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### Hegemony Bad

#### History proves American hegemony is unsustainable.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2007 “American Empire: A Debate” p 63

States are ever-vigilant when it comes to maintaining their security because they want to survive as independent players in international politics. Up to a point, therefore, it is a good thing for a state to be powerful. But when a state becomes too powerful, it frightens others; in self-defense, they seek to offset and contain those great powers that aspire to primacy. And the ironclad lesson of history is clear: states that bid for hegemony (primacy) invariably fail.As Henry A. Kissinger has said, "hegemonic empires almost automatically elicit universal resistance, which is why all such claimants have sooner or later exhausted themselves."34Indeed, the history of modern international politics is strewn with the geopolitical wreckage of states that bid unsuccesfully for primacy: The Hapsburg Empire under Charles V, France under Louis XI V and Napoleon, Victorian Britain, Germany under Hitler. By pursuing a strategy of primacy, the United States today risks the same fate that has befallen other great powers that have striven to dominate the international political system.

#### Hegemony ensures U.S. involvement in overseas conflicts and nuclear war – withdrawal prevents automatic deployment to honor alliances.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 169

Rather than being instruments of regional pacification, today America's alliances are transmission belts for war that ensure that the U.S. would be embroiled in Eurasian wars. In deciding whether to go war in Eurasia, the United States should not allow its hands to be tied in advance. For example a non—great power war on the Korean Peninsula—even if nuclear weapon were not involved—would be very costly. The dangers of being entangled in a great power war in Eurasia, of course, are even greater, and could expose the American homeland to nuclear attack. An offshore balancing grand strategy would extricate the United States from the danger of being entrapped in Eurasian conflicts by its alliance commitments.

### Hegemony Bad

#### Regional threats ensure balancing behavior – even if the U.S. does not scare states into military buildup, its security guarantee can never be strong enough to dissuade it in all instances.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 151

Up until now, other states have foregone overt counterbalancing because they benefit from American hegemony. However, Washington's ability to provide other major states with collective goods—in both the security and economic spheres—is a wasting asset. Although other states have relied on U.S. security guarantees to protect them against regional rivals and instability, the credibility of America's extended deterrence commitments is increasingly problematic. As other major states experience growing doubts about whether they can count on the United States to protect them, they will move—and, indeed, in some cases already have--to acquire military capabilities so that, if necessary, they can defend themselves without U.S. assistance.67 When other major states build up militarily as a hedge against abandonment by the United States, they open a second avenue to multipolarity. Regardless of how multipolarity comes about—as the result of balancing against the United States, or as a result of others arming themselves as a hedge against regional rivals—the consequences for America's hegemonic grand strategy are the same. Precisely because multipolarity is antithetical to the Open Door world that the United States seeks, the aim of American grand strategy is to prevent the other major powers—even U.S. allies—from gaining autonomy in the realm of security.

### Hegemony Bad

#### Multipolarity is inevitable in a world of either American hegemony or withdrawal – engagement fosters a violent war-filled transition.

Christopher Layne (Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University) 2006 “The Peace of Illusions” p 190

Advocates of hegemony claim that it is illusory to think that the United States can retract its military power safely from Eurasia. The answer to this assertion is that the risks and costs of American grand strategy are growing, and the strategy is not likely to work much longer in any event. As other states—notably China—rapidly close the gap, U.S. hegemony is fated to end in the next decade or two regardless of U.S. efforts to prolong it. At the same time, understandable doubts about the credibility of U.S. security guarantees are driving creeping re-nationalization by America's Eurasian allies, which, in turn, is leading to a reversion to multipolarity. In this changing geopolitical context, the costs of trying to hold on to hegemony are high and going to become higher. Rather than fostering peace and stability in Eurasia, America's military commitments abroad have become a source of insecurity for the United States, because they carry the risk of entrapping the United States in great power Eurasian wars.

#### American withdrawal would be coupled with cooperation with new regional powers – this makes the transition smooth and avoids great power wars – sooner is better than later.

Charles A. Kupchan, Political Science Quarterly, 00323195, Summer 2003, Vol. 118, Issue 2 “The Rise of Europe, America's Changing Internationalism, and the End of U.S. Primacy” Database: Academic Search Premier

As this new century progresses, unipolarity will give way to a world of multiple centers of power. As this transition proceeds, American grand strategy should focus on making both Europe and East Asia less reliant on U.S. power, while at the same time working with major states in both regions to promote collective management of the global system. The ultimate vision that should guide U.S. grand strategy is the construction of a concert-like directorate of the major powers in North America, Europe, and East Asia. These major powers would together manage developments and regulate relations both within and among their respective regions. They would also coordinate efforts in the battle against terrorism, a struggle that will require patience and steady cooperation among many different nations. Regional centers of power also have the potential to facilitate the gradual incorporation of developing nations into global flows of trade, information, and values. Strong and vibrant regional centers, for reasons of both proximity and culture, often have the strongest incentives to promote prosperity and stability in their immediate peripheries. North America might, therefore, focus on Latin America; Europe on Russia, the Middle East, and Africa; and East Asia on South Asia and Southeast Asia. Mustering the political will and the foresight to pursue this vision will be a formidable task. The United States will need to begin ceding influence and autonomy to regions that have grown all too comfortable with American primacy. Neither American leaders, long accustomed to calling the shots, nor leaders in Europe and East Asia, long accustomed to passing the buck, will find the transition an easy one. But it is far wiser and safer to get ahead of the curve and shape structural change by design than to find unipolarity giving way to a chaotic multipolarity by default. It will take a decade, if not two, for a new international system to evolve. But the decisions taken by the United States early in the twenty-first century will play a critical role in determining whether multipolarity reemerges peacefully or brings with it the competitive jockeying that has so frequently been the precursor to great power war in the past.[\*]

### Hegemony Bad

#### Their impact is silly – U.S. engagement actually increases the likelihood of war in Asia and Europe – these areas can easily secure themselves.

Eugene Gholz and Daryl G. Press (doctoral candidates in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology) and Harvey M. Sapolsky (Professor of Public Policy and Organization in the Department of Political Science at M.I.T. and Director of the M.I.T. Defense and Arms Control Studies (DACS) Program Spring 1997 “come home America – the strategy of restraint in the face of temptation” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4

The selective engagers’ strategy is wrong for two reasons. First, selective engagers overstate the effect of U.S. military presence as a positive force for great power peace. In today’s world, disengagement will not cause great power war, and continued engagement will not reliably prevent it. In some circumstances, engagement may actually increase the likelihood of conflict. Second, selective engagers overstate the costs of distant wars and seriously understate the costs and risks of their strategies. Overseas deployments require a large force structure. Even worse, selective engagement will ensure that when a future great power war erupts, the United States will be in the thick of things. Although distant great power wars are bad for America, the only sure path to ruin is to step in the middle of a faraway fight. Selective engagers overstate America’s effect on the likelihood of future great power wars. There is little reason to believe that withdrawal from Europe or Asia would lead to deterrence failures. With or without a forward U.S. presence, America’s major allies have sufficient military strength to deter any potential aggressors. Conflict is far more likely to erupt from a sequence described in the spiral model. The danger of spirals leading to war in East Asia is remote. Spirals happen when states, seeking security, frighten their neighbors. The risk of spirals is great when offense is easier than defense, because any country’s attempt to achieve security will give it an offensive capability against its neighbors. The neighbors’ attempts to eliminate the vulnerability give them fleeting offensive capabilities and tempt them to launch preventive war.71 But Asia, as discussed earlier, is blessed with inherent defensive advantages. Japan and Taiwan are islands, which makes them very difficult to invade. China has a long land border with Russia, but enjoys the protection of the East China Sea, which stands between it and Japan. The expanse of Siberia gives Russia, its ever- trusted ally, strategic depth. South Korea benefits from mountainous terrain which would channel an attacking force from the north. Offense is difficult in East Asia, so spirals should not be acute. In fact, no other region in which great powers interact offers more defensive advantage than East Asia. The prospect for spirals is greater in Europe, but continued U.S. engagement does not reduce that danger; rather, it exacerbates the risk. A West European military union, controlling more than 21 percent of the world’s GDP, may worry Russia. But NATO, with 44 percent of the world’s GDP, is far more threatening, especially if it expands eastward. The more NATO frightens Russia, the more likely it is that Russia will turn dangerously nationalist, redirect its economy toward the military, and try to re-absorb its old buffer states.72 But if the U.S. military were to withdraw from Europe, even Germany, Europe’s strongest advocate for NATO expansion, might become less enthusiastic, because it would be German rather than American troops standing guard on the new borders.

### Hegemony Bad

#### Potential to redeploy solves all of their offense.

Barbara Conry (foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute) 2/5/1997 "U.S. "Global Leadership": A Euphemism for World Policeman" CATO INSTITUTE http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=1126

A more critical issue is the evolution of the international system after U.S. hegemony. Washington can exert considerable influence (though not full control) over the development of that system. Although a number of different scenarios may be acceptable to the United States, Washington should make certain that any global system that succeeds American hegemony has two important characteristics. First, international power and responsibility must be decentralized; the transfer of U.S. global influence and responsibilities to another state, alliance, or global organization such as the United Nations should not be permitted. It is as unrealistic to base the international system on the illusion that some other country or international organization can effectively lead the world as it is to depend on U.S. global leadership. Second, the international system must include a means of checking aspiring hegemons. Regional Security Organizations Such a system could take several forms. One possibility is the strengthening of regional security organizations, such as the Western European Union. Regional security organizations are an effective way of keeping order among member states and can also take care of contingencies in their general areas. Had the European countries not been so dependent on NATO, for example, the WEU should have been able to subdue the crisis in the former Yugoslavia if the conflict had been perceived as a wider threat to Europe. Regional organizations could also serve as potential partners to the United States in the event of a serious threat to their mutual interests elsewhere in the world. Unfortunately, regional security organizations require a high degree of cohesion among member states and therefore are not possible in many parts of the world. The WEU is probably the only such organization that is viable in the near future, although effective regional security organizations encompassing some Latin American and Asian countries are not inconceivable. In much of the rest of the world, however, there is little evidence of the cohesion and common interest that would be a precondition for a functioning regional security organization. Spheres of Influence An alternative to regional security organizations is the creation of spheres of influence. The notion of spheres of influence has in the past carried a rather sinister connotation and could still be troublesome if a dominant regional power sought to subvert its neighbors, especially if it subsequently aspired to challenge other major powers. But as long as dominant powers restrict their activities to typical "great power" behavior--which would generally mean shoring up security and prestige but not expansionism--there is nothing inherently evil about spheres of influence. Several prominent foreign policy scholars have pointed out the feasibility of spheres of influence. Ronald Steel of the University of Southern California has written, Regional disturbances that do not threaten the world power balance should be dealt with by the major powers of the region, ideally with the endorsement of the international community. Instead of seeking an ephemeral global security, we should, as Charles William Maynes has argued in Foreign Policy, encourage a policy of "regional self-reliance [that] would recognize that certain powerful states in each area will inevitably play a special security role." In other words, we must accept the reality of the longstanding tradition of spheres of influence--a tradition that we scrupulously insist upon in the Western Hemisphere under our unilaterally imposed Monroe Doctrine. [61] Spheres of influence make sense because the world's major powers have an interest in, and usually the ability to maintain a degree of order in, their regions. There is always some risk that the leading power in a particular sphere of influence may abuse its position or develop expansionist ambitions. The decentralization of international power, however, should ensure that the United States, other major powers, or regional security organizations--acting alone or in concert--could check unacceptable behavior on the part of a dominant regional power. Balance of Power Yet another alternative is the establishment of regional balance-of-power arrangements, which may be appropriate in the Middle East, for example. There are serious obstacles to the creation of a viable regional security organization in that area--as demonstrated by the problems the Gulf Cooperation Council has faced--and there is no clear dominant power around which a sphere of influence is likely to develop. Instead, the locus of power tends to shift among the larger states. The United States has in the past sought to manipulate the balance of power by bolstering certain countries as a means of checking others. That risky strategy had disastrous consequences with respect to Iran and Iraq, and, given the unpopularity of the regimes in Egypt and Saudi Arabia and those regimes' close identification with Washington, it may well backfire again. Allowing the balance of power in the region to evolve without U.S. interference would help shield the United States from the consequences of violent and sudden shifts in the balance but could still be expected to prevent a regional hegemon from rising. As University of Chicago political scientist Stephen M. Walt pointed out in The Origins of Alliances, Compared with the other hypotheses examined in this book, the general hypothesis that states choose allies in order to balance against the most serious threat was the clear winner. Its merits were shown in two important ways. First, balancing was far more common than bandwagoning, and bandwagoning was almost always confined to especially weak and isolated states. Second, the importance of ideological distinction declined as the level of threat increased; ideological solidarity was most powerful when security was high or when ideological factors and security considerations reinforced each other. [62] The tendency of states to balance against a prospective hegemon, instead of "bandwagoning," has been evident in the Middle East. As Walt observed, "Despite the fact that the Middle East lacks an established tradition of balance of power statecraft . . . , the advantages of seeking allies in order to balance against threats have obviously been apparent to the various actors in the Middle East. . . . the ascendancy of ambitious regional powers (such as Iraq under Nuri al-Said and Egypt under Nasser) consistently led other regional actors to join forces . . . to resist the attempt." [63] The strategic environment of the Middle East of the 1990s remains conducive to balancing, as an assortment of similarly sized powers--Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran--continue to share an interest in preventing the rise of any single power to primacy. The United States may have to tolerate a degree of instability as power shifts among those states, but American vital interests should be reasonably safe as long as power remains diffused throughout the region. If a hegemon were to arise, especially if it were clearly hostile to U.S. interests, the United States would still have the option of acting alone or joining forces with European and other powers to deal with that problem.

### Hegemony Impact D 1NC

#### Heg doesn’t solve war

Barbara Conry (former associate policy analyst, was a public relations consultant at Hensley Segal Rentschler and an expert on security issues in the Middle East, Western Europe, and Central Asia at the CATO Institute) and Charles V. Pena (Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute as well as a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, and an adviser on the Straus Military Reform Project at the CATO Institute) 2003 “47. US Security Strategy” CATO Handbook for Congress, http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-47.pdf

Another rationale for attempting to manage global security is that a world without U.S. hegemony would soon degenerate into a tangle of chaos and instability, in which weapons proliferation, genocide, terrorism, and other offensive activities would be rampant. Prophets of such a development hint that if the United States fails to exercise robust political and military leadership today, the world is condemned to repeat the biggest mistakes of the 20th century—or perhaps do something even worse. Such thinking is seriously flawed. First, instability in the international system is nothing new, and most episodes do not affect U.S. vital interests. Furthermore, to assert that U.S. global leadership can stave off otherwise inevitable global chaos vastly overstates the power of any single country to influence world events. Indeed, many of the problems that plague the world today, such as civil wars and ethnic strife, are largely impervious to external solutions. There is little to back up an assertion that only Washington’s management of international security can save the world from political, economic, or military conflagration.

### 2NC – Hegemony Impact D

#### Empirically proven

Christopher J. Fettweis (Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College) 2010 “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

#### International system resilient – no conflict

Christopher Preble (director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) August 2010 “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?” http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

### 2NC – Hegemony Impact D

#### No credible threats now

Doug Bandow (senior fellow at the Cato Institute. He is a former special assistant to President Reagan) January 2010 “Military Spending — For What?” http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11143

The United States dominates the globe militarily. The threats facing America pale compared to its capabilities. Why, then, is Washington spending so much on the military? In 2010 the U.S. will spend roughly $700 billion on the military. This is an increase of 2 percent (after inflation) from the Obama administration's original nonwar defense budget of $534 billion. Despite initial plans for zero growth in defense spending in coming years, there are rumors that the Department of Defense will receive a 2 percent increase in real outlays through 2015. Still, some conservatives want to enshrine a military buildup in a law mandating fixed outlays at 4, 5 or even 6 percent of gross domestic product. Hawks focus on the percentage of GDP going to the military — currently about 4.4 percent — since that figure has fallen over the years. America spends more inflation- adjusted dollars on the military today than at any time since the end of World War II. Figured in 2000 dollars, the U.S. devoted $774.6 billion to the military in 1945, the final year of World War II. In 1953, the final year of the Korean War, military outlay ran to $416.1 billion. Expenditure during the Vietnam War peaked at $421.3 billion in 1968. By contrast, in 2010 — even before the Afghan surge and other unplanned expenditure — the administration expected to spend $517.8 billion. That's more than during the lengthy, but often warm, Cold War. Expenditure as a percentage of GDP has fallen because the U.S. economy has grown. GDP in 2010 (in 2000 dollars) will run to about $11.7 trillion. That is almost twice as much as in 1986, more than three times as much as in 1968, and nearly six times as much as in 1953. Military outlay should be tied to threats, not economic growth. Can anyone credibly claim the military threat facing America is two, three, or six times as great today as during those years? Today the U.S. does not face a significant military threat. As Colin Powell famously declared in 1991 when chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "I'm running out of enemies. I'm down to Castro and Kim Il Sung." The U.S. has no great power enemies. Relations with China and Russia are at times uneasy, but not confrontational, let alone warlike. Washington is allied with every other industrialized state. America possesses the most sophisticated nuclear arsenal and the most powerful conventional force. Washington's reach exceeds that of Rome and Britain at their respective peaks. Other nations, most notably China, are stirring, but it will take years before they match, let alone overtake, the U.S. Even subtracting the costs of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars leaves American military outlay around five times that of China and 10 times that of Russia. Combine a gaggle of adversaries, enemies and rogues — Burma, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria — and the U.S. spends perhaps 25 times as much. The United States is not alone. The European Union has 10 times the GDP and three times the population of Russia. Military outlay by the U.S. plus its NATO allies accounts for about 70 percent of world military spending. Add in America's other allies and friends, such as South Korea, and the total share of global military outlay hits 80 percent. In short, Washington spends what it spends not to defend America but to maintain the ability to overpower other nations. But it will become increasingly expensive for America to preserve the ability to attack countries like China. Terrorism remains a pressing security threat. However, terrorist attacks, though horrid, do not pose an existential danger. Al-Qaida is no replacement for Nazism and Communism, nuclear-topped ICBMs and armored divisions. Nor is traditional military force the best way to combat terrorism. Indeed, foreign intervention often promotes terrorism, like swatting a hornet's nest. America's military spending is determined by its foreign policy. America's commitments are a matter of choice. They don't make sense today. Engagement is good, but military force is not the only form of engagement. And any international involvement must balance costs and benefits. Adjusting commitments would allow a vastly different, and less expensive, force structure. The U.S. could make significant cuts and still maintain the globe's strongest and most sophisticated military — one well able to defend Americans.

### 2NC – Hegemony Impact D

#### Western alliances ensure no violent overturning of the current liberal order

John Ikenberry (professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University) January/February 2008 “The Rise of China and the Future of the West Can the Liberal System Survive?” Foreign Affairs

Second is the coalition-based character of its leadership. Past orders have tended to be dominated by one state. The stakeholders of the current Western order include a coalition of powers arrayed around the United States -- an important distinction. These leading states, most of them advanced liberal democracies, do not always agree, but they are engaged in a continuous process of give-and-take over economics, politics, and security. Power transitions are typically seen as being played out between two countries, a rising state and a declining hegemon, and the order falls as soon as the power balance shifts. But in the current order, the larger aggregation of democratic capitalist states -- and the resulting accumulation of geopolitical power -- shifts the balance in the order's favor. Third, the postwar Western order has an unusually dense, encompassing, and broadly endorsed system of rules and institutions. Whatever its shortcomings, it is more open and rule-based than any previous order. State sovereignty and the rule of law are not just norms enshrined in the United Nations Charter. They are part of the deep operating logic of the order. To be sure, these norms are evolving, and the United States itself has historically been ambivalent about binding itself to international law and institutions -- and at no time more so than today. But the overall system is dense with multilateral rules and institutions -- global and regional, economic, political, and security-related. These represent one of the great breakthroughs of the postwar era. They have laid the basis for unprecedented levels of cooperation and shared authority over the global system. The incentives these features create for China to integrate into the liberal international order are reinforced by the changed nature of the international economic environment -- especially the new interdependence driven by technology. The most farsighted Chinese leaders understand that globalization has changed the game and that China accordingly needs strong, prosperous partners around the world. From the United States' perspective, a healthy Chinese economy is vital to the United States and the rest of the world. Technology and the global economic revolution have created a logic of economic relations that is different from the past -- making the political and institutional logic of the current order all the more powerful. ACCOMMODATING THE RISE The most important benefit of these features today is that they give the Western order a remarkable capacity to accommodate rising powers. New entrants into the system have ways of gaining status and authority and opportunities to play a role in governing the order. The fact that the United States, China, and other great powers have nuclear weapons also limits the ability of a rising power to overturn the existing order. In the age of nuclear deterrence, great-power war is, thankfully, no longer a mechanism of historical change. War-driven change has been abolished as a historical process.

### 1NC – Economy - Resilient

#### Econ resilient

Fareed Zakaria (editor of Newsweek International) December 2009 “The Secrets of Stability,” http://www.newsweek.com/id/226425/page/2]

One year ago, the world seemed as if it might be coming apart. The global financial system, which had fueled a great expansion of capitalism and trade across the world, was crumbling. All the certainties of the age of globalization—about the virtues of free markets, trade, and technology—were being called into question. Faith in the American model had collapsed. The financial industry had crumbled. Once-roaring emerging markets like China, India, and Brazil were sinking. Worldwide trade was shrinking to a degree not seen since the 1930s. Pundits whose bearishness had been vindicated predicted we were doomed to a long, painful bust, with cascading failures in sector after sector, country after country. In a widely cited essay that appeared in The Atlantic n this May, Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, wrote: "The conventional wisdom among the elite is still that the current slump 'cannot be as bad as the Great Depression.' This view is wrong. What we face now could, in fact, be worse than the Great Depression." Others predicted that these economic shocks would lead to political instability and violence in the worst-hit countries. At his confirmation hearing in February, the new U.S. director of national intelligence, Adm. Dennis Blair, cautioned the Senate that "the financial crisis and global recession are likely to produce a wave of economic crises in emerging-market nations over the next year." Hillary Clinton endorsed this grim view. And she was hardly alone. Foreign Policy ran a cover story predicting serious unrest in several emerging markets. Of one thing everyone was sure: nothing would ever be the same again. Not the financial industry, not capitalism, not globalization. One year later, how much has the world really changed? Well, Wall Street is home to two fewer investment banks (three, if you count Merrill Lynch). Some regional banks have gone bust. There was some turmoil in Moldova and (entirely unrelated to the financial crisis) in Iran. Severe problems remain, like high unemployment in the West, and we face new problems caused by responses to the crisis—soaring debt and fears of inflation. But overall, things look nothing like they did in the 1930s. The predictions of economic and political collapse have not materialized at all. A key measure of fear and fragility is the ability of poor and unstable countries to borrow money on the debt markets. So consider this: the sovereign bonds of tottering Pakistan have returned 168 percent so far this year. All this doesn't add up to a recovery yet, but it does reflect a return to some level of normalcy. And that rebound has been so rapid that even the shrewdest observers remain puzzled. "The question I have at the back of my head is 'Is that it?' " says Charles Kaye, the co-head of Warburg Pincus. "We had this huge crisis, and now we're back to business as usual?"This revival did not happen because markets managed to stabilize themselves on their own. Rather, governments, having learned the lessons of the Great Depression, were determined not to repeat the same mistakes once this crisis hit. By massively expanding state support for the economy—through central banks and national treasuries—they buffered the worst of the damage. (Whether they made new mistakes in the process remains to be seen.) The extensive social safety nets that have been established across the industrialized world also cushioned the pain felt by many. Times are still tough, but things are nowhere near as bad as in the 1930s, when governments played a tiny role in national economies. It's true that the massive state interventions of the past year may be fueling some new bubbles: the cheap cash and government guarantees provided to banks, companies, and consumers have fueled some irrational exuberance in stock and bond markets. Yet these rallies also demonstrate the return of confidence, and confidence is a very powerful economic force. When John Maynard Keynes described his own prescriptions for economic growth, he believed government action could provide only a temporary fix until the real motor of the economy started cranking again—the animal spirits of investors, consumers, and companies seeking risk and profit. Beyond all this, though, I believe there's a fundamental reason why we have not faced global collapse in the last year. It is the same reason that we weathered the stock-market crash of 1987, the recession of 1992, the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian default of 1998, and the tech-bubble collapse of 2000. The current global economic system is inherently more resilient than we think. The world today is characterized by three major forces for stability, each reinforcing the other and each historical in nature.

### 2NC - Economy – Resilient

#### Economy resilient – economic collapses in ’87, ’92, ’97, ’98, and 2000 were bigger and deeper – your evidence is alarmist

#### Other even bigger crises prove resilience

Mark Skousen. "What have we learned." Forecasts&Strategies. 2 Jun. 2003. http://www.markskousen.com/article.php?id=1096

The second lesson is that the global economy is far more resilient than anyone imagined. During the past 20 years, we have suffered through two major energy crises, double digit inflation, stock market and real estate crashes in the U.S. and Japan, an unprecedented credit crunch, mammoth federal deficits, the AIDS crisis, several major wars, terrorist attacks, the collapse of the Soviet Union and many other mini-panics, and yet we continue to survive and even prosper. We are not depression-proof, but we are surprisingly depression-resistant. Armageddon has again been postpone

#### Economic institutions ensure bounceback even if there is a total meltdown

Glenn Somerville. "Paulson: Economy resilient but Fed move helpful." Reuters. 22 Jan. 2008. http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20080122/bs\_nm/usa\_economy\_paulson\_dc

Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson said on Tuesday he was confident the U.S. and global economies were resilient but welcomed an emergency rate cut by the Federal Reserve as a helpful move. ADVERTISEMENT The U.S. central bank cut benchmark U.S. interest rates by a steep three-quarters of a percentage point while Paulson while still answering questions after addressing a Chamber of Commerce breakfast meeting. Paulson had earlier acknowledged the U.S. economy has slowed "materially" in recent weeks but, despite a meltdown in global stock prices, insisted that the global economy had "underlying resiliency" that would let it weather the storm. The U.S. Treasury chief initially looked surprised when a Chamber of Commerce official said the Fed had just cut rates in a relatively rare move between meetings of its policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee, but praised the action. "This is very constructive and I think it shows this country and the rest of the world that our central bank is nimble and can move quickly in response to market conditions," Paulson said. The U.S. Treasury chief, who headed Wall Street giant Goldman Sachs before taking over Treasury in 2006, said the $145-billion short-term stimulus package that President George W. Bush was asking Congress to work on was needed to minimize the impact of a U.S. economic slowdown. "We need to do something now, because short-term risks are clearly to the downside, and the potential benefits of quick action to support our economy have become clear," Paulson said. But early signs were that Bush's call for bipartisan action -- and a relatively positive Congressional response to it -- were not calming financial markets but might actually be fanning fears that the economy was at greater risk of toppling into recession than officially acknowledged. Stock markets around the world sank sharply on Monday, when U.S. markets were closed for the holiday in observance of slain civil rights leader Martin Luther King's birthday. Paulson tried to reassure that there was reason to feel confident in the U.S. economy's long-term prospects, notwithstanding severe problems in the housing sector and other credit-market strains. "The U.S. economy is resilient and diverse," he said. "It's been remarkably robust and it will be again." He added: "The unemployment rate remains low and job creation continues, albeit at a modest pace. The structure of our economy is sound and our long term economic fundamentals are healthy."

### 2NC - Economy – Resilient

#### Technology ensures adaptation that prevents total collapse

The Economist, “The turning point - The global economy” September 22, 2007 p. ln

Yet the global economy has taken some big blows during the golden age. In the last decade the rich world has weathered the Asian financial crisis, Russia's debt default, the dotcom boom and bust, terrorist attacks on America, sharp increases in oil prices and the uncertainty that came with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Still, economic volatility has not picked up. It is true that the abrupt curtailment of energy supplies to a world that was highly dependent on oil was a unique and traumatic event. But economies were more hidebound then: job markets were less flexible and producers more stymied by regulation. The painful results cannot wholly be put down to energy dependency. The more likely explanation is that economies have become far better at absorbing shocks, because they are more flexible. There are many structural shifts that might have contributed to this, from globalisation to the decline of manufacturing in the rich world. The academic literature keeps returning to three: improvements in managing stocks of goods, the financial innovation that expanded credit markets, and wiser monetary policy. For such a tiny part of GDP, the content of warehouses has had a surprisingly big effect on its volatility. When industries cut or add stocks according to demand, that adjustment magnifies the effect of the initial change in sales. Stock levels were once much larger relative to the size of the economy, so a small slip in demand could easily blow up into a recession. But thanks to improvements in technology, firms now have timelier and better information about buyers. Speedier market intelligence and production in smaller batches allows firms to match supply to changing conditions. This makes huge stocks unnecessary and minimises the lurches in inventories that were once so destabilising. The entire inventory of some lean-running companies now consists of whatever FedEx or UPS is shipping on their account. Mr Cecchetti and his colleagues calculate that, on average, more than half the improvement in the stability of economic growth in the countries they studied is accounted for by diminished inventory cycles. That something so workaday as supply-chain management could have so marked an effect might seem a dull conclusion. But dullness is a virtue, because technological improvement is irreversible. This means the greater stability it provides is likely to be permanent.

### Economy – US Not Key to Global

#### US not key to global economy

NYT (New York Times) July 2009 “In Asia, a Derided Theory Returns” http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CEFDE163EF932A35754C0A96F9C8B63&pagewanted=1

For a while, when the global economic crisis was at its worst, it was a dirty word that only the most provocative of analysts dared to use. Now, the D-word -- decoupling -- is making a comeback, and nowhere more so than in Asia. Put simply, the term refers to the theory that emerging countries -- whether China or Chile -- will become more independent of the ups and downs in the United States as their economies become stronger and more sophisticated. For much of last year, the theory held up. Many emerging economies had steered clear of investments that dragged down a string of banking behemoths in the West, and saw nothing like the turmoil that began to engulf the United States and Europe in 2007. But then, last autumn, when the collapse of Lehman Brothers caused the global financial system to convulse and consumer demand to shrivel, emerging economies around the world got caught in the downdraft, and the D-word became mud. Now, the tables are turning again, especially in Asia, where many emerging economies are showing signs of a stronger recovery than in the West. And economists here have begun to use the D-word in public once again. ''Decoupling is happening for real,'' the chief Asia-Pacific economist at Goldman Sachs in Hong Kong, Michael Buchanan, said in a recent interview. Or as the senior Asia economist at HSBC, Frederic Neumann, said, ''Decoupling is not a dirty word.'' To be sure, the once sizzling pace of Asian economic growth has slowed sharply as exports to and investments from outside the region slumped. Across Asia, millions of people have lost their jobs as business drops off and companies cut costs and output. Asia is heavily dependent upon selling its products to consumers in the United States and Europe, and many executives still say a strong U.S. economy is a prerequisite for a return to the boom of years past. Nevertheless, the theory of decoupling is back on the table. For the past couple of months, data from around the world have revealed a growing divergence between Western economies and those in much of Asia, notably China and India. The World Bank last week forecast that the economies of the euro zone and the United States would contract 4.5 percent and 3 percent, respectively, this year -- in sharp contrast to the 7.2 percent and 5.1 percent economic growth it forecasts for China and India. Forecasts from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development that were also published last week backed up this general trend. Major statistics for June, due Wednesday, are expected to show manufacturing activity in China and India are on the mend. By contrast, purchasing managers' indexes for Europe and the United States are forecast to be merely less grim than before but still show contractions. Why this diverging picture? The crisis hit Asia much later. While the U.S. economy began languishing in 2007, Asian economies were still doing well right up until the collapse of Lehman Brothers last September. What followed was a rush of stimulus measures -- rate cuts and government spending programs. In Asia's case, these came soon after things soured for the region; in the United States, they came much later in the country's crisis. Moreover, developing Asian economies were in pretty good shape when the crisis struck. The last major crisis to hit the region -- the financial turmoil of 1997-98 -- forced governments in Asia to introduce overhauls that ultimately left them with lower debt levels, more resilient banking and regulatory systems and often large foreign exchange reserves. Another crucial difference is that Asia, unlike the United States and Europe, has not had a banking crisis. Bank profits in Asia have plunged and some have had to raise extra capital but there have been no major collapses and no bailouts. ''The single most important thing to have happened in Asia is that there has not been a banking crisis,'' said Andrew Freris, a regional strategist at BNP Paribas in Hong Kong. ''Asia is coming though this crisis with its banking system intact. Yes, some banks may not be making profits -- but it is cyclical and not systemic.''

### 1NC – Economy - No War

#### Economic collapse doesn’t cause war – no causal connection

Thomas P.M. Barnett (senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine) August 2009 “The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis” http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: \* No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); \* The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); \* Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); \* No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); \* A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and \* No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order. Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere any time soon? Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the Internet is for.

###  2NC – Economy - No War

#### Econ collapse doesn’t cause war – all your warrants are empirically denied – Barnett evidence says there’s no causal connection – multiple databases show the recent financial crisis did not cause military backlash – ZERO increase in war – does not break down trade or great power cooperation

#### Countries turn inward – creates peace

Lloyd deMause, director of The Institute for Psychohistory, “Nuclear War as an Anti-Sexual Group Fantasy” Updated December 18th 2002, http://www.geocities.com/kidhistory/ja/nucsex.htm

The nation "turns inward" during this depressed phase of the cycle. Empirical studies have clearly demonstrated that major economic downswings are accompanied by "introverted" foreign policy moods, characterized by fewer armed expeditions, less interest in foreign affairs in the speeches of leaders, reduced military expenditures, etc. (Klingberg, 1952; Holmes, 1985). Just as depressed people experience little conscious rage--feeling "I deserve to be killed" rather than "I want to kill others" (Fenichel, 1945, p. 393)--interest in military adventures during the depressed phase wanes, arms expeditures decrease and peace treaties multiply.

#### No causal relationship – ignores other variables

Niall Ferguson (Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University) 2006 Foreign Affairs, September/October, Vol. 85, Issue 5

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

### 2NC – Economy - No War

#### No escalation – its all just rhetoric

Charles Boehmer (political science professor at the University of Texas) 2007 Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”

The theory presented earlier predicts that lower rates of growth suppress participation in foreign conflicts, particularly concerning conflict initiation and escalation to combat. To sustain combat, states need to be militarily prepared and not open up a second front when they are already fighting, or may fear, domestic opposition. A good example would be when the various Afghani resistance fighters expelled the Soviet Union from their territory, but the Taliban crumbled when it had to face the combined forces of the United States and Northern Alliance insurrection. Yet the coefficient for GDP growth and MID initiations was negative but insignificant. However, considering that there are many reasons why states fight, the logic presented earlier should hold especially in regard to the risk of participating in more severe conflicts. Threats to use military force may be safe to make and may be made with both external and internal actors in mind, but in the end may remain mere cheap talk that does not risk escalation if there is a chance to back down. Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) found that secure leaders were more likely to become involved in war than insecure leaders, supporting the theory and evidence presented here. We should find that leaders who face domestic opposition and a poorly performing economy shy away from situations that could escalate to combat if doing so would compromise their ability to retain power.

#### Domestic opposition outweighs – support for military adventures

Daniel Deudney, Hewlett Fellow in Science, Technology, and Society at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies @ Princeton University, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Environment and Security: Muddled and Thinking April 1991, proquest

In addition, economic decline does not necessarily produce conflict. How societies respond to economic decline may largely depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. And as people get poorer, they may become less willing to spend scarce resources for military forces. As Bernard Brodie observed about the modern era, “The predisposing factors to military aggression are full bellies, not empty ones.” The experience of economic depressions over the last two centuries may be irrelevant, because such depressions were characterized by under-utilized production capacity and falling resource prices. In the 1930s, increased military spending stimulated economies, but if economic growth is retarded by environmental constraints, military spending will exacerbate the problem.