Heidegger Kritik

[Heidegger Kritik 1](#_Toc298337630)

[1NC 3](#_Toc298337631)

[\*\*\*Links\*\*\* 6](#_Toc298337632)

[Arendt in Space 7](#_Toc298337633)

[Technological Space 9](#_Toc298337634)

[Space Exploration 11](#_Toc298337635)

[Technology 12](#_Toc298337636)

[Earth/World 13](#_Toc298337637)

[Distance (Harman) 16](#_Toc298337638)

[Necessity 17](#_Toc298337639)

[Science 19](#_Toc298337640)

[Knowledge-Production 22](#_Toc298337641)

[Hegemony 24](#_Toc298337642)

[Hegemony Module 25](#_Toc298337643)

[Economy 27](#_Toc298337644)

[Privatization 28](#_Toc298337645)

[Development 29](#_Toc298337646)

[Free Will 31](#_Toc298337647)

[Environment 32](#_Toc298337648)

[Ethics 33](#_Toc298337649)

[Mars Colonization 34](#_Toc298337650)

[A/T: Link Turn 35](#_Toc298337651)

[A/T: Link Turn (Gaia Hypothesis) 36](#_Toc298337652)

[A/T: Link Turn (Overview Effect) 37](#_Toc298337653)

[A/T: Permutation (Intelligibility) 38](#_Toc298337654)

[A/T: Permutation (Crowd-Out) 39](#_Toc298337655)

[A/T: Permutation (Auseinandersetzung) 40](#_Toc298337656)

[A/T: Permutation (Auseinandersetzung) 41](#_Toc298337657)

[\*\*\*Internal Links\*\*\* 42](#_Toc298337658)

[Technology = Reductive 43](#_Toc298337659)

[Enframing 44](#_Toc298337660)

[Calculation 45](#_Toc298337661)

[All of the Above 46](#_Toc298337662)

[All of the Above, pt. 2 47](#_Toc298337663)

[\*\*\*Impacts\*\*\* 48](#_Toc298337664)

[Atrocity 49](#_Toc298337665)

[Zero Point 50](#_Toc298337666)

[Ontological Damnation 52](#_Toc298337667)

[Extinction 54](#_Toc298337668)

[Standing-Reserve 55](#_Toc298337669)

[Ext – Standing Reserve 56](#_Toc298337670)

[Disposable Globe 58](#_Toc298337671)

[War 59](#_Toc298337672)

[No Solvency 60](#_Toc298337673)

[\*\*\*Alternative/Framing\*\*\* 61](#_Toc298337674)

[Critique 62](#_Toc298337675)

[Critique Key 64](#_Toc298337676)

[Critique Solves Policymaking 65](#_Toc298337677)

[“UQ” 66](#_Toc298337678)

[Do Nothing 67](#_Toc298337679)

[Natural Reintegration 68](#_Toc298337680)

[Ontology First – General 69](#_Toc298337681)

[Ontology First – Prerequisite 70](#_Toc298337682)

[Ontology First – Value 71](#_Toc298337683)

[A/T: Policymaking Good 72](#_Toc298337684)

[A/T: Policymaking = Education 73](#_Toc298337685)

[Framework “Propositions” 76](#_Toc298337686)

[A/T: Technology Inevitable 77](#_Toc298337687)

[A/T: “Can’t have value to life if we’re all dead” 79](#_Toc298337688)

[A/T: Heidegger = Nazi 80](#_Toc298337689)

[A/T: Heidegger = Nazi 81](#_Toc298337690)

[A/T: Heidegger = Nazi 82](#_Toc298337691)

[A/T: Heidegger = Nazi 83](#_Toc298337692)

[\*\*\*Affirmative Answers\*\*\* 85](#_Toc298337693)

[Link Turn (Phenomenology) 86](#_Toc298337694)

[Link Turn (Phenomenology) 87](#_Toc298337695)

[Link Turn – Critical Technology 88](#_Toc298337696)

[No Link – Technology 89](#_Toc298337697)

[Permutation (Critical Technology) 92](#_Toc298337698)

[Permutation (Pragmatism) 93](#_Toc298337699)

[Permutation (Positivism) 94](#_Toc298337700)

[Permutation Net-Benefit (Nazism) 95](#_Toc298337701)

[Technology Good (Politics) 96](#_Toc298337702)

[Positivism Good (Politics) 99](#_Toc298337703)

[Ontology Focus Bad 100](#_Toc298337704)

[Nazism Key 102](#_Toc298337705)

[Cede the Political 104](#_Toc298337706)

[Phenomenology Fails 105](#_Toc298337707)

[Ext – Phenomenology Fails 106](#_Toc298337708)

[Non-Falsifiable 109](#_Toc298337709)

1NC

The development and exploration of space occurs entirely within the horizons of technological thinking. For technology, outer space is just another phenomenological resource from which technological being transforms the cosmos into standing reserve. This impulse mirrors the structure of totalitarianism.

Lazier 2011 [Benjamin, Associate Professor of History and Humanities at Reed College, “Earthrise: or, Globalization of the World Picture,” in *The American Historical Review* 116.3]

IN 1990, THE GERMAN ASTRONOMERS Freimut Boerngen and Lutz Schmadel named an asteroid after one of the foremost political philosophers of the twentieth century, the German Jewish e´migre´ Hannah Arendt.1 Whether Arendt would have appreciated the gesture is uncertain.2 After all, she opened her philosophical masterpiece The Human Condition (1958) by voicing grave concerns about a second satellite— Sputnik. In 1957, man had for the first time propelled his artifacts into the beyond, and he was likely to follow by propelling himself as well. But to desire to depart from the scene of the world, she felt, meant also to think of the world as something worth leaving. To emancipate ourselves from its physical limits—gravity—meant also to emancipate ourselves from the gravity of its existential claims upon us. Sputnik therefore embodied an impulse already much in evidence on Earth—to create an artificial planet. In Sputnik the ambitions of modern man lay revealed.3 These ambitions were ominous. They had also in part been realized. The Human Condition appeared not long after Arendt’s famous study The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), and she advanced through Sputnik some of the themes broached in that earlier effort. Totalitarianism, it turns out, shared something important with the Russian satellite. Sputnik embodied a desire to fabricate an artificial substitute for the living Earth. Totalitarianism, in turn, distinguished itself from every other form of rule in its ambition to create a new world fit to compete with this one, the nontotalitarian world, and its success was to be measured in the consistency of its artful fiction. Totalitarian regimes create an “artificially fabricated insanity,” and “their art consists in using and at the same time transcending the elements of reality.”4 To- talitarianism’s artful fiction, however, had its all too real apotheosis in the concentration camp universe, a realm inhabited by a population of twilight creatures that Arendt called “the living dead.” In her view, we did not need to depart from the surface of the Earth to create a death star. Western civilization had already managed it, right here. All of this is curious. Only the morally maladroit would think to compare the death camps with a metal ball called “Companion.” Notwithstanding the Cold War context in which it was launched or the shock it unleashed, Sputnik was for some just a harmless piepende Kunstmond, as the German philosopher Hans Blumenberg described it.5 It was a beeping, diminutive moon-manque´, a stimulus to reflection, but hardly to panic. Nonetheless, Arendt appealed to the same vocabulary to make sense of them both. For all their differences, Sputnik and totalitarianism, modern science and modern politics shared a common pathology. Each testified to the modern displacement of the grown by the made, of living organisms by technical artifacts. Arendt’s approach was idiosyncratic. Her concern was not. Anxiety about the triumph of the made over the grown was shared by a slew of twentieth-century figures across virtually every domain of thought and culture, and it has hardly abated since. It is the subtext for a host of pressing concerns, including the anthropogenic origins of global warming, the engineering of transgenic organisms, the industrialization of agriculture, and the question of legal standing for natural objects.6 The field of environmental history is rooted in this anxiety, and it is a key issue in other fields as well. Historians of urbanism and the city, of industry, of regimes of labor (such as Taylorism or Fordism), of fashion and craft, of technology—in sum, anyone concerned with the history of what it has meant to make in the modern era—implicitly reflects on the issue. This holds for the making not only of things, but also of selves and of worlds. Blumenberg exaggerated when he declared the question of organism and artifact the theme of modern intellectual history—but perhaps not by all that much.7 To best grasp the importance of this theme, consider Earth, on some counts the largest organism of them all. Arendt and other mid-century intellectuals concocted powerful ideas about the transformation of the Earth into a man-made planet, ideas that crystallized in reflections on what it means when we look back upon Earth from beyond. In 1966, for example, Arendt’s teacher Martin Heidegger, perhaps the most consequential philosopher of the twentieth century, spoke with consternation about photographs of the planet shot from space. “This is no longer the earth on which man lives,” he complained.8 Blumenberg worked in the same influential tradition of thinking about technology and modernity that animated Heidegger and Arendt. Indeed, he may well have been that tradition’s most superlative interpreter and his- torian.9 But in 1975, Blumenberg decisively reversed their claims and declared their anxieties misplaced. He expected that the view of Earth from beyond would re-vindicate Earth—and the modern project itself—albeit by radicalizing the Copernican revolution that had undermined Earth’s centrality in the first place.10 Within the span of a decade, something had changed—evident both in philosophical reflection and in Western culture writ large. The “Earthrise era” had begun. In some ways, it is also our own. Broadly speaking, the Earthrise era comprises several important developments. The first is the rise of an “Earthly vision,” or a pictorial imagination characterized by views of the Earth as a whole. Hear the word “Earth,” and the images likely to flash through the mind are descendants of two views afforded by the Apollo missions. One shows the Earth half-cloaked in shadow as it floats over a lifeless moonscape. It arrived on Christmas 1968 and is called “Earthrise”: hence, the “Earthrise era.” (See Figure 1.) A second photograph, from December 1972, shows the disk of our terraqueous planet suspended in the void. It is officially titled “Blue Marble” and is reputed to be the most widely disseminated photograph in human history. (See Figure 2.) Its “frameless” frame—the void—has left it especially open to appropriation. These two images and their progeny now grace T-shirts and tote bags, cartoons and coffee cups, stamps commemorating Earth Day and posters feting the exploits of suicide bombers. In other words, this pictorial imagination is not simply that. As a stand-in for the idea of the Whole Earth itself, it has acquired an iconic power that helps organize a myriad of political, moral, scientific, and commercial imaginations as well.11 Views of Earth are now so ubiquitous as to go unremarked. But this makes them all the more important, and their effects historically novel. Our ideas and intuitions about inhabiting the world are now mediated through images that displace local, earthbound horizons with “horizons” that are planetary in scope—the distinction between earth and sky surmounted by that between Earth and void. These intuitions have dovetailed with new habits of speech, a vocabulary—and a second key development of the Earthrise era. But there is something peculiar about this vocabulary. It is just as “global” as “Earthly,” if not more so, and it is peculiar because the Earth as seen from space is often perceived as the natural or organic antithesis of an artifactual globe. Still, there is no avoiding the fact that as common expressions, the word “globalization” and the phrases “global environment,” “global economy,” and “global humanity” simply did not exist before the Earthrise era, and this explosion of globe talk is part and parcel of changes in the Western pictorial imagination that at first glance seem unsuited to it.12

The alternative to technological thought is astronoetics. The utter eccentricity of earth and reason is the spring of valuation: technological thinking’s attempt to universalize the power of management through thought produces an *absolute* violence against the trauma of Being, whereas astronoetic acknowledgement of Being can ground human valuation of Being in non-violent terms.

Lazier 2011 [Benjamin, Associate Professor of History and Humanities at Reed College, “Earthrise: or, Globalization of the World Picture,” in *The American Historical Review* 116.3]

Blumenberg’s classic statement on this count arrived in 1966, in a book titled The Legitimacy of the Modern Age. It is one of the most ambitious revisions of Western intellectual history ever ventured. The modern project, he conceded, suffered from an illegitimacy complex, and its technological excesses were unfortunate but understandable reactions to this felt deficiency. But Blumenberg wanted to go one step further. He aimed to save the modern age from its felt compulsion to rebel against the premodern sources of authority it sought to overcome. These were two above all: teleological nature and the biblical God. Each in its way belittled human artifice. The first was associated with the ancient injunction that art was to imitate nature, the second with ancient and medieval ideas about divine creativity. In turn, overcoming these traditions entailed the invention of a new science that sought the artful domination of nature by vesting in man the creative capacity of a God. Blumenberg hoped to rein in the radicalism of this overcoming by emancipating us from its felt need.51 His astronoetic enterprise proceeded along similar lines. He aimed to save the Copernican insight, but to temper some of the baleful, if unintended, effects of its associated science. He wanted to give the Copernican turn a final twist. This meant, above all, to put Earth in its place. It meant to yoke Earth back to the center of our attention by insisting on an Earthly eccentricity that not even Copernicus had countenanced. “A decade of intensive attention to astronautics has produced a surprise that is, in an insidious way, pre-Copernican,” Blumenberg observed. “The Earth has turned out to be a cosmic exception.”52 The radical eccentricity of the Earth made it paradoxically all-important. Only by being humbled still further could it be ennobled in post-Copernican eyes. Blumenberg appealed to a similar line of thought with respect to reason. It, too, had its place. Like Earth, reason was eccentric, and it was eccentric, in part, because it was Earth-bound. This ran contrary to the expectations of many Enlightenment thinkers, who proceeded as if the universality of reason meant just that—that it was a property in the universe at large. Kant, for example, was careful to speak of rational beings, not specifically human beings, when he outlined his metaphysics of morals. Fontenelle had conjectured that reason might be better exercised by the inhabitants of the moon than on Earth and by men.53 All of this Blumenberg rejected. It was, in fact, Enlightenment unease about the “terrestrial contingency” of reason, he held, that had led to the postulate of inhabited, otherworldly worlds in the first place. Reason was neither “the summit of nature’s accomplishments” nor “a logical continuation of them.” It was instead an accident of evolution, a deviation in the animal man, and to call it universal was in truth to seek a false, if powerful, anthropocentric consolation for the original Copernican trauma. A “true Copernicanism” would have no need for such solace, would insist instead on a thoroughgoing anthropo-eccentrism—in the form of human reason understood as merely human, as all too human, with both the promise and the deficiency the locution implies. True Copernicanism entailed modesty about what man, with his reason, might accomplish, but also an acceptance that reason, like Earth, is all man has. True Copernicanism was therefore the astronoetic expression of the cure Blumenberg proposed for the felt illegitimacy of the modern age writ large.54 Astronautics was unlikely to confirm or falsify these positions in the abstract. It could, however, generate a visual experience that made the questions of exobiology and exorationality a practical dead letter. This experience was in part a matter of aesthetic pleasure. In the age of astronautics, the view out had proved disappointing. The cosmos was simply “too deserted, too monotone, too poor,” Blumenberg decided, to satisfy us for long. By contrast, the Earth was a sight to marvel. Only this could account for the alacrity with which the manned exploration of extra-orbital space was brought to an end. Only as a “purely sensory phenomenon” could it have prompted the geotropism it did.55 This, in part, is what made photographs of the Earth different from their astronoetic predecessors. Blumenberg also had philosophical reasons for insisting on the priority of a visual encounter with Earth. To consider the point, he looked to a thought experiment broached early in the twentieth century by the mathematician-philosopher Jules Henri Poincare´. Poincare´ asked about the conditions of possibility for a Copernicus. He wondered whether an Earth forever shrouded in clouds, or the melancholy circumstance of human beings who had never seen sun or stars, trapped in an “atmospheric cave,” would have precluded the Copernican conclusion. Poincare´’s answer was no. The Copernican discovery, he reasoned, was “blind.” It relied not on sense impressions but on dispelling the optical illusion that most readily presents itself to the pre-critical mind: that the sun revolves around the Earth. It was in the end as a physicist, not an astronomer, as a mathematician, not a spectator, that Copernicus had achieved his breakthrough. Still, Blumenberg had his doubts. The radicalism of the Copernican revolution, after all, was intelligible only against its historical background—the millennia-old tradition of sensory observation. Copernicus could opt for physics only because he was first an astronomer; he could opt for blind science only because he first could see.56 Enter “Earthrise.” There was something about the view of Earth adrift in a cosmic desert that allowed for a pre-Copernican experience joined to a post-Copernican science. Somehow, images of the Earth from space made the problems of magnitude and eccentricity irrelevant—the fact that Earth is tiny, man still smaller, and at the center of absolutely nothing. Seeing the planet from afar did not produce new scientific knowledge to blunt that trauma’s force. The sight of an incomparably lonely living Earth, however, did produce a felt experience of a planet so eccentric, so exceptional, that it became the only thing worth attending to in the first place. The decisive thing about the view from space, that is, was “a revision that brought to an end the Copernican trauma of the Earth’s having the status of a mere point—of the annihilation of its importance by the enormity of the universe. Something that we do not yet fully understand has run its course: The successive increases in the disproportion between the Earth and the universe, between man and totality, have lost their significance—without its having been necessary to retract the theoretical effort.”57 Heidegger worried that thinking globally precluded being locally. The Earthrise era, Blumenberg thought, would enable us to do both at once.

\*\*\*Links\*\*\*

Arendt in Space

Space exploration represents the final advance of science to sever humanity from its original perception

Arendt 61 [Hannah, American political philosopher, “The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man” The New Atlantis Fall 2007]

The sad truth of the matter, however, is that the lost contact between the world of the senses and appearances and the physical world view had been re-established not by the pure scientist but by the “ plumber.” The technicians, who account today for the overwhelming majority of all “researchers,” have brought the results of the scientists down to earth. And even though the scientist is still beset by paradoxes and the most bewildering perplexities, the very fact that a whole technology could develop out of his results demonstrates the “soundness” of his theories and hypotheses more convincingly than any merely scientific observation or experiment ever could. It is perfectly true that the scientist himself does not want to go to the moon; he knows that for his purposes unmanned spaceships carrying the best instruments human ingenuity can invent will do the job of exploring the moon’s surface much better than dozens of astronauts. And yet, an actual change of the human world, the conquest of space or whatever we may wish to call it, is achieved only when manned space carriers are shot into the universe, so that man himself can go where up to now only human imagination and its power of abstraction, or human ingenuity and its power of fabrication, could reach. To be sure, all we plan to do now is to explore our own immediate surroundings in the universe, the infinitely small place that the human race could reach even if it were to travel with the velocity of light. In view of man’s life span—the only absolute limitation left at the present moment—it is quite unlikely that he will ever go much farther. But even for this limited job, we have to leave the world of our senses and of our bodies not only in imagination but in reality. It is as though Einstein’s imagined “observer poised in free space”—surely the creation of the human mind and its power of abstraction—is being followed by a bodily observer who must behave as though he were a mere child of abstraction and imagination. It is at this point that all the theoretical perplexities of the new physical world view intrude as realities upon man’s everyday world and throw out of gear his “natural,” that is, earthbound, common sense. He would, for instance, be confronted in reality with Einstein’s famous “twin paradox,” which hypothetically assumes that “a twin brother who takes off on a space journey in which he travels at a sizable fraction of the speed of light would return to find his earthbound twin either older than he or little more than a dim recollection in the memory of his descendants.”21 For although many physicists had found this paradox difficult to swallow, the “clock paradox,” on which it is based, seems to have been verified experimentally, so that the only alternative to it would be the assumption that earthbound life under all circumstances remains bound to a time concept that demonstrably does not belong among “true realities,” but among mere appearances. We have reached the stage where the Cartesian radical doubt of reality as such, the first philosophical answer to the discoveries of science in the modern age, may become subject to physical experiments that would make short shrift of Descartes’ famous consolation, I doubt, therefore I am, and of his conviction that, whatever the state of reality and of truth as they are given to the senses and to reason, you cannot “doubt of your doubt and remain uncertain whether you doubt or not.”22

The earth is the ontological well from which the meaningfulness of human existence springs. The call of the topic is framed on all sides by a merely technological relationship to self and world and thus empties existence of ontological significance.

Arendt 61 [Hannah, American political philosopher, “The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man” The New Atlantis Fall 2007]

It is at this point, it seems to me, that the humanist’s concern with man and the stature of man has caught up with the scientist. It is as though the sciences had done what the humanities never could have achieved, namely, to prove demonstrably the validity of this concern. The situation, as it presents itself today, oddly resembles an elaborate verification of a remark by Franz Kafka, written at the very beginning of this development: Man, he said, “found the Archimedean point, but he used it against himself; it seems that he was permitted to find it only under this condition.” For the conquest of space, the search for a point outside the earth from which it would be possible to move, to unhinge, as it were, the planet itself, is no accidental result of the modern age’s science. This was from its very beginnings not a “natural” but a universal science, it was not a physics but an astrophysics which looked upon the earth from a point in the universe. In terms of this development, the attempt to conquer space means that man hopes he will be able to journey to the Archimedean point which he anticipated by sheer force of abstraction and imagination. However, in doing so, he will necessarily lose his advantage. All he can find is the Archimedean point with respect to the earth, but once arrived there and having acquired this absolute power over his earthly habitat, he would need a new Archimedean point, and so ad infinitum. In other words, man can only get lost in the immensity of the universe, for the only true Archimedean point would be the absolute void behind the universe. Yet even if man recognizes that there might be absolute limits to his search for knowledge and that it might be wise to suspect such limitations whenever it turns out that the scientist can do more than he is capable of comprehending, and even if he realizes that he cannot “conquer space,” but at best make a few discoveries in our solar system, the journey into space and to the Archimedean point with respect to the earth is far from being a harmless or unequivocally triumphant enterprise. It could add to the stature of man inasmuch as man, in distinction from other living things, desires to be at home in a “territory” as large as possible. In that case, he would only take possession of what is his own, although it took him a long time to discover it. These new possessions, like all property, would have to be limited, and once the limit is reached and the limitations established, the new world view that may conceivably grow out of it is likely to be once more geocentric and anthropomorphic, although not in the old sense of the earth being the center of the universe and of man being the highest being there is. It would be geocentric in the sense that the earth, and not the universe, is the center and the home of mortal men, and it would be anthropomorphic in the sense that man would count his own factual mortality among the elementary conditions under which his scientific efforts are possible at all. At this moment, the prospects for such an entirely beneficial development and solution of the present predicaments of modern science and technology do not look particularly good. We have come to our present capacity to “conquer space” through our new ability to handle nature from a point in the universe outside the earth. For this is what we actually do when we release energy processes that ordinarily go on only in the sun, or attempt to initiate in a test tube the processes of cosmic evolution, or build machines for the production and control of energies unknown in the household of earthly nature. Without as yet actually occupying the point where Archimedes had wished to stand, we have found a way to act on the earth as though we disposed of terrestrial nature from outside, from the point of Einstein’s “observer freely poised in space.” If we look down from this point upon what is going on on earth and upon the various activities of men, that is, if we apply the Archimedean point to ourselves, then these activities will indeed appear to ourselves as no more than “overt behavior,” which we can study with the same methods we use to study the behavior of rats. Seen from a sufficient distance, the cars in which we travel and which we know we built ourselves will look as though they were, as Heisenberg once put it, “as inescapable a part of ourselves as the snail’s shell is to its occupant.” All our pride in what we can do will disappear into some kind of mutation of the human race; the whole of technology, seen from this point, in fact no longer appears “as the result of a conscious human effort to extend man’s material powers, but rather as a large-scale biological process.”27 Under these circumstances, speech and everyday language would indeed be no longer a meaningful utterance that transcends behavior even if it only expresses it, and it would much better be replaced by the extreme and in itself meaningless formalism of mathematical signs. The conquest of space and the science that made it possible have come perilously close to this point. If they ever should reach it in earnest, the stature of man would not simply be lowered by all standards we know of, but have been destroyed.

Technological Space

We must ground ourselves in fidelity to the Earth: it is the ontological wellspring from which human experience is made possible. The technological relationship to Earth reduces it to “mere” scientific truth, standing ready to be exploited by the technical misadventures of humanity.

Turnbull 2006 [Neil, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Social Theory at Nottingham Trent University, “The Ontological Consequences of Copernicus: Global Being in the Planetary World,” in *Theory, Culture, Society* 23]

The Planet Contra Nihilism IN THE ‘parable of the madman’, Nietzsche addressed what he believed to be the consequences of Copernican astronomy and Darwinian evolutionary theory for Western culture’s most cherished and deeply held moral and metaphysical convictions (Nietzsche, 1977: 202–3). In his view, rather than producing ‘Enlightenment’ and liberating humanity from the dead hand of religious dogma and superstition, these theories threatened to undermine the moral and intellectual foundations of life in the West. According to Nietzsche, Copernicanism and Darwinism endangered the ancient, residual, yet still ubiquitous, metaphysical idea that there is an ultimate foundation or ‘ground’ to the universe, capable of cognizance, and of ‘rationally supporting’ judgment in all its forms. Nietzsche encapsulated the theological dimensions of these anxieties in his claim that ‘God is Dead’. However, as many have pointed out, this was no simple counter-theological statement, but a warning about the bottomless void – what might be termed the ‘spatial nihilism’ – implicit within the ‘new cosmology’. For in Nietzsche’s view, with the quest for greater epistemological self-assuredness, modern humanity is in danger of not only sacrificing its traditional bases of meaning, but of losing the very idea that the world exists as something fixed, stable and significant. Thus the madman asks the crowd: ‘[w]hither are we moving now? Away from all suns? Are we not perpetually falling? Backward forward, sideward in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not straying as if through an infinite nothing?’ (Nietzsche, 1977: 203). Essentially, Nietzsche’s claim is that Copernicanism and Darwinism force us to question the significance of both the Greek Humanist and the Judeo–Christian conceptions of humanity and its world (that is, to think beyond the territorialization of Western philosophy as somewhere between ‘Athens’ and ‘Jerusalem’). In Nietzsche’s view, modern metaphysics is both ‘groundless’ and ‘simian’ because, after Copernicus and Darwin, ‘the earth does not stand fast’ (Nietzsche, 1998: 2) and ‘man is more of an ape than any ape’ (Nietzsche, 1969: 42). In such a context Nietzsche’s madman is not a prophet of lost archaic theological certainties, but a new voice of sanity, castigating, warning and exhorting his ‘metaphysically somnambulant’ audience to wake up to the truly frightening placelessness of modernity’s Copernican and Darwinian forms of life. And many who have followed Nietzsche in this regard have noted that the key to understanding the significance of modernity’s unheimlich ontology resides within a broader appreciation of the way in which the new cosmology has undermined traditional conceptions of earth. As Nietzsche’s heir Martin Heidegger famously claimed, when seen in Copernican planetary-cosmological terms, the earth is no longer the earth in any vital or lived sense but simply an object comprised of ‘purely technological relationships’ and an object, moreover, that is subjectivized into a representation, a vorstellung, that ‘stands before us’ rather than as something in ‘our midst’ (Heidegger, 1993: 105–6). For Heidegger, once perceived and conceived as a visual representation of a planetary bounded whole, the earth becomes ‘deworlded’: appearing as just one more casual system within a much wider cosmological causal order. And this is why for Heidegger – in his much-cited reflections on this matter – the interplanetary images of the earth from space are not simply the end product of a rather complex and powerful set of technological process that enframe the earth as a mass industrialized object, but are images that radically diminish the meaning of the earth, rendering humanity without a world within which to dwell (a theme that I return to later). When seen in Heideggerian terms, Copernicanism reduces the earth to mere ‘planetary matter’; an absurd and inhuman cosmic accident devoid of any ultimate sense or significance. In such a context we can no longer speak of a meaningful world at all, because when the earth is ‘reduced’ to a visual representation, it ceases to be a context of significance but stands as something that ‘transcends all tacitly shared assumptions’. As such, it is ‘beyond all frameworks – an abyss’ (Wood, 2002: 15). It becomes a ‘spectral earth’ – a mere flicker of light in the cosmological void. As Lyotard claimed, as a Copernican technologized object the earth ‘isn’t at all originary’ but merely a ‘spasmodic state of energy, an instant of established order, a smile on the surface of matter in a remote corner of the cosmos’ (Lyotard, 1991: 10). Thus the modern astronaut is seen as one of the primary agents of modern worldlessness in Heideggerian philosophy (and one is immediately struck by the phenomenological similarities between the spatial nihilism of Nietzsche’s madman and the free-floating placeless experience of the modern astronaut). For when the earth is seen from an astronautic point of view, all traditional human concerns are deterritorialized and strangely diminished to the extent that interplanetary representations of the earth threaten to sever the connection between humanity and its traditional ontological supports. Heideggerian scholars such as Robert Romanyshyn have developed this idea and used it as the basis for an existential critique of ‘the mad astronaut’: the quintessentially modern avatar that stands as the highest expression of modernity’s unheimlich rootlessness. Romanyshyn’s is a critique of what might be termed ‘the astronautic condition of modernity’ (1989; 200), as, in Romanyshyn’s view, the modern astronaut – what so many modern Western children want to ‘grow up to be’ – is a metaphor for a hypermodern cultural-psychological dream of distance, departure and escape from matter that reveals a world of pure ‘spectacular wonder’, and that disguises and perhaps even obliterates those deep and emotional connections to the earth that maintain a sense of ontological security and lived reality. These Heideggerian concerns are echoed in the claim that the ‘planetary earth’ is a symbol of Western capitalism’s domination of nature and global exploitation of cultural life. Seen thus, the image of the earth from space can be seen as the aesthetic core of the ideology of the expansionary – neo-liberal – phase of global capitalism and the sublime object of the post-ideological West. It is an object that conveys a new ‘satellite geography’ (see Redfield, 1996) and a placeless map that is the representational condition of possibility for the establishment of global surveillance and communication systems (Western capital’s command-and-control system). This placeless space of the planet is seen as challenging traditional notions of space and perhaps even traditional conceptions of the real itself. And according to Paul Virilio, the interplanetary idea of the earth is not only internally related to the idea of limitless capitalist expansion (see Virilio, 2002: 63) because, in his view, planetary technologies are bringing about an ‘exotic reorganisation of sight enabling perception to escape from the “real space of our planet”’ into what he terms ‘a horizonless perception under a vanished sky’ (see Virilio, 1997: 2, 2000: 63). Here, as with more orthodox Heideggerian analyses, the representation of the earth as planet is seen as a symbol of the deterritorializing technological power of global capitalism: a power that renders the ‘sphere of experience’ as ‘a synthesis of home and non-place, a nowhere place’ (Beck, 2002: 30).

Space Exploration

Space exploration is a prime example of the danger of Heidegger’s modern technological age. As enduringly dangerous in itself, this outweighs nuclear and biological warfare.

Cariño in 09 (Jovito V., PHILIPPINIANA SACRA, Vol. XLIV, No. 132 September-December, 2009 pp. 491-504 Heidegger and the Danger of Modern Technology, *Introduction*) JM

The modern age, to paraphrase Martin Heidegger, is the age of modern technology (he called it in fact, the atomic age 1 ). It is the age of space exploration; of the search for traces of life in planet Mars; of Human Genome Project; of stem cell research, of trains surging in speed; of nanotechnology; of designer babies; of mobile phones which contain virtually anything that can be reduced to bytes and that means practically everything. Beneath the dazzle that accompanies the proliferation of these technological wonders, there lurks a certain kind of danger, a danger more potent, more menacing than the possibility of nuclear meltdown or an outbreak of a biochemical warfare. This danger is more than mere dangerous because as Heidegger himself says it is “danger as such.” As the danger like no other, its threat is more enduring. It continues to persist over and around us as long as the age of modern technology holds sway. In this paper, I will discuss what Heidegger has to say about that danger – what made it possible and what shall make possible our salvation from it. My discussion shall evolve around the question: What is the danger of modern technology as interpreted by Martin Heidegger? Heidegger’s mind on this matter is amply sketched in a collection of essays called The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (1977) where we read how he pushed to the limit the question of technology as he dialogued with modern science and the ancient Greeks. A companion material is The Principle of Reason (1991) which contains the transcript of his lectures delivered in the Winter Semester of 1955-56 in University of Freiburg in Bresgau and its abbreviated form, an address entitled “The Principle of Reason” which was delivered at The Bremen Club and the University of Vienna on May 25, 1956 and October 24, 1956 respectively. In both the lecture series and the shorter address, Heidegger takes us through the labyrinthine paths of the history of Western philosophy via his hermeneutic of the principle of rationality formulated by Leibniz as nihil est sine ratione, “nothing is without reason.” The Leibnizian formula, says Heidegger, signaled not only the end of the incubation period of the principle of reason (which lasted for 2,300 years); it also launched another episode of incubation with its canonization of the rule of reason posited by modernity as the persistent drive for the calculation of things.

Space exploration results from our viewing of space as an infinite standing reserve, the supreme manifestation of the danger of technology.

Soccio in 09 (Douglas J., Professor of Philosophy @ Shasta University Archetypes of Wisdom: An Introduction to Philosophy Seventh Edition *The Age of Technology: Danger* p.515, 2009) JM

We measure—“order”—the cosmos itself, looking to outer space for new sources of energy to add to the ever-expanding standing-reserve. When nature as a whole is threatened by technology, we employ technology to count and record (“order”) endangered species via wireless transmitters. We scientifically analyze soil and air samples, track storms via satellite, and obsessively tweak additives and supplements to enhance our food supply. We seek out new superdrugs to kill off superbugs created by older drugs crafted to kill off older bugs. Yet in these very attempts to control the world and to come to technically “correct” understandings of the world, “the truth will withdraw,” Heidegger warns. Correct, calculative, objective understanding of particulars, though not sufficient for grasping the truth of existence, is potently useful, seductive, and distracting and induces complacency. This, says Heidegger, is “the supreme danger” of technology, a danger rooted in our overall indifference to every- thing that is not part of the standing-reserve. So long as we are chiefly inter- ested in things as means, as instruments, as standing-reserve, we inevitably come to a point where we take ourselves for standing-reserve. Then, ironically and monstrously, . . . precisely as the one so threatened, [man] exalts himself to the posture of the lord of the earth. In this way the illusion comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as it is his construct. This illusion gives rise in turn to one final delusion: it seems as though man everywhere and always encounters only himself. . . . In truth, however, precisely nowhere does man today any longer encounter himself, i.e., his essence.

Technology

Ontologically meaningful action can only occur within the frame of the earth, but technology sets the world against the horizons of human terrestriality.

Turnbull 2006 [Neil, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Social Theory at Nottingham Trent University, “The Ontological Consequences of Copernicus: Global Being in the Planetary World,” in *Theory, Culture, Society* 23]

The philosophical problematic of worldhood has been something of perennial concern for the modern philosopher. The idea of ‘a world’ – defined as a bounded space of meaning and significance, ‘an organized ensemble, which is closed, but which, strangely, is representative of all the rest’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 233) – has been perhaps the nodal concern of the Western philosophical tradition. Richard Rorty has suggested that the problematic of ‘world’ is modern philosophy’s ‘obsession’ with the ‘ineffable cause of sense and goal of the intellect’ (Rorty, 1972: 663). Generally, the modern Western philosophical tradition has defined ‘the world’ as something constructed by the subject; that is, constructed by thought (and it was with Kant that this modern subjectivization of worldhood first emerged in earnest). With the romantic philosophers of culture at the beginning of the 19th century, the modern subjectivist conception of the world was given a new twist and some additional sociological vitality with the emergence of weltanschauung as a philosophical concern (an idea that was eventually to give rise to the relativist idea, now a postmodern staple, that people who speak different languages and different cultures live in ‘different worlds’). With Schopenhauer and the early Heidegger, however, the modern subjectivist conception of ‘world’ is rendered more practical; being conceived as primarily a ‘work-world’ shaped by artisanal activities. In 20th-century philosophy, ‘the world’ begins to be conceived ‘more realistically’ and loses its private and subjective character. This can be seen in the ideas of the early Wittgenstein, for whom the world was seen as a logical space of pure facticity and a ‘limited whole’ – a world that ‘is all that is the case’ (Wittgenstein, 1922: 1) and conceived as identical with life itself (see Stokhof, 2002). For the early Heidegger too, ‘world’ is also conceived less subjectively because we cannot simply speak of ‘the world’, but of the ‘it’ that ‘worlds’ (see Bearn, 1994: 64; Kisiel, 2002: 130). In both cases, worlds are understood as spaces where events happen (temporalized spaces). More generally, however, as the validity of the subjectivist notions of ‘world’ derived from the Enlightenment were slowly eroded by modern science’s ‘objective’ mathematical worlds, the very idea of the world, as Heidegger observed, was rendered problematic. With the emergence of physical science, the world is reduced to the status of a ‘picture’ and, as such, something ‘set before’ humanity as series of objects for calculation and manipulation (see Heidegger, 1977). In Heidegger’s view in what he termed the ‘age of the world-picture’, worldview has become ‘freezing, finality, end, system’ and as such philosophically impenetrable (Heidegger, 2000: 188). As such, the world as traditionally conceived disappears, replaced by representations of the world (of which the earth from space is perhaps the ultimate example, a kind a ‘world-picture’ that, in a very literal way, is a ‘picture of the world’). It is possibly because of the problematic status of both ‘world’ and ‘worldliness’ (weldligkeit) in the 20th century that, in the later writings of both Heidegger and Wittgenstein, we can see an attempt to interrogate modern philosophical problematics via a new philosophical concern with what is a fundamental precondition of ‘worldhood’, with terrestriality. Both these philosophers follow Nietzsche in this regard. In Nietzschean philosophy we can see a nascent moment in modern philosophy’s attempt to construct a new terrestrial ontology earth and earthliness. In Also Sprach Zarathustra, Nietzsche has Zarathustra plead with the crowd in the market place to: . . . remain true to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of superterrestrial hopes! They are poisoners whether they know it or not. They are despisers of life, atrophying and self-poisoned men, of whom the earth is weary: so let them be gone. (Nietzsche, 1969: 42; original emphasis) What Nietzsche is suggesting here is that with the refuting of the idea transcendental ‘grounds’ in post-Kantian philosophy, the earth is the only viable idea of ontological support available to the honest philosopher. In Nietzschean philosophy, the figure of the earth is used as a metaphor of Dionysian vitality and a philosophical term of art that provides the basis for Nietzsche’s much celebrated cyclical conception of temporality – daybreak, morning, ‘the great noon’ and the ‘eternal return’ – that stands in stark opposition to modernity’s linear history. Heidegger and Wittgenstein, however, went beyond Nietzsche in many respects in that their philosophical conceptions of the earth were more alive to the ontological issues emerging from the forms of spatiality produced by modern space and transport technologies. Both recognized that space technologies open the possibility for a less earth-bound ontology (and as such pose a fundamental challenge to the terrestrial and territorial horizon projected by traditional European weltanschauungen). For them, modern technology threatens to uproot authentic thought and speech from its ‘true heimat’ – the terra firma of European soil – by portending, respectively, new and heightened forms of nihilism and scepticism. In their view, the role of philosopher is to ‘think against’ the deterritorializing dynamics of (space) technology by demonstrating that meaningful thinking and speaking are only possible when thinkers and speakers are rooted and immersed in particular terrestrial forms of life and/or ways of being-in-the-world.

Earth/World

The relationship between the made and the grown is eclipsed by the way technology calls forth the cosmos to appear to humanity. Technology can only grasp the relationship between the made and the grown in terms of a hierarchy which makes possible the exploitation of the distinction in terms of standing reserve. Space development and exploration add just one phenomenological angle by which we can seek this hierarchy in the cosmos.

Lazier 2011 [Benjamin, Associate Professor of History and Humanities at Reed College, “Earthrise: or, Globalization of the World Picture,” in *The American Historical Review* 116.3]

In some respects, it is easy to see why. Take, for example, an important early lecture (November 13, 1935) that Heidegger delivered on the origins of the work of art. There he spoke at length about the categories of “earth” and “world.” Worldliness had been a prominent Heideggerian theme for some time, addressed (albeit differently) in his 1927 masterpiece Being and Time. In this lecture, however, he explored its relation to a new category in his vocabulary—earth. Here is how he defined it: earth is “that whence the arising brings back and shelters everything that arises as such.” Earth is a “sheltering agent,” he explained, for those things that “arise.” The language is obscure to moderns. It might have made more sense, however, to some ancients. That is, Heidegger appealed openly (with some modifications) to an ancient Greek conception of teleological nature or physis. For Aristotle, physis referred to an autonomous source or principle of movement in a living organism; Heidegger referred to it as an “emerging and arising in itself and in all things.” What some Greeks called physis, he explained, “we call earth,” or in the German, Erde.23 In this, Heidegger mirrored a number of twentieth-century thinkers anxious about modern technology who looked to ancient ideas about nature as antidotes. Their aim was to resist the impulse to reduce life to a set of mechanical, causal relationships. Physis and teleology, by contrast, entailed a causal principle embedded in the living body itself; organisms, in this view, are both their own cause and effect. Or as Heidegger put it, earth ought not be understood as a “mass of matter deposited somewhere.” Heidegger wanted also to resist a second reduction. He worried about the displacement of earth by the “merely astronomical idea of a planet,” of Erde by Erdball.24 In the images of Earth from space, he saw earth undone. These images occluded a second existential horizon also, the one with which earth was paired: world. Although the concept evolved over the course of Heidegger’s career, in this lecture it referred to a realm for human being opened up by artifacts, by great works of art above all. “World” refers to a scene for human life, for “the destiny of a historical people” to play itself out. It is also in some ways active and independent of man: “the world worlds,” Heidegger says. It is a “self-opening openness.” The language is admittedly strange. As an illustration, consider what Heidegger had to say about Greek temples: “The temple, in its standing there, first gives to things their look and to men their outlook on themselves.” In other words, the Greek could be (or become) Greek only in the space opened up by the templework. The temple also helps us see what Heidegger had in mind when he spoke of earth and world. The temple “roots itself” in the mountain; the stone of the mountain “juts through” the temple-work in turn. Stone and the space opened up by the temple, earth and world, are therefore joined, albeit in a productive struggle that makes each what it is. In “setting up a world,” that is, the work of art also “lets the earth be an earth.”25 But the view of Earth from space threatened both of these horizons for human being. If the view transformed earth into Earth, existential ground into planetary body, it did away with world by erasing evidence of artifice altogether. “Not a trace of human beings,” Blumenberg later remarked about the sight, “as if there had never been men, his works, his refuse at all!”26 Whatever Heidegger’s anxieties about the character of modern making, and they were legion, a stubborn fact remains: without human artifice, there can be neither earth nor world, no scene for being-human. Arendt voiced similar anxieties in The Human Condition. Like Heidegger, she made recourse to the categories of “earth” and “world” to describe dimensions of the human condition.27 And like Heidegger, she worried about the eclipse of the grown by the made.28 Some of her most potent language, however, was reserved for a related, inverted fear: the reduction of the made to the grown. At a still-proximate reserve from the surface of the planet, for example, artifacts and the work required to produce them would appear as those of ants appear to human beings. Our cities would appear as hives, the act of making as the unconscious, unwilled activity of a species.29 Even nuclear weapons, she hypothesized, could be understood in this way: as an unwilled strategy for holding population growth in check.30 Arendt may have opposed the eclipse of the grown by the made for fear of doing away with one dimension of the background condition—the biological—out of which human beings emerge. But from a certain remove, that very process appeared as just the opposite: the eclipse of worldliness by earthliness, and the subsumption of human being into the metabolic sway of life and death. The perverse effect of modern technological acumen was to reduce the most artifactual of creatures to mere organisms. From space, the future of the human condition looked bleak. There was something about a view of the planet as such that worried both Heidegger and Arendt. In part, their concern is exemplified by a lexical spill: from the word “earth” to the words “Earth,” “planet,” and “globe.” We often see Earth when we hear “earth,” and we refer to views of Earth almost indiscriminately as views of planet and globe. Heidegger and Arendt enjoin us to ask what prompts this slippage and what it implies. Should we do so, we are led to consider that for moderns to think of planets is already to think of globes, or that for moderns to marshal the intellectual resources required to think about planets implicitly means to relate to them in ways enabled by their intensive and extensive mapping. The naked Earth, in this view, is anything but. At least for moderns, it is “set up” or disclosed as a globe, as a map, clothed in an artifactual, if invisible, net. What appears as the Whole Earth is in fact just another instance of the technological globe—and still worse, a technological globe that masks its fact. We are fated to a globalization of the world picture, in this view, even when, strictly speaking, we see no globe at all.

The world and earth are constantly disclosed to Dasein *as such*, but technology tears humanity out of this ontological wellspring of value and reduces everything to standing reserve.

Turnbull 2006 [Neil, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Social Theory at Nottingham Trent University, “The Ontological Consequences of Copernicus: Global Being in the Planetary World,” in *Theory, Culture, Society* 23]

As is well known, in Being and Time, the early Heidegger conceived of the world as a phenomenological space that conditions ‘the totality of our involvement with things’ (1961: 415). For him, the world is constituted by a tacit set of basic existential attitudes to the world – care, understanding, mood and so on – and is related to ‘what lies before’ in the sense of being handy or readily available. In later works such as The Origin of the Work of Art, the world continues to be viewed in a similar way as the ‘governing expanse’, which ‘gives things their measure’, ‘an open space’ within which things ‘receive protection’ (1978b: 160). Thus, in the early Heidegger’s view, it is the world that provides the conditions of possibility for the basic shape and character of phenomenological experience as such. As one commentator has put it: the world . . . gives its rule or law to things as that which directs the way they come to stand such that the opening of a world measures the relations between existent things, giving them proximity or distance, their peculiar temporal status and their scope and limits. (Fynsk, 1993: 141) However, the question of the significance of the earth and its relationship to both technology and world in the context of ‘dwelling’ – as a key element of the ‘fourfold’ of Earth, Sky, Gods and Mortals – is the more prominent feature of his later work (and it is for this reason that many Heideggerians read him as a proto-ecological philosopher [see Foltz, 1995; Zimmerman, 1994]). Some Heidegger scholars recognize that the new emphasis given to earth in Heidegger’s later philosophy is an ‘attempt to think the essence of things in a new way’ (Mulhall, 1990: 169) and that, for the late Heidegger, ‘authentic dwelling’ is no longer a matter of a temporalized ‘being-in-the-world’ – as it was in Being and Time – but is reconceived as a dwelling ‘poetically on the earth’ and ‘under the sky’ (Heidegger, 1978a: 351). Thus, for the later Heidegger, authentic ways of living stand radically opposed to what might be termed ‘Copernican modes of existence’, for to live authentically on the earth is to ‘receive the sky as sky’ and to ‘leave the sun and moon to their journey, the stars to their courses’ (1978a: 352). As the earth is transformed into a cosmological representation, the earth loses its ontological status as a site of dwelling and is reduced to an object of possible knowledge for modernity’s technological subject. The later Heidegger thus strives to defend an earthbound notion of the world and this, in his view, requires that we reject Copernican ideas of the primacy of space in that, for him, ‘spaces receive their essential being from locales and not from “space”’ (1978a: 356). In Heidegger’s view, the earth is the ontological basis for our localized sense of place. It is what he terms ‘the serving bearer’ – an idea related to the pagan conception of the earth as the giver of life – and as such a primordial ground ‘blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up in plant and animal’ (1971: 149–50). Thus, for the later Heidegger worlds are only conceivable as such – such that the world is attained as world – only when they framed by the sky above and the earth beneath (see Malpas, 2000: 227). Clearly, for the later Heidegger, the idea of ‘the world’ is conceptually inseparable from that of ‘the earth’ (and in many ways, for the later Heidegger, the idea of the world within which ‘Dasein is’ is replaced by the idea of the fourfold within which ‘man dwells’). The close relationship between earth and world for Heidegger can again be seen in the Origins of the Work of Art, where Heidegger recognizes that ‘[w]orld and earth are essentially different from one another and yet never separated. The world grounds itself in the earth and the earth juts through the world’ (1978b: 174).2 When seen in this way, the earth is viewed as forming the ontological basis for what Heidegger terms ‘the work’ – of both artist and artisan – and its corollary the ‘thingly character of the world’ (1978b: 180). More generally, Heidegger conceives the earth as the ground of all appearance and the physys out of which the world emerges (a ground that supports the nomos of the world). For, in Heidegger’s view, only a world supported by the earth can give things their proper measure: and without this relation, things have no ‘true’ measure (and in such a case, the measurement of the world in terms of an abstract mathematicized facticity – required for the efficient maintenance of purely technological relationships – becomes the anthropocentric measure of all things).

Distance (Harman)

**The affirmative’s technological attempt to remove the “distance” between humanity and space reduces it to an ontological standing reserve.**

Harman in 09 (Graham, Professor of Philosophy @ American University in Cairo, “Cambridge Journal of Economics”, 2009, Vol. 34(1), Technology, objects and things in Heidegger p.17-25) JM

 ‘All distances in time and space are shriveling’ (Heidegger, 1994, p. 5).4 So go the opening words of Heidegger's 1949 Bremen lectures. Physical distance is dissolved by aircraft. The radio makes information instantly available that once went unknown. The formerly slow and mysterious growth of plants is laid bare through stop-action photography. But Heidegger is unimpressed by these technological gimmicks: ‘the hasty removal of all distances brings no nearness; for nearness does not consist in a small amount of distance’ (Heidegger, 1994, p. 5). Or even more memorably: ‘Small distance is not already nearness. Great distance is not yet farness’ (Heidegger, 1994, p. 5). None of this should come as a surprise to readers of Being and Time, where Heidegger observed that the eyeglasses on my face are further than the acquaintance I see approaching on the street, since the glasses are usually ignored as long as they are clean and in good working order. Distance is not a discrete physical span, but refers primarily to distance and nearness for human concern. Yet even nearness to human concern is not ‘true’ nearness: for Heidegger, a stop-action film gives us no true nearness to the growth of plants. If we call something ‘near’ when it is a small physical distance away, or instead call it ‘near’ because it is an immediate object of our concern, in both cases we make the same mistake: we reduce the thing to its presence-at-hand. Though the phrase ‘presence-at-hand’ was no longer used in 1949, it is still what Heidegger means. True nearness to the thing comes not from making it as close as possible in physical or mental terms. Instead, true nearness requires distance. True nearness and true distance are one and the same. The inability to let anything be distant from us is what Heidegger calls the ‘distanceless’, or das Abstandlose. ‘Everything dissolves together into a uniform lack of distance’ (Heidegger, 1994, p. 6). And this leads to one of Heidegger's major technical terms pertaining to technology: ‘The distanceless is never without a stance [Stand]. It stands, insofar as everything present is standing reserve [Bestand]’ (Heidegger, 1994, pp. 25–6). This ‘standing reserve’ is without distance, without true nearness, and is ontologically identical with what was earlier called presence-at-hand. It may be a more politically sinister form of such presence than most, but it should be remembered that ‘technology’ for Heidegger is already present in human history long before steamships and computers appear. All science is ruled in advance by technology—a forgetting of the hiddenness of being and a reduction of things to their presence or outward look. Insofar as being itself must be manifested in some form of oversimplified presence, it is even the case that being itself can be held responsible for the era of technology. Technology turns everything into an accessible surface, devoid of distance. At times Heidegger also shows the disturbing tendency to treat all technology as the same. This can be seen in his claim that the explosion of the atomic bomb at Hiroshima four years earlier is not so important, since the real disaster happened long ago when being was forgotten in favour of presence (Heidegger, 1994, p. 6). Or, even more controversially: ‘Agriculture is now a motorized nourishment industry, essentially the same as the fabrication of corpses in gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the blockade and starvation of nations, the same as the fabrication of hydrogen bombs’ (Heidegger, 1994, p. 27). In this way, all objects are reduced to a single mournful feature: their superficiality in comparison with the withdrawn depth of being

Necessity

We must give up on modern philosophy’s insistence on the *necessity* of truth; throughout the Enlightenment, this resulted in the denigration of the earth and all things associated with its raw materiality—emotion, passion, human finitude. Nietzschean philosophy’s attempt to re-ground human meaning in the chaotic flux of earthliness replicates the structure of Enlightenment thinking by insisting that meaning is, by definition, *grounded*. Instead, to say with Nietzsche, in order to “have fidelity to the Earth,” we must recognize that only Nothing can ground a “meaningful” relationship to the Cosmos.

Turnbull 2006 [Neil, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Social Theory at Nottingham Trent University, “The Ontological Consequences of Copernicus: Global Being in the Planetary World,” in *Theory, Culture, Society* 23]

Deleuze and Guattari stand out as the two philosophers who have provided the most systematic attempt to philosophize in a ‘post-Copernican’ mode for an age when the old earth has become what they term ‘desert earth’ and the sense of a ‘new earth’ has yet to be philosophically articulated. For them, the issue of the nature and significance of the earth remains one of the central concerns of philosophy: but only when the idea of the earth is sharply differentiated from that of territory. The earth for Deleuze and Guattari represents a utopia (see Goodchild, 1996) and stands in stark opposition to the earth of ‘English’ capitalistic expansion: the old Greek earth ‘broken, fractalised and extended to the entire universe’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 104). In their view, Heidegger made the mistake of conflating earth and territory, for now the earth has become something other than territory in its cosmopolitical separation from cartographic control. Thus, for Deleuze and Guattari, the earth is ‘[t]he Deterritorialised, the Glacial, the giant Molecule – “a body without organs”’ (1987: 40). The earth is thus not ‘one element among other elements’ (1994: 85), fixed in specific place in time under a ‘specific sky’, but a fluidity ‘that brings all elements within a single embrace’ (1994: 85). The earth is a space permeated by flows in all directions, free intensities and nomadic singularities (1987: 40). When conceived in this manner, the earth is no longer conceived as a background but a destratified plane upon which all minds and bodies can be situated. According to them, the plane of the earth ‘knows nothing of differences in level, orders of magnitude, or distances’ (1987: 68); such codings can only come from the social technological ‘machinic assemblages’ that straddle and ‘cartographise’ the earth. In opposition to the idea of the ‘coded’ earth, they offer an idea of the earth as decoded and unengendered, an ‘immobile motor’, ‘[s]uffering and dangerous, unique, universal’ it is the ‘full body’ and an ‘enchanted surface of inscription’ (1983: 154). It is the ‘single plane’ that escapes the territorial codings of the modern nation-state, and is the extraterritorial grounds for thinking and acting beyond its remit. To conceive of the earth in this manner requires a rejection of the basic assumptions of ‘subjectivist’ modern philosophy – for when rendered ‘earthly’, thinking is neither a line drawn between subject and object nor a revolving of one around the other, but something that takes place in a deterritorialized space between territory and earth (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 85). The implication of this claim is that the major issue facing contemporary Western philosophy today is how to ‘devise’ a philosophy that interrogates and gives ‘ontological sense’ to planetary deterritorialization – the epochal moment when the earth loses its ancient association with territory – when, as Deleuze and Guattari point out, philosophy itself is still territorialized on Greek soil, such that Greece – and ipso facto Europe – is still ‘the philosopher’s earth’ (see Deleuze and Guattari, 1994: 86). Clearly, this will demand a different set of ‘philosophical ideals and vocabularies’ – ones less ‘grounded’ in narrowly defined ideas of earth as both terra and its political corollary territory. Deleuze and Guattari note that, at the birth of modernity, modern philosophy ‘turns back against itself so as to summon forth a new earth and a new people’ (1994: 99). This new earth was the Copernican earth: the earth removed from its nodal position as the ultimate ground of the Aristotelian universe and ‘exploded’ into ‘the universe’ while at the same time being redefined and repositioned as one element of a wider heliocentric interplanetary system (the ‘third stone from the sun’). Its continual movement and dependence upon much larger and scientifically more significant interplanetary forces made it a poor candidate for certainty and necessity. Grounds were thus located elsewhere by modern philosophers – in more anthropological locations such as subjectivity, language and/or the hidden teleologies of history. It is only in the last century that such moves were exposed by the late Wittgenstein and late Heidegger as metaphysical illusions as existentially pernicious as the Aristotelian metaphysics that they replaced. But, in turn, the emergence of the planetary dimension to modern life undermined their territorialized conceptions of philosophy, creating a hiatus in the history of Western philosophy (that some have mistaken for the end of philosophy itself). However, when this issue is conceived in a Deleuzian manner, philosophy’s task is again to summon forth a new conception of the earth appropriate to the global cosmopolitan age. This conception of the earth can longer function as an a priori cognitive self-justifying principle; for the global earth is a dynamic and fluid – largely ‘oceanic’ – earth where ground, sky and water converge to form a new planetary idea of the world (where the earth, as world, is understood, in an Irigarayan manner, as largely ‘air’). But this does not necessarily imply that planetary representations are simply another imperialistic avatar ‘that universalises loss of meaning, the society of the void’ (Latouche, 1996: 73). No, for the new universal expresses a new political imaginary outside the ideological strictures of the modern nation-state. It is the condition of possibility for a planetary ideal of a new humanity – the non-human basis and destiny of every human – that brings together the planet’s cultural and ecological elements in a singular cosmological embrace (suggesting that both natural and cultural life are holistically related as vibrant multiplicities). This is earth is not the hypermodern Copernican earth, where human values and vitalities are rendered diminutive by the ‘vast sea of darkness surrounding a blue and green point of unified, singular human space’ (Redfield, 1996: 258), but a dynamic and open earth that is an expansive plane that brings all elements with a single plane of composition. It stands for the idea of a way of ‘dwelling’ without territory; an idea of global being for a new planetary Mitsein. This idea of the earth is also found in Indian philosophy – especially in Vedic traditions where the earth is conceived as ‘the far-spreading one’ and a ‘great wide abode’ (see Radhakrishnan and Moore, 1989: 11–12). And, for Deleuze and Guattari, this new earth requires a more topological articulation by a new kind of philosopher – in their view the philosopher must become nonphilosopher – in order to make ultimate sense and significance of what might be the ‘tao of globalisation’ (see Anderson, 2004: 77) and the ‘last universal’: the planetary world that must be shared by all.

Science

The exploration and development of space assumes humanity to be the highest being

Arendt 61 [Hannah, American political philosopher, “The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man” The New Atlantis Fall 2007]

Has man’s conquest of space increased or diminished his stature?”1 The question raised is addressed to the layman, not the scientist, and it is inspired by the humanist’s concern with man, as distinguished from the physicist’s concern with the reality of the physical world. To understand physical reality seems to demand not only the renunciation of an anthropocentric or geocentric world view, but also a radical elimination of all anthropomorphic elements and principles, as they arise either from the world given to the five human senses or from the categories inherent in the human mind. The question assumes that man is the highest being we know of, an assumption which we have inherited from the Romans, whose humanitas was so alien to the Greeks’ frame of mind that they had not even a word for it. (The reason for the absence of the word humanitas from Greek language and thought was that the Greeks, in contrast to the Romans, never thought that man is the highest being there is. Aristotle calls this belief atopos, “absurd.”)2 This view of man is even more alien to the scientist, to whom man is no more than a special case of organic life and to whom man’s habitat—the earth, together with earthbound laws—is no more than a special borderline case of absolute, universal laws, that is, laws that rule the immensity of the universe. Surely the scientist cannot permit himself to ask: What consequences will the result of my investigations have for the stature (or, for that matter, for the future) of man? It has been the glory of modern science that it has been able to emancipate itself completely from all such anthropocentric, that is, truly humanistic, concerns. The question propounded here, insofar as it is addressed to the layman, must be answered in terms of common sense and in everyday language (if it can be answered at all). The answer is not likely to convince the scientist, because he has been forced, under the compulsion of facts and experiments, to renounce sense perception and hence common sense, by which we coordinate the perception of our five senses into the total awareness of reality. He has also been forced to renounce normal language, which even in its most sophisticated conceptual refinements remains inextricably bound to the world of the senses and to our common sense. For the scientist, man is no more than an observer of the universe in its manifold manifestations. The progress of modern science has demonstrated very forcefully to what an extent this observed universe, the infinitely small no less than the infinitely large, escapes not only the coarseness of human sense perception but even the enormously ingenious instruments that have been built for its refinement. The data with which modern physical research is concerned turn up like “mysterious messenger[s] from the real world.”3 They are not phenomena, appearances, strictly speaking, for we meet them nowhere, neither in our everyday world nor in the laboratory; we know of their presence only because they affect our measuring instruments in certain ways. And this effect, in the telling image of Eddington, may “have as much resemblance” to what they are “as a telephone number has to a subscriber.”4 The point of the matter is that Eddington, without the slightest hesitation, assumes that these physical data emerge from a “real world,” more real by implication than the world we live in; the trouble is that something physical is present but never appears.

Scientific sense is inhuman sense.

Arendt 61 [Hannah, American political philosopher, “The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man” The New Atlantis Fall 2007]

The goal of modern science, which eventually and quite literally has led us to the moon, is no longer “to augment and order” human experiences (as Niels Bohr,5 still tied to a vocabulary that his own work has helped to make obsolete, described it); it is much rather to discover what lies behind natural phenomena as they reveal themselves to the senses and the mind of man. Had the scientist reflected upon the nature of the human sensory and mental apparatus, had he raised questions such as What is the nature of man and what should be his stature? What is the goal of science and why does man pursue knowledge? or even What is life and what distinguishes human from animal life?, he would never have arrived where modern science stands today. The answers to these questions would have acted as definitions and hence as limitations of his efforts. In the words of Niels Bohr, “Only by renouncing an explanation of life in the ordinary sense do we gain a possibility of taking into account its characteristics.”6 That the question proposed here makes no sense to the scientist qua scientist is no argument against it. The question challenges the layman and the humanist to judge what the scientist is doing because it concerns all men, and this debate must of course be joined by the scientists themselves insofar as they are fellow citizens. But all answers given in this debate, whether they come from laymen or philosophers or scientists, are non-scientific (although not anti-scientific); they can never be demonstrably true or false. Their truth resembles rather the validity of agreements than the compelling validity of scientific statements. Even when the answers are given by philosophers whose way of life is solitude, they are arrived at by an exchange of opinions among many men, most of whom may no longer be among the living. Such truth can never command general agreement, but it frequently outlasts the compellingly and demonstrably true statements of the sciences which, especially in recent times, have the uncomfortable inclination never to stay put, although at any given moment they are, and must be, valid for all. In other words, notions such as life, or man, or science, or knowledge are pre-scientific by definition, and the question is whether or not the actual development of science which has led to the conquest of terrestrial space and to the invasion of the space of the universe has changed these notions to such an extent that they no longer make sense. For the point of the matter is, of course, that modern science—no matter what its origins and original goals—has changed and reconstructed the world we live in so radically that it could be argued that the layman and the humanist, still trusting their common sense and communicating in everyday language, are out of touch with reality; that they understand only what appears but not what is behind appearances (as though trying to understand a tree without taking the roots into account); and that their questions and anxieties are simply caused by ignorance and therefore are irrelevant. How can anyone doubt that a science enabling man to conquer space and go to the moon has increased his stature? This sort of bypassing the question would be very tempting indeed if it were true that we have come to live in a world that only the scientists “understand.” They would then be in a position of the “few” whose superior knowledge entitles them to rule the “many,” namely, all non-scientists, laymen from the scientist’s point of view—be they humanists, scholars, or philosophers—all those, in short, who raise pre-scientific questions because of ignorance. This division between the scientist and the layman, however, is very far from the truth. The fact is not merely that the scientist spends more than half of his life in the same world of sense perception, of common sense, and of everyday language as his fellow citizens, but that he has come in his own privileged field of activity to a point where the naïve questions and anxieties of the layman have made themselves felt very forcefully, albeit in a different manner. The scientist has not only left behind the layman with his limited understanding; he has left behind a part of himself and his own power of understanding, which is still human understanding when he goes to work in the laboratory and begins to communicate in mathematical language. Max Planck was right, and the miracle of modern science is indeed that this science could be purged “of all anthropomorphic elements” because the purging was done by men.7 The theoretical perplexities that have confronted the new non- anthropocentric and nongeocentric (or heliocentric) science because its data refuse to be ordered by any of the natural mental categories of the human brain are well enough known. In the words of Erwin Schrödinger, the new universe that we try to “conquer” is not only “practically inaccessible, but not even thinkable,” for “however we think it, it is wrong; not perhaps quite as meaningless as a ‘triangular circle,’ but much more so than a ‘winged lion.’”8

Modern science attempts to calculate and enframe objects by revealing them, causing man to forget that concealing belongs with revealing. This forgetting is the ultimate danger to Heidegger because enframing causes man to become a standing-reserve unable to encounter or realize himself.

Cariño in 09 (Jovito V., “PHILIPPINIANA SACRA”, Vol. XLIV, No. 132 September-December, 2009 pp. 491-504 Heidegger and the Danger of Modern Technology, *Enframing and the History of Western Thought – The Danger of Modern Technology*) JM

Human subjectivity as mere calculation of objects first displays itself in the appearance of modern physics as a modern science. “Modern science’s way of representing,” according to Heidegger, “pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of objects.” 27 The description “modern,” Heidegger further added, points not so much to the sciences’ application of experiments on nature but to modern sciences penchant to set up nature that it may be calculated in advance. It is in this sense that modern physics is the herald of Enframing, 28 and as the essence of modern technology, enframing “starts man upon the way of that revealing through which the real everywhere, more or less distinctly, becomes standing reserve.” Enframing is a mode of revealing that challenges forth and orders. As a mode of revealing, enframing also belongs to destining, to Geschick. Man also belongs to destining because he is the one who listens and hears but once he opens himself to the essence of modern technology, he can be swayed to the pursuit only of what is revealed in the sense of ordering and challenging forth. In such an event, the other possibility of belonging to what is unconcealed is also blocked. Even this, says Heidegger, is part of the destining of man and part of the destining of all coming to presence. Following the Greeks, Heidegger maintains that: “That which is earlier with regard to the arising that holds sway become manifest to us men only later.” 30 In another essay, Heidegger describes that which manifests itself only later as the “inaccessible and not to be gotten around.” 31 That is how what is concealed reveals itself to us – as a concealment that unconceals itself in revealing and a revealing which remains concealed in unconcealment. The two elements, concealing and revealing, always go hand in hand. Modern man though, through the enchanting effect of modern technology, has been fixated merely with what is revealed. It is this penchant for what is revealed that deceives man to believe that he can grasp everything or to use Mcwhorter’s expression, manage everything. 32 When we delude ourselves this way, we forget not only ourselves but the passing of unconcealment itself. Such forgetting is an element of what Heidegger points out as “danger”. What is such danger? I shall explore Heidegger’s answer to this question in the third part of this paper. The Danger of Modern Technology. In the destining that destines both man and Enframing, two possibilities come to fore: first, the possibility of man pursuing nothing but what is revealed in ordering and challenging forth; and second, the possibility of the blocking of man from being admitted to what is unconcealed and apparently, given the contemporary man’s obsession to rule and control the “mega-energies” of nature. It seems that the former possibility is the one holding sway. Since nature is seen as a storehouse of resources, man’s relation with it is reduced in terms of management. Earth’s resources are a plenty hence the necessity of management as a strategy for domination and control, but the more he tries to manage everything, the more man distances himself from what is essential. What makes the situation doubly unfortunate is that this fact is hidden from man himself, that is, the fact of his belonging to what is concealed. McWhorter writes: The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then , in what it knows – not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission – but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It forgets that any other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever beyond the power of human management. We can never have, or know, it all; we can never manage everything. Man’s belonging to what is concealed although oftentimes forgotten by man himself is within the destining of man, the same destining which introduces itself to man as danger. It is danger or as Heidegger calls it, “danger as such” because once the destining of revealing holds sway, man can turn away from what is unconcealed by reducing it to what is calculable and can be represented. Heidegger calls this representation of the unconcealed “correct determinations.” 36 Further, Heidegger holds that God himself is not free from this representational thinking. He is invariably called the cause or causa efficiens or whatever is convenient for those who think they exalt God by domesticating him in their own categories. As pointed out by Heidegger, the determinations may be correct but in the midst of these correct formulations, the danger can likewise persist, that “in the midst of all that is correct the true will withdraw.” However, this is not yet the ultimate danger for Heidegger. Man encounters the ultimate danger when the destining holds sway in the manner of Enframing. Heidegger calls it the ultimate danger because in its holding sway, Enframing does not only reduce objects as standing-reserve, as the orderer of the standing-reserve, man himself is reduced to the status of standing-reserve. This leads to what Heidegger characterizes as “the ultimate delusion” which man experiences when he “stands so decisively in attendance on the challenging-forth of Enframing that he does not apprehend Enframing as a claim, that he fails to see himself as the one spoken to and hence, also fails in every way to hear in what respect he eksists, from out of his essence, in the realm of an exhortation or address, and thus can never encounter himself.”

Knowledge-Production

Technology reduces knowledge-production to a mere tool and robs us of what it means to be thinking beings.

Heidegger 59 (Martin, An Introduction to Metaphysics, P. 46-50)

The crux of the matter is the reinterpretation of the spirit as intelligence, or mere cleverness in examining and calculating given things and the possibility of changing them and complementing them to make new things. This cleverness is a matter of mere talent and practice and mass division of labor. The cleverness itself is subject to the possibility of organization, which is never true of spirit. The attitude of the litterateur and esthete is merely a late consequence and variation of the spirit falsified into intelligence. Mere intelligence is a semblance of spirit, masking its access. The spirit is falsified into intelligence thus falls to the level of a tool in the service of others, a tool the manipulation of which can be taught and learned. Whether this use of intelligence relates to the regulation and domination of the material conditions of production (as in Marxism) or in general to the intelligent ordering and explanation of everything that is present and already posited at any time (as in positivism) or whether it is applied to the organization and regulation of a nation’s vital resources and race – in any case the spirit as intelligence becomes the impotent superstructure of something else, which, because it is without spirit or even opposed to the spirit, is taken for the actual reality. If the spirit is taken as intelligence, as is done in the most extreme form of Marxism, then it is perfectly correct to say, in defense against it, that in the order of the effective forces of human being-there, the spirit, ie intelligence, must always be ranked below healthy physical activity and character. But this order becomes false once we understand the true essence of the spirit. For all true power and beauty of the body, all sureness and boldness in standing, are grounded in the spirit and rise or fall only through the power or impotence of spirit. The spirit is the sustaining, dominating principle, the first and the last, not merely and indispensible third factor. As soon as the misinterpretation sets in that degrades the spirit to a tool, the energies of the spiritual process, poetry and art, statesmanship and religion, become subject to conscious cultivation and planning. They are split into branches. The spiritual world becomes culture and the individual strives to perfect himself in the creation and preservation of this culture. These branches become fields of free endeavor, which sets its own standards and barely manage to live up to them. These standards of production and consumption are called values. The cultural values preserve their meaning only by restricting themselves to an autonomous field: poetry for the sake of poetry, art for the sake of art, science for the sake of science. Let us consider the example of science, which is of particular concern to us at the university. The state of science since the turn of the century – it had remained unchanged despite a certain amount of house cleaning – is easy to see. Though today two seemingly different conceptions of science seem to combat one another – science as technical, practical, professional knowledge and science as cultural value per se – both are moving along the same downgrade of misinterpretation and emasculation of the spirit. They differ only in this: in the present situation the technical, practical conception of science as specialization can at least lay claim to frank and clear consistency, while the reactionary interpretation of science as cultural value now making its reappearance seeks to conceal the impotence of the spirit behind an unconscious lie. The confusion of spiritlessness can even go so far as to lead the upholders of the technical, practical view of science to profess their belief in science as a cultural value; then the two understand eachother perfectly in the same spiritlessness. We may choose to call the institution where the specialized sciences are grouped together for purposes of teaching and research a university, but this is no more than a name; the “university” has ceased to be a fundamental force for unity and responsibility. What I said here in 1929, in my inaugural address, is still true of the German university: “The scientific fields are still far apart. Their subjects are treated in fundamentally different ways. Today this hodgepodge of disciplines is held together only by the technical organization of the universities and faculties and preserves what meaning it has only through the practical aims of the different branches. The sciences have lost their roots in their essential ground.” Science today in all its branches is a technical, practical business of gaining and transmitting information. An awakening of the spirit cannot take its departure from such science. It is itself in need of an awakening. The last misinterpretation of the spirit is based on the above-mentioned falsifications which represent the spirit as intelligence, and intelligence as a serviceable tool which, along with its product, is situated in the realm of culture. In the end the spirit as utilitarian intelligence and the spirit as culture become holiday ornaments cultivated along with many other things. They are brought out and exhibited as a proof that there is no intention to combat culture or favor barbarism. In the beginning Russian Communism took a purely negative attitude but soon went over to propagandist tactics of this kind. In opposition to this multiple misinterpretation of spirit, we define the essence of the spirit as follows (I shall quote from the address I delivered on the occasion of my appointment as rector, because of its succinct formulation): “Spirit is neither empty cleverness nor the irresponsible play of the wit, nor the boundless work of dismemberment carried on by the practical intelligence; much less is it world-reason; no, spirit is a fundamental, knowing resolve toward the essence of being.” Spirit is the mobilization of the powers of the essent as such and as a whole. Where spirit prevails, the essent as such becomes always and at times more essent. Thus the inquiry into essent as such and as a whole, the asking of the question of being, is one of the essential and fundamental conditions for an awakening of the spirit and hence for an original world of historical being-there. It is indespensible if the peril of world darkening is to be forestalled and if our nation in the center of the Western world is to take on its historical mission. Here we can explain only in these broad outlines why the asking of the question of being is in itself through and through historical, and why, accordingly, our question as to whether being will remain a mere vapor for us or become the destiny of the West is anything but an exaggeration and a rhetorical figure.

Hegemony

The aff’s world-ordering engages in a type of thinking that reduces all life on earth to a tool to be instrumentalized, further disconnecting ourselves from what it means to be.

Swazo 02 – Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alaska (Norman K., Crisis Theory and World Order: Heideggerian Reflections, p. 110-11)

The inevitability of such a fight issues from the pathology of nihilism— all political thought and practice in our time cannot but be "pathologically conditioned" (Twilight of the Idols, "The Problem of Socrates," note 10). The attraction to "rational design" of the world order is today motivated by a Sense of imminent catastrophe and, thus, by the human impulse to self preservation. Here, however, it is life itself that compels; and precisely in this attraction to rational design of the world order is there betrayed what Nietzsche recognizes in Western moralism: It is pathologically conditioned. And what is this pathology? It is nothing other than the strife of subjective egoisms as yet unmastered. Such is the essence of power-politics. But this, presumably, is life (will to power); and, as Nietzsche puts it, "life itself forces us to posit values; life itself values through us when we posit values" (Twilight of the Idols, "Morality as Anti-Nature," note 5). In world order thinking, I submit, the West discharges the energy of its moral essence, doing so as author of the prevailing morality and as the locus of the dominant subjective egoisms which have been inevitably diffused to determine all political cultures, the latter of which are now bound to the West's hegemony over world political culture. The contemporary world order in structure and value orientation is instituted on the basis of Western reason, and as such it is characterized by an "order of rank" in which European values have primacy, i.e., are hegemonous vis-a-vis all "other" (Asian, African, Latin American, etc.) plausibly autochthonous valuations. World order thinking, thus, compelled by life itself in all its prevalent pathology, posits its values-peace, justice, economic well-being, ecological balance-over against all that shows itself as the contemporary pathology of "petty politics" and all that is countervaluation in the strife motivated by the requirements of global hegemony. In this positing of primacy to the Western valuation, the Occident reveals its near exhaustion, if not its desperation, in the face of competing modes of subjectivity as manifest by a fragmented and antagonistic "system" of nation-states, each with its "splinter-will." Given that this world order movement is transnational, the West co-opting sympathetic forces in the developing world, twit her this exhaustion nor this desperation is restricted to the West: The "crisis" is effectively planetary. Nietzsche was not amiss in his articulation of the great task that would define the twentieth century, i.e., the problem of global governance. Neither was he amiss in appreciating its hesitant approach, despite its inexorability. That is, Nietzsche recognizes the persistent, though declining, influence of the Christian ideal with respect to the problem of global governance, anticipating that this ideal would yet issue in the call for a moral world order: Notwithstanding the death of God, Christian value judgments would be transmuted into the political domain. The twentieth century's emerging order would be a "hybrid" of sickness, the will to power heightening the demands of modern man's self-determination, the Christian conscience yet restraining-in short, a "fettered" moment in humanity's movement toward total self-affirmation, total sovereignty in the absence of God and transcendent norms. "They are rid of the Christian God," writes Nietzsche in his Twilight of the Idols ("Skirmishes of an Untimely Man," note 5), yet "now believe Al the more firmly that they must cling to Christian morality." It is not yet realized, observes Nietzsche, that "when one gives up the Christian faith, one pulls the right to Christian morality out from under one's feet." Accordingly, the contemporary world order movement expresses a commitment to transforming the philosophic orientation (values) as well as transforming institutional structures and patterns of behavior. World order thinking is, thus, normative. That world order thinking is value thinking is evidence of its essential debt to the Nietzschean metaphysic, to thinking the world order from the vantage of subjectness, for it is only with Nietzsche that value thinking comes to predominate in the twentieth century."' As Heidegger puts it, "Values stem from valuation; valuation corresponds to the will to power." That is, insofar as the creation of secureness is grounded in value-positing and world order thinkers on their own essential authority (understood metaphysically, not personally) seek to secure a world order, then world order thinking cannot but be so grounded. It is precisely this ground, i.e., a self-grounded value-posit, that entails the technocratic conception of world order and, thus, eliminates a meaningful distinction between the normative and technocratic approaches. How so? Heidegger answers in words that indict all value thinking: "thinking in terms of values is a radical killing. It ... strikes down that which is as such, in its being-in itself. . . ." Everything which is "is transformed into object" and "swallowed up into the immanence of subjectivity.""' Commensurate with this subjectivity is that objectivity which, in the essence of the technological, is total, and which finds its instrument in technocracy.

Hegemony Module

Technological relationships to the world and others are characterized by their utterly managerial essence, and they can only produce systems of value which find their own validity in total world-ordering. Yet, the means to real peace is rooted in the ambivalence of the human soul.

Swazo 02 – Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alaska (Norman K., Crisis Theory and World Order: Heideggerian Reflections, p. 55-58)

Gadamer poses fundamental questions in view of the "victorious course of modern science" and "the development of scientific methods to guide the life of society," i.e., the pervasiveness of scientific thinking in "all aspects of social praxis."" Observing (a) that the application of science in many areas of social praxis "gives expertise a commanding position in the economy and society" and (b) that there has been a shift from "simply understanding the existing order of things" to "the difficulties of planning and creating an order not yet in being," Gadamer asks: Should something that does not yet exist be planned and implemented? ... Does talk of creating a world-order still make sense if, from the start, we are faced with irreconcilable ideas on the constitution of a right order? Can one plan according to a standard of world-order if one is ignorant of the end towards which all mediating and possible steps proceed? Does not all planning on a world scale depend on the existence of a definite mutual conception of the goal? Gadamer's concern in this writing is with what is held to count as "a meaningful standard" for politics when politics "presupposes the changeability of conditions." Thus, when speaking of politics at the world scale the question is: According to what criteria is correctness of a universal political order to be measured? To the extent that scientific precision underscores planning for the future, Gadamer is concerned that precise political arrangements may rather "provoke all the very opposite ideas of world-order." He (a) contends that "there exists no rational basis for believing that the expansion of those areas in which rational planning and administration is successful would bring a reasonable world-wide political system any closer to realization," and (b) considers that it may rather be "the overdependence on science" that "has increased the uncertainty regarding the intended goals, the content of a world-order as it should be, by first subjecting the design of our world to scientifically informed and guided planning, while obfuscating the uncertainty which surrounds the standards."" In short, Gadamer thinks the task to be wrongly posited, for here is "an ideal of administration ... which does not specify its content" and in which "the issue is not which order should rule, but that everything should have its order." This is nothing less than "the idea of a superior techne"-as Gadamer puts it, "the political techne," "the ultimate expertise." The key question, then, is: "Does the ideal of techne, the teachable and learnable expertise, satisfy the demands confronting man's political existence?"" The philosophic issue here is that between the moderns and the ancients concerning the nature and purpose of politics, between science applied to society, i.e., techne, and practical knowledge or phronesis. This, for Gadamer, is the real antinomy confronting world order thinkers: The question we pose goes completely against the grain of the unquestioned belief in science so characteristic of our age. It has to be asked because it goes further back in time. The problem must be viewed in a more general context, as a broader question posited with the inception of modern science in the seventeenth century and unresolved since then. All reflection about the potential ordering of our world must proceed from the deep tension which exists between the asserted authority of science and the ethics and customs of national forms of life transmitted by religion.... It seems to me less urgent to find ways of reconciling occidental civilization with alien traditions in distant lands and bringing them to a fruitful symbiosis, than to evaluate the significance of the civilizing progress, made possible by science, in terms of our own cultural heritage and to discover ways of reconciling such progress with our moral and religious traditions. For that in truth is the problem of world-order which occupies us at present, because, by virtue of the civilizing achievements of European science, the problem has been raised to a uniform level of importance throughout the world." Like Gadamer questioning the legitimacy of the "scientific" planning the implementation of a world Order, von Weizsacker raises the quid juris question, "With what concepts are we to think into the future, and with what right do we think towards it?" In asking this question von Weizsacker expresses concern for what he calls the uncanny phenomenon of "ambivalence"-"that frightening phenomenon that we have all seen and experienced in our own actions, namely that a position taken which then requires a radical form destroys itself and produces its own negation." Despite the desirability of the world order values and the rationality of assent to them, von Weizsacker notes that "insight into ambivalence simultaneously shakes the naïveté" of this set of values, inasmuch as there remain vital questions having to do with the process of "self-enlightenment" which cannot be answered or resolved by means of a "program." It is von Weizsacker's insight that "What this world cannot master are the realities in man that are not present in his expressed ideas. These show themselves in the phenomena . . . described under the name ambivalence." Given his views on human nature, von Weizsacker believes that the "actual task" towards which world order thinking must contribute, "on whose success the possibility of a true world peace stands or falls, is the realization of the human self."" Only thus can it be expected that "a whole society should come of age." Yet, this possibility, as the possibility of living together, requires a "communal truth." Here lies a fundamental difficulty. As von Weizsacker observes: There is a pluralism of truths and forms of peace. Traditional societies lived by a religious truth and by the peace it made possible. The modern world lives by the truth of science and the technocratic peace it makes possible. But in the face of this pluralism what does truth mean?" Again, as with Gadamer, the authority of tradition in contradistinction to that of modem science is at issue here. If world peace is a principal desideratum of the world order quest, is technocratic peace the fitting response? That is, if a process of self-enlightenment is what is essential, does a whole society come of age when technocratic peace prevails? For von Weizsacker, to think the possibility of self-realization is to understand that only the great traditions of religious thought pose and answer the question in depth." The JudeoChristian tradition which belongs to European culture, observes von Weizsacker, yields its "answer" in its ethic of nonviolence-but in a distinction between what men can bring about and what only God will bring about, thus in comprehension of what is and is not achievable: The actual overcoming of violence can occur only where its roots are, in the human soul. Society will always give cause enough for acts of violence; I can overcome the violence in myself only when I can renounce the unquestionable right I have to hit back, can "turn the other cheek!" The overcoming of violence must always originate in myself. Here the ethic of nonviolence has its basis in truth. Only he who finds peace with himself, and that means peace with God, can radiate peace. But the peace that arises from a group of such men is no possible target of a plan any longer, no "preferred world" for intellectual activists. But it is impossible that a genuine, everlasting world peace will be secured without this force. Scientifically speaking this is no political programme, but psychology, in exact form." In short, the world that claims us out of the future in which world peace is achieved is for von Weizsacker not "a world of will and understanding," i.e., of Western reason. To understand the phenomenon of ambivalence is to understand that "the sphere of the will and understanding has the character of the empty boundlessness of power." Yet, this is so "only when the other realities in man are not developed, realities that set limits to this sphere and give it content." Von Weizsacker's concern for the phenomenon of ambivalence is consonant with what cultural historian William Irwin Thompson, in his meditation on the ineradicability of evil from the human order, has called the phenomenon of enantiodromia. Says Thompson, "the most perplexing form of evil, and especially so for all idealists, is that kind of evil which comes out of our efforts to do good."" Like von Weizsacker who speaks of the phenomenon of love as that which is essential to self-fulfillment, i.e., to the overcoming of individual and group egoism, and which remains "completely incomprehensible in terms of expedient rationality," Thompson speaks of love in the context of those egoistic motivations to do good which result in enantiodromia: There can be no love in one who does not love himself, and one can only love himself if he has the compassion that grows out of the terrifying confrontation with one's own self. To look into one's shadow is to learn compassion for the shadow of others, and if one has no compassion for himself, then he can have no compassion for others. If you hate yourself with a fierce loathing, you may try to run from your own shadow in a campaign to do good, not for love, but to rescue your ego and convince yourself that you are not evil. In the eyes of how many world-transforming activists do we see dissonance, anxiety, fear, and self-loathing? They would reform the world, but they cannot even reform themselves."

Economy

Claims of economic survival only serve to hide the inherent technological process of global domination and calculation of resources.

Joronen in 10(Mikko, Doctoral candidate in Human Geography @ The University of Turku, The Age of Planetary Space *Planetary System of Ordering,* 2010 <http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/66733/AnnalesAII257Joronen.pdf?sequence=1>) JM

Under such colonization of calculable price mechanism, the whole globe eventually becomes an area of domination: the metaphysical essence of markets is to bring all beings into a quasi-Darwinian struggle for survival between the powers of business calculation. It is precisely because this survival is based on successful accumulation and efficient commodification of beings, that under the contemporary global capitalism the whole globe becomes conquered for its market. Under such economic malleability everything is established as producible products and hence delivered to the markets in terms of growing efficiency and competitiveness. Out of the colossal competition between the figures of calculation and machination, globalization turns into a struggle between different technological worldviews (Heidegger 1977d:134–135; See also Joronen 2008; Moisio 2008:89–90). Globalization – growing giganticism fuelled by the competition between powers of efficient manipulation – and survival – a struggle to maximize the utility and control of beings under the pre-delineating framework of gigantic calculation – are both manifestations of the operational logic of technological Gestell. Consequently, economic survival struggle and the glorification of competitiveness hide the fact that they aim at massive ordering, thus admiring the megalomania of endless growth and expansion. By penetrating and spreading, and hence, by turning all beings under the logic of technological manipulation, the techno-capitalist logic of optimization of productivity and competitiveness that constantly seeks to open new markets by turning things into products of profit making eventually present one of the ontic realities that have accelerated the globalization of Gestell.

Privatization

Private actors fail – the codes of “business ethics” under which they act perpetuate the objectification critiqued by Heidegger and are meaningless in the post-modern world.

Ladkin in 06 (Donna, PhDProfessor in Leadership and Ethics @ Cranfield School of Management

 “When Deontology and Utilitarianism Aren't Enough: How Heidegger's Notion of "Dwelling" Might Help Organisational Leaders Resolve Ethical Issues” Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Apr., 2006), pp. 87-98) JM

Limitations of current approaches to “Business Ethics” In contemporary times, business ethics has largely come to mean adherence to codes of practice, or the development of those codes of practice. Accordingly, business ethics has come to be associated with beureaucracy, systems whose intent is to control, delineate, or prescribe behaviors. As Cummings (2000) points out, these conceptions of business ethics have their legacy in the Enlightenment’s project of objectification, rationality, and the pursuit of meta-narratives unaffected by context. Ethics born of this approach are, paradoxically, in opposition to what many of us know the modern world of oganisations to be – that is, post-modern; in which meanings are constantly shifting, in which we are encouraged to acknowledge the plurality of stories informing organizational life, and wherein no one is believed to have an undisputed corner on “truth”. He notes the irony of the growth of business ethics literature, and the proliferation of “codes of conduct” which are ever more lacking in meaning for the world in which we operate. Elaborating on this idea he writes: “…many now regard the current codes that constitute people’s appreciation of what business ethics amounts to, as so general as to be meaningless as a guide to practical action in a fast changing world characterized by unique situations, why ethics is of little use in the development of company strategy (except in the restrictive sense) why many see business ethics as only being cynically or instrumentally adhered to on an ‘as needed’ basis” (213). This view is supported by the kind of response often evoked by organizational leaders encountering the topic of business ethics. From their perspective, initiatives to make them more aware of the need to adhere to certain codes of practice can seem irrelevant in the face of those situations which truly test their ethical sensibilities. The following case study illustrates such a scenario and the issues it raises. The details of this actual case have been altered in order to preserve the anonymity of those involved.

Development

Their notion of development is part and parcel with the Eurocentric tradition of technocratic management of “unimproved” or “uninhabited” spaces.

Spanos 2000 (William V., Prof of English @ Binghamton, *America’s Shadow*, p. 41-44)

What, however, the panoptic Eurocentric eye of the Enlightenment comes to see in the space within this reconfigured trope of the circle is no longer - or at least not exclusively - a vast "uninhabited" empti­ness, in which the natives do not count as human beings. Rather, it comes primarily to see an uninformed terra incognita. As the texts of early European travel writers (and social historians) invariably char­acterize this amorphous and ahistorical "new world," the European panoptic gaze falls on an "unimproved" space. As the privative pre­fix emphatically suggests, it is a space-time in which everything in it­ flora, fauna, minerals, animals, and, later, human beings - is seen and encoded not so much as threatening, though that meaning is clearly there as well, as wasteful or uneconomical and thus as an untended fallow (female) terrain calling futurally for the beneficial ministrations of the (adult, male) center.72 The predestinarian metaphorics of the cir­cle precipitates a whole rhetoric of moral necessity. The "wilderness" as "underdeveloped" or "unimproved" or "uncultivated" (i.e., "unful­filled" or "uncircular") space must, as the privative prefixes demand, be developed, improved, cultivated (i.e., fulfilled or circularized). Indeed, it is the wilderness's destiny. From this representation of the colonial Others as mired in and by their own chaotic primordial condition, one of the most debilitating of which is unproductive perpetual war, it is an easy.. step to representing them, as American writers and historians did the Indian race in the nineteenth century, as either self-doomed73 or appealing to the European to save them from themselves by way of imposing his peace on their multiply wasteful strife.74 Referring to John Barrow's representative (enlightened) "anti­conquest" narrative about his travels as an agent of the British colonial governor in the interior of the Cape Colony at the end of the eighteenth century, Mary Louise Pratt writes: The visual descriptions presuppose - naturalize - a transforma­tive project embodied in the Europeans. Often the project surfaces explicitly in Barrow's text, in visions of "improvement" whose value is often expressed as aesthetic.. It is the task of the advanced scouts for capitalist "improve­ment" to encode what they encounter as "unimproved" and, in keeping with the terms of the anti-conquest, as disponible, avail­able for improvement. European aspirations must be represented as uncontested. Here the textual apartheid that separates land­scapes from people, accounts of inhabitants from accounts of their habitats, fulfills its logic. The European improving eye produces subsistence habitats as "empty" landscapes, meaningful only in terms of a capitalist future and of their potential for producing a marketable surplus. From the point of view of their inhabitants, of course, these same spaces are lived as intensely humanized, sat­urated with local history and meaning, where plants, creatures, and geographical formations have names, uses, symbolic functions, histories, places in indigenous knowledge formations.75 This is an acute observation about the "anti-conquest" imperialist discourse of Enlightenment travel writing. But it is limited by its charac­teristic restriction of the word "improvement" to the historical context of modern capitalism (though the aside referring to the expression of the vision of improvement in aesthetic terms is suggestive). Like so much "postcolonial" criticism, its historicist problematic is blind to the ge­nealogy of this modern "anti-conquest" concept. It fails to see that the rhetoric of "improvement" is a capitalist extension of a much older sys­tem of imperial tropes, one that, in naturalizing the latter, obscures the will to power over the Other that is visible in its earlier form. This word, that is, not only looks forward to "underdeveloped," the sedimented counterword that constitutes the base of the neocolonialist discourse of late capitalism, as Pratt seems to be suggesting. It also harks back to what Enrique Dussel calls the "developmental fallacy" informing En­lightenment philosophy of history from Adam Smith and John Locke through Hegel "and a certain Marx to Habermas. Tracing the genealogy of Habermas's Eurocentric representation of modernity back to Hegel, Dussel writes:In the Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, Hegel portrays \_ world history (Weltgeschichte) as the self-realization of God, as a theodicy of reason and of liberty (Freiheit), and as a process of Enlightenment (Aufklarung)....In Hegelian ontology, the concept of development (Entwick­lung) plays a central role. This concept determines the movement of the concept (Begriff) until it culminates in the idea - that is, as it moves from indeterminate being to the absolute knowledge in the Logic. Development... unfolds according to a linear dialectic; although originally an ontological category, today it is primar­ily considered as a sociological one with implications for world history. Furthermore, this development has a direction: Universal history goes from East to West. Europe is abso­lutely the end of universal history. Asia is the beginning. But this alleged East-West movement clearly precludes Latin America and Africa from world history and characterizes Asia as essentially confined to a state of immaturity and childhood (Kindheit).... The immaturity (Umrei fe) marking America is total and physi­cal; even the vegetables and the animals are more primitive, brutal, monstrous, or simply more weak or degenerate.76Even more fundamentally, Pratt's "unimproved" has its origins in the more deeply inscribed metaphorics of the seed and its cultivation, as Dussel's recurrent invocation of the rhetoric of "immaturity that in-. forms the Hegelian discourse suggests. This is the trope (which is also an aesthetics) that, along with the gaze and the centered circle, informs the very etymology of "metaphysics" and that is encoded and naturalized in the truth discourse of the Occident. That is to say, the genealogy of the word "improvement" in the discourse of post-Enlightenment travel lit­erature is traceable to the origins of Occidental history. (The metaphor of the "virgin land," which, as I have intimated, is equally pervasive in the discourse of early colonialism, constitutes a particularly telling gen­dered allotrope of this metaphorical system circulating around the seed. It focalizes the identification of the panoptic gaze that perceives this "unimproved" circular space with the brutal phallic will.)77 A retrieval of the equally inaugural visual metaphorics with which it is affiliated will bring into visibility the ideological agenda hidden in the benign connotations of the metaphor of "improvement." In the positivist En­lightenment, the "unimproved" space of the "wilderness" is understood as a darkness in the sense not so much of savage or barbarous (though, again, that meaning: resonates in the word as well), as of a potentially knowable and usable unknown. What its eye beholds primarily is a ter­rain that, as the European cliche about the "inscrutability" of the Orient has it, compels knowing and naming precisely because its darkly unim­proved state resists scrutiny- and domestication. For the French--natural scientist Michel Adanson, for example, the world of nature wasa confused mingling of beings that seem to have been. brought to­gether by chance: here, gold is mixed with another metal, with stone, with earth; there, the violet grows side by side with an oak. Among these plants, too, wander the quadruped, the reptile, and the insect; the fishes are confused, one might say, with the aque­ous element in which they swim, and with the plants grow in the depth of the waters.... This mixture is indeed so general and so multifarious that it appears to be one of nature's laws.7In thematizing this knowledge-producing naming-this Linnaean classi­ficatory motif -I do not, despite its decisive contribution to the imperial project proper, want to limit its origins to the Enlightenment. As the natural affiliation of seed with light (the spatialization of differential temporal phenomena) suggests, its ultimate origin lies in the Occident's appropriation of the biblical narrative of Adam, armed with the Lo­gos, naming the beasts. In combinations with the classical apotheosis of the sun/seed, this narrative has played a decisive role of persuasion throughout the history of Christian European imperial conquest, not least in that history of genocidal American expansionism inaugurated by the Adamic Puritans' pacification of the American wilderness.

Free Will

Their assumptions about freedom undermine our potential to achieve it; freedom becomes value for them as opposed to an inevitable condition of our existence. Freedom is not a mastery of the world around us, but the potential for its mystery. Freedom is beyond valuation, to assume otherwise destroys it.

Theile 94 (Leslie Paul Thiele, Assistant Professor of Political Science University of Florida, June 1994, “Heidegger on Freedom: Political not Metaphysical,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88 No. 2, p.283-284)

Disclosive freedom, Heidegger insists, is not merely one value among others. Nor either, is free­dom a metavalue, the "value of all values" that allows one to choose between and secure other values (Cranston, 1967, 42). "Freedom," Heidegger writes, is not a particular thing among others, not something lined up as part of a row, but rather it prescribes and permeates the totality of beings as a whole. If we are to investigate freedom as the ground of possibility of hu­man being, then its essence is more primordial than human. Man is only a guardian of freedom, . . . human freedom signifies now no longer: freedom as a property of human, but the reverse: human as a possibility of freedom. Human freedom is the freedom which invades and sustains man, thereby rendering man possible. (197fr89, 31:134135; see also 1985a, 9) Traditional Western thinking posits freedom as the autonomous subject's most valued asset, as its capac­ity to define and control what it confronts. Heideg­ger, contrariwise, understands freedom as that which exposes human being to the undefinable and unmas­terable, to Being. But what is beyond one's power to master or define is also beyond one's power to calculate and assess. Freedom, therefore, is that unique capacity of human being that allows a reach­ing beyond calculation and valuation. Heidegger observes that through the characterization of something as "a value" what is so valued is robbed of its worth. That is to say, by the assessment of something as a value what is valued is admitted only as an object of human's estimation. But whata thing is in its Being is not exhausted by its being an object.... Every valuing, even where it values posi­tively, is a subjectivizing. It does not let beings: be. Rather, valuing lets beings: be valid-solely as the ob­jects of its doing ... When one proclaims "God" the altogether "highest value," this is a degradation of God's essence. Here, as elsewhere, thinking in values is the greatest blasphemy imaginable against Being. (1976, 228) Everything Heidegger says here of God or Being might also be said of freedom. Once freedom be­comes a value-even the highest value-it ceases to identify that which enables us to partake of the mystery of Being. Subjecting freedom to metaphysi­cal or representational thought-allowing its desig­nation as a value-is an effective assertion of the self s capacity to evaluate and control its relation to Being conceptually if not physically. According to Heideg­ger, however, "freedom's incomprehensibility con­sists in the fact that it resists com-prehension ... be­cause freedom transposes us into the occurrence of Being, not in the mere representation of it" (1985a, 162). Freedom is the gift that allows human being to glance beyond the self-beyond being and its mas­tery in thought, word, or deed. For Heidegger-and in stark contrast to the Western metaphysical tradi­tion-freedom is not a value, but beyond valuation; freedom is evidenced not in decisionistic willfulness but through careful nonwilling; freedom is not an unbounded power to do but a discovery and disclos­ing of one's place within bounds.

Environment

**Their environmentalism claims are just false perpetuations of the failed, worn-out political environmental movement. Heidegger says we that rethinking our relationship with nature is the only way to truly solve.**

DeLuca in 05 (Kevin Michael, Associate Professor of Speech Communication @ the Institute of Ecology at the University of Georgia, Thinking with Heidegger: Rethinking Environmental Theory and Practice, Ethics & the Environment 10.1 p. 67-87, 2005) JM

Environmentalism is tired. It is a movement both institutionalized and insipid. The vast majority of Americans claim to be environmentalists while buying ever more SUVs, leaf-blowers, and uncountable plastic consumer goods. Indeed, environmentalism itself has become just another practice of consumerism, a matter of buying Audubon memberships, Ansel Adams calendars, and 'biodegradable' plastic bags with one's Sierra Club credit card. As a practice of everyday life, environmentalism has devolved into another lifestyle choice. On the political front, carbon-copy blow-dried presidential candidates proclaim their allegiance to the environment, an allegiance that is more a sign of fealty to opinion polls than a concern with environmental issues. In the world of real-politic, environmental regulations are gutted as corporations write legislation for the politicians they have bought. Outspent and outmaneuvered, mainstream environmental groups preach at the altar of broken promises about the potential of lobbying and insider access while awaiting the blandishments of the next candidate. As [End Page 67] a political practice, mainstream environmentalism has degenerated into a marginal special-interest group. On the intellectual front, a confusing array of reform environmentalists, deep ecologists, social ecologists, ecofeminists, wilderness advocates, social justice activists, social constructionists, and Christian ecologists offer a cacophony of competing paradigms and programs while exchanging charges and countercharges of wrong-headedness and infidelity. If on the level of practice an exhausted environmentalism has achieved both institutionalism and irrelevance, intellectually environmentalism has reached several stasis points. This is crucial, for at a level that is unusual for social movements, environmentalism has always highlighted the importance of how we think about the environment, that ideas of nature are powerful because practices follow from ideas. In other words, how we think about nature guides how we act toward nature. In the midst of this melee I want to suggest we reconsider the work of Martin Heidegger. I want to think Heidegger in distress: in the distress of machination; in the distress of the technological enframing of the earth; in the distress of the environmental crisis. In rejecting a Heideggerian hermeneutics, a piety to textual exegesis, I hope to stress Heidegger in order to stress environmental theory. With few exceptions,1 two insufficient responses typify the reception of Heidegger in environmental thinking. One is to champion Heidegger as some proto-environmentalist. Certainly, quotes from such works as Being and Time, Contributions to Philosophy: From Enowning, "The Question Concerning Technology," "Building Dwelling Thinking," and "The Age of the World Picture" inspire such a reading. Such readings, however, present a simplified Heidegger. For example, a poor reading of an essay such as "The Question Concerning Technology" produces the conclusion that Heidegger was anti-technology.2 These misreadings are not merely accidental but a result of the goal of the citation. The challenge of Heidegger is not engaged to develop environmental theory; rather, Heidegger is cited to lend some borrowed legitimacy to the fledgling enterprise. The most prominent example of this move occurs in Devall and Sessions' Deep Ecology, wherein Heidegger joins a potpourri of thinkers, including Dogen, Job, St. Francis of Assisi, Giordano Bruno, Spinoza, Thoreau, Chief Seattle, Herman Melville, John Muir, Aldous Huxley, Gandhi, Rainer Maria Rilke, Aldo Leopold, Robinson Jeffers, Mary Austin, Rachel Carson, Barry Commoner, Stanley Diamond, and [End Page 68] David Brower from a host of traditions, including Taoism, Hinduism, Zen Buddhism, Christianity, Native American thought, Romanticism, and ecological science (1985, 79–108). The result is confusion, at best.

Ethics

Technology is ambiguous, failure to recognize this results in an ethical crisis that strips us of what the essence of human being is

**Hodge 95** [Joanna, Professor of Philosophy at Manchester Metropolitan University, “Introduction,” Heidegger and Ethics pg.49, 1995, SM, Accessed: 7/1/11]

The essence of technology is thus ambiguous, in ways which connect to an ambiguity diagnosed by Heidegger as central to philosophical enquiry. The claim about the ambiguity of technology runs: 'The essence of technology is in an elevated sense ambiguous. Such ambiguity points to the mystery of alI revelation: i.e. of truth' (QT: 33). In 'The question of technology', Heidegger discusses the oddness of there being so little reflection on the impact of the spread of technical relations in our world. This failure to reflect marks an ethical crisis, which Heidegger, as a result of his preoccupation with reading and transmitting the philosophical tradition, cannot identify as such. What Heidegger calls the end of philosophy in the completion of metaphysics is here interpreted as the emergence of an ethical challenge to the domination of philosophy by metaphysical concerns, which presume that specifying the nature of entities is the primary aim of philosophical enquiry. This challenge prompts a recognition of the priority of a question about the location from which that specification takes place. Instead of Heidegger's emphasis on a cumulative but illogical development, in which even the traces of a history of being disappear, the lectures in The Principle of Reason can be read as locating a tension between that emphasis and an attempt to identify the consequences for the essence of what it is to be human resulting from this disappearance and the consequent uninhibited spread of technical relations in our world. One such consequence is that it becomes unclear what the essence of human beings is.

Mars Colonization

The concept of Martian Colonization enframes the universe, Earth, Mars, Nature as a recourse to be extracted. We view the question of Mars as “What can Mars do for us?” As long as we view the universe as a recourse to be extracted we can never truly encounter ourselves and our purpose of being.

**Jerkins 09** [Jae, Professor of Philosophy Florida State University, Florida Philosophical Review Vol. IX, issue 2 pg131-132, “Heidegger’s Bridge: The Social and Phenomenological Construction of Mars,” SM, Accessed: 6/29]

 This is a central point of concern I have over the issue of colonization. When Modernity’s gaze upon the world calls forth the project of colonization, this causes the process of enframing to begin, whereupon we mark the world for our own usage until the day comes when humanity itself may be commodified as a standing-reserve. Heidegger explains, “Man becomes that being upon which all that is, is grounded as regards the manner of its Being and its truth. Man becomes the relational center of that which is as such.” 48 As objects in nature are relegated to standing-reserve, Heidegger explains, “everything man encounters exists only insofar as it has his construct.” 49 Since nothing exists outside of humanity’s construction, we end up only ever encountering ourselves. Yet because we do not realize that the phenomena before us are of our own construction, a distortion caused by enframing, Heidegger contends that we fail to grasp an important existential truth—we can never truly encounter ourselves, our world, or Mars for that matter. 50 When humanity gazes out at the world, “he fails to see himself as the one spoken to.” 51 The dizzying rise in modern technology has precipitated a fundamental change in our perception of objects and, inevitably, in ourselves. By turning the world into technology, humankind turns itself into the world’s technicians. We reassemble and reconfigure the natural world for our own use, playing the part of the self-made, frontier-forging individual—the modern man. Technology unlocks the energy in nature, transforming the rushing water of the Rhine into energy, storing up that energy, distributing it to German power outlets, and thus revealing the concealed power in nature. This challenge to nature, to stop being and to become a resource/commodity for modern human beings, is how modern technology serves as revealer. The Problem of Enframing For Mars, the prospect of enframing is extremely problematic, given its phenomenological nature. As interpretive discourse directs the narratives of Mars (scientific and otherwise), enframing comes rather easily and often appears as a benign force in the media and public discourse, asking, “What can Mars do for us?” Because the interpretation of Mars precedes any objective knowledge, as illustrated by Lowell’s once popular canal theories, we must proceed in the awareness that Mars is, in the public mind, what is said of it. Heidegger warns, “The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing,” adding his somewhat romantic call to modernity, “and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.” 52 Heidegger’s point is well-taken—what is damaging to our participation in the world is the exclusivity technology brings to bear as a form of modern revelation. Heidegger explains that when technological enframing takes place, “it drives out every other possibility of revealing.” 53 When technological ordering comes to be the only way we perceive the world, then the world becomes revealed to us only through the banal act of securing natural resources, no longer allowing what Heidegger calls the “fundamental characteristics” of our resources to appear to us. 54 The Earth becomes minerals, the sky becomes gases, and the Martian surface becomes whatever those with means will it to be. When we gaze at Mars with an eye toward technologically enframing it, we deny ourselves the possibility of other forms of revelation which, given the great passage of time, may come to make our generation appear quite near-sided and audacious—or worse, cause permanent damage to a planet we are far from grasping in its sublime entirety. Heidegger describes the enframing of a tract of earth as “a coal–mining district”; can the enframing of Mars as a natural resource be far from Heideggerian thought? 55 To appreciate fully the meaning in this world and of the “red planet,” we must come to terms with our modern predilection for technological enframing and be accepting of other, more long-term, open-minded and inclusive perspectives of place-making.

A/T: Link Turn

Their thinking about the development and exploration of space is structured by a planetarily determined technological picture of the world: phenomenologically, a technical relationship to the world comes before what worlds are possible to picture.

Lazier 2011 [Benjamin, Associate Professor of History and Humanities at Reed College, “Earthrise: or, Globalization of the World Picture,” in *The American Historical Review* 116.3]

To make sense of these developments—the combination of Earthly vision with global vocabulary—we might think of the Earthrise era as a stage in a longer history, a “globalization of the world picture.” “World picture” is the English equivalent of Weltbild, a philosophical term of art coined by Wilhelm Dilthey but now associated with Martin Heidegger. Heidegger did not use it to refer literally to images of the planet. Rather, he meant that the ways we comport ourselves vis-a`-vis our natural and human-built worlds are pre-structured by a grasp of the world and everything in it as a picture, as something to survey and frame for our pleasure and use. Consider in this context the words of Apollo 8 astronaut Frank Borman: “Look at that picture over there!” The first human to lay eyes on an Earthrise made intuitive appeal to a language that is the staple of tourists everywhere—to describe not the sight itself, but the conditions in which the sight could first be disclosed or come into view, its frame. It may be the most definitive confirmation possible of Heidegger’s claim, made thirty years before, that “the fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as picture.”13 Thinkers in the phenomenological tradition, which attends to pre-cognitive ways of being in the world, help us see that this was no failure of imagination on Borman’s part. His remark voiced something more like the condition for modern human experience in the first place—and if Heidegger was right, our condition in this alleged age of the world picture.14 So we are left with several questions about the Earthrise era: the scope of its vision, the peculiarity of its vocabulary, and the changes it inaugurated in the conditions for human experience, or what some philosophers call the “human condition.” To address these questions, it helps, first, to situate the reactions of these philosophers to the view of Earth from space alongside those of their non-philosophical contemporaries, on the premise that philosophers and Grub Street pamphleteers alike reflect on the shared events of the day. They do so, of course, with different vocabularies, and at times philosophical discourse can come off as alien indeed. This is a difference to acknowledge. It is also a difference for historians to exploit. Arendt and company wrote with enormous depth, and so it can help, second, to think with them, on the premise that philosophers have something to say even to those of us who do not answer to the name. At the very least, they provide us with a repository of conceptual tools with which to reassess the era of which they were themselves a part. IN SEPTEMBER 1966,MARTIN HEIDEGGER agreed to an interview with the leading news magazine Der Spiegel. Ostensibly, the aim was to explain his collusion with the Nazi regime. The appeal of National Socialism, Heidegger had remarked in a 1935 lecture, had little to do with the justifications offered by most of its sympathizers. In parentheses, he added that “the inner truth and greatness” of the movement inhered instead in its willingness to confront a singular crisis: “the encounter between global technology and contemporary man.”16 This crisis had abated not at all in the postwar years, he now explained. If anything, the achievements of the postwar welfare state testified still more to its currency: Everything is functioning. This is exactly what is so uncanny, that everything is functioning and that the functioning drives us more and more to even further functioning, and that technology tears men loose from the earth and uproots them. I do not know whether you were frightened, but I at any rate was frightened when I saw pictures coming from the moon to the earth. We don’t need any atom bomb. The uprooting of man has already taken place. The only thing we have left is purely technological relationships. This is no longer the earth on which man lives.17 A great deal of ink has been spilled over the meaning of Heidegger’s remarks. Was Nazism great because it faced up to the problem of technology or because it was that problem’s greatest exemplification or symptom?18 Usually overlooked in the brouhaha, however, is the phrase translated as “global technology.” The German original, planetarisch bestimmten Technik, has a different point of emphasis. More literally, it means “planetarily determined technics.” The translation suggests a concern with technology circumstantially endowed with a global reach, the German with the “planetary” itself. In the translation, the globalism of technology is a historical accident or effect; in the original, it is just as much a cause. The implication: modern technology, wherever it happens locally to be deployed, already presupposes a global or planetary scope. Phenomenologically—at least in the modern era—the planetary comes first.

A/T: Link Turn (Gaia Hypothesis)

Gaia hypothesis gets co-opted by technological thinking; even if we think of the earth as an organism, it’s just another lifeform we try to reduce to standing reserve.

Lazier 2011 [Benjamin, Associate Professor of History and Humanities at Reed College, “Earthrise: or, Globalization of the World Picture,” in *The American Historical Review* 116.3]

In this series of readings, the commercial and environmental globes map neatly onto the distinction between organism and artifact. In this series of readings, Heidegger and Arendt were wrong. But there is more to this world picture than meets the eye. Many of those credited with inventing (or reviving) the idea of an organic Earth imagined it as a technologically ordered globe as well. Brand’s catalog, for example, was subtitled “Access to Tools.” His embrace of cybernetic technoscience was sometimes expressed in a rhetoric that would have made the most assiduous of Earth-exploiters proud. “We are as gods,” he wrote in the initial lines of his catalog’s first issue, “and might as well get used to it.”38 His injunction also bears out Marshall McLuhan’s assessment, at first glance puzzling, that ecological thought was enabled—not contested— by a grasp of the planet as a work of art. With Sputnik, that is, “the natural world was completely enclosed in a man-made container. At the moment that the Earth went inside this new artifact, Nature ended and Ecology was born.”39 McLuhan exaggerated. The artifactual envelope in which Earth is now clothed— and it is clothed, as any map of satellite paths and space junk can attest—took time to develop.40 (See Figure 6.) But McLuhan was right to suggest that ecology could constitute Earth as an object of technical decree.41 Take again the case of one-time NASA engineer Lovelock. In one breath, he could speak of the return of an ancient belief (Gaia) and an ancient understanding of nature (akin to physis). In the next, he could invoke that belief on behalf of some wild ideas for planetary management. For example, he hypothesized that future generations—recognizing themselves as Gaia come to consciousness of itself, their technological powers as Gaia’s own—might stave off runaway glaciation by loading the atmosphere with chlorofluorocarbons, thereby instigating a greenhouse effect. The Gaia hypothesis may have been for those “who like to walk or simply stand and stare,” he explained. It was for people like Heidegger, who compared his version of thinking to wandering, “planetary” in the original sense of the word.42 But Gaia was in fact just another name for a scientific discipline, which aimed at the technical control of the planet. Sometimes it went by the name earth systems science, sometimes by geophysiology.43 In the years since, Lovelock’s example has proliferated. We now picture Antarctica, for example, much the way we look at an ailing brain.44 The neo-vitalist language of planetary ailment (“the Earth has a fever”) is often coupled with a technical language of medical diagnosis and cure.45 Meanwhile, both Lovelock and Brand have become leading prophets in this, our age of global warning. Both have transformed the Whole Earth icon into its apocalyptic twin, an update to the mushroom cloud it once displaced. Gaia, they say, is now more liable to visit death upon humankind than life. She will have her revenge, Lovelock warns, unless forestalled, as Brand urges, by the “Whole Earth Discipline” of planetary engineering under corporate sponsorship.46 In sum, the organic globe may be as much a technologically ordered globe as the commercial globe that so many environmentalists decry—and in many instances, it no doubt is.

A/T: Link Turn (Overview Effect)

Things like the Overview Effect mask their own reliance on technology and enframing.

Lazier 2011 [Benjamin, Associate Professor of History and Humanities at Reed College, “Earthrise: or, Globalization of the World Picture,” in *The American Historical Review* 116.3]

Arendt had despaired over the impulse to manufacture a planet, and to look back upon the Earth from its artificial ground. Heidegger did, too. Blumenberg’s worry was a bit different. He fretted over those whose Disney adventure would supplant the true meaning of the sight that Arendt and Heidegger decried. Would EPCOT lead its visitors to conclude that for man “the name ‘Earth’ has nothing to do with spaceships and planetary wandering, but with firm ground under the feet as the condition for every coming-to-rest”? Probably not. The sight was more likely to confound than to confirm Husserl’s dictum that the original origin, earth, does not move. The experience of “Earthrise” was supposed to reverse the globalization of the world picture, or to initiate a new one altogether. It was the saccharine crime of Disney, in a small way, to preclude it.62 Still, there is a deep irony in all this. The sight Blumenberg thought was transformative, the one no imaginative exercise could have anticipated, the one that “could not have been invented,” that “in the sky above the moon one sees the Earth”—the irony is that this view was invented. It was made available only by a reorientation of the frame so that the lunar horizon appears below, as our everyday experience of our earthbound condition would lead us to expect. (See Figure 8.) If the sight dispelled Blumenberg’s photographic memory of Earth in the form of a globe, it could do so only after it had been reframed to conform to a pre-critical expectation—the geospatial intuition that there is indeed earth, whether terrestrial or lunar, beneath our feet. Blumenberg’s experience was born in part of reality, but not the one he thought captured in “Earthrise.” It was born of the pre-cognitive recalcitrance of his earthbound condition. His experience was born also of desire— the desire for a frame beyond the technological ordering that Heidegger had identified, a counter-enframing perhaps, but an enframing nonetheless. It replaced one photographic memory with another, one hallucination with a second. Were Blumenberg still with us, he might well point out that this enduring uncertainty only reaffirms the need for astronoetics in the first place. It is an exercise, after all, meant to pitch to and fro between the competing attractions of “pastoral idyll,” on the one hand, and “the plain preparation of precise knowledge,” on the other—or, put a bit differently, between Heidegger’s errant wandering and the techno- scientific project of planetary management.63 Astronoetics, he might say, helps us see how in looking back at the Earth we escape some entanglements, but with a newfound sense for others we would like to affirm. Even if Earthrise was picture first, experience second, it could still prompt a transformation: a return to Earth by way of the rise of Earth in the pictorial imagination.

A/T: Permutation (Intelligibility)

The permutation is unintelligible: for the affirmative, Being *just is* what can be appropriated and used technologically. This mode of thinking is totalizing and crowds out other possibilities of thought.

McWhorter 92 (Ladelle, Professor of Philosophy and Women’s Studies at Richmond, *Heidegger and the earth: Essays in environmental philosophy*, Thomas Jefferson University Press, pp. 6)

The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in what it knows - not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission - but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It forgets that any other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever beyond the power of human manage­ment. We can never have, or know, it all; we can never manage everything. What is now especially dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, born of forgetfulness, is that it results in our viewing the world as mere resources to be stored or consumed. Managerial or technological thinkers, Heidegger says, view the earth, the world, all things as mere Bestand, standing-reserve. All is here simply for human use. No plant, no animal, no ecosystem has a life of its own, has any significance, apart from human desire and need. Nothing, we say, other than human beings, has any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of human will. Whether we believe that God gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the face of ecological fragility makes us always right, we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a stockpile or a set of commodities to be managed, bought, and sold. The forest is timber; the river, a power source. Even people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled. This managerial, technological mode of revealing, Heidegger says, is embedded in and constitutive of Western culture and has been gathering strength for centuries. Now it is well on its way to extinguishing all other modes of revealing, all other ways of being human and being earth. It will take tremendous effort to think through this danger, to think past it and beyond, tremendous courage and resolve to allow thought of the mystery to come forth; thought of the inevitability, along with revealing, of conceal­ment, of loss, of ignorance; thought of the occurring of things and their passage as events not ultimately under human control. And of course even the call to allow this thinking - couched as it so often must he in a grammatical imperative appealing to an agent - is itself a paradox, the first that must be faced and allowed to speak to us and to shatter us as it scatters thinking in new directions, directions of which we have not yet dreamed, directions of which we may never dream.

A/T: Permutation (Crowd-Out)

Technological thinking crowds out other ways of thinking.

Botha 02 (Catherine, Dept of Philosophy @ Univ of Pretoria, “Heidegger, Technology, and Ecology,” South African Journal of Philosophy, Vol 22, Issue 2)

Technology is ontologically devastating, because it usurps all other modes of revealing. With every thing standing in reserve for our use, “distance” disapears (Heidegger, 1993:331). Here, Heidegger is referring to distance as an existential sense of our proximity to horizons: those between earth and sky, mortals and immortals. This blurring of borders is the main indicator of an unchecked anthropomorphism. This anthropomorphism that objectifies the world in order to exploit it is also one that creates the world in its own image, where every thing that human kind comes into contact with becomes an extension of it self. Yet, human being as Dasein necessarily inhabits a “there” and so can never encounter only her self (Heidegger, 1993:332). Since human being is a thinking being-in-the-world, a situated and limited being, Heidegger can claim that the ultimate victory of tech no logical human kind is a delusion. Its sovereignty would, how ever, not be any less catastrophic, be cause delusion may be come accepted as reality. Human nature and human freedom, in Heidegger's special sense of the word (1993:330), still lie in the balance. The Danger. The danger, there fore, is for Heidegger not the potential physical self-annihilation of humanity, but rather that intensive technological production will over power human's capacity for diverse modes of disclosure. Philosophic thought would be re placed with utilitarian cognition; artistic creativity would atrophy as a result of end less innovative production, and political action would be obviated by social en engineering. Heidegger's fear is that some day, calculative thinking would be accepted and practised as the only way of thinking. Calculative thinking is the type of thought that deals only with the quantifiable and the measurable. “Calculation refuses to let any thing appear except what is count able ... Calculative thinking compels it self into a compulsion to master every thing on the basis of the consequential correctness of its proce dure” (Heidegger, 1998:235). Most disturb ing is that technological calculation and innovation may satisfy our needs to such an extent that we would not even notice what we had lost.

A/T: Permutation (Auseinandersetzung)

The permutation fails – the aff needs to abandon its preconceived notions of self-concern and existing goals to truly engage in the manifestation of “Being”

Ladkin in 06 (Donna, PhDProfessor in Leadership and Ethics @ Cranfield School of Management

 “When Deontology and Utilitarianism Aren't Enough: How Heidegger's Notion of "Dwelling" Might Help Organisational Leaders Resolve Ethical Issues” Journal of Business Ethics, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Apr., 2006), pp. 87-98) JM

Understanding the "language" of being itself demands a very focused and active kind of attention. This kind of attending aims to perceive below the surface of appearance of things, to the very heart of their meanings. To attend in this way requires an openness of heart aswell as perceptual acuity. It also demands a certain psychological capacity, that of allowing self-concerns to "take a backseat" in the encounter. This kind of withdrawal is the second aspect of "staying with" I'd like to explore in more detail. In "staying with", the person who is attending must paradoxically pay so much attention to the other, that they suspend their sense of self. Heidegger refers to this as "presencing", and he suggests that through such presencing, the "Being of Beings" comes into manifestation (Heidegger 1971: 151). Zimmerman (2000) describes this capacity: “such ‘presensing’, paradoxically, requires an ‘absensing’, or a clearing or opening in which to occur (251). In other words, the way of being which enables this kind of “staying with” to occur is one in which self-concerns are absent, or at least temporarily suspended. In the most practical sense, to really “stay with” another, we must let go of our own interpretations, analyses, and most importantly, our judgments, in order to be fully available. Through this quality of openness, the other can reveal aspects of him or herself which might otherwise remain hidden. his way of being could be seen as antithetical to much of what is proposed as effective leadership practice. In much literature about leadership, the leader is the person who influences (Burns 1978; Drath 2001; House 1976) and her or his viewpoint is very present inmaking judgements, interpretations, and decisions. "Staying with", requires a very different kind of leadership presence, one that attends to the other rather than necessarily asserting one’s own position. Such attending requires time and above all, commitment to letting go of one’s preconceived perceptions and goals. “Staying with" exists along a continuum of ways of being. Taken to itsmost extreme form, it could involve a capacity most often associated with "enlightenment", the kind of complete emptying of the self in order to be present to the other. However, "staying with" could also, at amore quotidian level, involve engaging an active and conscious openness to the situation at hand. It could be enacted through basic behaviours such as: Inquiring of the various stake holder groups and really listening to their concerns and the assumptions and emotions behind their concerns, Seeking to understand more fully the history of the situation and which factors have brought you to the current state, Exploring the emotional terrain inherent within a situation and remaining open to both negative and hard to hold emotions as well as more pleasant ones, Being open to intuitive insights, dreams, chance encounters which might shed light on the situation, Creating new ways of conceptualizing the situation; rewriting it as a story, drawing it, having others draw it. In other words, the leader who is concerned with developing his or her capacity to "stay with" a given situation can build this in a number of ways. At a basic level, the leader could practice attending more consciously to his or her habits of judging and jumping to conclusions, and instead work to remain open and inquiring. Alternatively, the leader might begin to practice meditation or other consciously reflexive disciplines in order to build the capacity to "stay with" the other in away which enables him or her to really perceive the meanings behind the surface appearance of difficult situations.

A/T: Permutation (Auseinandersetzung)

We do not genuinely question if our answers do not risk our leaving everything behind [i.e., the aff becomes a question in the alt, but the aff remains unconditionally true in the permutation]

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 45-46]

Heidegger thus ontologises both phenomenology and hermeneutics, which hitherto had consequently been neither phenomenological nor hermeneutical enough for him, when enlisting them to deconstruct the philosophical tradition in order to get at what it covered-over; namely the ontological difference between Being and beings, presencing rather than presence, difference as such; the very uncanniness of Being and thus of human being and of Language, in which each is disclosed. Such destructuring—like the later Derridaean version of deconstruction32—was not, of course, a radical turn away from or step out of tradition, because tradition is not something which is first given and then decided upon. Tradition is only tradition in the act of taking something up in one way or another, which is to say also saying in the process what that something is. Destructuring was, therefore, a radical new turn towards the history of philosophy, or step back into it. Rather than disowning what has gone before, the tradition here becomes tradition in being re-won and newly owned. If the target of the destructive move of this deconstruction was consequently not the tradition as if it was some reified object but the processes of reception by which the tradition comes to be as tradition, its prize was a more original, thoughtful, and thoughtprovoking appropriation of that tradition. Heidegger’s way of doing this, Auseinandersetzung, was deliberately and forcefully agonistic: Auseinandersetzung brings philosophers into the sharpest focus and it unfolds their meaning in the history of philosophy by taking each thinker seriously as an adversary, as someone who demands that certain decisions be made about essential understandings of the world and of Being. By forcing a confrontation with one’s faith, ideas of nature, or ideals of political belonging, such decisions can wound, even kill, before they are complete in this duel—demanding that we defend, give-up or transfigure cherished beliefs and conceptions which order our lives. In confrontation, what—or rather how—we are is at stake. Without this principle of interpretation, a thinker cannot make out his own standpoint, so that he also cannot get at the opposition he wants.33 Here it is worth reinforcing the point that the contemporary thinker who has taken Heidegger’s method most to heart—and, indeed, practised it most directly and forcefully upon Heidegger himself, precisely because of the vital importance of what he thinks is at stake there—has been Emmanuel Levinas. While it seeks to rediscover something in the past, rather than of the past, like genealogy, however, a term which Heidegger uses twice, the critique of this deconstructive Auseinandersetzung is not ‘fault finding or underlining of errors’.34 Rather, it is an insistence upon formulating and meeting today’s challenges by posing more originally those questions the answers to which, having formed the present, threaten to entrap us, unsustainably and unsurvivably, within it if they are not reformulated and re-posed (recovered) in response to our present need to think and live-out our existence futurally. Such thinking is not only forcefully aimed at the present, therefore, it is also aimed at rethinking past questions and ways of posing questions, the answers to which have given rise to the present.35 For: ‘Every answer keeps its force as answer only so long as it is rooted in questioning’.36 The release of the present into a different future is, then, propelled less by new answers—architectonic principles and systems—or by the reoccupation of positions established by previous questions.37 Instead, it comes through new ways of formulating old questions or, rather, by the new questions which such reformulation poses in and to the challenges of a present which becomes a fatal cul de sac—deathly enclosure—if it cannot be renewed by such appropriative questioning.

\*\*\*Internal Links\*\*\*

Technology = Reductive

Technology reduces everything to a resource to be managed and exploited by human artifice; the technological relationship to earth inaugurated by the space age makes Dasein’s relationship to Being impossible.

Lazier 2011 [Benjamin, Associate Professor of History and Humanities at Reed College, “Earthrise: or, Globalization of the World Picture,” in *The American Historical Review* 116.3]

Why would Heidegger react with such ill feeling? In part, the answer is prosaic. In 1966, Heidegger was not privy to the totemic shots of “Earthrise” and “Blue Marble.” Indeed, it is easy to see how the photos he did have at his disposal (from Lunar Orbiter 1) might have been frightening in the extreme. (See Figure 3.) They are stark and austere. They are also vertiginous in a way that the iconic “Earthrise” is not. They confound one of the presuppositions of phenomenological analysis, that the body has a customary orientation in space: up and down, front and back, above and below, before and behind.19 The reflections of Heidegger’s teacher Edmund Husserl attest to the importance of this point. Husserl, the founder of the phenomenological movement, did not live to see photographs of the Earth from space. He did, however, consider the possibility in a thought experiment broached in an unpublished essay left behind in his papers. Its title, “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature,” is a bit misleading. A note scrawled on the envelope in which the manuscript was discovered revealed his true aim: “Overthrow of the Copernican theory in the usual interpretation of a world view.” Why on earth would Husserl have wished to contest the Copernican turn? Why on earth: that, precisely, was the problem. Taken to its logical conclusion, he feared, the Copernican theory dislodged man from his earthly horizon. Notwithstanding our post-Copernican knowledge that the Earth revolves around the sun, Husserl insisted that our everyday experience is pre-Copernican through and through. This held as much for ancient cave dwellers as for his students at the university in Freiburg. Or as he had written on his envelope, “The original ark [arche], earth, does not move.”20 Husserl therefore recommended that we recall an experience Copernicanism had suppressed: nature as it is intuitively felt and lived. Heidegger would consider something of the same. He would ask after the prospect of retreating from “mathematical formalism” in favor of an “immediate return to intuitively given nature” (if never wholly to embrace it). He would look with disfavor on the tendency of modern astronomical science to make obsolete the distinction between earthly and celestial bodies by reducing all natural bodies to specimens of a single kind. He would dispute the exclusive truth claims made by post-Copernican science: “Galileo,” he once wrote, “is not more true than Aristotle.”21 He too would insist that the planet as such could not be the proper scene for human being. Or at least not the kind he had in mind. The planet was simply too big. Heidegger’s word for human being, Dasein, means being-there. It presumes local, situated, and finite, not global or planetary, horizons. To enter into a relation with something of such size therefore demands a form of management and radical reduction, and a mode of being-human especially suited to the process: hence his talk in a later essay of the “planetary imperialism” of “technologically organized man.”22 The rise of the planetary in the modern imagination was synonymous for Heidegger with the demise of the earthly and the worldly, and these images from space only consolidated a process—a globalization of the world picture—already long in the making.

Enframing

Enframing forms the horizon of worldly coherence

Swazo 02 – Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alaska (Norman K., Crisis Theory and World Order: Heideggerian Reflections, p. 125-26)

We will not understand why it is that the sciences cannot but move forward with the "epistemological task" of concern to systems theory "to derive and validate the basic principles and metaprinciples that commonly govern physical, biological, social, ecological, and artificial systems."" The domain of the political and the revealing of political things are not excluded from this happening, as is to be seen in the application of systems philosophy to the conception of world order. Albert Bergesen has put the matter rather succinctly: "Since the advent of modern science the basic unit of analysis has been the societal, whether as social formation, mode of production, nation state, or simply society. World-system theory, conversely, suggests not only networks on a scale larger than a single society, but also implies that the motor of historical change operates at this distinctly world level."" What is significant about this methdological commitment is that “the debate on the origin/length of world history's systemic tendencies represents an effort at formulating distinctly global theory." It is only because our moment in the history of Being is that of Enframing that something like systems theory can come to the fore to provide ostensibly suitable canons for the unification of modern science: Enframing, the dispensation of Technology, is what first grants the possibility of system as systems philosophy and contemporary positive science understand and employ it; Enframing is what first grants all that attends systems theory in its emphasis on isomorphy of conceptual "frame-work." Hence, the planetary domination of technology claims the human being to conceive the world order as a world system-as "structured image" (Gebild)-in accordance with the governing constellation of being as presence." Thus is it that Enframing lays claim to political thinking and doing in the service of a technocratic world order and a technocratic peace. Through such a world order, fabricated by man, "man contends for the position in which he can be that particular being who gives the measure and draws up the guidelines for everything that is".24 This he can do by transforming, yet continuing, the metaphysical task: "Traditionally defined as the science of being qua being, ontology in systems philosophy becomes the general theory of system qua system."" What matters, however, is that the technocratic conception of world order be understood not merely as a human activity but, rather, in terms of the essence of technology. That is: "If Enframing is a destining [Geschick] of the coming to presence [Wesen] of Being itself, then we may venture to suppose that Enframing, as one among Being's modes of coming to presence, changes."" This is of utmost significance for world order thinking inasmuch as Technology, as an essential determination of Being, underlies "the structure of relationships of a certain type of humanity to beings as a whole," yet every change in the understanding of Being brings about "a transposition of another type of humanity to the whole of beings," i.e., a different historical determination of human being." Thereby, one comes to see that a future world order qua technocratic is not a course either inevitable or unalterable.

Calculation

Modern political relations are reduced to objects of calculation by the imperative to secure security; calculation replaces valuation, and we are confronted with the technologized arm of modern politics which would reduce us to cogs in the machine

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 20-22]

The reduction of metaphysics, and so also of political understanding, to calculation, results from the very inception of metaphysical thought. Because the appearance of things is inevitably various, because we ourselves always encounter them from a manifold of perspectives and because, finally, we ourselves are also mortal and fallible creatures, whatever the secure ground of things is that metaphysics seeks, it cannot actually be the sensible world of the appearance of things themselves. For they are too…well, insecure. It has, ultimately, to be suprasensible, situated outside the realm of the appearance of things, otherwise the ground that is sought would be as mutable (read insecure) as the coming and going, and apparently endless variation, of the world itself. It could not serve, therefore, as the guarantor which the answer to metaphysics’ guiding question requires. Literally, it could not offer any security for the sensible world of appearances if it were already located within, and therefore also contaminated by, the very insecurity of the comings and goings of that world. Metaphysics, then, is the masque of mastery; securing some foundation upon which to establish the sum total of what is knowable with certainty, and conforming one’s everyday conduct—public and private—to the foundation so secured. Such foundations may go by different names but that of the project itself does not. Hence, the responsibility, traditionally incumbent upon the philosopher—his ‘true’ mission—consisted in securing ultimate referents or principles. Philosophy was, as Nietzsche put it, a matter of valuation, ‘that is, establishment of the uppermost value in terms of which and according to which all beings are to be’.14 In as much as these were precisely what were to be secured, for without them no beings would be, without them, it was said, where would we be? The philosopher therefore spoke as a security expert. A security expert not merely in respect of what the substantial values were, but increasingly only in terms of how they were to be Security, philosophy and politics 21 secured, whatever they were to be taken to be; hence the rise of theory and of method. The philosopher became a security expert, then, in the sense of being able to tell you how to secure security. He or she was someone skilled in determining the means by which the invariable standards to establish meaning in discourse, soundness in mind, goodness in action, objectivity in knowledge, beauty in art, or value in life were to be secured (guaranteed). In such wise, whatever was said— meant; done; understood; esteemed; or valued—was authorised and secured by reference to such a standard, principle or reference. The philosopher’s task had to be to tell you how to secure such a thing even after they had come-up with an essential value of one description or another. Their security project could not then cease, but only intensify. For having secured this secure value, the value then had to be located securely, and securely policed, so that it could never be forgotten or lost again. Even with Nietzsche, in order for the will to power, as the essence of the Being of beings, to secure itself it has continuously to extend itself; that is to say, it secures itself in its essence as never-ending increase continuously extending itself. Hence, though Nietzsche’s will to power may be differentiated as self-overcoming— against the Darwinian, or even Spinozan, principle of self-preservation— it is arguable that this represents the security project à l’outrance. The charge levelled at philosophy at the end of metaphysics—the ‘end of philosophy’ thesis which has consequently turned philosophical thought into a contemplation of the limit; where limit is, however, thought liminally and not terminally—is that the philosopher has simply run out of things to say. It is that the philosopher cannot, in fact, secure any particular value for you and is, therefore, confronted with the manifest impossibility of discharging the traditional security function, other than to insist upon securing security itself. All that remains of the great project of Western philosophy, then, is the continuing, increasingly violent, insistence upon the need to secure security; hence its nihilism. The savage irony is that the more this insistence is complied with, the greater is the violence licensed and the insecurity engendered. The essence of metaphysics, then, is nihilistic, as the best of the realists fear that it is, precisely because it does not matter what you secure so long as security itself is secured. That is to say, so long as things are made certain, mastered and thereby controllable. Securing security does not simply create values. In essence indifferent to any particular value, and committed as it must ultimately be merely to rendering things calculable so that the political arithmetic of securing security can operate, it must relentlessly also destroy values when they conflict with the fundamental mathesis required of the imperative to secure. Its raison d’être, in other words, masquerading as the preservation of values, is ultimately not valuation at all but calculation. For without calculation how could security be secured? And calculation requires calculability. Whatever is must thereby be rendered calculable—whatever other value might once have been placed upon it—if we are to be as certain of it as metaphysics insists that we have to be if we are to secure the world. Western understanding of the political is, therefore, continuously suborned by metaphysics’ will to the calculative truth of correspondence, and its various regimes of power and knowledge to which Foucauldian genealogy alerts us. It is consequently Foucault’s indebtedness not only to Nietzsche but also to Heidegger which antecedes, while it remains nonetheless integrally related to, the task of genealogy.15 In order to pursue the recovery of the question of the political from metaphysics, therefore, I not only have to be able to pose the question which I have used Foucault to pose, I have to use it to bring security into question and explore that question through the sources which Foucault himself drew upon. Metaphysics is itself unwittingly an aid here, for it bears its own deconstruction within itself. Consider the outcome of the guiding question—why is there something rather than nothing?—for with its closure we are challenged to rethink the question.

All of the Above

**The affirmatives has become tied up in the task of developing the technological world which creates the prosses of enframing the world in Heidegger’s term of “standing reserve” as a recourse to be used to further our technological advancement.**

**Rosemann 02** [Philipp, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Dallas, Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.4, “Heidegger’s Trancendental History”, 2002, SM, Accessed: 6/28/11]

For Heidegger, the technological age—we could perhaps say, postmodernity 63 —is deeply ambiguous, perhaps more so than any other economy of presence. On the one hand, in the technological world the human being comes to be so caught up in the task of efficiently "ordering" his environment and himself, that the oblivion of the Mystery must seem total. Heidegger thus speaks of the "supreme danger" technology poses. 64 Yet on the other hand, "where danger is grows the saving power also"—not only in the sense that art may lead us to the forgotten, mysterious essence of technology, but also insofar as the very triumph of technological ordering could prepare its own demise: "the frenziedness of technology may entrench itself everywhere to such an extent," Heidegger writes, "that someday, throughout everything technological, the essence of technology may unfold essentially in the propriative event of truth." 65 This opportunity is, I think, due to the fact that technology represents, in some way, a return to antiquity, though under radically different auspices. In fact, postmodern technology reverses the process of the gradual differentiation and fragmentation of the unity of the Greek world. 66 Heidegger's analysis of the essence of technology confirms this suggestion. "Enframing," the essence of technology, completes the modern project of representing, vorstellen, nature in a systematically ordered "picture." This project, however, acquires a new rigor, indeed rigidity, such that the modern Vorstellen transmutes into a simple Stellen. Heidegger terms the essence of technology, Ge-stell. The German word stellen means "to place, to put, to stand"—in the sense of, "I stood the jug on the table"—but also "to apprehend." In German, you would say of a thief that he is gestellt, apprehended, an expression in which stellen connotes some kind of chase and subsequent cornering. Nature, in the technological age, is cornered to such an extent that it becomes impossible to encounter it as anything but a resource for the efficient functioning of the technological system. Heidegger uses the example of the river Rhine, which even well-meaning holiday-makers can no longer experience as anything but a resource for relaxation "stood" there for them by the vacation industry. 67 [End Page 512] On the face of it, technology thus appears as a hardening of modernity, of the subject's domination over the object. At the same time, however, it constitutes the dissolution of modernity. Heidegger speaks of the "objectlessness" (das Gegenstandslose) 68 of standing-reserve: "Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve [i.e., resource] no longer stands over against us as object." 69 An example serves to elucidate Heidegger's meaning. Is an airliner sitting on a runway not an object? "Certainly. We can represent (vorstellen) the machine so." 70 Yet the aircraft is no longer experienced as an ob-ject, that is to say, an entity with a certain degree of autonomy that limits the subject's sphere of action. Nowadays airports have become huge shopping-malls meant to distract us from the actual object of our presence there, namely, to traverse space rapidly. We board through air-conditioned gangways that prevent us from seeing the body of the aircraft we are about to enter; and once we are inside, a television screen lights up, even before we are given further opportunities to eat, drink, and shop. The dissolution of the object is paralleled by the disappearance of the subject. Postmodern people are no longer subjects in the sense of beings upon which all that is, is grounded. "The current talk about human resources, about the supply of patients for a clinic, gives evidence of this." 71 People are no longer conceived of as the ultimate agents and ends of the technological process, but as one more element that needs to be factored into the systemic whole. In this way, the complex system of "interlocking processes" that constitutes contemporary technology turns into an end in itself; it threatens to dissolve subject and object alike as it transforms both into Be-stand, standing-reserve to promote and secure its own efficiency. Nonetheless, Heidegger emphasizes that, in contradistinction to the object, the subject can never fully be absorbed into the system, "[s]ince man drives technology forward." 72 Following Heidegger's great contemporary Ernst Cassirer, the postmodern tendency to regard subject and object as functional elements of a larger system could be described as a move from substance to function. 73

All of the Above, pt. 2

Modern or machine technology enframes human beings as standing-reserve to be used by the system, either as the designer technology uses to become more powerful, the builder who puts together the technology, or the user who is used by the technology to operate.

**Belu 10** [Dana, Department of Philosophy California State University, Inquiry Vol. 53 Issue 1, pg. 4-5. “Heidegger’s Aporetic Ontology of Technology,” February 2010. SM. Accessed: 6/29/11]

Machine technology is, fundamentally, no mere mechanism (Räderwerk) and it is not a particular instantiation of enframing as a universal concept. 17 Rather, enframing is an essential dispensation as that sine qua non without which machines cannot exist. In fact, “Modern technology is what it is not only through the machine, rather the machine is what it is and how it is from out of the essence of technology. One says nothing about the essence of modern technology when one represents it as machine technology.” 18 The staggering implication is that machine technology is somehow superfluous for understanding the essence of technology. 19 Heidegger underscores this point when he says, elsewhere, that “the utilization of machinery and the manufacture of machines. . . is only an instrument concordant with technology, whereby the nature of technology is established in the objective character of its raw materials.” 20How does this affect human beings? Heidegger claims that “because man cannot decide, out of himself and by himself, regarding his own essence it follows that the ordering of standing-reserve and enframing is not only something human”. 21 But insofar as it is something human, humans are coresponsible because they exercise a capacity (Fähigkeit) for determined participation. The apparent autonomy and self-determination humans enjoy gives the impression that they can opt out of continuous ordering but this is merely the way that enframing dissimulates itself as the illusion of agency. If people “are in their essence already enframed as standing-reserve”, 22 what kind of freedom is this but a mechanical and nihilistic reproduction of the same? When Heidegger insists on the universal character of enframing he underscores this point. 23 In Heidegger’s view freedom is to be conceived only ontologically, as openness to being in the form of enframing, rather than ontically or instrumentally (as the ability of the autonomous agent to choose among a variety of options). Unable to change his urge to order and control, the technicized being is sub-jected to the imperatives of the system. Substantive goals and meaningful differences are leveled by the ubiquity of technical reason and replaced with a self-optimizing system. Total enframing thus totally encompasses humans. “To the enframed belongs also man, admittedly in his own way, be it that he serves the machine or that within ordering he designs and constructs the machine. The human being is in his own way a stock-piece in the strongest sense of the words, stock and piece.” 24 Thus, as technical makers, users and designers, human beings are resources too. Because all activities today are in one way or another technologically mediated everyone is enframed as either a technical maker, user and/or designer or a combination thereof. In his most extreme statements of the case the difference between humans and things is effaced. For instance, the technological ordering of nature is of a different kind than the one through which the earlier peasant ordered his acres. The peasant’s doing did not impose upon, nor challenge the earth; it concerned itself with the potential growing powers of the seed; it sheltered them in their thriving. In the meantime the ordering of the fields crosses over in the same ordering, reducing the air to oxygen, the earth to coal and ore, the ore to uranium, the uranium to atomic energy and this to an orderable destruction. Agriculture is now the motorized food industry, in essence the same as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and the extermination camps, the same as the embargo and starvation of countries, the same as the production of hydrogen bombs. 25

\*\*\*Impacts\*\*\*

Atrocity

Technological detachment is the root cause of historical atrocity.

Huchingson 1990 [James, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Florida International University, “Earthstruck,” in *Zygon* 25.3]

In 1968 in an essay responding to exhilaration over American successes in space, Hannah Arendt wrote cautiously about the potential of spaceflight for good ("The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man, ' ' in Between Past and Present; New York: Viking). She expressed reservations about the benefits of looking down upon Earth from orbit and the changes in attitude this vantage point would bring. Specifically, Arendt feared that the sheer remoteness of the astronaut's orbital gyre from the surface of the planet would numb his (or her) empathetic connections with the world below. The distance and detachment brought about by the achievement of Einstein's ideal of the scientist (the "observer freely poised in space' ') would encourage us to see ourselves as a form of collective biological behavior, capable of systematic manipulation by "the same methods we use to study the behavior of rats." Arendt' s pessimism was realistic. Detachment is the sine qua non of violence of many sorts. In the form of uncaring, it fractures the integrity of human community by permitting members of one group to neglect the critical needs of other groups, such as Armenians, Jews, Amerindians, and women. Individually, detachment allows one person to exploit or abuse others in the marketplace, in personal relationships, and in the household. Here the victim is the customer, lover, spouse, and child. Detachment, which finally breeds alienation, contempt, and mistrust, results inevitably in the decay of civitas, the virtue of community loyalty and responsibility without which a culture risks mortal decline. All too often, alienation in the political realm provides opportunity for the development of totalitarian regimes that, by magnifying their detachment from the people, govern by repression and violence. In the larger historical sense, Arendt's warnings are candid extrapolations of the events of our century. Who would not be suspicious after the tragedies of Guernica, Dresden, Hiroshima, and Vietnam, which illustrate the detachment of technocratic control and the destruction of large populations through air power? The projected militarization of space, the ultimate high ground, by SDI and sophisticated reconnaissance satellites does little to relieve her pessimism. Flying higher and faster seem only to offer better opportunities for some people, some states, to control and destroy other people, other states.

The technological relationship to the cosmos replicates the same thoughtless violences which informs the worst atrocities in history.

Arendt 61 [Hannah, American political philosopher, “The Conquest of Space and the Stature of Man” The New Atlantis Fall 2007]

The magnitude of the space enterprise seems to me beyond dispute, and all objections raised against it on the purely utilitarian level—that it is too expensive, that the money were better spent on education and the improvement of the citizens, on the fight against poverty and disease, or whatever other worthy purposes may come to mind—sound to me slightly absurd, out of tune with the things that are at stake and whose consequences today appear still quite unpredictable. There is, moreover, another reason why I think these arguments are beside the point. They are singularly inapplicable because the enterprise itself could come about only through an amazing development of man’s scientific capabilities. The very integrity of science demands that not only utilitarian considerations but the reflection upon the stature of man as well be left in abeyance. Has not each of the advances of science, since the time of Copernicus, almost automatically resulted in a decrease in his stature? And is the often repeated argument that it was man who achieved his own debasement in his search for truth, thus proving anew his superiority and even increasing his stature, more than a sophism? Perhaps it will turn out that way. At any event, man, insofar as he is a scientist, does not care about his own stature in the universe or about his position on the evolutionary ladder of animal life; this “carelessness” is his pride and his glory. The simple fact that physicists split the atom without any hesitations the very moment they knew how to do it, although they realized full well the enormous destructive potentialities of their operation, demonstrates that the scientist qua scientist does not even care about the survival of the human race on earth or, for that matter, about the survival of the planet itself. All associations for “Atoms for Peace,” all warnings not to use the new power unwisely, and even the pangs of conscience many scientists felt when the first bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki cannot obscure this simple, elementary fact. For in all these efforts the scientists acted not as scientists but as citizens, and if their voices have more authority than the voices of laymen, they do so only because the scientists are in possession of more precise information. Valid and plausible arguments against the “conquest of space” could be raised only if they were to show that the whole enterprise might be self-defeating in its own terms.

Zero Point

The economies of value created by the technologisation of the political allow for all subject to the political to be both valued and consequentially devalued, because death is the frame of reference within which these calculations operate any comparative devaluation of an aspect of humanity is justifiable, there is nothing abstract about this, this is the zero-point of holocaust.

Dillon 1999 [Michael, “Another Justice,” *Political Theory* 27:2]

Philosophy's task, for Levinas, is to avoid conflating ethics and politics. The opposition of politics and ethics opens his first major work, Totality and Infinity, and underscores its entire reading. This raises the difficult question of whether or not the political can be rethought against Levinas with Levinas. Nor is this simply a matter of asking whether or not politics can be ethical. It embraces the question of whether or not there can be such a thing as an ethic of the political. Herein, then, lies an important challenge to political thought. It arises as much for the ontopolitical interpretation as it does for the under- standing of the source and character of political life that flows from the return of the ontological. For Levinas the ethical comes first and ethics is first phi- losophy. But that leaves the political unregenerated, as Levinas's own defer- ral to a Hobbesian politics, as well as his very limited political interventions, indicate.32 In this essay I understand the challenge instead to be the necessity of thinking the co-presence of the ethical and the political. Precisely not the subsumption of the ethical by the political as Levinas charges, then, but the belonging together of the two which poses, in addition, the question of the civil composure required of a political life. Otherness is born(e) within the self as an integral part of itself and in such a way that it always remains an inherent stranger to itself.33 It derives from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular hermeneutical manifestation; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by this absence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject lack the very foundations in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, however, mean that the dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ulti- mately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.34 They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability.35 Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure."36 But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being. The event of this lack is not a negative experience. Rather, it is an encoun- ter with a reserve charged with possibility. As possibility, it is that which enables life to be lived in excess without the overdose of actuality.37 What this also means is that the human is not decided. It is precisely undecidable. Undecidability means being in a position of having to decide without having already been fully determined and without being capable of bringing an end to the requirement for decision. In the realm of undecidability, decision is precisely not the mechanical application of a rule or norm. Nor is it surrender to the necessity of contin- gency and circumstance. Neither is it something taken blindly, without reflection and the mobilisation of what can be known. On the contrary, know- ing is necessary and, indeed, integral to 'decision'. But it does not exhaust 'decision', and cannot do so if there is to be said to be such a thing as a 'dec- ision'. We do not need deconstruction, of course, to tell us this. The manage- ment science of decision has long since known something like it through the early reflections of, for example, Herbert Simon and Geoffrey Vickers.38 But only deconstruction gives us it to think, and only deconstructively sensible philosophy thinks it through. To think decision through is to think it as het- erogeneous to the field of knowing and possible knowing within which it is always located.39 And only deconstruction thinks it through to the intimate relation between 'decision' and the assumption of responsibility, which effect egress into a future that has not yet been-could not as yet have been-known: The instant of decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to this accumu- lation of knowledge. Otherwise there is no responsibility. In this sense only must the per- son taking the decision not know everything.40 Ultimately one cannot know everything because one is advancing into a future which simply cannot be anticipated, and into which one cannot see.

Ontological Damnation

Loss of Being obliterates the value to life and is a fate worse than nuclear annihilation

Zimmerman 94(Michael, Prof of Philosophy @ Tulane, Contesting Earth’s Future, p.119-120)

Heidegger asserted that human self assertion, combined with the eclipse of being, threatens the relations between being and human Dasein. Loss of this relations would be even more dangerous than a nuclear war that might “bring about the complete annihilations of humanity and the destruction of the earth.” This controversial claim is comparable to the Christian teaching that it is better to forfeit the world than to lose one’s soul by losing one’s relations to God. Heidegger apparently thought along the lines: it is possible that after a nuclear war, life might one again emerge, but it is far less likely that there will ever again occur an ontological clearing through which such life could manifest itself. Further, since modernity’s one-dimensional disclosure of entities virtually denies them any “being at all,” the loss of humanity’s openness for being is already occurring. Modernity’s background mood is horror in the face of nihilism, which is consistent with the aim of providing material “happiness” for everyone by reducing nature to pure energy. The unleashing of vast quantities of energy in nuclear war would be equivalent to modernity’s slow motion destruction of nature: unbounded destruction would equal limitless consumption. If humanity avoided nuclear war only to survive as contented clever animals, Heidegger believed we could exist in a state of ontological damnation: hell on earth masquerading as material paradise. Deep ecologists might agree that a world of material human comfort purchased at the price of everything wild would not be a would worth living in, for in killing wild nature, people would be as good as dead.

Technological thinking reduces everything to being-erasing ordering

Belu & Feenberg in 10 (Dana S., Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy @ California State University Dominiguez Hills & Andrew, Research Chair in Philosophy of Technology @ Simon Fraser University, Heidegger’s Aporetic Ontology of Technology, p.3, February 2010) JM

In “Das Ge-Stell” Heidegger tends toward a totalized account of enframing. Ordering is a fundamental feature of the technical lifeworld. Its essence is something more than “merely a machination (Machenschaft) of people, consummated in the way of exploitation,” (GA 79, p. 29) because in the technical age people are themselves constrained to order. This constraint is, presumably, most evident in our handling of machine technology but is not restricted to this realm. This power of ordering allows the supposition that, what is here called “ordering” is not merely a human doing, even though the human being belongs to its execution [. . .] Insofar as human representation readily sets up what presences as the orderable in the calculation of ordering, the human being remains in its essence, whether consciously or not, set up as something to be ordered by ordering [. . .] The human being is ordering’s man [. . .] The essence of man is consequently set-up, bringing ordering into human ways Thus we in the technological age are determined or “set-up” by being as enframing. The truth or unhiddenness (aletheia) of technical beings and things remains concealed. “Ordering strikes nature and history, everything that is, and in all ways, how what presences is. What presences is set-up as orderability and is in advance represented as permanence whose stand is determined from out of ordering. What is permanent and constantly present is standing-reserve.” Heidegger’s description of this system in these essays is remarkable. Enframing “snatches everything that presences into orderability and is in this way a gathering of this snatching. Enframing is: Ensnatching (Geraff)”. The possibilities of relating to any and all types of machine technology are summed up by enframing. Enframing describes the on-going commotion (Betrieb) of rotation and turning or spinning (Drehung) of gears (Getriebe), that orders (bestellt) hydroelectric power plants, automobiles and business (Betrieb) round and round (Kreisgang) in a chain of ordering (Kette des Bestellens), without substantive goals and meaning. Thus, a leveled down, impersonal and mechanical form of exchange defines all human activity. Furthermore, the rotating mechanism that sets wheels and gears in motion is the same as the circulation of industry, information and the flow of markets. Heidegger writes, Machine technology does not exist separately . . . Machine technology does not merely replace equipment and mechanisms. It is just as little an object. It stands only insofar as it moves. It moves insofar as it runs. It runs in the hustle and bustle of business. The hustle and bustle drives as the intrigue of the ordering of the orderable. When the machine idles, then its rest constitutes a circumstance of business, its stopping or disturbance. Machines belong inside a machinery. But this machinery is not a heap of machines. **This machinery runs** out of the ensnatching of business as **that which is ordered as resource by enframing**

Extinction

Technological thought can only confront its inherent limitations via the manufacture of catastrophe and violence.

Swazo 02 – Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alaska (Norman K., Crisis Theory and World Order: Heideggerian Reflections, p. 157-60)

The grounding question claims us today in the historical moment of philosophy's completion. It cannot but claim us out of the authentic future and, hence, in a transformed manner: Metaphysical thinking asks and hears "what is ..."; essential thinking asks and hears "what calls for. . . ." The grounding question properly formulated, then, is not merely "What is politics?" but, rather "What calls for politics?"' In this question we have a pathway for essential political thinking. It is incumbent upon us to understand the question, to hold out the question as a possibility of thinking without presuming to answer forthwith. Obscurity, uncertainty, and precariousness hold sway along this pathway of transition; to think otherwise is to surrender the authentic future to that inauthentic future in which historicism and actualism give determination to the political. To think along the pathway of this question is to understand the relation between planetary thinking and planetary building in new light. Inasmuch as there is an essential connection between planetary politics and the planetary domination of technology, the question of the relation of planetary thinking and planetary building must first be understood in terms of "a preparation of man for taking over a world-domination." We must recognize, however, that both the manner of preparation and the character of this world-domination are problematic, especially to the extent that modern subjectivity drives humanity towards this goal. Nietzsche is the first thinker to recognize our historical moment as just such a preparation, notes Heidegger: "Nietzsche is the first thinker who, in view of a world history emerging for the first time, asks the decisive question and thinks through its metaphysical implications. The question is: Is man, as man in his nature til now, prepared to assume dominion over the whole earth?"' Bernard Dauenhauer's comments on this issue are illuminating. Following Heidegger's reflections, Dauenhauer claims that the "decisive question" as posed by Nietzsche is "not well formulated" inasmuch as "it is still asked from the standpoint of metaphysics," i.e., from a standpoint yet having to overcome "metaphysical vengeance."' In the preceding chapter, we have considered how a "fundamental metaphysical position" is articulated by Nietzsche. We have also understood something of the relationship between this metaphysics and the normative and technocratic dimensions of contemporary world order thinking, insofar as quiescent in this thinking is the Nietzschean appeal to that autonomous creativity which posits new values on the basis of humanity's self-affirmation. With this in mind, Dauenhauer's remarks are especially pertinent: Heidegger tells us that Nietzsche was the first to see that both to come to his own essence and to be prepared to rule the earth, man must be healed of vengeance.... Vengeance ... is that response to what is other than oneself which debases the other in order to place oneself in a superior position and thus to maintain that the only thing which counts is one's own importance. In ... his reflections on technique, Heidegger has pointed out the vengeance involved in the technocratic reduction of nature first to an object of research and ultimately to mere raw material to be disposed of at man's pleasure. The logic of this movement eventually engulfs man himself so that he, too, is only raw material. Vengeance culminates, then, in nihilism.' In short, says Dauenhauer, "The man of vengeance cannot protect the earth. Since he would debase it to raw material for his own purposes, he cannot rule the earth. Rather, he destroys it as earth." Thus, both the normative and technocratic dimensions of world order thinking, grounded as they are in n subjectivist metaphysics, entail a world-domination wholly indefensible: Global dominion under the sway of metaphysical vengeance-in which the human himself succumbs to the enhancement of his power-ultimately entails precisely that crucible of tragedy and catastrophe about which world order scholar Richard Falk has warned. It is in recognition of this imminent consequence that Heidegger asks: But, how could man accede to rulership over the earth, how can he take under his protection the earth as earth, if and for so long as he debases what is terrestrial, in permitting the spirit of vengeance to determine his meditation? If it is a question of saving the earth as earth, it is necessary from the outset that the spirit of vengeance disappear." It may be said that, despite the lack of an explicit thematic treatment of the political in his thought, Heidegger concerns himself with the same decisive question raised by Nietzsche. Like Nietzsche, Heidegger seeks to overcome the spirit of vengeance. Heidegger's "solution" (to use the word loosely), however, is unlike Nietzsche's insofar as Heidegger does not think ontologically in terms of values or a mere reversal of Platonism." The whole of Heidegger's later thinking, as a meditation on this preparation of humanity for global governance, attends to the decisive question in a way that is no longer metaphysical but essential. Heidegger is the first to think this decisive question essentially inasmuch as he thinks this question in terms of the history of Being. Only thus is it possible to overcome metaphysical vengeance, for in questioning concerning the meaning of Being in general the tension between a `transcendent-permanent' and an `earthly-temporal’ is transformed.

Standing-Reserve

A technological approach to the world forces a conceptualization of things as commodities to be used and manipulated by humans. We lose our ability to stand-open to nature’s revealing of itself and believe ourselves to be the ‘Lords of the Earth,’ failing to realize that it is both nature and ourselves that have become the victims of technological manipulation.

Condella 2001(Craig A., Fordham University, “Overcoming the Destining Of Technological Being,” Fall 2001 Symposium: Humanity’s Place in the Cosmos, November 6, 2001, http://www.fordham.edu/philosophy/fps/symposia/2001fall/condella.htm)

What, then, is the essence of technology? In searching for an answer to this all-important question, Heidegger (as he so often does) looks back to the ancient Greeks to locate *techne* as a form of *poiesis*, i.e. a bringing-forth. It is a way of bringing something forth from concealment to unconcealment. Technology, simply put, is a mode of revealing which brings something into presence. As a form of revealing or unconcealment, technology evinces itself fundamentally as a happening of truth – an occurrence referred to by the Greeks as *aletheia*. In sum, the essence of technology is a bringing-forth from concealment to unconcealment and, consequently, an occasioning of truth. Curiously enough, nothing overtly dangerous emerges from the essence of technology as identified by Heidegger, but then again why should it? After all, nothing about the ancient Greek notion of *techne*, which included the fine arts no less than the works of the craftsman, strikes us as straightaway threatening. For Heidegger, then, the Greek notion of *techne* allows us to grasp technology’s essence, but not the danger which we presently encounter. To find the latter, we must determine what it is exactly that makes the technology of modernity so unique. According to Heidegger, “The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such.” Herein we encounter the essence of modern technology as a challenging-forth, along with its rendering of nature as standing-reserve. With modern technology, the bringing-forth of techne is fundamentally transformed into a challenging-forth. What modern technology challenges can be see as twofold. First, and perhaps more obvious, is its challenging of nature. Modern technology essentially transforms nature into an energy source which it manipulates and uses at its own discretion. Nature, at the hands of modern technology, is reduced to Bestand (standing-reserve). Beyond even this challenging, however, are the demands placed upon man who, put simply, is challenged-forth into the challenging of nature. Heidegger calls this challenging-forth of man to order nature as standing-reserve Ge-stell (enframing) and thus locates the essence of modern technology outside of human control. Modern technology, as a revealing that orders, is thus no mere human doing. Therefore we must take the challenging that sets upon man to order the actual as standing-reserve in accordance with the way it shows itself. That challenging gathers man into ordering. This gathering concentrates man upon ordering the actual as standing-reserve. In the end, modern technology as Ge-stell creates a situation in which man orders nature and thus posits himself as “lord of the earth” when, in all reality, he himself is being ordered in just the same way. Within such a situation, man becomes blind to all other modes of revealing outside of the technological. He sees nature as existing fundamentally for him while being driven by a power greater than himself, a power which not only distorts nature but obfuscates man’s understanding of his own self. With modern technology, man is hoodwinked into believing that he fulfills his true essence to the very extent that he dominates his surroundings. Whereas man prides himself on using technology to his own advantage, it is modern technology which, in all reality, uses man. Not until we see modern technology as something outside of our control can we even begin to overcome the danger harbored within its very essence.

Ext – Standing Reserve

The demand of modern technology has reduced natural recourses into nothing more than “Standing- Reserve”, worth nothing more than the supply and energy we can extract from them

**Jerkins 09** [Jae, Professor of Philosophy Florida State University, Florida Philosophical Review Vol. IX, issue 2 pg129-130, “Heidegger’s Bridge: The Social and Phenomenological Construction of Mars,” SM, Accessed: 6/29]

Martin Heidegger also claims that people in the 20 th century falsely view technology as a Kantian “means to an end”—when in reality, Heidegger maintains, technology is not a means but rather “a mode,” or “a way of revealing.” 42 This revealing that modern technology is responsible for is a challenge, a “demand” to nature “that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such.” 43 Heidegger uses the river Rhine as an example of the demands of modern technology. The Rhine has been dammed up in order to provide hydraulic pressure for a hydroelectric power plant. This use of technology changes our phenomenological perception of the Rhine. A vast ecological system, the ancient source of legends and songs, the home of lush forests and breathtaking castles, has been relegated to a “water power supplier.” 44 This modern ability to take nature out of its original context of being and reassign it within a use-value technological context is known as enframing. In the modern age, we have begun to reorganize everything around us into technological frames of reference and usage; Heidegger warns that the river Rhine is now a power source, the once mystical German soil is now a mineral deposit, and the refreshing mountain air is simply a supply of nitrogen. 45 The objects that make up our world have become resources—subjects for us to master, purchase, and own. We have alienated ourselves from all things and placed them into a standing reserve, a standby mode in which “whatever stands by…no longer stands over us as object.” 46 Our general disregard for the meaningfulness of the world is precisely what causes objects to lose any coherent status for us. Heidegger finds that the consequence of enframing, whereby the entire natural world inevitably becomes “orderable as standing reserve,” is that “man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve… [who inevitably] comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve.” 47 We may shape the world, but the world inevitably shapes us.

**Reducing the world to “Standing Reserve” removes our possibility to an authentic being.**

**Kinsella 07**

[William, Associate professor in the Department of Communication at North Carolina State University, Environmental Communication Vol. 1 Issue 2 pg. 196, “Heidegger and Being at the Hanford Reservation: Standing Reserve, Enframing, and Environmental Communication Theory.” November 2007, SM, Accessed: 7/3/11]

Heidegger believed that the reduction of nature to a standing reserve alienates us not only from the elements of our environment, but also, in a fundamental existential sense, from our very being . 2 Human being\*understood by Heidegger as both actor and activity\*is always being-in-the-world, involving ongoing engagement with the other phenomena of that world. To be authentically, this engagement requires meeting the world not only on our terms, but also on its own terms; only through such meeting can we realize true being. Linking this concept of being to the problematic of technology, Heidegger (1977a) proposed that ‘‘the essence of technology is by no means anything technological’’ (p. 4); rather, it is manifested in modes of thinking, language, and action that are oriented toward enframing. These approaches alienate us from the radical otherness of the phenomena that surround us, disabling the possibilities for authentic being. Well aware of the material hazards posed by nuclear weapons and nuclear wastes, Heidegger nevertheless saw an even greater threat in the prospect that human being might be reduced, along with the rest of nature, through the modality of enframing.

Modern scientific technology creates an “enframing” in which all beings and nature are not permitted to be what they are and instead are framed as a standing reserve of resources for use and disposal.

Leitch in 04 (Vincent B., Chair of English @ the University of Oklahoma, Postmodern Theory of Technology: Agendas, 2004, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/symploke/v012/12.1leitch.html> ) JM

In Heidegger's account, Descartes symbolizes the moment when science and technology get harnessed together, creating the tragic project of "Enframing" (Gestell), which is characterized by its devotion to standing-reserve or storing up resources (Bestand): "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering"(17). What typifies modern technological rationality is its desire for order, control, domination, security; its mastery, willfulness, utilitarianism; its dedication to calculation, objectification, representation; its frantic transformation of everything including nature and human beings into efficient machines and resources. More and more, nothing is permitted to be what it is. Letting things be appears increasingly impossible. Openness to being, to uncertainty, to spontaneous and responsive awareness—such ways of living fall away and human being becomes further estranged from self and environment. Not surprisingly, numerous strands of modern and postmodern theory seek to reclaim openness to being. For Heidegger technology, in its dangerous late modern scientific form, contends with everything, sets upon it, and requisitions it for use.

Disposable Globe

Modern technology views the “planetary globe” as a disposable resource floating in space, to be cast aside at our convenience.

Joronen in 10(Mikko, Doctoral candidate in Human Geography @ The University of Turku, The Age of Planetary Space *Introduction,* 2010 <http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/66733/AnnalesAII257Joronen.pdf?sequence=1>) JM

Accordingly, Heidegger understands modern technology above all as a metaphysical project. Modern technological devices, from the “manual technology and manufacture” of the industrial age to the revolutions made first by the “engine technology” and then by what Heidegger (1998h:132–133) calls the ruling determination of modern technology as “cybernetics” (i.e. the rise and irruption of the systems of maximum possible automation of command), all manifest a peculiar mode of revealing that is not just total in nature, but an ever-growing imperial drive structured to constantly reach towards global enlargement and intensificatio**n**. Eventually such technological unfolding leads to a diversity of phenomena, including the worldwide homogenization of modes of living, the constant mobilization of cultural and economic practices, the global circulation of information, goods, capital, people, and knowledge, the establishment of colossal stocks of energy with massive potentiality of destruction as well (with the weapons of mass destruction), and the commodification and productisation of all aspects of life from nature to culture, from genetic information to consumption culture – even a certain insensibility with regard to tragedies of suffering (for instance through the television spectacles of war and catastrophe), as Haar adds (1993:80; see also Gillespie 1984:128; Mugerauer 2008:xv-xviii). In spite of the seemingly diverging characters, the former phenomena are nothing but epiphenomena of the age defining metaphysical scaffolding of technological revealing; it is the ‘framework’ of calculative drive, the technological revealing of ‘enframing’, which allows for multiple set of phenomena to emerge. As will be later shown in more detail, such sense of unity is first and foremost typical for a metaphysical mechanism of unfolding operative throughout the 2300 year tradition of Western thinking, a mechanism still being constitutive for the contemporary technological ‘enframing’ (Gestell) and self-heightening ‘machination’ (Machenschaft) of all things. As a matter of fact, it is the planetary outcome of such a technological mode of unfolding, which according to Peter Sloterdijk (2009) was first initiated and started as a ‘mathematical globalization’ – as a project that in Heideggerean reading was boosted into its technological form by early modern philosophers and mathematical physicists – further proceeding as a ‘terrestrial globalization’, finally leading to an age of ‘planetary globe’, which eventually turned the earth into a mere planet under totally penetrable networks of orderings (Thrift 2008:234–235; Morin 2009; See also Heidegger 1998h:133; Dallmayr 2005:44; Radloff 2007b:36–48). As the thesis will show, the contemporary planetary unfolding was first initiated by the latent ground of thought behind the metaphysical formulations of early Greek philosophers, further boosted by the mathematical developments of early modern thinkers, finally coming forth as cybernetic systems of ordering cast upon the planet. In such a planet, conceived as a mass of matter wandering in empty universe, everything is called to be useable, penetrable, mouldable, ‘decodable’ and mobile.

War

Technology goes hand in hand with the enframing militaristic force of nation states that devalues human beings and refuses to recognize their own substance.

Burke in 07(Anthony, Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations @ The University of New South Wales Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason, War as a Way of Being: Lebanon 2006, 2007 [**http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory\_and\_event/v010/10.2burke.html**](http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html)) JM

This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'. The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'.

No Solvency

Technological thinking is always in the service of maintaining the status quo.

Swazo 02 – Professor of Philosophy at the University of Alaska (Norman K., Crisis Theory and World Order: Heideggerian Reflections, p. 43)

Whether the subject was understood as world order studies, global policy analysis, or futurology, a sense of the problem and the need for drastic global reform came of age. The report of the first phase of the Club of Rome's Project in the Predicament of Mankind perhaps served most to generate awareness of the imminent crisis. Concerned with "five basic factors that determine and therefore, ultimately limit, growth on this planet-population, agricultural production, natural resources, industrial production, and pollution," this research group constructed a world model "built specifically to investigate five major trends ```of global concern accelerating industrialization, rapid population growth, widespread malnutrition, depletion of nonrenewable resources, and a deteriorating environment."' The main conclusion of the report is that "If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, food production and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to growth on this planet will be reached some time within the next one hundred years."' Scenarios of the future, as I have noted, depend on methodological orientations, on whether the analysis is concerned with empirical norms primarily or some balance of empirical norms with moral norms. Futures research concerned more with empirical norms tends to concentrate on quantitative methods and computer analysis, producing "hard" models or scenarios of alternative futures. Robert Clute describes such efforts thus: International futures research attempts to examine current interrelated global issues in order to project or forecast the future consequences of past and present trends and to suggest alternative scenarios in an attempt to avoid undesired consequences. This work has become known as futurology, which, according to Victor Ferkiss, "combines the knowledge of the scientist, the will of the utopian and the imagination of the writer of science fiction." The policy aspect of international futures is in essence an attempt at long-term planning.' The problem with futures research, however, notes Clute, is that the most visible works which "purport to be global in approach are, in the main, biased toward scenarios that are concerned with maintaining the systems and values If the market economy, developed states. ... Indeed, many of the major futures studies are extremely ethnocentric and are therefore resisted by much of the world."'

\*\*\*Alternative/Framing\*\*\*

Critique

Critique destabilizes reified distinctions between earth and heaven upon which the most violent aspects of the age of the world picture are premised.

Lazier 2011 [Benjamin, Associate Professor of History and Humanities at Reed College, “Earthrise: or, Globalization of the World Picture,” in *The American Historical Review* 116.3]

This approach is openly eclectic. It swings between the registers of intellectual history, cultural history, environmental history, and the history of science. It also affords returns, above all in new kinds of stories about the Earthrise era. For example, we typically include the “Earthrise” photograph in a congratulatory story about the rise of environmentalism. There is something to this. Like globe talk, the language of environmentalism is an invention of the Earthrise era.15 But there is a more sober and wide-ranging story to be told. The examples of Heidegger, Arendt, and Blumenberg help us see how the history of the Whole Earth icon is part of a history of competing globalisms, and still more of technologically complicit ones— commercial and environmental globalisms above all. Their example therefore prompts us to ask whether the visions and vocabularies of the Earthrise era have inadvertently accelerated our planetary emergency as much as they have inspired us to slow it down. They also help reveal the structural tensions between organism and artifact at the core of canonical environmental texts of the Earthrise era (such as Stewart Brand’s Whole Earth Catalog and James Lovelock’s Gaia) that destabilize the concept of a “global environment” itself. If this approach supplements traditional contexts (the Cold War, environmentalism) with new ones (the history of organisms and artifacts in the modern era), it also calls attention to categories often excluded from historical consideration in the first place, by subjecting to historical analysis what philosophers such as Arendt call the human condition or, in a different key, what Heidegger means by world picture. Here is where the expression “globalization of the world picture” can help. It opens Heidegger’s totalizing view of the modern age to the swerve of historicity, so that we might speak of reversals, ruptures, and heterogeneous eras—an Earthrise era, for example, or a post-Earthrise condition in which the view of the whole Earth exerts its most subtle and wide-ranging effects precisely when its novelty fades. Stated a bit differently, the expression illuminates the historical predicament in the injunction to “Think globally, act locally!” The first half of this phrase is not so much a moral directive, which we may or may not opt to follow, as it is one description of the human condition in the Earthrise era. There now holds sway a world picture in which the condition of “earthliness” is conjured by way of a view from the most unearthly of places—the void; in which the horizons of earthbound experience compete with horizons that are planetary, or capital-E Earthly, in scope; and in which the vision of the naked Earth is also the view of a globe in disguise, the greatest of organisms: a man-made planet. Thinking globally is probably now less our choice than our lot. A history of the Earthrise era can help us understand what this means and how it came to be.

The alternative is a precondition to the affirmative because technology thoroughly conditions our experience of space and earth.

Lazier 2011 [Benjamin, Associate Professor of History and Humanities at Reed College, “Earthrise: or, Globalization of the World Picture,” in *The American Historical Review* 116.3]

All these examples point to the combination, and also the clash, of the earthly with the Earthly that now conditions human experience. And the diversity of those whom it affects (philosophers, artists, astronauts, politicians, and children subjected to psycho-scientific machinations) says something about its scope. It is wide, and it is deep. In this light, the statement that “thinking globally” is now less our choice than our lot ought to be emended, to allow for a post-Earthrise condition in which the global is sometimes coeval with, not posterior to, the thinking, and in which the thinking is entwined with feeling and sensing. There is reason for ambivalence about this development. To be sure, there is environmental awareness, concern for the planet, even feelings of mystical communion with the Earth. But for every impulse to care, there are injunctions to manage and control. For every encounter with wholeness, there are by definition moments of terrific alienation. In the testimony of Apollo astronauts, these moments tend to come when the Earth has shriveled to the size at which the brain can cognize it as a distinct object—not when the Earth is first visually surveyed, but farther out, when the eyes absorb it in its entirety in direct line of sight, grasped all at once as a whole.68 But what of the rest of us, those for whom the Earthrise era is no astronautic adventure but an astronoetic one, launched by the pictures the astronauts brought back? Have we shared in these doubled-up moments of plenitude and estrangement also? Almost certainly, albeit in a different key. A full account of this trip must wait for now. But to begin, just reflect on the vertigo that can well up when Whole Earth comes to mind and we register that, yes, somewhere down there on that great blue ball is us.

Critique Key

We must leave behind old conceptual categories of technological efficacy and authenticity in order to cope with the new planetary space age.

Turnbull 2006 [Neil, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Social Theory at Nottingham Trent University, “The Ontological Consequences of Copernicus: Global Being in the Planetary World,” in *Theory, Culture, Society* 23]

The political a priori of the planetary dimension has been conceived by one influential commentator as a fledgling ‘extra-terrestrial planetary humanism’, and an expression of ‘heterological, postanthropological, cosmopolitan’ world ‘yet-to-come’ (Gilroy, 2000: 334). This may, perhaps, eventually annul the Greek moment of philosophy itself because, in a planetary world, one ‘cannot take for granted any particular Western philosophical system’ (Patomäki, 2002: 90; see also Hall, 2001; Maffie, 2001).5 Thus what is needed is a thoroughgoing re-examination of the traditional conceptual hierarchies and lexica that have traditionally been the source of modern philosophy’s ‘conceptual core’, typically those inherent within the panoply of spatial tropes – from classical ideas of form to modern ideas of world – through which Western philosophy has defined its programmatic aims. Henri Lefèbvre was one of the first thinkers to acknowledge this problem by recognizing that, in an age of planetary technology, the modern philosopher is forced to think beyond traditional ideas of both world and earth. In his view, ‘the conflation of the terms “planet”, “earth”, “worldwide” and “universe” is still rather ridiculous. Mounting a critique of the confusions surrounding the term “world” may increasingly be a key issue for reflective thought’ (Lefèbvre, 1995: 254). One way to approach this issue is to follow Irigaray and chide Heidegger – and Wittgenstein – for their preoccupation with earth as a ground for thinking and judging. However, it may be that these philosophers simply assumed too narrow – and too culturally and historically parochial – an account of the earth’s ontological significance. For, as the above discussion has shown, in a planetary age the philosophical problem of the meaning of the earth remains a pivotal issue: only in this case the idea and the experience of the earth seems much larger, more ‘vital’, more complex and more redolent with political significance than the early modern Copernican earth. As ‘planetary technology’ – to use Heidegger’s phrase – provides practical conditions of possibility for a new convergence of ‘earth’ and ‘world’ upon wider sets of planetary concerns, so the philosopher is forced to concede that the earth is no longer a certain existential ground linked to primal kinaesthetic experience – the ontological first principle of saying and doing – but has become an affordant sign of cosmopolitan cultural reality: an aestheticized and cosmological planetary ‘blue globe’ that extends the perceptual horizon and thus opens up a very different idea of the world, a world where the planetary dimension becomes a new axiomatic and new authority for knowing and judging. But how is the philosopher to make ontological sense of these new planetary forms of authority?

Critique Solves Policymaking

An uncritical relationship to technology is characterized by error, blindness, and forgetting; the critique serves as a propadeuetic to policymaking because it situates how and what we value as a result of the phenomenological resources before us.

Lazier 2011 [Benjamin, Associate Professor of History and Humanities at Reed College, “Earthrise: or, Globalization of the World Picture,” in *The American Historical Review* 116.3]

WHETHER THIS HOPE WILL COME to pass remains to be seen. Blumenberg’s oversight, after all, alerts us in miniature to an important point. The story of the Earthrise era is not just about Cold War origins and the space race, let alone a feel-good tale about ecological awareness. Resituated in a new context (the history of organisms and artifacts in the modern era), Earthrise and its afterlives become just as much a story of error, blindness, and forgetting. Of error: Blumenberg’s mistake shows that to look at the Earth in the sky above the moon is in fact to gaze upon the Earth-organism as pictorial artifact, Whole Earth as world picture. Of blindness: many have espied in Whole Earth an organic icon, but if we follow the lead of Heidegger and Arendt, we must ask whether Whole Earth has always been a globe in disguise, and “global environment” just one of several competing but also complicit globalisms in the Earthrise era. Last, Earthrise is a story of forgetting. To focus on how the view of Earth from space was overtly mobilized is to miss some of the more subtle effects of this sight after we ceased to register its novelty—after we ceased, in a fashion, to see it. This last is the most difficult to address. How are we to write a history of something that “disappears” in its ubiquity? How are we to write a history of an imagination that becomes all the more important as it disseminates and fades, as it seeps into the mental architecture that conditions our most basic, everyday experience? It is one thing to trace the spread and use of the images themselves—their visible appropriations, whether by environmentalists, oil executives, humanitarians, cold warriors, or jihadis. It is one thing to account for the uneasy convergence of Earthly vision with global vocabulary by resituating the history of these photos in a broader story about what has happened to organisms and artifacts in the modern age. But it is something else to track how the planetary horizons afforded by photographs of the whole Earth have surmounted, inflected, complemented, or corrupted the earthbound horizons of everyday experience. To do so would be to trace the effects of that dissonance described by Husserl, produced by living locally while thinking globally, and to address the question: How did the experience of this split between life as lived and life as known change once we came to see in pictures what Husserl could only imagine? Doing so would provide a window on what it means to live in a world in which “Earthrise” has risen, and in which it has more recently set—or settled, in the seat of human perception, where it acts upon us in ways we often do not notice. The term “Earthrise era” does not quite capture this development, since it foregrounds what in this instance is more important as background. As homage to Arendt, let’s call it a “post-Earthrise condition” instead. The term entails fealty, but also sedition, because as a historical development the phenomenon poses a challenge to Arendt’s ideas about the “human condition.” With some exceptions, most historians are not accustomed to making use of categories such as the human condition. And for good reason: It smacks of a place anterior to culture or society or meaning. It seems better left to paleoanthropologists willing to venture into the distant past (“prehistory”) or to philosophers like Heidegger and Arendt willing to broach ideas about the deep present—in this case, that we are earthbound creatures, that we inhabit man-made worlds, and that residues of this earthliness and worldliness are embedded in everything that we are and do.64 But the concept is not totally foreign. Their vocabulary of earthliness recalls a category to which historians are accustomed: “environment,” understood broadly as that which surrounds and conditions us. And their vocabulary of worldliness echoes in a second category: “space of experience,” which historians use to speak of urban cityscapes, changing skylines, and the new sorts of sensory and mental lives they afford or inflict. Still, we would be remiss to disregard how the post-Earthrise condition stretches these categories to their limits. The sedimentation of Whole Earth iconography into the mental architecture of the West means that for the foreseeable future, environment will be inflected by planet, cityscape by globe, and skyline by space—not the “space of experience” but the void. The lived experiences of earthliness and worldliness, at least as Heidegger and Arendt imagined them, are available, if they are available, only against the background of this new dispensation. What they pursued as a philosophical inquiry is therefore best continued as a historical one. What is to be gained by such a history? And how are we to write it? To the first question, the answer is a rich, textured account of what it has meant to live, feel, and know in an age when human beings finally came to see what they for millennia could only imagine—the whole Earth. Regarding the second, if we take seriously the proposition that photographs like “Earthrise” have abetted the globalization of the world picture by supplementing one set of horizons with another, we need first to think more creatively about where to look for the relevant evidence.

“UQ”

The Copernican Revolution is upon us: now is the key time to critique technology’s aspiration to total control and universality and usher in a new planetary cosmopolitanism.

Turnbull 2006 [Neil, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Social Theory at Nottingham Trent University, “The Ontological Consequences of Copernicus: Global Being in the Planetary World,” in *Theory, Culture, Society* 23]

Thus in this article my aim is to interrogate the Nieztschean– Heideggerian style of philosophical critique of what might be termed ‘cosmological hypermodernity’ and its heliocentric conception of a ‘mobile earth’, and to show the extent to which visual representations of the earth as planet support a different, ‘less grounded’ but ‘more worlded’ conception of the earth (and a conception of the earth that in many ways requires Western philosophy re-engage with its classical philosophical heritage, as well as strive for new dialogic openings with non-Western philosophical traditions). As the experience of the earth becomes representational – and virtual – the earth is not deworlded as such but is ‘reworlded’ along a new planetary dimension – as a new unbounded planetary space that itself becomes a privileged place for a new theoria of ‘earth-in-the-cosmos’ (Harries, 2001: 328–30). For, with the astronaut’s technological representation of the earth sub speciae techne, and its emergence as a new quasispiritual and highly aesthetic percept, the earth has moved back to centre of political consciousness, not in the traditional sense of the ‘earth as Garden’, but as new technologically worlded and neo-stoic cosmopolitical percept of the ‘earth-as-planet’ (see Ihde, 1990). My main claim in what follows is that when earth is no longer simply a fixed ground but something more dynamic, expansive and virtual, contemporary Western philosophy is forced into a new revisionary phase. Western philosophy, I suggest, needs to begin the task of finding a new conceptual lexicon through which ‘cosmopolitan planetariness’ can be articulated (a new conceptual a priori that ‘speaks for’ a new planetary sense of worldhood). The article concludes with a discussion of the kind of revisions required and I go on to suggest that as the earth becomes a virtualized symbolic resource, the very idea of ‘inhabiting’ the earth needs to be rethought, and that Deleuzian attempts to rethink the earth as an ‘open and expansive plane without territory’ offer some important insights into the a priori of our post-astronautic planetary condition and the philosophical ‘meaning of the planet’.

**Do Nothing**

The alternative is to do nothing for technology – only by passive waiting can we avoid causes-and-effects and focus ourselves on the issue of our own being.

Harman in 09 (Graham, Professor of Philosophy @ American University in Cairo, “Cambridge Journal of Economics”, 2009, Vol. 34(1), Technology, objects and things in Heidegger p.17-25) JM

Another word in Heidegger's constellation of technology terms is danger, which turns out to be yet another synonym for a presence-at-hand that strips the world of all concealed mystery. ‘The essence of technology is en-framing. The essence of en-framing is danger’ (Heidegger, 1994, p. 54). Though the danger is already with us, we do not yet experience it as danger (Heidegger, 1994, p. 55). And to add yet another term to the mix: ‘in the wake of every danger, there looms a distress. Distress compels. [Not nötigt]’ (Heidegger, 1994, p. 55). This talk of danger also links up with one of Heidegger's favourite passages from the poet Friedrich Hölderin. In the hymn ‘Patmos’, Hölderlin writes: ‘Wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst / Das Rettende auch’ [‘But where danger is, there grows / also that which saves’]. This two-sided interplay of danger and saving power reflects the two faces of being itself. Being presents itself as a present-at-hand façade, but also withdraws into inscrutable subterranean depth. Technology is not a lamentable human deed of Neolithic times or the Industrial Revolution, but an unavoidable facet of being itself. For being (or sometimes ‘beyng’ [Seyn], to use Heidegger's beloved archaic spelling) lies far beyond the normal cause-and-effect relationships of the world: ‘beyng is not accompanied by anything comparable to it. It is caused by nothing else, and is not the cause of itself. Beyng does not proceed, and never proceeds, from a causal connection’ (Heidegger, 1994, p. 75). Hence, humans cannot force a change in the essence of technology to occur and must passively wait. But this still leaves us with a special role denied to all other entities: ‘the great human essence resides in the fact that it belongs to the essence of being, is used by it to preserve the essence of being in its truth’ (Heidegger, 1994, p. 70). In the danger of being lies the possibility of a turn (Kehre) away from the forgetting of being into the truth of being itself (Heidegger, 1994, p. 71). Despite the horror of technology, Heidegger contends that we can see the lightning-flash of being in the essence of technology. By stripping everything down to such a miserable form of presence-at-hand, it confronts us with the call of distress from being itself (Heidegger, 1994, p. 77). But humans, the shepherds of being, must continue to wait: ‘Only when humans, as the shepherds of being, wait upon the truth of being can they in any way anticipate the arrival of the other destiny of being, without degenerating into a mere wish to know’ (Heidegger, 1994, pp. 71–2).

Natural Reintegration

The Alternative is to reevaluate the way in which humans associate with technology and nature, to seek reintegration instead of domination.

Charley in 09 (Mejame Ejede, Associate Professor of Philosophy @ Mary Washington University, PROBLEMATIC OF TECHNOLOGY AND THE REALMS OF SALVATION IN HEIDEGGER’S PHILOSOPHY, *Technology and the Disclosure of Being,* p. 357-8, September 1 2009) JM

While Heidegger is pessimistic regarding the future of a humanity dominated by Gestell, he proposes a way out, a salvation, the decision by which man could come out of his errancy. This salvation being paradoxically contained in technology itself or in its essence. This could be the meaning of the citation from the poet Hölderlin found at the end of the „Question concerning Technology’’: „but where danger is, grows the saving power also’’. Heidegger’s conclusion has left many critics unsatisﬁed and has raised the fundamental question: how indeed can technology be at the same time a mortal danger and that which saves from this danger? As far as we are concerned, Heidegger says in substance that the imperialistic character of technology comes from reason itself, insofar as it claims to stretch its empire everywhere and dominate all objects. Now a reason at the service of the will to power is a lost reason. Techno-science is the implementation of a project, whose essence is contained in reason taking the form of the scientiﬁ c representation of the world. The form becomes explicit with the objectiﬁ ed system of science. Plus, the sword of Damocles that hangs over man does not in the ﬁ rst place come from machines and appliances of technology, whose action could eventually be deadly. The danger, contrary to what we naively believe, is not in the use that is made of technology, but in the spirit determining it since its origin, in the logic leading to it. The danger of dangers, is the lack of awareness of this danger. A radical awareness of the nature of the technological project is necessary. That is why Heidegger cites Hölderlin: „But where danger is, grows the saving power also’’. A critical lucidity with respect to the technological process is the only way open for us to get out of this alienation. This is the only way that would enable us to rediscover a bit of the humility which characterised the relation of traditional man to nature, and the relation of man to man. This entirely presupposes the modiﬁ cation of the representation of man’s relation with nature. We must recover the meaning of man’s integration in Nature instead of seeking to dominate it. In the language of Heidegger, it is our relation to Being that is at issue. Thus of the peasant in those days, Heidegger says: „The work of the peasant does not enframe the cultivated earth. When he sows grain, he conﬁ des it to the forces he wakes such that it prospers’’. Traditional people did not challenge the earth, they knew how to respect it, and to watch, as a shepherd who watches his sheep. The peasant conﬁ des the seed to the earth and watches it. What has happened in man’s relation to the earth? Agriculture has become industrial, it has become technical. The earth is only matter to be exploited technically. It is requisitioned by technology.

Ontology First – General

**Ontology must come first, our actions and even our very selves are shaped by the ontology which we intentionally or unintentionally prescribe to. Especially in the context of the issues of modernity the foundations of all thought: political, philosophical, and technological are shaped by ontology.**

Dillon 1999 [Michael, “The Scandal of the Refugee: Some Reflections on the ‘Inter’ of International Relations and Continental Thought,” in *Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics*, eds. David Campbell and Michael Shapiro (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999) pg. 97-99]

As Heidegger-himself an especially revealing figure of the deep and mutual implication of the philosophical and the political-never tired of pointing out, the relevance of ontology to all other kinds of thinking is fundamental and inescapable. For one cannot say anything about that is, without always already having made assumptions about the is as such. Any mode of thought, in short, always already carries an ontology sequestered within it. What this ontological turn does to other-regional-modes of thought is to challenge the ontology within which they operate. The implications of that review reverberate through the entire mode of thought, demanding a reappraisal as fundamental as the reappraisal ontology has demanded of philosophy. With ontology at issue, the entire foundations or underpinnings of any mode of thought are rendered problematic. This applies as much to any modern discipline of thought as it does to the question of modernity as such, with the exception, it seems, of science, which, having long ago given up the ontological questioning of when it called itself natural philosophy, appears now, in its industrialized and corporatized form, to be invulnerable to ontological perturbation. With its foundations at issue, the very authority of a mode of thought and the ways in which it characterizes the critical issues of freedom and judgment (of what kind of universe human beings inhabit, how they inhabit it, and what counts as reliable knowledge for them in it) is also put in question. The very ways in which Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other continental philosophers challenged Western ontology, simultaneously, therefore reposed the fundamental and inescapable difficulty, or *aporia*, for human being of decision and judgment. In other words, whatever ontology you subscribe to, knowingly or unknowingly, as a human being you still have to act. Whether or not you know or acknowledge it, the ontology you subscribe to will construe the problem of action for you in one way rather than another. You may think ontology is some arcane question of philosophy, but Nietzsche and Heidegger showed that it intimately shapes not only a way of thinking, but a way of being, a form of life. Decision, a fortiori political decision, in short, is no mere technique. It is instead a way of being that bears an understanding of Being, and of the fundaments of the human way of being within it. This applies, indeed applies most, to those mock-innocent political slaves who claim only to be technocrats of decision making. While Certain continental thinkers like Blumenberg and Lowith, for example, were prompted to interrogate or challenge the modern’s claim to being distinctively “modern,” and others such as Adorno questioned its enlightened credentials, philosophers like Derrida and Levinas pursued the metaphysical implications (or rather the implications for metaphysics) of the thinking initiated by Kierkegaard, as well as by Nietzsche and Heidegger. The violence of metaphysics, together with another way of thinking about the question of the ethical, emerged as the defining theme of their work. Other, notably Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard, Baudrillard, and Bataille turned the thinking of Nietzsche and Heidegger into a novel kind of social and political critique of both the regimes and the effects of power that have come to distinguish late modern times; they concentrated, in detail, upon how the violence identified by these other thinkers manifested itself not only in the mundane practices of modern life, but also in those areas that claimed to be most free of it, especially the freedom and security of the subject as well as its allied will to truth and knowledge. Questioning the appeal to the secure self-grounding common to both its epistemic structures and its political imagination, and in the course of reinterrogating both the political character of the modern and the modern character of the political, this problematization of modernity has begun to prompt an ontopolitcally driven reappraisal of modern political thought.

Ontology First – Prerequisite

The K outweighs – considering the relationship with “Being” is a prerequisite to solving any relationships between human beings.

Rae 10 (Gavin, PhD in Philosophy @ The University of Warwick “Re-Thinking the Human: Heidegger, Fundamental Ontology, and Humanism” Hum Stud (2010) 33:23–39) JM

At the start of his seminal work on Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time, Hubert Dreyfus notes that ‘‘Heidegger claims thatthe tradition has misdescribed and misinterpreted human being. Therefore, as a ﬁrst step in his project, he attempts to work out a fresh analysis of what it is to be human’’ (1991, p. 1). Importantly, however, while the human being plays a crucially important role in Heidegger’s project, it does not have fundamental importance; as we will see, a study of the human being is a necessary precursor to the study of that which Heidegger holds to be fundamentally important: being. Heidegger’s attempt to re-think the human being in-line with the question of being leads him to criticise traditional conceptions of the human on two related accounts: ﬁrst, that they forget the question of being; and secondly, that they are underpinned by a binary logic that forestalls any thinking of being. To correct what he sees as the fundamental failing of traditional accounts of the human being, Heidegger, in Being and Time, emphasises the primary importance of being. However, the means through which being can be understood is by ﬁrst analysing a speciﬁc type of being, namely, the human being; what Heidegger calls ‘‘Dasein’’ (1962, p. 27). This brings Heidegger to propose an ontological analysis of the human being as the means to understand being. As Tom Rockmore (1995, pp. 95–96) notes, however, frequently the second movement to being was forgotten or ignored and Heidegger’s thought was interpreted as a philosophical anthropology of the human being. For Heidegger, however, while philosophical anthropology can tell us something about the human being, it can not tell us the whole truth. Disclosing the truth about the human being requires that the being of the human being be disclosed. But Heidegger does not simply suggest that traditional philosophical accounts of the human being have forgotten and/or ignored the question of being. He goes further by suggesting that traditional philosophical accounts of the human being cannot think of being because their thinking is constrained within a logic of binary oppositions. Most notable of these binary oppositions is that between essence and existence. For Heidegger, the human being has traditionally been thought to possess a ﬁxed deﬁning essence that either determines human being or that exists as a potential to be made actual. The problem with this conception of the human being is, according to Heidegger, that it fails to understand that the human being is deﬁned by existential ‘‘possibility’’ (1962, p. 33). Its existential possibility means that the truth of the human being cannot be captured within ﬁxed conceptual boundaries; the open-ended ‘‘nature’’ of the human being is deﬁned by its ‘‘existence’’ (Heidegger 1962, pp. 32, 68). However, the problem with deﬁning the human being in terms of its existence was that it appeared to many commentators that Heidegger was simply inverting the privileging of essence constitutive of traditional conceptions of the human being. Such thinking misinterprets Heidegger’s thought. It assumes that Heidegger’s notion of existence is the existence that has been thought to exist in opposition to essence. For Heidegger, deﬁning the human being by its existence does not mean that the human being is simply deﬁned by its actions; by existence, Heidegger means something very speciﬁc. This speciﬁcity can only be understood by remembering his privileging of being. Deﬁning the human being by its existence means, for Heidegger, not that the human being is what it does, but that the human being exists in such a relation to being that it, and it alone amongst beings, is able to disclose being.

Ontology First – Value

Ontology must come first: only by becoming explorers of what we accept as reality can we truly explore reality. Questioning what we accept as truth is the only way to be fully human.

Jerome 92 [Miller, Professor of Philosophy at Salisbury State University in Maryland, In the Throe of Wonder: Intimations of the Sacred in a Post-Modern World pg. 197-198, 1992, SM, Accessed: 7/1/11]

This is a question each must answer for herself since it involves nothing less than deciding whether to be oneself. In my judgment, no one can take seriously the whole process of intelligent inquiry and rational reflection which culminates in making judgments and not take seriously those primal experiences in which all inquiry originates. To be fully intelligent, fully rational, we must side with wonder and against the self- evidence of the present- at- hand, with horror and against the recoil that wants to flee from nothingness, with awe and against the self- importance that refuses to acknowledge the possibility of there being a reality greater than ourselves. The decision to trust these experiences as the primal sources of knowing is more crucial than our affirmation of any proposition. For theories and propositions themselves owe their existence to the creative eros of intelligence which is itself set in motion by the unknown which these experiences alone make accessible to us. None of the specific realizations to which inquiry leads us, no matter how important they may be, can rival the transformative effect of our primal decision to turn from the given to the eros of questioning. That turn is our fundamental conversion. But the distinguishing characteristic of this conversion is that instead of providing us with an unshakable foundation of an unquestionable truth on which to base all we think and do, it pulls all foundation out from under us and throws what we thought were our certainties into question. It requires our giving up all the hope we ever had of grounding our thought on an arche that can be known directly, without having to trust ourselves to the uncontrollable, unpredictable throe of inquiry. To make this conversion is not to acquire a dogma but to become a questioner. But we cannot enter fully into the ordeal of questioning unless we allow ourselves to be bound by its own immanent imperatives. If we leave our safe harbor and venture into the unknown which both fascinates and horrifies, we cannot possibly know where we are going. But exploring is different from pointless drifting- not because the explorer has a destination but because her movement is governed by the throe of the unknown itself. The fact that the given does not provide us with an immovable truth on which to erect the edifice of our thought does not mean, as the pragmatists of post- modern culture claim, that the idea of truth itself has to be jettisoned. Indeed, it is only our habit of equating truth with the given which would lead us to jump to that conclusion. But if being is not the given, is not the from- which of wonder, horror, or awe, if, rather, being is the unknown toward- which of all our questions, then the knowledge of being becomes possible only when we relinquish our hold on the given and open ourselves to those truths which cannot be reached except by trusting the eros of inquiry. The post- modern dismissal of truth as a philosophical objective, far from demonstrating a radically deconstructive approach to traditional foundationalism, only confirms that the post- modern pragmatist remains wedded to its presuppositions. He has simply despaired of achieving what the foundationalist still hopes to accomplish. The underlying cause of such despair is our refusal to give up the dream of having the truth given to us. To relinquish that dream is a kind of death, and requires a willingness to suffer nothingness. Such suffering is intrinsic to the very nature of the turn- we cannot make the turn unless we experience it. In the experience of wonder, nothingness remains implicit; in horror it becomes conscious and is explicitly addressed; in awe it is fully acknowledged and finally embraced. Immanent within each of these experiences is an imperative to let go of that from which they wrench us. Thus we can become explorers only to the degree that we are willing to surrender our hold on life. That we can live fully only by letting go of everything and becoming destitute, that our enthusiasm for life can be heartfelt only if our hearts are broken open- this is the paradox which lies at the crux of that turn which is constitutive of our very being, the turn which, when we make it, engages us in the throe of questioning and so converts us into lovers of wisdom. To surrender to that throe unconditionally, to be willing to follow it wherever it leads is not an imperative just for the philosopher. It is the only way to be fully human.

A/T: Policymaking Good

Critique comes before policymaking: problem-solution models follow from epistemological and ontological assumptions about the world in which they function.

Dillon and Reed 2000 [Michael, Professor of Politics at Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations at Kings College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, Complex Emergency,” in *Alternatives* 25:1]

As a precursor to global governance, governmentality, according to Foucault's initial account, poses the question of order not in terms of the origin of the law and the location of sovereignty, as do traditional accounts of power, but in terms instead of the management of population. The management of population is further refined in terms of specific problematics to which population management may be reduced. These typically include but are not necessarily exhausted by the following topoi of governmental power: economy, health, welfare, poverty, security, sexuality, demographics, resources, skills, culture, and so on. Now, where there is an operation of power there is knowledge, and where there is knowledge there is an operation of power. Here discursive formations emerge and, as Foucault noted, in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.[ 34] More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is prescribed and policed in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a market for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet serial policy failure—the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A nonlinear economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it. In consequence, thinking and acting politically is displaced by the institutional and epistemic rivalries that infuse its power/ knowledge networks, and by the local conditions of application that govern the introduction of their policies. These now threaten to exhaust what "politics," locally as well as globally, is about.[ 36] It is here that the "emergence" characteristic of governance begins to make its appearance. For it is increasingly recognized that there are no definitive policy solutions to objective, neat, discrete policy problems. The "subjects" of policy increasingly also become a matter of definition as well, since the concept population does not have a stable referent either and has itself also evolved in biophilosophical and biomolecular as well as Foucauldian "biopower" ways.

A/T: Policymaking = Education

Their conception of knowledge is securitized; they think knowledge is that which grounds the possibility of a human relationship to truth.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 17-18]

The very alliance of security and knowledge, so characteristic of modern (inter)national politics, is what excites my suspicion most, and generates my sympathy for the genealogist.9 ‘Look,’ insisted the first genealogist, ‘isn’t our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover under everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us?’ ‘Is it not the instinct of fear’, he asked—making explicit the crucial connection between the will to truth and the will to secure—‘that bids us to know?’: And is the jubilation of those who attain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security.10 Hence: security as knowledge (certainty); security’s reliance upon knowledge (surveillance); security’s astonishing production of knowledge in response to its will to know (calculability); and the claim of knowledge which gives security its licence to render all aspects of life transparent (totality). All these constitutive elements of our contemporary manifold politics of security excited my suspicion because they comprise a monumental enterprise of power-knowledge whose insatiable maw threatens to consume not only all thought, and not only that relating to the question of the political, but of what it is to be human. Rather, and by first noting and questioning the already hypertrophic register of security, I want to call the entire scheme of security into question. For that way lies a modest contribution to making ‘our way back from the world to the life already betrayed by knowledge; knowledge that delights in its theme and is absorbed in the object to the point of losing its soul and its name there, of becoming mute and anonymous’.11 ‘Foucault’s genius is evidenced not in the pasting together of unrelated anecdotes’, a recent Foucault commentator noted, but in illustrating that historical coherences are formed from the confluence of multiple strategies and tactics of power and knowledge. History, he shows, is not the product of grand narratives with teleological movements but of diverse struggles that nonetheless become organised into coherent (that is to say, more or less continuous) patterns of domination, subjectification, and government.12 One of those constellations of struggles, however, indeed the one which informs all others, is the recurring struggle for the political itself. For whatever politics is allowed or taken to be—how it is captured, fixed and determined in its foundations; in short secured—is a decisive element in all power struggles. And yet I think that the very surfeit of information about politics which academic and media technologies create has made us so ignorant of the political, and the way that it is secured, that we are hardly even capable of formulating, much less posing and pursuing, the question of the political itself.

Their conception of knowledge attempts to cover up the *aporia* of human being as a mode of knowing; this epistemology will always attempt to simplify the world in the name of reducing the complexity and freedom of being to a calculable object, reproducing the problematic of modern political philosophy.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 75-76]

I recognise the danger that this movement of mine could be taken to excuse paying insufficiently close attention to Heidegger’s texts, or of failing to understand enough about what Heidegger has tried to say, and of similarly failing to do justice to these other complex and important thinkers. Such a danger will always exist, of course, especially when dealing with a thinker who is not only as difficult and subtle, not to say obscure, as Heidegger, but whose thought also evolved in important ways, exciting powerful responses from other eminent philosophers. Although I may very well fail on all these counts I do not intend, however, to take any liberties either with Heidegger or with the others. Rather, I am mindful, here, of Robert Bernasconi’s wise observation. Issued specifically in respect of Heidegger, it has a certain relevance to these other thinkers as well. ‘One cannot readily say what Heidegger says’, Robert Bernasconi notes, for the simple reason that Heidegger overcomes the ‘what’ of essentia by transforming the way of saying. Hence all writing about Heidegger should begin and end with a disclaimer. The disclaimer, in attempting to be faithful to what claimed [my emphasis] Heidegger, must at the same time disregard his warnings and lift the silence about silence.118 My object, then, is not to provide myself with excuses in advance but to explain instead both how I have tried to go about this work, and that—as I pursued what claimed my attention; specifically the aporia of obligatory freedom as it is simultaneously both disclosed and endangered through the preoccupation with security—the very path of my own thinking, as well as the content of it, began to change. ‘What happens’, Gerald Bruns asks, ‘when you try to follow Heidegger up or down one of his paths of thinking, studying him, trying out his moves, finding yourself caught up in him?’ His response seems to me to be an exemplary one. One of the things that happens, he says, ‘is that you begin to appreciate why people are careful to confine themselves to forms of mental activity that have no history’. By that he meant: purely analytical programs like formal logic, philosophy of language, linguistics, semiotics, most forms of literary criticism, perhaps most of what gets taught in school: programs you can get in and out of quickly and cleanly without the burden of having done anything more blameworthy than test, or apply, a certain method, skill, technique, or training.119 Precisely because it is so dangerous—and dangerous precisely because it is so intimately connected with history—there is often an almost desperate, and even violent, insistence that politics, too, both as a practice and as an object of study, be reduced in this way. In short, technologised. So-called political ‘realists’ and ‘idealists’ alike, for example, and for similar reasons, would reduce the political to the formulaic so as to settle its hash once and for all. I take their responses, however, to be symptomatic of a persistent and ancient desire to escape the sheer difficulty as well as the historically and singularity of the political.

Their framework conceives of knowledge as a relation to the world whereby we *appropriate* the world—this inevitably reproduces the calculative and technological relationship to the world which reproduces the dangers of the security paradox. Instead, we need to think of knowledge as an ethical encounter.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 48-49]

Appropriation usually means to take into one’s possession. In Heidegger it has the additional senses of being taken over, or caught-up by, as well as of entering into and making one’s own, and it occurs as he tries to think more about the presencing of things and the intimate way human being belongs to that presencing. Human beings, therefore, exist in the sense that they are ‘given-to’, simultaneously in receipt of and captured by, existence (in the way that some are given-to drink). Hence, Ereignis is the event of that play of existing in which there is an ineradicable belonging together of Being and the ‘there’ of Being, namely human being (hence the term Dasein), in which human beings find themselves ‘given-to’ existence, and wherein their own existence is at play as they find themselves challenged to make it their own in accordance with it as a possibility which has continuously to be assumed. The play, of course, is deadly serious; although it has its funny side— funny peculiar, as well as funny ‘ha! ha!’. Truth, then, is no longer a property of thought or discourse. Neither is it any longer a product of representative-calculative technique. Rather, it is a heterogeneous event of disclosure with which untruth is integrally involved as well; hence the originary and radical uncanniness of the opening whose lighting (revealing presencing) is always also traversed by darkness (the concealment of the superabundance of what is not).43 In other words, for beings to be there has to be a space or clearing for them to be in. For there to be the presence of things there has not only to be presencing as such but also, integral to that presencing, concealment; because to be manifest means not to be concealed, or to have been brought out of concealment, where concealment is the plenitude of what is not. Because Heidegger does not give-up on this crucial point, however, you cannot give-up on it either if you are to respond seriously to his thinking. But that does not mean that you must rest with Heidegger’s account of, or rather with what seems most to preoccupy him about, the clearing; namely, what many charge him with, his privileging of Being, his essentialising of Being and his particular brand of mythologising. Caputo, for example, taking his cue from Emmanuel Levinas, radicalises this declension of truth as disclosure into the event of manifestation by lifting it out of Heidegger’s history of Being, wherein he suspects it of a mythologising privileging of a certain historical epoch (that of the Greeks), and gives it a new critical function on behalf of Justice by insisting that every time is a manifestation of manifesting. Thus ‘possessed of its own grace and its own malice’, each time, including of course our own, is a time of presencing, argues Caputo, in which the event of the obligatory freedom of human being has to be responsibly assumed and Justice is called for.44 Even with Heidegger, however, it is nonetheless powerfully evident that this Radical hermeneutical phenomenology 49 clearing is a site of ethical encounter. For, in calling the entire epistemological background and ambitions of contemporary philosophy into question, Heidegger was attempting to provide a radical—‘that meant a more ethical’45—understanding of human being-in-the-world. It must be emphasised that ‘ethical’, here, does not mean a system of ethics in the form of a regional ontology of metaphysical thought. Nor is it a command ethic specified and handed down by some sovereign unappealable authority exegetically elaborated through theology. Just as Heidegger was attacking the epistemological hubris of contemporary philosophy by insisting that his hermeneutical phenomenology was a way of indicating the general structures of being-in-the-world for a being that had nonetheless to take-up its being in its own ways—and that he was therefore not attempting to offer a secure, or securing, epistemological account of such a being—so also the very ethicality of that being equally derives from being thrown into the world in a way that obliges it to takeup its being there. In each instance, Heidegger is showing something not claiming, or aspiring to, adequation between his concepts and the thing itself, simply because the thing itself here, namely human being, necessarily exceeds the concept.

Their conception of knowledge is intimately related to certainty which betrays its commitment to political securitization.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 90-91]

If we think the political in the way that we do because of the way that we think, the way that we think truth is most decisive for the way in which we think the political because the way that we think truth, for Heidegger, determines our being. More than that. Because we are not dealing with a unifocal concept of truth, here, but with a complex bi-focal belonging together of both truth and untruth, in which the issues of freedom and Justice also arise, it is the way in which we think that complex which matters most. For the way in which we think truth and untruth stages the entire problematic not only of politics but also of law and freedom. Heidegger’s entire life’s work was devoted to exploring what he thought of as a transformation in the essence of truth in the tradition of the ‘West’. Indeed, the extent to which one can talk about ‘the tradition’ or ‘the West’ depends upon this story about truth, its emergence in the Greek world and its transformation through the Roman and Medieval worlds into the Modern. The point about the transformation of the essence of truth is that it is a story about the transformation of the essence of politics, law and freedom as well, because of the ways in which these all depend upon how truth is disclosed, what truth is understood to be and how such a disclosive understanding pervades and grounds a way of life or a world. A transformation in the essence of truth necessarily, therefore, also entails a transformation in the essence of politics, and it is this story which Heidegger The topos of encounter 91 recounts in an extraordinarily dense fashion in the Parmenides lectures. That is the only place in which he connects-up the transformation in the essence of truth to the transformation in the essence of politics in any extended way. Even then, the argument is cryptic and undeveloped. But the conclusion to which it points is, nonetheless, very clear. Whereas the Greek polis is founded on, or grounded in the understanding of truth as *aletheia*, the transformation in the essence of truth means that politics is no longer determined upon the basis of *aletheia* but on the understanding of truth as certainty and correctness. It is there also, therefore, that he demonstrates how the transformation in the essence of truth is intimately connected with security. For, in addition to arguing that the essence of truth as disclosure first becomes lost, and then transformed through its Latinisation, so also he argues further that: The inception of the metaphysics of the modern age rests on the transformation of the essence of *veritas* into *certitudo*. The question of truth becomes the question of the secure, assured and self-assuring use of *ratio*.35

Framework “Propositions”

Framework propositions are those little necessary a priori truths which make human judgments meaningful; historically, they are grounded in a relationship human being has to the earth, and this relationship can be either technological or disclosive.

Turnbull 2006 [Neil, Senior Lecturer in Philosophy and Social Theory at Nottingham Trent University, “The Ontological Consequences of Copernicus: Global Being in the Planetary World,” in *Theory, Culture, Society* 23]

Interestingly, in On Certainty – Wittgenstein’s last work, written shortly before his death in 1953 – Wittgenstein makes somewhat similar claims: again suggesting the importance of the earth for the mid 20th-century European philosopher. In many places in this work, Wittgenstein offers a philosophical defence of what might be termed the ‘necessity of earthly grounds’. Here, Wittgenstein argues that the earthliness of thought and action is not something that could be reasonably doubted and represents ‘the bedrock’ of the form of life upon which ‘we’ – in this case mid 20thcentury western Europeans – think, judge and act. More specifically, Wittgenstein views the earth as a primal ‘ontological ground’ – something that exists outside of the categories of ‘true’ and ‘false’ – that silences the doubts of the sceptic who claims that ‘we cannot know’. Thus, in his view, the earth functions philosophically in the same way as the cogito in Cartesian rationalism: as an unshakeable conviction about a key feature of the world capable of providing ‘ontological support’ to human judgement. In Wittgenstein’s view, statements about the earthliness of human life occupy the nodal point of what Wittgenstein terms ‘framework propositions’ – the weakly a priori cultural assumptions that make up what ‘our world picture’ (Weltbild).3 Framework propositions are representations of the cultural grammars that express the historical particularity of ‘our form of life’; giving shape and significance to ordinary acts of judgement (again suggesting a new unity of earth and world in Wittgenstein’s later work). In Wittgenstein’s view, these framework propositions are immune from doubt. As he states: ‘[e]verything that I have seen or heard gives me the conviction that no man has ever been far from the earth. Nothing in my world speaks in favour of the opposite’ (1969: 93). Thus, for Wittgenstein, ‘my not having been to the moon is as sure a thing for me as any grounds that I could give for it’ (1969: 111). In response to the sceptic who might respond with ‘How do you know?’ Wittgenstein answers simply: that ‘this would not fit into the rest of my convictions’ (1969: 102). So, for Wittgenstein – in 1953 – deterritorialized ‘planetary’ experiences are ruled out as a priori impossible, and the terrestriality and territoriality of experience takes on the status of a necessary truth (Wittgenstein also claimed that he is a priori certain that he has never been to China [1969: 333]). The sceptic’s question here is simply not a ‘real question’ for Wittgenstein because grounds for doubt are lacking in this case (as there can be no grounds for doubting our most basic idea of grounds). In 1953, the technical and cultural conditions of possibility for space travel were absent and, thus, when conceived in a Wittgensteinian way, one cannot realistically imagine this state of affairs as possible and so it provides no grounds for doubt. Like Heidegger’s, Wittgenstein’s later philosophy views the earth as ontologically axiomatic. For, according to Wittgenstein, ‘only in such-andsuch a circumstance’ does a ‘reasonable person’ doubt that they have ever been far away from the earth (1969: 333). However, in a technological hypermobile and globalized world, these ‘such-and-such a circumstances’ have become more generalized and commonplace. In such contexts the sceptical question ‘refuted’ by Wittgenstein no longer strikes one as fundamentally odd and its sceptical point no longer ‘purely philosophical’. Although the earth might have been a source of a priori certainty in 1953, this is no guarantee that it will retain this epistemological status given radically different historical circumstances, as ‘the earth’ also experiences historical variation in its sense and significance (see Furley, 1989). Although the idea of ‘the earth’ as ‘the ground beneath’ possessed an intuitive self-evidence in 1953, and was the nodal point of Mitteleuropean consciousness and the centripetal force of its cognitive frameworks, the earth appears differently and has a different sense to those who, at beginning of the 21st century, have – albeit often only vicariously – imbibed the many varieties of astronautic representations of the earth as a new cultural a priori and repository of a new global cultural grammar. For when ‘rendered planetary’, the earth no longer ‘grounds’ as such but has become more like a Heideggerian world: an open expanse that lies in front of us, as vast visible space revealing hitherto unknown human/ecological threads and patterns that increasingly give things a new ‘planetary’ measure of social, ecological and cultural connectivity.

A/T: Technology Inevitable

Technology isn’t inevitable

**Kateb 97** – Professor of Politics, Princeton (George, Technology and philosophy, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m2267/is\_n3\_v64/ai\_19952031/pg\_3, )

I find in Weber, Heidegger, and Arendt the following themes, all of which are first stated or suggested by Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spins of Capitalism (1958[1904-5]). All the themes go against both philosophical Marxism and against common sense. First, it is a fact worthy of meditation that, in its origin, modern technology is not a human-species-wide phenomenon, but a distinctively Western one. Although the West was and is indebted to the scientific and technical achievements of other regions and cultures, it is responsible for modern technology. In the three thinkers, and others as well, the Western distinctiveness is rendered ambivalently: celebration and profound disquiet are mixed together in the analysis of both the feats of prowess and the underlying passions that brought those feats into existence. I would add that such ambivalence is one of the most prominent features in a lot of the writing about technology. A second theme is that, just as modern technology was not a universal phenomenon, so there was nothing inevitable about it in the West. All three philosophers have a keen feeling for accident and contingency, for roads not taken, for opportunities either not accepted or forced into being. A third theme is that the passions, drives, and motives that helped to promote technology are, to a significant extent, instigated or inspired by ideas, religious or philosophical, that manage to be absorbed into the self-conception that many individuals in a cross-national cultural setting hold of themselves. Modern technology is not only applied science; even more profoundly, it is philosophy or theology enacted. Philosophers and theologians are the originators. Other people go along or are carried along, because of the original reasons, or because of their own varied reasons, half-reasons, and nonreasons. The long and short of it is that only in the West, but contingently so, modern technology emerged, and did so because of the birth and spread of hard, abstract ideas that are not explainable in the Marxist manner as inevitable reflexive responses to material circumstances. And it has emerged and continues to flourish as a special and particular project; what is more, a project of excess and extremism. The modern West, best seen as the creator of modern technology, is not only distinctive, it is anomalous in comparison to the rest of the world; and the anomaly is stupendous and perhaps monstrous. The marvel lies not only in the results of the project but, to begin with, in the fact that the project of modern technology was ever undertaken and then sustained. Humanity in the West has had a certain kind of relation to nature and human beings not to be found elsewhere, or found in a much diluted form.

Technology not inevitable

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Heidegger and Arendt amplify the story told by Weber, and also told, well before him, by Thoreau and Melville and others in the United States. In such essays as "The Age of the World Picture" (1938), "The Question Concerning Technology" (1949-50), and "Science and Reflection" (1954) (all three in Heidegger, 1977), Heidegger finds the origin of modern technology in Western metaphysics. He emphasizes the outlook of thinkers as lawgivers, and sees in them the true bearers of the passions and drives and motives that are the foundation of modern technology, rather than assigning the inspiration to common Western humanity as a whole. When philosophers are not content to awaken wonder at the world, but instead strive to remake the world, they sometimes succeed. Their greatest success is modern technology. Modern technology is, to repeat our phrase, a certain relation to nature or reality or the world; it is therefore not merely the inevitable application of that immense scientific knowledge that grows once humanity is rid of communal or religious superstition and repression. Certainly that is part of the story, but for Heidegger it is not the principal part. Rather, modern technology is the materialization of Western metaphysics, which is the parent of both modern technology and modern science. Indeed, the technological aim drives the development of modern science. Western metaphysics is just one interpretation of reality, just as its offspring--modern science and modern technology--are particular relations to reality, to what is given. Heidegger means to show that Western metaphysics--and metaphysics includes theology--is a continuously if sometimes covertly reiterated Platonism. By his method of exegesis, Heidegger tries to persuade us that Platonic metaphysics converts the world into a picture for the mind's eye, and by doing that, prepares Western humanity to lose sight of the mere fact of existence, the unsummoned thereness of reality, of the given. Metaphysics inveterately reduces the world. The purpose of the reduction is to make the world intelligible and hence manageable, fit to be worked on, and made ready to have practical order imposed on it. The world, as given, is disliked; it is disliked in large part just because it is given; the dislike engenders anger, and from anger comes rebellion. Western humanity is and has always been at war with given reality, to a much greater degree than the rest of humanity, and in a remarkably distinct manner. Technology is the most spectacular campaign in the great war waged by Western humanity against nature or reality as given. To repeat: the deepest cause of that war is not scarcity, not the failure of nature to make better provision for a necessitous humanity, but, instead, a Western willfulness, a will to power, to mastery, an overflow of energy that wants to shake the world to pieces and make it over. The craving is either to put the human stamp on reality or at least to rescue nature from the absence of any honestly detectable stamp, any detectable natural purpose or intention. As Nietzsche says: humanity, in its asceticism, "wants to become master not over something in life but over life itself, over its most profound, powerful, and basic conditions" (Nietzsche, 1969, sec. 11, pp. 117-18). Western humanity cannot let things be on their own terms or coax gently from them their own best potentiality; it is so far unable to practice what Heidegger calls Gelassenheit. Western metaphysics is the sponsor of anger and hence of repeated violence towards nature.

A/T: “Can’t have value to life if we’re all dead”

Death is the ground of freedom in life—our decisions have no meaning if they are not framed by human finitude. Treating death as a mere event to be avoided reduces our ability to freedom to mere calculation. Rather dead than ontologically damned, then.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 82-84]

Whereas tragic denial is willful blindness to this conflict, ‘to go through life with one’s eyes open’ means ‘to see tragic denial shape the entire morphological scope of the law’.14 To go through life with one’s eyes open requires a commitment, The topos of encounter 83 also, however, to explore the tragic topos of the encounter that human being has in its own being of obligatory freedom with the uncanniness of Being as such, and the demitted call of Justice which resounds throughout it. Such is the special place of the political that political thought has to think: ‘it is more salutary for thinking to wander in estrangement than to establish itself in the comprehensible’.15 It is a matter for it, then, of remaining faithful to phenomena as they constantly and continuously display this occulting phenomenalising manifested through a temporal being freed by birth into no escape from death, continuously challenged to accord Justice to that condition in the living of it, distinguished by always already knowing beforehand the not-mere in the there of its very own there-being. It is precisely here also that the uncanny question of Otherness arises, because: From the singularity of being follows the singularity of Not belonging to it, and consequently the singularity of the other. The one and the other are binding.16 Yes and No, in short, are equi-primordial, co-originary. Yes, there is manifestation and, No, there is…what? Something absolutely crucial arises now because the ‘No’ here is no simple no, no mere symmetrical dialectical negation of the—‘No, there is no manifestation’—capable of realising some final synthesis. Rather, it is the ‘No’ of—‘No there is no manifestation of manifestation’— in which the superfluity of the very absence of manifestation, its retraction or withdrawal as Heidegger calls it, is what makes way for beings to have their very possibility to be at all. Withdrawal it has to be, then, if the overdose of manifesting is to be liminal rather than terminal. For if we were always already in receipt of the full dose, let alone overdosed, what would there be left for us to have and to be, to do and to see? If our standing was already commanded or guaranteed—rather than given to be assumed—why should we have to stand at all? Underway through time’s making way—the taking place of Being—human being has to find its own way of way-making consonant with the uncanny challenge to be of its specific and concrete, historical passage in truth. Born to die we always already pre-hend this No in every Yes—this Not-being in anything and everything—by virtue of our very own mortal existing. For we die. Just as visibility never becomes visible, manifestation never becomes manifest. And yet we are manifest because we dwell in manifestation. There has, therefore, to be visibility for things to appear, manifesting for things to stand-out, which is not itself a thing. This is what Heidegger means when he says that Being is Nothing. This is what he means when he talks of the withdrawal or the retraction of Being. There has similarly to be Being for beings to be, but Being is never manifested as such, for that would be the final trip. Co-originary, the No and the Yes of the Being of being which we experience in and as our existence—our own standing-out in Being, in which the hiddenness of Being takes place, stands-out, in its hiddenness through its questioning by us— are not, however, co-equal. Equiprimordial but without equipoise, there is a radical asymmetry in which the No outweighs the Yes. For, remember, the No—or to be precise, the Not—is no simple negation. Recall how Heidegger insists upon it as superfluity, as the possible that always already stands higher than the actual, as that the essence of which is ‘to come’; which, like death is for us, dis-locates, dispossesses, individualises and singularises. For born free there is no way out, either, of our mortality and no one can suffer anyone else’s death. Only I can die my death. Knowing that singularises me, removes me from the world and deprives me of any certain meaning other than that of the opaque mystery of not being. And whereas this has often been taken to be either a mystical and mystifying anthropology or, worse still, another account of atomistic individuality, it is of course neither. For this singular being singularised by its birthing-towards-death (its mortal natality and natal mortality) is nonetheless also, it has to be recalled, a being-in-the-world and a being-with-others in unassimilable Otherness. However much the paths of Heidegger’s thought may wind through singularisation, world, the other, the four-fold and the very uncanniness which being there at all brings to light, there is no remit for forgetting that it is this composite uncanny phenomenolising—in which human beings share an integral and, as far as we know distinctively responsible, share—which is at issue.

A/T: Heidegger = Nazi

We would never deny that philosophy and politics go together; we deny that any answers to their relationship come ready-made and determined by our preconceptions of philosophy and politics.

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 42-43]

Mistrust, because when he chose his own radical politics he chose disastrously. If we cannot escape his philosophy neither can we escape his politics. That he seems to have recognised what a disastrous choice he had made, has not detracted from the terrible fact that he made it; neither has the fact that in thinking about technology or technicity, he devoted much of the rest of his work to thinking through that nihilism of which Nazism was an expression in a way that consequently remains a powerful resource for critical political thinking in the age of technology. Frustration, on the other hand, arises most amongst those who expect their politics to arrive ready-made, in self-assembly packs or, at least, as an intelligible set of instructions. Such is not on offer with Heidegger. Instead, his call to think anew about the established ways in which we have come to think at all, makes us think anew about the very limits of politics, and about the political as the liminal operation of limit in the assumption by human beings of their peculiar mode of free being. It is not politics, as it has come to be understood in an increasingly technologised global life, which arises as a positive concern through Heidegger’s thinking, therefore, but what he would no doubt have called the very essence of the political. There are no instructions, however, especially after his association Radical hermeneutical phenomenology 43 with the Nazis, as to how this may resolve itself in terms of specific political commitments. Quite the contrary. Given the character of his thought, such commitments cannot, however, be determined in advance of the particular circumstances in which human being, at determinate times and in determinate places, is challenged to free itself from the closures which are threatened by such specific historical circumstances. For Heidegger, what distinguishes the predicament of contemporary human being is the determinate technological emplacing of late modern times. In necessarily broaching the question of the essence of the political once more, because he questions the thought in which it was first thought,18 I find that there is a sensibility in Heidegger’s thought which thoroughly informs the very structure of it. That sensibility has a very special purchase on, and provides a very particular means of disclosing the entire question of, the political. Although he speaks of it rarely and with restraint—‘even in his reading of Nietzsche’,19 and of Hölderlin— this sensibility and structure is that of what he also referred to as the highest form of ‘Saying’ the tragic.20 But we cannot begin to appreciate the character and the significance of this sensibility without making our way to it, however summarily, via the route of that radical phenomenology of hermeneutical questioning by which means Heidegger opened-up philosophy’s question of Being; and disclosed the mutually disclosive relationship between Being and human being as the there of Being (Dasein) in a way that has so profoundly influenced the thought of the freedom of human being.

A/T: Heidegger = Nazi

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 131-132]

Here, with his very political fallibility, arises a particular reason why it does so. There is a pressing need to recover the question of the political as much from Heidegger-the-Nazi, who seems to corrupt it, as from Heidegger the philosopher who appears to elide it. A refurbished interrogation and understanding of the political is consequently one of the prizes to be prised-out of an engagement with Heidegger.7 The preface for such an engagement, which is all I have been attempting here, must, I have been arguing, proceed through security by way of the tragic. We cannot, therefore, go the route which Heidegger himself first took and against which his subsequent thinking was quite clearly and critically devoted. That is precisely the technological nemesis to which his own thought alerts us and from which the recovery of the political will always be required. The matter of Heidegger’s ‘silence’—that is to say, his refusal to repudiate the Nazi period publicly, to ‘atone’ for his membership of the Nazi Party, and his silence concerning the fate of European Jewry—is particularly relevant here. I could say that I do not have the space to give it all the thought and close attention it deserves, but in fact I do not know precisely what amount of space it would require. For this conventional genuflection to seriousness implies that somehow I do know, or could know. But I do not. And yet it is not a matter of me not knowing. I simply think it is not knowable. The question will never be answered and so it will never be settled. This is in fact what allows me to go on about it, and with it. Given the importance attached to silence in all of Heidegger’s thought, this ‘silence’ cannot be mere omission.8 In his lectures on Parmenides, for example, he says, ‘to keep silent’ is not merely to say nothing. Without something essential to say, one cannot keep silent. Only within essential speech, and by means of it alone, can there prevail essential silence, having nothing in common with secrecy, concealment, or ‘mental reservations’.9 Manifestly, it is not a simple oversight either, because silence always resounds for Heidegger, and so perhaps it is also something even more than a ‘radical failure of thought’.10 For, in his thinking, Heidegger systematically and consistently elevated reticence and comportment even above thought. Or, rather, consonant with his radical hermeneutical phenomenology, and with his history of Being and its preoccupation with the hidden and the inconspicuous, Heidegger made of thought something which was fundamentally related to dwelling in a pious attentiveness to the mystery of Being. Hence, one might suspect that his association with the Nazis was no mere ‘deficiency’ of thought, but a consequence of his own ‘disposition’ or comportment.11 And it is precisely this, though worked through his thought in detailed ways, which John Caputo concludes is Heidegger’s scandal.12

A/T: Heidegger = Nazi

Dillon 1996 [Michael, professor Politics and International Relations at the University of Lancaster, *The Politics of Security*,pp. 132-133]

Somehow Heidegger, here on this site and with respect to the site-ing of the political, seemed unwilling to think through the fundamental belonging together of dwelling and displacement: that we are all strangers native born, and so always already dwelling en route; that routes and roots are ineradicably intertwinned; hence, that to found and be a people (even, in his terms, with the assignment of the word) is an exclusionary practice; that indigeneity, however useful it may be as a device to protect some from the violence of Modernity and its modernisers, is a certain sort of violent claim; and that to circumscribe and inhabit a ‘place’ simultaneously also poses the question of the one who is thereby estranged from that place, or comes to that place as a stranger. All of this, of course, is, nonetheless, however, precisely what his entire account of mortal existence also proclaims. For Heidegger, par eminence, is the philosopher of pathways. His very thought—especially where it concerns ‘Homecoming’, because homecoming (always already referring to an originary dispossession or being-out-of-place, rather than any simple-minded geographical repatriation) is a continuous cherishing re-calling of what it is to be human13—insists that displacement is a pre-condition of dwelling.14 Homecoming, not staying but lingering a while, is only ever an episode in wandering. Moreover, and despite misguided criticisms that have been directed at him to this effect, while this exile in freedom is a continuous struggle to be, and to preserve the law of the possible which freedom entails, it is an exile without nostalgia. Consequently, and though it nonetheless appears as if it also entails some failure of thought, this lacuna in Heidegger makes thought resound, and resounds to thought as well, in its own distinctive way; precisely because it always leaves the The political and the tragic 133 question of judgement open.15 Heidegger seemed to make, take and accept no judgement upon himself. Did he evade judgement? More than that. Is the question—that is to say philosophy’s question, the question of Being—itself a way of evading judgement? Or, on the contrary, but in ways with which we are unfamilar, does it not necessarily always already belong together with judgement, which it poses as a certain sort of aporia that summons the resoluteness entailed in de-cision? In noting the possibility of such a double evasion ‘we’ are, therefore, always confronted with having to say what it is we are judging, whom we are to judge, who we are who judge, what judgement is, on what authority and in whose name it is exercised, and whether it is sufficient merely to judge, when confronting Heidegger-the-Nazi. His silence thus exposes how a ‘we’ is comprised by judgement (de-cision); how large an excess beyond judgement judgement, nonetheless, leaves-out for further account; and the violence against that remainder which judgement necessarily creates because there are no innocent alternatives (which is not the same as saying that all alternatives must therefore be equally ‘guilty’, or to explore what ‘guilt’ is).16 It exposes, too, the way rhetorics of moral indignation and ritual purification provide an easy way out of the matter for thought—and so therefore of judgement and decision—which Heidegger-the-Nazi presents. While Being poses the aporia of judgement for human being in its very mortal freedom, does confining oneself to the question of Being become a way of evading judgement; of securing oneself through a subtle strategem from the intractable inescapable burden of judgement? Or, instead, does it effect a radically different disposition in and towards the aporia of judgement? Was Heidegger struggling all along, therefore, to escape the violent, dirty, debt-incurring, business of judgement whose aporetic difficulty his own thought of Being had nonetheless illuminated? Or, considering his reflections on silence as well as his silence, are ‘we’ more forcefully directed towards the burden of response-ability we carry in the freedom into which we are thrown after Heidgger—the heavy political mortgage of the twentieth century? Did he intend or anticipate any or all, and more, of this? Of course I do not even pretend to know. But whatever reasons he may, or may not have had, for keeping silent, he must have done. He was too smart not to know. Do we, in any event, need to know that he knew for all the thoughts which his silence prompts to matter? For they do matter. Very much. And they matter, ultimately, more than Heidegger’s life and thought, however much that life and thought forces us to endure this burden of judgement ourselves. Consequently, what is important for me in this affair is that, in the process of enduring the knowledge of Nazism as well as of Heidegger’s association with it, it is possible for us to recognise ‘ourselves’ illuminated also in the aporia of judgement. Such a recognition is itself an assumption of response-ability for—which is the same as being open to, or freed as—a being-in-common that always and everywhere, in its openness, remains capable of Holocaust.

A/T: Heidegger = Nazi

To Heidegger, even if Nazism opposed technology, their policies were crude failures – he believes they were too limited in their methods.

Rockmore 97 **(**Tom, Professor of Philosophy @ Duquesne University, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy, *Nazism and Technology*, p. 205-207, 1997) JM

The link between Heidegger's view of technology and Nazism is controversial. With a single exception, most observers consider Heidegger's view of technology as indicating his distance from National Socialism. Heidegger himself calls attention to the relation of his theory of technology to Nazism in the well-known Spiegel interview. Heidegger's Spiegel interview is more significant than its designation as an interview suggests. It was not the result of a simple meeting with a journalist, but the product of careful planning, whose text was later worked over before publication. The interview records Heidegger's largely successful effort to influence the way in which his person and thought would be regarded after his death. Now the single most important theme of this interview consists in Heidegger's comments on the theme of technology which emerges in his later thought. It is, then, useful to examine the text of his interview as an initial indication of the relation between his view of technology and his Nazism. Heidegger's interview with Der Spiegel offers a simplified but not inaccurate access to his difficult theory of technology. In the course of the interview, Heidegger makes a series of points about technology, which are clearly related to his later thought: 1. His understanding of technology changed from the early idea of the confrontation between human being and planetary technology, in his lecture course on metaphysics, to the later idea of enframing (Gestell ).Enframing is roughly a conception of horizon, as the limits within which something occurs. For Heidegger, the limit of modernity is technology. 2. The force of global technology as a factor in determining history can scarcely be overestimated. This is a further form of the view, which emerges in Heidegger's later thought, that human being is powerless before Being. 3. At present, he is unconvinced that democracy is adequate as a political system in a technological age. Heidegger here draws the political consequence of his later conception of Being as the real historical agent. 4. Human being is unable to master or to respond adequately to the essence of technology. This idea is the corollary of the view that ultimate agency is lodged in Being. 5. The age of technology has brought forward a series of technological relationships in which man is uprooted from his tradition and his home. Heidegger here returns to a form of his idea of authenticity, which he later develops in the direction of an authentic form of life. 6. Metaphysical thinking, which ends in Nietzsche, is unable adequately to think technology.7. The essence of technology lies in the concept of enframing. This is an indication of how Heidegger understands technology. 8. The situation of human being with respect to technology is not one of fate and it is possible to prepare for a reversal (Urnkehr ). Heidegger holds out in this way the prospect of emerging from the hegemony of technology. This signals a residual role for thought beyond philosophy. 9. National Socialism was moving in the direction of reacting against technology although it fell short of the goal. Heidegger now disputes the view that Nazism was itself a simple manifestation of technology, or only that, since he insists that Nazism intended to react against the hegemony of modern technology. 10. We can prepare to counteract technology, although only a god can save us, through a new appropriation of the European tradition in which thinking transforms thinking. This is a further formulation of Heidegger's conviction that after the death of God, which Nietzsche has announced, after the end of the old mythology, we require a new mythology. There is a clear connection between Heidegger's Nazism and his approach to technology. Heidegger describes his theory of technology as an effort to go further down the road traveled by National Socialism, understood as an initial but intrinsically insufficient effort to come to grips with the problem of technology. [14] Numerous commentators have insisted on the role of technology in Nazism, in particular on the integral way in which it furthered Nazi genocide.[15] Heidegger takes a completely different, in fact opposite line. For Heidegger, National Socialism opposes the rule of technology; but in virtue of its supposed incapacity to think, Nazism is unable to break away from it.[16] Heidegger presents his own thought as an improvement on the "inadequate" effort of Nazi thinkers to face technology. In answer to a question raised during the interview, Heidegger states: It seems to me that you are taking technology too absolutely. I do not see the situation of man in the world of global technology as a fate which cannot be escaped or unravelled. On the contrary, I see the task of thought to consist in helping man in general, within the limits allotted to thought, to achieve an adequate relationship to the essence of technology. National Socialism, to be sure, moved in this direction. But those people were far too limited in their thinking to acquire an explicit relationship to what is really happening today and has been underway for three centuries. Here, in his own way, Heidegger is signaling, as clearly as he can—candidly, and accurately—that his theory of technology is meant to carry out the ideas which the National Socialists were too limited to develop through a theory of technology with political consequences. What does it mean, in the era of technology, to achieve an adequate relationship to the essence of technology, an explicit relationship to what is happening today and has been under way for three centuries? One thing it means is to confront modernity. Now in the period after Being and Time , most explicitly in the Nietzsche lectures, Heidegger came to understand his own thought of Being as confronting modernity, and the rule over beings, in the name of Being. Nazism, too, he tells us in this passage, made a similar attempt, although it fell short in its inability—which Heidegger criticizes in a variety of texts, such as the Nietzsche lectures and the Beiträge —to think Being authentically. Now part of the authentic thought of Being is authentic human being, or Dasein, as the vantage point from which to comprehend Being. Authentic human being is what Heidegger since the rectoral address has in view through the idea of the historical realization of the Germans as German. Although Heidegger has undertaken to deconstrust subjectivity in order to consider Being without Dasein, in another sense Dasein is still central to his thought in his concern with resistance to the loss of tradition and of the place to dwell. If this is correct, we can anticipate that Heidegger's theory of technology, which he intends as a carrying out of the confrontation of technology which the Nazis were too crude to perform, continues to share the insistence on the authentic gathering of the Volk . Like his theory of Being, the theory of technology which derives from the theory of Being is intrinsically political, where politics is directed toward the authenticity of the Germans and, beyond the Germans, toward knowledge of Being. To miss this point, to understand his theory of technology merely as an analysis of technology, even more precisely as a scrutiny of the essence of technology, is simply to miss the central thrust of Heidegger's view.

\*\*\*Affirmative Answers\*\*\*

Link Turn (Phenomenology)

Space exploration and development provide new phenomenological resources from which to value the earth and otherness.

Huchingson 1990 [James, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Florida International University, “Earthstruck,” in *Zygon* 25.3]

The astronauts, who came from many cultural backgrounds, testify to an experience that seems to be universal, or collective, or more fundamental than even a common shaping could account for. Although the photographs and passages are of course selected, they seem to reflect the responses of those who have flown into space. Their common witness is religious in a broad sense of that term—of being grasped, shaken, and transformed by an unexpected and astonishing encounter. Their comments provide important evidence for a wide transformation of attitudes, now occurring, that is both induced and expressed by the exploration of space. Since this is an extraordinary book, there is no need to continue an assessment of its quality. Instead, we should delineate its meaningful themes and what they represent for our search, philosophical and religious, for human significance in the scheme of things. Home Planet gives first approximations of emerging images of the Earth and the place of human life upon it that may dominate the thinking of our children's children. Most of the dozens of succinct reports that accompany the photographs are easily gathered into common themes, one of which is the surprising existential quality of the experience for men and women whose training is almost exclusively technical. In space "we experience those uniquely human qualities: awe, curiosity, amazement," reports one astronaut. ' 'You look down upon the Earth with a mixed feeling of delight and adoration," says another. A Soviet cosmonaut, whose exposure to Wittgenstein is probably minimal, unknowingly paraphrases a famous remark by the Austrian philosopher: "I love . . . looking at the Earth. It isn't important who she is, just that she is." The likes of Heschel, Buber, Maslow, Heidegger, and Otto would find their existential philosophies reflected in such remarks. Many quotations stress a second common theme: Earth as a vulnerable and finite place. "The Earth was small . . . and so touch-ingly alone." "The beautiful, warm, living object looks so fragile, so delicate, that if you touched it with a finger, it would crumble and fall apart." This perception of vulnerability, combined with the theme of wonder and adoration, gives rise to a resolve to protect the planet against onslaughts by the human species. "She has generously given us everything she has amassed over the billions of years of inanimate development. We have grown strong and powerful, yet how have we answered this goodness?" The rhetorical statement of one cosmonaut is verified by another: We "are standing guard over the whole of our Earth." The most urgent task of the race "is to cherish and preserve it for future generations." A third theme of the book is the sense of the Earth as ' 'other. ' ' This perception is well documented in earlier quotes and, indeed, is presupposed by them. The most important spiritual spin-off of space exploration is the experience of the planet as a separate and distinct physical reality, apart from the observer, that confronts him (and her) and demands response. Before the astronauts returned with these pictures there was no way to capture the Earth in the act of self-presentation. In all previous times, people were hampered in attempts to understand the Earth by their very proximity to its surface. It was the obscure backdrop for life and history—a woefully inadequate model atop a desk or a mosaic of photographs from low-level glimpses of an endless scroll of localities, regions, continents, and seas. Now something truly novel has been impressed upon our history: the view of the Earth adjacent to our spaceship, a neighbor. There is no way at this time to assess the potential of this new standpoint, but we can say that it is considerable. Indeed, the editor of Home Planet is aware of this, and he quotes astronomer Fred Hoyle on the inside front cover: "Once a photograph of the Earth, taken from the outside is available ... a new idea as powerful as any in history will be let loose."

Link Turn (Phenomenology)

The phenomenological fact of Earthrise solves borders and violence; space exploration makes us kinder, and more sober.

Huchingson 1990 [James, Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Florida International University, “Earthstruck,” in *Zygon* 25.3]

Another, associated theme is the elimination of boundaries. Viewing the whole Earth, the astronauts quickly forgot the state borders imposed upon her by territorial consciousness. In reality, the surface of the planet is seamless. The ever-changing patterns beneath the spacecraft, provided by the geologic and meteorological nature of the globe, are ample enough. An Arab astronaut recalls his expanding and inclusive perception: "The first day or so we all pointed to our countries. The third or fourth day we were pointing to our continents. By the fifth day we were aware of only one Earth." These perceptions are confirmed by a cosmonaut: "And then it struck me that we are all children of our Earth. It does not matter what country you look at. We are all Earth's children, and we should treat her as our Mother." Finally, the astronauts and cosmonauts bear witness to an inalienable sense of attachment to the Earth. Separation from the home planet by hundreds of thousands of miles only accentuated their sense of belonging. The view from afar "is so moving that you can hardly believe how emotionally attached you are to the rough patterns shifting steadily below." The exhilaration one might expect at being liberated from Earth's gravity to float freely in space, to explore the celestial bodies and endless reaches of the galaxy, is missing. The old cliché about distance and fondness holds true even with respect to interplanetary spacefaring: "A cosmonaut, should he eat bread somewhere near Mars baked from wheat raised in a space laboratory, will, believe me, think of the grain and flowers gathered on Earth." Konstantin Tsiolkovsky , the father of Russian rocketry, is quoted as saying, "The Earth is a cradle, but man cannot live in a cradle forever." With all due respect, however, Tsiolkovsky's "cradle" is more difficult to forget than either he or Star Trek triumphalism would have us believe! The overall response of these astronauts/cosmonauts is reminiscent of prophets and mystics who testify to their heaven-sent revelations or insight. (The irony is that the former had to enter the heavens to receive theirs.) The planet unveils herself to the spacefarers as they literally fly next to her in formation. Earth has always been understood in the cosmic hierarchy as the inferior, profane plane of existence to which the sacred descends or beyond which the hero must go to reach holy heights—Moses ascending Sinai or Muhammad rising from Jerusalem to preview paradise. But in this modern case something totally unexpected has happened. In an astonishing and unprecedented turning of the tables, Earth is discovered to be suspended in the heavens! Our mundane plane of existence has unveiled herself for what she is: materia matrix—the maternal source and sustainer of life, floating out there in the deep, black void. So it seems that Arendt's apprehensions are unfounded. Human penetration of space beyond the atmosphere has resulted in neither diminished stature for earthlings in their own eyes nor exploitation. Earthbound politicians, generals, and technocrats may have harbored predatory hopes when they created the technology of spaceflight, but those they sent outward were transformed by the experience. By their own accounts, they have "become more full of life, softer . . . more kind and patient." The haughty, the high, and the mighty failed to materialize with the ascent into space. Humility (from humus, meaning "earthy") instead dominates the space voyager's response. And if we who must remain on Earth can share in the experience and be shaped by it, this legacy of our early attempts to fly into space may be one of the most important contributions of our waning century.

Link Turn – Critical Technology

We can take a critical relationship to human use of technology and still act in the interests of the aff.

Hicks 3 (Steven V., Professor and chair of philosophy at Queens College of the CUNY, “Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Foucault: Nihilism and Beyond,” Foucault and Heidegger: Critical Encounters, Ed. Alan Milchman and Alan Rosenberg, p. 109, Questia)

<Why a “philosophical shock”? The answer, in part, may be that from Foucault's perspective, Heidegger's insightful reading of Nietzsche and the problem of nihilism is itself too ascetic. Heidegger's emphasis on “silence” as proper to Dasein's being, his frequent use of quasireligious (even Schopenhauerean) terms of “grace” and “call of conscience, ” his many references to the destiny of the German Volk, his avoidance of politics and the serious “quietistic” tone of Heideggerian Gelassenheit are all reminiscent of the life-denying ascetic ideal Nietzsche sought to avoid. 65 Moreover, Foucault seems to join with Derrida and other “neo-Nietzscheans” in regarding Heidegger's idea of “letting Being be”—his vision of those who have left traditional metaphysics behind and with it the obsession with mastery and technology that drives contemporary civilization—as too passive or apathetic a response to the legitimate problems of post-Nietzschean nihilism that Heidegger's own analysis uncovers. 66 Here we have arrived at a key difference between Heidegger and Foucault: for Foucault, Heidegger takes insufficient account of the playful and even irreverent elements in Nietzsche and of Nietzsche's critique of the dangers of the ascetic ideal. Foucault joins with other new Nietzscheans in promoting, as an alternative to Heideggerian Gelassenheit, the more Nietzschean vision of “playing with the text”—which in Foucault's case means promulgating active and willful images of resistance and struggle against particular practices of domination, rebellion against “micro-powers, ” and blatant disregard for tradition (cf. DP, 27). 67 This context-specific, unambiguously confrontational nature of Foucault's critique of the forms of domination and technologies of power lodged in modern institutions offers a more Nietzsche-like response than the one Heidegger offers to the nihilistic problems of Western civilization. As Foucault sees it, the lessons Heidegger would have us draw from Nietzsche throw us back to the passive “nihilism of emptiness” that Nietzsche feared. While not predicting the emergence of better times, Foucault tries to offer a better (less passive, less ascetic) model for reforming our “background practices” and for cultivating an affirmative attitude toward life that he and other neo-Nietzscheans think may be “our only chance to keep from extinguishing life on earth altogether.”

No Link – Technology

Heidegger is unable to distinguish between forms of technology due to a flawed theory of agency.

Rockmore 97 **(**Tom, Professor of Philosophy @ Duquesne University, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy*, Toward Criticism of Heidegger’s View of Technology* p. 233-4, 1997) JM

The main defect of Heidegger's theory of technology lies in his arbitrary, unjustified assumption of a particular theory of agency as its basis. The problem of agency, or subjectivity, is an important philosophical theme. The part of the modern philosophical tradition stemming from Descartes can be understood as an ongoing effort to comprehend the subject, initially as a kind of epistemological placeholder, an ultimately bare posit, such as the Cartesian cogito or the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception, and later as a social being in the views of Fichte, Hegel, and Marx. Heidegger's nonanthropological analysis of technology differs in a fundamental way from the average interpretation of technology, whether as instrumental or applied science, which presupposes that technology yields to an anthropological approach. In his early thought, Heidegger utilizes the concept of Being as a pole of attraction, much as the Aristotelian God, which acts in that it is desired. In his later thought, Heidegger rethinks Being as an event (Ereignis ) acting upon us, for instance as sending or granting various capacities to art, technology, and so on. Heidegger's extension of his theory of Being to the phenomenon of technology is problematic. A line of argument acceptable within the context of his thought of Being is not necessarily acceptable when considered on its own merits. Even if, for purposes of argument, we grant the correctness of Heidegger's later view of Being against the background of his position, and the correctness of his extension of his view of Being as a theory of technology, it does not follow that we need accept his view of technology. Heidegger "derives" his understanding of technology from his understanding of Being, but he provides no reason to accept his view of technology as such. The view of Being as agent which follows from the evolution of his position is not supported by his analysis of technology. To put the same point differently: Heidegger holds that phenomenology is concerned with disclosing what is concealed; unfortunately, Heidegger does not disclose his transhuman concept of Being as agent within, but rather imposes it upon, technology. Heidegger's arbitrary conception of agency leads to a number of difficulties in his understanding of technology. First, there is an evident inability to differentiate forms of technology. A theory of technology must be able to distinguish among different forms of technology. There are obvious differences between the horse-drawn plow and the tractor, the spear and the atom bomb, the abacus and the computer, the movable-type printing press and the linotype machine, and so on. Each pair illustrates the difference between an earlier and a later way to perform the same or similar tasks. In each case, later technology builds on and improves the performance of earlier types of technology. The chronologically later kinds of technology in these examples are also technologically more sophisticated and, in that sense, technologically more advanced. Since Heidegger apparently condemns modern technology as such, he does not, and in fact is unable to, introduce such routine distinctions. But such distinctions are not merely a useless finesse; they are rather necessary in order to make a choice of the means as a function of the end in view.

Heideggerian views of technology are not the only alternative

Rockmore 97 **(**Tom, Professor of Philosophy @ Duquesne University, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy*, Toward Criticism of Heidegger’s View of Technology* p. 235, 1997) JM

Third, Heidegger exaggerates the differences between theories of technology which differ not in kind, but in degree only. A reference to Heidegger's and non-Heideggerian readings of technology as respectively authentic and inauthentic reflects his conviction that the exclusive authenticity of his own approach is guaranteed by its link to Being. Yet Heideggerian and non-Heideggerian views of technology are not mutually exclusive, but overlap. An example is the status of Marx's theory, which Heidegger praises for its concern with history while criticizing its purported failure to subordinate the essence of materialism to the history of being.[106] Now Marx's position is a form of philosophical anthropology that can be understood as an analysis of technological society in terms of a theory of capital formation. Marx's theory of modern society in part relies on the anthropological perspective of human activity, and in part relies on a transpersonal concept of capital as the agent of capitalism.Since Marx's position combines both human and transhuman concepts of agency, Heidegger is incorrect to regard his own appeal to a transhuman form of agency as an exclusive alternative to other views of technology.

Heidegger’s view of technology is too narrow – it is unable to understand the specific forms of technological achievement.

Rockmore 97 **(**Tom, Professor of Philosophy @ Duquesne University, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy*, Toward Criticism of Heidegger’s View of Technology* p. 236, 1997) JM

Fifth, Heidegger's understanding of technology is overly abstract. Technology presupposes a multiply determined environment, with social, political, historical, and other components. Heidegger offers us a theory of technology as such. But there is no technology in general; there are only instantiations of forms of technology, such as those required to produce steam engines, lasers, supersonic airplanes, and so on. Technological achievements need to be grasped in the wider context in which they arise. One does not need to be a technological nominalist to hold that if anything like a general theory of technology is possible, it can only be based on the concrete analysis of specific technological forms. Heidegger is concerned with the history of ontology, but he is apparently unconcerned with the historical manifestation of technological being.

Permutation (Critical Technology)

The world of technology can operate within Heidegger’s idea of the alternative. Heidegger does not oppose technology, just questions the way it is evaluated, as long as we can consider the meaning of technology of our own making, we can avoid the danger it presents.

**Cariño** **09** [Jovito, Mentor College of Architecture University of Santo Tomas. Philippiniana Sacra Vol. 44 Issue 132, p491-504, 14p, “Heidegger and the Danger of Modern Technology”, 2009, SM, accessed: 6/29/11]

The benefits of modern technology can never be overstated and Heidegger himself is not discounting them. The surest way to miss the point of Heidegger is to consider him as anti-technology. Heidegger does 40 Huxley, Aldous. Brave New World. London: Vintage, 2004, pp. 211-212. 41 TCT, Ibid., p. 27. 42 Ibid., p. 28. 502 JOVITO V. CARIÑOPHILIPPINIANA SACRA, Vol. XLIV, No. 132 (September-December, 2009) not oppose technology and certainly he does not propose that we slip back to the primitive ways of the Neanderthal age. He himself stated that technology is not the danger and that there is no demonry in technology. 43 As a thinker, Heidegger’s main concern is to bring to fore, or better yet, to challenge, to subject to question modern man’s seeming forgetfulness in the face of the “danger” posed by modern technology. For as long as man withholds his attention from what Heidegger describes as the “inconspicuous state of affairs;” 44 for as long as we consider technology as something neutral, then the essence of technology and its danger shall remain unknown to us.

Permutation (Pragmatism)

Permutation: Do Both. A pragmatic relationship to technology checks the link and solves the aff.

Margolis 6 (Joseph, “Pragmatism’s Advantage” 2006, Temple University http://www.arsdisputandi.org/index.html?http://www.arsdisputandi.org/publish/articles/000126/index.html)

It was, of course, originally a parochial success, though it did gain adherents abroad; and it began to attract a wider Eurocentric interest in its short second life, despite a distinctly poor showing at home. We may even speculate about a third career. For **pragmatism has begun**, possibly for the first time in its history, **to be seriously treated as a distinct alternative to – possibly more than an alternative, perhaps a connective tissue spanning the great divide between – analytic and continental philosophy**. At any rate, **it now counts as a distinctly strong constellation of doctrines and strategies potentially capable of contesting the hegemonies of the day—within both the English-language analytic movement of the last half of the twentieth century and the trailing forces of the** Cartesian, Kantian, Husserlian, and Heideggerean movements of late continental Europe. It would not be unreasonable to say that pragmatism’s promise at the present time is a function of the fatigue of its principal competitors and of the economy and fluency with which it can coopt the principal strengths that remain attractive among the many movements of Eurocentric philosophy, without betraying its own conviction. Rightly perceived, pragmatism’s best feature lies with its post-Kantian ancestry coupled with its opposition to the extreme forms of analytic scientism with which it has shared a gathering sense of conceptual rigor. **It forms**, for that reason, **a natural bridge between analytic and continental philosophy, for rigor is not inherently scientistic.** In my opinion, none of the three movements mentioned (hardly unified within themselves) is separately likely to overtake its own limitations or incorporate the best work of the others in a compelling way. Still, within its own conceptual space**, pragmatism favors a constructive realism drawn in as spare a way as possible from post-Kantian resources, freed from every form of cognitive, rational, and practical privilege, opposed to imagined necessities de re and de cogitatione, committed to the continuities of animal nature and human culture, confined to the existential and historical contingencies of the human condition, and open in principle to plural, partial, perspectived, provisional, even non-converging ways of understanding what may be judged valid in any and every sort of factual and normative regard**. There may well be a touch of reportorial distortion in going beyond these clichés; but, risking that, it would not be unreasonable to say that pragmatists believe that the analysts are likely to favor scientism and the continentals, to exceed the bounds of naturalism, and that both tendencies are more extreme or extravagant than their policies require. In this fairly direct sense, pragmatism’s strength lies in the possibility of a rapprochement by way of the ‘corrections’ mentioned. It could never have claimed such an advantage earlier, had not the main efforts of analytic and continental philosophy perseverated too long in their obviously vulnerable commitments. Pragmatism has persevered as well, of course, but it seems poised now for a larger venture.

Permutation (Positivism)

Perm solves – the ontology of positivism is complementary to the kritik

Cupchik 1 (Gerald Prof at U of Toronto Scarborough FQS Vol 2, No 1 feb (2001): Qualitative and Quantitative Research: Conjunctions and Divergences http://www.qualitative-research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/968/2112) TBC 7/8/10

Constructivist Realism is therefore a position which acknowledges that social phenomena exist in communities quite independently of professional researchers. These real phenomena will be observed and named by members of the natural community, and understood by experienced or wiser people of good judgment. Scholars can approach this real world each in their own way. An empathic approach would be one in which an attempt is made to understand these phenomena holistically and from the perspective of the participants. It is here that a qualitative method can be used to exhaustively tap all perspectives. But, to the extent that the scholar comes from outside the community, there will be speculative leaps in the search for a coherent account of the phenomenon. A sympathetic approach involves an expression of interest in the community and a sincere desire to work productively with its real phenomena. The questions asked are more limited and external to the social system and the quantitative models that are brought to bear are but a pale shadow of the original phenomenon. Precision is gained but at the loss of subtlety. [30] Both types of scholars are selective of their facts and ultimately engage in acts of construction. Both begin with a concrete world and step into another world of abstraction. The same criterion of value can be applied to both kinds of constructions. If we hold the real social phenomenon in one hand with an extended arm and interpose our theoretical accounts with the other hand, as lenses focused on the phenomenon, is it brought more clearly into view? If our abstract concepts do not account for patterns in the lived-world then our theories lack in value, however they are derived. But if the in-depth examination of a phenomenon helps clarify patterns that lie within it and these patterns are formally described, then the qualitative and quantitative approaches will have done their duty; richness and precision will have complemented each other. [31] I have argued in this paper that the fundamental goal of social research should be to reveal the processes that underlie observed social phenomena. Social phenomena are multilayered events as is the inquiring mind of the social scientist. Qualitative method should not be seen as providing access to the "meaning" of individual events, texts, and so on. Rather, understood within the tradition of observation in natural history, qualitative method provides a basis for "thick" description. This rich source of data is most productive when it focuses on events or episodes in which the phenomenon in question is well represented. To the extent that the interviewer and the respondent share an ongoing reference point, it makes it easier to locate the respondent's concrete discourse in a meaningful abstract theoretical context of interest to the interviewer. This enhanced intersubjectivity provides a basis for reconciling the problematic of realism-relativism in a "grounded" fashion (RENNIE 1995; 1998; 2000). [32] Quantitative method can yield insights to the extent that evocative stimuli design are presented to relevant groups and the resulting statistical interactions help tease out the underlying processes. Statistically significant effects can draw our attention to socially meaningful events which are then re-examined in descriptive depth. This interplay between descriptive richness and experimental precision can bring accounts of social phenomena to progressively greater levels of clarity. Together, qualitative and quantitative methods provide complementary views of the phenomena and efforts at achieving their reconciliation can elucidate processes underlying them. Constructivist realism is an ontological position that accommodates the best of positivism and interpretivism.1) [33]

Permutation Net-Benefit (Nazism)

Perm do both, with recognition of Heidegger’s Nazism – bringing it to light is a prerequisite for the kritik to solve. His admirers are blinded and a radical break is needed – that’s the permutation.

Rockmore 97 **(**Tom, Professor of Philosophy @ Duquesne University, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy*, Introduction* p. 2-3, 1997) JM

Since a relation between Heidegger's thought and his Nazism has been known for more than half a century, one must ask why it has not been studied earlier in greater depth. The reasons include the relative success at what can charitably be described as damage control on the part of his most fervent admirers—those for whom he can apparently do no wrong, or at least none of lasting consequence for his thought—as well as a lack of insight into its philosophical significance. But the recent discussion has provided sustained attention to the series of issues surrounding Heidegger's thought and politics. It is now too late to put the genie back in the bottle, to deflect attention away from this relation, since the publications by Farias and Ott raise this issue in a way that in good faith cannot simply be ignored. Everything about this relation is subject to dispute. It has been asserted that it is philosophically insignificant, since the struggle concerning Heidegger is merely symptomatic of a weakness of contemporary thought. It has been claimed that Heidegger was not a Nazi, or at least not in any ordinary sense. It has been suggested that we must differentiate between Heidegger the thinker and Heidegger the man, for the former cannot be judged in relation to the latter. It has been argued that information recently made available is not new and was already known to any serious student. It has been held that everything that Heidegger ever did or wrote was Nazi to the core. It has been maintained that Heidegger's only problem was that he never said he was sorry, that he never excused himself or asked for forgiveness. Finally, it has been maintained with all the seriousness of the professional scholar, in a way recalling many a theological dispute, that Heidegger's thought is so difficult that only one wholly immersed in it, at the extreme only a true believer committed to his vision, could possibly understand it. Yet if it can only be comprehended by a "true" believer, then Heidegger's Nazism is beyond criticism or evaluation of any kind, since no "true" believer will criticize it. The view of the present study is that all of the above claims about the relation of Heidegger's thought and his Nazism are false. Attention focused on Heidegger's Nazi inclinations by Farias, Ott, and others (e.g., Pöggeler, Marten, Sheehan, Vietta, Lacoue-Labarthe, Derrida, Bourdieu, Schwan, Janicaud, Zimmerman, Wolin, Thomä, etc.) has created a momentum of its own. It has been realized that Heidegger's Nazism raises important moral and political issues that cannot simply be evaded and that must be faced as part of the continuing process of determining what is live and what is dead in Heidegger's thought. It is not inaccurate to say that as a result of recent discussion, at least two things have become clear: First, the problem cannot simply be denied since one can no longer even pretend to understand Heidegger's philosophy, certainly beginning in 1933, if one fails to take into account his Nazism. In a word, serious study of Heidegger's thought can no longer evade the theme of Heidegger's Nazism. Second, the issues posed by Heidegger's unprecedented turn to Nazism on philosophical grounds, and the way the theme has been received in the discussion of his thought, point beyond his position to raise queries about the nature of philosophy and even the responsibility of intellectuals.

The perm is the only way to solve – Heidegger’s alternative doesn’t necessitate exclusion usage of modern technology, which is needed to solve societal problems.

Rockmore 97 **(**Tom, Professor of Philosophy @ Duquesne University, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy*, Toward Criticism of Heidegger’s View of Technology* p. 233, 1997) JM

Heidegger is correct in saying that a commitment to technology tends to divert attention from what is not technologically useful. Yet he seems unaware that even the decision to listen to nature in a supposedly nonviolent manner consists in imposing an interpretative framework upon it. It is not the case that the alternative consists in a choice between a technological explanatory matrix or none at all since to decide for the latter is to effect a choice. Although it might be desirable to comprehend nature without violence, this is clearly not possible if to do so requires one to abandon any structure of interpretation. Heidegger's own interpretative structure is clearly evident in his constant recourse to the categories of Being. Heidegger's suggestion of a form of the Greek concept of art as an alternative to modern technology is unsatisfactory. The obvious objection is that technology is not art. Although art on occasion relies on forms of technology, for instance in the casting necessary to create a bronze statue, types of art entirely dispense with technology of any kind, such as drawing in the sand on a beach. Further, Heidegger gives no indication that he has ever considered the obvious social cost necessary to realize his idea of technology. To return to something like the Greek view that Heidegger favors would require the abandonment of more familiar forms of technology, which are deeply embedded in modern industrial society. Since the capacities to feed and clothe the population depend on modern technology, were one to take seriously Heidegger's technological vision, were one to attempt to put it into practice, modern life as we know it would have to be abandoned. There is something very utopian about such an idea.

Technology Good (Politics)

Heidegger’s philosophy has moral consequences and leads to paralysis – It justifies sitting back and allowing for the Holocaust while criticizing the technology used to kill the Jews

Bookchin 95(Murray, Founder of the Institute for Social Ecology and Former Professor at Ramapo College, 1995 [Re-enchanting Humanity, p. 168-170] Rein)

"Insofar as Heidegger can be said to have had a project to shape human lifeways, it was as an endeavor to resist, or should I say, demur from, what he conceived to he an all-encroaching technocratic mentality and civilization that rendered human beings 'inauthentic' in their relationship to a presumably self-generative reality, 'isness', or more esoterically, 'Being' *(Sein).* Not unlike many German reactionaries, **Heidegger viewed ‘modernity' with its democratic spirit, rationalism, respect for the individual, and technological advances as a 'falling' *(Gefallen)* from a primal and naive innocence in which humanity once 'dwelled,’** remnants of which he believed existed in the rustic world into which he was born a century ago. 'Authenticity', it can be said without any philosophical frills, lay in the pristine Teutonic world of the tribal Germans who retained their ties with ‘the Gods’, and with later peoples who still tried to nourish their past amidst the blighted traits of the modern world. Since some authors try to muddy Heidegger's prelapsarian message by focusing on his assumed belief in individual freedom and ignoring his hatred of the French Revolution and its egalitarian, 'herd'-like democracy of the 'They', it is worth emphasizing that such a view withers m the light of his denial of individuality. The individual by himself counts for noth­ing', he declared after becoming a member of the National Socialist party in 1933. 'The fate of our Volk m its state counts for everything.'22 **As a member of the Nazi party**, which he remained up to the defeat of Germany twelve years later, **his antihumanism reached strident**, often blatantly reactionary proportions. Newly appointed as the rector of the University of Freiburg upon Hitler's ascent to power, **he readily adopted the *Fuehrer*-principle of German fascism** and preferred the title *Rektor-Fuhrer***,hailing the spirit of National Socialism as an antidote to 'the darkening of the world, the flight of the gods, the destruction of the earth [by technology], the transformation of men into a mass, the hatred and suspicion of everything free and creative.’28** His most unsavory remarks were directed in the lectures, from which these lines are taken, 'from a metaphysical point of view', against 'the pincers' created by America and Russia that threaten to squeeze 'the farthermost corner of the globe ... by technology and ... economic exploitation.'29 Technology, as Heidegger construes it, is 'no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing. If we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will open itself up to us. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth.’30 After which Heidegger rolls out technology's transformations, indeed mutations, which give rise to a mood of anxiety and finally hubris, anthropocentricity, and the mechanical coercion of things into mere objects for human use and exploitation. Heidegger's views on technology are part of a larger weltanschauung which is too multicolored to discuss here, and demands a degree of inter­pretive effort we must forgo for the present in the context of a criticism of technophobia. **Suffice it to say that there is a good deal of primitivistic animism in Heidegger's treatment of the 'revealing' that occurs when *techne* is a 'clearing' for the 'expression' of a crafted material** - not unlike the Eskimo sculptor who believes (quite wrongly, I may add) that he is 'bringing out' a hidden form that lies in the walrus ivory he is carving. But this issue must be seen more as a matter of metaphysics than of a spir­itually charged technique. Thus, **when Heidegger praises a windmill**, in contrast to the 'challenge' to a tract of land from which the ‘hauling out of coal and ore' is subjected**, he is *not* being 'ecological'. Heidegger is concerned with a windmill, not as an ecological technology, but more metaphysically with the notion that 'its sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind's blowing'. The windmill 'does not unlock energy from the air currents, in order to store it'.31 Like man in relation to Being, it is a medium for the 'realization' of wind, not an artifact for acquiring power**. Basically, **this interpretation of a technological interrelationship reflects a regression** - socially and psychologically as well as metaphysically – **into quietism. Heidegger advances a message of passivity or passivity conceived as a human activity, an endeavor to let things *be* and 'disclose' themselves. 'Letting things be' would be little more than a trite Maoist and Buddhist precept were it not that Heidegger as a National Socialist became all too ideologically engaged, rather than 'letting things be', when he was busily undoing 'intellectualism,' democracy, and techno­logical intervention into the 'world'**. Considering the time, the place, and the abstract way in which Heidegger treated humanity's 'Fall' into technological ‘inauthenticity’ – a ‘Fall’ that he, like Ellul, regarded as inevitable, albeit a metaphysical, nightmare - **it is not hard to see why he could trivialize the Holocaust, when he deigned to notice it at all, as part of a techno-industrial ‘condition’. 'Agriculture is now a motorized *(motorsierte)* food industry, in essence the same as the manufacturing of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps,' he coldly observed, 'the same as the blockade and starvation of the countryside, the same as the production of the hydrogen bombs.’32 In placing the industrial *means* by which many Jews were killed before the ideological ends that guided their Nazi exterminators, Heidegger essentially displaces the barbarism of a *specific* state apparatus, of which he was a part, by the technical proficiency he can attribute *to the world at large!*** These immensely revealing offhanded remarks, drawn from a speech he gave in Bremen m 1949, are beneath contempt. **But they point to a way of thinking that gave an autonomy to technique that has fearful moral consequences which we are living with these days in the name of the sacred, a phraseology that Heidegger would find very congenial were he alive today**. Indeed, **technophobia**, followed to its logical and crudely primitivistic conclusions, **finally devolves into a dark reactionism – and a paralyzing quietism. For if our confrontation with civilization turns on passivity before a ‘disclosing of Being’, a mere ‘dwelling’ on the earth, and a ‘letting things be’**, to use Heidegger’s verbiage – much of which has slipped into deep ecology’s vocabulary as well – **the choice between supporting barbarism and enlightened humanism has no ethical foundations to sustain it. Freed of values grounded in objectivity, we are lost in a quasi-religious antihumanism, a spirituality that can with the same equanimity hear the cry of a bird and ignore the anguish of six million once-living people who were put to death by the National Socialist state.**

Technology cannot overtake the entirety of the species as Heidegger would have us believe – he cedes the political, which is a necessary and unavoidable facet of human beings that leads us to finding the greater good.

Weinberger 92 (Jerry, Professor of Political Science @ Michigan State University, “Politics and the Problem of Technology: An Essay on Heidegger and the Tradition of Political Philosophy”, The American Political Science Review Vol. 86, No. 1 (Mar., 1992), pp. 112-127) JM

In other words, we would have to show that Heideggerian being, which grants a causeless and "tactical" play of its domains, cannot account for the genuine gravity of political life-for how the elements of experience contend against each other, as we see in the challenge of thought to faith, the tension between private and public life, the conflicts between morality and politics, the difference between the good and the just, and so on. We would have to show that such contention is possible only insofar as their elements are related causally and hierarchically, so that each by its very nature claims an authority, beyond the con- tingencies of any given world, to order the others. And we would have to see that however much the fact of such contention calls forth our efforts to overcome it by way of making and knowing, both making and knowing are even at their best the very source of this contention. Nature, as I propose to think about it, is beyond any project for conquest. Technology could, of course, simply destroy the natural soul by making it either subhuman or godlike; but it could never wholly stamp the human species because it cannot supply all of the needs that the soul has spontaneously (or by nature), such as the desire for noble preeminence. I Consequently, the harder technology presses, the more intensely we sense a "problem" with it. l am suggesting that the problem o technology is most fully understood when we approach it through the old-fashioned question of natural justice that transcends any given political conventions. I am thus suggesting that no era’s thinking and practice is so finite and self-contained that it can be wholly stamped bv technology and that we do not have to recur to Heideggerian being to see the limits of the stamp. But I am also suggesting that such direction as nature gives to our groping for justice will never satisfy the demands of everyday politics and morality; for that direction consists in the limited extent to which the widest opening of our eyes can cure the blindnesses of political life. All this is to say that we can choose against Heidegger only by showing that our view inclines us best to see unblinkingly the fissures within political life and to resist the dogmatic partisanship that is inseparable from tt-'ctme and peicsis. Is it possible that for all its extraordinary power, the Heideggerian attempt to grasp the character of thought and art results in an equally extraordinary obtuseness toward the nature of political life? I would argue that both anticipatory resoluteness and Gelassenheit do just this: the former tempts us to a spurious unity of such things as work, thought, and war; and the latter tempts us to the sgurious disconnectedness of these same phenomena. Z Is it thus possible that Heideggerian being is itself a danger of technology, which always (like morality) tempts us vainly to try to jump out of our political skins? My argument is that if we own up to what it means to be human, the answer is a provisional yes. But if we need further proof that the homely problems of political life just will not go away, that there really are not that many of them, and that we deny this at our peril, perhaps we need only relearn how to look right under our noses. There is nothing more technological than the idea that a metaphysical tradition - some rational system could wholly stamp an age and its practical life. This is, however, just what Heidegger’s account of technology would have us believe. And yet Heidegger's accounts of Gestcll and Bestmtd do help us to think about what is so disturbing about modern technology-its tendency to deny the objects of the soul's desire, the noble and beautiful things that are in essence both rare and elusive. ln thinking about technology, we discover that not the stamp of meta- physics but the political problems within which thought arises out of production is turned toward a mysterious but necessary whole and is always pre- carious. Technology is indeed a danger that saves: it compels us to think anew about the meaning of nature. But if, in grasping technology, we owe anything to Heidegger (and we certainly do) it is that Heidegger helps us to see how technology turns us away from Heidegger.” I suspect that such a turn will require us to admit that we cannot escape the question of the highest good and that while neither politics nor justice is that highest good, we cannot think it apart from the moral demands for justice that frame political life and any questioning about being and the soul.

Positivism Good (Politics)

Positivism is best – self correcting and it uses observable regularities to inform action – focus on epistemology causes a retreat from policy relevance

Houghton 8 (David Patrick Ass. Prof. of IR at UCF, Positivism ‘vs’ Postmodernism: Does Epistemology Make a Difference? International Politics (2008) 45) TBC 7/8/10

As long ago as 1981, Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach effectively laid the influence of the dogmatic behaviouralism of the 1960s to rest in their book The Elusive Quest, signaling the profound disillusionment of mainstream IR with the idea that a cumulative science of international relations would ever be possible (Ferguson and Mansbach, 1988). The popularity of the ‘naïve’ form of positivism, wed to a view of inexorable scientific progress and supposedly practiced by wide-eyed scholars during the 1960s, has long been a thing of the past. Postmodernists hence do the discipline something of an injustice when they continue to attack the overly optimistic and dogmatic form of positivism as if it still represented a dominant orthodoxy which must somehow be overthrown. Equally, supporters of the contemporary or 'neo-' version of positivism perform a similar disservice when they fail to articulate their epistemological assumptions clearly or at all. Indeed, the first error is greatly encouraged by the second, since by failing to state what they stand for, neo-positivists have allowed postmodernists to fashion a series of 18 straw men which burn rapidly at the slightest touch. Articulating a full list of these assumptions lies beyond the scope of this article, but contemporary neo-positivists are, I would suggest, committed to the following five assumptions, none of which are especially radical or hard to defend: (1) that explaining and/or understanding the social and political world ought to be our central objective; (2) that - subjective though our perceptions of the world may be - many features of the political world are at least potentially explainable. What remains is a conviction that there are at least some empirical propositions which can be demonstrably shown to be ‘true’ or ‘false’, some underlying regularities which clearly give shape to international relations (such as the proposition that democracies do not fight one another); (3) that careful use of appropriate methodological techniques can establish what patterns exist in the political world, even if these patterns are ultimately transitory and historically contingent; (4) that positive and normative questions, though related, are ultimately separable, though both constitute valid and interesting forms of enquiry. There is also a general conviction (5) that careful use of research design may help researchers avoid logical pitfalls in their work. Doubtless, there are some who would not wish to use the term 'positivism' as an umbrella term for these five assumptions, in which case we probably require a new term to cover them. But to the extent that there exists an 'orthodoxy' in the field of International Relations today, this is surely it. Writing in 1989, Thomas Biersteker noted that “the vast majority of scholarship in international relations (and the social sciences for that matter) proceeds without conscious reflection on its philosophical bases or premises. In professional meetings, lectures, seminars and the design of curricula, we do not often engage in serious reflection on the philosophical bases or implications of our activity. Too often, 19 consideration of these core issues is reserved for (and largely forgotten after) the introductory weeks of required concepts and methods courses, as we socialize students into the profession” (Biersteker, 1989). This observation – while accurate at the time – would surely be deemed incorrect were it to be made today. Even some scholars who profess regret at the philosophically self-regarding nature of contemporary of IR theory nevertheless feel compelled to devote huge chunks of their work to epistemological issues before getting to more substantive matters (see for instance Wendt, 1999). The recent emphasis on epistemology has helped to push IR as a discipline further and further away from the concerns of those who actually practice international relations. The consequent decline in the policy relevance of what we do, and our retreat into philosophical self-doubt, is ironic given the roots of the field in very practical political concerns (most notably, how to avoid war). What I am suggesting is not that international relations scholars should ignore philosophical questions, or that such ‘navel gazing’ is always unproductive, for questions of epistemology surely undergird every vision of international relations that ever existed. Rather, I would suggest that the existing debate is sterile and unproductive in the sense that the various schools of thought have much more in common than they suppose; stated more specifically, postpositivists have much more in common than they would like to think with the positivists they seek to condemn. Consequently, to the extent that there is a meaningful dialogue going on with regard to epistemological questions, it has no real impact on what we do as scholars when we look at the world ‘out there’. Rather than focusing on epistemology, it is inevitably going to be more fruitful to subject the substantive or ontological claims made by positivists (of all metatheoretical stripes) and postpositivists to the cold light of day. Substantive theoretical and empirical claims, 20 rather than ultimately unresolvable disputes about the foundations of knowledge, ought to be what divide the community of international relations scholars today.

Ontology Focus Bad

Heidegger’s privileging of ontology is complicit in atrocities

Committee on Public Safety 96 (The writers subsume their individual names within the denomination of "Committee" in deference to the indivisibility of the work presented Levinasian Scholars "My Place in the Sun" Reflections On The Thought Of Emmanuel Levinas Diacritics 26.1 (1996) 3-10 Project Muse) TBC 7/7/10

At the heart of Levinas's critique of Heidegger is the reproof that the question of man has become submerged in the question of being, and thus that the recovery of the meaning of being entails the forgetting of the meaning of the human. Heidegger's Letter on Humanism (Brief über den Humanismus), published in 1947, in which he claims that "what is essential is not humanity, but being" [Brief 24] is offset by the title of Levinas's work, published in the same year, in which he shows how the anonymity of existence, or being, is redeemed only by the existent, or be-ing; hence, De l'existence à l'existant, from existence to the existent--denoting a sense of direction, lost needlessly in Lingis's translation of the title as Existence and Existents. Levinas depicts the anonymity of being through the il y a, in which the impersonality of the verb mirrors the subjectless horror of existence. The anonymity of the il y a is "saved" ultimately only through the face of the other for whom one is always inescapably responsible. It is not that Levinas retreats from the ontological (the domain of Sein or being) to the ontic (the domain of the Seienden or be-ings), or that he rejects being in favor of some pre-Heideggerian idealist notion of the subject. Rather, his emphasis on the passage from the bare meaning of être or existence to l'étant or existent gropes toward what finally comes to signify the ethical, whereby the anonymity of the infinitive is overcome by the priority of the participial being-for-another-existent and the subject deposed rather than posed [EI 50]. "I am wary of that debased word 'love,'" he remarks again to Nemo, "but the responsibility for the other, being-for-the-other, seemed to me, even at that time [1947], to put an end to the anonymous and senseless rumbling of being" [EI 51]. Only in the most practical and mundane of obligations to the other is ontology rendered ethical and humane. This horror invoked by the anonymous il y a is not to be confused with Heideggerian anguish before death, or care for being. Levinas describes how the original De l'existence appeared in a cover on which were inscribed the words "where it is not a question of anxiety" [EI 47]. One could scarcely ask for a more explicit derangement of fundamental ontology, in the light of a horror of the il y a which had become historically incarnated for him: "None of the generosity which the German counterpart of the 'there is,' the 'es gibt,' is said to contain was displayed between 1933 and 1945," he writes later [DL 375]. There is no mistaking his imputation of ideological implications of complicity between Heideggerian Sein and modern genocide. They are related, not by happenstance but as the fundamental possibility of each other. Invoking the Platonic concept of the good beyond being (epekeina ts ousias), Levinas contests the notion that nothingness is a privation of being and that evil is a privation of the good, insisting that evil itself is a positive mode of being. Being can be more primally terrible than simply not-being. In brief, the distance between Heideggerian ontology and Levinasian ethics can be measured by the difference between an inquiry into being qua being (ti to on) and an inquiry into humanity itself (ti bioteon)--a distance which, as Heidegger himself observes in his Letter [Brief 22], is paradoxically both farther away than any individual be-ing and yet nearer than any be-ing could ever be.

Heideggerian focus on Ontology leads to genocide

Committee on Public Safety 96 (The writers subsume their individual names within the denomination of "Committee" in deference to the indivisibility of the work presented Levinasian Scholars "My Place in the Sun" Reflections On The Thought Of Emmanuel Levinas Diacritics 26.1 (1996) 3-10 Project Muse) TBC 7/7/10

Heidegger's depiction of human being as fundamentally in relation makes of otherness a condition of Dasein's possibility. To master one's own relation to being means to master one's own relation to another: "Dasein's understanding of being already entails the understanding of others, because its being is being-with" [SZ 1.4.§26]. In this sense, then, Miteinandersein, being-with-one-other, is a being with oneself also. Levinas critiques this notion of Miteinandersein for depicting the self and the other as related side by side, mediated through a third common term--the truth of being [TA 18-19]. In contrast, Levinas posits the relation of the face to face, that is, between two, and with no third term, no external authority. Once three are involved, we enter the universe of the one and the many and, hence, of "the totalizing discourse of ontology" [Kearney 57-58]. Only in the ethical relation of two can the self encounter the other immediately without recourse to an anonymous and faceless collectivity. Describing ethics as a "meontology" [Kearney 61], Levinas argues that its openness to the other is prior to ontology's closure upon itself. It is not that Heidegger's rupture with Western metaphysics through fundamental ontology went too far, but that it did not go far enough. It ushered in a philosophy of identity based on bonds and on consanguinity without fully confronting the advent of otherness in the epiphany of the human face. How, wonders Levinas, can fundamental ontology embrace the consanguineous body yet refuse the face? By repudiating idealism's abstract human nature, fundamental ontology gave vent to what rationalism, as the self-proclaimed universal mark of "humanity," had been repressing all along: "the hatred of a man who is other than myself," the very essence, that is, of anti-Semitism [DL 361]. For Levinas, the unthought of Heidegger's ontology comes to light in the death camps. They are related as being and be-ings themselves are related, within a hermeneutic circle where it is impossible to inquire about the one without understanding it in terms of the other. As Heidegger observed in the introduction to Being and Time, such concrete inquiry, if taken as a formal concept from the perspective of analytic logic, can only beg the question [SZ Einleitung 1.§2]. But just as he seeks to think the relation between being and be-ings in a manner more rigorous than the conceptual, so Levinas relates fundamental ontology and [End Page 6] anti-Semitism as each other's condition of possibility. From as early as the essay translated here, but repeated often, Levinas prophesied that the advent of fundamental ontology was of historic moment, and that philosophy after Heidegger could never be innocent again. Alongside the Jews, Enlightenment rationalism also perished in the Holocaust. With the Holocaust, the Jew (re)entered history; after two millennia of being represented as the great refusers of the present, as atavists of the Old Law, left behind by the New, the Jew now became contemporaneous. Their testament typologized away into the shadowy prefigurement of what is to come and has already come, the Jew became the fulfillment of the present, in a literalness beyond all metaphor [DL 170-77]. Thus it is that, through genocide, Levinas saw history and philosophy mediated. Not since dialectical materialism have we encountered such an audacious literalness, such theoreticization of historical concreteness.

Commitment to “Being” prefers totalitarianism to democratic values.

Rockmore 97 **(**Tom, Professor of Philosophy @ Duquesne University, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy*, Toward Criticism of Heidegger’s View of Technology* p. 237, 1997) JM

Seventh, Heidegger's understanding of technology is incompatible with a commitment to democracy, democratic values, and what is called the democratic way of life. Heidegger reminds us of this consequence in both word and deed: in his statement, quoted above, that he is not convinced that democracy is the best political system; and in his turning in the early 1930s to National Socialism, a main example of political totalitarianism. Democracy is problematic, but at this late date it is still the best political means to attain and to defend the goal of human freedom. Other thinkers have rejected democracy, most notably in Plato's embrace of the concept of aristocratic government.But there is a significant difference. Plato rejects the democratic type of government on the basis of a commitment to the state as a whole, hence to human being. Yet Heidegger rejects democracy because of his commitment to Being, but not to human being, also manifest in his nonanthropological theory of technology. Heidegger's antimetaphysical theory of technology is by definition antidemocratic; it presupposes as a leading characteristic the rejection of the anthropological viewpoint that is the foundation of democracy.

Heideggerian philosophies abandon ethics and moral responsibility in favor of ontological “Being”

Rockmore 97 **(**Tom, Professor of Philosophy @ Duquesne University, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy*, Toward Criticism of Heidegger’s View of Technology* p. 238, 1997) JM

The ethical implications of Heidegger's view of technology are perhaps less visible but even more important than the political ones. There is a continuous line of argument leading from the Enlightenment commitment to reason to the insistence on responsibility as the condition of morality, which peaks in Kant's ethical theory. When Heidegger attributes ultimate causal authority to Being, he clearly reverses the Enlightenment view that through the exercise of reason human being can attain dominion over the world and itself. In the final analysis, if Heidegger is correct, human actions depend on the gift of Being, hence on a suprahuman form of agency. Heidegger's insistence on Being as the final causal agent signals an abandonment of the idea of ethical responsibility. If responsibility presupposes autonomy, and autonomy presupposes freedom, then to embrace Being as the ultimate explanatory principle is tantamount to casting off the idea of ethical responsibility, the possibility of any moral accountability whatsoever. Heidegger's rejection of the idea of responsibility other than through the commitment to Being is incompatible with the assumption of personal moral accountability. This consequence, which follows rigorously from his position, calls for two comments. First, it in part explains his failure ever to take a public position on the well-known atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi movement to which he turned. If one's ontological analysis does not support the concept of personal responsibility, then one does not need to react on the personal level to what, from Heidegger's perspective, can be attributed to Being. Second, Heidegger's rejection of personal responsiblity in his later thought denies a fundamental tenet of his own earlier position. In Being and Time , Heidegger maintained that authenticity required a resolute choice of oneself. But if choice depends on Being, then in the final analysis, as Heidegger clearly saw, the only choice is the choice for or against Being.

Nazism Key

Heidegger’s failure to confront Nazism leads to the failure of his philosophy

Rockmore 97 **(**Tom, Professor of Philosophy @ Duquesne University, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy, *Heidegger’s Nazism and the Limits of His Philosophy*, p. 290, 1997) JM

Heidegger's Nazism and the failure to confront it are philosophically significant for Heidegger's philosophy, for its reception, and for philosophy itself**.** At a time when some are still concerned to deny the existence of the Holocaust, in effect to deny that Nazism was Nazism, and many still deny that Nazism had a more than tangential appeal to one of the most significant theories of this century, merely to assert the philosophical significance of an abject philosophical failure to seize the historical moment for the German Volk and Being is not likely to win the day. Yet there is something absurd, even grotesque about the conjunction of the statement that Heidegger is an important, even a great philosopher, perhaps one of the few seminal thinkers in the history of the tradition, with the realization that he, like many of his followers, entirely failed, in fact failed in the most dismal manner, to grasp or even to confront Nazism. If philosophy is its time captured in thought, and if Heidegger and his epigones have basically failed to grasp their epoch, can we avoid the conclusion that they have also failed this test, failed as philosophers? Since even those thinkers who hold that we need to begin again, to begin from the beginning, rely on a reading of the history of the philosophical tradition, philosophy is inseparable from its past. If philosophy is a historical discipline, then it is unavoidably under obligation to come to grips with what has come before in order to progress. Yet it is significant that after some twenty-five hundred years of practice, there are no widely accepted standards as to how to judge prior philosophical views. In the absence of clear guidelines, we can measure the failure of Heidegger and some of his students to come to grips with Nazism in his thought or even with Nazism as it existed, parenthetically like so many other philosophers and academics in general, against the idea of the philosophical pursuit offered by the philosophers themselves.

Heidegger’s Nazism turns the K: rejects human values of equality, freedom, and democracy – he subordinates real human beings to his abstract concept of “Being”

Rockmore 97 **(**Tom, Professor of Philosophy @ Duquesne University, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy, *Heidegger’s Nazism and the Limits of His Philosophy*, p. 292, 1997) JM

The problem posed by Nazism is a human problem in the most basic meaning of the term "human." It is widely known that Nazism posed a decisive threat to values, to human beings, to the democratic form of life, to the idea of human and racial equality, to concepts of mutual tolerance—in short, was a menace to the small advances of human beings concerned to realize, as Hegel put it, the idea of freedom. Heidegger either could not understand or was unconcerned with the problem posed by Nazism to human beings since he consistently offered the main role to Being. Heidegger's philosophy is rooted in his antihumanistic subordination of human being to Being, to which he subordinated his own entire life, and to which his students on occasion seem willing to subordinate themselves and others in the increasingly unavailing effort to excuse Heidegger the philosopher and sometimes even Heidegger the man. Heidegger's understanding of the problem of Being required him to reject values and anything linked to value as incompatible with thought in the deepest sense, which is limited to contemplation of the idea of Being. According to Heidegger, any concept of value is inextricably linked to the philosophies of the worldview which are philosophy in name only, since they fall below the genuine thought necessary to think Being.

Heidegger attempted to conceal his Nazism within his writing to create a false view of his philosophy – even his disciples agree.

Rockmore 97 **(**Tom, Professor of Philosophy @ Duquesne University, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy, *Revealing Concealed Nazism* p. 2-3, 1997) JM

The concern of this book is not with Heidegger's position as a whole, but with the link between his Nazism and that position. Now the theme of his Nazism is only in part visible, because it is mainly hidden, or concealed, in Heidegger's philosophy. An important part of our task will be to reveal Heidegger's Nazism in a way that also preserves the capacity for critical judgment. Much of the Heidegger literature is limited to exegesis in which his disciples, who routinely forgo criticism, expound the "revealed truth."[1] On the contrary, the aim of this essay is to describe, to interpret, and, when necessary, to criticize this aspect of his thought. We can begin with the description of some of the main obstacles impeding access to Heidegger's philosophical thought—in particular, access to his Nazism. Heidegger was concerned to conceal what he was not obliged to reveal about his Nazism, to provide what can charitably be described as an indulgent, even a distorted view of the historical record and of his thought. Some of Heidegger's closest students, above all Karl Löwith, Otto Pöggeler, and more recently Thomas Sheehan, Theodore Kisiel, and Dominique Janicaud, have scrupulously attempted to disclose the nature and significance of his Nazism. Others, convinced of the importance of Heidegger's thought, have on occasion confused, even clearly identified, allegiance to Heidegger's thought and person with the discovery of the truth. In consequence, a certain number of obstacles, conceptual and otherwise, have arisen which impede an objective discussion of Heidegger's Nazism. In order to discuss this topic, it will be useful to identify the main obstacles. Accordingly, this chapter, whose intent is prolegomenal, will be devoted to clearing away some of the conceptual underbrush that has in the meantime grown up around the link between Heidegger's Nazism and his philosophy in order to expose this theme for more detailed study.

Cede the Political

The alt cedes the political and does nothing to confront social and economic justice inherent in society.

**Yar 2k** – Senior Lecturer in Criminology, Lancaster (Majid, Arendt's Heideggerianism, Cultural Values 4.1)

Similarly, we must consider the consequences that this 'ontological substitution' for the essence of the political has for politics, in terms of what is practically excluded by this rethinking. If the presently available menu of political engagements and projects (be they market or social liberalism, social democracy, communitarianism, Marxism, etc.) are only so many moments of the techno-social completion of an underlying metaphysics, then the fear of 'metaphysical contamination' inhibits any return to recognizable political practices and sincere engagement with the political exigencies of the day. This is what Nancy Fraser has called the problem of 'dirty hands', the suspension of engement with the existing content of political endas because of their identification as being in thrall to the violence of metaphysics. Unable to engage in politics as it is, one either [a] sublimates the desire for politics by retreating to an interrogation of the political with respect to its essence (Fraser, 1984, p. 144), or [b] on this basis, seeks 'to breach the inscription of a wholly other politics'. The former suspends politics indefinitely, while the latter implies a new politics, which, on the basis of its reconceived understanding of the political, apparently excludes much of what recognizably belongs to politics today. This latter difficulty is well known from Arendt's case, whose barring of issues of social and economic justice and welfare from the political domain are well known. To offer two examples: [ 1] in her commentary on the U.S. civil rights movement in the 1950s, she argued that the politically salient factor which needed challenging was only racial legislation and the formal exclusion of African-Americans from the political sphere, not discrimination, social deprivation and disadvante, etc.(Arendt, 1959, pp. 45-56); [ 2] Arendt's pronounceraent at a conference in 1972 (put under question by Albrecht Wellmer regarding her distinction of the 'political' and the 'social'), that housing and homelessness were not political issues, that they were external to the political as the sphere of the actualisation of freedom as disclosure; the political is about human self-disclosure in speech and deed, not about the distribution of goods, which belongs to the social realm as an extension of the oikos.[ 20] The point here is not that Arendt and others are in any sense unconcerned or indifferent about such sufferings, deprivations and inequalities. Rather, it is that such disputes and ends are identified as belonging to the socio-technical sphere of administration, calculation, instrumentality, the logic of means and ends, subject-object manipulation by a will which turns the world to its purposes, the conceptual rendering of beings in terms of abstract and levelling categories and classes, and so on; they are thereby part and parcel of the metaphysical-technological understanding of Being, which effaces the unique and singular appearance and disclosure of beings, and thereby illegitimate candidates for consideration under the renewed, ontological-existential formulation of the political. To reconceive the political in terms of a departure from its former incarnation as metaphysical politics, means that the revised terms of a properly political discourse cannot accommodate the prosaic yet urgent questions we might typically identify under the rubric of 'policy'. Questions of social and economic justice are made homeless, exiled from the political sphere of disputation and demand in which they were formerly voiced. Indeed, it might be observed that the postmetaphysical formulation of the political is devoid of any content other than the freedom which defines it; it is freedom to appear, to disclose, but not the freedom to do something in particular, in that utilising freedom for achieving some end or other implies a collapse back into will, instrumentality, teleocracy, poeisis, etc. By defining freedom qua disclosedness as the essence of freedom and the sole end of the political, this position skirts dangerously close to advocating politique pour la politique, divesting politics of any other practical and normative ends in the process.

Phenomenology Fails

Phenomenology fails – it turns into limited anthropology

Bartok 84 (Philip J. Dept of Phil U of Notre Dame FOUCAULT’S ANALYTIC OF FINITUDE AND THE “DEATH” OF PHENOMENOLOGY) TBC 7/8/10

In support of Foucault’s argument it should be noted that Husserl readily admits that in its attempt to move beyond the empirical to the transcendental, transcendental phenomenology does not leave behind the horizon of empirical contents, but merely wins for the data in this horizon a transcendental rather than an empirical significance. From its starting point in the natural attitude, the transcendental phenomenological reduction merely effects a “readjustment of viewpoint”, one which preserves a “thoroughgoing parallelism” between a phenomenological psychology and a transcendental phenomenology: “[T]o each eidetic or empirical determination on the one side there must correspond a parallel feature on the other”.15 But for Husserl, the full sense of the “transcendental” is achieved only through the application of both transcendental phenomenological and eidetic reductions, that is, in the in the discovery of the essential features of pure conscious experience.16 The eidetic reduction too departs from the empirical, taking a fact, whether in the natural attitude or in transcendentally purified consciousness, as the starting point for systematic variation in pure fantasy.17 Taken together, the transcendental phenomenological and eidetic 7 reductions lead the phenomenologist from the empirical starting point of the natural attitude to a description of the essences of pure conscious experience. Against this attempt to move from the empirical to the transcendental Foucault suggests that, [i]t is probably impossible to give empirical contents transcendental value, or to displace them in the direction of a constituent subjectivity, without giving rise, at least silently to an anthropology - that is, to a mode of thought in which the rightful limitations of acquired knowledge . . . are at the same time the concrete forms of existence, precisely as they are given in that same empirical knowledge.18

Phenomenology fails – we can’t transcend purely empirical ideas

Bartok 84 (Philip J. Dept of Phil U of Notre Dame FOUCAULT’S ANALYTIC OF FINITUDE AND THE “DEATH” OF PHENOMENOLOGY) TBC 7/8/10

Foucault’s line of argument here is most plausibly understood as an internal objection to Husserl’s approach: Transcendental phenomenology fails to achieve the (transcendental) aims set out for it by Husserl himself. The transcendental reduction fails insofar as it merely effects something like a shift of vision, attempting to assign transcendental significance to what are, by Husserl’s own admission, merely empirical contents. If Foucault’s archaeological analysis of the character of the modern episteme is adequate, this failure was inevitable given the fact that Husserl’s project was configured by an episteme characterized by the analytic of finitude. Given the problematic dual status of “man” under this episteme, Husserlian phenomenology cannot help but devolve into an anthropology.

Phenomenology fails – ontology factually doesn’t come first

Searle 5 (John, Prof Berkeley The Phenomenological Illusion SCHRIFTENREIHE- WITTGENSTEIN GESELLSCHAFT, VOL 34, pages 17-38 http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/PhenomenologicalIllusion.pdf) TBC 7/9/10

The observer independent is ontologically primary, the observer dependent is derivative. Now here is the interest of all this for the present discussion: Heidegger has the ontology exactly backwards. He says the ready-to-hand is prior, the present-at-hand is derivative. The hammers and the dollar bills are prior to the sheets of paper and the collection of metal molecules. Why does he say this? I think the answer is clear; phenomenologically the hammer and the dollar bill typically are prior. When using the hammer or the dollar bill, we don’t think much about their basic atomic structure or other observer independent features. In short, Heidegger is subject to the phenomenological illusion in a clear way: he thinks that because the ready-to-hand is phenomenologically prior it is ontologically prior. What is even worse is that he denies that the ready-to-hand is observer relative. He thinks that something is a hammer in itself, and he denies that we create a meaningful social and linguistic reality out of meaningless entities. Rather he says we are “always already” in a meaningful world. Here is what he says: The kind of Being which belongs to these entities is readiness-to-hand. But this characteristic is not to be understood as merely a way of taking them, [my italics] as if we were talking such “aspects” into the “entities” which we proximally encounter, or as if some world-stuff which is proximally present-at-hand in itself were “given subjective colouring” in this way. (Heidegger 1962, 101) This seems wrong. If you take away the rhetorical fl ourishes in his prose, the view that he says is false, is the correct view. The characteristic of being money or a hammer is precisely a “way of taking them”. Such features as being money or being a hammer are observer relative and in that sense the object is “given subjective coloring” when we treat it as a hammer. Heidegger’s views are expressions of his rejection of the basic nature of the basic facts.

Ext – Phenomenology Fails

Alt doesn’t solve – intention does not affect action the way they assume

Searle 5 (John, Prof Berkeley The Phenomenological Illusion SCHRIFTENREIHE- WITTGENSTEIN GESELLSCHAFT, VOL 34, pages 17-38 http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~jsearle/PhenomenologicalIllusion.pdf) TBC 7/9/10

Another example of the phenomenological illusion comes out in Merleau- Ponty’s discussion of skillful coping, which he calls “motor intentionality”. (Merleau-Ponty 1962) The idea is that because there are all kinds of routine actions, such as walking or driving a car, that do not have the concentrated focused consciousness of intentionality, of the kind you get for example when you are giving a lecture, that therefore they have a different kind of intentionality altogether. If it feels different then it must be different. But if you look at the actual conditions of satisfaction there is no difference in the logical structure. To see this, contrast doing a type of action as skillful coping and doing it as concentrated deliberate action. For example, normally when I get up and walk to the door I do it without special concentration or deliberation. Skillful coping. But suppose I do it and concentrate my attention on doing it. Deliberate action. The cases as described, though they feel different, are logically similar. In both cases I am acting intentionally and in both there are causally self referential conditions of satisfaction. I succeeded in what I was trying to do only if my intentions in action caused the bodily movements. It is a clear case of the phenomenological illusion to suppose that different phenomenology implies a different kind of intentionality with a different logical structure.

Phenomenology relies on a perceptual illusion

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Why are these points not obvious? I think the answer is the phenomenological illusion. In general these features are not present to the phenomenology. We do not, when playing tennis have a conscious experience of having propositional representations of conditions of satisfaction and we do not consciously think of ourselves as embodied consciousnesses in interaction with the world. The phenomenological illusion can even give us the impression that the tennis racket is somehow part of our body; and indeed when we are playing tennis or skiing, the tennis racket or the skis seem more like an extension of the body than they seem like instruments. But this, of course, is a phenomenological illusion. In fact there are no nerve endings in the tennis racket, nor in the skis; but if you get good at skiing or playing tennis it will seem almost as if there are. It does not seem like you are an embodied brain engaged with a world; rather it seems like you and the world form a single unity, and of course there is no propositional content running consciously through your head. But all the same, the entire logical apparatus of intentionality applies. If you describe the phenomenology and stop there, you miss the underlying logical structures

Phenomenology fails - Phenomenologists rely on a tautological understanding of basic facts

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As far as I can tell (and I may be mistaken about this) because of their failure to recognize the primacy of the basic facts, the phenomenologists seem to be unable to give a de re reading of references to objects. They hear the references to the basic facts, about molecules, for example, as always already inside the scope of the “present-at-hand” (or some other phenomenological) operator, and they hear the references to hammers and money, etc. as always already inside the scope of the “ready-to-hand” (or some other phenomenological) operator. Look at the quote from Dreyfus above. “Heidegger holds that there is no way to account for referring and truth starting with language as occurent sounds …” But that is precisely how one has to account for meaning, reference, truth, etc. because we know before we ever start on the philosophical problems that the speech act is performed by making “occurent sounds”, marks, etc. The inadequacy of existential phenomenology could not be stated more clearly: Dreyfus is in effect saying that the Heideggerian cannot state the solution because he cannot hear the question.

Phenomenology – facts can be detatched from their perspectives

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On the same page, the following sentence occurs: “It seemed to me that both the external, logical, god-like claim that, for there to be a social world, the brute facts in nature must somehow acquire meaning, and the internal phenomenological description of human beings as always already in a meaningful world, were both correct but in tension.” (Dreyfus 1999, 12) The reference to “god-like” reveals that once again he thinks that the stance is part of the phenomenon, that the brute facts only exist from a certain stance or from a point of view, either godlike or “detached, logical”, as the case might be. Now, this is a very deep mistake, and it is a foundational mistake. Where brute, observer independent facts are concerned, there is no point of view built into their ontology. The basic facts exist apart from any stance or point of view.

Phenomenology is wrong – there are objective facts

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The picture that Dreyfus seems to have is that institutional facts exist from one point of view and brute facts exist from another point of view. But that is wrong. Brute facts simply exist. No point of view is necessary. Institutional facts exist from a point of view of the participants in the institution and their participation in the institution creates the facts. But where Dreyfus cites a “tension” there is no tension. There is no tension at all in supposing that the piece of paper in my hand is both a piece of paper and a ten dollar bill. There is a philosophical problem, as to how human beings create an institutional reality by imposing status functions on brute facts. I ask the question, How do we get from the brute facts to the institutional facts? How does the mind impose status functions on the phenomena? The logical form of that question is: Given that there is a brute reality of observer independent phenomena, phenomena that have an absolute existence, independent of any human attitudes, stances, etc., how do such phenomena acquire status functions? The reference to brute phenomena is de re, it has wide scope occurrence. The problem is that the phenomenologist tends not to hear the de re occurrence. Thus Dreyfus hears the question as asking: From the detached logical point of view there exist brute facts, from the active participants point of view there exist institutional facts. What is the relation between them? Now there does seem to be a “tension” because there is now a problem about reconciling the detached logical point of view with the active participant’s point of view. Nothing has wide scope or de re occurrence. That is the perspectivalism that I have tried to identify.

The fact that basic truths change does not mean that truth is relative

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There is an objection one frequently hears that goes as follows: What I call the basic facts are just what happens to be widely believed at a certain point in history, a “contemporary given” as Dreyfus calls them. But they were not always believed in the past and it is quite likely that they will be superseded in the future. So there are no timeless absolute basic facts; there are just beliefs that people think are true relative to their time and place. This mistake is prominent in Thomas Kuhn, for example. (Kuhn 1962) But the answer to it is this. It is only on the assumption of a non-relative, absolute reality that it is worthwhile to change our opinions in the first place. We are trying to get absolute non-relative truths about an absolute non-relative reality. The fact that we keep changing our opinions as we learn more only makes sense given the assumption that our aim is the description of an absolute non-relative world. The fact of opinion change is an argument against relativism, not an argument for it. It is quite likely that our conception of what I have been calling the basic facts will be improved on, and that at least some of our present conceptions will become obsolete. This does not show that there are no basic facts, nor that the basic facts only have a relative existence, but that their absolute existence does not by itself guarantee that at any point in our history we have accurately stated them. The facts don’t change, but the extent of our knowledge does

Non-Falsifiable

Heidegger provides no warrants or analysis to his arguments against technology – only claims based off of the presupposition of Being.

Rockmore 97 **(**Tom, Professor of Philosophy @ Duquesne University, On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy*, Toward Criticism of Heidegger’s View of Technology* p. 233-4, 1997) JM

Second, his nonanthropological interpretation of technology is problematic. Heidegger's claim does not follow from a critique of the rival view or views, which he simply rejects in virtue of his prior commitment to Being as the ultimate explanatory factor. A prior commitment helps to explain why Heidegger analyzes technology as he does, but it does not justify his analysis. In order to make out his nonanthropological technological view, Heidegger needs to supplement his analysis, for instance through a demonstration that the anthropological and nonanthropological approaches exhaust the possible ways to understand technology, an indication of the basic flaws leading to a rejection of the so-called anthropological approach, or an argument in favor of his own rival view. It is not sufficient to point out that Heidegger's theory successfully accounts for the transhuman agency exhibited by technology unless it can be shown that technology has a transhuman dimension, something Heidegger merely asserts but does not demonstrate.