## 1AC Advantage

#### A national, public high-speed rail system is a microcosm in the struggle between the public commons and the privatization of everyday life. Embracing the shared space of public transit in the form of the railway is a crucial first step in the fight against neoliberalism and the assertion of democratic possibility.

Murray 2002 (Andrew, Communications Officer for the train drivers union ASLEF Off the Rails: the Crisis on Britain's Railways, Preface to the Paperback Edition, xii)

That brings us to as near to a national consensus as we are ever likely to get on anything. The fragmented, profit-motive railway has been a catastrophe. But if a railway disasters appear to remain a distressing constant, at least two significant things have changed in the year since the first edition of this book appeared. First, according to polling evidence, the public finally started blaming the present government, rather than its predecessor, for the continuing problems on the railways. Second, and probably as a result of that, the government finally started doing something about it, with the decision to hand control of the network itself to a new not-for-profit trust which would be under effective government control. The means for achieving this--declaring Railtrack insolvent--quickly became mired in legal rancor, with the shareholders who had for years waxed fat on taxpayer subsidies to their failing monopoly demanding one last fix from the public purse. Eventually they got their way, with the government offering #300 million or so in compensation. Nonetheless, for the first time since privatization was launched on the world by the Thatcher government in the early 1980s, a significant state sell-off has been reversed. So a slice of history was made when Stephen Byers announced last October that he intended to take back the track,' consciously invoking the slogan used by the railway trade unions in campaigning for a restoration of a publicly run railway. The outrage which greeted this announcement from the City of London and its press allies were proof enough of the shock felt at this move--a move which the government had long resisted because, in Tony Blair's own revealing explanation, it did not want to be seen as 'old Labour'. Much more remains to be done, however. Declaring Railtrack insolvent and appointing rather more vigorous leadership at the head of the Strategic Rail Authority is not likely to be sufficient in itself. The bulk of the companies which have brought the industry to its present state, either through their own shortcomings or through the interactions imposed by the structure of John Major's privatization, remain in private hands. Re-integration of the fragmented railway remains the most pressing question for the government, and it would appear impossible to take any significant steps in that direction without simultaneously extending public control and ownership to those sections of the industry--train operations and infrastructure maintenance above all--which are at present outside it. It remains to be seen whether or not the government has the political will to take the further steps necessary. Public opinion overwhelmingly desires a return to a nationalized railway. On the other hand, new Labour remains loath to upset City interests further, the more so since some of the companies whose interests would be challenged by an extension of public ownership--Balfour Beatty, Jarvis and others--are the same companies the government is relying on for its controversial Private Finance Initiative projects and other measures to extend privatization into the education, health and local government services. That is the paradox in the government's position. It acknowledges that privatization has failed the railways and is seeking to temper the consequences of that in timorous fashion, yet it is pushing ahead with other privatisations, often involving the same companies and City interests, in equally sensitive sectors. Indeed, the contractor responsible for the track around Potters Bar--Jarvis--stands to be a major beneficiary from the part-privatisation of the London Underground, the PPP plan which has achieved the feat of being even more unpopular than the privatization of the mainline railways themselves. The discussion about the future of the railways has become a kind of microcosm of the wider debate about the role of the public and private sectors, the proper scope of market forces and, more generally, what values and whose interests should rive public policy. It is impossible not to see in the sickness afflicting the railways the terminal decay of the political ideology which made this chaos possible. But that ideology--private good, public bad; profit and self-interest at the heart of the running every service will mean safety and efficiency looking after themselves--will not lie down and die. Too many of the exercise a disproportionate influence on government policy are still making too much money from the privatization racket for that to happen. They will fight all the way, as the uproar manufactured over Railtrack's insolvency showed. it continues to be my hope that a study of the privatization of our railways will sustain in public opinion the conviction and resolution needed to overcome vested interest, and re-establish the primacy of the public interest, not only in relation to the railway industry, but elsewhere as well.

#### And, High-speed rail means the shift to the post-highway, post-automobile city, fundamentally reorganizing the relationship between space speed and urban politics. We can’t escape time-space compression and the destabilization of status quo modes of subjectivity. The only question is whether we cling to the illusion of static identity or risk the ethical possibilities of new spatial organization.

Sibley 2011 [Rebecca Mane, Masters of Architecture from Rice University, “Amplified Encounters at High Speed,” M.A. Thesis at Rice University supervised by Professor Troy Schaum, 13, Proquest]

Pushing the limits of the contemporary city to the accelerated speed of post-highway urbanism leads to high-speed rail. Super networks facilitate high-speed connections at multiple scales from regional, national, to global, shrinking both distance and time along corridors connecting dense urban centers These high speed connections create singular entities out of multiple regional cities, strung along the lines of the rail A new type of linear endless manifests itself within these corridors, shifting between the urban, suburban, and landscape The linear city, created and reinforced by the highway will experience a shift in infrastructure and speed with the introduction of the high speed rail If the sign became the response to the speed and urban effect of the highway, what becomes legible at the blur of 170 mph? SHIFT IN SPEED LEADS TO SHIFT IN PERCEPTION The amplification of speed leads to a shifted perception of the city, from the highway experience of roadside signs and buildings to a blurred panorama of quickly passing urban and rural landscapes, where both time, distance, and experience of the city are collapsed The insertion of high speed rail between freeway cities radically alters their relationship, shrinking both distance and time along corridors connecting dense urban centers A new spatial typology can be found along these lines of high speed, a further territorial blurring between landscapes of the urban, suburban, and rural Our perception as collective, high-speed subjects is simultaneously bound, by both the frame of the window and the limits of our visual perception when exposed to speed, and expanded, by the linear endlessness between stops

#### Achieving a shift from the isolated individualism of automobilities to the shared space and proximity of train travel opens us to new possibilities of collective belonging beyond the stale consensus of liberalism and right-wing nationalism. Expanding rail travel fundamentally shifts the affective atmospheres at work in public life

Bissell 09 (David, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, “Passenger mobilities: affective atmospheres and the sociality of public transport”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2010, volume 28, pages 270-289)//SK

In an age of increased carbon conscience, and in an attempt to encourage a `greener' mobile future (see Urry, 2008), the imperative of switching from reliance on automobilities to public transport is a common thread that weaves through much contemporary government ideology. Whilst the comfort of habit is often invoked as a trenchant hurdle that needs to be broken down, such idealistic mantras often fail to acknowledge that the reticence of such a switch for many might be tempered by the necessity to surrender particular freedoms that have often been associated with automobility throughout the 20th century. Such freedoms, particularly within the context of urban driving, are often more illusory than they are substantive (Katz, 1999; Michael, 1998). Yet the supposed flexibility and autonomy of the car driver contrast markedly with the masochism of the railway passenger who must acquiesce not only to the regulatory fixity of timetables and scheduling (Morse, 1998) but offer herself or himself up to become part of a mobile public. In the face of widespread and rapid social change and technological innovation, particularly during the latter half of the 20th century, it is intriguing to consider how the spatial configuration and arrangement of the railway carriage remain a resolutely modernist assemblage. As de Certeau describes, ``the unchanging traveller is pigeonholed, numbered and regulated in the grid of the railway car, which is a perfect actualisation of the rational utopia'' (2002, page 111). Unacquainted bodies still jostle uneasily against each other together on rows of seats that face each other. Schivelbusch's (1979) observations on the mild discomfort of being with unknown others in the 19th-century railway carriage, together with much writing on the status of the individual within the crowd at the turn of the 20th century, particularly through Simmel and Benjamin, still hold a surprising degree of analytical legitimacy today.(7) Consequently, it is perhaps easy to appreciate how `the passenger' as an ``anonymised parcel of flesh'' (Thrift, 1996, page 266) has become the dominant unit of analysis for social scientific thought which has attended to the embodied experience of being on the move (although see McCormack, 2008). Yet invoking such an analytical figure at once implies the existence of a bounded, autonomous, reflexive, self-determined `individual' whilst at the same time downplays the significance of other materialities and forces that do not conform to this schema. Consequently, social scientific thinking about the sociality of mobilities has tended to privilege the discursive registers of text and talk that flicker through and across different intersecting networks (Larsen et al, 2006; Urry, 2007). Where materialities beyond bodies are invoked most notably technological apparatuses and infrastructures their role is primarily functional and instrumental in extending the scale, frequency, and spontaneity through which such discursive (and often overtly productivist) socialities can take place. Within this version of sociality, spaces of public transport might be characterised by their relative absence of sociality. Yet what this paper has demonstrated is that there are communicative registers at play within these spaces that transcend the limiting grammars and vocabularies of discourse. This opens up and expands the remit of what constitutes the `social' by reconfiguring the relations between technologies, matter, and bodies. More specifically, in this paper I have argued that attending to and understanding affective registers of communication at play within spaces of public transport that transcend individual bodies allows us to consider how particular hybrid constellations of bodies and objects are generated and sustained that eschew the dualistic conventions of the human/nonhuman. Far from incidental, these powerful but often overlooked affective modulations have the capacity to generate significant material effects. Put simply, affective atmospheres that coalesce and collapse, erupt and dissipate within the railway carriage can significantly temper the experience of the railway journey. Through the movement of affect, dispositions become fostered and bodies become primed to act in different ways. But in contrast to much work on the sociality of mobilities, such atmospheres are not the outcome of conversational practices; rather they emerge through the complex interplay of technologies, matter, and bodies. But where does this leave us in thinking about passengers? Recognising that these autonomous affects give rise to particular collectives and social formations is not saying that becoming a passenger absolves the body of responsibility; that particular dispositions will inevitably cohere and condense. This is certainly not to advocate the notion that we should be ``unalloyedly nice'' to all things at all times (Thrift, 2005, page 140). Equally, it is not about suggesting that we should attempt to engage in moreöwhat have traditionally been construed as sociable' practices with other passengers. Many passengers might indeed seek solace from the quietude and anomie of solitary travel. Indeed, as Laurier and Philo remind us, people have ``a right to be left alone in public'' (2006, page 199). On the other hand, the emergence of negative, misanthropic affects that are very often the hallmark of travelling by public transport might be one of the powerful contributing factors that make it a less-than-desirable option, deterring people from making the switch from private forms of transport.(8) Preventing commonly diagnosed forms of antisocial behavior particularly malicious or explicit acts of destructivenessöis an imperative of public transport providers; and embodied in the UK government's wider Respect Agenda (Home Office, undated) and Respect Action Plan (Home Office, 2006). Yet, in addition to presuming the existence of a normative framework for `desirable' social conduct, such attention overlooks the low-grade malice that often simmers in these spaces, erupting and rendered visible in small acts of violence. This is significant because, over time, exposure to and imbrication within such affectual atmospheres has the capacity to wear the body down. Whilst often held to be symptomatic of the kinaesthetic ``reeks and jiggles'' of submitting to the technology of transport itself, as Hutchinson (2000) puts it, lethargy, weariness, and fatigue might equally emerge from the routine misanthropism that seems to be such a characteristic part of the public transport experience.(9) Coexistence; being-with others is an integral aspect of railway travel. Yet dwelling within the transient community that characterises spaces of public transport is arguably something that we need to understand better. Whilst it might be easy to suggest that, since passengers are united in their motivation to travel from A to B, travelling on public transport constitutes a common experience, such an instrumental characterisation obscures the diversity that is shot through the passenger body criss-crossed with multiple expectancy, use of travel time, rationale, thresholds, and so on. As such, aspirations of positive belonging motivated by assumptions of unity, agreement, and common-being (for example, see Mackenzie and Dalby, 2003) are inherently unsatisfactory. Following from Nancy's (1991) discussion of the ``inoperative community'', Welsh and Panelli are keen to stress how the collective of community should valorise ``togetherness'' over ``sameness'' as ``community cannot be a construction but is the event-of-being-with, or that which constitutes being'' (2007, page 351). In part, this might be about recognising the fluid relations that passengers have with the transient community of the railway carriage: specifically, an oscillation between the need to be part of a community, perhaps during the event of a delay, and the ``surprise and satisfaction when relative independence from community is reaffirmed'' (Panelli and Welch, 2005, page 1608). But this invokes the illusion of an individual, reflexive passenger with a capacity for responsibility; to ``act autonomously according to conscience'' (Diprose, 2008, page 619). Yet, as this paper has described, a greater attention to affective modulations and their force that transcend the individual takes the onus of responsibility and primary ethical agency away from individual passengers towards a more collective rendering of responsibility that envelops humans and non-humans within the emergence of affective atmospheres. Here, the sociality of the railway carriage is tangled up as much with the agentive force of music players, signage, paper tickets, and seat backs, as with `individual' bodies. In this respect, the spaces of public transport present an arena for an ethics in process to emerge, rather than hostage to a prescriptive, circumscribed `morality'. Such ``a caring for belonging'' (Massumi, 2002, page 255) is visible in the light-touch gestures of generosity that flicker between passengers and objects (see also Laurier and Philo, 2006). These events of kindness, which Brennan (2004, page 124) describes as ``the refusal to pass on or transmit negative affects and the attempt to prevent the pain they cause to others'', illustrate a collective sense of conviviality, but one that operates through affective registers. But what about the injustices that are narrated through the folds of this paper? Thrift (2005) hopes for a transposition of negative affects of misanthropy to more enabling, positive affects associated with kindness and compassion.Yet I would suggest that the response to particular negative atmospheres affects associated with frustration, irritability, or angeröalso render visible a care for life and a demand to respond. Being imbricated within such affective atmospheres reveals an interest in the event. Events of being rattled, shaken, or knocked therefore contain within them an ethical potential, opening up opportunities for repair and offering a potential to redraw and negotiate the field of what might be possible. Reminiscent of Rancie©re's `politics of disagreement', the sociality of public transport is therefore a collective accomplishment. To be sure, I am certainly not condoning or valorising events of injustice and hurt. Rather I am suggesting that these spaces of negotiation are ``sites of ethical responsibility'' (Popke, 2009, page 84) with the capacity to redraw our ethical orientation, and potentially enhance our affective capacities.

#### And, we can’t go back to an age before technology—pursuing high-speed rail as a shared resource through an embrace of pluralism harnesses the revolutionary power of speed to democratic ends. Opening ourselves up to the dynamism of speed is crucial to overcome virulent nationalism, social violence, and the drumbeat of war.

Connolly 2 (William E. Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, “Neuropolitics Thinking, Culture, Speed” Theory Out of Bounds, Volume 23, University of Minnesota Press, P140-2)

Arendt fears that the late-modern acceleration of pace accentuates a dangerous nostalgia to return to the “quiet of the past,” a quiet placed in quotes because our contemporary memory of it is unavoidably inflected differently than it would have been experienced during the fugitive present when the horizon of the future was open. For the future is never what it used to be, and neither is the past. This nostalgia for a comforting image of the past expresses anxiety about the security of immortality, existential meaning, moral boundaries, explanatory confidence, and narrative closure. All these are called into question by the acceleration of pace. Arendt herself is deeply ambivalent about the condition she diagnoses. I concur in that ambivalence enough to say that without the pull of the past the horizon of the future would explode into an abyss. With it, the fundamental issues are, first, how to engage the rift and, second, how to respond thoughtfully to the acceleration of pace without falling into either a dangerous insistence upon slowing the world down to a snail’s pace or a crude celebration of high velocity per se. The challenge for those who embrace the rift is how to reconfigure the balance between past and future in a world whirling faster than heretofore. And how to respond with agonistic respect to those who do not embrace the idea of a rift in a context where neither this cosmology nor those ranged against it is soon likely to receive a definitive demonstration. The intellectual challenge is how to come to terms productively with the ambiguous relations among time, pace, freedom, plurality, and democracy. None of us may really be prepared to meet this challenge. But time is short. You might say that as the asymmetries between different zones of time widen it becomes easier to discern the rift, which, as Nietzsche, Deleuze, Prigogine, Arendt, and I contend, is constitutive of time itself. But, again, that very suspicion may tempt many into a dangerous, reactive response: into a series of familiar political movements to slow time down to conceal the rift. Such reactive drives are not too likely to grab hold effectively of the processes of capitalist invention, finance, investment, labor migration, geographic expansion, and intraterritorial colonization, even though these are preeminent forces propelling the acceleration of pace. For these processes flow through and across states in ways that make it difficult for any territorially organized entity to govern them effectively. The collapse of the Soviet Union is probably bound up in part with that state’s inability either to avoid these processes or to absorb them into its political economy without transforming it. So now resentment against the acceleration of pace becomes projected upon religious and nationalist drives to identify a series of vulnerable constituencies as paradigmatic enemies of territorial culture, traditional morality, unified politics, and Christian civilization. The atheist, the postmodernist, the gay, the prostitute, the Democracy and Time 146,7 Jew, the media, the nomadic Indian, and the Gypsy have all been defined as paradigmatic agents of restlessness, nomadism, superficial fashion, immorality, and danger by defenders of close integration among political territory, religious unity, and moral monism. Such definitions displace upon vulnerable constituencies anxiety about the pace of life and the rift in time. The underlying enemy is speed and uncertainty, but it is difficult to grab hold of the capitalist systems in which these processes are set. The hopeful thing is how many contemporary Christians, in the name of Christian love, join others in resisting and transcending these ugly equations. When Wolin’s presentation of the acceleration of pace in several zones of life is juxtaposed to my portrayal of the rift in time, a different picture of the contemporary condition emerges. Uneven pace across zones helps to reveal more poignantly what has always been in operation, a rift between past and future that helps to constitute the essence of time and to enter into the constitution of politics itself. It now becomes possible to come to terms with this condition in a more affirmative way. I do not think, again, that the reading of time I endorse has been proved defin- itively, nor is either it or the interpretations it contends against apt to be. But this interpretation does pose powerful challenges to those who implicitly treat one of the alternative conceptions of time as if it were undeniable. To embrace the rift is to challenge demands in contemporary social science for consummate explanation, cul- tural theory for smooth narrative, moral philosophy for thick, stable universals, and popular culture for the sufficiency of common sense. Even as efforts to slow the world down fail, they do untold harm to many constituencies striving to respond in new ways to injuries imposed upon them and new possibilities opened up before them. Perhaps the best way to proceed is to strive to modulate the fastest and most dangerous military and corporate processes while intervening politically within accelerated processes of communication, travel, population flows, and cultural intersection to support a more generous ethos of pluralism. Such a double orientation does not scrap the advantages of territorial democracy, but it does support democratic movements that extend beyond the parameters of the territorial state as well as operate within it. The challenge is how to support the positive connections among democracy, uneven zones of tempo, and the rift in time without legitimating a pace of life so fast that the promise of democracy becomes translated into fascist becoming machines.

Connolly 2 (William E. Krieger-Eisenhower Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, “Neuropolitics Thinking, Culture, Speed” Theory Out of Bounds, Volume 23, University of Minnesota Press, P178-9)

Sheldon wolin seeks to save local democracy by slowing down time. Paul Virilio lifts the issue of speed into the ether of global politics itself. It would be difficult to overstate the importance of Virilio to exploration of the effects of speed upon the late-modern condition. Everybody who engages the issue is indebted to him, even when they disagree with him profoundly. When speed accelerates, Virilio says, space is compressed. And everything else changes too: the ability to deliberate before going to war; the priority of civilian control over the military; the integrity of the territorial politics of place; the capacity to think with concepts in relation to images; the ability to escape the eye of surveillance; and so on and on. Not only does Virilio chart the multiple effects of speed, he develops an arresting vocabulary to fix these effects in our minds: the war machine, the unspecified enemy, the nonplace of speed, the negation of space, the perpetual state of emergency, the miniaturization of action, the disappearance of the present, and the integral accident. These pithy formulations encapsulate in their brevity the compression of time they represent, giving us a double dose of the phenomenon Virilio warns against. And the danger is great. Little doubt about that. If you treat the war machine as the paradigm of speed, as Virilio does, it seems that sometime during the 1960s the ability to deliberate democratically about military action was jeopardized by the imperative to automatize split-second responses to preemptive strikes a minute or less away from their targets. My concern, nonetheless, is that Virilio allows the military paradigm to overwhelm all other modalities and experiences of speed. Virilio remains transfixed by a model of politics insufficiently attuned to the positive role of speed in intrastate democracy and cross-state cosmopolitanism. He underplays the positive role speed can play in ventilating dogmatic identities in the domains of religion, sensuality, ethnicity, gender, and nationality. And he remains so sunk in the memory of the territorial nation as the place of democratic deliberation that he too quickly dismisses the productive possibilities (I do not say probabilities) of cosmopolitanism in the late-modern time. Let’s listen to some moves in Virilio’s presentation of the correspondences between speed, temporality, territory, democratic deliberation, nation- hood, and belonging. The speed of the political decision depends on the sophistication of the vectors: how to transport the bomb? how fast? The bomb is political . . . not because of an explosion that should never happen, but because it is the ultimate form of political surveillance. Social conflicts arise from rivalries between those who occupy and preserve an eco-system as the place that specifies them as a family or group, and that therefore deserves every sacrifice, including sudden death. For “if to be is to inhabit,’ not to inhabit is no longer to exist. Sudden death is preferable to the slow death . . . of the man deprived of a specific place and thus of his identity. Contraction in time, the disappearance of the territorial space, after that of the fortified city and armor, leads to a situation in which the notions of “before” and “after” designate only the future and the past in a form of war that causes the “present” to disappear in the instantaneousness of decision. “Unlike cinema,” Hitchcock said, “with television there is no time for suspense, you can only have surprise.” This is . . . the paradoxical logic of the videoframe which privileges the accident, the surprise, over the durable substance of the message. In the first instance, it [war] involves the elimination of the appearance of the facts, the continuation of what Kipling meant when he said: “Truth is the first casualty of war.” Here again it is less a matter of introducing some maneuver . . . than with the obliteration of the very principle of truth. Moral relativism has always been offensive, from time immemorial. The more speed increases the faster freedom decreases.1 But what if, as I began to argue in the last chapter, the compression of distance through speed has some of the effects Virilio records while it also supports the possibility of democratic pluralization within states and the periodic emergence of citizen cosmopolitanism across states speaking affirmatively to issues of ecology, peace, indigenous minorities, the legitimation of new identities and rights, and the better protection of old rights? Then acceleration would carry positive possibilities as well as dangers. And a single-minded attack on its dangers would forfeit access to its positive possibilities. Let me, then, summarize my contentions: • The contemporary accentuation of tempo in interterritorial communications, entertainment, tourism, trade, and population migration exposes more constituencies more actively to the comparative particularity and contestability of faiths and identities they may heretofore have taken to be universal or incontestable. • The accentuated pace in the experiences of accident, innovation, and surprise, listed by Virilio only as a destructive effect of speed, can also function over time to disrupt closed models of nature, truth, and morality into which people so readily become encapsulated, doing so in ways that support revisions in the classical paradigms of science and more active appreciation of positive possibilities in the politics of becoming by which new identities and rights are engendered. • Virilio’s identification of the territorial nation as repository of democratic unity and of slow pace as the temporal condition of national deliberation deprecates pursuit of a more expansive ethos of multidimensional pluralism that speaks to diversities, both submerged and visible, already extant on most politically organized territories. Speed is dangerous. A military culture organized around missiles accentuates danger and compresses the time in which to respond to it. At a certain point of acceleration speed in other domains also jeopardizes freedom and shortens the time in which to engage ecological issues. But, as already suggested in the last chapter, the crawl of slow time contains significant injuries, dangers, and repressive tendencies too. Speed is therefore profoundly ambiguous. The positive possibilities in this ambiguity are lost to those who experience its effects only through nostalgia for a fictive time when a slow pace, the centered nation, the security of eternal truth, the experience of nature as purposive organism or set of timeless laws, and the solidity of thick moral universals governed experience of the world and enabled democratic deliberation. Today, ironically, the most virulent attempts to slow things down now take the form of national and religious fundamentalisms that deploy media sound bites and military campaigns of ethnic cleansing to return to a slow, centered world. Indeed, the ambiguity of speed finds its most salient manifestation in the paradoxical contest taking place in our souls, our states, and our interstate actions between the pluralization of public cultures and their fundamentalization. Fundamentalism is the shape the desire for a slow, centered world takes when its temporal conditions of possibility are absent. The drives to pluralize and to fundamentalize culture form, therefore, two contending responses to late-modern acceleration. Each propensity intensifies under the same temporal conditions. And that struggle goes on within us as well as between us. As that contest proceeds it also becomes clear why democratic pluralists must embrace the positive potentialities of speed while working to attenuate its most dangerous effects. We explored these issues in chapter 6 primarily within the compass of the territorial state. We turn now to that dimension of citizen politics that reaches across states.

#### And democratic speed is crucial to rethinking political community beyond the narrow confines of the present. Resistance to the radical newness of a comprehensive high-speed rail program and the reorganization of technology and space it would bring is symptomatic of an anxious fear of the future. The fantasy of a static identity projected through linear time for all eternity is the first casualty of democratic speed.

Glezos 2011 (Simon, PhD in Poli Sci from Johns Hopkins, Professor at the University of Regina, Contemporary Political Theory, 10.2, 147)

There is more at stake here than just a pedantic act of reclassification. This speaks to the central problem with the liberal narrative of speed. According to the liberal narrative of speed, the job of political governance is to maintain the stability of a political community by extending the present as far as possible into the future. It seeks not just the continued survival of its citizens, but the continuity through time of a certain way of life, of the identity of a political community.

This is by no means a tendency unique to liberalism. Most, if not all forms of political community engage in processes of projecting a narrative of identity into the future. However, it is important to understand that this is not a practice that liberalism escapes. Instead, this process of teleological projection is inflected with liberalism’s particular ideals and principles. Thus we see Locke’s constitutions that should last forever, Mill’s slow convergence of all nations towards liberal democratic government (1998), even Francis Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ hypothesis (1992), not to mention specific national liberal projects, such as America’s narrative of itself as the ‘city upon a hill’. Liberalism is just as bound up in projecting the identity of a political community into the future as any other. In the context of such a project, the future (as open futurity) must be seen as a threat, and therefore something to be, at least, contained, and, at most, suppressed. The temporal assumptions of the liberal narrative generate a generic hostility to the newness of the future.

This hostility to the new consists of more than the natural annoyance or anger people feel when their plans are upset. Speed is not simply to be understood in terms of the unexpected. Rather it must be understood in terms of an open futurity; an ateleological futurity, the breakdown of the linear progression of time. Speed makes us aware of what William Connolly calls a ‘rift in time’. This is,

“A rift as constitutive of time itself, in which time flows into a future neither fully determined by a discernible past y nor directed by an intrinsic purpose pulling it along. Free time. Or, better, time as becoming, replete with the dangers and possibilities attached to such a world. (2002, p. 144)

This rift in time makes the absolute linear narration of political life untenable. The notion of a ‘rift in time’, and experiences of radical newness, do not just challenge the validity of a particular narrative. Instead they challenge the very possibility of this kind of teleological narrative of a mechanical unfolding of time. The awareness of the rift in time which speed brings produces what Rosa calls the ‘‘‘de-temporalization of life’’ where life is no longer planned along a line that stretches from the past into the future’ (Rosa, 2003, p. 19). In doing so, the rift functions as an existential threat to a community’s self- understanding. Connolly says ‘Attention to the rift y sow(s) anxiety in those who seek closure in y territorial conceptions of politics and ethical sensibilities’ (2002, p. 146). Speed is one of the vectors that can force attention to the rift. And a generalized social acceleration means many more such experiences of speed, and hence more moments of anxiety (Rosa, 2003, p. 19). Speed puts pressure on the universals and implicit teleologies of liberalism and thus challenges its sense of identity. Connolly continues by saying ‘When the tempo of life accelerates it now takes more political work to protect the assumption that the identities layered into us conform to a universal model commanded by a god or decreed by nature’ (2002, p. 158). This anxiety, this sense of existential crisis, can crystallize into what Nietzsche terms ressentiment, a reactive cultural dynamic which is unable to come to terms with a temporality which seems unresponsive to the demand for universal norms and a teleological narrative of political identity. This ressentiment against an open future – against an ateleological future – then expresses itself through an

attempt to impose a telos on the future.

#### Finally, the incessant regeneration of the present political order only happens through mass violence. We reinvest in the neoliberal order because of the promise of security and freedom in the face of anxiety produced by social acceleration. In practice, the embrace of these abstract ideals means the constant and global rooting out and killing of racially and sexually aberrant others who threaten our closed community’s homogenous identity. Moving from the isolation of neoliberal transportation to the proximity of public means embracing shared space and the ethical possibility of unpredictable relations. Vote affirmative to risk the encounter with the other and refuse to resolve our insecurity through violence.

Agathangelou et al. 2008 (Anna, Associate Professor of Politics at York University, “Intimate Investments: Homonormativity, Global Lockdown and the Seductions of Empire,” Radical History Review, 100, p.120)

In this essay, we wish to follow Sudbury in expanding analyses of “global lock- down” to “other spaces of confinement” to account for the affective economies of the diffuse networks of punishment, mass warehousing, and criminalization that come to constitute overlapping carceral landscapes.11 By “affective economies,” we refer to the circulation and mobilization of feelings of desire, pleasure, fear, and repulsion utilized to seduce all of us into the fold of the state — the various ways in which we become invested emotionally, libidinally, and erotically in global capitalism’s mirages of safety and inclusion. We refer to this as a process of seduction to violence that proceeds through false promises of an end to oppression and pain. It is precisely these affective economies that are playing out as gay and lesbian leaders celebrate their own newfound equality only through the naturalization of those who truly belong in the grasp of state captivity, those whose civic redemption from the category of the sodomite or the criminal has not been promised/offered (which one, it might not matter . . .) by the Supreme Court. It is precisely the aforementioned “good feeling” strategically deployed through homonormativization — mobilizations that barely mask the bloody, violent consequences of neoliberal privatization, the mass warehousing and liquidation of mostly brown and black bodies, and of imperial(ist) war—that we wish to locate alongside the pleasure and glee that we were all com- pelled to perform in the wake of Saddam Hussein’s execution. It is this circulation of desire and relief continually shored up in support of the relentless lockdown and torture of prisoners in both declared and nondeclared sites of global war.

To (re)consolidate itself, empire requires and solicits the production of certain ways of being, desiring, and knowing (while destroying others) that are appropriately malleable for what comes to be constituted as the so-called new world order.12 Just as the strategies of execution and criminalization are crucial to the practices of global war, including prisons, this strategy of creating and liquidating enemies is offered, quite importantly in the wake of trauma, as a solution for fear and insecurity. In other words, as the imperial hold grows all the more tenuous, more and more violence is required to maintain its virulent mirage.13 To deal with pain, fear, and insecurity, this logic tells us, the demonization and demolition of the racially and sexually aberrant other must be performed again and again.14 Moreover, within this imperial fantasy, this production, consumption, and murder of the other is to be performed with gusto and state-sanctioned pleasure, as a desire for witnessing executions becomes a performance of state loyalty.15 Likewise, in the case of prisons, it is the continual and powerful mobilization of discourses of “protection,” “safety,” and “victim’s rights” that elicit support for what seems to be limitless prison expansion.16 Lastly, it is our argument that this promise project is always reliant on a series of (non)promises to those on whom the entire production is staged. Offering certain classes of subjects a tenuous invitation into the folds of empire, there are always the bodies of (non)subjects that serve as the raw material for this process, those whose quotidian deaths become the grounding on which spectacularized murder becomes possible. Thus, while it is central to our thesis that the sexualized production of the racialized other holds together these ostensibly different moments, this is a variegated and heterogeneous process that simultaneously creates others as mono- lithic and draws up and exacerbates internal divisions within different communities. There are, thus, the “enemy Others” and the “other Others” whose life and death do not even merit mention or attention.