Hegemony Good DA

[Hegemony Good DA 1](#_Toc264078680)

[\_\_\_\*\*1NC 3](#_Toc264078681)

[Hegemony DA – 1NC 4-5](#_Toc264078682)

[\_\_\_\*\*Uniqueness 6](#_Toc264078684)

[Heg Up – 2NC\*\* 7](#_Toc264078685)

[Heg Up – Africa 8](#_Toc264078686)

[Heg Up – Central Asia 9](#_Toc264078687)

[Heg Up – Leadership 10](#_Toc264078688)

[Heg Up – Climate Change 11](#_Toc264078689)

[Heg Up – Unipolarity 12-13](#_Toc264078690)

[Heg Up – AT: Asia/ME 14](#_Toc264078692)

[Heg Up – AT: Economy 15](#_Toc264078693)

[Heg Up – AT: Iraq 16](#_Toc264078694)

[Heg Up – AT: Liberal Hippies 17](#_Toc264078695)

[Heg Up – AT: Soft Power Down 18](#_Toc264078696)

[\_\_\_\*\*Links 19](#_Toc264078697)

[2NC Link Wall 20-21](#_Toc264078698)

[Allies Link 22-23](#_Toc264078700)

[Afghanistan Link 24-25](#_Toc264078702)

[Iraq Link 26](#_Toc264078704)

[Japan Link 27](#_Toc264078705)

[Kuwait Link 28](#_Toc264078706)

[South Korea Link 29-30](#_Toc264078707)

[\_\_\_\*\*Internals 31](#_Toc264078709)

[East Asia k2 Heg 32-33](#_Toc264078710)

[East Asia – Outweighs 34](#_Toc264078712)

[\_\_\_\*\*Impact Stuff 35](#_Toc264078713)

[Heg Good\*\* 36-42](#_Toc264078714)

[Heg Good – Collapse 🡪 War 43](#_Toc264078721)

[Heg Good – CCP Collapse 44](#_Toc264078722)

[Heg Good – Democracy 45](#_Toc264078723)

[Heg Good – Democracy EXT 46-47](#_Toc264078724)

[Heg Good – Economy EXT 48](#_Toc264078725)

[Heg Good – Free Trade 49](#_Toc264078726)

[Heg Good – Free Trade EXT: AT – Copley Indicts 50](#_Toc264078727)

[Heg Good – Great Power Wars (GPW) 51](#_Toc264078728)

[Heg Good – GPW 52-53](#_Toc264078729)

[Heg Good – Israel 54](#_Toc264078731)

[Heg Good – Nuclear Terror EXT 55](#_Toc264078732)

[Heg Good – Nye 56](#_Toc264078733)

[Heg Good – Poverty 57](#_Toc264078734)

[Heg Good – Prolif 58](#_Toc264078735)

[Heg Good – Russia 59-60](#_Toc264078736)

[\_\_\_\*\*AT: Decline Inevitable 61](#_Toc264078737)

[AT: Decline Inevitable\*\* 62-64](#_Toc264078738)

[AT: Decline Inevitable – Hutton EXT 65](#_Toc264078741)

[AT: Decline Inevitable – Aging Crisis EXT 66](#_Toc264078742)

[AT: Decline Inevitable – Thayer EXT 67](#_Toc264078743)

[AT: Decline Inevitable – Stratfor EXT 68](#_Toc264078744)

[AT: Decline Inevitable – Concerted Efforts Key 69](#_Toc264078745)

[AT: Decline Inevitable – Economy Answers 70](#_Toc264078746)

[AT: Decline Inevitable – Heg Key 71](#_Toc264078747)

[AT: Decline Inevitable – Multilat Key 72](#_Toc264078748)

[AT: Decline Inevitable – No Timeframe 73](#_Toc264078749)

[AT: Decline Inevitable – Terrorism Answers 74](#_Toc264078750)

[AT: Decline Inevitable – Transition Conflict Answers 75](#_Toc264078751)

[\_\_\_\*\*AT: Assorted Neg Args 76](#_Toc264078752)

[AT: China Rise 77-78](#_Toc264078753)

[AT: China Rise – Aging Crisis EXT 79](#_Toc264078755)

[AT: Counter-Balancing 80-81](#_Toc264078756)

[AT: Counter-Balancing – No Great Rival 82](#_Toc264078758)

[AT: Econ Collapse / Costs of Hegemony Unsustainable 83](#_Toc264078759)

[AT: EU Rise 84](#_Toc264078760)

[AT: EU Rise – Economic Model EXT 85](#_Toc264078761)

[AT: Foreign Debt 86](#_Toc264078762)

[AT: Imperial Overstretch 87](#_Toc264078763)

[AT: India Rise 88](#_Toc264078764)

[AT: Interventionism 89](#_Toc264078765)

[AT: Layne 90](#_Toc264078766)

[AT: Readiness Collapse 91](#_Toc264078767)

[AT: NATO Collapse 92](#_Toc264078768)

[AT: Soft Balancing 93](#_Toc264078769)

[AT: Russia Rise 94](#_Toc264078770)

[AT: Soft Power Collapse Inevitable 95](#_Toc264078771)

[AT: Terrorism 96](#_Toc264078772)

[\_\_\_\*\*Aff Answers 97](#_Toc264078773)

[Collapse Inevitable – 2NC 98-102](#_Toc264078774)

[Heg Down – 2AC 103-104](#_Toc264078775)

[Heg Down – Terminal D 105](#_Toc264078777)

[Heg Down – Terminal D 106](#_Toc264078778)

[Heg Down – AT: Militarily Superior 107](#_Toc264078779)

[Heg Down – AT: Soft Balancing 108](#_Toc264078780)

[Heg Down – AT: Those are Brinks 109](#_Toc264078781)

[Heg Down – AT: Transition From Heg 🡪 War 110](#_Toc264078782)

[Heg Down – AT: Unipolarity\*\* 111](#_Toc264078783)

[Heg Down – AT: Unipolarity\*\* 112](#_Toc264078784)

[Heg Bad 2AC\*\* 113-118](#_Toc264078785)

[AT: Transition Wars 119](#_Toc264078791)

\_\_\_\*\*1NC

Hegemony DA – 1NC

A. Uniqueness – American overseas military commitments make it a preeminent global power – defense expenditures are vital to military dominance

Ikenberry et al, ‘9. G. John Ikenberry is a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, Michael Mastanduno is a professor of government and associate dean for social sciences at Dartmouth College, and William C. Wohlforth is a professor of government at Dartmouth College. “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009, p. Muse.

There is widespread agreement, moreover, that any plausible index aggregating the relevant dimensions of state capabilities would place the United States in a separate class by a large margin.12 The most widely used measures of capability are gdp and military spending. As of 2006 the United States accounted for roughly one-quarter of global gdp and nearly 50 percent of gdp among the conventionally defined great powers (see Table 1). This surpasses the relative economic size of any leading state in modern history, with the sole exception of the United States itself in the early cold war years, when World War II had temporarily depressed every other major economy. By virtue of the size and wealth of the United States economy, its massive military capabilities represented only about 4 percent of its gdp in 2006 (Table 2), compared with the nearly 10 percent it averaged over the peak years of the cold war—1950–70—as well as with the burdens borne by most of the major powers of the past.13 The United States now likely spends more on defense than the rest of the world combined (Table 2). Military research and development (R&D) may best capture the scale of the long-term investments that military expenditures on R&D were more than six times greater than those of Germany, Japan, France, and Britain combined. By some estimates over half of the military R&D expenditures in the world are American, a disparity that has been sustained for decades: over the past thirty years, for example, the United States invested more than three times what the EU countries combined invested in military R&D. Hence, on any composite index featuring these two indicators the United States obviously looks like a unipole. That perception is reinforced by a snapshot of science and technology indicators for the major powers (see Table 3). These vast commitments do not make the United States omnipotent, but they do facilitate a preeminence in military capabilities vis-à-vis all other major powers that is unique in the post-seventeenth-century experience. While other powers can contest U.S. forces operating in or very near their homelands, especially over issues that involve credible nuclear deterrence, the United States is and will long remain the only state capable of projecting major military power globally.14 This dominant position is enabled by what Barry Posen calls “command of the commons”—that is, unassailable military dominance over the sea, air, and space. The result is an international system that contains only one state with the capability to organize major politico-military action anywhere in the system.15 No other state or even combination of states is capable of mounting and deploying a major expeditionary force outside its own region, except with the assistance of the United States. Conventional measures thus suggest that the concentration of military and overall economic potential in the United States distinguishes the current international system from its predecessors over the past four centuries (see Figure 1). As historian Paul Kennedy observed: “Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing, . . . I have returned to all of the comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation comes close.”16 The bottom line is that if we adopt conventional definitions of polarity and standard measures of capabilities, then the current international system is as unambiguously unipolar as past systems were multipolar and bipolar.

B. Power is zero-sum – if America reduces its commitment, the perception alone will sacrifice its global military preeminence

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota [Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

There is no viable alternative grand strategy for the United States than primacy. Primacy is the best and most effective means to maintain the security and safety of the United States for the reasons I argued in chapter 1. However, it is also the best because every other grand strategic "alternative" is a chimera and can only weaken the United States, threaten the security and safety of the American people, and introduce great peril for the United States and for other countries. A large part of what makes primacy such a success is that other countries know where the United States stands, what it will defend, and that it will be involved in disputes, both great and small. Accordingly, other countries have to respect the interests of the United States or face the consequences. Offshore balancing incurs the risks of primacy without its benefits. It pledges that the United States will defend its interests with air power and sea power, but not land power. That is curious because we could defend our interests with land power but choose not to, suggesting our threat to defend is not serious, which weakens our credibility and invites challenges to the interests of the United States. Offshore balancing increases the probability of conflict for the United States. It raises the danger that the interests of the United States will be challenged not only from foes like China and Iran, but, perversely, also from countries now allied with the United States like Japan and Turkey./ General Douglas MacArthur said that there was no substitute for victory. Just as there is no substitute for victory, there is no alternative for leadership. For if the United States does not provide that leadership to its allies by pledging to use all of its power in their defense, then they will provide their own security. If the United States does not lead the world, another hegemon will rise to replace it. That hegemon will be China. China will then be in a position to dictate to the rest of world, including the United States. The United States would be far less secure in such a world. <116-117>

Hegemony DA – 1NC

C. Maintaining preeminence is crucial to preventing great power nuclear war

**Khalilzad**, **’95** Former RAND Fellow, Current US Ambassador

[Zalmay, “Losing the Moment?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, pg. 84, Spring, Lexis]

<Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a **global nuclear exchange**. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

D. Even if another great power doesn’t arise, reducing our alliance commitments independently triggers nuclear war

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

If the United States adopted offshore balancing, many of those allies would terminate their relationship with the United States. They would be forced to increase their own armaments, acquire nuclear weapons, and perhaps ally against the United States, **even aiming their nuclear weapons at the U**nited **S**tates. In those circumstances, the United States would be far less secure and much worse off than it is now. That might be the future if the United States changed its grand strategy. To be sure, at present the United States is a great ally. It is rich and powerful, with many allies all over the world. It weilds enormous influence in international institutions as well. When a global problem arises, countries turn to the United States to solve it. When you reflect on all the countries who have been hegemons, the United States is the most accommodating and helpful the world has seen. That is a weighty point and must be emphasized—too frequently, it is not. The United States is so for many reasons, including its democratic ideology, the good-natured qualities of the American people, and geography; and the United States is far away from the Eurasian and African landmasses, which makes it a more attractive ally for a typical country in Eurasia—say, Poland or Turkey—since the United States must be invited in comparison to a great power like Russia. If Warsaw or Ankara were to invite the Russians in, they may never leave, and they might incorporate Poland or Turkey into Russia. There is no danger of that with the United States. And this simple fact alone helps us enormously in our relations with the rest of the world. <109>

\_\_\_\*\*Uniqueness

Heg Up – 2NC\*\*

Economic crisis, resiliency, exports, investments and population ensure sustainability

Michael Lind, ‘9, policy director of the New America Foundation’s Economic Growth Program. “The Next Big Thing: America.” Foreign Policy, May/June. <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4848&print=1>.

There will be no winners from the prolonged and painful economic emergency. But some countries will lose more than others. The United States is likely to emerge less damaged than most, as unfair as that will seem to a world that blames it for triggering the crisis. For one thing, it is much easier for a chronic trade-deficit country such as the United States to rebuild its battered export sector than it is for export-oriented countries like China and Japan to rebalance their economies toward more consumption and social insurance. For another, the United States, alone among the world’s leaders, is potentially an industrial superpower, a commodity superpower, and an energy superpower at the same time. The United States will also continue to benefit from the inward flow of foreign money, talent, and labor. Others may grumble about the creditworthiness of Uncle Sam in light of emergency-driven deficits, but in the foreseeable future what places will be a safer haven for investments? A fragile and politically unstable China? Japan, with a shaky economy and aging population? A Europe of squabbling nation-states, riven by cleavages between natives and Muslim immigrants? Authoritarian petrostates where assets can be confiscated without warning? The crisis has reduced the flow of immigrants into the United States along with the demand for their labor, but both should recover, putting the country back on its pre-crisis path of immigration-fed population growth and leading to a population of 400 to 500 million by 2050 and as many as a billion people by 2100. Whether the U.S. economy can grow rapidly enough to maintain a high standard of living for all those people remains to be seen (though prophets of Malthusian gloom about alleged U.S. overpopulation have been refuted many times before). The bottom line is: The populations of Europe, Russia, and Japan are declining, and those of China and India are leveling off. The United States alone among great powers will be increasing its share of world population over time. Otto von Bismarck observed that God favors fools, drunkards, and the United States of America. The U.S.A. has been a lucky country, and despite its present suffering it is unlikely that America’s luck has run out. Relying on the import of money, workers, and brains for more than three centuries, North America has been a Ponzi scheme that works. The present crisis notwithstanding, it still will.

We win a tie – the US can persevere in the squo but upcoming policy outcomes are key – from the Chief on National lntel

Blair, ‘9. Dennis, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR. “SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING; SUBJECT: THE CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.” CAPITOL HILL HEARING, March 10, Lexis.

In conclusion, the international security environment is complex. The global financial crisis has exacerbated what was already a growing set of political and economic uncertainties. We are, nevertheless, in a strong position to shape a world reflecting universal aspirations and the values that have motivated Americans since 1776; human rights, the rule of law, liberal market economics, social justice. Whether we can succeed will depend on actions we take here at home; restoring strong economic growth and maintaining our scientific and technological edge, and defending ourselves at reasonable costs, while preserving our civil liberties. It will also depend on actions abroad, Not only how we deal with individual regimes, individual crises, but also in how we develop a new multilateral system, formal or informal, for effective international cooperation in areas like trade and finance, in neutralizing extremist groups using terrorism, in control-ling the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and developing codes of conduct for cyberspace and space, and in mitigating and slowing global climate change.

Heg Up – Africa

American leadership in Africa is rising

R. Nicholas Burns, ‘9 – is Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and Interna-tional Politics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard Univer-sity. “The Ascension.” The National Interest, Jan-Feb, Lexis.

In Africa, the United States is highly regarded due to President Bush's stra-tegic and humanitarian commitment in the massive HIV/AIDS- and malaria-relief programs. This is recognized and appreciated by millions of Africans, as is our newfound partnership with Nigeria and South Africa and our work with the African Union on regional security issues. Finally, and most important, President Bush has put in place counterterrorism policies that have contributed to the preven-tion of a single, catastrophic attack in our country since 9/11.

Heg Up – Central Asia

Central Asia is stable and US alliances are strong

Dr You Ji, ‘9 – is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute. “OBAMA’S ASIAN POLICY: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY,” EAI Background Brief No. 425, Jan 21. Google search result: bb425+filetype:pdf.

2.5 Continuity also reflects a fact that Bush in his second term has actually run an effective Asian policy: Sino-US relations are arguably at their best, and the ties between the US and its regional allies are solid.5 These have been the two cornerstones of US diplomacy in the Far East. 6 In addition the US has improved relations with South Asian and ASEAN countries. 2.6 Almost all the flashpoints in East Asia are under control. With the help of China the US has moved to stabilize the precarious situation in the Korean Peninsula, achieving the initial success of disabling key DPRK nuclear facilities. The Taiwan tension has been visibly eased with KMT in power. The Spratlys disputes have been deprived of the trigger of war, thanks to China signing the ASEAN Treaty of Amity in 2002. There is little sign of any serious crisis in the making that requires the US to take any immediate counter-measures.

Heg Up – Leadership

Leadership is high – key categorical measures and international forces ensure unipolarity

Burns, ‘9. Nicholas, PROFESSOR OF PRACTICE OF DIPLOMACY AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, “SESSION I OF A COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS SYMPOSIUM ON THE UNITED STATES AND THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE; SUBJECT: AMERICAN LEADERSHIP AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IN AN AGE OF NONPOLARITY.” Federal News Service, May 7, Lexis.

MR. BURNS: I'd just make a couple of points to start off. And I'm very happy to be with David and Ellen, both. All of us have worked together in the U.S. government -- David and I, just most recently, for Secretary Rice. I think, first of all, I'm not sure I agree with the title of the panel, and I feel compelled to say that. I'm not sure we're living in a nonpolar world. In fact, I'm quite sure we're not. And I'm quite sure that, as far as I can see over the horizon -- which is maybe 20 to 25 years into the future, I think we'll still be living in a U.S.- dominated world, where the U.S. is a superpower in that world, for better or for worse -- from my perspective, for the better. I think American leadership is good for the world and it's necessary for the world -- just based on my experience serving in a variety of administrations, Democratic and Republican in Washington. And the measure of American power, military, economic, political -- Joe Nye, my colleague at Harvard, of course, has talked a lot about soft power -- the United States is leading in each of those, even in economic power, despite what has happened in this city, in this country since September. And so it's inter-esting to talk about a nonpolar world -- we did in my class this year. I don't think we're there. I don't think it's desirable. And that leads to a second point: I do think that most people are looking for American leadership on this issue of global governance, and of how we struc-ture the world so it can be what we want it to be -- more peaceful, more stable, more just. And, in that respect, I think that President Obama has a rare and unique opportunity to lead on this issue, of how we look at the international institutions that have been so important to us and see how we can modernize them. What I see in the international reaction to President Obama is a thirst for American leadership, and for positive American leadership -- what some people around the world might say is a return to positive American leadership. And I think, in what he's been able to do -- it's only been 110 days, or whatever, but he's been able at least to lay out the architecture for an American foreign pol-icy that would have us be more engaged in most of the principal international institutions. He's certainly sent that signal here, with the appointment of Susan Rice to be U.N. ambassador. She is close to him. She's a member of the Cabinet. A lot of you know Susan -- uniquely energetic, talented, intelligent. She's the right person for that job.

Heg Up – Climate Change

Climate change is inevitable and locks in US leadership

Blair, ‘9. Dennis, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR. “SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING; SUBJECT: THE CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.” CAPITOL HILL HEARING, March 10, Lexis.

Most of the world's population will move from rural to urban areas. They're seeking economic opportunity. And many, particularly in Asia, will achieve ad-vanced lifestyles with greater per capita consumption and greater generation per capita of pollution. According to the United Nations International Panel on Climate Change physi-cal effects of climate change will worsen in coming years. Multilateral policy making on climate change is likely to be substantial and it will be a growing priority among traditional security affairs. The world sees the United States in a pivotal leadership role. As effects of climate change mount the United States will come under increasing pressure to help the international community set goals for emissions reductions and to help others through technological progress.

Heg Up – Unipolarity

US has no serious competitors – others far behind

Freedman, ‘9. Lawrence, Prof of war studies @ King’s College London. “A Subversive on the Hill,” The National Interest, May-June, Lexis.

At any rate, there are for the moment no serious peer competitors to the United States. Those in Europe that have the desire to become a competitor do not have the capabilities, and those that might develop the capabilities do not have the desire. The EU is too cumbersome and divided to offer a decisive approach, even to the problems of its own region. Russia desperately wants to be a great power and it has some cards to play, but it is difficult for Moscow to have an impact much beyond its own periphery or as a spoiler at the UN. Its long-term economic and demographic profile counts against it. China has been rising, but with a regional rather than global focus. It is gaining a greater say in international economic institutions, but only because in these arenas it is working with views of good economic practice that are similar to those of the other members. Despite the formidable reserves it has accumulated, Beijing could still struggle in the current crisis if its deep inequalities, environmental damage, demographic pressures and political dysfunctions are thrown into sharp relief. Neither Asians nor Europeans expect to be of much help in each others’ regional crises—they all look to Washington.

Unipolarity predominates – level of superiority is unprecedented

Ikenberry et al, ‘9. G. John Ikenberry is a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, Michael Mastanduno is a professor of government and associate dean for social sciences at Dartmouth College, and William C. Wohlforth is a professor of government at Dartmouth College. “Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences,” World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009, p. Muse.

The United States emerged from the 1990s as an unrivaled global “unipolar” state. This extraordinary imbalance has triggered global debate. Governments and peoples around the world are struggling to understand to how an American-centered unipolar system operates—and to respond to it. What is the character of domination in a unipolar distribution? To what extent can a unipolar state translate its formidable capabilities into meaningful influence? Will a unipolar world be built around rules and institutions or be based more on the unilateral exercise of unipolar power? Scholars too are asking these basic questions about unipolarity and international relations theory. The individual contributions develop hypotheses and explore the impact of unipolarity on the behavior of the dominant state, on the reactions of other states, and on the properties of the international system. Collectively, they find that unipolarity does have a profound impact on international politics. International relations under conditions of unipolarity force a rethinking of conventional and received understandings about the operation of the balance of power, the meaning of alliance partnerships, the logic of international economic cooperation, the relationship between power and legitimacy, and the behavior of satisfied and revisionist states. American primacy in the global distribution of capabilities is one of the most salient features of the contemporary international system. The end of the cold war did not return the world to multipolarity. Instead the United States—already materially preeminent—became more so. We currently live in a one superpower world, a circumstance unprecedented in the modern era. No other great power has enjoyed such advantages in material capabilities—military, economic, technological, and geographical. Other states rival the United States in one area or another, but the multifaceted character of American power places it in a category of its own. The sudden collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire, slower economic growth in Japan and Western Europe during the 1990s, and America’s outsized military spending have all enhanced these disparities. While in most historical eras the distribution of capabilities among major states has tended to be multipolar or bipolar—with several major states of roughly equal size and capability—the United States emerged from the 1990s as an unrivaled global power. It became a “unipolar” state.

Heg Up – Unipolarity

Unipolarity now – military, economic, institutional and cultural power are all unrivaled

Stephen M. Walt, ‘9. Professor of international affairs at Harvard University. “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009, Lexis.

Despite these ambiguities, Wohlforth is almost certainly correct in describing the current structure of world politics as unipolar. The United States has the world’s largest economy (roughly 60 percent larger than the number two power), and it possesses by far the most powerful military forces. If one includes supplemental spending, U.S. military expenditures now exceed those of the rest of the world combined.21 Despite its current difficulties in Iraq and the recent downturn in the U.S. economy, the United States retains a comfortable margin of superiority over the other major powers. This capacity does not allow the United States to rule large foreign populations by force or to re-create the sort of formal empire once ruled by Great Britain, but it does give the United States “command of the commons” (that is, the ability to operate with near impunity in the air, oceans, and space) and the ability to defeat [End Page 92] any other country (or current coalition) in a direct test of battlefield strength.22 Put differently, the United States is the only country that can deploy substantial amounts of military power virtually anywhere—even in the face of armed opposition—and keep it there for an indefinite period. Moreover, it is able to do this while spending a substantially smaller fraction of its national income on defense than previous great powers did, as well as a smaller fraction than it spent throughout the cold war.23 The United States also enjoys disproportionate influence in key international institutions—largely as a consequence of its economic and military capacities—and casts a large cultural shadow over much of the rest of the world as well.24 In short, America’s daunting capabilities are a defining feature of the contemporary international landscape, the debacle in Iraq and its various fiscal deficits notwithstanding. U.S. primacy shapes the perceptions, calculations, and possibilities available to all other states, as well as to other consequential international actors. Although other states also worry about local conditions and concerns, none can ignore the vast concentration of power in U.S. hands.

Unipolarity predominates – challengers won’t match it

Jervis, ‘9. Robert, professor of international politics at Columbia University. “Unipolarity; A Structural Perspective.” World Politics. Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009. Lexis.

To say that the world is now unipolar is neither to praise American power, let alone its leadership, nor to accuse the United States of having established a worldwide empire. It is to state a fact, but one whose meaning is far from clear, as we have neither a powerful theory nor much evidence about how unipolar systems operate. A central difficulty for sorting this out entails determining the extent to which behavior and outcomes we have seen stem from structure, rather than from other levels of analysis, such as idiosyncratic aspects of the international environment, the American domestic system, and the role of individual leaders. How might the system function if the unipole were Nazi Germany, Stalin’s USSR (or Brezhnev’s), or a traditional autocracy? Or if it were the United States in a different era? There would surely be major differences, but we should still start our analysis with structure. In fact, this takes us quite far and, as well, to some unexpected places. Realism indicates that the unipole is likely to be difficult to restrain, no matter how benign its intentions or domestic regime. Furthermore, it is far from clear that it should seek to maintain existing arrangements. Both normal ambitions and, in the current context, American values and beliefs may lead the superpower to seek to change the system rather than preserve it.

Heg Up – AT: Asia/ME

US has capacity and resources to solve ME and South Asia problems

Blair, ‘9. Dennis, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR. “SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING; SUBJECT: THE CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.” CAPITOL HILL HEARING, March 10, Lexis.

But, despite these setbacks, al-Qaeda remains dangerous. Yemen is reemerging as a jihadist battleground; the capabilities of terrorist groups in East Africa will increase in the next year; and we remain concerned about the potential for home-grown American extremists, inspired by al-Qaeda's militant ideology, to plan attacks in this country. There are many challenges in that region that stretches from the Middle East to South Asia, and these challenges exist despite the progress I outlined in countering violent extremism. The United States has strong tools -- from mili-tary force, to diplomacy and good relations with the vast majority of these na-tions, and we will need all these tools in order to help forge a durable struc-ture for peace and prosperity.

Heg Up – AT: Economy

Economic crisis didn’t alter global power balance – no one came out ahead

Freedman, ‘9. Lawrence, Prof of war studies @ King’s College London. “A Subversive on the Hill,” The National Interest, May-June, Lexis.

It is at the regional level rather than the global level that the American position might become vulnerable. The current crisis may well produce great turbulence in particular countries or groups of countries at a time when the United States feels it has enough on its plate internationally and is in an introspective mood because of the severity of its own economic challenges. Yet, contrary to early expectations, the economic crisis has not in itself led to a shifting of power balances. When the crisis was assumed to be largely financial in nature, so that the United States and the United Kingdom would suffer most, a shift to the surging economy of China was anticipated. Continental Europe could look on smugly and the oil producers would continue to benefit from high prices. The collapse of world trade, and subsequently the price of oil, soon made these judgments look premature. Indeed, the shock may be greater for countries with no relevant experience of the business cycle or else, as with the oil producers, burdened with ambitious plans based on the always-dangerous assumption that the recent past describes an indefinite future. The crisis is pulling everyone down: for the moment, at least, there are no clear winners. If the United States was the only country held back because of its economic difficulties then others might well take advantage of perceived American weakness. But in this case, with everyone struggling to confront big domestic issues, the United States is unlikely to face major challengers. When a state is forced to dedicate resources to internal problems, it has its own incentives to keep external relations calm. True, unforeseen crises can upset all calculations, but shared weakness may give the Obama administration some relief in terms of how it might be tested. It is already committed to addressing these various regional conflicts with a greater reliance on diplomatic means than the Bush administration, a sign that new military conflicts are unlikely.

Heg Up – AT: Iraq

Their Iraq arg assumes the past – US strategy is rapidly improving and collapse is unlikely

Maples, ‘9. General, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTOR GENERAL. “SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING; SUBJECT: THE CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.” CAPITOL HILL HEARING, March 10, Lexis.

GEN. MAPLES: First of all, let me start with Iraq. The security situation in Iraq does continue to improve. Overall, violence across the country declined in the last six months of 2008 and by January of 2009 attacks were 60 percent lower than in January of 2008. While Iraqi leaders have reached accommodation on a range of key issues, many of Iraq's underlying problems, such as lingering ethno sectarian rivalries, a weakened insurgency, a still developing central government, and a lack of a shared national vision will continue to challenge Iraqis over the next year and beyond. Iraqi security forces improved their overall capabilities in 2008, demon-strating an increased ability to plan, prepare, and execute independent counter-insurgency operations. The ISF continues to rely on coalition support for key enabling capabilities, including close air support, intelligence, and logistics. A rapid degradation of the security situation is unlikely in 2009, although the failure of the Iraqi government to address key issues may erode security over time. Control of disputed areas -- particularly in Nineveh and Kirkuk -- may be the greatest potential flashpoint in Iraq for 2009.

Heg Up – AT: Liberal Hippies

Unipolarity is an amorphous concept – their authors’ claims are part of a liberal self-fulfilling prophecy

Jervis, ‘9. Robert, professor of international politics at Columbia University. “Unipolarity; A Structural Perspective.” World Politics. Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009. Lexis.

It is a safe prediction that analyses of unipolarity, which are only just beginning to appear, will be influenced both by contemporary world events and by the authors’ attitudes toward American policy. Constructivists and liberals will be particularly critical, not because of something deeply embedded in those theoretical frameworks, but rather because [End Page 189] most scholars of these persuasions want to minimize the use of force and are on the political left. Realists span the political spectrum and if for no other reason their analyses are likely to be diverse. The influence of political preferences is easier to detect in retrospect but will be significant, especially because opinion on current U.S. foreign policy is so polarized.3 It should not be taken as capitulation to full subjectivity to say that our political theories are touched by our politics.

Those hippies’ dreams might be good but their vision is off

Jervis, ‘9. Robert, professor of international politics at Columbia University. “Unipolarity; A Structural Perspective.” World Politics. Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009. Lexis.

To say that the world is now unipolar is neither to praise American power, let alone its leadership, nor to accuse the United States of having established a worldwide empire. It is to state a fact, but one whose meaning is far from clear, as we have neither a powerful theory nor much evidence about how unipolar systems operate. A central difficulty for sorting this out entails determining the extent to which behavior and outcomes we have seen stem from structure, rather than from other levels of analysis, such as idiosyncratic aspects of the international environment, the American domestic system, and the role of individual leaders. How might the system function if the unipole were Nazi Germany, Stalin’s USSR (or Brezhnev’s), or a traditional autocracy? Or if it were the United States in a different era? There would surely be major differences, but we should still start our analysis with structure. In fact, this takes us quite far and, as well, to some unexpected places. Realism indicates that the unipole is likely to be difficult to restrain, no matter how benign its intentions or domestic regime. Furthermore, it is far from clear that it should seek to maintain existing arrangements. Both normal ambitions and, in the current context, American values and beliefs may lead the superpower to seek to change the system rather than preserve it.

Heg Up – AT: Soft Power Down

Soft power alone is insufficient – re-generating hard power enhances soft power

Jervis, ‘9. Robert, professor of international politics at Columbia University. “Unipolarity; A Structural Perspective.” World Politics. Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009. Lexis.

It is even more difficult to measure and generalize about other forms of capability, often summarized under the heading “soft power.”5 It [End Page 191] seems likely, however, that the distribution of most forms of soft power will roughly correlate with the distribution of economic and military resources. Soft power matters but by itself cannot establish or alter the international hierarchy. Some small countries are widely admired (for example, Canada), but it is unclear whether this redounds to their benefit in some way or helps spread their values. Although states that lose economic and military strength often like to think that they can have a disproportionate role by virtue of their culture, traditions, and ideas, this rarely is the case. Intellectual and cultural strength can feed economic growth and perhaps bolster the confidence required for a state to play a leading role on the world stage, but material capabilities also tend to make the state’s ideas and culture attractive. This is not automatic, however. As I will discuss further below, economic and military power are not sufficient to reach some objectives, and a unipole whose values or behavior are unappealing will find its influence reduced.

\_\_\_\*\*Links

2NC Link Wall

The plan is suicidal – it results in multiple regional wars and doesn’t achieve any of the desired balancing effects because of transition issues

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota [Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

Each country knows it will never be perfectly secure, but that does not detract from the necessity of seeking security. International politics is a dangerous environment in which countries have no choice but to participate. Any involvement—from the extensive involvement of the United States to the narrow activity of Switzerland—in this dangerous realm runs the risk of a backlash. That is simply a fact of life in international politics. The issue is how much participation is right. Thankfully, thus far the United States recognizes it is much better to be involved so that it may shape events, rather than to remain passive, having events shaped by other countries, and then adjusting to what they desire. In contrast to Layne's argument, maximizing the power of the United States aids its ability to defend itself from attacks and to advance its interests. This argument is based on its prodigious economic, ideological, and military power. Due to this power, the United States is able to defeat its enemies the world over, to reassure its allies, and to dissuade states from challenging it. From this power also comes respect and admiration, no matter how grudging it may be at times. These advantages keep the United States, its interests, and its allies secure, and it must strive to maintain its advantages in international politics as long as possible. Knowing that American hegemony will end someday does not mean that we should welcome or facilitate its demise; rather the reverse. The United States should labor to maintain hegemony as long as possible—just as knowing that you will die someday does not keep you from planning your future and living today. You strive to live as long as possible although you realize that it is inevitable that you will die. Like good health, Americans and most of the world should welcome American primacy and work to preserve it as long as possible. The value of U.S. power for the country itself as well as for most of the world is demonstrated easily by considering four critical facts about international politics. First, if you doubt that more power is better, just ask the citizens of a country that has been conquered, like the Czech Republic, Poland, Kuwait, or Lebanon; or the citizens of a country facing great peril due to external threats or terrorists, like Colombia, Georgia, Israel, Nepal, or Turkey. These countries would prefer to possess greater power to improve their security. Or query the citizens of a fallen empire. For the British, French, or Russians, having the power to influence the direction of international politics, having the respect and recognition that flows from power, and, most importantly, having the ability to advance and defend their country's interests are elements of power that are missed greatly. In sum, the world looks very different from the perspective of these countries than it does from a powerful and secure United States. Second, U.S. power protects the United States. That sentence is as genuine and as important a statement about international politics as one can make. International politics is not a game or a sport. There are no "time outs," there is no halftime and no rest. It never stops. There is no hiding from threats and dangers in international politics. If there is no diplomatic solution to the threats it confronts, then the conventional and strategic military power of the United States is what protects the country from such threats. Simply by declaring that the United States is going home, thus abandoning its commitments or making half pledges to defend its interests and allies, does not mean that others will respect its wishes to retreat. In fact, to make such a declaration implies weakness and emboldens aggression. In the anarchic world of the animal kingdom, predators prefer to eat the weak rather than confront the strong. The same is true in the anarchic realm of international politics. If the United States is not strong and does not actively protect and advance its interests, other countries will prey upon those interests, and even on the United States itself. Third, countries want to align themselves with the United States. Far from there being a backlash against the United States, there is worldwide band-wagoning with it. The vast majority of countries in international politics have alliances with the United States. There are approximately 192 countries in the world, ranging from the size of giants like Russia to Lilliputians like Vanuatu. Of that number, you can count with one hand the countries opposed to the United States—China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela. Once the leaders of Cuba and Venezuela change, there is every reason to believe that those countries will be allied with the United States, as they were before their present rulers—Fidel Castro and Hugo Chavez—came to power. North Korea will collapse someday, removing that threat, although not without significant danger to the countries in the region. Of these states, only China has the potential power to confront the United States. The potential power of China should not be underestimated, but neither should the formidable power of the United States and its allies. There is an old saying that you can learn a lot about someone by looking at his friends (or enemies). It may be true about people, but it is certainly true of the United States. Of the 192 countries in existence, a great number, 84, are allied with the United States, and they include almost all of the major economic and military states. This includes twenty-five members of NATO (excluding the United States—Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom); fourteen major non-NATO allies (Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Jordan, New Zealand, Argentina, Bahrain, Philippines, Thailand, Kuwait, Morocco, and Pakistan); nineteen Rio Pact members (excluding Argentina and Venezuela—The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Para guay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay); seven Caribbean Regional Security System members (Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines), and thirteen members of the Iraq coalition who are not captured by the other categories: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Fiji, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Singapore, Tonga, and Ukraine. In addition, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Tunisia are now important U.S. allies. <CONTINUED>

2NC Link Wall

<CONTINUED>

This is a ratio of almost 17 to 1 (84 to 5) of the countries allied with the United States against those who are opposed to it. And other states may be added to the list of allies. For example, a country like Nigeria is essentially pro-United States although there is no formal security arrangement between those countries. This situation is unprecedented in international politics—never have so many countries been aligned with the dominant state in mod¬ern history. As Figure 3.1 demonstrates, it is a big change from the Cold War when most of the countries of the world were aligned either with the United States (approximately forty-five) or the Soviet Union (about twenty-four countries), of the Soviet Union, as captured by Figure 3.2. Figure 3.3 illuminates the ratio of states aligned with the United States to those opposed to it in the post-Cold War period. So, while we are entitled to our own opinions about international politics, we not entitled to our own facts. They must be acknowledged. In the post-Cold War world, the United States is much better off—it is much more powerful and more secure—than was during the Cold War. What is more, many of the allies of the United States have become more dependent on the United States for their security than during the Cold War. For many years now, most NATO countries have only spent a fraction of their budget on defense, and it is not transparent how they would defend them¬selves if not for the United States did not. Only six of the twenty-five members of NATO (not counting the United States) are spending 2 percent or more of their GDP on defense, while nineteen spend less than 2 percent. Such a low level of defense spending is possible only because of the security provided by the United States. The fourth critical fact to consider is that the security provided by the power of the United States creates stability in international politics. That is vitally important for the world, but easily forgotten. Harvard professor Joseph Nye often compares the security provided by the United States to oxygen. If it were taken away, a person would think of nothing else. If the security and stability provided by the United States were taken away, most countries would be much worse off, and arms races, vicious security competition, and wars would result. It would be a world without NATO or other key U.S. alliances. We can imagine easily conflict between traditional rivals like Greece and Turkey, Syria and Israel, India and Pakistan, Taiwan and China, Russia and Georgia, Hungary and Romania, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and an intense arms race between China and Japan. In that world, the breakup of Yugoslavia would have been a far bloodier affair that might have escalated to become another European war. In contrast to what might occur absent U.S. power, we see that the post-Cold War world dominated by the United States is an era of peace and stability. The United States does not provide security to other countries because it is altruistic. Security for other states is a positive result (what economists call a positive externality) of the United States pursuing its interests. Therefore, it would be a mistake to seek "benevolence" in great power politics. In international politics, states advance their self-interest and, most often, what might appear to be "benevolent" actions are undertaken for other reasons. To assist Pakistani earthquake refugees, for example, is benevolent but also greatly aids the image of the United States in the Muslim world—so self-interest is usually intertwined with a humanitarian impulse. The lesson here is straightforward: Countries align themselves with the United States because to do so coincides with their interests, and they will continue to do so only as long as their interests are advanced by working with Uncle Sam. In 1848, the great British statesman Lord Palmerston captured this point best when he said: "We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow." <105-109>

Their turns all miss the boat – three reasons

Diamond, ‘96[Larry, Senior researcher fellow at Hoover Institution, Orbis, “Beyond the Unipolar Moment: Why the United States Must Remain Engaged”, p. 405-413]

As for provoking our allies to pick up the burden and coalesce, certainly we need to pursue more-equitable burden sharing. And to some extent (especially in the war in the Persian Gulf), we have done so. But there are three serious problems with the confident assumption that our allies can and will fill the gaps we leave. First, they may judge that, absent a significant U.S. security presence, they lack the collective power to balance and deter a rising regional power. Thus, they may consider the only realistic course to be to fall into its power orbit, to capitulate preemptively and join its bandwagon. Secondly, enough countries in a region may judge capitulation cheaper and easier than resistance, so that the others have no choice but to fall in line. As Samuel Huntington has suggested, the prospect of East Asian countries, from japan to Thailand, responding to China in this way is very real, and it will increase significantly if the United States withdraws as a balancing force. The same can be said with respect to Iran and its smaller Gulf neighbors. Thirdly, we should always beware of what we wish for-it may come true. For instance, the time may be at hand to assign a much more active security role to a Germany that has long since candidly acknowledged its war crimes and become a leading force for European integration. Certainly Europe can and should shoulder more of the military and financial burden of defending itself, its sea lanes, and its interests in the Middle East. But do we really want to encourage the active remilitarization of a Japan that has yet to come to grips with its own war guilt, and in which assertive nationalism is on the rise? A continued American security partnership with Japan, as part of our strategic engagement in Northeast Asia, seems a better and safer bet for peace and stability.

Allies Link

Withdrawal collapse alliances that are key to hegemony

Kristol and Kagan, ’96. William and Robert, Fellows @ Carnegie, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=276>.

And America's allies are in a better position than those who are not its allies. Most of the world's major powers welcome U.S. global involvement and prefer America's benevolent hegemony to the alternatives. Instead of having to compete for dominant global influence with many other powers, therefore, the United States finds both the Europeans and the Japanese -- after the United States, the two most powerful forces in the world -- supportive of its world leadership role. Those who anticipated the dissolution of these alliances once the common threat of the Soviet Union disappeared have been proved wrong. The principal concern of America's allies these days is not that it will be too dominant but that it will withdraw. Somehow most Americans have failed to notice that they have never had it so good. They have never lived in a world more conducive to their fundamental interests in a liberal international order, the spread of freedom and democratic governance, an international economic system of free-market capitalism and free trade, and the security of Americans not only to live within their own borders but to travel and do business safely and without encumbrance almost anywhere in the world. Americans have taken these remarkable benefits of the post-Cold War era for granted, partly because it has all seemed so easy. Despite misguided warnings of imperial overstretch, the United States has so far exercised its hegemony without any noticeable strain, and it has done so despite the fact that Americans appear to be in a more insular mood than at any time since before the Second World War. The events of the last six months have excited no particular interest among Americans and, indeed, seem to have been regarded with the same routine indifference as breathing and eating. And that is the problem. The most difficult thing to preserve is that which does not appear to need preserving. The dominant strategic and ideological position the United States now enjoys is the product of foreign policies and defense strategies that are no longer being pursued. Americans have come to take the fruits of their hegemonic power for granted. During the Cold War, the strategies of deterrence and containment worked so well in checking the ambitions of America's adversaries that many American liberals denied that our adversaries had ambitions or even, for that matter, that America had adversaries. Today the lack of a visible threat to U.S. vital interests or to world peace has tempted Americans to absentmindedly dismantle the material and spiritual foundations on which their national well-being has been based. They do not notice that potential challengers are deterred before even contemplating confrontation by their overwhelming power and influence.

Only allies enable American to survive the end of unipolarity – they are the cornerstone of leadership

A. Wess Mitchell, ‘8 – is co-founder and director of research at the Center for European Policy Analysis. “Multipolar Moment,” Nov 23 (Rubaie’s 21st birthday), LA Times, Part A; Pg. 36, Lexis.

This is the world that Obama must equip the nation to navigate. It is impera-tive that he initiate a fundamental break from the post-Cold War U.S. strategic playbook. He must find a way to be flexible without being perfidious, to be a realist without being cynical, to match American policy ends with American power means. He must not persist, like his immediate predecessor, with a unipolar mind-set and a bipolar tool kit in a multipolar world. What is an eager but overburdened young president to do? Conventional wisdom holds that the United States is not suited to playing power politics: Real-politik, it is said, is not in our political DNA. And indeed, we are not a cyni-cal people. But Obama need not reach far to find a shrewd new way to cope with an imposing new world. Embedded in our own domestic political system are the tools he will need. Three concepts, each deeply rooted in American democracy, may prove useful. Think of them as the ABCs of American statecraft for a multi-polar world: A: Allies are the political "base." As Obama knows, successful candidates take care to maintain their links to the party faithful. Lose them, and a poli-tician deals from a position of weakness. In a multipolar world, allies provide the crucial "votes" that America needs to succeed against rivals. The first rule of American politics should be the first rule of American geopolitics: "Tend to your base." B: Bargains are the coin of the realm. Every American politician understands the importance of trade-offs: Help a rival senator pass a bill, and he'll help you build that new highway back home. It's the same in foreign policy. "Ice NATO expansion," Moscow may tell the new president, "and we'll help you with Iran." As they do in the Senate, these offers force us to weigh values and interests. And as in the Senate, America must beware of cutting deals at the expense of our most precious resource -- our base. C: Checked power is safe power. The concept of a balance of power is the tap-root of American political thought. Congress, courts and the president contain and curtail one another in an elaborate dance that sifts power, protecting the republic. Understanding this separation of powers will equip Obama well for multipolarity. He need not dominate the new system or head off peers, only keep their power in manageable bounds. The notion that democracies in general, and America in particular, are at a disadvantage in the rough-and-tumble world of geopolitics must be jettisoned. The skills we need are all well known to President-elect Obama. Incorporating these most American of concepts into our foreign policy may offer the new presi-dent some surprising advantages for coping with an unfamiliar new world. America, it turns out, can handle the end of the unipolar moment.

Allies Link

Alliances are make or break even if other facet of hegemony is maintained – historical examples prove

Freedman, ‘9. Lawrence, Prof of war studies @ King’s College London. “A Subversive on the Hill,” The National Interest, May-June, Lexis.

If the international position of the United States were really to come under pressure, it would be because it could not meet its obligations to like-minded allies—rather than because it was failing to hold on to colonial possessions. It is the case that America’s international position still involves commitments to countries that follow different value systems, as in the Middle East. But it is also true that these relationships can cause awkwardness. Arguably, the United States has gotten into trouble in the past for failing to remain true to its own ideology, undermining its impact by acting in illiberal ways, for example in the ways now summed up by a reference to the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad, or by holding back on criticizing illiberal states with economic strength or substantial oil reserves, such as Saudi Arabia. There is always a balancing act between the assertion of liberal values and the pragmatic, realist demands of the moment, which may well require working with states or groups known for their dubious practices. But the U.S. position with its core allies can be put at risk when it veers too far in an illiberal direction. This is why the Bush administration’s combination of disdain for allied opinion and indifference to charges of illiberality in the war on terror did as much damage to America’s international standing as the mismanagement of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. America’s favored geographical position, raw military strength and economic clout provide the necessary conditions for the United States to act as a great power, but they are not sufficient. What matters is that these are tied to a network of alliances, marked by a shared commitment to liberal capitalism.

Afghanistan Link

The perception of American commitment in Afghanistan ushers in a new wave of leadership – pulling backing crushes NATO, empowers Russia and China and collapses American military power

Daniel Twining, ‘9. “The stakes in Afghanistan go well beyond Afghanistan,” Foreign Policy, 9-30, <http://www.gmfus.org/publications/article.cfm?id=665>.

The problem with the current debate over Afghanistan is that it is too focused on Afghanistan. There is no question that the intrinsic importance of winning wars our country chooses to fight -- to secure objectives that remain as compelling today as they were on September 12, 2001 -- is itself reason for President Obama to put in place a strategy for victory in Afghanistan. But the larger frame has been lost in the din of debate over General McChrystal's leaked assessment, President Obama's intention to ramp up or draw down in Afghanistan, and the legitimacy of the Afghan election. In fact, it is vital for the United States and its allies to recommit to building an Afghan state that can accountably govern its people and defeat the Taliban insurgency -- for reasons that have to do not only with Afghanistan's specific pathologies but with the implications of failure for the wider region and America's place in the international system. The surreal belief in some quarters that abandoning Afghanistan -- described as a "graveyard of empires" with its complicated tribes, forbidding terrain, and peripheral strategic importance -- would not have direct and bloody consequences for the United States, never mind the Afghan people, can be answered with three numbers: 9-11. It is troubling that our political and foreign policy elites even need to engage this debate (including its more sophisticated but equally illusory variants like moving to an "over-the-horizon" strike-and-retreat strategy). At the same time, the experts (correctly) advocating a counterinsurgency strategy make the same mistake of framing their arguments purely with reference to Afghanistan's internal dynamics. As important as they are, they constitute only part of a wider strategic landscape that would be upended by a U.S. decision to reduce its political and military commitment to Afghanistan. A recent trip to Islamabad and Lahore revealed to me that most Pakistani elites -- including the small minority that could credibly be described as sympathetic to Western goals in Afghanistan -- already believe that the game is up: the will of the transatlantic allies is broken, Obama doesn't have the courage or vision to see America's mission in Afghanistan through to victory, and the U.S. is well along the road to walking away from Afghanistan as it did after 1989. This widespread Pakistani belief has encouraged behavior deeply inimical to Washington's regional aims, with the effect that the American debate over whether Afghanistan is worth it is inspiring Pakistani actions that will make success all the harder to achieve. After all, why shouldn't the Pakistani security services continue to invest in their friendly relations with the Taliban if Mullah Omar and company soon will take power in Afghanistan's Pashtun heartland? Why should the Pakistani military take on the militant groups that regularly launch cross-border attacks into Afghanistan when the NATO targets of those attacks will soon slink away in defeat? Why should the Pakistani government get serious about wrapping up the Quetta Shura when the Afghan Taliban appears to be ascendant in the face of Western weakness? Why should Pakistan's intelligence service break its ties to Lashkar-e-Taiba, one of the world's most potent terrorist groups, when it forms such a useful instrument with which to bleed U.S. ally India? And why should Pakistani civilian and military leaders overtly cooperate with the United States when it appears such a weak and unreliable ally of the Afghan people -- incapable, despite its singular wealth and resources, of defeating a 25,000-man insurgency in one of the poorest countries on Earth? As Chris Brose and I recently argued, it is vital for the West to prevail in Afghanistan because of its effect in shaping Pakistan's strategic future. Proponents of drawing down in Afghanistan on the grounds that Pakistan is the more important strategic prize have it only half right: if Pakistan is the strategic prize, it should be unthinkable not to press for victory in Afghanistan given the spillover effects of a Western defeat there. All of Pakistan's pathologies -- from terrorist sanctuary in ungoverned spaces, to radicalized public opinion that creates an enabling environment for violent extremism, to lack of economic opportunity that incentivizes militancy, to the (in)security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, to the military's oversized role in political life in ways that stunt the development of civilian institutions -- all of this will intensify should Afghanistan succumb to the Taliban as the West withdraws. These dynamics, in turn, will destabilize India in ways that could torpedo the country's rise to world power -- and the strategic dividends America would reap from India's success. New Delhi is now a truer proponent of Washington's original objectives in Afghanistan -- the Taliban's decisive defeat by military force rather than reconciliation and the construction of a capable Afghan democracy -- than some American leaders are now. Afghanistan is in India's backyard -- they shared a border until 1947 -- and the collapse of its government would destabilize Pakistan in ways that would quickly cost Indian dearly. Indian strategists fear that the spillover from a Taliban victory in Afghanistan would induce Pakistan's "Lebanonization," with the Pakistani Taliban becoming a kind of South Asian Hezbollah that would launch waves of crippling attacks against India. India cannot rise to be an Asian balancer, global security provider, and engine of the world economy if it is mired in interminable proxy conflict with terrorists emanating from a weak or collapsing state armed with nuclear weapons on its border. The strategic implications of a Western defeat in Afghanistan for American relations with other major powers are similarly troubling. The biggest game-changer in the nuclear standoff with Iran is not new sanctions or military action but a popular uprising by the Iranian people that changes the character of the radical regime in Tehran -- a prospect one would expect to be meaningfully diminished by the usurpation through violence of the Afghan government, against the will of a majority of Afghans, by the religious extremists of the Taliban. And despite welcome new unity in the West on a tougher approach to Iran's development of nuclear weapons following revelations of a new nuclear complex in Qum, how can Washington, London, Paris, and Berlin stare down the leaders of Iran -- a potentially hegemonic Middle Eastern state with an advanced conventional and near-nuclear arsenal and a vast national resource base -- if they can't even hold their own against the cave-dwelling, Kalashnikov-wielding despots of the Taliban? Russia appears to be quietly reveling in the prospect that NATO, which appeared so threatening to Russian eyes during its multiple rounds of enlargement during the 1990s, could be defeated in its first real out-of-area operation. <CONTINUED>

Afghanistan Link

<CONTINUED>

A NATO defeat in Afghanistan would call into question the future of the alliance and the credibility of American leadership with it, possibly creating a new and lasting transatlantic breach and intensifying concerns about the alliance's ability to protect weak European states against a resurgent Russia. China has no interest in Afghanistan's collapse into a sanctuary for Islamist extremists, including Uighers who militate against China's rule in Xinjiang. But a Western defeat in Afghanistan, which if historical precedent holds would be followed by a bout of U.S. isolationism, would only create more space for China to pursue its (for now) peaceful rise. And that is the point: the debate over whether to prevail in Afghanistan is about so much more. An American recommitment to a sustained counterinsurgency strategy that turned around the conflict would demonstrate that the United States and its democratic allies remain the principal providers of public goods -- in this case, the security and stability of a strategically vital region that threatens the global export of violent extremism -- in the international system. A new and sustained victory strategy for Afghanistan would show that Washington is singularly positioned to convene effective coalitions and deliver solutions to intractable international problems in ways that shore up the stability of an international economic and political order that has provided greater degrees of human freedom and prosperity than any other. By contrast, a U.S. decision to wash its hands of Afghanistan would send a different message to friends and competitors alike. It would hasten the emergence of a different kind of international order, one in which history no longer appeared to be on the side of the United States and its friends. Islamic extremism, rather than continuing to lose ground to the universal promise of democratic modernity, would gain new legs -- after all, Afghan Islamists would have defeated their second superpower in a generation. Rival states that contest Western leadership of the international order and reject the principles of open society would increase their influence at America's expense. Just as most Afghans are not prepared to live under a new Taliban regime, so most Americans are surely not prepared to live in a world in which the United States voluntarily cedes its influence, power, and moral example to others who share neither our interests nor our values.

Iraq Link

Achieving military success in Iraq is vital to American hegemony – even the perception of a continued military operation ensures a new era of American power

Walter Russell Mead, ‘8 – Senior Fellow @ CFR. “Morale Matters,” <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=392>.

Nevertheless, even a partial, inconclusive and contested “win” for the United States in Iraq could have significant consequences both in the United States and beyond. First, the prestige of the American military could be significantly enhanced, both at home and abroad. For a liberal democracy to carry out a successful counterinsurgency campaign under a media spotlight is difficult under any circumstances. Many critics of the Iraq war effort argued consistently that such a victory was impossible, and that therefore the only possible course was to stage an American withdrawal in the least humiliating and disruptive way possible. Others, at home and abroad, argued that American military power reflected technological superiority and large budgets, but that both the American military and American society lacked the will and the ability to prevail in tough ground combat. Defeating al-Qaeda and other Sunni insurgents, while persuading both Sunni and Shi‘a militias in Iraq to pursue their goals through non-military channels, would be a substantial and striking victory in the face of this simple-minded conventional thinking. The American military would emerge from Iraq tempered and tested rather than broken, with a demonstrated capability at counterinsurgency in the Middle East. This could end up a significant factor in international affairs, because it could suggest that the approach of countering American military strength by concentrating on asymmetric warfare might not be quite as promising as some had hoped. The close personal relationships that U.S. officers have formed with their counterparts in the emerging Iraqi security forces could also play a significant role in regional politics. For the next thirty years, Americans and Iraqis who have learned to respect and understand each other during this war will occupy senior positions in both military establishments. The Pentagon is much better and much more experienced at cultivating individual and institutional military-to-military relationships than many civilian observers understand. A deep and intimate relationship with the security forces of the new Iraqi state is likely to be a significant asset for American foreign policy well into the future. Building bridges: U.S. soldiers and Iraqi officials celebrate the opening of a rural clinic. [credit: Sgt. Jason Stadel] In domestic American politics, the military would emerge from even a modest and moderate success in Iraq with dramatically enhanced prestige. Future presidents would have a much harder time going to war against military advice, and future war critics would have an even harder time getting support for votes to cut funding for unpopular but perhaps necessary wars. Overall, one might see a somewhat more mature attitude in America toward the use of force: Given the huge costs of the Iraq war and the military’s general caution about going to war, the United States may be a little less quick on the trigger than the Bush Administration was in Iraq. On the other hand, once the United States is engaged, the public’s instinct to stay the course and persevere may be stronger. When it comes to the Middle East, the one thing we know we won’t see is a peaceful, happy region where American leadership is trusted and popular. The confrontation with Iran remains explosively dangerous. Vast swathes of Arab public opinion remain profoundly hostile and suspicious. The war against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan remains fiendishly complex and difficult. U.S.-Turkish relations, while happily on the mend, cannot quickly recover from the shocks of recent years, and the Turkish-Iraqi border is likely to remain a troubled one. The Israel-Palestine issue shows no sign of resolution. The Middle East will for the foreseeable future remain combustible, agitated by deep waves of anti-American and anti-Western passion, and it will also continue to be the most important source of the hydrocarbon fuels on which the world economy will continue to depend. But victory, however qualified, will help in a region where the United States will continue to have vital interests in play. Some of these consequences have already been felt. There is some significant polling evidence that, despite constant and even growing dislike of the United States, support for suicide bombing and other terror tactics has fallen in the Arab world in recent years. Al-Jazeera footage of bombs going off in Iraqi markets has not inspired a generation to join al-Qaeda; it has filled far more people with loathing and horror at the gruesome consequences of this form of war. The victims are Arabs, not Americans or Israelis. As the Arab world has watched the insurgency in Iraq with unprecedented immediacy, traditional Arab and Islamic teachings against anarchy and rebellion look more sensible than ever.

Japan Link

U.S. military presence is vital to perception of commitment and East Asian leadership

Auslin, ‘10– resident scholar at AEI. Michael, 3/17/10, “U.S.-Japan Relations: Enduring Ties, Recent Developments,” House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment, . <http://www.aei.org/speech/100130/>.

Despite this litany of problems both real and perceived, the U.S.-Japan alliance, and the broader relationship it embodies, remains the keystone of U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region.  There is little doubt that America and Japan share certain core values that tie us together, including a belief in democracy, the rule of law, and civil and individual rights, among others, which should properly inform and inspire our policies abroad.  Moreover, after the cataclysm of World War II, we have worked together to maintain stability in the western Pacific, throughout the Cold War and after.  Without the continued Japanese hosting of U.S. forces, our forward-based posture is untenable, particularly in a period of growing Chinese military power in which the acquisition of advanced weapons systems indicates increased vulnerability of U.S. forces over time. There are over 35,000 U.S. military personnel in Japan, and another 11,000 afloat as part of the 7th Fleet, while three-quarters of our military facilities are in Okinawa.  Maintaining this presence is a full-time job for officials on both sides of the Pacific.  Both Washington and Tokyo have revised the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) governing the U.S. military in Japan to respond to local concerns over judicial access to U.S. service members, and domestic pressures to reduce Japan's $4 billion annual Host Nation Support (HNS) are a continuing feature of bilateral discussions.  The new Japanese government has indicated its desire to consider further revision of SOFA and HNS, which portends continued, sometimes difficult negotiations between both sides, though I would be surprised by any significant changes in either.  It is clear, however, that the presence of U.S. military forces is welcomed by nearly all nations in the Asia-Pacific region and sends a signal of American commitment to the region.  From a historical standpoint, the post-war American presence in the Asia-Pacific has been one of the key enablers of growth and development in that maritime realm.  And today, for all its dynamism, the Asia-Pacific remains peppered with territorial disputes and long-standing grievances, with few effective multilateral mechanisms such as exist in Europe for solving interstate conflicts.  Our friends and allies in the area are keenly attuned to our continued forward-based posture, and any indications that the United States was reducing its presence might be interpreted by both friends and competitors as a weakening of our long-standing commitment to maintain stability in the Pacific. The shape of Asian regional politics will continue to evolve, and while I am skeptical of what can realistically be achieved by proposed U.S.-Japan-China trilateral talks, it seems evident that we must approach our alliance with Japan from a more regionally oriented perspective, taking into account how our alliance affects the plans and perceptions of other nations in the region.

Kuwait Link

Forces in Kuwait are vital to hegemony

WILLIAM E. ODOM, ‘6 – Lieutenant General (Retired), United States Army and Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Yale University. “American Hegemony: How to Use It, How to Lose It,” <http://www.amphilsoc.org/sites/default/files/1510403.pdf>.

As a final example, let us recall the Persian Gulf War in 1990–91. President George H. W. Bush won UN Security Council backing, assembled a large military coalition, including French forces, expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait, and persuaded Japan, Germany, and a dozen other countries to contribute sufficient funds to pay for the entire operation. I trust that by now you understand what I mean when I speak about how to use American hegemony . Over the last dozen years, however, and especially since 2002, we have seen examples of how to lose it. During the 1990s, we saw the Clinton administration cut U.S. ground and tactical air forces by almost half. Maritime forces were reduced very little. That force structure left the United States firmly in control of the porpoises and the whales while leaving the land to the tyrants in the Balkans. Timidity, diffidence, and dilly-dallying during the disintegration of Yugoslavia marked Washington’s reaction to spreading instability in Southeastern Europe. By bombing Serbia and Kosovo for seventy-three days, President Clinton damaged the U.S. image in much of Europe and elsewhere and delayed a decisive toppling of the corrupt and antiliberal political regimes in both places, an outcome still not achieved today, nearly a decade later. Had he launched a ground invasion with a couple of armored brigades, advancing from Hungary to envelop Belgrade instead, he could have destroyed the Milosevic regime in a week or ten days with few casualties. (The German army took the same approach in 1940, capturing Belgrade in a week while sustaining fewer than a dozen casualties.) A direct occupation, predominately with U.S. forces but also jointly with NATO countries, could have administered and governed directly, reestablishing property rights and effective courts, and raised a new generation of political elites genuinely committed to liberal values.

South Korea Link

South Korean forces are crucial to U.S. hegemony and preventing the rise of another great power

Kristol and Kagan, ’96. William and Robert, Fellows @ Carnegie, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=276>.

Consider the events of just the past six months, a period that few observers would consider remarkable for its drama on the world stage. In East Asia, the carrier task forces of the U.S. Seventh Fleet helped deter Chinese aggression against democratic Taiwan, and the 35,000 American troops stationed in South Korea helped deter a possible invasion by the rulers in Pyongyang. In Europe, the United States sent 20,000 ground troops to implement a peace agreement in the former Yugoslavia, maintained 100,000 in Western Europe as a symbolic commitment to European stability and security, and intervened diplomatically to prevent the escalation of a conflict between Greece and Turkey. In the Middle East, the United States maintained the deployment of thousands of soldiers and a strong naval presence in the Persian Gulf region to deter possible aggression by Saddam Hussein's Iraq or the Islamic fundamentalist regime in Iran, and it mediated in the conflict between Israel and Syria in Lebanon. In the Western Hemisphere, the United States completed the withdrawal of 15,000 soldiers after restoring a semblance of democratic government in Haiti and, almost without public notice, prevented a military coup in Paraguay. In Africa, a U.S. expeditionary force rescued Americans and others trapped in the Liberian civil conflict. These were just the most visible American actions of the past six months, and just those of a military or diplomatic nature. During the same period, the United States made a thousand decisions in international economic forums, both as a government and as an amalgam of large corporations and individual entrepreneurs, that shaped the lives and fortunes of billions around the globe. America influenced both the external and internal behavior of other countries through the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Through the United Nations, it maintained sanctions on rogue states such as Libya, Iran, and Iraq. Through aid programs, the United States tried to shore up friendly democratic regimes in developing nations. The enormous web of the global economic system, with the United States at the center, combined with the pervasive influence of American ideas and culture, allowed Americans to wield influence in many other ways of which they were entirely unconscious. The simple truth of this era was stated last year by a Serb leader trying to explain Slobodan Milosevic's decision to finally seek rapprochement with Washington. "As a pragmatist," the Serbian politician said, "Milosevic knows that all satellites of the United States are in a better position than those that are not satellites." And America's allies are in a better position than those who are not its allies. Most of the world's major powers welcome U.S. global involvement and prefer America's benevolent hegemony to the alternatives. Instead of having to compete for dominant global influence with many other powers, therefore, the United States finds both the Europeans and the Japanese -- after the United States, the two most powerful forces in the world -- supportive of its world leadership role. Those who anticipated the dissolution of these alliances once the common threat of the Soviet Union disappeared have been proved wrong. The principal concern of America's allies these days is not that it will be too dominant but that it will withdraw. Somehow most Americans have failed to notice that they have never had it so good. They have never lived in a world more conducive to their fundamental interests in a liberal international order, the spread of freedom and democratic governance, an international economic system of free-market capitalism and free trade, and the security of Americans not only to live within their own borders but to travel and do business safely and without encumbrance almost anywhere in the world. Americans have taken these remarkable benefits of the post-Cold War era for granted, partly because it has all seemed so easy. Despite misguided warnings of imperial overstretch, the United States has so far exercised its hegemony without any noticeable strain, and it has done so despite the fact that Americans appear to be in a more insular mood than at any time since before the Second World War. The events of the last six months have excited no particular interest among Americans and, indeed, seem to have been regarded with the same routine indifference as breathing and eating. And that is the problem. The most difficult thing to preserve is that which does not appear to need preserving. The dominant strategic and ideological position the United States now enjoys is the product of foreign policies and defense strategies that are no longer being pursued. Americans have come to take the fruits of their hegemonic power for granted. During the Cold War, the strategies of deterrence and containment worked so well in checking the ambitions of America's adversaries that many American liberals denied that our adversaries had ambitions or even, for that matter, that America had adversaries. Today the lack of a visible threat to U.S. vital interests or to world peace has tempted Americans to absentmindedly dismantle the material and spiritual foundations on which their national well-being has been based. They do not notice that potential challengers are deterred before even contemplating confrontation by their overwhelming power and influence.

South Korea Link

The only way to preserve hegemony is exerting influence in South Korea

Kristol and Kagan, ’96. William and Robert, Fellows @ Carnegie, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=276>.

Moral clarity. Finally, American foreign policy should be informed with a clear moral purpose, based on the understanding that its moral goals and its fundamental national interests are almost always in harmony. The United States achieved its present position of strength not by practicing a foreign policy of live and let live, nor by passively waiting for threats to arise, but by actively promoting American principles of governance abroad -- democracy, free markets, respect for liberty. During the Reagan years, the United States pressed for changes in right-wing and left-wing dictatorships alike, among both friends and foes -- in the Philippines, South Korea, Eastern Europe and even the Soviet Union. The purpose was not Wilsonian idealistic whimsy. The policy of putting pressure on authoritarian and totalitarian regimes had practical aims and, in the end, delivered strategic benefits. Support for American principles around the world can be sustained only by the continuing exertion of American influence. Some of that influence comes from the aid provided to friendly regimes that are trying to carry out democratic and free market reforms. However strong the case for reform of foreign aid programs, such programs deserve to be maintained as a useful way of exerting American influence abroad. And sometimes that means not just supporting U.S. friends and gently pressuring other nations but actively pursuing policies in Iran, Cuba, or China, for instance -- ultimately intended to bring about a change of regime. In any case, the United States should not blindly "do business" with every nation, no matter its regime. Armand Hammerism should not be a tenet of conservative foreign policy.

\_\_\_\*\*Internals

East Asia k2 Heg

US primacy is key to East Asian perception of security from China

Stephen M. Walt, ‘9. Professor of international affairs at Harvard University. “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009, Lexis.

Similar motivations remain evident today, with geography once again making U.S. power both less threatening and more highly valued. In Europe, U.S allies continue to favor an American military presence as an insurance policy against any future renationalization of foreign policy, a development that could turn Europe back toward rivalry and [End Page 111] conflict. Although this possibility might seem remote, the fear has been real enough to convince many Europeans that keeping the American “night watchman” in place is still worth it.65 Similarly, a desire to enhance their security against regional threats (including a resurgent Russia) explains why East European states like Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic countries were so eager to join nato and so willing to curry favor with Washington by backing the Iraq war. According to Piotr Ogrodzinski, director of the America department of the Polish Foreign Ministry: “This is a country that thinks seriously about its security. There’s no doubt that for such a country, it’s good to be a close ally of the United States.” Or as a leading Polish newspaper opined in 2001: “Poland has a tragic historical experience behind it, and it needs an ally on which it can depend.”66 It is therefore not surprising that new Europe remains more pro-American than old Europe, given that the former has a more obvious reason to worry about a resurgent great power to the East. In Asia, the end of the cold war did not eliminate the desire for U.S. protection. In addition to general concerns about the stability of governments in North Korea, Indonesia, and elsewhere, a number of Asian countries share U.S. concerns about the long-term implications of Chinese economic growth. If China continues to grow and develop, it is likely to translate that increased economic strength into greater military power and regional influence. In addition to Taiwan (which has long sought U.S. protection against pressure from the PRC), Asian countries like Japan, Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and India continue to welcome a close strategic partnership with the United States. Thus, when the United States lost access to its military bases in the Philippines in the late 1980s, Singapore signed a memorandum of understanding giving the U.S. access to facilities there and constructed berthing space (at its own expense) large enough to accommodate U.S. aircraft carriers. Prime Minister [End Page 112] Lee Kwan Yew justified this policy by saying that “nature does not like a vacuum. And if there is a vacuum, somebody will fill it.”67 Malaysia endorsed Singapore’s decision and eventually offered the U.S. access to some of its own military installations as well. As one senior Malaysian official commented: “America’s presence is certainly needed, at least to balance other power with contrasting ideology in this region . . . the power balance is needed . . . to ensure that other powers that have farreaching ambitions in Southeast Asia will not find it easy to act against countries in the region.”68 Even Vietnam increasingly sees U.S. power as a useful counterweight to China’s looming presence, with the vice chairwoman of the National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs Committee declaring that “everyone know[s] we have to keep a fine balance” and emphasizing that Vietnam will neither “lean over” toward Washington nor “bow” to Beijing.69 Finally, the United States and India have recently signed a far-reaching but controversial agreement for strategic cooperation (including cooperation on nuclear energy) that also reflects shared concerns about China’s rise and the overall balance of power in Asia.70

East Asia k2 Heg

Leadership is key in East Asia – concerted attention will strengthen alliances, joint contributions and soft power

Park Cheol Hee, ‘9. “Obama's keyword for East Asia: U.S., Korea, Japan expected to team up to fight financial crisis, promote peace keeping” (The fourth in a series of articles analyzing the political, security, economic and other aspects of Korea-U.S. relations under the Obama administration), Korea Herald, Jan 29, Lexis.

Regaining trust in U.S. leadership for global governance is a must. Because of its appearance as a revisionist hegemony during the previous administration, America's fame in the world significantly diminished. The Washington consensus based on the neoliberal market economy principle is doubted in and outside the United States. Without reinvigorating American leadership, the status of the United States as a global hegemony may be challenged in the future. Because of the pressures to address many imminent issues, East Asia has not seemed to draw strong attention from the new administration. However, East Asian issues cannot be neglected or set aside. Obama himself has a strong personal connection with Asia. He is possibly the first American president who singled out Asian-Americans as a legitimate and integral part of American citizenship during the campaign. Asia is truly within his parameter of interests. It goes without saying that Obama's strategy toward East Asia would be in line with his general foreign policy visions. Above all, the goal of renewing American leadership will guide his foreign policy initiative. Unlike the Bush administration that heavily relied on unilateral, hegemonic, aggressive inter-ventionism, Obama is likely to secure shared security partnership through inter-national coordination and collaboration. Imperial overstretch is not likely to be repeated. Diplomacy will be respected in close combination with multilateral consultation. Dialogue and restraint will be exerted before the United States resorts to power. Unlike the previous administration that employed military strength and enforcement, the Obama administration is likely to enhance soft power. He is clearly aware that power alone cannot protect the United States. Instead of adopting the balance of power strategy, Obama puts emphasis on the power of balance. When it comes to East Asia, the Obama administration is not likely to tact-fully contain or adroitly encircle China. The United States will engage and em-brace China in a strategic manner, affording China a legitimate status as a re-sponsible stakeholder in the region. By softly approaching China, the United States might pursue a goal of making China a proactive participant in the global governance regime. Despite this forward-looking engagement strategy toward China, balancing China's hard power will not be neglected. Obama will not close an eye on China's military activities, human rights violations and unfair trade practices. In reprogramming the Pentagon for a new age, Robert Gates, a nominee for the Secretary of Defense, offers the notion of a balanced strategy. In particular, he highlights a balance between institutionalizing capabilities such as counter-insurgency and foreign military assistance and maintaining the United States' existing conventional and strategic technological edge against other military forces. It is not in the realm of speculation that China belongs to a category of conventional power that is rapidly catching up to the United States in the military arena. This should be one of the reasons why Obama declared that he would strengthen the alliance with Japan, Korea, and Australia in the Asia-Pacific region. This does not mean that America together with a league of democ-racies in the region will face China in a confrontational fashion. That was more of a John McCain-type hard-balancing strategy. Instead, together with allies in the region, the Obama administration is likely to show the resilience of soft power of democratic nations in the region, coordinative potential for cooperation in the military and nonmilitary issues, and potential joint contributions to global governance. In a word, Obama is ex-pected to take a balanced approach in dealing with China and traditional allies in the Asia-Pacific.

East Asian heg is key to unipolarity, alliances, democracy, economy and terror

Dr You Ji, ‘9 – is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute. “OBAMA’S ASIAN POLICY: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY,” EAI Background Brief No. 425, Jan 21. Google search result: bb425+filetype:pdf.

2.2 Obama’s campaign slogan of change appealed to American voters. Yet in practice change is not for change’s sake. In Asia it has to be designed to advance US’ strategic interests. Since the structure of these interests has its inherent track linking the past and future, change cannot happen promptly and in isolation. It has to be embedded in continuity. 2.3 Firstly, continuity in US’ core regional interests remains unchanged. Five of them have been central to all US presidents since WWII and will guide Obama as well. Topping the list is the prevention of the emergence of a power that will challenge US’ dominance. Next is to ensure security for US allies. The third is to promote Asian democratization. The fourth is to sustain economic prosperity through market and free trade.4 Since 2001 war against terror has been a new priority in US’ foreign policy agenda in the region.

East Asia – Outweighs

East Asia is Obama’s crucible – it is the most important region on Earth

R. Nicholas Burns, ‘9 – is Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and Interna-tional Politics at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard Univer-sity. “The Ascension.” The National Interest, Jan-Feb, Lexis.

If there is one great strategic shift that the Obama team will focus on in its first day in office, it is that America's vital, national interests are now more engaged in South Asia and the Middle East than in any other part of the world. For nearly all of the last century, America was active on all global fronts but focused more on Europe than anywhere else because that was where the five-alarm fires were burning. From Woodrow Wilson sending more than a million American soldiers to the Western Front in the Great War to Bill Clinton's inter-ventions in Bosnia and Kosovo more than seventy years later, Europe was Amer-ica's key concern. Those twenty-first century fires now burn in South Asia and the Middle East. In spite of the Bush administration's success on India, South Asia presents two huge, negative fault lines. The war in Afghanistan-Pakistan may turn out to be for Obama the crucible that Iraq was for George W. Bush. As Obama takes office, the war seems to be turning in a decidedly negative direction. Taliban attacks on American and Afghan forces have grown in intensity and effectiveness throughout 2008. The new Pakistani government seems unwilling or unable to exert effective counterforce against Taliban and al-Qaeda safe ha-vens on the Pakistani side of the mountainous border. As American troops fight bravely in the violent east and south, many of NATO's European forces, including those from Germany, Italy and Spain, are sitting in relative safety and security in the more placid north and west, refusing service in the hot combat areas. NATO's existential crisis, caused by one half of the alliance squarely taking on the fight and the other avoiding it, must be resolved if there is to be any chance of an eventual success. Even more important, NATO has been unable to cre-ate an effective counterinsurgency campaign against the Taliban as its military efforts have been completely separated from the UN's economic and humanitarian activities. The successful integration of the two that General David Petraeus managed so brilliantly in Iraq is glaringly absent in Afghanistan.

East Asia is the regional of single greatest importance during the next 20 years

Tierney et al, ‘9. Michael J. Tierney, director of international relations and Weingartner associate professor of government, all at the College of William and Mary. Amy Oakes, an assistant professor of government, Susan Peterson, dean of undergraduate studies and professor of government, and Daniel Maliniak, a Ph.D. student at U.C. San Diego. “Inside the Ivory Tower,” Foreign Policy, March/April, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4685&print=1>.

Public Enemy No. 1 Political pundits and journalists may buzz reflexively over the latest economic stimulus package or saber-rattling by Iran. But scholars of international relations take a longer view, scanning the horizon for power shifts that could affect the global pecking order. So, which countries pose the greatest threat to the U.S. position today? Forty-three percent of respondents agreed that China’s growing military power could threaten international stability. In fact, specialists predict that the strategic importance of East Asia generally will continue to grow. Although only 30 percent see the region as the one of greatest concern for the United States today (up from 19 percent in 2006), 68 percent reported it would be the region of greatest strategic importance in 20 years.

\_\_\_\*\*Impact Stuff

Heg Good\*\*

1. Collapse of US hegemony causes a multipolar vacuum leading to multiple scenarios for extinction

**Ferguson, 4** – Professor of History at New York University's Stern School of Business and Senior fellow at the Hoover Institution

[Niall, “A world without power,” Foreign Policy 143, p. 32-39, July-August]

So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous--roughly 20 times more--so friction between the world's disparate "tribes" is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization--the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital--has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization--which a new Dark Age would produce--would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy--from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai--would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony--its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier--its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity--a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder.

**2. Collapse of hegemony leads to massive economic collapse that has a high probability of nuclear escalation**

**Mandelbaum, ‘5** – Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins

[Michael, *The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World’s Government in the Twenty-First Century*, p. 224]

At best, an American withdrawal would bring with it some of the political anxiety typical during the Cold War and a measure of the economic uncertainty that characterized the years before World War II. At worst, the retreat of American power could lead to a repetition of the great global economic failure and the bloody international conflicts the world experienced in the 1930s and 194os. Indeed, **the potential for economic calamity** and wartime destruction **is greater** at the outset of the new century than it was in the first half of the preceding one because of the greater extent of international economic interdependence and the higher levels of prosperity—there is more to lose now than there was then—and because of the presence, in **large numbers, of nuclear weapons**.

Heg Good\*\*

3. We control the escalation internals – hegemony collapse causes major escalating regional wars

**Lieber, 5** – Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University

[Robert J., *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*, p. 53-54]

Withdrawal from foreign commitments might seem to be a means of evading hostility toward the United States, but the consequences would almost certainly be harmful both to regional stability and to U.S. national interests. Although Europe would almost certainly not see the return to competitive balancing among regional powers (i.e., competition and even military rivalry between France and Germany) of the kind that some realist scholars of international relations have predicted," elsewhere the dangers could increase. In Asia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan would have strong motivation to acquire nuclear weapons – which they have the technological capacity to do quite quickly. Instability and regional competition could also escalate, not only between India and Pakistan, but also in Southeast Asia involving Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and possibly the Philippines. Risks in the Middle East would be likely to increase, with regional competition among the major countries of the Gulf region (Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq) as well as Egypt, Syria, and Israel. **Major regional wars**, eventually **involving** the use of **w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction plus human suffering on a vast scale, floods of refugees, economic disruption, and risks to oil supplies are all readily conceivable.

4. We also control timeframe and probability – hegemony collapse guarantees several scenarios for extinction within a year

Drezner, ‘3

**[**Daniel W., Assistant Professor of Political Science at University of Chicago, “The perils of hegemonic power”, January 6, 2003, <http://www.danieldrezner.com/archives/2003_01.html>]

Michael Ignatieff's cover story on empire in yesterday's New York Times Magazine will be discussed in the next few days, but I actually think James Dao's Week in Review piece on U.S. troops in Korea makes many of the same points more concisely. The problem facing the U.S. is that even though critics on all sides are currently attacking the U.S. right now for trying to dictate affairs across the globe, these same critics are also likely to assail the U.S. for any retreat from its current positions.

Imagine for a second that the U.S. announced that it had decided to heed the calls to reign in its power. Say U.S. troops were pulled out of Europe, Korea, and the Middle East. No change in our economic or cultural policies, just a withdrawal of troops from the globe. What would happen? Undoubtedly, some of the animus towards the U.S. would dissipate in the short run. However, within the next year**:**

1) Japan would go nuclear.  
2) The Balkans would be likely to erupt again, with Macedonia being the trigger this time.  
3) Afghanistan would implode.  
4) India and Pakistan would likely escalate their border skirmishes.  
5) Israel would escalate its quasi-military actions in the occupied territories.  
6) Arab fury at the U.S. inaction in the Middle East would rise even further.  
7) Anti-American activists would criticize the U.S. for isolationism and inaction in the face of global instability.

I don't deny that the looming specter of U.S. hard power in Iraq and elsewhere is eroding our capital of soft power. However, to paraphrase Churchill, the current policy is without question an awful one, until you consider the alternatives.

On the margins, I believe that more accommodating U.S. policies on trade and the environment might buy an additional amount of good will from the developing and developed world, respectively. But those changes will not conceal the overwhelming U.S. advantage in military might, nor will it erase the natural emnity that comes with it.

Heg Good\*\*

5. Hegemony is crucial to preventing WMD terrorism that guarantees immediate extinction

**Korb ’03** Project Director of Council Policy Initiative, Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations

[Lawrence, “A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction”, <http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/National_Security_CPI.pdf>]

U.S. Dominance and Preventive Action. The most serious threats to American security come from the combination of terrorism, rogue states, and WMD. The temptation to try using these weapons against Americans is high for several reasons, including the fact that clearly identifying and punishing an attacker is inherently difficult. We are not going to be able to talk others out of developing these weapons, nor are we likely to be able to build an international coalition to help us get rid of these weapons. Therefore we must have both the capability and the will to use force against those states and the groups within them that represent the most serious threats to our security and way of life. And we should be prepared to do this essentially with U.S. military power alone, unbound by the need for allies or UN approval. In the longer term, we must undercut our potential adversaries by ensuring the spread of free market democracy throughout the world.

Larger trends have conspired to make the threat posed by radicalism much greater in recent times. Given the rapid dissemination of destructive technologies, sensitive information, and capital flows in today’s globalized world, threats from terrorist networks and rogue states can and will **materialize** more **rapidly** than in the past. Moreover, any attacks promise to be **much more devastating** if and when these actors get their hands on WMD. As the world’s leading military and economic power, the United States is the most likely target of these terrorists and tyrants. In the face of, and in response to, these imminent dangers, it has not only the duty but also the legal and moral right to launch preemptive attacks, unilaterally if necessary. Common sense dictates that the government not stand idly by and wait to act until catastrophic attacks are visited upon the American people.

The United States has the unrivaled military and economic capability to repel these challenges to our security, but it must display the will to do so. To be able to carry out a strategy of preventive action, taking preemptive military action when necessary, this country must be a hegemonic power. The United States can protect its security and that of the world in the long run only by maintaining military dominance. Only America can effectively respond to the perils posed by terrorists, regional thugs, weapons proliferators, and drug traffickers. It can do the most to resolve problems created by “failed” states before they fester into major crises. And it alone can ensure that the world’s sea lanes and skies are kept safe and open for free trade. But the array of challenges in its path requires military dominance and cannot be met on the cheap.

The ultimate goal of American foreign policy will be to use this power, alone if necessary, to extend free-market democracy around the globe. This is the only way in which the United States can deal with the long-term causes of terrorism. These terrorists come from countries that suffer from political repression, economic incompetence, and a broad lack of respect for the rule of law. And, contrary to what some believe, democracy and capitalism do not spread inexorably on their own. The United States therefore **needs to assume a leadership role** in spreading and accelerating the growth of free-market democracies that have been taking hold in the aftermath of the Cold War.

Heg Good\*\*

6. NATURAL DISASTERS –

A. Hegemony is crucial to response to natural disasters

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

The U.S. military is the earth's "911 force"—it serves as the world's police; it is the global paramedic, and the planet's fire department. Whenever there is a natural disaster, earthquake, flood, typhoon, or tsunami, the United States assists the countries in need. In 1991, when flooding caused by cyclone Marian killed almost 140,000 people and left 5 million homeless in Bangladesh, the United States launched Operation Sea Angel to save stranded and starving people by supplying food, potable water, and medical assistance. U.S. forces are credited with saving over 200,000 lives in that operation.

In 1999, torrential rains and flash flooding in Venezuela killed 30,000 people and left 140,000 homeless. The United States responded with Operation Fundamental Response, which brought water purification and hygiene equipment saving thousands. Also in 1999, Operation Strong Support aided Central Americans affected by Hurricane Mitch. That hurricane was the fourth-strongest ever recorded in the Atlantic and the worst natural disaster to strike Central America in the twentieth century. The magnitude of the devastation was tremendous, with about 10,000 people killed, 13,000 missing, and 2 million left homeless. It is estimated that 60 percent of the infrastructure in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala was destroyed. Again, the U.S. military came to the aid of the people affected. It is believed to have rescued about 700 people who otherwise would have died, while saving more from disease due to the timely arrival of medical supplies, food, water, blankets, and mobile shelters. In the next phase of Strong Support, military engineers rebuilt much of the infrastructure of those countries, including bridges, hospitals, roads, and schools.

On the day after Christmas in 2004, a tremendous earthquake and tsunami occurred in the Indian Ocean near Sumatra and killed 300,000 people. The United States was the first to respond with aid. More importantly, Washington not only contributed a large amount of aid, $350 million, plus another $350 million provided by American citizens and corporations, but also—only days after the tsunami struck—used its military to help those in need. About 20,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines responded by providing water, food, medical aid, disease treatment and prevention, as well as forensic assistance to help identify the bodies of those killed. Only the U.S. military could have accomplished this Herculean effort, and it is important to keep in mind that its costs were separate from the $350 million provided by the U.S. government and other money given by American citizens and corporations to relief organizations like the International Committee of the Red Cross/Red Crescent.

The generosity of the United States has done more to help the country fight the war on terror than almost any other measure. Before the tsunami, 80 percent of Indonesian opinion was opposed to the United States; after it, 80 percent had a favorable opinion of the United States. In October 2005, an enormous earthquake struck Kashmir, killing about 74,000 people and leaving 3 million homeless. The U.S. military responded immediately, diverting helicopters fighting the war on terror in nearby Afghanistan to bring relief as soon as possible. To help those in need, the United States provided about $156 million in aid to Pakistan; and, as one might expect from those witnessing the generosity of the United States, it left a lasting impression about the United States. Whether in Indonesia or Kashmir, the money was well spent because it helped people in the wake of disasters, but it also had a real impact on the war on terror. <44-45>

B. Natural disasters threaten human extinction faster than any war scenario

**Sid-Ahmed, ‘5** – Yeah, it’s the same guy

[Mohamed. “The post-earthquake world.” Al-Ahram Weekly Online. Jan 6-12, 2005. <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/724/op3.htm>]

The human species has never been exposed to a natural upheaval of this magnitude within living memory. What happened in South Asia is the ecological equivalent of 9/11. Ecological problems like global warming and climatic disturbances in general threaten to make our natural habitat unfit for human life. The **extinction of the species has become a very real possibility**, whether by our own hand or **as a result of natural disasters** of a much greater magnitude than the Indian Ocean earthquake and the killer waves it spawned. Human civilisation has developed in the hope that Man will be able to reach welfare and prosperity on earth for everybody. But now things seem to be moving in the opposite direction, exposing planet Earth to the end of its role as a nurturing place for human life.

Today, **human conflicts** have become less of a threat than the confrontation between Man and Nature. At least they **are less likely to bring about the end of the human species**. The reactions of Nature as a result of its exposure to the onslaughts of human societies have become more important in determining the fate of the human species than any harm it can inflict on itself.

Until recently, the threat Nature represented was perceived as likely to arise only in the long run, related for instance to how global warming would affect life on our planet. Such a threat could take decades, even centuries, to reach a critical level. This perception has changed following the devastating earthquake and tsunamis that hit the coastal regions of South Asia and, less violently, of East Africa, on 26 December.

This cataclysmic event has underscored the vulnerability of our world before the wrath of Nature and shaken the sanguine belief that the end of the world is a long way away. Gone are the days when we could comfort ourselves with the notion that the extinction of the human race will not occur before a long-term future that will only materialise after millions of years and not affect us directly in any way. **We are now forced to live with the possibility of an imminent demise of humankind.**

Heg Good\*\*

7. Hegemony is crucial to preventing great power nuclear war

**Khalilzad**, **’95** Former RAND Fellow, Current US Ambassador

[Zalmay, “Losing the Moment?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 2, pg. 84, Spring, Lexis]

<Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a **global nuclear exchange**. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

8. Unipolarity produces widespread stability and peace

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

Peace, like good health, is not often noticed, but certainly is missed when absent. Throughout history, peace and stability have been a major benefit of empires. In fact, pax Romana in Latin means the Roman peace, or the stability brought about by the Roman Empire. Rome's power was so overwhelming that no one could challenge it successfully for hundreds of years. The result was stability within the Roman Empire. Where Rome conquered, peace, law, order, education, a common language, and much else followed. That was true of the British Empire (pax Britannica) too.

So it is with the United States today. Peace and stability are major benefits of the American Empire. The fact that America is so powerful actually reduces the likelihood of major war. Scholars of international politics have found that the presence of a dominant state in international politics actually reduces the likelihood of war because weaker states, including even great powers, know that it is unlikely that they could challenge the dominant state and win. They may resort to other mechanisms or tactics to challenge the dominant country, but are unlikely to do so directly. This means that there will be no wars between great powers. At least, not until a challenger (certainly China) thinks it can overthrow the dominant state (the United States). But there will be intense security competition—both China and the United States will watch each other closely, with their intelligence communities increasingly focused on each other, their diplomats striving to ensure that countries around the world do not align with the other, and their militaries seeing the other as their principal threat. This is not unusual in international politics but, in fact, is its "normal" condition. Americans may not pay much attention to it until a crisis occurs. But right now states are competing with one another. This is because international politics does not sleep; it never takes a rest. <42>

Heg Good\*\*

9. EAST ASIA –

A. Leadership is key to stability and conflict control in East Asia

Mochizuki, ‘96

[Mike, Sr. Fellow @ Brookings, Japan Quarterly, P. 10-11]

Bilateral cooperation is also essential in crises that do not involve military conflict. A state that engages in provocative behavior, such as threatening military maneuvers or deployment, must be restrained before it escalates into an overt military attack. The international community should send clear signals that the escalation of provocation will be resisted and military aggression will be punished. The United Nations provides one forum to send such a message, but this organization has not always been an effective tool in forging an international response to provocation or even aggression - especially when such a response is resisted by a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. As the Persian Gulf crisis of 1990 demonstrated, even in cases of blatant aggression, American leadership was necessary to get the United Nations to act. Similar U.S. leadership will be essential in mounting an effective response to a crisis in East Asia. But at a time when American citizens are thinking about limiting their country’s role in security problems far from home, the United States’ ability to lead will increasingly depend upon the willingness of its key allies such as Japan to actively support and participate in at international response to the provocative behavior. This response may range from economic sanctions to military measures. In the context of East Asia, how closely Japan is in step with the United States will be an important factor in the calculations of potential aggressors. Any signs that these two powers are at odds during a crisis might tempt the provocative state to escalate tensions. This will increase the possibility of miscalculation and war. In other words, the odds of peaceful resolution of crises will be greater when the United States and Japan stand together.

**B. East Asian instability leads to nuclear war**

Landy, ‘00

[Jonathon, National Security and International Correspondent, Knight Ridder, March 10, p. Lexis]

Few if any experts think China and Taiwan, North Korea and South Korea, or India and Pakistan are spoiling to fight. But even a minor miscalculation by any of them could **destabilize Asia, jolt the global economy**, and even start a **nuclear war**. India, Pakistan, and China all have nuclear weapons, and North Korea may have a few, too. Asia lacks the kinds of organizations, negotiations, and diplomatic relationships that helped keep an uneasy peace for five decades in Cold War Europe.

“**Nowhere else on Earth** are the stakes as high and relationships so fragile,” said Bates Gill, director of northeast Asian policy studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank. “We see the convergence of great power interest overlaid with lingering confrontations with no institutionalized security mechanism in place. There are elements for potential **disaster.**

In an effort to cool the region’s tempers, President Clinton, Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and National Security Adviser Samuel R. Berger all will hopscotch Asia’s capitals this month.

For America, the stakes could hardly be higher.

There are 100,000 U.S. troops in Asia committed to defending Taiwan, Japan and South Korea, and the United States would **instantly become embroiled** if Beijing moved against Taiwan or North Korea attacked South Korea. While Washington has no defense commitments to either India or Pakistan, a conflict between the two could end the global taboo against using nuclear weapons and demolish the already shaky international nonproliferation regime.

Heg Good\*\*

10. INDIA-PAKISTAN –

**A. Leadership is key to India-Pakistan peace**

Khalilzad and Lesser 1998

[Zalmay and Ian, Ambassador to Afghanistan and Sr. analyst at RAND, Sources of Conflict in the 21st Century, page 161]

The fifth driver is Indian, Pakistani, and Chinese perceptions of the role of extraregional powers in any future conflict. Although extraregional powers such as the United States will remain critical and influential actors in South Asia, the nature of their presence and the way their influence is exercised will remain important factors for stability in South Asia. The United States, in particular, contributes to stability insofar as it can creatively use both its regional policy and its antiproliferation strategies to influence the forms of security competition on the subcontinent, the shape and evolution of Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs, and the general patterns of political interaction between India and Pakistan. The nominally extraregional power, China, also plays a critical role here both because of its presumed competition with India and because Beijing has evolved into a vital supplier of conventional and nuclear technologies to Pakistan.

**B. Causes extinction**

Caldicott, ‘2

[Helen, Founder of Physicians for Social Responsibility and Nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize, “The New Nuclear Danger: George W. Bush’s Military-Industrial Complex”, p. xiii]

The use of Pakistani nuclear weapons could trigger a chain reaction. Nuclear-armed India, an ancient enemy could respond in kind. China, India’s hated foe, could react if India used her nuclear weapons, triggering a nuclear holocaust on the subcontinent. If any of either Russia or America’s 2,250 strategic weapons on hair-trigger alert were launched either accidentally or purposefully in response, nuclear winter would ensue, **meaning the end of most life on earth.**

11. JAPAN REARM –

A. Hegemony is vital Japanese foreign protection

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

Third, our allies like Australia, Great Britain, Japan, Kuwait, Israel, and Thailand are protected by American military might and so we are able to deter attacks against them. They are aligned with the United States, and thus under its "security umbrella"—any attack on those states would be met by the military power of the United States. Other states know this and, usually, that is sufficient to deter aggression against the allies of the United States. <16>

B. Japanese domestic protection results in extinction

Ratner, ‘3

[Ellen, 1/17. World Net Daily Executive Report]

Experts predict that with Japan's high-tech, industrial economy, they could assemble a full nuclear arsenal and bomb delivery systems within three years. This would be a disaster. Not only would it trigger a new, intra-Asian arms race—for who could doubt that if Japan goes nuclear, China and North Korea would be joined by South Korea and even Taiwan in building new and more weapons? Likewise, given the memories, who could doubt that such a scenario increases the risks of nuclear war somewhere in the region? By comparison, the old Cold War world, where there were only two armed camps, would look like kid stuff. 

Heg Good – Collapse 🡪 War

US decline would be historically unprecedented and result in major conflict

Robert A. Pape, ‘9. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago. “Empire Falls,” The National Interest, January 2009 - February 2009. Lexis.

THE UNITED States has always prided itself on exceptionalism, and the U.S. downfall is indeed extraordinary. Something fundamental has changed. America’s relative decline since 2000 of some 30 percent represents a far greater loss of relative power in a shorter time than any power shift among European great powers from roughly the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War II. It is one of the largest relative declines in modern history. Indeed, in size, it is clearly surpassed by only one other great-power decline, the unexpected internal collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Most disturbing, whenever there are major changes in the balance of power, conflict routinely ensues. Examining the historical record reveals an important pattern: the states facing the largest declines in power compared to other major powers were apt to be the target of opportunistic aggression. And this is surely not the only possible danger from relative decline; states on the power wane also have a history of launching preventive wars to strengthen their positions. All of this suggests that major relative declines are often accompanied by highly dangerous international environments. So, these declines matter not just in terms of economics, but also because of their destabilizing consequences.

The magnitude is unprecedented

Robert A. Pape, ‘9. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago. “Empire Falls,” The National Interest, January 2009 - February 2009. Lexis.

Clearly, major shifts in the balance of power in the international system often lead to instability and conflict. And America’s current predicament is far more severe. This time, our relative decline of 32 percent is accompanied, not by an even-steeper decline of our near-peer competitor, but rather by a 144 percent increase in China’s relative position. Further, the rapid spread of technology and technological breakthroughs means that one great discovery does not buoy an already-strong state to decades-long predominance. And with a rising China—with raw resources of population, landmass and increasing adoption of leading technology—a true peer competitor is looming. America’s current, rapid domestic economic decline is merely accelerating our own downfall. The distinct quality of a system with only one superpower is that no other single state is powerful enough to balance against it. A true global hegemon is more powerful still—stronger than all second-ranked powers acting as members of a counterbalancing coalition seeking to contain the unipolar leader. By these standards, America’s relative decline is fundamentally changing international politics, and is fundamentally different from Russia circa 1850 and Great Britain circa 1910.

Heg Good – CCP Collapse

**Continued American strength checks Chinese economic declines that would collapse the CCP**

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota


[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

Much of the current account deficit is due to China and, to a lesser extent, Japan. That actually is good news for the current account deficit of the United States because the Chinese, Japanese, and other central banks in East Asia have an enormous stake in selling to the United States. These economies depend on exports, and the United States is an enormous market for their products and services. To ensure that their currency is weak against the American dollar, which is good for their export industries, they keep buying dollars and securities based on the dollar.

If they did not, the dollar would lose value against the Chinese currency (the renminbi), causing Chinese imports to. cost more, resulting in fewer Americans buying them, in turn causing a loss of jobs and downturn in the Chinese economy at a critical time—millions of Chinese are moving from rural areas to the cities to seek manufacturing jobs. If there were a substantial downturn in the Chinese economy, unemployment could lead to political unrest. The communist leaders of China are acutely aware of this, since economic problems fueled the revolution in which they took power.

Prominent historian Niall Ferguson estimates that if the dollar fell by one-third against the renminbi, the Chinese could suffer a loss of about 10 percent of their GDP.27 That would be catastrophic, and so it is unacceptable to the Chinese. Thus, China's economic interest requires it to fund the current account deficit of the United States. "The United States may be discovering what the British found in their imperial heyday," Ferguson writes; that is, "If you are a truly powerful empire, you can borrow a lot of money at surprisingly reasonable rates. Today's deficits are in fact dwarfed in relative terms by the amount the British borrowed to finance their Global War on (French) Terror between 1793 to 1815"—and the British Empire lasted another 150 years. <21>

**That causes global nuclear war**



Heg Good – Democracy

US hegemony is essential to support democracy

Diamond, ‘96

[Larry, Senior researcher fellow at Hoover Institution, Orbis, “Beyond the Unipolar Moment: Why the United States Must Remain Engaged”, p. 405-413]

In the past, global power has been an important reason why certain countries have become models for emulation by others. The global power of the United States, and of its Western democratic allies, has been a factor in the diffusion of democracy around the world, and certainly is crucial to our ability to help popular, legitimate democratic forces deter armed threats to their overthrow, or to return to power (as in Haiti) when they have been overthrown. Given the linkages among democracy, peace, and human rights-as well as the recent finding of Professor Adam Przeworski (New York University) that democracy is more likely to survive in a country when it is more widely present in the region-we should not surrender our capacity to diffuse and defend democracy. It is not only intrinsic to our ideals but important to our national security that we remain globally powerful and engaged-and that a dictatorship does not rise to hegemonic power within any major region.

Democracy resolves several scenarios for extinction

Diamond, ‘95

[Larry, Professor, Stanford University, and Co-Director of National Endowment for Democracy, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990s: ACTORS AND INSTRUMENTS, ISSUES AND IMPERATIVES]

The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically “cleanse” their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build weapons of mass destruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built.

Heg Good – Democracy EXT

US hegemony is crucial to democracy which deters active conflict

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

The American Empire gives the United States the ability to spread its form of government, democracy, and other elements of its ideology of liberalism. Using American power to spread democracy can be a source of much good for the countries concerned as well as for the United States. This is because democracies are more likely to align themselves with the United States and be sympathetic to its worldview. In addition, there is a chance—small as it may be—that once states are governed democratically, the likelihood of conflict will be reduced further. Natan Sharansky makes the argument that once Arabs are governed democratically, they will not wish to continue the conflict against Israel.5' This idea has had a big effect on President George W. Bush. He has said that Sharansky's worldview "is part of my presidential DNA.""

Whether democracy in the Middle East would have this impact is debatable. Perhaps democratic Arab states would be more opposed to Israel, but nonetheless, their people would be better off. The United States has brought democracy to Afghanistan, where 8.5 million Afghans, 40 percent of them women, voted in October 2004, even though remnant Taliban forces threatened them. Elections were held in Iraq in January 2005, the first free elections in that country's history. The military power of the United States put Iraq on the path to democracy. Democracy has spread to Latin America, Europe, Asia, the Caucasus, and now even the Middle East is becoming increasingly democratic. They may not yet look like Western-style democracies, but democratic progress has been made in Morocco, Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, the Palestinian Authority, and Egypt. The march of democracy has been impressive.

Although democracies have their flaws, simply put, democracy is the best form of government. Winston Churchill recognized this over half a century ago: "Democracy is the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." The United States should do what it can to foster the spread of democracy throughout the world. <43>

**Heg Good – Deters Conflict**

Hegemony deters active conflict

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

Second, American interests abroad are protected. U.S. military power allows Washington to defeat its enemies overseas. For example, the United States has made the decision to attack terrorists far from America's shores, and not to wait while they use bases in other countries to plan and train for attacks against the United States itself. Its military power also gives Washington the power to protect its interests abroad by deterring attacks against America's interests or coercing potential or actual opponents. In international politics, coercion means dissuading an opponent from actions America does not want it to do or to do something that it wants done. For example, the United States wanted Libya to give up the weapons of mass destruction capabilities it pos­sessed or was developing. As Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz said, "I think the reason Mu'ammar Qadhafi agreed to give up his weapons of mass destruction was because he saw what happened to Saddam Hussein." <16>

Heg Good – Economy EXT

**US hegemony is crucial to the global economy**

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

Economic prosperity is also a product of the American Empire. It has created a Liberal International Economic Order (LIED)—a network of worldwide free trade and commerce, respect for intellectual property rights, mobility of capital and labor markets—to promote economic growth. The stability and prosperity that stems from this economic order is a global public good from which all states benefit, particularly states in the Third World. The American Empire has created this network not out of altruism but because it benefits the economic well-being of the United States. In 1998, the Secretary of Defense William Cohen put this well when he acknowledged that "economists and soldiers share the same interest in stability"; soldiers create the conditions in which the American economy may thrive, and "we are able to shape the environment [of international politics] in ways that are advantageous to us and that are stabilizing to the areas where we are forward deployed, thereby helping to promote investment and prosperity...business follows the flag. <43>

Heg Good – Free Trade

**US power is key to global capitalism and free trade**

**Schwarz, ‘96** – Correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly

[Benjamin, “Why America thinks it has to run the world,” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol.277, Iss. 6, pg. 92-100, June, Proquest]

America's foreign policy has been based on a hybrid of Lenin's and Kautsky's analyses. It has aimed at the unified, liberalized international capitalist community Kautsky envisioned. But the global role that the United States has undertaken to sustain that community is determined by a worldview very close to Lenin's. To Washington, Baker's "global liberal economic regime" cannot be maintained simply by an internationalized economic elite's desire for it to exist; it can be maintained **only by American power.** Thus, in explaining its global strategy in 1993, in its "post-Cold War" defense strategy, the Pentagon defined the creation of "a prosperous, largely democratic, market-oriented zone of peace and prosperity that encompasses more than two-thirds of the world's economy" as "perhaps our nation's most significant achievement since the Second World War"--not the victory over Moscow. And it declared that this global capitalist order required the "stability" that only American "leadership" could provide. Ultimately, of course, U.S. policymakers and Lenin diverge. Although Lenin recognized that any given international political order was by its nature impermanent, America's foreign-policy strategists have hoped to keep the reality of international politics permanently at bay.

**The impact is nuclear war**

**Copley News Service, 99**

[December 1, l/n]

**For decades**, many **children** in America and other countries **went to bed fearing annihilation by nuclear war**. The specter of nuclear winter freezing the life out of planet Earth seemed very real. Activists protesting the World Trade Organization's meeting in Seattle apparently have forgotten that threat. The truth is that **nations join together** in groups like the WTO not just **to further their own prosperity, but also to forestall conflict with other nations.** In a way, **our planet has traded in the threat of a worldwide nuclear war for the benefit of cooperative global economics**.  Some Seattle protesters clearly fancy themselves to be in the mold of nuclear disarmament or anti-Vietnam War protesters of decades past. But they're not. They're special-interest activists, whether the cause is environmental, labor or paranoia about global government.  Actually, most of the demonstrators in Seattle are very much unlike yesterday's peace activists, such as Beatle John Lennon or philosopher Bertrand Russell, the father of the nuclear disarmament movement, both of whom urged people and nations to work together rather than strive against each other. These and other war protesters would probably approve of 135 WTO nations sitting down peacefully to discuss economic issues that in the past might have been settled by bullets and bombs.  **As long as nations are trading peacefully, and their economies are built on exports to other countries, they have a major disincentive to wage war**. That's why bringing China, a budding superpower, into the WTO is so important. As exports to the United States and the rest of the world feed Chinese prosperity, and that prosperity increases demand for the goods we produce, the threat of hostility diminishes. Many anti-trade protesters in Seattle claim that only multinational corporations benefit from global trade, and that it's the everyday wage earners who get hurt. That's just plain wrong. First of all, it's not the military-industrial complex benefiting. It's U.S. companies that make high-tech goods. And those companies provide a growing number of jobs for Americans. In San Diego, many people have good jobs at Qualcomm, Solar Turbines and other companies for whom overseas markets are essential. In Seattle, many of the 100,000 people who work at Boeing would lose their livelihoods without world trade. Foreign trade today accounts for 30 percent of our gross domestic product. That's a lot of jobs for everyday workers. **Growing global prosperity has helped counter the specter of nuclear winter. Nations of the world are learning to live and work together**, like the singers of anti-war songs once imagined. **Those who care about world peace shouldn't be protesting world trade. They should be celebrating it.**

Heg Good – Free Trade EXT: AT – Copley Indicts

**Free trade checks global nuclear conflict**

**Miller and Elwood, ‘88**

[Vincent and James, Founder and President of the International Society for Individual Liberty, and Vice-President of the ISIL, “FREE TRADE OR PROTECTIONISM? The Case Against Trade Restrictions,” http://www.isil.org/resources/lit/free-trade-protectionism.html]

WHEN GOODS DON'T CROSS BORDERS, ARMIES OFTEN DO

History is not lacking in examples of cold trade wars escalating into hot shooting wars:

\* Europe suffered from almost non-stop wars during the 17th and 18th centuries, when restrictive trade policy (mercantilism) was the rule; rival governments fought each other to expand their empires and to exploit captive markets.

\* British tariffs provoked the American colonists to revolution, and later the Northern-dominated US government imposed restrictions on Southern cotton exports - a major factor leading to the American Civil War.

\* In the late 19th Century, after a half century of general free trade (which brought a half-century of peace), short-sighted politicians throughout Europe again began erecting trade barriers. Hostilities built up until they eventually exploded into World War I.

\* In 1930, facing only a mild recession, US President Hoover ignored warning pleas in a petition by 1028 prominent economists and signed the notorious Smoot-Hawley Act, which raised some tariffs to 100% levels. Within a year, over 25 other governments had retaliated by passing similar laws. The result? World trade came to a grinding halt, and the entire world was plunged into the "Great Depression" for the rest of the decade. The depression in turn led to World War II.

THE #1 DANGER TO WORLD PEACE

The world enjoyed its greatest economic growth during the relatively free trade period of 1945-1970, a period that also saw no major wars. Yet we again see trade barriers being raised around the world by short-sighted politicians. Will the world again end up in a shooting war as a result of these economically-deranged policies? Can we afford to allow this to happen in the nuclear age?

Heg Good – Great Power Wars (GPW)

Unipolarity prevents conflict and solves great power war – a transition would be disastrous

Wohlforth, ‘9. William, professor of government at Dartmouth College. “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics v61, n1, January, Muse.

The evidence suggests that narrow and asymmetrical capabilities gaps foster status competition even among states relatively confident of their basic territorial security for the reasons identified in social identity theory and theories of status competition. Broad patterns of evidence are consistent with this expectation, suggesting that unipolarity shapes strategies of identity maintenance in ways that dampen status conflict. The implication is that unipolarity helps explain low levels of military competition and conflict among major powers after 1991 and that a return to bipolarity or multipolarity would increase the likelihood of such conflict. This has been a preliminary exercise. The evidence for the hypotheses explored here is hardly conclusive, but it is sufficiently suggestive to warrant further refinement and testing, all the more so given [End Page 56] the importance of the question at stake. If status matters in the way the theory discussed here suggests, then the widespread view that the rise of a peer competitor and the shift back to a bipolar or multipolar structure present readily surmountable policy challenges is suspect. Most scholars agree with Jacek Kugler and Douglas Lemke’s argument: “[S]hould a satisfied state undergo a power transition and catch up with dominant power, there is little or no expectation of war.” 81 Given that today’s rising powers have every material reason to like the status quo, many observers are optimistic that the rise of peer competitors can be readily managed by fashioning an order that accommodates their material interests. Yet it is far harder to manage competition for status than for most material things. While diplomatic efforts to manage status competition seem easy under unipolarity, theory and evidence suggest that it could present much greater challenges as the system moves back to bipolarity or multipolarity. When status is seen as a positional good, efforts to craft negotiated bargains about status contests face long odds. And this positionality problem is particularly acute concerning the very issue unipolarity solves: primacy. The route back to bipolarity or multipolarity is thus fraught with danger. With two or more plausible claimants to primacy, positional competition and the potential for major power war could once again form the backdrop of world politics. [End Page 57]

Heg Good – GPW

Unipolarity deflates GPW – we control the key internal for motives and decision-making

Wohlforth, ‘9. William, professor of government at Dartmouth College. “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics v61, n1, January, Muse.

Does unipolarity promote peace among major powers? Would the return of multipolarity increase the prospects for war? Although unipolarity has been marked by very low levels of militarized competition among major powers, many scholars doubt whether the association is causal. Mainstream theories of war long ago abandoned the notion of any simple relationship between polarity and war, positing that conflict emerges from a complex interaction between power and dissatisfaction with the status quo. “While parity defines the structural conditions where war is most likely,” one team of prominent power transition theorists notes, “the motivation driving decisions for war is relative satisfaction with the global or regional hierarchy.”1 High levels of dissatisfaction may prompt states to take on vastly superior rivals. To explain the low levels of conflict since 1991, therefore, scholars must look beyond the distribution of capabilities to account for the absence of such dissatisfaction. To most observers, moreover, satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the status quo among today’s great powers appear to be driven by factors having little or nothing to do with the system’s polarity. “For most scholars,” writes Robert Jervis, “the fundamental cause of war is international anarchy, compounded by the security dilemma. These forces press hardest on the leading powers because while they may be able to [End Page 28] guarantee the security of others, no one can provide this escape from the state of nature for them.”2 But for today’s leading powers anarchyinduced security problems appear to be ameliorated by nuclear deterrence, the spread of democracy, the declining benefits of conquest, and changing collective ideas, among other factors. In combination, these factors appear to moderate insecurity and resulting clashes over the status quo, which most scholars believe drive states to war. Mainstream theories of war thus seem irrelevant to what Jervis terms an “era of leading power peace.” The upshot is a near scholarly consensus that unpolarity’s consequences for great power conflict are indeterminate and that a power shift resulting in a return to bipolarity or multipolarity will not raise the specter of great power war. This article questions the consensus on two counts. First, I show that it depends crucially on a dubious assumption about human motivation. Prominent theories of war are based on the assumption that people are mainly motivated by the instrumental pursuit of tangible ends such as physical security and material prosperity. This is why such theories seem irrelevant to interactions among great powers in an international environment that diminishes the utility of war for the pursuit of such ends. Yet we know that people are motivated by a great many noninstrumental motives, not least by concerns regarding their social status. 3 As John Harsanyi noted, “Apart from economic payoffs, social status (social rank) seems to be the most important incentive and motivating force of social behavior.”4 This proposition rests on much firmer scientific ground now than when Harsanyi expressed it a generation ago, as cumulating research shows that humans appear to be hardwired for sensitivity to status and that relative standing is a powerful and independent motivator of behavior.5 [End Page 29] Second, I question the dominant view that status quo evaluations are relatively independent of the distribution of capabilities. If the status of states depends in some measure on their relative capabilities, and if states derive utility from status, then different distributions of capabilities may affect levels of satisfaction, just as different income distributions may affect levels of status competition in domestic settings. 6 Building on research in psychology and sociology, I argue that even capabilities distributions among major powers foster ambiguous status hierarchies, which generate more dissatisfaction and clashes over the status quo. And the more stratified the distribution of capabilities, the less likely such status competition is. Unipolarity thus generates far fewer incentives than either bipolarity or multipolarity for direct great power positional competition over status. Elites in the other major powers continue to prefer higher status, but in a unipolar system they face comparatively weak incentives to translate that preference into costly action. And the absence of such incentives matters because social status is a positional good—something whose value depends on how much one has in relation to others.7 “If everyone has high status,” Randall Schweller notes, “no one does.”8 While one actor might increase its status, all cannot simultaneously do so. High status is thus inherently scarce, and competitions for status tend to be zero sum.9

Heg Good – GPW

Wohlforth says role uncertainty is the key internal for war because most wars have historically been status-driven

Only unipolarity resolves the nature and identity of status competition

Wohlforth, ‘9. William, professor of government at Dartmouth College. “Unipolarity, Status Competition, and Great Power War,” World Politics v61, n1, January, Muse.

When applied to the setting of great power politics, these propositions suggest that the nature and intensity of status competition will be influenced by the nature of the polarity that characterizes the system. Multipolarity implies a flat hierarchy in which no state is unambiguously number one. Under such a setting, the theory predicts status inconsistency and intense pressure on each state to resolve it in a way that reflects favorably on itself. In this sense, all states are presumptively revisionist in that the absence of a settled hierarchy provides incentives to establish one. But the theory expects the process of establishing a hierarchy to be prone to conflict: any state would be expected to prefer a status quo under which there are no unambiguous superiors to any other state’s successful bid for primacy. Thus, an order in which one’s own state is number one is preferred to the status quo, which is preferred to any order in which another state is number one. The expected result will be periodic bids for primacy, resisted by other great powers.37 For its part, bipolarity, with only two states in a material position to claim primacy, implies a somewhat more stratified hierarchy that is less prone to ambiguity. Each superpower would be expected to see the other as the main relevant out-group, while second-tier major powers would compare themselves to either or both of them. Given the two poles’ clear material preponderance, second-tier major powers would not be expected to experience status dissonance and dissatisfaction, and, to the extent they did, the odds would favor their adoption of strategies of social creativity instead of conflict. For their part, the poles would be expected to seek to establish a hierarchy: each would obviously prefer to be number one, but absent that each would also prefer an ambiguous status quo in which neither is dominant to an order in which it is unambiguously outranked by the other. Unipolarity implies the most stratified hierarchy, presenting the starkest contrast to the other two polar types. The intensity of the competition over status in either a bipolar or a multipolar system might [End Page 40] vary depending on how evenly the key dimensions of state capability are distributed—a multipolar system populated by states with very even capabilities portfolios might be less prone to status competition than a bipolar system in which the two poles possess very dissimilar portfolios. But unipolarity, by definition, is characterized by one state possessing unambiguous preponderance in all relevant dimensions. The unipole provides the relevant out-group comparison for all other great powers, yet its material preponderance renders improbable identity-maintenance strategies of social competition. While second-tier states would be expected to seek favorable comparisons with the unipole, they would also be expected to reconcile themselves to a relatively clear status ordering or to engage in strategies of social creativity.

Heg Good – Israel

**The strength of American hegemony is vital to the Israeli perception of security**

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

Third, our allies like Australia, Great Britain, Japan, Kuwait, Israel, and Thailand are protected by American military might and so we are able to deter attacks against them. They are aligned with the United States, and thus under its "security umbrella"—any attack on those states would be met by the military power of the United States. Other states know this and, usually, that is sufficient to deter aggression against the allies of the United States. <16>

**Israel will stop its nuclear ambiguity if it feels threatened**

**CSM, ‘6**

(December. <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1214/p07s02-wome.html>)

The only inside documentation of the program was made public in the 1980s by Mordechai Vanunu, a former employee at Israel's Dimona Nuclear reactor who gave pictures of the core to the London Sunday Times, a report which spurred a round of speculation about the size of Israel's nuclear arsenal.

Some in Israel have questioned whether stifling discussion of the country's most important weapon is healthy for a democracy. But defenders of the policy insist that silence is the most responsible approach Israel can take.

"This is viewed as something that is obviously not for use unless Israel faces an extreme situation where it feels its existence is threatened," says Emily Landau, a fellow at the Tel Aviv University affiliate Institute of National Security Studies. "The international community should be happy that Israel's policy is a policy of ambiguity."

But an atomic Iran would require a change in Israel's longstanding policy, say some experts. A region with more than one potential atomic power calls for a more explicit form of deterrence.

"In order to make a situation that existed in the cold war, that existed between the US and Soviet Union, you need that both sides threatened by each other," says Michael Karpin, an author of a history of Israel's nuclear program, "otherwise the side that doesn't make the threat is weaker. For a balance of terror so that both sides don't use the bomb, you need to know that the other side has the bomb."

**That causes a nuclear arms race and relapse into war**

**Joshi**, **’00** – Strategic Analysis: A Monthly Journal of the IDSA

(Sharaad. [March 2000 (Vol. XXIII No. 12)](http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_mar00.html) “Israel’s nuclear policy: A cost benefit analysis” http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa\_00jos01.html)

Israel’s opaque nuclear posture helps maintain a nuclear status quo in the Middle East. Any attempt at an official disclosure or testing of weapons would open the nuclear Pandora’s box in the Middle East. The Arabs have lived with this situation for three decades. As mentioned earlier, moderate Arab states, especially in the Persian Gulf, are more concerned about Iranian/Iraqi nuclear ambitions while becoming quite complacent about Israel’s nuclear ambiguity. Some Arabs, especially Palestinians, even see the Israeli undeclared deterrent as playing a positive and stabilising role in promoting the cause of Arab-Israeli peace, because it gives Israel the courage to make tough territorial concessions from a position of strength. Therefore, behind common Arab public demands that Israel sign the NPT and place its nuclear establishment under IAEA safeguards, lies considerable flexibility and political realism. [31](http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_00jos01.html" \l "note31#note31)

A change in the ambiguous posture would start an intensified arms race and disrupt the fragile peace process. Until there is comprehensive peace in the region, it might be best not to acknowledge the nuclear issue at all.

Heg Good – Nuclear Terror EXT

**Hegemony is crucial to preventing WMD terrorism**

**Schmitt**, **‘6** – Resident scholar and director of the Program on Advanced Strategic Studies at the American Enterprise Institute

[Gary, “Is there any alternative to U.S. primacy?” The Weekly Standard, Books & Arts, Vol. 11 No. 22, February, Lexis]

<The core argument itself is not new: The United States and the West face a new threat--**weapons of mass destruction** in the hands of terrorists--and, whether we like it or not, no power other than the United States has the capacity, or can provide the decisive leadership, required to handle this and other critical **global security issues**. Certainly not the United Nations or, anytime soon, the European Union. In the absence of American primacy, the international order would quickly return to disorder. Indeed, whatever legitimate concerns people may have about the fact of America's primacy, the downsides of not asserting that primacy are, according to The American Era, potentially far more serious. The critics "tend to dwell disproportionately on problems in the exercise of [American] power rather than on the dire consequences of retreat from an **activist foreign policy**," Lieber writes. They forget "what can happen in the absence of such power.

Heg Good – Nye

**Hegemony is crucial to precluding power transitions that guarantee nuclear war and extinction**

**Nye, ‘90**, former assistant secretary of defense and president of Harvard's Kennedy school of government

[Joseph**,** Bound To Lead: The Changing Nature Of American Power 1990, p. 16-17]

Some suggest that the current debate on American decline should be regarded as a register of mass psychology and popular fads rather than an analysis of power.42 Others ask why Americans should worry about power. Why not focus solely on wealth and live as well as Swedes or Canadians? The short answer is that the United States is not in the same geopolitical position as Sweden or Canada. It cannot afford a free ride in world politics. If the largest country in a world of nation-states abdicates leadership (as the United States did in the 1920s), the results can be disastrous for all. In an assessment of the debate about American decline, British scholar Susan Strange concludes that "we are all in agreement... on the critical nature of the present end-of-century decade. We share a common perception that mankind... is standing at a fork in the road... In the last resort, it may be that this common concern is more significant than the differences in interpretation.

Decline and War

Perceptions of change in the relative power of nations are of critical importance to understanding the relationship between decline and war. One of the oldest generalizations about international politics attributes the onset of major wars to shifts in power among the leading nations. Thus Thucydides accounted for the onset of the Peloponnesian War which destroyed the power of ancient Athens. The history of the interstate system since 1500 is punctuated by severe wars in which one country struggled to surpass another as the leading state. If, as Robert Gilpin argues, "international politics has not changed fundamentally over the millennia," the implications for the future are bleak. And if fears about shifting power precipitate a major war in a world with **50,000 nuclear weapons, history as we know it may end**.

Heg Good – Poverty

**Hegemony is crucial to ending poverty and creating prosperity**

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

Perhaps the greatest testament to the benefits of the American Empire comes from Deepak Lal, a former Indian foreign service diplomat, researcher at the World Bank, prolific author, and now a professor who started his career confident in the socialist ideology of post-independence India that strongly condemned empire. He has abandoned the position of his youth and is now one of the strongest proponents of the American Empire. Lal has traveled the world and, in the course of his journeys, has witnessed great poverty and misery due to a lack of economic development. He realized that free markets were necessary for the development of poor countries, and this led him to recognize that his faith in socialism was wrong. Just as a conservative famously is said to be a liberal who has been mugged by reality, the hard "evidence and experience" that stemmed from "working and traveling in most parts of the Third World during my professional career" caused this profound change.6'

Lal submits that the only way to bring relief to the desperately poor countries of the Third World is through the American Empire. Empires provide order, and this order "has been essential for the working of the benign processes of globalization, which promote prosperity."62 Globalization is the process of creating a common economic space, which leads to a growing integration of the world economy through the increasingly free movement of goods, capital, and labor. It is the responsibility of the United States, Lal argues, to use the LIED to promote the well-being of all economies, but particularly those in the Third World, so that they too may enjoy economic prosperity. <44>

**The effects of poverty outweigh nuclear war**

**Abu-Jamal,** journalist and political activist, **‘98**

[Mumia, A Quiet and Deadly Violence, 9-19, [http://wwwflashpoints.net/mQuietDeadlyViolence.html](http://www.flashpoints.net/mQuietDeadlyViolence.html)]

**We live**, equally immersed, and to a deeper degree, **in a nation that** condones and **ignores** wide-ranging "**structural' violenc**e, of a kind that destroys human life with a breathtaking ruthlessness. Former Massachusetts prison official and writer, Dr. James Gilligan observes;   By "structural violence" I mean the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstrably large proportion of them) are a function of the class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society's collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting "structural" with "behavioral violence" by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. --(Gilligan, J., MD, Violence: Reflections On a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage, 1996), 192.)   **This form of violence**, not covered by any of the majoritarian, corporate, ruling-class protected media, **is** invisible to us and because of its invisibility, all the more **insidious**. How dangerous is it--really? Gilligan notes:  [E]very fifteen years, on the average, **as many people die because of relative poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war that caused 232 million deaths**; and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. **This is**, in effect, **the equivalent of an ongoing, unending, in fact accelerating**, **thermonuclear war**, or genocide **on the** weak and **poor every year of every decade, throughout the world**. [Gilligan, p. 196]    Worse still, in a thoroughly capitalist society, **much of that violence became internalized, turned back on the Self, because**, in a society based on the priority of wealth, **those who own nothing are taught to loathe themselves**, as if something is inherently wrong with themselves, instead of the social order that promotes this self-loathing. This intense self-hatred was often manifested in familial violence as when the husband beats the wife, the wife smacks the son, and the kids fight each other.   This vicious, circular, and invisible violence, unacknowledged by the corporate media, uncriticized in substandard educational systems, and un-understood by the very folks who suffer in its grips, feeds on the spectacular and more common forms of violence that the system makes damn sure -that we can recognize and must react to it.

Heg Good – Prolif

**Hard power prevents nuclear acquisition**

**Mandelbaum, ‘5** – Professor and Director of the American Foreign Policy Program at Johns Hopkins

[Michael, *The Case for Goliath: How America Acts As the World’s Government in the Twenty-First Century*, p. 46]

By contributing in this way to the global public good of nuclear nonproliferation, the United States functions as governments do within sovereign states. American nuclear guarantees help to secure something that all countries want but would probably not get without the United States. The military deployments and political commitments of the United States have reduced the demand for nuclear weapons, and the number of nuclear-armed countries, to levels considerably below what they would otherwise have reached. But American policies have not entirely eliminated the demand for these armaments, and so the ongoing effort to restrict their spread must address the supply of them as well.

**Prolif will trigger preemptive nuclear wars around the planet**

**Utgoff 02 –** Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis

[Victor A., “Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions,” *Survival,* Summer, p. 87-90]

**Escalation of violence is** also basic **human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges** of violent acts **can escalate to levels unimagined** by the participants before hand. Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, **widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons**, and that such **shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible** with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, **we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West** of the late 1800s. **With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips**, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but **every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even  whole nations**. This kind of world is in no nation’s interest. The means for preventing it must be pursued vigorously. And, as argued above, a most powerful way to prevent it or slow its emergence is to encourage the more capable states to provide reliable protection to others against aggression, even when that aggression could be backed with nuclear weapons. In other words, the world needs at least one state, preferably several, willing and able to play the role of sheriff, or to be members of a sheriff’s posse, even in the face of nuclear threats.

Heg Good – Russia

**A. Transitions away from hegemony lead the US to seek confrontation with Russia in the Middle East**

**Friedman, ‘8**

[George. 4-1. <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/rotating_focus> “Russia and Rotating the U.S. Focus.” ]

The global system is making a major shift now, as we have been discussing. Having gotten off balance and bogged down in the Islamic world, the only global power is trying to extricate itself while rebalancing its foreign policy and confronting a longer-term Russian threat to its interests. That is a delicate maneuver, and one that requires deftness and luck. As mentioned, it is also a long shot. The Russians have a lot of cards to play, but perhaps they are not yet ready to play them. **Bush is risking Russia disrupting the Middle East** as well as increasing pressure in its own region. He either thinks it is worth the risk or he thinks the risk is smaller than it appears. Either way, this is an important moment.

**US-Russia relations on the Middle East are key to preventing Russia collapse and nuclear war**

Dmitry V. **Suslov**, Deputy Director on Research at the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Moscow, Russia, **‘5**

[US-Russia Relations Saved for Now, 2-28, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5348>]

**Putin's appreciation of power** - and his readiness to use it - could **allow him to realize the objective necessity to become a good US partner**, but only if Russia's almost desperate domestic situation is changed, or at least better managed. "Containing Putin's authoritarianism" is already off the Bush agenda. Russia's domestic situation is so unstable and explosive, its state apparatus so ineffective, and the majority of bureaucrats so frightened (and deaf at the same time), that **an overt attempt to stop Putin would produce an opposite result: a severe blowback on the part of the regime, which would finally destabilize the situation altogether.** However, a disaster might come even sooner should the US consider a "regime change" in Russia itself. Most likely, **the result would be either total chaos - with an uncontrollable nuclear arsenal - or an authoritarian nationalist regime.**

**The outlet for the United States to strengthen Russian democracy is through continuing dialogue** with Putin, and cautious actions that disprove his advisors' arguments. Possibilities include real support to stabilize the CIS, avoiding indirect help to Chechen separatists, easing access of Russian non-fuel goods to the Western markets, and strengthening Russian civil society by intensified US-Russian civil society dialogue. The Bush administration must convince Putin that it is truly interested in a stable, strong, and integral Russia. As **for the foreign policy agenda, its basis should be** stabilization and **governance promotion in the broader Middle East.**

**Heg Good – WTO**

**Hegemony is crucial to the US ability to finesse other WTO members – sustained allies resolve other deficits to US hegemony**

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

The soft power of the United States is considerable. We are able to persuade many countries to work with us, whether in military actions like Iraq, or in the economic realm, such as in the World Trade Organization. Why do other countries often want to work with the United States? This is so for two major reasons.

The first reason is self-interest. Countries may help the United States because they want to seek favor from Washington. For example, by participating in the occupation of Iraq, a country like El Salvador earns good will in Washington. At some point in time, El Salvador will remind U.S. officials of that when it needs a favor from Washington. This is what political experts call "logrolling," or, put another way, "If you scratch my back, I'll scratch yours."

The second reason is soft power. Other countries want to work with the United States because they share its goals and want what the United States wants. This is not logrolling. They help because they really want to, not with the expectation that they will receive some specific reward. At some point, the soft power of the United States has changed their opinion, so that individuals or countries that once opposed the United States now understand its actions, and, most often, support them. The soft power of the United States goes far in explaining why the United States has so many allies and so much support in other countries. <26>

\_\_\_\*\*AT: Decline Inevitable

AT: Decline Inevitable\*\*

1. US global hegemony is sustainable and inevitable – multiple advantages in key strategic areas ensure the US will maintain leadership and remain the sole superpower

**Hutton, ‘8** – Visiting fellow @ Oxford, govn’r of London School of Econ, visiting prof @ University of Manchester Business School and Bristol

[“Forget the naysayers - America remains an inspiration to us all.” The Guardian (London). Sunday May 11 2008. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/may/11/usa>]

In one respect, it is hardly surprising. Iraq, Afghanistan and the rise of China. The credit crunch. The $124 a barrel oil price. The unbelievable unfairness of Bush's tax cuts. The racism and violence that still pockmark American life. Yet the pessimism is overdone. The more I visit the US the more I think the pundits predicting the US's imminent economic and political decline hugely overstate their case. Rather, the next 50 years will be as dominated by the US as the last 50. The US will widen its **technological and scientific dominance**, sustain its **military hegemony**, launch a period of r**eindustrialisation** and continue to define modernity both in **culture and industry**.

The fashionable view is that the American economy is a busted flush, a hollowed-out, deindustrialised shell housed in decaying infrastructure that delivers McJobs and has survived courtesy only of a ramped-up housing market and the willingness of foreigners to hold trillions of dollars of American debts.

China and India are set to overtake it in the foreseeable future. At best, the US will have to get used to living in a multipolar world it cannot dominate. At worst, it will have to accept, along with the West, that the new economic and political heart of the world is Asia.

The US economy is certainly in transition, made vastly more difficult by the spreading impact of the credit crunch. But the underlying story is much stronger. The country is developing the prototypical knowledge economy of the 21st century, an economy in which the division between manufacturing and services becomes less clear cut, in a world where the deployment of knowledge, brain power and problem-solving are the sources of wealth generation.

What counts is the strength of a country's universities, research base, commitment to information and communications technology and new technologies along with a network of institutions that supports new enterprise. **Here, the US is so far ahead of the rest of the world it is painful.**

The figures make your head spin. Of the world's top 100 universities, 37 are American. The country spends more proportionately on research and design, universities and software than any other, including Sweden and Japan. Of the world's top 50 companies ranked by R&D, 20 are American. Fifty-two of the world's top 100 brands are American. Half the world's new patents are registered by American companies.

This year, American exports have grown by 13 per cent, helped by the falling dollar, so that the US has reclaimed its position as the world's number one exporter. Moreover, and little remarked on, two-thirds of America's imports come from affiliates of American companies that determinedly keep most of the value added in the US. The US certainly has a trade deficit, but importantly it is largely with itself.

The US will recover from the credit crunch. Already there is an aggression and activism about how to respond that makes the British look limp in comparison. Four-fifths of new mortgages are underwritten by public mortgage banks, interest rates have been slashed and a bank bail-out was launched instantly. More activism is planned. There is a dynamic readiness to fix things in a tight economic corner, irrespective of ideology, that can only be admired.

It is a dynamism that infects the political process. I was in the US on the day Indiana and North Carolina went to the polls in the Democratic primaries. The conventional wisdom is that Obama and Clinton's fight is self-defeating and it would be better if Clinton had stood down earlier. I disagree. It has brought politics alive. Democrats are enrolling to vote in their hundreds of thousands because their vote and opinion now count. They will stay enrolled and vote in November.

There is also a great maturity about the process. It is a political argument that necessarily demands respect for your opponent because if you win you will need their support in November. Americans do public argument well. The tradition might have corrupted since de Tocqueville made the same observation in 1835, but it lives on. And it is a vital underpinning of American success.

It is this strange cocktail of argument, of plural institutions that check and balance, of investing in knowledge and of a belief that no problem can't be fixed that underpins American strength. China is the only country in the world with a similar continental-scale economy and bigger population that conceivably could mount a challenge, but it has none of these institutions and processes. Despite its size, it has only three universities in the top 100, not one brand in the top 100, not one company in the world top 50 ranked by R&D and it registers virtually no patents.

China has no tradition of public argument, nor independent judiciary. Unless and until its institutions change, it will always trail the US in the 21st century knowledge economy and experience upheaval and possible revolution along the way. India, a democracy with the right institutions, is much better placed - but with income per head 2 or 3 per cent of that in the US, a challenge will take centuries rather than decades.

It is the maligned EU that has the institutions and economic prowess to emerge as a genuine knowledge economy counterweight to America.

Sure, the US has problems. It runs its financial system like a casino. It is a grossly unfair society. Its road and rail systems have been neglected for decades. University entrance has become too expensive. It has fetishised deregulation. Money corrupts its political process. To compromise the rule of law in order to 'win' the war on terror was stupid. But none of those problems can't be fixed and the US is about to elect a President who will promise to try, in a world in which it remains the indispensable power.

Anybody who would prefer China's communists needs to see their doctor. The greatest danger is that we start believing the pessimism. The United States is - and remains - formidable. Which is just as well for all of us.

AT: Decline Inevitable\*\*

2. Other powers won’t be able to overcome the US – the global aging crisis locks in long-term hegemony

**Haas, ‘7** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University

[Mark L. Haas. “A Geriatric Peace?; The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations.” Center of Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: International Security. Summer 2007. p. Lexis]

In the coming decades, the most powerful states in the international system will face a challenge unlike any experienced in the history of great power politics: significant aging of their populations. Global aging will be a **potent force for the continuation** of U.S. economic and military dominance. Aging populations are likely to produce a slowdown in states' economic growth at the same time that governments will face substantial pressure to pay for massive new expenditures for elderly care. This economic dilemma will create such an austere fiscal environment that the other great powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States' huge power lead. Moreover, although the U.S. population is growing older, it is doing so to a lesser extent and less quickly than all of the other major actors in the system. Consequently, the economic and fiscal costs created by social aging--as well as their derivative effects on military spending--will be significantly lower for the United States than for potential competitors. Nevertheless, the United States will experience substantial new costs created by its own aging population. As a result, it will most likely be unable to maintain the scope of its current international position and will be less able to realize key international objectives, including preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, funding nation building, and engaging in military humanitarian interventions.

In coming decades, the most powerful states in the international system will face a challenge unlike any other experienced in the history of great power politics: significant aging of their populations. Due to steep declines in birthrates over the last century and substantial increases in life expectancies, all of the current great powers are growing older--in most cases at a substantial rate and extent. 1 By 2050 at least 15 percent of the citizens in these states will be over 65. 2 In Japan more than one out of every three people will be over this age. China alone in 2050 will have more than 329 million people over 65, which is equal to the entire current populations of France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom combined. 3 As social aging progresses over the next half century, the populations in Germany, Japan, and Russia are expected to shrink significantly. Russia's population is already decreasing by nearly 700,000 people per year, and Japan, too, is currently experiencing absolute population decline. 4 Russia's aging problem is so severe that President Vladimir Putin asserted in 2006 that demography is "Russia's most acute problem today." 5 Global aging has key ramifications for the future of international relations. This article concentrates on the effects of this variable for the future of U.S. security.

Global population aging will influence U.S. foreign policies in five major ways in coming decades. First, this phenomenon will be a potent force for the continuation of U.S. power dominance, both economic and military. Aging populations are likely to result in the slowdown of states' economic growth at the same time that governments face substantial pressure to pay for massive new expenditures for elderly care. This double economic dilemma will create such an austere fiscal environment that the other great powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States' huge power lead. Investments designed to improve overall economic growth and purchases of military weaponry will be crowded out. Compounding these difficulties, although the United States is growing older, it is doing so to a lesser extent and less quickly than all the other great powers. Consequently, the economic and fiscal costs for the United States created by social aging (although staggering, especially for health care) will be significantly lower for it than for potential competitors. Global aging is therefore not only likely to extend U.S. hegemony (because the other major powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States' economic and military power lead), but deepen it as these others states are likely to fall even farther behind the United States. Thus despite much recent discussion in the international relations literature and some policymaking circles about the likelihood of China (and to a lesser extent the European Union) balancing U.S. power in coming decades, the realities of social aging and its economic and military effects make such an outcome unlikely. 6

3. Flaws in US hegemony are self-correcting

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

Although the United States is the dominant military power at this time, and will remain so into the foreseeable future, this does not mean that it does not suffer from problems within its own military, many of which are being addressed. The "defense transformation" efforts started by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld are attempts to make the U.S. military more combat effective and efficient. The U.S. military is the best, but no one would claim that it is perfect. However, a large part of the reason the U.S. military is the best is because it is constantly evaluating its problems so that it may solve them. Many people do not realize this. Despite a common image of the military in American popular culture as lowbrow and full of Cletus-the-Slack-Jawed-Yokel characters from The Simpsons television show, the military is comprised of some of the smartest and best-educated people you will ever meet. Most mid- and high-ranking officers have master's or even doctoral (Ph.D.) degrees. These are people who would be very successful in corporate careers but choose the military because of their patriotism and desire to serve their country. <18>

AT: Decline Inevitable\*\*

4. The US has strategic control – residual threats don’t alter the fundamental coordinates of hegemony

Stratfor ‘8

[“Net Assessment: United States.” Dec 2007 – Jan 2008. <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/net_assessment_united_states>]

Behind the noise, however, is this fact: **The global situation for the United States has not changed since before 9/11**. America remains in control of the world’s oceans. The jihadist strategic threat has not solidified, although the possibility of terrorism cannot be discounted. The emerging Russian challenge is not trivial, but the Russians have a long way to go before they would pose a significant threat to American interests. Another potential threat, China, is contained by its own economic interests, while lesser powers are not of immediate significance. American global pre-eminence remains intact and the jihadist threat has been disrupted for now. **This leaves residual threats to the United States, but no strategic threats.**

AT: Decline Inevitable – Hutton EXT

Hegemony is sustainable and prolonged – extend the Hutton evidence – the US will widen its technological, scientific, industrial, cultural, and military hegemony over the coming 50 years – the US controls the prototypical knowledge economy that triumphs in a globalized era – defer to Hutton, he’s a fellow at Oxford while Layne and others are disproved by more than a decade of history

AT: Decline Inevitable – Aging Crisis EXT

Extend the Haas evidence – the aging crisis will deplete the financial resources of would-be challengers to US primacy – this level of deflation ensures that primacy will either be continued or strengthened

More evidence – the aging crisis locks in primacy for 3 reasons

**Haas, ‘7** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University

[Mark L. Haas. “A Geriatric Peace?; The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations.” Center of Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: International Security. Summer 2007. p. Lexis]

Population aging in the great powers will be a potent force for the prolongation of U.S. power dominance in the twenty-first century for three principal reasons. First, the massive costs and probable slowdowns in economic growth created by aging populations will inhibit the other major powers from increasing military expenditures anywhere close to matching U.S. defense spending; these factors are even likely to push many of these states to reduce their military expenditures from current levels. Second, with aging populations and shrinking workforces, the other great powers will have to spend increasing percentages of their defense budgets on personnel costs and military pensions at the expense of purchasing the most technologically sophisticated weaponry. The more money that states spend on military personnel and pensions as opposed to weapons, the lower the likelihood will be of these countries challenging U.S. military dominance. 44 The third factor reinforces both of the previous points. Although the U.S. population is aging, it is doing so to a lesser extent and less quickly than those of the other great powers (even India's population, though it will remain younger than that of the United States for the first half of the twenty-first century, is aging significantly faster than the U.S. population). As a result, the pressures pushing for the crowding out of military spending in favor of elderly care and the increasing substitution of labor for capital within defense budgets will be considerably smaller for the United States than for potential great power competitors, to the great benefit of its relative power position in coming decades.

AT: Decline Inevitable – Thayer EXT

US hegemonic strategy is self-correcting – extend the Thayer evidence – major strategic threats are handled by a military comprised of officers who spend decades mastering military history and strategy to earn PhD’s in their field which is a reason their strategy should be preferred over the brief treatise offered by a history professor

AT: Decline Inevitable – Stratfor EXT

There’s no looming challenger to US hegemony – extend the Stratfor evidence – jihadists, Russian nationalists, and Chinese power rise are all constrained by a variety of domestic factors – our evidence is superior, two reasons –

A subpoint it makes a distinction between residual factors which are present but don’t threaten hegemony and the strategic threats which don’t exist in the 21st century –

B subpoint it’s a net assessment by a group of strategic forecasters which is more reliable than a series of casual historical observations

<Ins. AT: China/Russia/EU/India rise ans>

AT: Decline Inevitable – Concerted Efforts Key

Even if nonpolarity occurs concerted efforts can reduce the impact and tilt the odds against collapse

**HAASS, ‘8** is President of the Council on Foreign Relations

[RICHARD N. “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance.” Foreign Affairs. May/June. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html>

Nonpolarity will be difficult and dangerous. But encouraging a greater degree of global integration will help promote stability. Establishing a core group of governments and others committed to cooperative multilateralism would be a great step forward. Call it "concerted nonpolarity." It would not eliminate nonpolarity, but it would help manage it and increase the odds that the international system will not deteriorate or disintegrate.

AT: Decline Inevitable – Economy Answers

Economic difficulties are absorbed by awesome hegemonic production – even recessions won’t cause concern

Stratfor ‘8

[“Net Assessment: United States.” Dec 2007 – Jan 2008. <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/net_assessment_united_states>]

One must always remember the U.S. GDP — $13.2 trillion — in measuring any number. Both the annual debt and the total national debt must be viewed against this number, as well as the more troubling trade deficit. The $13.2 trillion can absorb damage and imbalances that smaller economies could not handle. We would expect a recession in the next couple of years simply based on the time since the last period of negative growth, but we tend to think that it is not quite here yet. But, even if it were, it would simply be a normal part of the business cycle, of no significant concern.

Any tool of measurement demonstrates American economic superiority – this growth is sustainable and will continue

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

In order to demonstrate this argument, we have to examine the aggregate economic strength of the United States versus the economic power of other countries. Table 1.4 captures the relative economic might of the United States. It provides a comparison of the world's top twenty economies as estimated by the Central Intelligence Agency, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and the World Bank. For the United States, the data are consistent using any of the major tools economists employ to estimate economic might (the CIA's GDP-PPP, GDP for the IISS, and GNI for the World Bank). The data show that the United States is clearly the world's most powerful economy in both absolute and relative terms.

Indeed, if we consider economies, only the twenty-five-member-nation European Union (EU) possibly surpasses American economic might, and if it does, it is not by much. In 2004, the EU's economy was $11.05 trillion, in contrast to the $10.99 trillion U.S. economy in 2003, according to the CIA.26 If we recognize that the CIA estimates the EU had 1 percent real growth in 2004, and the United States had 3.1 percent real growth in 2003, it is the case that the economies are really the same size. Additionally, as I will describe below, the U.S. economy is much more efficient and better primed for continued economic growth than is the EU's sclerotic and moribund economy. <20>

AT: Decline Inevitable – Heg Key

Even if decline is inevitable its effects aren’t – restoring hegemony is key to global security

**HAASS, ‘8** is President of the Council on Foreign Relations

[RICHARD N. “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance.” Foreign Affairs. May/June. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html>

Still, even if nonpolarity was inevitable, its character is not. To paraphrase the international relations theorist Hedley Bull, global politics at any point is a mixture of anarchy and society. The question is the balance and the trend. A great deal can and should be done to shape a nonpolar world. Order will not just emerge. To the contrary, left to its own devices, a nonpolar world will become messier over time. Entropy dictates that systems consisting of a large number of actors tend toward greater randomness and disorder in the absence of external intervention.

The United States can and should take steps to reduce the chances that a nonpolar world will become a cauldron of instability. This is not a call for unilateralism; it is a call for the United States to get its own house in order. Unipolarity is a thing of the past, but the United States still retains more capacity than any other actor to improve the quality of the international system. The question is whether it will continue to possess such capacity.

AT: Decline Inevitable – Multilat Key

Multilateralism solves apolarity

**HAASS, ‘8** is President of the Council on Foreign Relations

[RICHARD N. “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance.” Foreign Affairs. May/June. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html>

Multilateralism will be essential in dealing with a nonpolar world. To succeed, though, it must be recast to include actors other than the great powers. The UN Security Council and the G-8 (the group of highly industrialized states) need to be reconstituted to reflect the world of today and not the post-World War II era. A recent meeting at the United Nations on how best to coordinate global responses to public health challenges provided a model. Representatives of governments, UN agencies, NGOs, pharmaceutical companies, foundations, think tanks, and universities were all in attendance. A similar range of participants attended the December 2007 Bali meeting on climate change. Multilateralism may have to be less formal and less comprehensive, at least in its initial phases. Networks will be needed alongside organizations. Getting everyone to agree on everything will be increasingly difficult; instead, the United States should consider signing accords with fewer parties and narrower goals. Trade is something of a model here, in that bilateral and regional accords are filling the vacuum created by a failure to conclude a global trade round. The same approach could work for climate change, where agreement on aspects of the problem (say, deforestation) or arrangements involving only some countries (the major carbon emitters, for example) may prove feasible, whereas an accord that involves every country and tries to resolve every issue may not. Multilateralism à la carte is likely to be the order of the day.

AT: Decline Inevitable – No Timeframe

Timeframe arguments are backwards – the aging crisis means that even if other nations balance quickly they can’t sustain a prolonged showdown with the US

**Haas, ‘7** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University

[Mark L. Haas. “A Geriatric Peace?; The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations.” Center of Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: International Security. Summer 2007. p. Lexis]

The argument that currently younger states such as China and India have time to balance the United States before their aging problems become fiscally overwhelming ignores, however, the fact that power is relative. To balance the United States, competitors must not only spend significantly more money on their militaries than they do presently, but spend significantly more than the United States will in coming decades. The United States’ fairly advantageous demographic position, though, makes the likelihood of such an outcome low. Moreover, each year that goes by in which the United States’ military lead remains roughly the same increases the odds of the continuation of U.S. hegemony. The closer that potential balancers of the United States come to experiencing the full effects of their aging crises, the more likely crowding out of military spending in favor of geriatric care will occur, and the more likely U.S primacy will continue.

AT: Decline Inevitable – Terrorism Answers

The US can and will win the war against terrorism – history is on our side and fundamentalism will die out

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

The Threat from Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism: Dangerous but Manageable The terrorist attacks of 9/11 demonstrated the danger the terrorist group al Qaeda poses to the United States. In the wake of that attack, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom to overthrow the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which sheltered al Qaeda, and to put great pressure on al Qaeda's members and finances throughout the world. Great progress has been made in the war against al Qaeda. The United States has been successful at undermining that terrorist network, the Department of Homeland Security has been created to aid the defense of American territory, and, most importantly, no attacks have occurred on American soil since 9/11. But the war on terrorism is at root a war of ideas. As Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld explained in 2003, "all elements of national power: military, financial, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence and public diplomacy," are necessary to win the war on terror. But, he added, "to win the war on terror, we must also win the war of ideas." Military, diplomatic, and other elements are necessary "to stop terrorists before they can terrorize," but "even better, we must lean forward and 34 stop them from becoming terrorists in the first place."" Winning the war of ideas is critical to keeping people from becoming terrorists.

Americans need to remember that their country has fought and won wars of ideas before. World War II was a war of ideas between liberalism and fascism. The Cold War took the war of ideas to new heights. Few Americans comprehend how attractive communism was in a Europe destroyed by World War II. Communism seemed to offer a better life and, in many countries, such as France and Italy, the communists had a solid record of fighting the Germans. Nonetheless, the United States engaged communism in a war of ideas and won.

It can also win the physical battle with the few extremists in the Islamic world who are motivated by a contorted fundamentalist interpretation of Islam. The majority of Muslims are not fundamentalists, and in fact reject fundamentalism as simply wrong. Leading Sunni scholars have stigmatized fundamentalism as aberrant—a perversion of the religion. Even to most Muslims who are fundamentalists, al Qaeda is seen as a deviant group that is wrong to use terrorism as a weapon against innocent civilians, including their coreligionists (many of al Qaeda's victims have been Muslim), governments in the Islamic world, and the West. <39> \

The battle is over and the bums lost

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

The American victory in the war against al Qaeda begins by recognizing that terrorist organizations not only can be defeated but, indeed, often are. Almost all of the left-wing terrorist organizations of the Cold War were defeated—from the Weather Underground in the United States to the Japanese Red Army, the Red Army faction in Germany, and the Red Brigades in Italy. The Peruvians defeated the Shining Path. The British fought the IRA to a standstill. The French defeated Corsican nationalists and the communist terrorist group Direct Action. The Algerians have successfully suppressed the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), an especially vicious terrorist organization that killed well over one hundred thousand people between 1990 and 2000 in Algeria and France." In 1994, a GIA terrorist thankfully was thwarted from flying an Air France aircraft into the Eiffel Tower—an attack that served as a template for the 9/11 attacks in the United States. Spain has greatly weakened the Basque separatist terrorist group ETA. The Turks have emasculated the PKK (now called New PKK). The Israelis defeated the PLO, as did the Jordanians. And while the Israelis have not destroyed the three major terrorist groups, Fatah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, they have been extremely effective at penetrating these groups to prevent attacks. Attacks have declined 60 percent between 2003 and 2004—there were only six suicide bombings in Israel and eight in the occupied territories—and the Israelis believe they foiled 114 planned suicide bombings in 2004." Reflecting on the decline of these groups over the last few years, the Israel internal security organization, Shin Bet, estimates that it prevents 90 percent of attacks before they occur. The Egyptians have broken the back of the Islamic Group and of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. So while it is true that al Qaeda should not be underestimated—it is motivated, competent, and resilient—it does have vulnerabilities and can be defeated, just as many terrorist groups before it were. <41>

AT: Decline Inevitable – Transition Conflict Answers

Extend the Haas evidence – rising geriatric populations will substantially deflate the geopolitical ambitions of great power rivals

More evidence – that removes any possibility of transition conflicts

**Haas, ‘7** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University

[Mark L. Haas. “A Geriatric Peace?; The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations.” Center of Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: International Security. Summer 2007. p. Lexis]

Second, global aging increases the likelihood of continued peaceful relations between the United States and the other great powers. Studies have shown that the probability of international conflict grows when either the dominant country anticipates a power transition in favor of a rising state or states, or when such a transition actually takes place. 7 By adding substantial support to the continuation of U.S. hegemony, global aging works against either outcome from transpiring. An aging world therefore decreases the probability that either hot or cold wars will develop between the United States and the other great powers.

\_\_\_\*\*AT: Assorted Neg Args

AT: China Rise

**1. Chinese ascension won’t threaten American primacy and hegemony solves the risk – several reasons**

**Nye and Armitage, ‘7** – Distinguished service professor @ Harvard and President, Armitage International

[Joseph and Richard. “CSIS COMMISSION ON SMART POWER: A smarter, more secure America.” http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071106\_csissmartpowerreport.pdf]

China’s soft power is likely to continue to grow, but this does not necessarily mean that Washington and Beijing are on a collision course, fighting for global influence. First, a number of factors ultimately will limit China’s soft power, including its own domestic political, socioeconomic, and environmental challenges. Second, there are a number of critical areas of mutual interest between the United States and China on which the two powers can work together—and in some cases already are. Energy security and environmental stewardship top that list, along with other transnational issues such as public health and nonproliferation. Finally, global leadership does not have to be a zero-sum game. **China can only become preeminent if the U**nited **S**tates **continues to allow its own powers of attraction to atrophy.**

**2. Aging crisis –**

**a) China will face the world’s largest demographic crisis**

**Haas, ‘7** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University

[Mark L. Haas. “A Geriatric Peace?; The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations.” Center of Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: International Security. Summer 2007. p. Lexis]

I begin my analysis with the aging problems in China, which is the state most frequently mentioned as a likely balancer of the United States. Of all the great powers, China will face particularly severe fiscal challenges due to demographic trends. These challenges will begin to hit with substantial force in only ten to fifteen years, when China's large postwar baby boom generation begins to reach retirement age.

Rising longevity in China and the "one child policy," which has helped lower China's fertility to a current rate of 1.7, have made China a rapidly aging society. By 2050 China's median age is predicted to be nearly 45, which will be one of the oldest in the world (the oldest country in the world today, Japan, has a median age of just under 43). 47 The ratio of working-age adults to elderly will shrink from just under 10 in 2000 to 2.5 by 2050. 48 China today has roughly 100 million citizens over the age of 65. In only twenty years, this number will double. Roughly thirty years from now, it is expected to triple. 49

In relation to the other great powers, which had the benefit of achieving high levels of GDP per capita before growing old, China is particularly unprepared for the effects of social aging. Despite China's very high levels of economic growth since the 1990s, it will become the first country to grow old before becoming an advanced industrial state. Consequently, China will find it even more difficult to pay for its obligations to the elderly than will the industrialized great powers. 50

China's work-retirement system beginning in the 1950s under Mao Zedong followed the Soviet model: workers in state-owned companies were promised fairly generous retirement benefits but received low wages. 51 As a result, most Chinese workers did not earn enough to accrue sufficient private savings to finance their retirements. Nearly 80 percent of Chinese urban households with individuals aged 55 and over today have less than one year of income saved, and only 5 percent have more than two years of income in savings. 52 Consequently, according to one expert on this subject, "the majority of the people in the People's Republic of China [will] be obliged to rely heavily on social security pensions after retirement." 53 Over the decades, however, the Chinese government, however, has set aside little money to pay for these obligations. Three-quarters of all Chinese workers are without any pension coverage, yet independent estimates have found a potential shortfall between China's governmental obligations to the elderly and saved assets to be as much as 150 percent of GDP (this is in addition to existing debt, which currently stands at nearly 30 percent of GDP). 54

China has traditionally relied on the family unit to provide for elderly care in lieu of adequate public and private resources. Increasing rates of divorce, urbanization (and related migration), 55 and female workforce participation will, however, place significant strain on this tradition. Decreasing family size will prove especially problematic for preserving elderly welfare within the context of the family. Demographers refer to a rapidly growing "4-2-1" phenomenon in China, in which one child is responsible for caring for two parents and four grandparents. 56

Given these facts, within fifteen years China's leaders will be faced with a difficult choice: allow growing levels of poverty within an exploding elderly population, or provide the resources necessary to avoid this situation. The Chinese government's assumption of the unfunded pension liabilities of state-owned enterprises reveals the political and moral pressure working for the latter outcome. This pressure to significantly expand and deepen China's welfare system will only grow as its aging crisis becomes increasingly acute in the decades to come. In this context, the **crowding out of military and other discretionary expenditures will be likely**.

AT: China Rise

**b) That locks in US hegemony**

**Haas, ‘7** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University

[Mark L. Haas. “A Geriatric Peace?; The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations.” Center of Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: International Security. Summer 2007. p. Lexis]

Global population aging will influence U.S. foreign policies in five major ways in coming decades. First, this phenomenon will be a potent force for the continuation of U.S. power dominance, both economic and military. Aging populations are likely to result in the slowdown of states' economic growth at the same time that governments face substantial pressure to pay for massive new expenditures for elderly care. This double economic dilemma will create such an austere fiscal environment that the other great powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States' huge power lead. Investments designed to improve overall economic growth and purchases of military weaponry will be crowded out. Compounding these difficulties, although the United States is growing older, it is doing so to a lesser extent and less quickly than all the other great powers. Consequently, the economic and fiscal costs for the United States created by social aging (although staggering, especially for health care) will be significantly lower for it than for potential competitors. Global aging is therefore not only likely to extend U.S. hegemony (because the other major powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States' economic and military power lead), but deepen it as these others states are likely to fall even farther behind the United States. Thus despite much recent discussion in the international relations literature and some policymaking circles about the likelihood of China (and to a lesser extent the European Union) balancing U.S. power in coming decades, the realities of social aging and its economic and military effects make such an outcome unlikely. 6

**3) Several factors inhibit Chinese growth**

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

The declining birth rates that flow from this will hinder economic growth in the long run. China eventually will face other major economic and social problems as well, including those related to the economic fragility of its financial system and state-owned enterprises, economic malaise brought on by widespread corruption, ubiquitous environmental pollution, HIV/AIDS and other epidemic diseases like SARS, and the high energy costs, which stifle economic growth. In addition, unlike the United States, China is not a model for other countries. Chinese political values are inferior to those of the United States because China is repressive. The Chinese do not respect human rights, including religious and political freedom. <33>

**4) Regional enemies will turn to the US to block Chinese hegemony**

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

There is also the wildcard of potential conflict over Taiwan. A war with Taiwan would retard China's economic progress and scare neighboring states. The fact that China has so many territorial and other disputes with its major neighbors, Japan, India, Russia, and Vietnam, means that many countries see it as a threat and will want to ally with the United States against Chinese power. The rise of China is ripe for potential conflict with its neighbors, and this constitutes a big danger in international politics. <33>

AT: China Rise – Aging Crisis EXT

**Chinese production will plummet by 2020 due to the aging crisis**

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

Although its continued economic growth is impressive, China faces major problems that will hinder its ability to replace the United States as the world's hegemon. The first of these is a rapidly aging population beginning in 2020. Nearly 400 million Chinese will be over sixty-five years old by 2020. This could be a source of unrest and economic stagnation. Younger generations will be pressed to care for the older population. There will be a great discrepancy between the numbers of young people and the elderly, and China lacks the pension and health care infrastructure characteristic of Western societies. Many Chinese will have to work far into old age and will not be able to care for themselves should they fall sick or be too old to earn a wage. As we see with Japan, economic productivity will peak. <32>

AT: Counter-Balancing

Balancing won’t happen – unipolarity makes the risks and challenges too high – geography shields any remnant of risk

Stephen M. Walt, ‘9. Professor of international affairs at Harvard University. “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009, Lexis.

Even if other states now worry about the unipole’s dominant power position, the condition of unipolarity also creates greater obstacles to the formation of an effective balancing coalition. When one state is far stronger than the others, it takes a larger coalition to balance it, and assembling such a coalition entails larger transaction costs and more daunting dilemmas of collective action. In particular, each member of the countervailing coalition will face greater incentives to free ride or pass the buck, unless it is clear that the unipolar power threatens all of them more or less equally and they are able to develop both a high degree of trust and some way to share the costs and risks fairly. Moreover, even if a balancing coalition begins to emerge, the unipole can try to thwart it by adopting a divide-and-conquer strategy: punishing states that join the opposition while rewarding those that remain aloof or support the unipole instead. These structural obstacles would exist regardless of who the single superpower was, but a counterhegemonic alliance against the United States faces an additional nonstructural barrier. The United States is [End Page 96] the sole great power in the Western hemisphere, while the other major powers are all located on the Eurasian landmass. As a result, these states tend to worry more about each other; furthermore, many have seen the United States as the perfect ally against some nearby threat. Accordingly, they are even less likely to join a coalition against the United States, even if U.S. power is substantially greater. Assembling a vast counter-American coalition would require considerable diplomatic virtuosity and would probably arise only if the United States began to pose a genuine existential threat. It is unlikely to do so, however, in part because this same geographic isolation dampens American concerns about potential Eurasian rivals.30 America’s geopolitical isolation has been an advantage throughout its history, and it remains an important asset today.31

**Cooperation with great powers is inevitable – rivalry theories are displaced Cold War relics**

**Hachigian, ‘8** – Senior Vice President at the Center for American Progress

[Nina. “The United States and Shifting Global Power Dynamics.” April 18. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/16002/united_states_and_shifting_global_power_dynamics.html>]

In our book, Mona Sutphen and I lay out a new paradigm for thinking about what we call the “pivotal powers,” China, India, Russia, the EU and Japan. America need not fear their strength. In fact, in order to keep Americans safe and prosperous, we need to work with these powers as never before. If America leads abroad and tackles its problems at home, we will continue to thrive in a more crowded world.

Importantly, pivotal powers now want what we want—a stable world with open markets. None are true ideological adversaries. Though hot spots remain, no intractable disputes divide us. Nation states seeking order are on the same side against the forces of chaos—terrorists, climate change, disease, and proliferation. Only together can they defeat these rotten fruit of globalization. For instance, China allows American agents into China’s ports to help screen outbound shipping containers for smuggled radioactive devices. A climate crisis will come unless all the big emitters act.

Nevertheless, near panic dominates the debate about emerging powers, especially inside the Beltway—they are taking our jobs, luring away R&D, giving solace to enemies and reducing democracy’s appeal. There is truth in some of these claims. But remedies to these problems, more often than not, begin with domestic policy. For example, more innovation in China and India benefits America, as long as innovation continues here. That requires investments in math and science education.

Thinking of big powers principally as competing rivals is not the right paradigm. Companies compete for profits. Countries do not. Nor is there a vast zero-sum head-to-head battle for influence. Policymakers need to shed the “us against them” Cold-War mindset.

We advocate “strategic collaboration” with the pivotal powers. The biggest challenge America faces is not their growing strength. It is convincing them to contribute to the world order—regimes and institutions that will tackle shared challenges like economic stability and nuclear proliferation. America still has to lead, but in a new way that encourages others to take responsibility.

AT: Counter-Balancing

\

**Interdependence prevents counter-balancing**

**HAASS, ‘8** is President of the Council on Foreign Relations

[RICHARD N. “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance.” Foreign Affairs. May/June. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html>

A further constraint on the emergence of great-power rivals is that many of the other major powers are dependent on the international system for their economic welfare and political stability. They do not, accordingly, want to disrupt an order that serves their national interests. Those interests are closely tied to cross-border flows of goods, services, people, energy, investment, and technology -- flows in which the United States plays a critical role. Integration into the modern world dampens great-power competition and conflict.

AT: Counter-Balancing – No Great Rival

**No risk of a great power rival**

**HAASS, ‘8** is President of the Council on Foreign Relations

[RICHARD N. “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance.” Foreign Affairs. May/June. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html>

But this has not happened. Although anti-Americanism is widespread, no great-power rival or set of rivals has emerged to challenge the United States. In part, this is because the disparity between the power of the United States and that of any potential rivals is too great. Over time, countries such as China may come to possess GDPs comparable to that of the United States. But in the case of China, much of that wealth will necessarily be absorbed by providing for the country's enormous population (much of which remains poor) and will not be available to fund military development or external undertakings. Maintaining political stability during a period of such dynamic but uneven growth will be no easy feat. India faces many of the same demographic challenges and is further hampered by too much bureaucracy and too little infrastructure. The EU's GDP is now greater than that of the United States, but the EU does not act in the unified fashion of a nation-state, nor is it able or inclined to act in the assertive fashion of historic great powers. Japan, for its part, has a shrinking and aging population and lacks the political culture to play the role of a great power. Russia may be more inclined, but it still has a largely cash-crop economy and is saddled by a declining population and internal challenges to its cohesion.

AT: Econ Collapse / Costs of Hegemony Unsustainable

**The cost of hegemony is sustainable – defense spending represents a reasonable proportion of GDP and the cost is affordable**

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

No other country, or group of countries, comes close to matching the defense spending of the United States. Table 1.3 provides a context for this defense spending through a comparison of the defense spending of major countries in 2004, according the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The United States is far ahead of the defense spending of all other countries, including its nearest competitor, China. This is by design. As former Speaker of the House of Representatives Newt Gingrich has argued, "You do not need today's defense budget to defend the United States. You need today's defense budget to lead the world. If you are prepared to give up leading the world, you can have a much smaller defense budget." To maintain the robust American lead in military capabilities, it must continue to spend large, but absolutely affordable, sums.

And it is affordable. While the amount of U.S. defense spending certainly is a large sum, it is only about 4 percent of its gross domestic product, as Table 1.3 illustrates. An examination of the data in the table is remarkable for four reasons. First, U.S. defense spending is about half of the world's total defense spending. Second, the United States spends more than almost all the other major military powers in the world combined. Of course, most of those major military powers are also allies of the United States. Third, U.S. defense spending is very low when measured as a percentage of its economy, about 3.7 percent of its total economy. Fourth, defense spending at that level is easily affordable for the United States into the future.

In fact, in absolute real terms, the United States spends about 10 percent more on defense than it did during the Cold War. If we examine the history of defense spending during the Cold War, only in fiscal years 1946, 1951-1953, 1967-1969, 1983-1990 did the United States spend more on defense when measured in fiscal year 2005 dollars.0 And because the U.S. economy was smaller, the defense spending burden was greater in those years; it is much less now. Nor is the burden of military service too great for the American people to bear. As Table 1.3 demonstrates, there are only about 1.5 million people in uniform, out of a population of 300 million, or approximately 0.5 percent of the population. In comparison, during World War II, when the U.S. population numbered some 140 million, about 13 million people, or nearly 9 percent of the population, were in uniform.' <14>

AT: EU Rise

**No risk of EU rise – political and socioeconomic factors block**

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

Yet unlike China, the EU simply does not pose a great danger to the American Empire for two major reasons—political and socioeconomic. The political similarities between the EU and the United States are enormous. In essence, the political values of EU are largely those of the United States. This is not a surprise, in many respects; the United States is the daughter of Europe, and that may be excellent news for future warm relations between them. In addition, if the "clash of civilizations" argument made famous by Samuel Huntington is correct (that is, that future major conflicts will be between civilizations), then as other civilizations become more powerful—such as the Chinese or Islamic—Europe and the United States will be united again by the threat from those civilizations." They were united during the Cold War by the threat from the Soviet Union, and history teaches that an external threat can produce comity where once there was rivalry.

In addition to the political reasons, there are three major socioeconomic reasons why the EU will not be able to challenge the United States. These are (1) the costs of expansion; (2) the different approach to work and the related costs of generous social welfare programs in the EU; and (3) the aging EU workforce and the risks of Muslim immigration to the EU's identity. <34>

AT: EU Rise – Economic Model EXT

**The US economic model ensures it will sustain at a higher and more stable rate than the EU**

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

The second economic reason is that the EU is based on a different socioeconomic model than the United States. The American economy is as close as it gets to raw capitalism. You have to work to feed, house, and clothe yourself in America. The social safety net does have large gaps in comparison to Europe, and there is great disparity in wealth—a smaller number of people have control over more of the wealth of the country than in Europe. America is a great place to be rich. It is in Europe as well, but less so due to high taxes and greater income equality. The ratio between what the top tier of American CEOs earn and what the average manufacturing employee earns is 475:1. In Europe, the ratio is 24:1 in Britain, 15:1 in France, and 13:1 in Sweden. On the other hand, the American economy is fluid, so the guy who invents the better mousetrap is able to market it and make a million. There is relatively little government intervention in the economy, and capitalism is warmly embraced. America is the epitome of free market capitalism.

The European economy does not work that way. In contrast to America, there is much more government intervention in the economy—laws that govern business practices and protect workers and the environment—and there is great ambivalence toward capitalism. Europeans prefer a closer distribution of wealth so that there is not an enormous gap between the richest and the poorest. In the United States, about 20 percent of adults are living in poverty, while the numbers are about 7.5 percent for France, 7.6 percent for Germany, 6.5 percent for Italy, and 14.6 percent for Britain. Europeans strongly prefer a social safety net. A system of cradle-to-grave welfare programs exists to help Europeans receive an education and to shelter people from the storms of life, even if they are tempests that affect health, housing, or employment. European unemployment rates are consistently higher than those in the United States because the costs of being unemployed are much lower due to the social safety net than in the United States, where modest unemployment benefits soon are exhausted.

Americans also work much harder than Europeans. In 2003, Americans worked an average of 1,976 hours. German and French workers averaged about 400 fewer hours per year. One American in three works more than 50 hours a week. It is the rare European who matches those hours. Vacations are generous for Europeans, about 5 weeks, as are holidays. Employees have 23 paid holidays in Britain, 25 in France, and Sweden has 30. In the United States, depending in which state you reside, you get 4 to 10 holidays." In sum, Americans work much harder than Europeans. <35>

AT: Foreign Debt

**Foreign debt won’t threaten preponderance – at worst it will temporarily decrease the standard of living and fuel a new global appetite for US assets to fill the vacuum**

**Levey and Brown, ‘5**

[David H. and Stuart S. “The Overstretch Myth.” Foreign Affairs. March 2005 - April 2005. p. Lexis]

Would-be Cassandras have been predicting the imminent downfall of the American imperium ever since its inception. First came Sputnik and "the missile gap," followed by Vietnam, Soviet nuclear parity, and the Japanese economic challenge--a cascade of decline encapsulated by Yale historian Paul Kennedy's 1987 "overstretch" thesis.

The resurgence of U.S. economic and political power in the 1990s momentarily put such fears to rest. But recently, a new threat to the sustainability of U.S. hegemony has emerged: excessive dependence on foreign capital and growing foreign debt. As former Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers has said, "there is something odd about the world's greatest power being the world's greatest debtor."

The U.S. economy, according to doubters, rests on an unsustainable accumulation of foreign debt. Fueled by government profligacy and low private savings rates, the current account deficit--the difference between what U.S. residents spend abroad and what they earn abroad in a year--now stands at almost six percent of GDP; total net foreign liabilities are approaching a quarter of GDP. Sudden unwillingness by investors abroad to continue adding to their already large dollar assets, in this scenario, would set off a panic, causing the dollar to tank, interest rates to skyrocket, and the U.S. economy to descend into crisis, dragging the rest of the world down with it.

Despite the persistence and pervasiveness of this doomsday prophecy, U.S. hegemony is in reality solidly grounded: it rests on an economy that is continually extending its lead in the innovation and application of new technology, ensuring its continued appeal for foreign central banks and private investors. The dollar's role as the global monetary standard is not threatened, and the risk to U.S. financial stability posed by large foreign liabilities has been exaggerated. To be sure, the economy will at some point have to adjust to a decline in the dollar and a rise in interest rates. But these trends will at worst slow the growth of U.S. consumers' standard of living, not undermine the United States' role as global pacesetter. **If anything, the world's appetite for U.S. assets bolsters U.S. predominance rather than undermines it.**

**Even the worst case prompts massive buying – a deflated dollar would lead to massive domestic investment which would even out the trade balance and ensure little long-term effect to hegemony**

**Levey and Brown, ‘5**

[David H. and Stuart S. “The Overstretch Myth.” Foreign Affairs. March 2005 - April 2005. p. Lexis]

Whichever perspective on the current account one favors, the United States cannot escape a growing external debt. The "hegemony skeptics" fear such debt will lead to a collapse of the U.S. dollar triggered by a precipitous unloading of U.S. assets. Such a selloff could result--as in emerging-market crises--if investors suddenly conclude that U.S. foreign debt has become unsustainably large. A panicky "capital flight" would ensue, as investors raced for the exits to avoid the falling dollar and plunging stock and bond prices.

But **even if such a sharp break occurs--which is less likely** than a gradual adjustment of exchange rates and interest rates--market-based adjustments will mitigate the consequences. Responding to a relative price decline in U.S. assets and likely Federal Reserve action to raise interest rates, U.S. investors (arguably accompanied by bargain-hunting foreign investors) would repatriate some of their $4 trillion in foreign holdings in order to buy (now undervalued) assets, tempering the price decline for domestic stocks and bonds. A significant repatriation of funds would thus slow the pace of the dollar decline and the rise in rates. The ensuing recession, combined with the cheaper dollar, would eventually combine **to improve the trade balance**. Although the period of global rebalancing would be painful for U.S. consumers and workers, it would be even harder on the European and Japanese economies, with their propensity for deflation and stagnation. Such a transitory adjustment would be unpleasant, but **it would not undermine the economic foundations of U.S. hegemony**.

AT: Imperial Overstretch

**Imperial overstretch is a myth – economic strength shores up power – even Kennedy now concede the foundation of empire is secure**

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

Reflecting on the history of world politics, Kennedy submits that the United States not only has overwhelming dominance but possesses such power so as to be a historically unique condition: "Nothing has ever existed like this disparity of power; nothing. I have returned to all of the comparative defense spending and military personnel statistics over the past 500 years that I compiled in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and no other nation comes close," not even an empire as great as the British, because "even the Royal Navy was equal only to the next two navies. Right now all the other navies in the world combined could not dent American maritime supremacy."" Moreover, Kennedy recognizes that the steady economic growth of the American economy, and the curbing of inflation, means that "America's enormous defense expenditures could be pursued at a far lower relative cost to the country than the military spending of Ronald Reagan's years," and that fact is "an incomparable source of the U.S. strength."

**When Kennedy, who was perhaps the strongest skeptic of the economic foundation** of America's power, comes to acknowledge, first, that no previous empire has been as powerful as America is now; and, second, that its strength will last because of the fundamental soundness of its economy, then, as Jeff Foxworthy would say, "You might be an empire...." And it is one that will last a considerable amount of time. As with its military might, the economic foundation of the American empire is sound for the projected future.

AT: India Rise

**1. Aging crisis –**

**a) India will face one and is massively under-prepared – that deflates any chance of military spending**

**Haas, ‘7** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University

[Mark L. Haas. “A Geriatric Peace?; The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations.” Center of Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: International Security. Summer 2007. p. Lexis]

In the next forty years, India will confront many of the same challenges that China will in this period. Although India will remain the youngest of all the great powers through the midpoint of this century, it is aging much faster than any of these other states. By 2050 India's median age is predicted to increase by 15.3 years from that in 2000 (23.4 years), which is a larger increase than in any other great power (and by a very wide margin in all cases except China). 57 At century's midpoint, India will possess more than 236 million people over 65, making it the second-oldest country in the world in this category, trailing only China. India today has more than 58 million people above this age, which is more than twice as many seniors in Japan and more than 1.5 times as many in the United States.

At the same time that India is aging rapidly, it is the least prepared of all the great powers to pay for the costs of elderly care (with the possible exception of China). A high majority of Indian seniors have little savings and consequently need substantial aid to maintain basic levels of health and welfare. 58 Surveys have consistently found that more than half of all elderly Indians are "fully dependent" on others for their economic well-being, and another 15 percent are "partially dependent." 59 Consistent with these numbers, 73 percent of all seniors in India are below or just above the poverty line. 60 Despite the great vulnerability of the elderly in India, almost no monies have been set aside for social welfare programs. 61 As poorly funded as India's elderly care system is today, this situation will only worsen in coming decades as the number of seniors, in both absolute numbers and as a percentage of the population, balloons.

Like China, India will grow old before becoming rich. A generation before the median ages in the European powers and Japan were over 35, these states' GDPs per capita were $6,000-$8,000 (at 2000 prices and exchange rates). 62 In roughly one generation from now, India will age to this level, but its GDP per capita in 2005 was only $720 (China's was only $1,740). 63 Even if India's economy grows at a robust rate of 5.5 percent per year for the next thirty years, it will be approaching the age levels of many of the great powers today, but with "income levels almost an order of magnitude lower than those of Japan in the mid-1980s" (i.e., roughly twenty years before Japan's aging crisis became acute). 64

In sum, in roughly forty years India will possess large numbers of poor, vulnerable seniors, but it will lack the resources necessary to address this problem without substantial sacrifice. Like China, India will be faced with a choice: allow very high levels of poverty among its seniors, or divert resources toward preventing this outcome by significantly expanding its welfare system. To the extent that India's leaders opt for this latter choice, **the likelihood of India being able to increase significantly military spending is low.**

**b) That locks in US hegemony**

**Haas, ‘7** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University

[Mark L. Haas. “A Geriatric Peace?; The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations.” Center of Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: International Security. Summer 2007. p. Lexis]

Global population aging will influence U.S. foreign policies in five major ways in coming decades. First, this phenomenon will be a potent force for the continuation of U.S. power dominance, both economic and military. Aging populations are likely to result in the slowdown of states' economic growth at the same time that governments face substantial pressure to pay for massive new expenditures for elderly care. This double economic dilemma will create such an austere fiscal environment that the other great powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States' huge power lead. Investments designed to improve overall economic growth and purchases of military weaponry will be crowded out. Compounding these difficulties, although the United States is growing older, it is doing so to a lesser extent and less quickly than all the other great powers. Consequently, the economic and fiscal costs for the United States created by social aging (although staggering, especially for health care) will be significantly lower for it than for potential competitors. Global aging is therefore not only likely to extend U.S. hegemony (because the other major powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States' economic and military power lead), but deepen it as these others states are likely to fall even farther behind the United States. Thus despite much recent discussion in the international relations literature and some policymaking circles about the likelihood of China (and to a lesser extent the European Union) balancing U.S. power in coming decades, the realities of social aging and its economic and military effects make such an outcome unlikely. 6

AT: Interventionism

**Crises are inevitable – active hegemony deters conflicts that necessitate interventionism**

**Kagan and Kristol, ‘00**

[Robert and William, Kagan is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and Kristol is the editor of The Weekly Standard, and a political analyst and commentator, “Present Dangers,” p. 13-14]

It is worth pointing out, though, that a foreign policy premised on American hegemony, and on the blending of principle with material interest, may in fact mean fewer, not more, overseas interventions than under the "vital interest" standard. Had the Bush administration, for example, realized early on that there was no clear distinction between American moral concerns in Bosnia and America's national interest there, the United States, with the enormous credibility earned in the Gulf War, might have been able to put a stop to Milosevic's ambitions with a well-timed threat of punishing military action. But because the Bush team placed Bosnia outside the sphere of "vital" American interests, the resulting crisis eventually required the deployment of thousands of troops on the ground.

The same could be said of American interventions in Panama and the Gulf. A passive worldview encouraged American leaders to ignore troubling developments which eventually metastasized into full-blown threats to American security. Manuel Noriega and Saddam Hussein were given reason to believe that the United States did not consider its interests threatened by their behavior, only to discover that they had been misled. In each case, a broader and more forward-leaning conception of the national interest might have made the later, large and potentially costly interventions unnecessary. The question, then, is not whether the United Sates should intervene everywhere or nowhere. The decision Americans need to make is whether the United States should generally lean forward, as it were, or sit back. A strategy aimed at preserving American hegemony should embrace the former stance, being more rather than less inclined to weigh in when crises erupt, and preferably before they erupt. This is the standard of a global superpower that intends to shape the international environment to its own advantage. By contrast, the vital interest standard is that of a "normal" power that awaits a dramatic challenge before it rouses itself into action

AT: Layne

**Layne concedes that hegemony is good for international stability and the economic order**

**Layne, ‘7** – Ph.D. in political science @ the University of California

[Christopher. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

American primacy does benefit the world in some ways. Scholars of international political economy have devised an explanation—"hegemonic stability theory"—to show just why this is so. Like Britain during the period from 1814 to 1914, American military and economic power provides the framework or an open, economically interdependent—in today's catchword, "globalized"—international economy. The U.S. dollar is the international economy's "reserve currency," which serves as the medium of exchange and thus lubricates international trade and investment. Through the huge outflow of dollars—a combined effect of the U.S. merchandise trade deficit, overseas investments by American firms, and foreign aid and military expenditures overseas—the United States provides the international economy with liquidity. The United States—generally acting through institutions that it controls like the International Monetary Fund (IMF)—also is the international economy's "lender of last resort." American largess—typically in the form of low-interest loans by the IMF—is what keeps tottering economies in East Asia, Mexico, and Latin America from going belly-up. Finally, the United States is the world's market, or consumer, of last resort. Americans' seemingly insatiable demand for overseas products—cars, electronics, computers, apparel—drives the growth of overseas economies like those of China, India, South Korea, and Latin America. The boundless appetite of U.S. consumers for foreign goods is the locomotive force for global economic growth.

Other countries also benefit from American military power. Wars are bad for business, and the U.S. military presence abroad supposedly "reassures" East Asia and Europe that these regions will remain stable and peaceful, thereby contributing to economic confidence. As Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld put it, other states "think of the value [U.S.-provided] security provides the world, and the fact that all of the economic activity that takes place is stunted and frightened by instability and fear...: 4' Moreover, the U.S. military protects the "global commons" of air, sea, and space—the avenues through which information is transmitted, and through which goods and people flow from nation to nation. Most important, because many states abroad live in dangerous neighborhoods, the forward deployment of U.S. military forces protects them from troublemakers that live nearby. Moreover, because American military power supposedly is "off-shore," the United States does not threaten the security of other states. As Stephen Walt puts it, "The United States is by far the world's most powerful state, but it does not pose a significant threat to the vital interests of the major powers.” <65-66>

AT: Readiness Collapse

**Readiness won’t collapse, it will just limit the scope of interventions**

**Friedman, ‘8**

[George. 4-1. <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/rotating_focus> “Russia and Rotating the U.S. Focus.”

For the past year, Stratfor has been focusing on what we see as the critical global geopolitical picture. As the U.S.-jihadist war has developed, it has absorbed American military resources dramatically. **It is overstated to say that the United States lacks the capacity to intervene anywhere else in the world**, but it is not overstated to say that the United States cannot make a major, sustained intervention without abandoning Iraq. Thus, the only global power has placed almost all of its military chips in the Islamic world.

AT: NATO Collapse

**NATO crises are inevitable and non-threatening – the alliance has survived far worse than the link**

**Thayer, ‘7** – Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota

[Bradley A. American Empire: A Debate. Routledge Press: Taylor and Francis Group, NY. Page # below in < >]

Of course, being so powerful does not mean that the United States always g is what it wants. Like people, countries have free will, including the ability not to follow the American lead, The invasion of Iraq in 2003 is a case in point. Much has been made of the decision of major NATO allies like France and Germany not to participate in the Iraq war. Diplomatically, of course, it would have been better for the United States had they done so.

Nonetheless, in its fifty-year history, the NATO alliance has faced crises and survived them. Indeed, it survived many worse ones in far more difficult strategic conditions during the Cold War, when the profound threat from the Soviet Union existed. There were serious fights over German rearmament, a shared European nuclear force called the Multilateral Nuclear Force, French President Charles de Gaulle's withdrawal from NATO's military mission, and the deployment of modern, intermediate-range nuclear forces in the early 1980s." It is certain that NATO will face crises in the future. In fact, crises for NATO are like subway trains—you may expect that they will come along at regular intervals—and if you miss one, don't worry, there will be another one soon. <19>

AT: Soft Balancing

**Soft-balancing is a naïve myth for two reasons – its use as an analytical tool should be discarded**

**Brooks and Wohlforth, ‘5** – Asst Professor and Professor in the Department of Government @ Dartmouth College

[Stephen G. and William C. “Hard Times for Soft Balancing.” The Center for Strategic and International Studies

and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; International Security. 2005 Summer. P. Lexis]

The development of the concept of soft balancing is an attempt to stretch balance of power theory to encompass an international system in which traditional counterbalancing among the major powers is absent. There are two fundamental flaws, however, in current treatments of soft balancing: the failure to consider alternative explanations for state actions that have the effect of constraining the United States, and the absence of empirical analysis of the phenomenon. A comparison of soft balancing and four alternative explanations in the main cases highlighted by proponents of the concept -- Russia's strategic partnerships with China and India, Russian assistance to Iran's nuclear program, the European Union's efforts to enhance its defense capability, and opposition to the U.S.-led Iraq war in 2003 -- reveals no empirical support for the soft-balancing explanation. The lack of evidence for the relevance of balancing dynamics in contemporary great-power relations indicates that further investments in adapting balance of power theory to today's unipolar system will not yield analytical dividends.

AT: Russia Rise

**1. Aging crisis –**

**a) Russia will face a catastrophic demographic catastrophe – it is completely unprepared**

**Haas, ‘7** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University

[Mark L. Haas. “A Geriatric Peace?; The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations.” Center of Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: International Security. Summer 2007. p. Lexis]

Russia also currently faces substantial demographic challenges that, in one prominent scholar's estimation, "may be fairly characterized as **severe, dramatic, and even critical**." 68 In addition to a declining workforce, an exploding retirement population, an underfunded pension system, and low levels of financial independence among seniors, 69 Russia confronts a demographic challenge unlike any of the other great powers: significant, long-term retrogression in the nation's overall health. The deterioration of the health of Russian citizens has resulted in a substantial decline in life expectancy since the 1960s and will no doubt retard economic expansion. In the context of slowing economic growth and fewer, less healthy working-age adults, Russia's government will have difficulty preserving reasonable levels of welfare for its aging population without significant cuts in other spending, including for economic development and defense. As Nicholas Eberstadt puts it, "The specter of a swelling population of elderly pensioners dependent for support on an unhealthy and diminishing population of low-income workers suggests some particularly **unattractive trade-offs** between welfare and growth. Should Russian resources be allocated to capital accumulation or to consumption for the unproductive elderly? Given Russia's population structure, the question cannot be finessed." 70

**b) That locks in US hegemony**

**Haas, ‘7** – Assistant Professor of Political Science at Duquesne University

[Mark L. Haas. “A Geriatric Peace?; The Future of U.S. Power in a World of Aging Populations.” Center of Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: International Security. Summer 2007. p. Lexis]

Global population aging will influence U.S. foreign policies in five major ways in coming decades. First, this phenomenon will be a potent force for the continuation of U.S. power dominance, both economic and military. Aging populations are likely to result in the slowdown of states' economic growth at the same time that governments face substantial pressure to pay for massive new expenditures for elderly care. This double economic dilemma will create such an austere fiscal environment that the other great powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States' huge power lead. Investments designed to improve overall economic growth and purchases of military weaponry will be crowded out. Compounding these difficulties, although the United States is growing older, it is doing so to a lesser extent and less quickly than all the other great powers. Consequently, the economic and fiscal costs for the United States created by social aging (although staggering, especially for health care) will be significantly lower for it than for potential competitors. Global aging is therefore not only likely to extend U.S. hegemony (because the other major powers will lack the resources necessary to overtake the United States' economic and military power lead), but deepen it as these others states are likely to fall even farther behind the United States. Thus despite much recent discussion in the international relations literature and some policymaking circles about the likelihood of China (and to a lesser extent the European Union) balancing U.S. power in coming decades, the realities of social aging and its economic and military effects make such an outcome unlikely. 6

AT: Soft Power Collapse Inevitable

**No risk of an internal link – hatred doesn’t translate into policy shifts – it’s all talk**

**HAASS, ‘8** is President of the Council on Foreign Relations

[RICHARD N. “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance.” Foreign Affairs. May/June. <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87304/richard-n-haass/the-age-of-nonpolarity.html>

The fact that classic great-power rivalry has not come to pass and is unlikely to arise anytime soon is also partly a result of the United States' behavior, which has not stimulated such a response. This is not to say that the United States under the leadership of George W. Bush has not alienated other nations; it surely has. But it has not, for the most part, acted in a manner that has led other states to conclude that the United States constitutes a threat to their vital national interests. Doubts about the wisdom and legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy are pervasive, but this has tended to lead more to denunciations (and an absence of cooperation) than outright resistance.

AT: Terrorism

**Decline in primacy does not solve terrorism**

**Lieber, ‘5** – Professor of Government and International Affairs at Georgetown University

[Robert J., *The American Era: Power and Strategy for the 21st Century*, p. 29]

Realist views tend to rest on certain general assumptions about the nature of world politics, for example, that states with the capacity to use WMD or who make these weapons available to terrorists can be reliably deterred. And in the case of Iraq, realists believed Saddam Hussein could have been dissuaded from attacking his neighbors and that even if he eventually acquired nuclear weapons, he could have been deterred by the overwhelming power of the United States.37 Some in this group, in comparing the United States with other dominant powers of the past, invoke the examples of great empires that came to grief through imperial overreach or through causing other powerful states to form coalitions against them.38 And because of the emphasis on system-level explanations, some realists downplay the traits of especially violent and fanatical individual leaders or groups. However, as Richard Betts notes, although American primacy is one of the causes of the terror war "There is no reason to assume that terrorist enemies would let America off the hook if it retreated."39

**Decline in hegemony won’t solve terrorism – it only decreases the ability to combat it**

**Brooks and Wohlforth, ‘2**

[Stephen, Assistant Professor, and William, Associate Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth, Foreign Affairs, “American Primacy in Perspective”, Volume 81, Issue 4, p. Lexis]

Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the world's malcontents. When there was a Soviet Union, after all, it bore the brunt of Osama bin Laden's anger, and only after its collapse did he shift his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of bipolarity that was ignored at the time but looms larger in retrospect). But **terrorism has been a perennial problem** in history, and multipolarity did not save the leaders of several great powers from assassination by anarchists around the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, a slide back toward multipolarity would actually be the **worst of all worlds** for the United States. In such a scenario it would continue to lead the pack and serve as a focal point for resentment and hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have **fewer carrots and sticks to use** in dealing with the situation. The **threats would remain, but the possibility of effective and coordinated action against them would be reduced.**

\_\_\_\*\*Aff Answers

Collapse Inevitable – 2NC

**Collapse is inevitable – the transition to multipolarity will be peaceful if the US accedes**

Randall L. **Schweller,** Jan/Feb, **’10**. *Professor of Poli Sci @ Ohio State*. Author of Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power, “Ennui Becomes Us,” The National Interest, Lexis.

**The messiness of this state of affairs contradicts a rare consensus** in the field of international relations **that concentrated power in the hands of one dominant state is essential to** the establishment and maintenance of **international order**. According to the theory, the demand for international regimes is high but their supply is low because only the leadership of a hegemonic state can overcome the collective-action problems-mainly the huge start-up costs-associated with the creation of order-producing global institutions. **The current world has turned this logic on its head**. The problem is the virtual absence of barriers to entry. Most new treaty-making and global-governance institutions are being spearheaded not by an elite club of great powers but rather by civil-society actors and nongovernmental organizations working with midlevel states. **Far from creating more order and predictability, this explosion of so-called global-governance institutions has increased the chaos, randomness, fragmentation, ambiguity and impenetrable complexity of international politics.** Indeed, the labyrinthine structure of global governance is more complex than most of the problems it is supposed to be solving. And countries' views are more rigidly held than ever before. ALAS, AS entropy increases within a closed system, available or "useful" energy dissipates and diffuses to a state of equal energy among particles. **The days of unipolarity are numbered. We will witness instead a deconcentration of power that eventually moves the system to multipolarity and a restored balance. It will not, however, be a normal global transition. Great powers will not build up arms and form alliances. They will not use war to improve their positions in the international pecking order. They will not seek relative-power advantages. That is because they no longer have to obsess over how others are doing-much less over their own survival, which is essentially assured in today's world of unprecedented peace. States will instead be primarily concerned with doing well for themselves.** What they will do is engage in economic competition. **The law of uneven economic growth among states and the diffusion of technology will cause a deconcentration of global power. Global equilibrium in this new environment is a spontaneously generated outcome among states seeking to maximize their absolute wealth, not military power or political influence over others**. The pace of these diffusion processes has increased during the digital age because what distinguishes economies today is no longer capital and labor-now mere commodities-but rather ideas and energy. Information entropy is creating fierce corporate competition. Our creeping sameness hasn't led us to the mythical natural harmony of interests in the world that international liberalism seems to take for granted. To the contrary, it's a jungle out there. Global communication networks and rapid technological innovation have forced competitive firms to abandon the end-to-end vertical business model and adopt strategies of dynamic specialization, connectivity through outsourcing and process networks, and leveraged capability building across institutional boundaries. They have also caused public policies to converge in the areas of deregulation, trade liberalization and market liberalization. All of these trends have combined to create relentlessly intensifying competition on a global scale.4 So while we may indeed be looking more alike, what precisely are the traits that we share? Sameness in the "flat" world, where the main business challenge is not profitability but mere survival, breeds cutthroat competitors no more likely to live in harmony with each other than the unfortunate inhabitants of Hobbes's state of nature. So, instead of shooting wars and arms buildups, we will see intense corporate competition with firms engaging in espionage, information warfare (such as the hiring of "big gun" hackers) and guerilla marketing strategies. IN TERMS of the global balance of power, **the rapid diffusion of knowledge and technology is driving down America's edge in productive capacity and, as a consequence, its overall power position**. Indeed, **the transfer of global wealth and economic power now under way-roughly from West to East-is without precedent in modern history in terms of size, speed and directional flow**. If these were the only processes at work, then the future of international politics might well conform to the benign, orthodox liberal vision of a cooperative, positive-sum game among states operating within a system that places strict limits on the returns to power. But this is not to be because, in a break from old-world great-power politics, there will be no hegemonic war to wipe the international slate clean. We will therefore be stuck with the bizarre mishmash of global-governance institutions that now creates an ineffectual foreign-policy space. Trying to overhaul existing institutions to accommodate rising powers and address today's complex issues is an impossible task. So while liberals are correct to point out that the boom in global economic growth over the past two decades has allowed countries to move up the ladder of growth and prosperity, this movement, combined with a moribund institutional superstructure, creates a destabilizing disjuncture between power and prestige that will eventually make the world more confrontational. The question arises, with hegemonic war no longer in the cards, how can a new international order that reflects these tectonic shifts be forged? Aside from a natural disaster of massive proportions (a cure most likely worse than the disease itself), there is no known force that can fix the problem. <CONTINUED>

**Collapse Inevitable – 2NC**

<CONTINUED>

**THE PRIMARY cause of these tectonic shifts is American decline. Hegemonic decline is inevitable because unchecked power tends to overextend itself and succumb to the vice of imperial overstretch; because the hegemon overpays for international public goods, such as security**, while its free-riding competitors underpay for them; **and because its once-hungry society becomes soft and decadent**, engaging in self-destructive hedonism and overconsumption. In recent years, **the America-in-decline debate of the 1980s and early 1990s has reemerged with a vengeance**. Despite the fact that the United States is the lone superpower with unrivaled command of air, sea and space, there is a growing chorus of observers proclaiming the end of American primacy. Joining the ranks of these "declinists," Robert Pape forcefully argued in these pages that "America is in unprecedented decline," having lost 30 percent of its relative economic power since 2000.5 To be sure, **the macrostatistical picture of the United States is a bleak one. Its savings rate is zero; its currency is sliding to new depths; it runs huge current-account, trade and budget deficits; its medium income is flat; its entitlement commitments are unsustainable; and its once-unrivaled capital markets are now struggling to compete with Hong Kong and London. The staggering costs of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, combined with the financial bailout and stimulus packages doled out in response to the subprime-mortgage and financial-credit crises, have battered the U.S. economy, opening the door for peer competitors to make substantial relative gains**. The current bear market ranks among the worst in history, with the Dow and S&P down almost 50 percent from their 2007 peaks. The major cause of our troubles, both in the short and long term, is debt: the United States is borrowing massively to finance current consumption. America continues to run unprecedented trade deficits with its only burgeoning peer competitor, China, which, based on current trajectories, is predicted to surpass the United States as the world's leading economic power by 2040. As of July 2009, Washington owed Beijing over $800 billion, meaning that every person in the "rich" United States has, in effect, borrowed about $3,000 from someone in the "poor" People's Republic of China over the past decade.6 But this devolution of America's status is truly inevitable because of the forces of entropy. No action by U.S. leaders can prove a viable counterweight. AND **AS power devolves throughout the international system, new actors will emerge and develop to compete with states as power centers**. Along these lines, Richard Haass claims that we have entered an "age of nonpolarity," in which states "are being challenged from above, by regional and global organizations; from below, by militias; and from the side, by a variety of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and corporations." Of course, there is nothing especially new about this observation; **cosmopolitan liberals have been pronouncing (prematurely, in my view) the demise of the nation-state-the so-called "hollow state" and a crisis of state power-and the rise of nonstate actors for many decades. What is new is that even state-centric realists like** Fareed **Zakaria are now predicting a post-American world, in which international order is no longer a matter decided solely by the political and military power held by a single hegemon or even a group of leading states**. Instead, the coming world will be governed by messy ad hoc arrangements composed of a la carte multilateralism and networked interactions among state and nonstate actors. One wonders what order and concerted action mean in a world that lacks fixed and predictable structures and relationships. Given the haphazard and incomplete manner by which the vacuum of lost state power is being filled, why expect order at all? **THE MACROPICTURE that emerges from these global trends is one of historically unprecedented change** in a direction consistent with increasing entropy: unprecedented hegemonic decline; an unprecedented transfer of wealth, knowledge and economic power from West to East; unprecedented information flows; and an unprecedented rise in the number and kinds of important actors. Thus, the onset of this extreme multipolarity or multi-multipolarity will not herald, as some observers believe, a return to the past. To the contrary, it will signal that maximum entropy is setting in, that the ultimate state of inert uniformity and unavailable energy is coming, that time does have a direction in international politics and that there is no going back because the initial conditions of the system have been lost forever. If and when we reach such a point in time, much of international politics as we know it will have ended. Its deep structure of anarchy-the lack of a sovereign arbiter to make and enforce agreements among states-will remain. But increasing entropy will result in a world full of fierce international competition and corporate warfare; continued extremism; low levels of trust; the formation of nonstate identities that frustrate purposeful and concerted national actions; and new nongeographic political spaces that bypass the state, favor low-intensity-warfare strategies and undermine traditional alliance groupings. Most important, **entropy will reduce and diffuse usable power in the system, dramatically reshaping the landscape of international politics. The U**nited **S**tates **will see its relative power diminish, while others will see their power rise. To avoid crises and confrontation, these ongoing tectonic changes must be reflected in the superstructure of international authority**. Increasing entropy, however, means that the antiquated global architecture will only grow more and more creaky and resistant to overhaul. No one will know where authority resides because it will not reside anywhere; and without authority, there can be no governance of any kind. The already-overcrowded and chaotic landscape will continue to be filled with more meaningless stuff; and the specter of international cooperation, if it was ever anything more than an apparition, will die a slow but sure death.

**Collapse Inevitable – XT**

**Extend Schweller – economic decline, overstretch and the rise of other powers make a collapse in effective \*hegemony\* inevitable, even if the US maintains some power status**

**Unipolarity and hegemony are collapsing – specifically indicts their author(s) –**

Robert A. **Pape, ‘9**. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago. “Empire Falls,” The National Interest, January 2009 - February 2009. Lexis.

AMERICA IS in unprecedented decline. The self-inflicted wounds of the **Iraq** War, growing government **debt**, increasingly negative current-**account balances and other** internal **economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power** in today’s world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. If present trends continue, we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony. Since the cold war, the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments, seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood—the Americas—but also in Europe and Asia, along with the oil-rich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources, but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo. The Bush administration has not just continued America’s traditional grand strategy, but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time—waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America’s military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia itself. For nearly two decades, those convinced of U.S. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others, virtually discounting the possibility that Germany, France, Russia, China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power. From public intellectuals like Charles **Krauthammer** and Niall **Ferguson** to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert **Kagan**, even to academicians like Dartmouth’s William **Wohlforth and** Stephen **Brooks, all believe the principal feature** of the post-cold-war world **is the unchallengeable dominance of American power**. The United States is not just the sole superpower in the unipolar-dominance school’s world, but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to American interests. This is simply no longer realistic**. For the past eight years, our policies have been based on these flawed arguments, while the ultimate foundation of American power**—the relative superiority of the U.S. economy in the world—**has been in decline since early on in the Bush administration**. There is also good reason to think that, without deliberate action, the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time. To be sure, the period of U.S. relative decline has been, thus far, fairly short. A healthy appreciation of our situation by American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate, if not rectify, further decline in the foreseeable future. Still, America’s shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U.S. grand strategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America’s global position from accelerating. **Although the immediate problems of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda**’s new sanctuary in western Pakistan, **Iran**’s continued nuclear program **and Russia**’s recent military adventure in Georgia **are high-priority issues, solutions to each of them individually and all of them collectively will be heavily influenced by America’s reduced power position in the world**. Most important, America’s declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end, that major powers will increasingly have the strength to balance against U.S. policies they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreign-policy choices. Like so many great powers that have come and gone before, our own hubris may be our downfall.

**Collapse Inevitable – XT**

**Hegemony is declining – the structure of the status quo makes nuclear conflict inevitable –**

Niall **Ferguson, ‘9**. Laurence A. Tisch professor of history at Harvard University. “The Axis of Upheaval,” March/April 2009, Foreign Policy, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4681&print=1>.

The bad news for Bush’s successor, Barack Obama, is that he now faces a much larger and potentially more troubling axis—an axis of upheaval. This axis has at least nine members, and quite possibly more. What unites them is not so much their wicked intentions as their instability, which **the global financial crisis** only makes worse every day. Unfortunately, that same crisis **is making it far from easy** for the United States **to respond to** this **new “grave and growing danger.”** When Bush’s speechwriters coined the phrase “axis of evil” (originally “axis of hatred”), they were drawing a parallel with the World War II alliance between Germany, Italy, and Japan, formalized in the Tripartite Pact of September 1940. The axis of upheaval, by contrast, is more reminiscent of the decade before the outbreak of World War II, when the Great Depression unleashed a wave of global political crises. The Bush years have of course revealed the perils of drawing facile parallels between the challenges of the present day and the great catastrophes of the 20th century. Nevertheless, there is reason to fear that the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression could have comparable consequences for the international system. For more than a decade, I pondered the question of why the 20th century was characterized by so much brutal upheaval. I pored over primary and secondary literature. I wrote more than 800 pages on the subject. And ultimately I concluded, in The War of the World, that **three factors made the location and timing of lethal organized violence more or less predictable** in the last century. **The first factor was ethnic disintegration**: Violence was worst in areas of mounting ethnic tension. **The second factor was economic volatility**: The greater the magnitude of economic shocks, the more likely conflict was. **And the third factor was empires in decline**: When structures of imperial rule crumbled, battles for political power were most bloody. **In** at least one of the world’s regions—**the** greater **Middle East**—**two of these** three **factors have been present** for some time: **Ethnic conflict** has been rife there for decades, **and** following the difficulties and disappointments in Iraq and Afghanistan, **the United States already seems likely to begin winding down its** quasi-imperial **presence** in the region. It likely still will. **Now the third variable, economic volatility, has returned with a vengeance**. U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke’s “Great Moderation”—the supposed decline of economic volatility that he hailed in a 2004 lecture—has been obliterated by a financial chain reaction, beginning in the U.S. subprime mortgage market, spreading through the banking system, reaching into the “shadow” system of credit based on securitization, and now triggering collapses in asset prices and economic activity around the world. After nearly a decade of unprecedented growth, the global economy will almost certainly sputter along in 2009, though probably not as much as it did in the early 1930s, because governments worldwide are frantically trying to repress this new depression. But no matter how low interest rates go or how high deficits rise, there will be a substantial increase in unemployment in most economies this year and a painful decline in incomes. Such economic pain nearly always has geopolitical consequences. Indeed, **we can already see the first symptoms** of the coming upheaval. In the essays that follow, Jeffrey Gettleman describes **Somalia’s endless anarchy**, Arkady Ostrovsky analyzes **Russia’s new brand of aggression, and** Sam Quinones explores **Mexico’s drug-war-fueled misery. These**, however, **are just three case studies** out of a possible nine or more. **In Gaza**, Israel has engaged in a bloody effort to weaken Hamas. But whatever was achieved militarily must be set against the damage Israel did to its international image by killing innocent civilians that Hamas fighters use as human shields. Perhaps more importantly, social and economic conditions in Gaza, which were already bad enough, are now abysmal. This situation is hardly likely to strengthen the forces of moderation among Palestinians. Worst of all, events in Gaza have fanned the flames of Islamist radicalism throughout the region—not least **in Egypt. From Cairo to Riyadh**, governments will now think twice before committing themselves to any new Middle East peace initiative. Iran, meanwhile, continues to support both Hamas and its Shiite counterpart in Lebanon, Hezbollah, and to pursue an alleged nuclear weapons program that Israelis legitimately see as a threat to their very existence. No one can say for sure what will happen next within **Tehran’s complex political system**, but it is likely that the radical faction around President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will be strengthened by the Israeli onslaught in Gaza. Economically, however, Iran is in a hole that will only deepen as oil prices fall further. Strategically, the country risks disaster by proceeding with its nuclear program, because even a purely Israeli air offensive would be hugely disruptive. All this risk ought to point in the direction of conciliation, even accommodation, with the United States. But with presidential elections in June, Ahmadinejad has little incentive to be moderate. On Iran’s eastern border, **in Afghanistan**, upheaval remains the disorder of the day. Fresh from the success of the “surge” in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, the new head of U.S. Central Command, is now grappling with the much more difficult problem of pacifying Afghanistan. The task is made especially difficult by the anarchy that prevails in neighboring Pakistan. India, meanwhile, accuses some **in Pakistan** of having had a hand in the Mumbai terrorist attacks of last November, **spurring yet another South Asian war scare**. Remember: The sabers they are rattling have nuclear tips. The democratic governments in Kabul and Islamabad are two of the weakest anywhere. Among the biggest risks the world faces this year is that one or both will break down amid escalating violence. Once again, the economic crisis is playing a crucial role. Pakistan’s small but politically powerful middle class has been slammed by the collapse of the country’s stock market. Meanwhile, **a rising proportion** of the country’s huge population of young men **are staring unemployment in the face**. It is not a recipe for political stability. This club is anything but exclusive. **Candidate members include Indonesia, Thailand, and Turkey, where there are already signs that the economic crisis is exacerbating domestic political conflicts**. And let us not forget the plague of piracy in Somalia, the renewed civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the continuing violence in Sudan’s Darfur region, and the heart of darkness that is Zimbabwe under President Robert Mugabe. The axis of upheaval has many members. <CONTINUED>

**Collapse Inevitable – XT**

<CONTINUED>

And it’s a fairly safe bet that the roster will grow even longer this year. The problem is that, as in the 1930s, most countries are looking inward, grappling with the domestic consequences of the economic crisis and paying little attention to the wider world crisis. This is true even of **the United States**, which **is now so preoccupied with its own economic problems that countering global upheaval looks like an expensive luxury**. With the U.S. rate of GDP growth set to contract between 2 and 3 percentage points this year, and with the official unemployment rate likely to approach 10 percent, all attention in Washington will remain focused on a nearly $1 trillion stimulus package. Caution has been thrown to the wind by both the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. The projected deficit for 2009 is already soaring above the trillion-dollar mark, more than 8 percent of GDP. Few commentators are asking what all this means for U.S. foreign policy. The answer is obvious: **The resources available for policing the world are certain to be reduced for the foreseeable future**. That will be especially true if foreign investors start demanding higher yields on the bonds they buy from the United States or simply begin dumping dollars in exchange for other currencies. Economic volatility, plus ethnic disintegration, plus an empire in decline: That combination is about the most lethal in geopolitics. We now have all three. The age of upheaval starts now.

**Economic downturn will significantly reshape the global order in the next 4 years**

**Engler, ‘9**. Mark. Senior analyst with Foreign Policy In Focus. “Empire Foreclosed?” Foreign Policy in Focus, April 17, 2009. ProQuest Information and Learning.

It's hard to believe those sentiments, hallmarks of George W. Bush's first term, were features of our very recent history. The debate they were a part of now seems distinctly strange and foreign. Since then, **the world has experienced a catastrophic occupation in Iraq**, and voters have ousted the Republican vanguard of the "War on Terror." Overt defenders of imperialism have found good reason to creep back into their wardrobes. And **that**, of course, **is to say nothing of the bursting of the housing bubble, the fall of Lehman, and the end of the hedge fund era. With unemployment rising** and Wall Street shamed, **we have entered a period of economic downturn** acute enough to raise serious questions about the viability of U.S. power. The pressing issue today is: How will the economic crisis affect our country's role in the world? Or, more bluntly: Is America's empire facing foreclosure? The answer involves more than just quibbles over the semantics of U.S. dominance. **Together, the fallout from** the imperial hubris of the **Bush** administration **and the discrediting of the deregulated market fundamentalism** that thrived even under Bill Clinton **have opened new possibilities for** reshaping the global order in the Obama years.

**US global influence is collapsing – superiority has vanished in every category**

**Starobin, ‘9**. Paul, contributing editor to The Atlantic Monthly and contributor to the National Journal, June, “After America,” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4957>.

The world is at a hinge moment in history: **The United States has reached the end of a global ascendency in political, economic, and cultural terms. This is not just about the "rise of the rest**" -- the Indias and Chinas of the world. **It's also about** what I call "**middling America," a society that is lagging behind others on standard barometers of modernity, from healthcare to education, from financial regulation to the application of green and digital technologies**. The global economic crisis, with America as the epicenter, is a case in point of a tarnished U.S. model. **At the same time, venerable American institutions**, whether it's Harvard or Hollywood, **have migrated to a post-national, global identity; they belong to the world more than to the United States**. The future, in short, is no longer happening only, or even especially, in America. **The gold standards of global excellence are scattered around the planet.**

Heg Down – 2AC

Unipolarity and hegemony are collapsing – your impact authors are wrong and multiple issues collapse sustainability

Robert A. Pape, ‘9. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago. “Empire Falls,” The National Interest, January 2009 - February 2009. Lexis.

AMERICA IS in unprecedented decline. The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq War, growing government debt, increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today’s world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. If present trends continue, we will look back at the Bush administration years as the death knell for American hegemony. Since the cold war, the United States has maintained a vast array of overseas commitments, seeking to ensure peace and stability not just in its own neighborhood—the Americas—but also in Europe and Asia, along with the oil-rich Persian Gulf (as well as other parts of the world). Simply maintaining these commitments requires enormous resources, but in recent years American leaders have pursued far more ambitious goals than merely maintaining the status quo. The Bush administration has not just continued America’s traditional grand strategy, but pursued ambitious objectives in all three major regions at the same time—waging wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, seeking to denuclearize North Korea and expanding America’s military allies in Europe up to the borders of Russia itself. For nearly two decades, those convinced of U.S. dominance in the international system have encouraged American policy makers to act unilaterally and seize almost any opportunity to advance American interests no matter the costs to others, virtually discounting the possibility that Germany, France, Russia, China and other major powers could seriously oppose American military power. From public intellectuals like Charles Krauthammer and Niall Ferguson to neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz and Robert Kagan, even to academicians like Dartmouth’s William Wohlforth and Stephen Brooks, all believe the principal feature of the post-cold-war world is the unchallengeable dominance of American power. The United States is not just the sole superpower in the unipolar-dominance school’s world, but is so relatively more powerful than any other country that it can reshape the international order according to American interests. This is simply no longer realistic. For the past eight years, our policies have been based on these flawed arguments, while the ultimate foundation of American power—the relative superiority of the U.S. economy in the world—has been in decline since early on in the Bush administration. There is also good reason to think that, without deliberate action, the fall of American power will be more precipitous with the passage of time. To be sure, the period of U.S. relative decline has been, thus far, fairly short. A healthy appreciation of our situation by American leaders may lead to policies that could mitigate, if not rectify, further decline in the foreseeable future. Still, America’s shrinking share of world economic production is a fact of life and important changes in U.S. grand strategy are necessary to prevent the decline in America’s global position from accelerating. Although the immediate problems of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, al-Qaeda’s new sanctuary in western Pakistan, Iran’s continued nuclear program and Russia’s recent military adventure in Georgia are high-priority issues, solutions to each of them individually and all of them collectively will be heavily influenced by America’s reduced power position in the world. Most important, America’s declining power means that the unipolar world is indeed coming to an end, that major powers will increasingly have the strength to balance against U.S. policies they oppose and that the United States will increasingly face harsh foreign-policy choices. Like so many great powers that have come and gone before, our own hubris may be our downfall.

Heg Down – 2AC

Attempting to preserve hegemony only exacerbates the effects of collapse

Robert A. Pape, ‘9. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago. “Empire Falls,” The National Interest, January 2009 - February 2009. Lexis.

The balance of world power circa 2008 and 2013 shows a disturbing trend. True, the United States remains stronger than any other state individually, but its power to stand up to the collective opposition of other major powers is falling precipitously. Though these worlds depict potential power, not active counterbalancing coalitions, and this type of alliance may never form, nonetheless, American relative power is declining to the point where even subsets of major powers acting in concert could produce sufficient military power to stand a reasonable chance of successfully opposing American military policies. Indeed, if present trends continue to 2013 and beyond, China and Russia, along with any one of the other major powers, would have sufficient economic capacity to mount military opposition at least as serious as did the Soviet Union during the cold war. And it is worth remembering that the Soviet Union never had more than about half the world product of the United States, which China alone is likely to reach in the coming decade. The faults in the arguments of the unipolar-dominance school are being brought into sharp relief. The world is slowly coming into balance. Whether or not this will be another period of great-power transition coupled with an increasing risk of war will largely depend on how America can navigate its decline. Policy makers must act responsibly in this new era or risk international opposition that poses far greater costs and far greater dangers. A COHERENT grand strategy seeks to balance a state’s economic resources and its foreign-policy commitments and to sustain that balance over time. For America, a coherent grand strategy also calls for rectifying the current imbalance between our means and our ends, adopting policies that enhance the former and modify the latter. Clearly, the United States is not the first great power to suffer long-term decline—we should learn from history. Great powers in decline seem to almost instinctively spend more on military forces in order to shore up their disintegrating strategic positions, and some like Germany go even further, shoring up their security by adopting preventive military strategies, beyond defensive alliances, to actively stop a rising competitor from becoming dominant. For declining great powers, the allure of preventive war—or lesser measures to “merely” firmly contain a rising power—has a more compelling logic than many might assume. Since Thucydides, scholars of international politics have famously argued that a declining hegemon and rising challenger must necessarily face such intense security competition that hegemonic war to retain dominance over the international system is almost a foregone conclusion. Robert Gilpin, one of the deans of realism who taught for decades at Princeton, believed that “the first and most attractive response to a society’s decline is to eliminate the source of the problem . . . [by] what we shall call a hegemonic war.” Yet, waging war just to keep another state down has turned out to be one of the great losing strategies in history. The Napoleonic Wars, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War, German aggression in World War I, and German and Japanese aggression in World War II were all driven by declining powers seeking to use war to improve their future security. All lost control of events they thought they could control. All suffered ugly defeats. All were worse-off than had they not attacked.

Heg Down – Terminal D

Hegemony is dead – decades of historical literature prove modern factors ensure collapse

Niall Ferguson, ‘9. Laurence A. Tisch professor of history at Harvard University. “The Axis of Upheaval,” March/April 2009, Foreign Policy, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4681&print=1>.

The bad news for Bush’s successor, Barack Obama, is that he now faces a much larger and potentially more troubling axis—an axis of upheaval. This axis has at least nine members, and quite possibly more. What unites them is not so much their wicked intentions as their instability, which the global financial crisis only makes worse every day. Unfortunately, that same crisis is making it far from easy for the United States to respond to this new “grave and growing danger.” When Bush’s speechwriters coined the phrase “axis of evil” (originally “axis of hatred”), they were drawing a parallel with the World War II alliance between Germany, Italy, and Japan, formalized in the Tripartite Pact of September 1940. The axis of upheaval, by contrast, is more reminiscent of the decade before the outbreak of World War II, when the Great Depression unleashed a wave of global political crises. The Bush years have of course revealed the perils of drawing facile parallels between the challenges of the present day and the great catastrophes of the 20th century. Nevertheless, there is reason to fear that the biggest financial crisis since the Great Depression could have comparable consequences for the international system. For more than a decade, I pondered the question of why the 20th century was characterized by so much brutal upheaval. I pored over primary and secondary literature. I wrote more than 800 pages on the subject. And ultimately I concluded, in The War of the World, that three factors made the location and timing of lethal organized violence more or less predictable in the last century. The first factor was ethnic disintegration: Violence was worst in areas of mounting ethnic tension. The second factor was economic volatility: The greater the magnitude of economic shocks, the more likely conflict was. And the third factor was empires in decline: When structures of imperial rule crumbled, battles for political power were most bloody. In at least one of the world’s regions—the greater Middle East—two of these three factors have been present for some time: Ethnic conflict has been rife there for decades, and following the difficulties and disappointments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States already seems likely to begin winding down its quasi-imperial presence in the region. It likely still will. Now the third variable, economic volatility, has returned with a vengeance. U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke’s “Great Moderation”—the supposed decline of economic volatility that he hailed in a 2004 lecture—has been obliterated by a financial chain reaction, beginning in the U.S. subprime mortgage market, spreading through the banking system, reaching into the “shadow” system of credit based on securitization, and now triggering collapses in asset prices and economic activity around the world. After nearly a decade of unprecedented growth, the global economy will almost certainly sputter along in 2009, though probably not as much as it did in the early 1930s, because governments worldwide are frantically trying to repress this new depression. But no matter how low interest rates go or how high deficits rise, there will be a substantial increase in unemployment in most economies this year and a painful decline in incomes. Such economic pain nearly always has geopolitical consequences. Indeed, we can already see the first symptoms of the coming upheaval. In the essays that follow, Jeffrey Gettleman describes Somalia’s endless anarchy, Arkady Ostrovsky analyzes Russia’s new brand of aggression, and Sam Quinones explores Mexico’s drug-war-fueled misery. These, however, are just three case studies out of a possible nine or more. In Gaza, Israel has engaged in a bloody effort to weaken Hamas. But whatever was achieved militarily must be set against the damage Israel did to its international image by killing innocent civilians that Hamas fighters use as human shields. Perhaps more importantly, social and economic conditions in Gaza, which were already bad enough, are now abysmal. This situation is hardly likely to strengthen the forces of moderation among Palestinians. Worst of all, events in Gaza have fanned the flames of Islamist radicalism throughout the region—not least in Egypt. From Cairo to Riyadh, governments will now think twice before committing themselves to any new Middle East peace initiative. Iran, meanwhile, continues to support both Hamas and its Shiite counterpart in Lebanon, Hezbollah, and to pursue an alleged nuclear weapons program that Israelis legitimately see as a threat to their very existence. No one can say for sure what will happen next within Tehran’s complex political system, but it is likely that the radical faction around President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will be strengthened by the Israeli onslaught in Gaza. Economically, however, Iran is in a hole that will only deepen as oil prices fall further. Strategically, the country risks disaster by proceeding with its nuclear program, because even a purely Israeli air offensive would be hugely disruptive. All this risk ought to point in the direction of conciliation, even accommodation, with the United States. But with presidential elections in June, Ahmadinejad has little incentive to be moderate. On Iran’s eastern border, in Afghanistan, upheaval remains the disorder of the day. Fresh from the success of the “surge” in Iraq, Gen. David Petraeus, the new head of U.S. Central Command, is now grappling with the much more difficult problem of pacifying Afghanistan. The task is made especially difficult by the anarchy that prevails in neighboring Pakistan. India, meanwhile, accuses some in Pakistan of having had a hand in the Mumbai terrorist attacks of last November, spurring yet another South Asian war scare. Remember: The sabers they are rattling have nuclear tips. The democratic governments in Kabul and Islamabad are two of the weakest anywhere. Among the biggest risks the world faces this year is that one or both will break down amid escalating violence. Once again, the economic crisis is playing a crucial role. Pakistan’s small but politically powerful middle class has been slammed by the collapse of the country’s stock market. Meanwhile, a rising proportion of the country’s huge population of young men are staring unemployment in the face. It is not a recipe for political stability. This club is anything but exclusive. Candidate members include Indonesia, Thailand, and Turkey, where there are already signs that the economic crisis is exacerbating domestic political conflicts. And let us not forget the plague of piracy in Somalia, the renewed civil war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the continuing violence in Sudan’s Darfur region, and the heart of darkness that is Zimbabwe under President Robert Mugabe. The axis of upheaval has many members. <CONTINUED>

Heg Down – Terminal D

<CONTINUED>

And it’s a fairly safe bet that the roster will grow even longer this year. The problem is that, as in the 1930s, most countries are looking inward, grappling with the domestic consequences of the economic crisis and paying little attention to the wider world crisis. This is true even of the United States, which is now so preoccupied with its own economic problems that countering global upheaval looks like an expensive luxury. With the U.S. rate of GDP growth set to contract between 2 and 3 percentage points this year, and with the official unemployment rate likely to approach 10 percent, all attention in Washington will remain focused on a nearly $1 trillion stimulus package. Caution has been thrown to the wind by both the Federal Reserve and the Treasury. The projected deficit for 2009 is already soaring above the trillion-dollar mark, more than 8 percent of GDP. Few commentators are asking what all this means for U.S. foreign policy. The answer is obvious: The resources available for policing the world are certain to be reduced for the foreseeable future. That will be especially true if foreign investors start demanding higher yields on the bonds they buy from the United States or simply begin dumping dollars in exchange for other currencies. Economic volatility, plus ethnic disintegration, plus an empire in decline: That combination is about the most lethal in geopolitics. We now have all three. The age of upheaval starts now.

Heg Down – AT: Militarily Superior

We’ll name 7 major threats to US military superiority – prefer a General DIA Director

Maples, ‘9. General, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTOR GENERAL. “SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE HEARING; SUBJECT: THE CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.” CAPITOL HILL HEARING, March 10, Lexis.

Turning to global military trends of concern: The proliferation and poten-tial use of weapons of mass destruction, often linked with delivery system en-hancements, remains a grave enduring and evolving threat. Terrorist organizations will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials. The threat posed by ballistic missile delivery systems is likely to increase over the next decade. Ballistic missile systems with advanced liquid or solid propellant propulsion systems are becoming more mobile, survivable, reliable, accurate and possess greater range. Cyber attacks on our information systems are a significant concern. Nation and non-state terrorist and criminal groups are developing and refining their abilities to exploit and attack computer networks in support of their military, intelligence or criminal goals. The scope and sophistication in the malicious targeting against U.S. networks has steadily increased and is of particular con-cern because of the pronounced military advantages that the U.S. has tradition-ally derived from information networks. The international proliferation of space-related expertise and technology is also increasing, largely through commercial enterprises, and is helping nations acquire space and space-related capabilities, including some with direct mili-tary applications. Included are more capable communications, reconnaissance, navigation and targeting capabilities. At the same time, countries such as Russia and China are developing systems and technologies capable of interfering with or disabling vital U.S. space-based navigation, communication and intelligence collection capabilities. In addition to direct-descent anti-satellite missile capabilities such as satellite track-ing, jamming and laser blinding are also under development. The global economic crisis, to date, has not led to widespread defense spending cuts, with the exception of some central and eastern European nations. China's defense spending growth in 2009 is supported by continued economic growth and large international reserves. China will likely continue to downsize forces -- freeing funds needed to meet modernization and reform goals.

Heg Down – AT: Soft Balancing

Even soft balancing upsets unipolarity and it’s inevitable

Nexon, ‘9. Daniel, Assistant professor in the Department of Government and the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. “The Balance of Power in the Balance,” World Politics – Volume 61, Number 2, April 2009, Muse.

Aspects of both theories suggest that status quo powers—those satisfied with the current order—will not challenge a preeminent power and thus will not bring about a period of temporary systemic balance. But the existence of revisionist states may not be necessary for the emergence of systemic power balances. Even if potential challengers adopt strategies of accommodation with a hegemonic power, their greater underlying resources—or ability to translate those resources into economic performance—may push the distribution of power toward greater equilibrium. 29 Leaders face a number of incentives to maintain or expand [End Page 339] their relative allocation of resources to military capabilities independent of assessments of external threats, let alone their orientation toward preeminent powers.30

Heg Down – AT: Those are Brinks

Their ‘brink’ assertion is arbitrary and inane – recent declines in power are historically unprecedented in magnitude

Robert A. Pape, ‘9. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago. “Empire Falls,” The National Interest, January 2009 - February 2009. Lexis.

THE UNITED States has always prided itself on exceptionalism, and the U.S. downfall is indeed extraordinary. Something fundamental has changed. America’s relative decline since 2000 of some 30 percent represents a far greater loss of relative power in a shorter time than any power shift among European great powers from roughly the end of the Napoleonic Wars to World War II. It is one of the largest relative declines in modern history. Indeed, in size, it is clearly surpassed by only one other great-power decline, the unexpected internal collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Most disturbing, whenever there are major changes in the balance of power, conflict routinely ensues. Examining the historical record reveals an important pattern: the states facing the largest declines in power compared to other major powers were apt to be the target of opportunistic aggression. And this is surely not the only possible danger from relative decline; states on the power wane also have a history of launching preventive wars to strengthen their positions. All of this suggests that major relative declines are often accompanied by highly dangerous international environments. So, these declines matter not just in terms of economics, but also because of their destabilizing consequences.

Room for error has vanished – unipolarity is obsolete

Robert A. Pape, ‘9. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago. “Empire Falls,” The National Interest, January 2009 - February 2009. Lexis.

The United States is not just declining. Unipolarity is becoming obsolete, other states are rising to counter American power and the United States is losing much of its strategic freedom. Washington must adopt more realistic foreign commitments. SINCE 2000, a systemic change has been occurring in the economic foundations of America’s relative power, and it may fall even further in the foreseeable future. None of the dramatic consequences for U.S. grand strategy is likely to be immediate, but neither are those effects easily avoidable. For nearly two decades, the United States has experienced tremendous latitude in how it chooses to conduct itself in the world. But that latitude is now shrinking, and American policy makers must face facts. With the right grand strategy, however, America can mitigate the consequences of its relative decline, and possibly even reverse it.

Heg Down – AT: Transition From Heg 🡪 War

We control UQ on peaceful global transition – it’ll come now, absent US preponderance

Starobin, ‘9. Paul, contributing editor to The Atlantic Monthly and contributor to the National Journal, June, “After America,” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4957>.

In a multipolar world of nation-states, the biggest winners will be those states that can succeed in establishing regional hegemonies in their neighborhoods. The world's regional policemen might include the United States in North America; Brazil in South America; India and China in Asia; Russia in its "near abroad"; possibly Iran in the Middle East (with Israel fending for itself); and South Africa in sub-Saharan Africa. Europe can be a winner if it finds the will to assert itself in this order. If not, Europe can expect to find itself increasingly encroached upon by other powers, like Russia. The losers will include weak small states -- the Georgias of the world -- that bank on protection against the local neighborhood bully -- in Georgia's case, Russia -- from an America no longer up to the task. The grimmest fate will await those peoples who feel themselves as a nation but are bereft a viable state. These are the Palestinians of the world, the many millions who live in what seem to be permanently failed states -- states in name only. The multipolar world will likely be democratic in some regions and autocratic in others, according to the traditions of the neighborhoods -- and in that sense, this world will represent a defeat for champions of liberal Western values as a universal standard. The multipolar world will be peaceful to the degree that the big players can arrive at satisfactory terms for coexistence. China wins in a Chinese Century, but who else? Asian societies with a history of tense relations with the Chinese, including the Japanese and the Vietnamese, may be losers. India fears being a loser but may not be, given the protection afforded by its sheer size and the ways in which its economy complements China's. Distance may prove a blessing for the economies that succeed in developing profitable trade relationships with China -- from the Pacific Coast of America to continental Europe. For resource-rich lands that China aims to exploit, like Chile with its copper treasure, much depends on whether China is disposed to be a benign or a cruel imperial ruler. An age of global city-states as well as a universal civilization offers a chance for Europe to matter again, in a large way, because Europe is a font of the cosmopolitan values that would be ascendant in these worlds. But North Americans, South Americans, and Asians are by no means dealt out. There would be tremendous opportunities for global elites -- for architects, artists, business executives, university presidents, political leaders, global-health specialists, and others who tend to live in big cities and who already are starting to think of themselves as a superclass. The multilingual person stands to do better than the monolingual one. Woe to those in the provinces, on the margin of things, and unable to think or operate in a global way. As the After America world starts to take definition, the planet naturally will become less America-focused. For some, America's descent from the heavens will be cause for what the Germans call schadenfreude, pleasure taken in another's pain. But as the world becomes accustomed to a new order of things, I suspect the enduring sentiment will be more like indifference. Our species tends to be heartless that way.

Transition theory is flawed – 3 reasons

Nexon, ‘9. Daniel, Assistant professor in the Department of Government and the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. “The Balance of Power in the Balance,” World Politics – Volume 61, Number 2, April 2009, Muse.

Hegemonic order and power transition accounts also contain theories of power balances (and of balancing) but comprise, at best, extremely weak balance of power theories. Both suggest that systemic balances of power should obtain only under restricted conditions. First, differences in relative growth rates might create a rough equilibrium between major powers. Second, major shifts in administrative, military, social, or economic technologies might shift relative capabilities and thereby create a systemic balance of power. Third, dissatisfaction with the current orders allocation of status, material benefits, or other goods might lead states to enhance their capabilities to challenge a predominate power while accelerating processes of hegemonic overextension (Lemke, BoP:T&P, 55–58).28

Heg Down – AT: Unipolarity\*\*

Multipolarity is approaching – G20 proves

Sang-Seek, ‘9. Park Sang-seek is a professor at the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, Kyung Hee University. “'Great Game' for global order?” The Korea Herald, April 7, Lexis.

The G20 summit in London ended with an optimistic note. But the final communique was a compromised document between the forces to preserve the basic architecture of the existing financial order and the forces to replace it with a new one: the first led by the Anglo-American partnership and the second by the BRICs with the support of the non-participating developing world. The Franco-German coalition took the intermediary position. Notwithstanding this division, the most interesting phenomenon was an invisible struggle between the United States and China. From the perspective of international politics, the most serious issue in the 21st century will be whether China will challenge the U.S. dominant position in the international order, and if so, when and how it will. We can detect China's true intentions and strategy for a new international order by examining the actions and policies it has been taking in dealing with the international financial crisis. The game in the 21st century financial crisis is actually a game between the United States and China. It is reminiscent of the Great Game between the United Kingdom and Russia in the 19th century. In that Great Game Britain staged all-out military and diplomatic moves to contain Russia's attempt to control Central Asia, particularly India. U.S. President Obama said, shortly after the international financial crisis, that we are entering the beginning of the end of the crisis. I would say that we are entering the beginning of the end of U.S. hegemony in the world. The United States was one of the superpowers during the cold war period and has been the hegemonic power in the world since the end of the cold war. There are similarities and differences between British hegemony and American hegemony. Both hegemonic powers were able to contain the challenger (Russia/ the Soviet Union) and other rising great powers opposed the challenger. Moreover, both hegemonic powers were in control of the international financial order and the international political and security order, both of which are two basic requirements for global hegemony. One difference is that Britain used naked military power to dominate the world, but the U.S. has alternated soft and hard power and relied on nuclear parity. Now we are witnessing the beginning of the end of the international economic order based on the Bretton Woods financial institutions as well as the international security order sustained by American military superiority. The G20 summit signaled the beginning of a new Great Game between the United States and China. This new Great Game has started with a money game, but it will eventually develop into a full-pledged political game. Let us read the signs indicating this. In a hierarchical international system, the hegemonic power maintains a constant watch on the rising great powers. Historically, rising great powers are divided into the powers satisfied with or tolerating the status quo and those against it. When a rising power challenges the status quo, other great powers may support or oppose it. In most cases, the challenger acts alone and is defeated. In the United States, expert opinions are divided on the true foreign policy goals of China. Some argue that it will challenge U.S. hegemony singularly or in alliance with other great powers, and others hold that it will seek peaceful coexistence, believing that the U.S. will not be able to maintain its hegemonic position for long. Still others aver that it will seek a multipolar world, with China in control of East Asia. We can conceive of other scenarios after U.S. hegemony. The international financial crisis has provided China with both a crisis and an opportunity: the economic recession for China and the restructuring of the unipolar international political order and economic and financial architecture. China leading the developing world and in coalition with some major powers including Russia, France and Germany, have been advocating a multipolar international political and economic order. This time China, in league with other members of the BRICs and the Franco-German alliance, pushes for the creation of a new international reserve currency replacing the U.S. dollar. If this is realized, the U.S. will lose its hegemony in the international economic order and therefore it has rejected it. Along with this reform proposal, China, together with major economic powers from diverse continents including Japan, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, the euro zone, Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia, endorses the restructuring of the International Monetary Fund. However, it should be noted that it does not advocate the abolition of the IMF.

Heg Down – AT: Unipolarity\*\*

Even if unipolarity remains hegemony will collapse

Clark, ‘9. Ian, ESRC Professional Fellow, (Author of Legitimacy in international society: Oxford University Press), “Bringing hegemony back in:the United States and international order,” International Affairs 85: 1 (2009) 23–36.

There are three problems in how the idea of hegemony is conventionally deployed with regard to the current international order. First, even those who think it a good thing (mainly using residual variants of Hegemonic Stability Theory [HST]) concede that hegemony is decreasingly sustainable in emerging conditions. Second, only those who think hegemony thoroughly malign consider it to have a durable future. Third, both sides hold an unquestioned assumption that there is a single model of hegemony: whether it is benign or malign, we all at least agree on what the beast looks like. All three of these entrenched positions have led to a distorted and impoverished discussion of the potential of hegemony. This article reviews the muddled state of the hegemony debate, stakes out a positive case on behalf of hegemony, and does so by revisiting the historical precedents to establish its subtly diverse institutional forms. It has become fashionable enough across the past decade to refer to US hegemony as the defining feature of the post-Cold War international order. Such claims seldom rest on anything more than a view of US primacy, namely that the system is now unipolar, and the US enjoys an unprecedented preponderance of material resources within it. There have more recently been premonitions of the possible end of this hegemony, as the US is predicted to lose either its will or its nerve to sustain that role, or even more importantly because of US ‘decline’ in the face of the ‘rise of the rest’.1 This article stands that conventional analysis on its head. It starts from a wholly different understanding of hegemony, as rooted in social legitimacy.2 Accordingly, it rejects the contention that we are now experiencing, or have recently experienced, any American hegemony at all. Appealing to the same logic, it argues that evidence for the rise of others does not, by itself, amount to any decisive objection to the development of hegemony in the near future. The key question, as Barry Buzan reminds us, is whether the United States will prove capable of recruiting ‘followers’.3 Hegemony, as advanced here, describes an international order project that confers on the United States a leading, but circumscribed, role. Moreover, the possible textures of that role can better be grasped after closer reflection on the relevant historical precedents. What is meant by this hegemony? It does not refer simply to a set of material conditions in which one state is predominant: it is not, in other words, primacy alone.4 Neither is it something that is unilaterally possessed by the hegemon, nor something that the dominant state has in its pocket, to save or squander at will. Rather, it is a status bestowed by others, and rests on recognition by them. This recognition is given in return for the bearing of special responsibilities. In short, by hegemony is meant an institutionalized practice of special rights and responsibilities conferred on a state with the resources to lead.

Heg Bad 2AC\*\*

**Unipolar military dominance causes a high risk of nuclear war**

David P. **Calleo, ‘3**. Currently director of the European Studies Program and *Professor @ Johns Hopkins* University. Taught at Brown, Yale and Columbia. *Member of the Council on Foreign Relations* and the International Institute for Strategic Studies, former research fellow at the University of Oxford. Past Rockefeller, Guggenheim and Fulbright fellow. Ph.D., Yale University. “Europe and America: Different Geopolitical Wavelengths,” Annual Foreign Policy Conference. Heinrich Böll Stiftung - November 13th, 2003, [www.sais-jhu.edu/faculty/calleo/DGAP.doc](http://www.sais-jhu.edu/faculty/calleo/DGAP.doc).

**Military superiority is frequently vulnerable to** what might be called **the “Law of Asymmetrical Deterrence**.” In the Cold War, for example, despite the huge nuclear arsenals of the superpowers, **anyone** else **with a “second-strike” capability could have a reasonable deterrent** with only a few hundred missiles. Nothing has changed in that realm since the Soviet collapse – except that there are a few more nuclear powers. Nuclear deterrence still seems a cheap way for the weak to counter the strong. This seems true of weapons of mass destruction in general. Not only are they relatively cheap equalizers, but **the presence of a superpower**, actively exercising its military superiority, **is a great inducement for others to acquire these equalizing weapons. Our current unipolar strategic doctrine aims not only to put down rogue states, but to preempt any rising power** that might threaten our predominance in any major part of the world. In effect, our **unipolar doctrine puts us** not only **in conflict with** the Afghanistans, Iraqs, Syrias and Irans of this world – but points toward conflict with **China, Russia, and even Europe** itself. **These are conflicts that, if pursued resolutely – in the name of unipolar hegemony – can easily carry a high risk of nuclear war.**

**Try or die – the longer the transition, the more dangerous the decline**

**Larison, 12-12**-09. Larison has a *PhD in Byzantine history* and is a contributing editor at the American Conservative and a columnist for The Week online. “Six questions for Daniel Larison,” <http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2009/12/six_questions_for_daniel_laris>.

DIA: Do you think Barack **Obama's** conciliatory gestures to the rest of the world represent an abandonment of American hegemony, or are they an effort to make the world more comfortable with it? Mr Larison: Most of his **conciliatory gestures have been nothing more than** just that, **gestures. I find this preferable to riding roughshod over allies and rivals, but it is undeniably a matter of adopting a different tone and style rather than changing the nature of America's relations with other nations**. Mr **Obama has no interest in abandoning American hegemony** or, as he would prefer to call it, American leadership, but he is attempting to exercise it under straitened conditions. To that end he has made a number of speeches, and these have naturally been misunderstood and distorted as "apologies". In reality, Mr Obama has not once apologised for anything America has done in the past, but he is ridiculed this way because he does not engage in boastful triumphalism. In the zero-sum reckoning of his extremely insecure domestic critics, any rhetorical or symbolic concession, no matter how minor, is a defeat and an embarrassment for America. **Even on those policies where he has made a great show of changing course, such as** engaging with Iran or "resetting" relations with **Russia, the substance of the policies has not changed much at al**l. DIA: You are not a hegemonist. Is that a result of the way America has conducted itself abroad, or do you think unipolarity is inherently bad? Mr Larison: Unipolarity is abnormal and it is unsustainable**, so I think it unwise to organize American foreign policy around the preservation of something that is going to disappear sooner or later. Because unipolarity never lasts, the chief means for preserving it is military power, and this leads a government to entangle itself in a number of unnecessary, costly and ultimately ruinous wars** to keep hold of something that will slip away from it in any case. **Indeed, the strenuous effort to hold on to preeminence usually hastens an even steeper decline than would have happened otherwise**. The paradox is that it is the hegemonists who have done more to undermine American hegemony than anything their opponents could have hoped to achieve, while their opponents have called for husbanding America's resources responsibly and carefully rather than frittering them away. Certainly, **the frequent recourse to military force over the last 20 years has deepened my antipathy to the constant and unnecessary projection of American power around the world**. The goal of maintaining hegemony seems to me a foolish one, but it is the means employed to that end that I find indefensible and outrageous.

Heg Bad 2AC\*\*

**Unipolarity causes WMD terror**

Stephen M. **Walt, ‘9**. Professor of international affairs at Harvard University. “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” World Politics, Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009, Lexis.

**Another** and perhaps **related feature** of the current system **that accompanies the current unipolarity** but is not a necessary part of such a system **is the rise of nonstate actor**s. This important area is still lacking in satisfactory theories, and they may not even be possible given the diverse nature of the phenomena, which include Amnesty International and Hezbollah. The relationship between nonstate actors and the state system is complex, with the former largely depending on the latter and strengthening its members in some ways while weakening them in others. Nonstate actors increased before the emergence of unipolarity but may now assume a greater role, or at least a higher public profile, because **unipolarity decreases the prominence of other state challengers. Nonstate actors are also likely to focus attention on the unipole, both criticizing and seeking to influence it**, which could have the unintended consequence of underlining rather than undermining the unipole’s position. **The nonstate actors that have had the most impact recently have been terrorists**. Even if many people exaggerate the magnitude of the threat,32 it has shaped the current world yet is not a defining characteristic of unipolarity. The rise of terrorism is not entirely divorced from it, however. **The enormous power in the hands of the unipole encourages terrorism in part by taking so many weapons out of others’ hands, in** [End Page 203] **part by making it the target of discontent almost anywhere, and in part by its intrusive presence throughout the world**.33 But it would be going too far to say that terrorism is an automatic concomitant of this kind of system. Instead, it is largely the product of the particular circumstances of the current world, and indeed is a significant menace only because it coexists with modern technologies, especially wmd.

**WMD terror outweighs**

**Chesney ’97** [Robert, Law Clerk, Loyola of LA International & Comparative Law Review, “National Insecurity, Nov, LN]

The horrible truth is that the threat of nuclear terrorism is real, in light of the potential existence of a black market in fissile material. Nuclear terrorists might issue demands, but then again, they might not. Their target could be anything: a U.S. military base in a foreign land, a crowded U.S. city, or an empty stretch of desert highway. In one fell swoop, nuclear terrorists could decapitate the U.S. government or destroy its financial system. The human suffering resulting from a detonation would be beyond calculation, and in the aftermath, the remains of the nation would demand both revenge and protection. Constitutional liberties and values might never recover. When terrorists strike against societies already separated by fundamental social fault lines, such as in Northern Ireland or Israel, conventional weapons can exploit those fault lines to achieve significant gains. n1 In societies that lack such pre-existing fundamental divisions, however, conventional weapon attacks do not pose a top priority threat to national security, even though the pain and suffering inflicted can be substantial. The bedrock institutions of the United States will survive despite the destruction of federal offices; the vast majority of people will continue to support the Constitution despite the mass murder of innocent persons. The consequences of terrorists employing weapons of mass destruction, however, would be several orders of magnitude worse than a conventional weapons attack. Although this threat includes chemical and biological weapons, a nuclear weapon's devastating [\*32]  potential is in a class by itself. n2 Nuclear terrorism thus poses a unique danger to the United States: through its sheer power to slay, destroy, and terrorize, a nuclear weapon would give terrorists the otherwise-unavailable ability to bring the United States to its knees. Therefore, preventing terrorists from obtaining nuclear weapons should be considered an unparalleled national security priority dominating other policy considerations.

Heg Bad 2AC\*\*

**Unipolarity exacerbates the risks of economic shocks, disease, and environmental collapse**

**Jervis, ‘9**. Robert, professor of international politics at Columbia University. “Unipolarity; A Structural Perspective.” World Politics. Volume 61, Number 1, January 2009. Lexis.

**A related question is what kinds of threats can challenge the security of the unipole and which ones cannot**. Standard theories of the rise and fall of great powers point out that the leading power is often brought low because the relative strength of its economy wanes as the cost of protecting its position increases and because the public goods of peace and an open economic system that it provides allow others to grow faster than it does.9 If the burden of being a sole superpower is similarly great, unipolarity could erode, but, conversely, if it is able to profit from its position, the structure can be self-sustaining. In the contemporary system, the U.S. is running large budget and current account deficits, but it would be wrong to conclude that this shows the hallmarks of imperial overstretch. The defense and associated burdens are small as a percentage of gdp and the deficits could be wiped out by slightly higher taxes. It is domestic and idiosyncratic factors rather than structural factors that are at work here. **Unipolarity is no guarantee against** economic shocks, widespread disease, or environmental degradation**. These might be** more likely under unipolarity **if the absence of peers leads the unipole to act without restraint and induces irresponsibility in other actors**. But the contrary argument that concentration of power makes it more likely that the superpower will produce public goods was the central claim of hegemonic stability theory (hst) in the economic area, and while the theory has been battered by encounters with evidence, it still retains enough life so that a recovery is possible. On balance, then, we are left with only the milder conclusion that even if **unipolarity** almost by definition involves [End Page 193] security against other state actors in the system, it **is not necessarily stable against all forms of threat.**

**(\_\_\_) New pandemics cause extinction**

**Greger, ‘6** – Director of Public Health and Animal Agriculture at The Humane Society of the United States  [Michael, graduate of the Cornell University School of Agriculture and the Tufts University School of Medicine. Also an internationally recognized lecturer, he has presented at the Conference on World Affairs, the National Institutes of Health, and the International Bird Flu Summit, among countless other symposia and institutions. “Get rid of the ‘if.’This is going to occur.” http://www.Birdflubook.com]

Other public health authorities have expressed similar sentiments on a global scale. **[WHO]** **World Health Organization executive director** David **Nabarro was recently appointed the bird flu czar** of the United Nations. At a press conference at UN headquarters in New York, **Nabarro tried to impress** upon journalists **that “we’re dealing here with world survival issues—or the survival of the world as we know it.”**583 “The **reality is that if a pandemic hits,” explained the executive director of Trust for America’s Health**, a public health policy group, “**it’s not just a health emergency. It’s the big one.”**584

**(\_\_\_) The loss of biodiversity is incalculably disastrous**

**Chen, 2K** (Chen, Jim. Professor. Law. Vance K. Opperman Research Scholar. Law School. University of Minnesota . "Globalization and its Losers." Minnesota Journal of Global Trade. 9 Minn. J. Global Trade 157. Winter, 2000. Lexis-Nexis.)

**The value of** endangered species and the **biodiversity** they embody **is "literally ... incalculable."** [**343**](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=36fdd99b020b5b000e5b5f8dd3c7e1b4&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAV&_md5=9694824086dd02643d04becda5d257e6#n343#n343) What, if anything, should the law do to preserve it? There are those that invoke the story of Noah's Ark as a moral basis for biodiversity preservation. [**344**](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=36fdd99b020b5b000e5b5f8dd3c7e1b4&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAV&_md5=9694824086dd02643d04becda5d257e6#n344#n344) Others regard the entire Judeo-Christian tradition, especially the biblical stories of Creation and the Flood, as the root of the West's deplorable environmental record. [**345**](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=36fdd99b020b5b000e5b5f8dd3c7e1b4&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAV&_md5=9694824086dd02643d04becda5d257e6#n345#n345) To avoid getting bogged down in an environmental exegesis of Judeo-Christian "myth and legend," we should let Charles Darwin and evolutionary biology determine the imperatives of our moment in natural "history." [**346**](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=36fdd99b020b5b000e5b5f8dd3c7e1b4&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAV&_md5=9694824086dd02643d04becda5d257e6#n346#n346) **The loss of biological diversity is quite arguably the gravest problem facing humanity.** If we cast the question as the contemporary phenomenon that "our descendants [will] most regret," t**he "loss of genetic and species diversity by the destruction of natural habitats" is worse than even "energy depletion, economic collapse, limited nuclear war, or conquest by a totalitarian government."** [**347**](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=36fdd99b020b5b000e5b5f8dd3c7e1b4&csvc=le&cform=&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=1&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAV&_md5=9694824086dd02643d04becda5d257e6#n347#n347) **Natural evolution may in due course renew the earth with a diversity of species approximating that of a world unspoiled by Homo sapiens -- in ten million years, perhaps a hundred million.**

Heg Bad 2AC\*\*

**(\_\_\_) Loss of growth guarantees global nuclear war**

**Friedberg and Schoenfield, ‘8** [Mr. Friedberg is a professor of politics and international relations at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School. Mr. Schoenfeld, senior editor of Commentary, is a visiting scholar at the Witherspoon Institute in Princeton, N.J., “The Dangers of a Diminished America”, WSJ, 10-21, <http://online.wsj.vom/articles/SB122455074012352571.html>]

**Then there are the dolorous consequences of a potential collapse of the world's financial architecture. For decades now, Americans have enjoyed the advantages of being at the center of that system**. The worldwide use of the dollar, and the stability of our economy, among other things, made it easier for us to run huge budget deficits, as we counted on foreigners to pick up the tab by buying dollar-denominated assets as a safe haven. **Will this be possible in the future?** Meanwhile, **traditional foreign-policy challenges are multiplying**. The threat from **al Qaeda** and Islamic **terrorist affiliates** has not been extinguished. **Iran and North Korea** are continuing on their bellicose paths, while **Pakistan and Afghanistan** are progressing smartly down the road to chaos. **Russia'**s new militancy **and China**'s seemingly relentless rise also **give cause for concern.** **If America now tries to pull back from the world stage, it will leave a dangerous power vacuum**. The stabilizing effects of our presence in Asia, our continuing commitment to Europe, and our position as defender of last resort for Middle East energy sources and supply lines could all be placed at risk. **In such a scenario there are shades of the 1930s, when global trade and finance ground nearly to a halt, the peaceful democracies failed to cooperate, and aggressive powers led by the remorseless fanatics who rose up on the crest of economic disaster exploited their divisions. Today we run the risk that rogue states may choose to become ever more reckless with their nuclear toys, just at our moment of maximum vulnerability.**

Heg Bad 2AC\*\*

**Unipolarity collapses effective international institutions**

Randall L. **Schweller,** Jan/Feb, **’10**. *Professor of Poli Sci @ Ohio State*. Author of Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power, “Ennui Becomes Us,” The National Interest, Lexis.

**IN INTERNATIONAL politics, the fewer the constraints on state behavior, the greater the level of entropy. This is why much of our current state of randomness can be laid at the doorstep of unipolarity, which has shown itself to be an "anything goes" international structure**. The United States is king and the world beneath it does not behave in the predictable ways of traditional multipolar or bipolar systems in which classic balance-of-power politics rule the day. **Consistent with increasing entropy, unipolar dynamics are random because the structure neither constrains the choices of the unipole nor anyone else. No longer is it a world of the Cold War threat u ber alles. No longer must states scurry to find patrons and allies for fear of war. And with no great-power rivals, the dominant state makes choices relatively unfettered by the imperatives and constraints of its external environment. The U**nited **S**tates **enjoys the luxury of choosing with whom to align based on nonpower considerations: ideological affinity; economic wants; or the vagaries of domestic politics**. And **when it so desires, the United States can simply go it alone,** cobbling together ad hoc "coalitions of the willing" when needed. Boundless freedom breeds randomness. The idiosyncratic beliefs and capricious choices of unconstrained American leaders tell us more about recent U.S. foreign policy than does international structure. **Unipolar systems have less glue to hold things together than other international structures. Under unipolarity, capabilities are concentrated; threats and interests, diffused**.1 **Alliances, the act of choosing friends and enemies that defines not just international politics but all politics, are built on shared interests and threat perceptions, two things in short supply today**. World politics matter most to the unipolar power, the sole actor with global reach. For everyone else, all politics are local. It is not surprising, therefore, to find the U.S. National Intelligence Council asserting that "at no time since the formation of the Western alliance system in 1949 have the shape and nature of international alignments been in such a state of flux as they have during the past decade." **Stable and meaningful geographic groupings are the stuff of multipolar and bipolar systems, where a small number of great powers interact with each other in fairly predictable ways**, balancing one another through arms and allies, controlling regions through spheres-of-influence arrangements and the rest. In **the new non-balance-of-power politics of unipolarity, traditional geographic groupings have lost salience**. There is no East versus West anymore, and it can scarcely be used as an intellectual justification for U.S. engagement in Europe or the creation of a League of Democracies to replace the United Nations.2 The very idea of a like-minded group of states known as the West is little more than a myth-one that gainsays the growing philosophic divisions between the United States and Western Europe over sovereignty, multilateralism and the use of force. Even the traditional concept of a North-South divide is of little utility, as China and India continue to rise. These archaic, Cold War groupings have been replaced by an arc of instability ranging from Southeast Asia, where the possibility exists of growing radical Islam and terrorism, to Central Asia, where the future threat of failed states looms. And as technology turns the world into a "global village," that globe shrinks. The digital revolution has brought about an entropy in the information world as well. IN SPITE of information's increased quantity and speed of transmission, modern people may feel as psychologist and philosopher William James did in 1899 that **an "irremediable flatness is coming over the world**." Here, I do not mean to suggest that the world is becoming flat in Thomas Friedman's sense of greater connectivity and a leveling of the global competitive playing field. Rather, **flatness refers to an increasing banality and loss of meaning in life**. Surprisingly, **information overload produces not a heightened sense of stimulation and awareness but rather boredom and alienation. A creeping sameness** or, at the other extreme, variation **that approaches randomness causes the brain to shut down**. This is what is known as information entropy: the degradation of information through monotonous repetition and meaningless variety. To illustrate how these opposites produce the same result, consider the average listener's response to the minimalism of Philip Glass and the random dissonance of Arnold Schoenberg. Most people are put to sleep by the music of both composers but that is because in the case of Glass the repetition and slow pace of new information loses our attention, whereas the endless atonal variety in Schoenberg's compositions comes across as simply random noise. What we find missing in both Glass and Schoenberg is significant variation or surprise. Monotony and boredom set in from too little or too much variety. **Entropy, as loss of meaning and communication, always lurks at both ends of the continuum. Just as energy and matter degrade over time to more probable and less informative states, the greater the flow and amount of information, the more likely it will degrade toward noise or sterile uniformity.** People deluged by a flood of meaningless variety quickly reach a saturation point where, as a means of self-defense, they develop the capacity to tune most everything out and become extremely selective, jaded, blase and callous. And **people bombarded by redundant information come to view life as banal, colorless, insipid, boring and characterless**.

Heg Bad 2AC\*\*

**Multipolar global institutionsprevent extinction**

**Feffer, ‘9**. John, Contributing Member/Researcher at Foreign Policy in Focus, “World Beat,” FPIF, Feb 17. Vol. 4 No. 7. Lexis.

**The neoconservative movement thrilled to** what it called **the "unipolar moment**." After the Berlin Wall collapsed and the Soviet Union followed suit, the United States was the last superpower standing. America faced a choice. It could use the unprecedented opportunity to help build a new international system out of the rubble of the Cold War. Or it could try to maintain that unipolar moment as long as possible. The neocons preferred the king-of-the-hill approach. The Clinton administration flirted with multilateralism. It came into office promising to support a range of international treaties and institutions. It of-fered to play well with others. But this more robust multilateral approach ran up against the three gorgons of the immediate post-Cold War period: Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. Whatever the Clinton administration's commitment to multi-lateralism had been, these gorgons turned it to stone. The administration fell back on what it called "Ã la carte multilateralism." That is, the United States would pursue multilateralism when it could, but act unilaterally when it must.History is on the verge of repeating itself. After eight years of neocon-servatives trying desperately to extend the unipolar moment, a new group is in the White House promising to change America's relationship with the world. Yet, plenty of gorgons beckon: Iraq, Afghanistan, North Korea. Will Obama's multilat-eral resolve turn to stone or will his administration truly remap U.S. global relations? "The new president is off to a good start," writes Foreign Policy In Focus (FPIF) contributor Ehsan Ahrari in The Making of a New Global Strategy. "He al-ready spoke to the Islamic world, stating that America will deal with it re-spectfully and on the basis of pragmatism; he invited Iran to unclench its fist and initiate an era of negotiations on the basis of mutual respect; and he ap-pointed George Mitchell and Richard Holbrooke as special envoys for the Middle East and South Asia, respectively. He sent Vice President Joe Biden to talk to the Europeans and to the Russians." The vice president was indeed in Europe the other week, but he spoke out of both sides of his mouth on the issue of multi-lateralism. He promised our European allies a "new era of cooperation." But he also warned that the United States would "work in a partnership whenever we can, and alone only when we must," which sounded an awful lot like the Clinton ad-ministration's eventual default position. But times have changed, argues FPIF contributor Hannes Artens. "**These aren't the golden 1990s, when U.S. power was at its zenith.** In this first decade of the 21st century, **the** capitalist **West is facing defeat in Afghanistan and** is on the verge of **'the worst recession in a hundred years**,' as British minister Ed Balls put it in perhaps only slight exaggeration," he writes in Multilateralism in Mu-nich. "This combination will force the Obama administration to stop cherry-picking issues on which it wants to cooperate and forging ahead on those issues it believes it can still handle alone. Necessity will dictate a more pragmatic multilateralism, in which all sides humbly accept what is realistically possi-ble." Are we thus witnessing the final end of the unipolar moment? **China is coming up fast. The European Union's expansion has been accompanied by relatively few growing pains**. **Several powerful countries in the South** (particularly India, Bra-zil, and South Africa) **are quietly acquiring more geopolitical heft**. **Global problems like climate change and financial collapse require global solutions, so we either evolve** multilateral responses **or we** do a dinosaur **dive into extinction**. Over here, meanwhile, the Pentagon is still maintaining the world's largest military force - but **we have failed to defeat al-Qaeda, we are quagmired in Afghanistan, and all of our nuclear weapons have done little to prevent North Korea from entering the nuclear club**. The global recession is hammering the U.S. economy, **and we might finally see the end of the dollar's reign as global currency**. With the bank bailout, the stimulus package, the bill for two wars plus the Pentagon's already gargantuan budget, **the red ink is mounting**. Debt has been the gravedigger of many an empire. I can hear the adding machine totting up the numbers.

AT: Transition Wars

**Extend Larison from the overview – unipolarity causes “a number of unnecessary, costly and ultimately ruinous wars … [which] usually hastens an even steeper decline than would have happened otherwise”**

**Attempting to preserve hegemony only exacerbates the effects of collapse**

Robert A. **Pape, ‘9**. Professor of political science at the University of Chicago. “Empire Falls,” The National Interest, January 2009 - February 2009. Lexis.

**The balance of world power circa 2008 and 2013 shows a disturbing trend. True, the United States remains stronger than any other state individually, but its power to stand up to the collective opposition of other major powers is falling precipitously**. Though these worlds depict potential power, not active counterbalancing coalitions, and this type of alliance may never form, nonetheless, American relative power is declining to the point where even subsets of major powers acting in concert could produce sufficient military power to stand a reasonable chance of successfully opposing American military policies. Indeed, if present trends continue to 2013 and beyond, **China and Russia, along with any one of the other major powers, would have sufficient economic capacity to mount military opposition at least as serious as did the Soviet Union** during the cold war. And it is worth remembering that the Soviet Union never had more than about half the world product of the United States, which China alone is likely to reach in the coming decade. The faults in the arguments of the unipolar-dominance school are being brought into sharp relief. The world is slowly coming into balance. **Whether or not this will be another period of great-power transition coupled with an increasing risk of war will largely depend on how America can** navigate its decline**. Policy makers** must act responsibly **in this new era or risk international opposition that** poses far greater costs and far greater dangers. A COHERENT grand strategy seeks to balance a state’s economic resources and its foreign-policy commitments and to sustain that balance over time. For America, a coherent grand strategy also calls for rectifying the current imbalance between our means and our ends, adopting policies that enhance the former and modify the latter. **Clearly, the United States is not the first great power to suffer long-term decline—we should learn from history**. Great powers in decline seem to almost instinctively spend more on military forces in order to shore up their disintegrating strategic positions, and some like Germany go even further, shoring up their security by adopting preventive military strategies, beyond defensive alliances, to actively stop a rising competitor from becoming dominant. For declining great powers, the allure of preventive war—or lesser measures to “merely” firmly contain a rising power—has a more compelling logic than many might assume. Since Thucydides, scholars of international politics have famously argued that a declining hegemon and rising challenger must necessarily face such intense security competition that hegemonic war to retain dominance over the international system is almost a foregone conclusion. Robert Gilpin, one of the deans of realism who taught for decades at Princeton, believed that “the first and most attractive response to a society’s decline is to eliminate the source of the problem . . . [by] what we shall call a hegemonic war.” Yet, **waging war just to keep another state down has turned out to be one of the great losing strategies in history**. **The Napoleonic Wars, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War, German aggression in World War I, and German and Japanese aggression in World War II were all driven by declining powers seeking to use war to improve their future security. All lost control of events they thought they could control. All suffered ugly defeats. All were worse-off than had they not attacked.**

**Their theory is flawed – 3 reasons**

**Nexon, ‘9**. Daniel, Assistant professor in the Department of Government and the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. “The Balance of Power in the Balance,” World Politics – Volume 61, Number 2, April 2009, Muse.

Hegemonic order and **power transition accounts** also **contain theories of power balances** (and of balancing) **but comprise, at best,** extremely weak **balance of power theories.** Both suggest that systemic balances of power should obtain only under restricted conditions. **First, differences in relative growth rates might create a rough equilibrium between major powers. Second, major shifts in administrative, military, social, or economic technologies might shift relative capabilities and thereby create a systemic balance of power. Third, dissatisfaction with the current orders allocation of status, material benefits, or other goods might lead states to enhance their capabilities to challenge a predominate power** while accelerating processes of hegemonic overextension (Lemke, BoP:T&P, 55–58).28

**AT: Transition Wars**

**We control UQ on peaceful global transition – it’ll come now, absent US preponderance**

**Starobin, ‘9**. Paul, contributing editor to The Atlantic Monthly and contributor to the National Journal, June, “After America,” <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4957>.

**In a multipolar world of nation-states, the biggest winners will be those states that can succeed in establishing regional hegemonies** in their neighborhoods. The world's regional policemen might include the United States in North America; Brazil in South America; India and China in Asia; Russia in its "near abroad"; possibly Iran in the Middle East (with Israel fending for itself); and South Africa in sub-Saharan Africa. **Europe can be a winner if it finds the will to assert itself in this order**. If not, Europe can expect to find itself increasingly encroached upon by other powers, like Russia. The losers will include weak small states -- the Georgias of the world -- that bank on protection against the local neighborhood bully -- in Georgia's case, Russia -- from an America no longer up to the task. The grimmest fate will await those peoples who feel themselves as a nation but are bereft a viable state. These are the Palestinians of the world, the many millions who live in what seem to be permanently failed states -- states in name only. The multipolar world will likely be democratic in some regions and autocratic in others, according to the traditions of the neighborhoods -- and in that sense, this world will represent a defeat for champions of liberal Western values as a universal standard. **The multipolar world will be peaceful to the degree that the big players can arrive at satisfactory terms for coexistence**. China wins in a Chinese Century, but who else? Asian societies with a history of tense relations with the Chinese, including the Japanese and the Vietnamese, may be losers. India fears being a loser but may not be, given the protection afforded by its sheer size and the ways in which its economy complements China's. Distance may prove a blessing for the economies that succeed in developing profitable trade relationships with China -- from the Pacific Coast of America to continental Europe. For resource-rich lands that China aims to exploit, like Chile with its copper treasure, much depends on whether China is disposed to be a benign or a cruel imperial ruler. An age of global city-states as well as a universal civilization offers a chance for Europe to matter again, in a large way, because Europe is a font of the cosmopolitan values that would be ascendant in these worlds. But North Americans, South Americans, and Asians are by no means dealt out. **There would be tremendous opportunities for global elites** -- for architects, artists, business executives, university presidents, political leaders, global-health specialists, and others who tend to live in big cities and who already are starting to think of themselves as a superclass. The multilingual person stands to do better than the monolingual one. Woe to those in the provinces, on the margin of things, and unable to think or operate in a global way. **As the After America world starts to take definition, the planet naturally will become less America-focused**. **For some, America's descent from the heavens will** be **cause** for what the Germans call schadenfreude, **pleasure taken in another's pain. But as the world becomes accustomed to a new order of things**, I suspect **the enduring sentiment will be more like indifference.** Our species tends to be heartless that way.