# High Speed Rail Negative

[Warming Answers 2](#_Toc327658611)

[Warming 1NC 3](#_Toc327658612)

[Ext – Low Usage 4](#_Toc327658613)

[Ext – HSR Doesn’t Solve Emissions 5](#_Toc327658614)

[Warming 1NC – Impact Defense 6](#_Toc327658615)

[Ext – Not Anthropogenic 9](#_Toc327658616)

[Ext – Warming Slow 10](#_Toc327658617)

[Oil Dependency Answers 11](#_Toc327658618)

[Oil Dependency 1NC 12](#_Toc327658619)

[Oil Dependency 1NC – AT: Economy Advantage 13](#_Toc327658620)

[Oil Dependency 1NC – AT: Economy Impact 14](#_Toc327658621)

[Oil Dependency 1NC – AT: Oil Shocks Impact 16](#_Toc327658622)

[No Economic Shocks 2NC 17](#_Toc327658623)

[Oil Dependency 1NC – AT: Peak Oil Impact 18](#_Toc327658624)

[Oil Dependency 1NC – AT: Resource Wars Impact 20](#_Toc327658625)

[Ext – No Conflict 22](#_Toc327658626)

[Primacy 1NC 23](#_Toc327658627)

[Heg Resilient – 2NC 25](#_Toc327658628)

[Primacy Doesn’t Solve War 2NC 26](#_Toc327658629)

[Ext – Ikenberry 2011 28](#_Toc327658630)

[Solvency Answers 29](#_Toc327658631)

[Solvency 1NC 30](#_Toc327658632)

[Answers To: HSR Good Scenarios 31](#_Toc327658633)

[AT: Air Pollution 32](#_Toc327658634)

[AT: Amazon 34](#_Toc327658635)

[AT: Environment 36](#_Toc327658636)

[Ext – No Impact to Species 37](#_Toc327658637)

[AT: Oxygen Impact 38](#_Toc327658638)

[AT: Ozone 39](#_Toc327658639)

[AT: Urban Sprawls 40](#_Toc327658640)

[Disadvantages 41](#_Toc327658641)

[Politics – Obama Good 42](#_Toc327658642)

[Spending – HSR 43](#_Toc327658643)

## Warming Answers

### Warming 1NC

#### HSR will not have a high user usage

**O’Toole**, 9/9/**2009** (Randal – senior fellow with the Cato Institute, High-Speed Rail Is Not “Interstate 2.0”, Cato Briefing Papers No. 113, p. 4)

In contrast, when combined with the existing Boston-to-Washington corridor, the FRA high-speed rail plan would reach only 33 states. Trains would stop in only 65 of the nation’s 100 largest urban areas. For most people in smaller urban areas and towns, the only access to high-speed trains would be by driving to a major city. Even many people in urban areas served by high-speed rail would be closer to airports than downtown rail stations. As a result, high-speed rail lines would move a relatively insignificant amount of passenger travel. A recent report compiling all of the often-optimistic projections of high-speed rail ridership estimated that the FRA high speed rail lines would carry 20.6 billion passenger miles of travel in 2025—less than 2 percent of what the interstates carried in 2007. 27 The average American would travel on the FRA system less than 60 miles a year. 28 If the average trip is 225 miles long, the average American would take a round-trip on the FRA system only about every eight years. Since California would have very-high-speed trains, Californians would ride high-speed rail more than the rest of the country, but still less than 300 miles per person per year. 29 These low numbers are confirmed by data from France and Japan, the two nations that have invested the most in high-speed rail. Though popular with American tourists, the average residents of France and Japan ride the TGVs (train à grande vitesse) and bullet trains less than 400 miles per year. 30 Given the greater geographic expanse and lower population densities of the United States, it seems unlikely that the nation as a whole would ever approach that level of per-capita ridership.

#### HSR will barely have an effect on CO2

**Morris**, 7/24/**2009** (Eric A. – researcher at University of California, Los Angeles’s Institute of Transportation Studies, High-Speed Rail and CO2, Freakonomics, p. http://www.freakonomics.com/2009/07/24/high-speed-rail-and-co2/)

This is a long list and the blog is a short medium. So for now let’s just consider the final point about HSR’s environmental benefits. Under some conditions, there is no doubt that an HSR system would reduce greenhouse emissions. Unfortunately, a study undertaken by the consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton for the U.K. Department for Transport raises some troublesome questions about whether these conditions can be met in reality. Booz Allen considered two potential U.K. HSR lines (London-Manchester and London-Edinburgh/Glasgow). They found that the CO2 emissions required to move HSR passenger seats were **about the same as those required to move automobile seats** — hardly a slam dunk for rail. In fact, intercity bus came out considerably cleaner than HSR on a per-seat-mile basis. HSR would emit less on a per-seat mile basis than air travel. But the major caveat is that all of these figures consider emissions from operations only, **without taking into account the very large amount of pollution that will be created in the construction of the HSR system**. When the emissions spewed by all those earth movers, tunnel boring machines, bulldozers, trucks, cranes, etc. are taken into account, the carbon advantage for HSR vis a vis air travel **largely evaporates**.

### Ext – Low Usage

#### HSR would produce negligible benefits --- not enough riders

O'Toole, 10 (Randal, Cato Institute Senior Fellow working on urban growth, public land, and transportation issues, author of Gridlock: Why We’re Stuck in Traffic and What to Do About It, “High Speed Rail”, June, http://www.downsizinggovernment.org/transportation/high-speed-rail)

5. Mobility Benefits. The mobility benefits of high-speed rail are negligible. Despite huge subsidies, the average residents of France and Japan ride their TGVs and bullet trains just 400 miles a year. With slower trains connecting lower-density cities and regions, the Obama administration's proposed high-speed rail system would be lucky to reach even 100 miles per capita of travel. Even a much more comprehensive, truly high-speed network is unlikely to approach 400 miles per capita because, unlike Europe and Japan, the United States has few major city pairs located close enough for high-speed trains to compete with airlines. High-speed rail's inability to draw more riders should be no surprise considering rail's inherent disadvantages compared with driving and air travel. Driving offers point-to-point convenience, while rail drops most travelers miles from their final destinations. Air service is at least twice as fast as the fastest trains and—since most Americans no longer live or work downtown—leaves average travelers no farther from their destinations than downtown train stations. Though high-speed rail is somewhat competitive on trips of 200 miles or so, it **is not the optimal transportation mode at any distance**.

#### The public will continue to drive to work

**Glaeser**, 8/4/**2009** (Edward – economics professor at Harvard University, Running the Numbers on High-Speed Trains, New York Times, p. <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/04/running-the-numbers-on-high-speed-trains/>)

How many riders will take high-speed rail between Houston and Dallas? Amtrak gets about 11 million customers in the Northeast Corridor, which has four large consolidated metropolitan areas together totaling 44 million people. If that four-to-one ratio held in Texas, then the high-speed rail link could expect three million riders, and more to come as Texas grows. But as President Obama has said one of the appeals of high-speed rail is “walking only a few steps to public transportation, and ending up just blocks from your destination.” That’s bad news for Texas. In Dallas less than 5 percent of the population takes public transportation to work, and more than 60 percent of all jobs are more than 10 miles from the city center. For these reasons, driving will continue to be extremely attractive for travelers who want to save parking fees and need cars once they arrive. I’ll go with 1.5 million trips a year (even including future growth), which would make the new rail line about as popular as all airplane flights between the two cities are today.

### Ext – HSR Doesn’t Solve Emissions

#### HSR will add CO2 emissions --- advancing fuel efficiency technologies guarantees the status quo will solve

**O’Toole**, 9/9/**2009** (Randal – senior fellow with the Cato Institute, High-Speed Rail Is Not “Interstate 2.0”, Cato Briefing Papers No. 113, p. 7)

Substituting more realistic assumptions greatly changes the results. In the 19 years between 1975 and 1994, automobile fuel economies increased by 33 percent and commercial airline economies increased by 44 percent. 54 If they achieve similar efficiencies in the 19 years between 2006 and 2025, and if the average auto carries 2.4 people in intercity travel and the average high-speed train fills only 51 percent of its seats, then rather than save 2.3 million metric tons of CO2 per year, high speed trains would instead add 220,000 metric tons of CO2 to the atmosphere each year. Moreover, not building high-speed rail would save huge amounts of energy and millions of tons of CO2 that would otherwise be used and released during construction. **Even if all the Center for Clean Air Policy’s optimistic assumptions proved correct**, high speed rail would not be a cost-effective way of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. McKinsey and Company estimates the United States can cut its greenhouse gas emissions in half by 2030 by investing in technologies that cost no more than $50 per metric ton of abated emissions. 55 But if high-speed rail costs $90 billion, then the cost per metric ton averages well over $3,000. For every ton abated through the use of high-speed rail, more than 60 tons of abatement could have been carried out using more cost-effective programs that reduce CO2 at a cost of $50 a ton or less. People who truly want to save energy should focus on intercity buses, which are far more energy efficient than high-speed rail, and on improving the energy efficiency of auto driving. 56 Traffic congestion wastes nearly 3 billion gallons of fuel per year, and low-cost solutions to congestion, such as traffic signal coordination, could save far more energy at a tiny fraction of the cost of high-speed rail. 57 Conclusion High-speed rail is a technology whose time has come—and gone. What might have been useful a century ago is today merely an anachronism that would cost tax payers tens or hundreds of billions of dollars yet contribute little to American mobility or environmental quality. The most ardent supporters of high-speed rail predict that the FRA plan would carry the average American less than 60 miles per year, and in most places outside of California the average would be even less. By comparison, the average American travels by automobile more than 15,000 miles per year. The environmental benefits of high-speed rail are similarly **miniscule**, and when added to the environmental costs of building high-speed rail lines the net result is certainly negative.

#### HSR will not reduce CO2 emissions --- population density and construction costs

**Upham**, 7/29/**2009** (BC, High Speed Rail? Not so Fast., Triple Pundit, p. <http://www.triplepundit.com/2009/07/high-speed-rail-not-so-fast/>)

A recent study by Booz Allen Hamilton, commissioned by the UK Department for Transport, suggests that the net CO2 emissions of a proposed HSR line from London to Manchester would be greater, over 60 years, than if it was never built at all – even if every air passenger switched to rail. Currently, rail holds a 54% share of the air/rail market between the cities. For a proposed line from London to Edinburgh, Scotland, CO2 emissions would drop below “doing nothing” only if 62% of passengers took the train, up from 15% now. Taking the train is still cleaner than flying, but the study takes into account not only emissions during operations, but also CO2 emitted in the building of a new HSR line: the pollution from cranes and bulldozers, building new stations, and everything else required in laying down new tracks. For the United States, the same analysis could be even further weighted towards planes over trains, because this country is not as densely populated as the UK, and thus rail is less likely to capture the market share necessary to reach the same levels of emissions (“emissions parity”) as doing nothing.

#### HSR emits more greenhouse gases than it saves --- electricity power and construction

**O’Toole**, 5/4/**2009** (Randal – senior fellow with the Cato Institute, High-Speed rail is No Solution, Cato Institute, p. <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/highspeed-rail-is-no-solution>)

Construction of such high-speed rails will consume enormous amounts of energy and emit enormous volumes of greenhouse gases. Since future cars and planes will be more energy efficient, there are likely to be **no long-term environmental benefits from investment in high-speed** rail. Electricity would power the California trains. But, because most U.S. electricity comes from coal or other fossil fuels, these high-speed trains **won't reduce emissions of greenhouse gases**. As we develop more renewable sources of electricity, we would do better using it to power plug-in hybrids or electric cars than high-speed rail.

### Warming 1NC – Impact Defense

#### Past emissions make warming inevitable

**Stern 7** (Nicholas, Head of the British Government Economic Service and I.G. Patel Chair – London School of Economics, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, p. 11-13)

Additional warming is **already in the pipeline** due to **past** and present **emissions**. The full warming effect of past emissions is **yet to be realised**. Observations show that the oceans have taken up around 84% of the total heating of the Earth’s system over the last 40 years36. If global emissions were stopped today, some of this heat would be exchanged with the atmosphere as the system came back into equilibrium, **causing an additional warming**. Climate models project that the world is **committed** **to** a **further warming** of 0.5° - 1 °C over several decades due to past emissions 37. This warming is smaller than the warming expected if concentrations were stabilised at 430 ppm CO2e, because atmospheric aerosols mask a proportion of the current warming effect of greenhouse gases. Aerosols remain in the atmosphere for only a few weeks and are not expected to be present in significant levels at stabilisation38. If annual emissions continued at today’s levels, greenhouse gas levels would be close to double pre-industrial levels by the middle of the century. If this concentration were sustained, temperatures are projected to eventually rise by 2 – 5ºC or even higher. Projections of future warming depend on projections of global emissions (discussed in chapter 7). If annual emissions were to remain at today’s levels, greenhouse gas levels would reach close to 550 ppm CO2e by 2050.39 Using the lower and upper 90% confidence bounds based on the IPCC TAR range and recent research from the Hadley Centre, this would commit the world to a warming of around 2 – 5°C (Table 1.1). As demonstrated in Box 1.2, these two climate sensitivity distributions lie close to the centre of recent projections and are used throughout this Review to give illustrative temperature projections. Positive feedbacks, such as methane emissions from permafrost, could drive temperatures even higher. Near the middle of this range of warming (around 2 – 3°C above today, the Earth would reach a temperature not seen since the middle Pliocene around 3 million years ago . This level of warming on a global scale is far outside the experience of human civilisation. However, these are conservative estimates of the expected warming, because in the absence of an effective climate policy, changes in land use and the growth in population and energy consumption around the world will drive greenhouse gas emissions far higher than today. This would lead greenhouse gas levels to attain higher levels than suggested above. The IPCC projects that without intervention greenhouse gas levels will rise to 550 – 700 ppm CO2e by 2050 and 650 – 1200 ppm CO2e by 210041. These projections and others are discussed in Chapter 7, which concludes that, without mitigation, greenhouse gas levels are likely to be towards the upper end of these ranges. If greenhouse gas levels were to reach 1000 ppm, more than treble pre-industrial levels, the Earth would be committed to around a 3 – 10°C of warming or more, even without considering the risk of positive feedbacks (Table 1.1).

#### Not anthropogenic –

#### A) Solar variation

**Hoyt 97** (Douglas, “Causes of Global Warming of about 0.5 C, 1880-1997”, http://users.erols.com/dhoyt1/annex10.htm)

Changes in solar luminosity are the **major driver** of climate change in the 20th century and earlier as shown by the third figure on our home page. The greenhouse effect models predict most of the warming will occur after 1940 when most of the carbon dioxide entered the atmosphere. The warming however occurred mostly before 1940. As the previous paragraph showed, this warming can not be a random event: it must have been forced by changes in external conditions. The key external parameter that changed was the luminosity of the sun. Changes in sunspot decay rates, sunspot structure, or solar cycle lengths all indicate a warming of the sun until the mid-1930's, a dimming of the sun until the 1960's, and a return to a brighter sun in the 1990's. Sunspot decay rates change by as much as 25% over decades. They can only do this if the convective energy transport in the sun in varying. There is no other choice. A variable convective energy flux must be accompanied by a change in solar luminosity. These changes in solar luminosity can be monitored by changes in sunspot structure, the number of penumbral spots, solar cycle lengths, and other proxies. The solar luminosity variations can be reconstructed to about 300 AD. Since 1000 AD these luminosity variations and climate have paralleled each other closely, although more work is required to reconstruct climate variations accurately.

#### B) Natural variance

**Daily Mail 7** ((London), 1-12, Lexis)

Then there's the claim that the climate is the hottest on record. But this statistical record goes back only a few centuries, if that. Yet there's plenty of other evidence that the climate in Europe was warmer than now by at least two degrees in 1100, when vines grew in Northumberland and farmers settled in Greenland. Since this was followed by the Little Ice Age, which lasted until 1880, it's hardly surprising - and surely a cause for rejoicing - that since then the climate has warmed up by about 0.6 degrees, well within normal patterns. As for the presumed villain of the piece, carbon dioxide, this makes up such a tiny fraction of the atmosphere that even if it doubled it would make little difference to the climate. And, like sea levels, it doesn't correlate with climate change. Historically, it has increased hundreds of years after the climate has warmed up. Between 1940 and 1975, when industrial activity - which produces carbon dioxide - rose rapidly, the climate actually cooled.

#### No impact – warming will be slow, at night, and beneficial

**Wittwer 95** (Sylvan, Professor of Horticulture and Director of the Michigan State University Agricultural Experiment Station, Food, Climate, And Carbon Dioxide: The Global Environment And World Food Production, p. 55-7)

It is further emphasized in this scenario that if there is a modest warming of a degree or two (CAST, 1992), this would likewise reflect the positive effects of a longer growing season and likely bring areas of both the northern and southern hemispheres into viable agriculture crop production, that are currently too cold for food or pasture crops. Also, the boundaries of winter wheat production would be extended further north and replace much of the spring wheat in the United States, Canada, Russia, and China—all of which are major wheat producers. This would have a positive impact on food production because winter wheat is more productive than spring wheat. Overall, it has been conservatively estimated that global agricultural productivity has risen by approximately 2.5 to 10%, and possibly as high as 14% from the current increase in atmospheric CO2 over preindustrial levels (Allen et al., 1987; Kimball, 1983a, b; Strain, 1992). It has also been estimated that the growing stock and forest growth in Europe has increased between 1971 and 1990 by 25 and 30%, respectively (Kauppi et al., 1992). Finally, there is a scenario that offers that there has not been, and will likely not be a significant global warming, and if there is, it may be overall more desirable than the climate we now have. Also, that any climate change (warming) will be at the **very lower levels** of projections coming from the interpretation of projections of general circulation climate modeling. This scenario is based on the reality of what has happened in the earth’s atmosphere thus far. It is emphasized that the computer projections of global warming are of known computational errors and do not include many variables, among which the most important is the effects of clouds, which may exceed by severalfold any anthropomorphic inputs of greenhouse gases, the inputs of oceans, and the biological sequestering by green plants and soils. The rationale is that the models have predicted much more warming than has already occurred. The GCMs, with their known flaws, form the only basis for predicting catastrophic warming, from a doubling of greenhouse gases, and particularly CO2. during the next century. If all the global warming of 0.4 to 0.60C, which has occurred during the past century could be attributed to an increased greenhouse effect, it would still be only one-third to one-half of the lowest now being predicted by current models. Most all such predictions are based on the climate change (temperature increase) that will occur when the atmospheric CO2 content doubles. If one now adds the effects of other greenhouse gases, including methane, nitrous oxide and the chlorofluorocarbons, which have also increased, along with the 25 to 30% increase in CO2 in the past 100 years, and have an approximate equivalent warming effect to that of CO2. we have already gone halfway to an equivalent CO2 doubling. This scenario is based on the following lines of evidence. First, is the magnitude of observed warming. The observed record thus far for global warming is far below the average of 4.20C (7.60F) projected, and at the lowest levels of the ranges reported. Second, are the timings and locations of the projected warming. The models have projected that most of the warming will occur in the high latitude winter, which presumes most of the warming to be at night. This would reduce or prevent deleterious temperature effects and would lengthen the growing seasons. Finally, there would be the growth enhancement caused by CO2. Carbon dioxide at its current atmospheric level, is a limiting nutrient for plants. A voluminous scientific literature has now demonstrated more growth through photosynthetic enhancement; improved CO2 dark fixation, reductions in both photo and dark respiration; increased water use efficiency by plants, including food crops, and greater resistance to air pollutants, as the atmospheric CO2 concentration increases.

#### Feedbacks check

**Hoyt 97** (Douglas, “Causes of Global Warming of About 0.5C, 1880-1997”,

http://users.erols.com/dhoyt1/annex10.htm)

The climate fluctuations of the twentieth century, according to the modelers, are "explained" by a greenhouse warming (using models with 200 adjustable factors), by sulfate aerosols when a cooling trend requires an explanation, and by natural variability when they don't have any factor that they can adjust. One is impressed how the climate modelers continued tuning of their climate models seems to closely parallel to the invention of epicycles used to rescue the Ptolemaic system. Two points need to be made: 1. Natural variability is **very small**. Major explosive volcanic eruptions cause (at best) one or two years of cooling, at which point the climate returns to its pre-perturbed state. The fact that climate responds by returning to its pre-perturbed state means that the climate system has a **fixed set point** and is **constantly trying to return** to that point. Using the terminology of thermostats, this means its **"dead band"** is **very small**. In other words, large fluctuations in climate can only occur if they are forced by changes in external boundary conditions.

#### Warming is slowing

**Science Daily 8** (“Will Global Warming Take A Short Break? Improved Climate Predictions Suggest A Reduced Warming Trend During The Next 10 Years”, 5-5,

http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/05/080502113749.htm)

To date climate change projections, as published in the last IPCC report, only considered changes in future atmospheric composition. This strategy is appropriate for long-term changes in climate such as predictions for the end of the century. However, in order to predict short-term developments over the next decade, models need additional information on natural climate variations, in particular associated with ocean currents. Lack of sufficient data has hampered such predictions in the past. Scientists at IFM-GEOMAR and from the MPI for Meteorology have developed a method to derive ocean currents from measurements of sea surface temperature (SST). The latter are available in good quality and global coverage at least for the past 50 years. With this additional information, natural decadal climate variations, which are superimposed on the long-term anthropogenic warming trend, can be predicted. The improved predictions suggest that global **warming will weaken** slightly **during the following 10** **years**. “Just to make things clear: we are not stating that anthropogenic climate change won’t be as bad as previously thought”, explains Prof. Mojib Latif from IFM-GEOMAR. “What we are saying is that on top of the warming trend there is a long-periodic oscillation that will probably lead to a to a **lower temperature increase** than we would expect from the current trend during the next years”, adds Latif. “That is like driving from the coast to a mountainous area and crossing some hills and valleys before you reach the top”, explains Dr. Johann Jungclaus from the MPI for Meteorology. “In some years trends of both phenomena, the anthropogenic climate change and the natural decadal variation will add leading to a much stronger temperature rise.”

### Ext – Not Anthropogenic

#### Natural forces causes climate change, not human activity

**Hecht 97** (Marjorie Mazel, Managing Editor, 21st Century Science and Technology, Spring)

The ice ages of the past and the coming Ice Age have a timetable of their own, quite independent of man’s industrial output of carbon dioxide. No scientist who knew these astronomical cycles could possibly be trapped into worrying about the ups and downs of local or global temperatures in time spans of years or even decades, or seriously be concerned with short-term computer modeling and associated scare stories about global warming. The times have changed, and so has the environmental ideology-but the long-range climate cycles have not changed. This means, that based on the last several million years of history, the world is inexorably moving into another ice age, no matter how much propaganda is generated about global warming. The global warming hypothesis and the many research artifacts it has generated can be dissected and disproved one by one; but the fact remains that the overall question of climate must be situated in a long view of history, not the short term.

#### Solar variation is the cause of warming – not CO2

**Solomon 7** (Lawrence, Staff Writer – National Post, “Look to Mars for the Truth on Global Warming”, The National Post, 2-7, http://www.nationalpost.com/story.html?id=edae9952-3c3e-47ba-913f-7359a5c7f723&k=0/)

Climate change is a much, much bigger issue than the public, politicians, and even the most alarmed environmentalists realize. Global warming extends to Mars, where the polar ice cap is shrinking, where deep gullies in the landscape are now laid bare, and where the climate is the warmest it has been in decades or centuries. "One explanation could be that Mars is just coming out of an ice age," NASA scientist William Feldman speculated after the agency's Mars Odyssey completed its first Martian year of data collection. "In some low-latitude areas, the ice has already dissipated." With each passing year more and more evidence arises of the dramatic changes occurring on the only planet on the solar system, apart from Earth, to give up its climate secrets. NASA's findings in space come as no surprise to Dr. Habibullo Abdussamatov at Saint Petersburg's Pulkovo Astronomical Observatory. Pulkovo -- at the pinnacle of Russia's space-oriented scientific establishment -- is one of the world's best equipped observatories and has been since its founding in 1839. Heading Pulkovo's space research laboratory is Dr. Abdussamatov, one of the world's chief critics of the theory that man-made carbon dioxide emissions create a greenhouse effect, leading to global warming. "Mars has global warming, but without a greenhouse and without the participation of Martians," he told me. "These parallel global warmings -- observed simultaneously on Mars and on Earth -- can only be a straightline consequence of the effect of the one same factor: a long-time change in solar irradiance." The sun's increased **irradiance** over the last century, **not C02 emissions**, **is responsible for** the global **warming** we're seeing, says the celebrated scientist, and this solar irradiance also explains the great volume of C02 emissions. "It is no secret that increased solar irradiance warms Earth's oceans, which then triggers the emission of large amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. So the common view that man's industrial activity is a deciding factor in global warming has emerged from a misinterpretation of cause and effect relations."

### Ext – Warming Slow

#### No runaway warming – their data assumes too much water vapor

**Carter 7** (Robert M., Adjunct Research Professor – James Cook University, “The Myth of Dangerous Human-Caused Climate Change”, AusIMM New Leaders’ Conference, 5-2)

Though not a pollutant, it is nonetheless the case that carbon dioxide absorbs space-bound infrared radiation, thereby increasing the energy available at Earth’s surface for warming or increased evaporation (eg de Freitas, 2002). Radiation theory thus accepted, there remain four problems with turning an increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide into global warming alarmism. First, the relationship between increasing carbon dioxide and increasing temperature is logarithmic, which lessens the forcing effect of each successive increment of carbon dioxide (Figure 4). Second, in increasing from perhaps 280 ppm in pre-industrial times to 380 ppm now, carbon dioxide should **already have produced** 75 per cent of the theoretical warming of ~1°C that would be caused by a doubling to 560 ppm (Lindzen, 2006); as we move from 380 to 560 ppm, **at most a trivial few tenths of a degree** of warming remain in the system. Claims of greater warming, such as those of the IPCC (2001), are based upon arbitrary adjustments to the lambda value in the Stefan-Boltzmann equation, and untested assumptions about positive feedbacks from water vapour. Third, the ice core data show conclusively that, during natural climate cycling, changes in temperature precede changes in carbon dioxide by an average 800 years or so (Fischer et al, 1999; Indermuhle et al, 2000; Mudelsee, 2001; Caillon et al, 2003); similarly, temperature change precedes carbon dioxide change, in this case by five months, during annual seasonal cycling (Kuo, Lindberg and Thomson, 1990). And, fourth, Boucot, Xu and Scotese (2004) have shown that over the Phanerozoic little relationship exists between the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide and necessary warming, including that extensive glaciation occurred between 444 and 353 million years ago when atmospheric carbon dioxide was up to 17 times higher than today (Chumakov, 2004).

#### Phytoplankton means warming will be slow

**Bailey 93** (Ronald, Science and Technology Reporter – Forbes & PBS, Ecoscam, p. 155)

The oceans may harbor another **natural "thermostat"** tending to cool the planet. Under warmer conditions, certain microscopic marine organisms (phytoplankton) create a gas called dimethyl sulfide (DMS), which acts as condensation nuclei for highly reflective clouds. The clouds cool the surface, which reduces the amount of DMS produced by the phytoplankton, thus regulating surface temperatures.

#### Worst case scenario – few tenths a degree

**Bailey 93** (Ronald, Science and Technology Reporter – Forbes & PBS, Ecoscam, p. 152-153)

Many climatologists believe that there may eventually be some warming associated with increased atmospheric C02, but nothing like the climate disaster predicted by the apocalyptics. Lindzen thinks that over the next century "a **virtually undetectable** rise of a **few tenths** of a degree might occur." Robert Balling says, "the temperature record the past century suggests that a doubling of carbon dioxide will produce a global temperature response at the **lowest** **end** of the model predictions, probably not more than 1.O [degree] C degrees." Patrick Michaels also believes global temperature might rise as much as I .OC (1.8F) degrees.

## Oil Dependency Answers

### Oil Dependency 1NC

#### HSR would have a minimal effect on oil dependency

**Druce**, 6/29/**2011** (Paul, Bad Arguments for High Speed Rail: Oil Consumption, Reason and Rail, p. http://reasonrail.blogspot.com/2011/06/bad-arguments-for-high-speed-rail-oil.html)

One of the ancillary benefits which is often inappropriately highlighted as a primary benefit by high speed rail proponents is that of reducing American oil consumption. Often, our reliance upon foreign oil, including some from Middle East nations such as Saudi Arabia, is seized upon by such proponents and the defense costs added to the price of oil. This, however, is a flawed notion that **ignores the interconnected nature of global trade**. Even if we were completely independent from foreign oil, or at least oil not from North America and Europe, including our shipping, we would still fund foreign militaries and place troops in these areas. A sudden lack of oil shipments from Saudi Arabia would cause major oil price shocks globally, not merely to those depending on oil from Saudi Arabia. Even if we were, by perhaps some magical free energy device, completely free from oil use except in raw industrial processes, we would still be gravely damaged economically because our economy **depends on foreign trade**. Major economic recessions or depressions in our trading partners will cause the same problems here as well. Now, for the actual matter at hand, that of high speed rail's role in reducing our dependence on oil. The California High Speed Rail Authority estimates that, by 2030, the high speed rail system will be saving 12.7 million barrels of oil per year. This, however, represents only sixteen hours worth of US consumption in 2009 and only 1.9% of California's annual consumption (one week's worth). Clearly it would have minimal, if any, effect on oil prices or oil dependence.

### Oil Dependency 1NC – AT: Economy Advantage

#### High speed rail turns the economy, while providing negligible benefits – other alternatives would remain cheaper

O'Toole, 11 (Randal, Cato Institute Senior Fellow working on urban growth, public land, and transportation issues, “High-Speed Pork: Faster trains will produce almost no new mobility”, The National Review, Feb 14, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259618/high-speed-pork-randal-otoole#)

President Obama’s high-speed-rail proposal will, over the course of six years, pour $53 million of taxpayer money into a megaproject that produces little value for the vast majority of Americans. It uses the classic pork-barrel strategy of starting a program small and then expanding it after Congress, prodded by special-interest groups, is fully committed. Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood admits Obama’s 25-year plan to extend high-speed train service to 80 percent of Americans will cost $500 billion, which means after six years, spending will have to increase to $24 billion a year. While this will please construction and engineering firms, the rest of us will get little other than the satisfaction of knowing our trains go as fast as those in France and China (though less than half as fast as planes). The real value of any new transportation technology comes from the new mobility it creates. For example, the average American travels 4,000 miles and ships 2,000 ton-miles of goods per year on interstate freeways, virtually none of which took place before the interstates were built. That new mobility helped people reach jobs and other opportunities and ship products that might never have existed without the interstates. In contrast, high-speed trains will produce almost no new mobility — **in fact, they could suppress freight mobility**, which is why the freight railroads are resisting government plans to use their tracks for high-speed passenger trains in North Carolina, Virginia, and Washington. The Florida Department of Transportation predicts 96 percent of the people riding its proposed Tampa-to-Orlando high-speed train would otherwise drive; only 4 percent will be new travelers. With 50 million people visiting Central Florida each year, high-speed rail will increase business by less than .25 percent. Similarly, the California High-Speed Rail Authority predicts 98 percent of the riders on its proposed San Francisco–to–Los Angeles high-speed trains would otherwise drive or fly. With only 2 percent new travel, the trains will create almost no new economic opportunities. Far from serving 80 percent of Americans, Obama’s trains will serve only about 8 percent. High-speed rail’s main market is downtown-to-downtown travel. But little more than 7 percent of Americans work in big-city downtowns, and fewer than 1 percent live there. Few aside from this fairly wealthy elite will regularly ride high-speed trains. For the few who use it, **high-speed rail will substitute an expensive form of travel for much more affordable forms**. Fares on Amtrak’s Acela average nearly 75 cents a passenger mile, compared with average airfares of 13 cents per passenger mile and bus fares that are even lower. New York–to–Washington tickets on the Acela start at $139; JetBlue starts at $39; and Megabus averages less than $15. Americans spend an average of 35 cents a vehicle mile on driving, and cars in intercity travel carry on average more than two people, so the cost per passenger mile is around 15 cents. Subsidies to airports and highways add only about a penny per passenger mile to these costs. The Acela’s high fares explain why it carries only 2 percent of passenger travel in the Boston-to-Washington corridor. Unlike the interstates, which were paid for exclusively out of gasoline taxes and other highway user fees, all of the capital costs and much of the operating costs of high-speed trains will be subsidized by taxpayers who will rarely ride the trains. This is the way it works in France and Japan, where — despite having population distributions much more conducive to rail travel — residents ride high-speed trains an average of less than 500 miles a year. Nor will high-speed rail offer any environmental benefits. The average intercity auto trip today uses less energy per passenger mile than the average Amtrak train. While it takes a lot of energy to move trains 150 miles per hour or more, autos are getting cleaner and more energy-efficient every year, so by 2025 the average car will be greener than the most efficient train. High-speed rail will do little more than drain our economy. It is foolish to ask taxpayers to spend hundreds of billions on trains that few can afford to use.

### Oil Dependency 1NC – AT: Economy Impact

#### Studies prove economic decline does not result in war

**Miller 00** (Morris, Economist, Adjunct Professor in the Faculty of Administration – University of Ottawa, Former Executive Director and Senior Economist – World Bank, “Poverty as a Cause of Wars?”, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, Winter, p. 273)

The question may be reformulated. Do wars spring from a popular reaction to a sudden economic crisis that
exacerbates poverty and growing disparities in wealth and incomes? Perhaps one could argue, as some scholars do, that it is some dramatic event or sequence of such events leading to the exacerbation of poverty that, in turn, leads to this deplorable denouement. This exogenous factor might act as a catalyst for a violent reaction on the part of the people or on the part of the political leadership who would then possibly be tempted to seek a diversion by finding or, if need be, fabricating an enemy and setting in train the process leading to war. According to a study undertaken by Minxin Pei and Ariel Adesnik of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, there would not appear to be any merit in this hypothesis. After studying ninety-three episodes of economic crisis in twenty-two countries in Latin America and Asia in the years since the Second World War they concluded that:19 Much of the conventional wisdom about the political impact of economic crises may be wrong ... The severity of economic crisis – as measured in terms of inflation and negative growth - bore **no relationship** to the collapse of regimes ... (or, in democratic states, rarely) to an outbreak of violence ... In the cases of dictatorships and semidemocracies, the ruling elites responded to crises by increasing repression (thereby using one form of violence to abort another).

#### History proves no conflict

**Ferguson 6** (Niall, Professor of History – Harvard University, Foreign Affairs, 85(5), September / October, Lexis)

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, **no** general **relationship between economics and conflict is discernible** for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some **severe economic crises were not followed by wars**.

#### Long time-frame for a war

**Russett 83** (Bruce, Dean Acheson Professor of International Relations and Political Science – Yale University, “Prosperity and Peace: Presidential Address”, International Studies Quarterly, 27(4), p. 384)

The ‘optimism’ argument seems strained to me, but elements of Blainey’s former thesis, about the need to mobilize resources before war can be begun, are more plausible, especially in the 20th century. Modern wars are fought by complex organizations, with complex and expensive weapons. It takes time to design and build the weapons that military commanders will require, and it takes time to train the troops who must use them. Large bureaucracies must plan and obtain some consensus on those plans; and even in a dictatorship the populace in general must be prepared, with clear images of who are their enemies and of the cause that will justify war with them. In short, preparations for war take time. Just how long a lag we should expect to find between an economic downturn and subsequent war initiation is unclear. But surely it will be **more than a year or two**, and war may well occur **only after** the economy is recovering.

#### Economy is resilient

**Behravesh 06** (Nariman, most accurate economist tracked by USA Today and chief global economist and executive vice president for Global Insight, Newsweek, “The Great Shock Absorber; Good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility have strengthened the global economy's 'immune system.'” 10-15-2006, www.newsweek.com/id/47483)

The U.S. and global economies were able to withstand three body blows in 2005--one of the worst tsunamis on record (which struck at the very end of 2004), one of the worst hurricanes on record and the highest energy prices after Hurricane Katrina--without missing a beat. This resilience was especially remarkable in the case of the United States, which since 2000 has been able to shrug off the biggest stock-market drop since the 1930s, a major terrorist attack, corporate scandals and war. Does this mean that recessions are a relic of the past? No, but recent events do suggest that the global economy's "immune system" is now strong enough to absorb shocks that 25 years ago would probably have triggered a downturn. In fact, over the past two decades, recessions have not disappeared, but have become considerably milder in many parts of the world. What explains this enhanced recession resistance? The answer: a combination of good macroeconomic policies and improved microeconomic flexibility. Since the mid-1980s, central banks worldwide have had great success in taming inflation. This has meant that long-term interest rates are at levels not seen in more than 40 years. A low-inflation and low-interest-rate environment is especially conducive to sustained, robust growth. Moreover, central bankers have avoided some of the policy mistakes of the earlier oil shocks (in the mid-1970s and early 1980s), during which they typically did too much too late, and exacerbated the ensuing recessions. Even more important, in recent years the Fed has been particularly adept at crisis management, aggressively cutting interest rates in response to stock-market crashes, terrorist attacks and weakness in the economy. The benign inflationary picture has also benefited from increasing competitive pressures, both worldwide (thanks to globalization and the rise of Asia as a manufacturing juggernaut) and domestically (thanks to technology and deregulation). Since the late 1970s, the United States, the United Kingdom and a handful of other countries have been especially aggressive in deregulating their financial and industrial sectors. This has greatly increased the flexibility of their economies and reduced their vulnerability to inflationary shocks. Looking ahead, what all this means is that a global or U.S. recession will likely be avoided in 2006, and probably in 2007 as well. Whether the current expansion will be able to break the record set in the 1990s for longevity will depend on the ability of central banks to keep the inflation dragon at bay and to avoid policy mistakes. The prospects look good. Inflation is likely to remain a low-level threat for some time, and Ben Bernanke, the incoming chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, spent much of his academic career studying the past mistakes of the Fed and has vowed not to repeat them. At the same time, no single shock will likely be big enough to derail the expansion. What if oil prices rise to $80 or $90 a barrel? Most estimates suggest that growth would be cut by about 1 percent--not good, but no recession. What if U.S. house prices fall by 5 percent in 2006 (an extreme assumption, given that house prices haven't fallen nationally in any given year during the past four decades)? Economic growth would slow by about 0.5 percent to 1 percent. What about another terrorist attack? Here the scenarios can be pretty scary, but an attack on the order of 9/11 or the Madrid or London bombings would probably have an even smaller impact on overall GDP growth.

### Oil Dependency 1NC – AT: Oil Shocks Impact

#### No economic collapse from shocks – most comprehensive data.

**Khadduri**, 8/23/**2011** (Walid – former Middle East Economic Survey Editor-in-Chief, The impact of rising oil prices on the economies of importing nations, Al Arabiya News, p. http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/08/23/163590.html)

What is the impact of oil price shocks on the economies of importing nations? At first glance, there appears to be large-scale and extremely adverse repercussions for rising oil prices. However, a study published this month by researchers in the IMF Working Paper group suggests a different picture altogether (it is worth mentioning that the IMF has not endorsed its findings.) The study (Tobias N. Rasmussen & Agustin Roitman, "Oil Shocks in a Global Perspective: Are They Really That Bad?", IMF Working Paper, August 2011) mentions that “Using a comprehensive global dataset […] we find that the impact of higher oil prices on oil-importing economies is generally small: a 25 percent increase in oil prices typically causes GDP to fall by about half of one percent or less.” The study elaborates on this by stating that this impact differs from one country to another, depending on the size of oil-imports, as “oil price shocks are not always costly for oil-importing countries: although higher oil prices increase the import bill, there are partly offsetting increases in external receipts [represented in new and additional expenditures borne by both oil-exporting and oil-importing countries]”. In other words, the more oil prices increase, benefiting exporting countries, the more these new revenues are recycled, for example through the growth in demand for new services, labor, and commodity imports. The researchers argue that the series of oil price rallies (in 1983, 1996, 2005, and 2009) have played an important role in recessions in the United States. However, Rasmussen and Roitman state at the same time that significant changes in the U.S. economy in the previous period (the appearance of combined elements, such as improvements in monetary policy, the institution of a labor market more flexible than before and a relatively smaller usage of oil in the U.S. economy) has greatly mitigated the negative effects of oil prices on the U.S. economy. A 10 percent rise in oil prices before 1984, for instance, used to lower the U.S. GDP by about 0.7 percent over two to three years, while this figure started shrinking to no more than 0.25 percent after 1984, owing to these accumulated economic changes. This means that while oil price shocks continue to adversely impact the U.S. economy, the latter has managed, as a result of the changes that transpired following the first shock in the seventies, to overcome these shocks, and subsequently, the impact of oil price shocks has become extremely limited compared to previous periods.

### No Economic Shocks 2NC

#### Oil shocks won’t collapse the economy – economic restructuring such as monetary, labor and oil consumption reforms mitigate the impact. Higher prices lead to revenue recycling through imports. That’s Khadduri 2011.

#### Prefer our evidence because our studies are the most comprehensive.

**Khadduri**, 823/**2011** (Walid – former Middle East Economic Survey Editor-in-Chief, The impact of rising oil prices on the economies of importing nations, Al Arabiya News, p. http://english.alarabiya.net/views/2011/08/23/163590.html)

The significance of this study lies in its investigation of the impact of rising oil prices worldwide, especially in developing countries, in contrast with the limited focus on the United States or the Western industrialized countries in other similar available literature. Thus, the researchers draft a comprehensive global portrait of the intertwined relationship between crude oil prices on the one hand, and economic production and international trade on the other. They thus conclude that “the results show that these correlations have, across the world, usually been positive. High oil prices have generally coincided with good times for the world economy, especially in recent years.”

#### South American imports and the SPR prevent oil shocks.

**Singh**, 1/3/**2012** (Michael – managing director of the Washington Institute, The Real Iranian Threat in the Gulf, Foreign Policy, p. [www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1789](http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC06.php?CID=1789))

Iran's bellicose rhetoric and Gulf wargames in recent days have given rise to the question of whether Tehran could close the Strait of Hormuz. As many analysts have observed, the answer is no -- not for a meaningful period of time. Less frequently addressed, however, is whether Iran would even try. The answer to that question is also "no" -- even the attempt would have devastating strategic consequences for Iran. The presumable target of an Iranian effort to close the Strait would be the United States. However, while we would of course be affected by any resulting rise in global oil prices, the U.S. gets little of our petroleum from the Gulf. The U.S. imports only about 49 percent of the petroleum we consume, and over half of those imports come from the Western Hemisphere. Less than 25 percent of U.S. imports came from all the Gulf countries combined in October 2011 -- far less than is available in the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, were Gulf supplies to be interrupted.

### Oil Dependency 1NC – AT: Peak Oil Impact

#### No peak – their studies are trash

**Williams 3** (Bob, Executive Editor – Oil and Gas Journal, Oil and Gas Journal, 7-14, Lexis)

A number of prominent energy consultants, economists, and petroleum scientist have taken issue with the notion that the world awaits an imminent peak in oil production. Thomas Ahlbrandt, world energy project chief with the US Geological Survey in Denver, objects to the concept underlying the Hubbert curve. "Is there an imminent oil peak? **The short answer is no**," he said. "I believe in the plateau concept, which reconciles the need for additional resources within the constraints of infrastructure and capital investment. "The symmetric rise and fall of oil production is not technically supportable, as Hubber, Laherrere, and others have published, although generally not recognized by (Colin) Campbell, (Kenneth) Deffeyes, and others who have been making draconian end-of-civilization claims since 1989 and every year since , , , Why is there no accountability for these failed forecasts either by Hubbert or disciples such as Campbell, Laherrere, etc.?" Instead, Ahlbrandt and others point to even mature areas such as the UK North Sea, which **in the past 20 years has repeatedly defied forecasts of a bell-curve-style decline** (Figs. 6-7). And peak-oil critics also noted the **surge in discoveries in areas deemed critical for future supply, such as the deepwater Gulf of Mexico** (Fig. 8). Sarah Emerson, managing director, Energy Security Analysis Inc., Wakefield, Mass., is one of many energy economists who contend that the Hubbert modelers disregard the roles of oil supply, demand, and prices as well political and regulatory impacts. "I do not believe the peak in global oil production is imminent," she told OGJ. ", , , The geologists who present the resource scarcity argument tend to ignore changes in the economic context. For example, foreign investment laws can change in countries with large reserves and limited access to capital or technology. This means places where we never expected development (or expected slow development) suddenly open up. A list of the countries who have opened up to foreign investment is an impressive who's who of producers: Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Venezuela, now Iraq, and maybe even someday Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. New-found access to capital and technology requires a total reappraisal of resource development." She contends that the global oil industry and market is "incredibly dynamic, constantly changing as it responds to regulation and innovation. "The Hubbert curve analysis is **far too static** to stand as a guiding assessment of the future of global oil supply. As with any 'model' results, it should be one input into a broader, more comprehensive market analysis."

#### No solvency for peak oil – change would have to be global and would, at minimum, take 50 years

**Hertsgaard 4** (Mark, Renowned Author, Wash Post, 6-13, Lexis)

According to Roberts, a contributor to Harper's who visited Saudi Arabia and Azerbaijan and interviewed a range of industry, government and private experts for this book, there is little dispute among insiders that an oil peak is inevitable someday; oil is, after all, a finite resource. But there is considerable disagreement about when that will occur. Optimists, such as those in the U.S. Geological Survey and the Energy Information Agency, foresee no peak before 2035. "Pessimists, by contrast," Roberts writes, "a group whose members include geologists, industry analysts, and a surprising number of oil industry and government officials, believe that a peak may come much sooner -- perhaps as soon as 2005." That 30-year difference is crucial. To avoid the disaster scenario outlined above, the world must put in place substitute sources of energy, and a system for delivering them, before the peak occurs. Otherwise, shortages are certain and chaos likely. **Establishing an alternative system will be no small challenge**, however, for it must displace the 40 percent of global energy demand that is currently met by oil. Historically, human societies have **needed about 50 years** to shift from one energy foundation to another. Wood, for example, gave way to coal during the early 19th century and coal to oil in the mid-20th. Given how little the United States in particular has done so far to develop successful alternatives, one must hope the optimists are right in saying that we have decades, not months or years, to leave oil behind.

#### No resource wars over oil

**Victor 7** (David G., Professor of Law – Stanford Law School and Director – Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, “What Resource Wars?”, The National Interest, 11-12, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16020)

RISING ENERGY prices and mounting concerns about environmental depletion have animated fears that the world may be headed for a spate of “resource wars”—hot conflicts triggered by a struggle to grab valuable resources. Such fears come in many stripes, but the threat industry has sounded the alarm bells especially loudly in three areas. First is the rise of China, which is poorly endowed with many of the resources it needs—such as oil, gas, timber and most minerals—and has already “gone out” to the world with the goal of securing what it wants. Violent conflicts may follow as the country shunts others aside. A second potential path down the road to resource wars starts with all the money now flowing into poorly governed but resource-rich countries. Money can fund civil wars and other hostilities, even leaking into the hands of terrorists. And third is global climate change, which could multiply stresses on natural resources and trigger water wars, catalyze the spread of disease or bring about mass migrations. **Most of this is bunk,** and nearly all of it has focused on the wrong lessons for policy. Classic resource wars are good material for Hollywood screenwriters. They rarely occur in the real world. To be sure, resource money can magnify and prolong some conflicts, but the **root causes** of those hostilities usually lie elsewhere. Fixing them requires focusing on the underlying institutions that govern how resources are used and largely determine whether stress explodes into violence. When conflicts do arise, the weak link isn’t a dearth in resources but a dearth in governance.

#### Oil will be plentiful and mutual interests check violence

**Odell 4** (Peter, Professor Emeritus of International Energy Studies – Erasmus University, Why Carbon Fuels Will Dominate the 21st Century’s Global Energy Economy, p. xii-xiii)

Over the 21st century as a whole, a total of some 1660 Gigatons (\_ 1660 x 10' tons) oil equivalent of carbon energy will be produced and used, compared with a cumulative total in the 20th century of just under 500 Gigatons. This more-than-three-fold increase in the use of carbon energy in the 21st century reflects not only the **bountiful nature** of the world's endowment of carbon energy fuels, but also the willingness of the nations which are rich in coal, oil and/or natural gas to accept the depletion of their "natural" resources, in return for the economic growth it generates for the countries concerned and the rising incomes it secures for their populations. It also indicates the managerial and technological achievements which can be anticipated through the multitude of global regional and local entities responsible for the extraction, the transportation and the processing of the world's energy resources. The **fundamental mutuality** of the interests of the very many parties already involved in such activities - albeit with temporary disturbances between them arising from economic and/or political difficulties (as over the past 100 years) - will **virtually ensure supply continuity** at the levels required by demand developments. In this set of defined circumstances for the exploitation of carbon energies, **the concept of "resource wars"** (Klare, 2002; Kleveman, 2003) **becomes invalid**, as such phenomena are likely only in the context of a terminal scarcity of coal, oil and/or natural gas. This study demonstrates that **such scarcity is excludable**, except on a local or regional scale from time to time, **for the 21st century**.

### Oil Dependency 1NC – AT: Resource Wars Impact

#### Resource ‘conflicts’ don’t escalate – negotiations and compromise are the norm

**Goldstone 2** (Jack, Professor of Public Policy – George Mason, “Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict”, Journal of International Affairs, 56, Fall, p. 123)

Should we therefore dismiss the environment as a cause of conflict? No, although I believe we can be free of the fear that environmental decay will unleash wars and revolutions across the globe. Rather, what research has shown is that although environmental issues do cause international and domestic conflicts, they are of the kind that are **generally settled by negotiation and compromise** and do not lead to taking up arms. The reason for that is straightforward. Where the problem faced by two groups, or two nations, is over the degradation or depletion of an environmental resource, war neither solves the problem (it cannot make more of the resource) nor is it an economically efficient way to redistribute the resource (the costs of war almost invariably far outweigh the cost of gaining alternative resources or paying more for a share of the resource). For example, if two nations have a conflict over sharing river water—such as India and Bangladesh over the Ganges, Israel and Jordan over the river Jordan[ [12](http://web.ebscohost.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/ehost/detail?vid=3&hid=106&sid=b52b09a2-e198-49a9-9721-f665c7920b18%40sessionmgr109#bib12#bib12)] or Hungary and Slovakia over the Danube they may threaten violence but in fact are most likely to produce non-violent resolution through negotiation or arbitration rather than war (and indeed all of these conflicts led to treaties or international arbitration. The reason is that for one party to insist on all the water would in fact be a casus belli; and to risk a war to simply increase one's access to water is economically foolhardy. Throughout the world, the main use of freshwater (over three-quarters) is for irrigation to produce food. A reduction in water can be compensated either by adopting more efficient means of irrigation (drip rather than ditch); by switching to less water-intensive crops (dry grains rather than rice; tree crops rather than grains); or by importing food rather than producing it. All of these steps, though costly, are far, far, less costly than armed conflict. Thus for both the country with the ability to take more water and the country dependent on downstream flows, the issue will be how to use and negotiate use of the resource most efficiently; resort to war would inevitably be more costly than any gains that could be made from increased access to the resource. No nations have ever gone to war strictly over access to water; nor are any likely to do so in the future.

#### History proves – no resource wars

**Victor 7** (David G., Professor of Law – Stanford Law School and Director – Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, “What Resource Wars?”, The National Interest, 11-12, http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=16020)

If resource wars are actually rare-and when they do exist, they are part of a complex of causal factors-then much of the conventional wisdom about resource policies needs fresh scrutiny. A full-blown new strategy is beyond this modest essay, but here in the United States, at least three lines of new thinking are needed. First, the United States needs to think differently about the demands that countries with exploding growth are making on the world's resources. It must keep their rise in perspective, as their need for resources is still, on a per capita basis, much smaller than typical Western appetites. And what matters most is that the United States must focus on how to accommodate these countries' peaceful rise and their inevitable need for resources. Applied to China this means getting the Chinese government to view efficient markets as the best way to obtain resources-not only because such an approach leads to correct pricing (which encourages energy efficiency as resources become more dear), but also because it transforms all essential resources into commodities, which makes their particular physical location less important than the overall functioning of the commodity market. All that will, in turn, make resource wars even less likely because it will create common interests among all the countries with the greatest demand for resources. It will transform the resource problem from a zero-sum struggle to the common task of managing markets. Most policymakers agree with such general statements, but the actual practice of U.S. policy has largely undercut this goal. Saber-rattling about CNOOC's attempt to buy Unocal-along with similar fear-mongering around foreign control of ports and new rules that seem designed to trigger reviews by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States when foreigners try to buy American-owned assets-sends the signal that going out will also be the American approach, rather than letting markets function freely. Likewise, one of the most important actions in the oil market is to engage China and other emerging countries fully in the International Energy Agency-which is the world's only institution for managing the oil commodity markets in times of crisis-yet despite wide bipartisan consensus on that goal, nearly nothing is ever done to execute such a policy. Getting China to source commodities through markets rather than mercantilism will be relatively easy because Chinese policymakers, as well as the leadership of state enterprises that invest in natural resource projects, already increasingly think that way. **The sweep of history points against** classic **resource wars**. Whereas colonialism created long, oppressive and often war-prone supply chains for resources such as oil and rubber, most resources today are fungible commodities. That means it is almost always cheaper and more reliable to buy them in markets.

#### Market adjustments solve

**National Post 8** (Canada – National Edition, “Don’t Panic”, 4-26, Lexis)

The trouble with doom-and-gloom predictions -- whether they be about oil shortages, food scarcity, water wars or population explosions --is that most are based on the linear extrapolation of short-term trends. If, say, rice prices rise, alarmists assume they will keep rising indefinitely at the same rate -- and then produce scary-looking graphs that show trend lines veering up into the wild-eyed blue yonder. But history shows that human adaptation invariably intervenes --especially in parts of the world that have the benefit of a market economy. Scarcity drives innovations that pull the world back from the brink. Consumers take high prices as their cue to consume less; producers take the same cue to produce more. A new equilibrium is reached, just as college microeconomics textbooks would predict. That's why we aren't losing any sleep over the latest predictions from Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce chief economist Jeffrey Rubin, which were fronted prominently on Friday's National Post. New inventions, new oil discoveries and improvements in existing technologies will conspire to spare us Mr. Rubin's parade of horribles, which include $2.25-a-litre gasoline and tens of thousands of job losses in the auto-making sector. In a report entitled The Age of Scarcity, released on Thursday, Mr. Rubin predicts that by 2012, demand for oil, gas and diesel in the rest of the world will exceed that in OECD countries. As developing nations get richer, they will begin competing with the current industrialized world for diminishing resources. This will drive up the cost of everything from energy to food to computer components. Mr. Rubin predicts this will lead to the biggest economic disruption in North America since the 1973 oil crisis. But that same historical comparison suggests a reason Canadians should be suspicious of this ominous forecast: While the oil shortages of the 1970s displaced millions of assembly-line workers and led to a temporary slowdown of the North American economy, the adaptations they spurred ultimately made industry more efficient and ordinary people more prosperous. North American manufacturing is far more productive and energy-efficient now than it was 30 years ago, as well as producing far less pollution. (Many Canadians under 30, who have been reared on a constant diet of dire environmental claims, may have trouble believing this, but despite the rapid growth of our economy in the last three decades, smog is actually less toxic and our waters less polluted than in 1970.) In an interview with the National Post, Mr. Rubin fell into a common trap: He assumed growth is a zero-sum game, whereby someone must lose ground every time someone else gains it. "I think there will be fewer people on the road in North America in five years than there is right now," Mr. Rubin said on Thursday. "For everybody who's about to get on the road by buying a new Tata or a Chery car in the developing world, someone's going to have to get off the road in this part of the world. There's just not enough gasoline to go around." Anyone tempted to buy into this line of thinking would do well to remember the famous bet between Paul R. Ehrlich, author of the apocalyptic 1968 book The Population Bomb, and economist Julian Simon. Mr. Erlich predicted that by the late 1970s, the world would begin to run out of oil and metals, and that "wide-scale famine caused by declining food production" would cause hundreds of millions of deaths annually. Mr. Simon, on the other hand contended, that "natural resources are not finite in any serious way; they are created by the intellect of man, an always renewable resource." In 1980, he bet Mr. Ehrlich $1,000 that by 1990 a basket of any five commodities of his choosing would cost less than it had 10 years earlier. By the end-is-nigh thinking embraced by Mr. Ehrlich (and, to a lesser extent, Mr. Rubin), he should have won easily. Instead, Mr. Simon won. The five commodities chosen were, after inflation, 40% cheaper in 1990 than they had been a decade before. The same pattern is beginning to unfold in 2008. In just a few short months, rising prices for fuel have prompted the sort of market-driven energy efficiencies and environmental solutions that the green movement has failed to achieve through years of hectoring, regulating and legislating. Full-sized SUV sales have plummeted, home builders are designing smaller, low-consumption houses, airlines and railways are switching to more efficient planes and engines and car makers are scrambling to lighten their models. Thanks to just a 30% increase in pump prices, the automobile sector is likely to raise fleet fuel efficiency more than all the laws demanding higher standards passed in the past 35 years combined. There is no doubt that our society is changing because of the scarcity in food and fuel that Mr. Rubin highlights. But it defies the principles of economics to imagine that such scarcity will persist indefinitely. If there is one trend we can depend on, it is that the law of supply and demand will intervene to blunt the economic shocks that even the most prosperous nations must inevitably face.

### Ext – No Conflict

#### Empirical data concludes Neg – scarcity doesn’t cause conflict

**Salehyan 7** (Idean, Assistant Professor of Political Science – University of North Texas, “The New Myth About Climate Change”, Foreign Policy, August, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3922>)

First, aside from a few anecdotes, there is **little systematic empirical evidence** that resource scarcity and changing environmental conditions lead to conflict. In fact, **several studies** have shown that an abundance of natural resources is **more** **likely** to contribute to conflict. Moreover, even as the planet has warmed, the number of civil wars and insurgencies has decreased dramatically. Data collected by researchers at Uppsala University and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo shows a **steep decline** in the number of armed conflicts around the world. Between 1989 and 2002, some 100 armed conflicts came to an end, including the wars in Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. If global warming causes conflict, we should not be witnessing this downward trend. Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. **Clearly** then, **there is much more to** armed **conflict than resource scarcity** and natural disasters.

#### Resource abundance is equally likely to cause conflict

**Sharp 7** (Travis, Military Policy Analyst – Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, “Resource Conflict in the Twenty-First Century”, Peace Review, 19(3), http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/securityspending/articles/ resource\_conflict\_twenty\_first\_century/)

Brito and Intriligator's results have been supported more recently by the World Bank's Collier-Hoeffler (CH) model of civil war onset. The CH model maintains that the opportunities to organize and finance a war are more significant variables than any social or political grievances per se. Under this rubric, the CH model predicts that the chance a nation with limited resources will have a civil war in any five-year span is 1 in 100, but the chance that a resource rich nation will is 1 in 5, according to the March 2006 Harper's Index. Although mathematically-derived quantitative theories provide a **rigorous and concrete demonstration** of the causal relationship between resources and conflict, the historical record should verify any theory of war. I want to now use a specific case study to illustrate the historical link between natural resources and violence.

### Primacy 1NC

#### Heg is resilient

Wohlforth, 7 (William, Professor of Government – Dartmouth College, “Unipolar Stability”, Harvard International Review, Spring, http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1611/3/)

US military forces are stretched thin, its budget and trade deficits are high, and the country continues to finance its profligate ways by borrowing from abroad—notably from the Chinese government. These developments have prompted many analysts to warn that the United States suffers from “imperial overstretch.” And if US power is overstretched now, the argument goes, unipolarity can hardly be sustainable for long. The problem with this argument is that it fails to distinguish between actual and latent power. One must be careful to take into account both the level of resources that can be mobilized and the degree to which a government actually tries to mobilize them. And how much a government asks of its public is partly a function of the severity of the challenges that it faces. Indeed, one can never know for sure what a state is capable of until it has been seriously challenged. Yale historian Paul Kennedy coined the term “imperial overstretch” to describe the situation in which a state’s actual and latent capabilities cannot possibly match its foreign policy commitments. This situation should be contrasted with what might be termed “self-inflicted overstretch”—a situation in which a state lacks the sufficient resources to meet its current foreign policy commitments in the short term, but has untapped latent power and readily available policy choices that it can use to draw on this power. This is arguably the situation that the United States is in today. But the US government has not attempted to extract more resources from its population to meet its foreign policy commitments. Instead, it has moved strongly in the opposite direction by slashing personal and corporate tax rates. Although it is fighting wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and claims to be fighting a global “war” on terrorism, the United States is not acting like a country under intense international pressure. Aside from the volunteer servicemen and women and their families, US citizens have not been asked to make sacrifices for the sake of national prosperity and security. The country could clearly devote a greater proportion of its economy to military spending: today it spends only about 4 percent of its GDP on the military, as compared to 7 to 14 percent during the peak years of the Cold War. It could also spend its military budget more efficiently, shifting resources from expensive weapons systems to boots on the ground. Even more radically, it could reinstitute military conscription, shifting resources from pay and benefits to training and equipping more soldiers. On the economic front, it could raise taxes in a number of ways, notably on fossil fuels, to put its fiscal house back in order. No one knows for sure what would happen if a US president undertook such drastic measures, but there is nothing in economics, political science, or history to suggest that such policies would be any less likely to succeed than China is to continue to grow rapidly for decades. Most of those who study US politics would argue that the likelihood and potential success of such power-generating policies depends on public support, which is a function of the public’s perception of a threat. And as unnerving as terrorism is, there is nothing like the threat of another hostile power rising up in opposition to the United States for mobilizing public support. With **latent power** in the picture, it becomes clear that unipolarity might have more built-in **self-reinforcing mechanisms** than many analysts realize. It is often noted that the rise of a peer competitor to the United States might be thwarted by the counterbalancing actions of neighboring powers. For example, China’s rise might push India and Japan closer to the United States—indeed, this has already happened to some extent. There is also the strong possibility that a peer rival that comes to be seen as a threat would create strong incentives for the United States to end its self-inflicted overstretch and **tap** potentially **large wellsprings of** latent **power**.

#### Primacy does not solve war

**Legro 2011** (Jeffrey W. – professor of politics and Randolph P. Compton Professor in the Miller Center at the University of Virginia, Sell unipolarity? The future of an overvalued concept in International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity, p. EBook)

Such a view, however, is problematic. What seems increasingly clear is that the role of polarity has been overstated or misunderstood or both. This is the unavoidable conclusion that emerges from the penetrating chapters in this volume that probe America’s current dominant status (unipolarity) with the question “does the distribution of capabilities matter for patterns of international politics?”3 Despite the explicit claim that “unipolarity does have a profound impact on international politics”4 what is surprising is how **ambiguous** and **relatively limited** that influence is across the chapters. The causal impact of unipolarity has been **overvalued** for three fundamental reasons. The first is that the effects of unipolarity are often not measured relative to the influence of other causes that explain the same outcome. When the weight of **other factors** is considered, polarity seems to pale in comparison. Second, rather than being a structure that molds states, polarity often seems to be the product of state choice. Polarity may be more outcome than cause. Finally, while international structure does exist, it is constituted as much by ideational content as by material capabilities. Again polarity loses ground in significance.

#### The U.S. lead is insurmountable – still dominates economically and militarily.

**Kagan**, **1/11**/2012 (Robert – senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, Not Fade Away, The New Republic, p. International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity, p. http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI)

Less than a decade ago, most observers spoke not of America’s decline but of its enduring primacy. In 2002, the historian Paul Kennedy, who in the late 1980s had written a much-discussed book on “the rise and fall of the great powers,” America included, declared that never in history had there been such a great “disparity of power” as between the United States and the rest of the world. Ikenberry agreed that “no other great power” had held “such formidable advantages in military, economic, technological, cultural, or political capabilities.... The preeminence of American power” was “unprecedented.” In 2004, the pundit Fareed Zakaria described the United States as enjoying a “comprehensive uni-polarity” unlike anything seen since Rome. But a mere four years later Zakaria was writing about the “post-American world” and “the rise of the rest,” and Kennedy was discoursing again upon the inevitability of American decline. Did the fundamentals of America’s relative power shift so dramatically in just a few short years? The answer is no. Let’s start with the basic indicators. In economic terms, and even despite the current years of recession and slow growth, America’s position in the world has not changed. Its share of the world’s GDP has held remarkably steady, not only over the past decade but over the past four decades. In 1969, the United States produced roughly a quarter of the world’s economic output. Today it still produces roughly a quarter, and it remains not only the largest but also the richest economy in the world. People are rightly mesmerized by the rise of China, India, and other Asian nations whose share of the global economy has been climbing steadily, but this has so far come almost entirely at the expense of Europe and Japan, which have had a declining share of the global economy. Optimists about China’s development predict that it will overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world sometime in the next two decades. This could mean that the United States will face an increasing challenge to its economic position in the future. But the sheer size of an economy is not by itself a good measure of overall power within the international system. If it were, then early nineteenth-century China, with what was then the world’s largest economy, would have been the predominant power instead of the prostrate victim of smaller European nations. Even if China does reach this pinnacle again—and Chinese leaders face significant obstacles to sustaining the country’s growth indefinitely—it will still remain far behind both the United States and Europe in terms of per capita GDP. Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-century China learned and Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, “military strength underpins hegemony.” Here the United States remains unmatched. It is far and away the most powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no decline in America’s relative military capacity—at least not yet. Americans currently spend less than $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers combined. (This figure does not include the deployment in Iraq, which is ending, or the combat forces in Afghanistan, which are likely to diminish steadily over the next couple of years.) They do so, moreover, while consuming a little less than 4 percent of GDP annually—a higher percentage than the other great powers, but in historical terms lower than the 10 percent of GDP that the United States spent on defense in the mid-1950s and the 7 percent it spent in the late 1980s. The superior expenditures underestimate America’s actual superiority in military capability. American land and air forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and are the most experienced in actual combat. They would defeat any competitor in a head-to-head battle. American naval power remains predominant in every region of the world. By these military and economic measures, at least, the United States today is not remotely like Britain circa 1900, when that empire’s relative decline began to become apparent. It is more like Britain circa 1870, when the empire was at the height of its power. It is possible to imagine a time when this might no longer be the case, but that moment has not yet arrived.

### Heg Resilient – 2NC

#### Hegemony is resilient - our 1NC Wohlforth evidence gives two warrants:

#### First, it has vast latent power and could easily devote much more GDP and resources into sustaining its dominance if needed

#### Second, there are self-reinforcing mechanisms that maintain dominance - if balancing does occur, it will incentivize tapping into these vast resources

#### This proves the irrelevancy of their internal link – there’s no way one democracy assistance project is the independent factor that’s key to sustain heg

#### More evidence –

#### Reinforcing positive feedback loops make hegemony resilient

Mowle and Sacko, 7 (Thomas S., Associate Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy, and David H., Associate Professor of Political Science at the United States Air Force Academy, *The Unipolar World: An Unbalanced Future,* Pg. 160-1)

We expect that unipolarity will continue. The American perception of its own offensive advantage seems to have faded as the Iraqi occupation soured. American fears of others’ offensive advantage also seems to have lessened. The United States is likely to return to policies more consistent with perceived defensive advantage, like those followed under President Clinton. The United States will return to bystanding from distant conflicts, exerting its power as cheaply as possible. With this return to the normal politics of defensive advantage, the United States will stop hemorrhaging its blood and wealth, and recover its position. Other states, for their part, will quickly forget any qualms about bandwagoning, and turn away from challenging the United States. The existing minor examples of balancing are instructive in this regard. No state is more clearly trying to balance the United States than Iran. As of mid-2006, it was defying international institutions and testing new weapons. As it has done so, however, it has attracted balancers, not supporters. Iranian actions hardened European resolve against its nuclear programs, and even Russia has moved away from Iran. North Korea has also attracted few friends as it pursues a stronger military arsenal. Venezuela under Hugo Chavez has so far avoided counter-balancing by keeping his opposition to the US rhetorical. If Chavez were to begin building weapons to challenge the United States, openly support the overthrow of the pro-American Columbian government by its insurgencies, send Cuban style expeditionary forces to counter American goals, or cut oil from the world market—in other words, if he began actually balancing the United States—his neighbors and friends would begin to distance themselves from him. Our theory suggests that unipolarity creates positive, reinforcing feedback for itself—unipolarity reconstitutes itself. Unipolarity creates incentives for bandwagoning, rather than balancing. Bandwagoning reduces the appearance of offensive advantage, or the fear that other states are trying to overturn the system. With defensive advantage, the unipolar power is less active, so it appears to be benevolent and less threatening. This reinforces the trend towards bandwagoning, and reduces the likelihood that the unipolar power will quickly expend it power. All of these trends reinforce unipolarity itself, making it a potentially durable structure.

### Primacy Doesn’t Solve War 2NC

#### Unipolarity does not contain conflict, its effect has been continuously overvalued – the aff’s studies are flawed and ignore other factors such as interdependence that overshadow polarities contribution to peace. That’s Legro 11.

#### Prefer our ev because it indicts how much primacy contributes to peace

#### More evidence -Lots of factors prevent great power conflict without hegemony:

* Nuclear deterrence
* Economic interdependence
* Institutions
* Norms

Fettweis, 10 (Christopher J., Professor of Political Science at Tulane, *Dangerous Times? The International Politics of Great Power Peace*, pg. 175-6)

If the only thing standing between the world and chaos is the US military presence, then an adjustment in grand strategy would be exceptionally counter-productive. But it is worth recalling that none of the other explanations for the decline of war – nuclear weapons, complex economic interdependence, international and domestic political institutions, evolution in ideas and norms – necessitate an activist America to maintain their validity. Were American to become more restrained, nuclear weapons would still affect the calculations of the would be aggressor; the process of globalization would continue, deepening the complexity of economic interdependence; the United Nations could still deploy peacekeepers where necessary; and democracy would not shrivel where it currently exists. More importantly, the idea that war is a worthwhile way to resolve conflict would have no reason to return. As was argued in chapter 2, normative evolution is typically unidirectional. Strategic restraint in such a world be virtually risk free.

#### Decline in power does not result in a power vacuum – data is on our side.

Fettweis, 11 (Christopher – Department of Political Science at Tulane University, Free Riding or Restraint?, Comparative Strategy, 9/26, p. EBSCO Host)

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending**,** which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

### Ext – Ikenberry 2011

#### The international system is resilient to great power conflict.

**Ikenberry**, Summer **2011** (G. John – Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, A World of Our Making, Democracy: A Journal of Ideas, p. http://www.democracyjournal.org/21/a-world-of-our-making-1.php?page=all)

There are four reasons to think that some type of updated and reorganized liberal international order will persist. First, the old and traditional mechanism for overturning international order—great-power war—is no longer likely to occur. Already, the contemporary world has experienced the longest period of great-power peace in the long history of the state system. This absence of great-power war is no doubt due to several factors not present in earlier eras, namely nuclear deterrence and the dominance of liberal democracies. Nuclear weapons—and the deterrence they generate—give great powers some confidence that they will not be dominated or invaded by other major states. They make war among major states less rational and there-fore less likely. This removal of great-power war as a tool of overturning international order tends to reinforce the status quo. The United States was lucky to have emerged as a global power in the nuclear age, because rival great powers are put at a disadvantage if they seek to overturn the American-led system. The cost-benefit calculation of rival would-be hegemonic powers is altered in favor of working for change within the system. But, again, the fact that great-power deterrence also sets limits on the projection of American power presumably makes the existing international order more tolerable. It removes a type of behavior in the system—war, invasion, and conquest between great powers—that historically provided the motive for seeking to overturn order. If the violent over-turning of international order is removed, a bias for continuity is introduced into the system. Second, the character of liberal international order itself—with or without American hegemonic leadership—reinforces continuity. The complex interdependence that is unleashed in an open and loosely rule-based order generates expanding realms of exchange and investment that result in a growing array of firms, interest groups, and other sorts of political stakeholders who seek to preserve the stability and openness of the system. Beyond this, the liberal order is also relatively easy to join. In the post-Cold War decades, countries in different regions of the world have made democratic transitions and connected themselves to various parts of this system. East European countries and states within the old Soviet empire have joined NATO. East Asian countries, including China, have joined the World Trade Organization (WTO). Through its many multilateral institutions, the liberal international order facilitates integration and offers support for states that are making transitions toward liberal democracy. Many countries have also experienced growth and rising incomes within this order. Comparing international orders is tricky, but the current liberal international order, seen in comparative perspective, does appear to have unique characteristics that encourage integration and discourage opposition and resistance. Third, the states that are rising today do not constitute a potential united opposition bloc to the existing order. There are so-called rising states in various regions of the world. China, India, Brazil, and South Africa are perhaps most prominent. Russia is also sometimes included in this grouping of rising states. These states are all capitalist and most are democratic. They all gain from trade and integration within the world capitalist system. They all either are members of the WTO or seek membership in it. But they also have very diverse geopolitical and regional interests and agendas. They do not constitute either an economic bloc or a geopolitical one. Their ideologies and histories are distinct. They share an interest in gaining access to the leading institutions that govern the international system. Sometimes this creates competition among them for influence and access. But it also orients their struggles toward the reform and reorganization of governing institutions, not to a united effort to overturn the underlying order. Fourth, all the great powers have alignments of interests that will continue to bring them together to negotiate and cooperate over the management of the system. All the great powers—old and rising—are status-quo powers. All are beneficiaries of an open world economy and the various services that the liberal international order provides for capitalist trading states. All worry about religious radicalism and failed states. Great powers such as Russia and China do have different geopolitical interests in various key trouble spots, such as Iran and South Asia, and so disagreement and noncooperation over sanctions relating to nonproliferation and other security issues will not disappear. But the opportunities for managing differences with frameworks of great-power cooperation exist and will grow. Overall, the forces for continuity are formidable. Of course, there are many forces operating in the world that can generate upheaval and discontinuity. The collapse of the global financial system and an economic depression that triggers massive protectionism are possibilities. Terrorism and other forms of transnational violence can also trigger political panic and turmoil that would lead governments to shut down borders and reimpose restrictions on the movement of goods and people. But in the face of these seismic events in world politics, there are deep forces that keep the system anchored and stable.

## Solvency Answers

### Solvency 1NC

#### HSR is infeasible and difficult to construct

**Staley**, 12/16/**2010** (Sam – director of urban and land use policy at Reason Foundation, Infeasible and Not Cost Effective, New York Times, p. <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/10/13/will-we-ever-have-high-speed-trains/a-national-high-speed-network-in-the-us-is-infeasible-and-not-cost-effective>)

High-speed rail is highly unlikely to happen in the United States, at least not in the way it is envisioned by the Obama administration or the Federal Rail Administration. First, the concept of a "national" network of high-speed rail simply doesn't make sense for the U.S. Even the most ardent proponents recognize that high-speed rail would be most effective in meeting travel needs connecting employment centers between 200 miles and 500 miles apart. The nation is a vast geographic area covering thousands of miles of unpopulated and sparsely populated areas that are unsuitable to high-speed rail. At best, high-speed rail makes sense for very specific corridors, and these corridors will be regional, not national.

## Answers To: HSR Good Scenarios

**AT: Air Pollution**

#### Air quality is improving

**Hayward 4** (Steven F., Senior Fellow – Pacific Research Institute, Index of Leading Indicators, http://www.pacificresearch.org/pub/sab/enviro/04\_enviroindex/Enviro\_2004.pdf)

Average vehicle emissions are dropping about 10 percent per year as the fleet turns over to inherently cleaner vehicles, including modern SUVs. · Since 1985, nitrogen oxides (NOX) emissions from cars have dropped 56 percent and volatile organic compounds (VOCs) are down 67 percent, according to the most recent EPA data. · Stories touting an uptick in ozone pollution are based largely on the .weekend effect,. a paradoxical situation in which the weekend drop in NOX emissions, from 10 to 40 percent, causes an increase in ozone levels. · Asthma rates in children under the age of five rose more than 160 percent between 1980 and 1994, while air pollution rates fell from 25 to 80 percent. Was 2003 the year we started losing the battle against ozone smog? That is what you would think if you read the media headlines. .Smog Woes Back on Horizon,. trumpeted an abovethe- fold Los Angeles Times headline in mid-July.1 .It.s One Smoggy Summer,. declared the Associated Press. And USA Today joined the chorus in October with .Smoggy Skies Persist Despite Decade of Work..2 Unfortunately, a reader of these articles will learn very little about what is behind the recent uptick in ozone levels. To the contrary, most media stories convey **loads of misinformation**. The USA Today story, for example, offers this explanation of stubborn ozone levels: .One likely reason why the smog isn.t lifting: Americans are driving more miles than they did in the 1980s. And they.re driving vehicles that give off more pollution than the cars they drove in the .80s. (emphasis added). USA Today needs a better fact-checking department.

#### Global air pollution inevitable

**Watson 5** (Traci, Staff Writer – USA Today, “Air Pollution From Other Countries Drifts into USA”, USA Today, 3-13, http://www.usatoday.com/weather/resources/climate/2005-03-13-pollution-\_x.htm)

Americans drive imported cars, wear imported clothes and chug imported beers. Now scientists are discovering another, less welcome import into the USA: air pollution. Mercury from China, dust from Africa, smog from Mexico — all of it drifts freely across U.S. borders and contaminates the air millions of Americans breathe, according to recent research from Harvard University, the University of Washington and many other institutions where scientists are studying air pollution. There are no boundaries in the sky to stop such pollution, no Border Patrol agents to capture it. Pollution wafting into the USA accounts for 30% of the nation's ozone, an important component of smog, says researcher David Parrish of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. By the year 2020, Harvard University's Daniel Jacob says, imported pollution will be the primary factor degrading visibility in our national parks. While the United States is cutting its own emissions, some nations, especially China, are belching out more and more dirty air. As a result, overseas pollution could partly **cancel out** improvements in U.S. air quality that have cost billions of dollars.

#### No impact – there is no relationship between pollution and death

**Schwartz 3** (Joel, Adjunct Scholar – Competitive Enterprise Institute, “Particulate Air Pollution: Weighing the Risks”, April, http://cei.org/pdf/3452.pdf)

Nonetheless, both the Bush Administration and congressional Democrats have proposed sweeping new measures to further crack down on power plant emissions. The Administration’s Clear Skies Initiative and a more stringent Democratic alternative are largely justified by claims that current levels of particulate matter (PM) pose a serious public health threat. Supporters of these bills promise substantial benefits from additional PM reductions.

Nevertheless, the benefit claims for PM reductions rest on a **weak foundation**. EPA based its new annual fine PM (PM2.5) standard on a study known as the American Cancer Society (ACS) study of PM and mortality, which assessed the association between the risk of death between 1982 and 1998 with PM2.5 levels in dozens of American cities. Although the ACS study reported an association between PM and mortality, some odd features of the ACS results suggest that PM is not the culprit. For example, according to the ACS results, PM increased mortality in men, but not women; in those with no more than a high school degree, but not those with at least some college education; in former- smokers, but not current- or never-smokers; and in those who said they were moderately active, but not those who said they were very active or sedentary. These odd variations in the relationship between PM2.5 and mortality seem **biologically implausible**. Even more surprising, the ACS study reported that higher PM2.5 levels were not associated with an increased risk of mortality due to respiratory disease; a surprising finding, given that PM would be expected to exert its effects through the respiratory system. EPA also ignored the results of another epidemiologic study that found no effect of PM2.5 on mortality in a cohort of veterans with high blood pressure, even though this relatively unhealthy cohort should have been more susceptible to the effects of pollution than the general population. The evidence therefore suggests that the existing annual standard for PM2.5 is unnecessarily stringent. Attaining the standard will be expensive, but is unlikely to improve public health.

#### Tons of alt causes

**Brook 4** (Robert D. M.D., et al, “Air Pollution and the Cardiovascular Disease”, Circulation: Journal of the American Heart Association, 6-1, <http://circ.ahajournals.org/cgi/content/full/109/21/2655#SEC1/>)

A brief description of several individual air pollutants is provided first for background. A complete discussion is beyond the scope of this statement, and interested readers may find a more comprehensive review on this subject elsewhere.26 Particulate Matter Airborne Particulate Matter consists of a heterogeneous mixture of solid and liquid particles suspended in air, continually varying in size and chemical composition in space and time (Figure 1). Primary particles are emitted directly into the atmosphere, such as diesel soot, whereas secondary particles are created through physicochemical transformation of gases, such as nitrate and sulfate formation from gaseous nitric acid and sulfur dioxide (SO2), respectively. The **numerous** natural and anthropogenic sources of PM include motor vehicle emissions, tire fragmentation and resuspension of road dust, power generation and other industrial combustion, smelting and other metal processing, agriculture, construction and demolition activities, residential wood burning, windblown soil, pollens and molds, forest fires and combustion of agricultural debris, volcanic emissions, and sea spray. Although there are thousands of chemicals that have been detected in PM in different locations, some of the more common constituents include nitrates, sulfates, elemental and organic carbon, organic compounds (eg, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons), biological compounds (eg, endotoxin, cell fragments), and a variety of metals (eg, iron, copper, nickel, zinc, and vanadium).

### AT: Amazon

**Alternate causalities –**

#### A) Illegal logging

**Lane 8** (Jim, “World Wildlife Fund Exonerates Ethanol on Amazonian Deforestation and Food Production”, Biofuels Digest, Lexis)

May 27, 2008 (Biofuels Digest delivered by Newstex) -- The World Wildlife Fund has concluded, in a new study profiled on the BBC, that "ethanol production is not having a significant impact on food production, and that it is not contributing todeforestation in the Amazon." The report concludes that sugar cane ethanol has a positive impact on the environment. The report called for strict monitoring to protect remaining rainforest areas." In Brazil, the federal government announced a crackdown on illegal deforestation in the Amazonian rainforest. Biofuels producers have been accused of causing deforestation, however the authorities are targeting soy farmers, cattle ranchers and illegal timber operators in 36 pockets where increased deforestation has occurred. An emergency meeting of the Brazilian cabinet had been been called by President Luiz InÃ cio Lula da Silva after a 50 percent jump in deforestation rates, following a steady three-year decline. A German academic has analyzed the factors that are causing deforestation of the Amazon, and concluded that sugarcane ethanol production in south-central Brazil is not pushing cattle and soy farming into the Amazon region. Peter Zuurbier, Associate Professor and Director of the Wageningen UR Latin America Office, said that the problem is unclear land titles, unscrupulous timber companies, and poor soil conservation practices by cattle ranchers. He said that after illegal clear cutting by timber companies, the land is occupied by nomadic cattle herds that, over a period of 3 to 4 years, ruin the thin soil of the Amazon areas, which causes fertilizer-based soy farming to be brought into the area to improve productivity. Researchers say that Amazonian deforestation has increased in pace in 2007 and is likely to rise throughout 2008. Carlos Nobre, a scientist with Brazil's National Institute for Space Research, said that 2,300 square miles of forest had been converted to farmland in the past four months, compared with 3,700 square miles in the 12 months ending last July.

#### B) Mining

**Butler 6** (Rhett, “Deforestation in the Amazon”, Monga Bay, http://www.mongabay.com/brazil.html)

Mining has impacted some parts of the Amazon Basin. During the 1980s, over 100,000 prospectors invaded the state of Para when a large gold deposit was discovered, while wildcat miners are still active in the state of Roraima near the Venezuelan border. Typically, miners clear forest for building material, fuelwood collection, and subsistence agriculture.

**No Amazon species extinction – and no impact**

**Morano and Washburn 00** (Marc and Kent, Producers of American Investigator's "Amazon Rainforest: Clear-Cutting the Myths" “Shaky Science Behind Save-Rainforest Effort”, 6-26, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\_ID=17543)

Most of these estimates are rooted in the research of Harvard's Edward O. Wilson, featured by Time magazine as an environmental "hero" in its special Earth Day 2000 edition. In the accompanying article, Wilson argues passionately to stem the tide of extinctions "now 100 to 1,000 times as great as it was before the coming of humanity" -- neglecting to mention that his estimates of 50,000 extinctions per year are based on his own computer models. "There is **no scientific basis** for saying that 50,000 species are going extinct," says Greenspirit's Moore. "I want a list of Latin species." Moore maintains no one can name these species that are said to be going extinct. "The only place you can find them is in Edward O. Wilson's computer at Harvard University. They're actually electrons on a hard drive," Moore states. When asked if he can name a single species of the 50,000 that are said to go extinct, Keating admits: "No we cannot, because we don't know what those species are." Moore is flabbergasted by such statements. "You're telling me that I'm supposed to prove that those species didn't go extinct when they're not there anymore and we never knew they were there in the first place?" Moore asks rhetorically. "That's impossible. I don't know how Wilson can truck out the number 50,000 and keep a straight face." Stott agrees that the focus on species loss is misguided from a scientific point of view. "The earth has gone through **many periods** of major extinctions, some much bigger, let me emphasize, than even being contemplated today and 99.9999 percent (of all species) and I wouldn't know the repeating decimal have gone extinct. Extinction is a natural process," he asserts.

#### Regeneration solves the impact

**Morano and Washburn 00** (Marc and Kent, Producers of American Investigator's "Amazon Rainforest: Clear-Cutting the Myths" “Shaky Science Behind Save-Rainforest Effort”, 6-26, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\_ID=17543)

The idea that a cleared rainforest can grow back is an idea that is not accepted by most environmental campaigns and the popular culture. Yet recent studies indicate that trees do in fact regrow very well in rainforests. A 1998 study by Charles Cannon of Duke University found that eight years after industrial logging in Indonesian rainforests, recovery of both native flora and fauna far exceeded expectations. In Borneo, logged forest contained just as many tree species as unlogged forest. "These findings warrant reassessment of the [conservation](http://www.worldnetdaily.com/) potential of large tracts of commercially logged tropical rainforest," wrote Cannon. Science magazine contributor Robin Chazdon, an ecologist at the University of Connecticut, says: "You can find species that will show increased growth and increased population as a result of logging." "There are many, many tree species that we see commonly in the tropical flora whose regeneration is not occurring in natural forests. They require large scale disturbances," she says.

#### Their evidence is wrong – it double-counts

**Morano and Washburn 00** (Marc and Kent, Producers of American Investigator's "Amazon Rainforest: Clear-Cutting the Myths" “Shaky Science Behind Save-Rainforest Effort”, 6-26, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\_ID=17543)

Actor William Shatner in a National Geographic documentary claims that worldwide, "Rainforest is being cleared at a rate of 20 football fields a minute." Rainforest Action Network says the Amazon is being deforested at a rate of eight football fields a minute. Tim Keating of Rainforest Relief says that the deforestation can be measured in seconds. "It may be closer to two to three football fields a second," says Keating. When de Goes of Greenpeace Brazil is confronted with the disparity in numbers regarding these football fields, he replies, "The numbers are not important, what is important is that there is huge destruction going on." However, Moore says that the only way such huge numbers are generated is by using **double accounting**. "You would have cleared 50 times the size of the Amazon already if accurate." Luis Almir, of the state of Amazonas in Brazil calculated using five football fields a minute and concludes sarcastically that if the numbers were correct, "we would have a desert bigger than the Sahara."

#### Human intervention in the Amazon inevitable

**Morano and Washburn 00** (Marc and Kent, Producers of American Investigator's "Amazon Rainforest: Clear-Cutting the Myths" “Shaky Science Behind Save-Rainforest Effort”, 6-26, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\_ID=17543)

Despite all of this mounting scientific evidence supporting regeneration, many still want to keep mankind out of the Amazon and other tropical forests. Chazdon believes that it is not very realistic to keep [hu]man[s] out. "No matter how hard we try," she says, "it's hard to put a lock and key on the forests." She points out that great civilizations once inhabited Central and South America and newly discovered charcoal deposits and agricultural artifacts suggest that humans have repeatedly burned the rainforest. "We are part of the long history of humans that have relied on these forests and used them," pointing out that "the Mayan Empire deforested huge areas of Central America."

### AT: Environment

#### Environment is resilient

**Easterbrook 95** (Gregg, Distinguished Fellow – Fullbright Foundation, A Moment on Earth, p. 25)

In the aftermath of events such as Love Canal or the Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. **The environment** that contains them **is** close to **indestructible**. The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. **Human assaults** on the environment, though mischievous, **are** **pinpricks** compared to forces of the magnitude nature is **accustomed to resisting**.

#### Long time-frame

**Kay 1** (Jane, “Study Takes Historical Peek at Plight of Ocean Ecosystems”, San Francisco Chronicle, 7-26, Lexis)

The collapse of ecosystems often occur over a **long period**. In one example, when Aleut hunters killed the Alaskan sea otter about **2,500 years ago**, the population of their natural prey, the sea urchin, grew larger than its normal size. In turn, the urchins grazed down the kelp forests, important habitat for a whole host of ocean life. Then, when fur traders in the 1800s hunted the otters and sea cows almost to extinction, the kelp forests disappeared and didn't start to regenerate until the federal government protected the sea otters in the 20th century. In California, the diversity of spiny lobsters, sheephead fish and abalone kept down the urchin numbers. At present in Alaska, the kelp beds are declining again in areas where killer whales are preying on sea otters. Biologists think the killer whales switched to otters for food because there are fewer seals and sea lions to eat.

#### No extinction

**Easterbrook 3** (Gregg, Senior Fellow – New Republic, “We’re All Gonna Die!”, Wired Magazine, July, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday.html?pg=1&topic=&topic\_set=)

If we're talking about doomsday - the end of human civilization - many scenarios simply don't measure up. A single nuclear bomb ignited by terrorists, for example, would be awful beyond words, but life would go on. People and machines might converge in ways that you and I would find ghastly, but from the standpoint of the future, they would probably represent an adaptation. Environmental collapse might make parts of the globe unpleasant, but considering that the biosphere has survived ice ages, it **wouldn't be the final curtain**. Depression, which has become 10 times more prevalent in Western nations in the postwar era, might grow so widespread that vast numbers of people would refuse to get out of bed, a possibility that Petranek suggested in a doomsday talk at the Technology Entertainment Design conference in 2002. But Marcel Proust, as miserable as he was, wrote Remembrance of Things Past while lying in bed.

### Ext – No Impact to Species

#### Redundancy and adaptation solve

**Doremus 00** (Holly, Professor of Law – UC Davis, Washington & Lee Law Review, "The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection: Toward a New Discourse," 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, Winter, Lexis)

Notwithstanding its attractions, the material discourse in general, and the ecological horror story in particular, are not likely to generate policies that will satisfy nature lovers. The ecological horror story implies that there is no reason to protect nature until catastrophe looms. The Ehrlichs' rivet-popper account, for example, presents species simply as the (fungible) hardware holding together the ecosystem. If we could be reasonably certain that a particular rivet was not needed to prevent a crash, the rivet-popper story suggests that we would lose very little by pulling it out. Many environmentalists, though, would disagree. n212 Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it seemed in the 1970s. Although it is clear that the earth is experiencing a mass wave of extinctions, n213 the complete elimination of life on earth **seems unlikely**. n214 Life is remarkably robust. Nor is human extinction probable any time soon. Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment. Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. n215 One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees. n216 But this too may be overstating the case. Most ecosystem functions are performed by multiple species. This functional **redundancy** means that a **high proportion of species can be lost** without precipitating a collapse. n217

#### Ecosystems will survive

**Sagoff 97** (Mark, Senior Research Scholar – Maryland School of Public Policy, Pew Scholar in Conservation and the Environment, “Do We Consume Too Much?”, Atlantic Monthly, June,

http://www.chem.brown.edu/chem12/readings/atlantic/consume.html)

There is no credible argument, moreover, that all or even most of the species we are concerned to protect are essential to the functioning of the ecological systems on which we depend. (If whales went extinct, for example, the seas would not fill up with krill.) David Ehrenfeld, a biologist at Rutgers University, makes this point in relation to the vast ecological changes we have already survived. “Even a mighty dominant like the American chestnut,” Ehrenfeld has written, “extending over half a continent, all but disappeared without bringing the eastern deciduous forest down with it.” Ehrenfeld points out that **the species most likely to be endangered are those the biosphere is least likely to miss**. “Many of these species were never common or ecologically influential; by no stretch of the imagination can we make them out to be vital cogs in the ecological machine.”

### AT: Oxygen Impact

**No global oxygen impact**

**Morano and Washburn 00** (Marc and Kent, Producers of American Investigator's "Amazon Rainforest: Clear-Cutting the Myths" “Shaky Science Behind Save-Rainforest Effort”, 6-26, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE\_ID=17543)

Another familiar claim of the environmentalist community is that the Amazon constitutes the "lungs of the earth," supplying one-fifth of the world's oxygen. But, according to Antonio Donato Nobre of INPE, and other eco-scientists, the Amazon consumes as much oxygen as it produces, and Stott says it may actually be a **net user** of oxygen. "In fact, because the trees fall down and decay, rainforests actually take in slightly more oxygen than they give out," says Stott. "The idea of them soaking up carbon dioxide and giving out oxygen is a **myth**. It's only fast-growing young trees that actually take up carbon dioxide." Stott maintains that the tropical forests of the world are **"basically irrelevant"** when it comes to regulating or influencing global weather. He explains that the oceans have a much greater impact. "Most things that happen on land are **mere blips** to the system, **basically insignificant**," he says.

### AT: Ozone

#### Ozone stable – and no impact

**Lieberman 7** (Ben, Senior Policy Analyst – Heritage Foundation, “Ozone: The Hole Truth”, The Washington Times, 9-19, Lexis)

Environmentalists have made many apocalyptic predictions over the last several decades. Virtually none has come to pass. Yet each time, the greens and their political allies proclaim victory, arguing their preventive prescriptions averted disaster. Such is the case with the 1987 Montreal Protocol On Substances That Deplete The Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol). The lurid predictions of ozone depletion-induced skin cancer epidemics, ecosystem destruction and others haven't come true, for which Montreal Protocol proponents congratulate themselves. But in retrospect, the evidence shows ozone depletion was an exaggerated threat in the first place. As the treaty parties return to Montreal for their 20th anniversary meeting it should be cause for reflection, not celebration, especially for those who hope to repeat this "success story" in the context of global warming. The treaty came about over legitimate but overstated concerns that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs, a then-widely used class of refrigerants) and other compounds were rising to the stratosphere and destroying ozone molecules. These molecules, collectively known as the ozone layer, shield the Earth from excessive ultraviolet-B radiation (UVB) from the sun. The Montreal Protocol's provisions were tightened in 1990 and again in 1992, culminating with a CFC ban in most developed nations by 1996. So what do we know now? As far as ozone depletion is concerned, the thinning of the ozone layer that occurred throughout the 1980s apparently stopped in the early 1990s, too soon to credit the Montreal Protocol. A 1998 World Meteorological Organization (WMO) report said: "Since 1991, the linear [downward] trend observed during the 1980s has not continued, but rather total column ozone has been almost **constant**." However, the same report noted that the stratospheric concentrations of the offending compounds were still increasing through 1998. This lends credence to the skeptical view, widely derided at the time of the Montreal Protocol, that natural variations better explain the fluctuations in the global ozone layer. More importantly, the feared increase in ground level UVB radiation has also failed to materialize. Keep in mind that ozone depletion, in and of itself, doesn't really harm human health or the environment. It was the concern that an eroded ozone layer will allow more of the sun's damaging UVB rays to reach the Earth that led to the Montreal Protocol. But WMO concedes no statistically significant long-term trends have been detected, noting earlier this year that "outside the polar regions, ozone depletion has been relatively small, hence, in many places, increases in UV due to this depletion are difficult to separate from the increases caused by other factors, such as changes in cloud and aerosol." In short, the impact of ozone depletion on UVB over populated regions is so small it's hard to detect. Needless to say, if UVB hasn't gone up, then the fears of increased UVB-induced harm are unfounded. Indeed, the much-hyped acceleration in skin cancer rates hasn't been documented. U.S. National Cancer Institute statistics show malignant melanoma incidence and mortality, which had been undergoing a long-term increase that predates ozone depletion, has actually been leveling off during the putative ozone crisis. Further, no ecosystem or species was ever shown to be seriously harmed by ozone depletion. This is true even in Antarctica, where the largest seasonal ozone losses, the so-called Antarctic ozone hole, occur annually. Also forgotten is a long list of truly ridiculous claims, such as the one from Al Gore's 1992 book "Earth in the Balance" that, thanks to the Antarctic ozone hole, "hunters now report finding blind rabbits; fisherman catch blind salmon."

#### Natural variation determines ozone

**Carnacchio 97** (CJ, Staff – The Review, “The Sky Falls on Environmental Myths”, Michigan Review, 10-8, http://www.umich.edu/~mrev/archives/1997/10-8-97/environment.htm)

Myth #2: The Hole in the Ozone Layer: Contrary to the environmentalists' claims, there is no permanent hole in the ozone layer and no ozone shortage. Ozone is constantly created and destroyed. The interaction of ultraviolet radiation with oxygen molecules is what produces ozone. In the stratosphere, 10 to 40 kilometers above the earth's surface, several tons of ozone are produced every second. The amount of ozone present at any one time is influenced by many factors. For example, the amount of ultraviolet radiation reaching the stratosphere (and ultimately producing ozone) depends upon latitude, solar cycle, and season. Concentrations of ozone may differ drastically from one day to the next, sometimes by as much as 50 percent, depending on the weather. Ozone holes are **natural reactions** to these ultraviolet light variations. Ozone levels can also be affected by the amount of volcanic matter in the stratosphere. Each volcanic eruption emits roughly a thousand times the amount of ozone-depleting chemicals than all the CFCs man has ever produced. The ozone hole that appeared over Antarctica and caused all the panic is a natural and annual phenomena. The annual ozone hole was first measured in 1956-57, long before the ozone-destroying CFCs were in common use. The hole appears at the end of the dark, cold Antarctic winter, lasts about three to five weeks, and then disappears. There is no overall or permanent depletion of the ozone layer.

### AT: Urban Sprawls

#### HSR will not change the development of urban regions

**Glaeser**, 8/18/**2009** (Edward – economics professor at Harvard University, What Would High-Speed Rail Do to Suburban Sprawl, New York Times, p. <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/what-would-high-speed-rail-do-to-suburban-sprawl/#more-25947>)

A second economic argument for high speed rail is that it will revitalize troubled regions of the United States. This argument would never be made about Dallas or Houston, which are booming, but some argue that high-speed rail can save Buffalo, Detroit and Cleveland. Transportation can have a significant impact on urban growth. Josh Gottlieb and I estimated that counties with access to a rail line in 1850 grew 20 percent more over the next 40 years. Gilles Duranton and Matthew Turner found that a 10 percent increase in a metropolitan area’s stock of highways in 1980 caused a 2 percent increase in population growth over the next 20 years. But there are reasons to wonder whether rail’s impact today will be that large. Any transportation investment can create large economic ripples only if it significantly increases the speed at which an area with cheap real-estate gains access to a booming place that doesn’t have any comparable, closer available land area. For example, in Spain, the city of Ciudad Real seems to have gotten a big lift thanks to high-speed rail because people can now live in Ciudad Real, where housing is cheaper, and commute into Madrid. This logic has led some to think that high-speed rail will do wonders transforming Buffalo into a back office for Manhattan. Buffalo is 376 miles from Manhattan, so a 150-mile-an-hour rail line will take two and a half hours, which is not going to be significantly faster than air. Moreover, vast amounts of low-cost space are closer to Manhattan than the shores of Lake Erie. Faster connections between Buffalo and Toronto might do more, but in that case speed is **hampered by the burdens of border crossing**. Philadelphia is the more natural beneficiary of high-speed rail access to Manhattan; there are already people who live in Philadelphia and commute to New York. Yet even in this most propitious setting, the coming of Acela seems to have had little impact on the population decline of Philadelphia or growth of Wilmington. Perhaps the absence of any trend break in population growth around 2000 just reflects the incremental nature of the Acela investment, but there is little here to bring confidence that rail lines revitalize cities. Moreover, I don’t see why is it in the national interest to disperse economic activity from Manhattan to Buffalo or Philadelphia. I have long argued that the economic case for directing economic aid to declining regions is weak.

#### Studies show HSR will increase sprawl

**Glaeser**, 8/18/**2009** (Edward – economics professor at Harvard University, What Would High-Speed Rail Do to Suburban Sprawl, New York Times, p. <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/what-would-high-speed-rail-do-to-suburban-sprawl/#more-25947>)

But **there is little evidence documenting that rail has strong positive effects on land use**. Unfortunately, all of the evidence on this question comes from intraurban, not interurban rail lines. Atlanta’s rail line had little impact on population or employment within the metropolitan area. BART, the Bay Area Rapid Transit system serving the San Francisco region, seems to have done more, but the effects are still modest. Nathaniel Baum-Snow and Matthew Kahn have done the most comprehensive look at new intraurban rail systems in 16 cities. I asked them to examine whether population levels rose close to new rail stations, and they found no evidence for that. Moreover, the story of Ciudad Real should make us question the presumption that rail will centralize. If a Dallas-Houston line stops somewhere between the two cities, and fosters the growth of a new exurb, the result will be **more, not less, sprawl**.

## Disadvantages

### Politics – Obama Good

#### Plan would drain Obama’s capital – he’s already had to scale back plans

PRI, 12 (Public Radio International, “Obama's vision for a transportation makeover struggling to leave the station”, Jan 24, http://www.pri.org/stories/politics-society/government/obama-s-vision-for-a-transportation-makeover-struggling-to-leave-the-station-8099.html)

About this time last year, President Barack Obama was trumpeting his plan to build a high-speed rail network for the country. By the end of the year, rails had faded and it was back to roads and bridges. This time last year, President Barack Obama laid out his plan for an improved transportation infrastructure in America. He focused on high speed rail and providing federal funding to help develop new corridors for high speed rail transportation. But **after many defeats in Congress**, including de-funding of high-speed rail, the transportation initiative suddenly seems less futuristic and more focused on rebuilding the old highways of the past. Alex Goldmark, a reporter for WNYC's Transportation Nation, said while Obama's vision started with lofty goals of rail and new systems to reduce foreign energy dependence, by the end of the year **he'd recalibrated his desires** to be about rebuilding deteriorating roads and bridges. "If you look at how his speeches change over time...it shows that **he got so battered from the** political fight. He stuck his neck out on high-speed rail, which became a political football after governors in Florida and Wisconsin canceled their plans," Goldmark said. "He lost the funding fight in Congress and had to scale back what he was asking for." And even where projects are still going forward, like in California, prices keep going up for the work that is being done. "The immediate reaction to his high-speed rail plan was that he was going to raid the highway trust fund," Goldmark said. "That he was going to take money out of cars and roads and he was going to put it in this highfalutin tree-hugger thing of rails."

#### HSR costs political capital and garners very little support

**Nussbaum**, 4/11/**2012** (Paul, Cost the highest hurdle for high-speed rail in U.S., Philly News, p. http://www.philly.com/philly/business/20100809\_Cost\_the\_highest\_hurdle\_for\_high-speed\_rail\_in\_U\_S\_.html?viewAll=y)

As the United States takes its first tentative steps toward high-speed rail travel, the initial hurdle is the biggest: money. In the past, the nation's enthusiasm for fast trains has always evaporated when sticker shock set in. **Political support has been inconsistent and ephemeral**, leaving previous efforts to die amid debates over ridership, land acquisition, and cost - especially cost.

### Spending – HSR

#### HSR will cost half a trillion dollars

**O’Toole**, 5/4/**2009** (Randal – senior fellow with the Cato Institute, High-Speed rail is No Solution, Cato Institute, p. <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/highspeed-rail-is-no-solution>)

California wants to build a true high-speed rail line between San Francisco and Los Angeles, capable of top speeds of 220 miles per hour and average speeds of 140 miles per hour. The environmental analysis report for the California high-speed rail projects costs of $33 billion for 400 miles, while the Midwest Rail Initiative projects costs of $7.7 billion for 3,150 miles of moderate-speed rail. That's $82 million per mile for true high-speed rail (partly because the California project goes through some mountains) and only $2.4 million for moderate-speed rail. All else being equal, high-speed rail will cost 10 to 12 times more than moderate-speed rail. A true, national high-speed rail network would cost more than **half a trillion dollars**.