# \*\*\*IMPACT ANSWERS\*\*\*

## AT: Enframing

### Technology is not always enframing - the aff 🡺 liberation of technology from techne

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The idea of a "concrete technology," which includes human beings and nature in its very structure, contradicts the commonplace notion that technique "conquers" its objects. In Simondon's theory the most advanced forms of progress consist in the creation of complex synergies of technical and natural forces through advances that incorporate the wider contexts of human and environmental needs into the structure of technical systems. While there is no strictly technological imperative dictating such an approach, strategies of concretization could embrace these contexts as they do others in the course of technical development. Where these contexts include environmental considerations, the technology emerges as reintegrated or adapted to nature; where they include the capacities of the human operators, the technology progresses beyond deskilling to become the basis for vocational self-development and participatory management. Demands for environmentally sound technology, and humane, democratic and safe work, are thus not extrinsic to the logic of technology, but respond to the reflexive tendency of technical development to construct synergistic totalities of natural, human, and technical elements.

These considerations allow us to identify a type of directional development that is both technically and normatively progressive. The normative standards of that development are immanently derived from the resistances evoked by the technical process itself. That connection is clear where technical advance suppresses contextual features of nature and social life that the individuals mobilize to defend or to incorporate into improved designs through secondary instrumentalizations.

The theory of concretization offers a better account of the bias of technology than that proposed by substantivism. This bias is not determined once and for all by the essentialized primary instrumentalization as in Heidegger and Habermas, but also has a complex social dimension. To be sure, technology may enframe and colonize; but it may also liberate repressed potentialities of the lifeworld that would otherwise have remained submerged. It is thus essentially ambivalent, available for very different types of development (21).

### Enframing is inevitable – realism is the most productive way to enframe the world

Guzzini,senior research fellow at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute,1998 (Stefano, Realism in International Relations and International Political Economy, p. 212)

Therefore, in a third step, this chapter also claims that it is impossible just to heap realism onto the dustbin of history and start anew. This is a non-option. Although realism as a strictly causal theory has been a dis­appointment, various realist assumptions are well alive in the minds of many practitioners and observers of international affairs. Although it does not correspond to a theory which helps us to understand a real world with objective laws, it is a world-view which suggests thoughts about it, and which permeates our daily language for making sense of it. Realism has been a rich, albeit very contestable, reservoir of lessons of the past, of metaphors and historical analogies, which, in the hands of its most gifted representatives, have been proposed, at times imposed, and reproduced as guides to a common understanding of international affairs. Realism is alive in the collective memory and self-understanding of our (i.e. Western) foreign policy elite and public, whether educated or not. Hence, we cannot but deal with it. For this reason, forgetting realism is also questionable. Of course, academic observers should not bow to the whims of daily politics. But staying at distance, or being critical, does not mean they should lose the capa­city to understand the languages of those who make significant decisions, not only in government, but also in firms, NGOs, and other institutions. To the contrary, this understanding, as increasingly varied as it may be, is a prerequisite for their very profession. More particularly, it is a prerequisite for opposing the more irresponsible claims made in the name, although not always necessarily in the spirit, of realism.

## AT: Ontology 1st

### There are no prior questions to problem oriented IR- empirical validity is a sufficient justification for action. Emphasis on metaphysical hurdles destroys any chance of effectively describing the world and guiding action

David Owen, Reader of Political Theory at the Univ. of Southampton, Millennium Vol 31 No 3 2002 p. 655-7

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

### Subjectivity is rooted in material fact—the negatives superfluous questioning destroys political potential and results in unrestrained domination

Graham 99

(Philip , School of Communication Queensland University of Technology, Heidegger’s Hippies Sep 15 1999 http://www.geocities.com/SunsetStrip/Palms/8314/index.html)

Societies should get worried when Wagner’s music becomes popular because it usually means that distorted interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy are not far away. Existentialists create problems about what is, especially identity (Heidegger 1947). Existentialism inevitably leads to an authoritarian worldview: this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery world of twofold voluptuous delight, my “beyond good and evil,” without a goal, unless the joy of the circle itself is a goal; without will, unless a ring feels good will towards itself – do you want a name for this world? A solution to all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men? – This world is the will to power – and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power – and nothing besides! (Nietzsche 1967/1997).

Armed with a volume of Nietzsche, some considerable oratory skills, several Wagner records, and an existentialist University Rector in the form of Martin Heidegger, Hitler managed some truly astounding feats of strategic identity engineering (cf. Bullock, 1991). Upon being appointed to the Freiberg University, Heidegger pronounced the end of thought, history, ideology, and civilisation: ‘No dogmas and ideas will any longer be the laws of your being. The Fuhrer himself, and he alone, is the present and future reality for Germany’ (in Bullock 1991: 345). Heidegger signed up to an ideology-free politics: Hitler’s ‘Third Way’ (Eatwell 1997).

The idealised identity, the new symbol of mythological worship, Nietzsche’s European Superman, was to rule from that day hence. Hitler took control of the means of propaganda: the media; the means of mental production: the education system; the means of violence: the police, army, and prison system; and pandered to the means of material production: industry and agriculture; and proclaimed a New beginning and a New world order. He ordered Germany to look forward into the next thousand years and forget the past. Heidegger and existentialism remain influential to this day, and history remains bunk (e.g. Giddens , 1991, Chapt. 2).Giddens’s claims that ‘humans live in circumstances of … existential contradiction’, and that ‘subjective death’ and ‘biological death’ are somehow unrelated, is a an ultimately repressive abstraction: from that perspective, life is merely a series of subjective deaths, as if death were the ultimate motor of life itself (cf. Adorno 1964/1973). History is, in fact, the simple and straightforward answer to the “problem of the subject”. “The problem” is also a handy device for confusing, entertaining, and selling trash to the masses. By emphasising the problem of the ‘ontological self’ (Giddens 1991: 49), informationalism and ‘consumerism’ confines the navel-gazing, ‘narcissistic’ masses to a permanent present which they self-consciously sacrifice for a Utopian future (cf. Adorno 1973: 303; Hitchens 1999; Lasch 1984: 25-59). Meanwhile transnational businesses go about their work, raping the environment; swindling each other and whole nations; and inflicting populations with declining wages, declining working conditions, and declining social security. Slavery is once again on the increase (Castells, 1998; Graham, 1999; ILO, 1998).

There is no “problem of the subject”, just as there is no “global society”; there is only the mass amnesia of utopian propaganda, the strains of which have historically accompanied revolutions in communication technologies. Each person’s identity is, quite simply, their subjective account of a unique and objective history of interactions within the objective social and material environments they inhabit, create, and inherit. The identity of each person is their most intimate historical information, and they are its material expression: each person is a record of their own history at any given time. Thus, each person is a recognisably material, identifiable entity: an identity. This is their condition. People are not theoretical entities; they are people. As such, they have an intrinsic identity with an intrinsic value. No amount of theory or propaganda will make it go away.

The widespread multilateral attempts to prop up consumer society and hypercapitalism as a valid and useful means of sustainable growth, indeed, as the path to an inevitable, international democratic Utopia, are already showing their disatrous cracks. The “problem” of subjective death threatens to give way, once again, to unprecedented mass slaughter. The numbed condition of a narcissistic society, rooted in a permanent “now”, a blissful state of Heideggerian Dasein, threatens to wake up to a world in which “subjective death” and ontology are the least of all worries.

### Normative political calculation MUST precede ontological questioning

Jarvis 2k

(Darryl, Senior Lecturer in International Relations – University of Sydney, International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodernism, p. 128-9)

More is the pity that such irrational and obviously abstruse debate should so occupy us at a time of great global turmoil. That it does and continues to do so reflect our lack of judicious criteria for evaluating theory and, more importantly, the lack of attachment theorists have to the real world. Certainly it is right and proper that we ponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations, engage in epistemological and ontological debate, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. But to support that this is the only task of international theory, let alone the most important one, **smacks of intellectual elitism** and **displays** a certain **contempt** for those who search for guidance in their daily struggle as actors in international politics. What does Ashley’s project, his deconstructive efforts, or valiant fight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed, and destitute? How does it help solve the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, the casualties of war, or the émigrés of death squads? Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer **no**. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rationality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But to support that problem-solving technical theory is not necessary—or in some way bad—is a **contemptuous position** that abrogates any hope of solving some of the **nightmarish realities that millions confront daily**. As Holsti argues, we need ask of these theorists and their theories the ultimate question, **“So what?”** To what purpose do they deconstruct, problematize, destabilize, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? Does this get us any further, make the world any better, or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this “debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics” be judged pertinent, relevant, helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate. Contrary to Ashley’s assertions, then, a poststructural approach fails to empower the marginalized and, in fact, abandons them. Rather than analyze the political economy of power, wealth, oppression, production, or international relations and render and intelligible understanding of these processes, Ashley succeeds in ostracizing those he portends to represent by delivering an obscure and highly convoluted discourse. If Ashley wishes to chastise structural realism for its abstractness and detachment, he must be prepared also to face similar criticism, especially when he so adamantly intends his work to address the real life plight of those who struggle at marginal places.

## Utilitarianism

### Existence is a pre-requisite to ontology

Wapner ‘3

Paul, Associate professor and director of the Global Environmental Policy Program at American University, DISSENT, Winter, http://www.dissentmgazine.org/menutest/artiles/wi03/wapner.htm

The third response to eco-criticism would require critics to acknowledge the ways in which they themselves silence nature and then to respect the sheer otherness of the nonhuman world. Postmodernism prides itself on criticizing the urge toward mastery that characterizes modernity. But isn't mastery exactly what postmodernism is exerting as it captures the nonhuman world within its own conceptual domain? Doesn't postmodern cultural criticism deepen the modernist urge toward mastery by eliminating the ontological weight of the nonhuman world? What else could it mean to assert that there is no such thing as nature? I have already suggested the postmodernist response: yes, recognizing the social construction of "nature" does deny the self-expression of the nonhuman world, hut how would we know what such self-expression means? Indeed, nature doesn't speak; rather, some person always speaks on nature's behalf, and whatever that person says is, as we all know, a social construction. All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings wc ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation.

### Saving the most lives is not calculative. They deny human dignity by failing to maximize life

Cummiskey ’96 (David, Associate Philosophy Professor at Bates College, Kantian Consequentialism, p. 129-131)

It does, however, support the consequentialist interpretation. Since the moral demand to respect other persons is based on the equal moral status of all persons, Kant’s argument presupposes the equal value, or dignity, of all persons. Such beings are comparable, and the comparison demonstrates the equal objective value of all. The equal value of all rational being provides a clear basis for a requirement to maximally promote the flourishing of rational agency (chapter 5). Nonetheless, while the extreme interpretation must be rejected, the dignity- price distinction still accurately signifies the priority of rationality. If we refuse to sacrifice a person for the sake of the maximization of happiness or any other market value, then we have shown a “reverence” for such beings. But as we shall see more fully in chapter 9, this reverence is compatible with the sacrifice of some for the sake of other persons with dignity. It is mere dogmatic intuitionism or groundless deontology to insist that all such sacrifices are inconsistent with the equal dignity of all. At times the dignity principle seems to function like an inkblot where each sees whatever conclusions he or she is predisposed to accept. If one believes that a particular way of treating people is morally unacceptable, then such treatment is inconsistent with respect for the dignity of persons. Too often, when a deontologist uses the dignity principle as a normative principle, the cart is put before the horse: This reasoning presupposes that we have a standard of unacceptable conduct that is prior to the dignity principle. The dignity principle cannot then provide the reason why the conduct is unacceptable. The goal of the Kantian deontologist is to (directly) vindicate ordinary commonsense morality; but it is not at all clear how the dignity principle can even support the intuitive view that the negative duty not to kill is more stringent than the positive duty to save lives. How is the common view that we have only slight, if any, duties to aid those in desperate need consistent with the lexical priority of the dignity of persons over the price of the inclinations? Of course, on the one hand, it is commonly maintained that killing some persons to save many others fails to give due regard to the incomparable and absolute dignity of persons. On the other hand, it is maintained that respect for the dignity of persons does not require that one spend one’s discretionary income on saving lives rather than on one’s own personal projects. As long as one has done some minimum and indeterminate amount to help others, then one need not do any more. So the Kantian deontologist wants to use the dignity-price distinction to resolve conflicting grounds of obligation in an intuitively acceptable way, but it is far from obvious why allowing a loss of dignity for the sake of something with price is consistent with the dignity principle. In short, ordinary morality permits one to place the satisfaction of one’s inclinations above a concern for the dignity of all. Consequentialists have produced indirect justifications for many of these common intuitive judgments; it would seem that those appealing to the dignity principle must rely on similar arguments. Finally, even if one grants that saving two persons with dignity cannot outweigh and compensate for killing one—because dignity cannot be added and summed in this way—this point still does not justify deontological constraints. On the extreme interpretation, why would not killing one person be a stronger obligation than saving two persons? If I am concerned with the priceless dignity of each, it would seem that I may still save two; it is just that my reason cannot be that the two compensate for the loss of the one. Consider Hill’s example of a priceless object: If I can save two of three priceless statutes only by destroying one, then I cannot claim that saving two makes up for the loss of the one. But similarly, the loss of the two is not outweighed by the one that was not destroyed. Indeed, even if dignity cannot be simply summed up, how is the extreme interpretation inconsistent with the idea that I should save as many priceless objects as possible? Even if two do not simply outweigh and thus compensate for the loss of the one, each is priceless; thus, I have good reason to save as many as I can. In short, it is not clear how the.extreme interpretation justifies the ordinary killing/letting-die distinction or even how it conflicts with the conclusion that the more persons with dignity who are saved, the better.

# \*\*\*Alternative Answers\*\*\*

## Nazism

### The alternative produces the conditions necessary for fascism – its not a coincidence that Heidegger embraced Nazism as an authentic movement – its embedded in their search for ontological dignity

Zizek**,** Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana 1999 Slavoj, The Ticklish Subject, page 13-14

As Heidegger himself put it, those who came closest to the ontological Truth are condemned to err at the ontic level… err about what? Precisely about the line of separation between ontic and ontological. The paradox not to be underestimated is that the very philosopher who focused his interest on the enigma of ontological difference - who warned again and again against the metaphysical mistake of conferring ontological dignity on some ontic content (God as the highest Entity, for example) - fell into the trap of conferring on Nazism the ontological dignity of suiting the essence of modern man, The standard defence of Heidegger against the reproach of his Nazi past consists of two points: not only was his Nazi engagement a simple personal error (a 'stupidity [Dummheit]', as Heideg­ger himself put it) in no way inherently related to his philosophical project; the main counter-argument is that it is Heidegger's own philos­ophy that enables us to discern the true epochal roots of modern totalitarianism. However what remains unthought here is the hidden complicity between the ontological indifference towards social systems (capitalism, Fascism, Communism), in so far as they all belong to the same horizon of modern technology and the secret privileging of a concrete sociopolitical model (Nazism with Heidegger, Communism with some 'Heideggerian Marxists') as closer to the ontological truth of our epoch.

Here one should avoid the trap that caught Heidegger's defenders, who dismissed Heidegger's Nazi engagement as a simple anomaly a fall into the ontic level, in blatant contradiction to his thought, which teaches us not to confuse ontological horizon with ontic choices (as we have already seen, Heidegger is at his strongest when he demonstrates how, on a deeper structural level, ecological, conservative, and so on, oppositions to the modern universe of technology are already embedded in the horizon of what they purport to reject: the ecological critique of the technological exploitation of nature ultimately leads to a more ‘environ­mentally sound' technology, etc.). Heidegger did not engage in the Nazi political project 'in spite of' his ontological philosophical approach but *because of* it: this engagement was not 'beneath' his philosophical level ­on the contrary, if one is to understand Heidegger, the key point is to grasp the complicity (in Hegelese: 'speculative identity') between the elevation above ontic concerns and the passionate 'ontic' Nazi political engagement.

### Heidegger was very involved with Nazi activities; His philosophy doesn’t endorse ethics or human rights

Grange 91 (Joseph ,Professor of Philosophy department of the University of Southern Maine Heidegger as Nazi: A postmodern Scandal, 1991, Philosophy East and West 41 (4):515-522.)

I was told that Heidegger's involvement with the Nazis was an unfortunate, short-lived dalliance. It was to be understood as the outcome of political naivete, a momentary lapse not to be held against this great thinker. Such was the official party line. Heidegger's assumption of the Rectorship at the University of Freiburg (1933-1934) was a brief, fleeting moment in which he acted courageously to defend academic freedom and opposed antisemitic activities. His resignation was proof positive of his disapproval of the policies of National Socialism. Seen from this point of view, his infamous "Rector's Address" with its disturbing racist implications was merely a mistake in judgment, a minor error made in a gallant attempt to defend the German university. So I was taught. Victor **Farias'** book **makes it impossible to hold such a view.** The fact is that Heidegger was up to his ears in Nazi activities. And not for the space of a few unfortunate months in 1933-1934. **Rather his allegiance to the vision of Nazism appears to have been in place right up to the end of the war in 1945**. Here are some of the facts unearthed by Farias: 1. Heidegger collaborated with Nazi officials in identifying politically ac- ceptable candidates for University faculty appointments. 2. He sought to bring about a new German university order by bringing in candidates sympathetic to the program of National Socialism. 3. By cooperating with leading Nazis he sought to become the director of the project to organize the Academy of Professors of the German Reich. 4. His speeches and lectures were studded with references to the great- ness of the Fuhrer and the essential spiritual destiny of the German Volk-a form of metaphysical racism. 5. He planned an educational program whereby students would be in- doctrinated into the politics and vision of the Third Reich. This is chilling enough and much more could be cited, but let the words of the editors suffice: "This brilliant philosopher must be seen to be what he always was: A convinced Nazi, a phi ilosopher whose genuine interest in Nazism survived his apparent disillusionment with Hitler's particular form of National Socialism." Farias' book raises a single overwhelming question-one that cries out for an answer: Is there anything in Heidegger's philosophy that would have made his involvement with the Nazis impossible? The answer, tragi- cally, is no, and therein lies postmodernism's scandal. A full comprehension of this scandal requires an overview of Heideg- ger's thought. A single question connects all of Heidegger's thought: what is the meaning of Being? In the course of his life's work this question came to be asked from two perspectives (often termed the earlier and the later Heidegger). The first Heidegger is the author of Sein und Zeit (1927) who sought an answer to this fundamental question through an existential analytic of Dasein (human being). This is the Heidegger who gave the world its first insight into existence as a fundamental ontological category. It is the Heidegger famous for the invention of such existential terminology as authenticity, fallenness, resolve, and being-unto-death. The upshot of this investigation was the determination of Being as pro- foundly negatived. For despite its privileged access to Being, Dasein was through and through temporal, soaked in the waters of time, and unable to provide a clear, complete, and true vision of Being. What remained for Dasein was the possibility of a life of "authenticity" if it could "resolve" to live up to its "being-unto-death." What was left after this exhaustive phenomenological investigation- the history of Western Philosophy, German poetry, and efforts after original thinking-formed the content of the work of the later Heidegger. Philosophy East & West This turn in his thinking initiated a period of waiting, listening, and silence that characterized his philosophic work up to the end. The contempo- rary age was seen to culminate in technology, a dubious gift of the last remnants of logocentric reason. What remained for human beings was to wait. Being was seen to have withdrawn from authentic contact with the human race, and such presences of Being as were sent only proved the poverty of thought. Thus what began as the bravest of attempts to understand Being anew ended in a deafening silence. It is all much like a Beckett play but without the humor. Into this silence stepped the movement called deconstruction, initi- ating the so-called postmodern age. Three aspects of Heidegger's thought have served as a pivot for that movement's growth and development: the concept of authenticity, the doctrine of truth as Aletheia, and the vision of Being as Ereignis. Authenticity as used in Sein und Zeit designated the experience of engagement with Being: its opposite, the inauthentic, indicated the ontic realm, that place of everydayness where full Being is dissipated by fall- enness, thrownness, and a consequent forgetfulness of Being. It is this region of oblivion that must be overcome if Being is to disclose itself. But no measure for authenticity is ever given. What remains is a mute appeal to intuition and, quite obviously, an invitation to "true believers." The doctrine of Truth as Aletheia is even more pernicious. It says that this Greek term captures the essence of truth's meaning, for it shows that truth is ever askew, ever hidden, and always covered over. As such there is no firmness in our grasp of principles, no claim to truth in any of the ordinarily accepted meanings of the word. There is only a kind of vast, endless slippage toward darkness, forgetfulness, oblivion-the very meaning of the Greek word Lethe, river of dreams, sleep and narcosis. No wonder, then, that the postmoderns can deal so lightly with this concept. As one of their number remarked: "I no longer use the word 'true'; things are either interesting or uninteresting." Such is what happens when disclosure displaces truth as the goal of inquiry. Ereignis is the last word used by Heidegger to name Being. It is to be translated as the event of appropriation whereby Being becomes an active agent seizing experience in its grip and disclosing that which is. The quasi-mystical tones of all this are not made any more palatable by the fact that, according to Heidegger, in the modern age Being as Ereignis shows a marked tendency to hide itself. Thus the stage is set for an understanding of reality that in the absence of a public measure for truth depends on special intuitions and privileged revelations. Throw in a suspicion of reason as nothing more than the mask of the will-to-power and you have a concoction worthy of Wagnerian chords. What postmodernism has done with these ingredients varies with each thinker's talents. Derrida plays it his way; Lyotard another; Rorty a third. And so on and so forth. They all agree, however, in seeing reason as perversely linked with the ontotheological excesses of the past. Further, they see all standard philosophic concepts like goodness, truth, evil, freedom, fairness, and so on as masquerades requiring deconstruction. Their praxis is ever a "Hermeneutics of Suspicion." Having accepted Heidegger's undermining of the tradition of Western Philosophy, there is little left to do but get on with the task of exposing the relations of power that subvert Western cultural practices. Recent literature, conference themes, and the jargon that now permeates the Academy reveals just how completely this way of discourse has won the day. But now the ghost of Heidegger the Nazi! What does postmodern thought have to say? Very, very little. The editors of this volume are correct in calling it a scandal and a conspiracy of silence. With the exception of a few scattered articles there has been no attempt to put together the man and his politics, the thinker and his actions. Why? Heidegger and all who agree with him cannot speak to the question of values. Such things do not exist for they are only evasions, devolutions of thought occurring when Western thought lost sight of the question of the meaning of Being. At best they are the relicta of the modern urge to flatten everything into objectivity and systems-building. Much of the silence surrounding this scandal is the result of the absence of a kind of thinking that can capture the monstrosity of Nazism. In postmodern thought there are no categories with which to discern evil and its ways. The cause of the presence of this absence lies ready-to- hand. It is to be found on the very first page of Sein und Zeit: In the question with which this monumental work begins: Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word "being"? Not at all. So it is fitting that we raise anew the question of the meaning of Being. But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression "Being"? Not at all. In the course of his life's work Heidegger never succeeded in naming Being; furthermore, he sought to make a virtue out of that failure. Much of his deconstructive effort was given over to excoriating those philoso- phers who misnamed Being and so contributed to its oblivion. Consider an exactly opposite effort, one that Heidegger scorns as the beginning of the end of Philosophy. I mean the work of Plato. Now Plato begins by naming Being in a hypothetic fashion and then proceeds to work out its consequences by testing his theory against experience. Plato's name for Being is, of course, the Good, and goodness becomes the normative and formative measure whereby humans participate in the world. The greater the goodness, the greater the reality. The great power of this type of thinking is that it forces ethical questions to the fore. It makes a word such as "values" and all other terms like it the primary topic of philosophic effort. Heidegger and the postmoderns are 518 able to evade this issue by declaring it an abuse of language and an assault on Being itself. How does one talk about Ethics if the meaning of Being remains unknown? Not at all, comes the answer. Plato maintained that Philosophy does something supremely impor- tant: it allows us "to rule well." Ruling well means knowing the right relative status of norms and judging their proximate relevance to the world. To rule well means to be able to discern the value and merits of different kinds of existence. It signifies the possession of a standard by which one can act. Furthermore, this standard is public, open to discus- sion and reformable. Community and inquiry are indispensable ingredi- ents in the search for the Good. Thus thinking and doing join hands in the constructive effort to understand the world and its generic features. No such measure for human existence can be found in the Heideggerean corpus or in the works of postmodernism. Even the hint of such a hypothetic measure would suggest the hidden presence of a power game. Thinking, naming, saying, and doing are perpetually stymied by the absence of a meaning for Being. **Given the parameters he set for his philosophic enterprise, there is no way Heidegger could deal in a direct fashion with the question of Ethics**. A double thematic lies at the the heart of ethical discourse: the "Ought" and the consequences of our actions and decisions. The Ought deals with that enduring dimension of experience that lays claim to our being. Whence does it arise? How is it structured? What are its legitimate claims? These are the fundamental questions attached to the Ought. But a postmodern silence meets these questions. Likewise one would look in vain for a discussion of consequences and their impact on the world and our fellow humans. Indeed the act of naming Being is fundamental. For if one fails to do so, all things fall apart. The very center has vanished. In reading Heidegger and the postmoderns one often senses that something is missing. I would suggest that what is absent is full human experience, and what is being offered in its place is Philosophy. Now Philosophy is not the same as experience, but rather an abstraction from it. Its purpose is to allow us to develop, enhance, and appreciate our participation in the world. Philoso- phy is the quest for premises adequate to our experience. It is not a substitute for experience itself. In marking Philosophy's end, Heidegger and the postmoderns cite the failure of foundationalism. All Western Philosophy heretofore has been a vain search for ultimate foundations upon which to build a world view and a seamless cultural edifice. Philosophy meets its demise when it recognizes the logocentric pretensions of its claims to universality. In giving up the ghost, Philosophy yields to another movement of thought whose form, destiny, and aim are as yet unknown. But all this begs the question of Heidegger and Nazism. **The scandal Nazi activities lets out of postmodernism's closet is the fact that neither that movement nor its founder have anything to say about this century's most abhorrent evil. The reason why Heidegger failed to grasp the nature of Nazism is that his thought was deficient in the most fundamental way**. It failed to grasp the meaning of Being. If Farias' book has a moral, it would be something like this: The thought of Being and the thought of the Good are intimately related. Insofar as postmodern thought celebrates Heidegger's failure as the foundation of its development, it will continue to perpetuate the conspiracy of silence that has surrounded this scandal. When a philosopher's thought links together so closely authentic being, history, and personal insight, it cannot in any responsible way be severed from its commitments and activities. So it is with Martin Heideg- ger. The call for being one's own self (authenticity), the summons to deconstruct the history of Western Philosophy, and, finally, the charge to listen to the voice of being were the essentials of his way. The fact that these philosophical elements manifested themselves as forms of elitism, authoritarianism, and vicious political acts cannot be denied. Those postmoderns who pretend that this does not cast the darkest shadow over the essence of his thinking show the worst form of intellec- tual irresponsibility. Metaphysics was not overcome by Martin Heidegger. It was violently shoved aside. As a result Ethics died. Civilization needs both for its development. One of Heidegger's fundamental philosophical strategies was to associate all sorts of things with metaphysics and, then, declare those issues moot. How discuss what no longer has a word to express its being? But if Being needs a name, so does Evil. Philosophy's future re- volves about such a responsibility. Readers of this journal need to inquire into the deficiencies of Heideg- ger's thought. Otherwise, justice, human rights, and a host of other issues get tossed on the metaphysical junkpile.

### To Embrace Heidegger’s Philosophy is to Turn to Nazism.

Vogt, 2007, PhD [Erik, “Exception in Žižek’s Thought,” p. 6-7, published in diacritics, Project Muse <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/dia/summary/v037/37.2-3.vogt.html>], JB.

It is here that Žižek locates heidegger’s renunciation of the constitutive dimension of the political. First, he reminds us that heidegger’s prior involvement with National so- cialism has to be understood as the attempt to identify a concrete ontic political engage- ment that would suit best and is closest to the ontological truth of the essence of technol- ogy: “until about 1935, he thought that Nazism did provide a unique solution of how, on the one hand, thoroughly to embrace modern technology, work, and mobilization, while simultaneously including them in an ‘authentic’ political act of a people choosing its fate, acting on a decision, and so on. so we have technology, not aseptic traditionalism, but combined with roots, Volk, authentic decision, not das Man—in contrast to the Russian and American versions, which, each in its own way, betrays this authentic dimension (either in liberal individualism or in mass mobilization)” [Žižek, Parallax View 284]. And as Žižek immediately adds, even after 1935, when heidegger no longer provides Nazism with some kind of transcendental “dignity,” he continues to appreciate it “as the most radical version to enable modern man to confront technology” [284]. What is more, even heidegger’s famous turn toward Gelassenheit, supposedly marking his philosophi- cal disentanglement and turn away from his former involvement with National socialism as the culmination of the metaphysics of subjectivity, remains complicit with what it at- tempts to overcome. heidegger’s concept of ge-stell conceals, moreover, the antagonism of late-capitalist society in that this concealment is brought about by the reduction of economy to the closest realm of the oikos: “When heidegger talks about technology, he systematically ignores the whole sphere of modern ‘political’ economy, although modern technology is not only empirically, but in its very concept, rooted in the market dynamics of generating surplus-value. The underlying principle which impels the unrelenting drive of modern productivity is not technological, but economic: it is the market and com-modity principle of surplus-value which condemns capitalism to the crazy dynamics of permanent self-revolutionizing. Consequently, it is not possible to grasp the dynamics of modernity without what Marx called the ‘critique of political economy’” [Parallax View 277]T.

### Heidegger’s philosophies were strongly influenced by Nazism and his thought is irrevocably tied with national socialism

Hindess 92**--** Emeritus Professor in the School of Social Sciences at Australian NationalUniversity (Barry, February, “HEIDEGGER AND THE NAZIS: CAUTIONARY TALES OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE” Thesis Eleven, p 118-9)

However, the view that Heidegger’s thought is essentially Nazi has also been advanced by more serious critics. Adorno, for example, once described Heidegger’s philosophy as “fascist right down to its innermost components” Heidegger’s engagement with national socialism has often been interpreted as indicating that fundamental features of Heideggerian thought left him particularly vulnerable to the appeal of national socialism. In its simplest form the argument is that national socialism follows directly from Heidegger’s philosophical position. Loewith, for example, claims to find in Heidegger’s early concept of existence the constituents of his “later partisanship for Hitler” (Loewith, 1988, p. 123). Similar sentiments are expressed in Habermas’s Introduction to the German edition of Farias’s book.~ These claims hardly merit serious attention. The position presented in Heidegger’s Rectoral Address and his other partisan writings clearly undermine the contrast, central to the argument of Sein und Zeit, between the authentic individual Dasein and the anonymity of the collective das ~Ic~n.l° Heidegger and Modernity on the other hand suggests a less direct connection. The argument is not that Heidegger’s philosophy led him to embrace national socialism, but rather that his antihumanism left him particularly vulnerable to the appeal of national socialism. Ferry and Renaut use that supposed vulnerability to appeal of the irrational and the inhuman to attack the work of Derrida, Foucault and other contemporary anti-lumanists. The most obvious difficulty with any attempt to derive Heidegger’s alleged Nazism directly or indirectly from fundamental aspects of his thought concerns the critical character of his engagement with national socialism. Heidegger was a persistent critic of the Party’s failure to live up to the demands of what he saw as being its “inner truth and greatness”, and he was attacked by senior Party figures for advocating a “private national socialism” that rejected both national socialism’s racial doctrines and its concept of politicized science. Heidegger’s national socialism was that of a naive and unsuccessful opportunist, not that of a committed Nazi. The most that Habermas or Ferry and Renaut could be taken to show is that Heidegger was no friend of democracy and that support for an authoritarian German regime is consistent with his thought in some of its aspects. Where some commentators treat Heidegger’s thought as essentially Nazi, others try to separate it from his unpleasant political life. Rorty, for example, attributes Heidegger’s national socialism to the moral failings of Heidegger as a person and to his taking philosophy too seriously (Rorty, 1988). Just as we can separate, say, Frege’s vehement antisemitism from his work on the foundations of mathematics so, Rorty claims, we can separate Heidegger’s national socialism from what is most valuable in his thought. The analogy is a poor one, and not only because it trivializes the philosophical character of Heidegger’s critical engagement with national socialism. Even the most casual reader of Heidegger’s work could hardly fail to notice the recurrent theme of the special destiny and special responsibility of the German people - a theme that also runs through much of German philosophy. There is a significant point of contact here between Heidegger’s thought and national socialist ideology that Rorty simply refuses to acknowledge.

## Quietism

### The alternative 🡺 passivity and quietism in the face of suffering – Holocaust proves

Murray Bookchin, Founder of the Institute for Social Ecology and Former Professor at Ramapo College, 1995 [Re-enchanting Humanity, p. 168-170]

"Insofar as Heidegger can be said to have had a project to shape human lifeways, it was as an endeavor to resist, or should I say, demur from, what he conceived to he an all-encroaching technocratic mentality and civilization that rendered human beings 'inauthentic' in their relationship to a presumably self-generative reality, 'isness', or more esoterically, 'Being' *(Sein).* Not unlike many German reactionaries, Heidegger viewed ‘modernity' with its democratic spirit, rationalism, respect for the individual, and technological advances as a 'falling' *(Gefallen)* from a primal and naive innocence in which humanity once 'dwelled,’ remnants of which he believed existed in the rustic world into which he was born a century ago. 'Authenticity', it can be said without any philosophical frills, lay in the pristine Teutonic world of the tribal Germans who retained their ties with ‘the Gods’, and with later peoples who still tried to nourish their past amidst the blighted traits of the modern world. Since some authors try to muddy Heidegger's prelapsarian message by focusing on his assumed belief in individual freedom and ignoring his hatred of the French Revolution and its egalitarian, 'herd'-like democracy of the 'They', it is worth emphasizing that such a view withers m the light of his denial of individuality. The individual by himself counts for noth­ing', he declared after becoming a member of the National Socialist party in 1933. 'The fate of our Volk m its state counts for everything.'22 As a member of the Nazi party, which he remained up to the defeat of Germany twelve years later, his antihumanism reached strident, often blatantly reactionary proportions. Newly appointed as the rector of the University of Freiburg upon Hitler's ascent to power, he readily adopted the *Fuehrer*-principle of German fascism and preferred the title *Rektor-Fuhrer*,hailing the spirit of National Socialism as an antidote to 'the darkening of the world, the flight of the gods, the destruction of the earth [by technology], the transformation of men into a mass, the hatred and suspicion of everything free and creative.’28 His most unsavory remarks were directed in the lectures, from which these lines are taken, 'from a metaphysical point of view', against 'the pincers' created by America and Russia that threaten to squeeze 'the farthermost corner of the globe ... by technology and ... economic exploitation.'29 Technology, as Heidegger construes it, is 'no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth.’30 After which Heidegger rolls out technology's transformations, indeed mutations, which give rise to a mood of anxiety and finally hubris, anthropocentricity, and the mechanical coercion of things into mere objects for human use and exploitation. Heidegger's views on technology are part of a larger weltanschauung which is too multicolored to discuss here, and demands a degree of inter­pretive effort we must forgo for the present in the context of a criticism of technophobia. Suffice it to say that there is a good deal of primitivistic animism in Heidegger's treatment of the 'revealing' that occurs when *techne* is a 'clearing' for the 'expression' of a crafted material - not unlike the Eskimo sculptor who believes (quite wrongly, I may add) that he is 'bringing out' a hidden form that lies in the walrus ivory he is carving. But this issue must be seen more as a matter of metaphysics than of a spir­itually charged technique. Thus, when Heidegger praises a windmill, in contrast to the 'challenge' to a tract of land from which the ‘hauling out of coal and ore' is subjected, he is *not* being 'ecological'. Heidegger is concerned with a windmill, not as an ecological technology, but more metaphysically with the notion that 'its sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind's blowing'. The windmill 'does not unlock energy from the air currents, in order to store it'.31 Like man in relation to Being, it is a medium for the 'realization' of wind, not an artifact for acquiring power. Basically, this interpretation of a technological interrelationship reflects a regression - socially and psychologically as well as metaphysically – into **quietism**. Heidegger advances a message of passivity or passivity conceived as a human activity, an endeavor to let things *be* and 'disclose' themselves. 'Letting things be' would be little more than a trite Maoist and Buddhist precept were it not that Heidegger as a National Socialist became all too ideologically engaged, rather than 'letting things be', when he was busily undoing 'intellectualism,' democracy, and techno­logical intervention into the 'world'. Considering the time, the place, and the abstract way in which Heidegger treated humanity's 'Fall' into technological ‘inauthenticity’ – a ‘Fall’ that he, like Ellul, regarded as inevitable, albeit a metaphysical, nightmare - it is not hard to see why he could trivialize the Holocaust, when he deigned to notice it at all, as part of a techno-industrial ‘condition’. 'Agriculture is now a motorized *(motorsierte)* food industry, in essence the same as the manufacturing of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps,' he coldly observed, 'the same as the blockade and starvation of the countryside, the same as the production of the hydrogen bombs.’32 In placing the industrial *means* by which many Jews were killed before the ideological ends that guided their Nazi exterminators, Heidegger essentially displaces the barbarism of a *specific* state apparatus, of which he was a part, by the technical proficiency he can attribute *to the world at large!* These immensely revealing offhanded remarks, drawn from a speech he gave in Bremen m 1949, are beneath contempt. But they point to a way of thinking that gave an autonomy to technique that has fearful moral consequences which we are living with these days in the name of the sacred, a phraseology that Heidegger would find very congenial were he alive today. Indeed, technophobia, followed to its logical and crudely primitivistic conclusions, finally devolves into a **dark reactionism** – and a **paralyzing quietism**. For if our confrontation with civilization turns on passivity before a ‘disclosing of Being’, a mere ‘dwelling’ on the earth, and a ‘letting things be’, to use Heidegger’s verbiage – much of which has slipped into deep ecology’s vocabulary as well – the choice between supporting **barbarism** and enlightened humanism has **no ethical foundations to sustain it**. Freed of values grounded in objectivity, we are lost in a **quasi-religious antihumanism**, a spirituality that can with the same equanimity hear the cry of a bird and ignore the **anguish of six million** once-living people who were put to death by the National Socialist state.

## Essentialism

### Alternative’s collapse into essentialism 🡺 no solvency

Feenburg, 2002, PhD in Philosophy, Canada Research Chair in Philosophy of Technology in the School of Communication, Simon Fraser University [Andrew, “From Essentialism to Constructivism: Philosophy of Technology at the Crossroads," p. 2, <http://agora.qc.ca/textes/feenberg.html>], JB.

Recognition of the central importance of technical phenomena in the philosophies of Heidegger and Habermas promises a much more concrete social theory than anything possible in the past. However, neither fulfills the initial promise of their breakthrough. Both offer essentialist theories that fail to discriminate significantly different realizations of technical principles. As a result, technology rigidifies into destiny in their thought and the prospects for reform are narrowed to adjustments on the boundaries of the technical sphere. They hope that something—albeit a very different something—can be preserved from the homogenizing effects of the radical extension of technical systems, but they give us little reason to share their hope. In this talk I will attempt to preserve these thinkers' advance toward the critical integration of technical themes to philosophy without losing the conceptual space for imagining a radical reconstruction of modernity.

### Their argument relies too much on abstraction 🡺 essentializing all technology – proves the alternative is enframing as well

Feenburg, 2002, PhD in Philosophy, Canada Research Chair in Philosophy of Technology in the School of Communication, Simon Fraser University [Andrew, “From Essentialism to Constructivism: Philosophy of Technology at the Crossroads," p. 3-4, <http://agora.qc.ca/textes/feenberg.html>], JB.

Unfortunately, Heidegger's argument is developed at such a high level of abstraction he literally cannot discriminate between electricity and atom bombs, agricultural techniques and the Holocaust. All are merely different expressions of the identical enframing, which we are called to transcend through the recovery of a deeper relation to being. And since he rejects technical regression while leaving no room for a modern alternative, it is difficult to see in what that relation would consist beyond a mere change of attitude. Surely these ambiguities indicate problems in his approach (3).

# \*\*\*PERM SOLVENCY\*\*\*

## Perm Solves – Technological Thought

### Technological thought is not monolithic – can be combined with the alternative

Dreyfus and Spinosa, 97, PhDs, [Charles and Hubert, “Highway bridges and feasts: Heidegger and Borgmann on how to affirm technology,” SpringerLink, p. 173-4].

Resistance to technological practices by cultivating focal practices is the primary solution Borgmann gives to saving ourselves from technological devastation. Borgmann cannot find anything more positive in technology – other than indulging in good running shoes and a Big Mac every now and then – because he sees technology as the highest form of subjectivity. It may fragment our identities, but it maintains us as desiring beings not world disclosers. In contrast, since Heidegger sees technology as disaggregating our identities into a contingently built up collection of skills, technological things solicit certain skills without requiring that we take ourselves as having one style of identity or another. This absence of identity may make our mode of being as world disclosers impossible for us. This would be what Heidegger calls the greatest danger. But this absence of an identity also allows us to become sensitive to the various identities we have when we are engaged in disclosing the different worlds focused by different styles of things. For, although even dispersive technological skills will always gather in some fashion as they develop, the role of mortals as active world disclosers will only be preserved if it is at least possible for the gathering of these background skills to be experienced as such. And this experience will only be possible in technology if one can shift back and forth between pre-technological identities with their style of coping and a technological style. As such disclosers we can then respond to technological things as revealing one kind of world among others. Hence, Heidegger’s view of technology allows him to find a positive relation to it, but only so long as we maintain skills for disclosing other kinds of local worlds. Freeing us from having a total fixed identity so that we may experience ourselves as multiple identities disclosing multiple worlds is what Heidegger calls technology’s saving power.42 We have seen that for Heidegger being gathered by and nurturing non- technological things makes possible being gathered by technological things. Thus, living in a plurality of local worlds is not only desirable, as Borgmann sees, but is actually necessary if we are to give a positive place to technological devices. Both thinkers must, therefore, face the question that Borgmann faces in his recent book, as to how to live in a plurality of communities of focal celebration. If we try to organize our lives so as to maximize the number of focal worlds we dwell in each day, we will find ourselves teaching, then running, then making dinner, then clearing up just in time to play chamber music. Such a controlling approach will produce a subject that is always outside the current world, planning the next. Indeed such willful organization runs against the responsiveness necessary for dwelling in local worlds at all. But if, on the other hand, one goes from world to world fully absorbed in each and then fully open to whatever thing grabs one next, one will exist either as a collection of unrelated selves or as no self at all, drifting in a disoriented way among worlds. To avoid such a morphing or empty identities, one wants a life where engaging in one focal practice leads naturally to engaging in another – a life of affiliations such that one regularly is solicited to do the next focal thing when the current one is becoming irrelevant. Borgmann has intimations of such a life: “Musicians recognize gardeners; horse people understand artisans. . . . The experience of this kinship . . . opens up a wider reality that allows one to refocus one’s life when failing strength or changing circumstances withdraw a focal thing.43” Such a plurality of focal skills not only enables one to move from world to world; it gives one a sort of poly-identity that is neither the identity of an arbitrary desiring subject nor the rudderless adaptability of a resource. Such a kinship of mortals opens new possibilities for relations among communities. As Borgmann says: “People who have been captivated by music . . . will make music them- selves, but they will not exclude the runners or condemn the writers. In fact, they may run and write themselves or have spouses or acquaintances who do. There is an interlacing of communities of celebration”.44 Here, we suspect, we can find a positive place for technological devices. For there is room in such interconnecting worlds not only for a joyful family dinner, writing to a life-long friend, and attending the local concert but also for surfing on the Internet and happily zipping around an autobahn cloverleaf in tune with technology and glad that one is open to the possibilities of connecting with each of these worlds and many others.

### Technological thought can exist with the alternative – no residual link

Dallmayr, 1990, PhD, Doctor of Law, [Fred, “Rethinking the Political: Some Heideggerian Contributions,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 52, No. 4, JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1407522>, p. 543-4].

In more explicit fashion, the liberating quality of overcoming ( Verwindung) is delineated in the essay on "Releasement" (Gelassenheit), written nearly a decade later; at the same time,··the essay rejects any simple antiscientism or denigration of technology or the technological age. At this point, the latter age is rephrased or renamed as the "atomic age," that is, the age marked by atomic energy and the atom bomb; atomic power, in turn, is traced to the unfolding of modern science and thus to the structural process of enframing whereby nature is transformed into "a gigantic power station, an energy source for modern technology and industry." The same development progressively sets upon and enframes human Dasein, in the sense that, in all areas of life, "humans are encircled ever more tightly by the presence of technological gadgets and automata"; moreover, these gadgets and energies have long since "transgressed the range of human will power and capacity for decision"- thus revealing themselves as parts of an ontological structure or matrix. In the essay, these developments are again seen as harbingers of grave danger, mainly in two respects. First of all, technological enframing sets upon and undermines Dasein's reflective questioning of being, in favor of a purely technical or calculating rationality. As Heidegger recognizes, both types of thought are important in different contexts; however, what is threatened in our time is not calculation but reflectiveness or thought of being (Andenken). In addition, enframing erodes Dasein's placement or spatial-temporal location in being and world-that is, human rootedness or "autochthony" (Bodenstiindigkeit) - in favor of a general dispersal or dislocation. Again, rescue from these dangers cannot occur through sublime neglect, but only through sustained attentiveness to technological enframing-which reveals alternative modes of being and disclosure accessible through reflective questioning. "It would be foolish,"Heidegger insists, "to attack technology blindly, and shortsighted to condemn it as work of the devil. For, we all depend on technical devices-which even challenge us to ever greater advances." Yet, in the midst of technological enframing, another possibility is latent: namely, that of using technical devices without slavish attachment, that is, of living with technology in a free or released manner. In this fashion, Heidegger says, our relation to enframing becomes simple and relaxed: "We allow technical devices to enter our daily life, and at the same time we leave them outside, that is, we let them be as things exerting no absolute claim." The essay calls this option "releasement toward things" (Gelassenheit zu den Dingen) - an option which even carries the promise of a new autochthony or dwelling place.

### Technological thought is only destructive when it has exclusive reign over our epistemology – perm remedies

Carnevale, 2005, PhD in Philosophy [Franco A, “The Palliation of Dying: A Heideggerian Analysis of the “Technologization” of Death,” p. 5, Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology], JB.

Heidegger’s analysis of technology outlines two distinctive forms of thought: calculative and contemplative (Buckley, 1992). Calculative thought is centered on measurement and is oriented toward manipulation and control, striving to attain certainty and security. In contrast, contemplative thought seeks to question the meaning of things, particularly, the meaningful thinking of Being. Buckley (1992) highlights how representational thinking is central to Heidegger’s explication of the above distinction. Essential to traditional philosophy and modern science, Representational thought treats the world or reality itself as if it were a picture ... wherein so much energy has been spent on how the subject gets a correct picture of the world, how this picture is given, how the picture is ‘focused’ (Buckley, 1992, p. 236). This distinction between calculative and contemplative thought is qualitative rather than quantitative. That is, the former should not be regarded as a lesser version of the latter. They are essentially incommensurate. Buckley also points out that Heidegger does not view calculative thought - central to modern science - as negative. ‘The problem occurs when calculative thought becomes exclusive’ (Buckley, 1992, p. 238). This risks the potential for science to become a mere technique without true understanding – ‘an activity in passivity.’ Heidegger’s challenge seeks to demonstrate that calculation is but one form of thought, while arguing for a leap toward contemplative thought.