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## AT: Warming

### Take this hippies – the Earth will cool for decades

Peter Ferrara, economist writer, 5-31-2012, “Sorry Global Warming Alarmist, The Earth is Cooling,” Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2012/05/31/sorry-global-warming-alarmists-the-earth-is-cooling/

Climate change itself is already in the process of definitively rebutting climate alarmists who think human use of fossil fuels is causing ultimately catastrophic global warming. That is because natural climate cycles have already turned from warming to cooling, global temperatures have already been declining for more than 10 years, and global temperatures will continue to decline for another two decades or more.¶ That is one of the most interesting conclusions to come out of the seventh International Climate Change Conference sponsored by the Heartland Institute, held last week in Chicago. I attended, and served as one of the speakers, talking about The Economic Implications of High Cost Energy.¶ The conference featured serious natural science, contrary to the self-interested political science you hear from government financed global warming alarmists seeking to justify widely expanded regulatory and taxation powers for government bodies, or government body wannabees, such as the United Nations. See for yourself, as the conference speeches are online.¶ ¶ The Heartland Institute has effectively become the international headquarters of the climate realists, an analog to the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). It has achieved that status through these international climate conferences, and the publication of its Climate Change Reconsidered volumes, produced in conjunction with the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC).¶ Those Climate Change Reconsidered volumes are an equivalently thorough scientific rebuttal to the irregular Assessment Reports of the UN’s IPCC. You can ask any advocate of human caused catastrophic global warming what their response is to Climate Change Reconsidered. If they have none, they are not qualified to discuss the issue intelligently.¶ Check out the 20th century temperature record, and you will find that its up and down pattern does not follow the industrial revolution’s upward march of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2), which is the supposed central culprit for man caused global warming (and has been much, much higher in the past). It follows instead the up and down pattern of naturally caused climate cycles.

## AT: US-China War

### Heg solves US-China War

Dan Blumenthal, resident fellow in Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute, 5-2-2012, “A Strong Military Keeps the Threat of War Small,” NTY, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/02/are-we-headed-for-a-cold-war-with-china/a-strong-military-keeps-the-threat-of-war-small

We are not in a cold war with China. That is too simple a metaphor to describe the state of Sino-American relations. One the one hand, China and the U.S. are economic partners. Both countries have benefited enormously from bilateral trade. On the other hand, the relationship is rife with suspicion.¶ There are good reasons for mutual apprehension; they cannot be papered over with better communications or "confidence building measures." China's dictators are neither wrong in their belief that the ultimate U.S. aim is democracy in China, nor misguided in their belief that Washington will do whatever it takes to make sure China does not dominate Asia. Washington is right to believe that China has greater ambitions now that it is more powerful. China wants more control, if not hegemony, over the Asia Pacific.¶ There should be no surprise that China is a strategic rival: great power competition is the natural state of international politics. Why anyone thought China would be different is a mystery.¶ Though the two sides have clashing interests, neither side wants strategic competition to descend into conflict. Managing the competition calls for sophisticated statecraft. The two sides should acknowledge their divergent objectives, while continuing to focus on their mutual interests — deep economic reform in both countries¶ But, in the end, it will be old-fashioned deterrence by the U.S. that will keep the peace between these great powers. This is easier said than done. A war-weary United States is reluctant to provide resources for its stated strategy of checking Chinese power. Historically, Washington's habit is to cut its military after long wars. It is incumbent upon America to go against this penny-wise, pound-foolish practice.¶ America's leaders must make the case that paying now for a greater military presence in Asia will deter a far more costly possible conflict with China. By paying for the ships and aircraft our military needs, Americans may buy themselves peace

### No China-US War

Robert Ross, professor of political science at Boston College, Fall 2002, “"Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrance, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China,” Belfer Center, http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/250/navigating\_the\_taiwan\_strait.html

China’s limited number of nuclear weapons would seem to give it a retaliatory¶ force sufficient to fulfill a minimal deterrence capability. Chinese analysts argue that based on the assumption that states make a “cost-beneªt comparison”¶ (bi deshi) in deciding to use force, a limited nuclear force can target an adversary’s “strategic points” (yaohai) to inºict sufªcient costs to deter a superior¶ power’s use of nuclear weapons. In this respect, China’s nuclear forces serve as¶ a “counter-nuclear deterrent” (fan he weishe) capability, undermining an adversary’s ability to carry out “nuclear blackmail” (he ezha) to threaten China with a¶ nuclear attack in response to the latter’s use of conventional force to defend its¶ interests. China’s nuclear deterrent can also persuade other nuclear powers¶ from escalating a conventional war directly against Chinese territory, for fear¶ of a possible Chinese nuclear retaliation.¶ To the extent that China is thus engaged in mutual nuclear deterrence with¶ the United States, it participates in the stability-instability paradox. Chinese¶ leaders may believe that because the PRC can pose the risk of unintended escalation and mutually assured destruction, the United States would be deterred¶ from interfering in a conventional mainland-Taiwan conflict over a secondlevel U.S. interest such as the independence of Taiwan. It is not clear, however,¶ that leaders in Beijing believe that China has a sufªcient nuclear deterrent capability or that nuclear weapons can deter the conventional use of force.

### No US-China War

Zheng Yong Nian, director of the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, 3-22-2012, “Cultural Reasons China Won’t Go To War With US,” Strait Times, http://www.straitstimes.com/Review/Others/STIStory\_779066.html

AFTER the United States' declaration of a "return" to Asia, Sino-american relations entered an unusually tense period. Many have asked if the two big powers will go into conflict, and even a war. If one looks at the essence of Chinese culture, the answer is no.¶ ¶ Culture matters in international affairs and influences foreign policy as a way of thinking. The mode of thinking is not a cause of conflicts, but the interactions between two different ways of thinking is likely to lead to conflict. Culture can also be mobilised and utilised to influence foreign policy. Once mobilised, the impact of culture is infinite.¶ ¶ So why is war an impossibility between the two? One should distinguish between small-scale conflicts and major wars. All kinds of conflicts such as trade disputes and ideology-oriented debates on human rights are inevitable and normal. But for the China-us conflict to result in a major war is unlikely.¶ ¶ Here is the cultural argument. A long undisrupted history of several thousand years has bestowed China with a rare sense of "big history". China perceives long-term issues with a long-term vision. China is slow in dealing with international issues, while the Americans sometimes become impatient. China's normal approach to problems is to find the best solutions before acting on them. China sees many problems as inherent in the process of development and believes solutions will eventually emerge with time.¶ ¶ An analogy can be made here with Chinese medicine, which is slow in curing an illness but is considered better in completely curing one. The American way is similar to Western medicine's delivering of quick fixes.¶ The differences between cultures are also demonstrated in the different understanding of strategy. The West views China's "Tao Guang Yang Hui" (translated literally as "hiding brightness and cherishing obscurity") strategy as something temporary and believes China is waiting for better opportunities to emerge. This strategy is apparent in China's reactive and defensive foreign policy of the last few centuries. Its defensive foreign policy is best reflected in China's Great Wall, which was built for defending aggressive invasions. Although such defensive strategies are not very successful in Chinese history, they are deeply rooted in Chinese culture.¶ ¶ This defensive culture also prevails in China's military development. The military philosophy of "zhi ge wei wu" simply means that the purpose of developing weapons is to use them to stop their usage. For the West, it is for deterrence while for the Chinese it is defence. China develops a certain kind of weapon or military plan only to counteract weapons and military plans directed at it. China is rarely pre-emptive like the US. China has repeatedly stressed its nuclear policy of maintaining a minimum deterrence with a no-first-use pledge. Chinese defence policy is very different from the ones adopted by the Soviet Union, Germany and Japan before World War II, which all had a state will and plan to achieve hegemony.¶ ¶ The reactive element is also in the daily practices of China's foreign policy, which runs on a reactive mode like firefighters. This scant regard for foreign policy can be seen in China's chess game, "weiqi" (Japanese go). In Dr Henry Kissinger's new book, On China, he uses an analogy of weiqi to depict the difference between Western and Chinese strategic cultures. Western strategic culture is like a game of chess which tends to be a zero-sum game, while the Chinese weiqi is a non-zero-sum game where relative gains are possible.¶ ¶ In the West, be it the presidential system or the Cabinet system, the minister of foreign affairs is a prominent and influential position. By comparison, the weiqi philosophy emphasises relative gains. Chinese-style foreign policy could be likened to doing business: you may make more profits today, but I may make more tomorrow. With such a mentality, foreign policy is never an urgent matter. Unlike his counterpart in the West, the Chinese minister of foreign policy occupies an extremely low position in the administrative hierarchy and has limited influence

#### No US-China War

Zhu Feng, director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies at Beijing University, 5-3-2012, “No One Wants a Clash,” NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/02/are-we-headed-for-a-cold-war-with-china/no-one-wants-a-cold-war-between-the-us-and-china

However there is little worry that the two powers will collide into a “new cold war.” First of all, China’s authoritarian system has been tremendously mobilized for international integration. Beijing has been pretty conservative and doesn’t welcome democratization. But it does not strictly adhere to traditional communism either. Any new confrontation like the cold war would risk a huge backlash in China by greatly damaging the better-off Chinese people. Such a conflict could ultimately undermine the Communist Party’s ruling legitimacy.¶ Second, the power disparity between Washington and China hasn’t significantly narrowed, regardless of Chinese achievements in the past decades. My view is that Beijing remains an adolescent power, and should learn how to be a great power rather than unwisely rushing to any confrontation. Though some Chinese want the nation to assert itself more forcefully, the huge disparity in power should keep China in place. China is in no position to challenge the U.S. But China will be more enthusiastic and straightfoward about addressing and safeguarding its legal interests. Competition between Washington and Beijing will intensify, but that does not automatically mean that the relationship will be unmanageable.¶ Lastly, the cycle of action and reaction has mostly turned out to be fruitful for the U.S. and China. Further competition is promising. The U.S. doesn’t want to put China in a corner, or force Beijing to stand up desperately. The dealings over many thorny issues have proved that each side wants to handle the conflict, not escalate it. Chen Guangcheng’s departure from the U.S. Embassy is telling evidence. Neither side wants diplomatic confrontation. Rather, it seems that both sides are struggling to react constructively.¶ In the years to come, China-U.S. relations will continue to be very complicated, but also very important. The glue to keep these two nations together is not pragmatism only, but mutual interest — especially in trade

#### No US-China war – economic interdependence

David Pugliese, journalist with the Ottawa Citizen, 10-15-2011, “U.S. War With China Unlikely Because of Economic Interdependence Between Two Nations Says Study,” Ottawa Citizen, http://blogs.ottawacitizen.com/2011/10/15/u-s-war-with-china-unlikely-because-of-economic-interdependence-between-two-nations-says-study/

A new RAND Study concludes that a U.S. war with China is not likely but steps are needed to keep the peace between the two nations. Despite the potential for conflict over issues such as North Korea, Taiwan, or cyberspace, economic interdependence between the United States and China is a powerful source of deterrence, operating in effect as a form of “mutual assured economic destruction,” it notes.

## AT: Heg Collapse

### US Heg has been on decline

Parag Khanna, director of global Governance, 1-27-2008, “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony”, New York Times Magazine, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.html?pagewanted=all>

Turn on the TV today, and you could be forgiven for thinking it’s 1999. Democrats and Republicans are bickering about where and how to intervene, whether to do it alone or with allies and what kind of world America should lead. Democrats believe they can hit a reset button, and Republicans believe muscular moralism is the way to go. It’s as if the first decade of the 21st century didn’t happen — and almost as if history itself doesn’t happen. But the distribution of power in the world has fundamentally altered over the two presidential terms of George W. Bush, both because of his policies and, more significant, despite them. Maybe the best way to understand how quickly history happens is to look just a bit ahead.¶ It is 2016, and the Hillary Clinton or John McCain or Barack Obama administration is nearing the end of its second term. America has pulled out of Iraq but has about 20,000 troops in the independent state of Kurdistan, as well as warships anchored at Bahrain and an Air Force presence in Qatar. Afghanistan is stable; Iran is nuclear. China has absorbed Taiwan and is steadily increasing its naval presence around the Pacific Rim and, from the Pakistani port of Gwadar, on the Arabian Sea. The European Union has expanded to well over 30 members and has secure oil and gas flows from North Africa, Russia and the Caspian Sea, as well as substantial nuclear energy. America’s standing in the world remains in steady decline.¶ Why? Weren’t we supposed to reconnect with the United Nations and reaffirm to the world that America can, and should, lead it to collective security and prosperity? Indeed, improvements to America’s image may or may not occur, but either way, they mean little. Condoleezza Rice has said America has no “permanent enemies,” but it has no permanent friends either. Many saw the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as the symbols of a global American imperialism; in fact, they were signs of imperial overstretch. Every expenditure has weakened America’s armed forces, and each assertion of power has awakened resistance in the form of terrorist networks, insurgent groups and “asymmetric” weapons like suicide bombers. America’s unipolar moment has inspired diplomatic and financial countermovements to block American bullying and construct an alternate world order. That new global order has arrived, and there is precious little Clinton or McCain or Obama could do to resist its growth.

### America’s Heg only lasted through the 90’s

Parag Khanna, director of global Governance, 1-27-2008, “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony”, New York Times Magazine, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.html?pagewanted=all>

At best, America’s unipolar moment lasted through the 1990s, but that was also a decade adrift. The post-cold-war “peace dividend” was never converted into a global liberal order under American leadership. So now, rather than bestriding the globe, we are competing — and losing — in a geopolitical marketplace alongside the world’s other superpowers: the European Union and China. This is geopolitics in the 21st century: the new Big Three. Not Russia, an increasingly depopulated expanse run by Gazprom.gov; not an incoherent Islam embroiled in internal wars; and not India, lagging decades behind China in both development and strategic appetite. The Big Three make the rules — their own rules — without any one of them dominating. And the others are left to choose their suitors in this post-American world. The more we appreciate the differences among the American, European and Chinese worldviews, the more we will see the planetary stakes of the new global game. Previous eras of balance of power have been among European powers sharing a common culture. The cold war, too, was not truly an “East-West” struggle; it remained essentially a contest over Europe. What we have today, for the first time in history, is a global, multicivilizational, multipolar battle.

### Europe Influence is on the rise, eclipsing America

Parag Khanna, director of global Governance, 1-27-2008, “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony”, New York Times Magazine, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.html?pagewanted=all>

And Europe’s influence grows at America’s expense. While America fumbles at nation-building, Europe spends its money and political capital on locking peripheral countries into its orbit. Many poor regions of the world have realized that they want the European dream, not the American dream. Africa wants a real African Union like the E.U.; we offer no equivalent. Activists in the Middle East want parliamentary democracy like Europe’s, not American-style presidential strongman rule. Many of the foreign students we shunned after 9/11 are now in London and Berlin: twice as many Chinese study in Europe as in the U.S. We didn’t educate them, so we have no claims on their brains or loyalties as we have in decades past. More broadly, America controls legacy institutions few seem to want — like the International Monetary Fund — while Europe excels at building new and sophisticated ones modeled on itself. The U.S. has a hard time getting its way even when it dominates summit meetings — consider the ill-fated Free Trade Area of the Americas — let alone when it’s not even invited, as with the new East Asian Community, the region’s answer to America’s Apec.

### Chinese influence is also rising

Parag Khanna, director of global Governance, 1-27-2008, “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony”, New York Times Magazine, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.html?pagewanted=all>

The East Asian Community is but one example of how China is also too busy restoring its place as the world’s “Middle Kingdom” to be distracted by the Middle Eastern disturbances that so preoccupy the United States. In America’s own hemisphere, from Canada to Cuba to Chávez’s Venezuela, China is cutting massive resource and investment deals. Across the globe, it is deploying tens of thousands of its own engineers, aid workers, dam-builders and covert military personnel. In Africa, China is not only securing energy supplies; it is also making major strategic investments in the financial sector. The whole world is abetting China’s spectacular rise as evidenced by the ballooning share of trade in its gross domestic product — and China is exporting weapons at a rate reminiscent of the Soviet Union during the cold war, pinning America down while filling whatever power vacuums it can find. Every country in the world currently considered a rogue state by the U.S. now enjoys a diplomatic, economic or strategic lifeline from China, Iran being the most prominent example. Without firing a shot, China is doing on its southern and western peripheries what Europe is achieving to its east and south. Aided by a 35 million-strong ethnic Chinese diaspora well placed around East Asia’s rising economies, a Greater Chinese Co-Prosperity Sphere has emerged. Like Europeans, Asians are insulating themselves from America’s economic uncertainties. Under Japanese sponsorship, they plan to launch their own regional monetary fund, while China has slashed tariffs and increased loans to its Southeast Asian neighbors. Trade within the India-Japan-Australia triangle — of which China sits at the center — has surpassed trade across the Pacific.

### **Second world states are key to determining Heg**

Parag Khanna, director of global Governance, 1-27-2008, “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony”, New York Times Magazine, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.html?pagewanted=all>

There are plenty of statistics that will still tell the story of America’s global dominance: our military spending, our share of the global economy and the like. But there are statistics, and there are trends. To really understand how quickly American power is in decline around the world, I’ve spent the past two years traveling in some 40 countries in the five most strategic regions of the planet — the countries of the second world. They are not in the first-world core of the global economy, nor in its third-world periphery. Lying alongside and between the Big Three, second-world countries are the swing states that will determine which of the superpowers has the upper hand for the next generation of geopolitics. From Venezuela to Vietnam and Morocco to Malaysia, the new reality of global affairs is that there is not one way to win allies and influence countries but three: America’s coalition (as in “coalition of the willing”), Europe’s consensus and China’s consultative styles. The geopolitical marketplace will decide which will lead the 21st century.

### **The second world has grown confidante enough to form their own belt**

Parag Khanna, director of global Governance, 1-27-2008, “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony”, New York Times Magazine, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.html?pagewanted=all>

The new multicolor map of influence — a Venn diagram of overlapping American, Chinese and European influence — is a very fuzzy read. No more “They’re with us” or “He’s our S.O.B.” Mubarak, Musharraf, Malaysia’s Mahathir and a host of other second-world leaders have set a new standard for manipulative prowess: all tell the U.S. they are its friend while busily courting all sides.¶ What is more, many second-world countries are confident enough to form anti-imperial belts of their own, building trade, technology and diplomatic axes across the (second) world from Brazil to Libya to Iran to Russia. Indeed, Russia has stealthily moved into position to construct Iran’s Bushehr nuclear reactor, putting it firmly in the Chinese camp on the Iran issue, while also offering nuclear reactors to Libya and arms to Venezuela and Indonesia. Second-world countries also increasingly use sovereign-wealth funds (often financed by oil) worth trillions of dollars to throw their weight around, even bullying first-world corporations and markets. The United Arab Emirates (particularly as represented by their capital, Abu Dhabi), Saudi Arabia and Russia are rapidly climbing the ranks of foreign-exchange holders and are hardly holding back in trying to buy up large shares of Western banks (which have suddenly become bargains) and oil companies. Singapore’s sovereign-wealth fund has taken a similar path. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia plans an international investment fund that will dwarf Abu Dhabi’s. From Switzerland to Citigroup, a reaction is forming to limit the shares such nontransparent sovereign-wealth funds can control, showing just how quickly the second world is rising in the global power game.

### **Countries are walking away from the US**

Parag Khanna, director of global Governance, 1-27-2008, “Waving Goodbye to Hegemony”, New York Times Magazine, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/27/magazine/27world-t.html?pagewanted=all>

[Karl Marx](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/karl_marx/index.html?inline=nyt-per) and Max Weber both chastised Far Eastern cultures for being despotic, agrarian and feudal, lacking the ingredients for organizational success. Oswald Spengler saw it differently, arguing that mankind both lives and thinks in unique cultural systems, with Western ideals neither transferable nor relevant. Today the Asian landscape still features ancient civilizations but also by far the most people and, by certain measures, the most money of any region in the world. With or without America, Asia is shaping the world’s destiny — and exposing the flaws of the grand narrative of Western civilization in the process.¶ The rise of China in the East and of the European Union within the West has fundamentally altered a globe that recently appeared to have only an American gravity — pro or anti. As Europe’s and China’s spirits rise with every move into new domains of influence, America’s spirit is weakened. The E.U. may uphold the principles of the United Nations that America once dominated, but how much longer will it do so as its own social standards rise far above this lowest common denominator? And why should China or other Asian countries become “responsible stakeholders,” in former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s words, in an American-led international order when they had no seat at the table when the rules were drafted? Even as America stumbles back toward multilateralism, others are walking away from the American game and playing by their own rules.

## AT: CTBT

### CTBT fails

R. James Woolsey, chairman of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, director of the CIA during the Clinton administration, and Keith B. Payne, head of graduate department of defense and strategic studies of Missouri State University, 9-8-2011, “Reconsidering the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/276530/reconsidering-comprehensive-test-ban-treaty-r-james-woolsey?pg=3

The primary argument made by CTBT supporters is that the treaty would inspire the international community to rally with the United States in support of nuclear nonproliferation, strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and thereby help keep nuclear weapons out of terrorist hands. There are many reasons to question the hope that the gesture of U.S. ratification will have these profound symbolic, diplomatic, and psychological effects.¶ For example, Russia in particular values highly its continued possession and modernization of nuclear weapons. It views them as critically important to overcoming U.S. and Chinese conventional-force advantages. It would be naïve to expect otherwise, given Russia’s security concerns and its deficiencies in conventional forces. This emphasis on the continuing importance of modern nuclear arms may explain why Russia apparently has continued to test nuclear weapons at very low yields, despite its commitment not to do so.¶ In addition, under international law, U.S. ratification of the CTBT would legally bind the United States indefinitely to its restrictions, but would not bring the treaty into effect globally. To do so would necessitate that numerous additional countries also sign and ratify the treaty, including North Korea and Iran. In such cases, U.S. ratification would not likely inspire similar action. On the contrary, it could give North Korea an additional opportunity to play its favored game of extorting the international community. How much might we have to pay for North Korea’s favor in this regard, if such favor is even possible?

### CTBT fails – testing not needed before use

R. James Woolsey, chairman of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, director of the CIA during the Clinton administration, and Keith B. Payne, head of graduate department of defense and strategic studies of Missouri State University, 9-8-2011, “Reconsidering the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/276530/reconsidering-comprehensive-test-ban-treaty-r-james-woolsey?pg=3

Even if, by an unexpected stroke, U.S. CTBT ratification were to inspire the rest of the world to bring the treaty into force, it could not prevent further nuclear proliferation. Nuclear testing is not necessary for the development of primitive nuclear weapons. It never has been. The United States did not test the uranium-based “Little Boy” atomic bomb before dropping it on Hiroshima in 1945 (though it did test the plutonium-based “Fat Man” bomb, which was dropped on Nagasaki).

### CTBT fails – empirically denied

R. James Woolsey, chairman of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, director of the CIA during the Clinton administration, and Keith B. Payne, head of graduate department of defense and strategic studies of Missouri State University, 9-8-2011, “Reconsidering the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/276530/reconsidering-comprehensive-test-ban-treaty-r-james-woolsey?pg=3

What’s more, the argument that U.S. agreement to forgo nuclear testing would rally the world against nuclear proliferation is contrary to available evidence. The United States stopped all nuclear testing in 1992. Since then, China, France, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and apparently Russia have conducted nuclear tests, and several nuclear-weapon states (e.g., Russia, China, and France) have modernized their nuclear arsenals, while other states (e.g., India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran) have demonstrated or developed nuclear-weapon technologies. If the end of U.S. nuclear testing actually is the key to rallying international opposition against proliferation, we have little evidence of it after almost two decades of no U.S. testing.

### CTBT impossible to enforce – inspections fail

R. James Woolsey, chairman of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, director of the CIA during the Clinton administration, and Keith B. Payne, head of graduate department of defense and strategic studies of Missouri State University, 9-8-2011, “Reconsidering the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/276530/reconsidering-comprehensive-test-ban-treaty-r-james-woolsey?pg=3

Skepticism about the verification and enforcement of CTBT was key to the Senate’s rejection of the treaty in 1999. CTBT proponents now often promote the notion that CTBT verification and enforcement problems have been solved, but they are mistaken. The history of arms control from the 1930s until today demonstrates that without strong verification and enforcement measures, some states will violate solemn treaty commitments, and will continue to do so even after being caught. As a result, all now agree on the importance of on-site inspections of suspect nuclear testing to verify CTBT’s restrictions. Yet the treaty’s provisions for on-site inspections would require a mini-U.N.-like assembly of 31 countries to approve an on-site inspection request following suspicious activities. It is not difficult to see that agreement by 31 diverse countries to allow on-site inspection of suspicious behavior would become a political football; permission could not be assumed even following detection of highly incriminating behavior.¶ In addition, detection is not the same as enforcement — an important point typically dismissed by CTBT proponents. While the CTBT’s International Monitoring System provides some impressive detection technology, the treaty lacks any serious enforcement mechanisms whatsoever. Without enforcement mechanisms, the ability to detect treaty violations is, to paraphrase Frederick the Great, like an orchestra without instruments.

### Turn: CTBT prevents the U.S. from solving wars

R. James Woolsey, chairman of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, director of the CIA during the Clinton administration, and Keith B. Payne, head of graduate department of defense and strategic studies of Missouri State University, 9-8-2011, “Reconsidering the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,” National Review, http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/276530/reconsidering-comprehensive-test-ban-treaty-r-james-woolsey?pg=3

The United States holds to a “zero-yield” criterion, meaning that no sustained nuclear reactions can take place as part of a test. But other nations need not hold to the same scrupulous definition, and could allow very-low-yield nuclear reactions during tests. The U.S. “zero-yield” criterion could undercut our ability to develop new capabilities critical to deterring future threats, while opponents choosing a less rigorous testing restriction could conduct nuclear experiments that would provide important military and/or political advantages.¶ For this reason, CTBT ratification would close off a deterrence safety route that we may need to take, without providing a barrier against a range of threat developments that may drive us to seek that safety route. Ratification could erect a solid legal barrier to meeting future deterrence needs that cannot now be known with certainty. It would be compatible with the Obama administration’s policy not to develop any new U.S. nuclear-weapon capabilities — but not with prudent deterrence policy.¶ International relations are unpredictable, particularly with regard to the potential for the rapid development of severe security threats. Increasingly, technology spread, global communications, and cultural developments abroad have joined to make the United States the object of animosities and to shrink the security value of the great distances that separate us from most centers of serious threat. Technology spread, including chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver such weapons, has also increased the potential for unexpected threat developments and the lethality of otherwise second- and third-rate military powers. No one knows what types of nuclear weapons may be needed in the future to deter new threats, but they are not likely to be the ones we designed and built during the Cold War.¶ While the character of opponents’ nuclear and other highly lethal forces is not locked in, and would not be so under CTBT, it is unclear whether we would be able to design and produce the new types of capabilities we might need for future deterrence based solely on our past testing experience and extrapolations. Precluding our ability to test with an enduring legal instrument like the CTBT means taking the risk that we will not have the deterrent capabilities necessary to prevent a future war. Any future testing we might be compelled to undertake to help deter newly emerging threats would be burdened by delay and an extended prior period of intense internal review and argument. That delay and burden might have been survivable in prior centuries, when we enjoyed the luxury of time courtesy of the protection provided by vast oceans. It now would be a risk, unless the CTBT also could preclude the types of threat developments, some now unknown, that might compel us to test in the future. Unfortunately, however, the CTBT cannot prevent the development of new threats because it does little or nothing to make current and future enemies less hostile toward us, less able to reach us, or less able to attack us and our allies with primitive or modern nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction.

## AT: Prolif – Iran

### No impact to Iranian prolif

Robert Wright, senior editor at The Atlantic, 3-5-2012, “Could we live with a Nuclear Iran?,” the Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/could-we-live-with-a-nuclear-iran/253969/

Pillar's piece provides what, so far as I know, is the best concise assessment of what the risks of a nuclear Iran are and aren't--and what the risks of war with Iran are and aren't. His conclusion: "An Iran with a bomb would not be anywhere near as dangerous as most people assume, and a war to try to stop it from acquiring one would be less successful, and far more costly, than most people imagine."¶ The belief that a nuclear Iran would be a much more dangerous Iran rests on two main claims:¶ 1) Iran might launch a nuclear strike against Israel. This claim, though deployed to stir up fear in Israel and America, isn't given much credence by most national security experts in those countries because, as Pillar notes, it presupposes an Iranian leadership that is literally suicidal, willing to be destroyed by a nuclear counterattack. Pillar further undermines the claim by showing that Iran's leadership not only qualifies as sane in this minimal sense, but has a long history of cold (and, yes, chilling) cost-benefit analysis. "The government assassinated exiled Iranian dissidents in Europe in the 1980s and '90, for example, because it saw them as a counterrevolutionary threat. The assassinations ended when they started inflicting too much damage on Iran's relations with European governments." (Pillar also explains why this sort of self-interested calculus would keep Iran from handing a nuclear weapon off to a terrorist group for covert deployment.)¶ 2) Having nukes would let Iran throw its weight around with impunity--intimidating Arab states, launching missile attacks on Israel via Hezbollah, etc. This claim, more than the first, is taken seriously in national security circles, and that's why Pillar's contribution here is so valuable. He takes on leading proponents of the claim, notably Ash Jain of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, who has written at length about things Iran might do if "shielded by a nuclear weapons capability." Pillar writes, "We never get an explanation of how, exactly, such a shield would work. Instead there is only a vague sense that nuclear weapons would lead Iran to feel its oats.”

## AT: Nuclear War

### Nuke war is unlikely and the effects are exaggerated.

Simons Jenkins, journalist for the Guardian and the BBC, 1-7-2010, “The proliferation of nuclear panic is politics at its more ghoulish,” the Gaurdian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/07/nuclear-power-weapons-radiation-defence

Meanwhile, over in Ohio, Mueller describes the same terror infecting reaction to nuclear weapons. He points out that nuclear bombs are extremely hard to make, let alone deploy, and their destructive power and radiological aftermath are grossly overstated. The devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was largely the result of the buildings bombed being made of wood. Numbers killed were similar to those dying in conventional bomb attacks at the time. Yet we memorialise Hiroshima but not Tokyo, where 100,000 were killed in March 1945. Subsequent diseases from exposure to low-level radiation were harder to detect. Modern nuclear weapons are obviously more powerful, but again their blast areas would remain limited and their likely contamination, says Mueller, much exaggerated.¶ I used to believe that, for all their horror, atom bombs brought an end to the war in Japan – which other bombs had failed to do. After that war, they stabilised the nervous confrontation between east and west, deterring Soviets and Americans from going jointly berserk at such flashpoints as Berlin, Hungary or Cuba. Deterrence sort of worked.¶ History may be moot on those points, but what is surely clear is that nuclear weapons are now virtually useless. Like Allison, Mueller goes beyond the two iconic incidents of Hiroshima and Chernobyl to show how special interests have hijacked the nuclear mystique to exploit public fear.¶ The risk of anyone exploding a nuclear weapon, even in politically charged regions such as the Middle East, is infinitesimally small. Whoever did so would be too mad to be deterred by an enemy possessing nuclear weapons, any more than Ho Chi Minh's Vietnam, Argentina's Galtieri or Iraq's Saddam Hussein were deterred by America and Britain. Nor, says Mueller, would the consequence of even a serious bomb attack be as horrible as is claimed. Cities recover with remarkable alacrity, as even Hiroshima did from contamination. The second world war and many American bombing campaigns since have shown that human settlements are resilient to aerial bombardment.¶ As for the much-vaunted risk of a terrorist getting a nuclear weapon – the "1% chance" that kept poor Dick Cheney awake at night – Mueller points out that the chance must be not one in a hundred but one in millions. Cheney would have done better worrying about the proliferation of AK47s. Even were a "dirty" bomb somehow to be assembled and deployed, its radiological contamination is exaggerated by defence contractors and lobbyists frantic for contracts.¶ The billions of dollars being devoted to countering "cataclysmic" terrorism, in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Yemen, and to confronting such proto-nuclear states as Iran or North Korea, is not just disproportionate to the risk. The money would be better spent on other ways of reducing terrorism. In a futile pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation, America and Britain are combing the world accusing states of threatening somehow to destroy their civilisations when the risk of this happening is near meaningless.¶ As Mueller notes, it is not only ghoulish science and ghoulish journalism that sells, ghoulish politics does too. He has nothing against negotiating nuclear non-proliferation, but pleads "to avoid policies that can lead to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people under the obsessive sway of worst-case scenario fantasies", as is the case in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is these fantasies that line the streets of Wootton Bassett each week.¶ It is a monumental irony that rightwing politicians who rearm against the tiny risk to humanity from nuclear weapons are often the same as deny the risk to humanity from global warming. Both are risks. Both may be improbable, but the risk from radiation is minimal and containable, while the worst-case scenario from global warming is truly cataclysmic. Nor is such hypocrisy confined to the right. Many of those who claim global warming as the "greatest threat to the planet" tend also to be those who oppose nuclear energy as "too risky", or even too expensive.¶ This is all a massive failure of science to pierce the carapace of public ignorance. As Allison and Mueller argue, nothing is as potent as the politics of fear, and there is no fear as blind as that which comes from a bomb and a death ray. So what is science doing? The world is in the grip of a prejudice from which nothing seems able to free it. At least these books try.

## AT: Nuclear Terrorism

### No nuclear terrorism

Steve Chapman, editorial writer for the Chicago Tribune on international affairs, 5-17-2012, “The Implausibility of Nuclear Terrorism,” Reason.com, http://reason.com/archives/2012/05/17/the-implausibility-of-nuclear-terrorism

Why are we worried? Bomb designs can be found on the Internet. Fissile material may be smuggled out of Russia. Iran, a longtime sponsor of terrorist groups, is trying to acquire nuclear weapons. A layperson may figure it's only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard's Graham Allison, in his book "Nuclear Terrorism," concludes, "On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable."¶ But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike.¶ Given their inability to do something simple—say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb—it's reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, "the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small."¶ The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia's inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing.¶ Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not scrupulously maintained (as those have not been) quickly become what one expert calls "radioactive scrap metal." If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use.¶ As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally—for reasons even the Iranians can grasp.¶ Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. The terrorists, notes Mueller, would then have to spirit it "hundreds of miles out of the country over unfamiliar terrain, and probably while being pursued by security forces."¶ Then comes the task of building a bomb. It's not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment—plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. And if al-Qaida could make a prototype, another obstacle would emerge: There is no guarantee it would work, and there is no way to test it.¶ Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time - but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what's going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up.¶ Mueller recalls that after the Irish Republican Army failed in an attempt to blow up British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, it said, "We only have to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always." Al-Qaida, he says, faces a very different challenge: For it to carry out a nuclear attack, everything has to go right. For us to escape, only one thing has to go wrong.

# Impacts

## Terrorism – Yes WMDs – Biological

### Terrorists will use biological WMDs now

Council on Foreign Relations, 12-3-2008, “World at Risk: Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism,” Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/terrorism/world-risk-report-commission-prevention-wmd-proliferation-terrorism/p17910

This Congressionally-mandated report was written by the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism; they were "given a charter to assess, within 180 days, any and all of the nation’s activities, initiatives, and programs to prevent weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism. We were also asked to provide concrete recommendations—a road map, if you will—to address these threats."¶ It states that, "The commission believes that unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013. The Commission further believes that terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon. The Commission believes that the U.S. government needs to move more aggressively to limit the proliferation of biological weapons and reduce the prospect of a bioterror attack.".

## Yes China War – Taiwan Conflict Coming

### Taiwan preparing for war

Asia Pacific News, 7-16-2012, “Taiwan tests new weapons in China war simulation,” Asia Pacific News, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp\_asiapacific/view/1213830/1/.html

TAIPEI: Taiwan for the first time Monday tested how a fleet of advanced submarine hunting aircraft and attack helicopters would be utilized in the event of an attack by rival China, officials and media said.¶ The weapons were included at the beginning of the five-day "Han Kuang No 28" computer-aided wargame -- the biggest of the military's series of annual drills.¶ The Defence ministry confirmed the drill started Monday but refused to provide further details.¶ However Taipei-based Liberty Times said: "The authorities will use the event to evaluate how Taiwan's defence capacities could be boosted after the military obtains the two weapons

## Yes China War – Territory Disputes

### Tensions are rising in Asia

Bradley KLAPPER, (Quals.) 7-12-2012, KTTC.com, “US, China square off over South China Sea” http://www.kttc.com/story/19006237/us-china-square-off-over-south-china-sea

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia (AP) - The Obama administration pressed Beijing on Thursday to accept a code of conduct for resolving territorial disputes in the resource-rich South China Sea, a difficult U.S. mediation effort that has faced resistance from the communist government - although it has endeared the U.S. to once-hostile countries in Southeast Asia. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton met with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi on the sidelines of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' annual conference. Sitting across from each other at a long table in a grand hall with chandeliers, Clinton stressed the different ways Washington and Beijing are cooperating. Yang spoke of building an even closer U.S.-Chinese relationship. Neither side spoke about the South China Sea while reporters were allowed in the room. Several Asian governments have expressed worry about China's expansive maritime claims. Tensions have threatened to boil over in recent months, with a standoff between Chinese and Philippine ships and sharp disagreements between China and Vietnam. China claims virtually the entire area and has created an entirely new city to administer it, sparking deep concern from rival claimants. The sea hosts about a third of the world's cargo traffic, has rich fishing grounds and is believed to store vast oil and gas reserves. "The United States has no territorial claims there and we do not take sides in disputes about territorial or maritime boundaries," Clinton told foreign ministers gathered in Cambodia's capital. "But we do have an interest in freedom of navigation, the maintenance of peace and stability, respect for international law and unimpeded lawful commerce in the South China Sea." Later Thursday, Clinton told delegates the U.S. was "intensely focused" on how countries were handling the different claims, singling out "confrontational behavior" in the disputed Scarborough Shoal off the northwestern Philippines, including the denial of access to other vessels. The actions she cited were China's, though she didn't mention the offending country by name. According to Filipino officials, at different points earlier this year the Chinese attached fishing nets to ropes held by buoys to block entry to the sprawling lagoon at Scarborough Shoal, or tied several dinghies together with ropes. One official said the barriers were washed away by waves in recent storms. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because the sensitivity of the issue. "None of us can fail to be concerned by the increase in tensions, the uptick in confrontational rhetoric and disagreements over resource exploitation," Clinton said. "We have seen worrisome instances of economic coercion and the problematic use of military and government vessels in connection with disputes among fishermen. There have been a variety of national measures taken that create friction and further complicate efforts to resolve disputes." ASEAN's 10 members announced earlier this week that they have drafted a set of rules governing maritime rights and navigation, and procedures for when governments disagree. But China is not a member of the group and hasn't agreed to anything. The ASEAN countries are presenting their proposal to China at this week's conference in Cambodia's capital, though Beijing will probably want to water down any language that ties its hands. Clinton said the tensions "underscore the need for agreement among all parties on rules of the road and the establishment of clear procedures for addressing disagreements," still an elusive objective a decade after Southeast Asian countries adopted it as their goal. "We now look to ASEAN and China to make meaningful progress toward finalizing this code," Clinton added. She also suggested countries consider joint oil and gas exploitation in unresolved territories or other "creative ways" to avoid conflict. A senior administration official said Yang, in his discussion with Clinton, cautiously signaled China's willingness to negotiate with other Asian nations on the code. The talks could start as early as September, said the official, who briefed reporters on the meeting on condition of anonymity. Meanwhile, disagreements among ASEAN's members on Thursday were still holding up a concluding document for this year's meeting. How to address the Philippines' and Vietnam's disputes with China remained issues of contention, U.S. officials said. For the United States, the difficult diplomacy ahead could be a major test of the Obama administration's efforts to "pivot" American power toward the world's most populous continent. Just speaking out on the subject already has helped the U.S. deepen ties with Vietnam, and relations are warming with other governments in the region. But countless meetings between American and Chinese officials have not led to progress on a lasting solution. Various longstanding disputes among China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei involve the area's busy sea lanes, and many observers fear the complicated web of disputes could spark a violent conflict. The standoff between China and the Philippines in the Scarborough Shoal began in April when the Philippines accused Chinese fishermen of poaching in its exclusive economic zone, including the shoal. During the tensions, both sides sent government ships to the area though both have since withdrawn vessels. Vietnam has protested a recent announcement by the China National Offshore Oil Corp. opening nine oil and gas lots for international bidders in areas overlapping with existing Vietnamese exploration blocks. Vietnam says the lots lie entirely within its 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone and continental shelf.

### Friction in the area continues due to China

Reuters, written by Martin Petty 7-8-2012, Reuters, “Booming Southeast Asia in a quandary over U.S.-China rivalry” http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/08/us-china-usa-asean-idUSBRE86702420120708

A U.S.-China tug-of-war over Southeast Asian influence is proving to be a critical test for Washington's "pivot" East as Beijing strengthens its economic and military clout in its own backyard. Countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), one of the world's fastest growing regions, are weighing up how to play their cards as the United States plays catch-up with the Chinese juggernaut and tries to reassert itself in Asia. Washington's recent flurry of engagement with ASEAN states - from the Philippines and Thailand to Singapore and Vietnam - is a potential source of friction with China, especially as tempers flare over territorial disputes and the rapid Chinese military build-up in the resource-rich South China Sea. But with longstanding U.S. alliances in the region and China's client-state relationship with several members, the ASEAN bloc is unlikely to agree on issues involving the two superpowers at a meeting of their foreign ministers in Cambodia this week. Individual interests are seen more likely to triumph over consensus at the meeting, which will also be attended by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi. Some countries will be in a quandary about how to balance ties to get the best out of both of the big players, while others will seek to use the rivalry as an opportunity to extract leverage for economic or military advantage. Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar, ASEAN's poorest states, remain in China's orbit as a result of no-strings loans, desperately needed infrastructure development, military support and floods of investment from Chinese firms. Beijing also has close economic ties with Singapore and Malaysia and has been aggressively wooing Thailand - a major ally of Washington since World War Two and the launch pad for its Vietnam War operations - offering loans and technology for a high-speed rail network, hundreds of university scholarships to Thai students and recently agreeing to supply Bangkok with 10,000 Chinese-language teachers. Thitinan Pongsudhirak, director of Chulalongkorn University's Institute of Security and International Studies, said Thailand was a "pivot state" in ASEAN, traditionally close to Washington but now hedging more towards China. China's strategy in Thailand and several other ASEAN countries was not just trade and investment, but building close relationships to serve its long-term strategic interests. "China is already engaged all over Southeast Asia ... they're the resident superpower here," Thitinan said. "It's China's stealth power that we've not seen, it's not spoken, it's not aggressive. China can put a lot more in and doesn't need something out of it right away." U.S. MILITARY POWER After largely shunning ASEAN under the Bush administration, the United States may fear it is lagging behind as China taps ASEAN's growth. Some analysts say the new Asian strategy is as much about trying to dispel the notion that Washington's economic clout is shrinking as China continues to boom. The obvious signs of renewed U.S. engagement have so far been military-led, with Defense Secretary Leon Panetta visiting the region last month to announce plans to base 60 percent of U.S. warships in the Asia-Pacific by 2020, allowing the U.S. "to be agile, to be quickly deployable, to be flexible". Part of that would be the use of ports in the Philippines, Vietnam and possibly Singapore, in exchange for training and technical support. The U.S. is also seeking to set up a humanitarian response centre at a former Vietnam War-era base in U-Tapao in Thailand. Washington's charm offensive in the region has emboldened Vietnam and the Philippines, which have taunted China with renewed claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea and prompted talk of possible requests for the deployment of U.S. spy planes there. According to several ASEAN diplomats, China is suspicious of the U.S. motives and has been lobbying aggressively behind the scenes to shoot down a proposal by Vietnam and the Philippines to draft a joint ASEAN communique on the maritime dispute as rhetoric heats up again after a recent cooling-off period. The required consensus is unlikely, however, with ASEAN chair Cambodia - China's biggest regional ally and recipient of billions of dollars of loans and investment - refusing to play ball, diplomats told Reuters. Yet, China and the United States have played down talk of a geostrategic rivalry in the region, welcoming each others' presence and seeking to allay fears in ASEAN that their influence would negatively affect the grouping. "Too often in ASEAN there's a concern ... of dangerous strategic competition between the United States and China," Kurt Campbell, the State department's top official for East Asia and the Pacific, said recently. "It's our determination and strong determination to make clear we want to work with China." In an interview with Thailand's Nation newspaper two weeks ago, China's Vice Foreign Minister Fu Ying said ASEAN was an "unquestionable priority" for China, but in a veiled reference to new U.S. engagement, warned the group to stay independent. "If ASEAN takes sides, it would lose its relevance," Fu added. RESILIENT REGION U.S. officials stress that the shift in focus towards Asia is also as much about business. U.S. diplomats say corporate America is increasingly interested in Southeast Asia, encouraged by the plans for the ASEAN Economic Community. The ASEAN region has shown resilience to the global economic downturn and is currently one of the few bright spots in the world, driven by foreign direct investment, public infrastructure spending and strong domestic demand. Morgan Stanley has forecast the investment percentage of GDP for Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia to rise from 22.7 percent in 2011 to 23.2 percent and 23.6 percent in 2012 and 2013. But U.S. investment in the region could mean muscling-in on China's traditional turf. ASEAN's biggest-ever meeting of U.S. businessmen will take place this week in Cambodia, an event Clinton will also attend. She will also visit Laos, becoming the most senior U.S. official to do so in 57 years. She will announce a U.S. "Lower Mekong Initiative" offering support in education, environment, health and infrastructure in the Indochina region. Additionally, Washington has started easing some sanctions on fast-reforming Myanmar that could eventually allow U.S. firms to tap its vast resources, including timber, gemstones, gas and oil, a sector China has so far dominated to safeguard its massive energy needs. A U.S. business delegation will visit the country later this month. Such moves are good news for China-dependent economies like Laos and Myanmar, which are now reaching out to other countries to try to diversify their sources of investment. Most countries publicly say they won't side with China or the United States. Some see the engagement is a boon because individual states can exploit the rivalry for their own gain. Former Thai Foreign Minister Kantathi Suphamongkhon said there was a misperception Thailand's closer links with China meant a deterioration of its U.S. ties. Thailand, he said, was in a strong position to reap benefits from both countries. "It is important to avoid seeing Thailand's relations with the U.S. and with China as a zero sum game," he said in an email, adding that ASEAN had always wanted a U.S. presence in the region "as a force for stability". But it may have the opposite effect. The indirect U.S. involvement in the South China Sea issue has led to sabre-rattling and growing calls in China for a tougher stance on the dispute, which a U.S. official on Saturday said was complicated by "intense nationalist sentiment" in the countries affected. However, increased tensions, providing they do not escalate into confrontation, could work in favor of ASEAN states. "They don't want China and the United States to be in complete agreement," added Thai academic Thitinan. "These tensions and rivalries give them leverage and bargaining power." Though the far-reaching moves by Washington and Beijing to court individual ASEAN countries are likely to mean greater investment, the competing interests of the heavyweights may lead to split decisions on ASEAN policy that could dent the bloc's credibility as its 10 member states and 600 million citizens prepare to be integrated into one economic community by 2015. "The consequence of the U.S. pivot is any prospect for a unified ASEAN is minimal," said Michael Montesano of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. "Its members are all aligned in different ways and it puts ASEAN as a grouping in a very uncomfortable position."

## Yes China War – Code of Conduct

### China denies code of conduct- threatening stability

The Sydney Morning Harold written by Peter Hartcher, 7-21-2012, smh.com.au, http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/us-sees-risk-of-war-over-south-china-sea-20120720-22flc.html

THE White House has warned of the rising risk of accidental war in the South China Sea and called for countries in the region urgently to agree to a code of conduct. China resists such a code as it jostles for ownership of resource-rich seabeds claimed by six south-east Asian nations. But the top Asia policy official in the White House has said a recent two-month maritime standoff between China and the Philippines ''threatened to escalate'' and created ''a scenario of grave concern to all countries in the region''. The standoff ended only when a hurricane sent the Philippine vessels back to port. Analysts say the South China Sea is the new flashpoint of Asia. Most world shipping - and Australian exports - pass through it. ''A code of conduct, in our view, is a matter of commonsense,'' the National Security Council's senior director for Asia, Danny Russell, said. In a call implicitly aimed at China, Mr Russell said 10 years ago China had agreed to negotiate such a code of conduct. It has repeatedly said it will agree to discussions ''when the time is ripe''. A Pentagon official with responsibility for US defence policy in Asia, Vikram Singh, said: ''The time is ripe now''. China has said the US is meddling in the region's affairs by encouraging a code of conduct. The US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, responded: ''The US is a resident Pacific power''. Advertisement Mr Russell said though the US and Australia would not be signatories to any code for countries bordering the South China Sea, they had a right as Pacific powers to ''convey to the region the principles that are important to us''. These included freedom of navigation and the peaceful settlement of disputes. The US takes no position on the competing claims but wants a ''binding framework'' to avoid clashes or to resolve them peacefully. Mr Russell said: ''China and the Philippines found themselves in a difficult situation, facing pressure not to back down and the zero-sum challenge of competing territorial claims threatened to escalate tension.'' This issue split the 10-nation Association of South-East Asian Nations spectacularly last week. For the first time in its 45 years, its foreign ministers broke up without agreeing to a communique, the official record of talks. Asked about Beijing's expressions of concern at the US decision to put a permanent deployment of marines near Darwin, Mr Russell said: ''President [Barack] Obama has modernised and strengthened our alliances for the 21st century … The alliance system hasn't only maintained peace and stability, it's the system that has allowed China to flourish.''

## Yes China War – Aircraft Carriers

### New carrier, new war scenarios

Carl O Schuster, retired United States Navy Captain, 8-12-2012, “Greater China”, AsiaTimes.com, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/NG12Ad01.html

HONOLULU - China's as yet unnamed aircraft carrier will soon begin another round of sea trials before its planned commissioning in August. It has yet to conduct a full range of flight operations and its fixed-wing air component remains largely in the prototype and testing phase. It will be several months, if not years, before it can fulfill many of the key roles attributed to a modern aircraft carrier and will not achieve full operational capability, including a complete fixed-wing and helicopter equipped air wing, nor full integration into fleet operations before 2016-2017. Commissioning of the carrier nonetheless will mark a major milestone in China's progress towards becoming a major ocean-going naval power. The carrier will significantly improve the fleet's air defenses and broad ocean strike capabilities, but its full strategic significance cannot be understood without examining its role within China's increasingly aggressive posture in the South China Sea and complex fleet force structure. Beijing's fleet modernization program has involved the patient acquisition and development of the surveillance, sensor, command and control, and weapons systems integral to a balanced, modern ocean-going fleet. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has introduced these new systems incrementally, building primarily upon technology acquired openly from Europe, Israel and Russia as well as incorporating American systems obtained from a variety of sources. As a result, the latest Chinese surface ships and submarines are equipped with an array of first-rate sensor and weapons systems. The former have area air-defense systems not unlike America's Aegis-system, albeit with capabilities more akin to earlier rather than the latest models. The Luyang-II class guided missile destroyers are a formidable platform equipped with the HHQ-9 area air defense surface-to-air missile (SAM) system and both YJ-82 anti-ship (ASCM), and more ominously for neighboring Southeast Asian nations, HN-2 land attack cruise missiles (LACMs). With those high-end platforms entering service in growing numbers, China's new carrier will extend the fleet's reach, reinforcing its strike power and providing a command, control, communications, computer and intelligence (C4I) platform for an embarked fleet commander. The question moving ahead will be which roles dominate and under what conditions. All militaries balance their plans and structure against two often competing mission requirements: the most dangerous situation they will face and the most likely one. For the PLAN, the sea denial mission is perceived as countering the most dangerous. That is, denying a hostile fleet from controlling its most critical waters as defined in China's 2008 Defense White Paper, starting from the referred to "first island chain" stretching from the Yellow Sea down to the eastern and southernmost reaches of the South China Sea. For that strategic concern, the carrier can play a forward command role, extend the fleet's and nation's air defense umbrella by an additional 200 nautical miles, and protect reconnaissance platforms flying out from shore bases. The embarked admiral can command all the naval and forward air forces involved, including coordinating with the 2nd Artillery Corps in its employment of China's DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs). With ASBMs targeting enemy carriers, China's aircraft carrier could be used as a quick reaction strike platform against the enemy's other surface combatants. The carrier will be able to perform a similar mission under what Chinese leaders probably see as a more likely conflict scenario: a limited regional war under high technology conditions. China's recent emphasis on defending its "territorial sovereignty" in the South China Sea is of growing regional concern due to the extensive nature of its maritime claims. China's recent confrontation with the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal is the latest example of its growing assertiveness over the contested area. Beijing's elevation last month of the South China Sea islands of Xisha, Zhongsha and Nansha to prefecture status is indication of Beijing's hardening political commitment to these claims. The 2011 White Paper reiterated China's strong commitment to defending its claimed national territory and Beijing is increasingly employing military forces to fortify related maritime claims. Although the sea denial scenario would still apply in a limited regional war, the carrier's role against China's weaker neighbors would focus more on sustaining air and maritime superiority. China's fleet will likely rely on the carrier's air wing to intercept any enemy ASCM-carrying aircraft and attack any surface ships that move into position to threaten China's surface units or island garrisons. Chinese leaders probably view this last mission - the enforcement of maritime sovereignty over the South China Sea - as a likely scenario, especially should its growing coast guard prove insufficient to the task. Learning by doing For now, the carrier is more significant strategically for what it portends than what it is. China's leaders say they built the carrier primarily for experimentation and study and those roles will certainly dominate its early operations. However, China does not possess a pool of experienced aircraft personnel to fulfill the carrier's crew requirements. Although China has studied aircraft design and operation for over 20 years, the crew will still have to learn largely by doing. Based on its large number of sea trials, including at least eight since last August, the PLAN is taking a cautious and incremental approach to preparing the carrier and its crew for August's commissioning. Carriers are the world's most complex warships, involving the simultaneous operation of dozens of systems and hundreds of personnel at very close quarters. That is especially true during flight operations, the most dangerous of military activities outside of combat. Simulations and pier-side drills can help crews to prepare, but there is no substitute for actual operations. China's carrier is expected to begin simple one-two plane flight deck operations later this year, starting with "touch and goes" where planes simply touch the deck before resuming flight and later daytime landings and launches. Notwithstanding those exercises, China's carrier will enter service without a fully composed air wing. Its primary fixed-wing aircraft, the Shenyang J-15, has not entered production and is not expected to before 2014. China's Russian-built Sukhoi Su-33MKKs are reportedly carrier capable, but only J-15 prototypes have been seen flying off the carrier's deck. It appears that the Sukhoi aircraft were acquired specifically to build a pool of qualified aviators to facilitate the establishment of the carrier's air wing once its fixed wing component was operational. If the J-15 follows traditional aircraft development and production patterns, China will commission its first fully operational squadron by either late 2015 or early 2016. Several months of carrier workups will likely follow. Until then, the carrier's primary air wing components will consist of helicopters, primarily the Z-9 anti-submarine and Z-8 logistic models. There is no indication so far that China is developing a ship borne airborne warning and control system (AWACS), aerial refueling tanker, electronic warfare capability or maritime patrol aircraft. Those shortcomings mean China's carrier must rely on shore-based aircraft for those missions. Although jet aircraft can carry "buddy stores" to refuel their mates on long missions and carry electronic countermeasures pods or anti-radiation missiles to defeat enemy air defenses, their inclusion comes at the expense of ordnance and other payloads. The carrier's accompanying guided missile destroyers (DDGs) can also use their land attack cruise missiles against key enemy air defense centers and sites to clear the way for the air wing. There has been speculation that China is developing an airborne early warning (AEW) version of the Z-8, China's license-built model of the French SA-320 Super Frelon. While that helicopter has the lift and endurance to carry a long-range surveillance radar, it cannot service the command and control systems required to conduct AWACS missions. It can, however, detect and warn of incoming low-altitude cruise missiles and provide outstanding just-beyond-the-horizon surveillance, warning and targeting. But in a high intensity naval operation there is no substitute for an AWACS with its battle space management and long-range surveillance capabilities. To be sure, China's Z-9 ship borne helicopters are outstanding close-in surveillance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platforms, but they are no substitute for long-range or long endurance fixed-wing ASW search and localization aircraft. Perhaps China's military planners believe unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can fill its AWACS and long-range ASW and maritime surveillance roles. Given the carrier's long incubation period, that seems quite plausible - although such platforms will not be combat-ready and integrated into fleet operations before the end of this decade. Until then, the carrier's capabilities against a conventional takeoff or landing (CTOL) carrier or fully integrated enemy air and fleet defense system will be limited. Missions beyond war At the same time, aircraft carriers have significant uses beyond their war potential. With a likely eventual air wing of 20-30 fixed wing fighters and 12-18 helicopters, once fully operational, China's carrier will offer a full range of surveillance, helo-borne transport and fighter capabilities to support various combatant and non-combatant contingencies. China's maritime trade now stretches around the globe and requires ever rising levels of protection, a fact that has been driven home to China's political and naval leaders over the last four years. Indian Ocean piracy has hit China's trade hard, driving it to deploy small naval contingents to conduct anti-piracy operations; its 12th anti-piracy contingent recently departed for the western Indian Ocean. However, meeting the small surface action groups' needs without a forward base has provided challenging lessons and significant on-the-job logistics training for China's naval crews. The PLAN has already negotiated a series of access agreements reaching from the shores of Pakistan down to Djibouti to facilitate these missions. Regional media have speculated that China is also seeking an access arrangement, if not a permanent basing agreement, with the island nation of Seychelles. Although costs and geopolitical considerations will probably preclude China from seeking a permanent base in the Indian Ocean within this decade, anti-piracy missions and related logistics requirements will remain a key PLAN focus. Over the last three years China has needed to rapidly evacuate its citizens from three far-flung countries - Libya, Kenya and Yemen - which have suffered from violent political turmoil. With over 5.5 million of its citizens officially working overseas, many in countries facing stability challenges.

## Yes China War – Modernizing

### China has increased its power, U.S. has decreased its power

Manila Standard Today written by Rod Kapunan, 6-29-2012,Manila Standard Today, “The US, China and Asia” http://manilastandardtoday.com/www2/2012/06/29/the-us-china-and-asia/

The drift of many Asian countries away from the domineering claws of the American eagle is what Marx prophetically said “an exorable historical process.” It is power that determines the inertia of states to gravitate towards an emerging economic and political power, and equivocally to drift away from an existing one. It is a cycle in the rise and fall of empires that eminent British historian Arnold J. Toynbee acknowledged as inevitable. China, as an emerging modern power in Asia, follows the same pattern where power and influence provide the inertia that causes change in the present geo-political landscape. As a new powerhouse, countries in the Asia-Pacific rim, by the natural law of power magnetism, are bound to gravitate towards where economic power emanates. Even the redeployment of US forces in Asia-Pacific could not prevent that seismic shift from taking place. Besides Japan and South Korea, countries that adhere to Pax Americana, would soon have to review their ties with the US. They would want to take a more pragmatic approach of reassessing their position, whether to retain their alliance on the basis of political sentiment or in subscribing to realpolitik defined by what is most economically advantageous to them. While the shift may not be drastic, the US still maintains a decisive military edge over China, although its influence and credibility have been on the rapid decline. As the trend continues, with the US losing much of its global economic share that helped it determine the fate of other independent states, the residual inertia that comes out from that power has become less radiating. Maybe the immediate implication of the new modus videndi emerging in their dealings with China would not be dramatic to trigger a political convulsion as what happened with the emergence of Nazi Germany, just the same the undercurrent tremor is causing to erode the foundations of their existing strategic military alliance with the US. The jingoists in Washington fear that the increased attention given by many Asian countries towards China could metamorphose into a new military alliance in Asia. While China is not contemplating forming a military bloc with its neighbors against the US, countries in the Asia-Pacific rim are reassessing their military alliance with Washington if only to gain additional access to that country’s growing economic influence. Increased ties with the prosperous Dragon could bring about political and economic stability to their own people of which the US could no longer be counted upon. Of course, the shift in the balance of power would no longer follow the old line of fanning insurgency by way of ideological contest, but in firming up their own economic gains. This explains why the redeployment of US military forces from Europe to Asia has not been welcomed by most countries, except for Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and to a certain extent Vietnam. The issue is not the threat of aggression, but claims over uninhabited islets in the North and South China Sea. Beyond that nobody, except the Philippines, is contemplating reviving and rebuilding those military alliances with the US just to bolster their claim over those islets. While these countries seeking military accommodation could not achieve a NATO version automatic retaliatory clause in the event of aggression, nobody expects that to happen because China, despite the buildup of its naval forces in the Pacific remains defensive in its pronouncements. In fact, the drumbeating of China’s imperial ambition by the US has been perceived by other countries as more of a smokescreen by to cover the truth that its huge trade with China is partly responsible for its emergence as an economic powerhouse.¶ In our case, President Aquino’s attempt to orbit closer to the US military umbrella would not help resolve our dispute over the Panatag Shoal and in the rest of the islets, including the Kalayaan Group of Islands. The US has already clarified its position; that being a disputed territory, it would not take sides, although would continue to orchestrate the tension to invariably isolate China from the rest of Asia. Unfortunately, only the Philippines under the misguided Aquino administration fails to realize that the US would not go to war fighting side-by-side with us, but would simply supply us those costly weapons at our expense. At this point, it would be far more dangerous for us to play the role of Israel in the part of the globe, as one might suggest. Israel’s situation is totally different. First, it is waging a war to hold on to those territories it illegally occupied since 1967. Second, Israel as a criminal state enjoys the unequivocal support of the US; that an attack on that country would be treated by the US as an attack on its territory. Moreover, the modern armaments and the war Israeli wages just to maintain its military superiority in the region is subsidized, if not brokered by the US military industrial complex. In our case, there is no assurance the US would come to our side, nor would provide us with arms for free to help us sustain a war it instigated. Thus, taking this into account, the country might just find itself fighting a lonely war to end up waiting for another General MacArthur to liberate us.

### China plans to grow soon

Carl O Schuster, retired United States Navy Captain, 8-12-2012, “Greater China”, AsiaTimes.com, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/NG12Ad01.html

Beijing has likely given thought to expanding its capacity to evacuate them on short notice. The domestic political pressure for readiness will grow in the years ahead, driving the political leadership to at least consider a naval presence in waters near those areas. With its large helicopter contingent, the soon-to-be-commissioned carrier is second only to an amphibious task group in its ability to evacuate or assist large numbers of people in distant lands. Looking beyond the evacuation of its citizens, Beijing cannot have missed the important role America's carriers performed during the massive international relief effort that followed the 2004 Asian tsunami disaster. China's carrier will be able to perform similar missions, though humanitarian assistance operations rarely receive much notice in Beijing's budgetary or military planning debates. The return in diplomatic and public goodwill, however, could help to mitigate neighboring countries' threat perceptions associated with the carrier. Beijing has long wanted a carrier force and for decades is known to have studied closely carrier operations, design and technology. The prohibitive costs and political implications of acquiring a carrier made it the subject of much internal debate throughout the 1980s and 1990s. With those financial and political obstacles now overcome, military planners will gain intimate knowledge of a carrier's uses, costs and challenges. The latter should not be underestimated as carriers require significant logistical support, far beyond that needed for guided missile destroyers and lesser combatants. Discussions about China's carrier have so far seemingly overlooked issues related to integration with the PLAN's existing operations and coordination with its growing submarine force. Coordinating surface fleet and air operations with submarines adds yet another level of complexity to an already complicated military operation. By building and commissioning a carrier, China has signaled it aims to become a great naval power. How the PLAN employs its carrier-bolstered fleet over the next two to five years will largely shape regional and global perceptions of China and its intentions. Even the carrier's name, once christened, will carry political significance outside China's shores. With growing power comes growing responsibility - the world will be watching how Beijing responds to both challenges.

### China on the rise, though not peacefully

Chu Zhaogen, China Center for Public Policy Studies at Fudan University, 2012-07-19, China Daily, “Great powers more likely to cooperate”, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2012-07/19/content\_15600283.htm

There has been vigorous debate recently about whether we should be optimistic or pessimistic about the future of Sino-US relations. The offensive realism structured by John Mearsheimer, a well-known international relations theorist, suggests that the great powers are likely to seek hegemony. Hence, he never hesitates to propose that the United States should be alert to the threat of China's rise. He contends China will definitely continue to rise, but does not believe that it will do so peacefully. He predicts that foreign relations among the East Asian countries and those between China and the US will become more tense and dangerous, and become the real challenge to the US in the next few years. Wang Jisi, director of the Center for International and Strategic Studies at Peking University, and Ken Lieberthal, director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution, both hold a similar pessimistic attitude. They co-wrote a paper, "Addressing US-China Strategic Distrust", which recognizes that Sino-US relations have not embarked on a favorable road. "The major concern is that it appears as of 2012 that strategic distrust is growing on both sides and that this perception can, if it festers, create a self-fulfilling prophecy of overall mutual antagonism," they warn. But the assessment of the three prominent strategists, that there must be antagonism between China and the US, is not the reality. On the contrary, I am optimistic about the trend of the Sino-US relations. The strategic distrust between China and the US is certain to grow while the latter implements the policy of "back to Asia", but we should not forget the many unprecedented efforts to deepen and widen mutual trust. These include strategic and economic dialogue and direct military communication. The security dilemma of the great powers is the undisputable reality. But we should remember that we are all involved in an age of global interdependence, prospering or declining as a whole. When a country seeks security and power now, it is impossible to get beyond its core national interests to gain unilateral advantages. Sober realists on both sides understand the rule: smart politicians always try to pursue modest and appropriate power. No country can expect to gain from Sino-US conflict. There is economic friction, ideological differences and the strategic military distrust between China and the US, but China is one of the biggest beneficiaries of the globalization, led and dominated by the US. Regardless of cost and consequences, why would China want to change this while it is getting the benefits? In history, China has rarely expanded and invaded other countries. Since 1949, Beijing has settled 17 of its 23 territorial disputes. In most, it has offered significant compromises, usually receiving less than 50 percent of the contested land. Taylor Fravel, associate professor at MIT, testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, stating: "China has not used its armed forces to actively enforce its claims." Nor has it invented new claims to match its growing wealth and power. Would China necessarily pursue hegemony or challenge the US if China is well developed? Considering the difficulty China faces with its own reform and transition, it will experience serious inner conflict and radical adjustment. The challenges from inside are much heavier than those from outside. I, and quite a number of analysts, believe that it is impossible for China to challenge the US' hegemony within the next 100 years. As Vice-President Xi Jinping, said on his visit to the US: China and the US have no choice but to cooperate with each other. As China cannot pose a threat to the US until the distant future, why would the US wish to force China into challenging it earlier? These are the two biggest economies in the world. It would be fatal if their antagonism affected the global economy and development, not forgetting that they are both nuclear powers and Security Council permanent members. Sino-US confrontation would not only paralyze the biggest political and international organizations, such as the United Nations, the inevitable result of an all-out confrontation, like the Cold War, would be a lose-lose one. Recognizing this, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, recently said of Sino-US relations: "The goal for our relationship with China is to ensure that we defy history. It has never happened that an established power and a rising power have been able to find a way to not only coexist, but cooperate we intend to make history with our relationship with China."

## Yes China War – Military Exercises

### Alliances becoming uneasy

Xiaoxiong Yi Director of Marietta College's China Program, 6-28-2012, LancasterEagleGazette.com, “U.S., China on a collision course in the Asia-Pacific waters”, http://www.lancastereaglegazette.com/article/20120628/OPINION02/206280316/U-S-China-collision-course-Asia-Pacific-waters

The Asia-Pacific waters are heating up with naval war games. Led by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington, the U.S., Japan and South Korea conducted an unprecedented naval exercise June 21-22 in the waters south of the Korean peninsula. Immediately after the U.S.-Japan-South Korea trilateral exercise, the U.S. and South Korean navies conducted a bilateral drill Saturday-Monday in the Yellow Sea. Calling Japan and South Korea "cornerstone allies" of the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific, Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, called the trilateral exercise "a good opportunity for both Japan and South Korea to work more closely together with our help." Through these bilateral and trilateral naval exercises, Admiral Locklear expects that security cooperation between Japan and South Korea will be strengthened and the U.S. and its two key East Asian allies will form a stronger relationship "on the military side." Beijing immediately voiced its strong opposition to the joint naval exercises. "China holds that the international community, especially Asia-Pacific countries," stated Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Liu Weimin, "must take moves to increase peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in northern Asia, not to the contrary." Analysts see the U.S.-Japan-South Korea June naval exercises as an implicit response to the Russian-Chinese naval exercises of April 22-27. The large-scale Chinese-Russian April war game in the Yellow Sea, including six Russian guided-missile cruisers and Udaloy-class destroyers and 16 Chinese destroyers and submarines, was the two navies' first bilateral exercise. "The exercise represents the unshakable determination to implement the two governments' strategic partnership," said Gen. Chen Bingde, Chief of the General Staff of People's Liberation Army, "and promotes strategic coordination between the two militaries and strengthens the two naval forces' ability to jointly confront new regional threats." Naval exercises often play a key role in diplomatic signaling. "These exercises," wrote Stephen Blank of Jamestown Foundation, "appeared in the context of a growing frequency of exercises in Asia by Chinese and U.S.-Asian forces and amid the reorientation of U.S. forces to East Asia, a change that Beijing has publicly labeled as hostile. The Chinese military media in particular emphasizes the implicitly anti-American aspect of the Chinese-Russian exercise. Gen. Chen Bingde's remarks suggest the greater willingness of the Chinese military to take a hard line against the United States." Tensions are rising not only in the Yellow Sea and Northeast Asia, but also in the South China Sea. On June 21, China's cabinet approved the establishment of a prefecture-level San Sha Authority to administrate virtually the entire 3.5-million-square-kilometer waters of South China Sea. As China continues to modernize its navy at breakneck speed and claims its control over more than 90 percent of the South China Sea, the battle for disputed territorial waters is no longer just hot air. The South China Sea dispute has moved to the top of Asia's security agenda, with the militarization of the dispute continues apace. From the Yellow Sea to the South China Sea, the Pacific Ocean off the mainland of Asia has been turned into a "Sea of Tensions." And as Ross Babbage, founder of Canberra-based Kokoda Foundation, points out, "China is investing in a whole raft of capabilities to undermine the U.S. presence in the Western and Central Pacific. It is a fundamental challenge to the U.S. in Asia." The U.S. is pushing back. "Make no mistake," U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told the Shangri-La Dialogue, the annual security conference in Singapore attended by civilian and military leaders from Asia-Pacific nations, "the United States military is rebalancing and bringing an enhanced capability development to this vital region." As part of the strategic pivot to Asia, Panetta announced June 2 at the 11th Shangri-La Dialogue that the United States will deploy 60 percent of its warships in the Asia-Pacific, including six aircraft carriers and a majority of the U.S. navy's cruisers, destroyers, littoral combat ships and submarines. The United States' renewed commitment to Asia-Pacific regional defense ties has won strong endorsement from regional nations, including those with a history of adversarial or distant relations with Washington. However, as Washington is pushing ahead with a muscular realignment of its forces toward the Asia-Pacific region, Beijing is likely to be further antagonized. China's expansive military muscle and its long-term territorial ambitions and the United States' policy of "return to Asia" with a proactive leadership role have set the two great powers on a collision course in the Asia-Pacific waters.