dissonance in St. Petersburg. What the documents do not say is equally important. There is scant evidence of the main causal mechanisms of major contemporary theories of war. Theories based on security scarcity find little support. Russia escalated the crisis in full confidence that the Western powers had no credible military option in the theater.54 Before the combat operations began, neither the British nor the French appeared concerned about the threat Russia posed to their security. Indeed, even after the war began, Palmerston insisted that Britain had little to fear militarily [End Page 46] from Russia.55 There is scant evidence that British worries over access to India figured in prewar decision making, while concerns about Russian naval deployments in the Black Sea postdated the war and, in any case, had nothing to do with the security of the empire’s sea lines. Nor is there evidence that Russia’s dissatisfaction had anything to do with the material costs and benefits of the status quo. On the contrary, Russian decision makers saw their revisionism as a defense of their identity as a bulwark of the existing order. And there is no evidence concerning key implications of the bargaining model of war: that the parties saw themselves as disputing the allocation of a flow of goods that would be diminished by the costs of war; that negotiated bargains were frustrated by the inability to get commitments not to renege on agreements in the future; and that a resolution of the commitment problem is what allowed an agreement to end the war. Again and again, what frustrated intermediate bargaining involving issue linkage was the connection to status.56

# A2 Enemy Creation

## Your K creates ideological blinders on real violence – this makes conflict and violence inevitable – our scenarios are not constructed

Charles Krauthammer (Pulitzer prize winning columnist for the Washington Post) July 2, 2010 “ The Cowardice Of Not Calling Them Enemies”http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article/539272/201007021859/The-Cowardice-Of-Not-Calling-Them-Enemies.aspx

Instead, President Obama’s National Security Strategy insists on calling the enemy — how else do you define those seeking your destruction? — “a loose network of violent extremists.” But this is utterly meaningless. This is not an anger-management therapy group gone rogue. These are people professing a powerful ideology rooted in a radical interpretation of Islam, in whose name they propagandize, proselytize, terrorize and kill. Why is this important? Because the first rule of war is to know your enemy. If you don’t, you wander into intellectual cul-de-sacs and ignore the real causes that might allow you to prevent recurrences.

# A2 Method First

## Your security K is just a bunch of non-falsifiable conspiracy theories – they cherry-pick examples – this turns their methodology arguments

Marijke Breuning (professor of political science at the University of North Texas) December 2009 “Thinking Critically About Security Studies” International Studies Review Volume 11, Issue 4, Pages 792-794

In their zeal to critique conspicuous consumption and the American love affair with the SUV, Simon Dalby and Matthew Paterson resort to the familiar argument that the Dutch consume less oil because they choose "to walk, ride bicycles, or take the train" (p. 184). They forget to mention that this is an easy choice in a very densely populated country with public transportation plentiful in most locations, whereas gas is pricey and parking expensive (and difficult to find)—just as public transportation is preferred by many in New York City but generally not an option for residents of the many small towns of the American Midwest. These examples are typical of the interpretations offered in the volume's chapters. Greater reflection on initial judgments might have enabled the authors to arrive at deeper insights. Finally, there is the issue of assumptions. The contributors share a conviction that their perceptions are on target. There is no serious consideration of alternative explanations. Moreover, the explanations tend to attribute a unity of purpose to decisions made by disparate entities (e.g., government, business, and media) and occasionally resemble conspiracy theories. For instance, Marie Thorsten implies that TV shows such as 24 are designed to facilitate citizens' acceptance of the Bush administration's position that torture was both effective and acceptable. She does not consider the possibility that such shows may also turn people against such tactics or that they simply may have little impact because viewers understand them to be fictional entertainment. She also does not consider that the appearance of this show may have been a lucky happenstance for its creator, not something done by design and collusion. Ultimately, critical security studies as presented in this volume is remarkably uncritical. Careful investigation and considered judgment is replaced with the affirmation of foregone conclusions. More is required to successfully address contemporary security challenges.

# A2 Method First

## What we study is more important than how we study it - Overfocus on the method of the 1ac causes research biases that create even worse academic blinders

Samuel Barkin (Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida) December 2007 “ Should We Discard the "Qualitative" versus "Quantitative" Distinction?” International Studies Review Volume 9, Issue 4, Pages 753-770

I am not suggesting that getting method right, and doing it well, is not a key part of studying political science. But too great a focus on method can distract from other key parts of the research process. A response to the prevalence of quantitative methods that focuses on qualitative methods as a category risks fetishizing method at the expense of broader issues. Studying method in the absence of a broader epistemological context can lead to a commitment to technique without a clear grasp of its uses and limits. Particularly in a discipline in which (in the United States) quantitative methods courses are often required of graduate students but qualitative methods courses are not (Schwartz-Shea 2005:389), to discuss critical approaches primarily in the context of a course on qualitative methods is to allow students who focus on quantitative methods to avoid learning about it altogether. Too great a focus on method biases our work, and that of our students, toward empirical analysis and away from theory. It distracts us from the study of politics. One often sees statistically elegant studies of politically banal questions. And students of political science sometimes put so much effort into learning techniques of quantitative analysis that they neglect to learn about politics. Accepting the quantitative focus on method and mapping it onto nonquantitative approaches risks importing a norm that how you study politics is more important than what you study.

# Prefer Our Impacts

## Prefer our impacts – your long term inevitability claims are nonfalsifiable – our short term scenarios are more valid

Christopher J. Fettweis (assistant professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College) May 2004 “ Evaluating IR's Crystal Balls: How Predictions of the Future Have Withstood Fourteen Years of Unipolarity” International Studies Review Volume 6, Issue 1, Pages 79-104

Finally, and perhaps least important, the charge that fourteen years is too soon to embark on this venture is both overly literal and restrictive; after all, it is possible to project a few years beyond the immediate time horizon with a good degree of accuracy. Reasonable projections of economic potential and military spending are available for the next few years for the great powers. One of the more robust, if unsurprising, findings of quantitative international relations scholarship is that the best predictor of events in year X is the situation in year (X−1). Few would argue that drastic changes in the international system are terribly likely in the immediate future, say, over the next couple of years. Thus, the fourteen year time horizon used in this essay is, in reality, a bit longer. The obvious reaction by any skeptic to this venture—some form of "just you wait"—is too open-ended to be useful and renders the predictions unfalsifiable. Scholars who defend their probabilistic and even inevitable predictions about the evolution of the international system by asking for more time can never be proven wrong. Despite objections to the contrary, nothing in the logic of these projections suggests a reason to expect a delay in the beginning of their development. By now, fourteen years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the trends that these visions predicted ought to have at least begun to make themselves apparent in measurable ways. A little later this essay will seek to begin that measurement.

# Alt Doesn’t Solve

## Alt doesn’t solve – states will never alter or question their flawed methods – we must work within their logic to solve

Stephen Denney (Senior Editor for philosophy and politics at the Political Cartel Foundation) January 2010 “Great Power Politics: Not Dead, Just Napping” http://politicalcartel.org/2010/01/19/great-power-politics-not-dead-just-napping/

Since the fundamental structure of the system remains unchanged, it’s absurd to think that the behavior of the various actors within it would suddenly alter their centuries-long methods and practices. States still fear one other and seek to gain power at the others’ expense. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent reconfiguration of eastern Europe at the end of the the Cold War certainly caused a major shift in the global distribution of power, but that’s about it. The structure of the international system remains the same: states seek to maximize their relative levels of power at the expense of others, with hegemony as the end goal.

# Heg Bad Frontline

## Heg collapse doesn’t cause global nuclear war – conflicts would be small and managable

Richard Haas (president of the Council on Foreign Relations, former director of policy planning for the Department of State, former vice president and director of foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, the Sol M. Linowitz visiting professor of international studies at Hamilton College, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, and a research associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) April 2008 “Ask the Expert: What Comes After Unipolarity?” http://www.cfr.org/publication/16063/ask\_the\_expert.html

Does a non polar world increase or reduce the chances of another world war? Will nuclear deterrence continue to prevent a large scale conflict? Sivananda Rajaram, UK Richard Haass: I believe the chance of a world war, i.e., one involving the major powers of the day, is remote and likely to stay that way. This reflects more than anything else the absence of disputes or goals that could lead to such a conflict. Nuclear deterrence might be a contributing factor in the sense that no conceivable dispute among the major powers would justify any use of nuclear weapons, but again, I believe the fundamental reason great power relations are relatively good is that all hold a stake in sustaining an international order that supports trade and financial flows and avoids large-scale conflict. The danger in a nonpolar world is not global conflict as we feared during the Cold War but smaller but still highly costly conflicts involving terrorist groups, militias, rogue states, etc.

## Mulitpolarity is inevitable – trying to retain hegemony ensures a war-filled transition

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 190

Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing, and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. As other states—notably China—rapidly close the gap, U.S. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U.S. efforts to prolong it. At the same time, understandable doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America's Eurasian allies, which, in turn, is leading to a reversion to multipolarity. In this changing geopolitical context, the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia, America's military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States, because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars.

## Your evidence overestimates the US’s ability to shape the international system – doesn’t contain conflict and wont shape the new multipolar system

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 176-7

A second contention advanced by proponents of American hegemony is that the United States cannot withdraw from Eurasia because a great power war there could shape the post conflict international system in ways harmful to U.S. interests. Hence, the United States "could suffer few economic losses during a war, or even benefit somewhat, and still find the postwar environment quite costly to its own trade and investment."sa This really is not an economic argument but rather an argument about the consequences of Eurasia's political and ideological, as well as economic, closure. Proponents of hegemony fear that if great power wars in Eurasia occur, they could bring to power militaristic or totalitarian regimes. Mere, several points need to be made. First, proponents of American hegemony overestimate the amount of influence that the United States has on the international system. There are numerous possible geopolitical rivalries in Eurasia. Most of these will not culminate in war, but it's a good bet that some will. But regardless of whether Eurasian great powers remain at peace, the outcomes are going to be caused more by those states' calculations of their interests than by the presence of U.S. forces in Eurasia. The United States has only limited power to affect the amount of war and peace in the international system, and whatever influence it does have is being eroded by the creeping multipolarization under way in Eurasia. Second, the possible benefits of "environment shaping" have to be weighed against the possible costs of U.S. involvement in a big Eurasian war. Finally, distilled to its essence, this argument is a restatement of the fear that U.S. security and interests inevitably will be jeopardized by a Eurasian hegemon. This threat is easily exaggerated, and manipulated, to disguise ulterior motives for U.S. military intervention in Eurasia.

# Heg Bad Frontline

## Transition is smooth – decline in power causes global cooperation

Carla Norrlof (an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto) 2010 “America’s Global Advantage US Hegemony and International Cooperation” p. 50

Keohane and Snidal’s predictions – that the waning of American power did not have to jeopardize cooperation – were in this context reassuring. As mentioned at the outset of this chapter, Keohane explained the persistence of cooperation in terms of states’ continued demand for regimes.40 Snidal demonstrated that collective action depends as much on the hegemon’s size, as it does on the size of other actors in the international system. By paying attention to the size of all Great Powers, not just the hegemon, Snidal opened up the possibility that a more symmetrical distribution of power might enhance the prospects for the provision of public goods, thus offering a potential explanation for the otherwise puzzling persistence of cooperation in the 1980s despite America’s relative decline. The likelihood for cooperation increases with American decline because the hegemon can no longer singlehandedly provide the good as it declines, so smaller states have to chip in for the good to be provided. If one were to use Snidal’s production function in the revised model (i.e., by plugging the numbers from his production function into the revised model), the waning hegemon continues to be taken advantage of. While Snidal was modeling a theory he did not believe in, these distributional implications haunt the literature and cast decline as inescapable and continuous

## The impact is extinction – Multiple balancing powers and internal issues make heg collapse inevitable – only abandoning unipolarity solves

John Feffer (co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy Studies)February 2009 “A Multipolar Moment” http://www.fpif.org/articles/a\_multipolar\_moment

But times have changed, argues FPIF contributor Hannes Artens. "These aren't the golden 1990s, when U.S. power was at its zenith. In this first decade of the 21st century, the capitalist West is facing defeat in Afghanistan and is on the verge of 'the worst recession in a hundred years,' as British minister Ed Balls put it in perhaps only slight exaggeration," he writes in Multilateralism in Munich. "This combination will force the Obama administration to stop cherry-picking issues on which it wants to cooperate and forging ahead on those issues it believes it can still handle alone. Necessity will dictate a more pragmatic multilateralism, in which all sides humbly accept what is realistically possible." Are we thus witnessing the final end of the unipolar moment? China is coming up fast. The European Union's expansion has been accompanied by relatively few growing pains. Several powerful countries in the South (particularly India, Brazil, and South Africa) are quietly acquiring more geopolitical heft. Global problems like climate change and financial collapse require global solutions, so we either evolve multilateral responses or we do a dinosaur dive into extinction. Over here, meanwhile, the Pentagon is still maintaining the world's largest military force — but we have failed to defeat al-Qaeda, we are quagmired in Afghanistan, and all of our nuclear weapons have done little to prevent North Korea from entering the nuclear club. The global recession is hammering the U.S. economy, and we might finally see the end of the dollar's reign as global currency. With the bank bailout, the stimulus package, the bill for two wars plus the Pentagon's already gargantuan budget, the red ink is mounting. Debt has been the gravedigger of many an empire. I can hear the adding machine totting up the numbers. Or is that the sound of dirt hitting a coffin lid?

## US will over rely on its application of military power – ensures backlash and conflict

Carl Conetta (co-directs the Project on Defense Alternatives, a defense-policy think tank. Earlier, he was a research fellow at the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies)December 2008 “ Forceful Engagement: Rethinking the Role of Military Power in US Global Policy” <http://www.comw.org/pda/081201FE-ExecSum.htm>

Despite initial successes in Afghanistan and Iraq, an over-reliance on military instruments has weakened America’s armed forces, unsettled its alliances, spurred anti-Americanism, and prompted balancing behavior on the part of China and Russia. Global terrorist activity has increased, not decreased. And there is no real end in sight for US commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, instability is spreading to other countries and so are US military operations. The cost-benefit balance sheet indicates that the United States is using its armed forces and military power beyond the limit of their utility. Thus, the nation finds itself paying more and more for less and less security.

# Heg Causes Nuclear War – Alliances

## Heg based alliances ensure US draw-in into multiple nuclear conflicts

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 169

Rather than being instruments of regional pacification, today America's alliances are transmission belts for war that ensure that the U.S. would be embroiled in Eurasian wars. In deciding whether to go war in Eurasia, the United States should not allow its hands to be tied in advance. For example a non—great power war on the Korean Peninsula—even if nuclear weapon were not involved—would be very costly. The dangers of being entangled in a great power war in Eurasia, of course, are even greater, and could expose the American homeland to nuclear attack. An offshore balancing grand strategy would extricate the United States from the danger of being entrapped in Eurasian conflicts by its alliance commitments.

# A2 Heg Causes War

**Heg doesn’t solve war – US lacks influence it used to have to influence conflicts**

**Mastanduno 9** (Michael, Professor of Government at Dartmouth, World Politics 61, No. 1, Ebsco, DB)

During the cold war the United States dictated the terms of adjustment. It derived the necessary leverage because it provided for the security of its economic partners and because there were no viable alter natives to an economic order centered on the United States. After the cold war the outcome of adjustment struggles is less certain because the United States is no longer in a position to dictate the terms. The United States, notwithstanding its preponderant power, no longer enjoys the same type of security leverage it once possessed, and the very success of the U.S.-centered world economy has afforded America’s supporters a greater range of international and domestic economic options. The claim that the United States is unipolar is a statement about its cumulative economic, military, and other capabilities.1 But preponderant capabilities across the board do not guarantee effective influence in any given arena. U.S. dominance in the international security arena no longer translates into effective leverage in the international economic arena. And although the United States remains a dominant international economic player in absolute terms, after the cold war it has found itself more vulnerable and constrained than it was during the golden economic era after World War II. It faces rising economic challengers with their own agendas and with greater discretion in international economic policy than America’s cold war allies had enjoyed. The United States may continue to act its own way, but it can no longer count on getting its own way.

# Pre-emption Mod

## Heg means pre-emptive strikes that risk extinction

**BBC, 06** (“North Korean paper decries US pursuit of ‘preemptive nuclear strike’,” April 11, originally published by Minju Choson on February 15, Lexis)

In the "Review Report," the US Department of Defence decided to target "terrorist groups and rouge countries" as its basic goal of defence strategies and military operations. It is a well-known fact to the world that those called "rogue countries" by the United States is actually the anti-imperialist independent countries, which stand in the way of the US realization of world domination. The United States has unreasonably stigmatized the anti-imperialist independent countries as "rogue countries" and manifested its attempt for preemptive strike. From this perspective, it is very clear what the purposes of the military operation against "rouge countries" are, which have been raved by the United States. In one word, the cunning purpose is that the United States desires to achieve international hegemony by putting in place its attempt for preemptive strike against the anti-imperialist independent countries. Without minding global peace and stability at all, the United States is crazy about a nuclear war with blood-shot eyes, and this is bringing a new nuclear threat to the earth minute by minute. If this is left untreated, the peace and stability of the world as well as the existence of humanity itself will be put at risk.

# Terrorism Mod

## US heg breeds resentment and terrorism

**Walt 5** (Stephen, Professor of at Harvard, 9/5/5, “Taming American Power”, anglais.u-paris10.fr/IMG/doc/Taming\_American\_Power\_Stephen\_M\_.doc, DB)

Proponents of a muscular U.S. foreign policy tend to portray anti Americanism as hostility toward American values or simple resentment of U.S. dominance. President Bush has said that "America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon of freedom ... in the world." He later explained, "The terrorists who attacked our country on September 11, 2001, were not protesting our policies. They were protesting our existence." And the Pentagon's new National Defense Strategy, issued in March, stated, "Our leading position in the world will continue to breed unease, a degree of resentment, and resistance."

## The impact is extinction

**Sid-Ahmed, 04** – Al-Ahram political analyst (Mohamed, “Extinction!,” Al Ahram Weekly, No. 705, August/September 1, http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm)

What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race and develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive.

But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

# Heg = Terrorism

## US Heg causes terrorism – US presence in the Middle East and 9/11 proves

**Layne 9** (Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, literary and national editor of the Atlantic, Review of International Studies (2009), 5/25/9, “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”, Cambridge Journals, DB)

Terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda are non-state actors, and as such, they are not, strictly speaking, engaged in ‘balancing’ the US (because balancing is a form of state behaviour). Yet, at the same time, the actions of groups like Al-Qaeda reflect some of the key attributes of balancing. After all, beyond connoting the idea of counterweight, balancing also signifies opposition, or resistance, to a hegemon. Terrorists may not be able to balance against the US, but they can engage in a related form of activity aimed at undermining American primacy by raising its costs. Organisations like Al-Qaeda may be non-state actors, but their actions are of a kind frequently found in international politics: the use of violence against a state(s) to attain clearly defined political objectives. Indeed the use of violence for such purposes is the hallmark of terrorism. As Bruce Hoffman says, terrorism is ‘about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change’.38 Terrorism, moreover, is fundamentally an asymmetric form of conflict, because it is an instrument that the weak use against the strong.39 From this perspective, the 9/11 assault on the US was not a random, senseless, ‘irrational’ act of violence. In fact, the 9/11 attack was in keeping with the Clausewitzian paradigm of war: force was used against the US by its adversaries to advance their political objectives. As German military strategist Carl von Clausewitz himself observed, ‘War is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object’.40 Here, President Bush’s endlessly reiterated claim that the US was attacked because Islamic radicals ‘hate us because of our freedom’ betrayed a complete misunderstanding of the dynamics that underpin the clash between the US and Middle Eastern terrorists. For sure, there are Islamic radicals who, indeed, do hate the US for cultural, religious, and ideological reasons. But that is not why the US is a target for Islamic terrorists. 9/11 represented a violent counterreaction to America’s policies in the Middle East – especially its drive to dominate the region both geopolitically and culturally. As Michael Schuerer – who headed the CIA analytical team monitoring Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaeda – says, it is dangerous for the US to base its strategy for combating terrorism on the belief ‘that Muslims hate and attack us for what we are and think rather than for what we do’.41 In a similar vein, Richard K. Betts observed following the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center that, ‘It is hardly likely that Middle Eastern radicals would be hatching schemes like the destruction of the World Trade Center if the US had not been identified so long as the mainstay of Israel, the Shah of Iran, and conservative Arab regimes and the source of a cultural assault on Islam’.42 It is the US’ attempt to impose its primacy and preferences on the Middle East that fuels groups like Al-Qaeda and fans Islamic fundamental- ism. Terrorism is a form of ‘blowback’ against America’s preponderant role in international affairs. Despicable and brutal though it was, the 9/11 attack was undertaken with cool calculation to achieve well-defined geopolitical objectives. Underscoring this point, Scheurer observes that, ‘In the context of ideas bin Laden shares with his brethren, the military actions of Al-Qaeda and its allies are acts of war, not terrorism . . . meant to advance bin Laden’s clear, focused, limited, and widely popular foreign policy goals . . .’.43 Specifically, Al-Qaeda wants to compel the US to remove its military presence from the Persian Gulf, and force Washington to alter its stance on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.44 Al-Qaeda’s leaders also apparently hoped that the September 11 attacks would provoke a US overreaction, and thereby trigger an upsurge of popular discontent in the Islamic world that would lead to the overthrow of the Saudi monarchy and other pro-American regimes in the Middle East (Egypt, Pakistan, and Jordan, for example) and their replacement by fundamentalist Islamic governments.45 In other words, Al-Qaeda seeks to undermine US primacy, and thereby compel changes in America’s Middle Eastern grand strategy. The US presence on the ground in the Middle East also incites terrorists to attack American interests. In his study of suicide terrorist groups, Pape has found that ‘what nearly all suicide terrorist attacks have in common is a specific secular and strategic goal: to compel modern democracies to withdraw military forces from territory that the terrorists consider to be their homeland’.46 Al-Qaeda fits this pattern, and one of its principal objectives ‘is the expulsion of American troops from the Persian Gulf and the reduction of Washington’s power in the region’.47 Here, the Bush adminis- tration’s inflexible determination to maintain a long-term American military presence in Iraq is exactly the wrong policy to reduce terrorism. The Bush administration, of course, claimed that the US is fighting terrorism in Iraq. To make this point, it has grossly exaggerated the links between the insurgent group Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Osama Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda organisation and, hence – in a blatant prevarication – tied AQI and the war in Iraq to 9/11.48 Bush repeatedly asserted that, in Iraq the US is fighting the same terrorists who attacked the US on 9/11. Of course, this claim overlooked the fact that AQI came into existence only after the March 2003 US invasion of Iraq, and that its links with Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda are, at best, tenuous. The Bush administration’s deliberate fabrications were designed to win Congressional and public support for a prolonged ‘surge’.49 When it first announced the surge, the administration said it would last through 2007. Instead it lasted well into 2008, and it is likely that there will be more US forces in Iraq in January 2009 than there were prior to the surge. And, even when the surge itself has ended, any draw-down of US forces will take place gradually.50 General David Petraeus, who served as senior American commander in Iraq during the surge and now heads CENTCOM (the US military command with overall responsibility for the Middle East) has repeatedly emphasised that the US commit- ment to Iraq is long-term in nature, and American military planners are preparing for a long-lasting ‘post-occupation’ US presence there.51 In fact, it is clear that the Bush administration never intended to withdraw from Iraq militarily and aimed for the US to retain permanent US military bases there. President Bush all but confirmed this in May 2007 when he said that he wanted the US to play the same kind of role in Iraq that it has in South Korea since the end of the Korean War.52 What will happen under the new US administration is unclear. During 2008, the government of Iraqi Nouri al-Maliki indicated that Baghdad wanted to set a timeline for US troop withdrawals. The Iraqi government refused to accede to the Bush administration’s desire to negotiate a long-term security agreement that would allow the US to maintain permanent bases in Iraq. Although the Bush administration had strongly opposed any suggestions that there should be a fixed timetable for US withdrawal from Iraq in July 2008, Bush’s position seemed to soften and the administration said the US would support a ‘time horizon’ for US troop withdrawals from Iraq as an ‘aspirational goal’.53 What the new US admin- istration will do about the US presence in Iraq is an open question, but based on the positions taken by Senator Barak Obama (D. Ill.) and Senator John McCain (R. Ariz.) during the 2008 US presidential campaign, it seems certain that there will be a significant American military presence in Iraq for some time to come. Instead of reducing American vulnerability to terrorism, the presence of US troops in Iraq and the Middle East increases it by reinforcing the widespread perception in the Islamic world that the US is pursuing a neo-colonial policy in the Middle East in furtherance of its own imperial ambitions. The huge US politico-military footprint in the Middle East region – including Iraq – is, along with America’s policy on the Israel/Palestinian issue, the primary driver of Middle Eastern terrorism. The admin- istration’s overall policy in the Middle East has inflamed anti-American sentiment, and turned the entire region into a source of recruits for various radical terrorist groups. Instead of solving this problem, staying in Iraq will exacerbate it.

# Heg = Terrorism

## Terrorists attack due to US Heg

**Layne 9** (Layne, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, literary and national editor of the Atlantic, Review of International Studies (2009), 5/25/9, “America’s Middle East grand strategy after Iraq: the moment for offshore balancing has arrived”, Cambridge Journals, DB)

In addition to soft balancing, asymmetric strategies are another type of non- traditional balancing that is being employed to contest US primacy. When employed by states, asymmetric strategies mean the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. Regional powers – especially those on the US hit list like Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq – cannot slug it out toe-to-toe against the US’ dominant high-tech conventional forces. Because they are threatened by the US, however, these states seek other methods of offsetting American power, and dissuading Washington from using its military muscle against them. WMD – especially the possession of nuclear weapons – is one way these states can level the strategic playing field and deter the US from attacking them. Terrorism is another asymmetric strategy – one employed by non-state actors like Al-Qaeda and similar jihadist groups – to resist US dominance. The use of asymmetric strategies to oppose American power – especially in the Middle East where US policy has an imperial dimension – illustrates the dictum that empires inevitably provoke resistance.

## Heg causes terror – empirics and polls

**Eland 8** (Ivan. Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Ph.D. in Public Policy from George Washington University and Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. “Reverend Wright Is Not Totally Wrong”, May 5. http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=2182, DB)

But what about Wright’s implication that U.S. foreign policy causes blowback terrorism against the United States? Again, the facts are on his side. Poll after poll in the Arab/Islamic world indicates that U.S. political and economic freedoms, technology, and even culture are popular in these countries, but U.S. interventionist foreign policy toward the Middle East is not. Bin Laden has repeatedly said that he attacks the United States because of its occupation of Muslim lands and its support for corrupt Middle Eastern governments. Finally, empirical studies have linked U.S. foreign occupation and military interventions with blowback terrorism against the U.S. targets. The upshot of Rev. Wright’s remarks is that if the United States militarily intervened less overseas, the chickens would not be roosting as much in the U.S. henhouse. It is too bad that Rev. Wright’s largely correct analysis of U.S. foreign policy is being thrown out with his other wacky and bigoted ravings.

## US heg breeds resentment and terrorism

**Walt 5** (Stephen, Professor of at Harvard, 9/5/5, “Taming American Power”, anglais.u-paris10.fr/IMG/doc/Taming\_American\_Power\_Stephen\_M\_.doc, DB)

Proponents of a muscular U.S. foreign policy tend to portray anti Americanism as hostility toward American values or simple resentment of U.S. dominance. President Bush has said that "America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon of freedom ... in the world." He later explained, "The terrorists who attacked our country on September 11, 2001, were not protesting our policies. They were protesting our existence." And the Pentagon's new National Defense Strategy, issued in March, stated, "Our leading position in the world will continue to breed unease, a degree of resentment, and resistance."

# A2 Heg solves terror

## Heg can’t solve terrorism

**Nafaa 8** (Hassan, Secretary General of Arab Thought Forum, Amman, Jordan, 9/24/08, Al-Ahram Weekly Online, “Collapse of Empire,” <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2008/915/op1.htm>, DB)

Any incoming US president must bear in mind several lessons from the lean years of the Bush presidency. The first is that it is dangerous to link terrorism, which poses a real threat not just to one society or country, with imperial ambitions. The American insistence on pursuing its project of global hegemony behind the guise of the war on terror was ultimately detrimental to both causes. The hegemonic project is on the verge of collapse after the US has been sapped of enormous resources while terrorism has become more widespread. In the future, if the US intends to deal seriously with a drive to end terrorism, it must detach that drive from its imperial ambitions.

# China Mod

## Heg causes US-China war

**Layne 7** (Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, literary and national editor of the Atlantic, Review of International Studies (2009), "The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, p. 73-74, DB)

To be sure, the United States should not ignore the potential strategic ramifications of China’s arrival on the world stage as a great power. After all, the lesson of history is that the emergence of new great powers in the international system leads to conflict, not peace. On this score, the notion—propagated by Beijing—that China’s will be a “peaceful rise” is just as fanciful as claims by American policy-makers that China has no need to build up its military capabilities because it is unthreatened by any other state. Still, this does not mean that the United States and China inevitably are on a collision course that will culminate in the next decade or two in a war. Whether Washington and Beijing actually come to blows, however, depends largely on what strategy the United States chooses to adopt toward China, because the United States has the “last clear chance” to adopt a grand strategy that will serve its interests in balancing Chinese power without running the risk of an armed clash with [end page 73] Beijing. If the United States continues to aim at upholding its current primacy, however, Sino-American conflict is virtually certain.

## Extinction

Straits Times 6-25-2000

THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation.

# Taiwan Mod

## Security commitments in Asia will drag the U.S. into nuclear confrontations over Taiwan.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 167-8

Since the cold war, the strategic context affecting extended deterrence has shifted against the United States in other ways. For one thing, during the cold war the respective U.S. and Soviet spheres were demarcated clearly, which reduced the chances for a superpower clash. Moreover, both super-powers exercised considerable control over their major allies and thus were at minimal risk of being chain-ganged into a conflict—that is, getting dragged into a war in which their own interests were not directly implicated because of the actions of an ally or client.27ln contrast, today, instead of the cold war's clearly delineated spheres of influence, East Asia's likely flash-points are contested gray areas, which increases the chances for conflict. In addition, because states increasingly have greater latitude to pursue theirown foreign and security policy agendas than was the case during the coldwar, there is a real risk of the United States being dragged into a war because of a protected state's irresponsible behavior. A good illustration is the current Taipei regime's flirtation with declaring the island's independence fromChina—a move that Beijing says would compel a forcible Chinese re-sponse—which poses a real danger that the United States could be ensnared in a major war by the risk taking behavior of its Taiwanese client state.28 As China's military power—conventional and nuclear—increases, the po-tential risks to the United States of coming to Taiwan's (or Japan's) defensealso are increasing. The spring 1996 crisis between China and Taiwan is illusive. During the crisis—which China provoked by conducting intimidatingmilitary exercises in an attempt to influence Taiwan's presidential elections—a Chinese official said that unlike the Formosa Strait crises during the1950s, China now was a nuclear power, and the U.S. nuclear deterrent there-fore could not prevent Beijing from using force against Taiwan, because U.S.decision makers "care more about Los Angeles than they do about 'Taiwan."29This comment illustrates an important point:: Taiwan matters more to China than it does to Washington (and one hopes Los Angeles matters more to U.S.officials than does Taipei). In a showdown over Taiwan, the United Stateswould be engaged in extended deterrence to prevent China from attacking. Beijing, however, would be engaged in direct deterrence to prevent U.S. intervention in what it regards as an internal Chinese matter. Beijing's 1996 threat was, of course, hollow, but now that China is on the verge of possessing a survivable nuclear retaliatory capability, it is becoming quite real.

## China-Taiwan war escalates globally and goes nuclear

**Hunkovic, 09** – American Military University (Lee, “The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict,” <http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf>)

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclear conflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors could be affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and Great Britain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility exists that they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United States engage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not be economically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whose actions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.

# Space Mod

## U.S. hegemony will force space weaponization which causes space racing resulting in extinction.

Noam Chomsky 4/24/2004 “an interview with Noam Chomsky,” http://www.dissidentvoice.org/April2004/Mars0424.htm

Well the most visible and publicized implementation was the invasion of Iraq, but there was another one which was important and hasn’t been much discussed. The Bush administration immediately moved to expand offensive military capacity. They immediately moved to undermine international treaties. It terminated negotiations on an enforceable bio weapons treaty, undermined ratification of old bio-weapons treaties. The air force space command immediately announced plans to move from it called control of space to ownership of space, which is exactly consistent with the security strategy, that no one can challenge our total domination. What does ownership of space mean? Well that’s presented in leaked plans, you can find them. It means putting space platforms in orbit from which you can launch offensive weapons, highly destructive weapons, without warning and instantaneously with first strike authority. It was also just reported that the Pentagon is developing hypersonic planes which will orbit in space, enter the atmosphere at the last minute so they can’t be detected and instantaneously drop highly destructive precision weaponry. The world is under very tight surveillance so you can detect if somebody is walking across the street in Ankara. Now others react to that threat, so Russian defense spending has predictably sharply increased since Bush came in, by American calculation it might have tripled. Just a couple of weeks ago the Russian had their first major military maneuvers in the last two decades. They very pointedly said this is in response to US escalation. The US is developing low yield nuclear weapons which is in violation of international treaties and the Russians understand, as do strategic analysts, that their purpose is to attack the command bunkers that control their retaliatory nuclear systems, so they’re going to react to it. The Bush administration just announced that it is going to employ a missile defense system. Everybody knows that a missile defense system is an offensive weapon, it’s a first strike weapon. There’s universal agreement on this by both sides. We know how the US reacted to this when the Russians made a slight move in that direction by placing, in 1968, a small ABM system around Moscow. The US reacted at once by targeting it with offensive nuclear weapons, targeting the rear outposts with nuclear weapons so they would overwhelm any possible defense. Do you think the Russians will react differently? No they’re saying straight out that they’ve adopted Bush’s first strike doctrine; that they’re deploying their offensive missiles, which they claim are much more sophisticated and are on computer controlled automated launch. American strategic analysts call that an accident waiting to happen. These things are going to misfire. The American systems which are much more sophisticated have a three minute period during which human intervention can prevent automated response, the Russian systems are worse. Computer errors are daily occurrences in the US computer system. Think what they’re going to be like in the Russian systems. You are asking for a disaster. The Chinese are surely going to respond to a so called missile defense system since it eliminates their strategic nuclear capacity, so instead of having twenty missiles targeting the United States they’ll build it up and probably have a submarine launched capacity. That sets off a new cycle. China increases its missile capacity, India responds. India increases it and Pakistan responds. You get a ripple effect. This is extraordinarily dangerous. Do we want Pakistan to increase its offensive nuclear capacity? Have a look at how their missiles are controlled. These moves are deliberately, consciously, raising the threat to survival. And its not that Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld and so on want the world destroyed, it just doesn’t matter much to them, those risks aren’t important as compared to what its important, dominating the world by force and dismantling the hated welfare state measures at home, that’s important. In comparison if you threaten to blow up the world, if you increase the threat of terror, well that’s OK, that's the way the cookie crumbles.

# Korea Mod

## American hegemony in Asia ensures involvement in possibly nuclear war with North Korea.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 164-5

America's East Asian strategy is most immediately challenged by North Korea. Although Pyongyang claims it has nuclear weapons, it is uncertain whether it actually does. If it does not presently have them, however, it certainly is close to having some weapons in hand, and—unless something happens either diplomatically or militarily to interrupt its weapons development program—its arsenal could grow considerably during the next few years. Moreover, Pyongyang currently has ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads against targets in South Korea and Japan, and it could havesome intercontinental missile capability in a decade or so. The North Korean regime's unpredictability, its nuclear ambitions, and the military standoff along the 38th parallel between North Korean forces and U.S. and South Korean troops make the peninsula a volatile place. Conflict is not inevitable, but neither is it unimaginable. If diplomacy fails to bring about a North Korean agreement to dismantle its nuclear weapons, the United States may decide to strike preemptively in an attempt to destroy Pyongyang's nuclear facilities .0 It is impossible to know whether this would spark an all-out war on the peninsula. On the other hand, fearing it might be the target of such strikes or a U.S. campaign to bring about regime change, North Korea might lash out irrationally in ways that confound the predictions of deterrence theory. Given that the American homeland currently is not vulnerable to North Korean retaliation, the U.S.deterrent umbrella should dissuade Pyongyang from using nuclear weaponsto attack civilian or military targets in South Korea or Japan. Whether North Korean actually would be deterred, though, is a huge unknown. Three things are known, however. First, if North Korea has nuclear weapons, U.S. troops in South Korea, and possibly in Japan, are hostages." Second, even a non-nuclear conflict on the peninsula would be costly to the United States (notwithstanding the fact that the United States ultimately would prevail on the battlefield). Third, U.S. troops in South Korea act as a tripwire, which ensures that, if war does occur, the United States automatically will be involved.

## Lash-out and nuclear extinction

Africa News 1999 (10-25, Lexis)

Lusaka - If there is one place today where the much-dreaded Third World War could easily erupt and probably reduce earth to a huge smouldering cinder it is the Korean Peninsula in Far East Asia. Ever since the end of the savage three-year Korean war in the early 1950s, military tension between the hard-line communist north and the American backed South Korea has remained dangerously high. In fact the Koreas are technically still at war. A foreign visitor to either Pyongyong in the North or Seoul in South Korea will quickly notice that the divided country is always on maximum alert for any eventuality. North Korea or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has never forgiven the US for coming to the aid of South Korea during the Korean war. She still regards the US as an occupation force in South Korea and wholly to blame for the non-reunification of the country. North Korean media constantly churns out a tirade of attacks on "imperialist" America and its "running dog" South Korea. The DPRK is one of the most secretive countries in the world where a visitor is given the impression that the people's hatred for the US is absolute while the love for their government is total. Whether this is really so, it is extremely difficult to conclude. In the DPRK, a visitor is never given a chance to speak to ordinary Koreans about the politics of their country. No visitor moves around alone without government escort. The American government argues that its presence in South Korea was because of the constant danger of an invasion from the north. America has vast economic interests in South Korea. She points out that the north has dug numerous tunnels along the demilitarised zone as part of the invasion plans. She also accuses the north of violating South Korean territorial waters. Early this year, a small North Korean submarine was caught in South Korean waters after getting entangled in fishing nets. Both the Americans and South Koreans claim the submarine was on a military spying mission. However, the intension of the alleged intrusion will probably never be known because the craft's crew were all found with fatal gunshot wounds to their heads in what has been described as suicide pact to hide the truth of the mission. The US mistrust of the north's intentions is so deep that it is no secret that today Washington has the largest concentration of soldiers and weaponry of all descriptions in south Korea than anywhere else in the World, apart from America itself. Some of the armada that was deployed in the recent bombing of Iraq and in Operation Desert Storm against the same country following its invasion of Kuwait was from the fleet permanently stationed on the Korean Peninsula. It is true too that at the moment the North/South Korean border is the most fortified in the world. The border line is littered with anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles and is constantly patrolled by warplanes from both sides. It is common knowledge that America also keeps an eye on any military movement or build-up in the north through spy satellites. The DPRK is said to have an estimated one million soldiers and a huge arsenal of various weapons. Although the DPRK regards herself as a developing country, she can however be classified as a super-power in terms of military might. The DPRK is capable of producing medium and long-range missiles. Last year, for example, she test-fired a medium range missile over Japan, an action that greatly shook and alarmed the US, Japan and South Korea. The DPRK says the projectile was a satellite. There have also been fears that she was planning to test another ballistic missile capable of reaching North America. Naturally, the world is anxious that military tension on the Korean Peninsula must be defused to avoid an apocalypse on earth. It is therefore significant that the American government announced a few days ago that it was moving towards normalising relations with North Korea.

# Iraq Instability Mod

## US heg causes Iraqi instability

Selden 4 (Mark, coordinator of Japan Focus, an electronic journal and archive on Japan and the Asia-Pacific, 6/30/04 “Discusson of ‘Notes From Ground Zero’: Power equity and Postwar Construction in Two Eras”, <http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/SeldonDiscussion.html>, DB)

What policies make sense with respect to Iraq following the transfer of certain formal powers to the handpicked Iraq administration? What is most striking in my view is the continuity of the effort to sustain American domination of Iraq through the permanent stationing of 138,000 US troops supplemented by allied troops and US mercenaries, and the farflung base structure designed to support US primacy in the region. This, together with the dismantling of much of the previous Iraq administrative structure, the tieing of the hands of the present administration by a series of neoliberal policies that deny fiscal authority to the government, and the transfer of many of the most lucrative sectors of the Iraq economy to American firms, has created a situation that ties the hands of any Iraq administration. Policies that sharply reduced US domination of Iraq, including the systematic withdrawal of US forces and elimination of US bases, coupled with a stronger international presence, including the United Nations and European nations, both governments and NGOs, might create more hopeful conditions for relief, reconstruction and reform agendas that will be essential for the reconstruction of Iraq and a reduction of international tensions in a region that is super charged. It seems certain that if that multinational presence is predominantly military, the needs of the Iraqi people and society are unlikely to be met. Whatever the changes, we should not of course expect peace and development to reign any time soon. What can be said with confidence is that the US has embarked on a course that has brought disaster to Iraq and the region and disgrace to the United States. The Bush administration's attempt to hide the fact that fundamental elements of its flawed policies remain in place seems certain to add fuel to the fire.

## Finally, greaterIraq instability risks global nuclear war

Jerome Corsi 2007 January 8, pg. http://worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\_ID=53669

If a broader war breaks out in Iraq, Olmert will certainly face pressure to send the Israel military into the Gaza after Hamas and into Lebanon after Hezbollah. If that happens, it will only be a matter of time before Israel and the U.S. have no choice but to invade Syria. The Iraq war could quickly spin into a regional war, with Israel waiting on the sidelines ready to launch an air and missile strike on Iran that could include tactical nuclear weapons. With Russia ready to deliver the $1 billion TOR M-1 surface-to-air missile defense system to Iran, military leaders are unwilling to wait too long to attack Iran. Now that Russia and China have invited Iran to join their Shanghai Cooperation Pact, will Russia and China sit by idly should the U.S. look like we are winning a wider regional war in the Middle East? If we get more deeply involved in Iraq, China may have their moment to go after Taiwan once and for all. A broader regional war could easily lead into a third world war, much as World Wars I and II began.

# Iran Mod

## Heg causes war with Iran

Layne 7 (Christopher, Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute, literary and national editor of the Atlantic, Review of International Studies (2009), "The Case Against the American Empire," American Empire: A Debate, p. 64-65, DB)

Iran Because of the strategy of primacy and empire, the United States and Iran are on course for a showdown. The main source of conflict—or at least the one that has grabbed the lion’s share of the headlines—is Tehran’s evident determination to develop a nuclear weapons program. Washington’s policy, as President George W. Bush has stated on several occasions—in language that recalls his prewar stance on Iraq—is that a nuclear-armed Iran is “intolerable.” Beyond nuclear weapons, however, there are other important issues that are driving the United States and Iran toward an armed confrontation. Chief among these is Iraq. Recently, Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq, has accused Tehran of meddling in Iraqi affairs by providing arms and training to Shiite militias and by currying favor with the Shiite politicians who dominate Iraq’s recently elected government. With Iraq teetering on the brink of a sectarian civil war between Shiites and Sunnis, concerns about Iranian interference have been magnified. In a real sense, however, Iran’s nuclear program and its role in Iraq are merely the tip of the iceberg. The fundamental cause of tensions between the United States and Iran is the nature of America’s ambitions in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. These are reflected in current U.S. grand strategy—which has come to be known as the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine’s three key components are rejection of deterrence in favor of preventive/preemptive military action; determination to effectuate a radical shake-up in the politics of the Persian Gulf and Middle East; and gaining U.S. dominance over that region. In this respect, it is hardly coincidental that the administration’s policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy [end page 76] during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, not only on the nuclear weapons issue but—ominously—with respect to regime change and democratization. This is because the same strategic assumptions that underlay the administration’s pre-invasion Iraq policy now are driving its Iran policy. The key question today is whether these assumptions are correct

## Extinction

Jorge Hirsch (San Diego Union Tribune) January 3, 2006 “America’s nuclear ticking bomb” http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20060103/news\_mz1e3hirsch.html

If only conventional bombs are used in an unprovoked U.S. or Israeli aerial attack against Iran's facilities, Iran is likely to retaliate with missiles against coalition forces in Iraq and against Israel, as well as possibly a ground invasion of southern Iraq, that the 150,000 U.S. troops in Iraq would not be able to withstand. Iranian missiles could potentially contain chemical warheads, and it certainly would be impossible to rule out such possibility. Iran has signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (in 1993 and 1997 respectively), however it is still likely to have supplies, as determined by the U.S. State Department in August 2005. Early use by the United States of low-yield nuclear bombs with better bunker-busting ability than conventional bombs targeting Iranian nuclear, chemical and missile installations would be consistent with the new U.S. nuclear weapons doctrine and could be argued to be necessary to protect the lives of 150,000 U.S. soldiers in Iraq and of Israeli citizens. It would also send a clear message to Iran that any response would be answered by a far more devastating nuclear attack, thus potentially saving both American and Iranian lives. However, the nuclear threshold is a line of no return. Once the United States uses a nuclear weapon against a nonnuclear adversary, the 182 countries that are signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty will rightly feel at risk, and many of them will rush to develop their own nuclear deterrent while they can. A new world with many more nuclear countries, and a high risk of any regional conflict exploding into all-out nuclear war, will be the consequence. The scientific community (which created nuclear weapons) is alarmed over the new U.S. nuclear weapons policies. A petition to reverse these policies launched by physicists at the University of California San Diego has gathered over 1,500 physicists' signatures including eight Nobel laureates and many prominent members of the U.S. scientific establishment (http://physics.ucsd.edu/petition/). Scientists object strongly to the concept of WMD, that lumps together nuclear weapons with other "weapons of mass destruction" and blurs the sharp line that separates immensely more destructive nuclear weapons from all other weapons. An escalating nuclear war could lead to the destruction of civilization. There is no fundamental difference between small nuclear bombs and large ones, nor between nuclear bombs targeting underground installations versus those targeting cities or armies.

# Prolif Mod

## U.S. primacy causes nuclear prolif

**Weber et. al 7,** (Steven, Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies, Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, Ely Ratner, “How Globalization Went Bad”, January-February 2007, Foreign Policy, DB)

The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United States is bearing most of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. There’s effectively a market out there for proliferation, with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand, to the detriment of U.S. national security. It has become fashionable, in the wake of the Iraq war, to comment on the limits of conventional military force. But much of this analysis is overblown. The United States may not be able to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. But that doesn’t matter much from the perspective of a government that thinks the Pentagon has it in its sights. In Tehran, Pyongyang, and many other capitals, including Beijing, the bottom line is simple: The U.S. military could, with conventional force, end those regimes tomorrow if it chose to do so. No country in the world can dream of challenging U.S. conventional military power. But they can certainly hope to deter America from using it. And the best deterrent yet invented is the threat of nuclear retaliation. Before 1989, states that felt threatened by the United States could turn to the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella for protection. Now, they turn to people like A.Q. Khan. Having your own nuclear weapon used to be a luxury. Today, it is fast becoming a necessity. North Korea is the clearest example. Few countries had it worse during the Cold War. North Korea was surrounded by feuding, nuclear-armed communist neighbors, it was officially at war with its southern neighbor, and it stared continuously at tens of thousands of U.S. troops on its border. But, for 40 years, North Korea didn’t seek nuclear weapons. It didn’t need to, because it had the Soviet nuclear umbrella. Within five years of the Soviet collapse, however, Pyongyang was pushing ahead full steam on plutonium reprocessing facilities. North Korea’s founder, Kim Il Sung, barely flinched when former U.S. President Bill Clinton’s administration readied war plans to strike his nuclear installations preemptively. That brinkmanship paid off. Today North Korea is likely a nuclear power, and Kim’s son rules the country with an iron fist. America’s conventional military strength means a lot less to a nuclear North Korea. Saddam Hussein’s great strategic blunder was that he took too long to get to the same place.

## The impact is extinction

Victor A Utgoff 2002 (Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analysis) Survival Vol 44 No 2 Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions, p. 87-90

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

# A2 Heg Solves Prolif

## American hegemony cannot prevent proliferation by itself.

Zbigniew Brzezinski (formerly President Carter’s National Security Advisor, counselor and trustee at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and professor of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies @ Johns Hopkins University) 2007 “Second Chance” p 103

The failure to contain nuclear proliferation in the Far East and in South Asia conveyed a sobering lesson. Short of a unilateral military action--with all its unpredictable consequences—even the world's only superpower could not by itself dissuade a country firmly determined to acquire nuclear weapons. A successful preventive effort would have required an early concentration of attention on the issue, determined and coordinated mobilization of other concerned states, and early formulation of a program including both incentives, self-restraint and costly consequences for continued pursuit of nuclear weapons. In the early, heady days of American unilateral supremacy, it was easy to ignore incipient proliferation in the belief that an intimidating response by the United States would eventually suffice to halt it. The lesson bequeathed to the Clinton administration's successor was that even given the great asymmetry of power between the United States and any would-be proliferator, the only alternative to sear was genuine international cooperation, mounted on at least a regional basis, at an early stage of the nuclear challenge.

# Russia Mod

## Heg destroys Russian relations and causes global war

**Press TV 9** (“Medvedev lashes out at US hegemony,” Sept 15 http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=106209&sectionid=351020602, DB)

Russia's President has slammed America's global dominance saying all nations have the right to remark on the policies of a state whose actions affect the world. Speaking at the opening of a global security conference in the central Russian city of Yaroslavl on Monday, Dmitry Medvedev said those problems of one country, have the potential to lead to international conflict. "This happens immediately and incompetence and reluctance to solve one's own problems inflict damage not only to your country but to a huge number of other countries," he added. The Russian president also lashed out at what he thought the "ill-thought-out" policies of a country that led to the global financial melt down. Medvedev did not refer to the United States by name but the target of his comments was clear. His remarks came shortly before the US President Barack Obama delivered a key speech in New York, where he described the global economic crisis as Washington and Wall Street's "collective failure". Earlier in March the Kremlin had suggested that the international community should have a say when the world's richest countries make decisions with global implications. Medvedev's comments further developed those ideas, attacking efforts by any party to advance what he called "utopian projects of global supremacy … 'Global Caliphate' or 'Benevolent Hegemony'". There can be no "high-flown justification for military adventures, suppression of rights and freedoms -- of any illegal activities," he stressed.

## Goes nuclear

**NTI 9** (Global Security Newswire, 3/18, “Russia Open to U.S. Suggestions on Improving Relations, Curbing Iran”http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw\_20090318\_4374.php, DB)

Russian leaders have shown an interest in improving relations with Washington, a thaw that could enable the two former Cold War rivals to cooperate more closely on efforts to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions, the Washington Post reported today (see [GSN](http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20090316_6264.php), March 16).The two nations experienced growing tensions during the Bush administration as they disagreed over a variety of international security issues, particularly a U.S. plan to deploy missile defenses in Eastern Europe as a hedge against potential Iranian missile threats. Regarding Iran, Russia has cautiously supported some U.N. Security Council resolutions setting mild sanctions against Iran for its refusal to freeze its uranium enrichment program, but Moscow scuttled U.S. efforts last year to boost those penalties. Trying to change the climate, U.S. President Barack Obama has sent his counterpart a letter seeking a packaged solution to U.S.-Russian disputes, and Moscow appears interested, according to some analysts and officials. Russian officials "want to send a message to the Obama administration that they're prepared to have a new relationship, but it will have to be quid pro quo," said Dmitri Simes, president of the Washington-based Nixon Center. "If they have to sacrifice their special relationship with Iran, they want to see a change in their relationship with the United States" (Pan/DeYoung, [Washington Post](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/17/AR2009031703033.html), March 18). Simes directed a commission that called on the Obama administration this week to recognize the importance of good Russian relations to a breadth of international issues, including the Iranian nuclear crisis. "Without deep Russian cooperation, no strategy is likely to succeed in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear terrorism and nuclear war," says the commission report. "Working with Moscow to solve the Iran problem, including possibly strengthening sanctions on Iran if necessary, should be a top U.S. priority." "However, America is unlikely to be able to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue solely through sanctions, and Russia's cooperation could contribute substantially to a successful outcome," the report adds (Nixon Center[release](http://www.nixoncenter.org/RussiaReport09.pdf), March 16).

# Disease Mod

## Preeminence makes solving diseases like bird flu impossible – only multipolarity reduces global resentment enough to allow for responses to pandemics

**Weber et. al 7,** (Steven, Professor of Political Science at UC-Berkeley and Director of the Institute of International Studies, Naazneen Barma, Matthew Kroenig, Ely Ratner, “How Globalization Went Bad”, January-February 2007, Foreign Policy, DB)

The same is true for global public health. Globalization is turning the world into an enormous petri dish for the incubation of infectious disease. Humans cannot outsmart disease, because it just evolves too quickly. Bacteria can reproduce a new generation in less than 30 minutes, while it takes us decades to come up with a new generation of antibiotics. Solutions are only possible when and where we get the upper hand. Poor countries where humans live in close proximity to farm animals are the best place to breed extremely dangerous zoonotic disease. These are often the same countries, perhaps not entirely coincidentally, that feel threatened by American power. Establishing an early warning system for these diseases—exactly what we lacked in the case of SARS a few years ago and exactly what we lack for avian flu today—will require a significant level of intervention into the very places that don’t want it. That will be true as long as international intervention means American interference. The most likely sources of the next ebola or HIV-like pandemic are the countries that simply won’t let U.S. or other Western agencies in, including the World Health Organization. Yet the threat is too arcane and not immediate enough for the West to force the issue. What’s needed is another great power to take over a piece of the work, a power that has more immediate interests in the countries where diseases incubate and one that is seen as less of a threat. As long as the United States remains the world’s lone superpower, we’re not likely to get any help. Even after HIV, SARS, and several years of mounting hysteria about avian flu, the world is still not ready for a viral pandemic in Southeast Asia or sub-Saharan Africa. America can’t change that alone.

## Infections disease spread risks global extinction

Steinbruner 98 – Senior Fellow at Brookings Institution

[John D., “Biological weapons: A plague upon all houses,” Foreign Policy, Dec 22, LN]

It is a considerable comfort and undoubtedly a key to our survival that, so far, the main lines of defense against this threat have not depended on explicit policies or organized efforts. In the long course of evolution, the human body has developed physical barriers and a biochemical immune system whose sophistication and effectiveness exceed anything we could design or as yet even fully understand. But evolution is a sword that cuts both ways: New diseases emerge, while old diseases mutate and adapt. Throughout history, there have been epidemics during which human immunity has broken down on an epic scale. An infectious agent believed to have been the plague bacterium killed an estimated 20 million people over a four-year period in the fourteenth century, including nearly one-quarter of Western Europe's population at the time. Since its recognized appearance in 1981, some 20 variations of the HIVvirus have infected an estimated 29.4 million worldwide, with 1.5 million people currently dying of aids each year. Malaria, tuberculosis, and cholera-once thought to be under control-are now making a comeback. As we enter the twenty-first century, changing conditions have enhanced the potential for widespread contagion. The rapid growth rate of the total world population, the unprecedented freedom of movement across international borders, and scientific advances that expand the capability for the deliberate manipulation of pathogens are all cause for worry that the problem might be greater in the future than it has ever been in the past. The threat of infectious pathogens is not just an issue of public health, but a fundamental security problem for the species as a whole.

# A2 Heg Solves Peace Process

## US has no influence in the middle east – cant mediate the conflict

**Narwani, 10** Senior Associate @ Oxford University (Sharmine, “Washington Just Lost the Middle East in a Big Way”, May 24 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sharmine-narwani/washington-just-lost-the\_b\_586222.html

It's official. There is no longer any serious "cost" for defying the United States in the global arena. Unable to win wars or deliver diplomatic coups - and struggling to maintain our economic equilibrium - Washington has lost the fundamental tools for global leadership. And no place does this impotence manifest more vividly than the modern Middle East. Our pointless and protracted wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will be the last time we will launch a major battle in the region. That massive show of flexing brawn over brain burst a global perception bubble about our intentions, capabilities and reason. This credibility was compromised further with our irrational support of Israel's attacks on Lebanon and Gaza in 2006 and 2008/9 respectively. And by the double standards employed over Israel's violations of international law and its illegal nuclear weapons stash - particularly when viewed against the backdrop of our startling rhetoric over Iran's nuclear program. But nothing highlights our irrelevance more than two recent developments: 1) The US's inability today to convene even perfunctory peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians, let alone push through a negotiated solution - and this after 19 years of a "US-sponsored" peace process. 2) The US's inability to achieve a resolution with Iran over its nuclear program. The only breakthrough in this long-winded effort to tame Iran's nuclear aspirations was struck by Turkey and Brazil last week. In short, the US seems incapable of resolving even a traffic dispute in the Middle East. It is Qatar that stepped in to broker a deal between Hezbollah and the Lebanese government in 2008, and is knee deep in negotiating a solution to the conflict in Darfur. Syria helped gain the release of prisoners in Iran and Gaza. And now Turkey and Brazil have cajoled Iran into accepting an agreement that the US, France, England, Germany, Russia and China could not. We have been rendered irrelevant, despite our insistence on involving ourselves with every peep heard in the Mideast.

# Balancing Now – Generic

## Heg causes resentment and balancing

**Walt 5** (Stephen, Professor of at Harvard, 9/5/5, “Taming American Power”, anglais.u-paris10.fr/IMG/doc/Taming\_American\_Power\_Stephen\_M\_.doc, DB)

U.S. POLICYMAKERS have spent the past decade debating how best to wield American power. For the rest of the world, the debate is over how best to deal with it. With so much power in the hands of one country-a country that considers itself destined to lead the world how should other nations respond? Imagine, for a moment, that you are the president of France. You regard U.S. foreign policy as often naive and overweening, and your ideal world order is one in which no single state is dominant. So what do you do about the United States? Now picture yourself as the president of Russia. The only remnants of your country's former superpower status are an aging nuclear arsenal and membership in the UN Security Council. How do you improve Russia's situation in a world dominated by U.S. power? Or perhaps you are the prime minister of India. You face serious regional challenges-including the rising power of China-but relations with Washington are sometimes prickly, and the United States' global dominance is disquieting. Can you take advantage of parallel U.S. interests to advance those of India? Leaders throughout the world face similar issues, some more daunting than others. Consider Kim Jong I1. He rules a country that George W. Bush has called part of an "axis of evil," and North Korea's entire GDP is only one-twentieth the size of the U.S. defense budget. So how can Kim stay in power, much less improve his position, given U.S. opposition and North Korea's Lilliputian status? On the other end of the spectrum, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have worked hard to establish personal connections with U.S. presidents. Israel and the United Kingdom have long relied on their special relationships with the United States, and the political fortunes of Sharon and Blair depend on keeping these relationships strong. How do you deal with American power? This question is one for which every world leader must have an answer. And the response of other states to U.S. power is something Americans must care about as well. Basic security is at issue, as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks demonstrated. So is the health of the U.S. economy, with the market share of U.S. firms declining in key overseas markets due to anti-American sentiment. The time to worry is now. To be sure, many governments still value U.S. power and seek to use it to advance their own interests. Yet even Washington's close allies are now looking for ways to tame the United States' might. Many countries fear U.S. influence, and they have devised numerous strategies to manage and limit it. The United States will not and should not exit the world stage anytime soon. But it must make its dominant position acceptable to others-by using military force sparingly, by fostering greater cooperation with key allies, and, most important of all, by rebuilding its crumbling international image.

# Balancing Now – Generic

## Heg makes other countries try to tame America – 9/11 proves

**Walt 5** (Stephen, Professor of at Harvard, 9/5/5, “Taming American Power”, anglais.u-paris10.fr/IMG/doc/Taming\_American\_Power\_Stephen\_M\_.doc, DB)

U.S. POLICYMAKERS have spent the past decade debating how best to wield American power. For the rest of the world, the debate is over how best to deal with it. With so much power in the hands of one country-a country that considers itself destined to lead the world how should other nations respond? Imagine, for a moment, that you are the president of France. You regard U.S. foreign policy as often naive and overweening, and your ideal world order is one in which no single state is dominant. So what do you do about the United States? Now picture yourself as the president of Russia. The only remnants of your country's former superpower status are an aging nuclear arsenal and membership in the UN Security Council. How do you improve Russia's situation in a world dominated by U.S. power? Or perhaps you are the prime minister of India. You face serious regional challenges-including the rising power of China-but relations with Washington are sometimes prickly, and the United States' global dominance is disquieting. Can you take advantage of parallel U.S. interests to advance those of India? Leaders throughout the world face similar issues, some more daunting than others. Consider Kim Jong I1. He rules a country that George W. Bush has called part of an "axis of evil," and North Korea's entire GDP is only one-twentieth the size of the U.S. defense budget. So how can Kim stay in power, much less improve his position, given U.S. opposition and North Korea's Lilliputian status? On the other end of the spectrum, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and British Prime Minister Tony Blair have worked hard to establish personal connections with U.S. presidents. Israel and the United Kingdom have long relied on their special relationships with the United States, and the political fortunes of Sharon and Blair depend on keeping these relationships strong. How do you deal with American power? This question is one for which every world leader must have an answer. And the response of other states to U.S. power is something Americans must care about as well. Basic security is at issue, as the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks demonstrated. So is the health of the U.S. economy, with the market share of U.S. firms declining in key overseas markets due to anti-American sentiment. The time to worry is now. To be sure, many governments still value U.S. power and seek to use it to advance their own interests. Yet even Washington's close allies are now looking for ways to tame the United States' might. Many countries fear U.S. influence, and they have devised numerous strategies to manage and limit it. The United States will not and should not exit the world stage anytime soon. But it must make its dominant position acceptable to others-by using military force sparingly, by fostering greater cooperation with key allies, and, most important of all, by rebuilding its crumbling international image.

# Balancing Now – Obama Weakness

## Balancing now – Obama’s emphasis on soft power and diplomacy

Thomas Donnelly (resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute) and Gary J. Schmitt (a resident scholar and the director of advanced strategic studies at AEI) June 2010 “The Big Squeeze” http://www.aei.org/article/102119

Although there are any number of sentences to be found in the National Security Strategy that point toward policy continuities with past administrations, the document's emphasis on the utility of soft power, on domestic renewal, and on issues unrelated to traditional national security concerns suggests a turning away from what have been the essential elements of America's longstanding approach to security matters. No one in the administration will admit as much, but the body language of how the administration is treating the likes of Iran, its lack of attention to our allies, and its unwillingness to even mention the word "China" as being of possible security concern all point toward a policy of strategic retrenchment. The administration's plans for defense spending give credence to this shift. But rather than have an honest debate over grand strategy, the administration is pursuing its vision by consigning the discussion of the defense budget to the narrow band of our country's financial health, as though our economic problems could be solved by reining in our supposed "imperial overstretch." But that is false. Defense spending is not the reason America's fiscal house is in disorder, and cutting defense could only be at best a marginal palliative. Undermining America's ability to be the primary guarantor of global security, moreover, will create the conditions for greater competition among states and a more chaotic international environment. And it will inevitably lead the United States, for want of military capacity, to put off addressing security challenges until they became more difficult and costly to deal with.

# Balancing Now – EU

## US hegemony is declining –the EU is challenging US global power

**Kerans 9**- Strategic Cultural Foundation at Global Research [“Commercial Standards and the Decline of U.S. Hegemony” <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=14663>]

Less well-established is the study of the manner in which different categories of capitalist regimes influence each other. At times, of course, such influences are overt, and get plenty of attention, as when the IMF or World Bank under US direction demands pro-laissez faire policies as a condition of large-scale loans to a struggling state, for example. Where the influence is subtle and unintentional, however, it can go largely unnoticed. Such has been the case regarding the European Union's influence on the US and quite a few other countries since the close of the Cold War. The EU has waged an increasingly potent effort to control commercial standards that have long underlain the global hegemony of US corporations. The story deserves close attention,[1] for it sheds light both on a power shift away from the US, and on the potential for enlightened society to resist domination by enormously wealthy and well-organized special interests

# Balancing Now - China

## China is counterbalancing US influence in Latin America

**Hsiang,** 0**9** Associate Professor, Department of International Trade @ Chihlee Institute of Technology (Antonio C., “China Rising in Latin America:

More Opportunities than Challenges”, pgs.33-35, Journal of Emerging Knowledge on Emerging Markets, Vol. 1)

For some, China became the US’s new challenger in Latin America. “Almost two centuries later, Monroe’s fears are finally coming true, as extra-hemispheric powers such as Russia and China are beginning to foster a new generation of intrusive relations with Latin American nations.”3 Similarly, for Mary Anastasia O’Grady, columnist of The Wall Street Journal, “China is becoming a political rival of the U.S. in its own backyard.”4 China is also “perceived …in the US as a growing rival for energy resources, spreading its presence into the Middle East and, more recently, Latin America.”5 General Bantz Cradock, former head of the U.S. Southern Command, warned that China’s influence in Latin America is “an emerging dynamic that could not be ignored.”6 Peter Hakim, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, finds “many people in Latin America look to China as an economic and political alternative to U.S. hegemony.”7 Hillary Clinton, the secretary of state, has noted that China and Iran are making “disturbing” gains in the region. However, one of the important reasons for shrinkage of United States hegemony in its “backyard” is because Washington “goes wrong in Latin America through inattention, when it fails to confront emerging problems before they turn into crises.” Not only during the Bush administration, but nine months into Obama’s administration, “Western Hemisphere Affairs is the only regional bureau in the State Department that does not have an Obama appointee serving as assistant secretary of state and the most influential nation in the region, Brazil, has no U.S. ambassador.”8 On the contrary, many Latin Americans prefer to see China’s expanding ties to their region as an opportunity. Even for Washington, “the developing trade between China and Latin American countries represents an opportunity— if the U.S. plays its cards right.”9 During the Bush administration, there seems to be a precipitous decline in good will towards the U.S. from Latin American counterparts. On December 16, 2008, the Group of Rio, a body created in 1986 to promote Latin American cooperation, accepted Cuba as its 23rd member. The conference was held at Costa do Sauipe in Brazil and was attended by dignitaries of 33 Latin American and Caribbean countries. In defiance of U.S. opinion, the Group of Rio welcomed Raúl Castro on his first trip abroad since succeeding Fidel in 2006. So it’s not an accident that on the same day, then-President George W. Bush’s Secretary of Commerce Carlos Gutiérrez, a fierce anti-Castro Cuban-American, declared the U.S. would not lift the embargo against Cuba. The 33 Latin American nations attending the summit celebrated what many described as a new era of regional independence from Washington by giving a hero’s welcome to Raúl Castro. “No wonder: for anyone who had not already noticed, the summit buried for good the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, which declared Latin America off-limits to European powers.”10 In keeping with this development, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry has suggested that Raúl make a gesture of goodwill towards the international community perhaps a gradual but significant political opening including the release of political prisoners. This would help prove Cuba has embarked on a genuine transition.

**China’s already challenging U.S military strength**

**Buxbaum, 10** Analyst @ ISN Security Watch, (Peter A., “Chinese Plans to End US Hegemony in the Pacific”, http://oilprice.com/Geo-Politics/International/Chinese-Plans-to-End-US-Hegemony-in-the-Pacific.html)

The US is developing an air-sea battle concept to counter China's military buildup. But political problems and budgetary woes could kill the program before it ever gets started. China's People's Liberation Army is building up anti-access and area-denial capabilities with the apparent goal of extending their power to the western half of the Pacific Ocean. Chinese military and political doctrine holds that China should rule the waves out to the second island chain of the western Pacific, which extends as far as Guam and New Guinea, essentially dividing the Pacific between the US and China and ending US hegemony on that ocean. Among the anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) capabilities being fielded by China include anti-satellite weapons; spaced-based reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition; electromagnetic weapons; advanced fighter aircraft; unmanned aerial vehicles; advanced radar systems; and ballistic and cruise missiles. The Chinese also have an emerging and muscular deep-water navy. "The PLA navy is increasing its numbers of submarines and other ships," said Admiral Gary Roughead, chief of US naval operations, at a recent speech hosted by the Heritage Foundation, a conservative Washington think tank. "Navies tend to grow with economies and as trade becomes more important." All of this has US military planners and thinkers worried. The A2AD buildup threatens the US forward presence and power projection in the region. "Unless Beijing diverts from its current course of action, or Washington undertakes actions to offset or counterbalance the effects of the PLA’s military buildup," said a report recently released by the Washington-based Center for Budgetary and Strategic Assessments, "the cost incurred by the US military to operate in the [w]estern Pacific will likely rise sharply, perhaps to prohibitive levels, and much sooner than many expect[...].This situation creates a strategic choice for the United States, its allies and partners: acquiesce in a dramatic shift in the military balance or take steps to preserve it."

# Balancing Now – China

**China is counter-balancing the US now**

**Layne, 09** – Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "The Waning of U.S.

Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay", International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009, July 6th 2010, Galileo, p. 17-18, KONTOPOULOS) PDF

Toward multipolarity? The ascent of new great powers would be the strongest evidence of multipolarization, and the two most important indicators of whether this is happening are relative growth rates and shares of world GDP.46 Here, there is evidence that as the NIC, Khanna, Mahbubani, and, to a point, Zakaria contend, global economic power is flowing from the United States and Europe to Asia.47 The shift of economic clout to East Asia is important because it could propel China’s ascent—thus hastening the relative decline of U.S. power—and also because emerging regional multipolarity could trigger future major power war. China, of course, is the poster child for Asia’s rise, and many analysts— including the NIC, Khanna, and (implicitly) Mahbubani and Zakaria—agree that China is the rising power most likely to challenge U.S. hegemony.48 Unsurprisingly, Brooks and Wohlforth are skeptical about China’s rise, and they dismiss the idea that China could become a viable counterweight to a hegemonic United States within any meaningful time frame.49 Their analysis, how-ever, is static. For sure, the United States still has an impressive lead in the categories they measure.50 Looking ahead, however, the trend lines appear to favor China, which already has overtaken the United States as the world’s leading manufacturer—a crown the United States wore for more than a century. 51 China also may overtake the United States in GDP in the next ten to fifteen years. In 2003 Goldman Sachs predicted that China would pass the United States in GDP by 2041, but in 2008 it revised the time frame to 2028.52 And, in early 2009, the Economist Intelligence Unit predicted that China’s GDP would surpass the United States’ in 2021.53 Empirically, then, there are indications that the unipolar era is drawing to a close, and that the coming decades could witness a power transition.54

# Balancing Now - Russia/China Axis

## They’re forming a military alliance to hedge against the US---maintaining heg will cause nuclear conflict

**Roberts** 0**7** Economist and Former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Paul Craig, “US Hegemony Spawns Russian-Chinese Military Alliance”, http://www.antiwar.com/roberts/?articleid=11422)

This week the Russian and Chinese militaries are conducting a joint military exercise involving large numbers of troops and combat vehicles. The former Soviet Republics of Tajikistan, Kyrgkyzstan, and Kazakstan are participating. Other countries appear ready to join the military alliance. This new potent military alliance is a real world response to neoconservative delusions about US hegemony. Neocons believe that the US is supreme in the world and can dictate its course. The neoconservative idiots have actually written papers, read by Russians and Chinese, about why the US must use its military superiority to assert hegemony over Russia and China. Cynics believe that the neocons are just shills, like Bush and Cheney, for the military-security complex and are paid to restart the cold war for the sake of the profits of the armaments industry. But the fact is that the neocons actually believe their delusions about American hegemony. Russia and China have now witnessed enough of the Bush administration's unprovoked aggression in the world to take neocon intentions seriously. As the US has proven that it cannot occupy the Iraqi city of Baghdad despite 5 years of efforts, it most certainly cannot occupy Russia or China. **That means the conflict toward which the neocons are driving will be a nuclear conflict.** In an attempt to gain the advantage in a nuclear conflict, the neocons are positioning US anti-ballistic missiles on Soviet borders in Poland and the Czech Republic. This is an idiotic provocation as the Russians can eliminate anti-ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. Neocons are people who desire war, but know nothing about it. Thus, the US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan. Reagan and Gorbachev ended the cold war. However, US administrations after Reagan's have broken the agreements and understandings. The US gratuitously brought NATO and anti-ballistic missiles to Russia's borders. The Bush regime has initiated a propaganda war against the Russian government of Vladimir Putin. These are gratuitous acts of aggression. Both the Russian and Chinese governments are trying to devote resources to their economic development, not to their militaries. Yet, both are being forced by America's aggressive posture to revamp their militaries. Americans need to understand what the neocon Bush regime cannot: **a nuclear exchange between the US, Russia, and China would establish the hegemony of the cockroach.** In a mere 6.5 years the Bush regime has destroyed the world's good will toward the US. Today, America's influence in the world is limited to its payments of tens of millions of dollars to bribed heads of foreign governments, such as Egypt's and Pakistan's. The Bush regime even thinks that as it has bought and paid for Musharraf, he will stand aside and permit Bush to make air strikes inside Pakistan. Is Bush blind to the danger that he will cause an Islamic revolution within Pakistan that will depose the US puppet and present the Middle East with an Islamic state armed with nuclear weapons? Considering the instabilities and dangers that abound, the aggressive posture of the Bush regime goes far beyond recklessness. The Bush regime is the most irresponsibly aggressive regime the world has seen since Hitler's.

# Soft Balancing Now

## Soft balancing undermines American diplomatic channels, which facilitates anti-American coalitions and hard balancing.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 144-5

Soft balancing is a concession to the disparity in military power between the United States and other major states in today's international system.48 Soft balancing relies on diplomacy—conducted through ad hoc coalitions or through international institutions—and, rather than challenging U.S. hegemony directly, it seeks to constrain the United States and limit Washington's ability to impose its policy preferences on others. The key idea underlying soft balancing is that by coordinating their diplomacy and lending one another mutual support, soft balancers can gain outcomes vis-a-vis the United States that they could not obtain by acting separately. To date, soft balancing has taken two forms. First, the second-tier major powers have cooperated—either through informal ententes or by creating organizational structures—to rein in America's exercise of hegemonic power. Examples include periodic summit meetings (Sino-Russian, Franco-Russian, Sine-Indian-Russian) that pledge cooperation to restore multipolarity, and the Shanghai Cooperation Council, created by Moscow and Beijing to coordinate efforts to resist the intrusion of U.S. power into Central Asia.49 The second-tier major powers also engage in "binding" strategies that seek to enmesh the United States in international institutions, to ensure that it is restrained by international law and norms of permissible great power behavior. However, as the combinedefforts of France, Germany, and Russia to use the United Nations to preventthe March 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq demonstrate, binding is an ineffectivemeans of constraining U.S. hegemony (although perhaps marginally moresuccessful as a means of delegitimizing U.S. unilateral actions). This does notmean, however, that soft balancing is unimportant. After all, grand strategy isabout utilizing the key instruments of a state's power—military, economic,and diplomatic—to advance its interests and to gain security. Diplomacy invariably is an integral component of counterbalancing strategies. Thus, soft balancing's real significance is that, if states learn that they can work together diplomatically in standing up to the United States, the groundwork may belaid for future coalitions that will he able to engage effectively in hard balancing, or semi-hard balancing, against the United States.

## U.S. preponderance is spurring soft-balancing now – these indirect efforts will turn into a hard-line counterweight unless the U.S. begins to withdraw.

Robert A. pape (Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago) summer 2005 “soft balancing against the United States” Inernational Security

The George W. Bush administration's national security strategy, which asserts that the United States has the right to attack and conquer sovereign countries that pose no observable threat, and to do so without international support, is one of the most aggressively unilateral U.S. postures ever taken. Recent international relations scholarship has wrongly promoted the view that the United States, as the leader of a unipolar system, can pursue such a policy without fear of serious opposition. The most consequential effect of the Bush strategy will be a fundamental transformation in how major states perceive the United States and how they react to future uses of U.S. power. Major powers are already engaging in the early stages of balancing behavior against the United States, by adopting "soft-balancing" measures that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but use international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements to delay, frustrate, and undermine U.S. policies. If the Bush administration continues to pursue aggressive unilateral military policies, increased soft balancing could establish the basis for hard balancing against the United States. To avoid this outcome, the United States should renounce the systematic use of preventive war, as well as other aggressive unilateral military policies, and return to its traditional policy governing the use of force -- a case-by-case calculation of costs and benefits.

# Soft Balancing Now

## Soft balancing is occuring against the United States now – multiple areas prove that hegemony is being undermined.

Robert A. Pape (Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago) summer 2005 “soft balancing against the United States” Inernational Security

Soft balancing is replacing traditional hard balancing as the principal reaction of major powers to the Bush administration's preventive war doctrine. Until now, there has been no concept for this form of balancing behavior, and so it has been difficult to detect that the early stages of soft balancing against U.S. power have already started. On August 26, 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney called for the United States to launch a preventive war to depose Saddam Hussein. In September the United States issued its new strategy, asserting the right to wage preventive war against rogue states. Shortly thereafter, European, Middle Eastern, and Asian powers undertook a series of steps to contain U.S. military power using soft-balancing instruments. First, France, Sweden, and other European states used institutional rules and procedures in the UN to delay, if not head off completely, U.S. preventive war against Iraq. In the past, the United States has often been able to legitimate foreign and military policies by gaining the approval of the UN Security Council. In September 2002 it sought to gain such sanction for war against Iraq. France, however, threatened to veto the resolution authorizing war -- which would have been the first time a U.S. resolution had ever been vetoed in the Security Council -- unless two conditions were met: (1) the Bush administration would have to accept a serious effort to resolve matters with Iraq through weapons inspections; and (2) it would need to wait for a resolution authorizing war until after the inspections were completed. The administration agreed, even though this meant delaying its plan for war. In March 2003 the UN's chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, and the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, declared that the inspections had made substantial progress but would take months longer to complete -- a judgment that effectively prevented the United States from gaining the votes necessary for a Security Council resolution in support of the war. Second, Turkey and Saudi Arabia firmly denied the United States the use of their territory for ground forces and have been ambiguous about providing basing rights for logistic efforts and airpower. Turkey is the most important case because Bush administration officials made repeated efforts to gain its cooperation. In January 2003 the administration asked Turkey to allow the deployment of between 60,000 to 90,000 U.S. ground troops who then would cross Turkish territory into Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. Ankara balked. "The government has indicated its preparedness to meet American requests basically in all areas with the exception of the stationing of a large number of ground forces in Turkey," a Turkish official said. Turkey was strategically important to a low-cost, high-confidence strategy for defeating Iraq. The United States hoped to invade Iraq from Turkey in the north and Kuwait in the south, and so attack Saddam Hussein's overstretched military forces from different directions and quickly overwhelm them. Although U.S. officials expected that they could conduct a successful attack to conquer Iraq even without access to land bases in Turkey, they granted that such a war would be, as one ranking official put it, "harder and uglier." U.S. ships with an infantry division waited off the coast of Turkey for weeks, but the Turkish government remained firm.n62 Third, China and South Korea are attempting to elevate their role in diplomatic negotiations over North Korea's nuclear program, making it more difficult for the United States to use force. In October 2002 North Korea admitted to having an ongoing nuclear weapons program, declaring that in response to the growing U.S. threat to its country from the Bush doctrine of preventive war, it would accelerate its efforts to build nuclear weapons. The North Korean leadership offered to halt the nuclear program if the United States would sign a nonaggression treaty agreeing not to attack their country. While the United States has refused to make this pledge, South Korea has sided with North Korea, asking the United States to sign a nonaggression treaty in return for Pyongyang's agreement to abandon nuclear development and meeting with Japanese and Russian officials to gain their support for this position. December 2002 Gallup polls show that more South Koreans had a positive view of North Korea than of the United States. Of those surveyed, 47 percent felt positively about North Korea, while 37 percent held an unfavorable view. Only 37 percent had a positive view of the United States, while 53 percent viewed it unfavorably. This represented a significant change from 1994 when 64 percent of South Koreans surveyed said they liked the United States and only 15 percent disliked it. Also in December 2002 South Korea elected a new president, Roh Moo Hyun, who advocates continuation of the sunshine policy of engagement with North Korea and who, after the election, met with military officials and instructed them to draw up plans that assume a reduction in U.S. forces stationed there. "The U.S. military presence must be adjusted," says Kim Sangwoo, a foreign policy adviser to Roh.n63 None of these moves directly challenges U.S. military power, but they all make it more difficult for the United States to exercise that power. They impose immediate costs and constraints on the application of U.S. power by entangling the United States in diplomatic maneuvers, reducing the pressure on regional states to cooperate with its military plans, and bolstering the claims of target states that U.S. military threats justify the acceleration of their own military programs. They also establish a new pattern of diplomatic activity: cooperation among major powers that excludes the United States. If the United States remains committed to its unilateral military policies, such soft-balancing measures are likely to become more common. Balancing against a sole superpower such as the United States will have a logic of its own, one perhaps not wholly unique, but one that is nonetheless distinctive to the condition of unipolarity.n64

# A2 Brooks and Wohlforth

**Reject Brooks and Wohlforth – their analysis is based off a freeze frame of IR and doesn't into account other factors that cause hegemonic decline**

**Layne, 09** – Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay", International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009, July 6th 2009, Galileo, p. 15, KONTOPOULOS) PDF

Superficially, Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system; they do not engage the argument that, like all hegemonic systems, the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise. Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation. Over time, however, know-how, technology, and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system, which allows other states to catch up. Similarly, leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline.43 A key question is whether the early decades of the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U.S. hegemony. In this respect, the debate about unipolar stability is misleading. After all, despite their claim at the be-ginning of World Out of Balance that unipolarity is robust and that U.S. hegemony will endure well into the future, Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years, which is not very long at all.44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity; it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States, and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization.45

## Brooks and Wolforth concede that coalitional balancing will work against the US

Jack S. Levy (Board of Governors’ Professor at Rutgers University and former president of both the International Studies Association and the Peace Science Society) and William R. Thompson (Donald A. Rogers Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, former president of the International Studies Association, and Managing Editor of International Studies Quarterly) Summer 2010 “ Balancing on Land and at Sea Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?” <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Balancing_on_Land_and_at_Sea.pdf>

In addition, Brooks and Wohlforth’s argument that the balancing hypothesis applies only to states that are growing and threatening to achieve a position of hegemony but not to established hegemons such as the United States raises the question of why other leading states did not balance against the United States when it was a rising great power but before it established a position of primacy—perhaps in the late 1940s. If the hypothesis that great powers balance against aspiring hegemons is unconditionally valid, and if the only issue is the distribution of material capabilities, then there were plenty of opportunities for a counterbalancing coalition to form against the United States throughout the Cold War period. Instead, most of the great powers perceived that the greatest threat to their interests came from the Soviet Union, not from the United States, and they joined the United States in a defensive balancing coalition against the Soviet Union. Brooks and Wohlforth concede that even today the member states of the European Union collectively exceed the United States in gross domestic product, and the combination of the European Union, Japan, China, and Russia, reinforced by nuclear deterrence, could form an effective balancing coalition against the United States if it was seen as so threatening. Brooks and Wohlforth’s inability to provide a convincing explanation for the absence of coalition formation against the United States in the early Cold War period, when such behavior would not have been so risky, weakens their explanation for nonbalancing after the end of the Cold War.77

# A2 Brooks and Wohlforth

## Brooks and Wohlforth concede unipolarity can only last for 20 more years and that counterbalancing is occuring

**Layne,** 0**9** Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009)

Superficially, Brooks and Wohlforth make a strong case for unipolar stability. But there is less to their argument than meets the eye.42 Their case is based on a freeze-frame view of the distribution of capabilities in the international system; they do not engage the argument that, like all hegemonic systems, the American era of unipolarity contains the seeds of its own demise. Hegemons sprint to the front of the great power pack because of economic leadership based on productivity and technological innovation. Over time, however, know-how, technology, and managerial skills diffuse throughout the international economic system, which allows other states to catch up. Similarly, leadership costs sap the hegemon’s power and push it into decline.43 A key question is whether the early decades of the twenty-first century will witness the decline of U.S. hegemony. In this respect, the debate about unipolar stability is misleading. After all, despite their claim at the beginning [End Page 161] of World Out of Balance that unipolarity is robust and that U.S. hegemony will endure well into the future, Brooks and Wohlforth actually concede that unipolarity is not likely to last more than another twenty years, which is not very long at all.44 Not only is this a weak case for unipolarity; it is also an implicit admission that—although it has yet to bear fruit—other states are engaged in counterbalancing the United States, and this is spurring an ongoing process of multipolarization.45

# \*\*\*Sustainability\*\*\*

# Heg Unsustainable – Must Read

## Heg unsustainable – multiple constraints ensure collapse and rise of alternatives

Christopher Layne, Chair in National Security at the School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, 09

[“The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality?: A Review Essay,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009]

For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades, a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) *Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World.*[15](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.layne.html" \l "f15)*Global Trends 2025* is not light reading, but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. Its key geopolitical conclusion is that the U.S.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers); and economic, financial, and domestic political constraints that may erode U.S. capabilities. China, India, and possibly Russia are emerging great powers.[16](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.layne.html" \l "f16) As *Global Trends 2025* points out, the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. 7). Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid.). By 2025, China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. 30). India, buoyed by its strong economic growth rate, will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid.). Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status, the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. 29).[17](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.layne.html" \l "f17)**]** Because of uncertainties about economics, energy prices, domestic governance issues, and especially demography, Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. 31–32).[18](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.layne.html" \l "f18) Between 2009 and 2025, Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million, affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. 23–24, 30). If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power, however, the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U.S. global dominance” (p. 32). Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. 32, 82). According to the NIC, in addition to relative decline, the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. U.S. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. 93). The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. 3, 8–9, 13–14). At home, economic and political constraints may undermine U.S. hegemony. *Global Trends 2025* was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. Nevertheless, the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U.S. power. In particular, *Global Trends* predicts that over the next two decades, the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. Although at the time this issue went to press, the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come, China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified.[19](http://muse.jhu.edu.proxy.lib.umich.edu/journals/international_security/v034/34.1.layne.html" \l "f19) **[End Page 153]** As the NIC observes, the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. Thus, “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. 12, 94, 97). Moreover, the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U.S. freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p. 97). The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic, military, and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. 93). Ultimately, although the United States will probably be *primus inter pares* in a multipolar international system twenty years from now, it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid.).

# Heg Unsustainable – Must Read

**Decline is inevitable – heg is economically unsustainable**

**Layne, 09** – Mary Julia and George R. Jordan Professor of International Affairs at Texas A&M's George Bush School of Government and Public Service, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, LL.M. in International Law from Virginia Law, J.D. from USC, and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, "The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality? A Review Essay", International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009, July 6th 2010, Galileo, p. 21-23 KONTOPOULOS) PDF

The publications reviewed in this essay examine whether the United States is in (or is headed for) relative decline.74 Brooks and Wohlforth purport to deny the possibility that America is in relative decline, but a growing number of analysts disagree.75 The long-term impact of the current economic crisis largely will determine who is right (and to be fair, Brooks and Wohlforth wrote their book before its effects became evident). Yet, even before the meltdown, longterm structural weaknesses that have been accumulating for more than three decades were causing U.S. economic power to wane.76 The warning signs with respect to U.S. decline are a looming fiscal crisis and doubts about the future of the dollar as the reserve currency, both of which are linked to the fear that after recovery, the United States will face a serious inflationary threat.77 Optimists contend that once the United States recovers, fears of a fiscal crisis will fade: the country faced a larger debt to GDP ratio after World War II, and yet embarked on a sustained era of growth. The postwar era, however, was a golden age of U.S. industrial and financial dominance, trade surpluses, and sustained high growth rates. The United States of 2009 is far different from the United States of 1945, however, which is why many economists believe that even in the best case, it will emerge from the current crisis with serious macroeconomic handicaps.78 Chief among these handicaps are the increase in the money supply (caused by the massive amount of dollars the Federal Reserve and Treasury have pumped into circulation to rescue the economy), and the $1 trillion plus budget deficits that the Brookings Institution and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) project the United States will incur for at least a decade.79 When the projected deficits are bundled with the persistent U.S. current account deficit, the entitlements overhang, and the cost of two ongoing wars, there is reason to worry about the United States’ longterm fiscal stability.80 The CBO states, “Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt/GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustainable fiscal problem.”81 If the Congressional Budget Office is right, it spells trouble ahead for the dollar. As Jonathan Kirshner noted on the eve of the meltdown, the dollar’s vulnerability “presents potentially significant and underappreciated restraints upon contemporary American political and military predominance.”82 **The dollar’s loss of reserve currency status would undermine U.S. dominance**, and recent events have magnified concerns that predated the financial and economic crisis. 83 First, the other big players in the international economy now are either military rivals (China) or ambiguous “allies” (Europe) that have their own ambitions and no longer require U.S. protection from the Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Because of these two factors, as Eric Helleiner notes, if the dollar experiences dramatic depreciation in the future, there is a “risk of defections generating a herd-like momentum” away from it.84

# Heg Unsustainable – Imperial Overstretch

## Hegemony is unsustainable – structural factors

**Lieven 05** Anatol, a former senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace “Decadent America Must Give Up Imperial Ambitions” http://www.newamerica.net/node/7356

US global power, as presently conceived by the overwhelming majority of the US establishment, is unsustainable. To place American power on a firmer footing requires putting it on a more limited footing. Despite the lessons of Iraq, this is something that American policymakers--Democrat and Republican, civilian and military--still find extremely difficult to think about. The basic reasons why the American empire is bust are familiar from other imperial histories. The empire can no longer raise enough taxes or soldiers, it is increasingly indebted and key vassal states are no longer reliable. In an equally classical fashion, central to what is happening is the greed and decadence of the imperial elites. Like so many of their predecessors, the US wealthy classes have gained a grip over the state that allows them to escape taxation. Mass acquiescence in this has to be bought with much smaller--but fiscally equally damaging--cuts to taxes on the middle classes. The result is that the empire can no longer pay for enough of the professional troops it needs to fulfil its self-assumed imperial tasks. It cannot introduce conscription because of the general demilitarisation of society and also because elite youths are no longer prepared to set an example of leadership and sacrifice by serving themselves. The result is that the US is incapable of waging more wars of occupation, such as in Iraq. It can defeat other states in battle easily enough but it cannot turn them into loyal or stable allies. War therefore means simply creating more and more areas of anarchy and breeding grounds for terrorism. It is important to note that this US weakness affects not only the ambitions of the Bush administration, but also geopolitical stances wholly shared by the Democrats. The Bush administration deserves to be savagely criticised for the timing and the conduct of the Iraq war. Future historians may, however, conclude that President Bill Clinton's strategy of the 1990s would also have made the conquest of Iraq unavoidable sooner or later; and that given the realities of Iraqi society and history, the results would not have been significantly less awful. For that matter, can present US strategy against Iran--supported by both parties--be sustained permanently without war? Indeed, given the nature of the Middle East, may it not be that any power wishing to exercise hegemony in the region would have to go to war at regular intervals in defence of its authority or its local clients? Furthermore, the relative decline in US economic independence means that, unlike in 1917 or 1941, really serious war risks US economic disaster. Even a limited US-Chinese clash over Taiwan would be likely to produce catastrophic economic consequences for both sides.

# Heg Unsustainable – Economic Openess

## The economic system the U.S. has built and protected ensures rapid redistribution of power which hastens hegemonic decline.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 151-2

With stunning rapidity, China has emerged as a dominant factor in theglobal economy and is spearheading East Asia's drive to displace the United States as the locus of economic and technological leadership in the interna-tional economy.''° This trend, which includes China's great power emer-gence, highlights an important paradox of hegemonic stability theory. Over time, a liberal hegemon becomes the victim of the very open international economic system it put in place, because openness facilitates the diffusion of economic, technological, and organizational skills to other states, whichcauses the hegemon to lose its "comparative advantage" over them.71This dynamic is too frequently overlooked in current discussions of U.S. grandstrategy (and trade policy). The perverse grand strategic consequence ofAmerica's hegemonic role in the international economic system is that byacting in accordance with hegemonic stability theory's dictates, the United States is helping to accelerate a change in the relative distribution of power in the international system. As America's relative economic power wanes, others will have decreasing incentives to bandwagon with the United States.The ongoing redistribution of global power is bringing forward the day when eligible states will be strong enough economically to challenge U.S. preponderance militarily.

# Heg Unsustainable – Excessive Defense Spending

## Heg unsustainable – excessive defense expenditures

Michael Lind (Policy Director of New America's Economic Growth Program. He is a co-founder of the New America Foundation)Autumn 2008 “ A Concert-Balance Strategy for a Multipolar World” http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/concert\_balance\_strategy\_multipolar\_world\_8468

The concert-balance strategy, while still expensive compared to neo-isolationism, would be far less costly than a US grand strategy of hegemony. Adherents of the hegemony strategy sometimes claim that the United States can easily afford to spend the huge amount of resources on the military that dissuasion and reassurance would require. But even if that were true, the American public is not likely to support permanently higher defense expenditures, once the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are concluded. Even if the problem of health care costs increasing at a rate faster than gross domestic product (GDP) is solved in the near future, the growth of the population of retirees in the United States may raise Social Security and Medicare spending by at least four percent of GDP. It seems unlikely that the American electorate will tolerate either the substantial tax increases or the substantial cuts in middleclass entitlements needed to spend four to six percent of US GDP permanently on the military, as some have proposed. In any event, the costs of the hegemony strategy, if it were seriously pursued, inevitably would rise to levels the United States could not afford if the policy of dissuasion failed and growing powers such as China chose to make their military power commensurate with their economic strength. The French International Relations Institute has predicted that by 2050 Greater China (China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan) will be the world’s leading economic power, accounting for 24 percent of the international economy. North America (the United States, Canada, and Mexico) would be next, with 23 percent of world GDP.19 The US investment bank Goldman Sachs reached similar conclusions, predicting that by 2050 China will have the largest economy, followed by the United States and India. The next tier might be occupied by Russia, Brazil, and Japan, and a third tier would include Germany, Britain, and other once-mighty European economic powers. The European share of the global economy may decline from its current 22 percent, roughly comparable to that of the United States, to only 12 percent in 2050.20

# **Heg Unsustainable – Debt/Deficit**

## **U.S. is in decline – multiple reasons**

Task 9 (10/20/09, Aaron, "Niall Ferguson: U.S. Empire in Decline, on Collission Course with China," http://finance.yahoo.com/tech-ticker/article/357319/Niall-Ferguson:-U.S.-Empire-in-Decline,-on-Collision-Course-with-China)

The U.S. is an empire in decline, according to Niall Ferguson, Harvard professor and author of The Ascent of Money. "People have predicted the end of America in the past and been wrong," Ferguson concedes. "But let's face it: If you're trying to borrow $9 trillion to save your financial system...and already half your public debt held by foreigners, it's not really the conduct of rising empires, is it?" Given its massive deficits and overseas military adventures, America today is similar to the Spanish Empire in the 17th century and Britain's in the 20th, he says. "Excessive debt is usually a predictor of subsequent trouble." Putting a finer point on it, Ferguson says America today is comparable to Britain circa 1900: a dominant empire underestimating the rise of a new power. In Britain's case back then it was Germany; in America's case today, it's China. "When China's economy is equal in size to that of the U.S., which could come as early as 2027...it means China becomes not only a major economic competitor - it's that already, it then becomes a diplomatic competitor and a military competitor," the history professor declares. The most obvious sign of this is China's major naval construction program, featuring next generation submarines and up to three aircraft carriers, Ferguson says. "There's no other way of interpreting this than as a challenge to the hegemony of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region." As to analysts like Stratfor's George Friedman, who downplay China's naval ambitions, Ferguson notes British experts - including Winston Churchill - were similarly complacent about Germany at the dawn of the 20th century. "I'm not predicting World War III but we have to recognize...China is becoming more assertive, a rival not a partner," he says, adding that China's navy doesn't have to be as large as America's to pose a problem. "They don't have to have an equally large navy, just big enough to pose a strategic threat [and] cause trouble" for the U.S. Navy.

## Rising deficit will kill heg

**Ensinger, 10** Bachelor of Arts in Journalism and Political Science @ Ohio State (Dustin, “Huge Deficits Altering U.S. Hegemony”, http://economyincrisis.org/content/huge-deficits-altering-us-hegemony)

The sun may finally be setting on the American Century, according to The New York Times, which claims that America‘s massive and unsustainable debt will be the cause of waning influence around the world in the near future. Not only is the deficit out-of-control - expected to be 1.3 trillion in the 2011 fiscal year - but the nation’s projected long-term debt is even more unsustainable. By the end of the decade, deficits are projected to rise to over five percent of gross domestic product. “[Obama’s] budget draws a picture of a nation that like many American homeowners simply cannot get above water,” The Times writes. Even worse, much of that debt is borrowed from foreign central banks, especially Asian powers Japan and China. As of September 2009, China held $790 billion of U.S. debt while Japan held roughly $752 billion. The problem is exacerbated by the political impasse in America, in which each side is firmly entrenched in an unwavering ideological battle. Republicans refuse to even entertain the idea of any tax increase while Democrats chafe at the though of entitlement cuts. In reality, to put America back on a path of fiscal sanity and ensure that America remains a hegemony, there needs to be a combination of both.

# **Heg Unsustainable – Debt/Deficit**

**Heg is unsustainable now - economy**

**Sanger 10** (David E., Harvard graduate, Chief Washington Correspondent for The New York Times, member of two teams that won the Pulitzer prize, and has been awarded numerous honors for national security and foreign policy coverage, 2/2/10, “Deficits May Alter U.S. Politics and Global Power”, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/us/politics/02deficit.html>, DB)

WASHINGTON — In a federal budget filled with mind-boggling statistics, two numbers stand out as particularly stunning, for the way they may change American politics and American power. The first is the projected deficit in the coming year, nearly 11 percent of the country’s entire economic output. That is not unprecedented: During the Civil War, World War I and World War II, the United States ran soaring deficits, but usually with the expectation that they would come back down once peace was restored and war spending abated. But the second number, buried deeper in the budget’s projections, is the one that really commands attention: By President Obama’s own optimistic projections, American deficits will not return to what are widely considered sustainable levels over the next 10 years. In fact, in 2019 and 2020 — years after Mr. Obama has left the political scene, even if he serves two terms — they start rising again sharply, to more than 5 percent of gross domestic product. His budget draws a picture of a nation that like many American homeowners simply cannot get above water. For Mr. Obama and his successors, the effect of those projections is clear: Unless miraculous growth, or miraculous political compromises, creates some unforeseen change over the next decade, there is virtually no room for new domestic initiatives for Mr. Obama or his successors. Beyond that lies the possibility that the United States could begin to suffer the same disease that has afflicted Japan over the past decade. As debt grew more rapidly than income, that country’s influence around the world eroded. Or, as Mr. Obama’s chief economic adviser, Lawrence H. Summers, used to ask before he entered government a year ago, “How long can the world’s biggest borrower remain the world’s biggest power?” The Chinese leadership, which is lending much of the money to finance the American government’s spending, and which asked pointed questions about Mr. Obama’s budget when members visited Washington last summer, says it thinks the long-term answer to Mr. Summers’s question is self-evident. The Europeans will also tell you that this is a big worry about the next decade. Mr. Obama himself hinted at his own concern when he announced in early December that he planned to send 30,000 American troops to Afghanistan, but insisted that the United States could not afford to stay for long. “Our prosperity provides a foundation for our power,” he told cadets at West Point. “It pays for our military. It underwrites our diplomacy. It taps the potential of our people, and allows investment in new industry.” And then he explained why even a “war of necessity,” as he called Afghanistan last summer, could not last for long. “That’s why our troop commitment in Afghanistan cannot be open-ended,” he said then, “because the nation that I’m most interested in building is our own.”

## Heg collapsing now – debt growth will crush us in less than 6 years

Scott Condon (Aspen Times Correspondent) July 6, 2010 “ Professor says recession has put U.S. ‘on the edge of chaos' http://www.postindependent.com/article/20100706/VALLEYNEWS/100709935/1083&ParentProfile=1074

Even before the crisis, Goldman Sachs predicted that China would overtake the U.S. as the world's economic superpower by 2027, according to Ferguson. “The financial crisis has unquestionably hit the U.S. much harder than China,” he said. American politicians don't have a sense of urgency, Ferguson contended. They feel the country can limp along for another 20 years or so in its current financial health without making tough decisions about fiscal policy. He believes they are wrong. The federal government's debt has grown so large in the last decade that the U.S. will inevitably devote an increasing amount of taxes to it. Meanwhile it's facing a greater burden through the Medicare and Social Security programs as Baby Boomers grow old and frail. It's also currently fighting two wars. All that while revenues have plummeted in the recession. “If you really want to see when an empire is getting vulnerable, the big giveaway is when the costs of serving the debt exceed the cost of the defense budget,” Ferguson said. He predicted that's coming in the U.S. within the next six years

# Heg Unsustainable – Demographics

## Declining baby weights will destroy US productivity and innovation

**Raghavan, 10** Business Journalist and Managing Editor (Sreekumar, “Futurology: Why US hegemony will decline?”, http://www.commodityonline.com/news/Futurology-Why-US-hegemony-will-decline-25056-3-1.html)

Last week China released their GDP growth figures for 2009 which showed it grew 8.7% recording $4.91 trillion likely to overtake Japan to second position. USA is still the largest economy with a GDP of $14 trillion. PriceWaterHouse Coopers and Goldman Sachs have come out with their set of predictions – China will become the largest economy by 2020 and on some parameters India will overtake Japan in 2012. If China or India emerges stronger, the obvious reason is because they produce more goods and services, utlising their human and natural resources in an efficient manner. But the ‘Futurogist’ in me couldn’t ignore the following report from Massachussets, USA which states that during the past 15 years, US new borns are getting smaller which is to be studied in detail by the medical fraternity in the coming years. I am quoting the report in full before coming to my theory of why US hegemony will end in another 20-30 years as predicted by futurologists. “U.S. newborns have gotten smaller during the past 15 years, reversing a decades-long upward trend in birth weights, Harvard researchers say. Researchers at the Harvard Pilgrim Health Care Institute's department of population medicine, an affiliate of Harvard Medical School, analyzed data on birth weight, maternal and neonatal characteristics, obstetric care and other trends from the National Center for Health Statistics Natality Data Sets. The researchers looked at data from 36,827,828 U.S. babies born at full-term between 1990 and 2005. "Previous studies [covering periods into the early 1990s] have shown that birth weights have increased steadily during the past half-century," Emily Oken of Harvard Medical School said in a statement. "We expected to see a continuation of those increases." Instead, Oken and her colleagues found birth weights had decreased by an average of 1.83 ounces between 1990 and 2005. The study, published in February's Obstetrics & Gynecology, also found white, well-educated, married women who didn't smoke, received early prenatal care and delivered vaginally with no complications had babies who weighed an average of 2.78 ounces less at birth during the study period. The causes of this decline remain unclear and babies born small not only face short-term complications but increased risk as adults. Future research may identify other factors not included in the current data that might contribute to lower birth weight, such as trends in mothers' diets, physical activity, stress and exposure to environmental toxins.” So apart from factors such as industrial production, knowledge capital, innovation, natural resources, I feel the above report on US new borns indicate that biological reasons could also cause US hegemony to be threatened by emerging nations of China, Russia and India. After all the US economy was built on free enterprise, capitalism and innovative spirit. All of it will be lost if indeed, a new generation of kids are born who are underweight who could face increased risk in their adult life as well. Who knows biological reasons may be the critical factor that determines how long USA will remain the world’s largest economy. The fact that the finding has come from Harvard Medical School is sure to ignite further research into causes leading to low birth weight babies and how to correct them.

# Heg Unsustainable – Economic Crisis

## Economic crisis and multipolarity are the death knell of U.S primacy

**Kfoury,** 0**8** Professor of Computer Science @ Boston University, (Assaf, “US Hegemony Will Continue to Decline, says Chomsky”, Interview with Noam Chomsky, December 08, http://www.stwr.org/united-states-of-america/us-hegemony-will-continue-to-decline-says-chomsky.html)

AK: The economic crisis is felt acutely in the US, but has now spread to the entire world, even to countries (in South America, for example) that initially thought they would be spared. And the American presidential campaign and elections cannot but concern people everywhere, given the dominant role of the US globally. The simultaneous unfolding of the two -- the crisis and the presidential campaign -- has naturally elicited considerable discussion outside the US. In the Middle East, in particular, there has been a kind of speculation, perhaps wishful thinking, be it from the left or from the right. Some Arab commentators have speculated that an Obama administration will follow less aggressive policies. Some other Arab commentators want to see the economic crisis as the sign of an imminent American global decline, and warn pro-American governments and parties to stop doing the bidding of a doomed North American hegemon. What is your response to this kind of thinking? More generally, in relation to the Middle East, what direction is US policy likely to take with the coming Obama administration in the wake of the economic crisis? NC: I think that US hegemony will continue to decline as the world becomes more diverse. That process has been underway for a long time. US power peaked at the end of World War II, when it had literally half the world's wealth and incomparable military power and security. By 1970, its share of global wealth had declined by about half, and it has remained fairly stable since then. In some important respects, US domination has weakened. One important illustration is Latin America, Washington's traditional "backyard." For the first time since European colonization 500 years ago, South America is making significant progress towards integration and independence, and is also establishing South-South relations independent of the US, specifically with China, but elsewhere as well. That is a serious matter for US planners. As it was discussing the transcendent importance of destroying Chilean democracy in 1971, Nixon's National Security Council warned that if the US cannot control Latin America, it cannot expect "to achieve a successful order elsewhere in the world" -- that is, to control the rest of the world. Controlling Latin America has become far more difficult in recent years. It is important to recognize that these goals were explicitly and clearly articulated during World War II. Studies of the State Department and Council on Foreign Relations developed plans, later implemented, to establish a "Grand Area," in which the US would "hold unquestioned power," displacing Britain and France and ensuring the "limitation of any exercise of sovereignty" by states that might interfere with its global designs. Planners called for "an integrated policy to achieve military and economic supremacy for the United States" in the Grand Area, which was to include at least the Western hemisphere, the former British Empire, and the Far East. As the war progressed, and it became clear that Soviet military power was crushing the Nazi war machine, Grand Area planning was extended to include as much of Eurasia as possible. Since that time fundamental policies have changed more in tactics than in substance. And there is little reason to expect any change of goals with a new US administration, though the possibilities of realizing them are declining in a more complex and diverse global system. With regard to the Middle East, policy has been quite stable since World War II, when Washington recognized that Middle East oil supplies are "a stupendous source of strategic power" and "one of the greatest material prizes in world history." That remains true. It is interesting that as the pretexts for invading Iraq become more difficult to sustain, mainstream commentary is beginning to concede the obvious reasons for the invasion, and the need for the US to maintain control of Iraq, to the extent that it can. Thus when Obama called for shifting the focus of US military operations from Iraq to Afghanistan, the Washington Post editors instructed him that he was making a serious mistake, since Afghanistan's "strategic importance pales beside that of Iraq, which lies at the geopolitical center of the Middle East and contains some of the world's largest oil reserves." Propaganda about WMD and democracy is fine to keep the domestic public quiet, but realities must be recognized when serious planning is at stake. Both Democrats and Republicans accept the principle that the US is an outlaw state, entitled to violate the UN Charter at will, whether by threatening force against Iran (an explicit violation of the Charter) or by carrying out aggression (the "supreme international crime," in the words of the Nuremberg Tribunal). They also accept the principle that the US not only has the right to invade other countries if it chooses, but also to attack any country that it alleges is supporting resistance to its aggression. Here the guise is "the war on terror." Murderous attacks by US drones in Pakistan are one illustration. The recent US cross-border raid from Iraq, on October 26, on the town of Bukamal in Syria is another. The editors of the Lebanese Daily Star are quite right in warning that the attack on Syria is another contribution to the "loathsome legacy" of the Bush II administration. But it is not just Bush II, and there is, currently, no substantial basis for expecting any significant change under a new administration with regard to Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine, or any other crucial issue involving the Middle East. AK: Some on the left in the US have warned that, as American economic power wanes and with it the political influence that follows, the US will rely more on military force to assert itself. So, unless there is a concomitant drop in Washington's drive to remain the dominant global power, there will be more military provocations and a far more dangerous world. However, the US military is already over-stretched -- in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and elsewhere -- and many former military officers have recently gone public in expressing their concerns about a broken army. So, is this kind of speculation unduly alarmist? NC: I am frankly somewhat skeptical. For one thing, though ground forces are indeed overstretched, the US military is awesome in scale and power. US military spending is roughly comparable to the rest of the world combined, and the military is far more advanced technologically. It is rather striking that a small client state, Israel, claims to have air and armored forces that are larger and technologically more advanced than any NATO power, apart from the US. And the US is alone in the world in having a global basing system and naval and air forces that allow it to carry out violent action virtually everywhere. It is also alone in developing capacities for space warfare, over the strong objections of the rest of the world. In the economic sphere, for about thirty years the world has been tripolar, with powerful centers in North America, Europe, and East Asia. The diversification of the global economy has proceeded since, and may be somewhat accelerated by the current financial crisis, though that is not obvious. The US has enormous advantages in the economic domain, though also substantial weaknesses, like severe indebtedness. Europe could become an independent force in world affairs, but has chosen to subordinate itself to Washington. It has readily accepted extreme provocations, among them, Clinton's expansion of NATO to the East in violation of firm promises by the Bush I administration to Gorbachev, when he made the astonishing concession of allowing a united Germany to join a hostile military alliance. Some recent consequences in the Caucasus of this policy of expansion to the East have been on the front pages. The Asian countries have accumulated huge financial reserves, so much so that Japan, despite its stalling economy, is purchasing major US assets. In principle, China and Japan could diversify their currencies away from dollars. The effects could be dramatic, but it is not likely, for one reason because of their reliance on the US market, for another, because of US power, which they do not want to confront. It is true that Bush II has severely harmed the interests of those who own and run the society, one reason why he has come under such intense criticism within the mainstream. But it has hardly been a lethal blow. There is much talk about India and China becoming the major powers of the next century. No doubt they will continue to gain economic power, but they have enormous internal problems, unknown in the West. One indication is given by the UN Human Development Index, in which China ranks 81st and India 128th (unchanged through the period of its partial liberalization and rapid growth). And there is much more.

# Heg Unsustainable - Iran

## Hegemony’s done---Iran crisis

**PressTV, 10** (“Iran showed others how to resist US hegemony”, http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=117141&sectionid=351020101)

Iran's former deputy chief nuclear negotiator says Tehran's persistence in pursuing its peaceful nuclear program has defied US hegemony. "At the end of [President] Bush's tenure, the US had lost its identity as a hegemonic power because it did not gain any achievements in solving major international issues, including Iran's nuclear case," said Javad Vaeedi, the former deputy secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. "So Iran's persistence in its nuclear program showed others how to resist hegemony," Vaeedi added. He made the remarks at a forum about US President Barack Obama's policies held at Tehran University on Tuesday. The US believes that it should bring Iran's nuclear program under its control so that it can save face as a hegemonic power, Vaeedi stated. He noted that Obama is trying to create a "global consensus" against Iran as part of his policy to increase the international pressure on Iran. But Obama has failed to fulfill his "change" motto, and the situation is developing in a way that is just the opposite of what he had promised during his presidential campaign, Vaeedi observed.

# Heg Unsustainable – Laundry List

## U.S hegemony is unsustainable- economic problems, military overstretch, and rising powers

**Snyder** PhD, Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland **10** – [Quddus Z. Snyder, “Systermic theory in an era of declining US hegemony,” <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder.pdf>]

At the turn of the century it appeared as if we were living through a ‘hegemonic age.’ But recent developments might justify a reevaluation of this conclusion.**With its armed forces over-extended, and resources stretched, the US appears much weaker today** than it did five years ago. The classic Gilpinian dilemma provides insight into the present predicament the US finds itself in: This three-way struggle over priorities (protection, consumption, and investment) produces a profound dilemma for society. If it suppresses consumption, the consequence can be severe internal social tensions and class conflict…If the society neglects to pay the costs of defense, external weakness will inevitably lead to its defeat by rising powers. If the society fails to save and reinvest a sufficient fraction of its surplus wealth in industry and agriculture, the economic basis of the society and its capacity to sustain either consumption or protection will decline. Thus far the US has maintained a massive defense budget while consumption and investment have been sustained by deficit spending. It is unclear how long this formula will work. The problem does not only stem from fact that **the US is bogged down in two wars**, **it is also in the throes of a serious economic downturn**. Of course, everyone is getting hit. Because all are suffering, the US is still a giant in terms of relative power differentials. Relative power is important, but so is the hegemon’s ability to actually do things. It is unlikely that the US will have either the political will or capability to take on major international undertakings. It is unclear when the US will fully withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan; however, these projects will gobble up massive amounts of resources and treasure at a time when **America’s own recovery is being** partly **bankrolled by** foreign powers like **China.**43 The point is simply that **America’s unilateral assertiveness on the international scene is changing**. US security guarantees may prove less credible than they once were, leading allies to enhance their own military capabilities. The US may still be a giant, but one that, for now at least, seems more bound.

## According to the theory of hegemonic stability, US hegemony is unsustainable- all realists agree

**Snyder** PhD, Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland **10** – [Quddus Z. Snyder, “Systermic theory in an era of declining US hegemony,” <http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/irworkshop/papers_fall09/snyder.pdf>]

Crucial to hegemonic stability theory is that the hegemon actually does things, or provides benefits. For example, Keohane has argued that after World War II the US provided three major sets of benefits in the area of international political economy: First, it provided a stable international monetary system which facilitated trade and payments; second, it provided a market for goods and permitted trade on an asymmetrical basis; and third, the US helped its allies gain access to Middle Eastern oil at stable prices.25 Sadly, all good things must come to an end. Central to the theory of hegemonic stability is that **the arrangement is ultimately unsustainable**. **The hegemon cannot maintain its dominance** in the face of mounting costs, losses in relative power, and inevitable overextension. Challengers will arise. The hegemonic cycle usually ends in war, and thereafter begins anew: “The conclusion of one hegemonic war is the beginning of another cycle of growth, expansion, and eventual decline.”26 **Virtually no realist believes that hegemony can persist indefinitely.**

# Heg Unsustainable – Laundry List

## Decline of U.S hegemony is imminent – multiple reasons

**Toplin** Professor of History (Emeritus), University of North Carolina 3/8/**10** ["Decline of a Great Power?" http://hnn.us/articles/124000.html]

Today the mood is gloomy rather than optimistic. The American economy has lost traction, and the deficit is spiraling. America’s military remains deeply engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. Against this background, words that Paul Kennedy published in 1987 appear insightful. Kennedy warned that “decision-makers in Washington must face the awkward and enduring fact that the sum total of the United States’ global interests and obligations is nowadays far larger than the country’s power to defend them all simultaneously.” Today’s conversations about overreach usually apply to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz and his co-author, Linda Bilms, describe those engagements as “The Three Trillion Dollar War.” Stiglitz and Bilms note U.S. commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan are projected to cost almost ten times the price of the first Gulf War, a third more than the Vietnam War, and twice the price of America’s participation in the First World War. News stories about military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan dominate the headlines, but there are other important examples of on-going military obligations that receive less public attention in print and on television. The United States provides almost half of all global military spending (48%). U.S. troops are presently stationed in more than 150 countries. About 90,000 U.S. military personnel remain in two peaceful nations that surrendered more than sixty years ago (there are 57,000 U.S. military personnel in Germany and 33,000 in Japan). Paul Kennedy did not argue that a great nation must pull back completely, retreat from international affairs, or become isolationist when assessing the cost of international commitments. Nor did he did claim that the decline of a great global power, such as the United States, is inevitable. He stressed, rather, that national leaders should be aware of the interaction between strategy and economics. If leaders extend a country’s reach beyond the capacity of its material resources, wrote Kennedy, “the nation will be less secure in the long term.” That message is as relevant today as it was back in 1987, when many Americans found The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers a thoughtful commentary on the lessons of history.

# Heg Unsustainable – Laundry Listthoug

## Us hegemony is declining

**Anthony** author of Journal of Future Studies **10** – [Marcus T. Anthony, “Civilisational clashes and Harmonic Circles: The US and China,” LexisNexis. ]

The United States has been the undisputed world superpower since the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1990. **This balance of power is now shifting**, with Russia, India and China emerging as new potential world powers. A further issue is a possible decline or even **collapse of the** **United States as a world power**. Recent problems in the United States which have contributed to this perception include a **declining global image, the housing crisis and potential recession, the fiasco surrounding Hurricane Katrina, and the failure to effectively manage the Iraq occupation.** The United States and China have a potential to clash in the foreseeable future, even as the balance of power continues to shift. Recent friction includes the 1999 American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade; Chinese copyright violations; the controversy surrounding Chinese exports (toys and food) to the US; the trade dispute centering on the value of the RMB and the trade imbalance; allegations of systematic Chinese hacking of American state computer systems; and the perennial problem with Taiwan. Analyses of these issues in media and academia typically have a social/systems focus, with worldview distinctions sometimes featuring. However the focus of the Harmonic Circles process is not upon actual specific problems like these stated above. Instead attention centres upon the mental states that those problems evoke. Such specific disputes still need to be dealt with at a practical and diplomatic level. Ideally however, the introspective nature of Harmonic Circles can be employed before such diplomacy, in order to minimise psychological projections.

# Heg Unsustainable – Middle Powers

## Rising middle powers are challenging US supremacy

**The Daily Star 6/21 –** “America is declining, with middle powers challenging its supremacy” <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=5&article_id=116196#axzz0rYQWVueQ>

Long, unfinished wars in Iraq and Afghanistan – coupled with the global recession triggered by the excesses of Wall Street – are widely seen as symptoms of the relative decline in the economic and military clout of the United States. Rising middle-level powers such as Turkey and Iran in the Middle East and Brazil in South America now are challenging the diplomatic supremacy of Washington. Earlier this month, the new contours of diplomatic power were on display in Istanbul. The city was the site of the summit of the 20-member Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building in Asia, which was presided over by the Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The event also provided a venue for the first Turkish-Arab Cooperation Forum, also chaired by Turkey. A member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization – and until recently a rare regional ally of Israel – Turkey basked in the international limelight. An emboldened Turkey also defied Washington, voting against the United States-sponsored resolution imposing new sanctions Iran for its nuclear program, which was passed by the United Nations Security Council. Radical changes in the domestic Turkish political configuration as well as an altered external environment for Turkey have spurred the largest Muslim nation bordering Europe into playing a leading regional role

# Heg Unsustainable – Obama Weakness

## US hegemony is unsustainable- Obama is taking a soft power approach

**Carafano**, Ph.D leading expert in defense affairs, intelligence, military operations, and strategy. **9** [“Obama’s Soft Power Strategy makes U.S. look weak” <http://www.familysecuritymatters.org/publications/id.3967/pub_detail.asp>]

Last week, Washington seemed to lose more ground in dealing with its most intransigent foreign policy challenges. Topping foreign policy news for the week was Bill Clinton’s trip to North Korea where he got to “grip and grin” with the supreme leader Kim Jong-Il and [secure the release](http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/2009/08/07/2009-08-07_clinton_profoundly_honored_to_rescue_ling_lee.html) of two American journalists imprisoned in the country. Sending Clinton, essentially Kim’s price for releasing the two Americans, was a mistake, argues Heritage North Korean expert [Bruce Klingner](http://www.heritage.org/about/staff/bruceklingner.cfm). “Clinton’s mission [risks undermining](http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm2573.cfm) ongoing international efforts to pressure North Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons. The Obama Administration should have instead insisted on resolving the issue through existing diplomatic channels, including special envoy Ambassador Stephen Bosworth.” Rather than seeing how the crisis unfolded as good news, Klingner concluded, “Clinton's visit has roiled the North Korean policy waters beyond their already tumultuous state. There are great uncertainties over North Korean and U.S. intentions, escalating the risk of miscalculation, confrontation, and crisis.” While it is great to have the journalists back home, allowing North Korea to orchestrate the event may have the perverse affect of making it harder not easier to manage the rogue regime. Other breaking national security news involved another troubling state – Russia. Last week several news agencies broke the story of [Russian nuclear subs resuming patrols](http://abcnews.go.com/News/story?id=8257819&page=1) off the US coast. Also making headlines were new reports of Russian arms sales to Venezuela. According to [one press report](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iHhzHorwOZPnKO3tkXL757R6ehEQ), “President Hugo Chávez said Venezuela would purchase dozens of Russian tanks, in a move signaling growing military ties between the two countries that have frequently clashed with Washington.” Iran has been sending tough signals to Washington as well. Recently, an editorial in Conservative Iranian daily concluded, according to a translation provided by MEMRI.org that “the Americans are sending a desperate message to the world, begging Iran for dialogue.” Last week, when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was sworn in to a second term as president (despite continuing protests over claims of election fraud) he showed little interest in playing nice with the United States. His speech included a rebuke of the West as well as an affirmation of a determination that Iran would play a lead role in managing the world. Meanwhile, in what seems like an instant reply of what happened in North Korea, Iranian officials [claimed to have arrested](http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5j5ufIVGnJC7Y-6WVuLkdfPYhlf1gD99S61OO0) three Americans that strayed across the border into Iran. The administration had little to say about of any of these incidents. By electing not to speak out forcefully on Russia’s muscle flexing in the Western Hemisphere; Iran’s intransigence over its nuclear program; or showing much outrage over incarcerating American citizens in Iran and North Korea and then using them for “bargaining chips,” the administration looks weak. In addition, its vaunted “soft power” campaign focused on negotiation and accommodation appears only to be encouraging these countries to be more, not less belligerent.

# Heg Unsustainable – Transitioning Away From Military Power

## US military power is becoming obsolete- we are moving towards softer approaches

**Nye** Distinguised Service Professor at Harvard University **10** ["Is Military Power Becoming Obsolete?" <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19858/is_military_power_becoming_obsolete.html>]

Will military power become less important in the coming decades? It is true that the number of large-scale inter-state wars continues to decline, and fighting is unlikely among advanced democracies and on many issues. But, as Barack Obama said in accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009, "We must begin by acknowledging the hard truth that we will not eradicate violent conflict in our lifetimes. There will be times when nations — acting individually or in concert — will find the use of force not only necessary but morally justified." When people speak of military power, they tend to think in terms of the resources that underlie the hard-power behavior of fighting and threatening to fight — soldiers, tanks, planes, ships, and so forth. In the end, if push comes to shove, such military resources matter. Napoleon famously said that "God is on the side of the big battalions," and Mao Zedong argued that power comes from the barrel of a gun. In today's world, however, there is much more to military resources than guns and battalions, and more to hard-power behavior than fighting or threatening to fight. Military power is also used to provide protection for allies and assistance to friends. Such non-coercive use of military resources can be an important source of the soft-power behavior of framing agendas, persuading other governments, and attracting support in world politics. Even when thinking only of fighting and threats, many analysts focus solely on inter-state war, and concentrate on soldiers in uniforms, organized and equipped by the state in formal military units. But in the 21st century, most "wars" occur within, rather than between states, and many combatants do not wear uniform

.

# Heg Unsustainable – Iraq/WOT

## US hegemony is unsustainable- war on iraq

**Veldhuis** Southern Political Science Association **10** ["US hegemony and the Iraq war" http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\_mla\_apa\_research\_citation/3/9/6/5/2/p396529\_index.html]

For most of the twenty-first century, and particularly since September 11, 2001, the US has been the center of international attention for political leaders and scholars alike. From the proverbial “war on terror” to the wars in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the US has utilized its military capabilities to the greatest extent seen in a generation, and currently has almost one and a half million active duty men and women in its armed forces. Moreover, with a defense budget of ½ trillion dollars, the US is currently spending more money on defense than China, Russia, India, Germany and France combined. Furthermore, the GNP of the US is now over 23 percent of the GWP, pointing to the unipolarity of modern America. Few, scholars dispute the fact that the US has both the military and economic prowess to greatly influence world politics. However, with the cost of the Iraq war exceeding 7 billion a month, and both the international community and domestic body politic sharply divided on the practice of American foreign policy in the post 9/11 world, it seems that U.S. dominance and hegemony may not be as indomitable and infinite as once perceived. In this paper, I attempt to answer a most salient and pressing question: To what extent has the invasion of Iraq augmented or eroded US hegemony and influence in international politics? It is my contention that the US invasion of and subsequent war in Iraq has greatly injured American hegemony and soft power in international relations.

# A2 We Need to Shape the Multipolar system

## Maintaining heg even just to shape the new multipolar system causes backlash and war – only a complete transition away solves

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 158

At the same time, it doubtless is true that it will take some time for others' balancing efforts to realize their intended outcome. Although the United States, contrary to my 1993 prediction, probably will not be challenged by great power rivals as early as 2010, it is even more doubtful that U.S. hegemony will endure until the early 2030s. Is it worthwhile paying the price to hang onto unipolarity for,at best,another two decades? Given that American hegemony is destined to end sooner rather than later and that the costs of trying to "shape the international system" to America's liking will rise (even as the benefits of doing so diminish), it would make more sense grand strategically for the United States to retrench and husband its resources for the long haul. The United States can do this by adopting an offshore balancing grand strategy.

# Multipolarity Inevitable – Must Reads

## Multipolarity inevitable---collapse of the dollar, erosion of public support, and rising challengers

**Layne,** 0**9** Professor, and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service (Christopher, “The Waning of U.S. Hegemony—Myth or Reality”, International Security, Vol. 34, No. 1, Summer 2009)

For an overview of trends that could affect international politics over the next two decades, a good starting point is the National Intelligence Council’s (NIC’s) Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World.15Global Trends 2025 is not light reading, but it is significantly more insightful and intellectually courageous than typical government reports. Its key geopolitical conclusion is that the U.S.-dominated unipolar world will give way to multipolarity during the next two decades spurred by two causal mechanisms: the emergence of new great powers (and potentially important regional powers); and economic, financial, and domestic political constraints that may erode U.S. capabilities. China, India, and possibly Russia are emerging great powers.16 As Global Trends 2025 points out, the rise of China and India to great power status will restore each to “the positions they held two centuries ago when China produced approximately 30 percent and India 15 percent of the world’s wealth” (p. 7). Their ascent is being propelled by “the global shift in relative wealth and economic power” from North America and the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia—a shift “without precedent in modern history” (ibid.). By 2025, China figures to have the world’s second-largest economy (measured by gross domestic product [GDP]) and will be a first-rank military power (p. 30). India, buoyed by its strong economic growth rate, will “strive for a multipolar system with New Delhi as one of the poles” (ibid.). Although both states could encounter speed bumps that might slow—or even derail—their ascents to great power status, the NIC believes that the “chances are good that China and India will continue to rise” (p. 29).17 [End Page 152] Because of uncertainties about economics, energy prices, domestic governance issues, and especially demography, Russia’s great power trajectory is more problematic than China’s or India’s (pp. 31–32).18 Between 2009 and 2025, Russia’s population is forecast to drop from 141 million to below 130 million, affecting the availability of manpower for both the military and the labor pools (pp. 23–24, 30). If Russia overcomes its demographic challenge and continues its revival as a great power, however, the NIC believes it “will be a leading force in opposition to U.S. global dominance” (p. 32). Because its great power status is closely tied to its ability to control both the energy resources and pipelines of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Russia will also seek to reestablish its sphere of influence in the “near abroad” (pp. 32, 82). According to the NIC, in addition to relative decline, the United States will confront other constraints on its international role. U.S. military supremacy will no longer be as dominant as it has been since the Cold War’s end (p. 93). The United States’ soft power may diminish as its liberal model of political and economic development is challenged by authoritarian/statist alternatives (pp. 3, 8–9, 13–14). At home, economic and political constraints may undermine U.S. hegemony. Global Trends 2025 was published just before the full scope of the global financial and economic crisis became apparent. Nevertheless, the NIC did have an inkling of the meltdown’s potential long-term implications for U.S. power. In particular, Global Trends predicts that over the next two decades, the dollar’s role as the international economy’s preeminent reserve currency will erode. Although at the time this issue went to press, the dollar remained strong and will continue to be the reserve currency for some time to come, China’s spring 2009 call to replace the dollar with a new reserve currency signals that the NIC’s long-term worries may be justified.19 [End Page 153] As the NIC observes, the financial privileges conferred on the United States by the dollar’s unchallenged reserve currency status have underpinned the preeminent role of the United States in international politics since the end of World War II. Thus, “the dollar’s decline may force the United States into difficult tradeoffs between achieving ambitious foreign policy goals and the high domestic costs of supporting those objectives” (pp. 12, 94, 97). Moreover, the growing dependence of the United States on foreign capital inflows “may curtail U.S. freedom of action in unanticipated ways” (p. 97). The NIC concludes that America’s “interest and willingness to play a leadership role may be more constrained as the economic, military, and opportunity costs of being the world’s leader are reassessed by American voters” (p. 93). Ultimately, although the United States will probably be primus inter pares in a multipolar international system twenty years from now, it will have less power—and foreign policy options—than it has been accustomed to having since 1945 (ibid.).

# Multipolarity Inevitable – Must Reads

## Multipolarity coming quickly now – multiple reasons

**Hongmei,** 0**9** Columnist for People’s Daily (Li, “The U.S. Hegemony ends, the era of global multipolarity enter”, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/96417/6599374.html)

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently published two graphics which struck people as odd by the stark juxtaposition: In 2003, GDP in the U.S accounted for 32 percent of the world total, while GDP of the emerging economies put together took up only 25 percent. In 2008, however, things just reversed with 25 percent for the U.S. and 32 percent going to the emerging economies. The two graphs show GDP as a percentage of total world output. However, what deserves notice is that the dramatic reversal could take place in just five years, and how much more will it change in the next five or the next ten years? It is evident that the upshot of the shifting economic power signals a swift reduction of U.S. strength as a unipolar power. 'At best, America's unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s, but that was also a decade adrift…So now, rather than bestriding the globe, we are competing—and losing—in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the world's other superpowers: the European Union and China,' citing an article in Saturday's New York Times Magazine titled 'Waving Goodbye to Hegemony' by Parag Khanna. In the post-Cold War period and with the decomposition of the former Soviet Union, the world scenario was generally subject to the U.S influence. And especially in the 1990s, it seemed conceivable and probable that the international power structure would be ended in the U.S. predominance in the political, economic and cultural systems, or simply and bluntly put, the U.S. would be 'King of the hill.' It would be that case if the U.S. were not hit by the '9.11' terrorist attack. The U.S. used to rally the international support by launching a severe clampdown upon terror and acting as the global rescuer to keep the world free from the terrorist havoc. But quite soon, this noble campaign against terrorism, initiated by the U.S. Neo-Conservative elites, was interpreted by the international community as a camouflage used by the U.S. to hide its intention to regain monopoly over the entire globe. In 2008, nevertheless, the U.S hegemony was pushed onto the brink of collapse, as a result of its inherent structural contradictions, which proved well-rooted in the American society and far from conciliatory. A visible sign of the U.S. strength decline turned out to be the decline of its monolithic economic clout over the globe. The typically American liberal capitalist financial system, featuring the loopholes of effective monitoring and feeding greed and exploitation, sparked a swirl of Domino Effects last year and quickly sent the whole economy into plunging. The worst ever economic downturn since the Great Depression also helped the first African-American president Barack Obama take power in a backdrop that Americans are so dearly longing for a radical change. With the breakdown of the U.S.--dominated international power structure, the world attention would be focused on such an unavoidable question: Does the decline of U.S. geopolitical hegemony make multilateral global governance more likely? Perhaps it is still too early to rush any conclusion, but at least one thing is certain: the U.S. strength is declining at a speed so fantastic that it is far beyond anticipation. The U.S. is no longer 'King of the hill,' as a new phase of multipolar world power structure will come into being in 2009, and the international order will be correspondingly reshuffled. Albeit, for now, the new international power structure is still indiscernible— In the Middle East, peace talks between Palestine and Israel have yet to see any fruit, and maybe not in prospect; Iran is rising as a regional power; Latin America is stepping up its efforts to break away from the U.S. orbit; the European Union cannot afford its increasing expansion; Leading players on the European Continent such as Britain, Germany and France are battling their own economic downtrend; and Russia also faces a tough job in reducing its heavy reliance on gas exports and building the modern manufacturing industry of its own. China has grown to be a new heavyweight player and stepped into the limelight on the world stage. And its role in salvaging the plummeting world economy from hitting bottom looms large and active, as the U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said during her just wrapped-up Asian tour, 'the U.S. appreciates the continued Chinese confidence in the U.S treasuries.' If the Cold War was 'a tug of war' between East and West, and a showcase of hard power, what we have today, for the first time in history, is a global, multicivilizational and multipolar competition, and a display of smart power. To be the winner, one has to seek more cooperation rather than confrontation.

# Multipolarity Inevitable – Must Reads

## **America’s unipolar era has already ended**

Haas 7 - President of the Council on Foreign Relations (4/15/09, Richard, "What follows American dominion?" Goolgle Scholar)

The unipolar era, a time of unprecedented American dominion, is over. It lasted some two decades, little more than a moment in historical terms. Why did it end? One explanation is history. States get better at generating and piecing together the human, financial and technological resources that lead to productivity and prosperity. The same holds for companies and other organizations. The rise of new powers cannot be stopped. The result is an ever larger number of actors able to exert influence regionally or globally. It is not that the US has grown weaker, but that many other entities have grown much stronger. A second reason unipolarity has ended is US policy. By both what it has done and what it has failed to do, the US has accelerated the emergence of new power centres and has weakened its own position relative to them. US energy policy (or the lack thereof) is one driving force behind the end of unipolarity. Since the first oil shocks of the 1970s, US oil consumption has grown by some 20 per cent and, more important, US imports of petroleum products have more than doubled in volume and nearly doubled as a percentage of consumption. This growth in demand for foreign oil has helped drive up the world price from just over $20 a barrel to more than $100 a barrel. The result is an enormous transfer of wealth and leverage to those states with energy reserves. US economic policy has played a role as well. President George W. Bush has fought costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, allowed discretionary spending to increase by 8 per cent a year and cut taxes. The US fiscal position declined from a surplus of more than $100bn in 2001 to an estimated deficit of about $250bn in 2007. The ballooning current account deficit is now more than 6 per cent of gross domestic product. This places downward pressure on the dollar, stimulates inflation and contributes to the accumulation of wealth and power elsewhere in the world. Poor regulation of the US mortgage market and the credit crisis it spawned have exacerbated these problems. Iraq has also contributed to the dilution of American primacy. The conflict has proved to be an expensive war of choice – militarily, economically and diplomatically, as well as in human terms. Years ago, the historian Paul Kennedy outlined his thesis about “imperial overstretch”, which posited that the US would eventually decline by overreaching, just as other great powers had. Prof Kennedy’s theory turned out to apply most immediately to the Soviet Union, but the US – for all its corrective mechanisms and dynamism – has not proved to be immune.

# Multipolarity Inevitable – Generic

## Multipolarity coming now

**Phillips, 10** Analyst of Middle East Affairs (Chris, “US hegemony in Middle East is ending”, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/may/31/us-hegemony-middle-east-ending)

Yet even though the return to cold war bi-polar blocs in the Middle East is unlikely, the region's international relations are changing. US power is waning. Though Washington remains the world's only superpower, the quagmires of Iraq and Afghanistan have exposed the limits of US ambitions, while the economic crisis has forced the Obama administration to focus energy elsewhere. While the Bush era saw the US hegemonic in the region, squeezing the defiant few like Syria and Saddam Hussein's Iraq, today's Middle East sees a power vacuum led by partial US retreat being filled by assertive regional and middle powers. Turkey and Brazil's recent nuclear deal with Iran typify this emerging new climate. Stephen Walt has highlighted that this shift in power is global, with Asia's share of GDP already outstripping that of the US or Europe. As ever, it seems the Middle East could prove a microcosm of these international changes. If the age of American uni-polarity is coming to an end, perhaps hastened by unnecessary wars and economic shortsightedness, it is much more likely that international relations in the Middle East will come to reflect the multi-polar world that will follow rather than revert to a bi-polar cold war. In such circumstances, it won't just be Russia and Turkey expanding their reach in the region, but China, India and Brazil will all bid for a role, too – presumably having fewer demands than Washington about their clients pursuing democratic reforms and peace with Israel. Saudi Arabia's growing relationship with China might signify the shape of things to come. Not that this era is yet upon us. The US remains the superpower and could still effect serious change in the region, should it desire. However, the recent actions of Russia and Turkey in the Middle East do show a new assertiveness from regional powers to pursue their own path in defiance of US will, whether through arms deals, trade agreements or diplomatic coups. A new cold war is unlikely, but the age of unchallenged US hegemony in the Middle East could be ending.

# Multipolarity Inevitable - Generic

## Everyone has come to accept that multipolarity is inevitable---their authors are in denial

**Dickinson,** 0**9** Assistant Editor @ Foreign Policy, (Elizabeth, “New Order”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/19/new\_order)

The multipolar world has become a global reality, recognized as a near certainty by no less an authority than the U.S. intelligence community. But it wasn't always such. For most of its geopolitical life, "multipolar" has been a synonym for America-bashing, whether by erstwhile allies in the Cold War or an anxious Russia grappling with its post-superpower status. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright once bragged of the United States as the world's "indispensable nation"; today, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton promises to tilt the balance "away from a multipolar world and toward a multipartner world." circa 1350 to circa 1900: Although the term is not yet in use, Europe remains for centuries basically a multipolar world: Several countries vie for dominance, but none reigns supreme for more than a few decades at a time. March 5, 1946: Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech heralds the start of the Cold War, rendering the geopolitical world bipolar overnight. Refusing to take sides, five countries found the Non-Aligned Movement in 1955 under the leadership of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. 1969: "Our deepest challenge," U.S. national security advisor Henry Kissinger writes, will be "to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers." A year later, President Richard Nixon articulates the Nixon Doctrine, which seeks to exploit diplomatic divisions to reduce America's military commitments. January 8, 1978: French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing describes his differences with U.S. President Jimmy Carter as a "means to attain our grand objective, namely, the organization of a multipolar world which will not be limited by the decisions made by two superpowers alone." 1987: In The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Yale University historian Paul Kennedy predicts the balance of military power will shift over the coming 20 to 30 years, creating a truly multipolar world around 2009. "If the patterns of history are any guide, the multipolar economic balance will begin to shift the military balances," he later tells the New York Times. December 25, 1991: The Soviet Union ceases to exist, eliminating the second Cold War "pole" and launching a debate about the new world order. "Global politics," Samuel Huntington argues later in Foreign Affairs, "is now passing through one or two uni-multipolar decades before it enters a truly multipolar 21st century." April 23, 1997: Fear of U.S. unipolarity inspires China and Russia to sign a "Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order" in Moscow. February 2, 2000: Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, who earlier dubbed the United States the "indispensable nation," claims the U.S. is not looking to "establish and enforce" a unipolar world. Economic integration, she says, has already created "the kind of world that might even be called 'multipolar.'" Spring 2003: Calling for a "multipolar world" becomes a euphemism for opposing the Iraq war. British Prime Minister Tony Blair warns that French President Jacques Chirac's multipolar vision, and his prolific use of the term, is "dangerous and destabilizing." January 26, 2007: A New York Times editorial describes the "emergence of a multipolar world," with China taking "a parallel place at the table along with other centers of power, like Brussels or Tokyo." November 20, 2008: In its "Global Trends 2025" report, the U.S. National Intelligence Council declares the advent of a "global multipolar system" as one of the world's "relative certainties" within two decades. 2009: U.S. President Barack Obama takes office with what many deem a multipolar worldview, prioritizing rising powers such as Brazil, China, India, and Russia. "We will lead by inducing greater cooperation among a greater number of actors and reducing competition, tilting the balance away from a multipolar world and toward a multipartner world," Secretary of State Hillary Clinton says in a July address. July 22, 2009: "We are trying to build a multipolar world," U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden declares in a speech in Ukraine.

# Multipolarity Inevitable – Domestic Constrainsts

## Heg transition has already begun—domestic troubles

**Hadar, ’08** – research fellow in foreign policy studies, specializing in foreign policy, international trade, the Middle East, and South and East Asia (Leon T., May 21, *Balance of Power Is Continuing to Shift From the US*, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9417>)

But if the financial crisis at home has accentuated US geo-economic weakness in the form of massive deficits, a weak dollar and rising oil prices, the mess in Iraq and the continuing tension with Iran and other global military diplomatic problems like North Korea expose the erosion in US geo-strategic power. It is less likely that the Americans will be able to fight two major wars around the world at the same time. To put it differently, the US has less of the kind of economic and military leverage it used to employ in the past in order to affect the global balance of power. That not only means that Washington will have to place on the backburner its global democratic crusade. It will be more difficult for the Americans to energetically promote the liberalization of the global trade agenda. It also points to the need for America's military and trade partners, as well as the rising powers of China, India and Russia to try to fill the vacuum created by the overstretching of US economic and military power.

# Multipolarity Inevitable – Economic Blocs

## Economic blocs ensure multipolarity.

Aijaz Ahmad 4/17/2007 http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/ahmad170407.html

He went further and warned Europe itself that the continuing eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was "a serious provocative factor" and that the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had been converted into "a vulgar instrument for advancing the foreign policy goals of one country or a group of countries against other countries". The global missile defence system developed by the U.S. would, he said, "give it a free hand to launch not only local, but global conflicts" and the proposed deployment of U.S. missile interceptors in Europe to neutralise Russia's nuclear arsenals would trigger "another round of the inevitable arms race". Calling for a new "global security architecture", Putin reminded the Europeans that the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) had among them a larger gross domestic product (GDP) than the European Union. "There is no doubt that in the foreseeable future the economic potential of these new centres of power will inevitably get converted into political clout and will strengthen multipolarity," he said.

# Multipolarity Solves War

## U.S. withdrawal and a concurrent shift to multipolarity would prevent American involvement in major power wars.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 170

By devolving full responsibility for their defense to U.S. allies, offshore balancing would take advantage of the unique geostrategic advantages that allow the United States to benefit from multipolarity, exercise a free hand strategically, and avoid being automatically engulfed in Eurasian conflicts because of its alliance commitments. As an offshore balancer, the United States would reap security advantages from a reversion to multipolarity. The United States is far removed from powerful rivals and shielded from them both by geography and its own hard power. Consequently, as an insular great power, the United States is far less vulnerable to the effects of "instability" than are the major powers of Eurasia, and it could—and should—insulate itself from possible future Eurasian great power wars. For the United States, the risk of conflict and the possible exposure of the American homeland to attack, rather than arising from any direct threat to the United States itself; derive directly from the overseas commitments mandated by hegemony's all-encompassing definition of U.S. interests.

# Withdrawal = Smooth

## Withdrawal is smooth

Charles A. Kupchan, Political Science Quarterly, 00323195, Summer 2003, Vol. 118, Issue 2 “The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy” Database: Academic Search Premier

As this new century progresses, unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. As this transition proceeds, American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on U.S. power, while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective management of the global system. The ultimate vision that should guide U.S. grand strategy is the construction of a concert-like directorate of the major powers in North America, Europe, and East Asia. These major powers would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among their respective regions. They would also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism, a struggle that will require patience and steady cooperation among many different nations. Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade, information, and values. Strong and vibrant regional centers, for reasons of both proximity and culture, often have the strongest incentives to promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. North America might, therefore, focus on Latin America; Europe on Russia, the Middle East, and Africa; and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia. Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task. The United States will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with American primacy. Neither American leaders, long accustomed to calling the shots, nor leaders in Europe and East Asia, long accustomed to passing the buck, will find the transition an easy one. But it is far wiser and safer to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic multipolarity by default. It will take a decade, if not two, for a new international system to evolve. But the decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently been the precursor to great power war in the past.[\*]

# A2 We’ll Cling to Power

## US will accept its new role peacefully – no backlash

Charles A. Kupchan Fall 1999 World Policy Journal "Life after pax Americana"

The bad news is that the global stability that unipolarity has engendered will be jeopardized as power becomes more equally distributed in the international system. The good news is that this structural change will occur through different mechanisms than in the past, and therefore may be easier to manage peacefully. The rising challenger is Europe, not a unitary state with hegemonic ambitions. Europe's aspirations will be moderated by the self-checking mechanisms inherent in the EU and by cultural and linguistic barriers to centralization. In addition, the United Statesis likely to react to a more independent Europe by stepping back and making room for an EU that appears ready to be more self-reliant and more muscular. Unlike reigning hegemons in the past, the United States will not fight to the finish to maintain its primacy and prevent its eclipse by a rising challenger. On the contrary, the United States will cede leadership willingly as its economy slows and it grows weary of being the security guarantor of last resort. The prospect is thus not one of clashing titans, but of no titans at all. Regions long accustomed to relying on American resourcesand leadership to preserve the peace may well be left to fend for themselves. These are the main reasons that the challenge for American grand strategy as the next century opens will be to wean Europe and East Asia of their dependence on the United States andput in place arrangements that will prevent the return of competitive balancing and regional rivalries in the wake of an American retrenchment.

# A2 Transitions Historically Violent

## The new transition will be different from previous ones—more multipolar

**Pieterse, ’08** – professor in global sociology at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, specializes in globalization (Jan Nederveen, Future, *Globalization the next round: Sociological perspectives*, Lexis)

The general possibilities in relation to hegemony are continued American hegemony, hegemonic rivalry, hegemonic transition and multipolarity. The previous episode of hegemonic decline at the turn of the nineteenth century took the form of wars of hegemonic rivalry culminating in hegemonic transition. The current transition looks to be structurally different from the previous episode. Rather than hegemonic rivalry, we are witnessing global realignments toward growing multipolarity. Thus, what is at issue is not just a decline of (American) hegemony and rise of (Asian) hegemony, but a more complex field.

# US Will Over-Rely on Heg

## US military power has only limited effects – on the whole it causes backlash

Carl Conetta (co-directs the Project on Defense Alternatives, a defense-policy think tank. Earlier, he was a research fellow at the Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies) December 2007 “ A Prisoner to Primacy” <http://www.comw.org/pda/0712conetta.html>

Using military power to prevent the emergence of threats often implies treating actors who are not preparing or conducting an act of aggression as though they were. Preventative military operations target not aggression but, instead, the capability to aggress - be it existing, emergent, or suspected. Prevention can also target actors who we believe are disposed, due to the nature of their governments or belief systems, to do us some type of harm at some point in the future - that is, adversary regimes or movements, rogues and radicals. Of course, treating potential threats as though they are impending ones can exacerbate tensions and precipitate the outcome that "prevention" is meant to preclude. Thus, in addressing the nuclear programs of both North Korea and Iran, our coercive efforts spurred, rather than retarded, the behavior we had hoped to stop. Similarly provocative are some types of militarized "environment shaping" - what the Bush administration prefers to call "dissuasion." Armed dissuasion involves using military assets to "stake out" US interests in a specific situation or outcome. We might think of it as "preemptive deterrence" or "preemptive containment." Our worldwide military deployments, bases, exercises, assistance programs, and partnerships all serve a dissuasive function (among others). They are supposed to communicate implicitly that an undesirable competition or confrontation may ensue if another nation or actor undertakes a proscribed course of action. Beginning in 1997, US strategy has seen the success of dissuasion as depending in large part on maintaining America's considerable margin of global military superiority. In accord with this, a key objective of dissuasion has been to discourage other countries from initiating arms competitions with the United States. How? By continuously widening America's lead with the aim of making competition seem hopeless. Is dissuasion provocative or not? This depends in part on what behaviors it targets and what rules it seeks to set. Generally speaking: if dissuasive acts impinge on the internal affairs, sovereignty, core interests, or normal prerogatives of a target country, they are more likely to prompt resistance than compliance. The United States might effectively dissuade Chinese naval activism in the Caribbean, for instance - but not in the South China Sea. Likewise, if the United States seems to be claiming extraordinary rights or privileges through dissuasive acts, the targeted nations will either resist complying or strive to alter the power balance between themselves and America. This is precisely what China and Russia are attempting to do as the US network of bases and partnerships gradually surrounds them.

# Military Presence Key to Heg

## Military presence solves US hegemony

**Hadar 9,** Business Times Singapore Washington correspondent

(Leon, 12/15/09, “ Key US allies adjust to new realities;

But Japan and Turkey may not pursue an anti-American agenda or embark on a civilisational confrontation with the US”, Lexis)

Notwithstanding the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US-Japan alliance - not unlike the Energizer Bunny - kept going and going and going, as the two sides focused on new common threats, including China and North Korea. For Washington, the status quo helped perpetuate its hegemony in Northeast Asia by maintaining its military presence, while for the Japanese it permitted the free-riding on American military protection against China's strengthening military might and North Korean nuclear arms.

## The pillar of hegemony is global military presence

**Muzaffar 09**, President of the International Movement for a Just World, Professor of Global Studies at the Science University of Malaysia

(Chandra, November 10, 2009, “End looks near for American hegemony”, New Straits Times, LEXIS)

THE role the United States should play in a future East Asia Community was apparently one of the unresolved issues at the recent 16-nation East Asia Summit (EAS) in Hua Hin, Thailand. The truth is, the US is already a significant player in the region. This is not just the result of the deep economic and political ties that the US enjoys with most of the 10 Asean states, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand. Huge American military bases with tens of thousands of soldiers and some of the most sophisticated weaponry on earth are spread throughout Asia and the Pacific. The US has over the years forged security alliances with some of the governments in the region and continues to sell arms to many of them. Neither the EAS, Asean+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) nor Asean itself - the driving force behind the other two formations - has, at the collective level, questioned the overwhelming US military presence. The US quest for global hegemony - military power is a critical pillar of this - has never been on the formal agenda of any of the meetings of these groupings.

## Bases are key to global power projection—literal and perceptual

National Defense University,’09 (Institute for National Strategic Studies, Global Strategic Assessment 2009: America's Security Role in a Changing World, p. 400)

For the Air Force to project global power, it requires international bases to extend its reach and provide aerial refueling of shorter range lighters and transports. Besides projecting national power. basing agreements deter aggression by demonstrating the solidarity of the United States and its allies around the world. As a new generation of antiship missiles has continued to drive aircraft carriers farther from shore. basing will remain important to American defense interests. This requirement has not received the attention that it deserves: thus, basing issues and related power projection considerations must be given a high priority.

## Military bases key to hegemony

**Periodico 6/25** (Cuban News Paper, 6/25/10, “Military Bases to Guarantee US Hegemony”, http://www.periodico26.cu/english/opinion/may10/us-bases062210.html, DB)

In order for the United States to maintain its economic, political and military hegemony, they have set up military bases around the world. These bases have been used for rapid military incursions or to back a prolonged military occupation wherever US interests are at stake. Washington has many such bases, training camps, espionage centers, and deposits for nuclear weapons scattered around the world. These bases undermine the independence and sovereignty of the host countries. For the past 100 years alone, these bases have been instrumental in supporting over 100 military interventions worldwide. These bases are also synonym with violations of human rights, and environmental degradation. On this latter issue there is no better example than the base in the Puerto Rican Isle of Vieques. The isle has been used to dispose of radioactive material used in ammunition, seriously damaging the environment and causing cancer rates that are 40% higher than those reported in the rest of Puerto Rico. These military bases are an incentive for prostitution which often includes minors, and extortion. For instance, the Subic Base in the Philipines, which was the biggest US base in Asia, fueled the prostitution business in the nearest town of Ologapo, where at least a thousand brothels opened to “service” US marines. These bases have even prompted the resignation of government leaders, like, in the case of Japanese Prime Minister Yokio Hatoyama, who could not bear popular rejection after being unable to delivered promises regarding the Okinawa base. The people of Okinawa have long stand the reckless behavior of some US marines that have gone as far as committing rape and murder. The latest addition of seven other US military bases in Colombia, poses a clear threat to the neighboring countries, especially to Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, countries implementing big social changes that are at odds with Washington’s ideas about democracy. In short, US military bases are spreading like wild fire, in what could be considered a virtual military occupation of the

# Prolif Kills Heg

## Prolif Kills heg

**Jervis**, 0**9** Professor of international politics at Columbia University (Robert, “Unipolarity, A Structural Perspective”, World Politics Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009”

This raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents.55 The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. How they would use this increased security is far from clear, however. They might intensify conflict with neighbors because they no longer fear all-out war, or, on the contrary, they might be willing to engage in greater cooperation [End Page 212] because the risks of becoming dependent on others would be reduced. In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important. Unipolarity—at least under current circumstances—may then have within it the seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modification, and the resulting world would pose interesting challenges to both scholars and national leaders. [End Page 213]

# Growth Key to Heg

## Economic growth is key to hegemony

**Garamone 10,** American Forces Press Service

(Jim, May 28, 2010, “ National Security Advisor Describes New Strategy “, Lexis)

"This is a time of sweeping change," he said. "Two decades since the end of the Cold War, the free flow of information, people and trade continues to accelerate at an unprecedented pace. Events far beyond our nation's shores now impact our safety, our security and prosperity, and that of our allies and friends alike, in ways that we could not have imagined just a few years ago." This globalization of information and goods promises great benefits, Jones said, but it also can be used against the United States. "This interconnection also comes with the perils of global challenges that do not respect borders: global networks of terrorists and criminals, threats in space and cyberspace, a degrading climate and technologies with increasing destructive power," the retired Marine Corps general said. "In addition, the international architecture of the 20th century, designed for another time, is buckling under the weight of these new threats. As a consequence, it has been difficult to forge the cooperative approaches necessary to prevent states from flouting international norms and agreements." The United States must be strong economically to be a power internationally, Jones said, and part of the strategy recognizes the importance of economics and growth. "American innovation must be the foundation of American power," he said, "because at no time in human history has a nation of diminished economic vitality maintained its military and political primacy." Engaging with allies and friends is key to the strategy, Jones noted, adding that Obama has stressed that no one nation can solve the problems of the world.

## Econ growth is key to heg – defense spending advantages

**Schwarz 94,**  Benjamin Schwarz is The Atlantic’s literary editor and national editor.

(August 21, CAN INTERNATIONAL CAPITALISM SURVIVE THE DECLINE OF THE PAX AMERICANA?, lexis)

A hegemonic power forced to place such importance on military security must divert capital and creativity from the civilian sector, even as other states, freed from onerous spending for security, add resources to economically productive investments. As America's relative economic strength erodes, so does the comparative advantage over other powers upon which its hegemony is founded. America's declining advantage will spur the emergence of great power rivals, requiring the United States to spend more on defense to maintain its preponderance, which only further deteriorates its comparative advantage. Already, economic power has diffused from the United States to new centers of economic growth in Europe and Asia. Thus, a global economy bites the hegemon that feeds it, destroying the hegemon's relative dominance and shattering the very foundation upon which interdependence rests.

# Demo Promo Key to Heg

## Democracy promotion is key to sustaining hegemony

**Owen 6**, Ph.D., Harvard, Associate Professor, Honors Program Director. Field: International Relations @ University of Virginia

(John M., “ Democracy, Realistically”, Lexis)

The expansion of the zone of democracies since the 1980s is due in part to America's victory in the Cold War. The same expansion has in turn helped sustain American hegemony in the post-Cold War world. The consequences of the link between democracy and American power are profound. Realists must realize that preserving American power requires some democracy promotion. A democratic crusade--using force to bring liberty and justice to all without regard to cost--is never prudent, and indeed democracy promotion alone is insufficient grounds for a war. But the spread of free institutions has a rightful place among U.S. foreign policy goals, not least because it can serve the pre-eminent goals of national security and prosperity. This is why the United States has declared democracy promotion to be official policy since June 1982, when President Ronald Reagan announced to the British House of Commons, "The objective I propose is quite simple to state: to foster the infrastructure of democracy, the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities, which allows a people to choose their own way to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means."