### Plan:

#### The United States federal government should substantially increase its investment in a national network of high-speed passenger rail systems in the United States.

### Contention One: Economic Leadership

#### Subpoint a is Stimulus─

#### The recession is far from over-unemployment levels and economic activity remain completely inadequate─

Stiglitz ‘10 (Joseph, New Perspectives Quarterly, “Time for a Second Stimulus”, pg. 61, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-5842.2010.01164.x/pdf>, Stiglitz is an economist and a professor at Columbia University. He was awarded the Nobel Prize for economics in 2001. He was chief economist of the World Bank and chairman of President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisers.)

ON THE PROSPECTS OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY IN THE UNITED STATES -We’ve pulled back from the precipice, but the current situation cannot be described as a strong recovery. The recession may be over in the way economists describe it—two quarters of negative growth—since growth has turned positive. But the recession is far from over for those who don’t have jobs or can’t sell the goods they produce. The official unemployment rate may be 10 percent. But when we factor in those who are no longer looking for work because the recession has gone on so long, the picture looks pretty bad. Since the US Bureau of Labor Statistics collects data on those who have given up looking for work or taken a part-time job, we can calculate that the real unemployment level stands at over 19 percent. That means one out of five Americans looking for full-time work cannot get it now. And four out of 10 who can’t find work have been out of a job for more than half a year, which means whatever savings they had will have dried up while the prospects of re-employment in a good job go way down. That is a serious situation. It is bleaker for those over 50, and bleaker still for black youth, in which one out of two are unemployed. It is commonly said that growth in jobs always lags behind recovery. The truth is that the recovery hasn’t been strong enough to create enough jobs for new entrants to the labor force, no less to bring unemployment from 10 percent back to 5 percent. For that to happen in the US, growth must be at least 3 percent a year. I don’t see growth in 2010 or 2011 being above that level.

#### Major public investments in infrastructure are the key internal link to recovery─ targeted projects yield private investment and increased levels of economic activity. The US won’t be able to sustain debt without these initiatives.

STIGLITZ 12 University Professor at Columbia University, and a Nobel laureate in Economics

[Joseph E. Stiglitz, Stimulating the Economy in an Era of Debt and Deficit, The Economists’ Voice http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/ev March, 2012]

Any diagnosis of the current economic situation should focus on the fact that the shortfall between actual and potential unemployment is huge and that monetary policy has proven ineffective, at least in restoring the economy to anything near full employment. Under these circumstances, the traditional economists’ solution has been to advocate the use of fiscal policy—tax cuts and/or spending increases. There is an especially compelling case for increasing public investments because they would increase GDP and employment today as well as increase output in the future. Given low interest rates, the enhanced growth in GDP would more than offset the increased cost of government spending, reducing national debt in the medium term. Moreover, the ratio of debt to GDP would decrease and the ability of the U.S. economy to sustain debt (debt sustainability) would improve. This happy state of affairs is especially likely given the ample supply of high-return investment opportunities in infrastructure, technology, and education resulting from underinvestment in these areas over the past quarter century. Moreover, well-designed public investments would raise the return on private investments, “crowding in” this additional source of spending. Together, increased public and private investment would raise output and employment in the short run, and increase growth and debt sustainability in the medium and long run. Such spending would reduce (not increase) the ratio of debt to GDP. Thus, the objection that the U.S. should not engage in such fiscal policies because of the high ratio of debt to GDP is simply wrong; even those who suffer from deficit fetishism should support such measures. Critics of this standard Keynesian prescription raise two objections: (a) government is not likely to spend the money on high return investments, so that the promised gains will prove elusive and (b) the fiscal multipliers are small (perhaps negative), suggesting that the shortrun gains from fiscal policy are minimal at best. Both of these objections are easily dismissed in the current economic environment. First, the assertion that government is incapable of making high return investments is just wrong. Studies of the average returns on government spending on investments in technology show extraordinarily high returns, with returns on investments in infrastructure and education returns well above the cost of borrowing. Thus, from a national point of view, investments in these areas make sense, even if the government fails to make the investments with the absolute highest returns. Second, the many variants of the argument that the fiscal multiplier is small typically rest on the assumption that as government spending increases, some category of private expenditure will decline to offset this increase. 1 Certainly, when the economy is at full employment and capital is being fully utilized, GDP cannot increase. Hence, under the circumstances, the multiplier must be zero. But today’s economic conditions of significant and persistent resource underutilization have not been experienced since the Great Depression. As a result, it is simply meaningless to rely on empirical estimates of multipliers based on post-World War II data. Contractionary monetary policy is another reason why multipliers may be markedly larger now than they were in some earlier situations of excess capacity. In these cases, monetary authorities, excessively fearful of inflation, responded to deficit spending by raising interest rates and constraining credit availability, thus dampening private spending. But such an outcome is not inevitable; it is a result of policies, often guided by mistaken economic theories. In any case, such an outcome is irrelevant today. This is because the Federal Reserve is committed to an unprecedented policy of maintaining near-zero interest rates through at least the end of 2014, while at the same time encouraging government spending. With interest rates at record lows and the Federal Reserve committed to keeping them there, crowding out of private investment simply will not occur. On the contrary, as I have noted, public investment— for instance, in better infrastructure—is more likely to increase the returns to private investment. Such public spending crowds in private investment, increasing the multiplier. Sometimes economists claim that consumers, worried about future tax liabilities in the wake of government spending, would contract their spending. However, the applicability of this notion (referred to as Ricardian equivalence) is contradicted by the fact that when George W. Bush lowered taxes and massively increased the deficit, savings plummeted to zero. But even if one believed in the applicability of Ricardian equivalence in today’s economy, government spending on investments that increase future growth and improve the debt-toGDP ratio would induce rational to spend more today. Consumption would also be crowded in by such government expenditures, not crowded out. Indeed, if consumers had rational expectations, the multiplier would increase even more in a long-lived downturn like the current one. The reason is that some of the money that is saved this year will be spent next year, or the year after, or the year after that—periods in which the economy is still well-below capacity. This increased spending will lead to higher employment and incomes in these later years. But if individuals are rational, the realization that their future incomes will be higher will lead them to spend more today. Deficit spending today crowds in not just investment, but also consumption. Thus, a careful look at the current situation suggests that the impact of well-designed government programs will be to stimulate the economy more than is assumed to be the case in standard Keynesian models (which typically assume a short-lived downturn and yield a short run fiscal multiplier of around 1.5). Even in the current period, fiscal policy results in greater output increases because investment and consumption is crowded in, because: (a) the Federal Reserve is unlikely either to increase interest rates or reduce credit availability; (b) public investments are likely to increase the returns to private investments; and (c) rational consumers/ taxpayers may recognize that future tax liabilities will decline and that future incomes will rise as a result of these measures.

#### High speed rail represents the ideal infrastructure project-investment is key to long-term economic recovery─We have 6 internal links.

Todorvich et al. ‘11 Petra Todorovich, Director of America 2050, a national urban planning initiative to develop an infrastructure and growth strategy for the United States Daniel Schned, and Robert Lane “High-Speed Rail: International Lessons for U.S. Policy Makers.” [https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1948\_1268\_High-Speed%20Rail%20PFR\_Webster.pdf]

High-speed rail’s ability to promote economic growth is grounded in its capacity to increase access to markets and exert positive effects on the spatial distribution of economic activity (Redding and Sturm 2008). Transportation networks increase market access, and economic development is more likely to occur in places with more and better transportation infrastructure. In theory, by improving access to urban markets, highspeed rail increases employment, wages, and productivity; encourages agglomeration; and boosts regional and local economies. Empirical evidence of high-speed rail’s impact around the world tends to support the following theoretical arguments for high-speed rail’s economic beneﬁts. Higher wages and productivity: The time savings and increased mobility offered by high-speed rail enables workers in the service sector and in information- exchange industries to move about the megaregion more freely and reduces the costs of face-to-face communication. This enhanced connectivity boosts worker productivity and business competitiveness, leading to higher wages (Greengauge 21 2010). Deeper labor and employment markets: By connecting more communities to other population and job centers, highspeed rail expands the overall commuter shed of the megaregion. The deepened labor markets give employers access to larger pools of skilled workers, employees access to more employment options, and workers access to more and cheaper housing options outside of expensive city centers (Stolarick, Swain, and Adleraim 2010). Expanded tourism and visitor spending: Just as airports bring visitors and their spending power into the local economy, high-speed rail stations attract new tourists and business travelers who might not have made the trip otherwise. A study by the U.S. Conference of Mayors (2010) concluded that building high-speed rail would increase visitor spending annually by roughly $225 million in the Orlando region, $360 million in metropolitan Los Angeles, $50 million in the Chicago area, and $100 million in Greater Albany, New York. Direct job creation: High-speed rail creates thousands of construction-related jobs in design, engineering, planning, and construction, as well as jobs in ongoing maintenance and operations. In Spain, the expansion of the high-speed AVE system from Malaga to Seville is predicted to create 30,000 construction jobs (Euro Weekly 2010). In China, over 100,000 construction workers were involved in building the high-speed rail line that connects Beijing and Shanghai (Bradsher 2010). Sustained investment could foster the development of new manufacturing industries for rail cars and other equipment, and generate large amounts of related employment. Urban regeneration and station area development: High-speed rail can generate growth in real estate markets and anchor investment in commercial and residential developments around train stations, especially when they are built in coordination with a broader set of public interventions and urban design strategies (see chapter 3). These interventions ensure that high-speed rail is integrated into the urban and regional fabric, which in turn ensures the highest level of ridership and economic activity. For example, the city of Lille, France, experienced greater than average growth and substantial ofﬁce and hotel development after its high-speed rail station was built at the crossroads of lines linking London, Paris, and Brussels (Nuworsoo and Deakin 2009). Spatial agglomeration: High-speed rail enhances agglomeration economies by creating greater proximity between business locations through shrinking time distances, especially when the locations are within the rail-friendly 100 to 600 mile range. Agglomeration economies occur when ﬁrms beneﬁt from locating close to other complementary ﬁrms and make use of the accessibility to varied activities and pools of skilled labor. High-speed rail has also been described as altering the economic geography of megaregions. By effectively bringing economic agents closer together, high-speed rail can create new linkages among ﬁrms, suppliers, employees, and consumers that, over time, foster spatial concentration within regions (Ahlfeldt and Feddersen 2010). This interactive process creates net economic gains in addition to the other economic beneﬁts described here.

#### Action now is critical-Rising population levels makes current transportation infrastructure no longer sustainable. The plan is key to maintain US economic leadership─

Alexander ‘9. Christopher Alexander, December 9th, 2009, written for PennDesign, the University Of Pennsylvania School Of Design, “Planning for High-speed Rail in the United States,” chp.4, [<http://www.design.upenn.edu/hsr2011/planningforhsr.pdf>]

HSR has the capacity to produce economic growth on a national scale by improving connectivity and accessibility throughout an entire country and internationally. As developed countries around the globe begin to invest heavily in HSR, efficient, fast, and inexpensive transportation options will yield competitive advantages to the top players in the market. HSR systems that have generated economic benefits on a national scale, such as with the French TGV network, have done so by improving connections to centers of trade. This provides easier access for residents to both national and international markets and also creates enormous incentives for the business and other commercial interests. Although the volume of literature on the economic effects of HSR has shown that it is generally difficult to quantify the economic benefit such investment might yield, especially absent other variables, both research and the analysis of case studies demonstrate the potential for HSR to produce substantial economic growth. Furthermore, many developed and developing countries in Europe and Asia are investing heavily in HSR as they see the capacity it has to boost their economic standing. China is planning on spending an enormous amount of capital, over $300 billion, in the construction of a national HSR network linking its major metropolitan areas. 73 This amounts to nearly 7% of the country’s yearly GDP ($4.33 trillion, nominal). As the only developed country in the world experiencing notable population growth, the United States will likely add another 100-120 million people to its population by the year 2050.74 With road and air infrastructure operating at capacity (and in some cases beyond capacity), the need for new infrastructure and improvement of existing infrastructure is clear. This puts the U.S. in a unique position to gain significantly from the development of an interconnected HSR network. The demand for efficient, quick means of travel between the country’s metropolitan areas is well beyond the supply of infrastructure that currently exists. Ridership volume in excess of minimums suggested by both research and case studies is all but guaranteed in several megaregions throughout the country. And most importantly, cities, states, and regions are mobilizing to capitalize on the possibility of HSR linking them together by providing both HSR system plans and incentives for development. While the U.S. is still by far the largest economy in the world (discounting the combined EU economy), its continued economic growth is jeopardized without significant improvement in its transportation infrastructure. HSR provides a means to achieve a more robust national transportation system that can sustain the type of economic growth that will allow the U.S. to remain the world’s economic leader.

#### Subpoint b is The Knowledge Economy

#### Focus on fiscal and monetary policies have gotten the U.S. nowhere towards recovery-The government must foster the conditions necessary for a thriving knowledge economy─

Florida ‘10. Richard Florida is the director of the Martin Prosperity Institute at the University of Toronto’s Rotman School of Management. “The Roadmap to a High-Speed Recovery.” The New Republic 8-12-10. [http://www.tnr.com/article/economy/76961/richard-florida-reset-recovery-economy-future?page=0,0]

A year or so later, with midterm elections looming and an electorate that is as fearful and angry as any in memory, the stock market has risen, but even a breath of bad news can send it tumbling. As dismal as housing prices continue to be, they have yet to hit bottom in some places. Unemployment remains frozen at an overall level of nine-plus percent, and job creation has been anemic. If the crisis belonged to George W. Bush, the recovery has been Obama’s—and it has been a fragile and tentative one at best. Along with billions of dollars in stimulus payments, the president has spent down most of his political capital. So what is his next step? That depends upon how serious Obama is about his legacy—whether he is looking to win votes for himself and his party in the short-term, or to lay the foundation for a durable new economic and social order that is only beginning to emerge but is required for sustained prosperity. The two goals are not mutually exclusive, but neither are they always compatible. Let me say first that the bailouts and stimulus programs of the last two years were not a complete mistake. Economic policymakers don’t have the luxury of hindsight in the heat of a crisis; there is tremendous pressure on them to do something. It would have been suicidal not to give the banks the capital infusions they needed when the whole financial system was on the brink of meltdown or to refuse to help states avoid laying off thousands of teachers and police and other workers.But now we find ourselves having the wrong debate—about whether a stimulus is needed or not—and we need to shift it. The fiscal and monetary fixes that have helped mature industrial economies like the United States get back on their feet since the Great Depression are not going to make the difference this time. Mortgage interest tax credits and massive highway investments are artifacts of our outmoded industrial age; in fact, our whole housing-auto complex is superannuated. As University of Chicago economist Raghuram Rajan wrote recently in the Financial Times: “The bottom line in the current jobless recovery suggests the US has to take deep structural reforms to improve its supply side. The quality of its financial sector, its physical infrastructure, as well as its human capital, all need serious economic and politically difficult upgrades.” Now we’re getting to the nub of the matter. Why? Because this is no bump in the business cycle that we are going through; it is an epochal event, comparable in magnitude and scope to the Great Depression of the 1930s, and even more so, as historian Scott Reynolds Nelson has observed, to the decades-long crisis that began in 1873. Back then our economy was undergoing a fundamental shift from agriculture to industry. We are in the midst of an equally tectonic transition today, as our industrial economy gives way to a post-industrial knowledge economy—but by focusing all our attention of whether we need a bigger stimulus or a smaller deficit, we’re flying blind. These kind of epochal changes, which I have called “great resets,” are long, generational processes. They are driven by improvements in efficiency and productivity, and by the waves of innovation that Joseph Schumpeter called “creative destruction.” When economies slow down, inefficient companies go by the boards. Seeking better returns on investment, businesses redirect capital towards innovation. When the economist Alfred Kleinknecht diagrammed U.S. patents along a timeline extending through the nineteenth century, he found a huge spike in the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s, a period of depression that also saw the invention of electric power, modern telephony, and street and cable car systems. The economic historian Alexander Field observed a similar clustering and unleashing of innovation in the 1930s, which he dubbed the most “technologically progressive decade” of the twentieth century. More R&D labs opened in the first four years of the Great Depression than in the entire preceding decade, 73 compared to 66. By 1940, the number of people employed in R&D had quadrupled, increasing from fewer than 7,000 in 1929 to nearly 28,000 by 1940, according to the detailed historical research of David Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg. Our transition from a Fordist mass production economy, based on the assembly line, to a knowledge economy, in which the driving force is creativity and technological innovation, has been under way for some time; the evidence can be seen in the physical decline of the old manufacturing cities and the boom in high-tech centers like Silicon Valley, government boomtowns like Washington DC, and college towns from Boulder to Ann Arbor. Between 1980 and 2006, the U.S. economy added some 20 million new jobs in its creative, professional, and knowledge sectors. Even today, unemployment in this sector of the economy has remained relatively low, and according to Bureau of Labor Statistics projections, is likely to add another seven million jobs in the next decade. By contrast, the manufacturing sector added only one million jobs from 1980 to 2006, and, according to the BLS, will lose 1.2 million by 2020. This is the future towards which our post-industrial economy is already trending—and government should be proposing policies that will help to create a new geography and a new way of life to sustain and support it. But that doesn’t mean we need a centralized public bureaucracy to speed the process of change. As it happens, innovation occurs not only within big companies, major laboratories, and research universities, but also on the margins of business and academia. John Seely Brown, the former director of Xerox’s storied Palo Alto Research Center (PARC), has observed that many, if not most, of today’s high-tech innovations are products of the open-ended, collaborative explorations of hackers. Steve Jobs didn’t invent the PC; he saw its components at work at PARC, realized their potential, and put the pieces together.**Only networks of megaregions sustain the transition to a knowledge economy─**

Florida ‘10. Richard Florida is the director of the Martin Prosperity Institute at the University of Toronto’s Rotman School of Management. “The Roadmap to a High-Speed Recovery.” The New Republic 8-12-10. [http://www.tnr.com/article/economy/76961/richard-florida-reset-recovery-economy-future?page=0,0]

Instead of further encouraging the growth of an auto-housing-suburban complex, the government should promote those forces that are subtly causing the shift away from it. Chief among these are the creation of inter-connected mega-regions, like the Boston-Washington corridor and the Char-lanta region (Atlanta, Charlotte, and Raleigh Durham) and ten or so more across the United States. Concentration and clustering are the underlying motor forces of real economic development. As Jane Jacobs identified and the Nobel Prize-winning economist Robert Lucas later formalized, clustering speeds the transmission of new ideas, increases the underlying productivity of people and firms, and generates the diversity required for new ideas to fertilize and turn into new innovations and new industries. In fact, the key to understanding America’s historic ability to respond to great economic crises lies in what economic geographers call the “spatial fix”—the creation of new development patterns, new ways of living and working, and new economic landscapes that simultaneously expand space and intensify our use of it. Our rebound after the panic of 1873 and long downturn was forged by the transition from an agricultural nation to an urban-industrial one organized around great cities. Our recovery from the Great Depression saw the rise of massive metropolitan complexes of cities and suburbs, which again intensified and expanded our use of space. Renewed prosperity hinges on the rise of yet another even more massive and more intensive geographic pattern—the mega-region. These new geographic entities are larger than the sum of their parts; they not only produce but consume, spurring further demand.

#### High-speed rail networks are critical to development of these megaregions-This significantly contributes to economic growth─

Florida ‘10. Richard Florida is the director of the Martin Prosperity Institute at the University of Toronto’s Rotman School of Management. “The Roadmap to a High-Speed Recovery.” The New Republic 8-12-10. [http://www.tnr.com/article/economy/76961/richard-florida-reset-recovery-economy-future?page=0,0]

Infrastructure is key to powering spatial fixes. The railroads and streetcar, cable car, and subway systems speeded the movement of people, goods, and ideas in the late 19th century; the development of a massive auto-dependent highway system powered growth after the Great Depression and World War II. It’s now time to invest in infrastructure that can undergird another round of growth and development. Part of that is surely a better and faster information highway. But the real fix must extend beyond the cyber-economy to our physical development patterns—the landscape of the real economy. That means high-speed rail, which is the only infrastructure fix that promises to speed the velocity of moving people, goods, and ideas while also expanding and intensifying our development patterns. If the government is truly looking for a shovel-ready infrastructure project to invest in that will create short-term jobs across the country while laying a foundation for lasting prosperity, high-speed rail works perfectly. It is central to the redevelopment of cities and the growth of mega-regions and will do more than anything to wean us from our dependency on cars. High-speed rail may be our best hope for revitalizing the once-great industrial cities of the Great Lakes. By connecting declining places to thriving ones—Milwaukee and Detroit to Chicago, Buffalo to Toronto—it will greatly expand the economic options and opportunities available to their residents. And by providing the connective fibers within and between America’s emerging mega-regions, it will allow them to function as truly integrated economic units.

#### No other project will generate enough growth in the long-term. Failure to invest ensures fast collapse of US competitiveness─

Natale ‘10. Patrick J. Natale, December 14th, 2010, executive director, American Society of Civil Engineers, “HSR: We can’t afford to wait,” <http://transportation.nationaljournal.com/2010/12/highspeed-rail-political-footb.php#1820909>

Failing to invest in high-speed rail (HSR) may win a few political points today, but in the long run, it will only make traveling tomorrow that much more difficult. Today’s roads and airports are already congested and fuel to power cars and airplanes is already expensive. Without increased rail investment, population growth and energy concerns will choke the life out of our economy. ASCE’s Report Card for America’s Infrastructure graded our nation’s rail infrastructure a C- and estimated that it would take $63 billion over the next five years to bring it up to a good condition. While that cost may seem high, $63 billion is not out of the question when you see it as an investment in our economy. A true HSR network may take decades to complete, but it will keep people working that whole time. HSR is no different from any other category of infrastructure, the costs to build, fix or maintain are so high that we always find excuses not to invest. But this constant deferral is having very real consequences. Roads and bridges are unsafe and congested, airports are falling apart and our passenger rail system is almost non-existent. Around the world, goods, services and passengers are flowing on multi-modal systems, but continued success depends on improvements and investments being made. How long will it take our leaders to realize that failing to invest in infrastructure not only hurts our potential for economic competiveness in the future, but that it is already making an impact today? Congress has to start taking a longer-term view of our future—the kind of long-term thinking that brought us the National Highway System and the Transcontinental Railroad. Appropriators can reapportion a few billion dollars now to feel good about protecting our fiscal health, but all they’re doing is making our future worse.

#### Now the Impacts

#### Credible US economic leadership is key to maintaining capitalism, interdependence, and every level of global cooperation-The alternative is competitive mercantilism and a complete collapse of multilateralism─

Posen ‘9. Adam-Deputy Director & Senior Fellow of the Peterson Institute for International Economics. “Economic Leadership, Beyond the Crisis.” Available Online @

<http://clients.squareeye.com/uploads/foresight/documents/PN%20USA\_FINAL\_LR\_1.pdf>

In the postwar period, US power and prestige, beyond the nation’s military might, have been based largely on American relative economic size and success. These facts enabled the US to promote economic openness and buy-in to a set of economic institutions, formal and informal, that resulted in increasing international economic integration. With the exception of the immediate post-Bretton Woods oil-shock period (1974-85), this combination produced generally growing prosperity at home and abroad, and underpinned the idea that there were benefits to other countries of following the American model and playing by American rules. Initially this system was most influential and successful in those countries in tight military alliance with the US, such as Canada, West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. With the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989, and the concomitant switch of important emerging economies, notably Brazil, China, India, and Mexico, to increasingly free-market capitalism, global integration on American terms through American leadership has been increasingly dominant for the last two decades. The global financial crisis of 2008-09, however, represents a challenge to that world order. While overt financial panic has been averted, and most economic forecasts are for recovery to begin in the US and the major emerging markets well before end of 2009 (a belief I share), there remain significant risks for the US and its leadership. The global financial system, including but not limited to US-based entities, has not yet been sustainably reformed. In fact, financial stability will come under strain again when the current government financial guarantees and public ownership of financial firms and assets are unwound over the next couple of years. The growth rate of the US economy and the ability of the US government to finance responses to future crises, both military and economic, will be meaningfully curtailed for several years to come. Furthermore, the crisis will accelerate at least temporarily two related long-term trends eroding the viability of the current international economic arrangements. First, perhaps inevitably, the economic size and importance of China, India, Brazil, and other emerging markets (including oil-exporters like Russia) has been catching up with the US, and even more so with demographically and productivity challenged Europe and northeast Asia. Second, pressure has been building over the past fifteen years or so of these developing countries’ economic rise to give their governments more voice and weight in international economic decision-making. Again, this implies a transfer of relative voting share from the US, but an even greater one from overrepresented Western Europe. The near certainty that Brazil, China, and India, are to be less harmed in real economic terms by the current crisis than either the US or most other advanced economies will only emphasise their growing strength, and their ability to claim a role in leadership. The need for capital transfers from China and oil-exporters to fund deficits and bank recapitalisation throughout the West, not just in the US, increases these rising countries’ leverage and legitimacy in international economic discussions. One aspect of this particular crisis is that American economic policymakers, both Democratic and Republican, became increasingly infatuated with financial services and innovation beginning in the mid-1990s. This reflected a number of factors, some ideological, some institutional, and some interest group driven. The key point here is that export of financial services and promotion of financial liberalisation on the US securitised model abroad came to dominate the US international economic policy agenda, and thus that of the IMF, the OECD, and the G8 as well. This came to be embodied by American multinational commercial and investment banks, in perception and in practice. That particular version of the American economic model has been widely discredited, because of the crisis’ apparent origins in US lax regulation and over-consumption, as well as in excessive faith in American-style financial markets. Thus, American global economic leadership has been eroded over the long-term by the rise of major emerging market economies, disrupted in the shortterm by the nature and scope of the financial crisis, and partially discredited by the excessive reliance upon and overselling of US-led financial capitalism. This crisis therefore presents the possibility of the US model for economic development being displaced, not only deservedly tarnished, and the US having limited resources in the near-term to try to respond to that challenge. Additionally, the US’ traditional allies and co-capitalists in Western Europe and Northeast Asia have been at least as damaged economically by the crisis (though less damaged reputationally). Is there an alternative economic model? The preceding description would seem to confirm the rise of the Rest over the West. That would be premature. The empirical record is that economic recovery from financial crises, while painful, is doable even by the poorest countries, and in advanced countries rarely leads to significant political dislocation. Even large fiscal debt burdens can be reined in over a few years where political will and institutions allow, and the US has historically fit in that category. A few years of slower growth will be costly, but also may put the US back on a sustainable growth path in terms of savings versus consumption. Though the relative rise of the major emerging markets will be accelerated by the crisis, that acceleration will be insufficient to rapidly close the gap with the US in size, let alone in technology and well-being. None of those countries, except perhaps for China, can think in terms of rivaling the US in all the aspects of national power. These would include: a large, dynamic and open economy; favorable demographic dynamics; monetary stability and a currency with a global role; an ability to project hard power abroad; and an attractive economic model to export for wide emulation. This last point is key. In the area of alternative economic models, one cannot beat something with nothing – communism fell not just because of its internal contradictions, or the costly military build-up, but because capitalism presented a clearly superior alternative. The Chinese model is in part the American capitalist (albeit not high church financial liberalisation) model, and is in part mercantilism. There has been concern that some developing or small countries could take the lesson from China that building up lots of hard currency reserves through undervaluation and export orientation is smart. That would erode globalisation, and lead to greater conflict with and criticism of the US-led system. While in the abstract that is a concern, most emerging markets – and notably Brazil, India, Mexico, South Africa, and South Korea – are not pursuing that extreme line. The recent victory of the incumbent Congress Party in India is one indication, and the statements about openness of Brazilian President Lula is another. Mexico’s continued orientation towards NAFTA while seeking other investment flows (outside petroleum sector, admittedly) to and from abroad is a particularly brave example. Germany’s and Japan’s obvious crisis-prompted difficulties emerging from their very high export dependence, despite their being wealthy, serve as cautionary examples on the other side. So unlike in the1970s, the last time that the US economic performance and leadership were seriously compromised, we will not see leading developing economies like Brazil and India going down the import substitution or other self-destructive and uncooperative paths. If this assessment is correct, the policy challenge is to deal with relative US economic decline, but not outright hostility to the US model or displacement of the current international economic system. That is reassuring, for it leaves us in the realm of normal economic diplomacy, perhaps to be pursued more multilaterally and less high-handedly than the US has done over the past 20 years. It also suggests that adjustment of current international economic institutions is all that is required, rather than desperately defending economic globalisation itself. For all of that reassurance, however, the need to get buy-in from the rising new players to the current system is more pressing on the economic front than it ever has been before.Due to the crisis, the ability of the US and the other advanced industrial democracies to put up money and markets for rewards and side-payments to those new players is also more limited than it has been in the past, and will remain so for at least the next few years. The need for the US to avoid excessive domestic self-absorption is a real concern as well, given the combination of foreign policy fatigue from the Bush foreign policy agenda and economic insecurity from the financial crisis. Managing the post-crisis global economy Thus, the US faces a challenging but not truly threatening global economic situation as a result of the crisis and longer-term financial trends. Failure to act affirmatively to manage the situation, however, bears two significant and related risks: first, that China and perhaps some other rising economic powers will opportunistically divert countries in US-oriented integrated relationships to their economic sphere(s); second, thata leadership vacuum will arise in international financial affairs and in multilateral trade efforts, which will over time erode support for a globally integrated economy. Both of these risks if realised would diminish US foreign policy influence, make the economic system less resilient in response to future shocks (to every country’s detriment), reduce economic growth and thus the rate of reduction in global poverty, and conflict with other foreign policy goals like controlling climate changeor managing migration and demographic shifts. If the US is to rise to the challenge, it should concentrate on the following priority measures.

#### The impact is great power war, terrorism, and a collapse of the global economy─

Panzner ‘8, faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase (Michael, Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, Revised and Updated Edition, p. 136-138, googlebooks)

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster, But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify.   Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange, foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the (heap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly.  The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation.  In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level.  Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more healed sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an "intense confrontation" between the United States and China is "inevitable" at some point.  More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

#### Finally, collapse causes lash-out. The U.S. will go down fighting─

Goldstein ‘7 (Avery, Professor of Global Politics and International Relations @ University of Pennsylvania, “Power transitions, institutions, and China's rise in East Asia: Theoretical expectations and evidence,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 30, Issue 4 & 5 August)

Two closely related, though distinct, theoretical arguments focus explicitly on the consequences for international politics of a shift in power between a dominant state and a rising power. In War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin suggested that peace prevails when a dominant state’s capabilities enable it to ‘govern’ an international order that it has shaped. Over time, however, as economic and technological diffusion proceeds during eras of peace and development, other states are empowered. Moreover, the burdens of international governance drain and distract the reigning hegemon, and challengers eventually emerge who seek to rewrite the rules of governance. As the power advantage of the erstwhile hegemon ebbs, it may become desperate enough to resort to the ultima ratio of international politics, force, to forestall the increasingly urgent demands of a rising challenger. Or as the power of the challenger rises, it may be tempted to press its case with threats to use force. It is the rise and fall of the great powers that creates the circumstances under which major wars, what Gilpin labels ‘hegemonic wars’, break out.13 Gilpin’s argument logically encourages pessimism about the implications of a rising China. It leads to the expectation that international trade, investment, and technology transfer will result in a steady diffusion of American economic power, benefiting the rapidly developing states of the world, including China. As the US simultaneously scurries to put out the many brushfires that threaten its far-flung global interests (i.e., the classic problem of overextension), it will be unable to devote sufficient resources to maintain or restore its former advantage over emerging competitors like China. While the erosion of the once clear American advantage plays itself out, the US will find it ever more difficult to preserve the order in Asia that it created during its era of preponderance. The expectation is an increase in the likelihood for the use of force – either by a Chinese challenger able to field a stronger military in support of its demands for greater influence over international arrangements in Asia, or by a besieged American hegemon desperate to head off further decline. Among the trends that alarm those who would look at Asia through the lens of Gilpin’s theory are China’s expanding share of world trade and wealth (much of it resulting from the gains made possible by the international economic order a dominant US established); its acquisition of technology in key sectors that have both civilian and military applications (e.g., information, communications, and electronics linked with the ‘revolution in military affairs’); and an expanding military burden for the US (as it copes with the challenges of its global war on terrorism and especially its struggle in Iraq) that limits the resources it can devote to preserving its interests in East Asia.14 Although similar to Gilpin’s work insofar as it emphasizes the importance of shifts in the capabilities of a dominant state and a rising challenger, the power-transition theory A. F. K. Organski and Jacek Kugler present in The War Ledger focuses more closely on the allegedly dangerous phenomenon of ‘crossover’– the point at which a dissatisfied challenger is about to overtake the established leading state.15 In such cases, when the power gap narrows, the dominant state becomes increasingly desperate to forestall, and the challenger becomes increasingly determined to realize the transition to a new international order whose contours it will define. Though suggesting why a rising China may ultimately present grave dangers for international peace when its capabilities make it a peer competitor of America, Organski and Kugler’s power-transition theory is less clear about the dangers while a potential challenger still lags far behind and faces a difficult struggle to catch up. This clarification is important in thinking about the theory’s relevance to interpreting China’s rise because a broad consensus prevails among analysts that Chinese military capabilities are at a minimum two decades from putting it in a league with the US in Asia.16 Their theory, then, points with alarm to trends in China’s growing wealth and power relative to the United States, but especially looks ahead to what it sees as the period of maximum danger – that time when a dissatisfied China could be in a position to overtake the US on dimensions believed crucial for assessing power. Reports beginning in the mid-1990s that offered extrapolations suggesting China’s growth would give it the world’s largest gross domestic product (GDP aggregate, not per capita) sometime in the first few decades of the twentieth century fed these sorts of concerns about a potentially dangerous challenge to American leadership in Asia.17 The huge gap between Chinese and American military capabilities (especially in terms of technological sophistication) has so far discouraged prediction of comparably disquieting trends on this dimension, but inklings of similar concerns may be reflected in occasionally alarmist reports about purchases of advanced Russian air and naval equipment, as well as concern that Chinese espionage may have undermined the American advantage in nuclear and missile technology, and speculation about the potential military purposes of China’s manned space program.18 Moreover, because a dominant state may react to the prospect of a crossover and believe that it is wiser to embrace the logic of preventive war and act early to delay a transition while the task is more manageable, Organski and Kugler’s powertransition theory also provides grounds for concern about the period prior to the possible crossover.19

### Contention Two: Energy Efficiency

#### Scenario 1- Oil

#### Demand for oil will double over the next 20 years and current sources remain vulnerable to shocks–The plan is the only comprehensive solution.

Erin Kent Magee, March 17th, 2012, 2012 presidential candidate, previous educational services officer @ the DoD, previous royal ambassador to Japan, HRP, Western Australia “High Speed Rail: The Time is Now,” <http://tbqy.com/?p=2236>

The American economy is extremely vulnerable to oil price hikes, supply disruptions, and shortages due to our huge daily oil dependency. We use 20 million barrels of oil everyday in America, 70% of which is for transportation. We import 2/3 of our oil, much of it from unstable regions half way around the world. Current events across the Middle East and North Africa make our oil supply that much more vulnerable. The countries that produce oil, many of which have been steadily declining in overall production numbers, are producing less and less oil each year. This is due to the fact that many of the world’s leading oil fields have, or are currently maxing out and in decline. This makes it increasingly difficult to meet current American oil demand, and impossible to meet future increases in demand - expected to double over the next 20 years. High-Speed Rail will allow us to expand transportation options as we reduce our daily demand for oil. Since increasing oil supply is proving to be practically impossible, reducing demand is the only viable solution. Ramping up forms of transportation that consume little or no oil is the heart of the solution. Creating a national transportation network based on a system of electric trains throughout the country will take a huge bite out of our unsustainable appetite for oil, while increasing mobility, efficiency, global competitiveness and national security. In conjuction with butanol production, High-Speed Rail will reduce our dependence on foreign oil by more than 50% (2,3) High-Speed Rail is the large-scale, comprehensive solution to the oil supply problem, and is the most significant way to reduce our daily consumption of oil quickly and efficiently while maintaining our prosperity and economic growth. High-Speed Rail will mean: Less Money Spent on Gasoline, More Business & Real Jobs for Real People

#### The plan solves oil dependence quickly-Alternative energies won’t come fast enough and conflicts are inevitable if action isn’t taken in the short-term─

Perl ‘11. Dr. Anthony Perl is Professor of Urban Studies and Political Science at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, where he directs the Urban Studies Program. His latest book, co-authored with Richard Gilbert, is "Transport Revolutions: Moving People and Freight Without Oil." November 19, 2011 “How green is high-speed rail?” [http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/18/world/how-green-is-hsr/index.html]

Since electricity is an energy carrier, it can be generated from a mix of sources that incorporate the growing share of geothermal, hydro, solar, and wind energy that will be produced in the years ahead. And because electric motors are three to four times more efficient than internal combustion engines, an immediate improvement will precede introducing renewable energy into transportation. Grid-connected traction offers the only realistic option for significantly reducing oil use in transportation over the next 10 years. If such a shift does not begin during this decade, the risk of a global economic collapse and/or geo-political conflict over the world's remaining oil reserves would become dangerously elevated. Making a significant dent in transportation's oil addiction within 10 years is sooner than fuel cells, biofuels, battery-electric vehicles and other alternative energy technologies will be ready to deliver change. Biofuels that could power aircraft now cost hundreds of dollars per gallon to produce. Batteries that a big enough charge to power vehicles between cities are still too big and expensive to make electric cars and buses affordable. But grid-connected electric trains have been operating at scale and across continents for over a century. And when the Japanese introduced modern high-speed trains through their Shinkansen, in 1964, the utility of electric trains was greatly extended. Since the 1980s, countries across Asia and Europe have been building new high-speed rail infrastructure to deploy electric mobility between major cities up to 1,000 kilometers apart. For intercity trips between 200 and 1,000 kilometers, high-speed trains have proven their success in drawing passengers out of both cars and planes, as well as meeting new travel demand with a much lower carbon footprint than driving or flying could have done. If we are serious about reducing oil's considerable risks to global prosperity and sustainability, we will not miss the opportunity offered by high-speed rail to decrease transportation's oil consumption sooner, rather than later.

#### Continued dependence and oil shocks will result in great power conflicts and rapid warming. This independently makes US-Sino war inevitable─

King 8 [Neil King, Jr. “Peak Oil: A Survey of Security Concerns” CNAS Energy Security Visionaries Series. July 2008. http://www.aspousa.org/aspousa4/proceedings/\_CNAS\_King\_Peak\_Oil\_WorkingPaper.pdf]

Many commentators in the United States and abroad have begun to wrestle with the question of whether soaring oil prices and market volatility could spark an outright oil war between major powers—possibly ignited not by China or Russia, but by the United States. In a particularly pointed speech on the topic in May, James Russell of the Naval Postgraduate School in California addressed what he called the increasing militarization of international energy security. “Energy security is now deemed so central to ‘national security’ that threats to the former are liable to be reflexively interpreted as threats to the latter,” he told a gathering at the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy at Houston’s Rice University. 6 The possibility that a large-scale war could break out over access to dwindling energy resources, he wrote, “is one of the most alarming prospects facing the current world system.” 7 Mr. Russell figures among a growing pool of analysts who worry in particular about the psychological readiness of the United States to deal rationally with a sustained oil shock. Particularly troubling is the increasing perception within Congress that the financial side of the oil markets no longer functions rationally. It has either been taken over by speculators or is being manipulated, on the supply side, by producers who are holding back on pumping more oil in order to drive up the price. A breakdown in trust for the oil markets, these analysts fear, could spur calls for government action—even military intervention. “The perceptive chasm in the United States between new [oil] market realities and their impact on the global distribution of power will one day close,” Mr. Russell said. “And when it does, look out.” 8 The World at Peak: Taking the Dim View For years, skeptics scoffed at predictions that the United States would hit its own domestic oil production peak by sometime in the late 1960s. With its oil fields pumping full out, the U.S. in 1969 was providing an astonishing 25 percent of the world’s oil supply—a role no other country has ever come close to matching. U.S. production then peaked in December 1970, and has fallen steadily ever since, a shift that has dramatically altered America’s own sense of vulnerability and reordered its military priorities. During World War II, when its allies found their own oil supplies cut off by the war, the United States stepped in and made up the difference. Today it is able to meet less than a third of its own needs. A similar peak in worldwide production would have far more sweeping consequences. It would, for one, spell the end of the world’s unparalleled economic boom over the last century. It would also dramatically reorder the wobbly balance of power between nations as energychallenged industrialized countries turn their sights on the oil-rich nations of the Middle East and Africa. In a peak oil future, the small, flattened, globalized world that has awed recent commentators would become decidedly round and very vast again. Oceans will reemerge as a hindrance to trade, instead of the conduit they have been for so long. An energy-born jolt to the world economy would leave no corner of the globe untouched. Unable to pay their own fuel bills, the tiny Marshall Islands this summer faced the possibility of going entirely without power. That is a reality that could sweep across many of the smallest and poorest countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, reversing many of the tentative gains in those regions and stirring deep social unrest. Large patches of the world rely almost entirely on diesel-powered generators for what skimpy electricity they now have. Those generators are the first to run empty as prices soar. A British parliamentary report released in June on “The Impact of Peak Oil on International Development” concluded that “the deepening energy crisis has the potential to make poverty a permanent state for a growing number of people, undoing the development efforts of a generation.” 9 We are seeing some of the consequences already in Pakistan – a country of huge strategic importance, with its own stash of nuclear weapons – that is now in the grips of a severe energy crisis. By crippling the country’s economy, battering the stock market, and spurring mass protests, Pakistan’s power shortages could end up giving the country’s Islamic parties the leverage they have long needed to take power. It is not hard to imagine similar scenarios playing out in dozens of other developing countries. Deepening economic unrest will put an enormous strain on the United Nations and other international aid agencies. Anyone who has ever visited a major UN relief hub knows that their fleets of Land Rovers, jumbo jets and prop planes have a military-size thirst for fuel. Aid agency budgets will come under unprecedented pressure just as the need for international aid skyrockets and donor countries themselves feel pressed for cash. A peaking of oil supplies could also hasten the impact of global climate change by dramatically driving up the use of coal for power generation in much of the world. A weakened world economy would also put in jeopardy the massively expensive projects, such as carbon capture and storage, that many experts look to for a reduction in industrial emissions. So on top of the strains caused by scarce fossil fuels, the world may also have to grapple with the destabilizing effects of more rapid desertification, dwindling fisheries, and strained food supplies. An oil-constricted world will also stir perilous frictions between haves and have-nots. The vast majority of all the world’s known oil reserves is now in the hands of national oil companies, largely in countries with corrupt and autocratic governments. Many of these governments—Iran and Venezuela top the list—are now seen as antagonists of the United States. Tightened oil supplies will substantially boost these countries’ political leverage, but that enhanced power will carry its own peril. Playing the oil card when nations are scrambling for every barrel will be a far more serious matter that at any time in the past. The European continent could also undergo a profound shift as its needs—and sources of energy—diverge all the more from those of the United States. A conservation-oriented Europe (oil demand is on the decline in almost every EU country) will look all the more askance at what it sees as the gluttonous habits of the United States. At the same time, Europe’s governments may have little choice but to shy from any political confrontations with its principal energy supplier, Russia. An energy-restricted future will greatly enhance Russia’s clout within settings like the UN Security Council but also in its dealings with both Europe and China. Abundant oil and gas have fueled Russia’s return to power over the last decade, giving it renewed standing within the UN and increasing sway over European capitals. The peak oil threat is already sending shivers through the big developing countries of China and India, whose propulsive growth (and own internal stability) requires massive doses of energy. For Beijing, running low on fuel spells economic chaos and internal strife, which in turn spawns images of insurrection and a breaking up of the continent-sized country. Slumping oil supplies will automatically pit the two largest energy consumers—the United States and China—against one another in competition over supplies in South America, West Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. China is already taking this competition very seriously. It doesn’t require much of a leap to imagine a Cold War-style scramble between Washington and Beijing—not for like-minded allies this time but simply for reliable and tested suppliers of oil. One region that offers promise and peril in almost equal measure is the Artic, which many in the oil industry consider the last big basin of untapped hydrocarbon riches. But the Artic remains an ungoverned ocean whose legal status couldn’t be less clear, especially so long as the United States continues to remain outside the international Law of the Sea Treaty. As the ices there recede, the risk increases that a scramble for assets in the Artic could turn nasty.

#### War with China goes nuclear and destroys civilization─

Strait Times, June 25, 2000, p. Lexis

The high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -horror of horrors -raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilization. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armageddon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

#### Scenario 2-Congestion

#### Air and highway transportation use has completely outpaced capacity-High-Speed rail is the only alternative capable of solving─

Kobzantsev ‘9. Zlata Kobzantsev. December 9th, 2009, written for PennDesign, the University Of Pennsylvania School Of Design, “Planning for High-speed Rail in the United States,” Chapter 1: Metropolitan Congestion as a Factor for Successful Highspeed Rail.

Current automobile and air transportation traffic is congested, contributing to lost time and money and the inefficient use of resources. The demand for simultaneous highway use by private cars, trucks, and public transit, especially at peak hours, clogs roadways. Highway use has outpaced increased road capacity and growth in public transit. Everyday operations and unfortunate crashes can influence greater congestion. In 2007, 2.8 gallons of fuel were wasted, which is equivalent to 370,000 18-wheeler fuel delivery trucks lined up between Houston, Boston, and Los Angeles. The yearly amount of time that an individual is delayed by congestion has increased from 14 hours in 1982 to 36 hours in 2007. This time spent in congestion is equal to a work week and increases in larger metropolitan regions.12 For air travel, congestion influences increased departure and arrival delays. For every year since 2000, at least 15% of flights have been delayed at least 15 minutes.13 With future population growth and the expected traffic that will be generated from it, congestion of America’s roads and air corridors will increase. Past trends indicate that congestion on highways will outpace population growth because vehicle miles traveled in the 100 largest metropolitan regions in the U.S. increased by 28% between 1992-2002, which was twice as fast as the population of the metropolitan regions grew.14 The policies that have been used to reduce congestion on the nation’s roads have not matched the increasing rates of congestion. Increasing road width where possible, adding more public transit, and making transportation operations more efficient has helped decrease congestion, but only for a limited time and in smaller metro regions when increased capacity matches the rates of congestion growth.15 In order to deal with congestion, reduce delays, and improve safety, especially from air shuttle flights, some airports are redesigning their airspace.16 However, increasing capacity for both automobile and air travel is an expensive investment. High-speed rail (HSR) is an alternative mode that can alleviate congestion by filling the gap between automobile and air travel. HSR has been used in Europe and Asia to mitigate congestion. This system works best – that is, meeting and exceeding ridership projections – between cities that are highly congested and well connected to transit.17 Regions with congestion and with existing or planned transit systems will have the best potential to support proposed service by HSR in an emerging U.S. HSR system, since they will be able to readily provide HSR passengers -- who value transit, convenience, and savings in trip-times -- with convenient and fast intercity and inter-region travel.

#### Current efforts won’t come close to alleviating this-high speed rail can decrease congestion while simultaneously reducing emissions and oil dependence─

Rodda ‘9. Bryan Rodda December 9th, 2009, written for PennDesign, the University Of Pennsylvania School Of Design, “Planning for High-speed Rail in the United States,” Executive Summary

There is increasing acceptance in the field of transportation planning that continuing to build ever more highways and ever more runways is unsustainable and will not result in a solution for congestion.3 Introducing HSR as a new, viable alternative, however, offers the opportunity to relieve congestion at our nation’s busiest airports and on our busiest highways through diverting trips to the new rail mode, which is naturally suited for highcapacity travel through America’s densest, most congested travel corridors (see chapters 1 and 4). America’s airports are clogged. Newark International Airport is a good example of severely constrained American airport—it already operates at full capacity complete with a cap on the number of allowed flights per hour, and it physically landlocked with few options for adding any new runway space. The situation is similar in California’s largest cities, and the California’s High‐Speed Rail Authority has emphasized the potential cost savings of building HSR relative to expanding airport and highway capacity, noting: “California's planned 220 mph highspeed train system will cost less than half as much as building more freeway lanes and airport runways and will increase mobility while cutting air pollution and reducing the greenhouse gas emissions that cause global warming.” Highspeed rail is the most convenient, environmentally friendly way to travel across America’s megaregions, especially for trips of between 100 and 600 miles. Among current intercity transportation modes, America’s existing rail services are already the most energy‐efficient mode of travel on a per‐passenger‐mile basis, requiring 30 percent less energy on average than automobiles and 23 percent less energy than air.4 Creating a network of HSR lines using clean diesel or electric trains will result in additional energy benefits, helping the country to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and lessening our economic dependence on foreign sources of oil (see chapter 3). Also, the potential to upgrade existing rights‐of‐way and stations, rather than building new everywhere, offers additional environmental and economic benefits as well as the opportunity to preserve America’s historic railroad assets.

#### Emissions from congestion and transportation represent some of the largest contributions to warming-

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Surface transportation in the United States is a large source of greenhouse gas emissions, and therefore a large contributor to global climate change. Roughly a third of America’s carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions come from moving people or goods, and 80 percent of these emissions are from cars and trucks. To reduce CO2 emissions from the transportation sector, policy makers are primarily pushing for more efficient vehicles, alternative fuels, and reducing vehicle miles traveled (VMT). Those who promote vehicle improvements have focused on building lighter and smaller vehicles (while maintaining safety), improving powertrain efficiency, and introducing alternative technologies such as hybrid and fuel cell vehicles. Alternative fuel possibilities include many low-carbon options such as biofuels and synthetic fuels. Policy makers have placed less attention on reducing CO2 emissions by reducing traffic congestion. As traffic congestion increases, so too do fuel consumption and CO2 emissions. Therefore, congestion mitigation programs should reduce CO2 emissions. The key question is how big of an emissions reduction we can get by reducing congestion. This question is difficult to answer, because CO2 emissions, and the fuel consumption that causes them, are very sensitive to several factors. These factors include individual driving behavior, vehicle and roadway types, and traffic conditions. Because of these factors, a table that estimates CO2 emissions based only on a single variable, such as trip distance, cannot provide an accurate estimate. Rather, a comprehensive methodology that takes advantage of the latest vehicle activity measurements and detailed vehicle emission factors can create a more accurate emissions inventory for different types of vehicles and different levels of traffic congestion. With this methodology, we can accurately estimate how congestion mitigation programs will reduce CO2 emissions.

#### High speed rail can reduce CO2 emissions by 6 billion pounds per year─ We have the only comprehensive data─

CCAP ‘6. Center for Clean Air Policy & Center for Neighborhood Technology. CCAP has over

20 years of experience addressing climate change, air emissions, and energy policy. CNT serves as the umbrella for a number of projects and affiliate organization. They work in the areas of energy, transportation, materials conservation and housing preservation “High Speed Rail and Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the U.S.” January 2006 [http://www.cnt.org/repository/HighSpeedRailEmissions.pdf]

High speed rail is often cited as a solution to many transportation problems: It can reduce congestion on roads and at airports, is cost effective and convenient, improves mobility and has environmental benefits. While greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are likely to be reduced as travelers switch to high speed rail from other modes of travel, little modeling has been done to estimate this potential impact in the U.S. Those estimates that have been made simply assume a percentage of trips nationally will be diverted to rail from other modes. The Center for Neighborhood Technology (CNT) and the Center for Clean Air Policy (CCAP) have, alternatively, estimated on a corridor-by-corridor basis the annual GHG benefits of high speed rail systems in the U.S. using current plans for high speed rail development in the federally designated high speed rail corridors. To estimate high speed rail’s net emissions impact, we calculated the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions saved from passengers switching to high speed rail from other modes (air, conventional rail, automobile and bus) and subtracted the estimated emissions generated by high speed rail. Our calculations were based on passenger projections and diversion rates for each corridor and typical emissions rates for each mode of travel, including several different high speed rail technologies. Current projections show that passengers would take 112 million trips on high speed rail in the U.S. in 2025, traveling more than 25 billion passenger miles. This would result in 29 million fewer automobile trips and nearly 500,000 fewer flights. We calculated a total emissions savings of 6 billion pounds of CO2 per year (2.7 MMTCO2) if all proposed high speed rail systems studied for this project are built. Savings from cancelled automobile and airplane trips are the primary sources of the emissions savings; together these two modes make up 80 percent of the estimated emissions savings from all modes.

#### Warming causes extinction─

Brown, Director and Founder of the global institute of Environment in the U.S., 2008

[Lester E. Brown, “Plan B 3.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization”]

In 2004, Stephen Pacala and Robert Socolow at Princeton Uni­versity published an article in Science that showed how annual carbon emissions from fossil fuels could be held at 7 billion tons instead of rising to 14 billion tons over the next 50 years, as would occur with business as usual. The goal of Pacala, an ecol­ogist, and Socolow, an engineer, was to prevent atmospheric CO2 concentrations, then near 375 ppm, from rising above 500 ppm. I They described *IS* ways, all using proven technologies, that by 20S4 could each cut carbon emissions by 1 billion tons per year. Any seven of these options could be used together to pre­vent an increase in carbon emissions through 2054. Pacala and Socolow further theorize that advancing technology would allow for annual carbon emissions to be cut to 2 billion tons by 2104, a level that can be absorbed by natural carbon sinks in land and oceans. The Pacala/Socolow conceptualization has been extraordi­narily useful in helping to think about how to cut carbon emis­sions. During the three years since the article was written, the urgency of acting quickly and on a much larger scale has become obvious. We also need now to go beyond the conceptu­al approach that treats all potential methods of reducing carbon emissions equally and concentrate on those that are most prom­ising. Researchers such as James Hansen, a leading climate scien­tist at NASA, believe that global warming is accelerating and may be approaching a tipping point, a point at which climate change acquires a momentum that makes it irreversible. They think **we** may have a decade to turn the situation around before this threshold is crossed. I agree.?3 We often hear descriptions of what we need to do in the decades ahead or by 2050 to avoid "dangerous climate change," but we are already facing this. Two thirds of the glaciers that feed the Yellow and Yangtze rivers of China will disappear by 2060 if even the current 7 percent annual rate of melting con­tinues. Glaciologists report that the Gangotri glacier, which supplies 70 percent of the ice melt that feeds the Ganges River during the dry season, could disappear entirely in a matter of decades.74 What could threaten world food security more than the melt­ing of the glaciers that feed the major rivers of Asia during the dry season, the rivers that irrigate the region's rice and wheat fields? In a region with half the world's people, this potential loss of water during the dry season could lead not just to hunger but to starvation on an unimaginable scale. Asian food security would take a second hit because its rice­-growing river deltas and floodplains would be under water. The World Bank tells us that a sea level rise of only 1 meter would inundate half of the riceland in Bangladesh. While a 1-meter rise in sea level will not happen overnight, what is worrisome is that if ice melting continues at today's rates, at some point such a rise in sea level will no longer be preventable. The melting that would cause this is not just what may happen if the earth's tem­perature rises further; this is something that is starting to hap­pen right now with the current temperature. As summer neared an end in 2007, reports from Greenland indicated that the flow of glaciers into the sea had accelerated beyond anything glaciologists had thought possible. Huge chunks of ice weighing several billion tons each were breaking off and sliding into the sea, causing minor earthquakes as they did so.!6 With melt-water lubricating the surface between the glaciers and the rocks on which they rested, ice flows were accelerating, flowing into the ocean at a pace of 2 meters an hour. This accel­erated flow, along with the earthquakes, shows the potential for the entire ice sheet to break up and collapse?? Beyond what is already happening, the world faces a risk that some of the feedback mechanisms will begin to kick in, fur­ther accelerating the warming process. Scientists who once thought that the Arctic Ocean could be free of ice during the summer by 2100 now see it occurring by 2030. Even this could turn out to be a conservative estimate.78 This is of particular concern to scientists because of the albedo effect, where the replacement of highly reflective sea ice with darker open water greatly increases heat absorbed from sunlight. This, of course, has the potential to further accelerate the melting of the Greenland ice sheet. A second feedback loop of concern is the melting of per­mafrost. This would release billions of tons of carbon, some as methane, a potent greenhouse gas with a global warming effect per ton 25 times that of carbon dioxide.79 The risk facing humanity is that climate change could spiral out of control and it will no longer be possible to arrest trends such as ice melting and rising sea level. At this point, the future of civilization would be at risk. This combination of melting glaciers, rising seas, and their effects on food security and low-lying coastal cities could over­whelm the capacity of governments to cope. Today it is largely weak states that begin to deteriorate under the pressures of mounting environmental stresses. But the changes just described could overwhelm even the strongest of states. Civilization itself could begin to unravel under these extreme stresses.

### Contention Three: Solvency

#### Committed federal funding is key to jumpstart high-speed rail projects-it injects confidence into the market for its developement─

Todorvich et al. ‘11 Petra Todorovich, Director of America 2050, a national urban planning initiative to develop an infrastructure and growth strategy for the United States Daniel Schned, and Robert Lane “High-Speed Rail: International Lessons for U.S. Policy Makers.” [https://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/dl/1948\_1268\_High-Speed%20Rail%20PFR\_Webster.pdf]

Like other modes of transportation and public goods, high-speed rail generally does not pay for itself through ticket fares and other operating revenues. Reliable federal funding is needed for some portion of the upfront capital costs of constructing rail infrastructure, but operating revenues frequently cover operating and maintenance costs. Two well-known examples of highly successful high-speed rail lines—the Tokyo– Osaka Shinkansen and Paris–Lyon TGV—generate an operating proﬁt (JR Central 2010; Gow 2008). German high-speed trains also have been proﬁtable on an operating basis, with revenues covering 100 percent of maintenance costs and 30 percent of new track construction (University of Pennsylvania 2011). Moreover, as long as the HSIPR Program combines funding for both high-speed and conventional rail, federal grants, not loans, will be required to support its initiatives. Since conventional rail services are likely to need continued operating subsidies, it is even more important to secure a federal funding source for capital infrastructure costs. A small but reliable transportation tax for high-speed and conventional passenger rail would demonstrate the federal government’s commitment to a comprehensive rail program, giving states the assurance they need to plan high-speed rail projects and equipment manufacturers the conﬁdence they require to invest in the industry.

#### No other form of funding solves-Federal involvement is critical for coordination and sustaining projects─

Sweet ‘9. Matthias N. Sweet, Ph.D. candidate at the University of Pennsylvania City and Regional Planning “Planning for High-speed Rail in the United States.” Chapter 13: Financing High-speed Rail [<http://www.design.upenn.edu/hsr2011/planningforhsr.pdf>]

Capital costs for HSR are high and will likely need to be primarily born at the federal level, although states should also be expected to share a cost of initial capital costs. Corridors will cross state boundaries and benefits may also include spatial spillovers, therefore the federal role will also be important in facilitating coordination, standardizing bidding and labor pr.actices, and regulating relationships between state operating authorities and privately owned freight railroads which own many of the rights-of-way that will be used by HSR trains. Dedicated Funding Source While existing HSR funding is not dedicated, previous transportation program experience (see Interstate System discussion) suggests that if no dedicated federal funding source is identified, funding levels will not sustain the HSR program over the long-term. The Interstate Highway System’s success was largely due to the Highway Trust Fund, funded through a dedicated gas tax and other transportation related excise taxes, which financed highway construction for more than 50 years. The availability of a dedicated funding source impacts not only the decisions of the future, but immediate decisions about investing in projects requiring short-term or long-term support.

#### High-speed rail is competitive, efficient, and feasible in the short term.

Kobzantsev ‘9. Zlata Kobzantsev, University of Pennsylvania, Cornell University December 9th, 2009, written for PennDesign, the University Of Pennsylvania School Of Design, “Planning for High-speed Rail in the United States,” Chapter 1: Metropolitan Congestion as a Factor for Successful Highspeed Rail.

In the spectrum of transit modes, HSR fills a gap between short-distance flights and longdistance surface transit trips. The high speeds of HSR, at 125 miles per hour or higher (200 kilometer per hour or higher) shrink the functional distance of trips so that they can connect a megaregion.22 This provides a competitive advantage to HSR over cars because the faster trains achieve shorter trip times. The threshold of passengers for intercity and commuting travel is about an hour. This increases the number of passengers willing to travel on HSR and potential trips that could occur within this time threshold. This allows for HSR to connect a series of congested cities within a megaregion where there is demand for intercity travel, especially outside the immediate metropolitan region.23 When HSR operates at its fastest speeds of 186 miles per hour (300 kilometers per hour), then it can compete with air travel. When the trip time achieved by HSR is around three hours, it is comparable to the check-in, departure, flight, arrival, and check-out time of short-haul flights. The loading and unloading time needed to HSR is minimized and security check-in occurs more quickly. The services that HSR offers can be comparable to airplanes because HSR rides are also concerned with passenger comfort.24 The implementation of HSR lines in Asia and Europe have indicated that between 65%-80% of short-haul air travelers switch from air shuttles to HSR.25 Moreover, HSR has the advantage of connecting central business districts (CBD). This removes the need for supplementary travel arrangements between airports and cities or surrounding areas. When HSR is connected to a CBD and transit, this eliminates the need for parking. Locating HSR in city centers also reduces door-to-door trip time, which is an important factor in the modal choice of passengers.26