# \*\*\*MARS SPECIFIC K\*\*\*

## Mars Colonization – 1NC

### **The affirmative makes the universe standing reserve awaiting exploitation – their colonization of Mars 🡺 technological enframing which prevent any authentic revealing of the world**

Jerkins PhD Student in Religion @ FSU 2009 Jae Florida Philosophical Review Volume IX Issue 2 <http://www.philosophy.ucf.edu/fpr/files/9_2/jerkins.pdf>

This is a central point of concern I have over the issue of colonization. When Modernity’s gaze upon the world calls forth the project of colonization, this causes the process of enframing to begin, whereupon we mark the world for our own usage until the day comes when humanity itself may be commodified as a standing-reserve. Heidegger explains, “Man becomes that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being and its truth. Man becomes the relational center of that which is as such.”48 As objects in nature are relegated to standing-reserve, Heidegger explains, “everything man encounters exists only insofar as it has his construct.”49 Since nothing exists outside of humanity’s construction, we end up only ever encountering ourselves. Yet because we do not realize that the phenomena before us are of our own construction, a distortion caused by enframing, Heidegger contends that we fail to grasp an important existential truth—we can never truly encounter ourselves, our world, or Mars for that matter.50 When humanity gazes out at the world, “he fails to see himself as the one spoken to.”51

The dizzying rise in modern technology has precipitated a fundamental change in our perception of objects and, inevitably, in ourselves. By turning the world into technology, humankind turns itself into the world’s technicians. We reassemble and reconfigure the natural world for our own use, playing the part of the self-made, frontier-forging individual—the modern man. Technology unlocks the energy in nature, transforming the rushing water of the Rhine into energy, storing up that energy, distributing it to German power outlets, and thus revealing the concealed power in nature. This challenge to nature, to stop being and to become a resource/commodity for modern human beings, is how modern technology serves as revealer.

The Problem of Enframing

For Mars, the prospect of enframing is extremely problematic, given its phenomenological nature. As interpretive discourse directs the narratives of Mars (scientific and otherwise), enframing comes rather easily and often appears as a benign force in the media and public discourse, asking, “What can Mars do for us?” Because the interpretation of Mars precedes any objective knowledge, as illustrated by Lowell’s once popular canal theories, we must proceed in the awareness that Mars is, in the public mind, what is said of it. Heidegger warns, “The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing,” adding his somewhat romantic call to modernity, “and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.”52 Heidegger’s point is well-taken—what is damaging to our participation in the world is the exclusivity technology brings to bear as a form of modern revelation.

Heidegger explains that when technological enframing takes place, “it drives out every other possibility of revealing.”53 When technological ordering comes to be the only way we perceive the world, then the world becomes revealed to us only through the banal act of securing natural resources, no longer allowing what Heidegger calls the “fundamental characteristics” of our resources to appear to us.54 The Earth becomes minerals, the sky becomes gases, and the Martian surface becomes whatever those with means will it to be. When we gaze at Mars with an eye toward technologically enframing it, we deny ourselves the possibility of other forms of revelation which, given the great passage of time, may come to make our generation appear quite near-sided and audacious—or worse, cause permanent damage to a planet we are far from grasping in its sublime entirety. Heidegger describes the enframing of a tract of earth as “a coal–mining district”; can the enframing of Mars as a natural resource be far from Heideggerian thought?55 To appreciate fully the meaning in this world and of the “red planet,” we must come to terms with our modern predilection for technological enframing and be accepting of other, more long-term, open-minded and inclusive perspectives of place-making.

### **The aff will claim its mission is justified by scientific study and inquiry – however their epistemology is constructed via narrative knowledge – this non-scientific framing provides the impulse for colonization**

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The tenuous relationship between the empirical and the fictive lends science the availability to use other forms of knowledge, like narrative knowledge, to legitimate its activities. This narrative knowledge is often the kind of knowledge that scientists are believed to shun—ostensibly, scientists don’t tell stories, they present facts. Thus, empirical knowledge is the proclaimed mandate of the scientist. Yet it is often a narrative, and not empirical knowledge, that is used to advocate and legitimate the activities of the scientific community and the authoritative presence of their government structures.

Today, scientists studying Mars use the tools of the narrative of colonialism—with the enthusiasm of nationalism, the promises of corporate success, and the desire to dominate new frontiers—all to legitimate the project of going to Mars. When one legitimates an activity, they are promoting said activity as authorized, validated, or normative.33 Both scientific and governmental discourses are legitimated by narrative, and yet scientific discourse tends to push narrative aside as an inferior method of conveying knowledge.

There also exists a vague correlation between legitimation and truth. Jean-François Lyotard explains, “The language game of science desires its statements to be true but does not have the resources to legitimate their truth on its own.”34 The state tends to render science “understandable” by relating “scientific knowledge to ‘popular’ knowledge,” doing so by “spend[ing] large amounts of money to enable science to pass itself off as an epic.”35 Scientific documentaries like MARS: Dead or Alive are saturated with narratives, from the anthropomorphic rovers to the “hostile” land, because “scientific knowledge cannot know and make known that it is the true knowledge without resorting to the other, narrative, kind of knowledge, which from its point of view is no knowledge at all.”36

This paradoxical viewpoint of scientific narratives threatens to render scientific accounts of

Mars unchallengeable. Scientists attempt to explain what Mars is like, but then use colonialist narratives, modernist narratives, and Hegelian narratives of progress to induce the public into funding scientific projects. Thus, it becomes cumbersome to engage in dialogue concerning the legitimacy of Martian endeavors when scientists utilize narrative to legitimate what they do, while dismissing narrative as non-science. Instead, the scientific discourse of Mars should be seen for what it is—a changing, subjective, and complex exchange of the narrative and the empirical, influenced by historical context, bureaucratic powers, and the technological drive toward efficiency.

Martian Phenomenology

Thus, the meaning of Mars comes to us, not empirically from a telescope, but first and foremost hermeneutically through its discourse. This interpretive process means that there is no absolutely objective knowledge—only the changing interpretation of phenomena. Geneticist Richard Lewontin maintains that

Even agreed–on, widely practiced methodologies are culturally and historically situated...scientific truth-claims have complex internal structures and complicated networks of external affiliations that cannot be explained solely by reference to internal standards of legitimation.37

Though humankind has never set foot on Mars—somehow we seem to know when the movies have it right; somehow we seem to know when the author has grabbed hold of some kernel of truth about the “red planet.” This is because we are both audience and actor in an unending exchange of signifiers—movies, stories, pictures, and articles that share with us a phenomenon we call “Mars.” Edmund Husserl explains that we study phenomena by “grasp[ing] the corresponding subjective experiences in which we become ‘conscious’ of them, in which (in the broadest sense) they ‘appear.’”38 As narratives of Mars appear in the public discourse, we read and interpret them, utilizing the sum of our experiences and perspectives.

There exists the notion in science that Mars is a kind of unmarked, “empty slate” for us to write upon. In fact, Mars comes to us not only containing a rich heritage of stories and representations, but our own personal influences and interpretations as well. Percival Lowell’s ideas were not born in a vacuum. The romance of exotic places, the popularity of Darwinian evolution, and the political and religious climate of the day all played a significant part in Lowell’s interpretation of Mars.

### Their enframing drives out every other possibility of revealing 🡺 primordial justifications for violence

Burke**,** Senior Lecturer in Politics and IR, University of New South Wales, 2007 Anthony, Theory & Event, 10.2

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out **every other possibility of revealing**...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87

What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to **our entire space of truth and existence.** Many of the **most destructive features** of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become **inevitabilities**, and humans **suffer and die**. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic.

### Our alternative is to think Mars – the not-doing of the alternative is a necessary renouncement of the will – key to authentic relationship with Being

Zimmerman 1981 (Michael E. Zimmerman [prof of Philosophy @ Tulane U]; Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity, pp. 245-248)

Under the domination of egoism and self-will, an individual regards himself as the self-grounding vantage point around which everything else is organized as an object for him. In fact, however, we are born into a play of appearances which has no "center" and no "interiority." Only if we are released from the isolation imposed by self- I willed egoism, however, can we become fully open for this play. In releasement, the playful region "appropriates the presence [Wesen] of man for its own regioning.. . . " (G, 62/83) The released individual no longer experiences himself as looking out on objects; instead, he feels that beings are appearing to each other through him! How is this extraordinary releasement accomplished? First of all, since representational or objectifying thinking is itself a kind of willing, we can hardly expect to stop such thinking by an act of will. Willing only reinforces will. Yet the release does not occur unless one is somehow ready for it. Hence, the scientist says to the teacher: "You want a non-willing in the sense of renouncing of willing, so that through this we may release, or at least prepare to release, ourselves to the sought-for essence of a thinking that is not a willing." (G, 31/59-60) Renouncing will, however, requires a "trace" of willing which disappears entirely in releasement. This "trace of willing" is how we are to "think 'resoluteness' as it is thought in Being and Time: as the properly [eigens] undertaken self opening of Dasein for the open.. . . " (G, 59/81) Since releasement lies beyond willing, it stands outside of the ordinary distinction between activity and passivity. In the context of this dialogue, "doing" means acting to achieve a goal posited by the ego. The "not-doing" characteristic of the released individual, however, "is in no way a matter of weakly allowing things to slide and drift along." (G, 33/61). Instead, such not-doing is "something like the power of action and resolve." (G, 58/80) Releasement means resolving to let the nature of truth (un-concealment) be revealed. This resolve, a kind of "endurance" (Ausdauer) which increases as releasement itself increases, is called "constancy" (Instandigkeit). (G, 59/81) Releasement is a noble-mindedness (Edelmut) which humbly awaits the disclosure of the Being of beings. Awaiting the manifestation of Being can involve practical activity. As released, we are open for the possibilities of beings. Instead of subjecting things to our will, we seek to let them be what they already are. There are two ways of tilling the soil, for example. Subjectivistic man treats the earth merely as raw material to be exploited for profit; hence, he uses chemicals which dramatically improve crop "production" for a time, but which ultimately degrade the earth. Released man regards the earth as the source of life; hence, in tilling it, he takes care that the soil remains fertile and healthy. "Waiting" on Being can mean nurturing and caring. True nobility resides in such waiting. If the noble is that which has origins (Herkunft), and if our origin as human , beings is the region of regions (Ereignis), we are noble when we let ourselves be appropriated by the region. When appropriated, the ego gives way to what is more fundamental – openness. TEACHER: A patient noble-mindedness would be pure resting in itself of that willing, which, renouncing willing, has released itself to what is not will. SCHOLAR: Noble-mindedness would be the essence of thinking [Denken] and thereby of thanking [Danken]. TEACHER: Of that thanking which does not have to thank for something, but only thanks for being allowed to thank. (G, 64- 65/85) "Thinking" does not mean deductive reasoning, calculating, or categorizing. These dualistic operations reduce beings to objects for the subject. In genuine thinking, the "self" or "subject" disappears. In the released individual, there is no longer a self-conscious ego; instead, Ereignis is aware of itself through the cleared individual. i The ego-subject is eclipsed by the self-manifesting play of appearances. Heidegger remarks in his essay, "The Turning": Only when the human essence, in the Ereignk of the insight by which he himself is behold, renounces human self-will [Eigensinn] and projects himself toward that insight and away from himself, does he correspond in his essence to the claim of that insight. In thus corresponding man is gathered into his own [ge-eignet], so that he, within the safeguarded element of world, may, as mortal, look out toward the divine. (TK, 45/47) Thinking is a kind of thanking. In thanking, we accept the gift of existence. In accepting ourselves, we become ourselves. As released, we gratefully enter into the play of which we are already a part. Releasement means "homecoming" (Holderlin). Thinking as thanking means loving. In What Is Called Thinking?, Heidegger cites Holderlin's line: "Who the deepest has thought, loves what is most alive." (WHD, 9/20) Thinking as thanking means being "poor in I spirit," seeking nothing, and submitting to the necessity of the play of appearances. The "thinking which recalls" (andenkendes Denken) I preserves, gathers, and reveals the cosmic play analogously to how the cosmic play gathers the absence (aeon) in which beings can appear to one anpther. In a poem called "Thanks," written for Rene' Char, Heidegger says: "Giving thanks: announcing one's belonging to/the needy, appropriating event." (D, 87) Because we always belong to the appropriating event, we are always open

for it. Releasement means becoming aware of our openness. Because Heidegger wants to avoid describing Ereignis as an agent, he cannot quite say that Ereignis releases us. The release simply comes unexpectedly as a gift, in a way similar to the advent of what Christianity calls b b grace." As John D. Caputo and Reiner Schiirmann have demonstrated, Heidegger's concept of releasement (Gelassenheit) resembles the I Christian mystic Meister Eckhart's concept of releasement (Gelkenheit, J6 According to Caputo, the following "analogy of proportionality" holds between Heidegger's concept and that of Eckhart: Being is to Dasein as God is to the soul. For both thinkers, releasement (redemption) is not an achievement of the self; rather, it is a matter of becoming what we already are. For Heidegger, this means becoming the clearing in which the cosmic play can display itself; for I Eckhart, this means becoming the clearing for the birth of Jesus I (the advent of God) in the soul. Eckhart explains that the soul is the "image" of God insofar as God gives birth to His Son (hence, to Himself) in it. This divine birth, however, requires that the soul be cleared and prepared through grace. God does not give birth to Himself in a soul seized with self-will. Self-will includes being attached to worldly affairs. Hence, for Eckhart, releasement is detachment (Abgeschiedenheit) from things. So free is the released soul from purposive or willed activity that it does not even act in order to please God. It cannot please Him, for it is united with Him. Indeed, l it is united with the Godhead (Gottheit), the abyss which lies beyond the personal God of Creation

### The alt is a necessary prerequisite to policy action – only the alternative can engage an authentic relationship with the distant planet

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Using the double-entendre example of a bridge, Martin Heidegger examines the proximity of phenomenological distance. Heidegger implores his reader to think of “the old bridge” in distant Heidelberg, though for our purposes the place to consider could very well be Mars.39 Heidegger instructs, “This thinking toward that location is not a mere experience inside the person’s present here; rather, it belongs to the nature of our thinking of that bridge that in itself thinking gets through, persists through, the distance to that location.”40 From where we are, we are also at that bridge in Heidelberg—or on Mars for that matter. Heidegger informs us, “we are by no means at some representational content in our consciousness. From right here we may even be much nearer to that [bridge, city, or planet]…than someone who uses it daily as an indifferent river crossing.”41 When we pause to consider critically a place of great physical distance, we can become conscious of it in a far more powerful way than someone near it who casually takes for granted the existence of that place. This notion only further legitimizes the relevance of our phenomenological knowledge of Mars. We not only construct Mars socially and phenomenologically, we may even bridge the very distance cognitively.

## Mars Links - Discourse Key

### **Our relationship and understanding of mars is not neutral – it is shaped by our discursive framing of the “red planet”**

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When we talk about “Mars,” we must think critically about what we mean. Does the word “Mars” merely signify the “fourth planet from the Sun,” or does it mean something more? Does “Mars” invoke twentieth century science-fiction narratives of unfathomable alien civilizations? Does the word “Mars” summon images of a desolate wasteland—perhaps a harbinger of Earth’s future? Or does “Mars” conjure up visions of discovery and nationalist accomplishment, accompanied by stirring speeches, the pomp of fortissimo trumpets, and montages of buzz-cut astronauts and rockets in flight? Mars is much more than a planetary body in space—it is a set of beliefs and ideas.

We know the “red planet” today because of, not in spite of, the stories we tell about Mars. I will examine how the power of narrative has been used to convince the public that we should go to Mars. Modernity has phenomenologically shaped Mars and our present discourse of Mars is the result of that metamorphosis. The discourse of Mars is manifest in the phenomena we read, interpret, and share. This discourse also serves to legitimate the goals of those who are now talking about colonizing Mars. In this way, we create Mars discursively; and because of this, an examination of our discourse is integral to understanding the phenomenon we call “Mars.” So, if and when we physically journey to the fourth planetary body in the solar system, we go to a place called “Mars;” however, when we go to “Mars,” we go to a place we have phenomenologically constructed because of the power we possess to create a place.

## Mars Links - Mapping

### Mapping of Mars 🡺 scientific imperialism

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Since the beginning of Modern colonialism, the nature of place-making has largely been an imperial venture. When voices of authority assign a name to a space, this activity transforms it into a meaningful place.1 In this way, Mars has become a real place for us now, in the same way that America and Africa became meaningful places at the beginning of their colonial period—with maps of Latin place-names, the language of apparent scientific austerity. Philosopher V. Y. Mudimbe describes “the opposition of Greek or Roman civility” to that of the ancient “barbarians” “concretized by being located on a map…[where] the map is a scientific project” meant to identify the other; map-making thus becomes “the technical vision of subjective perceptions.”2

The power of the scientist as creator of place is palpable. Henri Lefebvre identifies map-making with creating a conceptualized, conceived space—calling this space “the space of scientists.”3 For example, outside the purview of the naked eye, scientists have used their unique powers of analysis to identify the source of the Mississippi River. When scientists identified the source as one particular lake among many, the area around the lake was designated a park—now flocked to by eager tourists. Yi-Fu Tuan, a scholar of place studies, explains, “Scientists thus appear to have a certain power: they can create a place by pointing their official fingers at one body of water rather than another.”4 In this way, place is given official meaning and status.

Science and Place-Making

The ongoing mapping/making of the solar system, and of Mars in particular, has had an amazing history. The first maps of Mars to have any detail at all first appeared in 1840.5 When Giovanni Schiaparelli first considered the project of mapping the Martian surface at the end of the 19th century, the scientist dutifully noted that his task was “not an exact science but an effort to register the contours of possibility for further investigation.”6

This kind of analysis came at a time when science was gaining ground as a reserved and rational authority, whose efforts were backed by the most painstakingly objective observations. Taxonomical efforts were being put into place for everything from insects to continents to human ‘races’—science was mapping the world. Nineteenth century maps of Africa reveal the way Europeans understood it. The Dark Continent was so named for the lack of meaning found on maps of the place—only where Europeans had traveled within Africa was place produced.

For instance, John Hanning Speke is said to have discovered the source of the Nile River in 1858—naming it “Lake Victoria” after the British monarch. What is missing from this account of Africa’s largest body of water is that untold numbers of native Africans had known of its existence for many years. So the European maps of Africa bore symbols pertinent to European knowledge— as if to say, “this is what is known so far about the untraveled continent.” Lake Victoria’s placement on the world map thus operated as a symbol of British colonial power, while ignoring the African narratives of place except in such cases as were thought beneficial for Europeans.

Tuan explains, “Objects that are held in awe by one people can easily be overlooked by another. Culture affects perception.”7 The reality of place-making is just as true today for Mars as it was years ago for Africa. The importance of local interpretation, local in the sense of both place and time, is integral to the understanding of place. As European interest in Africa’s resources increased, the maps became more complex. This is the 19th century legacy of map/place-making that we have inherited in the 21st century. All maps contain historical and political functions informed by the interests of the map-maker, the presupposed use of the colonist, and the level of technology available at the time the map was made. Martin Heidegger famously contends, “Our ordinary perceptual awareness of things is itself interpretive.”8 This contradicts the usual view of modern science—namely, that all knowledge is acquired by objective observation. However, empirical, scientific data has a long history of necessary, and sometimes unfortunate, subjective interpretation. One such case is the hapless tale of the Martian canals.

# \*\*\*HEIDEGGER K\*\*\*

## Heidegger K – 1NC

### INSERT LINK

### This enframing drives out every other possibility of revealing 🡺 primordial justifications for violence

Burke**,** Senior Lecturer in Politics and IR, University of New South Wales, 2007 Anthony, Theory & Event, 10.2

My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out **every other possibility of revealing**...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87

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### Our alternative is to do nothing about space beyond the Earth’s Mesosphere – this act of letting the universe be is key to an authentic relationship with the Earth

Turnbull Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Social Theory and Nottingham Trent U 2006 Neil, , “The Ontological Consequence of Copernicus: Global Being in the Planetary World”, Theory, Culture & Society Vol. 23(1))

However, the question of the significance of the earth and its relationship to both technology and world in the context of ‘dwelling’ – as a key element of the ‘fourfold’ of Earth, Sky, Gods and Mortals – is the more prominent feature of his later work (and it is for this reason that many Heideggerians read him as a proto-ecological philosopher [see Foltz, 1995; Zimmerman, 1994]). Some Heidegger scholars recognize that the new emphasis given to earth in Heidegger’s later philosophy is an ‘attempt to think the essence of things in a new way’ (Mulhall, 1990: 169) and that, for the late Heidegger, ‘authentic dwelling’ is no longer a matter of a temporalized ‘being-in-the-world’ – as it was in Being and Time – but is reconceived as a dwelling ‘poetically on the earth’ and ‘under the sky’ (Heidegger, 1978a: 351). Thus, for the later Heidegger, authentic ways of living stand radically opposed to what might be termed ‘Copernican modes of existence’, for to live authentically on the earth is to ‘receive the sky as sky’ and to ‘leave the sun and moon to their journey, the stars to their courses’ (1978a: 352). As the earth is transformed into a cosmological representation, the earth loses its ontological status as a site of dwelling and is reduced to an object of possible knowledge for modernity’s technological subject. The later Heidegger thus strives to defend an earthbound notion of the world and this, in his view, requires that we reject Copernican ideas of the primacy of space in that, for him, ‘spaces receive their essential being from locales and not from “space”’ (1978a: 356). In Heidegger’s view, the earth is the ontological basis for our localized sense of place. It is what he terms ‘the serving bearer’ – an idea related to the pagan conception of the earth as the giver of life – and as such a primordial ground ‘blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up in plant and animal’ (1971: 149–50).

Thus, for the later Heidegger worlds are only conceivable as such – such that the world is attained as world – only when they framed by the sky above and the earth beneath (see Malpas, 2000: 227). Clearly, for the later Heidegger, the idea of ‘the world’ is conceptually inseparable from that of ‘the earth’ (and in many ways, for the later Heidegger, the idea of the world within which ‘Dasein is’ is replaced by the idea of the fourfold within which ‘man dwells’). The close relationship between earth and world for Heidegger can again be seen in the Origins of the Work of Art, where Heidegger recognizes that ‘[w]orld and earth are essentially different from one another and yet never separated. The world grounds itself in the earth and the earth juts through the world’ (1978b: 174).2 When seen in this way, the earth is viewed as forming the ontological basis for what Heidegger terms ‘the work’ – of both artist and artisan – and its corollary the ‘thingly character of the world’ (1978b: 180). More generally, Heidegger conceives the earth as the ground of all appearance and the physys out of which the world emerges (a ground that supports the nomos of the world). For, in Heidegger’s view, only a world supported by the earth can give things their proper measure: and without this relation, things have no ‘true’ measure (and in such a case, the measurement of the world in terms of an abstract mathematicized facticity – required for the efficient maintenance of purely technological relationships – becomes the anthropocentric measure of all things).

# \*\*\*LINKS\*\*\*

## Overview Effect Link - 1NC

The overview effect is metaphysics – its quest for epistemologically sound understandings of the universe 🡺 enframing the earth as purely technological

Turnbull Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Social Theory and Nottingham Trent U 2006 Neil, , “The Ontological Consequence of Copernicus: Global Being in the Planetary World”, Theory, Culture & Society Vol. 23(1))

Essentially, Nietzsche’s claim is that Copernicanism and Darwinism force us to question the significance of both the Greek Humanist and the Judeo–Christian conceptions of humanity and its world (that is, to think beyond the territorialization of Western philosophy as somewhere between ‘Athens’ and ‘Jerusalem’). In Nietzsche’s view, modern metaphysics is both ‘groundless’ and ‘simian’ because, after Copernicus and Darwin, ‘the earth does not stand fast’ (Nietzsche, 1998: 2) and ‘man is more of an ape than any ape’ (Nietzsche, 1969: 42). In such a context Nietzsche’s madman is not a prophet of lost archaic theological certainties, but a new voice of sanity, castigating, warning and exhorting his ‘metaphysically somnambulant’ audience to wake up to the truly frightening placelessness of modernity’s Copernican and Darwinian forms of life. And many who have followed Nietzsche in this regard have noted that the key to understanding the significance of modernity’s unheimlich ontology resides within a broader appreciation of the way in which the new cosmology has undermined traditional conceptions of earth. As Nietzsche’s heir Martin Heidegger famously claimed, when seen in Copernican planetary-cosmological terms, the earth is no longer the earth in any vital or lived sense but simply an object comprised of ‘purely technological relationships’ and an object, moreover, that is subjectivized into a representation, a vorstellung, that ‘stands before us’ rather than as something in ‘our midst’ (Heidegger, 1993: 105–6). For Heidegger, once perceived and conceived as a visual representation of a planetary bounded whole, the earth becomes ‘deworlded’: appearing as just one more casual system within a much wider cosmological causal order. And this is why for Heidegger – in his much-cited reflections on this matter – the interplanetary images of the earth from space are not simply the end product of a rather complex and powerful set of technological process that enframe the earth as a mass industrialized object, but are images that radically diminish the meaning of the earth, rendering humanity without a world within which to dwell (a theme that I return to later). When seen in Heideggerian terms, Copernicanism reduces the earth to mere ‘planetary matter’; an absurd and inhuman cosmic accident devoid of any ultimate sense or significance. In such a context we can no longer speak of a meaningful world at all, because when the earth is ‘reduced’ to a visual representation, it ceases to be a context of significance but stands as something that ‘transcends all tacitly shared assumptions’. As such, it is ‘beyond all frameworks – an abyss’ (Wood, 2002: 15). It becomes a ‘spectral earth’ – a mere flicker of light in the cosmological void. As Lyotard claimed, as a Copernican technologized object the earth ‘isn’t at all originary’ but merely a ‘spasmodic state of energy, an instant of established order, a smile on the surface of matter in a remote corner of the cosmos’ (Lyotard, 1991: 10).

## Overview Effect K – Link Block

### ENFRAMING - Extend Turnbull 2006 – the focus on the overview effect is an attempt to conceal an authentic relationship with the Earth – the obsession with a fixed and static understanding of the global picture gives too much credence to the technology of life and displaces our ability to celebrate our Earthly existence – their desire for epistemological certainty prevents revealing any more authentic relationship – more evidence

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A cosmology is more than a system of classification, an origin myth, or a theory of the relationships among what there is in the universe; it also involves affective and aesthetic dimensions and the sense of coherence of a group’s characteristic words, practices, and objects. Often, however, when modern technology is linked to a “cosmology” or “worldview,” we are offered a much thinner picture than that suggested by anthropology’s presentations of the ways humans have organized nature and society—a “mechanization of the world picture” simplifying all experience to utilitarian building blocks of masses and forces, functionalist means and ends.1 A fear that “positivist” reduction and instrumentalization might come to dominate the entirety of human life runs throughout critical writings on technology. In this tradition, especially as it has reckoned with the technocratic destruction wrought by twentieth‐century wars, machines are frequently identified with the brutally abstract quest for efficiency and exploitation.2

The later works of Martin Heidegger took this tendency to an extreme. Even the neo‐Kantian language of “world‐picture” or “worldview,” he argued, brings with it the aggression implied by the technological relationship to nature: “The fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as picture.” With the appearance of a “subject” to whom all of nature must be represented, the road is cleared for an “assault” by man, taken as the “lord of the earth”: “In the planetary imperialism of technologically organized man, the subjectivism of man attains its acme, from which point it will descend to the level of organized uniformity and there firmly establish itself. This uniformity becomes the surest instrument of total, i.e. technological, rule over the earth.”3 Heidegger’s late works paint all modern technology and science with this broad and scary brush. As many have noted, it is as though his disappointment with the Nazi regime, which he notoriously supported in the 1930s, mutated after World War II into antipathy for industrial society as a whole. Heidegger’s readers have had an indirect impact on science and technology studies—perhaps chief among them Michel Foucault, who turned many of his fundamental insights to unexpected ends; long a central figure in philosophy of technology, Heidegger is currently undergoing a minor, grudging revival.4 Though I am neither a specialist nor a devotee of Heidegger’s works, the theme of this Focus section invites a reconsideration of his arguments about technology and, most notably, “things.”

### ANTI-WORLD - Overview effect does not produce unity it creates a worldlessness 🡺 global capitalist exploitation

Turnbull Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Social Theory and Nottingham Trent U 2006 Neil, , “The Ontological Consequence of Copernicus: Global Being in the Planetary World”, Theory, Culture & Society Vol. 23(1))

Thus the modern astronaut is seen as one of the primary agents of modern worldlessness in Heideggerian philosophy (and one is immediately struck by the phenomenological similarities between the spatial nihilism of Nietzsche’s madman and the free-floating placeless experience of the modern astronaut). For when the earth is seen from an astronautic point of view, all traditional human concerns are deterritorialized and strangely diminished to the extent that interplanetary representations of the earth threaten to sever the connection between humanity and its traditional ontological supports. Heideggerian scholars such as Robert Romanyshyn have developed this idea and used it as the basis for an existential critique of ‘the mad astronaut’: the quintessentially modern avatar that stands as the highest expression of modernity’s unheimlich rootlessness. Romanyshyn’s is a critique of what might be termed ‘the astronautic condition of modernity’ (1989; 200), as, in Romanyshyn’s view, the modern astronaut – what so many modern Western children want to ‘grow up to be’ – is a metaphor for a hypermodern cultural-psychological dream of distance, departure and escape from matter that reveals a world of pure ‘spectacular wonder’, and that disguises and perhaps even obliterates those deep and emotional connections to the earth that maintain a sense of ontological security and lived reality.

These Heideggerian concerns are echoed in the claim that the ‘planetary earth’ is a symbol of Western capitalism’s domination of nature and global exploitation of cultural life. Seen thus, the image of the earth from space can be seen as the aesthetic core of the ideology of the expansionary – neo-liberal – phase of global capitalism and the sublime object of the post-ideological West. It is an object that conveys a new ‘satellite geography’ (see Redfield, 1996) and a placeless map that is the representational condition of possibility for the establishment of global surveillance and communication systems (Western capital’s command-and-control system). This placeless space of the planet is seen as challenging traditional notions of space and perhaps even traditional conceptions of the real itself. And according to Paul Virilio, the interplanetary idea of the earth is not only internally related to the idea of limitless capitalist expansion (see Virilio, 2002: 63) because, in his view, planetary technologies are bringing about an ‘exotic reorganisation of sight enabling perception to escape from the “real space of our planet”’ into what he terms ‘a horizonless perception under a vanished sky’ (see Virilio, 1997: 2, 2000: 63). Here, as with more orthodox Heideggerian analyses, the representation of the earth as planet is seen as a symbol of the deterritorializing technological power of global capitalism: a power that renders the ‘sphere of experience’ as ‘a synthesis of home and non-place, a nowhere place’ (Beck, 2002: 30)

## Overview Effect Link – AT: Solves Impact

### The overview effect 🡺 de-radicalizing of environmental movements – cannot solve our impact

Bryant, 95, Phd in Geology, Professor of Oceanography, has an endowed chair in his name [William, "The Re-Vision of Planet Earth: Space Flight and Environmentalism in Postmodern America," p. 49-50, <https://journals.ku.edu/index.php/amerstud/article/view/2791/2750>], JB.

This changed relationship was precisely the goal of the environmental movement and the reason the picture of the whole Earth became so important to it. Framed in environmentalist terms, the image of Earth from outer space showed the planet in all its "sensual reality" as beautiful, frail, and vulnerable to the depredations of avaricious industry and technology. Further, the image empha- sized the common origins, conditions, and fate of people all over the planet. For the first time, one could look at the place where "everyone had lived and everything had happened." As poet Archibald MacLeish put it, "to see the Earth as it truly is. . . is to see ourselves as riders on the Earth together."18 In the environmentalist ideology, care taken in the way humans interacted with the Earth was paramount to the survival of the entire species. One powerful mechanism for merging these desired sensibilities—of an awareness of the sensual reality of the planet on the one hand, and a universal notion of humankind on the other—was through the metaphor Spaceship Earth. This metaphor, employed as a tool in the popularization of ecological consciousness, was emblematic of the environmentalists' radically reconstituted human/ nature relationship, but ultimately worked against that relationship by advancing a discourse on the environment which undermined its radical potential.

### Overview effect precludes authentic relationship with the environment

Bryant, 95, Phd in Geology, Professor of Oceanography, has an endowed chair in his name [William, "The Re-Vision of Planet Earth: Space Flight and Environmentalism in Postmodern America," p. 51-54, <https://journals.ku.edu/index.php/amerstud/article/view/2791/2750>], JB.

At one level, using the spaceship metaphor to make an ecological point during the first full blush of the space age might be seen as an instance of principled opportunism, as an attempt to turn the goals of the militaristic, technocratic state back upon themselves, or at the minimum to hit upon a familiar cultural chord to which a large audience might resonate. But no one making the ecological point ever seemed to acknowledge the deep irony in enlisting the help of an image that was itself the product of the very complex of economic, bureaucratie, military, and technological systems they held responsible for the destruction of the environment. The scientist J. Baird Callicott wrote, without irony, "More than any other single phenomenon, those photographs of a soft, lake-blue planet, coyly swirled about with flouncy clouds, floating in empty space—with the utter desolation of the moonscape in the foreground—precipi- tated the ecological and environmental decade that immediately followed," as though the image itself set off the environmental activism of the 1970s without the help of the environmental havoc left in the wake of all that went into getting a camera on the moon in the first place.28 In missing the irony inherent in Spaceship Earth, environmentalists rendered the metaphor self-defeating. To make a value judgment about the Earth, based on photographs from space, one had to make an abstraction of it, to dismiss the specifics of history and context. Not visible from space is the evidence of the real human/human and human/nature relationships transpiring on the surface of the planet, including not only the evil works of people perpetrated upon nature and upon themselves, but also the non-nurturing, non-life-supporting earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods that the Earth perpetrates upon people. Seen from outer space, the Earth "as it truly is" is not a site of human contestation. Spaceship Earth was an abstraction and reduction of the planet, which worked against the promise of a radically reconstituted human/nature relationship by dissolving context and history and leaving no concrete reality in which to build a politics. As Eric Sevareid said in his Earth Day1970 broadcast on CBS News, "We are now dealing with final facts, the chemistry and physics of plant and animal existence, not with the metaphysics of freedom, justice, equality or the other elastic elements in human happiness."29 By Earth Day 1990 the icon of the globe, which 20 years earlier had adorned posters and T-shirts in all its photographic detail, had evolved into a primitivistic drawing, a further abstraction. In contrast to its predecessor, Earth Day 1990 was notable for the absence of any call to reformulate the basic economic, technological, scientific, and bureau- cratic relations of society. Rather, it commanded the environmentally concerned to "think globally" and "act locally," and so bypass the intermediary web of institutions. In 1990, responsibility for changing the world rested not on the institution but on the individual, who by recycling and planting trees could somehow remedy the damage caused by the unmolested industry, bureaucratic largess, and technological overkill that was the focus of rhetorical attack in 1970. Apart from the irony behind the spaceship metaphor, there was also the issue of the metaphor itself. In the logic of Spaceship Earth, spaceships seem more Earth-like, perhaps more naturalized and less artificial. At the same time, Earth becomes more like a spaceship—that is, more like a product of human technol- ogy, to be operated and even fixed by humans armed with the proper manual. Further, the main purpose of its existence is to carry humans about and provide for their needs. Effectively, the Earth is seen as the instrument of humankind. Of course, to a large extent, post-Enlightenment Western civilization has always seen the Earth as an instrument. What the ecological model added to this conception was a sense of the instrument's limitations, its maintenance require- ments, and its capacity to break down. It implied the need for engineering, for the kind of technological fixes that have been the focus of environmental legislation since the 1960s. The Clean Air and Clean Water Acts that were passed in the years immediately following Earth Day 1970, for instance, did not outlaw pollution by stopping it at its source; rather, they launched an entire industry aimed at inventing abatement devices. Scientist George Wald warned an Earth Day 1970 crowd against letting "antipollution become our new multibillion-dollar busi- ness; to let the pollution go on merrily in all its present forms, and superimpose a new multibillion-dollar business of antipollution on top of it."30In the updated Clean Air Act of 1990, not only industry and technology, but the market itself was employed to address pollution, through tradable vouchers. This is not to say that the environmentally concerned individuals who first employed the metaphor of Spaceship Earth ever intended to undermine the radical potential of the ecology movement. Rather, they were no doubt confident in the metaphor's ability to help effect meaningful change. Nor is this to say that the metaphor itself somehow created the conditions whereby the environment would be depoliticized through abstraction and environmentalism would proffer an instrumentalist human/nature relationship. The metaphor shows the evidence of a discourse that simultaneously mobilized a public and contained it, a containment that has contributed to the failure of the social practice of environ- mentalism.

## Security Link

The attempt to eradicate threats to security is ontological violence 🡺 standing reserve and enframing

Mitchell 2005 Andrew Stanford University “Heidegger and Terrorism”, Research in Phenomenology, 35

The elimination of difference in the standing-reserve along with the elimination of national differences serve to identify the threat of terrorism with the quest for security. The absence of this threat would be the absence of being, and its consummation would be the absence of being as well. Security is only needed where there is a threat. If a threat is not perceived, if one believes oneself invulnerable, then there is no need for security. Security is for those who know they can be injured, for those who can be damaged. Does America know that it can be damaged? If security requires a recognition of one’s own vulnerability, then security can only be found in the acknowledgment of one’s threatened condition, and this means that it can only be found in a recognition of being as threat. To be secure, there must be the threat. For this reason, all of the planned securities that attempt to abolish the threat can never achieve the security they seek. Security requires that we preserve the threat, and this means that we must act in the office of preservers.

As preservers, what we are charged to preserve is not so much the present being as the concealment that inhabits it. Preserving a thing means to not challenge it forth into technological availability, to let it maintain an essential concealment. That we participate in this essencing of being does not make of it a subjective matter, for there is no isolated subject in preservation, but an opening of being. Heidegger will name this the clearing of the truth (Wahrheit) of being, and it is this clearing that Dasein preserves (bewahrt). When a thing truthfully is, when it is what it is in truth, then it is preserved. In preserving beings, Dasein participates in the truth (preservation) of being. The truth of being is being as threat, and this threat only threatens when Dasein preserves it in terror. Dasein is not innocent in the terrorization of being. On the contrary, Dasein is complicit in it. Dasein refuses to abolish terrorism.

For this reason, a Heideggerian thinking of terrorism must remain skeptical of all the various measures taken to oppose terrorism, to root it out or to circumvent it. These are so many attempts to do away with what threatens, measures that are themselves in the highest degree willful. This will can only impose itself upon being, can only draw out more and more of its wrath, and this inward wrath of being maintains itself in a never-ending supply. The will can only devastate the earth. Rather than approaching the world in terms of resources to be secured, true security can only be found in the preservation of the threat of being. It is precisely when we are busy with security measures and the frantic organization of resources that we directly assault the things we would preserve. The threat of being goes unheeded when things are restlessly shuttled back and forth, harried, monitored, and surveilled. The threat of being is only preserved when things are allowed to rest. In the notes to the “Evening Conversation,” security is thought in just such terms: Security (what one understands by this) arises not from securing and the measures taken for this; security resides in rest [in der Ruhe] and is itself made superfluous by this. (GA 77: 244)23 The rest in question is a rest from the economic cycling and circulating of the standing reserve. The technological unworld, the situation of total war, is precisely the era of restlessness (“The term ‘totality’ says nothing more; it names only the spread of the hitherto known into the ‘restless’” [GA 69: 181]). Security is superfluous here, which is only to say that it is unnecessary or useless. It is not found in utility, but in the preserved state of the useless. Utility and function are precisely the dangers of a t°xnh that has turned antagonistic towards nature. In rest, they no longer determine the being of the thing. In resting, things are free of security measures, but not for all that rendered insecure. Instead, they are preserved. There is no security; this is what we have to preserve. Heideggerian thinking is a thinking that thinks away from simple presence and absence. It thinks what Heidegger calls “the between” (das Zwischen). This between is a world of nonpresence and nonabsence. Annihilation is impossible for this world and so is security. The terror experienced today is a clue to the withdrawal of being. The world is denatured, drained of reality. Everything is threatened and the danger only ever increases. Dasein flees to a metaphysics of presence to escape the threatened world, hoping there to find security. But security cannot do away with the threat, rather it must guard it. Dasein guards the truth of being in the experience of terror. What is perhaps repugnant to consider in all this is that being calls for terrorism and for terrorists. With the enframing of being and the circulation of standing-reserve, what is has already been destroyed. Terrorism is merely the ugly confirmation of this point. As we have seen, being does not linger behind the scenes but is found in the staging itself. If being is to terrorize—if, in other words, this is an age of terrorism—then being must call for terrorists. They are simply more “slaves of the history of beyng” (GA 69: 209) and, in Heidegger’s eyes, no different from the politicians of the day in service to the cause of Americanism. But someone might object, the terrorists are murderers and the politicians are not. Granting this objection despite its obvious naïveté, we can nonetheless see that both politicians and terrorists are called for by the standing-reserve, the one to ensure its nonabsence, that the plan will reach everyone everywhere, and the other to ensure its nonpresence, that all beings will now be put into circulation by the threat of destruction. In this regard, “human resources” are no different from “livestock,” and with this, an evil worse than death has already taken place. Human resources do not die, they perish.

## Political Focus Link

### Focus on political strategies to solve global problems – only contemplation can reveal an authentic relationship with Being

Swazo 2002(Norman Swazo, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alaska Fairbanks, Crisis Theory and World Order: Heideggerian Reflections, pp. 73-74)

In a memorial address delivered in 1955 in commemoration of composer Conradin Kreutzer, Heidegger makes a distinction between calculative thinking (rechnedsDenken) and meditative thinking (besinnlichesDenken).2The former has as its unique mark the trait of "reckoning--of investigating, planning, and organizing with reference to given conditions and specific purposes. Such thinking counts on specific results and profits us in the **performance of practical affairs**. The possibilities with which such thinking is concerned are more or less "promising," i.e., more or less realizable as ends, given appropriate means. This thinking is, in a word, efficacious. It has its own need and justification in the very nature of human affairs and associations. World order thinking, I have said, is a calculative thinking. It **reckons with given conditions**, viz., **those global conditions (war, poverty, social injustice, ecological decay, etc.) characterizing a datable point of departure**(e.g., the "state of the world" in 1990). It investigates these conditions in accordance with the overarching **specific purpose of correcting structural deficiencies** in the world political system. Thereby, it is "value thinking." Indeed, **world order thinking is calculative thinking** most of all because it concerns itself with values, for 'value' means "that which is in view for a seeing that aims at something or that, as we say, reckons upon something and therewith must reckon with something else."' World order thinking aims at the elimination of war, at the preservation of the human species, at the elimination of social injustice, and at safeguarding the life-support systems of the planet.This it would do through reorientation of values and **public policy**, as well as through **institutional transformation at various levels of governmental and nongovernmental action and initiative**. It is concerned with possibilities of **political practice** and social organization in general, always with a view toward feasibility of intervention and with awareness that specific strategies can be system-diminishing, system-maintaining, system-reforming, or system-transforming.' In this sense, then, world order thinking is **diagnostic and prescriptive**, concerned overall with the process of transition from the present system of international relations to a more preferable structure of governance and planetary dwelling. The element of preference is indicative of an operative distinction, viz., that a world order that comes about through rational design is better than one that comes about by the mere drift of events, whether this order be benign or imposing (totalitarian).As Heidegger points out, of course, calculative thinking is but one mode of thinking, having as its necessary complement that thinking which he calls "meditative." Heidegger does not mean by this word a thinking that "finds itself floating unaware above reality," a thinking that "loses touch" and that is "'above' the reach of ordinary understanding-though it may seem to be all of this, and seem so especially when it is "worthless for dealing with current business" and "profits nothing in carrying out practical affairs." To the extent that these latter properly matter to us and we are concerned with action, with doing, meditative thinking often appears as wholly inconsequential or useless. Meditative thinking, nevertheless, has its own justification and need, inasmuch as "what is useless can still be a force, perhaps the only real force'-indeed so fundamental a force that it "imposes its measure upon its epoch.' Moreover, such thinking is, in its own manner of being, a doing-indeed, it is an authentic doing.In contrast to calculative thinking, meditative thinking stops and collects itself rather than races from one prospect to the next. It does not show results immediately--or even results as such-but "must also be able to bide its time, to await as does the farmer, whether the seed will come up and ripen." Here Heidegger introduces the metaphor of farming, of cultivating and tending to a field and awaiting its self-emergent yield. He contrasts

this sharply with the metaphor of an expressway in all that here speaks of busyness and hurried movement, even frenzy. Said positively, meditative thinking "contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is. In saying this Heidegger is concerned with "what really is happening in our age," with that by which this age-indeed, any age-is characterized, and which characterizes it such that it reigns over or governs both thinking and doing. What governs thinking and doing determines humanity's relation to the world and our place in it--determining our understanding of our own individual being and the being of all that constitutes our world. Meditative thinking, then, seeks to provide a reflective insight into the present age and, thus, to understand its fundamental features (Grundziige). It is in this sense that meditative thinking is in its own manner of being an authentic doing; for "Reflection on the essence of the modem age puts thinking and decision into the sphere of effective working that belongs to the genuinely essential forces of this age."? The import of meditative thinking, thus, issues from the recognition that (a) there is "a profound change taking place in man's relation to nature and to the world," but more important, that (b) "the meaning that reigns in this change remains obscure." To the extent that world order studies are steeped in a strategic rationality, in calculative thinking, they do not concern themselves with the task of having a reflective insight into the fundamental features of the age. They do not concern themselves with the ground that enables any thinking and doing such as is pursued by a science, natural or social. Yet, it is this enabling ground that is really determinative of that science, inasmuch as all positing of a domain of inquiry presupposes an ontology. World order studies, as a development of contemporary social science, likewise are dependent upon one or another ontological commitment. Specifically, I shall argue, they are determined by the ontological positions that prevail in the modern period of Western philosophy; for these are the positions fundamentally decisive for the profound change taking place in humanity's self-understanding, in our conception of all that is content of our world, and our relation to this world. About this I shall concern myself in section 2. Before doing this it is important that this relation between a positive science and ontology be stated in broad outline. For this I turn to Heidegger.

## Cooperation Link – 1NC

### Their desire for cooperation is based on a discourse of danger which attempts to remedy insecurity via integration and intervention into zones of conflict

Campbell**,** Int’l Boundaries Research At Durham, et al, 2007 David, Political Geography 26.4, ScienceDirect

Again, it is essential that we conceptualize these strategies as both containing and making imaginative geographies; specifying the ways “the world is” and, in so doing, actively (re)making that same world. This goes beyond merely the military action or aid programmes that governments follow, but indicates a wider concern with the production of ways of seeing the world, which percolate through media, popular imaginations as well as political strategy. These performative imaginative geographies are at the heart of this paper and will re-occur throughout it. Our concern lies specifically with the ways in which the US portrays – and over the past decade has portrayed – certain parts of the world as **requiring involvement,** as threats, as zones of instability, as rogue states, “states of concern”, as “global hotspots”, as well as the associated suggestion that by bringing these within the **“integrated” zones of democratic peace,** US security – both economically and militarily – can be preserved. Of course, the translation of such imaginations into actual practice (and certainly results) is never as simple as some might like to suggest. Nonetheless, what we wish to highlight here is how these strategies, in essence, produce the effect they name. This, again, is nothing new: the United States has long constituted its identity at least in part through discourses of danger that materialize others as a threat (see Campbell, 1992). Equally, much has been written about the new set of threats and enemies that emerged to fill the post-Soviet void – from radical Islam through the war on drugs to “rogue states” (for a critical analyses see, among others, Benjamin and Simon, 2003 and Stokes, 2005; on the genealogies of the idea of “rogue states” see Blum, 2002 and Litwak, 2000).

### Furthermore the ideology of international engagement requires incessant American intervention in the name of inclusion – the flip side to this coin is radical exclusion and violence

Campbell**,** Int’l Boundaries Research At Durham, et al, 2007 David, Political Geography 26.4, ScienceDirect

As we argue throughout this paper, the distinctive thing about recent National Security Strategies is their deployment of integration as the principal foreign policy and security strategy. It is telling that Bush's claim of “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” (Bush, 2001) relies not on a straightforward binary, as is sometimes suggested, but a process of incorporation. It is not simply us versus them, but **with us,** a mode of operating alongside, or, in the words of one of Bush's most enthusiastic supporters, “shoulder to shoulder” (Blair, 2001; see White & Wintour, 2001). This works more widely through a combination of threats and promises, as in this statement about the Palestinians: “If Palestinians embrace democracy and the rule of law, confront corruption, and firmly reject terror, they can count on American support for the creation of a Palestinian state” (The White House, 2002b: 9). Likewise, it can be found in some of remarks of the British Prime Minister Blair (2004) about the significance of democracy in Afghanistan, Africa and Iraq. Equally Bush's notorious ‘axis of evil’ speech did not simply name North Korea, Iran and Iraq as its members, but suggested that “states like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world” (Bush, 2002a, emphasis added). A comparison of the like, alongside the “with the terrorists” is actually a more complicated approach to the choosing of sides and the drawing of lines than is generally credited. Simple binary oppositions are less useful to an understanding here than the process of incorporation and the policy of integration.

These examples indicate the policy of integration or exclusion being adopted by the US and followed by certain allies. It warns those failing to adopt US values (principally liberal ‘representative’ democracy and market capitalism), that they will be excluded from an American-centric world. The place of US allies in these representations is not unimportant. Indeed, the strength of the US discourse relies also on its reflection and reiteration by other key allies, especially in Europe. Above and beyond the dismissive pronouncements of Rumsfeld about Europe's “Old” and “New” – a conception that was inchoately articulated as early as the 1992 DPG – the dissent of (even some) Europeans is a problem for the US in its world-making endeavours (see Bialasiewicz & Minca, 2005). It is not surprising, then, that following his re-election, George W. Bush and Condoleeza Rice embarked almost immediately on a “bridge-building” tour across Europe, noting not trans-Atlantic differences but “the great alliance of freedom” that unites the United States and Europe (Bush, 2005).

## Cooperation Link - Ext

### Our cooperation will not be value neutral – American foreign policy is overdetermined by the logic of integration which will view the plan as a concession and expect compliance with whatever our next foreign policy goal is – if the countries they cooperate with don’t follow US command they will suffer the consequences

Campbell**,** Int’l Boundaries Research At Durham, et al, 2007 David, Political Geography 26.4, ScienceDirect

In the aftermath of September the 11th it has become commonplace to argue that the world has fundamentally changed. President Bush claimed as much when he declared the attacks of that day meant “the doctrine of containment just doesn't hold any water” and the strategic vision of the US had to shift dramatically (Bush, 2003). As a result, integration – into a western and American set of values and modus operandi – has become the new strategic concept. Distinct from the superficial binaries of the Cold War, integration nonetheless involves its own set of exclusions, with forms of violence awaiting those who are either unwilling or unable to be incorporated.

This paper has traced the emergence of integration as the basis for the imaginative geography of the ‘war on terror’. It has done so by maintaining that the production of this imaginative geography should be understood in terms of performance rather than construction. That is because we are dealing with an assemblage of practices – state policy, ‘non-state scribes’ and the representational technologies of popular geopolitics – which together produce the effect they name, stabilizing over time to produce a series of spatial formations through the performance of security. Given the manner in which this emergent imaginative geography has materialized in the invasion and occupation of Iraq – which was carried out in the name of terror and has created the very terror it named – it is clear when we speak of performance we are dealing with much more than just thinking, writing or speaking differently.

Yet in practice the materialization of such strategies and imaginations has rarely been straightforward. In fact, in many instances the opposite of the intention has been created. We could point, for example, to the ways in which ‘territorial integrity’ was repeatedly mobilized as a war-aim in the invasion of Iraq and yet the consequence has been the creation of a state which is unable to protect its borders, cannot project its power effectively within them and is in danger of fragmentation into ethnically or religiously created regions (Elden, 2007). The self-serving apologetics of many of those integrally involved in the framing of such policies – Barnett (2005) and Fukuyama (2006), for two – indeed indicate the resilience of the imaginaries we describe, clear and present failures notwithstanding; it is not that they got things wrong, for the basic analysis still holds – it only needs to be enacted more effectively.

### More evidence

Campbell**,** Int’l Boundaries Research At Durham, et al, 2007 David, Political Geography 26.4, ScienceDirect

It is important to highlight the way performativity's idea of reiteration calls attention to changes in historically established imaginative geographies. While US foreign policy has been traditionally written in the context of identity/difference expressed in self/other relationships (Campbell, 1992), we detect in recent strategic performances a different articulation of America's relationship to the world. Signified by the notion of integration we identify elements in the formation of a new imaginative geography which enable the US to draw countries into its spheres of influence and control. We show how integration (and its coeval strategies of exclusion) has been enunciated over the last 15 years through popular-academic books, think-tank documents, policy programmes and security strategies, as well as popular geopolitical sources. This concept of integration, we argue, is enacted through a number of practices of representation and coercion that encourage countries to adopt a raft of US attitudes and ways of operating or else **suffer the consequences.** As such, we are witnessing the performance of a security problematic that requires critical perspectives to move beyond a simple ideal/material dichotomy in social analysis in order to account for more complex understandings of opposition, including the emergence of new, mobile geographies of exclusion.

### The process of international cooperation is a violent search for rational certainty which uses a technology of control to produce unnatural stability in the international arena – it replicates violence

Burke**,** Senior Lecturer in Politics and IR, University of New South Wales, 2007 Anthony, Theory & Event, 10.2

In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality...does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'.61

We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said:

## Innovation Link

### The desire for innovation is a symptom of profound boredom – the affirmative attempts to overcome

Thiele 97**—**Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida (Leslie P, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, Vol 29, No. 4, “Postmodernity and the Routinization of Novelty: Heidegger on Boredom and Technology” p. 489-90)

Postmodernity is characterized by the routinization of novelty, evidenced in the drive for technological change that makes constant demands on and is constantly demanded by postmodern publics and elites. Martin Heidegger sees this technological drive as sustained by the basic mood of our times: profound boredom. Though Heidegger's analysis of moods, and particularly his account of boredom, have largely been ignored, his assessment of boredom provides critical insights into the dynamics and dangers of postmodernity. The connection between technology and boredom, Heidegger warns, undermines the practice of philosophy and the inherently political human task of discovering a home in the world. Amongst the jackals, panthers, bitches, Apes, scorpions, vultures, serpents, Yelping, howling, snarling, groveling monsters, In the squalid menagerie of our vices, There is one uglier, filthier and most wicked! Although it manages no grand gestures or screams, It would gladly make the earth a shambles And swallow up the world with a yawn. Boredom!-involuntary tears burden its eye, As it dreams of gallows and smokes its hookah. Reader, you know this dainty monster well, Hypocrite reader-my match-my brother! -Charles Pierre Baudelaire, Les Fleurs du Mal To name a sensibility, to draw its contours and to recount its history, requires a deep sympathy modified by revulsion. Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation The term modernist was first used in the sixteenth century, often pejoratively, as a reference to someone who spurned tradition and advocated either new techniques of scientific inquiry or the study and use of vernacular languages rather than classical Greek or Latin. Breaking the chains of tradition, modernists assumed, would progressively liberate humankind, allowing it to claim its birthright as master of its world. Modernism was, and remains today, chiefly characterized by rapid innovation in the service of human power and prerogatives. Postmodernism is modernism stripped of teleology. It is chiefly characterized by the routinization of novelty. The modernist faith in progress has been undermined in the postmodern world. Yet the drive to innovate that fired the engines of progress has been intensified and accelerated.' Innovation now constitutes an end in itself, unencumbered with the baggage of final purposes, ultimate goals, or cosmic designs for humankind. The routinization of novelty is most clearly evidenced in the technological progress that makes constant demands upon, and is constantly demanded by, the postmodern public and elites. This contemporary lust for technological innovation, Martin Heidegger argues, is symptomatic of the "basic mood" of our age. Surprisingly, given the technological whirlwind to which it gives rise, Heidegger identifies this mood as profound boredom.

### The attempt to remedy profound boredom with technological thought 🡺 nihilism

Thiele 97**—**Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida (Leslie P, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, Vol 29, No. 4, “Postmodernity and the Routinization of Novelty: Heidegger on Boredom and Technology” p. 501-3)

Heidegger identifies "deep boredom" as a pervasive indifference to worldly existence as a whole. In deep boredom, worldly life is resisted and resented as a burden.33 No less than the anxious do the bored sense their alienation from the world and from themselves. Unlike the anxious, however, the bored forsake the quest for a home in the world. The world ceases to be a home in its familiar everydayness. But it also ceases to be an abode for ontological questioning. The absence of home is no longer experienced as a loss. In anxiety, one cares apprehensively for a homeless self. In the "mute fog" of boredom, this care dissipates.34 Anxious concern evaporates into a sterile calm. Heidegger writes, "Why are there beings rather than nothing.... The question is upon us in boredom, when we are equally removed from despair and joy, and everything about us seems so hopelessly commonplace that we no longer care whether anything is or is not."35 Anxiety is a mood that brings us "face to face with Nothing itself." Heidegger contrasts this to profound boredom, which "draws all things, all men and oneself along with them, together in a queer kind of indifference. This boredom reveals what-is in totality.... Yet at the very moment when our moods thus bring us face to face with what-is-intotality they hide the Nothing we are seeking". 36 The danger of boredom is not that it confronts us with the groundlessness of Being. If anything, that is its virtue. The danger of boredom is that it stifles all ontological questioning of this groundlessness in the fog of indifference. Boredom is, in itself, an anesthetizing mood. It inhibits thought and reduces feeling to torpor. To psychologize its genesis, one might say that the fear of facing one's ontological condition, the fear of anxiety itself, lures one into the insensibility of boredom. Heidegger describes this repression as a form of cowardice. He writes that "An experience of Being as something 'other' than everything that 'is' comes to us in anxiety [Angst], provided that we do not, from anxiety of anxiety, i.e. in sheer timidity, shut our ears to the soundless voice which attunes us to the horrors of the abyss."37 Anxiety and boredom both confront us with the abyss of Being as nothingness. Both anxiety and boredom bring us face to face with the threatening in significance of the finite self. In anxiety, however, one experiences a profound concern for this terrifying mystery, a concern that may transform itself into wonder if courageously digested. In boredom, the mystery is avoided by a listless or frenzied turning away. Nietzsche gestured at this danger. He vividly portrays the confrontation of nihilism in Zarathustra's story of the sleeping shepherd.A snake crawls into a sleeping shepherd's mouth and firmly lodges itself. Awakened, the horrified shepherd bites off the snake's head to rid himself of it. Thus winning his freedom, the shepherd laughs as only a victorious person can. Heidegger suggests that the shepherd was assailed by nihilistic boredom owing to a philosophic torpor. The "black snake," Heidegger writes, "is drear monotony, ultimately the goallessness and meaninglessness of nihilism."38T he shepherd's courage to bite deeply into the ungroundedness of life ultimately saves him. Today, Heidegger worries, we lack the courage of the shepherd. Rather than confronting and overcoming deep boredom, we choose to ignore, resent, or suppress it. This marks the true victory of nihilism. Heidegger worried that humanity's capacity for anxiety was waning just as the mood of profound boredom waxed. The mood of anxiety, he suggests, might become completely absorbed and displaced by boredom. Ennui would then supplant existential angst as the disposition through which contemporary human being becomes saturated with its thrownness. The result of this displacement would be a "philosophic somnolence Which is nihilism proper."39 This, Heidegger maintains, constitutes the chief threat to humanity. The ascendance of boredom signifies our incapacity to dwell in the question of Being and hence our incapacity fully to dwell in the world.40 Nihilism is profound boredom with a world that has lost its meaning. More to the point, nihilism isprofound boredom with a world from which human being has ceased to solicit or demand meaning. At the heart of nihilism, the significance of significance itself evaporates.

## Space Weaponization Link

### Space militarization assumes the inevitability of conflict—this sanitizes the violence of unilateral action

Grondin, 2k9

(David, assistant prof of Political Studies @ U of Ottawa, “The (power) politics of Space: The US astropolitical discourse of global dominance in the War on Terror”, *Securing Space*, 122-3)

This line of argument is usually linked to technological capacities. By asserting that other countries operate in Space, that conflicts are "natural" between humans — which brings the obvious "so why would it be different in Space" — technologies of power take the lead and one is left with devising what Space control strategy will be best and what one wants "to control, for how long, and for what purposes?" (Lambakis 2001: 281). In a context where one portrays the situation as one where US aerospace industry is "held back" by the rest of the world only for fear of potential conflicts that will evolve into Space warfighting because of a renewed arms race (Lambakis 2001: 282), the claim to let technology drive the policy and the political is not disinterested — albeit ill-advised — and definitely not a sure bet. For Space warriors such as Dolman and Lambakis, Space weaponization then appears to be not so much related to the security issue, but more so to the maintenance of a strong defence and aerospace industry. The technological takes over as the political is eclipsed by the military professionals. For Space warriors, with 9/11 and the War on Terror, a "Space Pearl Harbor" is always possible and a logic of security — coupled with (military) technology — drives their analysis. In Lambakis' words: We should never take anything having to do with Space (especially access to Space or freedom to operate in Space) for granted, and we should never unnecessarily limit our options. Dominance provides our leadership and our commanders' options in life or death situations. To not use the best and the latest in weaponry because our enemy does not have it or because it will not allow a fair fight is foolish. Where we are not militarily dominant and take our security for granted, there we are at risk of a future "September 11". (Lambakis 2003: 82) Fortunately, there is still debate going on because the policy-makers have not taken yet all the decisions and deployed all means to ensure the realization of Space weaponization (Waldrop 2005: 39), though the future is not so bright. If it were left to military leaders and professionals of Space, and it is not as Roger Handberg reminds us (2004: 78—88), Space weaponization would occur logically, if not naturally. When one assesses where the political leaders stand regarding this issue, what one can find out by consulting the NSS, the NMS and the NSP, one rapidly realizes that the political seems to go in the same direction as the military, even though the step towards Space weaponization is not as clearly acknowledged or enunciated as what one finds in the doctrinal documents of the US Air Force and Navy. It does however highlight that it supports such a path if it is to be essential to US national security and homeland security.

### The affirmatives inevitability arguments ignore important distinctions and details in space policy 🡺 premature and dangerous weaponization

Peoples Lecturer in I.R. at the U of Bristol, 2008 Columba Contemporary Security Policy 29.3 Taylor & Francis online

Though none of these pressures of themselves negate the tacit taboo on space weapons (broadly defined initially for our purposes as terrestrial-to-space, space-to-space and space-to-terrestrial weapons capabilities)8 that has generally held during the Cold War and after, they do raise serious issues over its long-term prospects. The aim of this article, in this context, is to assess the attitudes of major space-faring powers towards space weaponization. Central here, the article argues, is the question of whether the weaponization of space and/or conflict in space (taken here to mean the occurrence of military conflict in outer space itself, or from the Earth directed at any systems deployed in outer space) is inevitable, and the extent to which the major space powers espouse this proposition. What the article shows is that despite the general rejection of ‘inevitability’ within science and technology studies,9 and critique of its attendant ideas such as ‘technology creep’ in the development of weapons technology,10 the idea of inevitability still retains a prominent place (although for subtly differing reasons) in American, Chinese, and Russian perspectives on space weaponization. Further to this, as will be seen, the actual content of what it is exactly that is ‘inevitable’ – further development and deployment of anti-satellite weapons, placement of strike weapons in space, or conflict in and from space – frequently varies and is often based on assumed but underspecified technological developments. This is problematic and highly pertinent, the article concludes, in that it risks creating a discursively constructed security dilemma with regard to outer space that in turn increases the likelihood of actual space weaponization. As Bruce DeBlois notes, ‘what is internationally unsettling and even threatening is not the existing space weapons posture, but […] space weapons policy (or lack thereof)’.11 In other words, though space weapons capabilities may only be in their infancy in terms of actual development and deployment, the space policy discourse of several states is already predicated, to a greater or lesser extent, on the general probability of space weaponization and this in turn risks premature preclusion of alternative outcomes.

### Inevitability thesis 🡺 militarization

Peoples Lecturer in I.R. at the U of Bristol, 2008 Columba Contemporary Security Policy 29.3 Taylor & Francis online

Yet, even if a space security dilemma is a possibility, it is not quite yet fully ‘on’ (to use Herz's phrase), in practice at least. Raymond Aron may have been right to claim that ‘only a revolution in the heart of man and the nature of states’ could preserve outer space from ‘military use’,90 but the issue of whether this can or will lead to outright conflict in, from or because of outer space is a separate one. At the moment, policy leads practice in this issue: although several major powers have some capacity to attack the assets of others should they choose to do so, none, the United States included, has the technology available to dominate it entirely. In such conditions, the argument that the weaponization of space and/or space conflict is inevitable is particularly dangerous and ill-advised, and policy-makers need to pay particular attention to the potential role of the inevitability thesis in the construction of the space security dilemma.

For most analysts of the security dilemma, the dilemma necessarily exists as a condition of world politics that can, at least on some occasions, be prevented, mitigated or even escaped.91 No-one should doubt that the vagaries of the space militarization–weaponization debate, competition between the space powers in the commercial sector, and historical antipathies render such avoidance of a space security dilemma more difficult to attain. In addition, as many have pointed out, lack of agreement on a precise definition of space weapons and the problem of potential dual-use civilian technologies in space render the task of negotiating restrictions on the weaponization of space inherently complex.92 The problem with the inevitability thesis, however, is that it is, in its strongest variants, predicated upon a very narrow interpretation of the security dilemma in which prospects for mitigation are necessarily precluded. If something is assumed to be inevitable, then there is no incentive to try and prevent it from occurring. In fact, there might well be greater incentives to be the first to capitalize on a trend. Hence, if the inevitability thesis is accepted by policy-makers, it runs the risk of becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

### The technology of weaponization 🡺 sanitization of war and violence

Peoples Lecturer in I.R. at the U of Bristol, 2009 Columba Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22.4 Political Science Complete

A common theme that Scheuerman identiﬁes between Morgenthau and Herz is their shared concern over the political and normative implications of the speed of modern technology, and in particular a concern that the speed and destructiveness of military technology has a depoliticising effect by substituting technical considerations for political deliberation. This latter theme is also addressed by John Kaag and Whitley Kaufman in their discussion of the ethical issues surrounding ‘precision’ weapons and the increasing use of robotics in the legitimization of warfare in their article ‘Military frameworks: technological know-how and the legitimization of warfare’. Kaag and Kaufman critique the view that precision weapons render war more ‘ethical’ via their claimed superiority in discrimination (between combatants and non-combatants) in conﬂict situations, as well as the emergent claim that robotics diminishes the ethical quandaries of war. They do so by locating the discussion of Precision Guided Missiles and robotics in relation to a broader ethical-philosophical discussion that encompasses Aristotle, Augustine and Heidegger. Aristotle and Augustine countenance against the temptation to subjugate ethics—an ultimately human activity—to techne, whilst Heidegger identiﬁes this tendency as precisely inherent in the modern, instrumentalist view of technology.

## Environment Link

### Saving the environment for the sake of humanity 🡺 standing reserve

DeLuca, 2005, Associate Professor of Communication, Fellow at the Hinckley Institute of Politics [Kevin Michael, “Thinking with Heidegger: Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice,” p. 79, published in Ethics & the Environment, Project Muse <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/een/summary/v010/10.1deluca.html>], JB.

The ensuing decades have elaborated on Heidegger’s insight. The worst tendencies in postmodern theory can be read as illustrating the illusion that everything humanity encounters exists only insofar as it is a human construct. More significant is how this conceit of humanity as lord of the earth manifests itself in environmental discourses, so, in a common exam- ple, humans need to save the rainforests because unknown cures for human diseases may be found in them. How this dangerous dynamic reduces humans to standing-reserve plays itself out in the example of the forester: “The forester who measures the felled timber in the woods and who to all appearances walks the forest path in the same way his grandfather did is today ordered by the industry that produces commercial woods, whether he knows it or not. He is made subordinate to the orderabil- ity of cellulose, which for its part is challenged forth by the need for paper, which is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazines. The latter, in their turn, set public opinion to swallowing what is printed, so that a set configuration of opinion becomes available on demand. (1993, 323)” This example is useful in its exposure of how modern technology’s order- ing of nature is also an ordering of humanity and a reduction of both to standing-reserve. The example is further noteworthy for its illustration of how modern technology is a system or regime, not a particular device. Modern technology is not the chainsaw. Rather, it is the chainsaw and forestry science and the transportation system and the profession of jour- nalism and printing presses and public relations and mass communication technologies and the machinery of politics and. . . . It is this system that enframes/ensnares/produces a particular version of nature and a particu- lar type of humanity.

# \*\*\*IMPACTS\*\*\*

## Enframing Impact - Ext

The drive for ontological certainty closes off the ability to contest the truth claims of the aff – guarantees infinite violence

Burke**,** Senior Lecturer in Politics and IR, University of New South Wales, 2007 Anthony, Theory & Event, 10.2

I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is grounded in the truth of being, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context **violence** is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- it **permeates being.**

### **Enframing 🡺 utilization of life – makes humans tools for war fighting**

Burke**,** Senior Lecturer in Politics and IR, University of New South Wales, 2007 Anthony, Theory & Event, 10.2

Instead, Oppenheimer saw a process frustrated by roadblocks and ruptured by irony; in his view there was no smooth, unproblematic translation of scientific truth into social truth, and technology was not its vehicle. Rather his comments raise profound and painful ethical questions that resonate with terror and uncertainty. Yet this has not prevented technology becoming a potent object of desire, not merely as an instrument of power but as a promise and conduit of certainty itself. In the minds of too many rational soldiers, strategists and policymakers, technology brings with it the truth of its enabling science and spreads it over the world. It turns epistemological certainty into political certainty; it turns control over 'facts' into control over the earth.

Heidegger's insights into this phenomena I find especially telling and disturbing -- because they underline the ontological force of the instrumental view of politics. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger's striking argument was that in the modernising West technology is not merely a tool, a 'means to an end'. Rather technology has become a governing image of the modern universe, one that has come to order, limit and define human existence as a 'calculable coherence of forces' and a 'standing reserve' of energy. Heidegger wrote: 'the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.'77

This process Heidegger calls 'Enframing' and through it the scientific mind demands that 'nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and remains orderable as a system of information'. Man is not a being who makes and uses machines as means, choosing and limiting their impact on the world for his ends; rather man has imagined the world as a machine and humanity everywhere becomes trapped within its logic. Man, he writes, 'comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall...where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile Man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth.'78 Technological man not only becomes the name for a project of lordship and mastery over the earth, but incorporates humanity within this project as a calculable resource. In strategy, warfare and geopolitics human bodies, actions and aspirations are caught, transformed and perverted by such calculating, enframing reason: human lives are reduced to **tools, obstacles, useful or obstinate matter.**

Enframing 🡺utilization of life – destroys value

Jerkins PhD Student in Religion @ FSU 2009 Jae Florida Philosophical Review Volume IX Issue 2 <http://www.philosophy.ucf.edu/fpr/files/9_2/jerkins.pdf>

Technology as Revealer

Martin Heidegger also claims that people in the 20th century falsely view technology as a Kantian “means to an end”—when in reality, Heidegger maintains, technology is not a means but rather “a mode,” or “a way of revealing.”42 This revealing that modern technology is responsible for is a challenge, a “demand” to nature “that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.”43 Heidegger uses the river Rhine as an example of the demands of modern technology. The Rhine has been dammed up in order to provide hydraulic pressure for a hydroelectric power plant. This use of technology changes our phenomenological perception of the Rhine. A vast ecological system, the ancient source of legends and songs, the home of lush forests and breathtaking castles, has been relegated to a “water power supplier.”44

This modern ability to take nature out of its original context of being and reassign it within a use-value technological context is known as enframing. In the modern age, we have begun to reorganize everything around us into technological frames of reference and usage; Heidegger warns that the river Rhine is now a power source, the once mystical German soil is now a mineral deposit, and the refreshing mountain air is simply a supply of nitrogen.45 The objects that make up our world have become resources—subjects for us to master, purchase, and own.

We have alienated ourselves from all things and placed them into a standing reserve, a standby mode in which “whatever stands by…no longer stands over us as object.”46 Our general disregard for the meaningfulness of the world is precisely what causes objects to lose any coherent status for us. Heidegger finds that the consequence of enframing, whereby the entire natural world inevitably becomes “orderable as standing reserve,” is that “man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve… [who inevitably] comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve.”47 We may shape the world, but the world inevitably shapes us.

## Ontology 1st

### The affirmatives attempt to secure our world leads to an endless spiral of violence – only prioritizing ontology can remedy violence

Zimmerman philosophy at U of Colorado 1985 Michael Nuclear War Philosophical Perspectives page 135-136

We live in an age of crisis. Crises threaten to destroy established states of affairs, but crises are also opportunities for creating something novel and beautiful. At first glance, it would appear that the nuclear arms race is the most pressing crisis facing us. Surely if this arms race ends like those before it, we will destroy much of humanity as well as many other forms of life that share the Earth with us. The nuclear arms race, however, as I shall argue in the following essay, may only be a symptom of a deeper crisis that has been developing for many centuries. This crisis has to do with how we understand ourselves as human beings. Today, human beings in the so-called developed countries regard humankind as the center of reality, the source of all meaning, and the only beings with intrinsic value. I shall use the term “anthropocentric humanism” to refer to this way of understanding who we are. The dark side of humanism is often ignored in favor of the positive dimensions of the humanism with which we are more familiar. The positive thrust of humanism includes its recognition of the importance of individual human freedom and its affirmation of the dignity of humankinds. The dark side of humanism involves an arrogant human-centeredness that reduces the nonhuman world to the status of a commodity whose only value lies in its usefulness for human purposes. According to the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, conceiving of ourselves as masters of all beings, we adopt a false sense of superiority that undermines our true humanity. In the following essay, which will make use of some of Heidegger’s thoughts about human existence in the nuclear age, I argue that this same drive to dominate the natural world is present in the armed struggle between nations. The current nuclear arms race can be interpreted as a conflict between two great representatives of anthropocentric humanism, the United States and the Soviet Union. Strangely, each nation is prepared to annihilate the other side in order to defend the principles of “true humanism”. Marxists and capitalist alike regard their life as the only legitimate fulfillment of the Enlightenment ideal of human progress and freedom. But to a large extent both superpowers are guided by anthropocentric humanism, whose highest aim is power and security, Hence, neither superpower can rest content until the other side is eliminated or at least neutralized. Paradoxically, the quest for total security leads to total insecurity, as we are finding out now that the nuclear arms race is moving to even more threatening levels. In my view, the dangers of nuclear war will not be eliminated, even though some arms controls might be successfully negotiated, until there occurs a basic shift in our understanding of what it means to be human. The positive side of humanism, which has some insight into what it means to be fully human, points in the right direction, but the dark of anthropocentric side predominates today. Let us consider for a moment Heidegger’s view that anthropocentric humanism is the underling disorder, of which the nuclear arms race is but a particularly dangerous symptom.

### Every practice is always already ontological – attempts to exclude this question 🡺 genocidal violence

Dillon Prof of Politics at Lancaster 1999 Michael Political Theory 27.2 jstor

Because you cannot say anything about anything, that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such, however, the return of the ontological has even wider ramifications than that of genealogy. For any thought, including, therefore, that of Justice, always already carries some interpretation of what it means to be, and of how one is as a being in being. To call these fundaments into question is to gain profound critical purchase upon the thought that underpins the thought and practices of distributive justice itself. We are at the level of those fundamental desires and fears which confine the imagination and breed the cruelties upon which it relies in order to deflect whatever appears to threaten or disturb its various drives for metaphysical security.12

Politics and philosophy have always been wedded since their first inception in the polis. The return of the ontological was therefore prompted by the twin political and philosophical crises that assailed European civilisation at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Hence the crisis of (inter)national politics (to which E. H. Carr, for example, responded) was as much a crisis of thought as the crisis of thought, as expressed in debates about Empiricism, Scientism, Positivism, and Historicism at that time, was a crisis of politics. For what was at issue was a thinking way of life-complexly diverse and radically plural in its composition-that had hit the buffers in terms of the elevated universal expectations of reason and justice which its thought and politics had promised. Historicism's failure to meet the challenges of Empiricism, Positivism, and Scientism nonetheless served to expose the crisis of political modernity itself: bureaucratisation, rationalisation, global industrialisation, technologisation, the advent of mass society, world war and genocide.13 On the one hand, a return to "basics" was prompted by the ways in which the slaughter of the Great War, the holocaust of the Second World War, and the subsequent advent of the terminal dangers of the nuclear age undermined the confidence of a European civilisation gone global. This "failure of nerve" was enhanced by the impact of its racial and economic imperialism, together with the subsequent experience of postcolonialism. On the other hand, the return of the ontological was indebted philosophically, amongst other influences to Nietzsche's overturning of the metaphysical deceits of onto-theology, and to Heidegger's early attempt to formulate a fundamental ontology. In neither instance am I claiming that the outcome of the ontological turn has resulted in some new orthodoxy or canon.14 Levinas, for example, through moves too complicated to retrace in this exercise, championed the metaphysical over against the 'ontological'. Quite the contrary. The question of ontology has, instead, been split wide open, and the formulations, desires, institutions, and practices of our established ways of being-justice and Justice included-are shown to be suspended in that very opening.

Irrespective of this return to basics, the preoccupation of both thought and politics nonetheless also became the future. Just as the self-annihilationist capacities of European civilisation gone global posed the question of a habitable global future, so, in thought too, the crossover from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries became preoccupied with "an affirmation of the future or of an opening onto the future."15

Think of the problem of messianicity in Benjamin, the question of the future in Nietzsche, the privilege of the futural ecstasis in Heidegger.... These thinkers are all thinkers of the future.16

In each instance, also, the thought of and for the future is associated with destruction. The experiencing of an abyss resonates somehow with the thinking of the abyss and, there-"where the mouth gapes"17-both politics and philosophy think, and seek to affirm, the future.

The return of the ontological was, then, a plural one radically disturbing the fundaments of all regional thought such as that of politics and justice as well as the more well-known and elaborated, though intimately related, subject of reason. This movement of thought was positive in that, while providing a critical reappraisal of ontology (cf. Heidegger), a certain 'ontological' sensibility has also emerged from it. It is based upon a profound, if variously interpreted, appreciation of the ontological difference-the difference between beings, as existing entities, and being as such. It offers for all other thought the alternative and radically dualistic starting point of the mutually disclosive belonging together of being and beings.18

The return of the ontological thus became the driving force behind what William Connolly calls ontopolitical interpretation. Connolly reminds us that all political acts and every interpretation of political events, no matter how deeply they are sunk in specific historical contexts, "or how high the pile of data," upon which they sit, contain an "ontopolitical dimension."9 What that means, simply, is that all political acts, and all political utterances, express-enact-a view of how things are. They establish fundamental presumptions, "fix possibilities, distribute explanatory elements, generate parameters."20 In short, they establish a fundamental framework of necessity and desire. That is why the ontological turn has a direct bearing upon the question of Justice as well as upon the allied questions of freedom and belonging. It therefore challenges the language of politics as much as it challenges the politics of Language, and thus re-poses the very question of the political itself.21

## Ontological Damnation Impact

### Our inability to perceive the essence of the world and instead replace it with the commodification constructed by a technological world view prevents us from authentically being in the world and leaves us in a state of ontological damnation resulting in complete nuclear annihilation

Zimmerman 94 (Michael E., Professor of Philosophy at Tulane University, Contesting Earth’s Future: Radical Ecology and Postmodernity, 119-20)

Heidegger asserted that human self-assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relation between being and human Dasein.53 Loss of this relation would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might "bring about the complete annihilation of humanity and the destruction of the earth."54 This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one's soul by losing one's relation to God. Heidegger apparently thought along these lines: it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might once again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur an ontological clearing through which such life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity's one-dimensional disclosure of entities virtually denies them any "being" at all, the loss of humanity's openness for being is already occurring.55 Modernity's background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material "happiness" for everyone by reducing nature to pure energy.56 The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity's slow-motion destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided nuclear war only to survive as contented clever animals, Heidegger believed we would exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth, masquerading as material paradise. Deep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of everything wild would not be a world worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead. But most of them could not agree that the loss of humanity's relation to being would be worse than nuclear omnicide, for it is wrong to suppose that the lives of millions of extinct and unknown species are somehow lessened because they were never "disclosed" by humanity.

## Ontology Focus Good - Epistemology

### Ontology focus is key to investigating the truth value of the affirmative – their epistemology is ignorant of its technological pass towards ontology

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The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to an ontology of insecure national existence which itself admits no questioning. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' 22

The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction **cannot be examined.** As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made.

## Tech Thought 🡺 Concentration Camps

### Technological thought 🡺 concentration camps and extermination

Peoples, 2k9 Columba, Lecturer in I.R. at the U of Bristol, “Haunted dreams: Critical Theory, Technology and the militarization of Space”, Securing Outer Space, pg 102-103

Von Braun's imagination becomes an instrument of progress, to paraphrase Marcuse, becoming subservient to instrumental technical rationality. In this vision, ideological leanings are a somewhat secondary question. Perhaps appropriately, Ordway and Sharpe note that in the period during which von Braun and his rocket team were held by the allies before being allowed into the US, 'Some of the Germans were issued brand new Nazi Party uniforms, but without insignia — the only clothing for them the British quartermasters could find' (Ordway and Sharpe 2003: 209). This image — of the previous servant of the Nazi war machine now wearing the now apparently neutral costumes prior to their entry into the 'Free World' — fits the Marcusian vision perfectly. The elimination of the outward identifiers of fascism creates the grounds for the absorption of fascist techniques into capitalism: in this case, the instrumental calculation of the value of the Rocket Team to the US was reason enough to overlook the troubling context of their wartime work. We might say that technological rationality, in this instance, is overriding, final, and its own justification, becoming what Marcuse termed as the 'Happy Conscience': In this general necessity, guilt has no place. One man can give the signal that liquidates hundreds and thousands of people, then declare himself free from all pangs of conscience, and live happily ever after. The antifascist powers who beat fascism on the battlefield reap the benefits of the Nazi scientists, generals and engineers; they have the historical advantage of the late-comer. What begins as the horror of the concentration camps turns into the practice of training people for abnormal conditions — a subterranean human existence and the daily intake of radioactive nourishment. (Marcuse 1962: 80) The 'practice of training people for abnormal conditions' (in reference to nuclear tests involving troops as well as the inculcation of the Cold War at a broader societal level) has a grim resonance with the altitude and cold experiments of Dachau and Auschwitz, although Marcuse, in some ways foreshadowing the starting point taken by Giorgio Agamben, views the logic of the camp as something more pervasive (Agamben 1998). Marcuse quotes one commentator approvingly that 'The world of the concentration camps ... was not an exceptionally monstrous society. What we saw there was the image, and in a sense the quintessence, of the infernal society into which we are plunged every day'.4 Elsewhere Marcuse had noted that Throughout the world of industrial civilization, the domination of man by man is growing in scope and efficiency. Nor does this trend appear as an accidental, transitory regression on the road to progress. Concentration camps, mass exterminations, world wars and atom bombs are no 'relapse into barbarism,' but the unrepressed implementation of the achievements of modern science, technology and domination. (Marcuse 1998: 290) In sum, for Marcuse and the other early Critical Theorists technological rationality equates to a mode of being in which modern science, technology and domination necessarily go together.

## Tech Thought 🡺 ZPHC

### Technological thought 🡺 calculative revealing

Sawicki, 2003- Ph.D. Columbia University, Professor of Philosophy and Women's Studies, Chair of Women's And Gender Studies, Williams College (Jana, “Foucault and Heidegger Critical Encounters”, Heidegger and Foucault:Escaping Technological Nihilism, University of Minnesota Press Minneapolis London, Questia, REQ)

Heidegger perceives the real danger in the modern age to be that human beings will continue to regard technology as a mere instrument and fail to inquire into its essence. He fears that all revealing will become calculative and all relations technical, that the unthought horizon of revealing, namely the “concealed” background practices that make technological thinking possible, will be forgotten. He remarks: The coming to presence of technology threatens revealing, threatens it with the possibility that all revealing will be consumed in ordering and that everything will present itself only in the unconcealedness of standing-reserve. (QT, 33) [10](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194%22%20%5Ct%20%22_top)  Therefore, it is not technology, or science, but rather the essence of technology as a way of revealing that constitutes the danger; for the essence of technology is existential*,* not technological. [11](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194%22%20%5Ct%20%22_top) It is a matter of how human beings are fundamentally oriented toward their world vis a vis their practices, skills, habits, customs, and so forth. Humanism contributes to this danger insofar as it fosters the illusion that technology is the result of a collective human choice and therefore subject to human control. [12](http://www.questiaschool.com/read/108740194%22%20%5Ct%20%22_top)

### Calculative thought 🡺 zero point

Dillon, U of Lancaster, 1999 Michael, Another Justice, Political Theory, April page ingenta select

Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value—rights—may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, “we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure.”36 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the humanway of being.

## Tech Thought - Ext

### Modern technology turns everything into a resource, reducing humans to their material quality and function.

Kalthoff, 05, Professor of Sociology, [Herbert, “Practices of Calculation : Economic Representations and Risk Management,” Theory, Culture, and Society, <http://tcs.sagepub.com/content/22/2/69>, p. 72-74].

The starting point of Heidegger’s reflection is a dissatisfaction with anthropological and instrumental explanations of technology. Heidegger states that both positions are not wrong, but that they are inadequate for grasping the essence of technology and explaining how human beings are implicated in this very technology. The essence of technology can, according to Heidegger, only be understood if one considers how something that is absent is brought into existence and presence. His main concern was describing technology as ‘a way of revealing’ (Heidegger, 1977: 12) some- thing that is invisible or concealed. Thus, for Heidegger, technology is not just a means, but a way of ‘challenging [Herausfordern]’ (Heidegger, 1977: 14) in the sense of its making or its fabrication. Compared to old technol- ogy, modern technology ‘sets upon [stellt] nature’ (Heidegger, 1977: 15).4 Three systematic arguments are key to the signature of modern technology. The first argument is that modern technology introduces a system of ordering (Gestell, enframing) that treats every human or non-human object as a resource (‘standing-reserve’). For Heidegger, the paradigm for this process of ordering and efficiency is the production (‘revealing’) of energy out of the Rhine, which itself is determined by the power station – and not by the river.5 The example shows that each element is set by another element; this process is not restricted to natural things, but includes every human or non-human present in this circle of being set – an ‘endless dis- aggregation, redistribution, and reaggregation for its own sake’ (Dreyfus and Spinosa, 1997: 163, italics in the original). Furthermore, the example demonstrates that, according to Heidegger, modern technology reduces every object – human and non-human entities – to its material quality and function (e.g. to deliver hydraulic pressure), making it instantly and completely available – in other words, this is the core of the ordering systems (cf. Kolb, 1986). These characteristics of modern technology not only apply to technical ‘hardware’ (e.g. power stations), but they shape, for instance, information or organization (cf. Heidegger, 2002: 23–4). In his work on language (cf. Heidegger, 2003: 262–4) he even ‘switches to computer manipulation of information as his paradigm’ (Dreyfus and Spinosa, 1997: 163). The second argument turns the common subject–object explanation around and goes as follows: within its system of ordering, in which human and non-human entities are treated as mere resources (‘standing-reserves’),6 modern technology constitutes the social world in the sense that it shows how to deal with objects and organizes an effective ordering of resources. To illustrate this point Heidegger (1977) takes an aeroplane as an example:7 an aeroplane is not just an object with certain material characteristics, but it is part of an international transportation system with passengers used to fill it (cf. Dreyfus, 1993: 306). As far as calculation is concerned, modern technology transforms the objects it reveals into uniform, materialized things that can be measured and compared through computing, balancing and calculating.8 As a form of ‘revealing’, calculation is a central part of the ordering system, and it constitutes the objects it calculates in the sense that it fixes their existence: objects are revealed as objects that are calculable (cf. Seubold, 1986: 87–91). Transposed to risk calculation in banking this means that calculation is not an operation with things already in place, but an activity by which objects (e.g. risk or profit) are brought into existence. In this sense one can state that calculation and its media of expression (e.g. mathematical signs, writing, formulae, etc.) circumscribe economic risk – and in doing so the market, the business and the return. Performing calculations using technical devices means being set in a ‘chain’ (Heidegger) of calculation: one level of calculation sets or places another level of calcula- tion, one economic representation sets another economic representation, one interpretation sets another interpretation. As a result of the universalization of technological rationality and its calculation, which includes every- thing, according to Heidegger there is a tendency to establish a technological understanding of being as the only legitimate form of understanding (cf. Dreyfus, 1993; Dreyfus and Spinosa, 1997). The third argument is that calculation is not limited to operations with numbers: ‘Computing in a broader more essential sense means: to calculate with something. That means to take into consideration, to count on some- thing, i.e. to set into expectation’ (Heidegger, 1954: 54; my translation). It also means to form a judgement with something upon something – activi- ties, in which images, categories and distinctions are involved. To illustrate this point I would like to quote a senior risk analyst working for a French merchant bank in Paris: “One can say that figures do speak, that they provoke images. This means that we aren’t like robots. Every time I see figures, they provoke images and a certain behaviour. I’ll give you an easy example. Let’s say we have an enter- prise: The margins are not particularly good, the cash flow is not very good, we also have liabilities. I see that immediately, I immediately imagine the workers doing their jobs. I also imagine the problems with the stock, which is very important. I imagine the clients who are not paying their debts on time. All this. I simply have a mechanism, a logic, which starts moving inside my head. What happens is that the figures are a pretext with which you can go further. Therefore, figures do speak. But the figures speak because they make other things speak.” In defence of his work (‘we aren’t like robots’), the analyst underscores the reciprocity of understanding figures and economic objects, of experience and imagination. In his discussion of the ‘world picture’ Heidegger (1977: 129) underlines the empirical relevance of cognitive presentation (Vorstel- lung), saying that getting a picture of something is equivalent to being in the picture, which in turn means to produce or to build something.9 Wittgen- stein (1994), too, speaks about the relationship between calculation and assessments, pointing out that assessments are stabilized through a calcu- lation which is assumed to be fixed.10 To conceive of calculation as related to expectations or pictures broadens the perspective on these practices. In other words: the technical calculation of numbers (e.g. economic ratios) is not the end of the story, but rather the starting point of the process of ‘calcu- lating with something’, that is, expectation and interpretation.11

# \*\*\*AT:\*\*\*

## AT: Perm

### Thought alone is key – inclusion of the plan 🡺 calculative thought

Beistegui 2007(Miguel de Beistegui, Professor of Philosophy University of Warwick, Coventry. Questioning Politics, or Beyond Power. European Journal of Political Theory 2007; 6; 87. Sage Publications)

Let me begin with a few words regarding the nature of the complex and challenging – dare I say impossible? – task that faces us here. Following David Webb’s generous (yet also perhaps treacherous) invitation, let us assume, albeit tentatively, that we can indeed envisage Heidegger as a political thinker. Let us assume that, when wanting to address the question of politics today, we can or indeed ought to turn to his thought – and this in spite of the fact that everything he wrote and did in relation to political matters would be precisely such as to suspend the possibility of ever considering him seriously as a *political* thinker. If, against all odds, and for a moment at least, we can assume the possibility of turning to Heidegger as a political thinker in a manner that is productive, such a possibility **can only stem from the radical and revolutionary nature of his thought alone**, from the original task that he set for thought. **Such a task is first and foremost non-political**. This doesn’t mean that it is simply apolitical, or without any political relevance whatsoever. It does mean, however, that if we approach it from the outside, **with questions and problems already constituted and of a political nature, we shall never get an answer from it**. At the same time, if we follow Heidegger’s own path of thought, we shall most certainly never be able to envisage him as a *political* thinker. The question, then, is one of knowing whether we can extract a political dimension – and indeed a contribution to the current political situation – from a thinker whose thought is intrinsically not political. Can we move beyond this aporia?

Bearing in mind the reservations and difficulties I have just expressed, I would like to begin by presenting a conviction, perhaps something like an axiom, from which everything I shall say here, indeed from which in my view everything that can be said on the subject at all, derives. The (somewhat paradoxical) axiom stipulates that everything that can be extracted from Heidegger’s thought by way of political contribution can be so extracted only from a position that is itself *essentially* non-political. This means that **everything Heidegger says about politics, or that can be seen to resonate with our political situation, is articulated from a position or a space that is itself *not* political**, a space that, furthermore, defines and decides the *essence* of politics. Everything that Heidegger says on politics amounts to calling it into question, that is, our investment in it, and the assumptions that govern it. If Karl Löwith was correct in defining the fundamental character of contemporary politics as a *total* politicization of life, and in noting a remarkable contiguity between democratic and totalitarian regimes in that respect, then Heidegger’s contribution might be seen to consist in calling such a total politicization into question. With Heidegger, we might want to wonder to what extent it is indeed the *total* politicization of life that is the issue, or whether it is the preliminary and unquestioned interpretation of who we are, of our Being, in terms of life, a life itself immediately qualified as political (man as the *zoon politikon*), that is what makes this total politicization of our Being not only possible, but inevitable. Far from wanting to politicize Heidegger, then, far from wanting to bend this or that analysis (say, the analysis of the ‘being-with’ in *Being and Time*, or the discussion of the Greek *polis* in a number of texts from the 1930s and 1940s) **towards a problematic and a space that will have been recognized and secured in advance as ‘political’, we should emphasize the distance – indeed the abyss – that Heidegger is concerned to establish between thought proper and political philosophy or theory**, **between that to which thought responds in being the thought that it is – and for which it is responsible – and political questioning and analysis, however fruitful and urgent it may be.**

### Working within the system is not an option – status quo enframing makes it impossible to overcome violence from inside the space of international politics

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The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is **quite deliberate**; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force.

But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more.

When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But **this cannot be done** without seizing alternatives from outside the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90

### Technological thought eliminates all other potential revealing of the world – if we win a link the inclusion of the plan destroys the authenticity of the alternative and 🡺 standing reserve

McWhorter, Professor of Philosophy at Northeast Missouri State,1992 (LaDelle, Heidegger and the Earth, ed: McWhorter, p. vii-viii)

In order to approach the world in a manner exclusively technological, calculative, mathematical, scientific, we must already have given up (or lost, or been expelled by, or perhaps ways of being such as *we* are even impossible within) other approaches or modes of revealing that would unfold into knowledges of other sorts. Those other approaches or paths of thinking must already have been obliterated; those other knowledges must already have concealed themselves in order for technologjcal or scientific revelation to occur. The danger a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in what it knows - not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission - but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It forgets that any other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever beyond the power of human manage­ment. We can never have, or know, it all; we can never manage everything. What is now especially dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, born of forgetfulness, is that it results in our viewing the world as mere resources to be stored or consumed. Managerial or technological thinkers, Heidegger says, view the earth, the world, all things as mere *Bestand,* standing-reserve. All is here simply for human use. No plant, no animal, no ecosystem has alife of its own, has any significance, apart from human desire and need. Nothing, we say, other than human beings, has any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of human will. Whether we believe that God gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the face of ecological fragility makes us always right, we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a stockpile or a set of commodities to be managed bought, and sold. The forest is timber; the river, a power source. Even people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled. This managerial, technological mode of revealing, Heidegger says, is embedded in and constitutive of Western culture and has been gathering strength for centuries. Now it is well on its way to extinguishing all other modes of revealing all other ways of being human and being earth. It will take tremendous effort to think through this danger, to think past it and beyond, tremendous courage and resolve to allow thought of the mystery to come forth; thought of the inevitability, along with revealing, of conceal­ment, of loss, of ignorance; thought of the occurring of things and their passage as events not ultimately under human control.

## AT: Passivity

### The alternative is not passivity – waiting for authentic revealing is revolutionary

Joronen 2010

(Mikko, Dept of Geography and Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, U of Turku, The Age of Planetary Space: On Heidegger, Being, and Metaphysics of Globalization, pg 223)

In spite of the revolutionary sense of ‘power-free-letting-be’, our role as the ones who let being to make its transformation poses number of questions concerning our part in this radical turning from the ontological violence to the other beginning of abyssal being. What is exactly our relation to the finitude of being? Should we only wait for the end of the prevailing mode of being and thus hope a new sending of being? At least Heidegger’s comment in his posthumously published Der Spiegel interview about “only god” (i.e. a new sending of being) being capable of “saving us” seems to imply this, apparently leaving little room for human activism (Heidegger 1976:107; see also Schatzki 2007:32). Hence, is our part just to question the prevailing unfolding and so to wait for the new sending, the other beginning, the new arrival of being? First of all, it is crucial to recognize that waiting for the world-historical turning is not inactivity but a revolution that turns power-free thinking into praxis. It is a non-violent revolution, which can take many forms of activism such as disobedience and protests. In fact, Fred Dallmayr even compares this praxis of non-violent resistance with the paths of Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr. (2001:267). Altogether, as Malpas writes, there is no reason why the world-historical turning of being cannot be waited through political activism, as long as such activism avoids being taken up by a machinational mode of unfolding and thus remains non-violent and aware of its limitedness and finitude (Malpas 2006:300; see also Irwin 2008:170, 188–189)

## AT: Nihilism

### Refusing contemplation 🡺 nihilism

Thiele 97**—**Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida (Leslie P, Palgrave Macmillan Journals, Vol 29, No. 4, “Postmodernity and the Routinization of Novelty: Heidegger on Boredom and Technology” p. 500-1)

III. Anxiety and Boredom The mood Heidegger is best known for investigating, which became the basis for much existentialist interest in him, is anxiety or dread( Angst). Anxiety is the disposition in which thrownness is made self-conscious and experienced most profoundly. Anxiety disallows our everyday turning away from thrownness, maintaining the relation of Being-in as problematic. Heidegger states succinctly that "anxiousness as a state-of-mind is a way of Being-in-the-world that in the face of which we have anxiety is thrown Being-in-the-world." When anxious, one fears nothing in particular, nothing identifiable. Yet there remains a certain foreboding. A dread of confronting one's finitude, one's ungroundedness persists. The worldly stage is nervously sensed as not of one's making or choosing. One finds oneself cast in a role beyond one's power fully to direct or control. Anxiety is perhaps best described as the state of unease in which one's "there" is revealed to be not fully one's own. One feels displaced. The world is disclosed as foreign. Anxiety is the foreboding of homelessness. Heidegger describes anxiety as "unheimlich." Translators have generally rendered this as uncanny. The connotation of uneasy strangeness is also present in the German. Literally, however, unheimlich means unhomelike. Anxiety brings us back from our absorption in the world such that everyday familiarity collapses. This collapse of routine worldliness is ontologically definitive of human being. Anxiety, then, is the mood of homelessness that tears one away from moods of habitual coping. Anxiety is neither a deprived state of human being nor a deficient state of mind. On the contrary, from an ontological perspective, anxiety is a fundamental disposition, a home(less) base from which other moods depart.30 Being at home in the world, in the manner of feeling comfortable within the weave of convention, signals a fleeing into ontic familiarity in the face of ontological uncanniness. What is dangerous, Heidegger maintains, is not that this flight occurs. We all necessarily live in the manner of everydayness as a condition of human being, shifting for ourselves and with others. Life itself, one might fairly say, depends upon this ingenious or routine self-management. At the same time, anxiety should not be deprecated. It brings to light the ontological reality of our thrown, ungrounded, and contingent nature. We cannot achieve and should not seek a permanent escape from our existential homelessness and the anxiety it engenders.31 Indeed, the uniqueness and greatness of human being lies in its capacity reflectively to experience its ungrounded contingency. What is dangerous, Heidegger maintains, is the systematic effort to forego the struggle with contingency. Human being oscillates between an ontic ensconcing in the world and an ontological alienation from it. While one never truly secures a home on this earth, the effort to discover a home (in homelessness) is imperative. To abandon this effort. Heidegger suggests, is to embrace nihilism. Heidegger challenges us to dwell in the homelessness that anxiety brings to light. Indeed, the "becoming at home in not being home" (das Heimisch werden im Unheimischsein) is announced as the meaning of our worldly dwelling. What is truly dangerous, then, is not our ungrounded thrownness or contingent finitude, but our lack of concern for these states of homelessness. What is dangerous is not the mood of anxiety that brings us to contemplate nothingness, but **the nihilistic refusal to engage in such contemplation**. This refusal is primarily evidenced today not in everydayness per se, though Heidegger's commentators are frequently mistaken on this point. Everydayness simply demonstrates the temporary avoidance of anxiety. The refusal itself comes fully to fore chiefly in the mood of boredom.

### Nihilism is inevitable in any process of thought—does not mean that thought should be discouraged

Bonner 1,Chair Dept.of Sociology and Legal Studies, Director of the Human Sciences Initiative, Professor, Professor Sociology and Legal Studies / Sexuality, Marriage, and Family Studies, (Kieran M. Human Studies, Vol. 24, No. 4, “Reflexivity and Interpretive Sociology: The Case of Analysis and the Problem of Nihilism” p. 285-7)

Self-conscious nihilism is not a risk of the banal, of those who are not inclined to reflect on social life. Whatever may be said about Eichmann, be ing an oriented nihilist was not one of them. Rather, Arendt (1978, p. 4) was "struck by a manifest shallowness in the doer that made it impossible to trace the uncontestable evil of his deeds to any deeper level of roots or motives. ... it was not stupidity but thoughtlessness." To those caught up in the con? ventions of everyday thinking, nihilism appears to be an irrational or an elit ist indulgence, much in the same way the Annette Benning character views the Kevin Spacey character in the recent movie American Beauty. But it is not merely the intellectual disease of those who are excessively self-absorbed or the 1990s fad of adolescents who espouse anarchism. Neither is it merely the self-interested fear of "Western, white male, class-privileged arrogance If we cannot know everything, then we can know nothing" (Lather, p. 116). Ironi cally, it is a temptation made real by the practice of self-reflection itself. As Arendt (1978, pp. 176-177) acknowledges, "all critical examinations must go through a stage of at least hypothetically negating accepted opinions and 'val ues' by searching out their implications and tacit assumptions. In this sense" she goes on to say, "nihilism may be seen as an ever-present danger of think ing .. . [and] thinking is equally dangerous to all creeds." The only way to eliminate this danger of nihilism would be to eliminate thinking from everyday life. On the other hand, and as Arendt (p. 177) has so eloquently witnessed, "non-thinking, which seems so recommendable a state for political and moral affairs, also has its perils. By shielding people from the dangers of examination, it teaches them to hold fast to whatever the pre scribed rules of conduct may be at a given time in a given society. What peo ple then get used to is less the content of the rules . . . than possession of rules under which to subsume particulars.... I am alluding, of course, to what happened in Nazi Germany and, to some extent in Stalinist Russia." The problem of nihilism is that it can neither be embraced nor avoided. To avoid thinking is to get into the habit of forgetting the content of creeds and rules and to be satisfied with their mere possession. If at any given time a society is corrupt, then possessing the creeds or rules ofthat society will not help anyone avoid doing evil. "When everybody is swept away unthinkingly by what everybody else does and believes in, those who think are drawn out of hiding because their refusal to join in is conspicuous and thereby becomes a kind of action. . . . The manifestation of the wind of thought is not knowl edge; it is the ability to tell right from wrong." (pp. 192-193). However, "think ing is equally dangerous to all creeds and, by itself, does not bring forth any new creed." A rejection of all creeds, as exemplified by Meursault, is the "ever present danger of thinking." The deep problem of nihilism is intertwined with the deep need for thinking. "Nihilism ... is a perennial human danger: it cannot be 'solved' without the dissolution of human nature." (Rosen, 1969, p. xx) Rosen goes on to show how much of contemporary philosophy, whether Heidegger's ontology or Wittgenstein's ordinary language philosophy, has nihilistic roots. Rosen's "protective inoculation" against the otherwise "fatal results of this perennial pestilence" involves pointing out that any claim for embracing the arbitrari ness of'what is,' must acknowledge the significance of making the claim and thus stand in opposition to the content of the claim. Much (in thrust) like the 1974 stage of Analysis, the argument is that if nihilism is a risk of thinking, protection from this risk is gained through rigorous reflexivity. In the 1984 stage of Analysis however, Blum and McHugh's (sometimes tortuous) re-engagement of the problem of self-reflection flows from the recognition that theorizing is not affirmed by merely pointing out the self contradictory nature of the claims of its enemies. Rather, precisely because thinking and social life are inextricably intertwined, self-reflection must work and work constantly to demonstrate its connection and its difference. The intertwining is expressed by the claim that self-reflection is a moral enterprise. As Dallmayr, in his (not uncritical) review of their 1984 work, remarks (1988, p. 9) "perhaps the most significant strength of the study" is the "linkage of reflection and ethics and the revalorization of moral excellence and virtue." In their presentation, he says (pp. 7?8), "principled action overcomes or side? steps the dichotomy of rule-conformity and deviance ? because 'need' is al? ways particular and not subsumable under general rules, but without being arbitrary. ... In the context of both action and speech, the hallmark of self reflection for Blum and McHugh resides in 'irony' or the ironic insinuation of principle into discourse." That is, theirs is a self-reflection which is "mor ally oriented" to the principle which grounds the inquirer's reflection. 'What is,' is conceived as Good, as ultimate truth or as Absolute, in order that the discourse of self reflection can work itself out in relation to the deep need for self-reflection. The deep need for self-reflection is ironically insinuated into discourse as an instance of the deep need of discourse "to comprehend what is" as ultimate. That the ultimate truth needs discourse and is absolute points to a source of irony in my recognition that I am needed by the ultimate truth as much as it is needed by me. In this recognition, irony differs first from those who do not acknowledge the ultimate truth, and secondly those whose acknowl edgement only concedes how they need the ultimate truth. In contrast, irony enjoys its limit, it enjoys unfolding of the in-itself, because it enjoys being needed and used by the ultimate truth (1984, p. 148). Self-reflexive inquiry (thinking) is not undertaken because it is strong and grounded (though it is that too) but because it is needed. Without recognising that inquiry participates in the mutual need (and desire) of discourse and the ultimate truth for each other, humans end up being "confronted with a ration ally functioning but ultimately silent universe." In turn, the spectre of nihil ism ("what is the point?") haunts the age and inquiry. The "ironic insinuation of principle into discourse," recognises the mutuality of the need of the in quirer for discourse and the ultimate truth. This Blum and McHugh solution to the problem of reflexivity can be con? trasted with Gadamer's notion of the finiteness of human knowledge. For Gadamer, the experience of finiteness introduces a necessary negativity and limit to the tendency of the human hope and desire to soar to unreasonable conclusions. (1975, pp. 320?321) It provides a necessary antidote to the dan? gers of modern dogmatism and ideology. For Blum and McHugh, on the other hand, need and desire ground the interest in theorizing in the first place. The need and desire for discourse, as a need of the human condition, grounds the commitment to reflexive inquiry. While, according to Gadamer, the danger of an inquiry based on need and desire would be a tendency to dogmatism rather than "reasonableness" (Gadamer, 1986) or phronesis ? and some like Roche (1988) and Wolf (1988) see this dogmatism expressed in the work of Blum and McHugh?the danger of an inquiry based on awareness of the "ex? perience of human finitude" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 320) may be a tendency to dispiritedness.

## AT: Nazism

Heidegger’s ascension to the Nazi party was forced—his ideals met much resistance within the party

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In or around the first days of May, 1933, Martin Heidegger joined the Nazi party. It was the spring of resurgence in Germany. Three months earlier the National Socialists, on the move since late 1926 and the dominant force in the Reichstag since the elections of the previous July, had conspired to get Hitler appointed as Chancellor under the popular and obtuse 85-year-old President Hindenburg. Soon afterward the Reichstag fire decree of February 28 and the Enabling Act of March 23, in which full legislative powers were handed over to the Govern- ment, had helped create the appearance of "legal revolution"- note the recourse to paradox- despite various regrettable "excesses." In the Reichstag election on March 5, Hitler had commanded 43.9% of the votes, a percentage that was to rise dramatically in succeeding elec- tions, along with programmed political terror. Publicly muting the note of anti-Semitism that had characterized their speeches and articles in the twenties, and that before long would resurface (indeed Goebbels had already engineered a mostly unsuccessful one-day national boycott of Jewish stores on April 1 , and new anti-Semitic legislation was being passed), the Nazis bruited revisionist social and economic programs that included full employment in a classless society of soldier- workers. Earnest and hectic, the country surged with a confidence it had not known since 1914, and then scarcely in such torch-lit profusion, such blazonry. In Heidegger's case, membership in the party went along pro forma with his assumption, that April, of the rectorate, or academic presidency, of Freiburg University, which came in the wake of the forced resignation of the Social Democratic rector, Wilhelm von Möllendorff, himself elected only the preceding December. Heidegger claims that he was initially contacted about joining the party in the first weeks after he became rector, and that, having never been associated with partisan politics before, he agreed only on the condition that he would not have to participate in any kind of party activity.1 As it turned out, he gave a number of speeches as rector at university and city gatherings, where the swastika abounded, before audiences that in- cluded Nazi officials and Hitler Youth. He spoke repeatedly on the need of cooperation between students and workers, faculties and pro- fessions, university and civic communities. In the mutual fructification of the intellectual and the folk, by which spirit roots in common ground, politics becomes a name for the full blossoming of the human tree. In other words, such speeches themselves constitute participation in the party. This is not, however, to surmount the question of the political, the question of the boundaries of the political, which Heideg- ger himself never lost sight of. The rectorate was a vexed and, it appears, ultimately humiliating time for Heidegger. Not only the interference of various outside groups seeking to hire or fire particular professors and deans and to reduce the university to a vocational school, but the indifference of his own faculties to his vision of reform made the sacrifice of time harder to countenance. Philosophy wasn't exactly at home in administration. In "The Rectorate 1933/34- Facts and Thoughts," which Heidegger is said to have written in 1945 and given to his son Hermann to publish "at an appropriate time" (R, 6), he paints a picture of this embattled administration, naming names of his Nazi antagonists. He contends that he undertook the office, having demurred up to the day of election, in order both to deploy and moderate prevailing energies for renewal and "In the first weeks of my official activity, it was brought to my attention that the Minister [for Culture] laid stress on the rector's belonging to the party. One day there appeared before me at the rectorate the current district chief [Kreisleiter], Dr. Kerber, the deputy chief, and a third member of their office, to invite me to join the party. . . . The entrance into the party remained merely a formality [nur eine Formsache] insofar as the party leadership had no intention of including me in their deliberations over university, culture, and education. Not once during my entire rectorship did I take part in any consultation or discussions, let alone decisions, with party command or with the various party organs." The text of both essays is hereafter cited as R. Unless otherwise indicated, translations are my own. to be in a position "to counter the importunities of unqualified persons and the threatening predominance of the party apparatus and doctrine" (R, 24). He hoped that the university might be a model of concerted self-recollection to the society at large. "What would have happened," he speculates, "and what would have been averted if in 1933 all capable powers had set out, slowly and rthe newly empowered 'movement’- coherently, to refine?" (R, 25). Rather than withdraw into passivity, he decided to act on what he deemed "positive" possibilities in National Socialism. (I shall return to this idea of a positive national socialism, which I take to be the crux of the matter.) To any of his contemporaries who were able first to divine the coming catastrophe [das Unheil]- and, he confesses, "so wise was I not"- he bitterly proposes: why did they not seek at that time to direct things to the good? (R, 26). In the face of many no doubt real ambivalences, it may have been the international renown won six years earlier by Being and Time, and later loudly invoked when the university senate elected him with only one dissenting vote, that led him to believe he could defend uni- versity interests in the political arena. He was mistaken. On the day of the Rektoratsrede, the rector's inaugural address, on May 27, 1933, as the estivities were winding down, Heidegger was informed by a Nazi minister of culture that his speech was regarded as a brand of "private national socialism," which circumvented the perspectives of party program and, in particular, en- tirely neglected the theory of race (R, 30). Indeed, Heidegger's first official action as rector, on his second day in office, had been to prohibit the hanging of the Judenplakat on university grounds at a time when such anti-Semitic posters already hung in all German universi- ties. He remained firm in his refusal when, the following week, an SA man called to threaten dismissal from office and even the closing of the university. Later that spring Heidegger prevented the same Nazi stu- dents from organizing a book burning in front of the university, and he took measures to insure the safekeeping of the university library.. Fédier's account of the rectorate, which accords with Heidegger's "Das Rektorat" (published in France in 1982), includes these exonerations: 1) it is untrue that Heidegger was ever an anti-Semite, and 2) it is untrue that he refused his Jewish teacher Husserl access to the university or to its library. had nonetheless to contend with steadily mounting pressures from a ministry intent on bringing university affairs into line with propaganda efforts, on instituting new hiring standards by which party loyalty and party service would take precedence over professional competence, and on purging undesirables, especially within the legal, medical, and nat- ural science faculties. In spite of such menace and machination, Heidegger was able, during his ten-month administration, not only to protect his Jewish students and assistants, Werner Brock and Helene Weiss, but to retain the Jewish professors von Hevesy and Thannhauser and to appoint only non-Nazi deans.3 His plans for rethinking the educational project, however, never got off the ground. He narrates, in "The Rectorate," how, in prepara- tion for the winter semester, 1933-34, he invited a group of students and lecturers, "without regard to party affiliation or activity," to a "Todtnauberger Lager" an open-air seminar or retreat in the environs of his cabin in the Todtnauberg. His idea was to revive the discussion of the nature of science and knowing which he had begun- he hoped not prematurely- in the rectorial address. He relates that, when word of the program sped up the Rhine to the Baden cultural ministry at Karls- ruhe, some additional "participants" were sent from the University of Heidelberg. Things began suitably enough with small group discus- sions on subjects like the relation of knowledge to faith. On the morn- ing of the second day, however, an automobile drove into camp sudden and unannounced containing Nazi functionaries from Heidelberg, aca- demic men known to Heidegger. A member of this "Heidelberger Gruppe" which controlled the ministry at Karlsruhe, proceeded to de- liver a lecture on "Race and the Race-Principle." Heidegger states that he recognized their intention, not only to disrupt the gathering, but to undermine the general program at Freiburg University, with its renegade administration and faculty. And so, he says, he felt forced to accept their presence if the winter semester was not to be scuttled. He was loath to abandon what he considered the university's only chance for legitimate survival.

## AT: Cede the Political / Policy Making Good

### We are a prerequisite to political action—the will to technology coopts status quo politics.

Mitchell, 2k5

(Andrew J., Stanford University, “Heidegger and Terrorism”, *Research in Phenomenology,* 35)

The will that dominates the modern era is personal, even if, as is the case with Leibniz, the ends of that will are not completely known by the self at any particular time. Nonetheless, the will still expresses the individuality of the person and one’s perspective. In the era of technology, the will that comes to the fore is no longer the will of an individual, but a will without a restricted human agenda. In fact, the will in question no longer wills an object outside of itself, but only wills itself; it is a will to will. In this way, the will need never leave itself. This self-affirming character of the will allows the will an independence from the human. Manifest in the very workings of technology is a will to power, which for Heidegger is always a will to will. Because the will to will has no goal outside of it, its willing is goalless and endless. The human is just another piece of a standing-reserve that circulates without purpose. Actually, things have not yet gone so far; the human still retains a distinction, however illusive, as “the most important raw material” (GA 7: 88/EP, 104). This importance has nothing to do with the personal willing of conditional goals, as Heidegger immediately makes clear, “The human is the ‘most important raw material’ because he remains the subject of all consumption, so much so that he lets his will go forth unconditionally in this process and simultaneously becomes the ‘object’ of the abandonment of being” (GA 7: 88/EP, 104). Unconditioned willing transcends the merely human will, which satisfies itself with restricted goals and accomplishments. Unconditioned willing makes of the subject an agent of the abandonment of being, one whose task it is to objectify everything. The more the world comes to stand at the will’s disposal, the more that being retreats from it. The human will is allied with the technological will to will. For this reason—and the following is something often overlooked in considering Heidegger’s political position between the wars—Heidegger is critical of the very notion of a Führer, or leader, who would direct the circulation of the standing-reserve according to his own personal will. The leaders of today are merely the necessary accompaniment of a standing-reserve that, in its abstraction, is susceptible to planning. The leaders’ seeming position of “subjectivity,” that they are the ones who decide, is again another working of “objectification,” where neither of these terms quite fits, given that beings are no longer objective. The willfulness of the leaders is not due to a personal will: One believes that the leaders had presumed everything of their own accord in the blind rage of a selfish egotism and arranged everything in accordance with their own will [Eigensinn]. In truth, however, leaders are the necessary consequence of the fact that beings have gone over to a way of errancy, in which an emptiness expands that requires a single ordering and securing of beings. (GA 7: 89/EP, 105; tm) The leaders do not stand above or control the proceedings, the proceedings in question affect beings as a whole, including the leaders. Leaders are simply points of convergence or conduits for the channels of circulation; they are needed for circulation, but are nowhere outside of it. No leader is the sole authority; instead, there are numerous “sectors” to which each leader is assigned. The demands of these sectors will be similar of course, organized around efficiency and productivity in distribution and circulation. In short, leaders serve the standing-reserve. Any goal beyond the will itself, any political goal, for example, will not be able to voice itself over the will’s own monologue. Insofar as modern warfare was a use of force for political goals, modern warfare is surpassed. The will surrenders its relation to the object in order to will itself all the more forcefully. It reaches a point where no political, which is to say “external,” goal can reach it. There can be no opposition when the will recognizes nothing but itself, and the more the will succeeds in this, the more impersonal it becomes. Politics’ effectiveness withers away in this transformation, since the goals of politics remain always conditional. The unconditional will is apolitical, and this transforms the relation between war and politics as expressed in Clausewitz’s famed dictum. War is not, as Clausewitz still thinks, the continuation of politics by other means. If “war” means the “total war,” i.e. the war that arises from the machination of beings here let loose, then it becomes a transformation of “politics” and a revelation of the fact that “politics” and every plan-directed course of life were themselves only ever the uncontrolled execution of metaphysical decisions that they do not master. (GA 69: 209)

### Alternative is a prereq to any decision making process

Soccio, ’09 – Retired Professor of Philosophy, taught for 30 years (Douglas J, Archetypes of Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy, Wadsworth and Cengage Learning, Chapter 17)

Occasionally, we may have a flickering sense that somehow something is amiss here, that something seems lacking in our lives. What could it be? A first temptation might be to think that we only need to figure out how to have more money, more gadgets, more freedom. But what if we are thinking about all of this in a flawed way, calculating and analyzing and looking for the wrong kind of answer in the wrong places and in the wrong way—and not seeing what could save us, could enrich our lives? What if we must stop thinking technologically before we can respond to what technology “wants” to reveal to us—the truth of Being.

## AT: Realism

Realism is a reductionist falsehood – its overarching theory is not universal and it produces mass sacrifice of life

Richmond**,** School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, 2007 Oliver, Alternatives 32.2, OneFile

This means that much of orthodox IR theory is actually anti-peace. Its reduction and abstraction of human life within "international relations," instead made up of "actors, anarchy, interdependencies, threats, rationality," power, and interests leads to dangerous rational calculations that ultimately **sacrifice human life.** (72) IR represents its knowledge systems as universal, when in fact they are local to the West/North. (73) Such representational habits and knowledge systems are prone to isolating themselves in order to maintain their belief in universality. (74) For example, Sylvester has shown how Waltzian neorealism led to a form of IR in which, "parsimonious explanatory power traded off the gender, class, race, language, diversity, and cultural multiplicities of life." (75)

### Realism is a choice not an inevitability – their argument is simply an attempt to create a homogenous interpretation of international relations which assures technological oppression

Jabri**,** Centre for International Relations, Department of War Studies, King's College, University of London, 2004 Vivienne, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 29.3, Academic OneFile

There is much in the present condition that centers on a conception of the past that naturalizes and reifies. As Michel Foucault's analytic of power has shown, (2) the establishment of a hegemonic discourse requires a uniform rendition of past and present, where, in a sense the past comes to serve the present, is brought into the service of the present. Political discourses based on categories such as homogeneous community, the right to sovereignty, family, the literal reading of religious doctrine, appear to seek legitimacy through renditions of the past where the subject is uniform and content within the confines of family and community. History is rendered a technology, deployed in the practices of exclusion that identify exclusively those agencies that may possess legitimacy in renditions of past and present. Such historical technologies are not only aimed at the glorification of the past, but also at the reversal of particular social and political turning points of the past. Relations of power come to be formative of the historical process and the discursive practices that surround it. For Foucault, analyses of such relations must move beyond the dichotomy between structure and event, for "the important thing is to avoid trying to do for the event what was previously done with the concept of structure" since events differ in their "capacity to produce effects." (3)

### Realism is methodologically unsound – the inclusion of natural science into international relations fails to address the central concerns of the security system

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This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty -- the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has deep roots in modern thought, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge. As Kissinger's claims about the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there. While this process has origins in ancient Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and René Descartes, who all combined a hunger for political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a naïve faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar move, Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier, Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65

Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics, which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb. Yet this new scientific power was marked by a terrible irony: as even Morgenthau understood, the control over matter afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons themselves, into political utility and rational strategy.66

### Their argument is wrong – realism does not explain the international arena – it sanitizes violence and erases the suffering caused by state centric ideologies – aesthetic and emotional ideologies rule the current political order

Bleiker**,** School of Political Science and Int’l Studies, University of Queensland, 2006 Roland, Alternatives 31.1 OneFile

And yet, the actual policy analyses of terrorist threats are advanced in a highly detached and rationalized manner. (57) The very presentation of contemporary warfare, from sanitized video-images of satellite-guided missiles to the abstract language of defense experts (exemplified through terms like collateral damage and clean bombs) not only **eliminates suffering from our purview,** but also fails to take into account emotional issues when assessing threats and formulating policy.

Although unacknowledged by experts in security studies, there is an extensive body of literature that deals with emotional insight. Martha Nussbaum's impressive study on the topic is particularly significant here since she demonstrates that emotions do not just highlight our vulnerability toward events that lie outside of control, such as terrorist attacks. They are also important forms of knowledge and evaluative thought. Literature, music, and other works of art offer possibilities to express these emotional insights in ways that cannot easily be achieved through conventional accounts of events. This is why, Nussbaum stresses, emotional intelligence and aesthetic ways of representing them should be accepted, alongside more conventional sources, as legitimate elements in the formulation of ethical and political judgment. (58)

### The international system is shaped by the actions of states – realism is not a fixed entity it is a performative choice

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Peter, 11/17 Constructivism and Foreign Policy, <http://nw08.american.edu/~phoward/isane_05.doc>.

One of the central constructivist insights is that the international system is not a fixed, external, material structure—it is instead a socially produced structure of shared meanings (rules or norms) (Onuf 1989; Wendt 1999). The rules of the system are produced by the interactions of states and in turn shape state practice. Security is not a favorable distribution of material capabilities (Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979), but rather a particular regime of rules (Howard 2002; Kratochwil 1989). Kratochwil argues that even the most basic of security agreements constitute a regime. Any foreign policy move—negotiation, appeasement, threat, commitment, or challenge—requires a shared framework to make the action understandable to all participants. Actors rely on “background knowledge” as a basis for interpreting others’ moves (Kratochwil 1978). For a foreign policy to produce security, it must be able to somehow contribute to the shared understandings that constitute a security regime.

## AT: Education Arguments

### Questions of technology are excluded from traditional IR – only we have uniqueness

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Though technology is part of the fabric of global politics the ‘question of technology’, to borrow the title of Martin Heidegger’s famous essay, has received relatively little sustained attention within the study of International Relations (IR). Although exceptions to this general rule certainly exist (as is well illustrated, for example, in William Scheuerman’s contribution to this section), traditionally in IR the tendency has been to treat technology and technological change as a taken-forgranted ‘variable’ (see Herrera 2003; Reppy 1990). This contrasts with the degree of philosophical reﬂection given over to the social implications of technology by various thinkers who are now increasingly cited as intellectual resources within critical IR theory such as Michel Foucault, Carl Schmitt, and the various thinkers associated with Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. In addition, IR has been also largely oblivious to currents in the philosophy of technology ranging from Heiddeger to Haraway, as well as more recent work in the ﬁeld of science and technology studies.1 Given this, more substantive consideration of the contemporary ‘technological condition’ (Sharff and Dusek 2003) within IR is long overdue. The aim of this section, then, is to create a space to (re)consider the relationship between technology and international relations. Each of the articles in the section does so by drawing on and referring to a diverse range of philosophical traditions, and in doing so each makes a distinctive contribution to the overarching thematic of the section.