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Impact Defense:

\*\*AT: Middle East\*\*

AT: Middle East Wars

Middle East wars don’t escalate – historically & regional armies aren’t able to mount offensives.

Yglesias, 2007

[Matthew Yglesias is an Associate Editor of The Atlantic Monthly, “Containing Iraq,” The Atlantic, 12 Sep 2007, http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2007/09/containing\_iraq.php]

Kevin Drum tries to [throw some water](http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2007_09/012050.php) on the "Middle East in Flames" theory holding that American withdrawal from Iraq will lead not only to a short-term intensification of fighting in Iraq, but also to some kind of broader regional conflagration. Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, as usual sensible but several clicks to my right, also [make this point briefly](http://www.democracyjournal.org/article.php?ID=6555) in Democracy: "Talk that Iraq’s troubles will trigger a regional war is overblown; none of the half-dozen civil wars the Middle East has witnessed over the past half-century led to a regional conflagration." Als

o worth mentioning in this context is the basic point that the Iranian and Syrian militaries just aren't able to conduct meaningful offensive military operations. The Saudi, Kuwait, and Jordanian militaries are even worse. The IDF has plenty of Arabs to fight closer to home. What you're looking at, realistically, is that our allies in Kurdistan might provide safe harbor to PKK guerillas, thus prompting our allies in Turkey to mount some cross-border military strikes against the PKK or possibly retaliatory ones against other Kurdish targets. This is a real problem, but it's obviously not a problem that's mitigated by having the US Army try to act as the Baghdad Police Department or sending US Marines to wander around the desert hunting a [possibly mythical](http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2007/0710.tilghman.html) terrorist organization.

No risk of Middle East war.

Susan Maloney and Ray Takeyh, 6/28/2007. Senior fellow for Middle East Policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Studies at the Brookings Institution and senior fellow for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. “Why the Iraq War Won’t Engulf the Mideast,” International Herald Tribune, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0628iraq\_maloney.aspx.

Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

No global escalation

Gwynne Dyer, December 2002. Ph.D. in Military and Middle Eastern History from the University of London and former professor at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and Oxford University. “The Coming War,” Queen’s Quarterly, Questia.

All of this indicates an extremely dangerous situation, with many variables that are impossible to assess fully. But there is one comforting reality here: this will not become World War III. Not long ago, wars in the Middle East always went to the brink very quickly, with the Americans and Soviets deeply involved on opposite sides, bristling their nuclear weapons at one another. And for quite some time we lived on the brink of oblivion. But that is over. World War III has been cancelled, and I don't think we could pump it up again no matter how hard we tried. The connections that once tied Middle Eastern confrontations to a global confrontation involving tens of thousands of nuclear weapons have all been undone. The East-West Cold War is finished. The truly dangerous powers in the world today are the industrialized countries in general. We are the ones with the resources and the technology to churn out weapons of mass destruction like sausages. But the good news is: we are out of the business.

AT: Middle East Wars

Middle East wars don’t escalate – your evidence is media bias

Luttwak, 2007

[Edward Luttwak, CSIS senior associate and has served as a consultant to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force, and a number of allied governments as well as international corporations and financial institutions, “The middle of nowhere,” Prospect, May 2007, www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article\_details.php?id=9302]

Why are middle east experts so unfailingly wrong? The lesson of history is that men never learn from history, but middle east experts, like the rest of us, should at least learn from their past mistakes. Instead, they just keep repeating them. The first mistake is "five minutes to midnight" catastrophism. The late King Hussein of Jordan was the undisputed master of this genre. Wearing his gravest aspect, he would warn us that with patience finally exhausted the Arab-Israeli conflict was about to explode, that all past conflicts would be dwarfed by what was about to happen unless, unless… And then came the remedy—usually something rather tame when compared with the immense catastrophe predicted, such as resuming this or that stalled negotiation, or getting an American envoy to the scene to make the usual promises to the Palestinians and apply the usual pressures on Israel. We read versions of the standard King Hussein speech in countless newspaper columns, hear identical invocations in the grindingly repetitive radio and television appearances of the usual middle east experts, and are now faced with Hussein's son Abdullah periodically repeating his father's speech almost verbatim. What actually happens at each of these "moments of truth"—and we may be approaching another one—is nothing much; only the same old cyclical conflict which always restarts when peace is about to break out, and always dampens down when the violence becomes intense enough. The ease of filming and reporting out of safe and comfortable Israeli hotels inflates the media coverage of every minor affray. But humanitarians should note that the dead from Jewish-Palestinian fighting since 1921 amount to fewer than 100,000—about as many as are killed in a season of conflict in Darfur.

AT: Middle East Wars

THE RISK OF ANYTHING HAPPENING IS EXCEPTIONALLY LOW

**LAYNE** (Professor of Political Science @ Texas A&M) **2007**

[Christopher, American Empire: A Debate , P. 79-80 //

The same architects of illusion who fulminated for war with Iraq now are agitating for war with Iran. If Iran gets nuclear weapons they say, three bad things could happen: it could trigger a nuclear arms race in the Middle East; it might supply nuclear weapons to terrorists; and Tehran could use its nuclear weapons to blackmail other states in the region or to engage in aggression. Each of these scenarios, however, is improbable in the extreme. During the early 1960s, American policy-makers had similar fears that China's acqui- sition of nuclear weapons would trigger a proliferation stampede, But these fears did not materialize-and a nuclear Iran will not touch off a proliferation snowball in the Middle East. Israel, of course, already is a nuclear power (as is Pakistan, another regional power). The other three states that might be tempted to go for a nuclear weapons capability are Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. As MIT professor Barry Posen points out, however, each of these three states would be under strong pressure not do to so.84 Egypt is particu- larly vulnerable to outside pressure to refrain from going nuclear because its shaky economy depends on foreign-especially U.S-economic assistance. Saudi Arabia would find it hard to purchase nuclear weapons or material on the black market-which is closely watched by the United States-and, Posen notes, it would take the Saudis years to develop the industrial and engineering capabilities to develop nuclear weapons indigenously. Turkey is constrained by its membership in NATO and its quest to be admitted to membership of the European Union.

Korea War

\*\*AT: Korean Penninsula\*\*

AT: Korean War

No impact – a war on the Korean peninsula would involve few casualties and would be a decisive us victory

Orcutt, ‘4

[Daniel J. Orcutt, US Air Force, White House Fellow, Carrot, Stick, or Sledgehammer: US Policy Options for North Korean Nuclear Weapons, August 2004, http://www.nti.org/e\_research/official\_docs/other\_us/INSSAugust.pdf]

**However,** the lethality of modern weapons and the **US military’s** ability to limit collateral damage has caused **some**military experts **such as retired Air Force Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney** to argue that **although** a second Korean war would **cause significant damage, it would** not be nearly as bad as some **experts** predict**. In an August 2003 Wall Street Journal opinion article, former Central Intelligence Agency Director James Woolsey and retired Lieutenant General McInerney proposed that military force is a viable option for resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis and that, in fact,** “North Korea could be defeated decisively in thirty to sixty days**.”139 They proposed that the muchdiscussed 11,000 artillery pieces, of which half can target Seoul, could be destroyed or sealed in their hardened facilities with the combination of stealth and precision-guided munitions. Citing the available infrastructure in Northeast Asia and the access to North Korean targets from the sea, they view airpower as decisive with the possibility of generating and employing, “around 4,000 sorties a day compared to 800 a day that were so effective in Iraq.”140 In addition, the** threat of Marine **Corps amphibious** assault on both coasts of North Korea could place both Pyongyang and Wonsan at risk of rapid seizure**, especially since North Korea’s army mainly rests along the demilitarized zone.141 Recently, changes have occurred in both US military assets on the peninsula and the strategy by which to engage North Korean troops. According to an April 2004 Aviation Week & Space Technology article, US military planners in Korea are attempting to take advantage of improved assets such as AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopters, GPS-guided munitions, Shadow 200 unmanned aircraft, and PAC-3 ballistic missile interceptors.142 The current Seventh Air Force Commander, Lieutenant General Trexler, who is responsible for planning and executing the air campaign in the Korean theater, commented as follows: There is a shift happening.** The improved equipment gives us a capability to attack these enemy forces very quickly and prevent **some of the** mass casualties**.143 He went on to indicate that Korea “always has to be looked at differently” from operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, not only because of North Korea’s massive army, but also because North Korean artillery can, “rain havoc on a very large civilian population.”144**

North Korean war won’t escalate or go nuclear

Meyer ‘03

[Carlton, Editor – G2 Military, “The Mythical North Korean Threat”, http://www.g2mil.com/korea.htm]

Even if North Korea employs a few crude nuclear weapons, using them would be suicidal since it would invite instant retaliation from the United States.  North Korea lacks the technical know-how to build an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, despite the hopes and lies from the National Missile Defense proponents in the USA.  North Korea's industrial production is almost zero, over two million people have starved in recent years, and millions of homeless nomads threaten internal revolution. The US military ignores this reality and retains old plans for the deployment of 450,000 GIs to help defend South Korea, even though the superior South Korean military can halt any North Korean offensive without help from a single American soldier. American forces are not even required for a counter-offensive.  A North Korean attack would stall after a few intense days and South Korean forces would soon be in position to overrun North Korea. American air and naval power along with logistical and intelligence support would ensure the rapid collapse of the North Korean army.

AT: Korean War

Korean conflict extremely unlikely

Meyer ‘03

[Carlton, Editor – G2 Military, “The Mythical North Korean Threat”, http://www.g2mil.com/korea.htm]

The chance of a Korean war is extremely unlikely.  North Korean leaders realize they have no hope of success without major backing from China or Russia.  The previous South Korean President, Kim Dae Jung, encouraged peace and visited North Korea.  The two countries are reconnecting rail lines and sent a combined team to the Olympics.  Even the United States is providing $500 million dollars a year in food to the starving North Koreans.  The new South Korean President, Roh-Moo-hyun was elected on a peace platform and suggested US troops may be gone within ten years.

AT: Korean Instability – Alt Causality

Poverty is the root cause of a lack of security on the korean peninsula

AP, ‘7

The Associated Press in Jan 03, 2007 (Quals: SEOUL , Source: Taipei Times (http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2007/01/03/2003343181), Title: , AB)

South Korea's minister in charge of reconciliation with the North said yesterday that security on the divided peninsula would not improve until the issue of poverty in North Korea was addressed. Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung also said that the South should take responsibility for addressing the problem, hinting at the possibility that Seoul could resume a suspension of its aid to the North. Lee said in a New Year's message delivered to ministry officials: **"**As long as the North's poverty problem is not fundamentally addressed, security on the Korean peninsula will always be precarious and peace will not be guaranteed." Lee also said that the North should understand that resolving its poverty problem through cooperation with the South, not through pursuing nuclear weapons, would ensure the country's security. North Korea is one of the poorest countries in the world. It has relied on foreign assistance to feed its population of 23 million since a combination of natural disasters and mismanagement devastated its economy in the mid-1990s. Nonetheless, Pyongyang persistently sought nuclear weapons programs and carried out its first atomic test on Oct. 9.

AT: Korean War – A2: N. Korea Invades S. Korea

North Korea won’t invade South Korea – outdated tanks, lack of troop wartime experience, & can’t sustain an offensive

Kaplan, ‘3

[Fred Kaplan, “Backing Off the DMZ,” Slate, June 9, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2084177]

There's something to this argument, but the case is actually much stronger than the Pentagon is letting on. First, no matter how nutty Kim Jong-il might be, the odds are slim to zero that he will decide, one day, out of the blue, to invade South Korea. He may have a million-man army, half of it near the border. But most of the country's tanks date back to the Korean War (yes, they're 50 years old), its troops haven't fought.

\*\*\*Terrorism\*\*\*

\*\*AT: Terrorism – General\*\*

1NC: Terrorism

Terrorism support is falling now – the impact is non unique

**Mack**, Andrew **08**. (ex Official for the UN and currently lives in England. Often reports for BBC and gives interviews. http://www.bbc.co.uk/)

But the report still found a growing number of incidents. It reported 14,499 terrorist attacks in 2007, half of which led to at least one death (with a total of 22,000 deaths). Meanwhile, the Human Security Brief argues there has been a 40% decline in fatalities from terrorism. It does this by challenging the figures used by other counts, particularly when it comes to Iraq, questioning whether violent deaths of civilians in Iraq are really due to terrorism or instead due to a civil war, and if the latter, then why other civil wars - for instance in Sudan or Congo - do not have their fatalities included in count Removing Iraq does makes a significant difference. The Human Security Brief also argues that if you include civilian casualties, but look at the latter half of 2007, then there is a decline. The second argument against pessimism from the Human Security Brief is that al-Qaeda is becoming less popular. There is evidence that in Muslim countries which have been affected by al-Qaeda's terrorism, the organization has become notably less popular - for instance in Saudi Arabia since 2003. And in Iraq, Sunni insurgents have turned against al-Qaeda in Iraq. The brief also points out declining support for attacks on civilians in some Islamic countries and points to polls which show dramatic falls in support for Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan. This, though, is partly a reaction to the violence that has moved from the tribal areas of Pakistan into the heart of the country.

Terror threat overblown—more likely to be killed by a comet

John **Mueller**, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?” FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 85 n. 5, September/October 20**05**, p. 2+.

But while keeping such potential dangers in mind, it is worth remembering that the total number of people killed since 9/11 by al Qaeda or al Qaeda­like operatives outside of Afghanistan and Iraq is not much higher than the number who drown in bathtubs in the United States in a single year, and that the lifetime chance of an American being killed by international terrorism is about one in 80,000 -- about the same chance of being killed by a comet or a meteor. Even if there were a 9/11-scale attack every three months for the next five years, the likelihood that an individual American would number among the dead would be two hundredths of a percent (or one in 5,000).

Although it remains heretical to say so, the evidence so far suggests that fears of the omnipotent terrorist -- reminiscent of those inspired by images of the 20-foot-tall Japanese after Pearl Harbor or the 20-foot-tall Communists at various points in the Cold War (particularly after Sputnik) -- may have been overblown, the threat presented within the United States by al Qaeda greatly exaggerated. The massive and expensive homeland security apparatus erected since 9/11 may be persecuting some, spying on many, inconveniencing most, and taxing all to defend the United States against an enemy that scarcely exists.

JIHADISTS HAVE ABANDONED VIOLENCE—DON’T WANT TO ATTACK

John **Mueller**, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?” FOREIGN AFFAIRS v. 85 n. 5, September/October 20**05**, p. 2+.

The results of policing activity overseas suggest that the absence of results in the United States has less to do with terrorists' cleverness or with investigative incompetence than with the possibility that few, if any, terrorists exist in the country. It also suggests that al Qaeda's ubiquity and capacity to do damage may have, as with so many perceived threats, been exaggerated. Just because some terrorists may wish to do great harm does not mean that they are able to.Gerges argues that mainstream Islamists -- who make up the vast majority of the Islamist political movement -- gave up on the use of force before 9/11, except perhaps against Israel, and that the jihadists still committed to violence constitute a tiny minority. Even this small group primarily focuses on various "infidel" Muslim regimes and considers jihadists who carry out violence against the "far enemy" -- mainly Europe and the United States -- to be irresponsible, reckless adventurers who endanger the survival of the whole movement. In this view, 9/11 was a sign of al Qaeda's desperation, isolation, fragmentation, and decline, not of its strength.

1NC: Terrorism

The probability of terrorism is low.

**Eland ’07** [Ivan, Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at the Independent Institute, Ph.D in national security policy, former Director of Defense policy studies at CATO and spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, March 19, http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1944]

The Bush administration, desperate for justifications to buy a little more time with the American people for its failed adventure in Iraq, markets the idea that if the United States rapidly withdraws from Iraq, the “terrorists will follow us home.” A closer examination of this assertion—like the rest of the administration’s fear mongering—demonstrates it is baseless. U.S. State Department statistics show that historically, North America has had the lowest incidence of terrorism worldwide. The American public’s shocked reaction to the catastrophic 9/11 attacks was due, in part, to the infrequency of past terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. After the unique events of 9/11, terrorism in North America has resumed its historical modest trajectory. North America has been a relative safe haven from terrorism for several reasons. The United States is far away from the world’s centers of conflict. Although the United States is roundly hated in the world because of its unneeded meddling in faraway conflicts, most anti–U.S. terrorism is perpetrated on U.S. embassies and military facilities overseas—not on the American homeland. Terrorists, like conventional armies, have trouble operating in the United States because it is so far from their normal bases of operations. In addition, the United States does not have many militant foreign populations that could provide sanctuary and support for imported terrorists of the same ilk. According to Ohio State political scientist John Mueller, the lifetime probability that international terrorists will kill any one American is a miniscule one in 80,000—about the same as the same person being killed by a comet. Of course, the chances are even lower if you are an American living in America (instead of overseas) and not residing in New York, Washington, Chicago, or Los Angeles.

Terrorists won’t undertake any more large scale operations.

MUELLER, 2006(John, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State University, “Is There Still a Terrorist Threat?: The Myth of the Omnipresent Enemy,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October)

One reason al Qaeda and "al Qaeda types" seem not to be trying very hard to repeat 9/11 may be that that dramatic act of destruction itself proved counterproductive by massively heightening concerns about terrorism around the world. No matter how much they might disagree on other issues (most notably on the war in Iraq), there is a compelling incentive for states -- even ones such as Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Syria -- to cooperate in cracking down on al Qaeda, because they know that they could easily be among its victims. The FBI may not have uncovered much of anything within the United States since 9/11, but thousands of apparent terrorists have been rounded, or rolled, up overseas with U.S. aid and encouragement. Although some Arabs and Muslims took pleasure in the suffering inflicted on 9/11 -- Schadenfreude in German, shamateh in Arabic -- the most common response among jihadists and religious nationalists was a vehement rejection of al Qaeda's strategy and methods. When Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979, there were calls for jihad everywhere in Arab and Muslim lands, and tens of thousands flocked to the country to fight the invaders. In stark contrast, when the U.S. military invaded in 2001 to topple an Islamist regime, there was, as the political scientist Fawaz Gerges points out, a "deafening silence" from the Muslim world, and only a trickle of jihadists went to fight the Americans. Other jihadists publicly blamed al Qaeda for their post-9/11 problems and held the attacks to be shortsighted and hugely miscalculated. The post-9/11 willingness of governments around the world to take on international terrorists has been much reinforced and amplified by subsequent, if scattered, terrorist activity outside the United States. Thus, a terrorist bombing in Bali in 2002 galvanized the Indonesian government into action. Extensive arrests and convictions -- including of leaders who had previously enjoyed some degree of local fame and political popularity -- seem to have severely degraded the capacity of the chief jihadist group in Indonesia, Jemaah Islamiyah. After terrorists attacked Saudis in Saudi Arabia in 2003, that country, very much for self-interested reasons, became considerably more serious about dealing with domestic terrorism; it soon clamped down on radical clerics and preachers. Some rather inept terrorist bombings in Casablanca in 2003 inspired a similarly determined crackdown by Moroccan authorities. And the 2005 bombing in Jordan of a wedding at a hotel (an unbelievably stupid target for the terrorists) succeeded mainly in outraging the Jordanians: according to a Pew poll, the percentage of the population expressing a lot of confidence in bin Laden to "do the right thing" dropped from 25 percent to less than one percent after the attack.

No Internal Link – A2: Poverty → Terrorism

Studies prove - poverty doesn't cause terrorism

Alberto, ‘6

Abardie Alberto in May 2006 (Quals: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Source: The Economics Of National Security AEA Papers And Proceedings Vol. 96 No. 2 [http://64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:aN\_Xf6uAzbAJ:ksghome.harvard.edu/~.aabadie.academic.ksg/povterr.pdf+Recent+empirical+studies,+however,+have+challenged+the+%2B+Abadie&hl=en&c, Title: Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism , AB)

However, recent empirical studies have challenged the view that poverty creates terrorism.Using U.S. State Department data on transnational terrorist attacks, Krueger and Laitin (2003) and Piazza (2004) find no evidence suggesting that poverty may generate terrorism. In particular, the results in Krueger and Laitin (2003) suggest that among countries with similar levels of civil liberties, poor countries do not generate more terrorism than rich countries. Conversely, among countries with similar levels of civil liberties, richer countries seem to be preferred targets for transnational terrorist attacks.

No connection- several examples from qualified experts

Tripathi ‘7

(Salil, “Poverty does not provoke terrorism, as three experts show”, New Statesman, July 12, lexis)

The received wisdom says terrorism is linked to poverty and that, to root out terrorism, we must eradicate poverty first. Development agencies, anti-poverty activists, the former World Bank president James Wolfensohn and politicians such as George W Bush have all called for effort to reduce poverty so that terrorism can't win. This bogus view is blown apart by the Princeton economist Alan B Krueger and Jitka Malecková of Charles University in Prague who ask, in their paper "Education, Poverty and Terrorism", first published in 2002, if there is a causal link between these things. Their conclusion: the connection, if any, is at best indirect, usually complicated, and probably quite weak. Opinion polls among Palestinians that Krueger and Malecková have pored over show strong support for attacks against Israeli targets when those polled are students, merchants and professionals. When unemployed people are interviewed, the support for terrorism declines significantly. Reacting to last month's failed plots in the UK, Krueger told the Wall Street Journal: "Each time we have one of these attacks and the backgrounds of the attackers are revealed, this should put to rest the myth that terrorists are attacking us because they are desperately poor. But this misconception doesn't die." An analysis of Hezbollah activists in Lebanon also showed that its recruits typically lived above the poverty line and had higher education. Extremist Israeli Jewish-settler members of Gush Emunim had similar profiles. So what causes terror? Nasra Hassan, a UN official, interviewed extremist Palestinian youths and in "An Arsenal of Believers" - an extraordinary essay in the New Yorker in 2001 - she listed indignity, political humiliation and desperation born out of a sense of futility as possible explanations of terrorism. Indeed, when Krueger examined 781 terrorist incidents the US state department deemed "significant", he found that the attackers were from countries with political oppression, not poverty. Some 15 of the 19 hijackers on 11 September 2001 came from wealthy families in a prosperous country - Saudi Arabia. Osama Bin Laden's background was famously opulent; his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri is an affluent paediatrician.

AT: Terrorism – A2: Kills Economy

TERRORISM DOESN’T TANK ECONOMY – RECOVERIES ARE EMPIRICALLY QUICK

Ellen Simon, AP Business Writer, Sept 4, 2006.

“Terrorism Hurts Markets, But How Much?” AP Online, lexis//mac-djw.

How much does terrorism affect stock prices? To find the answer, economists have parsed market reaction to events dating back to the 1915 sinking of the Lusitania, academics have studied how attacks on McDonald's restaurants have affected the company's stock price and researchers in Israel have chronicled what 13 years of suicide bombings did to stocks there. Their unsurprising general conclusion is that terror attacks hurt stock prices but some of the details are unexpected. For instance, after Sept. 11, 2001, the stocks in the Standard & Poor's 500 rebounded to their pre-attack prices faster than every other major world index except Japan's Nikkei, according to research by Andrew H. Chen of Southern Methodist University and Thomas F. Siems of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. What none of the research has answered is the degree to which the fear of another terrorist attack on the United States has been factored into stock prices. David Sowerby, chief market analyst, Loomis, Sayles & Co., estimates that the threat of terrorism represents a 5 percent "tether" on stocks. How did he get that number? The overhang is "more than zero, less than 10. Five seems reasonable. If I said 4, I'd be fine-tuning it too much," he said. The price-to-earnings ratio on the S&P 500 is around 17. A traditional model pegs the price-to-earnings ratio, one of the most popular methods of gauging a stock's value, to Treasury bond yields. Under that formula, the price-to-earnings ratio should be closer to 20, said David Wyss, chief economist for Standard & Poor's. What's holding prices back? "Is it terrorist attacks, distrust of earnings, expectations of a slowdown?" he said. "I don't know." Similarly, "people keep saying there's a war premium in the price of oil," said Robert Streed, portfolio manager of Northern Trust Select Equity Fund in Chicago. "People keep throwing out numbers, but I can't see any objective way they come up with those numbers." Those who say some threat of a future attack is already baked into stock prices hasten to add that another attack in the United States would still send prices lower. "We would likely see a drop in stock prices of significant proportion, but investors seem to believe there would be a subsequent recovery," said Lynn Reaser, chief economist at the investment strategies group of Bank of America.

STOCKS RECOVERY QUICKLY AFTER TERRORIST ATTACK - FASTER COMMUNICATION AND BROADER MARKET PARTICIPATION

Ellen Simon, AP Business Writer, Sept 4, 2006.

“Terrorism Hurts Markets, But How Much?” AP Online, lexis//mac-djw.

Chen and Siems tracked the Dow Jones industrial average's recovery time from events ranging from the torpedo of the passenger ship Lusitania by Germany during World War I to Hitler's invasion of France to Sept. 11. They found that while the Dow rose the day of the Oklahoma City bombing and the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Kenya, it took the index 795 trading days to recover from the invasion of France and 232 days to rebound from the attack on Pearl Harbor. They theorize that faster communication and broader market participation has led to faster stock rebounds. A study by Israeli academics of stocks and suicide bombings found that stocks in companies outside the defense sector fell 4.58 percent.

TERRORISM DOESN’T CRASH THE MARKET – SHOCKS ARE ABSORBED QUICKLY

Ellen Simon, AP Business Writer, Sept 4, 2006.

“Terrorism Hurts Markets, But How Much?” AP Online, lexis//mac-djw.

What no one seems to talk about when it comes to terrorism is the possibility of a market crash. That may be because a spate of attacks worldwide, from Madrid to Mumbai, has not caused any country's market to crash. As former Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Harvey L. Pitt testified before the House Committee on Financial Services on Sept. 26, 2001. "The markets did not give way to panic selling.They simply did what they do best: They assessed, and responded to, the crisis rationally. Unlike human beings, capital markets are capable of absorbing great shocks quickly."

AT: Terrorism – A2: Kills the Economy

The economy would be resilient to another terrorist attack.

**Goto ’04** [Shihoko, UPI Senior Business Correspondent, “Investors Upbeat Despite Terror Threats,” UPI, Aug 3, Lexis]

Such an upward trend in equities is not surprising though, according to Lieberman. "The economy is very healthy and a terrorist attack today, unlike 9/11, would not be a total shock," he argued, adding that after the attacks of September 2001, the U.S. economy was able to rebound. Moreover, Lieberman said that "the stock market of that period was hurt far more by the poorly performing economy than by the terrorist attack." Certainly, looking at Spain's growth prospects despite the train bombings in Madrid earlier this year, it could be said that the detrimental effect of terrorist attacks on the overall economy could be relatively contained. Some analysts argue too that the Homeland Security Department had raised the level of alert a number of times over the past few years, but as nothing happened in the end, it is tempting to believe that the latest alert too would not be necessary. So that allows investors to focus more on the more concrete economic data, which have been quite robust over the past few months. Indeed, significant improvements in the labor market as well as capital expenditure and consumer spending have pushed the Federal Reserve to boost interest rates once again, having kept cutting rates steadily since January 2001. The key federal funds target rate stands at 1.25 percent since June, and many economists expect the Fed to continue boosting rates gradually in light of the economic upturn. Meanwhile, should there be another terrorist attack or a situation that leads the U.S. economy to head south, investors remain confident enough that the central bank will step in and slash monetary policy accordingly as it did following the Sept. 11 strikes. Such confidence in the economic fundamentals and the ability of the Fed to steer the country's economy towards growth is also being reflected in the currency markets as well as the equities market, as the greenback steadily increases in value against both the euro and the Japanese yen over the past few weeks. That trend is continuing despite the increased risk of a potential terrorist attack on major U.S. financial institutions.

Terrorism has minimal impact on the economy – 9/11 and London prove.

**Wyss ’05** [David, Chief Economist for S&P, Jul 11, “Where Terror Hurts Less,” http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/jul2005/pi20050711\_5798\_pi077.htm]

In retrospect, even the September 11 attacks, when U.S. financial markets were closed for several days and thousands perished in the collapse of the Twin Towers, had only a modest impact on the economy and the stock market. Of course, this analysis ignores other developments that may have affected the markets at the same time, but the past suggests the London attack will only have brief repercussions for the economy and financial markets. ALL TOO FAMILIAR.  Certainly, the initial response following the London blasts was noticeable, with European markets down 3% and U.S. futures off 2%. However, by the close of trading most European markets had regained about half their losses, and the U.S. was back to no change on the day. Bond prices rose on the initial flight to safety but had given back about half their gains by the close. The rebound was quicker than in recent similar episodes, which suggests investors are getting more experienced, unfortunately, at dealing with these types of crises. This is the third major terror attack of this nature on a Western city, and the impact on the stock market has been diminishing steadily. After September 11, the U.S. market -- as measured by the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index -- plummeted 4.9% on the next day of trading (admittedly, a week after the event, because the stock exchanges were closed at first). After the March, 2004, Madrid bombings, the S&P 500 fell 1.5%. After this most recent event on July 7, it actually closed higher. The potential economic repercussion of these events is also overstated. Often, the hit occurs in the quarter the event happened or the following quarter. But within a year, real gross domestic product is usually up, often strongly.

AT: Terrorism – A2: Kills Hegemony

Terrorism doesn’t kill hegemony.

**Abou ’06** [Khaled, “The Conference of the Books,” Mar 16, http://www.understanding-islam.com/related/text.asp?type=rarticle&raid=431]

However, terrorism is not a constructive or persuasive form of resistance, but a destructive and particularly futile form of opposition. Terrorism is not a counter-culture to hegemony, rather it is the complete lack of culture. Like many expressions of desperation, it is not the assertion of a counter-moral value but the complete lack of moral value. Fundamentally, terrorism is a desperate admission of defeat and an inability to persuade.

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# \*\*AT: Nuclear Terrorism\*\*

# 1NC: Nuclear Terrorism

no risk of nuclear terror – technical and logistical hurdles like access to heu are impossible to overcome

**Mueller** 1/1/**2008** [John Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science Department of Political Science, Ohio State University. THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD Prepared for presentation at the Program on International Security Policy, University of Chicago, January 15, 2008 ]

It is essential to note, however, that making a bomb is an extraordinarily difficult task. Thus, a set of counterterrorism and nuclear experts interviewed in 2004 by Dafna Linzer for the Washington Post pointed to the "enormous technical and logistical obstacles confronting would-be nuclear terrorists, and to the fact that neither al-Qaeda nor any other group has come close to demonstrating the means to overcome them." Allison nonetheless opines that a dedicated terrorist group, al-Qaeda in particular, could get around all the problems in time and eventually steal, produce, or procure a "crude" bomb or device, one that he however acknowledges would be "large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient" (2004, 97; see also Bunn and Wier 2006, 139; Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 61). In his recent book, Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor, William Langewiesche spends a great deal of time and effort assessing the process by means of which a terrorist group could come up with a bomb. Unlike Allison, he concludes that it "remains very, very unlikely. It's a possibility, but unlikely." Also: The best information is that no one has gotten anywhere near this. I mean, if you look carefully and practically at this process, you see that it is an enormous undertaking full of risks for the would-be terrorists. And so far there is no public case, at least known, of any appreciable amount of weapons-grade HEU [highly enriched uranium] disappearing. And that's the first step. If you don't have that, you don't have anything.

Terrorists will stick with conventional weapons –trends prove

**Mueller** 1/1/**2008** [John Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science Department of Political Science, Ohio State University. THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD Prepared for presentation at the Program on International Security Policy, University of Chicago, January 15, 2008 ]

The bottom line. Keller suggests that "the best reason for thinking it won't happen is that it hasn't happened yet," and that, he worries, "is terrible logic" (2002). "Logic" aside, there is another quite good reason for thinking it won't happen: **the task is bloody difficult**. The science fiction literature, after all, has been spewing out for decades--centuries, even--a wealth of imaginative suggestions about things that might come about that somehow haven't managed to do so. We continue to wait, after all, for those menacing and now-legendary invaders from Mars. Meanwhile, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all (thus far, at least) have relied on conventional destructive methods--there hasn't even been the occasional gas bomb. In effect the terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al-Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: "Make use of that which is available...rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach" (Whitlock 2007). That is: Keep it simple, stupid. In fact, it seems to be a general historical regularity that terrorists tend to prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones (Rapoport 1999, 51; Gilmore 1999, 37; Schneier 2003, 236). Indeed, the truly notable innovation for terrorists over the last few decades has not been in qualitative improvements in ordnance at all, but rather in a more effective method for delivering it: the suicide bomber (Pape 2005, Bloom 2005).

1NC: Nuclear Terrorism

Even if they wanted to – chances of success are about 1 in 3 billion

**Mueller** 1/1/**2008** [John Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science Department of Political Science, Ohio State University. THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD Prepared for presentation at the Program on International Security Policy, University of Chicago, January 15, 2008 ]

Evaluating the likelihood Even if there is some desire for the bomb by terrorists (something assessed more fully below), fulfillment of that desire is obviously another matter. Even alarmists Bunn and Wier contend that the atomic terrorists' task "would clearly be among the most difficult types of attack to carry out" or "one of the most difficult missions a terrorist group could hope to try" (2006, 133-34, 147). But, stresses George Tenet, a terrorist atomic bomb is "possible" or "not beyond the realm of possibility" (Tenet and Harlow 2007, 266, 279). It might be useful to take a stab at estimating just how "difficult" or "not impossible" their task is, or how distant the "realm of possibility" might be. After all, lots of things are "not impossible." As I recall, there is a James Bond movie out there someplace in which Our Hero leaps from a low-flying plane or helicopter and lands unruffled in the back seat of a speeding convertible next to a bemused blonde. Although this impressive feat is "not impossible," it may not have ever been accomplished--or perhaps more importantly, ever attempted--in real life. Or it is entirely "not impossible" that a colliding meteor or comet could destroy the earth, that Vladimir Putin or the British could decide one morning to launch a few nuclear weapons at Massachusetts, George Bush could decide to bomb Hollywood, that an underwater volcano could erupt to cause a civilization-ending tidal wave, or that Osama bin Laden could convert to Judaism, declare himself to be the Messiah, and fly in a gaggle of mafioso hit men from Rome to have himself publicly crucified.20 In all this, Brodie's cautionary comment in the 1970s about the imaginative alarmists in the defense community holds as well for those in today's terrorism community, both of which are inhabited by people of a wide range of skills and sometimes of considerable imagination. All sorts of notions and propositions are churned out, and often presented for consideration with the prefatory works: "It is conceivable that..." Such words establish their own truth, for the fact that someone has conceived of whatever proposition follows is enough to establish that it is conceivable. Whether it is worth a second thought, however, is another matter (1978, 83). At any rate, experience thus far cannot be too encouraging to the would-be atomic terrorist. One group that tried, in the early 1990s, to pull off the deed was the Japanese apocalyptic group, Aum Shinrikyo. Unlike al-Qaeda, it was not under siege, and it had money, expertise, a remote and secluded haven in which to set up shop, even a private uranium mine. But it made dozens of mistakes in judgment, planning, and execution (Linzer 2004). Chagrined, it turned to biological weapons which, as it happened, didn't work either, and finally to chemical ones, resulting eventually in a somewhat botched release of sarin gas in a Tokyo subway that managed to kill a total of 12 people. Appraising the barriers. As noted earlier, most discussions of atomic terrorism deal rather piecemeal with the subject--focusing separately on individual tasks such as procuring HEU or assembling a device or transporting it. But, as the Gilmore Commission, a special advisory panel to the President and Congress, stresses, building a nuclear device capable of producing mass destruction presents "Herculean challenges" and requires that a whole series of steps be accomplished. The process requires obtaining enough fissile material, designing a weapon "that will bring that mass together in a tiny fraction of a second, before the heat from early fission blows the material apart," and figuring out some way to deliver the thing. And it emphasizes that these merely constitute "the minimum requirements." If each is not fully met, the result is not simply a less powerful weapon, but one that can't produce any significant nuclear yield at all or can't be delivered (Gilmore 1999, 31, emphasis in the original). Following this perspective, an approach that seems appropriate is to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome by a terrorist group in order to carry out the task of producing, transporting, and then successfully detonating Allison's "large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient" improvised nuclear device. Table 1 attempts to do this, and it arrays some 20 of these--all of which must be surmounted by the atomic aspirant. Actually, it would be quite possible to come up with a longer list: in the interests of keeping the catalogue of hurdles down to a reasonable number, some of the entries are actually collections of tasks and could be divided into two or three or more. For example, number 5 on the list requires that heisted highly-enriched uranium be neither a scam nor part of a sting nor of inadequate quality due to insider incompetence; but this hurdle could as readily be rendered as three separate ones. In assembling the list, I sought to make the various barriers independent, or effectively independent, from each other, although they are, of course, related in the sense that they are sequential. However, while the terrorists must locate an inadequately-secured supply of HEU to even begin the project, this discovery will have little bearing on whether they will be successful at securing an adequate quantity of the material, even though, obviously, they can't do the second task before accomplishing the first. Similarly, assembling and supplying an adequately equipped machine shop is effectively an independent task from the job of recruiting a team of scientists and technicians to work within it. Moreover, members of this group must display two qualities that, although combined in hurdle 9, are essentially independent of each other: they must be both technically skilled and absolutely loyal to the project. Assessing the probabilities. In seeking to carry out their task, would-be atomic terrorists effectively must go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do so, they are likely to find their prospects daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even dispiriting. To bias the case in their favor, one might begin by assuming that they have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of these obstacles even though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances they could successfully pull off the mission come out to be worse than one in a million, specifically they are one in 1,048,567. Indeed, the odds of surmounting even seven of the twenty hurdles at that unrealistically, even absurdly, high presumptive success rate is considerably less than one in a hundred. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion--specifically 3,486,784,401. What they would be at the (entirely realistic) level one in ten boggles the mind. One could also make specific estimates for each of the hurdles, but the cumulative probability statistics are likely to come out pretty much the same--or even smaller. For example there may be a few barriers, such as number 13, where one might plausibly conclude the terrorists' chances are better than 50/50. However, there are many in which the likelihood of success is almost certainly going to be exceedingly small--for example, numbers 4, 5, 9, and 12, and, increasingly, the (obviously) crucial number 1. Those would be the odds for a single attempt by a single group, and there could be multiple attempts by multiple groups, of course. Although Allison considers al-Qaeda to be "the most probable perpetrator" on the nuclear front (2004, 29), he is also concerned about the potential atomic exploits of other organizations such as Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah, Chechen gangsters, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and various doomsday cults (2004, 29-42).21 Putting aside the observation that few, if any, of these appear to have interest in hitting the United States except for al-Qaeda (to be discussed more fully below), the odds would remain long even with multiple attempts. If there were a hundred determined efforts over a period of time, the chance at least one of these would be successful comes in at less than one one-hundredth of one percent at the one chance in two level. At the far more realistic level of one chance in three it would be about one in 50 million. If there were 1000 dedicated attempts, presumably over several decades, the chance of success would be less than one percent at the 50/50 level and about one in 50,000 at the one in three level.22

Nuclear Terrorism ≠ Extinction

The probability of nuclear terrorism is low and it won’t cause extinction

Bulletin of Atomic Scientists ’04 [November 1, Vol. 60, #6, Lexis]

There are too many different ways in which terrorists could perpetrate some kind of nuclear attack to mention in this limited space. But keep this in mind: There have been zero cases of nuclear terrorism --neither nuclear nor radiological. There are no known cases of theft or purchase of an intact nuclear weapon, so a terrorist attack with one is more than unlikely. There has not been any documented theft of enough fissile material for a crude nuke--although there have been attempts. There has never been a dirty bomb attack. There has never been a case of nuclear plant sabotage. If there were, it would be awful--but not the end of humanity.

# AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Some State Will Give Weapons

Likelihood of a state passing on a nuclear weapons to terrorist is close to none

too risky, likely to get caught

can’t contorl where it will be detonated

nuclear states don’t even pass weapons to allied states

terrorists have too many enemies – even ME regimes are on their targets

**Mueller** 1/1/**2008** [John Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science Department of Political Science, Ohio State University. THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD Prepared for presentation at the Program on International Security Policy, University of Chicago, January 15, 2008 ]

If the prospects that terrorists might come up with a bomb are "not impossible," how close to impossible are they? Langewiesche's discussion, as well as other material, helps us assess the many ways such a quest--in his words, "an enormous undertaking full of risks"--could fail. The odds, indeed, are stacked against the terrorists, perhaps massively so. Assistance by a state A favorite fantasy of imaginative alarmists envisions that a newly nuclear country will palm off a bomb or two to friendly terrorists for delivery abroad. As Langewiesche stresses, however, this is highly improbable because there would be too much risk, even for a country led by extremists, that the ultimate source of the weapon would be discovered (2007, 20; also Kamp 1996, 33; Bunn 2006, 115; Bunn and Wier 2006, 137).6 Moreover, there is a very considerable danger the bomb and its donor would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve (including on the donor itself). It is also worth noting that, although nuclear weapons have been around now for well over half a century, no state has ever given another state--even a close ally, much less a terrorist group--a nuclear weapon (or chemical, biological, or radiological one either, for that matter) that the recipient could use independently. For example, during the Cold War, North Korea tried to acquire nuclear weapons from its close ally, China, and was firmly refused (Oberdorfer 2005; see also Pillar 2003, xxi). There could be some danger from private (or semi-private) profiteers, like the network established by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. However, its activities were rather easily penetrated by intelligence agencies (the CIA, it is very likely, had agents within the network), and the operation was abruptly closed down when it seemed to be the right time (Langewiesche 2007, 169-72). In addition, al-Qaeda--the chief demon group and one of the few terrorist groups to see value in striking the United States--is unlikely to be trusted by just about anyone.7 As Peter Bergen (2007, 19) has pointed out, the terrorist group's explicit enemies list includes not only Christians and Jews, but all Middle Eastern regimes; Muslims who don't share its views; most Western countries; the governments of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Russia; most news organizations; the United Nations; and international NGOs. Most of the time it didn't get along all that well even with its host in Afghanistan, the Taliban government (Burke 2003, 150, 164-65; Wright 2006, 230-1, 287-88; Cullison 2004).

States won’t supply terrorists with nuclear weapons.

**Cirinione ’05** [Joseph, Sr Associate at Carnegie Endowment, Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, & Public Polcy, v. 19]

Likewise, we should also not be very concerned that Iran or North Korea would intentionally transfer a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group. No country has ever given a chemical, biological, or nuclear weapon to a group they could not control. Such an action would risk the possibility that the terrorist group might use the weapon against the country of origin or that there might be blowback from radiation or diseases back into the country. Most importantly, the country still risks retaliation by any target, such as the United States, that could discern the original source of the weapon.

AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Some State Will Give Weapons

And, rogue states would fear backlash.

**Kamp ’96** [Karl, Head of Foreign and Security Policy Section of the Konrad-Adenauer, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Jul/Aug, Vol. 52, Issue 4, p. 30]

But it seems doubtful that this model of state-sponsored terrorism would be followed wholesale in the case of nuclear terrorism. There are some fairly serious impediments to a state’s willingness to sponsor nuclear terror. Given the record so far, it seems unlikely that any sponsoring state would willingly “pass along” nuclear know-how or nuclear weapons. Every country that possesses nuclear weapons attaches overriding importance to the control of its nuclear arsenal. When it comes to nuclear weapons, the relations between nuclear and non-nuclear allies – even in NATO – involve security arrangements that imply deep distrust. The security of nuclear weapons and their protection against abuse or unauthorized use have the highest priority and are guaranteed by extensive technical and organizational measures by every current member of the “nuclear club.” Would a state that achieved nuclear capability choose to put nuclear weapons into the hands of terrorists, knowing that a dangerous group could turn against its own patron? The idea that any state – “rogue nation” or not – would hand over the control of nuclear weapons to an organization of criminals or religious zealots is nearly inconceivable.

And, deterrence prevents rogue states from giving nuclear weapons to terrorists.

**Eland ’04** [Ivan, Senior Fellow @ Independent Institue, Ph.D. in national security policy from GWU, former Director of Defense Policy Studies at CATO, Jan. 28, http://www.independent.org/newsroom/article.asp?id=1256]

But some clearly undesirable governments—for example, North Korea—eventually may get nuclear weapons and the long-range missiles to deliver them to the United States. North Korea always has been a bigger WMD threat than Iraq. But the United States could rely on its world dominant nuclear arsenal to deter attacks from the small arsenals of nascent nuclear powers, rather than conducting unnecessary preventative invasions. The United States took this route when the totalitarian Soviet Union and the even more radical Maoist China were developing nuclear weapons. Deterrence has worked in the past and will most likely work in the future because the remaining destitute “rogue” states have home addresses that could be wiped off the map—albeit with massive casualties—with thousands of U.S. nuclear warheads. Moreover, even though those nations disagree with intrusive U.S. foreign policy in their regions, they have no incentive to give such costly weapons to unpredictable terrorist groups. If such assistance were discovered, the superpower might be motivated to incinerate their countries. Before the war, the president’s own CIA reported that Iraq would be unlikely to use WMD or give them to terrorists unless the United States invaded.

And, rogue states aren’t dumb – they know the threat of terrorism.

**Mueller ’06** [John, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State, Hayes Chairs of National Security Studies at Mershon Center, Ph.D from UCLA, September 1, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901facomment85501/john-mueller/is-there-still-a-terrorist-threat.html]

One reason al Qaeda and "al Qaeda types" seem not to be trying very hard to repeat 9/11 may be that that dramatic act of destruction itself proved counterproductive by massively heightening concerns about terrorism around the world. No matter how much they might disagree on other issues (most notably on the war in Iraq), there is a compelling incentive for states -- even ones such as Iran, Libya, Sudan, and Syria -- to cooperate in cracking down on al Qaeda, because they know that they could easily be among its victims. The FBI may not have uncovered much of anything within the United States since 9/11, but thousands of apparent terrorists have been rounded, or rolled, up overseas with U.S. aid and encouragement.

AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Iran Supplies

Iran is ten years away from a bomb – can’t give terrorists something they don’t have.

**Linzer ’05** [Dafna, Washington Post Staff Writer, Aug 2, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/01/AR2005080101453.html]

A major U.S. intelligence review has projected that Iran is about a decade away from manufacturing the key ingredient for a nuclear weapon, roughly doubling the previous estimate of five years, according to government sources with firsthand knowledge of the new analysis. The carefully hedged assessments, which represent consensus among U.S. intelligence agencies, contrast with forceful public statements by the White House. Administration officials have asserted, but have not offered proof, that Tehran is moving determinedly toward a nuclear arsenal. The new estimate could provide more time for diplomacy with Iran over its nuclear ambitions.

Iran won’t supply terrorists with nukes:  
a. Unconventionality

**Byman ’05** [Daniel, Director at Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/fellows/byman20050908.pdf]

Yet despite Iran's very real support for terrorism today, I contend that it is not likely to transfer chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological weapons to terrorists for three major reasons. First, providing terrorists with such unconventional weapons offers Iran few tactical advantages as these groups are able to operate effectively with existing methods and weapons. Second, Iran has become more cautious in its backing of terrorists in recent years. And third, it is highly aware that any major escalation in its support for terrorism would incur U.S. wrath and international opprobrium. In my prepared statement, I begin by reviewing how Iran has used terrorism in the past and how this has changed over the years. I then assess U.S. attempts to press Iran with regard to terrorism and why they have met with little success. I conclude by arguing that, while I believe Iranian terrorism remains a threat, Tehran is not likely to pass chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to terrorists.

b. Hesitance.

**Byman ’05** [Daniel, Director at Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University Senior Fellow, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings, http://www.brookings.edu/views/testimony/fellows/byman20050908.pdf]

The picture painted above is not pretty, but it is not hopeless either. One bright spot is that Iran’s past behavior suggests it is not likely to provide chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons to a terrorist group. Because these weapons can be devastating—or, at the very least, psychologically terrifying even when the number directly affected is low—they are far more likely to provoke escalation. In addition, these weapons are widely seen as heinous, potentially de-legitimating both the group and its state sponsor. Perhaps not surprisingly, Iran has not transferred chemical or biological weapons or agents to its proxies, despite its capability to do so. Tehran has also sought at least a degree of deniability in its use of terrorism – a reason it often works through the Lebanese Hizballah to this day when backing terrorists. As Iran expert Kenneth Pollack notes, a chemical or biological attack (to say nothing of a nuclear strike) would lead the victim to respond with full force almost immediately.17 The use of proxies or cutouts would not shield Iran from retaliation. An even better indicator of Iran’s restraint so far is its unwillingness to transfer more advanced conventional systems – ones that would provoke far less outcry than a transfer of chemical weapons – to even its close proxies such as the Lebanese Hizballah. Hizballah’s most infamous weapon, the Katyusha rocket launcher, is based on a 1940s Soviet weapons system. Nor have Iran’s proxies used man-portable surface-to-air missiles.

C. Fear of trace-back.

**Bennet ’06** [David, Boston Globe, Staff Writer for Ideas, Mar 20, http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2005/03/20/give\_nukes\_a\_chance?mode=PF]

John J. Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago and another preeminent realist thinker, describes himself as closer to Waltz than to Allison on the issue. Mearsheimer agrees with Waltz, for example, that nuclear states, no matter how ''rogue,'' are unlikely to give their weapons to terrorists. Whatever its sympathies, Mearsheimer argues, ''Iran is highly unlikely to give nuclear weapons to terrorists, in large part because they would be putting weapons into the hands of people who they ultimately did not control, and there's a reasonably good chance that they would get Iran incinerated'' if the weapon was traced back to the regime in Tehran. ''Any country that gave [nuclear weapons] to terrorists who would use them against the US,'' Mearsheimer adds, ''would disappear from the face of the earth.'

AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Pakistan Supplies

Pakistan won’t give up its nuclear material – nationalistic pride.

**Milhollin ’02** [Gary, Director of Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control in Washington, February, Commentary Magazine pg 45-49]

What about getting material from Pakistan? Its centrifuges have been turning out bomb-grade uranium since 1986, and by now there is enough for 30 to 50 nuclear weapons. As is well known, at least some of its nuclear scientists have fundamentalist leanings. Could they spirit out enough for a bomb or two? The chances are virtually nil. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are its proudest achievement. Every gram of bomb-grade uranium has been produced at the expense of the country's suffering population, and every gram is also part of a continuous manufacturing flow. When uranium leaves the centrifuges, it goes to other plants where it is refined and then to still other plants where it is made into bombs. Pakistan produces enough for about three bombs per year, which means that one bomb's worth is the result of several months' output. If any uranium went missing, it would be as if the assembly workers for Ford Explorers suddenly stopped receiving engines. Someone down the production line would be bound to ask questions, and very quickly.

Terrorists wouldn’t know how to use a Pakistani nuke.

**Linzer ’04** [Dafna, Washington Post Staff Writer, Dec. 29, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?Article\_ID=10751]

There were as many as a dozen types of nuclear weapons in the hands of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, but Russian officials have said that several kinds have since been destroyed and that the country has secured the remainder of its arsenal. The nature and scope of nuclear caches are among the most tightly held national security secrets in Russia and Pakistan. It is unclear how quickly either country could detect a theft, but experts said it would be very difficult for terrorists to figure out on their own how to work a Russian or Pakistani bomb. Newer Russian weapons, for example, are equipped with heat- and time-sensitive locking systems, known as permissive action links, that experts say would be extremely difficult to defeat without help from insiders. "You'd have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions before the weapon would allow itself to be armed, for the fuses to fall into place and then for it to allow itself to be fired," said Charles D. Ferguson, science and technology fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. "You don't get it off the shelf, enter a code and have it go off."

# AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Steal a Nuke

No way terrorists can manage to steal – and even if they did, they couldn’t set it off

**Mueller** 1/1/**2008** [John Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science Department of Political Science, Ohio State University. THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD Prepared for presentation at the Program on International Security Policy, University of Chicago, January 15, 2008 ]

Stealing or buying a bomb: loose nukes There has been a lot of worry about "loose nukes," particularly in post-Communist Russia--weapons, "suitcase bombs" in particular, that can be stolen or bought illicitly. However, when asked, Russian nuclear officials and experts on the Russian nuclear programs "adamantly deny that al Qaeda or any other terrorist group could have bought Soviet-made suitcase nukes." They further point out that the bombs, all built before 1991, are difficult to maintain and have a lifespan of one to three years after which they become "radioactive scrap metal" (Badkhen 2004). Similarly, a careful assessment of the concern conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has concluded that it is unlikely that any of these devices have actually been lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be very low or even non-existent because they require continual maintenance (2002, 4, 12; see also Smith and Hoffman 1997; Langewiesche 2007, 19). By 2007, even such alarmists at Anna Pluto and Peter Zimmerman were concluding that "It is probably true that there are no 'loose nukes', transportable nuclear weapons missing from their proper storage locations and available for purchase in some way (2007, 56). It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly, of course, Chechen ones with whom it has been waging an vicious on-and-off war for over a decade (Cameron 2004, 84). Officials there insist that all weapons have either been destroyed or are secured, and the experts polled by Linzer (2004) point out that "it would be very difficult for terrorists to figure out on their own how to work a Russian or Pakistan bomb" even if they did obtain one because even the simplest of these "has some security features that would have to be defeated before it could be used" (see also Kamp 1996, 34; Wirz and Egger 2005, 502; Langewiesche 2007, 19). One of the experts, Charles Ferguson, stresses You'd have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions before the weapon would allow itself to be armed, for the fuses to fall into place and then for it to allow itself to be fired. You don't get off the shelf, enter a code and have it go off. Moreover, continues Linzer, most bombs that could conceivably be stolen use plutonium which emits a great deal of radiation that could easily be detected by passive sensors at ports and other points of transmission. The government of Pakistan, which has been repeatedly threatened by al-Qaeda, has a similar very strong interest in controlling its nuclear weapons and material--and scientists. Notes Stephen Younger, former head of nuclear weapons research and development at Los Alamos and director of the Defense Department's Defense Threat Reduction Agency from 2001 to 2004, "regardless of what is reported in the news, all nuclear nations take the security of their weapons very seriously" (2007, 93; see also Kamp 1996, 22; Milhollin 2002, 47-48). It is conceivable that stolen bombs, even if no longer viable as weapons, would be useful for the fissile material that could be harvested from them. However, Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland's Spiez Laboratory, point out that even if a weapon is not completely destroyed when it is opened, its fissile material yield would not be adequate for a primitive design, and therefore several weapons would have to be stolen and then opened successfully (2005, 502). Moreover, those weapons use (or used) plutonium, a substance that is not only problematic to transport, but far more difficult and dangerous to work with than is highly enriched uranium.

AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Steal a Nuke

Terrorists can’t steal – empirically every attempt has failed.

**Kamp ’96** [Karl, Head of Foreign and Security Policy Section of the Konrad-Adenauer, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Jul/Aug, Vol. 52, Issue 4, p. 30]

As plausible as it may seem that terrorists would consider the threat of nuclear destruction as the ultimate means of enforcing their demands, there has never been a genuine nuclear threat. Not a single instance has occurred in which a non-governmental group or individual has come anywhere close to obtaining a nuclear weapon – whether by theft or by the construction of a “homemade” device. Every part attempt at a nuclear blackmail most of which have occurred in the United States – has been a deception or a bluff, as have been the few nuclear threats that have occurred in Europe. How can we reconcile the frequent expressions of fear of nuclear terrorism with a history in which not a single incident has occurred? One explanation may lie in the fact that fears regarding nuclear terrorism are based on several assumptions that are accepted at face value. On closer examination, the truth of these assumptions seems less obvious. If all these assumption were true, we would have to ask why terrorists do not possess nuclear explosive devices today.

AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Steal From Russia

Shipping prevents theft from Russia.

**Linzer ’04** [Dafna, Washington Post Staff Writer, Dec. 29, http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?Article\_ID=10751]

Transporting a weapon out of Russia would provide another formidable obstacle for terrorists. Most of the ready-made bombs that could be stolen would be those made with plutonium, which emits far higher levels of radiation and is therefore more easily detected by passive sensors at ports than is highly enriched uranium, or HEU.

No risk of acquiring Russian materials and there’s no threat from use.

**Frost ’03** [Robin, MA in Political Science at SFU, October, “An Assessment of the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism,” Oct, http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2003/frost.htm]

Sokov quotes Igor Valynkin, the chief of the 12th GUMO, the Main Department of the Russian Ministry of Defence tasked with handling all nuclear weapons, as saying that the devices would have had very short maintenance schedules, possibly as little as six months. If certain crucial components, such as tritium boosters, were not replaced at regular intervals the bombs would go ‘stale’ and their nuclear yield could drop to close to zero. Since the window of greatest opportunity for theft occurred in the early 1990s, if any weapons were diverted at this point they would by now have missed twenty or more services and would be at or near the end of their useful lives. Sokov argues that stories about the loss of miniature weapons “were most probably not true, and … they were generated by incomplete information or ulterior motives”. His reasons for that conclusion include the fact that “no terrorist group has used such a device or even credibly threatened its use. … Since the majority of feasible scenarios involve Chechens, and since the period of greatest risk was in the early 1990s, the inactivity of Chechens in this matter is significant. Sokov concludes that “[e]ven assuming that some portable nuclear devices were lost, it would be very difficult to use them, and it is almost certain that the features that make portable nuclear devices so dangerous (small size and full-scale nuclear explosion effects) will not be taken advantage of”[[xxii]](http://www.cda-cdai.ca/symposia/2003/frost.htm#_edn22).

# AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Create Their Own

Terrorists creating their own weapons is a joke – way to many obstacles

* access to fissile material
* construction
* transportation
* financial

**Mueller** 1/1/**2008** [John Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center Professor of Political Science Department of Political Science, Ohio State University. THE ATOMIC TERRORIST: ASSESSING THE LIKELIHOOD Prepared for presentation at the Program on International Security Policy, University of Chicago, January 15, 2008 ]

Building a bomb of one's own Since they are unlikely to be able to buy or steal a useable bomb and since they are further unlikely to have one handed off to them by an established nuclear state, terrorists would need to manufacture the device themselves. Because of the dangers and difficulties of transporting and working with plutonium, a dedicated terrorist group, it is generally agreed, would choose to try to use highly enriched uranium (Kamp 1996, 33; Keller 2002; Milhollin 2002, 46-47; Rees 2003, 44-45; Linzer 2004; Allison 2004, 96-97; Goldstein 2004, 131-32; Cameron 2004, 84; Wirz and Egger 2005, 500; Bunn and Wier 2006, 135; Langewiesche 2007, 21-23).8 The goal would be to get as much of this stuff as necessary (more than 100 pounds is required to reach critical mass) and then fashion it into an explosive.9 Most likely this would not be a bomb that can be dropped or hurled, but rather an "improvised nuclear device" (IND) that would be set off at the target by a suicidal detonation crew. The process is a daunting one, and it requires that a whole cascade of events click perfectly and in sequence. This is a key issue. Those, like Allison, who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb, argue that a terrorist group could, if often with great difficulty, surmount each obstacle--that doing so in each case is "not impossible." But it is vital to point out that while it may be "not impossible" to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them rather quickly does approach impossibility. Let us assess the problem. Procuring fissile material. To begin with, stateless groups are simply incapable of manufacturing the required fissile material for a bomb since the process requires an enormous effort on an industrial scale (Milhollin 2002, 45-46; Allison 2004; Cameron 2004, 83; Bunn and Wier 2006, 136-37; Bunn and Wier 2006, 136-37; Langewiesche 2007, 20; Perry et al. 2007). Moreover, they are unlikely to be supplied with the material by a state for the same reasons a state is unlikely to give them a workable bomb. Thus, they would need to steal or illicitly purchase this crucial material. Although there is legitimate concern that some material, particularly in Russia, may be somewhat inadequately secured (though things have improved considerably), it is under lock and key, and even sleepy, drunken guards, notes Langewiesche, will react with hostility (and noise) to a raiding party. Thieves also need to know exactly what they want and where it is, and this presumably means trusting bribed, but not necessarily dependable, insiders. And to even begin to pull off such a heist, they need to develop a highly nuanced "sense for streets" in foreign lands filled with people who are often congenitally suspicious of strangers (2007, 33-48). Corruption in some areas may provide an opportunity to buy the relevant material, but purchasers of illicit goods and services would have to pay off a host of greedy confederates, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Not only could the exchange prove to be a scam, it could also prove to be part of a sting--or become one. Although there may be disgruntled and much underpaid scientists in places like Russia, they would have to consider the costs of detection. A. Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist was once a national hero for his lead work on his country's atomic bomb. But when he was brought down for selling atomic secrets to other governments, he was placed under severe house arrest, allowed no outside communication or contact, including telephone, newspapers, or internet, and is reportedly in declining health (Langewiesche 2007, 75-76).10 Renegade Russian scientists who happen not to be national heroes could expect a punishment that would be considerably more unpleasant. Once it is noticed that some uranium is missing, the authorities would investigate the few people who might have been able to assist the thieves, and one who seems suddenly to have become prosperous is likely to arrest their attention right from the start. There is something decidedly worse than being a disgruntled Russian scientist, and that is being a dead disgruntled Russian scientist. Thus even one initially tempted by, seduced by, or sympathetic to, the blandishments of the sneaky foreign terrorists might well quickly develop second thoughts and go to the authorities. It is also relevant to note that in the last ten years or so, there have been 10 known thefts of highly enriched uranium--in total less than 16 pounds or so, far less than required for an atomic explosion. Most arrestingly, notes Linzer, "the thieves--none of whom was connected to al Qaeda--had no buyers lined up, and nearly all were caught while trying to peddle their acquisitions" (Linzer 2004; see also Cameron 2004, 83-84; Younger 2007, 87; Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 60). Though, of course, there may have been additional thefts that went undiscovered (Bunn and Wier 2006, 137; Tenet and Harlow 2007, 276-77). If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a critical mass of relevant material, they would then have to transport it hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces (Langewiesche 2007, 48-50). Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes and, for a considerable fee, opium traders (for example) might provide expert,

# AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Create Their Own

Continues…

and possibly even reliable, assistance. But the routes are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of a handful of criminal and congenitally suspicious and careful regulators (Langewiesche 2007, 54-65). If they became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of these might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money likely to be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Moreover, it is not at all clear that people engaged in the routine, if illegal, business of smuggling would necessarily be so debased that, even for considerable remuneration, they would willingly join a plot that might end up killing tens of thousands of innocent people.11 Constructing an atomic device. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would have to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, and machinists. They would have to be assembled and retained for the task while no consequential suspicions are generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. They would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course. And, in addition, they would have to be willing to risk their lives, and certainly their careers, because after their bomb was discovered, or exploded, they would likely become the targets in an intense worldwide dragnet operation facilitated by the fact that their skills would not be common ones.12 Applying jargon that emerged in the aftermath of an earlier brutal conspiracy, their names would become Mudd. More than a decade ago Allison boldly insisted that it would be "easy" for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material (Allison et Continued…. al. 1996, 12).13 Atomic scientists, perhaps laboring under the concern, in Langewiesche's words, that "a declaration of safety can at any time be proved spectacularly wrong" (2007, 49), have been comparatively restrained in cataloguing the difficulties terrorists would face in constructing a bomb. But physicists Wirz and Egger have published a paper that does so, and it concludes that the task "could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group" (2005, 501). They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint they "would most certainly be forced to redesign" (2005, 499-500). The process could take months or even a year or more (Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 62), and in distinct contrast with Allison, they stress that the work, far from being "easy," is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements "in several fields verge on the unfeasible." They conclude that "it takes much more than knowledge of the workings of nuclear weapons and access to fissile material to successfully manufacture a usable weapon" (2005, 501-2). These problems are also emphasized in an earlier report by five Los Alamos scientists: although schematic drawings showing the principles of bomb design in a qualitative way are widely available, the detailed design drawings and specifications that are essential before it is possible to plan the fabrication of actual parts are not available. The preparation of these drawings requires a large number of man-hours and the direct participation of individuals thoroughly informed in several quite distinct areas: the physical, chemical, and metallurgical properties of the various materials to be used, as well as the characteristics affecting their fabrication; neutronic properties; radiation effects, both nuclear and biological; technology concerning high explosives and/or chemical propellants; some hydrodynamics; electrical circuitry; and others (Mark et al. 1987, 58).14 Moreover, stresses physicist David Albright, the process would also require "good managers and organization people" (Keller 2002). The Los Alamos scientists additionally point out that the design and building would require a base or installation at which experiments could be carried out over many months, results could be assessed, and, as necessary, the effects of corrections or improvements could be observed in follow-on experiments. Similar considerations would apply with respect to the chemical, fabrication, and other aspects of the program (Mark et al. 1987, 64-65). Although they think the problems can be dealt with "provided adequate provisions have been made," they also stress that "there are a number of obvious potential hazards in any such operation, among them those arising in the handling of a high explosive; the possibility of inadvertently inducing a critical configuration of the fissile material at some stage in the procedure; and the chemical toxicity or radiological hazards inherent in the materials used. Failure to foresee all the needs on these points," they conclude laconically, "could bring the operation to a close" (Mark et al. 1987, 62, emphasis added; see also Pluta and Zimmerman 2006, 64). Or, as Gary Milhollin puts it, "a single mistake in design could wreck the whole project" (2002, 48). Younger has more recently made a similar argument: it would be wrong to assume that nuclear weapons are now easy to make....I am constantly amazed when self-declared "nuclear weapons experts," many of whom have never seen a real nuclear weapon, hold forth on how easy it is to make a functioning nuclear explosive....While it is true that one can obtain the general idea behind a rudimentary nuclear explosive from articles on the Internet, none of these sources has enough detail to enable the confident assembly of a real nuclear explosive (2007, 86, 88).15 Although he remains concerned that a terrorist group could buy or steal a nuclear device or be given one by an established nuclear country (2007, 93), Younger is quick to enumerate the difficulties the group would confront when trying to fabricate one on their own. He stresses that uranium is "exceptionally difficult to machine" while "plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed. Both need special machining technology that has evolved through a process of trial and error." Others contend the crudest type of bomb would be "simple and robust" and "very simple" to detonate (Bunn and Wier 2006, 140). Younger disagrees: Another challenge...is how to choose the right tolerances. "Just put a slug uranium into a gun barrel and shoot it into another slug of uranium" is one deception of how easy it is to make a nuclear explosive. However, if the gap between the barrel and the slug is too tight, then the slug may stick as it is accelerated down the barrel. If the gap is too big, then other more complex, issues may arise. All of these problems can be solved by experimentation, but this experimentation requires a level of technical resources that, until recently, few countries had. How do you measure the progress of an explosive detonation without destroying the equipment doing the measurement? How do you perform precision measurements on something that only lasts a fraction of a millionth of a second? (2007, 89) All this work would have to be carried out in utter secret, of course, even while local and international security police are likely to be on the intense prowl. "In addition to all the usual intelligence methods," note the Los Alamos scientists, "the most sensitive technical detection equipment available would be at their disposal," and effective airborne detectors used to prospect for uranium have been around for decades and "great improvement in such equipment have been realized since" (Mark et al. 1987, 60). As Milhollin presents the terrorists’ problem, "the theft of the uranium would probably be discovered soon enough, and it might be only a short matter of time before the whole world showed up on their doorstep" (2002, 48).16 Moreover, points out Langewiesche, people in the area may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals (2007, 65-69).17 In addition, the bombmakers would not be able to test the product to be sure they were on the right track (Linzer 2004; Mark et al. 1987, 64). The process of fabricating an IND requires, then, the effective recruitment of people who at once have great technical skills and will remain completely devoted to the cause. This is not an impossible task--some of the terrorists who tried to commit mayhem in Britain in 2007 had medical degrees--but it certainly vastly complicates the problem. In addition, corrupted co-conspirators, many of them foreign, must remain utterly reliable, no curious outsider must get wind of the project over the months or even years it takes to pull off, and international and local security services must be kept perpetually in the dark. Transporting and detonating the device. The finished product could weigh a ton or more (Mark et al. 1987,

# AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Create Their Own

Continues…

55, 60; Bunn and Wier 2006, 142). Encased in lead shielding to mask radioactive emissions, it would then have to be transported to, and smuggled into, the relevant country. This would presumably require trusting it to the tender mercies of the commercial transportation system, supplying a return address, and hoping that the employees and policing agencies, alerted to the dangers by news of the purloined uranium, would remain oblivious. Or the atomic terrorists could try to use established smuggling routes, an approach that, again, would require the completely reliable complicity of a considerable number of criminals. The enormous package would then have to be received by a dedicated and technically-proficient group of collaborators. For this purpose, it would be necessary earlier to have infiltrated such people into the country or else to have organized locals. In a still-secret 2005 report, the FBI allowed as how it had been unable to find a single true al-Qaeda sleeper cell anywhere in the United States after years of devoted and well-funded sleuthing (Ross 2005), something that apparently continues to be true.18 (In interesting synergy, that would be exactly the number of weapons of mass destruction uncovered by the U.S. military in Iraq over the same period.) They don’t seem to have found any since that time, either. This does not conclusively prove either that there are no such cells in the United States or that al-Qaeda is incapable of infiltrating some in when the need arises, of course. But, while absence of evidence may not be conclusive evidence of absence, it should not be taken to be evidence of existence either. And while it is conceivable that locals could be organized for the destructive enterprise, they would of necessity have to be considerably higher up on brain chain than the ones so far apprehended--higher up, for example, than those who took violent jihadist videos into a store to be duplicated or who schemed to take down the Brooklyn Bridge with a blowtorch.19 The IND would then have to be moved over local and unfamiliar roads by this crew to the target site in a manner that did not arouse suspicion. And, finally, at the target site, the crew, presumably suicidal, would have to set off its improvised and untested nuclear device, one that, to repeat Allison's description, would be "large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient" (2004, 97). While doing this they would have to hope, and fervently pray, that the machine shop work has been perfect, that there have been no significant shakeups in the treacherous process of transportation, and that the thing, after all this effort, doesn't prove to be a dud. Assessing the financial costs. The discussion so far has neglected to consider the financial costs of the extended operation in all its cumulating, or cascading, entirely, but these could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up, and people to pay--or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to The Cause, but the vast conspiracy requires in addition the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Alarmists Zimmerman and Lewis (2006) suggest the entire caper could be pulled off for $10 million. The conspirators would be lucky to buy off three people with such a paltry sum. Moreover, the terrorists would be required to expose their ultimate goals to at least some of the corrupted, and at that point (if not earlier) they would become potential extortion victims. They could not afford to abandon unreliable people who know their goals (though they could attempt to kill them), and such people would now enjoy essentially monopoly powers ever to escalate their price. The cost of the operation in bribes alone could easily become ten times the sum suggested by Zimmerman and Lewis. And even at that, there would be, of course, a considerable risk that those so purchased would, at an exquisitely opportune moment of their choosing, decide to take the money and run--perhaps to the authorities representing desperate governments with essentially bottomless bankrolls and an overwhelming incentive to expend resources to arrest the atomic plot and to capture or kill the scheming perpetrators.

AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Easterbrook/Retaliation

Empirically denied – by 9/11 and the anthrax letters

There’d be no retaliation to terrorism – lack of targets.

**Biddle ’05** [Stephen, Assoc Professor of National Security Studies at US Army War College, April, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB603.pdf]

For some of the threat categories in Figure 1, this imprecision is nettlesome but tolerable―the enemy actors are reasonably clear, if implicit. “Rogue states” for example, presumably include the standard list of aggressive regional powers (e.g. Baathist Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, and so on). But for others, this lack of specificity is more problematic. This is especially true for terrorism and great power competition. Terrorism, after all, is a tactic, not an enemy. Taken literally, a “war on terrorism” is closer to a “war on strategic bombing” or a “war on amphibious assault” than it is to orthodox war aims or wartime grand strategies; one normally makes war on an enemy, not a method. Nor can one simply assume that anyone who uses terrorist tactics is to be the target of American war making. “Terrorism” is a diverse tactic, used by many groups in many ways to serve many different political agendas. Many of these groups and agendas pose no immediate threat to Americans. In fact, prior to 2001, it was rare for Americans to be killed by international terrorists. The most lethal terrorist groups of 1960-97, for example, were Aum Shinrikyo, the Tamil Tigers, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA) and Islamic Jihad―none of which deliberately targeted Americans. 10 A war that encompassed literally any group using terrorist tactics would be impossibly broad, engulfing a wide range of groups posing no meaningful threat to America. Terrorism per se thus cannot be the enemy. But it is far from clear exactly who the enemy is. The administration has made some effort to delimit the problem by adding the phrase “of global reach.” This is little help, however. In a globalized world, any terrorist with an airline ticket or an internet service provider has “global reach.” Official statements do little to narrow the focus. Many suppose that the real enemy is al Qaeda, and that “terrorism” is little more than a rhetorical synonym for Osama bin Laden’s organization. Yet the administration has explicitly, and repeatedly, made clear that this is not their view. Though the details revealed to date are ambiguous, it is clear that the declaratory policy of the U.S. Government defines the enemy more broadly than just al Qaeda.

No retaliation – it’d be too hard to implement.

Howard ’04 [Colonel Russ, Former Army Chief of Staff Fellow at Harvard, “The Changing of Terrorism,” pg. 42-3]

Deterrence against non-governmental actors would be also extremely difficult to implement. For example, where exactly do you nuke Osama bin Laden if he launches a biological attack. Deterrence generally does not work against terrorists. Stateless and usually spread over wide regions or even among continents, terrorists do not represent a viable target for retaliation. The death and destruction that can be visited upon a terrorist organization in a retaliatory attack is greatly exceeded by the damage even a small terrorist cell can inflict on civilian society.

No retaliation – could be on own soil.

Bowman ’06 [Dr. Robert, Retired USAF Lt. Col., January, http://www.rmbowman.com/ssn/terror.htm]

"For one thing, we no longer have just one opponent. There are so *many* out there who hate us! Any one of them would love to nuke us; and we don’t know which one will be able to do it first. And they’re all irrational, and perfectly capable of commiting suicide. We have no idea how to deter them. After all, deterrence is based on retaliation. But if a nuke goes off in Manhattan, whom do we retaliate against? And how? Even if we find out the nationality of the perpetrator, what do we do — nuke their whole country? And what if, like Oklahoma City, it’s one of *us*??

AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Dirty Bombs

Dirty bombs require a significant amount of nuclear waste which can’t be produced.

**Milhollin ’02** [Gary, Director of Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control in Washington, February, Commentary Magazine pg 45-49]

To inflict a dangerous dose over a broad area requires spewing around large amounts of nuclear waste. The only place to get such waste would be from a reactor, and the problems with that scenario have already been demonstrated. Even if a group of terrorists could somehow procure radioactive fuel rods or any other form of highly radioactive waste, wrapping the rods around "readily available conventional high explosives," as Woodward suggested in the Post, would kill the person doing the wrapping. So would transporting such a weapon to its destination, unless the rods were heavily shielded during the entire operation (which would bring us back to the implausible scenario with the giant protective casks). The fact is that it would be a near impossibility to create, in Woodward's words, a "zone of intense radiation that could extend several city blocks."

And, there’s not enough radiation for an impact.

**Milhollin ’02** [Gary, Director of Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control in Washington, February, Commentary Magazine pg 45-49]

What options remain? Stymied in their plan to acquire a real nuclear weapon, could a determined group of terrorists at least confirm Bob Woodward's fears by manufacturing a "dirty" bomb? Such a device would be much easier to build than a warhead. Instead of producing a nuclear explosion, it would only have to disperse radioactive particles. This is a likelier bet. But there is a different problem with these devices: they do not pack much radioactive punch. A bomb that carried enough radiation to injure many people quickly would be too hot to handle. The shielding would have to be many times heavier than the radioactive element-so massive, in fact, that there would be no practical way to transport or deploy the weapon. That is why the Pentagon does not consider such devices useful on the battlefield. Nor is it easy to bring a sufficient amount of radioactivity into contact with a bomb's human targets. Lacing a high-explosive charge with nuclear waste from a hospital or laboratory, for example, would kill some people immediately from the explosion, but the only radiological effect would be an increased risk of cancer decades later. Once the area around the blast was decontaminated, it would be safer to walk through it than to be a serious smoker.

And, dirty bombs wouldn’t cause a lot of deaths.

Stein ’02 [Ben, Inside Science News, Mar 12, http://www.aip.org/isns/reports/2002/038.html]

The latest post-9/11 disaster scenario making news headlines is the "dirty bomb." The theoretical situation occurs when terrorists get hold of radioactive material from a hospital or food-irradiation plant, attach it to an explosive, and detonate the bomb in an urban area. The explosion spreads the radioactive material all over a city and exposes the population to radiation. Yet according to a health physicist, the biggest health risk from a dirty bomb would not, reassuringly, be cancer, but something more preventable: panic. A dirty bomb "would probably not lead to many, if any, cancer deaths," says Andrew Karam, radiation safety officer of the University of Rochester in Rochester, NY. But if the public receives unreliable or exaggerated information about dirty bombs, Karam worries that "the use of a radiological weapon would result in many deaths in traffic accidents as people flee the scene, and possibly stress- and anxiety-induced heart attacks."

AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2; Domestic Cells

No terror cells in the US.

**Mueller ’06** [John, Professor of Political Science at Ohio State, Hayes Chairs of National Security Studies at Mershon Center, Ph.D from UCLA, September 1, http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20060901facomment85501/john-mueller/is-there-still-a-terrorist-threat.html]

The results of policing activity overseas suggest that the absence of results in the United States has less to do with terrorists' cleverness or with investigative incompetence than with the possibility that few, if any, terrorists exist in the country. It also suggests that al Qaeda's ubiquity and capacity to do damage may have, as with so many perceived threats, been exaggerated. Just because some terrorists may wish to do great harm does not mean that they are able to.

And, the US exaggerates threats of terror cells.

**Oliphant ’07** [James, Washington Bureau Chicago Tribune, Aug 16, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-070816padilla,0,4100154.story]

It also bolsters an administration that has enjoyed relatively few high-profile successes in busting up terror cells. To date, its largest triumph has been Zacarias Moussaoui, who ended up pleading guilty to conspiracy charges in the Sept. 11, 2001 attack, and now faces life imprisonment. Beyond that and hundreds of low-grade collars for offenses such as immigration violations, the administration has been known for sounding the alarm over threats that never came to be, as much as for locking up hard-core terrorists.

AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Nuke Water

Putting plutonium in a city’s drinking water or air wouldn’t work.

**Milhollin ’02** [Gary, Director of Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control in Washington, February, Commentary Magazine pg 45-49]

What about putting plutonium into a city's drinking water, or into the air? That, too, is a possibility-but according to a 1995 study by the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, plutonium dumped into a typical city reservoir would almost entirely sink to the bottom. The little that dissolved would be greatly diluted by the volume of the water, and the people drinking it would get a smaller dose than from natural background radiation. As for plutonium in the air, if an entire kilogram of the stuff were exploded in a city the size of Munich, Germany, and if 20 percent of it became airborne in respirable particles-as with anthrax, the particles would have to be the right size to lodge in the lungs-the effect (according to the same study) would be to produce fewer than ten deaths from cancer.

AT: Nuclear Terrorism – A2: Nuke a Reactor

There would be minimal impact from an attack against a reactor.

WNA ’04 [World Nuclear Association, Worldwide Organization Researching Both Sides of nuclear Energy, Apr 8]

However, no-one has ruled out the possibility of damage within the reactor containment from such a suicide attack, though any radiological effects from this are likely to be of less consequence than the aircraft impact and fire itself. In other words it would be futile for terrorists to target a US nuclear reactor because of the assumed likelihood of multiplied effects with major radiation release along the lines of some Chernobyl scenario. In fact the containment engineering and the internal design of the vast majority of the world's reactors would preclude that scenario, whatever the damage sustained.

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# \*\*AT: Bio Terrorism\*\*

# 1NC: Bio Terrorism

Bioweapons are hard to come by and don’t cause mass casualties

**O’Neill** 8/19/**2004** [Brandan, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction” http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CA694.htm]

\*\* Rapoport is a professor of political science at University of California, Los Angeles and editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence,

Yet, as Rapoport points out, while the Aum Shinryko attack certainly had tragic consequences, it also showed up the limitations of WMD attacks in terms of causing casualties or destruction. He says that even though Aum Shinryko had 'extraordinary cover for a long time' - meaning that the Japanese authorities were nervous about monitoring the group on the grounds that it was a religious outfit - and despite the fact that it had '20 members with graduate degrees in science, significant laboratories and assets of over a billion dollars', it still did not succeed in its aim of taking hundreds or thousands of casualties, of causing mass destruction. For Rapoport this shows that such weapons are far from easy to use, especially when the groups using them must move around quickly, 'as all terrorists must do'. According to Rapoport, the most striking thing about the Aum Shinryko attack is that no one died from inhaling the sarin gas itself - in every fatal case, the individual had made contact with the liquid. He cites Parachini again, who says that the individuals killed by Aum Shinryko are the only people to have lost their lives as a result of a WMD attack by a terrorist group over the past 25 years. (There were also five deaths as a result of anthrax attacks post-9/11, but Parachini doesn't include those because the individual responsible and the motivation for those attacks remain unknown.)

Even if terrorists had biological agent they would not be able to disperse them effectively

**Smithson, 2005**. (Amy E., PhD, is a the project director for biological weapons at the Henry L. Stimson Center. “Likelihood of Terrorists Acquiring and Using Chemical or Biological Weapons”. http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?SN=CB2001121259]

Terrorists cannot count on just filling the delivery system with agent, pointing the device, and flipping the switch to activate it. Facets that must be deciphered include the concentration of agent in the delivery system, the ways in which the delivery system degrades the potency of the agent, and the right dosage to incapacitate or kill human or animal targets. For open-air delivery, the meteorological conditions must be taken into account. Biological agents have extreme sensitivity to sunlight, humidity, pollutants in the atmosphere, temperature, and even exposure to oxygen, all of which can kill the microbes. Biological agents can be dispersed in either dry or wet forms. Using a dry agent can boost effectiveness because drying and milling the agent can make the particles very fine, a key factor since particles must range between 1 to 10 ten microns, ideally to 1 to 5, to be breathed into the lungs. Drying an agent, however, is done through a complex and challenging process that requires a sophistication of equipment and know-how that terrorist organizations are unlikely to possess. The alternative is to develop a wet slurry, which is much easier to produce but a great deal harder to disperse effectively. Wet slurries can clog sprayers and undergo mechanical stresses that can kill 95 percent or more of the microorganisms.

# 1NC: Bio Terrorism

No impact to bio weapons – they are minimally destructive

O’Neill 8/19/2004 [Brandan, “Weapons of Minimum Destruction” http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000000CA694.htm]

David C Rapoport, professor of political science at University of California, Los Angeles and editor of the Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence, has examined what he calls 'easily available evidence' relating to the historic use of chemical and biological weapons. He found something surprising - such weapons do not cause mass destruction. Indeed, whether used by states, terror groups or dispersed in industrial accidents, they tend to be far less destructive than conventional weapons. 'If we stopped speculating about things that might happen in the future and looked instead at what has happened in the past, we'd see that our fears about WMD are misplaced', he says. Yet such fears remain widespread. Post-9/11, American and British leaders have issued dire warnings about terrorists getting hold of WMD and causing mass murder and mayhem. President George W Bush has spoken of terrorists who, 'if they ever gained weapons of mass destruction', would 'kill hundreds of thousands, without hesitation and without mercy' (1). The British government has spent £28million on stockpiling millions of smallpox vaccines, even though there's no evidence that terrorists have got access to smallpox, which was eradicated as a natural disease in the 1970s and now exists only in two high-security labs in America and Russia (2). In 2002, British nurses became the first in the world to get training in how to deal with the victims of bioterrorism (3). The UK Home Office's 22-page pamphlet on how to survive a terror attack, published last month, included tips on what to do in the event of a 'chemical, biological or radiological attack' ('Move away from the immediate source of danger', it usefully advised). Spine-chilling books such as Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare, The New Face of Terrorism: Threats From Weapons of Mass Destruction and The Survival Guide: What to Do in a Biological, Chemical or Nuclear Emergency speculate over what kind of horrors WMD might wreak. TV docudramas, meanwhile, explore how Britain might cope with a smallpox assault and what would happen if London were 'dirty nuked' (4). The term 'weapons of mass destruction' refers to three types of weapons: nuclear, chemical and biological. A chemical weapon is any weapon that uses a manufactured chemical, such as sarin, mustard gas or hydrogen cyanide, to kill or injure. A biological weapon uses bacteria or viruses, such as smallpox or anthrax, to cause destruction - inducing sickness and disease as a means of undermining enemy forces or inflicting civilian casualties. We find such weapons repulsive, because of the horrible way in which the victims convulse and die - but they appear to be less 'destructive' than conventional weapons. 'We know that nukes are massively destructive, there is a lot of evidence for that', says Rapoport. But when it comes to chemical and biological weapons, 'the evidence suggests that we should call them "weapons of minimum destruction", not mass destruction', he says. Chemical weapons have most commonly been used by states, in military warfare. Rapoport explored various state uses of chemicals over the past hundred years: both sides used them in the First World War; Italy deployed chemicals against the Ethiopians in the 1930s; the Japanese used chemicals against the Chinese in the 1930s and again in the Second World War; Egypt and Libya used them in the Yemen and Chad in the postwar period; most recently, Saddam Hussein's Iraq used chemical weapons, first in the war against Iran (1980-1988) and then against its own Kurdish population at the tail-end of the Iran-Iraq war. In each instance, says Rapoport, chemical weapons were used more in desperation than from a position of strength or a desire to cause mass destruction. 'The evidence is that states rarely use them even when they have them', he has written. 'Only when a military stalemate has developed, which belligerents who have become desperate want to break, are they used.' (5) As to whether such use of chemicals was effective, Rapoport says that at best it blunted an offensive - but this very rarely, if ever, translated into a decisive strategic shift in the war, because the original stalemate continued after the chemical weapons had been deployed. He points to the example of Iraq. The Baathists used chemicals against Iran when that nasty trench-fought war had reached yet another stalemate. As Efraim Karsh argues in his paper 'The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis': 'Iraq employed [chemical weapons] only in vital segments of the front and only when it saw no other way to check Iranian offensives. Chemical weapons had a negligible impact on the war, limited to tactical rather than strategic [effects].' (6) According to Rapoport, this 'negligible' impact of chemical weapons on the direction of a war is reflected in the disparity between the numbers of casualties caused by chemicals and the numbers caused by conventional weapons. It is estimated that the use of gas in the Iran-Iraq war killed 5,000 - but the Iranian side suffered around 600,000 dead in total, meaning that gas killed less than one per cent. The deadliest use of gas occurred in the First World War but, as Rapoport points out, it still only accounted for five per cent of casualties. Studying the amount of gas used by both sides from1914-1918 relative to the number of fatalities gas caused, Rapoport has written: 'It took a ton of gas in that war to achieve a single enemy fatality. Wind and sun regularly dissipated the lethality of the gases. Furthermore, those gassed were 10 to 12 times as likely to recover than those casualties produced by traditional weapons.' (7) Indeed, Rapoport discovered that some earlier documenters of the First World War had a vastly different assessment of chemical weapons than we have today - they considered the use of such weapons to be preferable to bombs and guns, because chemicals caused fewer fatalities. One wrote: 'Instead of being the most horrible form of warfare, it is the most humane, because it disables far more than it kills, ie, it has a low fatality ratio.' (8) 'Imagine that', says Rapoport, 'WMD being referred to as more humane'. He says that the contrast between such assessments and today's fears shows that actually looking at the evidence has benefits, allowing 'you to see things more rationally'. According to Rapoport, even Saddam's use of gas against the Kurds of Halabja in 1988 - the most recent use by a state of chemical weapons and the most commonly cited as evidence of the dangers of 'rogue states' getting their hands on WMD - does not show that unconventional weapons are more destructive than conventional ones. Of course the attack on Halabja was horrific, but he points out that the circumstances surrounding the assault remain unclear. 'The estimates of how many were killed vary greatly', he tells me. 'Some say 400, others say 5,000, others say more than 5,000. The fighter planes that attacked the civilians used conventional as well as unconventional weapons; I have seen no study which explores how many were killed by chemicals and how many were killed by firepower. We all find these attacks repulsive, but the death toll may actually have been greater if conventional bombs only were used. We know that conventional weapons can be more destructive.' Rapoport says that terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons is similar to state use - in that it is rare and, in terms of causing mass destruction, not very effective. He cites the work of journalist and author John Parachini, who says that over the past 25 years only four significant attempts by terrorists to use WMD have been recorded. The most effective WMD-attack by a non-state group, from a military perspective, was carried out by the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka in 1990. They used chlorine gas against Sri Lankan soldiers guarding a fort, injuring over 60 soldiers but killing none. The Tamil Tigers' use of chemicals angered their support base, when some of the chlorine drifted back into Tamil territory - confirming Rapoport's view that one problem with using unpredictable and unwieldy chemical and biological weapons over conventional weapons is that the cost can be as great 'to the attacker as to the attacked'. The Tigers have not used WMD since.

1NC: Bio Terrorism

Bioterrorism is impossible – seven reasons

Ruppe ’05 [Brian, The National Journal, Apr 23, Lexis]

On the other hand, critics argue that some experts have oversimplified the significant technical challenges to building catastrophic biological weapons and have overestimated the abilities of terrorist groups to overcome them. "How do you kill a lot of people? There, you've got to get involved with airborne, deadly pathogens such as Bacillus anthracis spores, and that's fairly technically demanding to do," Zilinskas said. Potential difficulties, experts say, include obtaining proper equipment and an appropriate strain of pathogen; storing and handling the pathogen properly; growing it to produce a greater quantity; processing it to develop the desirable characteristics; testing it; and dispersing it. A terrorist group would need to have suitably educated and knowledgeable people, and sufficient time and freedom from government scrutiny, to do the work, they say. Potentially the toughest challenge, experts say, is "weaponization" -- processing an agent to the point that it can resist environmental stresses, survive dissemination, and increase its ability to infect (pathogenicity) and to harm (toxicity). This is particularly true if the terrorists want to spray the agent, which is a more effective approach for a mass attack than spreading an agent through human-to-human contact. "While collection and purification knowledge is widespread among ordinary scientists, weaponization is obviously a military subject, and much of the knowledge that surrounds it is classified," wrote Danzig, who believes that terrorists nevertheless might be able to develop catastrophic biological weapons. The key difficulty for producing an aerosolized weapon, Danzig said, "would be to produce a pathogen formulation in sizes that would be within the human respiratory range and that could be reliably stored, handled, and spread as a stable aerosol rather than clump and fall to the ground. Mastering these somewhat contradictory requirements is tricky... The challenge becomes greater as attackers seek higher concentrations of agent and higher efficiency in dissemination." Stanford's Chyba agrees on the difficulties of weaponization. "Aerosolization is clearly [a] serious hurdle. I just find it hard, currently, to imagine a Qaeda offshoot -- or, for that matter, any of the current non-state groups that I have read about -- being technically proficient in that."

Bioterrorism ≠ Extinction

Bioterrorism won’t cause extinction.

Gladwell ’99 [Malcolm, The New Republic, Jul 24, Lexis]

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adopt a specific strategy, but every strategy carries a corresponding cost, and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly, but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all but halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable, remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability, its essential rigidity, is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. aids is almost invariably lethal because its attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flu, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.

bioterrorism won’t escalate – no chance of extinction.

**Easterbrook ’01** [Gregg, Editor of the New Republic, Wired, Nov. 17, http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.07/doomsday\_pr.html]

Like chemical agents, biological weapons have never lived up to their billing in popular culture. Consider the 1995 medical thriller Outbreak, in which a highly contagious virus takes out entire towns. The reality is quite different. Weaponized smallpox escaped from a Soviet laboratory in Aralsk, Kazakhstan, in 1971; three people died, no epidemic followed. In 1979, weapons-grade anthrax got out of a Soviet facility in Sverdlovsk (now called Ekaterinburg); 68 died, no epidemic. The loss of life was tragic, but no greater than could have been caused by a single conventional bomb. In 1989, workers at a US government facility near Washington were accidentally exposed to Ebola virus. They walked around the community and hung out with family and friends for several days before the mistake was discovered. No one died. The fact is, evolution has spent millions of years conditioning mammals to resist germs. Consider the Black Plague. It was the worst known pathogen in history, loose in a Middle Ages society of poor public health, awful sanitation, and no antibiotics. Yet it didn't kill off humanity. Most people who were caught in the epidemic survived. Any superbug introduced into today's Western world would encounter top-notch public health, excellent sanitation, and an array of medicines specifically engineered to kill bioagents. Perhaps one day some aspiring Dr. Evil will invent a bug that bypasses the immune system. Because it is possible some novel superdisease could be invented, or that existing pathogens like smallpox could be genetically altered to make them more virulent (two-thirds of those who contract natural smallpox survive), biological agents are a legitimate concern. They may turn increasingly troublesome as time passes and knowledge of biotechnology becomes harder to control, allowing individuals or small groups to cook up nasty germs as readily as they can buy guns today. But no superplague has ever come close to wiping out humanity before, and it seems unlikely to happen in the future.

# 1NC: Human Rights

Human rights high now, Obama proves

**Pillay 09** (Navanethem, writer for the new york times. United Nations high commissioner for human rights May 13, 2009. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/14/opinion/14iht-edpillay.html)

For the first time, the United States is becoming a member of the U.N. Human Rights Council, the world’s main human rights forum. President Obama’s decision to seek membership is a welcome step to restoring international trust in U.S. support for human rights. Critics of the council point to the fact that among its 47 members there are countries with less-than-pristine human rights records. Why would the U.S. want to join human rights violators, they ask? To those critics I say two things: Is there any country that has a blemish-free record? Human rights violations are not the bane of any particular country or region. And even if such a thing were possible, what impact would a club of the virtuous have on those outside? Council membership is not a reward for good behavior. It is a responsibility, one that exposes members to increased accountability before their peers. One of the true innovations of the three-year-old council is its assessment of the human-rights record of every country in the world, including its own members. Almost 80 countries have been scrutinized. Only time can tell whether this new country-by-country review will effectively change for the better the human rights situation on the ground. But there are already hopeful signs that it will, and little doubt that this initiative carries promising potential.

War Turns Human Rights

War gives justification for human rights violations that otherwise wouldn’t be accepted



1NC: Racism

Racism is at an insignificant level

**McWhorter 08** John McWhorter, senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute; June 5, 2008; “Racism in Retreat;” The Sun, <<http://www.nysun.com/opinion/racism-in-retreat/79355/>>

His victory demonstrates the main platform of my race writing. The guiding question in everything I have ever written on race is: Why do so many people exaggerate about racism? This exaggeration is a nasty hangover from the sixties, and the place it has taken as a purported badge of intellectual and moral gravitas is a tire-block on coherent, constructive sociopolitical discussion. Here's a typical case for what passes as enlightenment. On my desk(top) is an article from last year's American Psychologist. The wisdom imparted? To be a person of color these days is to withstand an endless barrage of racist "microaggressions." Say to someone, "When I look at you, I don't see color" and you "deny their ethnic experiences." You do the same by saying, "As a woman, I know what you go through as a racial minority," as well as with hate speech such as "America is a melting pot." Other "microaggressions" include college buildings being all named after straight, white rich men (I'm not kidding about the straight part). This sort of thing will not do. Why channel mental energy into performance art of this kind? Some may mistake me as implying that it would be okay to stop talking about racism. But that interpretation is incorrect: I am stating that it would be okay to stop talking about racism. We need to be talking about serious activism focused on results. Those who suppose that the main meal in the aforementioned is to decry racism are not helping people. At this point, if racism was unattended to for 10 years, during that time it would play exactly the same kind of role it does in America now — elusive, marginal, and insignificant. Note that I did not say that there was no racism. There seems to be an assumption that when discussing racism, it is a sign of higher wisdom to neglect the issue of its degree. This assumption is neither logical nor productive. I reject it, and am pleased to see increasing numbers of black people doing same. Of course there is racism. The question is whether there is enough to matter. All evidence shows that there is not. No, the number of black men in prison is not counterevidence: black legislators were solidly behind the laws penalizing possession of crack more heavily than powder. In any case, to insist that we are hamstrung until every vestige of racism, bias, or inequity is gone indicates a grievous lack of confidence, which I hope any person of any history would reject. Anyone who intones that America remains permeated with racism is, in a word, lucky. They have not had the misfortune of living in a society riven by true sociological conflict, such as between Sunnis and Shiites, Hutus and Tutsis — or whites and blacks before the sixties. It'd be interesting to open up a discussion with a Darfurian about "microaggressions." To state that racism is no longer a serious problem in our country is neither ignorant nor cynical. Warnings that such a statement invites a racist backlash are, in 2008, melodramatic. They are based on no empirical evidence. Yet every time some stupid thing happens — some comedian says a word, some sniggering blockhead hangs a little noose, some study shows that white people tend to get slightly better car loans — we are taught that racism is still mother's milk in the U.S. of A. "Always just beneath the surface." Barack Obama's success is the most powerful argument against this way of thinking in the entire four decades since recreational underdoggism was mistaken as deep thought. A black man clinching the Democratic presidential nomination — and rather easily at that — indicates that racism is a lot further "beneath the surface" than it used to be. And if Mr. Obama ends up in the White House, then it might be time to admit that racism is less beneath the surface than all but fossilized.

War Turns Racism

War increase Racism and environmental destruction

The Environmental Justice Movement, 03

(March 31, “Environmental Justice Statement against the War in Iraq” <http://www.envirosagainstwar.org/know/read.php?itemid=24>)

The US policy on war is an assault on civil liberties and civil rights, and is a policy that promotes environmental racism. Increased militarism means polluting weapons and military industrial production facilities and the disposal of its waste will end up disproportionately in our communities. The production and use of depleted-uranium weapons on uninformed communities and exposed soldiers in Iraq will leave long lasting chemical and radiation damage that will effect human and ecological health for generations to come. This war continues a long history of militarism, aggression and genocide on which this was founded, and we recognize that war and militarism impact different parts of our communities in different ways. The geopolitical and racist values which gave rise to old world colonization are the same which underlie the war being pursued by the US military industrial complex against the peoples of Iraq.We are observing the role of war as a justified means to intensify systematic oppression based on race, religion and community, and to undermine civil liberties as we have seen in the attacks on Arabs, South Asians and Muslims.

War increase racism and oppression to women

[Population and Development Program](http://hamp.hampshire.edu/~clpp/popdev.html) at Hampshire College. 02

(<http://www.lysistrataproject.org/aboutus.htm>. Ten Reasons Why Militarism is Bad   
for Reproductive Freedom)

It is no secret that militarism fosters racial prejudice in the name of national security. From Japanese-American internment camps during World War II to the current INS detention of Middle Eastern men, war reinforces racial stereotypes and discrimination. Today, racial profiling of Arab-American, Muslim, and South Asian people is defended as necessary for homeland security. In the wake of September 11, national anti-immigrant groups strengthened their activism to severely restrict immigration into the United States. Organizations such as the Federation for American Immigration Reform, Negative Population Growth, and the Carrying Capacity Network blamed immigration for the attacks on the World Trade Center, using fear-based tactics to play upon the national panic. The sentiments of these organizations have helped lead to programs, public policy, or legislation that target women of color and immigrant women for population control. Population control has often taken the form of involuntary sterilizations, welfare family caps, and/or risky long-term contraceptives. Anti-immigration attitudes associated with militarism pose huge threats and challenges to immigrant women, particularly those seeking asylum or those fleeing domestic violence. According to Amnesty International, women seeking asylum in the U.S. (some of whom are pregnant) have reported being detained without adequate food or medical care and undergoing strip searches, as well as physical, verbal, and sexual assault.

# 1NC: Women’s Rights/Patriarchy

Women’s rights are high now, examples prove.

Smith 08 (Dee Dee, “The Womens Rights Movement) http://activism.suite101.com/article.cfm/the\_womens\_rights\_movement)

The success of the women’s rights movement is evident when we see females like Senator Hillary Clinton and many others running for and holding political offices. It is also evident in institutions of higher learning, religious institutions and even in the board room. Nonetheless, because young women in America have always enjoyed these liberties, are these freedoms as valued as they were by the foremothers of the movement? Recently many news stories have spoken of the injustices concerning women in the Middle East. One such story was told on court television. It was about a woman from Iran who risked all that she had to escape that country. She’d desired that her daughters experience the freedoms of a more liberated/equal society. Her hopes for her daughters included higher education, equal employment opportunities, freedom to marry/not marry, freedom to reproduce/not reproduce and protection from sexual abuse/violence. Because the daughters came to America at very young ages, they never really witnessed or experienced the oppression their mother fought so hard to escape. Consequently, to the mother’s dismay, the daughters did not value freedom in the same way that the mother had. The Women’s Rights Movement - Historians credit Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton for the birth of the women’s rights movement. Although the heart of the struggle centered around achieving the right to vote, these women and many other women's rights activists fought for the complete equality of/justice for women in America. Some of the battles fought and accomplishments won by this movement include: \* The right to vote \* Gender equality/equal employment opportunity \* Protection of women’s rights in divorce \* Laws/tough penalties for rape and sexual violence against women \* The promotion of higher education for women \* Passing of sexual harassment laws \* Implementation of laws/services to stop/protect against domestic violence \* Reduction of poverty and economic growth for women

Gender violence is declining

Cho & Wilke, ‘5

Hyunkag Cho, and Dina J. Wilke in December 2005 (Source: Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare [http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_m0CYZ/is\_4\_32/ai\_n16418565/pg\_2], Title: How has the Violence Against Women Act affected the response of the criminal justice system to domestic violence?, AB)

The rate of domestic violence appears to be declining. From 1993 to 1997 the domestic violence incidence rate fell from 9.8 to 7.5 per 1,000 women (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2000). Increased legal services for victims and improvements in women's economic status seem to have contributed to the decline (Farmer & Tiefenthaler, 2003), although the results of studies on the effect of arrest have been inconclusive (e.g., Schmidt & Sherman, 1993; Sherman & Berk, 1984; Sherman, Schmidt, & Rogan, 1992). For example, Sherman and colleagues (1984) significantly contributed to nation-wide adoption of pro-arrest policies by arguing that arrest and incarceration were effective ways to deter domestic violence, but then subsequently questioned their effectiveness (Schmidt & Sherman, 1993).

War Turns Rape

War increases rape and sexual violence – the DA flips the case

Goldstein, Professor of International Relations, American University, ‘04

[Joshua S., War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, second paperback edition,

Cambridge University Press, page(s) 364]

Rape in wartime may arise from different motivations than in peacetime. Among other reasons, a male soldier rapes because "war . . . has awakened his aggressiveness, and he directs it at those who play a subordinate role in the world of war." Wartime also offers different opportunities. One US soldier in Vietnam said: "They are in an all-male environment.... There are women available. Those women are of another culture, another colour, another society.. . You've got an M-16. What do you need to pay a lady for? You go down to the village and you take what you want" Some said that having sex and then killing the woman made the soldier a "double veteran." In one view, raping by soldiers in wartime results from the weakening of social norms - parallel with increased sex, swearing, looting, cruelty, and other such behaviors. Some see a "return to nature" in war. The US Infantry journal in 1943 referred to soldiers as "a society of men, frequently unwashed, who have been dedicated to the rugged task of killing other men, and whose training has emphasized that a certain reversion to the primitive is not undesirable." Romantic or forced sexual conquests reflect "the rapist in every man." "Copulation under such circumstances is an act of aggression; the girl is the victim and her conquest the victor's triumph. Preliminary resistance on her part always increases his satisfaction." One function of gang rape is to promote cohesion within groups of men soldiers. Men who would not rape individually do so as part of a display within the male group, to avoid becoming an outcast. "There is male bonding in the violence of massive criminal rape - performed in succession, by 3 to 27 men in some cases - against women political prisoners" under Latin American military regimes. Gang rapes may serve to relieve individual men of responsibility, just as groups absolve soldiers in killing (see p. 197). "Rape is obviously not an exclusive preserve of military men. But . . . aspects of the military institution and ideology" may increase pressure on men to participate in gang rape - to control a chaotic and fearsome external world while proving manhood and toughness to one's buddies within the military "family."

War Turns Rape

War fuels widespread rape

Goldstein, Professor of International Relations, American University, ‘04

[Joshua S., War and Gender: How Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa, second paperback edition,

Cambridge University Press, page(s) 362-363]

As for the rape of women, it is "a `normal' accompaniment to war." In contexts where war atrocities occur, rape usually is among them. In seventeenth-century Europe, Spanish troops in the Netherlands committed "countless cases of rape, murder, robbery and arson." During the US Civil War, members of the California Volunteers (militia) in Utah perpetrated the Bear River Massacre against Shoshone Indians, and raped surviving women. Massive atrocities including rapes followed the partition of India and Pakistan in 1948. In Central America in the 1980s, brutal guerrilla and counterinsurgency warfare was accompanied by widespread sexual assault. The association of rape with other atrocities is not universal, however. Wartime rape can occur without other atrocities. For example, in the Kapauku culture, where even accidental injury to women during battle is shameful, unmarried girls near the battlefield are considered "fair game" for rape by warriors. Men claim that the girls "like it anyway." Atrocities can also occur without rape. Recall, for example, that women sometimes help torture male prisoners (see pp. 113-15). Rape arises from different specific motivations in various wars - revenge for Russian soldiers in Berlin in 1945, frustration for US soldiers in Vietnam, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. Historically, the main point of rape in war seems to be to humiliate enemy males by despoiling their valued property - "the ultimate humiliation... the stamp of total con-quest." A raped woman "is devalued property, and she signals defeat for the man who fails in his role as protector." Rape is thus "a means of establishing jurisdiction and conquest" "Rape at once pollutes and occupies the territory of the nation, transgresses its boundaries, defeats its protectors." For its victims, rape as a "violent invasion into the interior of one's body represents the most severe attack imaginable upon the intimate self and the dignity of a human being," constituting "severe torture."  Rape is a crime of domination, and war has everything to do with domination. "[T]he rapist's sexuality is not at the center of his act; it is placed instrumentally at the service of the violent act." Rapes in wartime apparently bear no relationship to the presence of prostitutes or other available women - showing that rape is not driven by sexual desire. Atrocities in World War I often included rape - "numerous" cases were perpetrated by all the armies. A World War I French poem boldly states, "Germans, we shall possess your daughters." A German soldier describes how Turkish soldiers traveling with the Germans abducted 200 Armenian women and girls, raped them all night, then cut their throats. Hirschfeld credits the military brothel system (see pp. 343-44), "no matter how disgusting," with reducing the incidence of rape in World War I. In Bosnia, rape was an instrument of ethnic cleansing - used to humiliate and terrorize a population from one ethnic group in order to induce it to abandon desirable territory. The number of women raped (mostly Muslims raped by Serbian forces) has been estimated at 20,000 (by a European Union commission) to 50,000 (by the Bosnian government). "Rape occurs in nearly every war, but in this one ... degradation and molestation of women was central to the conquest" Some rapes were peculiarly oriented towards forced impregnation as a part of ethnic cleansing. The Bosnia war resulted in the inclusion of rape for the first time in an international tribunal's indictments for war crimes. The Bosnia case "is not an exceptional case" in magnitude. Systematic mass rape during conquest occurred in the Pakistani war against Bangladesh's independence in 1971 (200,000 women), the Berlin area after World War II (over 100,000), the Japanese "rape of Nanking" [Nanjing] in 1937-38 (over 20,000), and Japan's "comfort women" system (see pp. 345-46). The international women's movement from the late nineteenth century through World War II took steps to organize against rape in wartime. At the 1915 Hague Congress, Jane Addams said: "Worse than death.. .is the defenselessness of women in warfare and their violation by the invading soldier. Rape as an instrument of territorial control and domination seems to have spread in the 1990s. A "new style of warfare is often aimed specifically at women," using "organized sexual assault as a tactic in terrorizing and humiliating a civilian population." Simultaneously with Bosnia, rape played a role in the genocide in Rwanda and in the Haitian military's suppression of resistance. In one town in Mozambique in 1991 (during a little-noticed war that took a million lives), "every woman and girl in the town had been sexually assaulted" while the town was occupied by right-wing guerrillas. In the "ethnic cleansing" of Kosovo by Serb forces in 1999, rapes were again common, though apparently less systematic than in Bosnia. Other recent reports come from Liberia, Sierra Leone, Bu¬rundi, Uganda, Algeria, Indonesia, Kashmir, and Burma. At UN refugee camps, workers now regularly provide "morning-after" contraceptive pills to women raped in, or just before arriving at, the camps.

War Turns Gender Inequality

War increase gender inequality

Goldstein, Professor of International Relations, American University, ‘04

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Other authors found, however, in a sample of 33 gathering-hunting societies, that warfare decreases women's status, although this connection may change in some societies where men are away for extended periods. The authors consider 13 indicators of women's status in coding their sample of societies. They ignore indicators relating to ritual status, which they find to vary independently, and concentrate on indicators of domestic and political status which more often vary together. (Their status variable is a single, ordinal three-point scale in which women are ranked as relatively high on neither, one, or both of the dimensions of domestic and political status.)' A statistical analysis of 90 "small scale, preindustrial societies" connects war frequency with such gender-related measures as the strength of cross-cutting ties between communities within a society (e.g. marriage, trading), the presence of male kin "interest groups" (patrilineality), socioeconomic complexity, harsh child socialization practices, affectionate socialization practices, and "male gender identity conflict" (see p. 240). The study finds that, despite the tremendous diversity in both war practices and gender roles, some differences are usually found between more warlike and more peaceful societies. correlations as are found more plausibly derive from war's effect on gender relations than the reverse.

War silences women

[Population and Development Program](http://hamp.hampshire.edu/~clpp/popdev.html) at Hampshire College. 02

(<http://www.lysistrataproject.org/aboutus.htm>. Ten Reasons Why Militarism is Bad   
for Reproductive Freedom)

During war, the first voices to be eliminated from the public sphere are those belonging to women. According to a study conducted by Fairness and Accuracy in Media, in the month following September 11, women were outnumbered by 10 to 1 on op-ed pages of the New York Times, the Washington Post, and USA Today. Similarly, while Bush's 90% approval rate was consistently hailed, a poll finding that 48% of women supported limited or no military action was severely under-reported.

War Turns Gender Violence

War increases gender violence and oppression of women

Goldstein, Professor of International Relations, American University, ‘04

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The dominance hierarchies discussed in chapter 4 apply not only to men in groups but also to male-female relationships. Men and women in virtually all human cultures occupy dominant and subordinate status ranks. Men often exploit women's work, with and without pay - including sex work, domestic work, child care, nursing, and the array of low-wage jobs in modern industrial economies. Overall, though not everywhere, men enforce women's subordinate condition with widespread threats and uses of "hidden violence ... [r]ape, battery, and other forms of sexual and domestic violence." In the context of an exploitive dominance relationship, and especially in wartime when that relationship intensifies, keeping weapons out of the hands of the exploited-subordinate class makes sense. Letting women become warriors could threaten men's dominance over women. Therefore patriarchal cultures (i.e., all cultures) limit women's participation in combat. In this view, the armed male soldier faces both outward to meet dangers and opportunities beyond the border, and inward to maintain the gendered hierarchy of domestic society. Some conservative opponents of women in combat today connect war roles with the domestic gender order. According to a 1998 Southern Baptist resolution, the idea of women in combat "rejects gender-based distinctions established by God," negates "the unique gender-based responsibility of men to protect women and children," and implies a "shameful failure of male leader-ship." For these reasons, it "undermines male headship in the family." Similarly, in South Korea today, universal male conscription helps socialize men for later careers in business and politics, and maintains sharp gender divisions in families - male breadwinners, female housewives. I will explore three hypotheses sharing the premise that in wartime the exploitation of women intensifies, although this does not apply to every individual or category of woman in every war. First, war (which disrupts social relationships and norms) brings more women into sex work on more exploitive terms (although this sexuality covers a range that in-chides reciprocity at one end and slavery at the other). Is heightened male sexuality (reflected by women's wartime sex work) necessary for participation in combat? Second, war borrows gender as a code for domination-submission relationships (not just to delimit combat and normal life as in chapter 5). Enemies and subordinates are gendered feminine. As a result, recurrently, victorious soldiers express domination by raping conquered women. Does the tendency of male soldiers to feminize enemies explain the absence of women in their ranks? Third, women's paid and unpaid work (beyond sex work) weighs more heavily on women in wartime than peacetime. In simple societies, furthermore, frequent warfare tends to correlate (imperfectly) with a lower status for women. Do societies direct women away from combat roles in order to exploit their labor more efficiently in wartime?