ITS 1NC – Topicality

“In the United States”

1. **ITS mainly relies on GPS satellites to connect all of its nodes. These satellites are in space. Therefore, the USFG would not be investing “in the United States.”**

#### The US includes the territories and land over which it has jurisdiction

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 5 (Dictionary of Military, <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/United+States>, 2005)

Includes the land area, internal waters, territorial sea, and airspace of the United States, including the following: a. US territories, possessions, and commonwealths; and b. Other areas over which the US Government has complete jurisdiction and control or has exclusive authority or defense responsibility.

1. **Violation: The investment would not be in the US.**
2. **Prefer our interpretation for 2 reasons:**
   1. **Limits: Allowing for space affs would set a precedence for resurgence of the past years multitude of space affs, blowing up the size of the topic, making research impossible.**
   2. **Ground: Extends aff ground to last year’s topic and doubles the size of research.**
3. **Topicality is a voter for 3 reasons:**
   1. **Education: Allowing the topic to mushroom in size lessens the likeliness of clash and undermines the value of debate.**
   2. **Precedence: Don’t allow teams to continue reading space affs – rejecting the team now would set precedence that a new topic will not allow for such continuations.**
   3. **Fairness: The transcendence of topicality limits makes it impossible for the neg to research on potential affs.**

“Transportation Infrastructure”

Communication, water, and energy systems are regulated utilities, not “transportation infrastructure”

Quadrant 7

(Real Estate Investors, “Global Diversified Infrastructure Fund of Funds”, http://www.quadrantrealestateadvisors.com/investments/public/uploads/documents%5CGlobal%20Diversified%20Infrastructure%20Fund%20of%20Funds.pdf)

II. Defining Infrastructure Assets Starting with the failure of the levy systems in New Orleans, followed by the collapse of the Mississippi River Bridge in Minneapolis, Minnesota on August 1, 2007, American infrastructure capital needs were brought to the forefront of America. The aging stock of infrastructure continues to deteriorate and the demand for public and private investment continues to grow. The question now becomes, which entity is going to address this growing need? However, an even more fundamental question also exists, what are infrastructure assets? According to the American Heritage Dictionary, infrastructure comprises the “basic facilities, services and installations needed for the functioning of a community or society, such as transportation and communication systems, water and power lines, and public institutions including schools, post offices and prisons.” The dictionary also notes that the term infrastructure has been used since 1927 to refer to the public works required for an industrial economy to function or the installations necessary for the defence of a country. The expectation most have is that infrastructure assets primarily involve government regulated monopolies and governmentally maintained assets. Unfortunately, classification is not that simple. When defining infrastructure investments, the common definition accepted in the institutional investment management community is “the physical assets that are needed to provide essential services to society,” which has lead managers to have highly different interpretations of the definition of “essential.” In general, the infrastructure market is divided into two general sectors—economic infrastructure and social infrastructure. Economic infrastructure includes transportation assets and regulated utilities, which includes communication, water, and energy systems. Social infrastructure is more vaguely defined and may include any asset in which the government maintains control or assets that are necessary for the longevity of the population. Such assets include schools, prisons, hospitals, parks, and others.

The aff violates the interpretation because the ITS is defined under communications infrastructure:

SMMPO ’12, Southeastern Massachusetts Metropolitan Planning Organization, Chapter 15, Intelligent Transportation Systems, 2012, url: <http://www.srpedd.org/transportation/2012-documents/TPLANFINAL/chapter-15.pdf>.

Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) have been defined as: “the application of advanced sensor, computer, electronics, and communication technologies and management strategies – in an integrated manner – to improve the safety and efficiency of the surface transportation system.”

Prefer our interpretation: Legitimizing the aff’s use of the communications infrastructure unlimits the topic and allows for the aff to make plans on anything that counts as “infrastructure.”

Topicality is a voter: Allowing the size of the topic to mushroom would substantially lower the probability of clash and undermine the value of debate and undercut its educational value. Fairness is also important to consider because the amount of affs possible makes research impossible.

ITS 1NC – States CP

Counterplan: The fifty states should substantially invest in Intelligent Transportation Systems.

Transportation initiatives are best local; federal government isn’t necessary and local governments are sufficient

Transportation for America, October 2010 (White Paper; Smart Mobility for a 21st Century America, p.26)

The Twin Cities Metropolitan Area is using innovative solutions to relieve congestion on major highways in the region, with a particular focus on Interstate 35. The effort, part of a Minnesota Urban Partnership Agreement (UPA), utilizes a suite of intelligent transportation approaches, sometimes known as the 4Ts: Tolling, Transit, Telecommuting/ Travel Demand Management and Technology. The Minnesota UPA involves ITS technologies like real-time traffic and transit information, transit signal priority, and guidance mechanisms for shoulder-running buses. These technologies will significantly reduce travel time for riders. “Trip time will be about half an hour. We’ll offer six trips in the morning and six trips home in the afternoon,” Bob Gibbons, a spokesman for Metro Transit, told Minnesota Public Radio. First, the city is converting existing bus-only shoulder lanes and High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) lanes along portions of the Interstate into wider lanes with prices that vary based on occupancy. Cars with only one occupant will have to pay a toll to access the lanes during peak hours, with prices set to ensure free-flowing travel. City officials say this will enable bus speeds to increase to 50 mph from the current bus-only shoulder lane speeds of 35 mph or less. Second, a portion of the toll revenues from the new lanes will fund significant fare discounts for transit riders taking trips using the new facilities during peak periods. In and around the I-35W corridor, transit services will increase and a bus rapid transit network will be created, utilizing at least 27 newly purchased transit vehicles. There are also plans for six new park-and-ride lots with more than 1,400 additional spaces. Third, new dynamic message signs and some existing signs will inform travelers about the availability of the lanes for non-bus use, toll rates for when the lanes are available, travel speeds on priced lanes versus on general purpose lanes and transit alternatives. The final element of the Minnesota UPA is telecommuting. This locally funded effort will focus on expanding upon the successful Results-Only Work Environment program, in which employers agree to provide employees the flexibility to telecommute or shift their hours to avoid congested commutes. Approximately 75 percent of Best Buy’s 4,500 corporate office employees participate in ROWE. Officials are targeting large employers, including the 20 Fortune 500 companies in the region, for participation, with the goal of reducing 500 daily peak-period trips throughout the corridor.

All 50 states have already implemented programs like ITS.

USDOT ’98, “Tracking State Deployments of Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks,” 31-03-1998, url: www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/research/operations/.../trackcvins.pdf.

The ITS Joint Program Office (ITS/JPO) of the USDOT has begun tracking progress by state governments in the deployment of Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks (CVISN) in all 50 states through the year 2005. FHWA’s goal is to have between 22 and 35 states deploy the initial (Level 1) operating systems and capabilities of CVISN by the year 2005. This report summarizes the results of the effort to track CVISN deployment in 1996. This deployment is representative of the deployment status of CVISN components before specific CVISN deployments were in place.

ITS 1NC – Elections

#### Obama will win the election --- major indicators and polls point to a victory.

**West**, **7/12**/20**12** (Paul – Tribune Washington Bureau, Obama holds ‘significant lead’ over Romney in new national poll, The Olympian, p. http://www.theolympian.com/2012/07/12/2171777/obama-holds-significant-lead-over.html)

With the election still four months away, President Barack Obama holds "a significant lead" over Republican challenger Mitt Romney, according to a new Pew Research Center poll released Thursday. The national survey, completed July 9, showed Obama outpacing Romney by 50 percent to 43 percent. That's a more substantial gap than most recent surveys have registered, but Obama has held at least a small lead in earlier polling by Pew. The independent polling operation said there had been "no clear trend in either candidate's support" since Romney secured the GOP nomination in early spring. When it comes to fixing the economy - the top issue of the campaign - "Romney has not seized the advantage," Pew's analysis concluded. "In fact, he has lost ground on this issue over the past month." Of potentially greater significance than the overall national figures, Obama continues to lead Romney in battleground states. In the 12 states considered most competitive at this point, the president holds a seven percentage-point edge, 51 to 44, the Pew survey found. A Wall Street Journal survey, released late last month, also showed Obama with an eight-point advantage in battleground states. The national figures found no overall improvement in Romney's standing with voters over the past two months, a period in which Obama has attempted to keep his rival on the defensive with negative ad attacks on his business record and personal wealth. Some Republicans outside the Romney camp have become increasingly jittery about what they regard as insufficient progress by their party's unofficial nominee against a vulnerable incumbent. As the campaign heads into mid-summer, a period in which public attention will be diverted, at least in part, by the Olympic Games in London, Romney has failed thus far to capitalize on deep voter dissatisfaction with the way things are going in the country. At the same time, Obama's job-approval rating has ticked up slightly. In the latest poll, it stood at 50 percent, the first time Pew found that he had reached positive territory on that score since March. Voters were asked which candidate was best suited to fix the U.S. economy, and by a six-point margin they favored Obama over Romney, 48 percent to 42 percent. That's a sharp turnaround from June, when Romney held the advantage on that question by eight points, 49 percent to 41 percent. The Pew poll has a margin of error of plus or minus 2.1 percentage points. A similar shift was reflected among independent voters, a prized target for both candidates, who are now almost evenly divided on who would best improve the economy. In June, Romney enjoyed a 13-point edge among independents on that question. The latest survey, like most polling at this stage of the campaign, did not attempt to narrow the contest down to likely voters. Obama's lead, Pew found, stemmed from the fact that more voters currently identify themselves as Democrats than Republicans, and that virtually identical proportions of each say they will back their party's nominee. Put another way, the results of the survey are yet a further indication that voter mobilization will be crucial in determining the winner of this year's election. Obama has increased his lead among younger voters - historically the least likely to turn out on Election Day. It's now 24 percentage points, down from 34 points in the 2008 election. Independent voters - who typically decide close elections - remain split, with 46 percent favoring Romney and 45 percent supporting Obama, a statistical tie.

#### Despite support for transportation infrastructure, attempts to fund programs cause public backlash.

**McBee Strategic Insight**, 2/3/**2012** (Washington Research: The McBee 2012 Preview – Transportation Infrastructure Investment: “The Responsibility of Governing,” p. 4-6)

Whether those are just political talking points or a real desire to legislate remains to be seen. Regardless, public opinion largely backs up that view. According to a Rockefeller Foundation survey conducted in February 2011, two out of three voters consider improving the nation's transportation infrastructure to be "extremely" or "very" important, and four out of five believe that boosting federal funding will improve the economy "and create millions of jobs from construction to manufacturing to engineering." Ninety-one percent of those polled agreed that "our generation has a responsibility to the future to invest in America's infrastructure – just as our parents and grandparents did," and 71% said transportation funding ought to be an area of bipartisan compromise. However, when it comes to actually financing increased spending on infrastructure, that consensus quickly melts away. "Voters are far less accepting of proposals that would affect their own wallets," the Rockefeller Foundation survey found. True to form, 71% of voters said it would be "unacceptable" to raise the federal gasoline tax – the main funding source for the HTF – which has been set at 18.4 cents per gallon since 1993.

#### Paying for transportation infrastructure is election suicide. There is no support for funding.

**McBee Strategic Insight**, 2/3/**2012** (Washington Research: The McBee 2012 Preview – Transportation Infrastructure Investment: “The Responsibility of Governing,” p. 1)

Expected passage of a long-term aviation financing bill next week gives ground transportation advocates cause for hope, but that's likely a red-herring. The politics surrounding how to pay for infrastructure financing simply remain too hot to handle in an election year. President Obama has run away from any discussion of increasing the 18.4 cents per gallon federal gasoline tax, while Republicans won't support a tax increase of any kind to pay for new spending, even if some groups are willing to pay additional taxes. Those views are generally consistent with a voting public that wants to spend more on transportation infrastructure – but does not want to foot the bill out of their own wallets.

#### Romney is unilateralist – he’ll attack Iran without consent.

**Berman**, contributing writer for The Nation, **’12** [Ari. Investigative Journalism Fellow at The Nation Institute. “Romney: Bomb, Bomb, Bomb, Bomb, Bomb Iran” The Nation. June 19. http://www.thenation.com/blog/168478/romney-bomb-bomb-bomb-bomb-bomb-iran#/accessed:7/19/12]

Romney was asked about the Fly/Kristol article on Face the Nation on Sunday. He responded:¶ I can assure you if I'm President, the Iranians will have no question but that I would be willing to take military action, if necessary, to prevent them from becoming a nuclear threat to the world. I don't believe at this stage, therefore, if I'm President, that we need to have war powers approval or a special authorization for military force. The President has that capacity now.¶ It’s worth pausing a moment to consider the magnitude of this statement. Romney is saying that he doesn’t need Congressional approval for a US attack on Iran. Notes Andrew Sullivan: “Remember that this was Cheney's position vis-a-vis Iraq. Bush over-ruled him. Romney is to the neocon right of George W. Bush in foreign affairs.” He’s also to the right of Bill Kristol, which is no small feat.¶ Perhaps this shouldn’t be surprising, considering that Romney has chosen a team of neoconservative advisers hellbent on resurrecting the hawkish unilateralism of the early Bush years. As I reported in The Nation in May, nearly a dozen Romney advisers have urged the US to consider a military strike against Iran.¶ Top Romney adviser John Bolton, who many neocons hope will be secretary of state in a Romney administration, has been advocating war with Iran since 2008 and recently wrote that he wanted diplomatic talks between Iran and the international community to fail. “John’s wisdom, clarity and courage are qualities that should typify our foreign policy,” Romney said when Bolton endorsed him last January. (Less hawkish members of Romney’s foreign policy team have urged a negotiated settlement with Iran along the lines the Obama administration is currently pursuing.)¶ One could argue that the Obama administration’s refusal to seek Congressional approval for the NATO incursion in Libya set a precedent for Romney to sidestep Congress on Iran. But the Libya mission had the support of the Arab League and the United Nations Security Council, which wouldn’t be the case with an Iran attack. And a military strike against Iran would be far more dangerous and risky than taking out the Qaddafi regime. That’s why the administration and its diplomatic partners are trying to peacefully resolve what has unnecessarily become a brewing conflict.¶ On Saturday, Romney once again ridiculed Obama’s Middle East policy. “I think, by and large, you can just look at the things the president has done and do the opposite," Romney told the Faith and Freedom Coalition, a Christian right group run by Ralph Reed. If Obama seeks peace with Iran, then Romney and his ilk want yet another war.

ITS 1NC – Security Kritik

The affirmative’s obsession with ranking and managing risk is the essence of security logic

Hagmann & Cavelty, 2012 (National risk registers: Security scientism and the propagation of permanent insecurity, John Hagmann and Myriam Dunn Cavelty, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Sage Journals Feb 15 2012)

With the demise of communism as an overarching organizing principle and crystallization point, Western security doctrines have seen the inclusion of a growing range of different security issues from political, societal, economic and environmental sectors. By the same token, Western security politics has also been prominently infused with risk narratives and logics since the 1990s (Petersen, 2011; Hameiri and Kühn, 2011). Particular to risk-centric conceptualizations of public danger is the understanding that national and international security should take into account a varied set of natural or man-made disaster potentials, as well as other probable disruptions with potentially grave consequences for society. Also, specific to these dangers is the profound uncertainty regarding their exact form and likely impact, and the substantial room for conflicting interpretations surrounding them. However, **precise and ‘actionable’ knowledge of looming danger is quintessential to security politics**, the shift to new security narratives notwithstanding. Without conceptions of existing or upcoming collective dangers, security schemes are neither intelligible nor implementable. Whether the matter at hand concerns the installation of hi-tech body scanners at airports, the construction of avalanche barriers in the Alps or diplomatic initiatives for a global anti-terror alliance, any security agenda is rhetorically and politically grounded in a representation of national or international danger. In recent years, the epistemological foundations of security politics have been addressed by reflexive and critical approaches, a literature that enquires into the formation, contestation and appropriation of (in)security discourses. Situating itself in this broader literature, this article focuses on national risk registers as a particular means for authoritative knowledge definition in the field of national security. National risk registers are fairly recent, comprehensive inventories of public dangers ranging from natural hazards to industrial risks and political perils. Often produced by civil protection agencies, they seek to provide secure foundations for public policymaking, security-related resource allocation and policy planning. Evaluating and ranking all kinds of potential insecurities, from toxic accidents and political unrest to plant diseases, thunderstorms, energy shortages, terrorist strikes, wars and the instability of global financial markets, risk registers stand at the intersection of the broadening of security politics and the adoption of risk logics.

In particular, infrastructure development is the essence of modern securitization – it translates the normal function of life into the discourse of security

Lundborg and Vaughan-Williams, 10 (Tom Lundborg, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs, Nick Vaughan-Williams, University of Warwick, “There’s More to Life than Biopolitics: Critical Infrastructure, Resilience Planning, and Molecular Security,” Paper prepared for the SGIR Conference, Stockholm, 7-10 September, 2010)

While the terrain of security studies is of course fiercely contested, what is common among a range of otherwise often diverse perspectives is the core premise that ‘security’ relates to a realm of activity in some sense beyond the ‘norm’ of political life. Thus, in the language of the Copenhagen School, a securitizing move occurs when an issue not previously thought of as a security threat comes to be produced as such via a speech act that declares an existential threat to a referent object (Buzan et al 1998). A similar logic can be identified in approaches to security that focus on exceptionalism: the idea, following the paradigmatic thought of Carl Schmitt, that sovereign practices rely upon the decision to suspend the normal state of affairs in order to produce emergency conditions in which extraordinary measures—such as martial law, for example—are legitimised. For this reason, a tendency in security studies—even among self-styled ‘critical’ approaches – is to privilege analysis of high-profile ‘speech acts’ of elites, ‘exceptional’ responses to ‘exceptional’ circumstances, and events that are deemed to be ‘extraordinary’. Arguably this leads to an emphasis on what we might call the ‘spectacle of security’, rather than more mundane, prosaic, and ‘everyday’ aspects of security policy and practice. By contrast, the world of CIs necessitates a shift in the referent object of security away from the ‘spectacular’ to the ‘banal’. Instead of high-profile speech-based acts of securitization, we are here dealing with telecommunications and transportation networks, water treatment and sewage works, and so on: ‘semi-invisible’ phenomena that are often taken-for-granted fixtures and fittings of society, yet **vital for the maintenance of** what is considered to be ‘**normal daily life’**. For this reason our subject matter calls for a re-thinking of the very ‘stuff’ considered to be apposite for the study of international security. Indeed, analysing the role of CIs and resilience planning in global security relations adds particular resonance to existing calls within the literature to broaden and deepen the way in which acts of securitization are conceptualised (Bigo 2002; Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008; Williams 2003). Those adopting more sociologically-oriented perspectives, for example, have sought to emphasise the way in which securitizing moves can be made by institutions (as well as individuals), through repeated activity (as well as one-off ‘acts’), and involve various media (not only ‘speech’, but visual culture, for example). From this reconfigured point of view it is possible to then see how the design, planning, management, and execution of CIs also constitute an arena in which processes of securitization—of physical and cyber networks—takes place.

The dream of security produces apocalypse– *constructions* of existential risk produce the annihilation they are meant to escape

Pever Coviello, Prof. of English @ Bowdoin, 2k [*Queer Frontiers*, p. 39-40]

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way postapocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed-it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida’s suitably menacing phrase) "remainderless and a-symbolic destruction," then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, **always to an "other"** people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous **contagion, threatening the safety** and prosperity **of a cherished "general population**." This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag's incisive observation, from 1989, that, 'Apocalypse is now a long-running serial: **not 'Apocalypse Now' but 'Apocalypse from Now On.""** The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, through the perpetual threat of **destruction-through the constant reproduction of the figure of apocalypse**-agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of The History of Sexuality addresses himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, "life-administering." Power, he contends, "exerts a positive influence on life land, endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations?' In his brief comments on what he calls "the atomic situation;' however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as "managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race," agencies of modern power presume to act 'on the behalf of the existence of everyone." Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive or, indeed, **potentially annihilating**. "If genocide is indeed the dream of modem power," Foucault writes, "this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill; it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population." For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patterns and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, **seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.**

Alternative – Reject the affirmative’s security logic – only resistance to the discourse of security can generate genuine political thought

Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [*Critique of Security*, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps **to eschew the logic of security altogether** - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it **marginalises all else, most notably** the constructive conflicts, **debates** and discussions **that animate political life**. The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: **maybe there is no hole**."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an **alternative political language** which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to **blind ourselves** to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a **different conception of the good.** We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but **bracketing it out** and handing it to the state; **it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift**."'

Advantage: Econ

Squo solves: Econ on rise.

Recovery is on track- unemployment decreasing and spending rising

Rushe 6/26/12

Dominic Rushe is the US business correspondent for the Guardian, OECD: US economy is improving but recovery is far from complete- Report suggests economy has 'gained momentum' but says long-term unemployment and income equality must be solved, The Guardian, Tuesday 26 June 2012 11.21 EDT

The US recovery remains on track but "fissures" have begun to appear in the world's largest economy as it struggles with record long-term unemployment and income inequality, according to a report by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The international economist group is more bullish on the economy than Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke, who recently downgraded his forecasts for the US economy. And the report may prove useful ammunition for the Obama administration as the economy emerges as the key battleground of the 2012 election. The OECD offered support to president Barack Obama's plans to cut tax breaks for America's wealthiest, a plan known as the 'Buffett rule' after its championing by billionaire investor Warren Buffett. Growth in the US will remain moderate this year but the OECD report concludes that America's economic recovery has "gained momentum". Consumer and business spending have risen and unemployment, though still high at 8.2%, has fallen nearly two percentage points from its peak in 2009.

Tax Collections show the economy isn’t slowing

Adler 7/18/12

<http://www.businessinsider.com/federal-tax-revenues-economy-not-slowing-2012-7> Lee Adler is the editor and publisher of The Wall Street Examiner Jul. 18, 2012, 9:10 AM One Crucial Indicator Shows The US Economy Isn't Slowing At All

The mainstream consensus has lately been that the economy is slowing. Based on my tracking of federal revenues in real time, I suspect that that view is incorrect. Instead the recent data reflects only normal oscillations within the ongoing slow growth trend. Total federal tax collections, including withholding taxes, are available to us with just a one day lag in the US Treasury’s Daily Treasury Statements, which makes them an excellent analytical resource. Withholding is mostly for compensation, and thus it is a good measure of the economy’s strength. However, it is extremely volatile day to day so I rely more on a monthly moving average of the 10 day total collections, comparing that with the prior year. Smoothing sacrifices a bit of timeliness to get a clearer picture of the trend without losing too much of the edge that the daily data provides. Unfortunately, I have found even the 10 day total data too noisy for meaningful comparison so I’ve had to resort to additional smoothing. As a result the smoothed data is a little slow, so I also look at raw month to date data after mid month.

**A large network effect DOES NOT mean a large increase in investment.**

**Bennahum 2k** (David S. Bennahum , President & CEO, The American Independent News Network, strategy + business, 1/1/00, The Biggest Myth of the New Economy)

Yet the cost of maintaining this blistering pace of growth defies long-term logic. At that rate, AOL will spend far more to acquire each new customer and compensate for departing customers than it can possibly capture in revenues. In other words, the company's "value," as measured by market capitalization, is based on criteria that could destroy the company. The "more is more" logic is grounded more in metaphor than in economics. A quick look at other entities whose value exists in the network, rather than goods or services, shows similar patterns of hallucinatory thinking. Let's return to the fax machine network. Faxes are powerful tools, but since no one actually owns the "fax machine network," the only revenues (aside from the cost of a phone call) come from selling the machines themselves - a low-margin, high-volume activity and hardly a business with much appeal. One would be hard pressed to find a credible entrepreneur looking to break into fax-machine manufacturing. Likewise, e-mail is ubiquitous, yet the selling of e-mail programs is a terrible business; most consumers get free e-mail programs bundled with their free Web browsers. The only company capable of selling an e-mail reader is the Microsoft Corporation, and that is because its program, Outlook, is bundled as part of an office suite, and rarely sold on its own.

Jobs are not key to the economy – external factors and debt ceiling

Swanson 11

Ian Swanson - 07/07/11 “Top Obama adviser says unemployment won't be key in 2012” <http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/170309-plouffe-says-jobs-rate-not-key-in-2012>

President Obama’s senior political adviser David Plouffe said Wednesday that people won’t vote in 2012 based on the unemployment rate. Plouffe should probably hope that’s the case, since dismal job figures aren’t expected to get any better for Obama and the economy on Friday. Most economists expect a report from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to show that the nation added about 100,000 jobs in June. That’s not enough to keep up with population growth, let alone lower the unemployment rate or make a dent in the 9 million jobs lost during the so called Great Recession. [UPDATED: The [jobs report](http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/801-economy/170335-economy-adds-paltry-18k-jobs-as-unemployment-rate-creeps-up) released on Friday showed the economy added only 18,000 jobs, much less than anticipated. The unemployment rate creeped up to 9.2 percent.] It’s looking more and more like Obama will have to do something no president has done since Franklin Roosevelt: Win reelection with unemployment around 8 percent. Ronald Reagan, another president Obama is sometimes compared with, was reelected in 1984 when unemployment was 7.2 percent. Obama isn’t likely to see a number that low. Mark Zandi, chief economist for Moody’s Analytics, predicts the nation will have added 110,000 jobs in total in June, with 125,000 added in the private sector. Hiring by the public sector will continue to fall. The economy would have to add 350,000 jobs every month between now and December 2014 to get back to the pre-recession low of 5 percent unemployment, last seen in December 2007, according to the Economic Policy Institute (EPI). Reagan saw that kind of growth after the recession of the early 1980s, and it helped him win reelection by a comfortable 18 points. He also faced Walter Mondale, a weak opponent, from the opposing party — a bit of history Obama hopes to repeat in 2012. The economy hasn’t seen such high-octane growth since August 1993 to February 1995, when it last averaged 350,000 jobs created per month. Even during the tech boom in the latter half of the 1990s, the economy didn’t average that many jobs, according to Heidi Shierholz, an economist with EPI. The Obama campaign’s hope is that voters will feel the economy is improving in the fall of 2012, just as they did when Roosevelt and Reagan were reelected. That seemed to be at the root of Plouffe’s remarks on Wednesday, as quoted by Bloomberg. “The average American does not view the economy through the prism of GDP or unemployment rates or even monthly jobs numbers,” Plouffe said, according to Bloomberg. “People won’t vote based on the unemployment rate, they’re going to vote based on: ‘How do I feel about my own situation? Do I believe the president makes decisions based on me and my family?’ ” The remarks will likely irritate Democrats who think Obama and his political team have taken their eye off jobs. There’s some reason to think Obama could get a boost from the economy in the second half of the year, particularly given signs that the White House and congressional Republicans are moving closer to a deal that would lift the nation’s debt ceiling and cut trillions from annual deficits. There’s no doubt such a deal would boost confidence in the economy and the political system. It could also boost hiring. Layoffs have basically stopped since the recession, said Shierholz, but employers aren’t hiring even though corporations are expected to announce huge profits for the first half of the year. “We are still treading water at the bottom of a deep hole,” said Shierholz. The only real improvement in the labor market since the recession ended is with workers who have decided to sit out the slow economy and not look for a new job. That’s helped keep the unemployment rate low, Shierholz said. Zandi argues the economy was sidetracked for the first half of the year by a number of shocks that he hopes are temporary. They include the devastating tsunami in Japan that wreaked havoc on manufacturers around the world; turmoil in the Middle East; the ongoing conflict in Libya that sent crude oil prices to summer highs in the spring; and the debt talks, which Zandi said appear to have led the Treasury to slow outlays to avoid breaching the debt ceiling. “The ill effects of these shocks are or will soon fade and even add to growth during the second half of the year,” Zandi said in an email. He expects payroll employment gains to be back near 200,000 by the end of the year. If Zandi’s right and those gains continue through 2012, Plouffe might be proven right, too, as voters could be pleased with their position. But there isn’t a lot of room for Obama to maneuver when it comes to the unemployment rate.

1970’s economic decline not caused by lack of infrastructure investment- manufacturing industry proves

Hulten and Schwab 93

(Charles Hulten, Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland, Ph. D, Research Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Senior Fellow at the Conference Board, Robert Schwab, Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland, Ph.D., National Tax Journal, “Infrastructure Spending: Where Do We Go From Here?”, September, 1993)

One major problem arises from the fact that the U.S. time series data are domi- nated by two trends: infrastructure invest ment fell sharply starting in the late 1960s and early 197Os, and the aggregate U.S. economy has performed poorly since roughly 1973. This is sufficient to establish a correlation between infrastructure and output growth. But, while it is clear that the two are associated, it is far from clear that lower infrastructure investment was the cause of slower growth. Any variable that fell through the 1960s and early 197Os, like SAT scores, is an equally plausi- ble candidate as the cause of our growth problems. The following story illustrates this point. The number of storks in a certain region was found to be closely correlated with the number of babies that were born in that region. This might support the conclu- sion that storks bring babies. But the truth was more mundane. When the harvest was good, families were more likely to have another child and more storks came to the region to take advantage of the available food. Of course, it is always easy to dismiss any evidence by arguing that correlatron does not imply causality. But in this case, there are enough other troubling pieces of evi- dence to suggest that we truly are dealing with spurious correlation. For example, if infrastructure were an important part of the productivity problem, then we would expect to find a significant slowdown in in- dustries such as manufacturing that are very dependent on infrastructure but little change in other industries, such as services and finance, insurance, and real estate. But, in fact, the exact opposite is true; the productivity slowdown in manufacturing has been very mild. The growth rate of GDP per hour of work in manufacturing was roughly the same in the 1973-1987 period as it was during 1948.-1973. In contrast, in the private sector as a whole, GDP per hour grew at a rate only about one-third of the pre- 1973 rate.

Advantage: Bioterrorism

Squo solves: Interoperable measures to bioterrorism already in place.

Powner ’03, Director of Information Technology Issues, Government Accountability Office, “Bioterrorism: Information Technology Strategy Could Strengthen Federal Agencies’ Abilities to Respond to Public Health Emergencies,” May 2003, url: www.gao.gov/new.items/d03139.pdf.

The PHIN is an effort initiated by the CDC to provide **interoperability across public health functions and organizations**, such as state and federal agencies, local health departments, public health labs, vaccine clinics, clinical care, and first responders. It is intended to, among other things, (1) deliver industry standard data to public health, **(2) investigate bioterrorism detection, (3) provide disease tracking analysis and response**, and (4) support local, state, and national data needs. It builds on existing CDC investments from HAN, NEDSS, EPI-X, LRN, and the CDC Web. The PHIN will not replace any of these systems but will provide an “umbrella” to support the interoperability of existing CDC surveillance, communications, and reporting systems. In fiscal year 2001, CDC implemented the NEDSS architecture project to replace or enhance the interoperability of its numerous existing surveillance systems. NEDSS promotes the use of data and information standards to advance the development of efficient, integrated, and interoperable surveillance systems at the federal, state, and local levels. When completed, NEDSS will electronically integrate a wide variety of surveillance activities and will facilitate more accurate and timely reporting of disease information to CDC and state and local health departments. NEDSS is also designed to reduce provider burden in the provision of information and enhance both the timeliness and quality of information provided. The NEDSS architecture will include (1) data standards, (2) an Internet-based communications infrastructure built on industry standards, and (3) policy-level agreements on data access, sharing, burden reduction, and protection of confidentiality.

A bioterrorist attack is extremely unlikely.

Department of Health ’12, State of Indiana, “Public Health Preparedness Facts,” 2012, url: http://www.in.gov/isdh/17862.htm.

How likely is **a bioterrorist attack**? An attack with bacteria or virus spread in the air **would be extremely unlikely**. Why? It is difficult to make bacteria or virus that will survive being spread through the air. Terrorists have tried unsuccessfully to attack with biologic agents in the past. Will the public be notified? When it is determined that a biologic event has occurred, notification will promptly follow. Public health authorities have been working for the past few years to educate physicians and other health care providers to recognize and report the diseases that would most likely be used in a terrorist attack. An event would most likely be recognized by local health care providers who would then notify state and federal health authorities. Not only will the public be notified, there will be frequent updates of important public health messages. Communication in any disaster, including a bioterrorism event, is of the greatest importance.

A bioterrorist attack will have a very unlikely chance of causing extinction based on two arguments:

1. Human diversity, medicine and evolutionary limits check.

Gladwell 95 [Malcolm, New York bureau chief of The Washington Post, New Republic, July 17]

This is what is wrong with the Andromeda Strain argument. Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adopt a specific strategy, but every strategy carries a corresponding cost, and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly, but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all but halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable, remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability, its essential rigidity, is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. aids is almost invariably lethal because its attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flu, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms. If there are any conclusions to be drawn about disease, they are actually the opposite of what is imagined in books such as The Hot Zone and The Coming Plague. It is true that the effect of the dramatic demographic and social changes in the world over the past few decades is to create new opportunities for disease. But they are likely to create not homogeneous patterns of disease, as humans experienced in the past, so much as heterogeneous patterns of disease. People are traveling more and living in different combinations. Gene pools that were once distinct are mixing through intermarriage. Adults who once would have died in middle age are now living into their 80s. Children with particular genetic configurations who once died at birth or in infancy are now living longer lives. If you talk to demographers, they will tell you that what they anticipate is increasing clusters of new and odd diseases moving into these new genetic and demographic niches. Rare diseases will be showing up in greater numbers. Entirely unknown diseases will emerge for the first time. But the same diversity that created them within those population subgroups will keep them there. Laurie Garrett's book is mistitled. We are not facing "the coming plague." We are facing "the coming outbreaks."

2. Self-interest means no extinction.

MacPhee and Marx 98 [Ross, American Museum of Natural History and Preston, Aaron, Diamond AIDS Research Facility, http://www.amnh.org/science/biodiversity/extinction/Day1/disease/Bit1.html]

It is well known that lethal diseases can have a profound effect on species' population size and structure. However, it is generally accepted that the principal populational effects of disease are acute--that is, short-term. In other words, although a species many suffer substantial loss from the effects of a given highly infectious disease at a given time, the facts indicate that natural populations tend to bounce back after the period of high losses. Thus, **disease as a primary cause of extinction seems implausible**. However, this is the normal case, where the disease-provoking pathogen and its host have had a long relationship. Ordinarily, it is not in the pathogens interest to rapidly kill off large numbers of individuals in its host species, because that might imperil its own survival. Disease theorists long ago expressed the idea that pathogens tend to evolve toward a "benign" state of affairs with their hosts, which means in practice that they continue to infect, but tend not to kill (or at least not rapidly). A very good reason for suspecting this to be an accurate view of pathogen-host relationships is that individuals with few or no genetic defenses against a particular pathogen will be maintained within the host population, thus ensuring the pathogen's ultimate survival.

Advantage: Competitiveness

Economic weakness spells the end of hegemony now – retrenchment’s inevitable.

Layne 12 (Christopher, Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at Texas A&M University’s Bush School of Government and Public Service, International Studies Quarterly 56, “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, p. 210) MF

US decline has profound implications for the future of international politics. Hegemonic stability theory holds that an open international economic system requires a single hegemonic power to perform critical military and economic tasks. Militarily, the hegemon is responsible for stabilizing key regions and for guarding the global commons (Posen 2003). Economically, the hegemon provides public goods by opening its domestic market to other states, supplying liquidity for the global economy, and providing a reserve currency (Kindelberger 1973; Gilpin 1975). As US power continues to decline over the next ten to fifteen years, the United States will be progressively unable to discharge these hegemonic tasks. The United States still wields preponderant military power. However, as discussed above, in the next ten to fifteen years the looming fiscal crisis **will compel Washington to retrench strategically**. As the United States’ military power diminishes, its ability to command the commons and act as a hegemonic stabilizer will be compromised. The end of the United States’ role as a military hegemon is still over horizon. How- ever, the Great Recession has made it evident that the United States no longer is an economic hegemon. **An economic hegemon is supposed to solve global economic crises, not cause them.** However, it was the freezing-up of the US financial system triggered by the sub-prime mortgage crisis that plunged the world into economic crisis. The hegemon is supposed to be the lender of last resort in the international economy. The United States, however, has become the borrower of first resort—the world’s largest debtor. When the global economy falters, the economic hegemon is supposed to take responsibility for kick-starting recovery by purchasing other nations’ goods. From World War II’s end until the Great Recession, the international economy looked to the United States as the locomotive of global economic growth. As the world’s largest market since 1945, America’s willingness to consume foreign goods has been the firewall against global economic downturns. This is not what happened during the Great Recession, however. The US economy proved too infirm to lead the global economy back to health. Others—notably a rising China—had to step up to the plate to do so. The United States’ inability to galvanize global recovery demonstrates that in key respects it no longer is capable of acting as an economic hegemon. Indeed, President Barak Obama conceded as much at the April 2009 G-20 meeting in London, where he acknowledged the United States is no longer able to be the world’s consumer of last resort, and that the world needs to look to China (and India and other emerging market states) to be the motors of global recovery. Other recent exam- ples of how relative decline and loss of economic hegemony have eroded Washington’s ‘‘agenda set- ting’’ capacity in international economic manage- ment include the US failure to achieve global economic re-balancing by compelling China to reva- lue the renminbi, and its defeat in the 2009–2010 ‘‘austerity versus stimulus’’ debate with Europe.

**Unipolarity is the most conflict-prone international system – statistics prove.**

Monteiro 11 (Nuno P., assistant professor of political science at Yale, winter 2011/12, *International Security* Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. 17-19, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful,” http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00064)

How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, 1946 to 1989, bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity.46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods. Unipolarity is the **most conflict prone** of all the systems, according to at least two important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war. This is **by far** the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was, respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percent—or more than four times higher.47 These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is peaceful.48

Unipolarity leads to preventive wars.

Monteiro 11 (Nuno P. Monteiro, assistant professor of political science at Yale, winter 2011/12, *International Security* Vol. 36, No. 3, pp. p. 26-27, “Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful,” http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/ISEC\_a\_00064)

Defensive dominance, however, also gives the unipole reason to oppose any such revisions to the status quo. First, such revisions decrease the benefits of systemic leadership and limit the unipole’s ability to convert its relative power advantage into favorable outcomes. In the case of nuclear weapons, this limitation is all but irreversible, virtually guaranteeing the recalcitrant regime immunity against any attempt to coerce or overthrow it. Second, proliferation has the potential to produce regional instability, raising the risk of arms races. These would force the unipole to increase defense spending or accept a narrower overall relative power advantage. Third, proliferation would lead to the emergence of a recalcitrant major power that could become the harbinger of an unwanted large-scale balancing attempt. The unipole is therefore likely to demand that recalcitrant minor powers not revise the status quo. The latter, however, will want to resist such demands because of the threat they pose to those states’ security.74 Whereas fighting over such demands would probably lead to defeat, conceding to them peacefully would bring the undesired outcome with certainty. A preventive war is therefore likely to ensue.

Advantage: Disaster Response

Growth solves

Kenny 12 (Charles Kenny, senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, a Schwartz fellow at the New America Foundation, 4/9/12, "Not Too Hot to Handle," Foreign Policy, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/09/not\_too\_hot\_to\_handle)

Again, while climate change will make extreme weather events and natural disasters like flooding and hurricanes more common, the negative effect on global quality of life will be reduced if economies continue to grow. That's because, as Matthew Kahn from Tufts University has shown, the safest place to suffer a natural disaster is in a rich country. The more money that people and governments have, the more they can both afford and enforce building codes, land use regulations, and public infrastructure like flood defenses that lower death tolls.

**Humans are already adapting to climate change**

Biello (Environmental specialist staff writer for the Scientific American) 2012

(David, “How to Adapt to Climate Change,” 60-Second Earth, Energy & Sustainability, May 6, 2012, <http://www.scientificamerican.com/podcast/episode.cfm?id=how-to-adapt-to-climate-change-12-05-06>) //CL

For want of a mangrove, the village was lost. In fact, the loss of coastal mangroves made even a costly dyke along the Vietnamese seashore inadequate to cope with a recent typhoon. Plus, the absence of mangroves hit livelihoods—less seafood to catch. But one village had painstakingly replanted mangroves, scraping barnacles off the seedlings to ensure they took root. In return, those mangroves protected the village from the typhoon that devastated the rest of the coast. This is not a fable, it's a tale of how people are already adapting to climate change, as revealed at the International Institute for Environment and Development's sixth conference on community-based adaptation to climate change held in Vietnam in April. Farmers are trying to adapt, too. Whether by growing ginger in the shade of banana fronds in Southeast Asia or planting millet beneath new trees in the Sahel region of Africa. Those who can't adapt have to move, like Alaskans whose coastal towns have been undermined by severe winds or waves. Or whose water sources have been infiltrated by brine.

**Humans will adapt to a climate-changed world - empirics**

McDermott (Science and Climate Change staff writer for the Discovery Network sub-site Treehugger) 2012

Mat, “Exxon's CEO is Right, We Will Adapt to Climate Change,” June 29, 2012, <http://www.treehugger.com/climate-change/exxons-ceo-right-we-will-adapt-climate-change.html>) //CL

(Image Caption: Unprecedented wildfires are burning in the American west. What does big oil have to say about climate change? “We have spent our entire existence adapting. We’ll adapt.” – ExxonMobil CEO Red Tillerson, 6/27/12) I'm a day late to this image above and the social media outrage around it, but I've been thinking, and unfortunately ExxonMobil's CEO is right. That's the unfashionable thing to say in green circles, but he is right. Humanity has spent its time on this planet adapting. Both adapting the world we inhabit to meet our needs, on various timescales and over various areas of the globe, as well as adapting to the local conditions under which we live. And, we will adapt to climate change. But nevertheless, the statement is obfuscation of the highest order; it is literally true but contextually entirely false. And it is there where it's deep insidiousness resides. How many humans the planet can support in a world that is 2°C, 3°C, 4-6°C warmer on average—with all the ecosystem, biodiversity, agricultural changes that brings—is a very much open question. The odds are solidly in favor of far less than it now does, just because of climate change, ignoring resource overconsumption and population growth. Which is all to say, that while humanity will adapt to a climate changed world is true, there is no doubt that climate change will create, in comparison to today, let alone a pre-industrial, lower population world, a world that is less bountiful, prone to more extremes of temperature and weather in many places, less fecund—and since we're talking about human adaptation, more difficult to live in and less conducive to human civilization.

Advantage: Hazardous Materials

Chemical warfare highly unlikely.

Tucker ’01, Jonathan B. Tucker directs the CBW (Chemical and Biological Weapons) Nonproliferation Project at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, which is part of the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California. He has written a few books, including Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons. Amy Sands is the Associate Director of the Center and director of its Monitoring Proliferation Threats Project, April 2001, url: http://www.enotes.com/biological-chemical-article/terrorists-would-unlikely-use-biological-chemical.

Despite the few instances in recent years of terrorists employing biological and chemical weapons, it is an extremely uncommon phenomenon. The history of terrorist activities over the last several decades indicates that most extremist groups have neither the motivation nor capabilities to employ such weapons. Examining historical incidents indicates that terrorists seem to prefer the immediate drama of conventional explosions over the drawn-out consequences associated with biological or chemical agents.

Their first solvency card, SADP ’10, says nothing about ITS – in fact, this card is to their disadvantage because it shows that the squo solves.

Hazmat accident unlikely – empirics prove.

Railroads have an outstanding track record in safely delivering hazardous materials -- 99.998 percent of all rail cars containing hazardous materials arrived at destination safely, without any release due to an accident. In fact, the rail hazmat accident rate has declined by 88 percent from 1980 to 2007 and 39 percent since 1990. Railroads and trucks carry roughly equal hazmat ton-mileage, but trucks have 16 times more hazmat releases than railroads (Hazmat, nd). Statistically, railroads are the safer form of transportation for hazardous materials.

Advantage: Computational Science

**Warming isn’t real. Earth is actually getting colder - disproves anthropogenic warming**

**Klimenko 11** (RAS Klimenko, Moscow Power Engineering Institute, 2011, "Why is Global Warming Slowing Down?," *Doklady Earth Sciences*, Vol. 440(2))

The first decade of the present century has ended with a remarkable climatic event: for the first time over the past 65 years, the fiveyear average global temper ature over 2006–2010 turned out to be lower than the value for the previous fiveyear interval (2001–2005). In addition, the absolute maximum temperature, which was attained as long ago as in 1998, has not been surpassed for thirteen years. Both these facts seem ingly support the arguments of the opponents of global warming theory, at least those who regard the anthro pogenic origin of warming questionable or even far fetched. Indeed, the anthropogenic emission of car bon dioxide, which is the major greenhouse atmo spheric component, has risen by 60% from 5.2 giga tons to 8.5 gigatons of carbon, and its concentration has increased from 339 to 390 ppmv (parts per million by volume). How then do we explain the apparent slowdown in the rate of global warming? Evidently, the observed global rise in temperature (Fig. 1) is a response of the climatic system to the combined action of both anthropogenic and natural impacts. Some of the latter are precisely the factors responsible for the current climatic paradox. Further, we will attempt to identify these factors and, based on their analysis, forecast the global climatic trends for the next decades. Figure 2 presents the wavelet spectra yielded by continuously analyzing the time series of global tem perature over 1850–2011 [1]. Here, we analyze only one of three existing global temperature datasets which are continuously updated, namely the HadCRUT3 temperature series provided by the Uni versity of East Anglia (accessible at http://www.cru. uea.ac.uk/cru/data/temperature/), because this is, as of now, the only dataset covering more than a 150year interval, which is crucial for our study. We note that it only recently became possible to analyze such long time series and, thus, identification of multidecade rhythms became a solvable task. The temperature data were preliminarily rid of the longterm anthropogenic trend associated with the accumulation of greenhouse gases and aerosols in the atmosphere; this trend was calculated from the energybalance climate model developed at the Moscow Power Engineering Institute (MPEI) [2]. The resulting temperature series, free of anthropogenic trends, will contain important infor mation on the influence of natural factors. Figure 2 shows that, throughout the entire interval of instrumental observations since the mid nineteenth century, the data contain rather stable 70year and 20year cyclic components. A less significant 9year cycle was present in most observations (during 1870– 1900 and 1940–2000), and a 6year cycle persisted over a considerable part of the entire time span. Closely consistent results were also obtained when analyzing the temperature series by the maximum entropy method (MEM) (Fig. 3). As the order of the auroregression (AR) method is known to significantly affect the result, in our case this parameter was chosen to be onethird the length of the studied data series: according to the long experience in application of MEM in climate research, this value is suitable for providing useful information. All the harmonic com ponents identified above are statistically significant with a confidence level of 90%. Supposedly, the source of the dominant 70year cycle is the North Atlantic, where this harmonic is reliably identified not only in the ocean [3–5] but also on the continental margins: in Greenland [6], England [7], Finland [8], at the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago, and on the Yamal Peninsula [9]. More over, this periodical component is not only recognized in the instrumental data but it is also revealed in the time series of paleotemperature and pressure which date back to over hundreds and even thousands of years ago. We believe that this rhythm is associated with the quasiperiodical changes in the atmospheric and oceanic circulation known as the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) and with the related pulsations in the advection of warm waters to the basins of the Nor wegian and Barents seas. Indeed, the time series of the NAO index contain an approximately 60to 70year component [10] and show a strong positive correlation with the time series of temperature in the Northern hemisphere [11].

A bioterrorist attack is extremely unlikely.

Department of Health ’12, State of Indiana, “Public Health Preparedness Facts,” 2012, url: http://www.in.gov/isdh/17862.htm.

How likely is **a bioterrorist attack**? An attack with bacteria or virus spread in the air **would be extremely unlikely**. Why? It is difficult to make bacteria or virus that will survive being spread through the air. Terrorists have tried unsuccessfully to attack with biologic agents in the past. Will the public be notified? When it is determined that a biologic event has occurred, notification will promptly follow. Public health authorities have been working for the past few years to educate physicians and other health care providers to recognize and report the diseases that would most likely be used in a terrorist attack. An event would most likely be recognized by local health care providers who would then notify state and federal health authorities. Not only will the public be notified, there will be frequent updates of important public health messages. Communication in any disaster, including a bioterrorism event, is of the greatest importance.

A bioterrorist attack will have a very unlikely chance of causing extinction based on two arguments:

1. Human diversity, medicine and evolutionary limits check.

Gladwell 95 [Malcolm, New York bureau chief of The Washington Post, New Republic, July 17]

This is what is wrong with the Andromeda Strain argument. Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adopt a specific strategy, but every strategy carries a corresponding cost, and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly, but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all but halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable, remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability, its essential rigidity, is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. aids is almost invariably lethal because its attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flu, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms. If there are any conclusions to be drawn about disease, they are actually the opposite of what is imagined in books such as The Hot Zone and The Coming Plague. It is true that the effect of the dramatic demographic and social changes in the world over the past few decades is to create new opportunities for disease. But they are likely to create not homogeneous patterns of disease, as humans experienced in the past, so much as heterogeneous patterns of disease. People are traveling more and living in different combinations. Gene pools that were once distinct are mixing through intermarriage. Adults who once would have died in middle age are now living into their 80s. Children with particular genetic configurations who once died at birth or in infancy are now living longer lives. If you talk to demographers, they will tell you that what they anticipate is increasing clusters of new and odd diseases moving into these new genetic and demographic niches. Rare diseases will be showing up in greater numbers. Entirely unknown diseases will emerge for the first time. But the same diversity that created them within those population subgroups will keep them there. Laurie Garrett's book is mistitled. We are not facing "the coming plague." We are facing "the coming outbreaks."

2. Self-interest means no extinction.

MacPhee and Marx 98 [Ross, American Museum of Natural History and Preston, Aaron, Diamond AIDS Research Facility, http://www.amnh.org/science/biodiversity/extinction/Day1/disease/Bit1.html]

It is well known that lethal diseases can have a profound effect on species' population size and structure. However, it is generally accepted that the principal populational effects of disease are acute--that is, short-term. In other words, although a species many suffer substantial loss from the effects of a given highly infectious disease at a given time, the facts indicate that natural populations tend to bounce back after the period of high losses. Thus, **disease as a primary cause of extinction seems implausible**. However, this is the normal case, where the disease-provoking pathogen and its host have had a long relationship. Ordinarily, it is not in the pathogens interest to rapidly kill off large numbers of individuals in its host species, because that might imperil its own survival. Disease theorists long ago expressed the idea that pathogens tend to evolve toward a "benign" state of affairs with their hosts, which means in practice that they continue to infect, but tend not to kill (or at least not rapidly). A very good reason for suspecting this to be an accurate view of pathogen-host relationships is that individuals with few or no genetic defenses against a particular pathogen will be maintained within the host population, thus ensuring the pathogen's ultimate survival.

ITS 2NC – Topicality

AT: Communications vs. Transportation Infrastructure

“Communications” is a distinct category of infrastructure --- it’s massive

Faulkenberry 11

(Ken, MBA – University of Southern California, “Infrastructure Investment: Energy, Transportation, Communications, & Utilities”, Arbor Asset Allocation Model Portfolio Blog, September, http://blog.arborinvestmentplanner.com/2011/09/infrastructure-investment-energy-transportation-communications-utilities/)

Transportation Infrastructure Over the last several decades America’s infrastructure spending has been less than one-half other developed nations and only a quarter of emerging market countries. Civil engineers give our transport structures low marks. Our roads, railways, ports, and airports are all judged mediocre. It has become well recognized that we must invest more in upgrading our transportation infrastructure. But because of the years of neglect, substantial increases in operation and maintenance budgets will also be required. The above engineering and construction firms could also benefit from transportation infrastructure spending. Communications Infrastructure Communications infrastructure would include items we take for granted everyday, such as the internet, telephone, television (including cable TV), and satellite technology. Individual companies such as Cisco (CSCO) (internet) AT&T (T) and Verizon (VZ) (telephone), Comcast (CMCSA) (television), Boeing (BA) and Loral Space & Communications (LORL) (satellites), all play major roles in developing the communications infrastructure.

Err Negative

You should err neg on topicality and prefer Negative strategy to Affirmative ground – the Aff has structural advantages to create their Affirmative, the ability to choose a strategic area of the topic for the 1AC, and the first and last speech which already give them an advantage – they should be held to the reciprocal burden of providing an acceptable amount of predictable negative ground.

ITS 2NC – States CP

AT: Fed Key

Most states are already uniformly using ITS in their infrastructures.

Row ’12, Director of Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office Research and Innovative Technology Administration, US Department of Transportation, 91st Transportation Research Board (TRB) Annual Meeting, “The State of Intelligent Transportation Systems Industry,” 23-01-2012, url: www.its.dot.gov/presentations/pdf/TRB\_2012\_SRow%20\_SJR.pdf.

ITS Deployment Then and Now: Transit Management, Electronic Fare Collection, Commercial Vehicles. 50 states & District of Columbia deployed: Safety information exchange, Electronic credentialing & screening. 33 states - Exchanging credential data via CVIEW/SAFER. 28 States - Core CVISN Deployed. 40 states have electronic screening systems at over 360 weigh stations with 70,000 participating trucking companies and about 500,000 transponder-equipped trucks.

And, only the states can implement ITS.

**ITS/JPO Advisory Committee ’10,** Research and Innovation Technology Administration, US Department of Transportation, “Advisory memo to the USDOT,” 06-08-2010, url: http://www.its.dot.gov/itspac/meetings/advisory\_memo.htm.

The Federal/States Interface - A major challenge within the US transportation system is the relative responsibility for implementation by the Federal Government and the States.  While the Federal Government cannot drive implementation other than by cooperation by the States, it can provide the leadership and incentives to accelerate State implementation, and it certainly can track deployment success.  Only by tracking ultimate deployment can we learn which programs and initiatives are effective and successful.  JPO has a vital role to play here.  How can it best contribute to making this relationship more effective?

AT: 50 State Fiat Bad

The 50 state fiat is legitimate because it exercises the neg’s right to test all parts of the aff.

There is literature on the 50 states performing the ITS plan as shown by our Row ’12 and USDOT ’98 evidence.

This counterplan provides for critical civic education because state power vs. federal power has been a major issue since the creation of America and even in instances before its creation (ref. the three estates).

The aff gets to fiat actions through all three branches of the federal government – fiating that all 100 senators will agree on an issue is just as utopian as all 50 states agreeing on an issue.

The judge can act as an intermediary actor between the federal government and the states, and this exists in the real world, exemplified today by the Supreme Court ruling on the states v. the federal government on Obamacare.

ITS 2NC – Elections

AT: Obama Won’t Win

#### Obama will win the election – approval trends correlate

**Silver 7/11** (Silver, Nate, runs Five Thirty Eight NY Times Blog, 07/11/12, Five Thirty Eight NY Times Blog, July 11: Has Anything Changed in the Presidential Race?, http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/july-11-has-anything-changed-in-the-presidential-race/)

On the surface, Wednesday seemed to be a pretty good polling day for President Obama. The latest five state polls, including those in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, showed him ahead of Mitt Romney by a margin of at least six points. But our presidential forecast was unmoved – literally. It gives Mr. Obama a 66.1 percent chance of being re-elected, exactly the same number as on Tuesday. Why no change? The reason is pretty simple: the polls were broadly in line with the model’s previous expectations, which had Mr. Obama as a seven-point favorite in Wisconsin, for instance, and five points ahead in Pennsylvania. There were also polls out in Maine and New Mexico, states that sometimes get talked up as battlegrounds, but really aren’t. The model already had Mr. Obama ahead by 14 points and by 12 points in those states. Mr. Obama should be pleased with Wednesday’s polls in one sense. The polls no more than match the model’s expectations. But the model has Mr. Obama a little bit ahead in the national race, putting him up by around two points in the popular vote over Mr. Romney and projecting him to 294 electoral votes to Mr. Romney’s 244. In other words, Wednesday’s polling was consistent with the hypothesis that a Mr. Obama has a small lead in the race. That contrasts with national, but not necessarily state, polls on Tuesday that seemed to show more of a straight-up tie.

#### National polls are the best indicator of the winner. It deals with outliers and partisan hackery.

**Bernstein**, 7/8/**2012** (Jonathan – political scientist who contributes to the Washington Post blogs Plum Line and PostPartisan, Five myths about swing states, Tampa Bay Times, p. <http://www.tampabay.com/news/perspective/five-myths-about-swing-states/1239046>)

1 Swing-state polls are the key to predicting the winner. In fact, the opposite is true, especially this far from November. Generally, elections are determined by a "uniform swing." That is, if the Republican candidate does a little better overall, then he's going to do a little better in close states such as Ohio and Nevada, too. So even though the candidates will spend most of their time and money in the states they expect to matter most, it won't make much difference. Any candidate who wins the popular vote by at least 3 percentage points is certain to win the electoral college, and any candidate who wins the popular vote by as much as a full percentage point is overwhelmingly likely to win the electoral college. So the best way to follow the election is to read the national polling averages. National polls have a key advantage: There are a lot more of them, so we're less likely to be fooled by the occasional outlier. And the frequency of national polls, conducted by the same handful of firms, means informed readers can catch any obvious partisan tilts in the results and interpret them accordingly.

AT: No Public Backlash

#### The public distrusts claims that transportation spending is needed

Orski, 2/5/2012 (Ken – public policy consultant at the Urban Mobility Corporation, Why Pleas to Increase Infrastructure Funding Fall on Deaf Ears, New Geography, p. <http://www.newgeography.com/content/002662-why-pleas-increase-infrastructure-funding-fall-deaf-ears>)

Another explanation, and one that I find highly plausible, has been offered by Charles Lane, editorial writer for the Washington Post. Wrote Lane in an October 31, 2011 Washington Post column, "How come my family and I traveled thousands of miles on both the east and west coast last summer without actually seeing any crumbling roads or airports? On the whole, the highways and byways were clean, safe and did not remind me of the Third World countries. ... Should I believe the pundits or my own eyes?" asked Lane ("The U.S. infrastructure argument that crumbles upon examination"). Along with Lane, I think the American public is skeptical about alarmist claims of "crumbling infrastructure" because they see no evidence of it around them. State DOTs and transit authorities take great pride in maintaining their systems in good condition and, by and large, they succeed in doing a good job of it. Potholes are rare, transit buses and trains seldom break down, and collapsing bridges, happily, are few and far between. The oft-cited "D" that the American Society of Civil Engineers has given America’s infrastructure (along with an estimate of $2.2 trillion needed to fix it) is taken with a grain of salt, says Lane, since the engineers’ lobby has a vested interest in increasing infrastructure spending, which means more work for engineers. Suffering from the same credibility problem are the legions of road and transit builders, rail and road equipment manufacturers, construction firms, planners and consultants that **try to make a case for more money**.

#### Despite support for infrastructure, the public distrusts that funding will go to useful projects.

Slone, September 2009 (Sean – Transportation Policy Analyst at the Council of State Governments, Increasing Public Awareness of Infrastructure Costs & Finance, p. http://www.csg.org/knowledgecenter/docs/TIA\_infrastructure\_cost.pdf)

In a study earlier this year commissioned by the HNTB Corporation, a firm that provides architecture, engineering, planning and construction services, 81 percent of Americans surveyed said they agreed that making sacrifices to pay for infrastructure improvements now will make the difference between “a more prosperous or a more difficult future for the next generation.” Sixty-eight percent of respondents said they were willing to pay more in taxes to support highway and bridge maintenance and new construction to reduce traffic congestion. But how much more will Americans pay? The survey said the average American is willing to pay $22 a month to reduce the time spent in traffic by 20 percent. The survey further indicated more Americans trust state government above the federal or city governments and private sector companies to manage and maintain infrastructure projects. Yet 61 percent of respondents said they were not confident taxes they pay to build roads in their area are used well and actually make a difference. 4 That distrust in how tax dollars are spent is not helped by the public perception of what happened the last time Congress considered a transportation authorization bill, according to Washington State Secretary of Transportation Paula Hammond “All anybody remembers (from 2005’s SAFETEA-LU bill) was the ‘bridge to nowhere’ and earmarked funding for something that people have decided—whether it’s true or not—is a waste of money,” said Hammond, who chairs AASHTO’s National Transportation Marketing Campaign Task Force and is a member of The Council of State Governments Transportation Policy Task Force.

AT: Romney Won’t Strike

#### Romney election results in Iran strikes --- Obama reelection defuses the situation with diplomacy

Daily Kos, 4/16/2012 (President Obama versus Romney on Iran, p. <http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/04/16/1083726/-President-Obama-versus-Romney-on-Iran>)

3. Approach to foreign policy: Romney says he will “not apologize” for America and advocates a return to the Bush cowboy “my way or the highway” approach to dealing with other nations. When John Bolton is an endorser, that scares me. To me, however the biggest contrast is their approach to Iran. Binyamin Netanyahu by all accounts is a hawk who is pushing the United States to bomb Iran and has been doing so for a long time. He appears to see no need for negotiation. Granted, he has a right to protect his nation if he believes that its under threat. However, we all know how flawed the “intelligence” was for the Iraq war. And its important to let negotiations play out as far as possible before rushing to war, which would have many unintended consequences for years to come. (See the Iraq war). Here’s the big difference. Here’s Netanyahu’s recent response to the ongoing P5+1 talks: http://news.yahoo.com/... Netanyahu -- whose government has not ruled out a preemptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities -- earlier said however that Tehran had simply bought itself some extra time to comply. "My initial impression is that Iran has been given a 'freebie'," Netanyahu said during talks with visiting US Senator Joe Lieberman, the premier's office reported. "It has got five weeks to continue enrichment without any limitation, any inhibition. I think Iran should take immediate steps to stop all enrichment, take out all enrichment material and dismantle the nuclear facility in Qom," he said. "I believe that the world's greatest practitioner of terrorism must not have the opportunity to develop atomic bombs," he said. Here’s President Obama’s response yesterday to Netanyahu (in a response to a journalist's question) at the press conference in Cartagena: But Obama refuted that statement, saying "The notion that we've given something away or a freebie would indicate that Iran has gotten something." "In fact, they got the toughest sanctions that they're going to be facing coming up in a few months if they don't take advantage of those talks. I hope they do," Obama said. "The clock is ticking and I've been very clear to Iran and our negotiating partners that we're not going to have these talks just drag out in a stalling process," Obama told reporters after an Americas summit in Colombia."But so far at least we haven't given away anything -- other than the opportunity for us to negotiate," he said. Obama in conjunction with world powers is negotiating with Iran, trying to prevent a needless war. You can be sure that Mitt Romney would bow to his buddy Netanyahu and attack Iran. He has previously said “We will not have an **inch of difference between ourselves and Israel**”. As he also said in a debate, before making any decision regarding Israel, he will call his friend Bibi. Bottom line, if somehow the American people elect Mitt Romney, expect more of the bombastic, Bush cowboy approach to foreign policy with a more than likely bombardment of Iran. If the American people are not fooled by this charlatan and they reelect Barack Obama, he will continue in his measured way to deal with the threats around the world, quietly, through the use of negotiation, and force if absolutely necessary, but only as a last resort, without bragging, and scaring the American people with needless terrorism alerts.

Iran strikes escalates to a nuclear world war.

Chossudovsky, 12/26/2011 (Michel, Preparing to attack Iran with Nuclear Weapons, Global Research, p. http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=28355)

An attack on Iran would have devastating consequences, It would unleash an all out regional war from the Eastern Mediterranean to Central Asia, potentially **leading humanity into a World War III** Scenario. The Obama Administration constitutes a nuclear threat. NATO constitutes a nuclear threat Five European "non-nuclear states" (Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Turkey) with tactical nuclear weapons deployed under national command, to be used against Iran constitute a nuclear threat. The Israeli government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not only constitutes a nuclear threat, but also a threat to the security of people of Israel, who are misled regarding the implications of an US-Israeli attack on Iran. The complacency of Western public opinion --including segments of the US anti-war movement-- is disturbing. No concern has been expressed at the political level as to the likely consequences of a US-NATO-Israel attack on Iran, using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state. Such an action would result in "the unthinkable": a nuclear holocaust over a large part of the Middle East.

ITS 2NC – Security K

Impact: Serial Policy Failure

Their reliance on security suffers from serial policy failure – and the attendant endless production of new threats to be countered creates an endless politics of war

Dillon and Reed 09 (IR professor @ Lancaster University; Lecturer @ King’s College London, “The Liberal Way of Killing: Killing to Make Live”)

There is, third, the additional critical attribute of contingency. It is this feature which does not merely add governing through contingency to the political rationalities and governmental technologies of contemporary liberal rule. It lends its own distinctive infection to them; one which has had a profound impact on the nature of liberal rule and war in relation, especially, to its current hyperbolicization of security and its newly problematized and proliferating accounts of dangers, threats and enemies. For if the biopolitical imperative is that of making life live, the martial expression of that imperative, the drive to liberal war, is preparedness to make war on the enemies of life. The biopoltiical imperative to make life live finds its expression today, however in making life live the emergency of its emergence; for that is what species life is now said to be. The liberal way of rule and war has thus become the preparedness to make war on whatever threatens life’s capacity to live the emergency of its emergence. For allied to the radical contingency of species existence is an account of species existence as a life of continuous complex adaptation and emergence. From the perspective of security and war, in particular, such a pluripotent life, characterized by its continuously unfolding potential, is a life that is continuously becoming-dangerous to itself, and to other life forms. Such danger is not merely actual; because life itself, here has become not merely actual. The emphasis in the problematization of danger which accompanies such a politics of life itself therefore also shifts dramatically from the actual to the virtual. Only this explains the astonishing degree to which the historically secure lives of the Atlantic basin have come to construe themselves, politically, as radically endangered by as many unknown as there are unknowable dangers; a point regularly and frankly admitted, officially, from terror to health mandarins, nationally and internationally. Many have observed that the societies of the Atlantic basin are now increasingly ruled by fear; that there is a politics of fear. But they interpret this politics of fear in political naïve ways, as the outcome of deliberate machination by political and economic elites. They may well be correct to some degree. But what is perfectly evident, also, is that the elites themselves are governed by the very grid of intelligibility furnished by the account of life as an emergency of emergence. It is not simply a matter, therefore, of leaders playing on fears. The leadership itself is in the grip of a conjugation of government and rule whose very generative principle of formation is permanent emergency. In other words, fear is no longer simply an affect open to regular manipulation by leadership cadres. It is, but it is not only that, and not even most importantly that. More importantly (because this is not a condition that can be resolved simply by ‘throwing the rascals out’) in the permanent emergency of emergence, fear becomes a generative principle of formation for rule. The emergency of emergence therefore poses a found crisis in western understandings of the political, and in the hopes and expectations invested in political as opposed to other forms of life. Given the wealth and given the vast military preponderance in weapons of mass destruction and other forms of global deployed military capabilities of the societies of the Atlantic basin, notably, of course, the United States, this poses a world crisis as well. In short, then, this complex adaptive emergent life exists in the permanent state of emergence. Its politics of security and war, which is to say its very foundational politics of rule as well, now revolve around this state of emergency. Here, that in virtue of which a ‘we’ comes to belong together, its very generative principle of formation (our shorthand definition of politics), has become this emergency. What happens, we also therefore ask of the biopoliticization of rule, when emergency becomes the generative principle of formation of community and rule? Our answer has already been given. Politics becomes subject to the urgent and compelling political economy, the logistical and technical dynamics, of war. No longer a ‘we’ in virtue of abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by the rule of the emergency itself; and that is where the political crisis, the crisis of the political itself is that a ‘we’ can belong together not only in terms of agreeing to abide by the rule of its generative principles of formation but also by the willingness to keep the nature of operation of those generative principles of formation under common deliberative scrutiny. **You cannot, however, debate emergency. You can only interrogate the futile demand it makes on you**, and all the episteme challenges it poses, acceding to those demands according both to how well you can come to know them, and how well you have also adapted you affects to suffering them, or perish. The very exigencies of emergency thus militate profoundly against the promise of ‘politics’ as it has been commonly understood in the western tradition; not simply as a matter of rule, but as a matter of self-rule in which it was possible to debate the nature of the self in terms of the good for and of the self. Note, also, how much the very idea of the self has disappeared from view in this conflation of life with species life. The only intelligence, the only self-knowledge, the only culture which qualifies in the permanence of this emergency is the utilitarian and instrumental technologies said to be necessary to endure it. We have been here before in the western tradition and we have experienced the challenges of this condition as tyranny (Arendt 1968). The emergency of emergence, the generative principle of formation, the referential matrix of contemporary biopolitics globally, is a newly formed, pervasive and insidiously complex, soft totalitarian regime of power relations made all the more difficult to contest precisely because, governing through the contingent emergency of emergence, it is a governing through the transactional freedoms of contingency.

AT: Perm

The plan cannot be detached from its discursive underpinnings. The noble effort to restrict violence is enframed by a larger structure of security logic that writes the effort into a broader system of hegemonic power and economic domination.

Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘7 [*Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence*, p. 3-4]

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1

It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis **relate not only to the** most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, **but also to their available** (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, **but also their mainstream critique**s - whether they take the form **of liberal policy approaches** in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement **about major concepts**, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically **wards off critique.**

AT: Cede the Political

Turn – our poststructuralist stance is the only effective political strategy – the political has already been ceded to the right – broadening the scope of politics is key to effective engagement.

Grondin 4 [David, master of pol sci and PHD of political studies @ U of Ottowa “(Re)Writing the “National Security State”: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War,” http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/rewriting\_national\_security\_state.pdf]

A poststructuralist approach to international relations reassesses the nature of the political. Indeed, it calls for the **repoliticization of** practices of world **politics** that have been treated as if they were not political. For instance, limiting the ontological elements in one’s inquiry to states or great powers is a political choice. As Jenny Edkins puts it, we need to “bring the political back in” (Edkins, 1998: xii). For most analysts of International Relations, the conception of the “political” is **narrowly restricted to politics as practiced by politicians**. However, from a poststructuralist viewpoint, the “political” acquires a **broader meaning,** especially since practice is not what most theorists are describing as practice. Poststructuralism sees theoretical discourse not only as discourse, but also as political practice. Theory therefore becomes practice. The political space of poststructuralism is not that of exclusion; it is the political space of postmodernity, a dichotomous one, where one thing always signifies at least one thing and another (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 14). **Poststructuralism** thus **gives primacy to the political**, sinceit acts on us, while we act in its name, and leads us to identify and differentiate ourselves from others. This political act is never complete and celebrates undecidability, whereas decisions, when taken, express the political moment. It is a critical attitude which encourages dissidence from traditional approaches (Ashley and Walker, 1990a and 1990b). It does not represent one single philosophical approach or perspective, nor is it an alternative paradigm (Tvathail, 1996: 172). It is a nonplace, a border line falling between international and domestic politics (Ashley, 1989). The poststructuralist analyst questions the borderlines and dichotomies of modernist discourses, such as inside/outside, the constitution of the Self/Other, and so on. In the act of definition, difference – thereby the discourse of otherness – is highlighted, since one always defines an object with regard to what it is not (Knafo, 2004). As Simon Dalby asserts, “It involves the social construction of some other person, group, culture, race, nationality or political system as different from ‘our’ person, group, etc. Specifying difference is a linguistic, epistemological and, most importantly, a political act; it constructs a space for the other distanced and inferior from the vantage point of the person specifying the difference” (Dalby, cited in Tvathail, 1996: 179). Indeed, poststructuralism offers no definitive answers, but leads to new questions and new unexplored grounds. This makes the commitment to the incomplete nature of the political and of political analysis so central to poststructuralism (Finlayson and Valentine, 2002: 15). As Jim George writes, “It is postmodern resistance in the sense that while it is directly (and sometimes violently) engaged with modernity, it seeks to go beyond the repressive, closed aspects of modernist global existence. It is, therefore, not a resistance of traditional grand-scale emancipation or conventional radicalism imbued with authority of one or another sovereign presence. Rather, in opposing the large-scale brutality and inequity in human society, it is a resistance active also at the everyday, community, neighbourhood, and interpersonal levels, where it confronts those processes that **systematically exclude people from making decisions about who they are and what they can be**” (George, 1994: 215, emphasis in original). In this light, poststructural practices are used critically to investigate how the subject of international relations is constituted in and through the discourses and texts of global politics. Treating theory as discourse opens up the possibility of historicizing it. It is a myth that theory can be abstracted from its socio-historical context, from reality, so to speak, as neorealists and neoclassical realists believe. It is a political practice which needs to be contextualized and stripped of its purportedly neutral status. It must be understood with respect to its role in **preserving and reproducing the structures and power relations present in all language forms.** Dominant theories are, in this view, dominant discourses that shape our view of the world (the “subject”) and our ways of understanding it.

The political has already been ceded – try or die for the alternative.

Grondin 4 [David, master of pol sci and PHD of political studies @ U of Ottowa “(Re)Writing the “National Security State”: How and Why Realists (Re)Built the(ir) Cold War,” http://www.er.uqam.ca/nobel/ieim/IMG/pdf/rewriting\_national\_security\_state.pdf]

As American historian of U.S. foreign relations Michael Hogan observes in his study on the rise of the national security state during the Truman administration, “the national security ideology framed the Cold War discourse in a system of symbolic representation that defined America’s national identity by reference to the un-American ‘other,’ usually the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, or some other totalitarian power” (Hogan, 1998: 17). Such a binary system made it difficult for any domestic dissent from U.S. policy to emerge – it would have “amounted to an act of disloyalty” (Hogan, 1998: 18).15While Hogan distinguishes advocates from critics of the American national security state, his view takes for granted that there is a given and fixed American political culture that differs from the “new” national security ideology. It posits an “American way”, produced by its cultural, political, and historical experience. Although he stresses that differences between the two sides of the discourse are superficial, pertaining solely to the means, rather than the ends of the national security state, Hogan sees the national security state as a finished and legitimate state: an American state suited to the Cold War context of permanent war, while stopping short of a garrison state: Although government would grow larger, taxes would go up, and budget deficits would become a matter of routine, none of these and other transformations would add up to the crushing regime symbolized in the metaphor of the garrison state. The outcome instead would be an American national security state that was shaped as much by the country’s democratic political culture as it was by the perceived military imperatives of the Cold War (Hogan, 1998: 22). I disagree with this essentialist view of the state identity of the United States. The United States does not need to be a national security state. If it was and is still constructed as such by many realist discourses, it is because these discourses serve some political purpose. Moreover, in keeping with my poststructuralist inclinations, I maintain that **identity need not be, and indeed never is, fixed**. In a scheme in which “to say is to do”, that is, from a perspective that accepts the performativity of language, culture becomes a relational site where identity politics happens rather than being a substantive phenomenon. In this sense, culture is not simply a social context framing foreign policy decision-making. Culture is “a signifying part of the conditions of possibility for social being, […] the way in which culturalist arguments themselves secure the identity of subjects in whose name they speak” (Campbell, 1998:221). The Cold War national security culture represented in realist discourses was constitutive of the American national security state. There was certainly a conflation of theory and policy in the Cold War military-intellectual complex, which “were observers of, and active participants in, defining the meaning of the Cold War. They contributed to portray the enemy that both reflected and fueled predominant ideological strains within the American body politic. As scholarly partners in the national security state, they were instrumental in defining and disseminating a Cold War culture” (Rubin, 2001: 15). This national security culture was “a complex space where various representations and representatives of the national security state compete to draw the boundaries and dominate the murkier margins of international relations” (Der Derian, 1992: 41). The same Cold War security culture has been maintained by political practice (on the part of realist analysts and political leaders) through realist discourses in the post-9/11 era and once again **reproduces the idea of a national security state.** This (implicit) state identification is neither accidental nor inconsequential. From a poststructuralist vantage point, the identification process of the state and the nation is always a negative process for it is achieved by exclusion, violence, and margina-lization. Thus, a deconstruction of practices that constitute and consolidate state identity is **necessary:** the writing of the state must be revealed through the analysis of the discourses that constitute it. The state and the discourses that (re)constitute it thus frame its very identity and impose a fictitious “**national unity” on society**; it is from this fictive and arbitrary creation of the modernist dichotomous discourses of inside/outside that the discourses (re)constructing the state emerge. It is in the creation of a Self and an Other in which the state uses it monopolistic power of legitimate violence – a power socially constructed, following Max Weber’s work on the ethic of responsibility – to construct a threatening Other differentiated from the “unified” Self, the national society (the nation).16 It is through this very practice of normative statecraft,17 which produces threatening Others, that the international sphere comes into being. David Campbell adds that it is by constantly articulating danger through foreign policy that the state’s very conditions of existence are generated18.

We don’t cede the political – the alt opens up new, better space for political practices

Gunhild Hoogensen and Kirsti Stuvøy, Department of Political Science, University of Tromsø, Norway, June 2006, “Gender, Resistance and Human Security”, Security Dialogue, Vol. 37 No. 2, pg. 221-222 / KX

Human security can direct analytical attention to security as a life-world phenomenon in a societal context and, inspired by gender theory, provides an epistemological attitude for engaging practices of security in non-state domains, exploring contextually dependent securities and insecurities. The characterization of human security as people-centred and vested in the individual but realized intersubjectively in specific local contexts forms the core of our understanding of human security as an epistemic attitude to empirical security studies. It suggests that the way to understand and to establish knowledge about security in empirical terms is to enter people’s life-worlds and access local experiences of in/securities. Such an approach to studying world politics resonates in the work of Tétreault, who criticizes the limited imaginary that informs the narrow conceptualization of political space as structures (e.g. rules, beliefs, laws, acts, agencies) that constrain the domain of the political to the nation-state, thereby marginalizing other forms of political practice (see, for example, Tétreault, 2005: 180). Political practices are comprehended as institutionalized practices. To the contrary, Tétreault argues that political practice constitutes all actions initiated to challenge the management of politics. Political space is established as a common enterprise of humans: ‘Speech and action create politics, spaces of appearance in which people have the power to make the world. People matter!’ (Tétreault, 2005: 185). Analysis of world politics, therefore, concerns how social individuals enter political space and create support and legitimacy for their political projects (Tétreault, 2005: 181). In the context of security studies, this concern with creating political space directs attention to the actors, whose practices aim at creating secure spaces (Hoogensen, 2005a: 125). Security is not only about the recognition of threats but also about building capacities to create secure spaces. This focus on agency reflects upon the fundamental commitment of gender theory pertaining to the investigation of women’s lives ‘within states or international structures in order to change or reconstitute them’ (Tickner, 2005: 7). In terms of an epistemic attitude to empirical studies of human security, the analytical focus should therefore be on practices of capacity-building and enabling in specific life-world contexts.

Focusing on policy relevance obscures sources of suffering in search for political threats – it elevates realist ontology above individual security

Alex J. Bellamy and Matt McDonald, School of Political Science and International Studies, at the University of Queensland, September 2002, “The Utility of Human Security’: Which Humans? What Security? A Reply to Thomas & Tow” Security Dialogue Vol. 33 No. 3, pg. 374 / KX

Second, Thomas & Tow’s understanding of human security prioritizes ‘death by politics’ over ‘death by economics’.3 This shift comes when they argue that the hu-man security agenda needs to ‘provide tan-gible threat parameters’ (p. 181). In order to prevent human security from becoming ‘too amorphous and therefore question-able’, Thomas & Tow propose demarcating between general and specific threats, which they confess means emphasizing the threat from terrorism over and above the threat from malnutrition. Thus, they argue that humanitarian intervention and peacebuild-ing operations are the most effective practi-cal strategies for responding to human se-curity threats. By fortunate coincidence, such strategies ‘dovetail’ with the continua-tion of a statist conception of security. It appears that the sole criterion used by Tho-mas & Tow for singling out ‘specific’ over ‘general’ threats, and statist rather than non-statist solutions, is so-called ‘policy relevance’. This is deeply problematic, be-cause it allows realist ontology to ‘trump’ the security of individuals. If we were to follow Thomas & Tow, therefore, we would argue that the needs of human security dic-tated that terrorism, which kills fewer than 5,000 people per year – even in a year as unusually bloody as 2001 – should be given political priority (and hence more re-sources) over the ‘general’ threat of malnu-trition, which kills over 40,000 people every day. Thomas & Tow focus their analysis on areas of human security prioritized by the West in terms of ‘death by politics’ and the strategies for addressing those threats in terms of intervention. What they overlook, however, is that the threats they identify are not the most prescient ones globally, nor will the interventionist strategies they advocate deal with the global human inse-curity predicament. Although the West be-came more interventionist in the 1990s, the result has not been an easing of the human insecurity predicament. Rather, while there are certainly more elections around the world, there is also more inequality, more malnutrition, more refugees and more pre-ventable disease than there was before Western states became ‘good international citizens’. It is also worth bearing in mind that the Third World pays nine times more to the West in debt servicing than the West gives to the Third World in humanitarian assistance and development aid.

AT: Realism

The LITANY of Departures From Realism and Failure of “Systemic Punishment” Disproves Their Theory.

Ronald R. Krebs, Faculty Fellow - Government @ University of Texas at Austin, Donald D. Harrington, Prof. of Political Science Univ. of Minnesota, ‘6 [Rhetoric, Strategy, and War: Language, Power, and the Making of US Security Policy, http://www.polisci.umn.edu/~mirc/paper2006-07/fall2006/Krebs.pdf]

Structural realists, focusing on the imperatives to security- or power-maximization that states must obey if they are to survive in the anarchic international system, are simply uninterested in domestic debate of any sort. They have long argued that these systemic imperatives, derived from the distribution of material power and perhaps geography, constitute an objective “national interest” that must be the chief driver of foreign policy.23 When states, for whatever reason, behave in contrary ways, they will eventually suffer punishment for their foolishness.24 But are there really such objective systemic dictates? The very fact that American structural realists frequently rail against US foreign policy suggests that departures from realist expectations are **hardly exceptional**. The typical realist response is that in these cases actors with more parochial or moralistic perspectives have hijacked policy, but realists, with their inattention to domestic politics, are then hard pressed to explain when such views hold sway.25 Moreover, the fact that such “hijackings” are so common suggests either that the system does **not often punish states for disobeying its rules**, in which case the **structural logic collapses**, or that **there are no such rules in the first place**. Structural realism imagines foreign policy as an exceptional realm above the political fray. Yet, even when the house is on fire, foreign policy lies in the realm of choice, not compulsion, and **thus very much in the realm of the political.**

Realism creates a death drive.

Der Derian 98 [JAMES, ON SECURITY, http://www.ciaonet.org/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html]

In epistemic realism, the search for security through sovereignty is not a political choice but the necessary reaction to an anarchical condition: Order is man-made and good; chaos is natural and evil. Out of self-interest, men must pursue this good and constrain the evil of excessive will through an alienation of individual powers to a superior, indeed supreme, collective power. In short, the security of epistemic realism is ontological, theological and teleological: that is, metaphysical. We shall see, from Marx's and Nietzsche's critiques, the extent to which Hobbesian security and epistemic realism rely on social constructions posing as apodictic truths for their power effects. There is not and never was a "state of nature" or a purely "self-interested man"; there is, however, clearly an abiding fear of violent and premature death that compels men to seek the security found in solidarity.

Realism operates as a state control mechanism – we’re told we are violent and hence we become violent.

Bleiker 2K [Roland, Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics, Page 16, Google Books]

Human agency is not something that exists in an a priori manner and can be measured scientifically in reference to external realities. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as human agency, for its nature and its function are, at least in part, determined by how we think about human action and its potential to shape political and social practices. The mutually constituted and constantly shilling relationship between agents and discourses thus undermines the possibility of observing social dynamics in a value-free way. To embark on such an endeavour nevertheless is to superimpose a static image upon a series of events that can only be understood in their fluidity. It is to objectivise a very particular and necessarily subjective understanding of agency and its corresponding political practices. The dangers of such an approach have been debated extensively. Authors such as Richard Ashley, Jim George and Steve Smith have shown how positivist epistemologies have transformed one specific interpretation of world political realities, the dominant realist one, into reality per se." Realist perceptions of the international have'. gradually become accepted as common sense. to the point that any critique against them has to be evaluated in terms of an already existing and obiectivised world-view. There are powerful mechanisms of control precisely in this ability to determine meaning and rationality. 'Defining common sense', Smith thus argues, is 'the ultimate act of political power'." It separates the possible from the impossible and directs the theory and practice of international relations on a particular path.