# Heg File

#### Shaun, Julian, Taylor

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## Unsustainable

### Economy

#### Multiple warrants for impending power transition—emerging powers, internal constraints, financial crisis, military overstretch

**Layne 12** [Christopher Layne, Chair in National Security and Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, “The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline Became Inevitable”, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-western-decline-became-inevitable/256388/?single\_page=true, 4/26/12]

The signs of the emerging new world order are many. First, there is China's astonishingly rapid rise to great-power status, both militarily and economically. In the economic realm, the International Monetary Fund forecasts that China's share of world GDP (15 percent) will draw nearly even with the U.S. share (18 percent) by 2014. (The U.S. share at the end of World War II was nearly 50 percent.) This is particularly startling given that China's share of world GDP was only 2 percent in 1980 and 6 percent as recently as 1995. Moreover, China is on course to overtake the United States as the world's largest economy (measured by market exchange rate) sometime this decade. And, as argued by economists like Arvind Subramanian, measured by purchasing-power parity, China's GDP may already be greater than that of the United States. Until the late 1960s, the United States was the world's dominant manufacturing power. Today, it has become essentially a rentier economy, while China is the world's leading manufacturing nation. A study recently reported in the Financial Times indicates that 58 percent of total income in America now comes from dividends and interest payments. Since the Cold War's end, America's military superiority has functioned as an entry barrier designed to prevent emerging powers from challenging the United States where its interests are paramount. But the country's ability to maintain this barrier faces resistance at both ends. First, the deepening financial crisis will compel retrenchment, and the United States will be increasingly less able to invest in its military. Second, as ascending powers such as China become wealthier, their military expenditures will expand. The Economist recently projected that China's defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. Thus, over the next decade or so a feedback loop will be at work, whereby internal constraints on U.S. global activity will help fuel a shift in the distribution of power, and this in turn will magnify the effects of America's fiscal and strategic overstretch. With interests throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the Caucasus--not to mention the role of guarding the world's sea-lanes and protecting U.S. citizens from Islamist terrorists--a strategically overextended United States inevitably will need to retrench. Further, there is a critical linkage between a great power's military and economic standing, on the one hand, and its prestige, soft power and agenda-setting capacity, on the other. As the hard-power foundations of Pax Americana erode, so too will the U.S. capacity to shape the international order through influence, example and largesse. This is particularly true of America in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession. At the zenith of its military and economic power after World War II, the United States possessed the material capacity to furnish the international system with abundant financial assistance designed to maintain economic and political stability. Now, this capacity is much diminished. All of this will unleash growing challenges to the Old Order from ambitious regional powers such as China, Brazil, India, Russia, Turkey and Indonesia. Given America's relative loss of standing, emerging powers will feel increasingly emboldened to test and probe the current order with an eye toward reshaping the international system in ways that reflect their own interests, norms and values. This is particularly true of China, which has emerged from its "century of humiliation" at the hands of the West to finally achieve great-power status. It is a leap to think that Beijing will now embrace a role as "responsible stakeholder" in an international order built by the United States and designed to privilege American interests, norms and values.

#### Fiscal challenges will kill hegemony—dollar, investor confidence, debt-to-GDP ratio

**Layne 12** [Christopher Layne, Chair in National Security and Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, “The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline Became Inevitable”, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-western-decline-became-inevitable/256388/?single\_page=true, 4/26/12]

Indeed, looking forward a decade, the two biggest domestic threats to U.S. power are the country's bleak fiscal outlook and deepening doubts about the dollar's future role as the international economy's reserve currency. Economists regard a 100 percent debt-to-GDP ratio as a flashing warning light that a country is at risk of defaulting on its financial obligations. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has warned that the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio could exceed that level by 2020--and swell to 190 percent by 2035. Worse, the CBO recently warned of the possibility of a "sudden credit event" triggered by foreign investors' loss of confidence in U.S. fiscal probity. In such an event, foreign investors could reduce their purchases of Treasury bonds, which would force the United States to borrow at higher interest rates. This, in turn, would drive up the national debt even more. America's geopolitical preeminence hinges on the dollar's role as reserve currency. If the dollar loses that status, U.S. primacy would be literally unaffordable. There are reasons to be concerned about the dollar's fate over the next two decades. U.S. political gridlock casts doubt on the nation's ability to address its fiscal woes; China is beginning to internationalize the renminbi, thus laying the foundation for it to challenge the dollar in the future; and history suggests that the dominant international currency is that of the nation with the largest economy. (In his piece on the global financial structure in this issue, Christopher Whalen offers a contending perspective, acknowledging the dangers posed to the dollar as reserve currency but suggesting such a change in the dollar's status is remote in the current global environment.)

#### **Dollar Heg collapse is inevitable—the evidence is everywhere**

Payne 12 [Michael Payne, Independent Activist Ph.D Foreign Policy issues such as social, economic and political matters, “US hegemony about to collapse”, <http://www.herald.co.zw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=38743:us-hegemony-about-to-collapse&catid=39:opinion-a-analysis&Itemid=132>, April 12, 2012]

Dark times lie ahead for the US dollar as its future as the world’s reserve currency looks to be in great jeopardy. For more than 50 years the US dollar has been the chief monetary instrument used by the nations of the world to facilitate trade involving commodities such as petroleum, manufactured products, and gold. But the times are changing and many of these nations, with China at the forefront, are finalising trade agreements that utilise only their own currencies. So it appears that the reign of the US dollar as the world’s reserve currency will, quite likely, be coming to an end within the next 10 years. It is certainly no surprise that China, widely considered to be the premier economic power of the future, is wasting no time in exerting its growing power and influence in these matters. China is actively working with nations in Asia, the Middle East and other regions of the world to bring dramatic changes to the way world commerce is conducted and money is exchanged. Many of these countries who are moving away from the dollar no longer view America as a stable and reliable force on the world economic stage and they are seeking alternatives as a hedge against a severe future decline in the dollar’s value. That China is the main facilitator of these moves to do away with the dollar is without question — the evidence is everywhere. Here are some specific examples of the various agreements that have been signed between China and other nations in recent times. China and Iran are creating a barter system by which Iranian oil will be exchanged for Chinese imported products. This is, quite obviously, an agreement designed to counter US sanctions against Iran since China has no intention of discontinuing the importation of Iranian oil. Besides the barter system the two countries will also conduct trade using the Chinese yuan, the Iranian rial and gold. China and Japan announced plans to bypass the dollar and use their own currencies in their trade relations. Discussions involving a partnership between South Korea and China to exchange their currencies also have taken place. This is a huge development as China, Japan and South Korea are the dominant economic powers in that Asian region. China and Russia have, for more than a year, been conducting trade using rubles and the yuan. China and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have announced an agreement which will use the yuan for oil trades. The Chinese National Bank said that this agreement, worth around US$5,5 billion, was made to “strengthen financial co-operation, to promote trade and investments, and to mutually assure regional financial stability”. Russia and Iran have agreed to use rubles as a means of currency in their trades. Russia has joined China in opposing US sanctions against Iran and fully intends to maintain a close relationship with Iran. China will pursue bilateral trades with Russia and Malaysia using the yuan, the ruble and the ringgit, respectively. The BRICS recently agreed at their summit meeting in Sanya, China, to establish mutual lines of credit in local currencies. This, again, is a very significant development since this group of nations represents a very powerful economic bloc going into the future. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development has stated that “the current system of currencies and capital rules which binds the world economy is not working properly and was largely responsible for the financial and economic crises”. Further that “the dollar should be replaced with a global currency”. The IMF recently issued a statement about replacing the dollar as the world’s reserve currency with a system of Special Drawing Rights called SDRs, an international type of currency created in 1969 which is, in effect, a “basket of national currencies” backed by the full faith and credit of the member countries’ governments. It seems like everyone is jumping on the bandwagon to do away with the dollar as the reserve currency. This could be termed as “payback time” as many countries that either have lost respect for America, or who fear its military outreach, have found a way to combat physical force with economic power. That may well be the case when we consider that this movement is being strongly promoted by China, Russia, and Iran, no real friends of the US. When the dollar is no longer the world’s reserve currency, the effects on America will be very severe. It will have monumental negative effects on the economy and its ability to conduct trade with other nations. In many cases nations will simply stop using the dollar or use it at heavily discounted rates.

#### China is rising and will cause US collapse—militarily and economically

**Freeman 12** [Chas Freeman, chairman of Projects International, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs and U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, “The China Bluff”, <http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/the-china-bluff-6561>, February 23, 2012]

China has risen from poverty, impotence and isolation to retake its premodern place atop the world economic order. The People’s Republic is now a major actor in global governance. It is fully integrated into every aspect of the international system it once sought to overthrow and, in some ways, more devoted to that system than we are. Forty years ago, China’s backwardness and vulnerability were the wonder of the world. Now, the world envies and ponders the strategic implications of China’s rapidly growing wealth and power.¶ Reality, unlike ghosts in China, seldom travels in straight lines. But if current trends advance along current lines, as early as 2022 China will have an economy that is one-third to two-fifths larger than that of the United States. If China continues to spend roughly 2 percent of its GDP (or 11 percent of its central-government budget) on its military as it does now, ten years hence it will have a defense budget on a par with ours today. Even with the exchange-rate adjustments that will surely take place by 2022, $600 billion or so is likely to buy a lot more in China than it can here. And all that money will be concentrated on the defense of China and its periphery, whereas our military, under current assumptions, will remain configured to project our power simultaneously to every region of the globe, not just the Asia-Pacific region.

#### Economic trends show a shift in power—its not about China passing us, but about the relative decline of the US

**Herd 11** [Graeme P. Herd, Head of the International Security Programme and Co-Director of the International Training Course in Security Policy at the GCSP accredited by the University of Geneva,“The Global Puzzle: Order in an Age of Primacy, Power-Shifts and Interdependence”, Geneva Papers Research Series, 2011]

The global financial crisis is widely perceived to accelerate a centrifugal shift in¶ the relative balance of financial, economic and moral power from the US and Europe¶ to Brazil, Russia, India, and China (the BRIC states) – fast growing developing¶ countries, which were predicted in 2003 to form a powerful economic grouping¶ that would surpass the share of global GDP of rich democratic states (the US¶ and EU) by 2050, if not sooner.22 Goldman Sachs also highlighted the potential of¶ the next echelon of states to become this century’s largest economies, coining the¶ acronym Next-Eleven (or N-11 states).23 The impact of the global financial crisis¶ has differentiated more widely among this group than the BRICs.24¶ Indeed, in 2010 China passed the US as the world’s largest energy consumer¶ and world’s number one automobile manufacturer and possesses the world’s fastest¶ super-computer. It surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest economy, having¶ become the world’s largest exporter. Even in the military sphere where US primacy is¶ overwhelming – in 2009 the US accounted for a 46.5% share of global military spending,¶ with France (4.2%), UK (3.8%) and Russia (3.5%) in the top five global spenders –¶ China moved to second spot (6.6%).25 Two-thirds of global growth in the first decade¶ of the 21st century came from Asia, with half of the world’s population living in India¶ and China. President of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, identifies two lead indicators¶ evidencing the case for an ongoing economic power shift in stark terms: first, Asia’s¶ stock markets account for 32% of global market capitalization, placing them above¶ Europe and the US; second, while in 1978 the Asian share of the global economy in¶ purchasing power parity (PPP) terms was 7%, it was 21% by 2008.26¶ This evident redistribution of power is especially visible in the context of the global¶ financial crisis and the relative decline of the US and Europe. From Brussels, Javier¶ Solana has observed: “the crisis is accelerating the power shift from the West to the¶ East. This is true both in terms of material resources (military and economic) and ideological¶ pull.”27 From Moscow, Fyodor Lukyanov, influential editor of Russia in Global¶ Affairs journal, supports this contention, noting that “shifts in the global economic¶ balance have weakened the West’s monopoly on the world’s modernization reservoir.¶ For the first time ever, the theme of modernization is not tied exclusively to Europe,¶ but includes the Chinese, South Korean and Singaporean models of development.”28¶ From Washington DC, a US National Intelligence Council report, aptly entitled Global¶ Trends 2025 – A Transformed World, predicts a revolutionized global multipolar international¶ system, as new players gain seats at the international high table to which¶ they will bring new stakes and rules of the game.29

#### Heg Fails – China Controls Credit

Calleo 7 (David Dean Acheson Professor; Director of the European Studies Program; University Professor of The Johns Hopkins University, Survival, p. 73-8)

Given our future's high potential for discord and destruction, having a hegemonic superpower already installed might seem a great good fortune. Yet, recent experience also reveals that America's global predominance has been seriously overestimated. Put to the test, American power counts for less than expected. While the United States is lavishly outfitted for high-technology warfare, pursuing a hegemonic agenda in today's world requires different capabilities for more primitive forms of combat, like countering guerrilla warfare and suicidal terrorism. The American military loathes this kind of fighting and, to date, has not been very good at it. Greater success would seem to require a different sort of military - with more and cheaper troops, trained for intimate contact with the enemy, and prepared for high casualties. Controlling hostile populations will demand extensive linguistic and policing skills. The United States is now spending heavily to compensate for its deficiencies, but is still far short of the resources needed to prevail. This current shortage of means is a further blow to America's hegemonic expectations. Financial experience during the Cold War accustomed the United States to abundant credit from the world economy, with a good part of the exchange costs of America's world role eventually covered by others who accumulated the surplus dollars. During the Cold War, however, these others were allies dependent on American military protection. Today, while the United States' external deficit is bigger than ever, credit to finance it no longer depends on allies in urgent need of protection. Instead, credit comes increasingly from states whose indefinite accumulation of dollars seems contrary to their own long-term interests. China, for example, by continuing to add to its already immense reserves of surplus dollars, subsidises its own imports, together with American consumption and investment, but at the expense of its own more balanced internal development. Given the growing protectionism against its exports, it seems unreasonable to expect China to continue this practice indefinitely. If credit from China is restricted, the United States will face the tougher choices between guns and butter it has long been able to avoid. In the face of this unaccustomed constraint, how long will America's enthusiasm for hegemony endure?

### Moral Heg

#### Moral Hegemony is in the gutter—Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo

**Laciner 12** [Sedat Laciner, Ph.D International Relations, Turkish academic specialist on the Middle East and International Relations, with particular reference to Turkish foreign policy and rector of the Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University, editor of the "Journal of Administrative Studies" and the "Review of International Law and Politics", Chairman of the Journal of Turkish Weekly, a regular columnist of the Turkish daily newspaper Star, General Coordinator of the Ankara-based Turkish think tank International Strategic Research Organization, “Moral Collapse of The United States Hegemony”, <http://www.anatoliadaily.com/irst/index.php/authors/3-all-articles-of-sedat-laciners-/984-moral-collapse-of-the-united-states-hegemony>, 3/25/2012]

The invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan cost the USA a lot. Those Americans ,that could not reach their objectives in both invasion, so to say, fall down. The great crisis encountered in US is considerably the result of countless expenditures in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is being expressed that the both direct and indirect costs of the wars to the US exceed the 5 trillion dollars. Such amount of money equivalents at least the size of ten economies like Turkey. In other words, USA has lost at least ten Turkey in these countries. Despite such gigantic expense, U.S also refused to give up its comfort, and budget deficit just went further. To some commentators from now on, it is very difficult to recover the US economy. Perhaps this state of affairs will be the base of much greater economic and social crisis. Economic losses and political-military defeat is obvious in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nonetheless losses are not this much, but also US is losing its moral leadership with these occupations. Thorough the cold war, Washington democracy which introduce itself as the ‘leader of the free world’ have continuously advocated human rights and supremacy of law. Most of the time, even if it had credibility problem, most valid concept of the US world leadership was these moral values. Moreover, one of the most crucial factors of the collapse of USSR was the irresponsiveness of the Moscow to that U.S moral superiority. Here is the irony of fate that, the moral superiority of the US is ending in Afghanistan just like the USSR. Routine torture Since 2003 with the occupation of Iraq , the CIA torture planes revealed the American mistreatment and torture in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib prisons. Revealing images proved that how exhorter Americans snub the human life and dignity. And what’s more, American president Bush could defend, leave alone to be ashamed, what they did. Remember, President Bush and its vice president Cheney tried to explain to the world in which situations the torture is necessary. Now it is Obama’s turn. Obama, who managed to withdraw his armies from Iraq, is now looking for the quickest way for out of Afghanistan. Because he knows, too, that chance of being successful in Afghanistan is out of question any more. Hence the most recent developments proved this. Before the February of 2012, American soldiers burned the holy book of Islam (Quran). As soon as this incident was heard, the Washington administration tried to close the case by defining the situation as an “unfortunate mistake”. Before this case, which caused many deaths and injuries, was closed, an American soldier this time open fire at random entering the Afghan homes. Sixteen people, mainly women and children, lost their lives and many Afghans got injured. It is announced that at least three children who fell victim to massacre were shot from their heads. Given the reports of UN and human rights association in Afghanistan, in police stations and prisons torture has become a routine. Last year UN asked not to send the detainees to these prisons. But the US soldiers intentionally continued to send people they caught to these prisons, more precisely, the torture shops. Gun – shy state of minister In short, United States, politically, and militarily have already done in Afghanistan, such that even the secretary of defense Leon Panetta does not trust his own soldiers. Panetta scared of his soldiers so much that, before starting his speech in Helmand Force Base, weapons of almost two-hundred soldiers were collected and soldiers watched their secretary of defense minister in a purely disarmed position. Let’s put it this way, United States lost the most crucial capital in Iraq and Afghanistan required for the world’s political leadership, in a word, moral leadership as well. From now on, Americans will lose as much as they stay in Afghanistan.

### Foreign Policy

#### Decline in relative power is inevitable—overstretch, debt, emerging powers, foreign relations, legitimacy—its not a question of raw power but of translating that power into influence

**Maher 10** [Richard Maher, Ph.D Political Science Brown University with a focus on foreign policy disagreements between Britain, France, and Germany since the end of the Cold War, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World”, Science Direct, 11/12/2010]

And yet, despite this material preeminence, the United States sees its political and strategic influence diminishing around the world. It is involved in two costly and destructive wars, in Iraq and Afghanistan, where success has been elusive and the end remains out of sight. China has adopted a new assertiveness recently, on everything from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, currency convertibility, and America’s growing debt (which China largely finances). Pakistan, one of America’s closest strategic allies, is facing the threat of social and political collapse. Russia is using its vast energy resources to reassert its dominance in what it views as its historical sphere of influence. Negotiations with North Korea and Iran have gone nowhere in dismantling their nuclear programs. Brazil’s growing economic and political influence offer another option for partnership and investment for countries in the Western Hemisphere. And relations with Japan, following the election that brought the opposition Democratic Party into power, are at their frostiest in decades. To many observers, it seems that America’s vast power is not translating into America’s preferred outcomes. As the United States has come to learn, raw power does not automatically translate into the realization of one’s preferences, nor is it necessarily easy to maintain one’s predominant position in world politics. There are many costs that come with predominance – material, political, and reputational. Vast imbalances of power create apprehension and anxiety in others, in one’s friends just as much as in one’s rivals. In this view, it is not necessarily American predominance that produces unease but rather American predominance. Predominance also makes one a tempting target, and a scapegoat for other countries’ own problems and unrealized ambitions. Many a Third World autocrat has blamed his country’s economic and social woes on an ostensible U.S. conspiracy to keep the country fractured, underdeveloped, and subservient to America’s own interests. Predominant power likewise breeds envy, resentment, and alienation. How is it possible for one country to be so rich and powerful when so many others are weak, divided, and poor? Legitimacy—the perception that one’s role and purpose is acceptable and one’s power is used justly—is indispensable for maintaining power and influence in world politics. As we witness the emergence (or re-emergence) of great powers in other parts of the world, we realize that American predominance cannot last forever. It is inevitable that the distribution of power and influence will become more balanced in the future, and that the United States will necessarily see its relative power decline. While the United States naturally should avoid hastening the end of this current period of American predominance, it should not look upon the next period of global politics and international history with dread or foreboding. It certainly should not seek to maintain its predominance at any cost, devoting unlimited ambition, resources, and prestige to the cause. In fact, contrary to what many have argued about the importance of maintaining its predominance, America’s position in the world—both at home and internationally—could very well be strengthened once its era of preeminence is over. It is, therefore, necessary for the United States to start thinking about how best to position itself in the ‘‘post-unipolar’’ world.

#### American Superpower status is in a state of decline—disregard for collective defense guarantees internal hegemonic collapse—empirics prove

**Rahman 11** [Anisur Rahman, Freelance Writer associated news such as the Daily Star, “Beginning of the end of American hegemony”, <http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=202171>, 9/13/2011]

Ever since the end of World War II (WWII), the United States of America had enjoyed the status of a superpower of the world. No country overtly dared to challenge American hegemony. The other major victorious power of the WWII -- the erstwhile USSR -- did lodge a muted challenge and the so called "Cold War" ensued. But American militarily surrounded the whole of the Soviet bloc and contained the spread of socialism. American industrial base and its economy were by far the strongest in the world and the USSR was no match at all. This state of affairs continued until an apocalyptic event of historic proportions took place in 2001. On the morning of September 11, 2001, an earth-shattering (excuse the pun) event took place in America. The twin towers of the World Trade Centre in Lower Manhattan, New York, the potent symbol of American capitalism, were ignominiously destroyed by the al-Qaeda by crashing American civilian aircrafts onto them. It shook the whole of America to the core; the invincibility of the world's only superpower had been shattered brutally. The country was at the receiving end of an attack on its own soil. Even President George W. Bush, the most powerful man in the world, had to be protected in American itself from the threat of a terrorist attack on that day. The ignominy of the superpower was beyond belief and America is still reeling from that event. The hunt for the terrorists who perpetrated such a heinous crime was immediate. The al-Qaeda was on American radar for quite sometime and when it was found that this organisation was indeed behind this audacious attack, the fury was boundless. America vowed to destroy al-Qaeda completely. Bush asked the world to join him in his crusade and said: "Either you are with us or against us." America launched an attack on Afghanistan -- the bastion of the Taliban supporting al-Qaeda. Almost simultaneously, America targeted Iraq on the pretext that it supported and harboured Islamic terrorism. Bush stated in his State of the Union Address in January 2002 that Iraq, Iran and North Korea were an "axis of evil." America claimed that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) which must be destroyed, and that necessitated removal of Saddam Hussein. This hard-headed policy without any international consensus not only alienated America in the eyes of the world but also fractured Nato badly. France and Germany were strongly opposed to the Iraq adventure. Disregarding the division in the Western power bloc and ignoring international efforts for rational approach in tackling terrorism, America almost unilaterally led the attack on Iraq and Afghanistan. Lack of evidence that these two countries were behind the 9/11 attack did not deter America in her pursuit for revenge. It was a sheer gung-ho response. The country adopted the doctrine of "pre-emptive" strike on suspected countries. If necessary, America would carry out military action unilaterally without international consent or even UN approval. This was a brutal proclamation of military might and it did not endear America at all to the rest of the world. War is never a low cost undertaking. It is estimated that the total cost of American "War on Terror" from 2001 to 2011, with inflation adjusted figure, amounts to over $2,000 billion, almost twice the amount for the whole of the Vietnam War. But could America financially afford to wage two wars simultaneously? Even before these two wars of choice, American economy was not in great shape. Productivity was dropping, and American share of the world economy was in decline. Russia was putting its house together after the collapse of its empire in 1989. Slowly and imperceptibly China, India and Brazil were emerging as the world's economic powerhouses. The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was amassing a huge credit balance. All of these things were happening while America was blinded with rage and revenge and pursuing aggressive military adventures against her presumed enemies. Ten years on, following 2001, America finds itself in dire economic straits. Booming Chinese exports, were voraciously absorbed by the Americans. China offered credits, from her export earnings, to Americans to buy Chinese goods. To Americans It was like pay-day throughout the month. China, India and the OPEC countries also bought limitless amount of American sovereign bonds, which allowed America to pursue military adventures abroad without too much financial worry. But obviously things cannot go on like this forever and the consequence of such profligate behaviour will have to surface sometime. The annual budget deficit in America in 2011 is now nearly $1,600 billion ($1.6 trillion), the sovereign debt has ballooned to $14.3 trillion. In other words, every American man, woman and child bears a national debt of $55,000, which is one of the highest in the world, if not the highest. No wonder American credit rating agency, Standard and Poor's (S&P), recently downgraded American credit rating from AAA to AA+. This is the first time in American history that the country has lost its triple A rating. Moreover, S&P has put America on the negative watch, which means that if the country fails to come to grips with its national debt, the AA+ rating may be further downgraded. How did it all come about? How could the world's only superpower with the largest economy and huge industrial base run up such a massive, almost mind boggling national deficit? The answer to this can be found in profligate national expenditure and unilateral American military undertakings abroad, arising from excessive ego of national power. During the Cold War, America pursued a policy of collective defence -- Nato, Seato, Cento and so on to counter the might of the erstwhile USSR. The advantage of collective defence was that all participating countries shared the cost and pain of defence and war. But after the demise of socialism and disbanding of the USSR and consequent disappearance of Russian threat, America saw no further need for collective defence. When France and Germany opposed the attack on Iraq, America proclaimed that in the absence of collective agreement within Nato, the "mission will determine the participating countries." At heart, it was the stance of the superpower to pursue a military undertaking on its own if necessary, particularly when the issue was nothing short of punishing the country or countries for the audacious attack on America and challenging its global might. Historically, socialism hegemony did not collapse from foreign aggression. It happened from within when the state could no longer prop it up financially, when it failed to support client states internationally and maintain the military might of the superpower. It is the economic collapse which led to political collapse. Is a similar thing happening to America -- economic collapse leading to the demise of capitalism? Although it is highly unlikely that capitalism will disappear overnight the American brand of capitalism, i.e. raw capitalism with no compassion for the poor, the unfortunate and down trodden members of the society, is going to be damaged. If 1989 is regarded as the historic time when socialism collapsed, then in the same vein one can say that 2001 may come to be seen as the beginning of the end of American hegemony.

#### Unipolarity causes overextension – means we aren’t effective at anything

Maher 11 (Richard, Max Weber postdoctoral fellow at the European University Institute and Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Department at Brown University, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World,” Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, p. 53-68)

Overextension. During its period of preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values. Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define its interests in increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image.14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers’ control. Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their preeminence in the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological benefits. Preeminent states may, therefore, overestimate the intensity and immediacy of threats, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of threat to live with. To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one's role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States—in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan.

#### Having to maintain the status quo means we can’t direct attention to upcoming problems

Maher 11 (Richard, Max Weber postdoctoral fellow at the European University Institute and Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Department at Brown University, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World,” Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, p. 53-68)

 Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating—one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law—has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe—such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008—the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good—a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries—in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia—continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India-Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The only way to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically decreases its share. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States—maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used.

### Internal Policymaking

#### Hubris shapes foreign policy and makes for bad CBA in policymaking

**Fettweis 11** [Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, “The Superpower as Superhero: Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy”, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1902154>, September, 2011]

Barry Buzan has argued that the United States is particularly susceptible to what he called “middle kingdom syndrome,” in which it sees itself as the center of the universe, the “exclusive holder of the only civilized values and standards that matter,” one that has nothing of importance to learn from the rest of the world.12 What he meant, without saying it explicitly, was that the United States suffers from hubris, a malady as old as humanity itself. The common understanding of hubris has changed little since it was first described by the ancient Greeks. Arrogance, extreme haughtiness or excessive pride before the gods led to the downfall of many characters in their histories and tragedies, usually at the hands of Nemesis, the avenging goddess.13 Among moderns, Nemesis takes the form of overconfidence, overestimations of self-worth and excess self-esteem, or an “arrogance of power,” to use the words of former Senator William Fulbright. The Greeks felt that hubris was the “chief sin,” and the “principal fountain of bad judgment and disaster, the main source of political instability,” according to Joseph Spengler.14 From that fountain springs a variety of pathological beliefs, all of which are related to the inflated sense of the possible, overestimation of capabilities and underestimation of cost. Icarus felt no danger in flying near the sun; likewise, Oedipus acted in willful disobedience of the gods, and Alcibiades convinced the Athenians of the wisdom of invading Sicily. Hubris can also be considered a behavioral manifestation of narcissism, or excessive love of self, which causes a grandiose sense of importance and confidence in those afflicted with it. According to the current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association, those with “narcissistic personality disorder” entertain fantasies of unlimited power and success, as well as a sense of being special and unique.15 Narcissists require “excessive admiration,” and have a need for constant attention and praise.16 These are not merely pathologies of individuals; states can display their effects as well. The influence of narcissism and hubris upon foreign policy is predictable, understandable and, in the end, one hopes, correctible. Hubris and Foreign Policy Hubris shapes foreign policy in a few general, pathological ways. First and most obviously, its overestimation of capabilities makes international action more likely by decreasing expectations of costs while increasing those of success, effectively lowering the bar for invasions and interventions. Hubris also causes states to misjudge the likely reactions of others to their initiatives. Finally, it causes states to ignore outside counsel, trusting in their own judgment even when even their closest allies are fairly united in opposition. All of these become perhaps a bit more understandable and even predictable when explained in the context of the underlying narcissistic personality disorder. Overestimation of Capability Hubris has its most pernicious influence on the cost-benefit analyses that precede any war of choice. This is particularly dangerous for the United States, for whom the majority of wars and all interventions are choices, rather than “necessities,” to use the current terms of art.17 Very rarely do truly existential threats arise that demand action abroad for the world’s safest country; the United States always chooses whether or not to fight, since inaction is always a viable option. There have of course been times when the benefits of intervention have proven to outweigh the costs, making the choice of war the correct one – World War II, Somalia and Afghanistan are examples – so “war of choice” need not be a pejorative label, only an accurate one. Choices they were, and choosing necessarily involves some level of prior analysis. Such analyses suffer when made by policymakers in the throes of national hubris. Inflated senses of self-worth tend to be accompanied by unrealistic expectations for success; hubris causes policymakers to underestimate risks, making the difficult appear easy and the impossible merely difficult.18 When the risks of action are underestimated, policymakers can be in for nasty, expensive surprises. The relationship of hubris and overestimation of capabilities to the invasion of Iraq needs little further discussion, since it has been discussed at length elsewhere and its consequences are well known.19 Indeed the connections between unwarranted overconfidence and disasters in Vietnam, Laos, and perhaps now Libya should be quite clear. Doubt rarely enters into the mind of the narcissist for whom, according to psychiatrist Jerrold Post, “dogmatic certainty with no foundation of knowledge is a posture frequently struck.”20

#### Warnings of decline are dismissed as politically motivated, cowardly, or pessimistic in a sweeping American hubris

**Fettweis 11** [Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, “The Superpower as Superhero: Hubris in U.S. Foreign Policy”, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1902154>, September, 2011]

Finally, hubris makes actors less receptive to the counsel of others. Warnings of danger are¶ readily dismissed as politically motivated, cowardly, or just overly pessimistic. “It is difficult for the¶ narcissist,” according to Post, “to acknowledge ignorance and accordingly to seek or accept information¶ or constructive criticism of ~~his~~ ideas.”36 To do so would be to admit flawed knowledge or insufficient¶ wisdom, both of which are anathema to the fragile narcisissitic ego. Hubris not only makes actors¶ unreceptive to criticism or external advice, but it can make them downright hostile to it. This manifests¶ itself in the willingness – and indeed sometimes preference – to act alone.¶ There is no shortage of instances where the United States would have been better off had it¶ listened to voices of caution from its friends. Washington’s major allies were puzzled by its¶ preoccupation with Cuba in the early 1960s, and consistently warned against invasion. After the disaster,¶ historian Arthur Schlesinger, who was a senior advisor to President Kennedy, caught an earful of¶ warnings when he visited Western European capitals. He noted deep “shock and disillusion” over the¶ debacle among diplomats, political leaders and private citizens alike.37 Cautionary warnings from abroad¶ continued as the United States increased its commitment to Southeast Asia as the decade wore on, even¶ from Washington’s closest allies, who never seemed to understand the importance that the United States¶ placed on irrelevant, post-imperial backwaters like Vietnam and Laos.38¶ Post-Cold War America, the state that sees farther and more clearly into the future, has rarely felt¶ constrained by myopic poltroons in Old Europe and elsewhere. That the United States found no¶ meaningful support for the war in Iraq outside of Great Britain and Australia was not a concern of the¶ hawks, who dismissed warnings of others as merely the whining of effeminized, irresponsible¶ weaklings.39 The United States was quite prepared to act alone, and indeed often preferred it. The¶ warning of allies, of course, proved prescient; as Peter Beinart has suggested, what the people of the¶ United States needed was not its allies’ tanks, “but their judgment.”40¶ The basic logic that the opinion of the many is more likely to be correct than that of the one of the¶ one is lost on the hubristic, who trust their own views above all others whenever necessary.¶ Overconfident actors welcome neither the assistance nor the second opinions of others.

#### Unipolarity is unsustainable – preeminence causes bad policy decsions

Maher 11 (Richard, Max Weber postdoctoral fellow at the European University Institute and Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Department at Brown University, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World,” Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, p. 53-68)

To say that the end of unquestioned preeminence may be good for the United States is counterintuitive. Power matters in international politics, and preeminence has produced a number of benefits for the United States (and its allies): security, especially from attack by other states, and the absence of power competition more generally; relative order and stability, particularly the decreasing frequency of inter-state war; prosperity and unparalleled wealth creation, and greater freedom of action and influence over events.12 Preeminence, by definition, entails few constraints to the projection of power and influence abroad. By virtue of its position, other countries naturally look to the United States for leadership, on everything from Middle East peace to climate change. All other things being equal, preeminence clearly is preferable to a position of subservience, lack of agency, and weakness. At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed, because of America's unique political ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals as universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process, the United States is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For decades, perhaps since its very founding, the United States has viewed what is good for itself as good for the world. During its period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to maintain its position at the top and to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining elements of realpolitik and liberal universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic human rights). At times, these desires have conflicted with each other but they also capture the enduring tensions of America's role in the world. The absence of constraints and America's overestimation of its own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall position. And because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive domain of the president—who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the state's enduring national interests—the policymaking process is open to special interests and outside influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Five features in particular, each a consequence of how America has used its power in the unipolar era, have worked to diminish America's long-term material and strategic position.

#### Breadth of issues under Unipolarity distracts us from important issues

Maher 11 (Richard, Max Weber postdoctoral fellow at the European University Institute and Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Department at Brown University, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World,” Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, p. 53-68)

Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or long-term interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the post-Cold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia's doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken “nation building” in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is beyond the pale even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests.

### Psychology Indict

#### Proponents deny American decline in a psychological phenomenon that’s sweeping the nation

**Layne 12** [Christopher Layne, Chair in National Security and Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, “The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline Became Inevitable”, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-western-decline-became-inevitable/256388/?single\_page=true, 4/26/12]

We are seeing a similar phenomenon today in America, where the topic of decline stirs discomfort in national leaders. In September 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proclaimed a "new American Moment" that would "lay the foundations for lasting American leadership for decades to come." A year and a half later, President Obama declared in his State of the Union speech: "Anyone who tells you that America is in decline . . . doesn't know what they're talking about." A position paper from Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney stated flatly that he "rejects the philosophy of decline in all of its variants." And former U.S. ambassador to China and one-time GOP presidential candidate Jon Huntsman pronounced decline to be simply "un-American." Such protestations, however, cannot forestall real-world developments that collectively are challenging the post-1945 international order, often called Pax Americana, in which the United States employed its overwhelming power to shape and direct global events. That era of American dominance is drawing to a close as the country's relative power declines, along with its ability to manage global economics and security.

### AT: Cold War Examples

#### Cold War Examples only go neg—Multipolarity has been inevitable all along

**Layne 12** [Christopher Layne, Chair in National Security and Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, “The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline Became Inevitable”, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-western-decline-became-inevitable/256388/?single\_page=true, 4/26/12]

The Cold War was costly in treasure and in blood (the most obvious examples being the wars in Korea and Vietnam). America bears significant responsibility for heightening postwar tensions with the Soviet Union and transforming what ought to have been a traditional great-power rivalry based on mutual recognition of spheres of influence into the intense ideological rivalry it became. During the Cold War, U.S. leaders engaged in threat inflation and overhyped Soviet power. Some leading policy makers and commentators at the time--notably Kennan and prominent journalist Walter Lippmann--warned against the increasingly global and militarized nature of America's containment strategy, fearing that the United States would become overextended if it attempted to parry Soviet or communist probes everywhere. President Dwight Eisenhower also was concerned about the Cold War's costs, the burden it imposed on the U.S. economy and the threat it posed to the very system of government that the United States was supposed to be defending. Belief in the universality of American values and ideals was at the heart of U.S. containment strategy during most of the Cold War, and the determination to vindicate its model of political, economic and social development is what caused the United States to stumble into the disastrous Vietnam War. Whatever questions could have been raised about the wisdom of America's Cold War policies faded rapidly after the Soviet Union's collapse, which triggered a wave of euphoric triumphalism in the United States. Analysts celebrated America's "unipolar moment" and perceived an "end of history" characterized by a decisive triumph of Western-style democracy as an end point in human civic development. Almost by definition, such thinking ruled out the prospect that this triumph could prove fleeting. But even during the Cold War's last two decades, the seeds of American decline had already been sown. In a prescient--but premature--analysis, President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger believed that the bipolar Cold War system would give way to a pentagonal multipolar system composed of the United States, Soviet Union, Europe, China and Japan. Nixon also confronted America's declining international financial power in 1971 when he took the dollar off the Bretton Woods gold standard in response to currency pressures. Later, in 1987, Yale's Paul Kennedy published his brilliant Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, which raised questions about the structural, fiscal and economic weaknesses in America that, over time, could nibble away at the foundations of U.S. power. With America's subsequent Cold War triumph--and the bursting of Japan's economic bubble--Kennedy's thesis was widely dismissed. Now, in the wake of the 2008 financial meltdown and ensuing recession, it is clear that Kennedy and other "declinists" were right all along. The same causes of decline they pointed to are at the center of today's debate about America's economic prospects: too much consumption and not enough savings; persistent trade and current-account deficits; deindustrialization; sluggish economic growth; and chronic federal-budget deficits fueling an ominously rising national debt.

### AT: Soft Power Solves

#### “Good natured” US foreign policies backfire.

Kirss 2k12 (Alex Verschoor, B.A. in Political Science, Religion, and Sociology International Policy Digest-“Isolation and Hegemony: A New Approach for American Foreign Policy”http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/04/23/isolation-and-hegemony-a-new-approach-for-american-foreign-policy/ 4-23-12)

This is far and away the highest amount contributed by any nation. As of 2010 The U.S. provided between 22 and 25 percent for three main NATO funds: the civil budget, the military budget, and the security investment program. Why then does the United States stay involved with the UN and NATO? The root lies both in the inability of the United States to easily forgo its historical obsession with the paradigmatic liberal endeavor of the UN and because the U.S. believes, rightly or wrongly, that it gains something from the UN. A perhaps more pessimistic reading is that the U.S. cannot help itself from just wanting to be in control. Another reason is the simple fact that the United States sees itself as a moral force for good in the world, and should therefore exercise its power justly. These reasons form the bulk of the argument in favor of an internationalist foreign policy. They also, however, will prove inadequate to sustain a robust and flourishing United States in the foreseeable future due to their accumulated costs. Even well intentioned internationalist policies, for instance, embarked upon out of purely altruistic motives, are both costly and have the potential to backfire and cause more security issues for the United States.

### AT: Obama Solves

#### US promises to maintain military force are not possible.

Kirss 12 (Alex Verschoor, B.A. in Political Science, Religion, and Sociology International Policy Digest-“Isolation and Hegemony: A New Approach for American Foreign Policy”http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/04/23/isolation-and-hegemony-a-new-approach-for-american-foreign-policy/ 4-23-12)

As it stands, the current path of U.S. foreign policy is unsustainable. Not only do current interventionist policies breed ill well and animosity within the international community, the fiscal realities of running the U.S. government following the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the lingering impacts of the global financial crisis of 2008, mean that the U.S. cannot afford to continue on this path. These new realities are in the forefront of the most recent U.S. statement of defense policy and strategy, published in January 2012. In the document, which illustrates the guiding principles that the armed forces will follow in crafting national defense, President Obama opens his remarks by stating that “Our Nation is at a moment of transition.” He goes on to respond to the fear that the new fiscal environment will dangerously erode U.S. military might by noting “the fiscal choices we face are difficult ones, but there should be no doubt—here in the United States or around the world—we will keep our Armed Forces the best-trained, best-led, best-equipped fighting force in history.” Such rhetoric is intended to inspire, and may or may not accurately reflect the truth of the fiscal situation that the U.S. faces. The only other mention of new fiscal standards occurs in the introduction to the body of the document, where it is explained that the strategy was brought about “in light of the changing geopolitical environment and our changing fiscal circumstances.” At the same time it is not specifically clear as to how these fiscal realities will be translated into the practice of foreign policy. While the document speaks of “building partnership capacity elsewhere in the world” and “sharing the costs and responsibilities of global leadership” it is hard to see these statements as being anything more than empty platitudes.

## Impact Turns

### Generic

#### Multipolarity is better at combating dependency, prolif, pandemics, warming and terrorism – heg exasperates those problems in the status quo

Weber 7 (Steven, Director of the Institute for International Studies, Berkeley, [Foreign Policy](http://proquest.umi.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/pqdweb?RQT=318&pmid=23173&TS=1169999321&clientId=11201&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD), [Jan/Feb 2007](http://proquest.umi.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/pqdweb?RQT=572&VType=PQD&VName=PQD&VInst=PROD&pmid=23173&pcid=34598251&SrchMode=3). p. 48, <http://books.google.com/books?id=fA3Qs_Qq1DwC&pg=PA498&lpg=PA498&dq=22The+truly+dangerous+places+are+the+points+where+the+subterranean+networks+touch+the+mainstream+of+global+politics+and+economics.%22&source=bl&ots=SdXbliwJni&sig=eUmn7HhaoMUKq7jDlnrDfbmYy9U&hl=en&sa=X&ei=SRcLUOKVE8qAqgHsuLG6Cg&ved=0CFYQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=%22The%20truly%20dangerous%20places%20are%20the%20points%20where%20the%20subterranean%20networks%20touch%20the%20mainstream%20of%20global%20politics%20and%20economics.%22&f=false>)

That's nice work if you can get it. But the United States almost certainly cannot. Not only because other countries won't let it, but, more profoundly, because that line of thinking is faulty. The predominance of American power has many benefits, but the management of globalization is not one of them. The mobility of ideas, capital, technology, and people is hardly new. But the rapid advance of globalization's evils is. Most of that advance has taken place since 1990. Why? Because what changed profoundly in the 1990s was the polarity of the international system. For the first time in modern history, globalization was superimposed onto a world with a single superpower. What we have discovered in the past 15 years is that it is a dangerous mixture. The negative effects of globalization since 1990 are not the result of globalization itself. They are the dark side of American predominance. THE DANGERS OF UNIPOLARIT A straightforward piece of logic from market economics helps explain why unipolarity and globalization don't mix. Monopolies, regardless of who holds them, are almost always bad for both the market and the monopolist. We propose three simple axioms of "globalization under unipolarity" that reveal these dangers. Axiom 1: Above a certain threshold of power, the rate at which new global problems are generated will exceed the rate at which old problems are fixed Power does two things in international politics: It enhances the capability of a state to do things, but it also increases the number of things that a state must worry about. At a certain point, the latter starts to overtake the former. It's the familiar law of diminishing returns. Because powerful states have large spheres of influence and their security and economic interests touch every region of the world, they are threatened by the risk of things going wrong-anywhere. That is particularly true for the United States, which leverages its ability to go anywhere and do anything through massive debt. No one knows exactly when the law of diminishing returns will kick in. But, historically, it starts to happen long before a single great power dominates the entire globe, which is why large empires from Byzantium to Rome have always reached a point of unsustainability. That may already be happening to the United States today, on issues ranging from oil dependency and nuclear proliferation to pandemics and global warming. What Axiom 1 tells you is that more U.S. power is not the answer; it's actually part of the problem. A multipolar world would almost certainly manage the globe's pressing problems more effectively. The larger the number of great powers in the global system, the greater the chance that at least one of them would exercise some control over a given combination of space, other actors, and problems. Such reasoning doesn't rest on hopeful notions that the great powers will work together. They might do so. But even if they don't, the result is distributed governance, where some great power is interested in most every part of the world through productive competition Axiom 2: In an increasingly networked world, places that fall between the networks are very dangerous places-and there will be more ungoverned zones when there is only one network to join The second axiom acknowledges that highly connected networks can be efficient, robust, and resilient to shocks. But in a highly connected world, the pieces that fall between the networks are increasingly shut off from the benefits of connectivity. These problems fester in the form of failed states, mutate like pathogenic bacteria, and, in some cases, reconnect in subterranean networks such as al Qaeda. The truly dangerous places are the points where the subterranean networks touch the mainstream of global politics and economics. What made Afghanistan so dangerous under the Taliban was not that it was a failed state. It wasn't. It was a partially failed and partially connected state that worked the interstices of globalization through the drug trade, counterfeiting, and terrorism Can any single superpower monitor all the seams and back alleys of globalization? Hardly. In fact, a lone hegemon is unlikely to look closely at these problems, because more pressing issues are happening elsewhere, in places where trade and technology are growing. By contrast, a world of several great powers is a more interest-rich environment in which nations must look in less obvious places to find new sources of advantage. In such a system, it's harder for troublemakers to spring up, because the cracks and seams of globalization are held together by stronger ties Axiom 3: Without a real chance to find useful allies to counter a superpower, opponents will try to neutralize power, by going underground, going nuclear, or going "bad. Axiom 3 is a story about the preferred strategies of the weak. It's a basic insight of international relations that states try to balance power. They protect themselves by joining groups that can hold a hegemonic threat at bay. But what if there is no viable group to join? In today's unipolar world, every nation from Venezuela to North Korea is looking for a way to constrain American power. But in the unipolar world, it's harder for states to join together to do that. So they turn to other means. They play a different game. Hamas, Iran, Somalia, North Korea, and Venezuela are not going to become allies anytime soon. Each is better off finding other ways to make life more difficult for Washington. Going nuclear is one way. Counterfeiting U.S. currency is another. Raising uncertainty about oil supplies is perhaps the most obvious method of all Here's the important downside of unipolar globalization. In a world with multiple great powers, many of these threats would be less troublesome. The relatively weak states would have a choice among potential partners with which to ally, enhancing their influence. Without that more attractive choice, facilitating the dark side of globalization becomes the most effective means of constraining American power The world is paying a heavy price for the instability created by the combination of globalization and unipolarity, and the United States is bearing most of the burden. Consider the case of nuclear proliferation. There's effectively a market out there for proliferation, with its own supply (states willing to share nuclear technology) and demand (states that badly want a nuclear weapon). The overlap of unipolarity with globalization ratchets up both the supply and demand, to the detriment of U.S. national security.

#### U.S. hegemony causes war

Kolko 6 (Gabriel, historian of modern warfare, THE AGE OF WAR: THE UNITED STATES CONFRONTS THE WORLD, 2006, p. 173-6)

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, only the United States has the will to maintain a global foreign policy and to intervene everywhere it believes necessary. Today and in the near future, the United States will make the decisions that will lead to war or peace, and the fate of much of the world is largely in its hands. It possesses the arms and a spectrum of military strategies all predicated on a triumphant activist role for itself. It believes that its economy can afford interventionism and that the American public will support whatever actions necessary to set the affairs of some country or region on the political path it deems essential. This grandiose ambition is bipartisan, and details notwithstanding, both parties have always shared a consensus on it. The obsession with power and the conviction that armies can produce the political outcome a nation's leaders desire is by no means an exclusively American illusion. It is a notion that goes back many centuries and has produced the main wars of modern times. The rule of force has been with humankind a very long time, and the assumptions behind it have plagued its history for centuries. But unlike the leaders of most European nations or Japan, US leaders have not gained insight from the calamities that have so seared modern history. Folly is scarcely a US monopoly, but resistance to learning when grave errors have been committed is almost proportionate to the resources available to repeat them. The Germans learned their lesson after two defeats, the Japanese after World War II, and both nations found wars too ehausting and politically dangerous. The United States still believes that if firepower fails to master a situation, the solution is to use it more precisely and much more of it. In this regard it is exceptional—past failures have not made it any wiser. Wars are at least as likely today as any time over the past century. Of great importance is the end of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and Moscow's restraining influence elsewhere. But the proliferation of nuclear technology and other means of mass destruction have also made large parts of the world far more dangerous. Deadly local wars with conventional weapons in Africa, the Balkans, Middle East, and elsewhere have multiplied since the 1960s. Europe, especially Germany, and Japan, are far stronger and more independent than at any time since 1945, and China's rapidly expanding economy has given it a vastly more important role in Asia. Ideologically, communism's demise means that the simplified bipolarism that Washington used to explain the world ceased after 1990 to have any value. With it, the alliances created nominally to resist communism have either been abolished or are a shadow of their original selves; they have no reason for existence. The crisis in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), essentially, reflects this diffusion of all forms of power and the diminution of US hegemony. Economically, the capitalist nations have resumed their rivalries, and they have become more intense with the growth of their economies and the decline in the dollar—which by 2004 was as weak as it has been in over fifty years. These states have a great deal in common ideologically, but concretely they are increasingly rivals. The virtual monopoly of nuclear weapons that existed about a quarter-century ago has ended with proliferation.?, Whether it is called a "multipolar" world, to use French president Jacques Chirac's expression in November 2004, in which Europe, China, India, and even eventually South America follow their own interests, or something else, the direction is clear. There may or may not be "a fundamental restructuring of the global order," as the chairman of the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) National Intelligence Council presciently reflected in April 2003, but the conclusion was unavoidable "that we are facing a more fluid and complicated set of alignments than anything we have seen since the formation of the Atlantic alliance in 1949." Terrorism and the global economy have defied overwhelming US military power: "Our smart bombs aren't that smart."' Wars**,** whether civil or between states, remain the principal (but scarcely the only) challenge confronting humanity in the twenty-first century. Ecological disasters relentlessly affecting all dimensions of the environment are also insidious because of the unwillingness of the crucial nations—above all the United States—to adopt measures essential for reversing their damage. The challenges facing humanity have never been so complex and threatening, and the end of the Cold War, although one precondition of progress, is scarcely reason for complaceriby or optimism. The problems the world confronts far transcend the communist-capitalist tensions, many of which were mainly symptoms of the far greater intellectual, political, and economic problems that plagued the world before 1917—and still exist. Whatever the original intention, US interventions can lead to open-ended commitments in both duration and effort. They may last a short time, and usually do, but unforeseen events can cause the United States to spend far more resources than it originally anticipated, causing it in the name of its credibility, or some other doctrine, to get into disastrous situations that in the end defeat the United States. Vietnam is the leading example of this tendency, but Iraq, however different in degree, is the same in kind. Should the United States confront even some of the forty or more nations that now have terrorist networks, then it will in one manner or another intervene everywhere, but especially in Africa and the Middle East. The consequences of such commitments will be unpredictable. The United States has more determined and probably more numerous enemies today than at any time, and many of those who hate it are ready and able to inflict destruction on its shores. Its interventions often triumphed in the purely military sense, which is all the Pentagon worries about, but in all too many cases they have been political failures and eventually led to greater US military and political involvement. Its virtually instinctive activist mentality has caused it to get into situations where it often had no interests, much less durable solutions to a nation's problems, repeatedly creating disasters and enduring enmities. The United States has power without wisdom and cannot, despite its repeated experiences, recognize the limits of its ultrasophisticated military technology. The result has been folly and hatred, which is a recipe for disasters. September 11 confirmed that, and war has come to its shores. That the United States end its self-appointed global mission of regulating all problems, wherever, whenever, or however it wishes to do so, is an essential precondition of stemming, much less reversing, the accumulated deterioration of world affairs and wars. We should not ignore the countless ethical and other reasons it has no more right or capacity to do so than any state over the past century, whatever justifications they evoked. The problems, as the history of the past century shows, are much greater than the US role in the world: but at the present time its actions are decisive, and whether there is War or peace will be decided far more often in Washington than any other place. Ultimately, there will not be peace in the world unless all nations relinquish war as an instrument of policy, not only because of ethical or moral reasoning but because wars have become deadlier and more destructive of social institutions. A precondition of peace is for nations not to attempt to impose their visions on others, adjudicate their differences, and never to assume that their need for the economic or strategic resources of another country warrants interference of any sort in its internal affairs. But September 11 proved that after a half-century of interventions the United States has managed to provoke increasing hatred. It has failed abysmally to bring peace and security to the world. Its role as a rogue superpower and its promiscuous, cynical interventionism has been spectacularly unsuccessful, even on its own terms. It is squandering vast economic resources, and it has now endangered the physical security of Americans at home. To end the damage the United States causes abroad is also to fulfill the responsibilities that US politicians have to their own people. But there is not the slightest sign at this point that voters will call them to account, and neither the AMerican population nor its political leaders are likely to agree to Rich far-reaching changes in foreign policy. The issues are far too grave to wait for US attitudes and its political process to be transformed. The world will be safer to the extent that US alliances are dissolved and it is isolated, and that is happening for many reasons, ranging from the unilateralism, hubris, and preemptory style of the Bush administration to the fact that since the demise of communism, the world's political alignments have changed dramatically. Communism and fascism were both outcomes of the fatal errors in the international order and affairs of states that World War I spawned. In part, the Soviet system's disintegration was the result of the fact it was the aberrant consequence of a destructive and abnormal war, 11,);t at least as important was its leaders' loss of confidence in socialism. And suicidal Muslims are, to a great extent, the outcome of a half-century of US interference in the Middle East and Islamic world, which radicalized so many young men and women ready to die for faith. Just as the wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 created Bolsheviks, the repeated grave errors of the United States, however different the context or times, have produced their own abnormal, negative reactions. The twenty-first century has begun very badly because the United States continues with its aggressive policies. They are far more dangerous than those of the twentieth century. The destructive potential of weaponry has increased exponentially, and many more people and nations have access to it. What would once have been considered relatively minor foreign policy problems now have potentially far greater consequences. It all augurs very badly. The world has reached the most dangerous point in recent, or perhaps all of, history. There are threats of war and instability unlike anything that prevailed when a Soviet-led bloc existed. Even if the United States abstains from interference and tailors its actions to fit this troubled reality, there will be serious problems throughout much of the world. Internecine civil conflicts will continue, as well as wars between nations armed with an increasing variety of much more destructive weapons available from outside powers, of which the United States remains, by far, the most important source. Many of these conflicts have independent roots, and both principles and experiences justify the United States staying out of them and leaving the world alone. Both the American people and those involved directly will be far better off without foreign interference, whatever nation attempts it. US leaders are not creating peace or security at home or stability abroad. The reverse is the case: its interventions have been counterproductive, and its foreign policy is a disaster. Americans and those people who are the objects of successive administrations' efforts would be far better off if the United States did nothing, closed its bases overseas and withdrew its fleets everywhere, and allowed the rest of world to find its own way. Communism is dead, and Europe and Japan are powerful and both can and will take care of their own interests. The United States must adapt to these facts. But if it continues as it has over the past half-century, attempting to satisfy its vainglorious but irrational ambition to run the world, then there will be even deeper crises and it will inflict wars and turmoil on many nations as well as on its own people. And it will fail yet again, for all states that have gone to war over the past centuries have not achieved the objectives for which they sacrificed so much blood, passion, and resources. They have only produced endless misery and upheavals of every kind.

#### Heg ensures global conflict

Freier 6 (Lieutenant Colonel Nathan, is Director of National Security Affairs at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute [SSI], PARAMETERS, August 2006, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06autumn/freier.htm)

I propose an alternative perspective that calls the assumption that closed the previous section into serious question. This view accepts that the nation’s absolute power, in classically realist terms, may be unassailable for the foreseeable future; in short, its material capacity may in fact be somewhat secure from fundamental dislocation. However, its relative position of power and influence may at the same time be increasingly vulnerable to some conscious, internal repudiation of the high costs and risks associated with maintaining American primacy. Thus, though the United States may have all the potential power necessary to maintain its position, the will to employ that power most effectively may be at increasing risk. The framers of NSC 68 feared the same in 1950 when they observed: We run . . . the added risk of being confused and immobilized by our inability to weigh and choose, and pursue a firm course based on a rational assessment of each. The risk that we may thereby be prevented or too long delayed in taking all needful measures to maintain the integrity and vitality of our system is great. The risk that our allies will lose their determination is greater. And the risk that in this manner a descending spiral of too little and too late, of doubt and recrimination, may present us with even narrower and more desperate alternatives, is the greatest risk of all.18 The events of 9/11 changed only our perspective on the world, not our approach to it. The realities of post-modern great power and primacy were suddenly at the nation’s doorstep, seemingly unannounced and without the benefit of advanced consideration of how to both protect our physical security while, at the same time, securing and extending our long-term strategic position across Morgenthau’s elements of power. American great power relies on three key but vulnerable sources of strength for its continued vitality: a homeland secure from fundamental dislocation or disruption,19 a strong and vibrant network of alliances and partnerships founded on common interests and values,20 and a population and its opinion elites inured to the inherent costs of primacy.21 The events of 9/11 and subsequent experience have made clear the inherent vulnerability of all three. From the end of the Cold War to 9/11, there had been an obvious and natural erosion of common interest and discipline in the nation’s traditional alliances and partnerships. Further, many had begun warning that the political, economic, and physical security of the American homeland itself was increasingly vulnerable to attack by sub-state and transnational actors less constrained by the norms and conventions that govern international relations. Finally, all Americans had grown comfortable with the benefits of primary influence, but had done so with little appreciation for the substantial fiscal, material, human, psychological, and political burdens that could be associated with its continued maintenance over time. Thus, many were caught quite unaware by the steady accumulation of real cost that began suddenly with the 9/11 attacks and that has continued unabated ever since. With respect to the latter source of strength in particular—a population inured to the costs associated with primacy—there continues to be some genuine shock among average and elite Americans alike that ubiquitous American influence breeds resistance and unease. This dangerous naiveté ignores a central maxim of international politics—great power engenders respect but it also foments fear, envy, and venom as well. Worse, it hazards a persistent underappreciation of the accumulating costs associated with maintaining American primacy in a world increasingly marked by open resistance to and mistrust of US power and motivations. It is difficult for many Americans to reconcile in their own minds the idea that the United States can be admired, revered, and relied on, while at the same time actively resisted, balanced against, and hated as well.22 This cognitive dissonance can result in imprudent denial of political realism where some in the American strategy elite are captured by unachievable, risk-untested political rhetoric at the expense of real strategic calculation.

### Prolif

#### Offensive Dominance causes nationalism and war – Iraq proves

Monteiro 11 (Nuno, Professor of Political Science at Yale University Monteiro is a research fellow at Yale’s Whitney and Betty MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies and a member of the Scientific Council of the Portuguese International Relations Institute (IPRI), Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00064)

A unipole carrying out an offensive-dominance strategy wants to revise the status quo in its favor by acquiring more territory, by favorably changing the alignment of other states, or by altering the distribution of power in its own beneªt—or some combination of these. Territorial conquest, which is the most ambitious goal of an offensivedominance strategy, is a daunting task in an age of nationalism and is thuslikely to be rare. 89 Efforts to alter the international alignments of other states or the balance of power can be pursued through soft power and persuasion, but this is unlikely to prove sufªcient, and the unipole may decide to use force. 90 By putting recalcitrant minor powers in a position of extreme-self help, an offensive-dominance strategy triggers two pathways to conºict. In both cases, a deterrence breakdown leads to a preventive war. Following the ªrst pathway: the unipole makes revisionist demands that recalcitrant minor powers are unlikely to accept peacefully, because these pose a threat to their survival. Given its preponderance of power, the unipole may decide to go to war. The second causal pathway follows a slightly more complex logic. Like its defensive version, a strategy of offensive dominance provides strong incentives for recalcitrant minor powers to balance internally. These attempts to bolster their relative power, however, are likely to lead to war with the unipole before the recalcitrant power is able to acquire additional capabilities. The reason for this outcome is that the unipole will oppose any attempt by minor powers to revise the status quo in a way that is detrimental to its interests. In addition, wars pitting a recalcitrant minor power against a unipole implementing a strategy of offensive dominance have two effects common to defensive dominance. First, they encourage other recalcitrant minor powers to redouble their balancing efforts. Second, they may make room for wars among major and minor powers. Reacting to the September 11 terrorist attacks, the United States adopted a strategy of offensive dominance in the Middle East. Although this short period has produced only a slim empirical record that can be harnessed to support my theory, the mechanisms I posit can best be seen at work in the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. The United States’ goal was to revise Iraq’s international alignment and decrease its relative power by installing an accommodating regime in Baghdad and ending Saddam’s putative weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. 91 In the end, no WMD were found after the invasion. 92 Still, Saddam had possessed a nuclear program, which he stopped only grudgingly when UNimposed sanctions in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War made it impossible to acquire the materials and technology needed for a nuclear deterrent. 93 Indeed, the possibility of Iraq acquiring nuclear weapons, which Washington was convinced would soon become a reality, featured prominently in the George W. Bush administration’s argument for going to war. 94 Although confronted with an imminent invasion, Saddam refused to back down. His rationale seems to have been based on his estimate that, ªrst, France or Russia would intercede on Iraq’s behalf, preventing war and, second, if that failed, Iraqi forces would be capable of increasing the military costs for the United States to the point at which American public opinion would force Washington to back down. 95 None of this happened. China, France, and Russia—all major powers—did oppose UN authorization to use force against Iraq, but when the United States displayed an unequivocal determination to invade anyway, no major power did much to stop it. 96 Ultimately, U.S.-led coalition troops toppled Saddam’s regime in three weeks, and major military operations ended within a month of the invasion date. The Iraq War also led other recalcitrant minor powers to accelerate their proliferation attempts. Having been identiªed by President Bush, alongside Iraq, as members of the “axis of evil,” Iran and North Korea were particularly quick to respond. 97 A mere two weeks after the fall of Baghdad, Pyongyang ofªcials informed their American counterparts that North Korea possessed nuclear weapons, making the country immune to any U.S. attempts to depose its regime. 98 Iran, too, has ramped up its nuclear program since 2002 and is likely to continue pursuing a nuclear capability while trying to avoid preventive actionby the United States. 99 Unfortunately for the prospects of peace, it is also likely the United States will oppose this development and, if necessary, resort to the use of force. 100

### AT: Bandwagoning

#### Unipolarity causes conflict—bandwagoning costs more

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In this section, I analyze how the unipole’s strategic choices—defensive dominance, offensive dominance, or disengagement—can trigger conºictproducing mechanisms between the unipole and other states, or among the latter. I take the distribution of power between the unipole and major powers as ªxed. The ways in which unipolarity may be transformed into either a bipolar or a multipolar order, which may or may not lead to conºict, are beyond the scope of my argument. So are the ways in which the unipole may increase its power preponderance and become a global hegemon or an empire. Thus, my theory lays out how each of the unipole’s grand strategic choices produces conºict in the context of a unipolar structure that is at least somewhat durable. Speciªcally, I show how, in addition to wars between major and minor powers and to wars among the latter, two other types of war are likely to be prevalent in a unipolar world. First, and resulting from either of the dominance strategies, are wars pitting the sole great power against minor powers. Second, and stemming from a disengagement strategy, are major power wars. My theory explores the different mechanisms leading to each type of war. My theory therefore differs from Wohlforth’s in two key aspects. First, Wohlforth believes that power preponderance in a unipolar system is so marked that the expected costs of balancing are always prohibitive. Consequently, every state in the system will bandwagon with the unipole, making it impossible for the latter to be involved in wars. In contrast, I show that some states face lower costs of balancing relative to bandwagoning. They are therefore more likely to become recalcitrant minor powers, with whom the sole great power is likely to go to war even when implementing a defensivedominance strategy. Second, Wohlforth assumes that the unipole will always implement a strategy of defensive dominance: it will not engage in offensive revisionism, nor will it disengage from the world. I show how both offensive dominance anddisengagement are plausible strategic options for the unipole and then extrapolate the types of conºict that each is likely to produce. Speciªcally, offensive dominance (like its defensive variant) is likely to pit the unipole against recalcitrant minor powers. Disengagement, for its part, brings with it the possibility of wars between major powers.

### Terror

#### American acts of hegemony cause backlash and terrorist attacks.

Holt 2 (Henry, Asian studies scholar, consultant to the Central Intelligence Agency for many years, professor emeritus of the University of California, “Blowback- The Cost and Consequences of American Empire”, http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Blowback\_CJohnson/Blowback\_BCJ.html)

On rare occasions, as with the Italian cable cutting, when such a local tragedy rises to the level of global news, what often seems strangest to Americans is the level of national outrage elsewhere over what the U.S. media portray as, at worst, an apparently isolated incident, however tragic to those involved. Certainly, the one subject beyond discussion at such moments is the fact that, a decade after the end of the Cold War, hundreds of thousands of American troops, supplied with the world's most advanced weaponry, sometimes including nuclear arms, are stationed on over sixty-one base complexes in nineteen countries worldwide, using the Department of Defense's narrowest definition of a "major installation"; if one included every kind of installation that houses representatives of the American military, the number would rise to over eight hundred. There are, of course, no Italian air bases on American soil. Such a thought would be ridiculous. Nor, for that matter, are there German, Indonesian, Russian, Greek, or Japanese troops stationed on Italian soil. Italy is, moreover, a close ally of the United States, and no conceivable enemy nation endangers its shores. All this is almost too obvious to state-and so is almost never said. It is simply not a matter for discussion, much less of debate in the land of the last imperial power. Perhaps similar thinking is second nature to any imperium. Perhaps the Romans did not find it strange to have their troops in Gaul, nor the British in South Africa. But what is unspoken is no less real, nor does it lack consequences just because it is not part of any ongoing domestic discussion. ... it is past time for such a discussion to begin, for Americans to consider why we have created an empire-a word from which we shy away-and what the consequences of our imperial stance may be for the rest of the world and for ourselves. Not so long ago, the way we garrisoned the world could be discussed far more openly and comfortably because the explanation seemed to lie at hand-in the very existence of the Soviet Union and of communism. Had the Italian disaster occurred two decades earlier, it would have seemed no less a tragedy, but many Americans would have argued that, given the Cold War, such incidents were an unavoidable cost of protecting democracies like Italy against the menace of Soviet totalitarianism. With the disappearance of any military threat faintly comparable to that posed by the former Soviet Union, such "costs" have become easily avoidable. American military forces could have been withdrawn from Italy, as well as from other foreign bases, long ago. That they were not and that Washington instead is doing everything in its considerable powers to perpetuate Cold War structures, even without the Cold War's justification, places such overseas deployments in a new light. They have become striking evidence, for those who care to look, of an imperial project that the Cold War obscured. The byproducts of this project are likely to build up reservoirs of resentment against all Americans-tourists, students, and businessmen, as well as members of the armed forces-that can have lethal results. For any empire, including an unacknowledged one, there is a kind of balance sheet that builds up over time. Military crimes, accidents, and atrocities make up only one category on the debit side of the balance sheet that the United States has been accumulating, especially since the Cold War ended. What we have freed ourselves of, however, is any genuine consciousness of how we might look to others on this globe. Most Americans are probably unaware of how Washington exercises its global hegemony, since so much of this activity takes place either in relative secrecy or under comforting rubrics. Many may, as a start, find it hard to believe that our place in the world even adds up to an empire. But only when we come to see our country as both profiting from and trapped within the structures of an empire of its own making will it be possible for us to explain many elements of the world that otherwise perplex us. The term "blowback," which officials of the Central Intelligence Agency first invented for their own internal use, is starting to circulate among students of international relations. It refers to the unintended consequences of policies that were kept secret from the American people. What the daily press reports as the malign acts of "terrorists" or "drug lords" or "rogue states" or "illegal arms merchants" often turn out to be blowback from earlier American operations. One man's terrorist is, of course, another man's freedom fighter, and what U.S. officials denounce as unprovoked terrorist attacks on its innocent citizens are often meant as retaliation for previous American imperial actions. Terrorists attack innocent and undefended American targets precisely because American soldiers and sailors firing cruise missiles from ships at sea or sitting in B-52 bombers at extremely high altitudes or supporting brutal and repressive regimes from Washington seem invulnerable. As members of the Defense Science Board wrote in a 1997 report to the undersecretary of defense for acquisition and technology, "Historical data show a strong correlation between U.S. involvement in international situations and an increase in terrorist attacks against the United States. In addition, the military asymmetry that denies nation states the ability to engage in overt attacks against the United States drives the use of transnational actors [that is, terrorists from one country attacking in another]."

#### **Enmity and Anti-Americanism - conflict**

Maher 11 (Richard, Max Weber postdoctoral fellow at the European University Institute and Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Department at Brown University, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World,” Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, p. 53-68)

Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest. As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise to anti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in the missteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one's own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace it with a government much more friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itself when— and under what conditions—military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of the world had a particular animus for George W. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a “war” on terrorism and the division of the world between good and evil. With populations around the world mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen—let alone barely contemplated—such feelings of anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation.

### China

#### Current military posturing will cause escalatory war with China—destroys the economy because of interdependence

**Freeman 12** [Chas Freeman, chairman of Projects International, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs and U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, “The China Bluff”, <http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/the-china-bluff-6561>, February 23, 2012]

Right now, the military-strategic choice we’ve made is clear. We are determined to try to sustain the global supremacy handed to us by Russia’s involuntary default on its Cold War contest with us. In the Asia-Pacific region, this means "full-spectrum dominance" up to China’s twelve-mile limit. In effect, having assumed the mission of defending the global commons against all comers, we have decided to treat the globe beyond the borders of Russia and China as an American sphere of influence in which we hold sway and all others defer to our views of what is and is not permissible.¶ This is a pretty ambitious posture on our part. China’s defense buildup is explicitly designed to counter it. China has made it clear that it will not tolerate the threat to its security represented by a foreign military presence at its gates when these foreign forces are engaged in activities designed to probe Chinese defenses and choreograph a way to penetrate them. There’s no reason to assume that China is any less serious about this than we would be if faced with similarly provocative naval and air operations along our frontiers. So, quite aside from our on-again, off-again mutual posturing over the issue of Taiwan's relationship to the rest of China, we and the Chinese are currently headed for some sort of escalating military confrontation.¶ At the same time, most Americans recognize that our own prosperity is closely linked to continued economic development in China. In recent years, China has been our fastest growing export market. It is also our largest source of manufactured imports, including many of the high-tech items we take pride in having designed but do not make. And we know we have to work with China to address the common problems of mankind.¶ So our future prosperity has come to depend on economic interdependence with a nation we are also setting ourselves up to do battle with. And, at the same time, we hope to cooperate with that nation to assure good global governance. Pardon me if I perceive a contradiction or two in this China policy. It looks to me more like the vector of competing political impulses than the outcome of rational decisionmaking.

#### Current US Hegemonic Pursuit will cause instability in East Asia—causes conflict that implicates the Koreas and Taiwan

**Layne 12** [Christopher Layne, Chair in National Security and Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, “The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline Became Inevitable”, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-western-decline-became-inevitable/256388/?single\_page=true, 4/26/12]

Certainly, the Chinese have not forgotten. Now Beijing aims to dominate its own East and Southeast Asian backyard, just as a rising America sought to dominate the Western Hemisphere a century and a half ago. The United States and China now are competing for supremacy in East and Southeast Asia. Washington has been the incumbent hegemon there since World War II, and many in the American foreign-policy establishment view China's quest for regional hegemony as a threat that must be resisted. This contest for regional dominance is fueling escalating tensions and possibly could lead to war. In geopolitics, two great powers cannot simultaneously be hegemonic in the same region. Unless one of them abandons its aspirations, there is a high probability of hostilities. Flashpoints that could spark a Sino-American conflict include the unstable Korean Peninsula; the disputed status of Taiwan; competition for control of oil and other natural resources; and the burgeoning naval rivalry between the two powers. These rising tensions were underscored by a recent Brookings study by Peking University's Wang Jisi and Kenneth Lieberthal, national-security director for Asia during the Clinton administration, based on their conversations with high-level officials in the American and Chinese governments. Wang found that underneath the visage of "mutual cooperation" that both countries project, the Chinese believe they are likely to replace the United States as the world's leading power but Washington is working to prevent such a rise. Similarly, Lieberthal related that many American officials believe their Chinese counterparts see the U.S.-Chinese relationship in terms of a zero-sum game in the struggle for global hegemony.

### Allied Dependence

#### **Multipolarity causes reinforced security relationships**

Maher 11 (Richard, Max Weber postdoctoral fellow at the European University Institute and Visiting Lecturer in the Political Science Department at Brown University, Winter 2011, “The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World,” Orbis, Vol. 55, No. 1, p. 53-68)

Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that America's unprecedented power decreases its allies’ dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America's allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy. A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could change that, making these allies more dependent on the United States for their security. Russia's reemergence could unnerve America's European allies, just as China's continued ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades. New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create incentives for America's allies to reduce the disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce their security relationships with the United States.

## Transition—Offshore Balancing

### Generic

#### It is time to come to grips with the fact that the US exceptionalism is wrong—American relative power is declining and it will cause international instability—but off-shore balancing now solves the benefits of heg and the impact to the transition

**Layne 12** [Christopher Layne, Chair in National Security and Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, “The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline Became Inevitable”, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-western-decline-became-inevitable/256388/?single\_page=true, 4/26/12]

As U.S. power wanes over the next decade or so, the United States will find itself increasingly challenged in discharging these hegemonic tasks. This could have profound implications for international politics. The erosion of Pax Britannica in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was an important cause of World War I. During the interwar years, no great power exercised geopolitical or economic leadership, and this proved to be a major cause of the Great Depression and its consequences, including the fragmentation of the international economy into regional trade blocs and the beggar-thy-neighbor economic nationalism that spilled over into the geopolitical rivalries of the 1930s. This, in turn, contributed greatly to World War II. The unwinding of Pax Americana could have similar consequences. Since no great power, including China, is likely to supplant the United States as a true global hegemon, the world could see a serious fragmentation of power. This could spawn pockets of instability around the world and even general global instability. The United States has a legacy commitment to global stability, and that poses a particular challenge to the waning hegemon as it seeks to fulfill its commitment with dwindling resources. The fundamental challenge for the United States as it faces the future is closing the "Lippmann gap," named for journalist Walter Lippmann. This means bringing America's commitments into balance with the resources available to support them while creating a surplus of power in reserve. To do this, the country will need to establish new strategic priorities and accept the inevitability that some commitments will need to be reduced because it no longer can afford them. These national imperatives will force the United States to craft some kind of foreign-policy approach that falls under the rubric of "offshore balancing"--directing American power and influence toward maintaining a balance of power in key strategic regions of the world. This concept--first articulated by this writer in a 1997 article in the journal International Security--has gained increasing attention over the past decade or so as other prominent geopolitical scholars, including John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, Robert Pape, Barry Posen and Andrew Bacevich, have embraced this approach. Although there are shades of difference among proponents of offshore balancing in terms of how they define the strategy, all of their formulations share core concepts in common. First, it assumes the United States will have to reduce its presence in some regions and develop commitment priorities. Europe and the Middle East are viewed as less important than they once were, with East Asia rising in strategic concern. Second, as the United States scales back its military presence abroad, other states need to step up to the challenge of maintaining stability in key regions. Offshore balancing, thus, is a strategy of devolving security responsibilities to others. Its goal is burden shifting, not burden sharing. Only when the United States makes clear that it will do less--in Europe, for example--will others do more to foster stability in their own regions. Third, the concept relies on naval and air power while eschewing land power as much as possible. This is designed to maximize America's comparative strategic advantages--standoff, precision-strike weapons; command-and-control capabilities; and superiority in intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance. After all, fighting land wars in Eurasia is not what the United States does best. Fourth, the concept avoids Wilsonian crusades in foreign policy, "nation-building" initiatives and imperial impulses. Not only does Washington have a long record of failure in such adventures, but they are also expensive. In an age of domestic austerity, the United States cannot afford the luxury of participating in overseas engagements that contribute little to its security and can actually pose added security problems. Finally, offshore balancing would reduce the heavy American geopolitical footprint caused by U.S. boots on the ground in the Middle East--the backlash effect of which is to fuel Islamic extremism. An over-the-horizon U.S. military posture in the region thus would reduce the terrorist threat while still safeguarding the flow of Persian Gulf oil. During the next two decades, the United States will face some difficult choices between bad outcomes and worse ones. But such decisions could determine whether America will manage a graceful decline that conserves as much power and global stability as possible. A more ominous possibility is a precipitous power collapse that reduces U.S. global influence dramatically. In any event, Americans will have to adjust to the new order, accepting the loss of some elements of national life they had taken for granted. In an age of austerity, national resources will be limited, and competition for them will be intense. If the country wants to do more at home, it will have to do less abroad. It may have to choose between attempting to preserve American hegemony or repairing the U.S. economy and maintaining the country's social safety net. The Constellation of world power is changing, and U.S. grand strategy will have to change with it. American elites must come to grips with the fact that the West does not enjoy a predestined supremacy in international politics that is locked into the future for an indeterminate period of time. The Euro-Atlantic world had a long run of global dominance, but it is coming to an end. The future is more likely to be shaped by the East. At the same time, Pax Americana also is winding down. The United States can manage this relative decline effectively over the next couple of decades only if it first acknowledges the fundamental reality of decline. The problem is that many Americans, particularly among the elites, have embraced the notion of American exceptionalism with such fervor that they can't discern the world transformation occurring before their eyes.

### Magnitude Multiplier

#### The importance of managing the transition is critical—it is no simple intracivilizational power shift

**Layne 12** [Christopher Layne, Chair in National Security and Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, “The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline Became Inevitable”, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-western-decline-became-inevitable/256388/?single\_page=true, 4/26/12]

These profound developments raise big questions about where the world is headed and America's role in the transition and beyond. Managing the transition will be the paramount strategic challenge for the United States over the next two decades. In thinking about where we might be headed, it is helpful to take a look backward--not just over the past seventy years but far back into the past. That is because the transition in progress represents more than just the end of the post-1945 era of American global dominance. It also represents the end of the era of Western dominance over world events that began roughly 500 years ago. During this half millennium of world history, the West's global position remained secure, and most big, global developments were represented by intracivilizational power shifts. Now, however, as the international system's economic and geopolitical center of gravity migrates from the Euro-Atlantic world to Asia, we are seeing the beginnings of an intercivilizational power shift. The significance of this development cannot be overemphasized.

### AT: Causes Heg Collapse

#### Offshore balance doesn’t preclude power projection—the US still benefit

**Rubinovitz 12** [Ziv Rubinovitz, Post-doctoral Fellow at the Davis Institute for International Relations, e 22nd IPSA World Congress, “The US vs. the East Asian rising powers: Can the US stay on top?”, <http://rc41.ipsa.org/public/Madrid_2012/rubinovitz.pdf>, July 12, 2012]

Moreover, the U.S. is still – and will remain in the foreseeable future – the naval ¶ superpower with the most powerful navy that has the best power-projection capabilities. It ¶ can afford to leave the continent and become an offshore balancer. True, it will lose some of ¶ its influence, but it can preserve its power on the sea and project it restrictedly whenever ¶ needed. So, very briefly, the U.S. has a much wider room for maneuver than is presumed, and ¶ with the most powerful military with no parallel in the foreseeable future, the U.S. still has a ¶ wide spectrum of policies it can use, hence it is in the best position for the coming hegemonic ¶ competition.

#### Its all about the transition—American can still retain absolute power

**Layne 12** [Christopher Layne, Chair in National Security and Associate Professor at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, “The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline Became Inevitable”, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-western-decline-became-inevitable/256388/?single\_page=true, 4/26/12]

This does not mean the United States will go the way of Great Britain during the first half of the twentieth century. As Harvard's Stephen Walt wrote in this magazine last year, it is more accurate to say the "American Era" is nearing its end. For now, and for some time to come, the United States will remain primus inter pares--the strongest of the major world powers--though it is uncertain whether it can maintain that position over the next twenty years. Regardless, America's power and influence over the international political system will diminish markedly from what it was at the apogee of Pax Americana. That was the Old Order, forged through the momentous events of World War I, the Great Depression and World War II. Now that Old Order of nearly seven decades' duration is fading from the scene. It is natural that U.S. leaders would want to deny it--or feel they must finesse it when talking to the American people. But the real questions for America and its leaders are: What will replace the Old Order? How can Washington protect its interests in the new global era? And how much international disruption will attend the transition from the old to the new?

## Transition—Ikenberry

### Generic

#### Primacy is inevitable but unipolarity isn’t—markets and democracy have spread, revolutionary states have been pushed off the global stage, and cooperation is increasing globally—a shift to burdensharing is critical

Ikenberry 11 [May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, G. John, PhD, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67730/g-john-ikenberry/the-future-of-the-liberal-world-order?page=show>]

**Pronouncements of American decline miss the real transformation under way today. What is occurring is not American decline but a dynamic process in which other states are catching up and growing more connected**. **In an open and rule-based international order, this is what happens.** **If the architects of the postwar** liberal **order** **were alive** to see today's system, **they would think that their vision had succeeded beyond their wildest dreams. Markets and democracy have spread. Societies outside the West are trading and growing. The United States has more alliance partners** today than it did during the Cold War. **Rival hegemonic states with revisionist and illiberal agendas have been pushed off the global stage**. It is difficult to read these world-historical developments as a story of American decline and liberal unraveling. In a way, however, the liberal international order has sown the seeds of its own discontent, since, paradoxically, the challenges facing it now -- the rise of non-Western states and new transnational threats -- are artifacts of its success. But **the solutions to** these **problems -- integrating rising powers and tackling problems cooperatively -- will lead the order's old guardians and new stakeholders to an agenda of renewal.** **The coming divide in world politics will not be between the United States** (and the West) **and the** non-Western **rising states. Rather, the struggle will be between those who want to renew and expand today's system of multilateral governance arrangements and those who want to move to a less cooperative order** built on spheres of influence. These fault lines do not map onto geography, nor do they split the West and the non-West. There are passionate champions of the UN, the WTO, and a rule-based international order in Asia, and there are isolationist, protectionist, and anti-internationalist factions in the West. **The liberal international order has succeeded over the decades because its rules and institutions have not just enshrined open trade and free markets but also provided tools for governments to manage economic and security interdependence. The agenda for the renewal** of the liberal international order **should be driven by this same imperative:** to reinforce the capacities of national governments to govern and achieve their economic and security goals. **As the hegemonic organization of the liberal international order slowly gives way, more states will have authority and status.** But **this will still be a world that the United States wants to inhabit.** **A wider array of states will share the burdens of global economic and political governance,** and with its worldwide system of alliances, **the United States will remain at the center of the global system.** Rising states do not just grow more powerful on the global stage; they grow more powerful within their regions, and this creates its own set of worries and insecurities -- which is why states will continue to look to Washington for security and partnership. In this new age of international order, **the United States will not be able to rule. But it can still lead.**

#### The rise of other powers doesn’t mean rampant nationalist competition—there is no competition for the liberal international order

Ikenberry 11 (May/June issue of Foreign Affairs, G. John, PhD, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, “The Future of the Liberal World Order,” <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67730/g-john-ikenberry/the-future-of-the-liberal-world-order?page=show>)

For all these reasons, **many** observers **have concluded that world politics is experiencing not just a changing of the guard but also a transition in the ideas and principles that underlie the global order.** The journalist Gideon Rachman, for example, says that a cluster of liberal internationalist ideas -- such as faith in democratization, confidence in free markets, and the acceptability of U.S. military power -- are all being called into question. **According to this worldview, the future of international order will be shaped above all by China,** which will use its growing power and wealth to push world politics in an illiberal direction. Pointing out that China and other non-Western states have weathered the recent financial crisis better than their Western counterparts, **pessimists argue that an authoritarian capitalist alternative to Western neoliberal ideas has already emerged.** According to the scholar Stefan Halper, **emerging-market states "are learning to combine market economics with traditional autocratic or semiautocratic politics in a process that signals an intellectual rejection of the Western economic model."** Today's international order is not really American or Western--even if it initially appeared that way. **But this panicked narrative misses a deeper reality: although the United States' position in the global system is changing, the liberal international order is alive and well.** **The struggle** over international order today **is not about fundamental principles**. China and other **emerging great powers do not want to contest the basic rules and principles** of the liberal international order; **they wish to gain more authority and leadership within it.** Indeed, **today's power transition represents not the defeat of the liberal order but its ultimate ascendance. Brazil, China, and India have all become more prosperous and capable by operating inside the existing international order** -- benefiting from its rules, practices, and institutions, including the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the newly organized G-20. **Their economic success and growing influence are tied to the liberal internationalist organization of world politics, and they have deep interests in preserving that system.** In the meantime, **alternatives to an open and rule-based order have yet to crystallize.** **Even though the last decade has brought remarkable upheavals in the global system** -- the emergence of new powers, bitter disputes among Western allies over the United States' unipolar ambitions, and a global financial crisis and recession -- **the liberal international order has no competitors**. On the contrary, the rise of non-Western powers and the growth of economic and security interdependence are creating new constituencies for it. **To be sure, as wealth and power become less concentrated in the United States' hands, the country will be less able to shape world politics. But the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive.** Indeed, now may be the best time for the United States and its democratic partners to update the liberal order for a new era, ensuring that it continues to provide the benefits of security and prosperity that it has provided since the middle of the twentieth century.

### Solves Sustainability

#### American Primacy increasing now—but embracing multipolarity helps sustain it

Pelka 12 [[Zach Pelka](http://www.theheraldonthehill.com/uncategorized/2011/09/01/zach-pelka/), Herald on the Hill, “American Hegemony and Unipolarity”, <http://www.theheraldonthehill.com/editorials/2012/04/11/american-hegemony-and-unipolarity/>, April 11, 2012]

Differing from the cultural aspects of their hegemonic campaign, the United States has begun its global outreach to become a military hegemon with broad geographical reach, with troops in all but 46 countries across the globe. As the United States military forces have slowly entered nearly every country in the world, the country’s international influence has tremendously grown. From a focus on the democratization of states during the Cold War to the modern attempt at global domination, the United States has slowly shifted to a focus on military expansion, while attempting to limit the outreach of Communism and rogue states such as Cuba, Iran, and North Korea. The United States’ domestic policy on unipolarity is best defined by Charles Krauthammer as “favoring internationalism rather than isolationism,” which is exactly what George Washington warned about in his farewell address. As psychological worries about slipping American power increase, American hegemony has created increase global militarization, which has led to rejection of isolationist theories. Since the birth of the United States in 1776, the United States had grown from a regional hegemon in North America, to the standard bearer in global hegemony following World War II. Early in the country’s history, the Americans began their regional hegemony by revolting against the British colonization, while expanding into Native American territories. According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, a hegemon is a state with a preponderant influence or authority over others. This being said, a hegemon on the international level is a state or country that controls a given region on a multitude of levels. Following the United States victories in World War I, the United States began its global hegemonic reign, as Woodrow Wilson called the Paris 1919 Peace Conference, which realigned the new world, respecting its new position, yet failing to prevent further war. Attempting to remain a regional hegemon, the United States leaders stayed out of World War II until December 1941, because they hoped to achieve a relative gain in the international world, compared to the European nations that were being strongly depleted by war. Only entering once attacked on its own soil, the United States showed a commitment to gaining an advantage over previously powerful European nations. Following World War II, the United States became the world’s strongest power, shown through the implementation of the Marshall Plan that rebuilt Europe. Expanding on its hegemony by setting up a metaphorical “containment wall” of Communism, the United States hoped to expand Western democracy. Taking part in a number of proxy wars, the United States influenced many less powerful countries, while spreading its hegemonic power across the globe. With numerous international issues occurring that have put in the United States in shaky terms internationally such as the Syrian or Iranian conflicts, it is in the United States best interest to step back and allow China, Russia, India, and Brazil to assume some of the United States international responsibilities, which could in turn help the domestic economy. Changing hegemonic strategies, the United States has shifted mainly because it was the only legitimate hegemon once the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. As no other country rivaled the United States for global power, policy makers changed foreign policies to focus on expanding the United States’ global reach. With no other country threatening the United States, foreign affairs were more aggressive, as no other countries were an immediate threat to America’s campaign. In Realist terms, the United States hegemonic affairs were based on precautions on maintaining power, while further expanding its global reach. Through measures such as protecting Taiwan or allying with Israel, the United States has set up allies around the world as a precautionary action in case of international issues. With a pivotal geographical location, Taiwan prevents China from extending its sea boundaries, and as an ally of the United States, is in a perfect location for preventative actions against China. In summation, the transition to a sole hegemon has forced the United States to focus on maintaining power, rather than the previous foreign policy that was focused on expansion. Consequently, the necessary responsibilities the United States have had to uphold have hindered economic prosperity, while other nations such as China that were not as internationally responsible were able to flourish economically. Unable to explain how unipolarity is prevalent in today’s society, modern Realist thinkers are stumped on how the United States has remained the sole hegemon. Based on this uncertainty, Realist thinkers support bipolarity as the most stable international system. Consequently, many Realist supporters claim that the Cold War was far safer than today’s society because with two equivalent powers, the system is equal. In a unipolar world, one country controls the international system, which often leads to revolution and wars against that one country. The idea of Realism in international relations terms derives mainly from prominent political thinkers John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt, and Hans Morgenthau. Established on the premise that all states will pursue their own interests in the chase for hegemony to create stability and prosperity, Realism differentiates itself with other IR theories such as Constructivism, and Liberalism because of the focus on national greed, rather than good intentions. A unipolar world cannot be stable unless the hegemon is far more powerful than any other state, because in a Realist view, all countries will attempt to overthrow the hegemon. Throughout history, once a hegemon has been established, it is slowly dethroned as another country or countries take over. This is a cyclical process in which countries attempt to become the sole hegemon, such as Germany during World War II, or the Holy Roman Empire. As the hegemon’s power increases, surrounding states act together against the state, which causes instability in the international world. In many thinkers’ minds, unipolarity is dangerous because any false movement by American policy makers could create international outrage. Because of the United States’ sole hegemony, many countries blame the United States for international problems, while spreading animosity towards the international hegemon (United States).

#### Absolute Power is inevitable but adapting to the emerging multipolar system is critical—no cooperation makes war, dissent, and economic overstretch inevitable—only our evidence is supported by realism

Pelka 12 [[Zach Pelka](http://www.theheraldonthehill.com/uncategorized/2011/09/01/zach-pelka/), Herald on the Hill, “American Hegemony and Unipolarity”, <http://www.theheraldonthehill.com/editorials/2012/04/11/american-hegemony-and-unipolarity/>, April 11, 2012]

Based on the emerging nations of the new era, the United States has to step back as the world hegemon, and embrace being a member of a multipolar system. As China, India, and Russia grow, the United States needs to slowly allow these countries to take the reins in international relations. Hurting economically, the United States would benefit from a multipolar system in which these three countries, and potentially more, help to establish the world. With less pressure to solve international issues, the United States can focus on domestic issues, while still maintaining a hegemonic role in the multipolar world. Known for his offensive Realist theory, John Mearsheimer embraces multipolarity as the most stable international system, while explaining that unipolarity causes countries to attempt to overthrow the hegemon, which forces international problems. Embracing the gradual transition to multipolarity, the United States should retain its position as the most powerful nation. As the United States shares responsibilities with other hegemons, the world will experience absolute gain, rather than the present relative gain many countries are experiencing, because of the attempt to overthrow the United States. Hopefully allying with these potential hegemonic actors, the United States and these other countries can work together, while creating a more stable world. When these other countries gain power on the hegemonic level, the political world becomes far more stable, because political leaders are not focused on overthrowing the United States, but are rather focused on the absolute gain of their respective nations. By taking a less aggressive stance in foreign policies, the United States will be embraced by more countries, and could possibly be a more influential in the international world. Through the alleviation of power, the United States will be under less pressure to help surrounding nations, while as a less powerful country, the United States could focus more on domestic issues such as the economy or social issues. As the country slowly rebuilds, the United States will still be in a powerful position, and could possibly retain the position of the sole hegemon if that is what future politicians want. Currently with troops in 156 countries, the United States will remain in a dominant position militarily even if other countries arise to make a multipolar system. Because of its huge military advantage, the United States can step back politically in world affairs, while still being extremely influential globally. Arguably a good thing, the shear size of the United States army has been created mainly out of insecurity and fear, which has arguably hurt the US’s power, hurt the domestic economy, and led to foreign dissent. Spending less money on retaining global hegemony, the United States would be able to ensure the coming generations a successful future, while also decreasing the chance of a future war. By allowing the Chinese and Russians to step forward as a hegemon, the United States will most likely avoid war with either of these rising powers, while hopefully creating a democratic alliance. Allowing the Chinese to rise to the hegemonic level, the United States may be able to convince China to adapt to Western culture and begin to democratize. All in all, stepping back into a multipolar system makes sense economically for the United States, with less responsibility and pressure internationally, the US can focus on domestic issues. Also, because of the decline in world power, the United States may no longer be seen as the international bully, but rather may be seen as a peaceful democratic nation.

### No Transition Wars

#### Power shifts incentivize cooperation—Kantian peace is more likely than Hobbesian conflict

**Herd 11** [Graeme P. Herd, Head of the International Security Programme and Co-Director of the International Training Course in Security Policy at the GCSP accredited by the University of Geneva,“The Global Puzzle: Order in an Age of Primacy, Power-Shifts and Interdependence”, Geneva Papers Research Series, 2011]

However, alongside power-shifts, deepening economic, demographic, environmental¶ and energy interdependence gathers pace. This process is revolutionary,¶ the speed and intensity akin to war-time rate of change experienced between¶ 1940-1945. Niall Fergusson has characterized the global financial crisis as an “axis¶ of upheaval”, with unpredictable and unintended geopolitical consequences, as it¶ coincides with the depletion of non-renewable energy sources, a tipping point for¶ global climate change and turbulence associated with a declining world hegemon¶ – the US.37 The ability of states to pursue multiple interlocking goals is severely¶ tested. For example, states are committed to eradicate poverty through economic¶ growth. As a result, it is estimated that global energy demands will increase 45%¶ by 2050 (with demand driven primarily by fast-growing middle classes in China¶ and India). How then to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 50% in this period?38¶ What are the strategic effects of growing interdependence? The economy-environment-¶ energy nexus, the rise of non-state actors – whether organized crime or¶ terroristic in nature, and systems collapse triggered by systemic shocks present¶ two hard truths: all states are threatened; no single state can address them alone.¶ This dynamic suggests the emergence of a world order driven by a cooperative¶ imperative as reciprocal cooperation and collective action constitutes a rational¶ response to shared threats. A Kantian world order paradigm presents itself, one in¶ which the recognition of mutual indispensability creates incentives for peace with¶ a global security community. The 19 th century British politician Richard Cobden,¶ following Adam Smith, contended that market forces act in the moral world: “the¶ principle of gravitation in the universe — drawing men together and thrusting¶ aside the antagonism of race, and creed, and language.”39 The “capitalist peace”¶ thesis notes an “indirect link running from free trade or economic openness to¶ prosperity and democracy and ultimately to the democratic peace” and that “trade¶ and economic interdependence by themselves reduce the risk of conflict.”40 The¶ West’s strategic engagement with China is shaped by the assumption that its¶ powerful market knowledge economy, fuelled by an information revolution and¶ facilitated by the free flow of ideas will raise expectations of political liberalization¶ and democracy, and so buttress China’s peaceful rise.

## Transition—Retrenchment

### Generic

#### Relative decline sustains alliances and results in de-escalation

MacDonald & Parent 11 [Paul MacDonald, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College, Joseph Parent, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami, “Graceful Decline?,” International Security, Pg. 41-43, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00034, Spring 2011]

Contrary to these predictions, our analysis suggests some grounds for optimism. Based on the historical track record of great powers facing acute relative decline, the United States should be able to retrench in the coming decades. In the next few years, the United States is ripe to overhaul its military, shift burdens to its allies, and work to decrease costly international commitments. It is likely to initiate and become embroiled in fewer militarized disputes than the average great power and to settle these disputes more amicably. Some might view this prospect with apprehension, fearing the steady erosion of U.S. credibility. Yet our analysis suggests that retrenchment need not signal weakness. Holding on to exposed and expensive commitments simply for the sake of one’s reputation is a greater geopolitical gamble than withdrawing to cheaper, more defensible frontiers. Some observers might dispute our conclusions, arguing that hegemonic transitions are more conºict prone than other moments of acute relative decline. We counter that there are deductive and empirical reasons to doubt this argument. Theoretically, hegemonic powers should actually find it easier to manage acute relative decline. Fallen hegemons still have formidable capability, which threatens grave harm to any state that tries to cross them. Further, they are no longer the top target for balancing coalitions, and recovering hegemons may be influential because they can play a pivotal role in alliance formation. In addition, hegemonic powers, almost by definition, possess more extensive overseas commitments; they should be able to more readily identify and eliminate extraneous burdens without exposing vulnerabilities or exciting domestic populations. We believe the empirical record supports these conclusions. In particular, periods of hegemonic transition do not appear more conflict prone than those of acute decline. The last reversal at the pinnacle of power was the AngloAmerican transition, which took place around 1872 and was resolved without armed confrontation. The tenor of that transition may have been influenced by a number of factors: both states were democratic maritime empires, the United States was slowly emerging from the Civil War, and Great Britain could likely coast on a large lead in domestic capital stock. Although China and the United States differ in regime type, similar factors may work to cushion the impending Sino-American transition. Both are large, relatively secure continental great powers, a fact that mitigates potential geopolitical competition. 93 China faces a variety of domestic political challenges, including strains among rival regions, which may complicate its ability to sustain its economic performance or engage in foreign policy adventurism. 94 Most important, the United States is not in free fall. Extrapolating the data into the future, we anticipate the United States will experience a “moderate” decline, losing from 2 to 4 percent of its share of great power GDP in the five years after being surpassed by China sometime in the next decade or two. 95 Given the relatively gradual rate of U.S. decline relative to China, the incentives for either side to run risks by courting conflict are minimal. The United States would still possess upwards of a third of the share of great power GDP, and would have little to gain from provoking a crisis over a peripheral issue. Conversely, China has few incentives to exploit U.S. weakness. 96 Given the importance of the U.S. market to the Chinese economy, in addition to the critical role played by the dollar as a global reserve currency, it is unclear how Beijing could hope to consolidate or expand its increasingly advantageous position through direct confrontation. In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of retrenchment could reap potential beneªts. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S. troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul. 97 U.S. moderation on Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conºict. 98 Moreover, Washington’s support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S. prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order. 99 A policy of gradual retrenchment need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold additional territory. 100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk unnecessary clashes. 101

### Solves Sustainability

#### Heg is Unsustainable—partisanship, economy, public morale, overstretch—only Retrenchment solves

**Kupchan 12** [Charles Kupchan, Ph.D Professor of international affairs at Georgetown University, Council on Foreign Relations, Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow, “Grand Strategy: The Four Pillars of the Future”, <http://www.democracyjournal.org/23/grand-strategy-the-four-pillars-of-the-future.php?page=all>, Democracy Issue #23, Winter 2012]

Following World War II, a bipartisan foreign policy consensus emerged, which, although sorely tested by the Vietnam War, continued through the end of the Cold War. But that consensus has since been lost. **Congressional bipartisanship on foreign policy has sunk to lows not seen since the 1930s. Partisan confrontation on** **issues ranging from defense spending** to global warming **means that party often gets put before nation**, **that diplomatic inconstancy follows power shifts in Washington, and that the United States is poised to respond to global change with political stalemate** **rather than timely strategic adjustment**. The progressive response to the collapse of bipartisan cooperation on matters of national security should be two-fold. First, Democrats should follow President Obama’s lead and continue efforts to restore the postwar tradition of stopping partisan politics at water’s edge. A combination of ideology and party discipline encourages Republicans to make this task singularly difficult, giving progressives legitimate reason to question the merits of reaching across the aisle. But Democrats have little choice; although the president is commander-in-chief, many aspects of statecraft—resources for diplomacy and defense, treaties, the sustained use of force, trade deals—require congressional consent. Like it or not, progressives must continue the fight to rebuild consensus behind America’s role in the world. **Second, renewing the nation’s economic health is vital to advancing its national security. Fiscal solvency, industrial capacity, and technological prowess are essential ingredients of military primacy**. So too is broadly shared prosperity a precondition for political solvency. The bipartisan consensus that emerged after World War II rested on the rising economy’s dampening effect on partisan cleavages. **Today, unemployment, stagnating wages, and growing inequality are all contributing to ideological polarization**. Accordingly, progressives should be unequivocal in linking American leadership in the world to a responsible domestic program of spending cuts, revenue increases, and strategic investment in infrastructure and jobs. **Reviving economic growth, reducing unemployment and income inequality, improving education—these are prerequisites for rebuilding the economic base on which national power rests** and restoring the political consensus needed to guide U.S. statecraft. The first first principle of a progressive agenda is that political and economic renewal at home is the indispensable foundation for strength abroad. Conservatives do not offer a credible alternative to this first plank of a progressive agenda. They not only fail to appreciate the vital link between bipartisanship and national security but deliberately seek to undermine political consensus. President George W. Bush sought to exploit, not repair, political divides; his advisers explicitly advocated polarizing policies that catered to the Republican base, not the moderate center. Since Obama entered office, Republicans have consistently sought to obstruct his foreign policies—regardless of the substantive merits. Many Republicans opposed his effective reconfiguration of European missile defense, charged that his successful reset with Russia was a sellout, and criticized his calibrated approach to participating in NATO’s intervention in Libya. Conservatives also fail to offer a realistic program for economic renewal. They focus only on reductions in government spending and ignore the urgent need for new revenue and public investment. Additionally, their refusal to raise taxes on high earners demonstrates their disregard for economic inequality and its contribution to the fracturing of America’s political center. America’s strength on the world stage depends on a social cohesion borne of shared prosperity. Through shortsighted economic policies, conservatives are making the nation divided at home and weak abroad. Balancing Means and Ends **A progressive grand strategy must help guide the United States from its current state of overextension toward a new balance between its foreign policy ends and its economic and political means**. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the scope of America’s commitment has far outstripped the interests at stake. **The Iraq War, as unnecessary as it has been expensive, has drained the nation’s coffers and ground down the U.S. military**. In Afghanistan, it makes little sense for the United States to spend more than $100 billion per year in a nation whose annual GDP is roughly $14 billion, or for 100,000 U.S. troops to be in the fight when Al Qaeda’s operational capability in that country has been largely dismantled. An open-ended strategy of counterinsurgency should give way to a much smaller U.S. mission focused on counterterrorism. **At the same time that U.S. commitments have outrun interests, America’s resources for projecting power abroad are also contracting**. **Funding for the State Department, including for foreign assistance, is on the chopping block**. **The Pentagon is entering an era of lean times. And the U.S. public**—which should not determine foreign policy, but should certainly inform it—**is turning inward; a recent Pew survey found that 46 percent of Americans believe the country “should mind its own business” and 76 percent want us to “concentrate more on our own national problems” rather than on challenges far afield, by historical standards very high measures of isolationist sentiment**. **Taken together, these facts necessitate that the country scale back its international commitments to bring them into line with diminishing means. In** the first instance, strategic retrenchment requires completing the exit from Iraq and ensuring the expeditious drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan to minimum levels. It also means limiting the scope of U.S. involvement in other, less-than-vital military missions, as Obama has successfully done in Libya. That operation similarly demonstrated the merits of greater American reliance on allies; France, Britain, and other European members of NATO carried their fair share. Around the globe, Washington should look to partners—EU members, Turkey, the Gulf sheikdoms, Japan, South Korea, Australia, Brazil—to shoulder heavier military burdens and help manage local crises. **Greater reliance on regional organizations also holds the promise of a more equitable distribution of responsibility. With American encouragement and assistance, groupings such as the EU, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the African Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations can be more effective contributors to security in their own regions**. Progressives must also not shy away from arguing forcefully that U.S. foreign policy has been over-militarized since 9/11. America’s military primacy is a precious national asset, but **hard power has its limits. As has been made painfully clear in Iraq and Afghanistan, force can be very effective at punishing adversaries**—but it is a blunt instrument when it comes to securing desired political outcomes. Accordingly, **the United States needs to put greater emphasis on diplomacy, preventive action, development assistance, and trade when dealing with troubled regions.** **The United States of course must guard against doing too little**. Especially in the Persian Gulf and East Asia, **retrenchment must be accompanied by words and deeds that reassure allies of America’s staying power.** Moreover, there is no substitute for the use of force in dealing with imminent threats. Only through relentless military pursuit has the United States succeeded in eliminating numerous leaders of Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. In the aftermath of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States needs to refurbish its armed forces and remain ready for the full spectrum of potential missions.

#### Guarantees the long-term benefits of hegemony.

Kirss 12 (Alex Verschoor, B.A. in Political Science, Religion, and Sociology International Policy Digest-“Isolation and Hegemony: A New Approach for American Foreign Policy”http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/04/23/isolation-and-hegemony-a-new-approach-for-american-foreign-policy/ 4-23-12)

In modern foreign policy the United States faces a complicated irony: in a bid to ensure national security and maintain global primacy the U.S. spends a large quantity of blood and treasure on interventionist policies that may actually compromise national security and the future of American hegemony. The culmination of these exercises in grandiose foreign policy has been the invasion and occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, at the combined cost of between three and four trillion dollars. While it is possible to argue that the invasions have been successful in preventing further terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland, such a counterfactual proposition is difficult to prove. What is clear, however, is that such expenditures are unsustainable given a national debt of over $15 trillion. As the country debates the potential for military action in the Middle East in both Syria and Iran the necessity of a levelheaded understanding of the costs of such interventions, and their potentially fatal consequences for American standing in the world, cannot be overstated. Given the costs of large-scale foreign interventions, and the disproportionate share of the funding of organizations such as NATO and the United Nations that the United States carries, it is readily apparent that an isolationist foreign policy would present a prudent fiscal alternative to the current state of affairs. Given the historical and ideological connotations associated with the term “isolationism” it is important to clarify its intended meaning here. By “isolationism” I am advocating for a steady devolvement from foreign commitments and military involvements while maintaining economic and diplomatic ties, as well as overall U.S. military might, in order to preserve the long-term future of American hegemony. Here it might be argued that the concepts of isolationism and hegemony are antithetical. It would appear impossible to be both isolationist and hegemonic. At the same time, however, nothing could be further from the case.

#### **Chinese hegemony solves relations and results in US influence**

Kirss 2k12 (Alex Verschoor, B.A. in Political Science, Religion, and Sociology International Policy Digest-“Isolation and Hegemony: A New Approach for American Foreign Policy”http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2012/04/23/isolation-and-hegemony-a-new-approach-for-american-foreign-policy/ 4-23-12)

A brief period of apparent Chinese “hegemony” will do wonders for U.S. relations worldwide, as it hastens the process of forgetting past U.S. interventions while simultaneously providing a profoundly negative example of what hegemony will look like. Any form of Chinese hegemony will inevitably prove more detrimental to other nations than U.S. hegemony due to the relative lack of clear moral purpose and the fact that domestically the Chinese government has proven itself willing to be authoritarian and ruthless in ways that the U.S. is not. Mapped onto the international community, states will find Chinese “hegemony” to be even more burdensome and oppressive, leading them to direct their animosity, and hatred, against China rather than the U.S. Apparent Chinese “hegemony” is therefore not something that needs to be feared. It will ultimately prove as detrimental to China as an interventionist foreign policy has proven to the United States. As well, it will not prove a greater security threat to the United States. Devolving from foreign entanglements and interventions, as stated earlier, will allow for the U.S. military to refocus and reorganize in a way that will strengthen its ability to fight another potential hegemon, not weaken it. Isolationism will not mean a weakening of U.S. military might, which will remain strong enough to fight off any potential new challenges to homeland security.

## Misc

### AT Brooks & Wohlforth

#### Wohlforth is a fool – Unipolarity causes conflict, prolif and counter-balancing

Monteiro 11 (Nuno, Professor of Political Science at Yale University Monteiro is a research fellow at Yale’s Whitney and Betty MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies and a member of the Scientific Council of the Portuguese International Relations Institute (IPRI), Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful, http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00064)

This article has laid out a theory of unipolarity that accounts for how a unipolar structure of the international system provides signiªcant incentives for conºict. In doing so, my argument corrects an important problem with extant research on unipolarity—the absence of scholarship questioning William Wohlforth’s view that a unipolar world is peaceful. In this respect, Wohlforth’s words ring as true of extant scholarship today as they did in 1999: “When balance-of-power theorists argue that the post–Cold War world is headed toward conºict, they are not claiming that unipolarity causes conºict. Rather, they are claiming that unipolarity leads quickly to bi- or multipolarity. It is not unipolarity’s peace but its durability that is in dispute.” 112 Not anymoreIt is not that the core of Wohlforth’s widely shared argument is wrong, however: great power conºict is impossible in a unipolar world. Rather, his claim that unipolarity is peaceful has two important limitations. First, it focuses on great powers. But because unipolarity prevents the aggregation of conºicts involving major and minor powers into conºict between great powers, scholars must look beyond great power interactions when analyzing the structural incentives for war. Second, Wohlforth assumes that the unipole’s only reasonable strategic option is defensive dominance. But given that unipolarity provides the unipole with ample room for deªning its foreign policy, offensive dominance and disengagement are equally plausible strategies. This requires a look at how these two additional strategies facilitate conºict. After correcting for these two limitations, it becomes clear that unipolarity possesses much potential for conºict. Contrary to what Wohlforth argued, unipolarity is not a system in which the unipole is spared from any conºicts and major powers become involved only in peripheral wars. Instead, a unipolar system is one that provides incentives for recurrent wars between the sole great power and recalcitrant minor powers, as well as occasional wars among major and minor powers. That is the central prediction of my theory. To be sure, the unique historical character of the current unipolar era makes the task of building a general theory of unipolarity difªcult. Particularly, it requires great care in distinguishing between those features of the post–Cold War world that are intrinsic to a unipolar system and those that stem from speciªc aspects of contemporary international politics. Two points deserve mention. First, my theory of conºict in unipolarity is robust to changes in military technology. Still, some such changes would mean the end of unipolarity. At one end of the scale, some scholars argue that the widespread possession of equalizing technologies such as nuclear weapons would turn all minor powers into major powers and decrease the use of the unipole’s power-projection capabilities in ways that might invalidate the label of unipolarity. 113 At the other end of the scale, should the unipole develop a splendid ªrst-strike capability against all other states—an unlikely prospect, no doubt—its relative power would increase, perhaps replacing anarchy with hegemony. 114 Both of these developments would mean that my theory no longer applies. Second, my argument is robust to changes in the geographical conªguration of the distribution of power. Were a future unipolar era to feature a continental, rather than an offshore, unipole, the paths to conºict described above would still apply. A continental unipole’s inability to disengage from its neighbors might increase the proportion of conºict in which it will be involved at the expense of conºicts between others, but the conºict-producing mechanisms would remain the same. 115 From the perspective of the overall peacefulness of the international system, then, no U.S. grand strategy is, as in the Goldilocks tale, “just right.” 116 In fact, each strategic option available to the unipole produces signiªcant conºict. Whereas offensive and defensive dominance will entangle it in wars against recalcitrant minor powers, disengagement will produce regional wars among minor and major powers. Regardless of U.S. strategy, conºict will abound. Indeed, if my argument is correct, the signiªcant level of conºict the world has experienced over the last two decades will continue for as long as U.S. power remains preponderant. From the narrower perspective of the unipole’s ability to avoid being involved in wars, however, disengagement is the best strategy. A unipolar structure provides no incentives for conºict involving a disengaged unipole. Disengagement would extricate the unipole’s forces from wars against recalcitrant minor powers and decrease systemic pressures for nuclear proliferation. There is, however, a downside. Disengagement would lead to heightened conºict beyond the unipole’s region and increase regional pressures for nuclear proliferation. As regards the unipole’s grand strategy, then, the choice is between a strategy of dominance, which leads to involvement in numerous conºicts, and a strategy of disengagement, which allows conºict between others to fester. In a sense, then, strategies of defensive and offensive dominance are selfdefeating. They create incentives for recalcitrant minor powers to bolster their capabilities and present the United States with a tough choice: allowing them to succeed or resorting to war in order to thwart them. This will either drag U.S. forces into numerous conºicts or result in an increasing number of major powers. In any case, U.S. ability to convert power into favorable outcomes peacefully will be constrained. 117This last point highlights one of the crucial issues where Wohlforth and I differ—the beneªts of the unipole’s power preponderance. Whereas Wohlforth believes that the power preponderance of the United States will lead all states in the system to bandwagon with the unipole, I predict that states engaged in security competition with the unipole’s allies and states for whom the status quo otherwise has lesser value will not accommodate the unipole. To the contrary, these minor powers will become recalcitrant despite U.S. power preponderance, displaying the limited pacifying effects of U.S. power. What, then, is the value of unipolarity for the unipole? What can a unipole do that a great power in bipolarity or multipolarity cannot? My argument hints at the possibility that—at least in the security realm—unipolarity does not give the unipole greater inºuence over international outcomes. 118 If unipolarity provides structural incentives for nuclear proliferation, it may, as Robert Jervis has hinted, “have within it the seeds if not of its own destruction, then at least of its modiªcation.” 119 For Jervis, “[t]his raises the question of what would remain of a unipolar system in a proliferated world. The American ability to coerce others would decrease but so would its need to defend friendly powers that would now have their own deterrents. The world would still be unipolar by most measures and considerations, but many countries would be able to protect themselves, perhaps even against the superpower. . . . In any event, the polarity of the system may become less important.” 120 At the same time, nothing in my argument determines the decline of U.S. power. The level of conºict entailed by the strategies of defensive dominance, offensive dominance, and disengagement may be acceptable to the unipole and have only a marginal effect on its ability to maintain its preeminent position. Whether a unipole will be economically or militarily overstretched is an empirical question that depends on the magnitude of the disparity in power between it and major powers and the magnitude of the conºicts in which it gets involved. Neither of these factors can be addressed a priori, and so a theory of unipolarity must acknowledge the possibility of frequent conºict in a nonetheless durable unipolar system. Finally, my argument points to a “paradox of power preponderance.” 121 Byputting other states in extreme self-help, a systemic imbalance of power requires the unipole to act in ways that minimize the threat it poses. Only by exercising great restraint can it avoid being involved in wars. If the unipole fails to exercise restraint, other states will develop their capabilities, including nuclear weapons—restraining it all the same. 122 Paradoxically, then, more relative power does not necessarily lead to greater inºuence and a better ability to convert capabilities into favorable outcomes peacefully. In effect, unparalleled relative power requires unequaled self-restraint.

### AT: Thayer

#### **Thayer should not be methodologically preferred—he relies on a bankrupt view of IR and repeatedly contradicts himself—prefer Layne**

**Gordon 12** [David Gordon, senior fellow at the Ludwig von Mises Institute and columnist for LRC, “Must America Embrace Empire To Be Safe?”, <http://lewrockwell.com/gordon/gordon100.html>, June 28, 2012]

Thayer defends the current order, in which America seeks to dominate the world, but it is not altogether clear why he does so. He devotes the bulk of his essay to a description and celebration of American power, arguing that we can, if so minded, continue for a long time to impose our will on the rest of the world. The United States has the ability to dominate the world because it has prodigious military capability, economic might, and soft power. ["Soft power," roughly, is cultural and ideological influence.]... Will it be able to do so in the future? The answer is yes, for the foreseeable future – the next thirty to forty years. (p. 12) No doubt America also has the power to blow up the world, but it hardly follows that we should do so: "can" does not imply "ought." If, as Thayer thinks, we need to undertake the very costly task of imposing order on the rest of the world, must there not be some nation, or group of nations, that would otherwise pose a grave danger to our safety? If no such danger impends, why should we undertake the Herculean task of dictating and enforcing the terms of international order? Thayer fails utterly to show that the United States stands in peril from any other country. To the contrary, he shows that each of the two most likely challengers to American hegemony – China and the European Union – faces significant obstacles to an attempt to become the world's dominant power. Although its continued economic growth is impressive, China faces major problems that will hinder its ability to replace the United States as the world's hegemon ... unlike China, the EU [European Union] does nor pose a danger to the American Empire for two major reasons – political and economic. (pp. 32, 34) Thayer argues to this effect in order to show that the United States can maintain world dominance, but he does not see that he has at the same time undermined the case for doing this. Unless we face some powerful global antagonist, what is the point of the enterprise Thayer recommends? Thayer might reply to our objection in this way. We face no imminent danger from others only if we maintain our hegemonic position. Should we abandon this, other nations, China in particular, might supplant us and hence threaten our security. This response exposes the most basic objection to the line of thought that Thayer pursues. He takes for granted that a world power, at least one with a different political system from our own, poses a threat to us. Why need this be so? To take his example of China, in what way would even a vastly expanded and more powerful China pose an existential threat to the United States? What political ambition does China have in the Western hemisphere, let alone in America itself? The only territorial conflict Thayer adduces between America and China involves Taiwan, surely not an integral area for American security. Of course, a power that vies for hegemonic primacy is a threat to America, if one assumes that America needs to be the world's dominant power. But why assume this? Thayer's defense of American hegemony begs the question by building hegemony into the requirements for American security. In fairness to Thayer, he does succeed in mentioning a genuine threat to America. He is right that Islamic terrorist groups pose a genuine danger, but it surely does not require world hegemony to contain attacks from them. Further, as Layne aptly points out, these attacks are responses to American policy in the Middle East, itself a product of the hegemonic grand strategy. Were America to pursue a modest strategy confined to defense of our own territory, it is highly doubtful that these groups would view us as a target. The United States may be greatly reviled in some quarters of the Islamic world, but were the United States not so intimately involved in the affairs of the Middle East, it's hardly likely that the detestation would have manifested itself as violently as it did on 9/11. (p. 70) The assumption that American security requires world hegemony is indeed a puzzling one, and it is Layne who clarifies what lies behind it. As mentioned earlier, both authors are realists, who stress the primacy of power in international relations. Layne notes that one type of realist theory underlies Thayer's approach. "Offensive realism holds that the best strategy for a great power is to gain primacy because, if it can do so, it will not face any serious challenges to its security" (p. 62). As the old adage has it, the best defense is a good offense, and some proponents of this school of thought willingly embrace drastic prescriptions for policy. The mere prospect that China might rise in power to challenge American primacy is for these offensive realists sufficient grounds for launching a preventive war against that country. Advocates of containment hope that ... this strategy will halt China's rise and preserve America's primacy. However, as one leading proponent of containment argues, if these steps fail to stop China's great power emergence, "the United States should consider harsher measures." That is, before its current military advantage over China is narrowed, the United States should launch a preventive war to forestall China's emergence as a peer competitor. (p. 73) Layne does not mention in the text the author of this harrowing idea, but his reference discloses that it is the book's coauthor, Bradley Thayer (p. 99, note 74). Layne's response to offensive realism is within its own terms a good one. He points out that the pursuit of world hegemony will arouse the resentment of other nations, encouraging them to unite against the dominant power. Up to a point ... it is a good thing for a state to be powerful. But when a state becomes too powerful, it frightens others; in self-defense, they seek to offset and contain those great powers that aspire to primacy. (p. 63) So far as the danger to us posed by rising powers like China is concerned, why not rely on regional coalitions of nations to "balance against" the new threat? This is the essence of the "offshore balancing" strategy that Layne favors. It is, he holds, much less costly and dangerous than offensive realism. The key component of a new geopolitical approach by the United States would be the adoption of an offshore balancing strategy.... The other major powers in Asia – Japan, Russia, India – have a much more immediate interest in stopping a rising China in their midst than does the United States, and it is money in the bank that they will step up to the plate and balance against a powerful, expansionist state in their own neighborhood. (p. 76)

### AT: Kagan

#### Kagan is bad scholarship and a joke

Hadar 12 [Leon T. Hadar, Leon T. Hadar is a former research fellow in foreign policy studies, specializing in foreign policy, international trade, the Middle East, and South and East Asia. He is the former United Nations bureau chief for the Jerusalem Post and is currently the Washington correspondent for the Singapore Business Times. His analyses on global affairs have appeared in many newspapers, including the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Christian Science Monitor, and Philadelphia Inquirer, as well as in magazines such as Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, World Policy Journal, Current History, Middle East Journal, and Mediterranean Quarterly. The broadcast outlets CNN, Fox News, CBC, BBC and VOA have interviewed him. In addition, Hadar has taught at American University and Mount Vernon College-where he served as director of international studies-at the Institute on East-West Security Studies in New York, and at the Center for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland, College Park. Hadar is a graduate of Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He earned his MA degrees from the schools of journalism and international affairs and the Middle East Institute at Columbia University, and his Ph.D. in international relations is from American University. “The Reality of American Power: Why Robert Kagan Is Wrong”, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/leon-t-hadar/the-reality-of-american-p_b_1293836.html?ref=world>. 2/22/2012]

'You are not sick' is the kind of reassuring message that Robert Kagan is sending to the nation's foreign policy hypochondriacs aka 'declinists' in his new non-fiction book The World America Made, contending that America is in tip-top military and economic health and ready to take care of the rest of the world. He recalls that the same kind of hypochondriacs had complained that America was really, really in decline in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. But, as the sad case of our late Key Westerner demonstrates, even hypochondriacs do get sick. In the same way, great powers do decline, both in relative and absolute terms. Hence American global economic power started to decline relative to rising economic players like Japan and Germany in the post-1945 era, and relative to China and India more recently. And while in absolute terms the US continues to maintain the largest economy -- and remains the pre-eminent military superpower based on any standard one applies -- it still has to operate by the realist axiom that in the long run, no great power can preserve its military superiority on the basis of a weakening economic superstructure. Kagan, the son of a renowned historian who had studied the Peloponnesian War and the brother of the author of a book on the Napoleonic Wars, likes to present himself as a hard-core Realpolitik analyst of foreign policy, and tends to bash his intellectual rivals, the so-called 'declinists' as idealists. He says they place their faith in the dreamy notions of an evolving international community and the abolition of war through peaceful diplomacy and international law. Not unlike your average hypochondriac who dismisses the advice of the medical doctor, these declinists refuse apparently to face reality and listen to a rational scientist of power like Kagan, and instead assume that the US interests and values would continue to prosper in the more multipolar system in the kind of post-American world that commentator Fareed Zakaria imagined in his book on the same subject. His views matter now as he is a top foreign adviser to Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney. But if anything, it is Kagan who refuses to face the reality of current American global power. He also misrepresents the views of Zakaria and other realist foreign policy analysts who believe that the most ineffective way to maintain American power and influence is by continuing to do what Kagan has been advocating since the end of the Cold War -- engaging in unnecessary and wasteful wars in the Middle East and picking-up costly diplomatic fights with China and Russia while raising US defense budget to the stratosphere, igniting anti-American sentiment worldwide and eroding US credibility. Which brings me back to the inscription in the Key West cemetery. Imagine now that the physician who was taking care of that very sick Key Westerner -- let's call him Dr Kagan -- was not only dismissing the dangerous symptoms exhibited by his patient. How would we have reacted when we found out that the medical doctor was actually the one who had recommended that his patient take an health-inducing (and democracy promoting) trip to the Greater Middle East -- with a long stay in Iraq -- where the poor man contracted the deadly virus that led eventually to his demise? Military quagmires Indeed, there is an element of the theatre of the absurd in the spectacle of Kagan, the geo-strategist who was the leading intellectual cheer-leader for the decisions to invade Iraq and launch the Freedom Agenda in the Middle East that were so central to the erosion of US global position. He is now lashing out at others for their lack of faith in American power that he had so helped to diminish so much. Kagan also fails to recognise that the policies he and other neo-conservative intellectuals advocated -- that were embraced by the Administration of George W Bush -- played directly into the hands of the Chinese, who were delighted to see the Americans drown in the military quagmires in the Middle East while they were spending their time and resources in opening new markets for their trade and investments, including in Afghanistan and Iraq where security was being provided by US troops. And much of what Kagan writes about the potential threat to the post-World War II international system created by the US makes little sense. The policies pursued by the second Bush Administration based on the unilateral and pre-emptive strikes against real and imaginary aggressors with weapons of mass destruction, and right and obligation of the US to do 'regime changes' in other sovereign nation-states, were the ones that ran contrary to the set of international rules promoted by the US and its allies after 1945. In fact, these policies violated international rules established by the Westphalian Peace of 1648 to which China and Russia continue to adhere (hence, their most recent opposition to Western military intervention in Syria). Moreover, it seems that Kagan believes that continuing to accumulate power and using it more often is the surest way prevent American decline. Preoccupied with the high-brow discourse about high-power he refrains from engaging in such 'boring' subjects, like how to fix America's fiscal problems, to revive its manufacturing base, and to reform its ailing public education system. All Americans need to do is to believe in their power -- and it will come to be. It is quite depressing to see that despite the fact that Kagan the geo-strategist has been so wrong in the past and helped to contribute so much to the decline in American power, he continues to be taken seriously by American policymakers and the media.

### AT: Kagan/Mead

#### Kagan and Mead are overly optimistic

Black 12 (Conrad, Baron Black of Crossharbour, PC, OC, KCSG is a Canadian-born member of the British House of Lords, and a historian, columnist and publisher, who was for a time the third largest newspaper magnate in the world, America’s Decline Turns Out To Be Real But Reversible, <http://www.nysun.com/national/americas-decline-turns-out-to-be-real-but/87789/>)

Prominent public intellectuals in the United States are becoming increasingly vocal in their protestations that their country is not in decline. Robert Kagan militates in his latest book that the United States is still by far the most powerful country in the world, as it has been since the latter days of the Second World War. Walter Russell Mead wrote in The Wall Street Journal last week that the problem is not one of American decline, but the decline of its principal allies, Europe and Japan; while countries that have not historically been close allies such as China, India, Turkey and Brazil, are making swift economic, and therefore, political progress. Both Messrs. Kagan and Mead are putting forth reasonable arguments — unlike Barack Obama’s blustery assertion in his State of the Union message that declinists “don’t know what they are talking about.” But while Messrs. Kagan and Mead are telling the truth, they are not telling the whole truth. In 1945, the United States accounted for half the world’s entire economic product, as all other major industrial countries, except to some extent Britain, had been severely damaged by the war. The United States had a nuclear monopoly, was the founder of the United Nations (in which great hopes then reposed), and had led the world to victory over Nazism and Japanese imperialism. It was the only Great Power that in the 1930s had been led by a government that, in the aftermath of Decline from that pinnacle was inevitable. But it did not happen at once. Indeed, the overwhelming and relatively bloodless victory in the Cold War, the fruition of the brilliant American strategy of containment, left the United States as the only seriously Great Power in the world, a condition unique in the history of the nation-state, starting in the Middle Ages. As a result, there was, 20 years ago, a good deal of frothy (and, as it turns out, grossly premature) intellectual blather about the end of history and the political culmination of the world in democratic capitalism. The uni-polar era has not been a success for America. The great irony of these 20-something post-Cold War years has been that while the United States was the indispensable country in the triumph of capitalist democracy — its preservation from 1917 to 1941, and its outright victory in the following 50 years — it is not now one of the world’s best, or even better, functioning democracies. Under the Clinton, Bush Jr., and Obama administrations, there has been no coherent strategy to replace the previous masterly and bipartisan missions to lead the West to victory in the Second World War and in the Cold War. Bill Clinton, on the world stage, as in America, and before that in the diminutive state of Arkansas, exuded bonhomous goodwill, extended free trade to Mexico, and expanded NATO into the former Soviet Union, suavely calling it “a partnership for peace.” He moved in the Balkans, but only when the Europeans, who started by calling the challenge posed by Bosnian massacres “The hour of Europe,” fell on their faces and started crying like frightened little pigs for America to end ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. And even then, nothing would have happened if the Republican leader in the Senate, Robert Dole, a bravely wounded veteran of the European theatre in the Second World War, had not legislated military orders (lift and strike) normally in the province of the commander-in-chief. There never really was a Clinton foreign policy: His responses to the early terrorist attacks (Khobar Towers, the African embassies, the USS Cole) were very inadequate. George W. Bush, forced to deal with the monstrous outrage of the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, had a piercing, towel-snapping, locker room vision that since democracies do not engage in aggressive war, ergo, every country that was not already democratic should be propelled by the scruff of the neck and the small of the back toward democratization. Thus did Hamas replace Fatah in Gaza; the Muslim Brotherhood, (whose adherents had proudly murdered Anwar Sadat) is replacing Hosni Mubarak in Egypt; terrorist chaos is replacing Saleh in Yemen; and Hezbollah has more or less taken over from the Syrians in Lebanon. Trillions of dollars have been spent, along with over 6,000 American lives, in Afghanistan and Iraq, and it would be impetuous to forecast comparative stability and enlightenment in the near future of either country. Presidents Bush and Obama have done well uprooting and killing terrorists, and generally keeping them out of America, but Obama’s fiercest supporters apparently believed that all grievances in the Muslim, African, South Asian and Oriental countries against America could be resolved almost instantly because the U.S. government was no longer directed by a Caucasian of wholly Judeo-Christian background. Two flatteringly revisionist speeches in Cairo and Ghana and an absurdly exaggerated bow to the Mikado in Tokyo, and presto, all would be well. George W. Bush’s mindless championship of democracy in infertile ground gave way to Obama’s pseudo-realistic appeasement of Russia; carpet cold water-bombing of the Iranian democracy movement and Hillary Clinton’s initial lionization of Syria’s bloody-handed optometrist President Assad as a “reformer.” In swift review, Jimmy Carter evicted the pro-Western and relatively progressive Shah of Iran “like a dead mouse” (his national security advisor’s words), and we have had the ayatollahs since. George Bush Sr. ejected Saddam Hussein from Kuwait but left him in power in Baghdad. Bill Clinton proclaimed a quadruple-embargo: Iraq and Iran as sponsors of terrorism, and India and Pakistan as nuclear proliferators. George W. Bush led NATO and the UN into Afghanistan but then decamped to Iraq. He made it up well with India, but both he and Mr. Obama have been hosed out of their under-clothing by the ragtag of slippery officers and Islamist hucksters in office in Pakistan, which has passed on hundreds of millions of dollars of American assistance to the Haqqani Taliban, which in turn has been busy murdering NATO soldiers in Afghanistan. Mr. Obama is flirting with allowing Iran to fire the starting gun in a nuclear proliferation contest in the Middle East, while effectively assuring the Putin despotism through an open microphone that it can keep a full nuclear first-strike threat. The United States has spent a decade with its entire conventional ground forces military capacity mired in Near Eastern quagmires, and 15 years with bone-crushing current account deficits. This may not amount fully to “decline” — but it is something that Messrs. Mead and Kagan have not fully accounted for in their optimistic narratives. For good measure, under the Clinton and Bush administrations, the Western world was flooded with worthless American real estate-backed debt, largely by U.S. government order and statute, peddled by a corrupt Wall Street with the complicity of the Federal Reserve, in a massive political payoff to sleazy developers, crooked building trades unions and the spiviest elements of the New York financial community. And we have had five years of average $1.3-trillion federal budget deficits that have the effect of annual 100% increases in the country’s 2008 money supply, and there are fewer people working in the United States than when these mountainous deficits began. The political system is gridlocked and contemptible, and the commentariat is infested with shrieking imbeciles. The entire public service, at all levels, has unsustainable deferred benefit levels. The state school systems are an uncompetitive shambles. Medical care, per capita, costs almost 2.5 times what it does in Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain and Japan, yet 30% of Americans have inadequate health care. And the U.S. has, on average, 10 times as many incarcerated people as those countries, and the legal cartel is strangling the country. The prison industry is a $150-billion annual money-spinner; the organ transplant business generates $20-billion a year. Presidential elections cost each party a billion dollars, and the current and recent candidates are almost wholly implausible. Most of the legislators spend two thirds of their time raising money, and the rest serving their financial backers. The United States, always garish and overly pecuniary, has become a chronically corrupt country. Only twice before have there been three consecutive presidential terms as dangerously mistaken in policy terms as these last three: Fillmore, Pierce and Buchanan (1850-1861), and Harding, Coolidge, Hoover (1921-1933), and they brought on the Civil War and the Great Depression. Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt were required to put the country back together. Yes, America is the world’s greatest country; and yes, some other important countries have had even more serious problems. And yes, Mr. President, your country is in decline. It need not be irreversible, but those who have recognized this know what they are talking about after all.

# Heg Defense

## Impact Defense

### Generic

#### Global Politics have changed—new developments disincentive global power war and make hegemony obsolete

**Brzezinski 12** [Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. National Security Adviser from 1977 to 1981. His most recent book is Second Chance: Three Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower, “Zbigniew Brzezinski Discusses US Leadership in the 21st Century”, <http://ellenofthetenth.blogspot.com/2012/05/zbigniew-brzezinski-and-us-leadership.html>, May 01, 2012]

1. Global politics has significantly changed for the first time in 600 years. The past 600 years involved hegemonic war, not religious or ideological war, but war for land, war for empire and war for greed. The goals of these hegemonic wars were access to ports, outposts, colonies and control over land and resources. It started within Europe, but eventually moved out to the Americas, India and Asia and was the birth of international politics. In the 20th century, the change was that the victor became paramount and determined how mankind would be organized politically, but these wars were still hegemonic. There have been significant changes in the 21st Century. The US no longer has the power or legitimacy to be dominant. Conventional warfare has been transformed with the possibility of nuclear war which serves as a restraint on hegemonic warfare, escalation makes no sense. Today global power is diffused and disbursed between the West and East with the rise of China and India joining Japan as a global power (and Indonesia in the background). There has been a global political awakening and places that were previously drawn into hegemonic war by the dominant powers are now concerned about their own national identity, politics and the politics of other countries.

### AT: China

#### The current psychological approach to China is a strategic delusion—offshore balancing is the only sustainable strategy

**Freeman 12** [Chas Freeman, chairman of Projects International, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs and U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, “The China Bluff”, <http://nationalinterest.org/print/commentary/the-china-bluff-6561>, February 23, 2012]

Actually, we have a much bigger problem than that presented by the challenge of dealing with a rising China. We cannot hope to sustain our global hegemony even in the short term without levels of expenditure we are unprepared to tax ourselves to support. Worse, the logic of the sort of universal sphere of influence we aspire to administer requires us to treat the growth of others' capabilities relative to our own as direct threats to our hegemony. This means we must match any and all improvements in foreign military power with additions to our own. It is why our military-related expenditures have grown to exceed those of the rest of the world combined. There is simply no way that such a militaristic approach to national security is affordable in the long term, no matter how much it may delight defense contractors.¶ In this context, I fear that the so-called "pivot" to Asia will turn out be an unresourced bluff. It's impressive enough to encourage China to spend more on its military, but what it means, in practice, is that we will cut military commitments to Asia less than we cut commitments elsewhere. That is, we will do this if the Middle East comes to need less attention than we have been giving it. At best, the "pivot" promises more or less more of the same in the Indo-Pacific region. This would be a tough maneuver to bring off even if we had our act together both at home and in the Middle East. But we do not have our act together at home. Our position in West Asia and North Africa is not improving. And some Americans are currently actively advocating war with Iran, intervention in Syria, going after Pakistan, and other misguided military adventures in West and South Asia.¶ So, what’s the affordable alternative approach to sustaining stability in the Asia-Pacific region as China rises? My guess is that it’s to be found in adjustments in our psychology. We need to get over World War II and the Cold War and focus on the realities of the present rather than the past.¶ Japan initially defeated all other powers in the Asia-Pacific, including the United States. We then cleaned Japan's clock and filled the resulting strategic vacuum. We found our regional preeminence so gratifying that we didn’t notice as the vacuum we had filled proceeded to disappear. Japan restored itself. Southeast Asians came together in the Second Indochina War. ASEAN incorporated Indochina and Myanmar. India rose from its post-colonial sick bed and strode forward. Indonesia did the same.¶ But we have continued to behave as though there is an Asian-Pacific power vacuum only we can fill. And, as China’s rise has begun to shift the strategic equilibrium in the region, we have stepped forward to restore it. We seem to think that, if we Americans don’t provide it, there can be no balance or peace in Asia. But, quite aside from the fact that there was a balance and peace in the region long before the United States became a Pacific power, this overlooks the formidable capabilities of re-risen and rising powers like Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia and Vietnam. It is a self-realizing strategic delusion that powers a self-licking ice-cream cone.¶ If Americans step forward to balance China for everyone else in the region, the nations of the Indo-Pacific will hang back and let us take the lead. And if we put ourselves between them and China, they will not just rely on us to back their existing claims against China, they will up the ante. It cannot make sense to empower the Philippines, Vietnam and others to pick our fights with China for us.¶ The bottom line is that the return of Japan, South Korea and China to wealth and power and the impressive development of other countries in the region should challenge us to rethink the entire structure of our defense posture in Asia. Unable to live by our wallets, we must learn to live by our wits. In my view, President Nixon’s "Guam Doctrine" pointed the way. We need to find ways to ask Asians to do more in their own interest and their own defense. Our role should be to back them as our interests demand, not to pretend that we care more about their national-security interests or understand these better than they do, still less to push them aside to take on defense tasks on their behalf.

#### China’s strategy is one of soft balancing—traditional hegemonic responses don’t work and only make the situation worse

**Kucharski 12** [Milosz Kucharski, Ph.D Political Science with Focus in International Relations and Comparitive Politics, Chair of Political Science at UC Davis, International Relations vol. 26 no. 1 60-77, March 2012, Sage]

This article deals with soft balancing because there has been virtually no hard balancing against the US thus far. Soft balancing involves ‘limited, tacit, or indirect¶ balancing strategies largely through coalition building and diplomatic bargaining ¶ within international institutions’.¶ 6¶ It represents a non-military form of opposition, ¶ occurring when weaker states decide that the influence and actions of a stronger state ¶ are unacceptable; this form of balancing is undertaken to frustrate, undermine and ¶ impose costs on the actions of the dominant state. States undertake soft balancing to ¶ make it more difficult for the stronger party to use its power against them, to ‘equalize ¶ the odds in a contest between the strong and the weak’, and to deter the more powerful ¶ side from pursuing objectives that violate their core national interests.¶ 7¶ Although some ¶ skeptics maintain that soft balancing is indistinguishable from diplomatic friction,¶ 8¶ it ¶ produces very real effects by making the superpower somewhat less capable of imposing its will on the rest of the international community, and by leading to ‘outcomes ¶ contrary to US preferences – outcomes that could not be obtained’ otherwise.¶ 9¶ This article relies on four indicators of soft balancing, three of which were developed ¶ by Robert Pape. These include: (1) territorial denial, (2) entangling diplomacy, (3) economic statecraft, and (4) signaling the resolve to balance. Territorial denial involves ¶ denying the superpower access to territory. Territorial denial is used during military ¶ operations when the superpower can benefit from using third-party territories as either ¶ a staging or a transit area for its forces.¶ 10¶ Territorial denial can augment the costs of a ¶ given operation by increasing logistical expenses, by making power projection more ¶ difficult and by making certain strategies non-feasible. All of this effectively reduces ¶ the chances of a swift victory.¶ Entangling diplomacy involves the ‘use of international institutions and ad hoc diplomatic maneuvers’ to thwart the plans of the dominant power.¶ 11¶ This strategy is pursued ¶ by states when the behavior and intentions of the dominant state are seen as incompatible ¶ with their interests and when a hegemon’s actions are considered out of line. Soft balancing of this kind is effective because even the strongest states cannot ignore the rules of ¶ international conduct without losing legitimacy and support for their causes. Consequently, ¶ diplomatic entanglement can be used to increase costs to the superpower and decrease ¶ the legitimacy of its actions.¶ Economic statecraft is the art of using economic means to influence other states in the ¶ international system.¶ 12¶ Positive economic statecraft, which is not of interest to this article, involves the use of positive sanctions to provide rewards. On the other hand, negative economic statecraft, which is used here as an indicator of soft balancing, is associated ¶ with attempts to punish, frustrate, or threaten a third party (in this case, the United States). ¶ This form of economic statecraft relies on the use of negative sanctions such as embargos, boycotts, quotas, dumping, etc.¶ 13¶ Finally, signaling the resolve to balance has to do with demonstrating ‘resolve in a ¶ manner that signals a commitment to resist the superpower’s future ambitions’. Since ¶ challenging a hegemon either individually or collectively is extremely difficult under ¶ unipolarity, signaling the resolve to balance is the first step towards trying to actively ¶ oppose the superpower. Signaling the resolve to balance aims not only to frustrate and ¶ restrain the hegemon, but also to increase states’ trust in each other’s willingness to resist ¶ the unipole, thereby helping states to overcome collective action problems by creating ¶ expectations of balancing.¶ 14

### AT: Random Impacts

#### Hegemony doesn’t solve terror, disease, climate change or prolif –ensures counter-balancing

Hachigan and Sutphen 8(Nina and Monica, Senior fellow at Center for American progress, Stanford Center for International Security, The Next American Century, p. 168-9)

In practice, the strategy of primacy failed to deliver. While the fact of being the world’s only superpower has substantial benefits, a national security strategy based on suing and ratiaing primacy has not made America more secure. America’s military might has not been the answer to terrorism, disease, climate change, or proliferation. Iraq, Iran, and North Korea have become more dangerous in the last seven years, not less. Worse than being ineffective with transnational threats and smaller powers, a strategy of maintaining primacy is counterproductive when it comes to pivotal powers. If America makes primacy the main goal of its national security strategy, then why shouldn’t the pivotal powers do the same? A goal of primacy signals that sheer strength is most critical to security. American cannot trumpet its desire to dominate the world military and then question why China is modernizing its military.

### Oversimplification Indict

#### Unipolarity is no longer necessary—their evidence oversimplifies international relations

Preble 10 [Christopher Preble, director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, August 2010 “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?” <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/>] SV

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

### Psychology Indict

#### Proponents of hegemony are prone to cycles of belief—psychological mistakes make bad policy

Nye 10 [December University Distinguished Service Professor at [Harvard University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harvard_University) and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, December 2010, “THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POWER: DOMINANCE AND DECLINE IN PERSPECTIVE.” Published by Foreign affairs, <http://1431731ontario.net/Current/Articles/TheFutureOfAmericanPower_DominanceAndDeclineInPerspective.pdf>]

Despite such differences, Americans **are prone to cycles of belief in their own decline.** The Founding Fathers worried about comparisons to the Roman republic. Charles Dickens **observed** a century and a half ago, “If **its individual citizens, to a man, are to be believed, [the United States] always is depressed, and always is stagnated, and always is at an alarming crisis, and never was otherwise**.” In the last half century, **belief in American decline rose after** the Soviet Union launched **Sputnik in 1957**, after President Richard Nixon’s economic adjustments and the oil shocks in the 1970s, and after the closing of rust-belt industries and the budget deficits in the Reagan era. **Ten years later, Americans believed that the United States was the sole superpower, and now polls show that many believe in decline again. Pundits lament the inability of Washington to control states such as Afghanistan or Iran, but they allow the golden glow of the past to color their appraisals. The United States’ power is not what it used to be, but it also never really was as great as assumed**. After World War II, the United States had nuclear weapons and an overwhelming preponderance of economic power but nonetheless was unable to prevent the “loss” of China, to roll back communism in Eastern Europe, to overcome stalemate in the Korean War, to stop the “loss” of North Vietnam, or to dislodge the Castro regime in Cuba. **Power measured in resources rarely equals power measured in preferred outcomes, and cycles of belief in decline reveal more about psychology than they do about real shifts in power resources. Unfortunately, mistaken beliefs in decline — at home and abroad — can lead to dangerous mistakes in policy.**

## Heg Inevitable

### Generic

#### Power share of the US makes up for other sectors

Brooks & Wohlforth 8 (Stephen- Professor of Government B.A., Economics and Politics, UC Santa Cruz, M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D., Political Science, Yale University, and William- Professor of Government, B.A., International Relations, Beloit College M.A., International Relations, Yale University, M.Phil., Ph.D., Political Science, Yale University, “World Out of Balance- International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy”, Pg. 17)

THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION marked the emergence of historically unprecedented U.S. advantages in the scales of world power. No system of sovereign states has ever contained one state with comparable material preponderance.1 Following its invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the United States loomed so large on the world stage that many scholars called it an empire,2 but the costly turmoil that engulfed Iraq following the toppling of Saddam Hussein in 2003 quieted such talk. Suddenly, the limits of U.S. power became the new preoccupation. Many analysts began to compare the United States to Britain at the beginning of the twentieth century—an overstretched, declining, “weary Titan” that “staggers under the too vast orb of his fate.”3 What accounts for this sudden shift in assessments of American power? For most observers, it was not new information about material capabilities. As Robert Jervis observes, “Measured in any conceivable way, the United States has a greater share of world power than any other country in history.”4 That statement was as accurate when it was written in 2006 as it would have been at any time after 1991, and the primacy it describes will long persist, even if the most pessimistic prognostications about U.S. economic, military, and technological com- petitiveness come true. For most scholars of international relations, what really changed after 2003 were estimates of the political utility of America’s primacy. Suddenly, scholars were impressed by the fact that material preponderance does not always translate into desired out- comes. For many, theories of international relations (IR) that explain constraints on the use of power were vindicated by American setbacks in Iraq and elsewhere.

### AT: Iraq

#### Heg is inevitable- empirically proven.

Brooks & Wohlforth 8 (Stephen- Professor of Government B.A., Economics and Politics, UC Santa Cruz, M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D., Political Science, Yale University, and William- Professor of Government, B.A., International Relations, Beloit College M.A., International Relations, Yale University, M.Phil., Ph.D., Political Science, Yale University, “World Out of Balance- International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy”, Pg. 32-33)

Despite the weight of this evidence, elite perceptions of U.S. power had shifted toward pessimism by middle of the first decade of this cen- tury. As we noted in chapter 1, this was partly the result of an Iraq- induced doubt about the utility of material predominance, a doubt red- olent of the post-Vietnam mood. In retrospect, many assessments of U.S. economic and technological prowess from the 1990s were overly optimistic; by the next decade important potential vulnerabilities were evident. In particular, chronically imbalanced domestic finances and accelerating public debt convinced some analysts that the United States once again confronted a competitiveness crisis.23 If concerns con- tinue to mount, this will count as the fourth such crisis since 1945; the first three occurred during the 1950s (Sputnik), the 1970s (Vietnam and stagflation), and the 1980s (the Soviet threat and Japan’s challenge). None of these crises, however, shifted the international system’s struc- ture: multipolarity did not return in the 1960s, 1970s, or early 1990s, and each scare over competitiveness ended with the American position of primacy retained or strengthened.24

### AT: Rising Powers

#### Counterbalancing takes out rising powers

Brooks & Wohlforth 8 (Stephen- Professor of Government B.A., Economics and Politics, UC Santa Cruz, M.A., M.Phil., Ph.D., Political Science, Yale University, and William- Professor of Government, B.A., International Relations, Beloit College M.A., International Relations, Yale University, M.Phil., Ph.D., Political Science, Yale University, “World Out of Balance- International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy”, Pg. 38-39)

In this chapter, we show that the theory does not predict and histori- cal experience does not imply that there will be efforts to counter- balance the United States today. Balance-of-power theory predicts that states try to prevent rise of a hegemon. While scholars debate the historical evidence for this proposition, they fail to register a point important for constraints on U.S. power today: Even if a potential hegemon must be concerned about counterbalancing, the theory yields no such implication for one that has already established its material primacy. We argue that once a country achieves such a position, it has passed a threshold, and the effect of increasing power is reversed: the stronger the leading state and the more entrenched its dominance, the more unlikely and thus less constraining are counterbalancing dynamics. Our explanation for the absence of counterbalancing against the United States emphasizes a simple point: counterbalancing is and will long remain prohibitively costly for the other major powers. Because no country comes close to matching the comprehensive nature of U.S. power, an attempt to counterbalance would be far more expensive than a similar effort in any previous international system. Matching U.S. capabilities could become even more formidably costly, moreover, if the United States decided to increase its defense expenditures (cur- rently around 4 percent of GDP) to Cold War levels (which averaged 7.5 percent of GDP).4

### AT: China

#### Heg is inevitable—Kagan is wrong and China is weak

**Masud 12** [Kazi Anwarul Masud, Bangladesh - former Secretary and ambassador at Thailand, Vietnam, South Korea and Germany, “American primacy in international affairs”, <http://theindependentbd.com/paper-edition/editorial/post-editorial/92992-american-primacy-in-international-affairs.html>, February 3, 2012]

But neo-conservatives like Robert Kagan in his recent book The World America Made continues to reassert that it would be folly for the US and the world at large to let the Americans to take time-out from its global responsibilities. ¶ He considers it as “illusion” political scientist John Ikenberry’s argument that even with diminished American power “ the underlying foundation of liberal international order will survive and thrive” for several reasons. Kagan argues that great powers rarely decline suddenly. ¶ Besides measuring a nation’s relative power depends on some basic indicators: the size and influence of its economy relative to those of other competing powers; magnitude of its military power; and the influence it wields in international affairs. In 1969 the US produced a quarter of the global economic output and it remains so even today. ¶ China may become the largest economy in the world in a few decades but there is no guarantee that the short term economic decisions now being taken in an authoritarian system will remain constant in the long term when a richer middle class may not wish to barter away its freedom any longer for material gains.

# Heg Good

## Impact

### Generic

#### Its try or die for the aff—heg decline causes US-China war and regional blocs that escalates to large scale conflict

**Herd 11** [Graeme P. Herd, Head of the International Security Programme and Co-Director of the International Training Course in Security Policy at the GCSP accredited by the University of Geneva,“The Global Puzzle: Order in an Age of Primacy, Power-Shifts and Interdependence”, Geneva Papers Research Series, 2011]

What are the strategic effects of this power-shift? Stephen Walt, a leading US realist¶ international relations theorist, argues that China’s economic rise renders security competition¶ with the US “virtually inevitable”, evidencing the rapid expansion of Chinese¶ military, particularly naval, capability as “a classic manifestation of great power status”:¶ “Beijing is seeking to build its economy, then expand its military capacity, achieve a¶ position of regional dominance, and then exclude other major powers from its immediate¶ neighborhood.”30 With regards to the US-China relationship, Minixin Pei reinforces¶ this conflictual narrative, arguing that: “Because of the deep and unbridgeable¶ differences between the two countries in terms of their political values, conceptions of¶ international order and geopolitical interests, constant frictions, even minor conflicts,¶ should be the rule.”31 Martin Jacques understands friction as a consequence of power¶ shifts: “Google and climate change are relatively new disputes. But we should not be¶ surprised by them. China’s rise means that it is now involved in areas of the world and¶ on issues where previously it had little or no stake. As China becomes a global power¶ it is bound to come into conflict with the United States on a number of subjects.”32¶ Paul Krugman paints the portrait of a “rogue economic superpower, unwilling to play¶ by the rules” of the game, citing “China’s grossly protectionist exchange-rate policy”¶ as key evidence.33¶ If such trends continue and grow, we might hypothesis that a Hobbesian zerosum,¶ hierarchy and balance-of-power world order would emerge, one in which¶ Great Power competition is unconstrained and aggressive self-help behavior the¶ order of the day. Great Powers would consolidate their order-producing and¶ managerial role in their hinterlands and regional neighbourhoods. Geopoliticalbloc¶ formation would result. Regional hegemons could use hard coercive force if¶ necessary, but trade concessions, development assistance and market access or¶ denial would more likely be the sticks and carrots of first resort. A re-division of¶ the world in the 2010s and 2020s into multiple regionalisms creates the 21st century¶ variant of a competing mercantilist 19th century regional order.34 According¶ to this “multiple regionalisms” scenario, regional collectivities of diverse political¶ units consolidate around regional hegemons: limited inter-regional cooperation¶ occurs only when benefits are very apparent; regional hegemons organize and¶ structure intra-regional cooperation. In this competitive paradigm, the principle¶ of legitimate authority as embodied by states co-exists with the principle of exchange¶ as characterised by the efficiency of decentralised markets and embraced¶ most strongly by transnational corporations.35 The principle of solidarity, enacted¶ most widely by participative collective movements operating in increasingly transnational¶ and global civil society groups is subordinate. Under such conditions,¶ the previous durable, tolerable hegemony exercised by a single state – the US – is¶ understood to be “decreasingly sustainable”.36

#### Unipolarity reduces the likelihood of war.

Donovan 4 (Edgar, Works for the Department of Defense. “American Unipolarity: Is it a Sustainable Model Towards a More Peaceful World Order?”http://www.eddiedonovan.com/publications/IRFINAL2.pdf, March 24, 2004)

Uncontestable unipolarity as in the case of America's current position in the world creates massive disincentives for other powers to challenge hegemonic rivalry thus eliminating the threat of world war. Furthermore, as in the case of Gulf War I, America will also be able to contain and/or confront geopolitical crisiscs thereby reducing regional security dilemmas that during past multipolar eras would have certainly led to full scale regional conflicts. The end result will be an average smaller percentage of the overall world population killed due to war operations than in previous bipolar or multipolar eras.

### AT: Impact Turns

#### Balance of power theory conclude unipolarity is peaceful.

Wholforth 7 (William C.- Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The MIT Press Journal- “The Stability of a Unipolar World”. <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1.pdf> Sep. 5, 2007)

Unipolarity favors the absence of war among the great powers and compara- tively low levels of competition for prestige or security for two reasons: the leading state’s power advantage removes the problem of hegemonic rivalry from world politics, and it reduces the salience and stakes of balance-of-power politics among the major states. This argument is based on two well-known realist theories: hegemonic theory and balance-of-power theory. Each is con- troversial, and the relationship between the two is complex.35 For the purposes of this analysis, however, the key point is that both theories predict that a unipolar system will be peaceful. how to think about unipolarity Hegemonic theory has received short shrift in the debate over the nature of the post–Cold War international system.36 This omission is unwarranted, for the theory has simple and profound implications for the peacefulness of the post–Cold War international order that are backed up by a formidable body of scholarship. The theory stipulates that especially powerful states (“hegemons”) foster international orders that are stable until differential growth in power produces a dissatisaed state with the capability to challenge the dominant state for leadership. The clearer and larger the concentration of power in the leading state, the more peaceful the international order associated with it will be.

#### Unipolarity generates less incentives for power competition.

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In sum, both hegemonic theory and balance-of-power theory specify thresh- olds at which great concentrations of power support a peaceful structure. Balance-of-power theory tells us that smaller is better.40 Therefore one pole is best, and security competition among the great powers should be minimal. Hegemonic theory tells us that a clear preponderance in favor of a leading state with a comprehensive power portfolio should eliminate rivalry for pri- macy. Overall, then, unipolarity generates comparatively few incentives for security or prestige competition among the great powers.

## Sustainability

### Generic

#### Heg is sustainable and good – Decline is a farce – Ikenberry is wrong

Kagan 12 (Robert, is an American historian, author and foreign policy commentator at the Brookings Institution. He is a co-founder of the now-defunct neoconservative political organization Project for the New American Century, Not Fade Away: The myth of American decline, <http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?page=0,0>)

Is the United States in decline, as so many seem to believe these days? Or are Americans in danger of committing pre-emptive superpower suicide out of a misplaced fear of their own declining power? A great deal depends on the answer to these questions. The present world order—characterized by an unprecedented number of democratic nations; a greater global prosperity, even with the current crisis, than the world has ever known; and a long peace among great powers—reflects American principles and preferences, and was built and preserved by American power in all its political, economic, and military dimensions. If American power declines, this world order will decline with it. It will be replaced by some other kind of order, reflecting the desires and the qualities of other world powers. Or perhaps it will simply collapse, as the European world order collapsed in the first half of the twentieth century. The belief, held by many, that even with diminished American power “the underlying foundations of the liberal international order will survive and thrive,” as the political scientist G. John Ikenberry has argued, is a pleasant illusion. American decline, if it is real, will mean a different world for everyone. But how real is it? Much of the commentary on American decline these days rests on rather loose analysis, on impressions that the United States has lost its way, that it has abandoned the virtues that made it successful in the past, that it lacks the will to address the problems it faces. Americans look at other nations whose economies are now in better shape than their own, and seem to have the dynamism that America once had, and they lament, as in the title of Thomas Friedman’s latest book, that “that used to be us.” The perception of decline today is certainly understandable, given the dismal economic situation since 2008 and the nation’s large fiscal deficits, which, combined with the continuing growth of the Chinese, Indian, Brazilian, Turkish, and other economies, seem to portend a significant and irreversible shift in global economic power. Some of the pessimism is also due to the belief that the United States has lost favor, and therefore influence, in much of the world, because of its various responses to the attacks of September 11. The detainment facilities at Guantánamo, the use of torture against suspected terrorists, and the widely condemned invasion of Iraq in 2003 have all tarnished the American “brand” and put a dent in America’s “soft power”—its ability to attract others to its point of view. There have been the difficult wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which many argue proved the limits of military power, stretched the United States beyond its capacities, and weakened the nation at its core. Some compare the United States to the British Empire at the end of the nineteenth century, with the Iraq and Afghanistan wars serving as the equivalent of Britain’s difficult and demoralizing Boer War. With this broad perception of decline as the backdrop, every failure of the United States to get its way in the world tends to reinforce the impression. Arabs and Israelis refuse to make peace, despite American entreaties. Iran and North Korea defy American demands that they cease their nuclear weapons programs. China refuses to let its currency rise. Ferment in the Arab world spins out of America’s control. Every day, it seems, brings more evidence that the time has passed when the United States could lead the world and get others to do its bidding. Powerful as this sense of decline may be, however, it deserves a more rigorous examination. Measuring changes in a nation’s relative power is a tricky business, but there are some basic indicators: the size and the influence of its economy relative to that of other powers; the magnitude of military power compared with that of potential adversaries; the degree of political influence it wields in the international system—all of which make up what the Chinese call “comprehensive national power.” And there is the matter of time. Judgments based on only a few years’ evidence are problematic. A great power’s decline is the product of fundamental changes in the international distribution of various forms of power that usually occur over longer stretches of time. Great powers rarely decline suddenly. A war may bring them down, but even that is usually a symptom, and a culmination, of a longer process. The decline of the British Empire, for instance, occurred over several decades. In 1870, the British share of global manufacturing was over 30 percent. In 1900, it was 20 percent. By 1910, it was under 15 percent—well below the rising United States, which had climbed over the same period from more than 20 percent to more than 25 percent; and also less than Germany, which had lagged far behind Britain throughout the nineteenth century but had caught and surpassed it in the first decade of the twentieth century. Over the course of that period, the British navy went from unchallenged master of the seas to sharing control of the oceans with rising naval powers. In 1883, Britain possessed more battleships than all the other powers combined. By 1897, its dominance had been eclipsed. British officials considered their navy “completely outclassed” in the Western hemisphere by the United States, in East Asia by Japan, and even close to home by the combined navies of Russia and France—and that was before the threatening growth of the German navy. These were clear-cut, measurable, steady declines in two of the most important measures of power over the course of a half-century.

### Military

#### Heg is inevitable – strong military – even Xuetong agrees

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The answer is no. Let’s start with the basic indicators. In economic terms, and even despite the current years of recession and slow growth, America’s position in the world has not changed. Its share of the world’s GDP has held remarkably steady, not only over the past decade but over the past four decades. In 1969, the United States produced roughly a quarter of the world’s economic output. Today it still produces roughly a quarter, and it remains not only the largest but also the richest economy in the world. People are rightly mesmerized by the rise of China, India, and other Asian nations whose share of the global economy has been climbing steadily, but this has so far come almost entirely at the expense of Europe and Japan, which have had a declining share of the global economy. Optimists about China’s development predict that it will overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world sometime in the next two decades. This could mean that the United States will face an increasing challenge to its economic position in the future. But the sheer size of an economy is not by itself a good measure of overall power within the international system. If it were, then early nineteenth-century China, with what was then the world’s largest economy, would have been the predominant power instead of the prostrate victim of smaller European nations. Even if China does reach this pinnacle again—and Chinese leaders face significant obstacles to sustaining the country’s growth indefinitely—it will still remain far behind both the United States and Europe in terms of per capita GDP. Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-century China learned and Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, “military strength underpins hegemony.” Here the United States remains unmatched. It is far and away the most powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no decline in America’s relative military capacity—at least not yet. Americans currently spend less than $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers combined. (This figure does not include the deployment in Iraq, which is ending, or the combat forces in Afghanistan, which are likely to diminish steadily over the next couple of years.) They do so, moreover, while consuming a little less than 4 percent of GDP annually—a higher percentage than the other great powers, but in historical terms lower than the 10 percent of GDP that the United States spent on defense in the mid-1950s and the 7 percent it spent in the late 1980s. The superior expenditures underestimate America’s actual superiority in military capability. American land and air forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and are the most experienced in actual combat. They would defeat any competitor in a head-to-head battle. American naval power remains predominant in every region of the world. By these military and economic measures, at least, the United States today is not remotely like Britain circa 1900, when that empire’s relative decline began to become apparent. It is more like Britain circa 1870, when the empire was at the height of its power. It is possible to imagine a time when this might no longer be the case, but that moment has not yet arrived. BUT WHAT ABOUT the “rise of the rest”—the increasing economic clout of nations like China, India, Brazil, and Turkey? Doesn’t that cut into American power and influence? The answer is, it depends. The fact that other nations in the world are enjoying periods of high growth does not mean that America’s position as the predominant power is declining, or even that “the rest” are catching up in terms of overall power and influence. Brazil’s share of global GDP was a little over 2 percent in 1990 and remains a little over 2 percent today. Turkey’s share was under 1 percent in 1990 and is still under 1 percent today. People, and especially businesspeople, are naturally excited about these emerging markets, but just because a nation is an attractive investment opportunity does not mean it is a rising great power. Wealth matters in international politics, but there is no simple correlation between economic growth and international influence. It is not clear that a richer India today wields greater influence on the global stage than a poorer India did in the 1950s under Nehru, when it was the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, or that Turkey, for all the independence and flash of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, really wields more influence than it did a decade ago.

#### Decline is relative – we are still in good shape

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In the 1970s, the dramatic rise in oil prices, coupled with American economic policies during the Vietnam War, led the American economy into a severe crisis. Gross national product fell by 6 percent between 1973 and 1975. Unemployment doubled from 4.5 percent to 9 percent. The American people suffered through gas lines and the new economic phenomenon of stagflation, combining a stagnant economy with high inflation. The American economy went through three recessions between 1973 and 1982. The “energy crisis” was to Americans then what the “fiscal crisis” is today. In his first televised address to the nation, Jimmy Carter called it “the greatest challenge our country will face during our lifetimes.” It was especially humiliating that the crisis was driven in part by two close American allies, the Saudi royal family and the Shah of Iran. As Carter recalled in his memoirs, the American people “deeply resented that the greatest nation on earth was being jerked around by a few desert states.” The low point came in 1979, when the Shah was overthrown, the radical Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini came to power, and fifty-two Americans were taken hostage and held for more than a year. The hostage crisis, as Yergin has observed, “transmitted a powerful message: that the shift of power in the world oil market in the 1970s was only part of a larger drama that was taking place in global politics. The United States and the West, it seemed to say, were truly in decline, on the defensive, and, it appeared, unable to do anything to protect their interests, whether economic or political.” IF ONE WANTED to make a case for American decline, the 1970s would have been the time to do it; and many did. The United States, Kissinger believed, had evidently “passed its historic high point like so many earlier civilizations.... Every civilization that has ever existed has ultimately collapsed. History is a tale of efforts that failed.” It was in the 1970s that the American economy lost its overwhelming primacy, when the American trade surplus began to turn into a trade deficit, when spending on entitlements and social welfare programs ballooned, when American gold and monetary reserves were depleted. With economic difficulties came political and strategic insecurity. First came the belief that the tide of history was with the Soviet Union. Soviet leaders themselves believed the “correlation of forces” favored communism; the American defeat and withdrawal from Vietnam led Soviet officials, for the first time, to believe they might actually “win” in the long Cold War struggle. A decade later, in 1987, Paul Kennedy depicted both superpowers as suffering from “imperial overstretch,” but suggested that it was entirely possible that the United States would be the first to collapse, following a long historical tradition of exhausted and bankrupt empires. It had crippled itself by spending too much on defense and taking on too many far-flung global responsibilities. But within two years the Berlin Wall fell, and two years after that the Soviet Union collapsed. The decline turned out to be taking place elsewhere. THEN THERE WAS the miracle economy of Japan. A “rise of the rest” began in the late 1970s and continued over the next decade and a half, as Japan, along with the other “Asian tigers,” South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, seemed about to eclipse the United States economically. In 1989, the journalist James Fallows argued that the Japanese state-directed economy was plainly superior to the more laissez-faire capitalism of the United States and was destined to surpass it. Japan was to be the next superpower. While the United States had bankrupted itself fighting the Cold War, the Japanese had been busy taking all the marbles. As the analyst Chalmers Johnson put it in 1995, “The Cold War is over, and Japan won.” Even as Johnson typed those words, the Japanese economy was spiraling downward into a period of stagnation from which it has still not recovered. With the Soviet Union gone and China yet to demonstrate the staying power of its economic boom, the United States suddenly appeared to be the world’s “sole superpower.” Yet even then it was remarkable how unsuccessful the United States was in dealing with many serious global problems. The Americans won the Gulf War, expanded NATO eastward, eventually brought peace to the Balkans, after much bloodshed, and, through most of the 1990s, led much of the world to embrace the “Washington consensus” on economics—but some of these successes began to unravel, and were matched by equally significant failures. The Washington consensus began to collapse with the Asian financial crisis of 1997, where American prescriptions were widely regarded as mistaken and damaging. The United States failed to stop or even significantly to retard the nuclear weapons programs of North Korea and Iran, despite repeatedly declaring its intention to do so. The sanctions regime imposed against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was both futile and, by the end of the decade, collapsing. The United States, and the world, did nothing to prevent the genocide in Rwanda, partly because a year earlier the United States had been driven out of Somalia after a failed military intervention. One of the most important endeavors of the United States in the 1990s was the effort to support a transition in post-Soviet Russia to democracy and free-market capitalism. But despite providing billions of dollars and endless amounts of advice and expertise, the United States found events in Russia once again to be beyond its control. Nor were American leaders, even in the supposed heyday of global predominance, any more successful in solving the Israeli-Palestinian problem than they are today. Even with a booming economy and a well-liked president earnestly working to achieve a settlement, the Clinton administration came up empty-handed. As the former Middle East peace negotiator Aaron David Miller recounts, Bill Clinton “cared more about and invested more time and energy in Arab-Israeli peace over a longer period of time than any of his predecessors,” and was admired and appreciated by both Israelis and Palestinians—and yet he held “three summits within six months and fail[ed] at every one.” Clinton’s term ended with the collapse of peace talks and the beginning of the second Palestinian intifada. Even popularity was elusive in the 1990s. In 1999, Samuel P. Huntington labeled America the “lonely superpower,” widely hated across the globe for its “intrusive, interventionist, exploitative, unilateralist, hegemonic, hypocritical” behavior. The French foreign minister decried the “hyperpower” and openly yearned for a “multipolar” world in which the United States would no longer be dominant. A British diplomat told Huntington: “One reads about the world’s desire for American leadership only in the United States. Everywhere else one reads about American arrogance and unilateralism.” THIS WAS NONSENSE, of course. Contrary to the British diplomat’s claim, many other countries did look to the United States for leadership, and for protection and support, in the 1990s and throughout the Cold War. The point is not that America always lacked global influence. From World War II onward, the United States was indeed the predominant power in the world. It wielded enormous influence, more than any great power since Rome, and it accomplished much. But it was not omnipotent—far from it. If we are to gauge accurately whether the United States is currently in decline, we need to have a reasonable baseline from which to measure. To compare American influence today with a mythical past of overwhelming dominance can only mislead us. Today the United States lacks the ability to have its way on many issues, but this has not prevented it from enjoying just as much success, and suffering just as much failure, as in the past. For all the controversy, the United States has been more successful in Iraq than it was in Vietnam. It has been just as incapable of containing Iranian nuclear ambitions as it was in the 1990s, but it has, through the efforts of two administrations, established a more effective global counter-proliferation network. Its efforts to root out and destroy Al Qaeda have been remarkably successful, especially when compared with the failures to destroy terrorist networks and stop terrorist attacks in the 1990s—failures that culminated in the attacks of September 11. The ability to employ drones is an advance over the types of weaponry—cruise missiles and air strikes—that were used to target terrorists and facilities in previous decades. Meanwhile America’s alliances in Europe remain healthy; it is certainly not America’s fault that Europe itself seems weaker than it once was. American alliances in Asia have arguably grown stronger over the past few years, and the United States has been able to strengthen relations with India that had previously been strained. So the record is mixed, but it has always been mixed. There have been moments when the United States was more influential than today and moments when it was less influential. The exertion of influence has always been a struggle, which may explain why, in every single decade since the end of World War II, Americans have worried about their declining influence and looked nervously as other powers seemed to be rising at their expense. The difficulties in shaping the international environment in any era are immense. Few powers even attempt it, and even the strongest rarely achieve all or even most of their goals. Foreign policy is like hitting a baseball: if you fail 70 percent of the time, you go to the Hall of Fame.

#### **The US is sustainable—rebound**

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PERHAPS THE GREATEST concern underlying the declinist mood at large in the country today is not really whether the United States can afford to continue playing its role in the world. It is whether the Americans are capable of solving any of their most pressing economic and social problems. As many statesmen and commentators have asked, can Americans do what needs to be done to compete effectively in the twenty-first-century world? The only honest answer is, who knows? If American history is any guide, however, there is at least some reason to be hopeful. Americans have experienced this unease before, and many previous generations have also felt this sense of lost vigor and lost virtue: as long ago as 1788, Patrick Henry lamented the nation’s fall from past glory, “when the American spirit was in its youth.” There have been many times over the past two centuries when the political system was dysfunctional, hopelessly gridlocked, and seemingly unable to find solutions to crushing national problems—from slavery and then Reconstruction, to the dislocations of industrialization at the end of the nineteenth century and the crisis of social welfare during the Great Depression, to the confusions and paranoia of the early Cold War years. Anyone who honestly recalls the 1970s, with Watergate, Vietnam, stagflation, and the energy crisis, cannot really believe that our present difficulties are unrivaled. Success in the past does not guarantee success in the future. But one thing does seem clear from the historical evidence: the American system, for all its often stultifying qualities, has also shown a greater capacity to adapt and recover from difficulties than many other nations, including its geopolitical competitors. This undoubtedly has something to do with the relative freedom of American society, which rewards innovators, often outside the existing power structure, for producing new ways of doing things; and with the relatively open political system of America, which allows movements to gain steam and to influence the behavior of the political establishment. The American system is slow and clunky in part because the Founders designed it that way, with a federal structure, checks and balances, and a written Constitution and Bill of Rights—but the system also possesses a remarkable ability to undertake changes just when the steam kettle looks about to blow its lid. There are occasional “critical elections” that allow transformations to occur, providing new political solutions to old and apparently insoluble problems. Of course, there are no guarantees: the political system could not resolve the problem of slavery without war. But on many big issues throughout their history, Americans have found a way of achieving and implementing a national consensus. When Paul Kennedy was marveling at the continuing success of the American superpower back in 2002, he noted that one of the main reasons had been the ability of Americans to overcome what had appeared to him in 1987 as an insoluble long-term economic crisis. American businessmen and politicians “reacted strongly to the debate about ‘decline’ by taking action: cutting costs, making companies leaner and meaner, investing in newer technologies, promoting a communications revolution, trimming government deficits, all of which helped to produce significant year-on-year advances in productivity.” It is possible to imagine that Americans may rise to this latest economic challenge as well. It is also reasonable to expect that other nations will, as in the past, run into difficulties of their own. None of the nations currently enjoying economic miracles is without problems. Brazil, India, Turkey, and Russia all have bumpy histories that suggest the route ahead will not be one of simple and smooth ascent. There is a real question whether the autocratic model of China, which can be so effective in making some strategic decisions about the economy in the short term, can over the long run be flexible enough to permit adaptation to a changing international economic, political, and strategic environment. In sum: it may be more than good fortune that has allowed the United States in the past to come through crises and emerge stronger and healthier than other nations while its various competitors have faltered. And it may be more than just wishful thinking to believe that it may do so again.

### Psychology Indicts

#### Hegemony is not in terminal decline—their authors are prone to cycles of beliefs ingrained into their psychology

**Nye 12** [Joseph S. Nye, Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, “The Twenty-First Century Will Not Be a “Post-American” World”, Journal Article, International Studies Quarterly, volume 56, issue 1, pages 215-217, March 2012]

**Layne** is correct that such views reflect the slow growth and fiscal problems that followed the 2008 financial crisis, but one **should be wary of extrapolating long-run trends from short-term cycles**. Such **moods are not historically unprecedented**. **Americans have a long history of incorrectly estimating their power. After Sputnik, the Soviets were 10 feet tall; in the 1980s, it was the Japanese. Now it is the Chinese**. Layne is also right that enthusiasts for the “unipolar moment” badly overestimated American power a decade ago, but not all skeptics about American decline believed in American hegemony. For example, I argued in The Paradox of American Power that the prevailing concepts of polarity and hegemony led to confused analysis and poor policies. After the collapse of Cold War bipolarity, **power** in the global information age became distributed in a pattern that **resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game**. **On the top chessboard, military power is largely unipolar**, and **the United States is likely to retain primacy** for quite some time. But **on the middle chessboard, economic power has been multi-polar for more than a decade** (well before the 2008 financial crisis that Layne cites), with the United States, Europe, Japan, and China as the major players, and others gaining in importance. **The bottom chessboard is the realm of transnational relations that cross borders outside of government control**. It includes nonstate actors as diverse as bankers electronically transferring funds, terrorists transferring weapons, hackers threatening cyber-security, and threats such as pandemics and climate change. On this bottom board, power is widely diffused, and it makes no sense to speak of unipolarity, multipolarity, or hegemony. Hegemony (which Layne does not define here) is a confusing term. Some authors define it in terms of resources; others in terms of behavioral outcomes. But power measured in resources rarely equals power measured in behavioral outcomes. For example, **many analysts point to the current inability of the United States to control states like Iran or Afghanistan, but they allow the golden glow of the past to color their diagnosis of declining hegemony**. **After World War II, the United States had an overwhelming preponderance or “hegemony” measured in economic power and nuclear weapons resources, but nonetheless was unable to prevent the “loss” of China, to “rollback” communism in Eastern Europe, prevent stalemate in the Korean War, stop the “loss” of North Vietnam, or dislodge the Castro regime in Cuba**. “**Hegemony” is** often **illusory, and cycles of belief in decline tell us more about psychology than real shifts in power resources**.

### Self-Fulfilling Prophecy Indict

#### Rhetoric surrounding the inevitability of hegemonic decline produces a self fullfilling prophecy which creates the only scenario for collapse

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BUT THERE IS a danger. It is that in the meantime, while the nation continues to struggle, Americans may convince themselves that decline is indeed inevitable, or that the United States can take a time-out from its global responsibilities while it gets its own house in order. To many Americans, accepting decline may provide a welcome escape from the moral and material burdens that have weighed on them since World War II. Many may unconsciously yearn to return to the way things were in 1900, when the United States was rich, powerful, and not responsible for world order. The underlying assumption of such a course is that the present world order will more or less persist without American power, or at least with much less of it; or that others can pick up the slack; or simply that the benefits of the world order are permanent and require no special exertion by anyone. Unfortunately, the present world order—with its widespread freedoms, its general prosperity, and its absence of great power conflict—is as fragile as it is unique. Preserving it has been a struggle in every decade, and will remain a struggle in the decades to come. Preserving the present world order requires constant American leadership and constant American commitment. In the end, the decision is in the hands of Americans. Decline, as Charles Krauthammer has observed, is a choice. It is not an inevitable fate—at least not yet. Empires and great powers rise and fall, and the only question is when. But the when does matter. Whether the United States begins to decline over the next two decades or not for another two centuries will matter a great deal, both to Americans and to the nature of the world they live in.

### Sensationalism Indict

#### Characterizations of decline are sensationalist – only the sign of a septagonal alliance that does not necessitate US decline

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The world balance of power is changing. Countries like China, India, Turkey and Brazil are heard from more frequently and on a wider range of subjects. The European Union's most ambitious global project—creating a universal treaty to reduce carbon emissions—has collapsed, and EU expansion has slowed to a crawl as Europe turns inward to deal with its debt crisis. Japan has ceded its place as the largest economy in Asia to China and appears increasingly on the defensive in the region as China's hard and soft power grow. The international chattering class has a label for these changes: American decline. The dots look so connectable: The financial crisis, say the pundits, comprehensively demonstrated the failure of "Anglo-Saxon" capitalism. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have sapped American strength and, allegedly, destroyed America's ability to act in the Middle East. China-style "state capitalism" is all the rage. Throw in the assertive new powers and there you have it—the portrait of Americain decline. Actually, what's been happening is just as fateful but much more complex. The United States isn't in decline, but it is in the midst of a major rebalancing. The alliances and coalitions America built in the Cold War no longer suffice for the tasks ahead. As a result, under both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, American foreign policy has been moving toward the creation of new, sometimes difficult partnerships as it retools for the tasks ahead. From the 1970s to the start of this decade, the world was in what future historians may call the Trilateral Era. In the early '70s, Americans responded to the defeat in Vietnam and the end of the Bretton Woods era by inviting key European allies and Japan to join in the creation of a trilateral system. Western Europe, Japan and the U.S. accounted for an overwhelming proportion of the international economy in the noncommunist world. With overlapping interests on a range of issues, the trilateral powers were able to set the global agenda on some key questions. Currency policy, the promotion of free trade, integrating the developing world into the global financial system, assisting the transition of Warsaw Pact economies into the Western World—the trilateralists had a lot to show for their efforts. Enlarge Image Corbis The system worked particularly well for America. Europe and Japan shared a basic commitment to the type of world order that Americans wanted, and so a more cooperative approach to key policy questions enlisted the support of rich and powerful allies for efforts that tallied pretty closely with key long-term American goals. It is this trilateral system—rather than American power per se—that is in decline today. Western Europe and Japan were seen as rising powers in the 1970s, and the assumption was that the trilateral partnership would become more powerful and effective as time passed. Something else happened instead. Demographically and economically, both Japan and Europe stagnated. The free-trade regime and global investment system promoted growth in the rest of Asia more than in Japan. Europe, turning inward to absorb the former Warsaw Pact nations, made the fateful blunder of embracing the euro rather than a more aggressive program of reform in labor markets, subsidies and the like. The result today is that the trilateral partnership can no longer serve as the only or perhaps even the chief set of relationships through which the U.S. can foster a liberal world system. Turkey, increasingly turning away from Europe, is on the road to becoming a more effective force in the Middle East than is the EU. China and India are competing to replace the Europeans as the most important non-U.S. economic actor in Africa. In Latin America, Europe's place as the second most important economic and political partner (after the U.S.) is also increasingly taken by China. The U.S. will still be a leading player, but in a septagonal, not a trilateral, world. In addition to Europe and Japan, China, India, Brazil and Turkey are now on Washington's speed dial. (Russia isn't sure whether it wants to join or sulk; negotiations continue.) New partnerships make for rough sledding. Over the years, the trilateral countries gradually learned how to work with each other—and how to accommodate one another's needs. These days, the Septarchs have to work out a common approach. It won't be easy, and success won't be total. But even in the emerging world order, the U.S. is likely to have much more success in advancing its global agenda than many think. Washington is hardly unique in wanting a liberal world system of open trade, freedom of the seas, enforceable rules of contract and protection for foreign investment. What began as a largely American vision for the post-World War II world will continue to attract support and move forward into the 21st century—and Washington will remain the chairman of a larger board. Despite all the talk of American decline, the countries that face the most painful changes are the old trilateral partners. Japan must live with a disturbing rival presence, China, in a region that, with American support, it once regarded as its backyard. In Europe, countries that were once global imperial powers must accept another step in their long retreat from empire. For American foreign policy, the key now is to enter deep strategic conversations with our new partners—without forgetting or neglecting the old. The U.S. needs to build a similar network of relationships and institutional linkages that we built in postwar Europe and Japan and deepened in the trilateral years. Think tanks, scholars, students, artists, bankers, diplomats and military officers need to engage their counterparts in each of these countries as we work out a vision for shared prosperity in the new century. The American world vision isn't powerful because it is American; it is powerful because it is, for all its limits and faults, the best way forward. This is why the original trilateral partners joined the U.S. in promoting it a generation ago, and why the world's rising powers will rally to the cause today.

### Paralysis Indict

#### No Decline now – your authors are just declinists spreading paralyzing analysis – soft power up now – its good

Bev 12 (Jennie, A professional communications specialist and writer with over 900 articles and 80+ reports published + a regular columnist to Forbes Indonesia, The Jakarta Post, and Strategic Review. She is an Associate Partner of Fortune PR Indonesia, The Power of American "Soft Power", <http://www.forbes.com/sites/85broads/2012/05/23/the-power-of-american-soft-power/2/>)

Almost four years since the beginning of the Great Recession, signified by the implosion of the financial industry and the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the United States is recovering. In fact, some sectors have grown to new heights. Thus, a “declining USA” is no more than a myth. This myth is likely to continue for a while despite the recession officially ending in June 2009 as the high unemployment and on-going foreclosure crisis have cloaked significant economic improvements. In the last four years, declinism and declinists have been spreading paralyzing dystopian analyses. Combine this with Nouriel “Dr. Doom” Roubini’s “the perfect storm” forecast in 2013 and you probably would become even more paralyzed. Daniel Gross’ best-selling book Better, Stronger, Faster released in May 2012 is an exception. It is probably one of the first books that presents encouraging facts in this recovery period rather than discouraging views of America’s future. The mammoth has gotten back up, but it is always the memory of one’s fall that lingers in mind. We all remember that one fateful day when we attended the 341(a) bankruptcy hearing to meet creditors and not the thousands of days of financial stability. Just like we all remember vividly the day our loved one was buried six-feet under when he died and not the beautiful decades he shared his life with us. Failure and losing hurt, thus they are recorded for eternity in our long-term memory. It is just how our brain works, thanks to millions of years of evolution. The world was so shocked with the fall of USA, that its gradual rise hasn’t yet created a lasting mental image. Good news, American “soft power” is more powerful than any fiscal policy and political maneuver. Joseph Nye of Harvard University Kennedy School of Government says “soft power” refers to the ability to get through attraction rather than coercion or payments. By “to get” it means to receive favorable treatments based upon attractiveness of a country’s culture, ideals, and policies. For instance, inspired by TV series about medical doctors, some children in Taiwan aspire to study medicine at an American university. Infatuated by the idea of a fair trial, an Indonesian dissident aspires to become a lawyer. “Soft power” can be hardcore power. And the American brand is still the best out there. Also, thanks to low US dollar value, a record 62 million foreign tourists visited USA in 2011. In 2010, some 1.04 million immigrants applied for permanent residency, following 1.13 million in the previous year, which reflects the world’s insatiable faith in the US brand. The people of the world still believe that the USA is the place to visit, to reside, and to prosper.US brands, such as automobile giants Buick, GM, and Ford, continue to grow outside of the USA. US brands continue to influence socio-political-economic wellbeing of people of the world: Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube are vital in demonstrations and social unrests. US brands continue to serve people’s mobility and communication: Apple, Microsoft, CISCO, Oracle, and Boeing. People of the world is a market of seven-billion, and most of them have occasionally consumed black soda drinks called Coca-Cola and Pepsi. The US government has lost its geopolitical epicenter, yet American brands keep the legend alive. And the shift has occurred from public power to private power, from political power to economic power, from hard power to soft power, with the end of the Cold War as the turning point. The recent approval of the JOBS Act in April 2012 may as well pick up where the failure of previous policies have left, as its intention is creating an encouraging environment for growth of startup companies through more efficient and lenient procedures of capital raising, including crowdsourcing, venture capitalizing, and angel investing. And it is expected that every new investment would create at least six new jobs. I can see the greatness of American brands supported by the JOBS Act creating another shift in economic recovery, as once again a policy is providing a conducive environment for growth, just like when Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999. Now the question is: How far will the JOBS Act’s ripple effect go? And which direction does it go? North or south? Growth, stagnation, or decadence? Still, I believe in the power of “USA” as a brand and American brands. The world loves us.

### AT: Economy

#### Heg is sustainable—this answers their Debt, the dollar, and political gridlock arguments

**Nye 12** [Joseph S. Nye, Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, “The Twenty-First Century Will Not Be a “Post-American” World”, Journal Article, International Studies Quarterly, volume 56, issue 1, pages 215-217, March 2012]

Layne sees the current financial situation of the United States as proof of decline—even though the 2011 downgrading of America’s credit rating by Standard and Poors led to an increase rather than a decrease in bondholders’ desire to purchase US treasury bonds. Similarly, Layne refers to “China’s vote of no confidence in the dollar’s future,” but there is a gap between Chinese declaratory and practical policy. Despite its various declarations, China continues to hold dollars and is a long way from internationalization of the renminbi.

The United States has very real problems and certainly needs to deal with its debt and deficit problems, but the American economy remains highly productive. America remains first in total R&D expenditures, first in university rankings, first in Nobel prizes, first on indices of entrepreneurship, and according to the World Economic Forum, the fifth most competitive economy in the world (China ranks 26th). Moreover, the United States remains at the forefront of such cutting-edge technologies as bio-tech and nano-technology. This is hardly a picture of absolute economic decline such as in ancient Rome.

Some observers worry that America will become sclerotic like Britain at the peak of its power a century ago. But American culture is far more entrepreneurial and decentralized than was that of Britain where the sons of industrial entrepreneurs sought aristocratic titles and honors in London. And despite recurrent historical bouts of concern, immigration helps keep America flexible. In 2005, foreign-born immigrants had participated in one of every four technology start-ups in the previous decade. As Lee Kwan Yew once told me, China can draw on a talent pool of 1.3 billion people, while the United States can not only draw on a pool of 7 billion people, but can also recombine them in a diverse culture that enhances creativity in a way that ethnic Han nationalism cannot.

Many commentators worry about the inefficient American political system. It is true that the founding fathers created a system of checks and balances to preserve liberties at the price of efficiency. Moreover, the United States is now going through a period where party politics have become very polarized, but nasty politics is nothing new; it goes all the way back to the founding fathers. American government and politics have always had problems—and, though it is hard to remember in light of the current melodramas, sometimes worse than today.

The United States faces serious problems regarding debt, secondary education, and political gridlock, but one should remember that they are only part of the picture. In principle, and over a longer term, there are solutions to current American problems. Of course, such solutions may forever remain out of reach. But it is worth distinguishing situations where there are no solutions from those which could in principle be solved.

#### China won’t abandon the dollar—it’s too weak

**Nye 7/26** [Interview by Zachary Keck, Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, “The Interview: Joseph S. Nye”, http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/26/the-interview-joseph-s-nye/, July 26, 2012]

As I argue in The Future of Power, some analysts mistakenly think China can bring America to its knees by dumping its large holdings of dollars, but that asymmetry is balanced by another, China’s dependence on access to American markets for the success of its export led growth model. If China dumped its dollars, it could bring the U.S. to its knees but would bring itself to its ankles. If rising labor costs were to make Chinese goods less competitive, and if China were able to truly change its growth model to one based on domestic consumers, it would depend less on the American market and the balance of asymmetries and thus bargaining power would be affected. But this is not likely to happen soon.

### AT: China

#### Theorists exaggerate Chinese power

**Nye 12** [Joseph S. Nye, Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, “The Twenty-First Century Will Not Be a “Post-American” World”, Journal Article, International Studies Quarterly, volume 56, issue 1, pages 215-217, March 2012]

It is a mistake, however, to exaggerate Chinese power. For more than a decade, many have viewed China as the most likely contender to balance American power, or surpass it. Some draw analogies to the challenge imperial Germany posed to Britain at the beginning of the last century, though Germany surpassed Britain in 1900, and China has a long way to go to equal the power resources of the United States.

Even when the overall Chinese GDP passes that of the United States, the two economies will be equivalent in size, but not equal in composition. China would still have a vast, underdeveloped countryside, and it will begin to face demographic problems from the delayed effects of its one-child-per-couple policy. As the Chinese say, they fear the country will grow old before it grows rich. Per capita income provides a measure of the sophistication of an economy. China will probably not equal the United States in per capita income until sometime near the middle of the century. In other words, China’s impressive growth rate combined with the size of its population will likely lead it to pass the American economy in total size, but that is not the same as equality.

Moreover, linear projections can be misleading, and growth rates generally slow as economies reach higher levels of development. China’s authoritarian political system has thus far shown an impressive power conversion capability, but whether China can maintain that capability over the longer term is a mystery both to outsiders and to Chinese leaders. Unlike India, which was born with a democratic constitution, China has not yet found a way to solve the problem of demands for political participation (if not democracy) that tend to accompany rising per capita income. Whether China can develop a formula that can manage an expanding urban middle class, regional inequality, and resentment among ethnic minorities remains to be seen.

On American power relative to China, much will depend on the often underestimated uncertainties of future political change in China. China’s size and high rate of economic growth will bring it closer to the United States in power resources, and this can be described as a relative decline of American power compared to China, but that does not necessarily mean that China will surpass the United States as the most powerful country. Even if China suffers no major domestic political setback, many current projections are based simply on GDP growth. They ignore US military and soft-power advantages, as well as China’s geopolitical disadvantages. As Japan, India, and others try to balance Chinese power, they welcome an American presence. It is as if Mexico and Canada sought a Chinese alliance to balance the United States in North America.

The fact that Chinese power in Asia is contested both by India and Japan (as well as other states) provides a major power advantage to the United States. The US–Japan alliance and the improvement in US–Indian relations mean that China cannot easily expel the Americans. From that position of strength, the United States, Japan, India, Australia, and others can work to engage China and provide incentives for it to play a responsible role, while hedging against the possibility of aggressive behavior as China’s power grows. In other words, it will be possible to use our power to shape the environment in which China defines its national interests as it grows. This is a more complex process than the institutional “lock-in” negotiations that Layne caricatures and then asks “what’s in it for China.”

#### China is in a Chinese padlock

Kagan 12 (Robert, is an American historian, author and foreign policy commentator at the Brookings Institution. He is a co-founder of the now-defunct neoconservative political organization Project for the New American Century, Not Fade Away: The myth of American decline, <http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?page=0,0>)

The challenges today are great, and the rise of China is the most obvious of them. But they are not greater than the challenges the United States faced during the Cold War. Only in retrospect can the Cold War seem easy. Americans at the end of World War II faced a major strategic crisis. The Soviet Union, if only by virtue of its size and location, seemed to threaten vital strategic centers in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. In all these regions, it confronted nations devastated and prostrate from the war. To meet this challenge, the United States had to project its own power, which was great but limited, into each of those regions. It had to form alliances with local powers, some of them former enemies, and provide them with economic, political, and military assistance to help them stand on their own feet and resist Soviet pressure. In the Cold War, the Soviets wielded influence and put pressure on American interests merely by standing still, while the United States had to scramble. It is worth recalling that this strategy of “containment,” now hallowed by its apparent success, struck some influential observers at the time as entirely unworkable. Walter Lippmann attacked it as “misconceived,” based on “hope,” conceding the “strategic initiative” to the Soviets while the United States exhausted its resources trying to establish “satellite states, puppet governments” that were weak, ineffective, and unreliable.Today, in the case of China, the situation is reversed. Although China is and will be much richer, and will wield greater economic influence in the world than the Soviet Union ever did, its geostrategic position is more difficult. World War II left China in a comparatively weak position from which it has been working hard to recover ever since. Several of its neighbors are strong nations with close ties to the United States. It will have a hard time becoming a regional hegemon so long as Taiwan remains independent and strategically tied to the United States, and so long as strong regional powers such as Japan, Korea, and Australia continue to host American troops and bases. China would need at least a few allies to have any chance of pushing the United States out of its strongholds in the western Pacific, but right now it is the United States that has the allies. It is the United States that has its troops deployed in forward bases. It is the United States that currently enjoys naval predominance in the key waters and waterways through which China must trade. Altogether, China’s task as a rising great power, which is to push the United States out of its present position, is much harder than America’s task, which is only to hold on to what it has.

### AT: US = Britain

#### The US will not go down like the British—multiple warrants

**Nye 12** [Joseph S. Ny0065, Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, “The Twenty-First Century Will Not Be a “Post-American” World”, Journal Article, International Studies Quarterly, volume 56, issue 1, pages 215-217, March 2012]

 The analogy with British decline is misleading. Britain had naval supremacy and an empire on which the sun never set, but in 1914, Britain ranked only fourth among the great powers in its share of military personnel, fourth in GDP, and third in military spending. With the rise of nationalism, protecting the empire became more of a burden than an asset. For all the loose talk of American empire, the United States is less tethered and has more degrees of freedom than Britain had. And while Britain faced rising neighbors in Germany and Russia, America benefits from two oceans and weaker neighbors.

### AT: Emerging Powers

#### **Afforts to counterbalance the US fail before they can overthrow the US.**

Wholforth 7 (William C.- Assistant Professor of International Relations in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. The MIT Press Journal- “The Stability of a Unipolar World”. <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/wohlforthvol24no1.pdf> Sep. 5, 2007)

Third, the current unipolarity is not only peaceful but durable.11 It is already a decade old, and if Washington plays its cards right, it may last as long as bipolarity. For many decades, no state is likely to be in a position to take on the United States in any of the underlying elements of power And, as an offshore power separated by two oceans from all other major states, the United States can retain its advantages without risking a counterbalance\* The current candidates for polar status (Japan, China, Germany, and Russia) are not so lucky. Efforts on their part to increase their power or ally with other dissatisfied states are likely to spark local counterbalances well before they can create a global equipoise to U.S. power. The scholarly conventional wisdom holds that unipolarity is dynamically unstable and that any slight overstep by Washington will spark a dangerous backlash\*12 1 find the opposite to be true: unipolarity is durable and peaceful, and the chief threat is U.S. failure to do enough.13 Possessing an undisputed preponderance of power, the United States is freer than most states to disregard the international system and its incentives. But because the system is built around US. power, it creates demands for American engagement\* The more efficiently Washington responds to these incentives and provides order, the more long-lived and peaceful the system. To be sure, policy choices are likely to affect the differential growth of power only at the margins. But given that unipolarity is safer and cheaper than bipolarity or multipolarity, it pays to invest in its prolongation. In short, the intellectual thrust (if not the details) of the Pentagon's 1992 draft defense guidance plan was right\* I develop these propositions in three sections that establish my central argument: the current system is unipolar; the current unipolarity is peaceful; and it is durable\* I then conclude the analysis by discussing its implications for scholarly debates on the stability of the post-Cold War order and U.S. grand strategy.

### AT: Overstretch

#### Layne is wrong about imperial overstretch—defense expenditures as a share of GDP has decreased since the cold war

**Nye 12** [Joseph S. Nye, Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, “The Twenty-First Century Will Not Be a “Post-American” World”, Journal Article, International Studies Quarterly, volume 56, issue 1, pages 215-217, March 2012]

It is currently fashionable to compare American “hegemonic decline” to that of Britain or imperial Rome. It would be ahistorical to believe that the United States will have a preponderant share of power resources forever. However, the word “decline” mixes up two different dimensions: absolute decline in the sense of decay, and relative decline in which the power resources of other states grow greater or are used more effectively. Rome, an agrarian society with little economic productivity and much internecine warfare, succumbed not to the rise of another empire but to absolute decay, while Britain declined relative to the rise of new powers such as Germany and the United States. And the “declinists” of the 1980s whose theories Layne tries to rescue developed a theory of “imperial overstretch” in which defense expenditures constantly increase as a share of GDP until the “hegemon” collapses. This theory helps explain the collapse of the Soviet Union where defense expenditures eventually exceeded 20% of GDP, but in the United States, despite two ill-advised wars in the past decade, defense expenditure at 6% has decreased from its Cold War levels of 10%.

### AT: Soft Power

#### We never had non-military influence – heg is key

Kagan 12 (Robert, is an American historian, author and foreign policy commentator at the Brookings Institution. He is a co-founder of the now-defunct neoconservative political organization Project for the New American Century, Not Fade Away: The myth of American decline, <http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?page=0,0>)

IF THE UNITED STATES is not suffering decline in these basic measures of power, isn’t it true that its influence has diminished, that it is having a harder time getting its way in the world? The almost universal assumption is that the United States has indeed lost influence. Whatever the explanation may be—American decline, the “rise of the rest,” the apparent failure of the American capitalist model, the dysfunctional nature of American politics, the increasing complexity of the international system—it is broadly accepted that the United States can no longer shape the world to suit its interests and ideals as it once did. Every day seems to bring more proof, as things happen in the world that seem both contrary to American interests and beyond American control. And of course it is true that the United States is not able to get what it wants much of the time. But then it never could. Much of today’s impressions about declining American influence are based on a nostalgic fallacy: that there was once a time when the United States could shape the whole world to suit its desires, and could get other nations to do what it wanted them to do, and, as the political scientist Stephen M. Walt put it, “manage the politics, economics and security arrangements for nearly the entire globe.” If we are to gauge America’s relative position today, it is important to recognize that this image of the past is an illusion. There never was such a time. We tend to think back on the early years of the Cold War as a moment of complete American global dominance. They were nothing of the sort. The United States did accomplish extraordinary things in that era: the Marshall Plan, the NATO alliance, the United Nations, and the Bretton Woods economic system all shaped the world we know today. Yet for every great achievement in the early Cold War, there was at least one equally monumental setback. During the Truman years, there was the triumph of the Communist Revolution in China in 1949, which American officials regarded as a disaster for American interests in the region and which did indeed prove costly; if nothing else, it was a major factor in spurring North Korea to attack the South in 1950. But as Dean Acheson concluded, “the ominous result of the civil war in China” had proved “beyond the control of the ... United States,” the product of “forces which this country tried to influence but could not.” A year later came the unanticipated and unprepared-for North Korean attack on South Korea, and America’s intervention, which, after more than 35,000 American dead and almost 100,000 wounded, left the situation almost exactly as it had been before the war. In 1949, there came perhaps the worst news of all: the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb and the end of the nuclear monopoly on which American military strategy and defense budgeting had been predicated.

#### Soft Power is a lie

Kagan 12 (Robert, is an American historian, author and foreign policy commentator at the Brookings Institution. He is a co-founder of the now-defunct neoconservative political organization Project for the New American Century, Not Fade Away: The myth of American decline, <http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?page=0,0>)

A year later, NSC-68, the famous strategy document, warned of the growing gap between America’s military strength and its global strategic commitments. If current trends continued, it declared, the result would be “a serious decline in the strength of the free world relative to the Soviet Union and its satellites.” The “integrity and vitality of our system,” the document stated, was “in greater jeopardy than ever before in our history.” Douglas MacArthur, giving the keynote address at the Republican National Convention in 1952, lamented the “alarming change in the balance of world power,” “the rising burden of our fiscal commitments,” the ascendant power of the Soviet Union, “and our own relative decline.” In 1957, the Gaither Commission reported that the Russian economy was growing at a much faster pace than that of the United States and that by 1959 Russia would be able to hit American soil with one hundred intercontinental ballistic missiles, prompting Sam Rayburn, the speaker of the House, to ask, “What good are a sound economy and a balanced budget if we lose our national lives and Russian rubles become the coin of the land?” Nor was the United States always able to persuade others, even its closest allies, to do what it wanted, or to refrain from doing what it did not want. In 1949, Acheson tried and failed to prevent European allies, including the British, from recognizing Communist China. In 1954, the Eisenhower administration failed to get its way at the Geneva Conference on Vietnam and refused to sign the final accords. Two years later it tried to prevent the British, the French, and the Israelis from invading Egypt over the closure of the Suez Canal, only to see them launch an invasion without so much as a heads-up to Washington. When the United States confronted China over the islands of Quemoy and Matsu, the Eisenhower administration tried and failed to get a show of support from European allies, prompting John Foster Dulles to fear that NATO was “beginning to fall apart.” By the late 1950s, Mao believed the United States was a superpower in decline, “afraid of taking on new involvements in the Third World and increasingly incapable of maintaining its hegemony over the capitalist countries.” BUT WHAT ABOUT “soft power”? Wasn’t it true, as the political scientist Joseph S. Nye Jr. has argued, that the United States used to be able to “get what it wanted in the world” because of the “values expressed” by American culture as reflected through television, movies, and music, and because of the attractiveness of America’s domestic and foreign policies? These elements of soft power made other peoples around the world want to follow the United States, “admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness.” Again, the historical truth is more complicated. During the first three decades after World War II, great portions of the world neither admired the United States nor sought to emulate it, and were not especially pleased at the way it conducted itself in international affairs. Yes, American media were spreading American culture, but they were spreading images that were not always flattering. In the 1950s the world could watch televised images of Joseph McCarthy and the hunt for Communists in the State Department and Hollywood. American movies depicted the suffocating capitalist conformism of the new American corporate culture. Best-selling novels such as The Ugly American painted a picture of American bullying and boorishness. There were the battles over segregation in the 1950s and 1960s, the globally transmitted images of whites spitting at black schoolchildren and police setting their dogs on black demonstrators. (That “used to be us,” too.) The racism of America was practically “ruining” the American global image, Dulles feared, especially in the so-called Third World. In the late 1960s and early 1970s came the Watts riots, the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy, the shootings at Kent State, and then the government-shaking scandal of Watergate. These were not the kinds of images likely to endear the United States to the world, no matter how many Jerry Lewis and Woody Allen movies were playing in Parisian cinemas. Nor did much of the world find American foreign policy especially attractive during these years. Eisenhower yearned “to get some of the people in these down-trodden countries to like us instead of hating us,” but the CIA-orchestrated overthrows of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran and Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala did not help. In 1957, demonstrators attacked the vice president’s motorcade in Venezuela, shouting, “Go away, Nixon!” “Out, dog!” “We won’t forget Guatemala!” In 1960, Khrushchev humiliated Eisenhower by canceling a summit when an American spy plane was shot down over Russia. Later that year, on his way to a “goodwill” visit in Tokyo, Eisenhower had to turn back in mid-flight when the Japanese government warned it could not guarantee his security against students protesting American “imperialism.”

## Misc

### Nye Prodicts

#### Nye is one of the most respected and influential IR theorists worldwide

**Bowen 11** [Andrew Bowen, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of International Relations, Freelance writer, The Majalla, “Power in the 21st Century”, <http://www.majalla.com/eng/2011/07/article4181>, July 2011]

Joseph Nye is one of the world’s most respected and influential scholars on international relations and American foreign policy. Co-founding the school of neoliberalism in international relations with Robert Keohane, and coining the terms “soft power” and “smart power,” Nye has shaped how the world thinks and discusses international affairs. His writings have been a key source of influence for the development of Obama’s foreign policy.¶ Joseph Nye is the University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and the former Dean of the Kennedy School of Government. He currently serves as the North America Chairman of the Trilateral Commission. Nye’s long tenure of government service includes: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Chair of the National Intelligence Council, and Deputy Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science and Technology. He has published over 12 books, including, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Understanding International Conflict, The Powers to Lead, and Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power.

### Parent & MacDonald Indict

#### The Parent and MacDanold article is bad scholarship—it oversimplifies International Relations and doesn’t account for a variety of factors

**Grunstein 11** [Judah Grunstein, World Politics Review's editor-in-chief, Appeared on World Politics Review, the American Prospect online, French Politics, the Small Wars Journal and Foreign Policy online, “Hegemony vs. Restraint in the Debate Over U.S. Defense Cuts”, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/10626/hegemony-vs-restraint-in-the-debate-over-u-s-defense-cuts>, 11/10/2011]

If there's a weakness to both articles, it's that their arguments depend largely on best-case scenarios of outcomes that remain uncertain. As such, the retrenchment they call for represents significant risk to both U.S. interests and the global order, risk that the authors address by assuming it won't materialize. This is especially true for Parent and MacDonald. For instance, they argue that none of our allies in Asia or Europe face territorial threats, certainly true in the sense that total wars of territorial conquest are unimaginable, although Taiwan could be reasonably considered an exception to this rule. Nonetheless, it's safe to assume that China has no desire to occupy Japan or South Korea, and that even if it did, both have sufficient capabilities to deter such an intention. The same holds true for Europe vis à vis Russia. However, the authors don't address the far more relevant threat of "nibbling at the edges" of disputed borders, as in the South China Sea, the Caucasus and even along the China-India border. Nor do they take into serious enough consideration the question of intimidation, because for them, reducing America's forward base structure in East Asia will not mean a reduced U.S. commitment to its regional allies. As a result, it will have no impact on either assuring our friends or on deterring potential rivals. Perhaps, but perhaps not. A U.S. presence means U.S. skin in the game in the event of even an initial outbreak of hostilities. That has a far more visible and concrete impact in terms of assurance and deterrence than the promise of a U.S. riposte to any aggression. Offshore balancing certainly offers the U.S. more strategic flexibility than forward bases, but that very flexibility can create doubt in the minds of both allies and adversaries -- let alone friends that are not allies, such as India, that we are hoping to integrate into a regional security architecture. Parent and MacDonald also assume that a U.S. retrenchment will be orderly, and that any vacuum it creates will be filled by benign powers looking to reinforce and not contest the existing arrangement. Again, perhaps, but perhaps not. It's easy, for both supporters and critics alike, to talk in the abstract about the U.S. global role, while glossing over the concrete and massive nature of that role. As this eye-opening congressional testimony by Vice Adm. Bruce W. Clingan, via Raymond Pritchett, on "a day in the life" of the U.S. Navy shows, the U.S. really is everywhere and in a way that no other power has shown the willingness, let alone the ability, to replace even on a regional scale. When it comes to the U.S. role, there's certainly a lot, and given the financial burdens of this role, there's even too much. But it's hard to say exactly where the fat is. Something's got to give. But does it have to give as abruptly and as drastically as the restraint lobby, of which I also consider myself a member, is now advocating for? It's easy to call out various defense programs, cite their cost overruns and condemn them to the chopping block. But when you have a sense of where each one fits into the intricate scheme of the U.S. -- that is, the global -- security architecture, it's hard to hold back a wince. Finally, many if not all of the supporters of restraint base their argument on a reductionist vision of U.S. interests. But the U.S. simply cannot calculate its national interest as if it were just another nation -- it has assumed too prominent a global role. The reasons for that role were rarely altruistic, but they do create a responsibility to take into consideration our impact on the rest of the world. That means we must deleverage our global security position in the same manner that we deleverage our financial position -- gradually, orderly and responsibly. That might make the process more dangerous for the U.S., but it will most safely salvage the global stability we have for perhaps too long underwritten.