### **Solvency**

#### One icebreaker takes 10 years to build and deliver O'Rourke 12 (Ronald O'Rourke¶ Specialist in Naval Affairs, writing for the Congressional Research Service, June 14, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf)

The Coast Guard’s proposed FY2013 budget includes $8 million in acquisition funding to initiate¶ survey and design activities for a new polar icebreaker. The Coast Guard’s Five Year Capital¶ Investment Plan includes an additional $852 million in FY2014-FY2017 for acquiring the ship.¶ The Coast Guard anticipates awarding a construction contract for the ship “within the next five¶ years” and taking delivery on the ship “within a decade.” The project to design and build a polar¶ icebreaker is a new acquisition project initiated in the FY2013 budget.

#### Total time would be 10 years O'Rourke 12 (Ronald O'Rourke¶ Specialist in Naval Affairs, writing for the Congressional Research Service, June 14, 2012, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf)

The Coast Guard estimated in February 2008 that new replacement ships for the Polar Star and¶ Polar Sea might cost between $800 million and $925 million per ship in 2008 dollars to¶ procure.31 The Coast Guard said that this estimate¶ is based on a ship with integrated electric drive, three propellers, and a combined diesel and¶ gas (electric) propulsion plant. The icebreaking capability would be equivalent to the¶ POLAR Class Icebreakers [i.e., Polar Star and Polar Sea] and research facilities and¶ accommodations equivalent to HEALY. This cost includes all shipyard and government¶ project costs. Total time to procure a new icebreaker [including mission analysis, studies,¶ design, contract award, and construction] is eight to ten years.32

### Coast Guard Tradeoff Turn

#### Plan collapses the Coast Guard budget

Caldwell 11 ,(Stephen, Director of Homeland Security and Justice, December 1, “Coast Guard: Observations on Arctic Requirements, Icebreakers, and Coordination with Stakeholders” Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives”http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/Media/file/TestimonyCGMT/2011-12-1-Caldwell.pdf)

As mentioned above, the Coast Guard faces budget uncertainty and it may be a significant challenge for the Coast Guard to obtain Arctic capabilities, including icebreakers. Given our analysis of the challenges that the Coast Guard already faces in funding its existing acquisition programs, it is unlikely that the agency’s budget could accommodate the level of additional funding (estimated by the High Latitude Study to range from $4.14 billion to $6.9 billion) needed to acquire new icebreakers or reconstruct existing ones. The Recapitalization report similarly concludes that the recapitalization of the polar icebreaker fleet cannot be funded within the existing or projected Coast Guard budget. 31 All three reports reviewed alternative financing options, including the potential for leasing icebreakers, or funding icebreakers through the NSF or DOD. The Recapitalization report noted that a funding approach similar to the approach used for the Healy, which was funded through the fiscal year 1990 DOD appropriations, should be considered. 32 However, the Coast Guard has a more immediate need than DOD to acquire Arctic capabilities, including icebreakers, making it unlikely that a similar funding approach would be feasible at this time. For more details on Coast Guard funding challenges and options specific to icebreakers, see appendix IV.

#### **That turns the aff**

Biesecker 11 (Calvin Biesecker, April 14, 2011. “GAO Says Coast Guard Budget Assumptions High; Admiral Says They're Not.” Defense Daily. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\_6712/is\_10\_250/ai\_n57479707/)

The Coast Guard is making unrealistically high assumptions about the budgets it can expect to receive in the coming years, a problem that could manifest itself in program delays and waiting to make trade-offs in programs that should be considered today, a Government Accountability Official (GAO) said yesterday. However, a Coast Guard Admiral said he fully understands the nation's fiscal situation but that "our requirements are our requirements" and a minimum level of funding is needed to aggressively recapitalize assets or costs will increase for new and legacy systems. "I understand that we're asking more than we've gotten before but I believe...that we've proved our value to the nation and it's really up to Congress and the will of the people if they're willing to make that investment in their Coast Guard," Vice Adm. John Currier, deputy commandant for Mission Support, told the House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on the Coast Guard. "I think it's justified." The biggest risk to Coast Guard's acquisition efforts is how it is marrying resources to plans, John Hutton, director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management at the GAO, told the panel. For example, the Coast Guard's long-term budget plan assumes it will receive $2.4 billion in acquisition funding in FY '15, yet the service hasn't received more than $1.5 billion in any recent fiscal year, and with "rapidly building fiscal pressures in our government, this unrealistic budget planning exacerbates the challenges the Coast Guard programs face," he said. The service has experienced a number of program funding breaches because of this unrealistic planning and there will be more cost breaches if long-term planning remains "much higher than past appropriated or requested levels," Hutton said. Rep. Frank LoBiondo (R-N.J.), chairman of the subcommittee, said in his prepared remarks that the Coast Guard's National Security Cutter (NSC), which is being acquired to replace aging high-endurance cutters, is 38 percent over revised budget plans and two-years behind schedule. "In addition, both vessels require substantial retrofits to meet expected service lives," LoBiondo said. "That one's really hard for me to understand and accept." So far, the Coast Guard has taken delivery of two NSCs of a planned eight-ship buy. The vessels are being built by Northrop Grumman [NOC]. The third and fourth vessels are under construction and Currier said that if Congress approves a continuing budget resolution for the remainder of FY '11, which is expected to occur shortly, then the fifth ship should be under contract later this summer. Hutton also discussed a new study that the Coast Guard expects to complete this summer that is looking at its fleet needs amid the changing fiscal environment. Phase two of the Fleet Mix Analysis appears to include unrealistic cost constraints, he said. At the upper end planning for the Coast Guard's Deepwater program, spending is expected to average $1.7 billion annually, which is higher than the service's entire acquisition program receives, Hutton said. "More importantly, we understand that the Coast Guard does not plan to assess any fleet mixes smaller than the program of record, a step that would help them better prepare for and make any tradeoff decisions given our nation's fiscally constrained environment," he said. Hutton credited the Coast Guard with acknowledging that it needs to establish priorities among major programs and make some tradeoffs here to better align future budgets based on historical experience. But, he said, "The key will be whether and how the Coast Guard makes such tradeoffs. This is a key moment in time and it's important that the Coast Guard does not push tradeoff decisions to tomorrow."

### LOS CP

#### Text: The European Union should establish an Arctic Council to enact an international law over the arctic.

#### OR

#### Text: The Arctic Council should establish an international law of the sea

#### Only EU solves – cooperation and US isnt a member (perm answer)

The cornerstones of the current international law of the sea are¶ the LOS Convention and its two Implementing Agreements, the¶ Part XI Deep-Sea Mining Agreement,11 and the Fish Stocks¶ Agreement.12 The current international law of the sea applies to¶ the marine environment of the entire globe; including, therefore,¶ the entire marine environment of the Arctic Ocean,¶ however defined.¶ The LOS Convention’s overarching objective is to establish a¶ universally accepted, just, and equitable legal order, or “Constitution,”¶ for the oceans that lessens the risk of international conflict¶ and enhances stability and peace in the international community.¶ The LOS Convention currently has 160 parties, the Part XI Deep-¶ Sea Mining Agreement has 138 parties, and the Fish Stocks¶ Agreement has 77 parties. All Arctic states are parties to these¶ three treaties, except for the United States, which is not a party to¶ either the LOS Convention or the Part XI Deep-Sea Mining¶ Agreement.13 The European Community (EC) is party to all three treaties. This is important in view of the fact that Denmark, Finland,¶ and Sweden are Member States of the European Union14 and¶ Iceland and Norway are parties to the European Economic Area¶ (EEA) Agreement.15¶ The LOS Convention recognizes the sovereignty, sovereign¶ rights, freedoms, rights, jurisdiction, and obligations of states¶ within several maritime zones. The most important of these, for¶ the Arctic, are internal waters, territorial sea, exclusive economic¶ zone (EEZ), continental shelf, high seas, and the “Area.”16 Internal¶ waters lie landward of the baselines. The maximum breadth of the¶ territorial sea is twelve nautical miles (1 nautical mile = 1,852 meters)¶ measured from the baselines. Twenty-four nautical miles is¶ the maximum breadth for the contiguous zone as is 200 nautical¶ miles for the EEZ. However, in many geographical settings these¶ maximum breadths cannot be reached due to the proximity of the¶ baselines of opposite states. In such circumstances, maritime¶ boundaries have to be agreed on by the opposite states. Several of¶ these maritime boundaries have already been established in the¶ Arctic Ocean and negotiations on several others are still ongoing.¶ The LOS Convention recognizes the sovereignty of a coastal¶ state over its internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial¶ sea, the airspace above, and its bed and subsoil. Sovereignty entails¶ exclusive access and control of living and non-living resources¶ and all-encompassing jurisdiction over all human activities, unless¶ states have in one way or another consented to restrictions thereon.¶ The LOS Convention also recognizes specific economic and resource-¶ related sovereign rights and jurisdiction of a coastal state¶ with respect to its EEZ and, where relevant, outer continental¶ shelf. Nevertheless, other states have navigational rights or freedoms¶ within the maritime zones of coastal states and with respect¶ to their EEZ, and, where relevant, outer continental shelf, also the¶ freedoms of overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines¶ and “other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to¶ these freedoms . . . .”17¶ Article 76 of the LOS Convention also recognizes that in certain¶ circumstances the continental shelf extends beyond 200 nauti-cal miles from the baselines. This is the so-called “outer continental¶ shelf.” Coastal states that take the view that they have an outer¶ continental shelf must submit information on their outer limits¶ on the basis of the criteria in Article 76 to the Commission on the¶ Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).18 “The limits of the [outer¶ continental] shelf established by a coastal state on the basis of¶ these recommendations [of the CLCS] shall be final and binding.”19¶ So far, only the Russian Federation and Norway have made submissions¶ to the CLCS in relation to their outer continental shelves¶ that lie within the Arctic Ocean. The CLCS has, up until now, only¶ made an interim recommendation in relation to the submission of¶ the Russian Federation.20 The CLCS essentially recommended that¶ the Russian Federation make a revised submission as regards the¶ central Arctic Ocean basin.21 The Russian Federation is expected¶ to do this in 2010. Canada, Denmark (in relation to Greenland),¶ and the United States are all engaged in activities to enable them¶ to make submissions to the CLCS, despite the fact that the United¶ States is not yet party to the LOS Convention.22 Canada has to¶ make its submission by December 2013 and Denmark by December¶ 2014.23 It should be noted that it is likely that there will be two¶ pockets of the Area in the central Arctic Ocean and one large high¶ seas pocket.¶ In the high seas, all states have the freedoms already mentioned¶ above as well as the freedom to construct artificial islands¶ and other installations, the freedom to fish, and the freedom to¶ conduct scientific research. These freedoms are all subject to conditions¶ and obligations.24 The Area and its resources are the “common¶ heritage of mankind” and the International Sea-Bed Authority¶ (ISA) is charged with organizing and controlling all activities of¶ exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area.25

#### EU is solves best and is key to legitimacy VANDERZWAAG et al 9 (David VanderZwaag ¶ Dalhousie University - Schulich School of Law¶ Timo Koivurova ¶ University of Lapland - Arctic Centre - Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, June 11, 2009¶ Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, Vol. 18, No. 2, 247, 2009, <http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/transnational/vol18_2/koivurova.pdf>)

The competence of the EU and its Member States regarding¶ the Arctic Ocean is determined by general international law as¶ well as by European Community (EC) law. It goes without saying¶ that EU Member States cannot confer more extensive competence¶ to the EU than they themselves possess in accordance with international¶ law.¶ The fact that none of the current EU Member States are coastal¶ states with respect to the Arctic Ocean (not even via the EEA¶ Agreement or via Greenland, which chose in the mid-1980s to¶ withdraw from the then EEC, and hence is not part of the EC or¶ EU) is clearly a major feature and constraint of EU policy regarding¶ the Arctic Ocean. While neither the EU nor its Member States¶ can act as coastal states with respect to the Arctic Ocean, they can¶ still act in a wide range of other capacities. For instance, they may¶ act as flag states, port states, market states, or with respect to¶ their natural and legal persons. In a flag state capacity, the EU¶ and its Member States are able to exercise their rights and discharge¶ their obligations with respect to the Arctic Ocean, most¶ notably the freedoms of the high seas in the high seas pockets in¶ the Arctic Ocean (e.g., marine scientific research and the laying of¶ cables and pipelines), the navigational rights and freedoms in the¶ maritime zones of Arctic Ocean coastal states, and the obligations¶ relating to marine living resources and the marine environment¶ connected to these rights and freedoms.¶ In addition to these rights and obligations, the EU and its¶ Member States may also have various user and non-user interests¶ in the Arctic Ocean. The main user interests would be related to¶ the exploration and exploitation of offshore hydrocarbon resources.¶ As traditional energy resources will be of paramount importance to¶ all EU Member States for at least the next few decades, access to¶ the hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic will be an important security¶ issue. The main non-user interests include the protection and¶ preservation of the marine environment and safeguarding marine¶ biodiversity. The EU and its Member States could argue that they¶ want to become involved in the governance and regulation of the¶ marine Arctic to safeguard these non-user interests, in their own¶ right, or, together with non-Arctic states, on behalf of the international¶ community. Such participation may for instance be aimed at¶ monitoring and ensuring that obligations with respect to the Arctic¶ marine area are complied with.¶ In case the EU would act, it would also need to have shared or¶ exclusive competence. The distribution of competence between the¶ EU and its Member States is determined by the EC Treaty, the EUTreaty,26 and other treaties concluded within the framework of the¶ EC and the EU. The scope and extent of EC and EU competence is¶ governed by the principle of conferral and the use of conferred (exclusive)¶ competence is, inter alia, governed by the principles of¶ subsidiarity and proportionality.27 The distribution of competence¶ is a dynamic matter in which the judgments of the European Court¶ of Justice (ECJ) play a key role. While adjustments of competence¶ can be a consequence of increasing importance of EC legislation¶ and acts by the EC Commission, it can also be negotiated between¶ EU Member States. The latter adjustments can lead to more competence¶ being conferred to the EC and EU but also to competence¶ being delegated back to EU Member States.¶ The spheres in which the EC has competence can be gleaned¶ from Article 3 of the EC Treaty, which lists the activities the EC¶ shall undertake for the purposes set out in Article 2. While Article¶ 3 sets out the policy areas which the EU may address, it does not¶ in itself provide a legal basis for specific legislative acts. The specific¶ measures available to the EC are set out in other parts of the¶ EC Treaty. Included in this list are fishing, shipping (transport),¶ and environmental protection.28 In addition, Article 6 of the EC¶ Treaty stipulates, “[e]nvironmental protection requirements must¶ be integrated into the definition and implementation of the Community¶ policies and activities referred to in Article 3, in particular¶ with a view to promoting sustainable development.”29¶ EU Member States are generally free to pursue their own policies¶ alongside the EU, unless the EU’s or EC’s competence is exclusive¶ or a subject matter in shared competence is dealt with exhaustively¶ by the EU, leaving the Member States no room for additional¶ measures. The ECJ already ruled in 1981 that the EC has¶ exclusive competence in fisheries conservation and management.30¶ This exclusiveness relates to community waters and probably also¶ seaward thereof, but is also subject to some exceptions, for instance¶ in relation to enforcement.31 The consequential external competence of the EC in the sphere of fisheries implies that the EC¶ represents EU Member States, for instance in negotiations with¶ non-EU Member States and in regional fisheries management organizations¶ (RFMOs). Subject to some exceptions, EU Member¶ States cannot become members of RFMOs alongside the EC. One¶ of these exceptions relates to “overseas countries and territories”¶ and enables, inter alia, Denmark to become a member of RFMOs¶ alongside the EC on behalf of the Faroe Island, Greenland, or both.¶ Competence with regards to shipping and environmental protection¶ is shared between the EU and its Member States. This¶ mixed competence also means that the EC cannot represent EU¶ Member States in international fora, like the International Maritime¶ Organization (IMO). So far, the EC has, as an intergovernmental¶ organization, concluded an agreement on cooperation with¶ the IMO.32 In areas of shared competence, agreements are often¶ signed by the EC as well as by EU Member States (so-called¶ “mixed agreements”).33 This requires close cooperation¶ between them.

#### Law of the sea solves arctic enviormental exploitation, cooperation, and scientific expeditions VANDERZWAAG et al 9 (David VanderZwaag ¶ Dalhousie University - Schulich School of Law¶ Timo Koivurova ¶ University of Lapland - Arctic Centre - Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, June 11, 2009¶ Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, Vol. 18, No. 2, 247, 2009, <http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/transnational/vol18_2/koivurova.pdf>)

During the Cold War, Arctic-wide cooperation was not possible,¶ except in very limited policy areas, such as the conclusion of the¶ 1973 Polar Bear Treaty66 between the five Arctic range states. This¶ was due to the fact that the two superpowers and their allies confronted¶ each other in the Arctic, which was estimated by many as¶ one of the major military strategic hot spots during the Cold War.¶ After all, NATO was a neighbor to the Soviet Union via Norway,¶ and the United States and the Soviet Union shared a border in the¶ Bering and Chukchi Seas. It was the perestroika and glasnost that¶ opened up opportunities for pan-Arctic cooperation. Secretary-¶ General Gorbachev’s speech in Murmansk in 1987 proposed pan-¶ Arctic cooperation in a number of fields, one of these being the protection¶ of the Arctic environment. Inspired by Gorbachev’s speech¶ outlining various areas for Arctic cooperation, Finland took the initiative¶ in 1989 for pan-Arctic co-operation in one of these policy¶ areas, that of environmental protection; in 1991 the Arctic Environmental¶ Protection Strategy (AEPS) was adopted by the eight¶ Arctic states by means of a declaration.67The AEPS achieved one important thing. Even though the cooperation¶ itself was a fairly low-committal exercise with weak institutional¶ structure, it enabled us to start thinking of societal and¶ environmental problems for the first time from the Arctic perspective¶ (rather than from the perspective of individual country’s¶ northern or Arctic region) and tackle them with policy measures.¶ The AEPS is also vastly important for understanding the current¶ functioning of the Arctic Council,68 and the proposals to renew¶ it, since, even though the Arctic cooperation ostensibly was transformed¶ from the AEPS to the Arctic Council during the transitional¶ period of 1996-1998, the basic elements of the cooperation have¶ been in place from 1991, with only slight changes taking place.¶ Even though there is a new mandate on sustainable development¶ in the Council, the AEPS had a task force on sustainable development¶ and utilization in the Arctic, which had more ambitious¶ goals than the present Sustainable Development Working Group¶ (SDWG).69 There are still the same participants in the cooperation,¶ although the Declaration establishing the Council strengthened¶ the status of Arctic indigenous peoples’ organizations as permanent¶ participants with power to influence decision-making (they¶ were observers in the AEPS). The same institutional structure has¶ been retained, ministerial meetings convened every two years and¶ senior arctic officials (SAOs) managing the day-to-day activities of¶ the Council. The four environmental protection working groups of¶ the AEPS, namely Conservation of Arctic Flora and Faunaand Fauna¶ (CAFF), Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME),¶ Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR), and¶ the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), were¶ integrated into the structure of the Council. In addition, two new¶ working groups were established, the SDWG and the Arctic Contaminants¶ Action Program (ACAP).To date, there is no permanent secretariat in the Council, as¶ was the case in the AEPS, although the three Scandinavian states¶ have agreed to maintain the secretariat in Tromsø till 2012.70 Aswas the case in the AEPS, there is no permanent, mandatory funding¶ mechanism in the Council, although a project support instrument¶ has been created to pool resources for funding of individual¶ projects.71 Finally, and importantly, both the AEPS and the Arctic¶ Council were established via a declaration as soft-law organizations,¶ not inter-governmental organizations having binding¶ decision-making power.¶ Hence, even though many have cherished the argument that¶ the Council can be formalized into an inter-governmental organization,¶ given that Arctic cooperation has already once been revised¶ in its short life-cycle, it is important to keep in mind that the foundation¶ of the cooperation has remained much the same, allowing¶ us to conclude that the Arctic Council is fairly resistant to¶ change.But even though the structure has remained much the same,¶ the Arctic Council has become a stronger forum for cooperation¶ over the years of its existence. In addition to the changes identified¶ above, the working groups have become stronger in status and in¶ terms of their deliverables. This is due to the fact that it was¶ bound to take a few years before these working groups could start¶ functioning effectively. Increasingly, their strategies and deliverables¶ have become more ambitious. The Council ministers have¶ also adopted important, albeit not very strong, policy recommendations¶ connected with major scientific assessments, such as the¶ ACIA. After the release of the ACIA, climate change considerations¶ have become a cross-cutting issue in the Council, placing pressure¶ on the working groups to adjust their work to future challenges.¶ There is also more interest in the work of the Council; major states¶ (like China) are interested in becoming observers.

#### EU arctic policy key to cooperation and resource managementVANDERZWAAG et al 9 (David VanderZwaag ¶ Dalhousie University - Schulich School of Law¶ Timo Koivurova ¶ University of Lapland - Arctic Centre - Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law, June 11, 2009¶ Journal of Transnational Law & Policy, Vol. 18, No. 2, 247, 2009, <http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/transnational/vol18_2/koivurova.pdf>)

In connection with its climate policy work, the EU also pro-posed to revisit the governance framework applicable to the Arctic¶ marine area.103 The Climate Change and International Security¶ paper identified one policy option to “[d]evelop an EU Arctic policy¶ based on the evolving geo-strategy of the Arctic region, taking into¶ account, [inter alia], access to resources and the opening of new¶ trade routes.”104 The EU is also developing its Arctic policy as part¶ of its newly adopted integrated maritime policy wherein the Commission¶ (DG Mare) promises to produce a report “on strategic issues¶ relating to the Arctic Ocean” within the year 2008.105Most recently, the Commission issued its Arctic Communication.¶ 106 In the Introduction to the thirteen page document, the¶ Commission sets out EU interests and proposes action for EU¶ Member States and institutions around three main¶ policy objectives:¶ • Protecting and preserving the Arctic in unison with¶ its population¶ • Promoting sustainable use of resources¶ • Contributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance107¶ The Communication is structured along these three main policy¶ objectives. One of the salient features within “[p]romoting sustainable¶ use of resources” is the proposal to extend the spatial¶ scope of the NEAFC Convention (see subsection IV.B.). As the section¶ “[c]ontributing to enhanced Arctic multilateral governance” is¶ of most interest for this paper, some more attention is devoted to ithere. As a general comment, it should be noted that the section¶ contains quite a few sentences that would raise the eyebrows of¶ international lawyers and would have benefited from more accurate¶ drafting. The section contains the following policy objectives:¶ • The EU should work to uphold the further development¶ of a cooperative Arctic governance system based¶ on the UNCLOS which would ensure:¶ o security and stability¶ o strict environmental management, including¶ respect of the precautionary principle¶ o sustainable use of resources as well as open¶ and equitable access¶ • The full implementation of already existing obligations,¶ rather than proposing new legal instruments¶ should be advocated. This however should not preclude¶ work on further developing some of the frameworks,¶ adapting them to new conditions or Arctic specificities.¶ • The EU should promote broad dialogue and negotiated¶ solutions and not support arrangements which¶ exclude any of the Arctic EU Member States or Arctic¶ EEA EFTA countries.¶ • Arctic considerations should be integrated into wider¶ EU policies and negotiations.108¶ Subsequently, a list of policy actions is offered. These include:¶ • Explore the possibility of establishing new, multi-sector¶ frameworks for integrated ecosystem management. This¶ could include the establishment of a network of marine protected¶ areas, navigational measures and rules for ensuring¶ the sustainable exploitation of minerals.¶ • Enhance input to the Arctic Council in accordance with the¶ Community’s role and potential. As a first step, the Commission¶ will apply for permanent observer status in the¶ Arctic Council.¶ . . . .¶ • Explore all possibilities at international level to promote¶ measures for protecting marine biodiversity in areas¶ beyond national jurisdiction, including through the pursuit¶ of an UNCLOS Implementing Agreement.Work towards the successful conclusion of international negotiations¶ on marine protected areas on the high seas.109

### **Russia DA**

#### Arctic Cooperation Now

Economist 2012 (The Economist Print Edition, “, June 16, 2012, <http://www.economist.com/node/21556797>,)

Far from violent, the development of the Arctic is likely to be uncommonly harmonious, for three related reasons. One is the profit motive. The five Arctic littoral countries, Russia, the United States, Canada, Denmark and Norway, would sooner develop the resources they have than argue over those they do not have. A sign of this was an agreement between Russia and Norway last year to fix their maritime border in the Barents Sea, ending a decades-long dispute. The border area is probably rich in oil; both countries are now racing to get exploration started. Another spur to Arctic co-operation is the high cost of operating in the region. This is behind the Arctic Council’s first binding agreement, signed last year, to co-ordinate search-and-rescue efforts. Rival oil companies are also working together, on scientific research and mapping as well as on formal joint ventures. The third reason for peace is equally important: a strong reluctance among Arctic countries to give outsiders any excuse to intervene in the region’s affairs. An illustration is the stated willingness of all concerned to settle their biggest potential dispute, over their maritime frontiers, according to the international Law of the Sea (LOS). Even the United States accepts this, despite its dislike for treaties—though it has still not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, an anomaly many of its leaders are keen to end.

#### (Russia card) Unilateral action caues other countries to stop cooperatingDavis et al 11 (Darrin D. Davis¶ Lieutenant, United States Navy¶ B.A., University of New Mexico, 2006, Approved by: Anne L. Clunan¶ Thesis Co-Advisor¶ Mikhail Tsypkin¶ Thesis Co-Advisor¶ Daniel Moran, PhD¶ Chair, Department of National Security Affairs, ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY DISPUTES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY IN THE HIGH NORTH)

As discussed in Chapter II, states are generally setting cooperation as a policy priority in the Arctic. However, regional military cooperation has been limited. In the meantime, states are preparing to operate in the “new ocean.” The military certainly has a role in the Arctic. However, as the thesis describes, the degree in which the region is¶ 70¶ militarized (even in the absence of outright conflict) shapes the Arctic in ways that realists predict. Russian Lieutenant General Vladimir Shamanov of the Ministry of Defense justified his decision to create an Arctic Spetsnaz unit by citing U.S. exercises in Alaska in 2008, which involved 5,000 military personnel.163 This summer saw additional exercises and attention to the Arctic by the U.S. Navy. Acknowledging that unilateral military operations may be sub-optimal is a natural outgrowth of this research. The military has a role to play, doing the expensive and dangerous business of opening the Arctic frontier. However, an emphasis should be placed on operating in a multilateral military environment, including annual international exercises to continue a cooperative spirit and to avoid unnecessary security competition.¶ As we look toward the future of the Arctic it is important to understand the fallibility of predictions.164 Even recent articles discussing the “future” of the arctic with regard to shipping and resource exploration are rapidly becoming out of date. As of Summer 2011, Exxon and Rosneft signed a deal to begin developing Arctic oil resources, the sea ice reached another near record minimum, and several ships transited the northern sea route to from Murmansk to the far East. The future of the Arctic is here, now.

#### Unilateral action pushes relations over the brink (also a LOS solvency card)Asia News 12 (News Agency, no author given, <http://www.bakutoday.net/arctic-policy-between-the-united-states-and-russia-rivalry-and-cooperation.html>, July 6, 2012 5:08 pm)

Contradictions (explicit and implicit) between Russia and the United States on Arctic exist on several fronts. Like many other States, United States aspire to the status of the Northern sea route, passing along the Arctic coast of Russia, became international. In case of realization of these plans, RUSSIA will lose significant income not only for the use of the route of other States, it is objectively raise military-strategic vulnerability with North direction.¶ Differently by Moscow and Washington are the leading regional organization, the Arctic Council. If Russia is interested in expanding the powers of the Council, in 2009, the Directive expressly states that the United States believed Council only forum for discussion and oppose giving it the status of an international organization, a gauntlet that produces binding decisions.¶ On the other hand, the United States strongly supported the intensification of NATO in the Arctic, effectively pushing out other international organizations (the Arctic Council and the Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic region where the United States is not involved). When an existing relationship between NATO and Russia such moves will have negative consequences for Russia, which has no reliable allies in the Arctic.¶ Until the United States has not ratified the UN Convention on the law of the sea, it remains possible aggravation of disputes with Russia on distinguishing lines in Arctic seas and on the edge of the shelf. It should be remembered that the United States would belong to RUSSIA’s attempts to extend his shelf by Lomonosov Ridge and Mendeleev-raising. In 2001, the Department of State under pressure at the UN Commission on the limits of the continental shelf, his application was rejected. Russia has not ratified the Treaty with the United States on the boundary line in the Bering Sea.¶ But in the United States and Russia have relations and the considerable potential for cooperation in the Arctic. Its foundation many experts see a declaration signed by the “Arctic five ‘ in the town of Ilulissat in May 2008, which suggests that the legal basis for dividing lines is recognized by the 1982 Convention on the law of the sea, and the parties intend to solve the problem through negotiations. In line with the common aspiration of Barack Obama to reset relations with Russia and the President’s statements, the United States and the Secretary of State’s intention to cooperate with Russia in the Arctic. However, most likely, cooperation should be expected only on areas where the United States cannot do without Russian participation.¶ In particular, this concerns the safety of marine and aviation operations in Arctic latitudes, as in May 2011, Member States of the Arctic Council, signed the agreement. Each of the signatories undertook to create assets to ensure security in its segment and the rapid exchange of information.¶ Planned large-scale cooperation in the development of the Russian Arctic resources. The Russian company “Rosneft” and American Exxon-Mobil “in April 2012, signed an agreement on cooperation in the exploration and development of oil and gas resources in the Kara Sea.¶ Russia is attracting scarce financial resources (capitalization of Exxon-Mobil-400 billion) and modern technologies for exploration and drilling in the northern latitudes. Another joint project by Rosneft and the American company Conoco-Phillips “in Nenets autonomous district, where a promising Ardalinskoe deposit and investment is expected to increase from the American side.¶ Another area of cooperation is the development of the Transantarctic routes for flights involving infrastructure development and maintenance, modernization and construction of new airports in the territory of Russia. This segment is considered to be the fastest growing air travel market.¶ Mutually beneficial cooperation has been and remains the United States and Russia in the scientific research and environmental protection in the Arctic. It is obvious that any decisions relating to the economic development of the far North must rely on scientific analysis of the vulnerability of Northern nature and difficult weather, social, domestic and other conditions. In this respect Russia can offer the icebreaker fleet and rich experience of Arctic expeditions.¶ In military-political dimension in relations between Washington and Moscow could strengthen the mutual confidence in the Arctic in the military and political fields. Such measures should include mutual warning about plans to move military forces at fleets “sensitive” areas, limiting the military presence in the Arctic.¶ At the moment it is difficult to predict how the relationship United States and Russia in the Arctic. This will depend, first, on the overall mood in u.s.-Russian relations that might change with the coming to power in the United States the Republicans. Secondly, the efficiency of the Russian economic policy in the Arctic to attract foreign investment and technology. And there are already a number of positive steps. Thirdly, whether the United States will remain at the current course predominantly unilateral actions in the region, or they will make a choice in favour of multilateral cooperation.

### More Russian Relations Stuff

#### Icebreakers piss off Russia

Byers 2012 (Michael Byers, The Moscow Times, Canada Can Help Russia With Northern Sea Route, <http://byers.typepad.com/arctic/2012/06/canada-can-help-russia-with-northern-sea-route.html#more> 06/08/2012)

The Arctic Ocean's coastline belongs mostly to Russia and Canada, the two largest countries in the world. Each country owns territory on either side of a series of contested, and increasingly ice-free, Arctic straits. Russia considers the narrowest parts of the Northern Sea Route to be "internal waters." Canada takes the same view of the Northwest Passage. Internal waters are not territorial waters, and foreign ships have no right to access them without permission from the coastal state. Russia and Canada face a single, common source of opposition to their claims — namely, the United States, which insists that both the Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage are "international straits." The United States thus accepts that Russia and Canada "own" the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage, while asserting that foreign vessels have a right of "transit passage" through the straits that exceeds the right of "innocent passage" in regular territorial waters. A right of transit passage entitles foreign ships to pass through a strait without coastal state permission. It also means that foreign submarines can sail submerged, something that they are not allowed to do in regular territorial waters. The Northern Sea Route has become seasonally ice-free. Thirty-two ships traversed the waterway last summer, most of them transporting natural resources from Russian ports to Asian markets. The Kremlin is intent on turning the Northern Sea Route into a commercially viable alternative to the Strait of Malacca and the Suez Canal. In September 2011, then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said: "The shortest route between Europe's largest markets and the Asia-Pacific region lies across the Arctic. This route is almost a third shorter than the traditional southern one. I want to stress the importance of the Northern Sea Route as an international transport artery that will rival traditional trade lanes in service fees, security and quality. States and private companies that choose the Arctic trade routes will undoubtedly reap economic advantages." The dispute over the legal status of the Northern Sea Route began in 1965 when the U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker Northwind set out to traverse the Vilkitsky Strait between the Kara and Laptev seas. Strong diplomatic pressure was applied by the Soviet Union, pressure that, according to a U.S. State Department spokesman, extended to a threat to "go all the way" if the American ship proceeded into the strait. Washington responded by ordering the Northwind to turn around. Since then, no foreign surface vessel has sailed through the Northern Sea Route without Moscow's permission. The Northwest Passage has been ice-free for four of the last five summers. Twenty-two ships sailed through in 2011. The United States has twice sent surface vessels through the Northwest Passage without seeking Canada's permission: the SS Manhattan, an American owned-and-registered ice-strengthened super-tanker, in 1969; and the USCGC Polar Sea, a coastguard icebreaker, in 1985. On the 1985 occasion, the press attaché at the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa publicly expressed support for Canada's claim: "Whether it is the Northwest Passage or the Northeast Passage does not matter. Our position is based on provisions of international law. The waters around islands belonging to a country are the internal waters of that country." But there is no evidence of any prior or subsequent statements of support by the Soviet Union or Russia for Canada's position, nor any evidence of Canadian statements in the reverse. During the Cold War, it would have been difficult enough for Canada to oppose the United States — its most powerful NATO ally — on the Northwest Passage issue. Taking the Soviet Union's side in the Northern Sea Route dispute was simply not an option. As for the Soviet Union's near-complete silence on the Northwest Passage, one can postulate that Moscow decided not to disrupt the delicate balance that allowed Ottawa and Washington to "agree to disagree" on the issue. Had Moscow expressed more support for Ottawa's position, Washington might have decided that Ottawa's independent stance was no longer tolerable. But the Cold War is long over, and Russia has become an important trading partner of the West, as reflected in its recent admission to the World Trade Organization. Economic opportunities and environmental concerns dominate the policy landscape, and cooperation has replaced conflict as the dominant paradigm in the North. In January 2010, according to WikiLeaks, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper told NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen that the alliance had no role to play in the Arctic because "there is no likelihood of Arctic states going to war." Harper also said that "Canada has a good working relationship with Russia with respect to the Arctic, and a NATO presence could backfire by exacerbating tensions." Nine months later, Putin told an international conference: "It is well known that if you stand alone, you cannot survive in the Arctic. Nature alone, in this case, demands that people, nations and states help each other." Putin's comments came just a week after the Russian and Norwegian foreign ministers signed a boundary treaty for the Barents Sea, where the two countries had previously disputed 175,000 square kilometers of oil- and gas-rich seabed. Then, in May 2011, Russia, Canada, the United States, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland signed an Arctic search-and-rescue treaty. All this cooperation provides Russia and Canada with a narrow window of opportunity. With foreign shipping companies looking north, it is only a matter of time before other countries join the United States in overtly opposing Russia and Canada's internal waters claims. It is time for a joint Russian-Canadian position on the legal status of the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage — before it's too late.

#### US unilateral action in the arctic is percived as a move to control resources Stevens et al 10 (Andrew Hart, Bruce Jones and David Steven, Managing Global Order¶ May 2012, <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/mgo/docs/jones_arctic.pdf>, Andrew Hart is a doctoral candidate at the University of Colorado.¶ Bruce Jones is Senior Fellow and Director of the Managing Global Order¶ Initiative (MGO) at Brookings and New York University’s Center on International¶ Cooperation (NYU/CIC).¶ David Steven is a Senior Fellow at NYU/CIC and leads MGO’s Geopolitics¶ of Scarcity Project.)

These objectives were in turn the backdrop to a¶ challenge posed to us in 2010 by then Deputy Secretary¶ of State James Steinberg. Where bilateral relations¶ on security and economic issues had long¶ been the bread and butter of American diplomacy,¶ the new international realities increasingly require¶ the United States to better understand how¶ to foster and mange what Steinberg called “the¶ infrastructure for collective action.” His charge¶ to the MGO program was to chart those issues¶ where collective action was most needed and¶ where the frameworks to generate it most absent.¶ Among his top priorities was the Arctic.¶ This paper is our response. It is also a down payment¶ on a broader analysis of the changing challenge¶ of maritime security and the naval order,¶ part of an ongoing MGO workstream. For sixty¶ years, naval dominance has been the bedrock of¶ American power projection and the place where¶ U.S. hard power most directly protects a common¶ economic good, freedom of trade and the¶ free flow of energy. Will the high seas remain a¶ domain of U.S. dominance? Become a terrain of¶ acute competition for energy resources and regional¶ security, between the U.S. and the rising¶ powers? Or is there a prospect that regional and¶ global multilateral architecture, formal and informal,¶ can help to manage those tensions? The answer¶ will be crucial to the overall balance between¶ order and disorder in the international system.¶ The evolution of arrangements to manage rising¶ competition in the Arctic gives us some grounds¶ for cautious optimism about that broader challenge¶ ahead.

#### Cooperation is key – relations are on the brink now Stevens et al 10 (Andrew Hart, Bruce Jones and David Steven, Managing Global Order¶ May 2012, <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/mgo/docs/jones_arctic.pdf>, Andrew Hart is a doctoral candidate at the University of Colorado.¶ Bruce Jones is Senior Fellow and Director of the Managing Global Order¶ Initiative (MGO) at Brookings and New York University’s Center on International¶ Cooperation (NYU/CIC).¶ David Steven is a Senior Fellow at NYU/CIC and leads MGO’s Geopolitics¶ of Scarcity Project.)

As the Cold War receded, so too did the strategic¶ significance of the Arctic, once a zone¶ of U.S.-Soviet contestation. In recent years,¶ tensions have once again been rising. From the¶ infamous planting of the Russian flag on the floor¶ of the Arctic Ocean in 2007 to Secretary Clinton’s¶ appearance at the May 2011 Arctic Council ministerial,¶ states have turned their attention to the¶ North. The drivers of this shift are rapidly melting¶ ice and the consequent prospects for the development¶ of energy resources; its facilitators have¶ been innovating in extraction technologies and¶ marine transportation systems to move cargoes of¶ hydrocarbons and hard minerals along previously¶ inaccessible sea routes. Rising oil prices in 2004-¶ 2008 generated investment resources.¶ These changes have created a complex and, to¶ some, worrying political picture. Many fear the¶ Arctic will see an intensifying battle for sovereign¶ control and commercial advantage.1 While such¶ a view may be “more alarmist than alarming,”¶ insecurity in the far North has increased risks¶ of political and military conflict and highlighted¶ the need for a stable maritime security system to¶ manage disputes and other security concerns.2¶ The bleakest forecasts have overlooked positive developments¶ in the region. Despite the Arctic’s dangerous¶ mix of great power competition, unresolved¶ territorial disputes, and increasingly accessible oil¶ and gas reserves, there has to date been little actual¶ discord. Unlike in the South China Seas, whichfaces a similar mix of uncharted energy resources¶ and contested boundaries, Arctic states have¶ pledged to solve disputes in an orderly process,¶ managed the peaceful resolution of a major territorial¶ conflict, and concluded a binding agreement¶ to cooperate on search and rescue.¶ This is not to say there is no reason for worry. The¶ most contentious issues are yet to be resolved.¶ There is scope for strategic miscalculation, a loss¶ of faith in multilateral processes that deliver unwelcome¶ findings, or an environmental disaster¶ triggering a spiral of mistrust.¶ The Arctic therefore emerges as a rich case study¶ of current and potential areas of international cooperation¶ and tension, with implications for energy¶ security, global trade, global power politics,¶ sustainable development, and climate change. In¶ this paper, we first address the Arctic’s growing¶ strategic relevance and its potential conflict dynamic.¶ Second, we offer background on the existing¶ institutions and legal regimes, assessing their¶ strength and effectiveness, and then reviewing¶ recent negotiations. Finally, we examine ongoing¶ risks in the region, assessing their likely scale and¶ evolution.¶ We conclude that—for now—the prospects for¶ continued cooperation outstrip the potential for¶ conflict among Arctic states, and that the Arctic¶ offers lessons, and even elements of a model, for¶ tackling evolving challenges in other regions.

#### Unilateral action now causes conflict – icebreakers are the tipping point Stevens et al 10 (Andrew Hart, Bruce Jones and David Steven, Managing Global Order¶ May 2012, <http://www.cic.nyu.edu/mgo/docs/jones_arctic.pdf>, Andrew Hart is a doctoral candidate at the University of Colorado.¶ Bruce Jones is Senior Fellow and Director of the Managing Global Order¶ Initiative (MGO) at Brookings and New York University’s Center on International¶ Cooperation (NYU/CIC).¶ David Steven is a Senior Fellow at NYU/CIC and leads MGO’s Geopolitics¶ of Scarcity Project.)

Russian sabre rattling has aroused the greatest¶ fears. In 2007, Russian explorer and Presidential¶ Envoy for the Arctic, Artur Chilingarov, led an¶ expedition that planted a flag on the Arctic sea¶ bed. He told the media that “the North Pole is an¶ extension of the Russian coastal shelf.”37 In 2008,¶ the head of the Russian navy saw the potential for¶ a future “redistribution of power [in the Arctic],¶ up to armed intervention.”38 A year later, Russia’s¶ new Arctic policy underlined the importance of¶ securing sovereignty over the country’s strategic¶ resource base in the region and of ensuring ‘exclusive’¶ control over the Northern Sea Route.39¶ Reacting to the building ill-will, the Center for a¶ New American Security quipped that “the only¶ thing in the Arctic melting faster than the northern¶ ice cap is the international comity.”40¶ A military reaction to increased tensions is now¶ well underway. Although the classified nature of¶ many decisions hampers observers from making¶ a sound assessment of the evolving military balance, each of the five major Arctic States (U.S.,¶ Canada, Denmark, Norway and Russia) is either¶ rebuilding its Arctic capabilities or planning to do¶ so in the near future.41 In September 2011, Russia¶ announced plans to deploy two brigades to the¶ Arctic.42 It has also ordered three nuclear and six¶ diesel ice-breakers.43 Russia has fired cruise missiles¶ over the Arctic, resumed regular patrols of¶ the region for the first time since the break-up¶ of the USSR, and announced plans to augment¶ its naval surface capabilities and its submarine¶ force.44,45 Canada is buying 65 F-35 Lightning II¶ fighter aircraft in part to defend its Arctic sovereignty.¶ 46 It is also expanding its Arctic fleet, building¶ a flagship icebreaker that should be launched¶ in 2017,47 and developing ground satellite stations¶ to enhance its surveillance of the region.48 Denmark¶ is establishing an Arctic Command that¶ will eventually deploy F-16 aircraft to Greenland,¶ while Norway has recently moved its military¶ headquarters to a disused Cold War base in the¶ Arctic49 and, in building five frigates equipped¶ with the Aegis combat system, has undertaken its¶ largest ever military expenditure.50¶ The United States is a partial exception to the¶ build-up. It has been dubbed the “reluctant Arctic¶ power,” based on the fairly low priority it has¶ given its commercial and geopolitical interests in¶ the region, its hesitance in confronting rapidly¶ changing strategic realities, and its reluctance to¶ respond to military build-up by other Arctic nations.¶ 51 The U.S. lacked any formal Arctic strategy¶ until 2009, when the Bush administration published¶ a National Security Directive a few days before¶ President Obama’s inauguration. The directive¶ identified “broad and fundamental national¶ security interests in the Arctic,” while emphasizing¶ U.S. vulnerability to terrorism in the region.52¶ Later in 2009, the Navy published an Arctic¶ Roadmap which was intended to plug a gap until¶ the preparation of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense¶ Review (QDR).53 While its dominant submarine¶ fleet allows the U.S. the luxury of holding back,54 U.S. ships are able to operate only in the marginal¶ ice zone and with limited range.55 The U.S. has¶ only one deepwater port in the Arctic basin, at¶ Dutch Harbor at the end of the chain of Aleutian¶ Islands.¶ American ice-breaking capability is especially¶ limited. The U.S. has just three polar-based icebreakers.¶ The two heavy ice-breakers are more¶ than thirty years old and have both recently¶ been out of commission.56 One is now being decommissioned and the other refurbished in an¶ attempt to extend its life by five to seven years.57¶ The only modern ice-breaker is used mainly for¶ scientific research. As a result, the U.S. Coast¶ Guard has very little, if any, capacity to fulfill its¶ mission to provide assured access to Arctic waters¶ for the military.58 The U.S. may be able to travel¶ over and under the ice, but remains unable to cut¶ through it until it matches the investment being¶ made in ice-breaking by other Arctic nations.¶

### T In The US

#### In the “United States” excludes territories

Siksi 11 (Markku Suksi, Professor Department of Law National Director of the EMA Programme “Sub-State Governance Through Territorial Autonomy: A Comparative Study in Constitutional Law of Powers, Procedures and Institutions” Google books <http://books.google.com/books?id=d7UUkiwi_9cC&pg=PA173&lpg=PA173&dq=%22the+united+states+excludes+territories%22&source=bl&ots=HugdwNR3e7&sig=e09lLC4W8Fxe_1bL0oCA1E4bleg&hl=en&sa=X&ei=r-rhT8f3BIj69QS_y7mGCA&ved=0CC0Q6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false>)

The interpretation soon emerged that Puerto Rico would be governed under the plenary powers of Congress with reference to, in particular, Article IV, section 3(2), of the US Constitution. which constitutes the so-called territorial clause and according to which "the Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States". As a possession of the US. Puerto Rico is regarded as a territory that is unincorporated in the federal structure of the State." The political discussion continued between two alternatives, whether or not the US Constitution followed the Hag. A third interpretation, a middle ground of some sort was ultimately the one upon which the legislative approach and later also rulings of the US Supreme Court were based: the concept of the "United States" excludes territories and therefore, the new territories could be governed as colonies it" Congress so chose." This interpretation was adopted from the very beginning of the US - Puerto Rico relationship when the Organic Act of Puerto Rico, or the so called Foraker Act was enacted in 1900.

#### Violation: The aff mandates an increase of transportation infracstrucure in territories, not StatesRTP a. Limits – explode the topic to include affs that explore territory outside of the US – that means every ship the US owns is topical b.Jurisdiction – You can’t vote for something isnt part of the topic c. Extra T – The aff claims ADVs based off an untopical action of explore outside US territory, that allows the US to do an infinite number of things

#### That Also means no solvency – their ADVs are based off of an increase in Arctic exploration on territory that the US doesn’t own

### Privates CP

#### Privates can do the plan –cheaper and build it faster Treadwell 11 (Mead Treadwell¶ Lieutenant Governor¶ State of Alaska¶ Before the¶ United States House of Representatives¶ Committee Transportation on Transportation and Infrastructure¶ Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation¶ “America is Missing the Boat”¶ December 1, 2011¶ Washington, D.C., <http://housemajority.org/joule/pdfs/27/hjr0034_treadwell_testimony.pdf>)

In a conference recently in Juneau, University of Alaska Professor Dr. Lawson Brigham, a¶ former USCG icebreaker captain, noted that the U.S. Navy is building 47 Littoral Combat Ships¶ at a price of $400-500 million each. He asked, why not consider building 45 of these ships, and¶ allocating that other $800 million to $1 billion in the budget for the Coast Guard to build one¶ major polar icebreaker?¶ Some have argued we should charge for icebreaker escort services as other nations do. Ship¶ owners pay for services in the Panama and Suez Canals. U.S. vessels pay for oil spill¶ preparedness and insurance. A bill pending in this Congress would have the U.S. lease, rather¶ than own, icebreakers it needs in the Arctic. Long term charter agreements are in place in the¶ Antarctic, and it has been argued that private contractors are able to build icebreakers more¶ quickly and less expensively, operate them more efficiently in terms of cost and maintenance,¶ and would bear the expense of decommissioning. This is worthy of consideration if it moves us¶ forward faster in the Arctic.¶ 7¶ However we work out our finances, America and its trading partners could reap huge economic¶ benefits from accessing northern sea routes. Former U.S. Coast Guard Lieutenant Commander¶ Scott Borgerson wrote nearly four years ago about the financial advantages available to world¶ commerce through Arctic shipping.8 He told us how plying the Northern Sea Route from¶ Rotterdam to Yokohama instead of traveling via the Suez Canal would yield distance savings of¶ more than 40 percent. He told us that one container ship voyage from Seattle to Rotterdam via¶ the Northwest Passage instead of the Panama Canal could save about 20 percent of its costs –¶ then about $3.5 million dollars.¶ Borgerson envisioned a future of global Arctic shipping where “a marine highway directly over¶ the North Pole will materialize. Such a route,” he wrote, “which would most likely run between¶ Iceland and Alaska’s Dutch Harbor, would connect shipping megaports in the North Atlantic¶ with those in the North Pacific and radiate outward to other ports in a hub-and-spoke system.”

### Spending

#### A. Fiscal discipline now – political pressure will lead to debt compromise

Washington Post 7/18

Washington Post 7/18/12, http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/2012/jul/18/coalition-aims-to-head-off-debt-disaster/

WASHINGTON — A coalition of business leaders, budget experts and former politicians launched a $25 million campaign yesterday to build political support for a far-reaching plan to raise taxes, cut popular retirement programs and tame the national debt. With anxiety rising over a major budget mess looming in January, the campaign — dubbed "Fix the Debt" — is founded on the notion that the moment is finally at hand when policymakers will be forced to compromise on an ambitious debt-reduction strategy. After nearly three years of bipartisan negotiations, the broad outlines of that strategy are clear, the group's leaders said during a news conference at the National Press Club: Raise more money through a simplified tax code and spend less on Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, the primary drivers of future borrowing. "Everyone knows in their hearts and their minds what has to be done," said Democratic former Pennsylvania Gov. Ed Rendell, who is chairing the group with former New Hampshire Sen. Judd Gregg, a Republican. The goal of the campaign is to "create a safe environment where it's not only good policy, but good politics as well." The campaign was founded by former Clinton White House Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles and former Republican Sen. Alan Simpson of Wyoming. The two men led an independent fiscal commission that in 2010 produced a $4 trillion debt-reduction framework that has won praise from politicians across the political spectrum. But the Bowles-Simpson plan never won the explicit backing of President Barack Obama or GOP leaders and therefore never gained real traction in Congress. The campaign plans to launch a social media drive to persuade lawmakers to approve a plan similar to the Bowles-Simpson framework by July 4, 2013 — replacing $600 billion in abrupt tax hikes and sharp spending cuts that are otherwise set to take effect in January.

#### Two Icebreakers Costs almost $1.5 billion **O’Rourke 12**

(Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division, June 15, 2012, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41153.pdf)

#### In presenting the CBO’s estimate of the cost of Section 917 of S. 1892 as reported, the report¶ stated:¶ Assuming appropriation of the necessary amounts, CBO estimates that the USCG would¶ spend about $1.4 billion over the next five years to purchase two icebreakers. (Costs to¶ operate and maintain the two new vessels would total about $50 million a year beginning in¶ 2013.) We estimate that an additional $50 million would be spent over the 2008-2010 periodto recondition an existing USCG icebreaker, which is currently out of operation. Operating¶ and maintaining that vessel would cost about $10 million in 2010 and about $25 million¶ annually thereafter. This estimate is based on information provided by the Coast Guard¶ regarding the cost of constructing, operating, and maintaining such vessels to agency¶ specifications. (Page 8; see also pages 6 and 7)

#### Loss of fiscal discipline causes a downgrade

Mark Gongloff, Wall Street Journal, 08/2/’11, [Moody’s Affirms US AAA Rating, http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2011/08/02/moodys-affirms-us-aaa-rating/] VN

Moody’s just came out and said, great job, USA, you get to keep your AAA rating. For now. This follows Fitch, which earlier said more or less that they were still reviewing the US rating, a process that could take through August. They didn’t promise they’d keep a AAA rating at the end of the process, but called the debt deal “a step in the right direction.” Now the big shoe dangling is S&P, which is really on the hook, having sounded the loudest warning about a downgrade. The size of the debt deal doesn’t seem to hit the $4 trillion mark S&P has said would be necessary to keep a AAA rating. My prediction? They’ll issue a similar placeholder statement soonish. Meanwhile, let’s hear what Moody’s has to say: Moody’s Investors Service has confirmed the Aaa government bond rating of the United States following the raising of the statutory debt limit on August 2. The rating outlook is now negative. Moody’s placed the rating on review for possible downgrade on July 13 due to the small but rising probability of a default on the government’s debt obligations because of a failure to increase the debt limit. The initial increase of the debt limit by $900 billion and the commitment to raise it by a further $1.2-1.5 trillion by yearend have virtually eliminated the risk of such a default, prompting the confirmation of the rating at Aaa. In confirming the Aaa rating, Moody’s also recognized that today’s agreement is a first step toward achieving the long-term fiscal consolidation needed to maintain the US government debt metrics within Aaa parameters over the long run. The legislation calls for $917 billion in specific spending cuts over the next decade and established a congressional committee charged with making recommendations for achieving a further $1.5 trillion in deficit reduction over the same time period. In the absence of the committee reaching an agreement, automatic spending cuts of $1.2 trillion would become effective. In assigning a negative outlook to the rating, Moody’s indicated, however, that there would be a risk of downgrade if (1) there is a weakening in fiscal discipline in the coming year; (2) further fiscal consolidation measures are not adopted in 2013; (3) the economic outlook deteriorates significantly; or (4) there is an appreciable rise in the US government’s funding costs over and above what is currently expected.

#### D. Further downgrades would create a debt spiral, crippling the economy

Rowley 12 Charles Rowley, Professor Emeritus of Economics at George Mason University, 10/15/12, “Renewed threats to U.S. credit rating,” Charles Rowley’s blog, http://charlesrowley.wordpress.com/2012/06/15/renewed-threats-to-u-s-credit-rating/

If Moody’s downgrades and if S & P further downgrades U.S. credit ratings, this would move the United States out of the exclusive club of AAA-rated nations, and throw into question the privileged status of U.S. Treasury securities as a safe haven for global investors. Any significant flight from Treasuries would raise Treasury bond rates, with crippling consequences for the economy. A 1-percentage point increase in rates would raise Treasury debt payments by $1 trillion over the next decade, wiping out the benefits of all the budget cuts enacted by Congress last year. The dynamics of such a process may prove to be devastating, moving the U.S. federal government onto a path of sovereign downgrades that accelerates an already worsening fiscal situation. Greece here we come.

E. Economic collapse causes global nuclear war.

Merlini, Senior Fellow – Brookings, 11

[Cesare Merlini, nonresident senior fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe and chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Italian Institute for International Affairs (IAI) in Rome. He served as IAI president from 1979 to 2001. Until 2009, he also occupied the position of executive vice chairman of the Council for the United States and Italy, which he co-founded in 1983. His areas of expertise include transatlantic relations, European integration and nuclear non-proliferation, with particular focus on nuclear science and technology. A Post-Secular World? DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2011.571015 Article Requests: Order Reprints : Request Permissions Published in: journal Survival, Volume 53, Issue 2 April 2011 , pages 117 - 130 Publication Frequency: 6 issues per year Download PDF Download PDF (~357 KB) View Related Articles To cite this Article: Merlini, Cesare 'A Post-Secular World?', Survival, 53:2, 117 – 130]

Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism.

### Shipping Lanes ADV Frontline

#### Russia is making lanes now Konovalov 12 (Alexei Konovalov, Candidate of Sciences, head of the World’s Ocean Center at the State Research Institution, <http://arctic.ru/expert-opinions/issues-and-prospects-expanded-arctic-transportation-network>, 5/1/12)

#### It is common knowledge that the Arctic abounds in natural resources. However, Russia’s Arctic zone contains tremendous oil, gas and other strategic mineral deposits, the most attractive export items. Apart from an immensely rich natural-resource base, Russia’s location facilitating the active use of Arctic territories has paramount importance for the subsequent sustained development of Russia and its Arctic zone. The underused potential generated by spatial factors implies Russia’s unique transportation and logistics capabilities. Russia can become a competitive transit state with developed service option. Russia’s Arctic zone has an opportunity to alter its foreign-trade specialization in the next 10-12 years, to discard its narrow specialization prioritizing hydrocarbons extraction, reduce the commodity bias of its economy and eliminate many disproportions in its development.¶ The realization of Russia’s transportation potential through a system of international transport corridors passing through Russian territory and waters but remaining under Russia’s jurisdiction, as well as its incorporation into the global network, may be-come a very promising prospect. Today, a unique opportunity for the cost-effective use of the high-latitude Northern Transport Corridor, Russia’s national trans-Arctic route that combines the Northern Sea Route (NSR) with river and railway lines is opening up. Murmansk and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, the route’s remotest trans-port hubs, are called on to load consignments aboard ice-resistant vessels, to facilitate the maintenance of the icebreaker fleet and to support transit by means of feeder routes. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly more efficient to establish reduced-scheduled routes for transpolar traffic, including air routes, because these projects link the Earth’s Eastern and Western Hemispheres via the shortest routes, and to build a transcontinental route which tunnels under the Bering Strait.¶ The Northern Sea Route possesses some obvious competitive advantages. Suffice it to compare the length of the standard Yokohama–Hamburg run between the southern and northern routes. The NSR is free from high-seas terrorism and piracy. Regardless of the technical difficulties of Arctic navigation, the NSR is the shortest geographical trajectory linking Europe with the rapidly developing Asia-Pacific region and North America’s west coast. This route can handle transit consignments and Russian exports now being delivered to South East Asia via the Suez Canal.

#### **SQ solves your impacts – other actors fill in Hobson 12** (Margaret Kriz Hobson, E&E reporter¶ EnergyWire: Wednesday, June 27, 2012, <http://www.eenews.net/public/energywire/2012/06/27/1>)

Shell, which paid $2.1 billion in 2008 for leasing rights in the U.S. Arctic waters, is the first of several multinational oil companies that have lined up to explore for oil and gas in the region. ConocoPhillips and Statoil are also planning to move into the region during the next two years.¶ Canada, Norway, Russia and other Arctic nations are also encouraging oil and gas drilling off their northern shores. Norway, where interest in Arctic energy drilling is booming, yesterday announced plans to award oil and gas exploration permits next year in 72 blocks in the Barents Sea.¶ In Alaska, the sparsely populated northern communities will be dramatically affected if Shell's exploration is successful, said Charles Ebinger, director of the Brookings Institution's Energy Security Initiative.¶ "If Shell finds the mother lode, you will see a stampede," he said. "And I'm not sure that's good."¶ Yesterday, Salazar made it clear that change is coming to the American Arctic. Speaking to reporters, Salazar said the government will soon release its five-year plan for oil and gas that will allow leasing in the Beaufort Sea in 2017 and the Chukchi Sea in 2016.¶ The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that the Beaufort and Chukchi seas combined could hold as much as 27 billion barrels of oil and 132 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.¶ Oil development is only one facet of the changes coming to the Arctic, noted Alaska Sen. Mark Begich (D). "It's not just energy," he said. "It's also transportation, the visitor industry, scientific research, military. Some are looking at the mineral potential. When you put it all together, we see this a frontier that I think people underestimate."¶ With global warming causing Arctic waters to remain ice-free for longer stretches each summer, transportation companies plan to cut shipping costs by moving cargo through the Arctic Ocean. Tourist boats are popping up in Barrow and other Native communities along Alaska's northern shores.

#### Countries will fill in for lack of US capabilities Bert 12 (Captain Melissa Bert, USCG, Military Fellow, U.S. Coast Guard,http://www.institutenorth.org/assets/images/uploads/articles/A\_Strategy\_to\_Advance\_the\_Arctic\_Economy\_-\_Council\_on\_Foreign\_Relations.pdf)

The United States needs to develop a comprehensive strategy for the Arctic. Melting sea ice is generating¶ an emerging Arctic economy. Nations bordering the Arctic are drilling for oil and gas, and mining,¶ shipping, and cruising in the region. Russia, Canada, and Norway are growing their icebreaker fleets and¶ shore-based infrastructure to support these enterprises. For the United States, the economic potential¶ from the energy and mineral resources is in the trillions of dollars—based upon estimates that the Alaskan¶ Arctic is the home to 30 billion barrels of oil, more than 220 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, rare earth¶ minerals, and massive renewable wind, tidal, and geothermal energy. However, the U.S. government is¶ unprepared to harness the potential that the Arctic offers. The United States lacks the capacity to deal with¶ potential regional conflicts and seaborne disasters, and it has been on the sidelines when it comes to¶ developing new governance mechanisms for the Arctic. To advance U.S. economic and security interests¶ and avert potential environmental and human disasters, the United States should ratify the UN Law of the¶ Sea Convention (LOSC), take the lead in developing mandatory international standards for operating in¶ Arctic waters, and acquire icebreakers, aircraft, and infrastructure for Arctic operations.

No causal relationship between economic decline and war.

Ferguson 6 [Niall, MA, D.Phil., is Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and William Ziegler Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at Jesus College, Oxford University, and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Foreign Affairs, Sept/Oct, “The Next War of the World”]

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, **no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible** for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

Economic decline doesn’t cause war.

Jervis 11 [Robert, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics in the Department of Political Science, and a Member of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Force in Our Times Saltzman Working Paper No. 15 July 2011 http://www.siwps.com/news.attachment/saltzmanworkingpaper15-842/SaltzmanWorkingPaper15.PDF]

Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could the more peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp disputes? 45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy, and bring back old-fashioned beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other. It is not so much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see how without building on a pre-existing high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others. Is it possible that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an optimist could reply (correctly, in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic conflict, it will not make war thinkable.

U.S. not key to the global economy.

Caryl 10 [Christian, Senior Fellow at the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a contributing editor to Foreign Policy. His column, "Reality Check," appears weekly on ForeignPolicy.com, Crisis? What Crisis? APRIL 5, 2010, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/05/crisis\_what\_crisis?page=full]

Many emerging economies entered the 2008-2009 crisis with healthy balance sheets. In most cases governments reacted quickly and flexibly, rolling out stimulus programs or even expanding poverty-reduction programs. Increasingly, the same countries that have embraced globalization and markets are starting to build **social safety nets.** And there's another factor: Trade is becoming **more evenly distributed** throughout the world. China is now a bigger market for Asian exporters than the United States. Some economists are talking about **"emerging market decoupling."** Jonathan Anderson, an emerging-markets economist at the Swiss bank UBS, showed in one recent report how car sales in emerging markets have actually been rising during this latest bout of turmoil -- powerful evidence that **emerging economies no longer have to sneeze when America catches a cold**. Aphitchaya Nguanbanchong, a consultant for the British-based aid organization Oxfam, has studied the crisis's effects on Southeast Asian economies. "The research so far shows that the result of the crisis isn't as bad as we were expecting," she says. Indonesia is a case in point: "People in this region and at the policy level learned a lot from the past crisis." Healthy domestic demand cushioned the shock when the crisis hit export-oriented industries; the government weighed in immediately with hefty stimulus measures. Nguanbanchong says that she has been surprised by the extent to which families throughout the region have kept spending money on education even as incomes have declined for some. And that, she says, reinforces a major lesson that emerging-market governments can take away from the crisis: "Governments should focus more on social policy, on health, education, and services. They shouldn't be intervening so much directly in the economy itself."

### **Naval Power Frontline**

#### Multilateralism solves better Smith 10 (REGINALD R. SMITH, National Defense University, The Arctic:¶ A New Partnership Paradigm or the Next "Cold War"?, http://www.ndu.edu/press/arctic-new-cold-war.html#author)

Each of the Arctic Five participates in a number of multilateral political venues and has expressed interest in partnership to address current and emerging regional issues. The Arctic Council, one such venue, was formed in 1996 as a high-level membership forum to engender collaboration and cooperation on issues in the region; it has no legal authority through charter but has functioned well to promote multinational visibility and study on Arctic issues by all the Arctic states and indigenous peoples.72 The 2009 report Arctic Maritime Shipping Assessment, a combined effort of a council working group from Canada, Finland, and the United States, identified many areas ripe for cooperation, including development of hydrographic data and charting, harmonization of regulatory shipping guidelines, and the critical lack of SAR capability in the region.73 Russia has taken the lead on SAR within the council for developing an international cooperation plan. With the Obama administration's intent to reset relations with Russia by seeking areas where the two nations can work together, SAR may prove to be a unifying construct beneficial to all the Arctic nations, especially the United States.74 Initial groundbreaking work on the issue occurred in December 2009 in Washington, DC, with additional discussions in Moscow the following February under an Arctic Council resolution to develop a SAR agreement. The archetype for a U.S.-Russian effort is thus coming into being.75 Regional synchronization of SAR assets would address one of many U.S. critical capability shortfalls; the United States has no Coast Guard bases on the northern coast of Alaska (the closest is 1,000 miles south), and the closest deep-water port is Dutch Harbor, over 800 miles south of the Arctic circle.76 Another multilateral collaboration was the Danish-led Ilulissat Initiative, which resulted in the unanimous Ilulissat Declaration. In the declaration, all the Arctic Five nations affirmed that "an extensive legal framework applies to the Arctic Ocean . . . notably, the law of the sea [UNCLOS] provides for important rights and obligations [and] we remain committed to this legal framework. . . . [UNCLOS] provides a solid foundation for responsible management by the five coastal states and other users. We, therefore, see no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal scheme to govern the Arctic Ocean."77

The significance of the declaration is paramount to cooperation in that UNCLOS provides the international rallying point for the Arctic states.78 Similarly important, by virtue of the unanimous and strong affirmation of UNCLOS, the declaration effectively delegitimized the notion to administer the Arctic along the lines of an Antarctic-like treaty preserving the notions of sovereignty and resource exploitation in the region.79 With U.S. participation and declaration of support for UNCLOS in these venues, failure to ratify the treaty suggests that U.S. credibility and legitimacy, and hence the ability to build cohesive multilateral partnerships, are appreciably degraded. This conclusion is illustrated in Malaysia's and Indonesia's refusal to join the Proliferation Security Initiative using the U.S. refusal to accede to UNCLOS as their main argument.80 Accession to the treaty appears to be a key first step to preserving U.S. vital interests in the Arctic and building necessary credibility for regional and global partnerships in the political spectrum. Equally important to political partnerships in the region are those available through military collaboration of the Arctic nations.

There are a number of existing constructs for military partnership, most of which are currently bilateral and trilateral military-to-military ventures among the Arctic states and other interested states. The majority of these constructs are military exercises, such as the joint Canadian-Danish-American Northern Deployment 2009, that promote interoperability and cooperation among participating nations.81 Others include longstanding mutual defense organizations such as the U.S. and Canadian integration in the North American Aerospace Defense Command, a standard that has been suggested for an overall Arctic collaboration model.82 Similarly, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) includes among its membership all Arctic states except Russia. While NATO supports member states and has exercised member militaries in the Arctic areas off Norway, it is a divisive influence when trying to include Russia in an Arctic solution set.83 Ad hoc arrangements also promote cooperation as in the 2010 agreement between Norway and the United States solidifying a plan for the two national navies to train together in the northern Norwegian waters.84 Another ad hoc relationship is also forming among the Scandinavian countries seeking to "enhance security in the Arctic."85 The North Atlantic and North Pacific Coast Guard Forums are multilateral organizations that promote information sharing and cooperative efforts in a number of maritime issues including SAR. These forums have been generally successful in promoting maritime cooperation through information sharing and interoperability through training exercises and may provide a model for similar cooperation in the Arctic region.86 Another program that shows promise for a more broad-based cooperative effort is the U.S. Coast Guard's "Shiprider" initiative, under which the United States and partner nations exchange maritime law enforcement officials on each other's patrol vessels, allowing rule of law enforcement in both host and partner nation waters.87 To one extent or another, all "Arctic coastal states have indicated a willingness to establish and maintain a military presence in the high north."88 However, decidedly lacking among the Arctic nations' military forces is a unifying construct to promote cooperation and mutual interests in an all-inclusive multilateral basis. This is similarly reflected in the U.S. military enterprise as there are currently no "mechanisms for joint operations in the Arctic."89 Promoting a new broad-based military partnership paradigm to complement those opportunities available and emerging in the political arena seems to be the next logical step for preservation of the United States' vital Arctic interests.

## Diplomacy solves escalation

Betsy Baker, Sept 14 2008 Visiting Associate Professor, Vermont Law School, teaching "The Arctic, the Law of the Sea and the Environment" at VLS http://arctic-healy-baker-2008.blogspot.com/2008/09/conflict-in-arctic-tenacity-of-media.html

Other existing legal and diplomatic structures provide an imperfect but solid basis for Arctic states to resolve potential disagreements. The Arctic Council is a cooperative forum for states and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference to address a range of environmental and economic problems in the region. The Ilulissat (Greenland) Declaration, signed in May 2008, confirms the will of the five coastal Arctic states – Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia and the United States – to strengthen existing cooperation based on mutual trust and transparency. Treaties in force in the Arctic cover issues ranging from polar bear protection to pollution by dumping from vessels to biological diversity. Activists and diplomats alike should be concerned and asking hard questions about whether these agreements will be sufficient, or sufficiently enforced,to protect the Arctic, but to pretend that it is a lawless region up for grabs ignores the facts.

## States will seek multilateralism – solves your impacts

Betsy Baker, Sept 14 2008 Visiting Associate Professor, Vermont Law School, teaching "The Arctic, the Law of the Sea and the Environment" at VLS http://arctic-healy-baker-2008.blogspot.com/2008/09/conflict-in-arctic-tenacity-of-media.html

The territorial disputes referenced in the NYT editorial are also resolved not by conflict but by diplomacy. In June 1990 Russia (then still the Soviet Union) and the United States signed a brilliantly conceived single maritime boundary treaty that precludes the need to renegotiate the boundary once the extended continental shelf limits are determined. Canada’s recent announcement that it plans to extend enforcement jurisdiction from 100 to 200 miles beyond its shores should raise concern. But it must also be viewed within the context of the long-standing friendship and shared interests of the United States and Canada on such matters as environmental protection, trade (ca. $1.5 billion daily) and common security. Their disagreement over the Northwest Passage has never flared out of control and continues to be the subject of diplomatic attention.

## International law solves

Betsy Baker, Sept 14 2008 Visiting Associate Professor, Vermont Law School, teaching "The Arctic, the Law of the Sea and the Environment" at VLS http://arctic-healy-baker-2008.blogspot.com/2008/09/conflict-in-arctic-tenacity-of-media.html

Just hours after I returned, a week ago, from my trip to the Arctic Ocean, I was dismayed to open the New York Times and find on its editorial page hyperbole verging on that which other media sources use to perpetuate the myth of "fierce disputes over territory and natural resources" in the Arctic. ("Arctic in Retreat", September 8, 2008). As the sea-ice retreats, states are turning not to arms but to existing legal structures and a tradition of scientific and and diplomatic cooperation to address common problems as well as dis- agreements. Immediately after transporting our mapping crew to shore last week, The Healy turned right around and began breaking ice for a Canadian icebreaker, the Louis Saint Laurent. This month-long joint mission to map parts of the Arctic Ocean floor is scientific and diplomatic cooperation at its international best. Like the Russian mapping the NYT mentions in its editorial, the US and Canada are gathering data in preparation not for conflict but for submission in a staid and stable legal process designed to provide certainty for all states involved. The Law of the Sea Convention establishes this orderly mechanism of rigorous scientific vetting for states seeking to extend their authority over larger portions of the continental shelf. The United States is the only Arctic state not party to the Convention but is nonetheless mapping for its potential shelf extension in keeping with procedures agreed by the international community.

### Oil Spills ADV Frontline

#### Alt cause – arctic enviorment

Kroh et al 12 (Kiley Kroh, Associate Director for Ocean Communications at the Center for American Progress, Michael Conathan, Director of Ocean Policy at the Center for American Progress, and Emma Huvos, February 2012. “Putting a Freeze on Arctic Ocean Drilling.” Center for American Progress. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/02/pdf/arcticreport.pdf)

The colder temperatures, stronger winds, darkness, snow, and ice characteristic of Arctic climates can greatly inhibit the containment and recovery equipment necessary for successful oil spill response. 38 A major component of any containment effort is the deployment of floating barriers called booms used to limit the spread of oil. Once collected, as much of the oil as possible is either recovered from the surface of the water using devices called skimmers, or when it collects in extremely high concentrations, it can be burned off using a process known as in-situ burning. Throughout the course of the Deepwater Horizon response, nearly 900 skimmers and 13.5 million feet of boom were used as part of the mechanical recovery process, and the Coast Guard conducted 411 in-situ burns. 39, 40 Cold temperatures can cause skimmers, boom, and pumps to freeze, hindering mechanical recovery. Additionally, nearly 2 million gallons of the dispersant Corexit were injected directly into the Macondo wellhead to help break up the oil as it gushed out so less of it would rise to the surface and reach the shore. Dispersants are not preapproved for use in Arctic conditions and likely wouldn’t be a feasible option even if they were, as they’ve shown reduced effectiveness in cold waters. 41 High winds like those found at times in the Arctic can also make it unsafe for response vessels to operate and prevent aircraft from flying, impeding clean up techniques and delivery of supplies. Vessel and aircraft responses are also limited by darkness. During the month of October there is less than half the amount of daylight in the Arctic than there was in the Gulf of Mexico in May during the Deepwater Horizon cleanup. Snow can further diminish response capabilities by interfering with onshore mobilization efforts.14 As temperatures drop, the potential for hypothermia among responders rises and they must limit the length of their shifts, decreasing the efficiency of response operations. As Rob Powell of the World Wildlife Fund explains, this is especially significant because “if a major spill were to occur in Arctic waters, cleanup crews would have to spend, on average, three to five days of each week simply standing by, watching helplessly as the blowout or spill continued to foul fragile Arctic ecosystems.” 42 All these environmental challenges would make responding to an oil spill deeply challenging in the best of times—never mind during frequent storms

Turn: trade causes spills

Mahony 11 (Honor, EU Observer, “Arctic shipping routes unlikely to be ‘Suez of the north”)

 Environment And then there is the environmental impact of increased shipping. More traffic means there is a greater risk of oil spill. The ships will introduce alien species through their hull water and are likely to interrupt the migratory patterns of marine mammals. Carbon emissions could accelerate ice melting even further, and this in a region where the average temperature has risen almost twice as fast as the rest of the world's. Other ship emissions , such as SOx and NOx, may also have unforeseen consequences on the Arctic environment. Norwegian explorer Borge Ousland says it is vital not to forget that changes in the Polar regions could have global ef-fects. "It is easy to look at the Polar regions as an isolated area but any change in temperature has an effect on the rest of the world," he said recently. "I am very worried about what I have seen in the last 20 years. When I went up to the North Pole for the first time in 1990, the ice was three to four metres thick. In 2007 we measured the ice for the Norwegian Polar Institute and the coverage of ice was now 1.7 metres thick."

No collapse – adaptation and functional redundancy.

Doremus, Berkeley Law, 2K [Holly, Law Professor – Cal Berkeley, 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 11, L/N]

Reluctant to concede such losses, tellers of the ecological horror story highlight how close a catastrophe might be, and how little we know about what actions might trigger one. But the apocalyptic vision is less credible today than it seemed in the 1970s. **Nor is human extinction probable any time soon.** Homo sapiens is adaptable to nearly any environment. Even if the world of the future includes far fewer species, it likely will hold people. n215 [\*47] One response to this credibility problem tones the story down a bit, arguing not that humans will go extinct but that ecological disruption will bring economies, and consequently civilizations, to their knees. n216 But this too may be overstating the case. Most ecosystem functions are performed by **multiple species.** This functional redundancy means that a high proportion of species can be lost without precipitating a collapse. n217

Alt cause outweigh.

Pynn 7 [Larry, staff writer at The Vancouver Sun, “Global warming not biggest threat: expert,” The Vancouver Sun, http://www2.canada.com/vancouversun/news/story.html?id=6e2988da-31ab-4697-810d-7a008306d571&p=1]

"We all worry about climate change, as we should, but it doesn't mean we shouldn't worry about protecting habitat," says James Grant, a biology professor at Concordia University in Montreal and co-author of a new report on threats to endangered species in Canada. "The really immediate causes right now for many species are things like farming, urbanization and habitat loss caused by the direct things we do." Research by Grant and his pupils shows the biggest threat is habitat loss at 84 per cent, overexploitation 32 per cent, native species interactions 31 per cent, natural causes 27 per cent, pollution 26 per cent, and introduced species 22 per cent. On average, species are threatened by at least two of the six categories. Human activities representing the biggest source of habitat loss and pollution are not industrial resource extraction, but agriculture at 46 per cent and urbanization at 44 per cent. "Farming is huge," Grant said in an interview. "The Prairies are one of the most affected habitats in the world. We've turned them into wheat fields." The southern Okanagan-Similkameen is another example, home to about one-third of species at risk in B.C. as well as a thriving agricultural industry, including vineyards, and increased urban development.

### **Research ADV Frontline**

#### SQ solves science diplomacy

Johnson 10

(Jenny. American Association for the Advancement of Science, 8 April. http://www.scidev.net/en/news/usaid-appointment-boosts-science-diplomacy-focus.html)

The US government's international development agency is stepping up its focus on science and technology with a key appointment intended to enhance the agency's programmes in the Middle East and bolster the Obama administration's push for science diplomacy. Alex Dehgan was appointed USAID's science and technology advisor last month (11 March). The agency described him in a statement as "the focal point for implementing the Administrator's vision to restore science and technology to its rightful place within USAID". An agency spokeswoman said that Dehgan will work closely with USAID's senior counselor and director of innovation, Maura O'Neill, and will help shape development strategies, as well as create "novel science-based initiatives". Dehgan's appointment is widely seen as strengthening the administration's commitment to science diplomacy — the use of scientific programmes, such as efforts to forge international cooperation among scientists and engineers, to achieve broader political objectives. Dehgan, a conservation biologist and an attorney in international law, has worked for the US State Department in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Middle East. He also has experience working on large-scale conservation projects in the non-governmental sector. The appointment is "very encouraging", said Caroline Wagner, author of The New Invisible College: Science for Development. "Dehgan has a long background in science diplomacy, he is a bench-trained scientist, and he is young — he has energy and drive." She said that this appointment adds to a growing list of high-level experts currently promoting US science diplomacy. "There is a lot of interest and experience that's being brought to this issue." Al Teich, director of science and policy programmes at the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), said that the appointment of Dehgan — who has worked as an AAAS fellow, helping to set up an electronic library of scientific journals in Iraq — shows that science diplomacy is "an idea whose time has come".

#### Alt cause – no diplomats

Lord et al 09

(Kristin - *vice president at the Center for a New American Security and a nonresident fellow of the Brookings Institution,* Vaughan Turekian, *chief international officer and director of the Center for Science Diplomacy at the American Association for the Advancement of Science*, “The Science of Diplomacy” http://www.cnas.org/node/918, 7/28/10)

Facing a complex set of foreign-policy challenges, the United States can no longer afford to overlook such a useful instrument of statecraft. Regrettably, the U.S. government is not well organized to take advantage of science diplomacy. The National Science Foundation and technical departments (Energy, Agriculture, Health and Human Services, and Defense) apply their resources to science -- but not to its diplomatic use. Thus, the Obama administration should appoint a senior-level ambassador for science and technology cooperation in the State Department. He or she could convene an interagency group coordinating the strategic use of science diplomacy.

**Humans will be unable to adapt to climate change**

Haby (Meteorologist with The Weather Prediction) 2010

(Jeff, “Global Warming,” 2010, <http://www.theweatherprediction.com/global_warming/>) //CL

One of the most talked about topics in meteorology and climatology is global warming. Global warming is the theory that states when greenhouse gases are added to the earth's atmosphere the result will be for increased average global temperature. The main greenhouse gas that is of concern is Carbon Dioxide. The replacing of trees and vegetation with pavement also contributes to warmer surface temperatures. This page will clarify many of the issues about global warming. It has been debated whether global warming is a theory or a fact. The overwhelming majority of scientists studying the issue agree that global warming is a fact, although there is considerable debate on the magnitude. Although global warming is widely believed, it is a problem that is easy to put off. It is easier to notice sudden changes such as a volcanic eruptions and tsunamis than it is to notice slow processes such as climate change. At one extreme of the global warming debate is those that believe the change in precipitation, temperature and sea level will be severe. They predict the average global temperature to rise several degrees Celsius over the next several decades. Sea level will rise and take over large portions of the land in coastal areas. Agriculture will be significantly impacted with some currently rainy regions becoming much drier and some dry regions becoming much wetter. Humans will be unable to adapt very successfully to the change: disease, famine and destruction of the world economy will far surpass the problems of today.

**Climate change is completely natural and the world is cooling – historical cycle, satellite data, ocean oscillation, and sunspots prove**

Ferrara 12 (Peter Ferrara, Director of Entitlement and Budget Policy for the Heartland Institute, General Counsel for the American Civil Rights Union, and Senior Fellow at the National Center for Policy Analysis, he served in the White House Office of Policy Development under President Reagan, and as Associate Deputy Attorney General of the United States under President George H.W. Bush, he is a graduate of Harvard College and Harvard Law School, 5/31/12, “Sorry Global Warming Alarmists, The Earth Is Cooling” www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2012/05/31/sorry-global-warming-alarmists-the-earth-is-cooling/2/)

Check out the 20th century temperature record, and you will find that its up and down pattern does not follow the industrial revolution’s upward march of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), which is the supposed central culprit for man caused global warming (and has been much, much higher in the past). It follows instead the up and down pattern of naturally caused climate cycles. For example, temperatures dropped steadily from the late 1940s to the late 1970s. The popular press was even talking about a coming ice age. Ice ages have cyclically occurred roughly every 10,000 years, with a new one actually due around now. In the late 1970s, the natural cycles turned warm and temperatures rose until the late 1990s, a trend that political and economic interests have tried to milk mercilessly to their advantage. The incorruptible satellite measured global atmospheric temperatures show less warming during this period than the heavily manipulated land surface temperatures. Central to these natural cycles is the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO). Every 25 to 30 years the oceans undergo a natural cycle where the colder water below churns to replace the warmer water at the surface, and that affects global temperatures by the fractions of a degree we have seen. The PDO was cold from the late 1940s to the late 1970s, and it was warm from the late 1970s to the late 1990s, similar to the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO). In 2000, the UN’s IPCC predicted that global temperatures would rise by 1 degree Celsius by 2010. Was that based on climate science, or political science to scare the public into accepting costly anti-industrial regulations and taxes? Don Easterbrook, Professor Emeritus of Geology at Western Washington University, knew the answer. He publicly predicted in 2000 that global temperatures would decline by 2010. He made that prediction because he knew the PDO had turned cold in 1999, something the political scientists at the UN’s IPCC did not know or did not think significant. Well, the results are in, and the winner is….Don Easterbrook. Easterbrook also spoke at the Heartland conference, with a presentation entitled “Are Forecasts of a 20-Year Cooling Trend Credible?” Watch that online and you will see how scientists are supposed to talk: cool, rational, logical analysis of the data, and full explanation of it. All I ever see from the global warming alarmists, by contrast, is political public relations, personal attacks, ad hominem arguments, and name calling, combined with admissions that they can’t defend their views in public debate. Easterbrook shows that by 2010 the 2000 prediction of the IPCC was wrong by well over a degree, and the gap was widening. That’s a big miss for a forecast just 10 years away, when the same folks expect us to take seriously their predictions for 100 years in the future. Howard Hayden, Professor of Physics Emeritus at the University of Connecticut showed in his presentation at the conference that based on the historical record a doubling of CO2 could be expected to produce a 2 degree C temperature increase. Such a doubling would take most of this century, and the temperature impact of increased concentrations of CO2 declines logarithmically. You can see Hayden’s presentation online as well. Because PDO cycles last 25 to 30 years, Easterbrook expects the cooling trend to continue for another 2 decades or so. Easterbrook, in fact, documents 40 such alternating periods of warming and cooling over the past 500 years, with similar data going back 15,000 years. He further expects the flipping of the ADO to add to the current downward trend. But that is not all. We are also currently experiencing a surprisingly long period with very low sunspot activity. That is associated in the earth’s history with even lower, colder temperatures. The pattern was seen during a period known as the Dalton Minimum from 1790 to 1830, which saw temperature readings decline by 2 degrees in a 20 year period, and the noted Year Without A Summer in 1816 (which may have had other contributing short term causes). Even worse was the period known as the Maunder Minimum from 1645 to 1715, which saw only about 50 sunspots during one 30 year period within the cycle, compared to a typical 40,000 to 50,000 sunspots during such periods in modern times. The Maunder Minimum coincided with the coldest part of the Little Ice Age, which the earth suffered from about 1350 to 1850. The Maunder Minimum saw sharply reduced agricultural output, and widespread human suffering, disease and premature death. Such impacts of the sun on the earth’s climate were discussed at the conference by astrophysicist and geoscientist Willie Soon, Nir J. Shaviv, of the Racah Institute of Physics in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and Sebastian Luning, co-author with leading German environmentalist Fritz Vahrenholt of The Cold Sun. Easterbrook suggests that the outstanding question is only how cold this present cold cycle will get. Will it be modest like the cooling from the late 1940s to late 1970s? Or will the paucity of sunspots drive us all the way down to the Dalton Minimum, or even the Maunder Minimum? He says it is impossible to know now. But based on experience, he will probably know before the UN and its politicized IPCC.