## Global Threats/Random Wars

### Accidental Launch

#### No scenario for escalation -- inevitable incentives for conflict minimization.

Quinlan, 9 - distinguished former British defence strategist, former Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the British Ministry of Defence, Prof. @ Wimbledon College and Merton College, Oxford. Director of the Ditchley Foundation, (Sir Michael, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects, 2009, Pg. 67-69, Google Books)//AH

It was occasionally conjectured that nuclear war might be triggered by the real but accidental or unauthorized launch of a strategic nuclear-weapon delivery system in the direction of a potential adver­sary. No such launch is known to have occurred in over sixty years. The probability of it is therefore very low. But even if it did happen, the further hypothesis of its initiating a general nuclear exchange is far-fetched. It fails to consider the real situation of decision-makers, as pages 63-4 have brought out. The notion that cosmic holocaust might be mistakenly precipitated in this way belongs to science fiction. One special form of miscalculation appeared sporadically in the speculations of academic commentators, though it was scarcely ever to be encountered—at least so far as my own observation went—in the utterances of practical planners within government. This is the idea that nuclear war might be erroneously triggered, or erroneously widened, through a state under attack misreading either what sort of attack it was being subjected to, or where the attack came from. The postulated misreading of the nature of the attack referred in particular to the hypothesis that if a delivery system—normally a missile—that was known to be capable of carrying either a nuclear or a conventional warhead was launched in a conventional role, the target country might, on detecting the launch through its earlywarning systems, misconstrue the mission as an imminent nuclear strike and immediately unleash a nuclear counter-strike of its own. This conjecture was voiced, for example, as a criticism of the pro­posals for giving the US Trident SLBM, long associated with nuclear missions, a capability to deliver conventional warheads. Whatever the merit of those proposals (it is not explored here), it is hard to regard this particular apprehension as having any real-life credibility. The flight time of a ballistic missile would not exceed about thirty minutes, and that of a cruise missile a few hours, before arrival on target made its character—conventional or nuclear—unmistakable. No government will need, and no non-lunatic government could wish, to lake within so short a span of time a step as enormous and irrevocable as the execution of a nuclear strike On the basis of early-warning information alone without knowing the true nature of the incoming attack. The speculation tends moreover to be expressed without reference either to any realistic political or conflict-related context thought to render the episode plausible, or to the manifest interest of the launching country, should there be any risk of doubt, in ensuring—by explicit communication if necessary—that there was no misinterpretation of its conventionally armed launch. It may be objected to this analysis that in the cold war the two opposing superpowers had concepts of launch-on-warning. That seems to be true, at least in the sense that successive US adminis­trations declined to rule out such an option and indeed included in their contingency plans both this and the possibility of launch-under-attack (that is launch after some strikes had been suffered and while the sequence of them was evidently continuing). The Soviet Union was not likely to have had more relaxed practices. But the colossal gravity of activating any such arrangements must always have been recognized. It could have been contemplated only in circumstances where the entire political context made a pre-emptive attack by the adversary plainly a serious and imminent possibility, and where moreover the available information unmistakably indi­cated that a massive assault with hundreds or thousands of missiles was on the way. That was a scenario wholly unlike that implicit in the supposition that a conventional missile attack might be briefly mistaken for a nuclear one. The other sort of misunderstanding conjectured—that of misread­ing the source of attack—envisaged, typically, that SLBMs launched by France or the United Kingdom might erroneously be supposed to be coming from US submarines, and so might initiate a super­power exchange which the United States did not in fact intend. (An occasional variant on this was the notion that 'triggering' in this way might actually be an element in deliberate French or UK deterrent concepts. There was never any truth in this guess in relation to the United Kingdom, and French thinking is unlikely to have been different.) The unreality in this category of conjecture lay in the implica­tion that such a scenario could develop without the US government making the most determined efforts to ensure that Soviet (or now Russian) leaders knew that the United States was not responsible for the attack, and with those leaders for their part resorting, on unproven suspicion, to action that was virtually certain to provoke nuclear counter-action from the United States. There used occasion­ally to be another speculation, that if the Soviet Union suffered heavy nuclear strikes known to come from France or the United Kingdom, it might judge its interests to be best served by ensuring that the United States did not remain an unscathed bystander. But even if that were somehow thought marginally less implausible, it would have been a different matter from misinterpretation of the initial strike. As was noted earlier in this chapter, the arrangements under which nuclear-weapon inventories are now managed are in several impor­tant respects already much less open to concern than they were dur­ing much of the cold war. Worries voiced more recently sometimes relate to 'cyber-attack'—hostile interference, whether by states or by other actors such as terrorists, with information systems used in the control of armouries. It is highly unlikely, though details are (again understandably) not made public, that regular reviews of control arrangements are oblivious to any such risks. Perceptions of them do however reinforce the already-strong case that whatever arrange­ments still remain in place for continuous high readiness to launch nuclear action at short notice should be abandoned. Chapter 13 returns to this.

#### Safeguards prevent any accidental or unauthorized launch.

**Williscroft, 12** – Member of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Phd @ graduated from University of Washington in Marine Physics and Meteorology. (Robert G., “Accidental Nuclear War,” Originally published in 1993, updated in 2012, <http://www.argee.net/Thrawn%20Rickle/Thrawn%20Rickle%2032.htm)//AH>

Is there a realistic chance that we could have a nuclear war by accident? Could a ballistic submarine commander launch his missiles without specific presidential authorization? Could a few men conspire and successfully bypass built-in safety systems to launch nuclear weapons? The key word here is “realistic.” In the strictest sense, yes, these things are possible. But are they realistically possible? This question can best be answered by examining two interrelated questions. Is there a way to launch a nuclear weapon by accident? Can a specific accidental series of events take place—no matter how remote—that will result in the inevitable launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? Can one individual working by himself or several individuals working in collusion bring about the deliberate launch or detonation of a nuclear weapon? We are protected from accidental launching of nuclear weapons by mechanical safeguards, and by carefully structured and controlled mandatory procedures that are always employed when working around nuclear weapons. Launching a nuclear weapon takes the specific simultaneous action of several designated individuals. System designers ensured that conditions necessary for a launch could not happen accidentally. For example, to launch a missile from a ballistic missile submarine, two individuals must insert keys into separate slots on separate decks within a few seconds of each other. Barring this, the system cannot physically launch a missile. There are additional safeguards built into the system that control computer hardware and software, and personnel controls that we will discuss later, but—in the final analysis—without the keys inserted as described, there can be no launch—it’s not physically possible. Because the time window for key insertion is less than that required for one individual to accomplish, it is physically impossible for a missile to be launched accidentally by one individual. Any launch must be deliberate. One can postulate a scenario wherein a technician bypasses these safeguards in order to effect a launch by himself. Technically, this is possible, but such a launch would be deliberate, not accidental. We will examine measures designed to prevent this in a later column. Maintenance procedures on nuclear weapons are very tightly controlled. In effect always is the “two-man rule.” This rule prohibits any individual from accessing nuclear weapons or their launch vehicles alone. Aside from obvious qualification requirements, two individuals must be present. No matter how familiar the two technicians may be with a specific system, each step in a maintenance procedure is first read by one technician, repeated by the second, acknowledged by the first (or corrected, if necessary), performed by the second, examined by the first, checked off by the first, and acknowledged by the second. This makes maintenance slow, but absolutely assures that no errors happen. Exactly the same procedure is followed every time an access cover is removed, a screw is turned, a weapon is moved, or a controlling publication is updated. Nothing, absolutely nothing is done without following the written guides exactly, always under two-man control. This even applies to guards. Where nuclear weapons are concerned, a minimum of two guards—always fully in sight of each other—stand duty. There is no realistic scenario wherein a nuclear missile can be accidentally launched...ever...under any circumstances...period!

**Multiple safeguards prevent accidents, and worst case, a weapon would just explode in the ocean.**

#### Slocombe ‘9

[Walter, senior advisor for the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad and a former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, he is a four-time recipient of an award for Distinguished Public Service and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, “De-Alerting: Diagnoses, Prescriptions, and Side-Effects,” Presented at the seminar on Re-framing De-Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems in the US-Russia Context in Yverdon, Switzerland, June 21-23]

Let’s start with Technical Failure – the focus of a great deal of the advocacy, or at least of stress on past incidents of failures of safety and control mechanisms.4 Much of the “de-alerting” literature points to a succession of failures to follow proper procedures and draw from that history the inference that a relatively simple procedural failure could produce a nuclear detonation. The argument is essentially that nuclear weapons systems are sufficiently susceptible of pure accident (including human error or failure at operational/field level) that it is essential to take measures that have the effect of making it necessary to undertake a prolonged reconfiguration of the elements of the nuclear weapons force for a launch or detonation to be physically possible. Specific measures said to serve this objective include separating the weapons from their launchers, burying silo doors, removal of fuzing or launching mechanisms, deliberate avoidance of maintenance measures need to permit rapid firing, and the like. . My view is that this line of action is unnecessary in its own terms and highly problematic from the point of view of other aspects of the problem and that there is a far better option that is largely already in place, at least in the US force – the requirement of external information – a code not held by the operators -- to arm the weapons Advocates of other, more “physical,” measures often describe the current arrangement as nuclear weapons being on a “hair trigger.” That is – at least with respect to US weapons – a highly misleading characterization. The “hair trigger” figure of speech confuses “alert” status – readiness to act quickly on orders -- with susceptibility to inadvertent action. The “hair trigger” image implies that a minor mistake – akin to jostling a gun – will fire the weapon. The US StratCom commander had a more accurate metaphor when he recently said that US nuclear weapons are less a pistol with a hair trigger than like a pistol in a holster with the safety turned on – and he might have added that in the case of nuclear weapons the “safety” is locked in place by a combination lock that can only be opened and firing made possible if the soldier carrying the pistol receives a message from his chain of command giving him the combination. Whatever other problems the current nuclear posture of the US nuclear force may present, it cannot reasonably be said to be on a “hair trigger.” Since the 1960s the US has taken a series of measures to insure that US nuclear weapons cannot be detonated without the receipt of both external information and properly authenticated authorization to use that information. These devices – generically Permissive Action Links or “PALs” – are in effect combination locks that keep the weapons locked and incapable of detonation unless and until the weapons’ firing mechanisms have been unlocked following receipt of a series of numbers communicated to the operators from higher authority. Equally important in the context of a military organization, launch of nuclear weapons (including insertion of the combinations) is permitted only where properly authorized by an authenticated order. This combination of reliance on discipline and procedure and on receipt of an unlocking code not held by the military personnel in charge of the launch operation is designed to insure that the system is “fail safe,” i.e., that whatever mistakes occur, the result will not be a nuclear explosion. Moreover, in recent years, both the US and Russia, as well as Britain and China, have modified their procedures so that even if a nuclear-armed missile were launched, it would go not to a “real” target in another country but – at least in the US case - to empty ocean. In addition to the basic advantage of insuring against a nuclear detonation in a populated area, the fact that a missile launched in error would be on flight path that diverged from a plausible attacking trajectory should be detectable by either the US or the Russian warning systems, reducing the possibility of the accident being perceived as a deliberate attack. De-targeting, therefore, provides a significant protection against technical error. These arrangements – PALs and their equivalents coupled with continued observance of the agreement made in the mid-90s on “de-targeting” – do not eliminate the possibility of technical or operator-level failures, but they come very close to providing absolute assurance that such errors cannot lead to a nuclear explosion or be interpreted as the start of a deliberate nuclear attack.6 The advantage of such requirements for external information to activate weapons is of course that the weapons remain available for authorized use but not susceptible of appropriation or mistaken use.

#### More ev -- tons of safeguards.

Mroz, 9 - President and CEO at the EastWest Institute, graduate studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, M.A. at Northeastern University, B.A. at University of Notre Dame. (John E., “Reframing Nuclear De-Alert Decreasing the operational readiness of U.S. and Russian arsenals” 2009, <http://www.ewi.info/reframing_dealert)//AH>

Russian opponents of de-alerting assert that neither country’s systems are targeted at the other; in fact, highalert levels have not prevented the two countries from building a strategic partnership. Nuclear weapons are under strict technical and organizational control, which excludes the possibility of accidental or unauthorized use. “The issue of the possibility of an ‘accidental’ nuclear war itself is hypothetical. Both states have developed and implemented constructive organizational and technical measures that practically exclude launches resulting from unauthorized action of personnel or terrorists. Nuclear weapons are maintained under very strict system of control that excludes any accidental or unauthorized use and guarantees that these weapons can only be used provided that there is an appropriate authorization by the national leadership.”10 Furthermore, the two countries have taken bilateral steps to reduce nuclear risk. These include the 1963 Hot Line, the 1971 agreement on measures to reduce the threat of nuclear war, the agreements on pre-launch notification of ballistic missile tests and on Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, as well as the 1998 and 2000 agreements on the establishment of Joint Center for the Exchange of Data from Early Warning Systems and Notification of Missile Launches (JDEC). The JDEC could not be operationalized due to a number of objective and subjective difficulties, including secrecy-related issues. Nonetheless, the concept remains potent. Apart from bilateral exchange of information, ballistic missile and satellite-launch-vehicle (SLV) launches of third parties could be covered by the JDEC.

#### No accidental/unauthorized launch.

Quinlan, 9 - distinguished former British defence strategist, former Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the British Ministry of Defence, Prof. @ Wimbledon College and Merton College, Oxford. Director of the Ditchley Foundation, RIP (Sir Michael, Thinking About Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects, 2009, Pg. 67-69, Google Books)//AH

Ensuring the safety and security of nuclear weapons plainly needs to be taken most seriously. Detailed information is understandably not published, but such direct evidence as there is suggests that it always has been so taken in every possessor state, with the inevitable occasional failures to follow strict procedures dealt with rigorously. Critics have nevertheless from time to time argued that the possibility of accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated at all. Two sorts of scenario are usually in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unintended nuclear explosion—a technical disaster at a storage site, for example, or the accidental or unautho­rized launch of a delivery system with a live nuclear warhead. The second is that of some event—perhaps such an explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as malfunction or misinterpretation of radar signals or computer systems—initiating a sequence of response and counter-response that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no one had truly intended. No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just as at an opposite extreme it is absurd to claim, as has been heard from distinguished figures, that nuclear-weapon use can be guaranteed to happen within some finite future span despite not having happened for over sixty years). But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability. We have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh their reality and implications against other factors, in security planning as in everyday life. There have certainly been, across the decades since 1945, many known accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skid­ding off roads to bomber aircraft crashing with or accidentally drop­ping the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements—it no longer is). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby environment highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear deto­nation. Some commentators suggest that this reflects bizarrely good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so many years. A more rational deduction from the facts of this long experi­ence would however be that the probability of any accident triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low. It might be further noted that the mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are technically demanding, and that in a large number of ways the past sixty years have seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements for both the design and the handling of weapons. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the cold war, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are now plainly less so. The years which the world has come through entirely without accidental or unauthorized detonation have included early decades in which knowledge was sketchier, precautions were less developed, and weapon designs were less ultra-safe than they later became, as well as substantial periods in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and diverse, movements more frequent, and several aspects of doctrine and readiness arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of nuclear war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misconstrued. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch—extraordinary good fortune again, critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from hundreds of events stretching over sixty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is remote. Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognizes the vast gravity of any launch, release sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. To convey that because a first step was prompted the world somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole, rather like asserting, when a tennis champion has lost his opening service game, that he was nearly beaten in straight sets. History anyway scarcely offers any ready example of major war started by accident even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution.

More ev -- their authors wildly overestimate the likelihood.

Quinlan, 5 - distinguished former British defence strategist, former Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the British Ministry of Defence, Prof. @ Wimbledon College and Merton College, Oxford. Director of the Ditchley Foundation, RIP (Sir Michael, “Thinking About Nuclear Weapons” 2005, http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/WHP41\_QUINLAN.pdf)//AH

The safety of nuclear weapons needed to be, and at least in the Western setting consistently was, taken most seriously. Critics have nevertheless from time to time argued that the possibility of accident involving nuclear weapons is so substantial that it must weigh heavily in the entire evaluation of whether war-prevention structures entailing their existence should be tolerated. Two sorts of scenario are customarily in question. The first is that of a single grave event involving an unwanted nuclear explosion—a technical disaster at a storage site, for example, or the launch (accidental or unauthorised) of a delivery system with a nuclear warhead. The second is that of some event—perhaps such an explosion or launch, or some other mishap such as radar or computer malfunction—initiating a sequence that culminated in a nuclear exchange which no-one had truly intended. No event that is physically possible can be said to be of absolutely zero probability (just as at an opposite extreme it is nonsensical to claim that nuclear-weapon use can be `guaranteed' To happen in the next half-century having not happened in the past one). But human affairs cannot be managed to the standard of either zero or total probability; we have to assess levels between those theoretical limits and weigh their reality and implications against other factors, in security planning as in everyday life. There have certainly been, in over fifty years since the Second World War, many accidents involving nuclear weapons, from transporters skidding off roads to strategic bombers crashing with or losing the weapons they carried (in past days when such carriage was a frequent feature of readiness arrangements). A few of these accidents may have released into the nearby atmosphere highly toxic material. None however has entailed a nuclear explosion. Some commentators suggest that this reflects remarkable good fortune amid such massive activity and deployment over so long. A more rational deduction from the facts of this experience would however be that the probability of any accident's triggering a nuclear explosion is extremely low. It might be further noted that the mechanisms needed to set off such an explosion are highly complex; and that in a large number of ways the half-century has seen extensive improvements in safety arrangements. It is undoubtedly possible to see respects in which, after the Cold War, some of the factors bearing upon risk may be new or more adverse; but some are plainly less so. The half-century we have come through entirely without accidental explosion included early years in which knowledge was sketchier, weapon design less safety-oriented and precautions less developed than they later became, as well as years in which weapon numbers were larger, deployments more widespread and alert arrangements more tense. Similar considerations apply to the hypothesis of war being mistakenly triggered by false alarm or misunderstanding. Critics again point to the fact, as it is understood, of numerous occasions when initial steps in alert sequences for US nuclear forces were embarked upon, or at least called for, by indicators mistaken or misinterpreted. In none of these instances, it is accepted, did matters get at all near to nuclear launch—more good fortune, the critics have suggested. But the rival and more logical inference from perhaps hundreds of events stretching over fifty years of experience presents itself once more: that the probability of initial misinterpretation leading far towards mistaken launch is hugely remote.Precisely because any nuclear-weapon possessor recognises the vast gravity of any launch, decision sequences have many steps, and human decision is repeatedly interposed as well as capping the sequences. (And even at the height of the Cold War no Western nuclear power had a launch-on-warning policy—that is, an intention to initiate nuclear retaliation on perceived evidence of impending rather than provenly-actual attack.) To convey that because an early step was prompted we somehow came close to accidental nuclear war is wild hyperbole. History anyway scarcely offers ready examples of major war started by accident (miscalculation is another matter, not at issue here) even before the nuclear revolution imposed an order-of-magnitude increase in caution.

### Arctic War

#### No war -- frameworks for cooperation and dialogue prevent it.

IISS 12 – British think tank in the area of international affairs. It describes itself as "the world’s leading authority on political-military conflict". (International Institute for Strategic Studies, “The Arctic ‘race for cooperation’”, IISS, February 24, 2012, <http://iissvoicesblog.wordpress.com/2012/02/24/the-arctic-race-for-cooperation/>, Callahan)

At the launch of the institute’s Forum for Arctic Climate Change and Security, Bildt highlighted the need for nations and companies to work together in the polar region. Rapid climate change – twice as fast in the Arctic than elsewhere – was opening up new maritime routes and opportunities for resources exploration. However, he insisted, it remained a harsh environment that made cooperation necessary. This relatively benign assessment surprised some of his London audience, one of whom said the issue of Arctic security normally in the UK focused warily on what the Russians were doing. Bildt admitted that Vladimir Putin’s election manifesto was ‘not entirely in tune with what I’m saying’. However, he stuck by his earlier assertion that the Arctic region had become much less militarised since the end of the Cold War. Of course, the United States continued to maintain the Thule Air Base in Greenland, some air-defence early warning radar stations were still found across the region and the Arctic remained an important site for satellite-control systems. But the maritime Arctic was governed by an international regime – the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – and the Arctic Council had increased the emphasis on peaceful collaboration since it was founded in 1996. The Russians were enthusiastic council participants, Bildt said, and other countries were jockeying to become observers to the process. The increasing retreat of Arctic ice in summer has worried climate scientists, but it could also open hitherto impassable sea channels. The Northwest Passage, through the Canadian Arctic and the Bering Strait between Alaska and Siberia, became temporarily ice-free for the first time in 2007. The Northern Sea Route skirting Russia’s northern coast and down the Japanese coastline into the Pacific Ocean would cut one-third of the distance to travel between Europe and Asia. However, ‘it ain’t that easy’, Bildt warned. Huge computer-navigated container ships would not be able to traverse Arctic waters. International negotiations were needed to resolve safety, traffic and insurance issues. ‘The first legally binding agreement, on search and rescue, was signed last year.’ Bildt was relatively optimistic that resources competition would not lead to conflict, because of: the primacy of UNCLOS; the concentration of Arctic oil and gas in continental-shelf areas where there were no jurisdictional disputes; and the fact that oil and gas were often transported out of the region by ship, reducing the likelihood of pipeline disputes. ‘I find it difficult to see that there would be any development that would take us back to the situation of the past,’ Bildt said, pointing out that since the resolution of a Russian/Norwegian boundary dispute the biggest jurisdictional conflict was between Canada and the US.

#### Russia/Norway agreements prove cooperation will expand and maintain peace.

Karlsbakk 7/3 – Writer for the Barents Observer. (Jonas, “Leading the way for Arctic cooperation”, Barents Observer, July 3, 2012, <http://barentsobserver.com/en/politics/leading-way-arctic-cooperation-03-07>, Callahan)

Arctic issues has for several years been high on the agenda both for Norway and Russia. As the international interest for the Arctic is growing, Norway’s and Russia’s Arctic strategy is well funded in the two countries High North policies. This was emphasized when Russia’s Ambassador at Large for Arctic Cooperation; Anton Vasiliev, met with County Governor of Finnmark, Runar Sjåstad in Moscow recently. Vasiliev highlighted in his meeting with the county delegation, the importance of establishing a well functioning management of the region. The Norwegian county of Finnmark has only 75 000 inhabitants. However, with is central location in the north bordering to Russia, it will be an important area for Norwegian business development in the years to come. Therefore it was important for the county delegation from Finnmark to learn about how Russia is planning for the future in this region. "The Arctic is a region which cannot not be managed by market demands. All development of the Arctic must happen through cooperation between the Arctic nations," says Vasiliev. He is therefore very pleased that there has been established an Arctic Council Secretariat in Tromsø to make sure that that the development is managed well. Solving disputes Vasiliev used the meeting with the County Govorner of Finnmark to highlight the importance of the delimitation line agreement in the Barents Sea. The agreement signed in 2010, ended a 40 year long dispute between Norway and Russia on where to draw the borderline. "The agreement is of course important for Norway and Russia, but at the same time it shows other Arctic nations how to solve border issues in the Arctic. Just look at how Norway has solved all their continental shelf claims through good dialogue with your neighbours. No hostility and no conflict." Solving border issues through bilaterally discussions in a peaceful manner like Norway did, is the best solution in Vasiliev’s opinion. Areas of focus For Russia there are four key areas of focus for their Arctic strategy. It is the use of Arctic resources, it is to maintain political stability, it is to maintain a sustainable development and it is to make better use of the Northern Sea Route for commercial ship traffic. Vasilliev see that things are changing very fast now in the Arctic. Not many did foresee the rapid growth in traffic through the Northern Sea Route. As the number of commercial ship transits is closing 100 each season, the need for better security measures has become more and more urgent. “Russia has invested a lot in strengthening the infrastructure along the NSR, with more ice breakers, better port infrastructure and more satellites to monitor the area. This will make the travel far safer for search and rescue operations” says Vasiliev.

#### Their ev is alarmism -- cooperation outweighs in the Arctic.

Macalister, ‘11

[Terry, energy editor of the Guardian, 7-6, “US and Russia stir up political tensions over Arctic,” <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/06/us-russia-political-tensions-arctic>]

The message was clear: the US is putting itself at the centre of the debate about the future of the far north at a time when a new oil and mineral "cold rush" is under way as global warming makes extraction more easy. And being the US, the soft diplomacy was backed up with a bit of symbolic hardware. A few weeks earlier two nuclear-powered submarines were sent to patrol 150 miles north of Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. Meanwhile Russia – also on the eight-nation council – was happy to push off the agenda any idea that countries such as China could gain observer status. The US navy move comes as Russia is said to have increased missile testing in the region and Norway has moved its main military base to the far north. Meanwhile China has started to woo countries such as Greenland, which are rich in rare earth minerals needed for mobile phones and other hi-tech equipment. The competing commercial interests in the Arctic are complicated by the lack of a comprehensive agreement on who owns what. Many countries are in the process of submitting competing land claims to the UN as part of its Law of the Sea Convention – a treaty as yet unsigned by the US. Canada and others were also disturbed when Artur Chilingarov, a veteran Russian polar explorer, placed a flag on the Arctic seabed in 2007. He told reporters his mission was to show the Arctic was Russian, adding: "We must prove the north pole is an extension of the Russian landmass." Canada took exception to the Russian move, seeing it as provocative, but Moscow dismissed the furore, insisting it was a theatrical gesture by a scientist hired by private companies to make the descent. But it is telling that the following year Chilingarov – also a member of the state parliament – was awarded a new title, Hero of the Russian Federation. Concerns about a new cold war – if not just a cold rush – have led academics such as Rob Huebert, a professor of political science at the University of Calgary, to warn in a recent paper prepared for the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute that "an arms race may be beginning". Huebert says he has heard the Russian prime minister, Vladimir Putin, talking of the need to establish a "zone of peace" in the Arctic but sees contrary actions as well. "Not withstanding the public statements of peace and co-operation in the Arctic issued by the Arctic states, tThe strategic value of the region is growing. As this value grows, each state will attach a greater value to their own national interests in the region. The Arctic states may be talking co-operation, but they are preparing for conflict." Meanwhile Admiral James Stavridis, Nato's supreme allied commander in Europe, in a foreword to a recent Whitehall Ppaper published by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies in London, argued: "For now, the disputes in the north have been dealt with peacefully, but climate change could alter the equilibrium over the coming years in the race of temptation for exploitation of more readily accessible natural resources." Stavridis believes military assets, such as coastguards, have an important role to play with international co-ordination in the area – but mainly for specialist assistance around commercial and other interests. He added: "The cascading interests and broad implications stemming from the effects of climate change should cause today's global leaders to take stock, and unify their efforts to ensure the Arctic remains a zone of co-operation – rather than proceed down the icy slope towards a zone of competition, or worse a zone of conflict." Huebert points out that as well as opening a new ultra-hi-tech operations centre inside a mountain at Reitan, in the far north of Norway, Oslo is also spending unprecedented money on new military hardware, not least five top-of-the-range frigates. The class of vessel is called Fridtjof Nansen, after the famous polar explorer, which perhaps indicates where the navy plans to deploy them. Meanwhile Canada's then foreign minister, Lawrence Cannon, voiced confidence his nation would win the territory. "We will exercise sovereignty in the Arctic," he told his Russian counterpart in talks in Moscow. But optimists say the fears are exaggerated and point to positive developments, not least Norway and Russia agreeing a mutually acceptable boundary line dividing up the Barents Sea. A partnership between Russia, Norway, the US and Britain has been quietly and successfully working away at decommissioning nuclear submarines and tackling other radioactive waste problems in the Kola Peninsula and Arkhangelsk regions. One former foreign minister told the Guardian: "We want to avoid complacency but all this alarmist talk of meltdown should be shunned. The Arctic is quite pacific. It is not a place of turmoil but an area of low tension."

#### More ev -- cooperations increasing now.

Dingman 11 – freelance writer and researcher whose work focuses on the Arctic, Inuit, and Canada/United States relations. She holds a Master's in International Affairs from The New School. (Erica, “The Arctic: Cooperation or Confrontation?” World Policy Blog, March 23, 2011, <http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2011/03/23/arctic-cooperation-or-confrontation>, Callahan)

One example is that of the United States and Canada, who have had a longstanding dispute over where to draw the line defining their border in the Beaufort Sea. While each country uses different parameters to stake their claim, in the summer of 2010 the United States and Canada collaborated for the third consecutive year on mapping the seabed of the Beaufort Sea. Unlike prior years, the 2010 survey included a sonar probe of the contested area. The findings will be useful to representatives of both governments, who started talks in July 2010 aimed toward resolution of overlapping interests in the Beaufort. Russia is also in the midst of resolving offshore boundary disputes. On September 15, 2010 Russia and Norway signed the bilateral Treaty Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, after four decades of tough negotiation. Norway’s Parliament ratified the treaty in February 2011, and President Medvedev sent the Treaty to the State Duma, which is expected to ratify it. Several Russo-Norwegian joint military exercises are slated for this year, and the two states have pledged to protect the environment, keep fish stocks at a sustainable level, and possibly cooperate on the exploitation of trans-boundary oil deposits. These cooperative efforts should serve as an example to other Arctic nations, demonstrating that difficult, drawn-out negotiations can result in a win-win outcome. Within days of the Russia-Norway treaty, Foreign Ministers Sergei Lavrov and Jonas Gahr Støre jointly penned an article for the Toronto Globe and Mailtitled “Canada, take note: Here’s how to resolve maritime disputes.” The two ministers wrote that the experience created “enormous value” in terms of the bi-lateral relations and for the “international community at large.” They went on to say that “when states consider their interests in a long-term perspective, aiming for sustainable solutions” the potential advantages far outweigh the individual gains.

### A2 Yes War – Resources

#### Resource competition leads to cooperation, not conflict.

Hong 11 – postdoctoral fellow with the China Institute, University of Alberta, and also the Deputy Director, Research Centre for Oceans Law and Policy, National Institute for the South China Sea Studies. (Nong, “Arctic Energy: Pathway to Conflict or Cooperation in the High North?” Journal of Energy Security, May 31, 2011, <http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=310:arctic-energy-pathway-to-conflict-or-cooperation-in-the-high-north&catid=116:content0411&Itemid=375>, Callahan)

The high cost of doing business in the Arctic suggests that only the world’s largest oil companies, most likely as partners in joint venture projects, have the financial, technical, and managerial strength to accomplish the costly, long-lead-time projects dictated by Arctic conditions. Incentives to settle outstanding disputes would rise with the increasing potential economic returns posed by exploitation and the resulting polarization within the international system. While there are disagreements between the Arctic states on maritime boundaries, there are still reasons to believe that these disagreements can be resolved amicably. The prospect for conflicts relating to unresolved boundary disputes seems remote. The existing vehicles for dispute resolution and cooperation in the region, UNCLOS and the Arctic Council, will also help to reduce tensions. Joint management of resource fields is another option that might come into play as countries involved in a dispute might see more advantage in approaching the disagreement this way rather than losing a claim in an international tribunal. Cooperation between Norway and Iceland regarding the development of the Dreki field could serve as a model for similar arrangements in the future. Another example is the continental shelf dispute concerning an area rich in natural gas between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea. Both countries dispute the other's interpretation of where their borders extend into the offshore EEZ. While it is possible that there could be a conflict between the two countries over this area, it seems highly unlikely given the potential costs versus the potential benefits. Geopolitical issues are not exclusively conflicts over interests, although such concerns tend to dominate. They can also reflect cooperative, multilateral initiatives by which a state pursues its interests vis-à-vis others. Such cooperative ventures are often considered desirable and even unavoidable when a state is seeking a result that cannot be achieved unilaterally. At the same time, cooperation frequently establishes a level of governance – in some cases formally, in others less formally – by which mutual understanding can clarify intentions and help to build trust. Recognizing and respecting each others rights constitutes the legal basis for cooperation between Arctic and non-Arctic states. In accordance with UNCLOS and other relevant international laws, Arctic states have sovereign rights and jurisdiction in their respective areas in the region, while non-Arctic states also enjoy rights of scientific research and navigation. To develop a partnership of cooperation, Arctic and non-Arctic states should, first and foremost, recognize and respect each other's rights under the international law. Examples between Arctic and non-Arctic states are there. On 22 November 2010, the Sovcomflot Group (SCF) and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a strategic long-term cooperation agreement. The parties agreed to develop a long-term partnership in the sphere of seaborne energy solutions, with the SCF fleet serving the continually growing Chinese imports of hydrocarbons. Taking into account the significant experience gained by Sovcomflot in developing the transportation of hydrocarbons in the Arctic seas, SCF and CNPC agreed upon the format for coordination in utilizing the transportation potential of the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s Arctic coast, both for delivering transit shipments of hydrocarbons and for the transportation of oil and gas from Russia’s developing Arctic offshore fields to China. A new fleet of tankers designed to operate in ice as well as additional heavy-duty ice breakers will be built to that end. South Korea´s Samsung Industries is looking into filling the technological gap to make it possible to deliver Arctic natural gas across the pacific ocean to East Asia. Russia is building massive duel-bowed oil tankers that are set to come into use as soon as next year. While traveling forward, the ships move as they normally would through open water. But when the vessels move backward, they can act as ice-breakers. Construction is underway on two 70,000-tonne ships and two more 125,000 tonne ships and there are rumors that another five are on order.

### Biotech

#### Biotech inevitable.

#### D'Haeze, ‘7

[Wim, Bio-Engineer in Chemistry and received his Ph.D. in Biotechnology at Ghent University, Senior Technical Writer in the pharmaceutical, "Blooming Biotech and Pharmaceutical Industries," 10-15, The Science Advisory Board, <http://www.scienceboard.net/community/perspectives.193.html>]

Whoever regularly follows the news will recognize that the Biotech and Pharmaceutical Industry is still expanding – booming – in the United States and Europe, but also in major Asian countries such as India, China, and Japan. A pattern that is often observed for pharmaceutical companies is headquartering in a major location in the United States or Europe while branching elsewhere in the United States, Europe, and/or Asia. Those processes are highly dependent on how successfully drug candidates move through the drug development pipelines and on how the drug development process is organized, planned, and executed. Research and Development hubs are located at the East coast (e.g., New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Atlanta, and Northern and Central New Jersey) and West coast (e.g., San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, and Seattle) of the United States and throughout major cities in Europe, but multinational companies have been or are stepping on land in countries throughout Asia as well. Reasons for the latter development may include substantial cheaper labor as compared to that in developed countries and the ability to produce medicines close to the market place. During recent years, India, for example, has become the home of a few hundred registered biotech and pharmaceutical companies and is now positioned within the top-5 producers of pharmaceuticals. Interestingly, the majority of its export (e.g., production of diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis (DTP) vaccine) goes to developing countries. Companies such as Biocon, Novo Nordisk, Aventis Pharma, Chiron Behring Vaccines, GlaxoSmithKline, Novozymes, Eli Lilly & Company, and Advanced Biochemicals are all represented in major Indian cities, including Bangalore, Calcutta, Hyderabad, Mumbai, Pune, and New Delhi. In 2005, Indian biotech and pharmaceutical companies represented a revenue of more than US$1 billion and the governmental goal articulated by the Indian Department of Biotechnology is to create a biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry generating US$5 billion in revenues annually and representing one million jobs by roughly three years from now. The government tries to achieve this goal in part by facilitating foreign-owned companies to establish in India, making it easier for investors by centralizing the process, creating at least ten new science parks by 2010, financially supporting new drug discovery proposals and research, and by supporting small biotech and pharmaceutical businesses and start-up companies.

### Bioweapons

#### Bioweapons don’t cause extinction -- empirical death tolls prove the impact is minimal.

Leitenberg, ‘5

[Milton, Senior research scholar at the University of Maryland, Trained as a Scientist and Moved into the Field of Arms Control in 1966, First American Recruited to Work at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Affiliated with the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the Center for International Studies Peace Program at Cornell University, Senior Fellow at CISSM, ASSESSING THE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND BIOTERRORISM THREAT, <http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/assessing_bw_threat.pdf>]

The conclusions from these independent studies were uniform and mutually reinforcing. There is an extremely low incidence of real biological (or chemical) events, in contrast to the number of hoaxes, the latter spawned by administration and media hype since 1996 concerning the prospective likelihood and dangers of such events. A massive second wave of hoaxes followed the anthrax incidents in the United States in October-November 2001, running into global totals of tens of thousands. It is also extremely important that analysts producing tables of “biological” events not count hoaxes. A hoax is not a “biological” event, nor is the word “anthrax” written on a slip of paper the same thing as anthrax, or a pathogen, or a “demonstration of threat”—all of which various analysts and even government advisory groups have counted hoaxes as being on one occasion or another.79 Those events that were real, and were actual examples of use, were overwhelmingly chemical, and even in that category, involved the use of easily available, off-the-shelf, nonsynthesized industrial products. Many of these were instances of personal murder, and not attempts at mass casualty use. The Sands/Monterey compilation indicated that exactly one person was killed in the United States in the 100 years between 1900 and 2000 as a result of an act of biological or chemical terrorism. Excluding the preparation of ricin, a plant toxin that is relatively easier to prepare, there are only a few recorded instances in the years 1900 to 2000 of the preparation or attempted preparation of pathogens in a private laboratory by a nonstate actor. The significant events to date are: • 1984, the Rajneesh, The Dalles, Oregon, use of salmonella on food; • 1990-94, the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group’s unsuccessful attempts to procure, produce and disperse anthrax and botulinum toxin;80 • 1999, November 2001, al-Qaida,81 the unsuccessful early efforts to obtain anthrax and to prepare a facility in which to do microbiological work; October-November 2001, the successful “Amerithrax” distribution of a high-quality dry-powder preparation of anthrax spores, which had been prepared within the preceding 24 months.

#### Bioweapons don’t cause extinction -- they’re weak and easy to control.

Mueller ‘10

[John, Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and a Professor of Political Science at The Ohio State University, A.B. from the University of Chicago, M.A. and Ph.D. @ UCLA, Atomic Obsession – Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda, Oxford University Press]

Properly developed and deployed, biological weapons could potentially, if thus far only in theory, kill hundreds of thousands, perhaps even millions, of people. The discussion remains theoretical because biological weapons have scarcely ever been used. For the most destructive results, they need to be dispersed in very low-altitude aerosol clouds. Since aerosols do not appreciably settle, pathogens like anthrax (which is not easy to spread or catch and is not contagious) would probably have to be sprayed near nose level. Moreover, 90 percent of the microorganisms are likely to die during the process of aerosolization, while their effectiveness could be reduced still further by sunlight, smog, humidity, and temperature changes. Explosive methods of dispersion may destroy the organisms, and, except for anthrax spores, long-term storage of lethal organisms in bombs or warheads is difficult: even if refrigerated, most of the organisms have a limited lifetime. Such weapons can take days or weeks to have full effect, during which time they can be countered with medical and civil defense measures. In the summary judgment of two careful analysts, delivering microbes and toxins over a wide area in the form most suitable for inflicting mass casualties-as an aerosol that could be inhaled-requires a delivery system of enormous sophistication, and even then effective dispersal could easily be disrupted by unfavorable environmental and meteorological conditions.

### China-Russia War

#### No war -- mutual interests ensure cooperation.

Hille and Anderlini 12 – Financial Times correspondents in Beijing (Kathrin and Jamil, “Russia and China to strengthen trade ties,” Financial Times, 6/5/12, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d8999462-af27-11e1-a8a7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1zrBVCIMo>, MMarcus)

The presidents of Russia and China laid out ambitious plans on Tuesday to tie their countries into a closer strategic and economic partnership as both Beijing and Moscow seek to use each other to balance their relationship with the US. The two presidents set a goal of more than doubling bilateral trade from $83.5bn last year to $200bn in 2020, Hu Jintao, China’s president, said after talks with Vladimir Putin, the Russian president. The ambitious target was announced together with a slew of investment and trading deals. It was held up by the two leaders as a sign of new heights for the relationship between two powers to be reckoned with on issues ranging from global trade to the international response to Syria. Mr Hu said that through closer co-operation [China](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b89f6838-7734-11e1-baf3-00144feab49a.html) and [Russia](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5198ac0a-abf8-11e1-a8a0-00144feabdc0.html) would “set the global political and economic order in a more fair and rational direction”. Chinese state media feted Mr Putin, a fairly frequent visitor to Beijing who had last been in town in October 2011, praising close and growing bilateral co-operation and consultation of the two nations on the world stage. People’s Daily, the ruling Communist party’s mouthpiece, even ran a long piece by Mr Putin himself in which he talked up ties with China. “Without the participation of Russia and China, without considering Russia and China’s interests, no international matter or issue can be discussed and implemented,” he wrote. Moscow and Beijing have angered western countries with their refusal to back an international intervention in the brewing civil war in Syria. But Russian and Chinese analysts say the two countries are still far away from a close alliance. “The reason the Chinese media are hyping the visit like this is that a significant portion of the Chinese leadership, including the military . . . hope to build Russia into an ally to help push back against the US,” said Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center. “But for Mr Putin the focus is mainly on strengthening the economic relationship.” And, he cautioned, historical suspicions lingered. “There remains a lack of trust between the two sides, and none of the two wants a true alliance.”

#### More ev -- bilateral war games prove.

MSNBC 12 (MSNBC, “Russian ships arriving in China for naval war game,” MSNBC World News, 4/21/12, <http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/04/21/11316416-russian-ships-arriving-in-china-for-naval-war-game?lite>, MMarcus)

The Russian guided-missile cruiser Varyag arrived at an east Chinese naval base Saturday ahead of a planned joint exercise with the Chinese navy, news agency Xinhua reported. The large-scale war game, the navies’ first bilateral drill, is scheduled Sunday through Friday off the resort city of Qingdao in the Yellow Sea, Xinhua said. Russia also sent from Vladivostok three Udaloy class destroyers and three support ships, said Russian news agency Ria Novosti. China will use 16 ships, including destroyers, frigates and two submarines, in the drill called Maritime Cooperation-2012, Ria Novosti said. “The exercises will involve several simulated missions, including the rescue of a hijacked ship, the escort of a commercial vessel, and the defense a convoy from air and sea attacks,” a Russian military spokesman told the news agency. The exercise will promote strategic coordination and mutual trust between the two militaries, said Chen Bingde, Chief of the General Staff of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Chen also said the drill would strengthen the naval forces' ability to jointly confront new regional threats and maintain peace and stability in the region and world. Since 2005, China and Russia have conducted several joint military exercises within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which also includes the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

### China-Russia War (RFE)

#### No war -- economic interests ensure that China and Russia will cooperate instead.

Rousseau 12 – Associate Professor and Chairman of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Khazar University in Baku, Azerbaijan and a contributor to Global Brief, World Affairs in the 21st Century. (Richard, “Will China Colonize and Incorporate Siberia?” Harvard International Review, June 27, 2012, http://hir.harvard.edu/will-china-colonize-and-incorporate-siberia?page=0,3, Callahan)

A final possible, converse scenario, which seems to be taking shape, is a deepened Sino-Russian partnership, as both countries wish to benefit from the exploration of Siberia and this can be achieved, at least nominally, through closer ties. Diplomatic and economic relationships are on a solid footing at present and there are few theoretical obstacles to further collaboration, should both parties desire it. China can bring in expertise and workers, with Russian consent, to start building facilities and populating various settlements, both new and old. Cooperation would especially facilitate exploitation of raw materials, which are indispensable for both countries’ long term economic growth.

#### No Chinese aggression -- the Russian Far East isn’t a priority for the CCP.

Harding 09 – Award-winning foreign correspondent with the Guardian. He has reported from Delhi, Berlin and Moscow and has covered wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. (Luke, “Russia fears embrace of giant eastern neighbour”, The Guardian, August 1, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/02/china-russia-relationship>, Callahan)

In reality, the relationship is far more fascinating than the baseless fears of Russia's nationalists. Over the past decade the number of Chinese migrants working in Russia's far east has actually fallen. In Moscow, the authorities have recently shut down the capital's enormous Cherkizovsky market, turfing thousands of Chinese out of a job. The huge bazaar was home to Chinese traders selling billions of dollars-worth of grey-sector goods. (According to China's Xinhua agency, losses from Wenzhou in Zhejiang province alone amount to more than $800m, after Russian police confiscated their stocks.) Some 150 Chinese workers have been deported since the market was closed on 29 June. Most experts believe China's own strategic goals do not include Russia's far east, or primitive territorial expansion. Instead Beijing's priorities lie elsewhere. They include development, reunification with Taiwan and internal stability, which experts suggest is more of a priority than ever following last month's ethnic riots against Han Chinese in Xinjiang.

#### China won't invade the Russian Far East.

#### Harding, ‘9

[Luke, Writer for the Observer, "Russia fears embrace of giant eastern neighbour," 8-2, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/02/china-russia-relationship>]

Most experts believe China's own strategic goals do not include Russia's far east, or primitive territorial expansion. Instead Beijing's priorities lie elsewhere. They include development, reunification with Taiwan and internal stability, which experts suggest is more of a priority than ever following last month's ethnic riots against Han Chinese in Xinjiang. According to Dr Bobo Lo, a lecturer on Chinese-Russian relations at the Centre for European Reform, Beijing's real challenge to Moscow is rather different. He argues that the rise of China will lead to the "steady marginalisation of Russia from regional and global decision-making". The Chinese do not want to invade Russia militarily because, he points out, they would lose.

### China-US War

#### No US-China war -- consensus of military experts.

Ackerman 11 – Signal Magazine’s Editor in Chief (Robert, quoting Timothy Keating, former admiral, “War Between China, U.S. Not Likely,” Signal Scope, 5/10/11, <http://www.afcea.org/signal/signalscape/index.php/2011/05/10/11510>)

The United States and China are not likely to go to war with each other because neither country wants it and it would run counter to both nations’ best interests. That was the conclusion of a plenary panel session hosted by former Good Morning America host David Hartman at the 2011 Joint Warfighting Conference in Virginia Beach. Adm. Timothy J. Keating, USN (Ret.), former head of the U.S. Pacific Command, noted that China actually wants the United States to remain active in the Asia-Pacific region as a hedge against any other country’s adventurism. And, most of the other countries in that region want the United States to remain active as a hedge against China. Among areas of concern for China is North Korea. Wallace “Chip” Gregson, former assistant secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, said that above all China fears instability, and a North Korean collapse or war could send millions of refugees streaming into Manchuria, which has economic problems of its own. As for Taiwan, Adm. Keating offered that with each day, the likelihood of a Chinese attack on Taiwan diminishes. Economic ties between the two governments are growing, as is social interaction. He predicts that a gradual solution to reunification is coming. The United States can hasten that process by remaining a powerful force in the region, he added.

#### Economic interdependence prevents conflict.

Hsu 11 - Senior writer for InnovationNewsDaily (Jeremy, “Economic Ties Could Help Prevent US-China War,” MSNBC, 11/1/11, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45125209/ns/technology_and_science-innovation/t/economic-ties-could-help-prevent-us-china-war/>, MMarcus)

As the U.S. faces China's economic and military rise, it also holds a dwindling hand of cards to play in the unlikely case of open conflict. Cyberattacks aimed at computer networks, targeted disabling of satellites or economic warfare could end up bringing down both of the frenemies. That means ensuring the U.S. economy remains strong and well-balanced, with China's economy possibly representing the best deterrent, according to a new report. The Rand Corporation's analysts put low odds on a China-U.S. military conflict taking place, but still lay out danger scenarios where the U.S. and China face greater risks of stumbling into an unwanted war with one another. They point to the economic codependence of both countries as the best bet against open conflict, similar to how nuclear weapons ensured mutually assured destruction for the U.S. and Soviet Union during the Cold War. "It is often said that a strong economy is the basis of a strong defense," the Rand report says. "In the case of China, a strong U.S. economy is not just the basis for a strong defense, it is itself perhaps the best defense against an adventurous China." Such "mutually assured economic destruction" would devastate both the U.S. and China, given how China represents America's main creditor and manufacturer. The economic fallout could lead to a global recession worse than that caused by the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The U.S. still spends more than five times on defense compared with China, but Rand analysts suggest that China's defense budget could outstrip that of the U.S. within the next 20 years. The U.S. Air Force and Navy's current edge in the Pacific has also begun to shrink as China develops aircraft, ships, submarines and missiles capable of striking farther out from its coast. Existing U.S. advantages in cyberwar and anti-satellite capabilities also don't offset the fact that the U.S. military depends far more heavily on computer networks and satellites than China's military. That makes a full-out cyberwar or satellite attacks too risky for the U.S., but perhaps also for China. "There are no lives lost — just extensive harm, heightened antagonism, and loss of confidence in network security," Rand analysts say. "There would be no 'winner.'" Open military conflict between China and the U.S. could also have "historically unparalleled" economic consequences even if neither country actively engages in economic warfare, Rand analysts say. The U.S. could both boost direct defense in the unlikely case of war and reduce the risk of escalation by strengthening China's neighbors. Such neighbors, including India, South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, also represent possible flashpoints for China-U.S. conflict in the scenarios laid out by the Rand report. Other possible danger zones include the South China Sea, where China and many neighboring countries have disputes over territorial claims, as well as in the murkier realm of cyberspace. Understandably, China has shown fears of being encircled by semi-hostile U.S. allies. That's why Rand analysts urged the U.S. to make China a partner rather than rival for maintaining international security. They also pointed out, encouragingly, that China has mostly taken "cautious and pragmatic" policies as an emerging world power. "As China becomes a true peer competitor, it also becomes potentially a stronger partner in the defense as well as economic field," the Rand analysts say.

#### China doesn’t want to instigate conflict -- they know they’d get crushed.

**Bandow, ‘8**

[Doug, former senior fellow at CATO, “Turning China into the Next Big Enemy,” 3-7, http://www.antiwar.com/bandow/?articleid=12472]

But the Defense Department is even more worried that the Chinese are spending too much, which is essentially defined as developing a military which one day could confront American forces – successfully. It's a fair concern, since Beijing's military build-up is transforming the international environment far more quickly than most American analysts had expected. The PRC has numerous reasons for seeking to create a superior military. The Pentagon notes that China probably is developing forces for use in such contingencies "as conflict over resources or disputed territories." Moreover, Beijing's growing "capabilities will increase Beijing's options for military coercion to press diplomatic advantage, advance interests, or resolve disputes in its favor." As Washington well knows, international political influence is more likely to follow a larger military. Russia has regained regional clout, but remains a smaller global player; Europe is an economic giant but a military midget. Beijing seems intent on twinning soft and hard power to enhance its global clout. Despite the multiple ends, however, the PRC appears to have two more basic goals with its military build-up. The first is to enable the PRC to compel Taiwan, through use of military force, if necessary, to accept some form of reunification. The second is to deter the U.S. from intervening to stop China from using coercion. As the Pentagon observes, "A potential military confrontation with Taiwan, and the prospect of U.S. military intervention, remain the PLA's most immediate military concerns." Indeed, much of the PRC's military program seems directed at creating a credible deterrent to America. The Pentagon reports: "China's nuclear force modernization, as evidenced by the fielding of the new DF-31 and DF-31A intercontinental-range missiles, is enhancing China's strategic strike capabilities. China's emergent anti-access/area denial capabilities – as exemplified by its continued development of advanced cruise missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles, anti-ship missiles designed to strike ships at sea, including aircraft carriers, and the January 2007 successful test of a direct-ascent, anti-satellite weapon – are expanding from the land, air, and sea dimensions of the traditional battlefield into the space and cyber-space domains." It's an impressive list. But America's military capabilities remain far greater. Why does the PRC need anti-ship missiles for use against aircraft carriers? Because it lacks even one carrier, while the U.S. controls the seas with 12 carrier groups. This country dominates most other military fields as well. America's nuclear missile arsenal is much bigger, more sophisticated, and more deadly than that possessed by China. Washington already is reaching into space with its missile defense program. Thus, the PRC is seeking to deter America from deploying its more powerful forces. Notes the Pentagon, "Through analysis of U.S and coalition warfighting practices since 1991, Beijing hopes to develop approaches to waging future conflict by adapting and emulating lessons learned in some areas while seeking perceived vulnerabilities that could be exploited through asymmetric means in others." In particular, "As part of its planning for a Taiwan contingency, China is prioritizing measures to deter or counter third-party intervention in any future cross-Strait crisis." Thus, Beijing might be preparing to confront the U.S. But the critical question is, confront the U.S. over what? If Beijing was plotting the conquest of Guam, Hawaii, and ultimately the North American continent, then Beijing's ongoing military build-up would look dangerous indeed. But there is nothing in China's long history that suggests such overarching ambitions. Unwilling to remain weak and thus subject to coercion by a trigger-happy superpower across the Pacific. Yes. Determined to vigorously assert its perceived interests. Yes. Expecting international respect and consultation that reflects its increasingly expansive interests and growing power. Yes. Ready to commit global aggression, initiate world war, and wreck both China's and America's futures. No. Which means the U.S. should think carefully before responding to China's ongoing build-up. The Pentagon speaks of a situation which "will naturally and understandably lead to hedging against the unknown," meaning Washington will need to spend even more on the military. If half of the world's military outlays aren't enough, one wonders how much would be. Two-thirds? Three-fourths? Even more? Washington should not fret. If the goal is defending America, the U.S. possesses sufficiency today. Just catching up with the U.S. will be a daunting task for the PRC. Explained the Pentagon: "The U.S. Intelligence Community estimates China will take until the end of this decade or longer to produce a modern force capable of defeating a moderate-size adversary. China will not be able to project and sustain small military units far beyond China before 2015, and will not be able to project and sustain large forces in combat operations far from China until well into the following decade." Washington already occupies the global summit, with the enormous military infrastructure of a superpower. China will not easily displace America with the world's most powerful military. Assume that China, still desperately poor and surrounded by potentially hostile states, decides to deploy one new carrier group a year, no mean task. The PRC still wouldn't match America until 2020. Even then Beijing wouldn't be strong enough to take aggressive action against the U.S. homeland or dependencies. To develop an air force capable of dominating U.S. airspace and ground forces capable of invading U.S. territory would be another step well beyond. Most important, the U.S. possesses what would remain an effective nuclear deterrent against almost any imaginable Chinese missile force. It's not that the PRC couldn't theoretically construct and deploy more and better nuclear missiles, strategic bombers, and nuclear-armed subs than the U.S., though such a process would take an enormous commitment over many years. But it's hard to imagine that China could ever deploy enough to create a first strike capability.

#### It won’t go nuclear.

**Aga, ‘9**

[Clifford, “Top 10 Military Powers of the World”, 10-28, http://totopereira.blogspot.com/2009/10/top-10-military-powers-of-world.html]

The above table gives us an overview of the strengths and fire power of the top 10 military powers of the world. The chart is just to view numbers, and rankings take into consideration many aspects such as intelligence, actual combat experience, training, skill, back-up, movement of troops and weapons, etc. Also as mentioned earlier, numbers will not be absolutely accurate, as they keep changing regularly according to specific needs and situations. An interesting fact is that, out of all the countries in the world, Israel has a reserve army that can be mobilized into actual combat more quickly than anyone else. Just numbers are not enough, and this is something that can be citied in a good example in the table regarding the USA and China. Though China has an army nearly twice the size of the USA, the strike power of the USA is double that of China. This is due to many other factors as we have mentioned, like training, skill, modernized equipment, strategy, intelligence, etc. Though, it can be safely said that these are the 10 top militaries in the world as we speak. There are also many other things that need to be taken into consideration regarding the top ten. For example, the United States indulges in combat mainly in other countries, and for the purpose of quashing terrorism, rouge armies, and peacekeeping ventures. Some countries are engaged in continuous small skirmishes with their neighbors, and are active in protecting their own borders. Nuclear weapons are also a key factor, something that has never been used since the bombing of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. God forbid, even if a war breaks out in which multiple countries are involved, it is very unlikely that they will be used, and the war(s) will be fought in the conventional ways itself. Another aspect is type of weaponry, the advanced military weapons that a state possesses.

### Cyberwar

#### No cyberwar impact.

#### Tanji, ‘9

[Michael, Threats Watch, 12-7, “"Digital Pearl Harbor?" How About the War We're Actually In?” http://threatswatch.org/rapidrecon/2009/12/digital-pearl-harbor-how-about/]

There is no such thing as an Electronic Pearl Harbor. On a fundamental level, for something to qualify as an EPH, we would have to have been untouched by offensive action by a belligerent adversary. We would have to ignore the glaring warning indicators, both strategic and tactical, that would lead to the destruction and disruption of so much technical capability that our ability to function as a power of any sort would be dramatically diminished for - in information-age terms - an extended period of time. Yet every year banks get hacked, the government gets pwned, the digital duct tape holding critical infrastructure together loses its grip . . . and the lights are still on, the nation is still in one piece and there is still a balance in everyone's accounts. Why? Because in a wartime footing people learn to deal with the damage, the destruction, the interruption and - to coin a phrase - soldier on. Stiff upper lip and all that. "War" might be too strong a word, but if we are going to draw parallels to conflicts past, we are actually engaged in something more akin to the First Battle of the Marne than we are waiting for Pearl Harbor. Make no mistake: we have been engaged in conflicts in the digital realm for forty-plus years. It has steadily grown against enemies both within and outside of our own institutions, both governmental and private. It's a war of attrition with aspects of terrorism, insurgency, and plain old criminal motivations. The battles rage daily, but you only really hear about the big ones. Like our most recent shooting war, hundreds of millions may have felt it necessary to engage in a fight, but a tiny fraction of those actually have to bloody themselves. The natural consequence is that everyone else forgets there are people fighting, so headlines that talk of concern over a sneak attack still get press. War, real war, requires that an adversary do much, much more than turn off the lights or cause tertiary deaths. I don't think for a second that our status as a world power, or our integrity as a nation, is endangered by a digital attack; unless of course we're the sort that just rolls over when our nose is bloodied.

#### Great powers won’t attack the US.

#### ChinaDaily, ‘10

[Chinadaily.com.cn, 1-26, “CYBER WAR NOT LIKELY EXPERT,” Lexis]

China and the US will not engage in a cyber war and may even reach an agreement on Internet security. However, the Google row will bring more difficulties to their dialogues, argues a US expert. To avoid any devastating consequences developing from the row, the two countries should restrain their cyber activities, which should not encompass espionage, said James Lewis, a senior fellow directing the Technology and Public Policy Program at the US based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), in an interview with the Oriental Morning Post of Shanghai A cyber war is "unlikely to break out if the two countries stick to this bottom line," Lewis said in the interview with the Shanghai based newspaper. His remarks came amid the escalating war of words resulting from the Google row, which analysts say has been politicalized by the involvement of the US government. Lewis pointed out that information stealing is common practice in cyber space, citing a US national defense official who said that "every day their computers are attacked nearly 300 million times, some banking systems are attacked over 7,000 times, and the websites of power companies are attacked 2,000 to 3,000 times." But such attacks should be limited to information stealing, and not involve devastating activities, such as attacking a power company's Internet and destroying their power system, which could lead two countries into war, said Lewis. "We are experiencing an era of an extremely unsafe Internet," Lewis said. "I hope China and the US can have dialogues on Internet security," as they have common interests in carrying trade and business communication in a stable cyber sphere. But the chances are good that the two countries will reach an agreement on Internet security, as both countries need a stable Internet for business communication, said Lewis.

### Democracy

#### Democratic peace theory is flawed -- democracy doesn’t prevent war, just American influence over Europe and South America.

Rosato 3Sebastian, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, The University of Chicago, The American Political Science Review. Menasha: Nov 2003. Vol. 97, Iss. 4; pg. 585, 18 pgs

The causal logics that underpin democratic peace theory cannot explain why democracies remain at peace with one another because the mechanisms that make up these logics do not operate as stipulated by the theory's proponents. In the case of the normative logic, liberal democracies do not reliably externalize their domestic norms of conflict resolution and do not treat one another with trust and respect when their interests clash. Similarly, in the case of the institutional logic, democratic leaders are not especially accountable to peace-loving publics or pacific interest groups, democracies are not particularly slow to mobilize or incapable of surprise attack, and open political competition offers no guarantee that a democracy will reveal private information about its level of resolve. In view of these findings there are good reasons to doubt that joint democracy causes peace. Democratic peace theorists could counter this claim by pointing out that even in the absence of a good explanation for the democratic peace, the fact remains that democracies have rarely fought one another. In addition to casting doubt on existing explanations for the democratic peace, then, a comprehensive critique should also offer a positive account of the finding. One potential explanation is that the democratic peace is in fact an imperial peace based on American power. This claim rests on two observations. First, the democratic peace is essentially a post-World War II phenomenon restricted to the Americas and Western Europe. second, the United States has been the dominant power in both these regions since World War II and has placed an overriding emphasis on regional peace. There are three reasons we should expect democratic peace theory's empirical claims to hold only in the post-1945 period. First, as even proponents of the democratic peace have admitted, there were few democracies in the international system prior to 1945 and even fewer that were in a position to fight one another. Since 1945, however, both the number of democracies in the international system and the number that have had an opportunity to fight one another have grown markedly (e.g., Russett 1993,20). Second, while members of double democratic dyads were not significantly less likely to fight one another than members of other types of dyads prior to World War II, they have been significantly more peaceful since then (e.g., Farber and Gowa 1997). Third, the farther back we go in history the harder it is to find a consensus among both scholars and policymakers on what states qualify as democracies. Depending on whose criteria we use, there may have been no democratic wars prior to 1945, or there may have been several (see, e.g., Layne 1994; Ray 1995; Russett 1993; Spiro 1994). Since then, however, we can be fairly certain that democracies have hardly fought each other at all. Most of the purely democratic dyads since World War II can be found in the Americas and Western Europe. My analysis includes all pairs of democracies directly or indirectly contiguous to one another or separated by less than 150 miles of water between 1950 and 1990 (Przeworski et al. 2000; Schafer 1993). This yields 2,427 double democratic dyads, of which 1,306 (54%) were comprised of two European states, 465 (19%) were comprised of two American states, and 418 (17%) comprised one American state and one European state. In short, 90% of purely democratic dyads have been confined to two geographic regions, the Americas and Western Europe. American preponderance has underpinned, and continues to underpin stability and peace in both of these regions. In the Americas the United States has successfully adopted a two-pronged strategy of driving out the European colonial powers and selectively intervening either to ensure that regional conflicts do not escalate to the level of serious military conflict or to install regimes that are sympathetic to its interests. The result has been a region in which most states are prepared to toe the American line and none have pretensions to alter the status quo. In Europe, the experience of both World Wars persuaded American policymakers that U.S. interests lay in preventing the continent ever returning to the security competition that had plagued it since the Napoleonic Wars. Major initiatives including the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, European integration, and the forward deployment of American troops on German soil should all be viewed from this perspective. Each was designed either to protect the European powers from one another or to constrain their ability to act as sovereign states, thereby preventing a return to multipolarity and eliminating the security dilemma as a factor in European politics. These objectives continue to provide the basis for Washington's European policy today and explain its continued attachment to NATO and its support for the eastward expansion of the European Union. In sum, the United States has been by far the most dominant state in both the Americas and Western Europe since World War II and has been committed, above all, to ensuring that both regions remain at peace.24 Evaluating whether the democratic peace finding is caused by democracy or by some other factor such as American preponderance has implications far beyond the academy. If peace and security are indeed a consequence of shared democracy, then international democratization should continue to lie at the heart of American grand strategy. But if, as I have suggested, democracy does not cause peace, then American policymakers are expending valuable resources on a policy that, while morally praiseworthy, does not make America more secure.

#### **Inherently violent states will wage wars no matter what -- Spanish-American War and Kargil Crisis disprove the impact.**

Nisley 8 (Thomas Jay Nisley, Prof. of International Studies, Southern Polytechnic State University, “The Pugnacious and the Pacific: Why Some Democracies Fight Wars” International Politics (2008) 45, 168–181)

Although there are many weaknesses to the logic of democratic peace, it is very difficult to find an exception to the rule that democratic states do not fight wars with other democratic states. Two possible exceptions to this rule are the Spanish–American War of 1898 and the Kargil War of 1999, between India and Pakistan. Proponents of the democratic peace can find reasons why these two wars do not count as wars between democracies. In the Spanish–American War, the argument is made that even though Spain had universal male suffrage and a bicameral legislature with an executive nominally responsible to it, there was not true party competition. Bruce Russett (1993) tells us, 'By mutual agreement, the Liberal and Conservative parties rotated in office; governmental changes proceeded rather than followed elections' (p. 19). The Kargil War is more difficult to explain away. In the important work on the democratic peace, Triangulating Peace, Bruce Russett and John Oneal (2001) try to explain away this exception in a footnote. The authors conceded that the 'Polity data by Jaggers and Gurr label both countries as democratic' (Russett and Oneal, 2001, 19, fn6). Russett and Oneal recognize that battle deaths were high enough to allow the conflict to be labeled a war. Nevertheless, they dismiss this exception to the democratic peace by saying that many of the battle deaths 'were of Islamic guerrillas, not regular Pakistani troops; thus, the conflict may not qualify as a true interstate war' (Russett and Oneal, 2001, 19, fn6). The only problem with an exception to the democratic peace as a defining regularity in world politics is that its statistical significance rests on complete absence of any cases of wars between democracies. One exception breaks the rule. This is the problem with the phenomena that not all democracies are peaceful. In fact, some democracies are thoroughly warlike. To his credit Harald Müller has tried to provide us an explanation for this phenomenon by taking a state-level approach. According to Müller, the normative explanation for the democratic peace is the most persuasive. If we concede to Müller that norms are the most important explanation, we should look for differences in the domestic norms of militant and pacifist democracies. Militant democracies develop a hostile interpretation of the actions of non-democratic states, while pacifist democracies are more tolerant and have a higher threshold for military force. Therefore, we can understand the war-proneness of such democracies as Israel, the United States, India, and the United Kingdom from their prevailing political cultures. The analysis of this study has not tried directly to refute Müller's analysis or the idea of the democratic peace at the dyadic level. Rather, what I have sought to do is understand the militancy of some democracies by examining traditional variables (and in some sense Realist variables) for outcomes leading to conflict. I am comfortable with the assertion that conflict in world politics is attributable to major powers that seek at a minimum to maintain their power (Waltz, 1979) or at the maximum seek to get as much power as they can (Mearsheimer, 2001). Moreover, violence begets more violence. States, once locked into a pattern of violence, can continue in multiple iterations of violence called enduring rivalries. States that came into existence through violent conflict such as Israel and India will remain violence-prone for many decades.

More empirical examples disprove DPT.

Nisley 8 (Thomas Jay Nisley, Prof. of International Studies, Southern Polytechnic State University, “The Pugnacious and the Pacific: Why Some Democracies Fight Wars” International Politics (2008) 45, 168–181)

There is a clear and sharp difference in the use of international violence among democracies. When examining the involvement in militarized interstates disputes (defined as use of force or war) among the continuously democratic states between the years 1950 and 2001, an interesting finding emerges. 'Of the 283 discrete involvements by these stable democracies, just four countries carried out 75.6% of these (19% of the whole group): Israel, the United States, India, and the United Kingdom' ([Müller, 2004](http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ip/journal/v45/n2/full/8800225a.html#bib25), 495). These four states accounted for 214 of the militarized interstate disputes over the period of observation. In contrast, the remaining 18 states only accounted for 69 militarized interstate disputes with three states (Luxemburg, Finland, and Austria) not having engaged in a single militarized interstate dispute during the 51-year period. A likely counter argument is that small states have little chance to get involved militarily. However, in an age of coalition warfare, military involvement by small states is relatively easy as they can join with larger states as they project power. President Bush's 'coalition of the willing' included many small states such as El Salvador and the Dominican Republic in the military involvement in Iraq. How do we make sense of this discrepancy in the pugnacity of democracies? To get to the heart of Müller's explanation, we must look at the identified causes of the democratic peace and Müller's evaluation of these explanations.

### Disease

#### Pandemics can’t cause extinction.

Posner 05 (Richard A, judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh

Circuit, and senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School, Winter. “Catastrophe: the dozen most significant catastrophic risks and what we can do about them.”)/MG

Yet the fact that Homo sapiens has managed to survive every disease to assail it in the 200,000 years or so of its existence is a source of genuine comfort, at least if the focus is on extinction events. There have been enormously destructive plagues, such as the Black Death, smallpox, and now AIDS, but none has come close to destroying the entire human race. There is a biological reason. Natural selection favors germs of limited lethality; they are fitter in an evolutionary sense because their genes are more likely to be spread if the germs do not kill their hosts too quickly. The AIDS virus is an example of a lethal virus, wholly natural, that by lying dormant yet infectious in its host for years maximizes its spread. Yet there is no danger that AIDS will destroy the entire human race. The likelihood of a natural pandemic that would cause the extinction of the human race is probably even less today than in the past (except in prehistoric times, when people lived in small, scattered bands, which would have limited the spread of disease), despite wider human contacts that make it more difficult to localize an infectious disease. The reason is improvements in medical science. But the comfort is a small one. Pandemics can still impose enormous losses and resist prevention and cure: the lesson of the AIDS pandemic. And there is always a lust time.

#### No terminal impact -- diseases are too fast or too slow.

The Independent 3 (UK “Future Tense: Is Mankind Doomed?”, [http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0725-04.htm 7/25/03](http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0725-04.htm%207/25/03))/MG

Maybe - though plenty of experienced graduate students could already have a stab. But nature knows that infectious diseases are very hard to get right. Only HIV/Aids has 100 per cent mortality, and takes a long time to achieve it. By definition, lethal diseases kill their host. If they kill too quickly, they aren't passed on; if too slowly, we can detect them and isolate the infected. Any mutant smallpox or other handmade germ would certainly be too deadly or too mild. And even Sars killed fewer people worldwide than die on Britain's roads in a week. As scares go, this one is ideal - overblown and unrealistic.

#### Their impact is alarmism -- no disease can be strong enough to cause extinction.

Gladwell 99 – Writer for the New Yorker and a bestselling author (Malcolm Gladwell, The New Republic, July 17 and 24, 1995 excerpted in Epidemics: Opposing Viewpoints, 1999, p. 31-32)//MG

Every infectious agent that has ever plagued humanity has had to adapt a specific strategy but every strategy carries a corresponding cost and this makes human counterattack possible. Malaria is vicious and deadly but it relies on mosquitoes to spread from one human to the next, which means that draining swamps and putting up mosquito netting can all hut halt endemic malaria. Smallpox is extraordinarily durable remaining infectious in the environment for years, but its very durability its essential rigidity is what makes it one of the easiest microbes to create a vaccine against. AIDS is almost invariably lethal because it attacks the body at its point of great vulnerability, that is, the immune system, but the fact that it targets blood cells is what makes it so relatively uninfectious. Viruses are not superhuman. I could go on, but the point is obvious. Any microbe capable of wiping us all out would have to be everything at once: as contagious as flu, as durable as the cold, as lethal as Ebola, as stealthy as HIV and so doggedly resistant to mutation that it would stay deadly over the course of a long epidemic. But viruses are not, well, superhuman. They cannot do everything at once. It is one of the ironies of the analysis of alarmists such as Preston that they are all too willing to point out the limitations of human beings, but they neglect to point out the limitations of microscopic life forms.

### EMP Attacks

#### No EMP threat and no impact.

#### Broad, ‘11

[William J., NYT, 12-11, “Among Gingrich’s Passions, a Doomsday Vision,” http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/us/politics/gingrichs-electromagnetic-pulse-warning-has-skeptics.html?src=me&ref=us]

Newt Gingrich , the Republican presidential hopeful, wants you to know that as commander in chief he is ready to confront one of the most nightmarish of doomsday scenarios: a nuclear blast high above the United States that would instantly throw the nation into a dark age. In debates and speeches, interviews and a popular book, he is ringing alarm bells over what experts call the electromagnetic pulse, or EMP — a poorly understood phenomenon of the nuclear age. The idea is that if a nuclear weapon, lofted by a missile, were detonated in outer space high above the American heartland, it would set off a huge and crippling shockwave of electricity. Mr. Gingrich warns that it would fry electrical circuits from coast to coast, knocking out computers, electrical power and cellphones. Everything from cars to hospitals would be knocked out. “Millions would die in the first week alone,” he wrote in the foreword to a science-fiction thriller published in 2009 that describes an imaginary EMP attack on the United States. A number of scientists say they consider Mr. Gingrich’s alarms far-fetched. As Mr. Gingrich starts to surge in Republican primary states, voters are likely to get to know some of his many passions. He is an outspoken advocate for zoos. He has suggested overhauling child labor laws so that students can take jobs and learn good work habits. He also has a long interest in the space program, which Mitt Romney all but mocked at the Republican debate in Iowa on Saturday night. Challenged to say where he and Mr. Gingrich differed, Mr. Romney replied, “We could start with his idea to have a lunar colony that would mine minerals from the moon.” But it is to the risk of an EMP attack that Mr. Gingrich has repeatedly returned. And while the message may play well to hawkish audiences, who might warm to the candidate’s suggestion that the United States engage in pre-emptive military strikes against Iran and North Korea, many nuclear experts dismiss the threat. America’s current missile defense system would thwart such an attack, these experts say, and the nations in question are at the kindergarten stage of developing nuclear arms. The Missile Defense Agency, an arm of the Pentagon that maintains an arsenal of ground-based interceptors ready to fly into space and smash enemy warheads, says that defeating such an attack would be as straightforward as any other defense of the continental United States. “It doesn’t matter if the target is Chicago or 100 miles over Nebraska,” said Richard Lehner, an agency spokesman. “For the interceptor, it’s the same thing.” He called the potential damage from a nuclear electromagnetic pulse attack “pretty theoretical.” Yousaf M. Butt, a consultant with Federation of American Scientists, who last year did a lengthy analysis of EMP for The Space Review, a weekly online journal, said, “If terrorists want to do something serious, they’ll use a weapon of mass destruction — not mass disruption.” He said, “They don’t want to depend on complicated secondary effects in which the physics is not very clear.” Mr. Gingrich’s spokesman, R. C. Hammond, did not respond to e-mails asking for comment. But the candidate, a former history professor and House speaker, has defended his characterizations as accurate. At a forum in Des Moines on Saturday for military veterans, Mr. Gingrich said an electromagnetic pulse attack was one of several pressing national security threats the United States faced. “In theory, a relatively small device over Omaha would knock out about half the electricity generated in the United States,” he told the veterans. He also referred to the apocalyptic novel “One Second After,” written by a friend and co-author of his historical novels, William R. Forstchen. The book describes an electromagnetic pulse attack on America, conjuring a world in which cars, airplanes, cellphones and refrigerators all die, and gangs of barbarians spring to life. In the book’s foreword, Mr. Gingrich calls the grim scenario a potential “future history” that should be “terrifying for all of us.” He says he knows its frightening plausibility from decades of personal study. Electromagnetic pulse is a real phenomenon, though many scientists consider it yesteryear’s concern. It came to light in July 1962 when the American military detonated a hydrogen bomb high above the Pacific. In Hawaii, street lights suddenly went out. The riddle got little direct investigation because in 1963 the superpowers agreed to end all but underground detonations of nuclear arms. But theoretical studies continued, and worries rose over the decades as electronic circuits became ever more sophisticated and fragile. Mr. Gingrich is part of a conservative movement that calls EMP an underappreciated danger. In Congress, spurred by Representative Roscoe G. Bartlett, Republican of Maryland, members of the movement hold hearings and recommend new safeguards, especially for the nation’s power grid, for which protective steps could run into many billions of dollars. In 2004, Mr. Gingrich appeared at a House hearing and said that not taking the EMP threat more seriously “is like going aboard the Titanic knowing it’s going to sink and not putting on the lifeboats.” As the alarms grew, critics voiced skepticism. In 2004, Philip E. Coyle III, a former head of Pentagon arms testing, wrote that the EMP lobby seemed to “extrapolate calculations of extreme weapons effects as if they were a proven fact” and “puff up rogue nations and terrorists with the capabilities of giants.” Of late, Mr. Gingrich has emerged as the most visible worrier, often raising the electromagnetic pulse issue in speeches and public appearances. In May 2009, he addressed the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s annual policy conference. “We are on the verge of catastrophic problems,” he said of electromagnetic attack. “We have zero national strategy to respond to it today.” That is why, Mr. Gingrich added, “I favor taking out Iranian and North Korean missiles on their sites.” Critics of such pre-emptive attacks say their advocates ignore, among other things, that Iran is having trouble keeping its missile bases from blowing up and that North Korea cannot seem to get a big rocket off the ground without it tumbling out of control. To even begin to attempt to do what Mr. Gingrich fears, these rogue states would have to perfect big rockets, powerful bombs and surreptitious ways to loft them high above America, military experts say. And if they did — and there are much easier ways to deliver a nuclear bomb than by missile, these experts argue — United States defenses would spring into action.

### Failed States

#### No threat from failed states -- data and case studies prove.

#### CFR, ‘11

[Council on Foreign Relations, 5-18, “Fragile States Do Not Automatically Threaten U.S., Argues Stewart Patrick in New Book,” http://www.cfr.org/rule-of-law/fragile-states-do-not-automatically-threaten-us-argues-stewart-patrick-new-book/p25024]

Since 9/11, it has become commonplace for policymakers to claim that the gravest threats to international security come from the world's most fragile states, notes Stewart M. Patrick, director of the International Institutions and Global Governance (IIGG) program at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Challenging this claim, Patrick argues in Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security that “globally, most fragile states do not present significant security risks, except to their own people, and the most important spillovers that preoccupy U.S. national security officials are at least as likely to emanate from stronger developing countries, rather than the world's weakest countries.” Relying on global data patterns and country case studies, Patrick demonstrates the “weak links” between state fragility and five major transnational threats: terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cross-border criminal activity, energy insecurity, and infectious diseases. He finds that “the relationship between state fragility and these threats is more complicated and contingent than the conventional wisdom would suggest.” In fact, he writes, threats are just as likely to come from stronger states with political objectives at odds with U.S. interests.

#### Prefer our ev -- their authors just cherrypick anecdotal examples with no causal or empirical analysis.

#### Patrick, ‘11

[Stewart, Research Fellow at the Center for Global Development, “Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security,” Google Books]

It has become commonplace to claim that the gravest dangers to U.S. and world secu­rity are no longer military threats from rival great powers but rather cross-border threats emanating from the world’s most poorly governed, economically stagnant, and conflict-ridden countries. Public officials and the media—as well as many scholars—depict weak and failing states as generating or enabling a vast array of dangers, from transnational terrorism to weapons proliferation, organized crime, humanitarian catas­trophes, regional conflict, mass migration, pandemic disease, environmental degrada­tion, and energy insecurity. Leading thinkers like Francis Fukuyama argue, “Since the end of the Cold War, weak and failing states have arguably become the single-most important problem for international order.” Official Washington agrees. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has spoken of the “chaos that flows from failed states,” which serve as “breeding grounds, not only for the worst abuses of human beings, from mass murders to rapes to indifference toward disease and other terrible calamities, but they 1are [also] invitations to terrorists to find refuge amidst the chaos.” Likewise, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates predicts, “Over the next 20 years, the most persistent and potentially dangerous threats will come less from emerging ambitious states, than from failing ones that cannot meet the basic needs—much less the basic aspirations—of their people.” This new focus on weak and failing states represents a noteworthy shift in U.S. threat perceptions. During the 1990s, a handful of U.S. strategists began to call attention to the possible spillover consequences of weak governance in the developing world. Most U.S. policymakers, however, regarded states with sovereignty deficits almost exclusively through a humanitarian lens: such countries piqued the moral conscience but appeared to have little strategic significance. This calculus shifted following September 11, 2001, when al-Qaeda attacked the United States from Afghanistan, one of the poorest and most wretched countries in the world. The assault quickly produced a consensus in U.S. policy circles that state fragility was both an incubator and vector of multiple transnational threats. President George W. Bush captured this new view in his National Security Strategy of 2002, declaring: “America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.” In the words of Richard Haass, the State Department’s director of policy planning, “The attacks of September 11, 2001, reminded us that weak states can threaten our security as much as strong ones, by providing breeding grounds for extremism and havens for criminals, drug traffickers, and terror­ists. Such lawlessness abroad can bring devastation here at home. One of our most pressing tasks is to prevent today’s troubled countries from becoming tomorrow’s failed states.” This new threat perception quickly became conventional wisdom among government officials, journalists, and independent analysts at home and abroad. Since 9/11, this preoccupation with spillovers from weak or failed states has driven a slew of U.S. policy pronouncements and institutional innovations spanning the realms of intelligence, diplomacy, development, defense, and even trade. In 2003, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) identifi ed some fifty lawless zones around the world that might be conducive to illicit activity, and began to devote new intelligence collection assets to long-neglected parts of the world. The following year, Secretary of State Colin Powell established an Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization in the State Department, which worked with the National Intelligence Council to identify states at risk of collapse where the United States could launch conflict prevention and mitiga­tion efforts. In 2006 the National Security Strategy cited “weak and impoverished states and ungoverned areas” as a critical threat to the United States, and Condoleezza Rice, Powell’s successor, announced a new “transformational diplomacy” initiative intended to help build and sustain democratic, well-governed states that respond to the needs of their people and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system. To advance this goal, Rice announced a sweeping plan to ensure that U.S. foreign assistance was more closely aligned with U.S. foreign policy priorities. USAID devised its own Fragile States Strategy, designed to bolster countries that otherwise might breed terror, crime, instability, or disease. The Bush administration even cast its campaign for regional trade liberalization as a means to prevent state failure and its negative externalities. These trends have continued into the Obama administration, informing the Presidential Policy Directive on Development issued in September 2010 and the first-ever Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), released three months later. Hillary Clinton, Obama’s Secretary of State, has repeat­edly depicted fragile and dysfunctional states as growing threats to global security, prosperity, and justice—and endorsed increased investments in U.S. “civilian power” resources to address these challenges. Such initiatives have been mirrored across the Potomac. The Defense Department’s guiding strategy documents now emphasize military cooperation to strengthen the sovereign capacities of friendly governments in the developing world against the internal threats posed by insurgents, terrorists, and criminals. “State weakness and failure may be an increasing driver of conflict and situations that require a U.S. military response,” the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy declared in spring 2009. As the National Defense Strategy of June 2008 explains, “Ungoverned, under-governed, mis­governed, and contested areas offer fertile ground for such groups to exploit the gaps in governance capacity of local regimes to undermine local stability and regional secu­rity.” The Defense Department and its Combatant Commands—including a new Africa Command—are responding to this new mission by deploying assets to the world’s rugged remote regions, uncontrolled borders, and un-policed coastlines. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has emphasized that, “Where possible, U.S. strategy is to employ indirect approaches—primarily through building the capacity of partner governments and their security forces—to prevent festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military intervention.” The new conventional wisdom is not restricted to the United States. Other rich world governments have adopted analogous policy statements and have begun to adapt their defense, diplomatic, and development policies and instruments to help prevent state failure and respond to its aftermath—and to quarantine themselves from the presumed “spillover” effects of state weakness. The European Security Strategy iden­tifies the “alarming phenomenon” of state failure as one of the main threats to the European Union. In Great Britain, Prime Minister Tony Blair’s government pioneered a government-wide effort to help prevent failed states from generating pathologies like crime, terrorism, disease, uncontrolled migration, and energy insecurity. Blair’s suc­cessor, David Cameron, has since launched a new UK National Security Strategy that prioritizes attention and resources to “fragile, failing, and failed states” around the world. Canada, Australia, and others have issued similar policy statements. Likewise at the multilateral level, international organizations depict state failure as the Achilles’ heel of collective security. A unifying theme of UN reform proposals over the past decade has been the need for effective, sovereign states to contend with today’s global threats. As UN Secretary General Kofi Annan declared in a December 2004 speech, “Whether the threat is terror or AIDS, a threat to one is a threat to all. . . . Our defenses are only as strong as their weakest link.” In 2006, UN member states endorsed the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission to ensure that states emerging from confl ict do not collapse once again into failure. In parallel with these steps, the major donors of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have pursued a “Fragile States” initiative, in partnership with the World Bank’s Low Income Countries Under Stress (now Fragile and Conflict Affected States) program. The underlying motivation for all of these efforts, as former Congressman Lee Hamilton has noted, is that “our collective security depends on the security of the world’s most vulnerable places.” What is striking, in view of this flurry of official activity, is how little empirical analysis has been undertaken to document and explore the connection between state failure and transnational security threats. Policymakers have advanced blanket associations between these two sets of phenomena, often on the basis of anecdotes or single exam­ples (e.g., al-Qaeda operations in Afghanistan before 9/11) rather than through sober analysis of global patterns or in-depth case studies that reveal causal linkages. Such sweeping generalizations provide little analytical insight or guidance for policymakers in setting priorities, since they fail to distinguish among categories of weak and failing states or to ask whether (or why) particular developing countries are associated with specific sets of threats. This book aims to fill these gaps by analyzing the relationship between state weakness and five of the world’s most pressing transnational threats. WEAK STATES AND TRANSNATIONAL THREATS: RHETORIC AND REALITY The growing concern with weak and failing states is really based on two separate prop­ositions: first, that traditional concepts of security such as interstate violence should expand to encompass cross-border threats driven by non-state actors (such as terror­ists), activities (crime), or forces (pandemics or environmental degradation); and sec­ond, that such threats have their origins in large measure in weak governance in the developing world. Since the Reagan administration, successive versions of the U.S. National Security Strategy have incorporated non-military concerns such as terrorism, organized crime, infectious disease, energy security, and environmental degradation. Th e common thread linking these challenges is that they originate primarily in sovereign jurisdic­tions abroad but have the potential to harm U.S. citizens. This definitional expansion has stimulated lively debate. Some national security traditionalists argue that such concerns pose at best an indirect rather than existential threat to U.S. national inter­ests, and that the effort to lump diverse phenomena into a common analytical frame­work dilutes the meaning of “national security.” Proponents of a wider view of national security respond that unconventional threats contribute to violence by destabilizing states and regions and generating spillover effects. More fundamentally, they argue that the traditional “violence paradigm” for national security must adapt to accommo­date other threats to the safety, well-being, and way of life of U.S. citizens. Such threats include not only malevolent, purposive ones such as transnational terrorism—something many traditionalists now accept—but also “threats without a threatener”: malignant forces that emerge from nature, such as global pandemics, or as by-products of human activity, such as climate change. Senator Barack Obama firmly embraced this perspective in his first major foreign policy address as a presidential candidate. “Whether it’s global terrorism or pandemic disease, dramatic climate change or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the threats we face at the dawn of the 21st century can no longer be contained by borders and boundaries.” Today the conventional wisdom in official circles holds that poorly governed states are disproportionately linked to these types of transnational threats. Lacking even minimal levels of resilience, they are perceived as more vulnerable than rich nations to illicit networks of terrorists or criminals, cross-border conflict, and devastating pan­demics. Yet traditionalists are often dubious that weak and failing states—in general—endanger U.S. national security. More relevant, they contend, are a handful of pivotal weak states, such as nuclear-armed Pakistan or North Korea, whose fortunes may affect regional balances of power or prospects for large-scale destruction. It is not always easy to predict, however, where such threats may emerge. In the 1990s, few anticipated that remote, poor, and war-ravaged Afghanistan would be the launching pad for the most devastating attack on the United States in the nation’s history. The unenviable challenge for policymakers is to try to anticipate where weak gov­ernance in the developing world is likely to become strategically salient. “A failing state in a remote part of the world may not, in isolation, affect U.S. national security,” Peter Bergen and Laurie Garrett explain, “but in combination with other transna­tional forces, the process of state failure could contribute to a cascade of problems that causes significant direct harm to the United States or material damage to coun­tries (e.g., European allies) or regions (e.g., oil-producing Middle East) vital to U.S. interests.” At least four things have been missing from the discussion of failed states and trans­national threats. The first is an appreciation that state failure is not simply an either/or condition. Rather, states may fall along a broad continuum in terms of their relative institutional strength, both at the aggregate level and within individual dimensions of state function. Equally important, states’ level of function (or dysfunction) may repre­sent a variable mixture of inadequate capacity and insufficient will. The second is a sophisticated understanding of the conditions under which state weakness may increase a country’s propensity to fall victim to or enable negative “spillovers,” ranging from terrorism to infectious disease. The third is the recognition that all weak states are embedded in a larger global system that can exert both positive and pernicious eff ects on their resilience and vulnerability. The fourth is an awareness of how transnational threats, such as crime, terrorism, or disease, can further undermine the capacity and will of weak states to meet their obligations to citizens and the international community.

#### Can’t solve and most states won’t collapse, just weaken.

#### Patrick, ‘11

[Stewart, Research Fellow at the Center for Global Development, “Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security,” Google Books]

Particularly in the developing world, many states have difficulty fulfilling even the most basic responsibilities of statehood. The reasons are partly historical. Although state sovereignty has been a bedrock of international legal and political order since the mid-seventeenth century, it is a comparatively recent phenomenon in much of the post-colonial world, a belated effort to superimpose a Western model of the legal-rational state onto often unpromising political, geographical, social, and cultural foundations. Generally speaking, a state’s propensity to weakness or even failure is determined by dynamic feedback among four sets of variables: its baseline level of institutional resilience; the presence of long-term drivers (or “risk factors”) of instability; the nature of the state’s external environment (whether positive or negative); and the occurrence of short-term shocks or “triggering” events. In extreme circumstances, as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or Liberia in the recent past, some weak states may actually fail. This typically occurs when the political legitimacy of the governing regime evaporates and the state faces an existential armed threat to its survival. The vast majority of fragile states, however, fall along a continuum of performance between the extremes of effective statehood and outright failure.

### Food Prices

#### Multiple factors make supply disruptions and price volatility inevitable.

#### Forbes, ‘11

[“Highly Leveraged Agriculture Will Keep Food Prices Volatile And High,” 9-9, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2011/09/09/highly-leveraged-agriculture-will-keep-food-prices-volatile-and-high/>]

With food prices remaining stubbornly high near record levels, price swings and volatility have come to constitute a new normal in the commodities complex. While pass-through to consumers is slow, this will put renewed pressure on producers, leveraged in terms of efficiency, and will put the world’s poor at risk as small disruptions, such as bad weather, can throw off crop counts and send prices even higher. Speaking at the Bloomberg Link Inflation Conference, portfolio managers Lincoln Ellis of Linn Group and Jennifer Fan of Arrowhawk Capital, along with MIT Professor Roberto Rigobon, made the case for a new normal in the commodities complex, particularly as it relates to food and agricultural products. Global food prices surged toward the end of 2010, pushing 44 million people into poverty, according to the World Bank. Prices have remained stubbornly high through 2011, as the UN’s FAO Price Index shows. Released Thursday, the latest data show the index just shy of the all-time high mark hit back in February, 26% above its measure a year ago. (Read On The Verge Of A Global Food Crisis). As the global population continues to grow, farmers and ranchers will face heightened pressure and relentless volatility as they produce food to feed the world. Fan explained that “agriculture as it is today is in a highly leveraged state” as “we grow more food to feed more people on an increasingly shrinking acreage.” As genetically modified seeds and fertilizers allow farmers to grow an increasing number of plants per acre, concentration increases the risk of disruption. Volatility is here to stay, all three experts agree, because a simple weather event can cause substantial damage. Fan cited the case of strong rains in the port of Santos in Brazil, causing sugar shipments to be delayed and sending sugar to multi-month highs in July. The price of sugar illustrates how volatility has played out in global food markets. The FAO’s sugar index jumped from 263 to 420 from August 2010 to January 2011, up 60% in a few months. It fell to 312 by May and then jumped right back to 400 by July, down 26% then up 28% in a few months. A true roller coaster ride. Professor Rigobon furthered the point, noting volatility was a consequence of a “de-synchronization between the forces of supply and demand.” As the global economy struggles to grow, and supply shocks hit prices, demand will be highly responsive too. (Read Why World Food Prices Will Keep Climbing). Interestingly, though, price volatility isn’t really being passed on to consumers, Rigobon explained. “Pass through has been extraordinarily slow,” noted the economist, who added “while the price of coffee may shoot up to infinity, a can of coffee in your supermarket of choice costs 2 to 5 cents more.” But Rigobon accepts pass through is much quicker in developing countries, where food consumes a greater, and very substantial, portion of disposable income. “In Brazil,” he said, “the price of bread fluctuates much quicker than in the U.S.” Ellis complements Rigobon‘s argument explaining that in a two-speed world, where dynamics for advanced and developing economies differ drastically, “we are seeing huge amounts of inflation being passed on to consumers in the emerging world.” The key is wage growth. With wages in advanced economies stagnating, retailers can’t afford the luxury to play with the price of inelastic goods like food, while in regions of fast wage growth, retailers adjust prices much more readily, as opposed to digesting the hit via lower margins. (Read China As America’s Banker, America As China’s Farmer: Malthus Was Right). Along with price volatility, the global economy will have to get used to higher prices. “There are long-term structural dynamics that will continue to support prices going forward, explained Ellis, “we are at a time in the commodities complex where it won’t necessarily be the case that high prices cure high prices.” Ellis told investors they would be “well positioned by having exposure to this space,” and suggested buying seed companies and larger agro-business companies. By 2050, the world will need 70% more food, the World Bank believes. With almost 1 billion undernourished people in the world, land degradation, and climate change, fundamentals appear to be in place to support food prices for the long run. That’s bullish for producers.

### Latin America War

#### No Latin American escalation.

#### Cárdenas, ‘11

[Mauricio, senior fellow and director of the Latin America Initiative at the Brookings Institution, 3-17, “Think Again Latin America,” Foreign Policy, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/17/think_again_latin_america?page=full>]

"Latin America is violent and dangerous." Yes, but not unstable. Latin American countries have among the world's highest rates of crime, murder, and kidnapping. Pockets of abnormal levels of violence have emerged in countries such as Colombia -- and more recently, in Mexico, Central America, and some large cities such as Caracas. With 140,000 homicides in 2010, it is understandable how Latin America got this reputation. Each of the countries in Central America's "Northern Triangle" (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) had more murders in 2010 than the entire European Union combined. Violence in Latin America is strongly related to poverty and inequality. When combined with the insatiable international appetite for the illegal drugs produced in the region, it's a noxious brew. As strongly argued by a number of prominent regional leaders -- including Brazil's former president, Fernando H. Cardoso, and Colombia's former president, Cesar Gaviria -- a strategy based on demand reduction, rather than supply, is the only way to reduce crime in Latin America. Although some fear the Mexican drug violence could spill over into the southern United States, Latin America poses little to no threat to international peace or stability. The major global security concerns today are the proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism. No country in the region is in possession of nuclear weapons -- nor has expressed an interest in having them. Latin American countries, on the whole, do not have much history of engaging in cross-border wars. Despite the recent tensions on the Venezuela-Colombia border, it should be pointed out that Venezuela has never taken part in an international armed conflict. Ethnic and religious conflicts are very uncommon in Latin America. Although the region has not been immune to radical jihadist attacks -- the 1994 attack on a Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, for instance -- they have been rare. Terrorist attacks on the civilian population have been limited to a large extent to the FARC organization in Colombia, a tactic which contributed in large part to the organization's loss of popular support.

### Small Arms

#### Proliferation of small arms is inevitable.

**Schlein**, ‘**7**

[Lisa, “Study Illegal Small Arms Trade Fuelling African Conflicts,” 1-3, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2007-01/2007-01-03-voa27.cfm?CFID=107152474&CFTOKEN=57424388]

The major wars of the 20th century gave a boost to the legal arms trade.   But the end of the Cold War and the move from international to local and regional conflicts pushed trade in small arms and light weapons into a gray zone where oversight is difficult.  Today, brokers and their networks of intermediaries and sub-contractors are increasingly involved in trafficking weapons to rebel groups fighting in developing countries. Amnesty International arms expert Barry Wood explains how illicit weapons are transported into the Democratic Republic of Congo. "This is one of the planes coming into the DRC.  That registration number there is entirely fictitious and that is more or less normal," he noted. Wood, co-author of a recent study on illicit arms brokering, says it requires a lot of expertise and can involve people across many continents.  The eventual destination of the weapons is more often than not Africa. "This one is again a plane with no markings on it whatsoever, just delivering its green boxes in Entebbe not very long ago," he added.  "And just in case you think the problem is going away, this is another arms flight coming into Darfur just a few months ago."

### Prolif

#### New proliferators will build small arsenals -- they’re stable.

Seng ’98

[Jordan, PhD Candidate in Pol. Sci. – U. Chicago, Dissertation, “STRATEGY FOR PANDORA'S CHILDREN: STABLE NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AMONG MINOR STATES”, p. 203-206]

However, this "state of affairs" is not as dangerous as it might seem. The nuclear arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will be small and, consequently, the command and control organizations that manage chose arsenals will be small as well. The small arsenals of limited nuclear proliferators will mitigate against many of the dangers of the highly delegative, 'non-centralized' launch procedures Third World states are likely to use. This will happen in two main ways. First, only a small number of people need be involved in Third World command and control. The superpowers had tens of thousands of nuclear warheads and thousands of nuclear weapons personnel in a variety of deployments organized around numerous nuclear delivery platforms. A state that has, say, fifty nuclear weapons needs at most fifty launch operators and only a handful of group commanders. This has both quantitative and qualitative repercussions. Quantitatively, the very small number of people 'in the loop' greatly diminishes the statistical probability that accidents or human error will result in inappropriate nuclear launches. All else being equal, the chances of finding some guard asleep at some post increases with the number of guards and posts one has to cover. Qualitatively, small numbers makes it possible to centrally train operators, to screen and choose them with exceeding care, 7 and to keep each of them in direct contact with central authorities in times of crises. With very small control communities, there is no need for intermediary commanders. Important information and instructions can get out quickly and directly. Quality control of launch operators and operations is easier. In some part, at least, Third World states can compensate for their lack of sophisticated use-control technology with a more controlled selection of, and more extensive communication with, human operators. Secondly, and relatedly, Third World proliferators will not need to rely on cumbersome standard operating procedures to manage and launch their nuclear weapons. This is because the number of weapons will be so small, and also because the arsenals will be very simple in composition. Third World stares simply will not have that many weapons to keep track of. Third World states will not have the great variety of delivery platforms that the superpowers had (various ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, long range bombers, fighter bombers, missile submarines, nuclear armed ships, nuclear mortars, etc., etc.), or the great number and variety of basing options, and they will not employ the complicated strategies of international basing that the superpowers used. The small and simple arsenals of Third World proliferators will not require highly complex systems to coordinate nuclear activities. This creates two specific organizational advantages. One, small organizations, even if they do rely to some extent of standard operating procedures, can be flexible in times of crisis. As we have discussed, the essential problem of standard operating procedures in nuclear launch processes is that the full range if possible strategic developments cannot be predicted and specified before the fact, and thus responses to them cannot be standardized fully. An unexpected event can lead to 'mismatched' and inappropriate organizational reactions. In complex and extensive command and control organizations, standard operating procedures coordinate great numbers of people at numerous levels of command structure in a great multiplicity of places. If an unexpected event triggers operating procedures leading to what would be an inappropriate nuclear launch, it would be very difficult for central commanders to “get the word out' to everyone involved. The coordination needed to stop launch activity would be at least as complicated as the coordination needed to initiate it, and, depending on the speed of launch processes, there may be less time to accomplish it. However, the small numbers of people involved in nuclear launches and the simplicity of arsenals will make it far easier for Third World leaders to 'get the word out' and reverse launch procedures if necessary. Again, so few will be the numbers of weapons that all launch operators could be contacted directly by central leaders. The programmed triggers of standard operating procedures can be passed over in favor of unscripted, flexible responses based on a limited number of human-to-human communications and confirmations. Two, the smallness and simplicity of Third World command and control organizations will make it easier for leaders to keep track of everything that is going on at any given moment. One of the great dangers of complex organizational procedures is that once one organizational event is triggered—once an alarm is sounded and a programmed response is made—other branches of the organization are likely to be affected as well. This is what Charles Perrow refers to as interactive complexity, 8 and it has been a mainstay in organizational critiques of nuclear command and control s ystems.9 The more complex the organization is, the more likely these secondary effects are, and the less likely they are to be foreseen, noticed, and well-managed. So, for instance, an American commander that gives the order to scramble nuclear bombers over the U.S. as a defensive measure may find that he has unwittingly given the order to scramble bombers in Europe as well. A recall order to the American bombers may overlook the European theater, and nuclear misuse could result. However, when numbers of nuclear weapons can be measured in the dozens rather than the hundreds or thousands, and when deployment of those weapons does not involve multiple theaters and forward based delivery vehicles of numerous types, tight coupling is unlikely to cause unforeseen and unnoticeable organizational events. Other things being equal, it is just a lot easier to know all of what is going on. In short, while Third World states may nor have the electronic use-control devices that help ensure that peripheral commanders do nor 'get out of control,' they have other advantages that make the challenge of centralized control easier than it was for the superpowers. The small numbers of personnel and organizational simplicity of launch bureaucracies means that even if a few more people have their fingers on the button than in the case of the superpowers, there will be less of a chance that weapons will be launched without a definite, informed and unambiguous decision to press that button.

No widespread prolif.

**Alagappa, ‘8**

[Muthiah, Distinguished Senior Fellow – East-West Center, in “The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, Ed. Muthiah Alagappa , p. 521-522]  
It will be useful at this juncture to address more directly the set of instability arguments advanced by certain policy makers and scholars: the domino effect of new nuclear weapon states, the probability of preventive action against new nuclear weapon states, and the compulsion of these states to use their small arsenals early for fear of losing them in a preventive or preemptive strike by a stronger nuclear adversary. On the domino effect, India's and Pakistan's nuclear weapon programs have not fueled new programs in South Asia or beyond. Iran's quest for nuclear weapons is not a reaction to the Indian or Pakistani programs. It is grounded in that country's security concerns about the United States and Tehran's regional aspirations. The North Korean test has evoked mixed reactions in Northeast Asia. Tokyo is certainly concerned; its reaction, though, has not been to initiate its own nuclear weapon program but to reaffirm and strengthen the American extended deterrence commitment to Japan. Even if the U.S. Japan security treaty were to weaken, it is not certain that Japan would embark on a nuclear weapon program. Likewise, South Korea has sought reaffirmation of the American extended deterrence commitment, but has firmly held to its nonnuclear posture. Without dramatic change in its political, economic, and security circumstances, South Korea is highly unlikely to embark on a covert (or overt) nuclear weapon program as it did in the 1970s. South Korea could still become a nuclear weapon state by inheriting the nuclear weapons of North Korea should the Kim Jong Il regime collapse. Whether it retains or gives up that capability will hinge on the security circumstances of a unified Korea. The North Korean nuclear test has not spurred Taiwan or Mongolia to develop nuclear weapon capability. The point is that each country's decision to embark on and sustain nuclear weapon programs is contingent on its particular security and other circumstances. Though appealing, the domino theory is not predictive; often it is employed to justify policy on the basis of alarmist predictions. The loss of South Vietnam, for example, did not lead to the predicted domino effect in Southeast Asia. In fact the so-called dominos became drivers of a vibrant Southeast Asia and brought about a fundamental transformation in that subregion (Lord 1993, 1996). In the nuclear arena, the nuclear programs of China, India, and Pakistan were part of a security chain reaction, not mechanically falling dominos. However, as observed earlier the Indian, Pakistani, and North Korean nuclear tests have thus far not had the domino effect predicted by alarmist analysts and policy makers. Great caution should be exercised in accepting at face value the sensational predictions of individuals who have a vested interest in accentuating the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Such analysts are now focused on the dangers of a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran may or may not have destabilizing effects. Such claims must be assessed on the basis of an objective reading of the drivers of national and regional security in Iran and the Middle East.

### Russia-US War

**No war -- Russia won’t risk it.**

**Perkovich 03** – Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment (George Perkovich, “Bush's Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/20030304faessay10227_perkovich.html?pagewanted=3>)

As for Russia, a full-scale war between it and the United States now seems inconceivable. Given the desires for larger cuts in nuclear forces that Russia displayed in negotiating the 2002 Moscow Treaty, Russia hardly seems enough of a threat to justify the size and forward-leaning posture of America's present arsenal.

**Economic interdependence prevents conflict.**

**Simes 07 –** (Dimitri K. Simes, President of the Nixon Center and Publisher of The National Interest, "Losing War." Foreign Affairs." NOv/DEc. 2007. Lexis)

The good news is that although Russia is disillusioned with the United States and Europe, it is so far not eager to enter into an alliance against the West. The Russian people do not want to risk their new prosperity--and Russia's elites are loath to give up their Swiss bank accounts, London mansions, and Mediterranean vacations. Although Russia is seeking greater military cooperation with China, Beijing does not seem eager to start a fight with Washington either. At the moment, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization--which promotes cooperation among China, Russia, and the Central Asian states--is a debating club rather than a genuine security alliance.

#### Nuclear primacy prevents escalation.

Artyukov and Trukhachev 06 – Members of the Center for Research on Globalization (Oleg and Vadim, “US capable of wiping out Russia’s nuclear capacity in a single strike,” GlobalResearch, 3/23/06, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=2154>, MMarcus)

For the first time in the last 50 years the USA is on the verge of attaining ultimate domination with regard to nuclear weapons. This means that Russia is no longer able to keep up with the United States. If a conflict were to break out, the USA would be able to quickly and with impunity attack Russian territory, and Russia would have no means to mount a response. This is roughly the message of an article published in the latest edition of the American journal Foreign Affairs. Its authors calculated that in comparison with the USSR, the amount of strategic bombers at Russia’s disposal has fallen by 39%, intercontinental ballistic missiles by 58% and the number of submarines with ballistic missiles by 80%. “However the true scale of the collapse of the Russian arsenal is much greater than can be judged from these figures,” they write. “The strategic nuclear forces now at Russia's disposal are barely fit to be used in battle.” Russian radar is now incapable of detecting the launch of American missiles from submarines located in some regions of the Pacific Ocean. Russian anti-air defense systems might not manage to intercept B-2 stealth bombers in time, which could easily mean that they are able to inflict a strike with impunity on Russian nuclear forces. If Russian missile forces continue to decrease at the current rate, then in about 10 years only isolated missiles, which the American anti-missile defense is capable of intercepting, will be able to deliver a retaliatory blow. “It will probably soon be possible for the USA to destroy the strategic nuclear potential of Russia and China with a single strike,” says the article.

#### No war -- incentives for cooperation outweigh.

**Markedonov, ‘9**

[Sergei, Heads the Dept. of Interethnic Problems – Institute of Political and Military Analysis (Moscow), Russian Politics and Law, “The ‘Five-Dya War’ Preliminary Results and Consequences” 47:3, May-June]

Paradoxical as it may sound, the NATO bloc took much more constructive and cautious approaches (than the United States) toward Russia. Recent events have shown that we should not identify the North Atlantic alliance with the United States. All the declarations made by NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer and NATO spokesman James Appathurai were much more politically correct than the arguments prepared by representatives of the U.S. State Department. For the sake of comparison, I provide here just two examples. During a visit to Tbilisi on 16 September, the NATO secretary-general declared that it was not part of his organization’s brief “to judge Russia.” At the same time, Matthew Bryza, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state [for European and Eurasian affairs] (the desk officer in charge of the current administration’s Caucasus policy) proposed to stop cooperating with Russia regarding the Karabakh settlement through the OSCE Minsk Group until the Medvedev–Sarkozy plan was completely implemented. Meanwhile, the Russian propaganda machine, ignoring the positive messages from NATO (for instance, its position on Afghanistan), identified the position of the entire bloc (far from pro-Russian but not so unambiguous as the American approach) with the views held by U.S. leaders. In general, in August–September 2008 Russian diplomats and politicians, instead of focusing on “dividing the West,” became carried away by demonizing it, which objectively helped Mikheil Saakashvili by distracting the attention of European politicians from the aggressive ambitions of the Georgian president. In any case, the conventional “West” (personified by various countries, blocs, and structures) is not ready for a new “cold war” against Russia. Moreover, if the South Caucasus is recognized as a zone of Moscow’s “special interests” (motivated, above all, by the security problems in the Russian South), our country would reduce its anti-Westernism, which is currently in demand. Today, a new “cold war” is not possible. That is another result of “hot August.” Between the Russian Federation and the West, there are no ideological differences: Moscow was not exporting socialism to South Ossetia and Abkhazia and was not defending anybody’s dynastic interests there. Of course, there are essential differences in the interpretation of national interests, and some stereotypes and phobias of the past still persist. There are, however, much more serious challenges than these: the situation in Afghanistan and Central Asia, the problems of Iran and North Korea, energy, and international terrorism, which require joint efforts and in principle cannot be resolved without mutual participation. All this gives us hopes, albeit weak, that a search for general rules governing the world order will soon begin.

#### It won’t cause extinction.

Robinson 86 – Founder of the Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine (Arthur, with Gary North, economic historian and publisher, Fighting Chance: Ten Feet to Survival, p. 11-20, MMarcus)

An all-out nuclear war between Russia and the United States would be the worst catastrophe in history, a tragedy so huge it is difficult to comprehend. Even so, it would be far from the end of human life on earth. The dangers from nuclear weapons have been distorted and exaggerated, for varied reasons. These exaggerations have become demoralizing myths, believed by millions of Americans. While working with hundreds of Americans building expedient shelters and life-support equipment, I have found that many people at first see no sense in talking about details of survival skills. Those who hold exaggerated beliefs about the dangers from nuclear weapons must first be convinced that nuclear war would not inevitably be the end of them and everything worthwhile. Only after they have begun to question the truth of these myths do they become interested, under normal peacetime conditions, in acquiring nuclear war survival skills. Therefore, before giving detailed instructions for making and using survival equipment, we will examine the most harmful of the myths about nuclear war dangers, along with some of the grim facts. ° Myth: Fallout radiation from a nuclear war would poison the air and all parts of the environment. It would kill everyone. (This is the demoralizing message of On the Beach and many similar pseudoscientific books and articles.) ° Facts: When a nuclear weapon explodes near enough to the ground for its fireball to touch the ground, it forms a crater. (See Fig. 1.1.) Many thousands of tons of earth from the crater of a large explosion are pulverized into trillions of particles. These particles are contaminated by radioactive atoms produced by the nuclear explosion. Thousands of tons of the particles are carried up into a mushroom-shaped cloud, miles above the earth. These radioactive particles then fall out of the mushroom cloud, or out of the dispersing cloud of particles blown by the winds thus becoming fallout. Each contaminated particle continuously gives off invisible radiation, much like a tiny X-ray machine while in the mushroom cloud, while descending, and after having fallen to earth. The descending radioactive particles are carried by the winds like the sand and dust particles of a miles-thick sandstorm cloud except that they usually are blown at lower speeds and in many areas the particles are so far apart that no cloud is seen. The largest, heaviest fallout particles reach the ground first, in locations close to the explosion. Many smaller particles are carried by the winds for tens to thousands of miles before falling to earth. At any one place where fallout from a single explosion is being deposited on the ground in concentrations high enough to require the use of shelters, deposition will be completed within a few hours. The smallest fallout particles those tiny enough to be inhaled into a person's lungs are invisible to the naked eye. These tiny particles would fall so slowly from the four-mile or greater heights to which they would be injected by currently deployed Soviet warheads that most would remain airborne for weeks to years before reaching the ground. By that time their extremely wide dispersal and radioactive decay would make them much less dangerous. Only where such tiny particles are promptly brought to earth by rain- outs or snow-outs in scattered "hot spots," and later dried and blown about by the winds, would these invisible particles constitute a long-term and relatively minor post-attack danger. The air in properly designed fallout shelters, even those without air filters, is free of radioactive particles and safe to breathe except in a few' rare environments as will be explained later. Fortunately for all living things, the danger from fallout radiation lessens with time. The radioactive decay, as this lessening is called, is rapid at first, then gets slower and slower. The dose rate (the amount of radiation received per hour) decreases accordingly. Figure 1.2 illustrates the rapidity of the decay of radiation from fallout during the first two days after the nuclear explosion that produced it. R stands for roentgen, a measurement unit often used to measure exposure to gamma rays and X rays. Fallout meters called dosimeters measure the dose received by recording the number of R. Fallout meters called survey meters, or dose-rate meters, measure the dose rate by recording the number of R being received per hour at the time of measurement. Notice that it takes about seven times as long for the dose rate to decay from 1000 roentgens per hour (1000 R/hr) to 10 R/hr (48 hours) as to decay from 1000 R/hr to 100 R/hr (7 hours). (Only in high-fallout areas would the dose rate 1 hour after the explosion be as high as 1000 roentgens per hour.)

#### Even Russian countervalue attacks wouldn’t devastate the US -- dangers of nuclear war are overstated.

Robinson 86 – Founder of the Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine (Arthur, with Gary North, economic historian and publisher, Fighting Chance: Ten Feet to Survival, p. 11-20, MMarcus)

° Myth: A Russian nuclear attack on the United States would completely destroy all American cities. ° Facts: As long as Soviet leaders are rational they will continue to give first priority to knocking out our weapons and other military assets that can damage Russia and kill Russians. To explode enough nuclear weapons of any size to completely destroy American cities would be an irrational waste of warheads. The Soviets can make much better use of most of the warheads that would be required to completely destroy American cities; the majority of those warheads probably already are targeted to knock out our retaliatory missiles by being surface burst or near-surface burst on their hardened silos, located far from most cities and densely populated areas. Unfortunately, many militarily significant targets - including naval vessels in port and port facilities, bombers and fighters on the ground, air base and airport facilities that can be used by bombers, Army installations, and key defense factories - are in or close to American cities. In the event of an all-out Soviet attack, most of these '"soft" targets would be destroyed by air bursts. Air bursting (see Fig. 1.4) a given weapon subjects about twice as large an area to blast effects severe enough to destroy "soft" targets as does surface bursting (see Fig. 1.1) the same weapon. Fortunately for Americans living outside blast and fire areas, air bursts produce only very tiny particles. Most of these extremely small radioactive particles remain airborne for so long that their radioactive decay and wide dispersal before reaching the ground make them much less life- endangering than the promptly deposited larger fallout particles from surface and near-surface bursts. However, if you are a survival minded American you should prepare to survive heavy fallout wherever you are. Unpredictable winds may bring fallout from unexpected directions. Or your area may be in a "hot spot" of life-endangering fallout caused by a rain-out or snow-out of both small and tiny particles from distant explosions. Or the enemy may use surface or near-surface bursts in your part of the country to crater long runways or otherwise disrupt U.S. retaliatory actions by producing heavy local fallout. Today few if any of Russia's largest intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are armed with a 20-megaton warhead. A huge Russian ICBM, the SS-18, typically carries 10 warheads each having a yield of 500 kilotons, each programmed to hit a separate target. See "Jane's Weapon Systems. 1987-1988." However, in March 1990 CIA Director William Webster told the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee that ".... The USSR's strategic modernization program continues unabated," and that the SS-18 Mod 5 can carry 14 to 20 nuclear warheads. The warheads are generally assumed to be smaller than those of the older SS-18s. ° Myth: So much food and water will be poisoned by fallout that people will starve and die even in fallout areas where there is enough food and water. ° Facts: If the fallout particles do not become mixed with the parts of food that are eaten, no harm is done. Food and water in dust-tight containers are not contaminated by fallout radiation. Peeling fruits and vegetables removes essentially all fallout, as does removing the uppermost several inches of stored grain onto which fallout particles have fallen. Water from many sources -- such as deep wells and covered reservoirs, tanks, and containers -- would not be contaminated. Even water containing dissolved radioactive elements and compounds can be made safe for drinking by simply filtering it through earth, as described later in this book. ° Myth: Most of the unborn children and grandchildren of people who have been exposed to radiation from nuclear explosions will be genetically damaged will be malformed, delayed victims of nuclear war. ° Facts: The authoritative study by the National Academy of Sciences, A Thirty Year Study of the Survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was published in 1977. It concludes that the incidence of abnormalities is no higher among children later conceived by parents who were exposed to radiation during the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki than is the incidence of abnormalities among Japanese children born to un-exposed parents. This is not to say that there would be no genetic damage, nor that some fetuses subjected to large radiation doses would not be damaged. But the overwhelming evidence does show that the exaggerated fears of radiation damage to future generations are not supported by scientific findings. ° Myth: Overkill would result if all the U.S. and U.S.S.R, nuclear weapons were used meaning not only that the two superpowers have more than enough weapons to kill all of each other's people, but also that they have enough weapons to exterminate the human race. ° Facts: Statements that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have the power to kill the world's population several times over are based on misleading calculations. One such calculation is to multiply the deaths produced per kiloton exploded over Hiroshima or Nagasaki by an estimate of the number of kilotons in either side's arsenal. (A kiloton explosion is one that produces the same amount of energy as does 1000 tons of TNT.) The unstated assumption is that somehow the world's population could be gathered into circular crowds, each a few miles in diameter with a population density equal to downtown Hiroshima or Nagasaki, and then a small (Hiroshima-sized) weapon would be exploded over the center of each crowd. Other misleading calculations are based on exaggerations of the dangers from long-lasting radiation and other harmful effects of a nuclear war. ° Myth: Blindness and a disastrous increase of cancers would be the fate of survivors of a nuclear war, because the nuclear explosions would destroy so much of the protective ozone in the stratosphere that far too much ultraviolet light would reach the earth's surface. Even birds and insects would be blinded. People could not work outdoors in daytime for years without dark glasses, and would have to wear protective clothing to prevent incapacitating sunburn. Plants would be badly injured and food production greatly reduced. ° Facts: Large nuclear explosions do inject huge amounts of nitrogen oxides (gasses that destroy ozone) into the stratosphere. However, the percent of the stratospheric ozone destroyed by a given amount of nitrogen oxides has been greatly overestimated in almost all theoretical calculations and models. For example, the Soviet and U.S. atmospheric nuclear test explosions of large weapons in 1952-1962 were calculated by Foley and Ruderman to result in a reduction of more than 10 percent in total ozone. (See M. H. Foley and M. A. Ruderman, 'Stratospheric NO from Past Nuclear Explosions", Journal of Geophysics, Res. 78, 4441-4450.) Yet observations that they cited showed no reductions in ozone. Nor did ultraviolet increase. Other theoreticians calculated sizable reductions in total ozone, but interpreted the observational data to indicate either no reduction, or much smaller reductions than their calculated ones. A realistic simplified estimate of the increased ultraviolet light dangers to American survivors of a large nuclear war equates these hazards to moving from San Francisco to sea level at the equator, where the sea level incidence of skin cancers (seldom fatal) is highest- about 10 times higher than the incidence at San Francisco. Many additional thousands of American survivors might get skin cancer, but little or no increase in skin cancers might result if in the post-attack world deliberate sun tanning and going around hatless went out of fashion. Furthermore, almost all of today's warheads are smaller than those exploded in the large- weapons tests mentioned above; most would inject much smaller amounts of ozone-destroying gasses, or no gasses, into the stratosphere, where ozone deficiencies may persist for years. And nuclear weapons smaller than 500 kilotons result in increases (due to smog reactions) in upper tropospheric ozone. In a nuclear war, these increases would partially compensate for the upper-level tropospheric decreases-as explained by Julius S. Chang and Donald J. Wuebbles of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. ° Myth: Unsurvivable "nuclear winter" surely will follow a nuclear war. The world will be frozen if only 100 megatons (less than one percent of all nuclear weapons) are used to ignite cities. World-enveloping smoke from fires and the dust from surface bursts will prevent almost all sunlight and solar heat from reaching the earth's surface. Universal darkness for weeks! Sub-zero temperatures, even in summertime! Frozen crops, even in the jungles of South America! Worldwide famine! Whole species of animals and plants exterminated! The survival of mankind in doubt! ° Facts: Unsurvivable "nuclear winter" is a discredited theory that, since its conception in 1982, has been used to frighten additional millions into believing that trying to survive a nuclear war is a waste of effort and resources, and that only by ridding the world of almost all nuclear weapons do we have a chance of surviving. Non-propagandizing scientists recently have calculated that the climatic and other environmental effects of even an all-out nuclear war would be much less severe than the catastrophic effects repeatedly publicized by popular astronomer Carl Sagan and his fellow activist scientists, and by all the involved Soviet scientists. Conclusions reached from these recent, realistic calculations are summarized in an article, "Nuclear Winter Reappraised", featured in the 1986 summer issue of Foreign Affairs, the prestigious quarterly of the Council on Foreign Relations. The authors, Starley L. Thompson and Stephen H. Schneider, are atmospheric scientists with the National Center for Atmospheric Research. They showed " that on scientific grounds the global apocalyptic conclusions of the initial nuclear winter hypothesis can now be relegated to a vanishing low level of probability." Their models indicate that in July (when the greatest temperature reductions would result) the average temperature in the United States would be reduced for a few days from about 70 degrees Fahrenheit to approximately 50 degrees. (In contrast, under the same conditions Carl Sagan, his associates, and the Russian scientists predicted a resulting average temperature of about 10 degrees below zero Fahrenheit, lasting for many weeks!) Persons who want to learn more about possible post-attack climatic effects also should read the Fall 1986 issue of Foreign Affairs. This issue contains a long letter from Thompson and Schneider which further demolishes the theory of catastrophic "nuclear winter." Continuing studies indicate there will be even smaller reductions in temperature than those calculated by Thompson and Schneider. Soviet propagandists promptly exploited belief in unsurvivable "nuclear winter" to increase fear of nuclear weapons and war, and to demoralize their enemies. Because raging city firestorms are needed to inject huge amounts of smoke into the stratosphere and thus, according to one discredited theory, prevent almost all solar heat from reaching the ground, the Soviets changed their descriptions of how a modern city will burn if blasted by a nuclear explosion. Figure 1.6 pictures how Russian scientists and civil defense officials realistically described - before the invention of "nuclear winter" - the burning of a city hit by a nuclear weapon. Buildings in the blasted area for miles around ground zero will be reduced to scattered rubble - mostly of concrete, steel, and other nonflammable materials - that will not burn in blazing fires. Thus in the Oak Ridge National Laboratory translation (ORNL-TR-2793) of Civil Defense. Second Edition (500,000 copies), Moscow, 1970, by Egorov, Shlyakhov, and Alabin, we read: "Fires do not occur in zones of complete destruction . . . that are characterized by an overpressure exceeding 0.5 kg/cm2 [- 7 psi]., because rubble is scattered and covers the burning structures. As a result the rubble only smolders, and fires as such do not occur." Translation: [Radioactive] contamination occurs in the area of the explosion and also along the trajectory of the cloud which forms a radioactive track. Firestorms destroyed the centers of Hamburg, Dresden, and Tokyo. The old-fashioned buildings of those cities contained large amounts of flammable materials, were ignited by many thousands of small incendiaries, and burned quickly as standing structures well supplied with air. No firestorm has ever injected smoke into the stratosphere, or caused appreciable cooling below its smoke cloud. The theory that smoke from burning cities and forests and dust from nuclear explosions would cause worldwide freezing temperatures was conceived in 1982 by the German atmospheric chemist and environmentalist Paul Crutzen, and continues to be promoted by a worldwide propaganda campaign. This well funded campaign began in 1983 with televised scientific-political meetings in Cambridge and Washington featuring American and Russian scientists. A barrage of newspaper and magazine articles followed, including a scaremongering article by Carl Sagan in the October 30, 1983 issue of Parade, the Sunday tabloid read by millions. The most influential article was featured in the December 23,1983 issue of Science (the weekly magazine of the American Association for the Advancement of Science): "Nuclear winter, global consequences of multiple nuclear explosions," by five scientists, R. P. Turco, O. B. Toon, T. P. Ackerman, J. B. Pollack, and C. Sagan. Significantly, these activists listed their names to spell TTAPS, pronounced "taps," the bugle call proclaiming "lights out" or the end of a military funeral. Until 1985, non-propagandizing scientists did not begin to effectively refute the numerous errors, unrealistic assumptions, and computer modeling weakness' of the TTAPS and related "nuclear winter" hypotheses. A principal reason is that government organizations, private corporations, and most scientists generally avoid getting involved in political controversies, or making statements likely to enable antinuclear activists to accuse them of minimizing nuclear war dangers, thus undermining hopes for peace. Stephen Schneider has been called a fascist by some disarmament supporters for having written "Nuclear Winter Reappraised," according to the Rocky Mountain News of July 6, 1986. Three days later, this paper, that until recently featured accounts of unsurvivable "nuclear winter," criticized Carl Sagan and defended Thompson and Schneider in its lead editorial, "In Study of Nuclear Winter, Let Scientists Be Scientists." In a free country, truth will out - although sometimes too late to effectively counter fast-hittingpropaganda. Effective refutation of "nuclear winter" also was delayed by the prestige of politicians and of politically motivated scientists and scientific organizations endorsing the TTAPS forecast of worldwide doom. Furthermore, the weakness' in the TTAPS hypothesis could not be effectively explored until adequate Government funding was made available to cover costs of lengthy, expensive studies, including improved computer modeling of interrelated, poorly understood meteorological phenomena.

## Asia

### Afghanistan War

#### Tons of alt causes to Afghanistan stability.

#### Arbour, ‘11

[Louise, president -- International Crisis Group, 12-27, “Next Year's Wars,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/27/next\_years\_wars]

A decade of major security, development, and humanitarian assistance from the international community has failed to create a stable Afghanistan, a fact highlighted by deteriorating security and a growing insurgent presence in previously stable provinces over the past year. In 2011, the capital alone saw a barrage of suicide bombings, including the deadliest attack in the city since 2001; multiple strikes on foreign missions in Kabul, the British Council, and U.S. Embassy; and the assassination of former president and chief peace negotiator Burhanuddin Rabbani. The prospects for next year are no brighter, with many key provinces scheduled for transfer to the ill-equipped Afghan security forces by early 2012. The litany of obstacles to peace, or at least stability, in Afghanistan is by now familiar. President Hamid Karzai rules by fiat, employing a combination of patronage and executive abuse of power. State institutions and services are weak or nonexistent in much of the country, or else so riddled with corruption that Afghans want nothing to do with them. Dari-speaking ethnic minorities remain skeptical about the prospects for reconciliation with the predominately Pashtun Taliban insurgency, which enjoys the backing of Pakistan's military and intelligence services. The Taliban leadership in Quetta seem to reason that victory is within reach and that they have simply to bide their time until the planned U.S. withdrawal in 2014.

#### No terminal impact.

#### Haass, ‘9

[Richard N., President -- CFR, former Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, 11-9, “In the Afghan War, Aim for the Middle,” http://www.cfr.org/publication/20383/in\_the\_afghan\_war\_aim\_for\_the\_middle.html]

Why does Afghanistan matter? We generally hear four arguments. First, if the Taliban returns to power, Afghanistan will again be a haven for terrorist groups. Second, if the Taliban takes over, Afghanistan will again become a human rights nightmare. Third, a perceived defeat of the United States in Afghanistan would be a blow to U.S. prestige everywhere and would embolden radicals. Fourth, an Afghanistan under Taliban control would be used by extremists as a sanctuary from which to destabilize Pakistan. None of these assumptions is as strong as proponents maintain. Afghanistan certainly matters -- the question is how much. Al-Qaeda does not require Afghan real estate to constitute a regional or global threat. Terrorists gravitate to areas of least resistance; if they cannot use Afghanistan, they will use countries such as Yemen or Somalia, as in fact they already are. No doubt, the human rights situation would grow worse under Taliban rule, but helping Afghan girls get an education, no matter how laudable, is not a goal that justifies an enormous U.S. military commitment. And yes, the taking of Kabul by the Taliban would become part of the radicals' narrative, but the United States fared well in Asia after the fall of South Vietnam, and less than a decade after an ignominious withdrawal from Beirut, the United States amassed the international coalition that ousted Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. There are and always will be opportunities to demonstrate the effectiveness of U.S. power.

#### More ev -- alt causes.

Kjaernet and Torjeson 8– \*Research Fellow in the Energy Programme and the Department of Russia and Eurasia at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs and Senior Research Fellow at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (Heidi and Stina, “Afghanistan and Regional Instability: A Risk Assessment”, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, http://english.nupi.no/Publications/Books-and-reports/2008/Afghanistan-and-regional-instability-A-risk-assessment)

The regional context of Afghanistan poses a range of challenges for the country’s stabilisation process: Pakistan Pakistan’s central government has lacked control of developments in the areas bordering Afghanistan (Baluchistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and the North-West Frontier Province), making President Musharraf unable to implement the US-encouraged crackdown on Pakistani Taleban supporters. The Pakistani border areas have become a key source of weapons, equipment and new recruits for anti-government militant groups in Afghanistan, while Pakistan–Afghanistan bilateral relations remain, as so often before, strained. The Pakistani election results from February 18 2008 give grounds for cautious optimism. Nevertheless, the serious challenges stemming from Pakistan will continue in the short to medium term for Afghanistan. Iran–US tensions The standoff between Iran and the USA over Iran’s nuclear programme has introduced difficulties in Iran–Afghan relations. Iran remains an important supporter of the Western-backed Hamid Karzai government. Nevertheless, in the face of US pressure, Iran is beginning to demonstrate, according to some reports, its ability to destabilise Afghanistan and derail Washington’s Afghan campaign, as a means of enhancing its overall leverage regarding the USA.1 Geopolitical rivalries Geopolitical rivalries in the region preclude any optimal co-ordination of support to Afghanistan by neighbours and great powers. These tensions include the long-standing conflict between India and Pakistan as well as the serious Russian and Chinese unease over the US and NATO military presence in the region. Regional trade difficulties Security concerns and post-Soviet bureaucratic inertia prevent Afghanistan’s northern neighbours from fully endorsing the vision, promoted by the USA and other nations, of Afghanistan’s economic recovery being facilitated by denser integration into regional trade and communication links. Uzbekistan The government of Uzbekistan is highly authoritarian and deeply unpopular. Large-scale political and social upheaval remains one likely future scenario for the country. Upheaval in Uzbekistan would pose a serious challenge to the stability of Afghanistan’s northern and western territories, including Mazar-e-sharif and possibly Meymaneh, where Norwegian troops are stationed. The German-run ISAF base located in Termez in Uzbekistan near the Uzbekistan–Afghanistan border, and Mazar-e-sharif would be particularly vulnerable in case of upheaval in Uzbekistan. Drugs Drugs production and trafficking constitute one of Afghanistan’s central domestic challenges, but drugs trafficking can also be seen as a regional problem. The large-scale criminal activities and incomes associated with regional drug flows are undermining the states of the region: in this way Afghanistan’s neighbours – Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in particular – are becoming weaker, more criminalised, more unstable and less able to act as constructive partners for Afghanistan. Water Afghanistan’s northern neighbours have a lengthy history of water disputes. If Afghanistan in the medium or long term decides to claim its legitimate share of the region’s water resources – as it may well do in order to further its economic development – then water-sharing in the region will become even more difficult. Bilateral and multilateral relations between and among the Central Asian states have been severely strained at times, although fully fledged ‘water wars’ have remained a remote prospect.

#### regional actors will maintain instability.

BBC Monitoring South Asia, 2009, “Paper says neighbors can end Afghanistan War,” December 19 2009, lexis.

One of the issues related to the war in Afghanistan has been the role of Afghanistan's neighbours in this war and effects of their policies on war and political processes related to war in Afghanistan. It has been believed that if Afghanistan's neighbours do not support the war, it cannot last long. Taking this belief into consideration, it has been argued on many occasions that Afghanistan's neighbours especially Pakistan have not had a genuine interest in ending this war. Although Pakistan has constantly spoken about its cooperation with the government of Afghanistan and the international community for peace and stability in Afghanistan, Pakistani claims have not been believed. US Commander in the Middle East and Central Asia, General David Petraeus, recently asked Pakistan to put pressure on Taleban on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. This demonstrates that the international community is not convinced that Pakistan has changed its policy on extremist groups in the region. Although Pakistan is at war with local Taleban in that country, it has a different policy on Afghan Taleban and does not want pressure on this group. Another country that can play an important role in the war in Afghanistan is Russia. NATO secretary general recently asked [Dmitry] Medvedev Wednesday last week to play a bigger role in supporting NATO troops in Afghanistan by dedicating more helicopters to these forces. It was reported some time ago that NATO forces have shown interest in using Russian made helicopters in their war in Afghanistan. Reports explained that NATO forces want to use Russian helicopters in Afghanistan because they are more suitable to Afghan terrain and climate and can be more effective in peace operations. Meanwhile, there are reports that Taleban are receiving Iranian weapons. According to Commander of US forces in Middle East and Central Asia, General David Petraeus, that these weapons are supplied to Taleban mainly in Western border areas between Afghanistan and Iran. Previously, such reports were unofficially discussed and even the Taleban were quoted as confirming these reports about their access to Iranian weapons. The Iranian government, however, has repeatedly rejected these reports and claims. Taking the negative relations between Iran and the United States into consideration, a number of political analysts believe that American military presence in Afghanistan has raised serious concerns for Iran. Therefore, Iran will do favours to the Taleban. These reports demonstrate that the negative role of Afghanistan's neighbours in the war in Afghanistan and their lack of support political process for peace and development in Afghanistan have resulted in the failure to achieve the desired results in this country despite spending heavy sums of money and investing human capital in Afghanistan for eight years. Efforts should therefore be made to ensure that these countries change their policies on Afghanistan and play a positive role in the political processes initiated by the government in this country. Experts believe that this can be possible only when Afghanistan's government is able to establish close relations with countries neighbouring Afghanistan and close to Afghanistan and if Afghanistan can convince them that a strong central government in Afghanistan will not pose any problems to those countries.

### Central Asia War

#### Cooperative frameworks prevent conflict breakout.

Maksutov 06 (Ruslan, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Central Asian Perspective”, August, http://www.sipri.org/contents/worldsec/Ruslan.SCO.pdf/download)

As a starting point, it is fair to say that all Central Asian countries—as well as China and Russia—are interested in security cooperation within a multilateral framework, such as the SCO provides. For Central Asia this issue ranks in importance with that of economic development, given the explosive environment created locally by a mixture of external and internal threats. Central Asia is encircled by four of the world’s eight known nuclear weapon states (China, India, Russia and Pakistan), of which Pakistan has a poor nuclear non-proliferation profile and Afghanistan is a haven for terrorism and extremism. Socio-economic degradation in Central Asian states adds to the reasons for concern and makes obvious the interdependence between progress in security and in development. Some scholars argue that currently concealed tendencies evolving in various states of Central Asia—such as the wide-ranging social discontent with oppressive regimes in the region, and the growing risks of state collapse and economic decline—all conducive to the quick growth of radical religious movements, could have far-reaching implications for regional stability once they come more into the light.41 At first sight, the instruments established by the SCO to fulfill its declared security building objectives seem to match the needs that Central Asian states have defined against this background. While the existence of the SCO further reduces the already remote threat of conventional interstate war in the region,42 it allows for a major and direct focus on the non-state, non-traditional and transnational threats that now loom so large by comparison.

#### Great powers will cooperate instead of fight.

**Collins and Wohlforth 04** - \*professor of political science at Notre Dame AND \*\*professor of government at Dartmouth (Kathleen and William, “Defying ‘Great Game’ Expectations, Strategic Asia 2003-2004, <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/15-Central%20Asia-press.pdf>)

While cautious realism must remain the watchword concerning an impoverished and potentially unstable region comprised of fragile and authoritarian states, our analysis yields at least conditional and relative optimism. Given the confluence of their chief strategic interests, the major powers are in a better position to serve as a stabilizing force than analogies to the Great Game or the Cold War would suggest. It is important to stress that the region’s response to the profoundly destabilizing shock of coordinated terror attacks was increased cooperation between local governments and China and Russia, and—multipolar rhetoric notwithstanding—between both of them and the United States. If this trend is nurtured and if the initial signals about potential SCO-CSTO-NATO cooperation are pursued, another destabilizing shock might generate more rather than less cooperation among the major powers. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan are clearly on a trajectory that portends longer-term cooperation with each of the great powers. As military and economic security interests become more entwined, there are sound reasons to conclude that “great game” politics will not shape Central Asia’s future in the same competitive and destabilizing way as they have controlled its past. To the contrary, mutual interests in Central Asia may reinforce the broader positive developments in the great powers’ relations that have taken place since September 11, as well as reinforce regional and domestic stability in Central Asia.

#### Tons of conflict mitigating factors in Central Asia -- no escalation.

#### Clais, ‘10

[Jonas, United States Institute of Peace, “Preventing Conflict in the “Stans”,” 4-23, <http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB%2021%20Preventing%20Conflict%20in%20the%20Stans.pdf>]

Despite this litany of conflict drivers, Central Asia has remained relatively peaceful for the past 20 years, apart from the 1992 Tajik civil war. Unlike most regions at low risk of conflict, Central Asia cannot rely on its institutional capacity to pave the road to self-sustainable peace. Although very effective in the short term, some of the factors mitigating conflict are unsustainable sources of stability. The Soviet legacy, characterized by extreme deprivation and violent suppression, nonetheless operates as a conflict-managing factor in Central Asia. Quantitative studies established a quasi-consensus among scholars on the negative effect of both extreme democracy and extreme autocracy on the risk of civil war, anocracies being most conflict-prone. 6 The brutal Soviet practices hardened and intimidated the population, discouraging popular uprisings. Current law enforcement tools used in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are often Soviet-inherited and serve as effective yet inhumane conflict management instruments. A recent report by the United Nations Human Rights Committee condemned the human rights situation in Uzbekistan, stressing the excessive use of torture. The Kyrgyz security forces, on the other hand, are rather ineffective, providing a safe-haven to militant groups based in the region. In Tajikistan, the civil conflict bred war fatigue, reducing the odds that an opportunistic leader will be able to mobilize Tajiks to violently undermine their government. Though they cannot assure stability in the long term, some of the region’s financial and socioeconomic lifelines also mitigate conflict in the short term. International, regional, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as individual countries, provide vital assistance to Central Asia’s development. Unfortunately, a significant proportion of the aid is lost to corruption before it reaches its targets. Chinese and Russian capital injections offer some breathing space, as well as crucial investments in economic infrastructure. Yet, as indicated earlier, these benefactors may demand political concessions in return. Migrant remittances also serve as an important source of revenue for the region, especially in Tajikistan, where remittances make up almost half of the country’s gross domestic product—by far the highest number worldwide.

7

#### Central Asian conflict won’t escalate -- powers have incentives to cooperate because of its strategic necessity.

#### Oliker, ‘3

[Olga, Senior International Policy Analyst at the RAND Corporation, “CONFLICT IN CENTRAL ASIA AND SOUTH CAUCASUS: IMPLICATIONS OF FOREIGN INTERESTS AND INVOLVEMENT,” http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1598/MR1598.ch7.pdf]

It is therefore highly likely that coming years will see continued competition among outside powers over the region and its resources and allegiances. This does not necessarily mean, however, that great power conflict will result. In fact, as the exploration of the interests and motivations of various actors undertaken in this chapter will show, competition is moderated by the many shared interests of the outside powers in question. But strategic and economic interests will also cause foreign states to be increasingly active in the region diplomatically, economically, and militarily. This means that if other factors spur conflict in the region, as analysis elsewhere in this report suggests is likely, there is significant potential for outside powers to get involved—even if their interests are not themselves the reason that conflict emerges. Because there is room for many states to gain from the region’s potential and because regional stability is a shared goal as well, there will be high in centives to cooperate as well as compete. Strategic reasons to maintain good ties among interested third parties will also temper the likelihood of conflict. But because there is also little doubt that some will gain more than others, it is likely that competition will remain a significant factor—and may at times be fierce. Moreover, the existence of incentives for cooperation among outside powers does not imply that third parties cannot be potential sources of regional conflict in other ways, or that one or more of them will not get involved in conflict if it occurs for other reasons.

### East Asia War

#### No Asia war -- multilateral organizations check.

Bitzinger and Desker 08 – (senior fellow and dean of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies respectively (Richard A. Bitzinger, Barry Desker, “Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival, December 2008, http://pdfserve.informaworld.com-/678328\_731200556\_906256449.pdf)

The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnationa terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely.

**No escalation -- states won’t risk it.**

Berry 01 – (Dr. Nicholas, Senior Analyst – CDI, “The Security Environment in Asia”, Defense Monitor – Center for Defense Information, 4, May, http://www.cdi.org/dm/2001/issue4/asiansecurity.html)

The Asian security environment is not organized for major war. An aggressive China could transform the security environment into one more conducive to major war. Only an aggressive China could end Japanese pacifism. The challenge for the United States is to keep China from becoming aggressive, a foreign policy posture that China itself wants desperately to avoid. The United States must constrain Taiwan's policy towards the mainland and not allow Taiwan to manage Washington's policy towards Beijing. The challenge for China is to keep the United States from forcing China to be aggressive over Taiwan. Multilateral cooperation is required to contain and eventually resolve the myriad bilateral disputes in Asia that could explode out of control. Taking each in turn: 1. The Asian security environment is not organized for war. So far, widespread latent hostilities, absent a serious regional aggressor, have prevented the region's multipolar structure from becoming bipolar and thus organized for war. Security relations in Asia are fragmented. In particular, China lacks allies. If Japan is the most resented, China is the most feared as the power on the rise and infused with enthusiastic nationalism. Erstwhile imperialist powers, Japan and Russia, are constrained by history. All states are economically interdependent, harbor anti-war sentiments, and have major domestic problems, including maintaining government legitimacy. War is not a rational foreign policy option for anyone. The strongest power in Asia, the United States, is determined to prevent war in the region, but if one occurs, the United States has the capability to determine the outcome to its advantage (albeit at great cost). Under the Powell Doctrine, there will be no more Koreas or Vietnams. Any Asian aggressor will suffer huge losses and defeat. No state will willingly confront the United States militarily. The United States has the capacity to be the inhibitor of war.

**Conflict won’t break out -- social/political development and economic integration.**

**White 08 –** Australian National University strategic studies professor (Hugh, “Why War in Asia Remains Thinkable”, 2010, Survival, vol. 50 no. 6, Ebsco)

Meanwhile, most countriesin the region have enjoyed remarkable social and political development, as authoritarian regimes (with a few exceptions) from Indonesia to South Korea have more or less peacefully given way to democratic change. Most notably, economies throughout East Asia have grown spectacularly, culminating in the remarkable transformation of China into a global economic power. Asia’s economies have become deeply integrated, with an accelerating flow of goods, services, investment and people from one country to another. Finally, political convergence and economic integration have fostered the evolution of regional institutions such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN+3 (Japan, China and South Korea) and the East Asia Summit (EAS), which, if still rather modest by European standards, nonetheless offer at least a start towards building institutions that could manage regional affairs in the decades ahead. In this Asia, ‘war’ in the traditional sense is indeed hard to imagine.

**Empirics prove no escalation.**

**White 08 –** Australian National University strategic studies professor (Hugh, “Why War in Asia Remains Thinkable”, 2010, Survival, vol. 50 no. 6, Ebsco)

If we conceive of ‘wars’ the way our parents and grandparents did – as major conflicts among powerful states that disrupt the lives of billions and transform the international order – then war in Asia today seems close to unthinkable. For over 30 years, East Asia has enjoyed peace such as it has probably never known before. In Northeast Asia, the region’s major powers – China, Japan and the United States – have maintained harmonious and cooperative relationships. Moreover, excluding only minor incidents in the Spratly Islands, none of East Asia’s major powers has used significant force against another Asian country since China’s limited war against Vietnam in 1979. For 40 years, the members of ASEAN have largely forsworn the use of force against one another; difficult issues like Taiwan, North Korea and the Spratlys have been effectively managed, and the deep problems of Indochina have been addressed. Minor clashes remain possible in trouble spots such as the Thailand–Myanmar border, and on Asia’s western margin there remains a real risk of major, even nuclear, war between India and Pakistan. But even the risk of an India–Pakistan war does not seem to threaten an outbreak of major war in East Asia.

**ASEAN solves stability.**

Noi 07 – (Goh Sui Noi, @ Straits Times, 8-23-07 [Asean 'holds key to building stable East Asian region'; S'pore official says grouping plays vital role by providing neutral platform, lexis]

GOVERNMENTS in the East Asian region have realised that it is in their nations' interests to build a community to preserve stability for growth, a senior Singapore official has said. And building such a community depends on Asean's ability to integrate deeper and faster, said Mr Bilahari Kausikan, Second Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. In addition, a grouping of the region's think-tanks, which held a conference in Singapore, yesterday called for greater cultural exchanges to promote community-building. 'An East Asian community will...depend on Asean's ability to integrate deeper and faster and create a community of its own,' Mr Kausikan said on Tuesday. He explained that the complexity and sensitivity of relationships among major powers meant that Asean played an essential role in providing a relatively neutral platform for an East Asian architecture. 'This is the real meaning of the oft-repeated refrain 'Asean in the driver's seat',' he said. He added that this was the broader significance of the Asean Charter, which will be discussed at the next summit of the 10-nation grouping to be held in Singapore in November. The charter, which will give a legal basis to the grouping, is expected to deepen integration within Asean.

### South Asia War

#### South Asia war doesn’t escalate.

**Tellis, ‘1**

[Ashley J., Senior policy analyst -- RAND, Professor of policy analysis -- RAND Graduate School, former senior adviser to the ambassador at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, served on the National Security Council staff as special assistant to the President and senior director for Strategic Planning and Southwest Asia, “India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal,”]

Averting defeat or accelerating victory in a conventional war. The effects of each of these contingencies would be different in the case of Pakistan and China thanks to differences in their relative capabilities vis-à-vis India, and hence they must be considered separately in the of how they could threaten the denuclearized India that ould be assumed to exist under Alternative I. As far as Pakistan is concerned, it is unlikely that the first form of threat – the use of nuclear weapons to either avert defeat or accelerate victory in the context of a conventional war of unlimited aims – would acquire any real significance because of the generally low probability that such premeditated conflicts will arise in South Asia today. Indeed, since 1971 the declining utility of unlimited-aims war in the region has slowly become a strategic fact of life that has been widely acknowledged both by the US government and by the strategic elites in South Asia, if not by some western commentators. The logic underlying this phenomenon has already been articulated elsewhere 22 and hence will not be repeated here except for two summary statements bearing on the issue: First, rapidly diminishing political incentives in both India and Pakistan interact with conditions of high defense dominance on both sides to make premeditated wars of unlimited aims only a remote possibility. Second, fears about operational ineffectiveness on both sides coupled with concerns about the inability to enforce war termination at the desired moment interacts to minimize the probability though not all premeditated conflicts of limited aims.23 The localized conflict at Kargil in 1999 remains an apt example of the kind of limited-aims war that could still occur under conditions of “ugly stability”24 in South Asia. Unlike most limited aims wars, which are aimed at securing finite portions of intrinsically valuable territory, Pakistan’s military operations at Kargil may well have focused at least as much on precipitating international intervention in support of its claims over Kashmir as they did on securing marginal pieces of Indian territory. If this was in fact the case, the Kargil crisis could well be viewed as good example of nuclear shadowed brinkmanship aimed at securing foreign intervention in an ongoing dispute rather than a purely limited-aims war as it is traditionally understood in the literature. 25 This peculiar kind of conflict, which might be termed “catalytic war” in that it is deliberately initiated with the intent on involving third parties to enter the fray in order to force the resolution of an ongoing political dispute could recur in the future if the power transitions currently under way within the Indian subcontinent continue to gather force. Under such conditions, Pakistani desperation coupled with factors such as decreasing state capacity, the rise of risk-acceptant national leadership, and the prospect of serious international attention could combine to create conditions in which premeditated catalytic conflicts might actually become an attractive option.26

### India-China War

#### No India-China war -- interdependence guarantees cooperation.

Das, 9 - Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi Delhi University St. Xavier's School, Delhi (Saurabh, “China Not A Threat to India” 8-24-2009 http://theviewspaper.net/china-not-a-threat-to-india/)//AH

China is a major economic and military power in Asia as well as in the world. China’s vested interest in Taiwan and in the South China Sea is known to the entire world. China almost started the process of knocking Taiwan out but fortunately because of 2008 Olympics it had to abort the bid. China’s clash with Vietnam is also known to the world and so its resolve to own Spartley islands, politically or forcibly. China is already busy in Xinjiang region trying to calm the Uighur separatist movement and trying its best to hold Tibet. The military intervention in Taiwan is a possibility in any day now and war of words with Vietnam has already started. So China is too busy in other matters which are, for that country, are much more important than engaging India. Secondly, India’s relation with China is improving and the fruit of it is the recognition of Sikkim as an integral part of India, which China was reluctant to accept in the past. The joint military exercise with India which was held last year shows that the Chinese mindset that it doesn’t consider India as its enemy. Thirdly, India is a big market for Chinese goods and India contributes a significant share in China’s economy. Both India and China complement each other economically as China is a major hardware producer while India produces software which are complementary to each other. Both China and India are global powers and do have considerable influence in Asia. So even if China plans to attack India it has to think about the considerable economic price it has to pay at the cost of its national interest. Fourthly, India is now a global player and if China attacked India, it has to face the wrath of all developing as well as developed nations. China is already facing criticism about the Tibet issue. Tiananmen Square has already brought in lots of negative publicity and the nature of the Chinese government’s secrecy and closeness is under discussion. So by attacking India, China will be in trouble and India is equally prepared and India will not submit like 1962. Indian Army is the third largest army in the world and is respected worldwide in terms of its operation capabilities. Indian Air Force pilots are some of the best pilots and India does have a Navy which can do considerable damage to any country in Asia. Moreover India is now capable of hitting Beijing and Shanghai with nuclear bombs which is enough to deter China from attacking India. India and China both share the dream of being super powers in the near future and both know that in the coming years the hegemony of US led power will decline which will create a free space that both India and China will fill. India and China both are aware of each other’s ambitions and aspirations and will never try to be a hindrance to each other. Both China and India need each other for their survival and prosperity. In the age of globalization and mutual economic cooperation, we need not be unnecessarily worried about much hyped military intention of China. India a vibrant democracy with more than 100 crores of people need not be cowed down in fear from its northern neighbour.

#### Policymakers in both countries will be rational -- no escalation.

Kumar, 11 – researcher @ Azim Premji University (Vikas, “Is a Sino-Indian war really possible?” April 7th, 2011, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/04/07/is-a-sino-indian-war-really-possible/)//AH

Both the Chinese and Indian media suffer from hysteria over an impending Sino-Indian War and occasionally indulge in competitive jingoism. The hysteria usually begins with some obscure news item or opinion piece published in one country regarding the offensive preparations from the other side of the Himalayas and quickly escalates to a ‘we-will-give-a-fitting-reply’ kind of exchange. The ‘naïve jingoist’ argument goes like this: we are aware of the other country’s irrationality and weaknesses while it is unaware of our rationality and strengths or has been misled by the West, which is why it is courting trouble by provoking us. Fortunately, the hysteria exhausts itself or is abated by pragmatic interventions by politicians and government officials who argue that another war between the two countries is impossible. Pragmatists argue that both countries prioritize economic goals and know that it will be impossible to emerge as a clear winner from the next war. Consider, for instance, Subramanian Swamy’s argument. Swamy, a former union minister, has engaged with the Chinese leadership, including the late Deng Xiaoping, in various capacities. He tried to deflate the overblown concerns of an imminent Chinese attack by arguing, among other things, that the Chinese leadership is ‘rational’ and that it knows that ‘India nationally consolidates when attacked from abroad’, ‘with Tibet and Sinkiang simmering, attacking India is not a one-way street’, and ‘the terrain on our side of the border provides a much shorter and friendlier supply chain.’ Swamy’s argument is representative of a class of pragmatic arguments: governments in both countries are rational; each country has its own strengths and weaknesses; disparity between their strengths is limited because the weaknesses can be easily exploited; and both sides know that the other is well-informed of these facts. The contrast between the pragmatic and naïve arguments could not be greater, even though both presume that India and China are natural competitors and war is a sub-optimal way of resolving conflict.

#### Won’t go nuclear.

**SAAG 2/10 –** SAAG is the South Asia Analysis Group, a non-profit, non-commercial think tank, the objective of SAAG is to advance strategic analysis and contribute to the expansion of knowledge of Indian and International security and promote public understanding ("An India-China Military Conflict? – Analysis," 2/10/12, [www.eurasiareview.com/10022012-an-india-china-military-conflict-analysis/](http://www.eurasiareview.com/10022012-an-india-china-military-conflict-analysis/)?)

Today, the scenario is different. The PLA is not prepared to fight a revolutionary war where giving up one’s life for the communist party was a matter of pride. It has not fought a battle for more than 30 years. Even the PLA’s fight against terrorism against small bands of Uighur separatists in Xinjiang does not show any special expertise. At the same time there is the PLA’s significant advancement in the areas of armaments, information supported warfare, and tri-services coordination. India’s military planners have been assessing these developments. A nuclear warfare in a limited confrontation is not in the calculations of military planning. That is a separate aspect. Despite China’s naval projection in the Indian Ocean and offer from Seychelles to open a naval base (obviously as a repayment to Chinese aid), an India-China confrontation on the high seas is a distant speculation. This, unless China perceives India’s Look East policy is conflicting seriously with China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea.

#### Recent summits prove cooperation -- they’re expanding ties in multiple areas.

ICEC, 12 - India China Economic and Cultural Council (“2012 declared as the year of India-China friendship and cooperation”2012, http://www.icec-council.org/news/2012-declared-year-india-china-friendship-and-cooperation)//AH

Strengthening India-China bilateral ties, leaders of both nations President Hu Jinatao and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh came together to declare 2012 as the year of India-China friendship and cooperation. Agreeing that bilateral relations were witnessing a ’very sound momentum’, both leaders also unveiled initiatives to boost cultural exchanges and overall contacts. As the two largest developing nations and two major Asian powers, China and India face important development opportunities and China-India relations have great potential for further development, said Hu. He added that China is willing to see a peaceful, developed and prosperous India, and is committed to building a more rigorous China-India relationship. He proposed that the two sides enhance dialogue and coordination on regional issues to safeguard peace and stability and promote common development in the region. Singh said India-China relations are one of the most important bilateral relationships in the 21st century. The two countries can learn from each other and work together for development as both countries are seeking fast development. He also expressed the hope to work with China to maintain peace and security on the borders and properly resolve border issues through friendly talks. Recent, high level exchanges between the two neighbours have been further fortified by maintaining a friendly and open dialogue between the sweet and sour countries. During the talks, both nations also agreed to open their markets further to each other in order to promote regional trade and development. While China-India bilateral trade is on course to hit US$100 billion to 2015, India’s trade deficit with China continues to yawn. In lieu of the paltry present global economic scene, the two nations also agreed that it would be prudent to boost bilateral trade to keep their GDP’s from falling sharply. Analysts have predicted that both India and China will see a drop in GDP numbers next year. The neighbors identified a five point agenda for bettering bilateral relations First, the two countries should maintain high-level contacts and increase political mutual trust. The two countries should also expand exchanges between their governments, legislatures, political parties and the military, strengthen strategic communication through various consultation mechanisms and carry out dialogues on new topics such as maritime cooperation. Second, the two sides should deepen practical cooperation and expand mutual benefits. The two countries should enhance economic policy coordination and cooperate in the fields of infrastructure, information technology, mutual investment and environmental protection. Third, China and India should expand cultural and people-to-people exchanges so as to promote mutual understanding. Fourth, the two countries should properly handle their differences and work for peace and stability. They urged to push forward border talks in the spirit of peace, friendship, equality, mutual respect and mutual understanding so as to jointly safeguard peace and security on the borders. Finally, the two countries should strengthen communication and coordination to expand cooperation in international affairs. China and India should enhance coordination and cooperation within the frameworks of the United Nations, the Group of 20 and BRICS, among others, and work together to address major global challenges such as climate change, energy and food security.

#### China won’t respond to provocations -- empirical proof.

Zhang, 12 – CNN (Chi-Chi Zhang, “China says India is a 'partner, not rival' after missile launch” Global Times, 4-20-12, http://articles.cnn.com/2012-04-20/asia/world\_asia\_china-react-india-missle\_1\_china-and-india-missile-global-times?\_s=PM:ASIA)//AH

China downplayed India's successful missile launch this week, saying that the two sides are not rivals but cooperating partners. "China and India are both emerging countries, we are not rivals but cooperation partners," said Liu Weimin, China's foreign ministry spokesman, on Thursday. "We believe the two countries should cherish the hard-won momentum of sound bilateral relations, promote bilateral friendship and cooperation and make active contributions to regional peace and stability." India's government touted the successful Thursday launch of the Agni V missile -- with a range of 5,000 kilometers (3,100 miles) capable of hitting cities as far as Shanghai -- as a milestone for the country. "This launch has given a message to the entire world that India has the capability to design, develop, build and manufacture missiles of this class, and we are today a missile power," VK Saraswat, chief of the Defence Research and Development Organisation, told India's Economic Times. The Agni V missile is a 17.5-meter-tall (75-feet), three-stage missile designed to carry a 1.5-ton nuclear warhead and is expected to be ready for use by the armed forces in 2014 following a series of tests, the report said. India's major media outlets touted the launch as India's entry into an elite club of countries, including the United States and Russia. But China's state-backed Global Times newspaper reported in an editorial that, "India shouldn't overestimate its strength." "India should be clear that China's nuclear power is stronger and more reliable," the editorial said. "For the foreseeable future, India would stand no chance in an overall arms race with China." While China has not perceived India as a threat, experts say India has boosted military spending in recent years in part due to China's increasing dominance in the Indian Ocean. The two sides fought a war in 1962 over border issues. "This launch is a part of India's development and modernization," said Ye Hailin, an international relations expert at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. "Some reports of the perceived threats have been exaggerated and I think we should take a step back from this rather than jump to conclusions."

### India-Pakistan War

#### National interests prevent provocations or escalation on both sides.

Cetron 04 – President of forecasting international (Marvin, “The Dragon and The Tiger

Prospects for China and India in the 21st Century,” World Future, 8/1/04, <http://www.wfs.org/confprcetron.htm>, MMarcus)

India and Pakistan both have compelling reasons to settle their dispute over Kashmir. After a Pakistani suicide bomber attacked India’s Parliament in 2001, several Fortune 500 companies quietly told the Vajpayee government that a war would compel them to move their Indian operations back to the U.S. The situation soon calmed, as India recognized that war with Pakistan would never be worth what it cost. Pakistan, in turn, has discovered a strong interest in remaining on good terms with the United States, a goal that excludes any possible attack on India. Probably within five years, and in no more than ten, India and Pakistan will finally accept the current Line of Control as a permanent border. Neither side will be entirely happy with this outcome. Both will consider it better than any possible alternative.

#### Deterrence prevents Indo-Pak war.

Ojha 99 – Journalist (Vivekanand, “No Alternative to Deterrence,” The Pioneer, 8/12/99, <http://www.media-watch.org/articles/0899/76.html>, MMarcus)

Now, for the Indian decision to conduct nuclear tests. Pakistan, with covert Chinese help, was in the process of acquiring nuclear capability. The only objective of Pakistan in developing nuclear weapons was to offset the Indian superiority in conventional warfare, so that it could use nuclear threats to prevent a full-scale Indian offensive against itself in case of conflict. The Indian tests, and the resulting deterrent capability, restrains Pakistan from using nuclear threats as it now knows that India will respond in kind. Thus, far from achieving parity for Pakistan, as alleged by some columnists, the nuclear tests have cemented India’s superiority in conventional warfare, by pre-empting Pakistan’s quest for advantage in nuclear warfare. But will deterrence work? Or will it lead to annihilation of mankind? Nuclear deterrence works successfully as it has done for the last 50 years after the erstwhile USSR acquired nuclear capability. Those like CP Bhambhri and Arundhati Roy have regularly ridiculed nuclear deterrence on the ground that it doesn’t guarantee peace. They are correct. It doesn’t. But nothing else does. What nuclear deterrence does achieve is to severely minimise the chances of any country using a nuclear weapon against you, under the knowledge that retaliation will be full and forthcoming. Some analysts contend that nuclear deterrence should also be successful in preventing conventional conflicts. They cite the Kargil conflict as a failure of the deterrence theory. This is not true. Nuclear weapons may not act as a deterrent to traditional warfare. It is to be noted that during the Cold War, the US and the erstwhile USSR were involved in a number of indirect conflicts, as in Afghanistan. The restraint that has been observed by all nuclear weapon states even during times of conflict is a feather in the cap of the nuclear deterrence doctrine. Moreover, with all its limitations, nuclear deterrence is the best way, short of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, to prevent possible nuclear attacks on a country.

Doesn’t cause extinction.

Bostrom 02 – Professor of philosophy at Oxford (Nick, “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards Volume 9 Number 1,” 2002, <http://www.nickbostrom.com/existential/risks.html>, MMarcus)

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.4 Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

### Korea War

#### 60 years of stability on the Korean peninsula prove war won’t happen -- deterrence checks it.

#### Kang, ‘10

[David, professor of international relations and business and director of the Korean Studies Institute at the University of Southern California, “Korea’s New Cold War,” 12-31, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/koreas-new-cold-war-4653]

However, despite dueling artillery barrages and the sinking of a warship, pledges of “enormous retaliation,” in-your-face joint military exercises and urgent calls for talks, the risk of all-out war on the Korean peninsula is less than it has been at anytime in the past four decades. North Korea didn’t blink, because it had no intention of actually starting a major war. Rather than signifying a new round of escalating tension between North and South Korea, the events of the past year point to something else—a new cold war between the two sides. In fact, one of my pet peeves is the analogies we use to describe the situation between South and North Korea. We often call the situation a “powder keg” or a “tinderbox,” implying a very unstable situation in which one small spark could lead to a huge explosion. But the evidence actually leads to the opposite conclusion: we have gone sixty years without a major war, despite numerous “sparks” such as the skirmishing and shows of force that occurred over the past month. If one believes the situation is a tinderbox, the only explanation for six decades without a major war is that we have been extraordinarily lucky. I prefer the opposite explanation: deterrence is quite stable because both sides know the costs of a major war, and both sides—rhetoric and muscle-flexing aside—keep smaller incidents in their proper perspective. How can this be, when North Korea threatens to use massive retaliation and mentions its nuclear weapons in its rhetoric, and when the South Korean leadership and military is determined to "respond relentlessly" to meet any North Korean provocation? Local skirmishing has stayed local for sixty years. The key issue is whether a local fight could escalate into all-out war, such as North Korea shelling Seoul with artillery or missiles. Such a decision would clearly have to be taken at the top of the North Korean leadership. Especially when tensions are high, both militaries are on high alert and local commanders particularly careful with their actions. Without a clear directive from the top, it is not likely that a commander one hundred kilometers away from the military exercises would make a decision on his own to start shooting at Seoul. For their part, North Korean leaders have not made such a decision in sixty years, knowing that any major attack on Seoul would cause a massive response from the South Korean and U.S. forces and would carry the war into Pyongyang and beyond. After the fighting, North Korea would cease to exist. Thus, while both North and South Korean leaders talk in grim tones about war, both sides have kept the actual fighting to localized areas, and I have seen no indication that this time the North Korean leadership plans to expand the fighting into a general war.

### Paki Instability

#### Crackdowns prevent serious instability.

Bandow 09– Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Doug, “Recognizing the Limits of American Power in Afghanistan,” Huffington Post, 11/31/09, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=10924>, MMarcus)

From Pakistan's perspective, limiting the war on almost any terms would be better than prosecuting it for years, even to "victory," whatever that would mean. In fact, the least likely outcome is a takeover by widely unpopular Pakistani militants. The Pakistan military is the nation's strongest institution; while the army might not be able to rule alone, it can prevent any other force from ruling. Indeed, Bennett Ramberg made the important point: "Pakistan, Iran and the former Soviet republics to the north have demonstrated a brutal capacity to suppress political violence to ensure survival. This suggests that even were Afghanistan to become a terrorist haven, the neighborhood can adapt and resist." The results might not be pretty, but the region would not descend into chaos. In contrast, warned Bacevich: "To risk the stability of that nuclear-armed state in the vain hope of salvaging Afghanistan would be a terrible mistake."

#### Won’t escalate -- Paki loose nukes aren’t a threat.

Innocent 10 - foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute (Malou, “Away from McChrystal and Back to the Basics,” Huffington Post, 6/28/10, <http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=11934>, MMarcus)

Pakistan has an elaborate command and control system in place that complies with strict Western standards, and the country's warheads, detonators, and missiles are not stored fully-assembled, but are scattered and physically separated throughout the country. In short, the danger of militants seizing Pakistan's nuclear weapons in some Rambo-like scenario remains highly unlikely.

#### More ev.

Simon and Stevenson 09 – adjunct Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and Professor of Strategic Studies at the US Naval War College, (Steven and Jonathan, “Afghanistan: How Much is Enough?” Survival, 51:5, 47 – 67, October 2009 http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/section?content=a915362559&fulltext=7132409)

The United States' next logical move would be to intensify pressure, raising civilian casualties, increasing political pressure on the Kabul and Islamabad regimes, and ultimately weakening them, which would only help al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In fact, some evidence of this dynamic has already materialised, as the Pakistani government has faced difficulties in dealing with hundreds of thousands of Pakistanis displaced by the military campaign, undertaken at Washington's behest, in the Swat Valley. Certainly worries about Islamabad's ability to handle the Taliban on its own are justified. Some Taliban members are no doubt keen on regime change in favour of jihadists, as noted by Bruce Riedel, who headed up the Obama administration's 60-day policy review.29 But Pakistan's military capabilities should not be given short shrift. The Pakistani army, however preoccupied by India, is seasoned and capable, and able to respond decisively to the Taliban should its activities reach a critical level of destabilisation. Inter-Services Intelligence, devious though it may be, would be loath to allow the transfer of nuclear weapons to the Taliban.

### South China Sea War

#### New political moves stabilize South China Sea tensions.

**China Daily 6/28** – Chinese news agency (Tan Yingzi, “US to calm disputes over South China Sea,” China Daily, <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2012-06/28/content_15530521.htm>) // CB

With friendly tone with Beijing, nation preps for ASEAN summit Coinciding with the decision by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to meet Southeast Asian leaders next month, a senior US official said on Wednesday that the United States must maintain a sound relationship with China for peace and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. On Wednesday, Kurt Campbell, the US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, said "one of the most important things for us at the (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) forum is to make it clear, particularly to colleagues in ASEAN, that we are committed to a strong, stable and durable relationship with China". "It is our strong determination to make it clear that we want to work with China," Campbell told the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank. Clinton and China's Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi are expected to meet in Cambodia for the ASEAN forum and roll out specific initiatives on humanitarian disaster relief and wildlife protection, Campbell said. Clinton's trip follows a series of recent diplomatic trips by the Obama administration in the Southeast Asia region, with Defense Secretary Leon Panetta's trip to Vietnam and a visit by Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Philippines earlier this month. China has overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea with Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. Campbell said the high-level visits show Washington's long-term commitment to regular engagement in the dynamic economic region. The US is also trying to persuade their European allies into a discussion about Southeast Asian affairs. European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton will be invited to the regional forum for the first time. "One of the areas that is dramatically lacking, in which is the remarkably little discussion or strategic engagement between Europe and US is on Asia," Campbell said. Clinton is also expected to lay out a multifaceted diplomatic approach at the ASEAN forum, including a specific economic initiative for Southeast Asia, though Campbell would not elaborate on details. After the forum, Clinton will take an economic envoy to Siem Reap, Cambodia, to meet business leaders to expand trade ties. Clinton's attendance highlights the challenges Beijing and Washington have been facing on Southeast Asian issues in recent years due to China's growing political and economic influence in Asia and the US' re-engaged diplomatic policy in the region. In 2010, Clinton waded into territorial disputes on the South China Sea by telling a security forum in Vietnam that a peaceful resolution over the Nansha and the Xisha islands were within the US' national interests. Beijing strongly objected at the time, saying Washington was interfering in Asian regional affairs and trying to hype disputes over the South China Sea. On the recent development of disputes between China, the Philippines and Vietnam, Campbell said the US has insisted on not taking a position and supporting current diplomatic efforts. Bonnie Glaser, an Asia-Pacific security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said the US does not view relations in the region in zero-sum terms and it is not seeking to force ASEAN members to choose between the world's two largest economies. "Although the US and other media often pin blame on China, I think other claimants of the South China Sea also sometimes behave in provocative or confrontational ways that has generated concern from the US government," she said.

#### Mutual interests prevent escalation and shutting down SLOCs -- no one will risk it.

#### Gupta, ‘11

[Rukmani, Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, 10-23, “South China Sea Conflict? No Way,” http://the-diplomat.com/2011/10/23/south-china-sea-conflict-no-way/?all=true]

The South China Sea issue – and China’s position on it – have been the subject of much deliberation, especially since the ASEAN Regional Forum Meeting in Hanoi last July. Indeed, it’s widely believed that the South China Sea will likely emerge as a conflict hotspot in the coming years. Evidence of this can be found in the heated rhetoric exchanged between parties to the dispute – most notably, China, Vietnam and the Philippines. A declaration by the United States that it has a ‘national interest’ in the region, meanwhile, was seen as a commitment to take an active part, much to Chinese chagrin. In recent weeks, statements by Chinese officials reasserting China’s ‘indisputable sovereignty’ over the South China Sea, and warnings for India against investing in the region, are seen as signs of Chinese aggressiveness that could precipitate conflict. Suggestions for greater Indian involvement in the South China Sea disputes are made on the grounds that India must be forceful in its dealings with China. The continuation of ONGC Videsh Limited’s (OVL) investments in Vietnamese energy fields is certainly advisable. In fact, there’s nothing to indicate that the Indian government is thinking otherwise. OVL’s presence in Vietnam isn’t a recent phenomenon. Its first joint venture for offshore oil and natural gas exploration in Vietnam’s Lan Tay field, along with Petro Vietnam and BP, became functional in 2003. Deals for the investments now in the headlines were signed in May 2006; this is a project that won’t be halted because of oblique Chinese statements. But what’s worrying is the suggestion that Indian involvement should extend to taking an active part in the territorial disputes themselves, and that India should actively extend its naval presence – either to protect OVL’s investments or to protect the sea lines of communication. A closer bilateral relationship with Vietnam, Vietnamese rhetoric on the South China Sea disputes and its history of standing up to big powers are offered as the rationale for India to engage and arm Vietnam to win a war in the South China Sea. These suggestions to recalibrate Indian policy towards the South China Sea and its relationship with Vietnam are premature at best. Despite the rhetoric, conflict in the South China Sea may well not be inevitable. If the history of dialogue between the parties is any indication, then current tensions are likely to result in forward movement. In the aftermath of statements by the United States, and skirmishes over fishing vessels, ASEAN and China agreed upon the Guidelines on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea at the Bali Summit in July 2010. And recent tensions may well prod the parties towards a more binding code of conduct. This isn’t to suggest that territorial claims and sovereignty issues will be resolved, but certainly they can become more manageable to prevent military conflict. There’s a common interest in making the disputes more manageable, essentially because, nationalistic rhetoric notwithstanding, the parties to the dispute recognize that there are real material benefits at stake. A disruption of maritime trade through the South China Sea would entail economic losses – and not only for the littoral states. No party to the dispute, including China, has thus far challenged the principle of freedom of navigation for global trade through the South China Sea. The states of the region are signatories to the UNCLOS, which provides that ‘Coastal States have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities, and exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental protection’ but that ‘All other States have freedom of navigation and over flight in the EEZ, as well as freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines.’ The prospect of threats to SLOCS thus seems somewhat exaggerated. It will also be pertinent to remember that the states involved deem the dispute as only one element of larger bilateral relationships. The South China Sea is by no means the only calculus through which smaller countries view their relationship with China. Philippine President Benigno Aquino, for example, has stated that the dispute in the South China Sea is but one aspect of the relationship with China. Vietnam, too, hasn’t let its relationship with China be stymied by the disputes over the South China Sea. The General Secretary of Vietnam’s ruling Communist Party, Nguyen Phu Trong, visited Beijing this month , with the joint statement issued there stating that the two sides would ‘actively boost co-operation’ in offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation. It was also agreed that negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the territorial disputes in the South China Sea would be speeded up, military cooperation between China and Vietnam would be strengthened, a hotline between defence ministers established and contacts between high-level officials would be increased. As of July 2011, China, ranking 14th among Vietnam’s foreign investors, had 805 operational projects in Vietnam with a capitalized value of $4.2 billion. Furthermore, China has been Vietnam’s largest trading partner since 2004. Bilateral trade between the two was valued at $27 billion in 2010. In the event of military hostilities, the first casualty would be the economic relationship, an outcome both countries are keen to avoid. Despite what opinion pieces in the Global Times may say, there’s reason to suspect that China doesn’t want to escalate conflict in the region. Although commentary from the United States has suggested that China considers the South China Sea a ‘core interest,’ no official Chinese writing can be found to corroborate this. In addition, China’s caution can also be seen as a reflection on Chinese military capabilities, which aren’t seen as strong enough to win a war over the South China Sea. In fact, the China National Defence News, published by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s General Political Department, has likened the use of force by China in the South China Sea to shooting one’s own foot. Not only would the use of force bring ASEAN together on the issue, it could conceivably involve the United States and Japan, derail China’s plans for continued economic growth and undo China’s diplomacy. Chinese declarations on the South China Sea can therefore be seen as attempts to exaggerate claims so as to secure a better negotiating stance.

#### No South China Sea conflict.

**Joyner 98** – IR professor at Georgetown (Chris, The Spratly Islands Dispute: What Role for Normalizing Relations between China and Taiwan?, Spring, http://www.nesl.edu/userfiles/file/lawreview/vol32/2/joyner.htm)

Nevertheless, several factors suggest the unlikelihood of large-scale military conflict over the Spratlys in the foreseeable future. For one, there is the geography: These islands are scattered over an immense area, nearly 200,000 square kilometers. Considerable room is available for naval patrols to maneuver and miss contact with one another. Relatedly, the Spratlys are more than 300 kilometers (185 miles) from [\*837] the Philippine and Vietnamese coasts, and more than 1000 kilometers (600 miles) from mainland China. This distance presents serious difficulties for any claimant government to patrol more than a small area of the Spratly archipelago at any one time, especially given these states’ relatively weak capabilities for projecting armed forces. No claimant state possesses sufficient logistical support capabilities to ensure effective occupation and maintain extended control over these islands, which underscores the importance of relative naval size. Even so, these conditions presumably should permit greater opportunities for confidence building measures to be considered as alternative strategies. 50 The Cold Wars passing has also fostered a sense of rapprochement throughout Asia, which makes the political costs of a large-scale military conflict in Spratlys less acceptable to the PRC or Taiwan. 51 The dynamic economic expansion of ASEAN counties, increasingly close links with the international community, and strategically significant shipping lanes through the South China Sea -- all converge to dissuade overt attempts by any state, including the PRC, to strive for regional military domination. That the economies of both the PRC and Taiwan have become increasingly interdependent with those of Southeast Asian states, including other claimants to the Spratlys, underscores that reluctance.

## China

### CCP Instability

#### No CCP collapse -- protests won’t gain strength, and the government is resilient and reforming.

#### Lundquist, 6-22-12

[David, lecturer of Western philosophy at Tsinghua University in Beijing, “Why China Won't Collapse,” http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/china-isnt-headed-collapse-7046]

The biggest threat to stability in China is not a hard, soft or crash landing—it’s greater prosperity without reform. A slowing economy will not rain revolution upon China in 2012, especially if Beijing’s underrated reforms continue. China is said to be headed for collapse for several reasons, any and all of which might combine to overwhelm its [increasingly expensive](http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/03/05/uk-china-unrest-idUKTRE7240B720110305" \t "_blank) repressive apparatus. Within this supposed house of horrors is corruption, exorbitant housing prices, costly education, an antsy middle class and college graduates with dreams deferred—not to mention frustration stemming from China’s shortage of females, dubbed China’s “[bachelor bomb](http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/14/opinion/14iht-edegner.html?_r=1" \t "_blank).” But those reasons take a narrow view of political change, assuming dissatisfaction will morph into regime change. For a more nuanced perspective, economic analysis has to give way to political analysis. One [well-articulated](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/12/29/the_coming_collapse_of_china_2012_edition?page=full%E2%80%8F,0" \t "_blank) China-collapse theory comes from Gordon Chang, who says that the country is enjoying the tail end of a “three-decade upward supercycle” spurred by Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, globalization and demography. Chang’s analysis might be entirely on point, but it doesn’t suggest a dramatic collapse. For one thing, although China is slowing, a hard landing is [looking less likely](http://www.marketwatch.com/story/china-survey-hard-landing-possible-but-not-likely-2012-03-28" \t "_blank). But Chang has more than economic arguments. And that’s where his case weakens severely; he foresees economic weakness aggravating deep-seated tensions in Chinese leadership and society, tensions which in turn will bring conflict among decision makers and general discontent among the masses. It’s a plausible picture, but the evidence behind it is lacking. We must ask: How exactly could an economic crisis destabilize China? That is, how do graphs and pie charts become chaos in the streets? Charting Revolutions The textbook example of a similar change might be Iran’s 1979 revolution, widely thought be propelled by a dramatic fall in global oil prices. But the Chinese economy is no oil-addicted dictatorship, and China has no Ayatollah Khomeini antagonizing it through sermons on scratchy cassette tapes. Contrary to the banal collapse theories, there are reasons to believe that a slowing Chinese economy will bring a chill of calm to the simmering cauldron of society. China is a modern, complex polity with an adept, agile government. In his landmark work *Political Order in Changing Societies*, Samuel Huntington argued that violence is a mark of modernizing societies. To Huntington, modernity meant three things: the government gains recognition as the legitimate wielder of force; the division of labor is divided between military, administrators, scientists and the judiciary; there is mass political participation, by which Huntington meant all forms of participation, be it democratic or totalitarian (as in the Cultural Revolution). By Huntington’s standards, the PRC is a quite modern polity, one he would deem “civic” because its institutions are developed beyond its level of political activity. In short, the system can withstand economic pressure. Indeed, Beijing is well-prepared to confront, divert or grant concessions to popular discontent. With firm institutions established, a state is less susceptible to economic vagaries, something Chang’s argument doesn’t consider. By proactively heading off economic distress, the PRC might even stand to gain trust and legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. After all, as Western governments rushed to ease the liquidity crunch of 2008–2009, baffled and nervous citizens said nary a word of protest as unelected bureaucrats worked their money-printing and bailout magic. Only after the crisis, years later, did diverse Occupy Wall Street movements include this as a minor detail in their failed campaign against capitalist excesses. A faltering economy does not necessarily cause disorder, even when effective institutions are absent. A recent [New York Times editorial](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/03/opinion/starving-iran-wont-free-it.html?hp" \t "_blank) opposing Western sanctions on Iran broaches this notion, arguing that the Iranian people might stand up to oppression once well-fed and prospering. The same very well could be true for China. Reform in China There are hundreds of thousands of conflicts between the Chinese people and the state every year. But putting aside egregious land-grab cases like the one in the southern Chinese village of Wukan last year, they rarely rise to the level of violence—much less regime-change—as many such events are simply labor disputes. The participants have little notion of a future democratic China, unlike some of their middle-class counterparts, who in contrast have few material incentives to protest but much to lose. “Chinese people generally do not have revolutionary intentions,” Gordon Chang recognizes. But reform is another story. No Chinese citizen goes unaffected by the government’s heavy-handedness—the paternalistic, technocratic, socialist or vulgarly utilitarian blemishes in its laws and administration. That means there’s a lot to fix. Unfortunately, important domestic-reform initiatives often receive comparatively little attention from Western media, fostering the perception that China is a radically illegitimate oligarchy powered by the blood of its treasured working class. This is a distorted picture that panders to democratic, wishful thinking about Chinese society. The truth is that however slowly and ham-handedly, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has accrued political capital by improving the lives of its people in ways many bygone regimes could not. In late February, the World Bank issued a report entitled "[China 2030](http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/2012/02/27/china-2030-executive-summary" \t "_blank).” Its suggestions for China’s economic health include decreasing state ownership of major industries, establishing protections for society’s most vulnerable citizens, as well as calls for tax reform, reduced carbon emissions and green energy. Lost in the foofaraw of a lone Chinese man [interrupting](http://news.yahoo.com/world-bank-protest-highlights-china-reform-tension-025004648.html" \t "_blank) a bank press conference to defend state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was the fact that the PRC’s State Council coauthored the report. A Chinese government body signed off on prescriptions counter to the interests of SOE monopolists—a milestone for the development of civil society there. SOEs have been criticized in China as price manipulators and as magnets for rent seeking. For example, oil companies like Sinopec have stymied [fuel-quality regulations](http://www.chinadialogue.net/article/show/single/en/4778" \t "_blank) and refused to supply petro to stations, [running them out of business](http://english.caixin.com/2011-12-01/100333527.html" \t "_blank). Often shielded by nationalistic sentiment, SOEs have now come under assault by academics and newspaper [editorials](http://english.caixin.com/2012-03-01/100362681.html" \t "_blank) that echo the World Bank report, identifying SOEs as special interests, distinct from public interests. Elsewhere in China, regional governments are having a crack at [mending the controversial hukou system](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/opinion/sunday/what-china-can-teach-europe.html?pagewanted=all" \t "_blank), which threatens to fragment China into two entrenched groups: legally recognized urbanites and migrant workers, the latter of whom generally enjoy no entitlement to medical care or education in the cities where they’ve come to toil. In a country of peasants, internal migration is not just a matter of civil rights. It’s a matter of economic transformation, as those former farmers have settled into cities and long forgotten tilling a field. As China’s population urbanizes, policy makers have proven adaptive and willing to experiment. The CCP has demonstrated a concern for China’s social fabric. Beijing has decreed that television programming, including wildly popular dating shows, avoid the depths of crass sexual and material indulgence. Obviously, such policies might be in the ultimate interest of self-preservation (especially given Hu Jintao’s less than subtle [warning](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/04/world/asia/chinas-president-pushes-back-against-western-culture.html?scp=1&sq=hu%20jintao%20criticize%20western%20culture&st=cse" \t "_blank) about Western culture’s ideological penetration of China). And it’s debatable whether traditional, native values are what China or any country needs for stability or prosperity. Granted, on some reform proposals, like liberalization of criminal law, [conflict has emerged](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/01/opinion/legalizing-the-tools-of-repression.html?scp=1&sq=china%20%20domestic%20security&st=cse" \t "_blank). But do these disagreements reveal cracks in the party leadership, as Chang implies? Probably not. First, these are practical differences among technocrats who are after the same thing: stability via steady growth. Second, policy disputes are also a sign that China’s decision making is more consultative and decentralized than before. As the hukou example above illustrates, once delegated certain powers, provinces and municipalities can innovate on a smaller scale than the central government, as in the U.S. federal system. Finally, interest groups and factions are nothing new to Chinese politics. Thus, it’s unrealistic to think factional tension could paralyze party leadership, military and police at the same time that protesters agitate and show potential for violence and greater lawlessness. What’s more, scholarly work on factional politics over recent decades, often with a focus on China, has shown how factions can coexist and even thrive by nearing some sort of competitive equilibrium. This may explain the relative quietude of Chinese elite politics since 1989. Why China Won’t Fall The political must be analyzed alongside the economic. China’s institutions are still significantly ahead of the demands of its society. Beijing’s apparent influence by Huntington’s theories is not surprising, as his works are popular among the PRC-establishment intellectuals, especially those on the government payroll. Meanwhile, the authoritarian CCP junta keeps the trains running fast and on time. This means a lot to the swaths of China’s massive, aging population. Hard landing or soft, don’t look for the Beijing to suffer any hits to the head in 2012. Collapse theories are rooted in idealism, but they’re no more likely to pan out because of it.

#### CCP won’t collapse -- they’ll evolve and maintain control.

**Dr. Wagner and Follath 11** Wagner has a PhD on Japan's foreign policy in the early Meiji period (1868-1894). From 1995 to 2004, Wagner was Spiegel correspondent in Tokyo and published reports that shook the contrast between decadence and poverty by the economic crisis in Japan showed. Follath is a journalist for Spiegel.-(Wieland and Eric, “China’s terribly successful Communist Party turns 90”, Spiegel Online, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/mao-inc-china-s-terribly-successful-communist-party-turns-90-a-770696.html)//sjl>

The membership of the Chinese Communist Party is almost as large as Germany's population. Its 78 million members make it the largest political party in the world, and a very successful one at that -- a terribly successful party, say many anxious Western observers. Soviet communism ended up in the dustbin of history. The parties in North Korea and Cuba led their people to economic downfall and are considered discredited. Communist parties stood -- and continue to stand -- for an incurable sclerosis, while their leaders are viewed as dinosaurs. The outcome of the socialist idea has served as ample proof that it cannot work in practice. In China, this quasi law of nature seems to have been suspended. The dinosaur has learned to evolve, and adaptation instead of agony shapes the picture, as Beijing rushes from one economic success to the next. In the last 30 years, China has increased its gross domestic product by about thirty times and has overtaken Germany and Japan as an economic power, and it will likely leave the United States behind by 2020, becoming the world's largest economy. No other country has amassed such large foreign currency reserves as the People's Republic. If it wanted to, Beijing could buy up all the companies listed on Germany's DAX index with only one-third of its $3 trillion (€2.1 trillion) in reserves. Politically and militarily, China is becoming increasingly self-confident in its role as the only superpower next to the United States. Beijing intimidates its Pacific neighbors with new land and naval weapons systems, making territorial claims in waters from Japan to Vietnam to the Philippines. The Biggest Challenge of Our Time The party has come a long way in the last nine decades. It consisted of all of 57 members when it was founded as an underground organization in Shanghai in 1921. In 1927 its brigades, worn down by a superior adversary and on the run, were on the verge of demise. In 1949, they triumphed on Tiananmen Square in Beijing and united the giant country. Today, as the only force that can take on the United States, the Communist Party is understandably bursting with self-confidence. At 90, and (at least) a little wiser, the party now strives to permanently correct China's economic course without diverging from the rigid one-party system.

**collapse would be stable.**

**Dr. Gilley 06**- PHD from Princeton university in political science is now an associate professor of political science (Bruce, “”Elite-led democratization in China: Prospects, perils, and policy implications”, *International Journal 61.2,* Spring 2006, proquest)//sjl

Certainly there are many scholars who write in the tradition of popular overthrow, expecting that democracy will come to China through a sharp conflict between a rising civil society and an unreformed communist state. Those who warn of rising class conflict or looming social conflict reflect a kind of romantic view of democratizations grounded in the enduring memory of the French Revolution. However, the popular overthrow scenario depends on a dramatically weakened state that on most accounts does not exist. As Guo Xiaoqin shows, a host of economic, intellectual, ideological, social, and institutional structures ensure that the state remains dominant over society in China.10 There is a broad scholarship that comes to roughly equal conclusions, in particular concerning business, institutions, and social attitudes. As Van Sun, a scholar-activist for the state-led approach to political change argues, "(experience suggests that drastic political change may worsen rather than alleviate corruption. So far, incremental change has proved a workable strategy for China. It appears to be what most Chinese want, and they likely will continue to rely on the state as the engine of change."11

### China-Taiwan War

#### No impact -- economic ties ensure peaceful resolution of disputes.

#### Kennedy, ‘11

[Matthew, master's degree in diplomatic studies from the University of Westminster in London, “Vail Valley Voices: Taiwan riles U.S.-China relations,” 8-31, http://www.vaildaily.com/article/20110831/EDITS/110839992/1021&ParentProfile=1065]

One might think, based on the above, that the relationship between Taipei and Beijing is frosty. Quite the opposite. The affiliation is politically tense, yet financially fruitful. The economic element may lead toward a resolution of the reunification dispute. Neither side refused to directly deal with each other until 2004. Taiwan elected a president during the year who was receptive to closer relations, unlike his predecessors. The changed relationship led to a meeting between China's President Hu Jin Tao and the chairman of Taiwan's leading political party in April 2005. Both sides increased their interactions, consequently, and signed several economic agreements shortly thereafter.

#### China won’t escalate the conflict.

**Yijiang, ‘9**

[Ding, Prof. Pol. Sci. and Chair IR Program – Okanagan U. College, Asian Affairs: An American Review, Beijing's New Approach and the Rapprochement in the Taiwan Strait”, (late 09, last issue pre 2010), 36:4]

The year 2008 saw major progress made in the reconciliation across the Taiwan Strait. Several factors contributed to this significant development, which has occurred amid China’s1 fast rise and a shifting balance of power in East Asia. The change of government in Taiwan has also been a factor. The cumulative effect of nearly twenty years of steadily deepening economic integration across the Taiwan Strait has played a role as well, with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) attracting a huge amount of Taiwanese investment, becoming home to hundreds of thousands of Taiwan’s businesspeople, and replacing theUnited States as Taiwan’s largest exportmarket every year since 2002. Taiwan’s exports to the Chinesemainland exceeded U.S.$100 billion in 2008, accounting for 40 percent of the island’s total exports and 26 percent of its total gross domestic product.2 This article, however, will focus on a single factor that has facilitated the recent rapprochement: a gradual change in Beijing’s strategy in the handling of its relationship with Taipei, which occurred between 2003 and 2008. Beijing’s reaction to 2007–8 presidential election campaigns in Taiwan marked a clear departure from its previous handling the provocative proindependence rhetoric that is characteristic of Taiwan’s election campaigns. The subsequent reconciliation with the newly elected Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government apparently proved that the change in its approach was working. The new strategy appears to be, “speak softly and carry a big stick” toward proponents of Taiwanese independence, relying on Washington to rein in the proindependence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), and at the same time actively seeking reconciliation with the anti-independence KMT by offering economic benefits to Taiwan and by making limited concessions on some difficult bilateral issues, including the sovereignty issue, to promote economic and social relations and to undercut the support for Taiwanese independence. There have been some scholarly discussions on different aspects of Beijing’s new approach. Alan D. Romberg, for example, observes that Beijing “will look to Washington to keep things under control rather than having to play a heavy hand itself,” indicating its greater willingness to rely on the United States to rein in the DPP while exercising self-restraint toward the DPP’s proindependence rhetoric.3 Romberg’s observation is supported by Lin Chong-Pin, who also finds that Beijing has launched “soft offensives” by offering Taiwan a large number of various kind benefits, ranging from billions of dollars of loans to Taiwanese businesses, to no tariffs for Taiwanese farm products, to much lower tuition fees than previously charged to Taiwanese students.4 In the words of Erik Lenhart, Beijing’s carrot for Taiwan is “getting much sweeter,” even though its basic principles remain unchanged.5 Chu Shulong and Guo Yuli offer an analysis of the Hu Jintao leadership’s new thinking behind the change of approach toward the Taiwan issue.6 In this article, I analyze the origins of Beijing’s new approach, its evolution, the current rapprochement, its limitations, and its significance for the future relationship between Taiwan and China.

#### **No war -- China knows provocations are too risky.**

Ross 02- Professor of Political Science, Boston College, and Associate of the John King Fairbank

Center for East Asian Studies, Harvard University (“Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation, Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations”, International Security, 2002, Volume 2, Number 2, http://www.mitpressjournals.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228802760987824)//PN

The U.S.-China military balance undermines PRC conªdence that it can deter U.S. intervention on behalf of Taiwan. But given U.S.-China asymmetric inter- ests in Taiwan, the extended deterrence capability of the United States also de- pends on China’s assessment of U.S. resolve. Although U.S. security interests in Taiwan are limited to reputation interests, China has enough respect for U.S. resolve that U.S.-China asymmetric interests do not appreciatively enhance China’s conªdence that it can use force without it leading to U.S. intervention. Chinese civilian and military analysts understand that U.S. domestic politics increases the likelihood of U.S. intervention in defense of Taiwan. Domestic political opposition toward China and political support for Taiwan in the United States are at their highest levels since the late 1960s. U.S. domestic poli- tics has encouraged the growth in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since the early 1990s, and it will constrain the administration’s options during a mainland- Taiwan conºict. Chinese military and civilian analysts also grasp the extent of Washington’s strategic commitment to Taiwan. They acknowledge that the March 1996 deployment of two U.S. carriers was a “strong military signal” of U.S. readiness to intervene in a possible war over Taiwan.58 Moreover, the car- rier deployment ªrmly coupled the U.S. commitment to defend Taiwan with the credibility of its security commitments to its allies in East Asia. Since then, Moreover, it can use precision-guided munitions to target leadership command-and-control centers to shorten the war and further reduce casualties. Chinese studies of the 1991 Gulf War conclude that high- accuracy, long-range weaponry was the decisive factor in the U.S. victory. One Chinese military analyst, summing up the impact of high technology on war- fare, has argued that “whoever possesses the newest knowledge and technol- ogy can thus grab the initiative in military combat and also possess the ‘killer weapon’ to vanquish the enemy.” Moreover, Chinese analysts recognize that the development by the United Sates of increasingly sophisticated unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) will enable U.S. forces to carry out these missions while further reducing their vulnerability to enemy forces.61 Thus the ability of the United States to wage war with minimal casualties contributes to the credibil- ity of its extended deterrence commitments. China’s expectation of U.S. intervention in a mainland-Taiwan war is reºected in various PLA studies. Analyses of blockade operations and warfare against a “large island,” for example, assume the intervention of an advanced power using large surface vessels—including aircraft carriers—which could signiªcantly impede PRC operations.62 PLA studies of the use of its short- range DF-15 conventional missiles against Taiwan assume that China’s coastal launch sites could be targeted by advanced technology, high-accuracy cruise missiles. Mobility and camouºage are thus critical to PLA planning. The PLA further assumes that in a war over Taiwan its coastal military installations and deployments—including airªelds and advanced aircraft, radar, and command- and-control facilities—and civilian and military infrastructure would be vul- nerable to devastating air assaults by long-range and highly accurate cruise missiles (similar to those the United States used against Iraq, Serbia, and Afghanistan) and by advanced UAVs. The PLA has reportedly deployed its Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles around Beijing, in apparent preparation for possible U.S. raids during a mainland-Taiwan war. Chinese leaders under- stand that the United States can penetrate Chinese airspace as effectively as it penetrated the airspace of Iraq, Serbia, and Afghanistan.63

#### **That deters a cross-strait war.**

Ross 02- Professor of Political Science, Boston College, and Associate of the John King Fairbank

Center for East Asian Studies, Harvard University (“Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation, Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations”, International Security, 2002, Volume 2, Number 2, http://www.mitpressjournals.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1162/016228802760987824)//PN

Chinese leaders acknowledge that U.S. capabilities would be particularly effective against Chinese forces operating in the Taiwan theater. A senior Chinese military officer has lectured his troops that China’s likely adversary in a local war would possess high-technology equipment that could neutralize China’s ability to rely on manpower to defeat the enemy. A civilian analyst has noted that, in a war in China’s coastal region, it would be difficult for the Peo- ple’s Liberation Army (PLA) to take advantage of its superior numbers—as it did during the Korean War—and that the adversary could “make full use of its superiority in air and naval long-range, large-scale, high-accuracy weaponry.”53 A military analyst was more direct, explaining that not only would such superior capabilities seriously restrict China’s ability to seize and maintain sea control around a “large island,” but they would also pose a major threat to China’s coastal political, economic, and military targets.54 Experts at China’s Air Force Command College have concluded that an “air-attack revo- lution” has occurred and that a “generation gap” exists between the high- technology air-attack capabilities of the United States and the “stagnant” air defense capabilities of less advanced countries, causing a “crisis” in air defense.55 Thus China assumes that if the United States intervened in a mainland- Taiwan war, the PLA could not protect its war-fighting capabilities, nor could it prevent U.S. penetration of Chinese airspace. It must also assume that the prospect of victory would be close to nil and that the costs of war and defeat would be massive. Once war began, the United States could target China’s large but backward navy. Even China’s advanced Russian destroyers equipped with highly capable missiles would not contribute to its war-fighting capability, because they lack sufficient stand-off range to challenge U.S. offensive forces. Indeed U.S. capabilities would be even more effective in targeting Chinese surface assets at sea than they have been in targeting enemy assets in deserts, as in the Gulf War and the war in Afghanistan.56 Moreover, China’s air force would likely remain grounded, because neither its pilots nor its aircraft could challenge U.S. air superiority. A U.S. defeat of the PRC, however, would entail more than the loss of Chi- nese military assets. China’s modernization effort would be set back decades. War with the United States would compel China to switch to a wartime econ- omy, requiring the reallocation of resources away from civilian infrastructure development to the large-scale acquisition of outdated military hardware; it would also cost China access to international markets, capital, and high tech- nology. The resulting economic dislocations would defer China’s ability to achieve great power status well into the second half of the twenty-first century.57 Most important, the combination of a military defeat over Taiwan and a domestic economic crisis would challenge the leadership’s core value—continued leadership of China by the CCP. Nationalism and economic performance, the twin pillars of CCP legitimacy, would collapse, bringing down with them party rule.

### Democracy

#### Chinese democratization is inevitable -- multiple trends.

Liu and Chen 12 – \*Associate professor of political science at Qinghua University, China. \*\*Assistant professor of

government and public administration at the University of Macau, China. (Yu and Dingding, “Why China Will Democratize”, The Washington Quarterly/CSIS, Winter 2012, <https://csis.org/files/publication/twq12winterliuchen.pdf>, Callahan)

Behind the political stagnation on the surface, signs abound that a fundamental political transformation is taking place in China. In the fall of 2011, an unusually large group of independent citizens launched very vocal campaigns to compete for seats in various local congresses. Around the same time, groups of ‘‘netizens’’ went to a small village in Shandong province to try to visit Chen Guangcheng, a human right activist under house arrest, despite repeated reports about visitors being beaten. In July 2011, a train crash near the city of Wenzhou caused a storm of criticism against the government on ‘‘weibo,’’ micro-blog sites in China that claim nearly 200 million readers. Although these are just three pieces of evidence, they represent a rising independent civil society and illustrate that China’s political regime is increasingly being challenged. Over the last decade, terms typically used by Western academics to describe Chinese politics have included ‘‘authoritarian resilience,’’ ‘‘illiberal adaption,’’ and ‘‘rightful resistance,’’ indicating a pessimistic view of China’s democratic future.1 However, reality sometimes changes faster than scholars can reckon. China is moving closer to vindicating classical modernization theory, which states that economic development eventually leads to democratization. We argue that there is good reason to be optimistic that China will become a democracy, and forecast that China will embark on democratization around 2020 or so, although how it will happen, how long the process will take, and even whether it is desirable are issues beyond the scope of this article. Our relative optimism stems from four interlinked mega-trends: economic development, cultural change, political leadership trends, and the global environment.

#### **More ev -- democratization process has momentum.**

JOD 12 – Journal of Democracy The Journal of Democracy is an initiative of the National Endowment for Democracy, the Washington-based democracy assistance group. (“Why China will democratize”, Democracy Digest, January 24, 2012, <http://www.demdigest.net/blog/2012/01/why-china-will-democratize/>, Callahan)

Never mind the Arab Spring. Prospects for democratization are likely to take a cue from the Obama administration and pivot towards Asia, a leading analyst believes. “If there is going to be a big new lift to global democratic prospects in this decade, the region from which it will emanate is most likely to be East Asia,” Stanford University’s Larry Diamond writes in the new issue of the Journal of Democracy. And the world’s leading authoritarian power will not remain immune from the democratic contagion, observers suggest. “The momentum for democratization in China will accelerate in the not-too-distant future,” two leading analysts contend, disputing the consensus that the ruling Communist party confidently presides over a resilient authoritarian regime. “Behind the political stagnation on the surface, signs abound that a fundamental political transformation is taking place in China,” with recent economic trends “creating a reservoir of forces available for political mobilization,” say Yu Liu, a political scientist at Qinghua University, and Dingding Chen, an assistant professor of government at the University of Macau, writing in the latest issue of The Washington Quarterly. Over the last year, China has witnessed “an unusually large group of independent citizens” contesting seats in local assemblies; an unprecedented ‘‘netizens’’ campaign in support of ‘barefoot lawyer’ Chen Guangcheng (right); and a wave of vocal anti-government criticism following the July 2011 train crash near Wenzhou. “Although these are just three pieces of evidence, they represent a rising independent civil society and illustrate that China’s political regime is increasingly being challenged,” they write. Pressure for democratization is also being driven by “four interlinked mega-trends: economic development, cultural change, political leadership trends, and the global environment.”

### Econ

#### Chinese economic collapse is inevitable -- multiple indicators.

#### Moss, 7-2-12

[Trefor, Hong Kong-based journalist and a former Asia-Pacific editor at Jane's Defence Weekly, “[5 Signs of the Chinese Economic Apocalypse](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/02/5_signs_of_the_chinese_economic_apocalypse),” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/02/5\_signs\_of\_the\_chinese\_economic\_apocalypse?page=full]

The lights are flickering in the world's economic powerhouse. Although China's outlook may still be positive by, say, European standards, the numbers show that the country's storied growth engine has slipped out of gear. Businesses are taking fewer loans. Manufacturing output has tanked. Interest rates have unexpectedly been cut. Imports are flat. GDP growth projections are down, with some arguing that China might already be in recession. In March, Premier Wen Jiabao put the 2012 growth target at 7.5 percent; then seen as conservative, it's now viewed as prescient. If realized, it would be China's lowest annual growth rate since 1990, when the country faced international isolation after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. What are the concrete indications that China is experiencing something more than just a spreadsheet slowdown? Here are five real-world signs of China's economic malaise. 1. BYE-BYE BMW The $586 billion stimulus package that enabled China to sail through the 2009 global downturn only deferred the pain for local governments. Now they're being asked to repay their debts, and that means some serious belt-tightening at City Hall. The fleets of flashy cars that local officials indulgently amassed during the boom years will be among the first things to go. The city of Wenzhou is planning to auction off 80 percent of its vehicles this year -- that's 1,300 cars -- with similar fire sales occurring nationwide. Even Ferrari is sounding nervous about the Chinese downturn, and not only because Bo Guagua is seemingly off its list of potential customers. Part of the headache for municipal governments is that land sales have dried up thanks to a central government initiative to cool China's overheating property market, as well as a shortage of cash and confidence among potential buyers. In June, the average housing price for 100 major Chinese cities rose for the first time in nine months, but prices are still down 1.9 percent from last year. Some government premises could be next on the block, once those official cars have been driven away by their new, private owners. Then the extreme economizing begins: China's elaborate official banquets could become a lot more prosaic. 2. RIOT IN GUANGDONG Senior government officials have warned for decades that economic slowdown could spell social unrest, and with few exceptions, China's modern growth rate has been impressive enough to keep most people happy most of the time. But as GDP growth dips below 8 percent for the first time in years, China's social fabric could come under strain, especially as thousands, if not millions, of migrant workers find their jobs under threat. "It's clear the slowdown of export growth as a result of weakness in Europe and the U.S. continues to weigh on the Chinese economy," Lu Ting, an economist at Bank of America Corp. in Hong Kong recently told Bloomberg Businessweek. Exporters are going bust, and some factories that remain open have switched from three shifts to just one. Migrant workers have always supplied the elbow grease that enables China's growth engine to purr. But it's critical to China's stability that those workers feel they are sharing in the rewards. Their disaffection has the potential to be China's undoing, as the southern manufacturing town of Shaxi in Guangdong came to realize last week when it became the scene of China's most recent large "mass incident." That incident appears to have been contained, but the authorities can only cope with so many Shaxis at once. 3. VANISHING RICH PEOPLE When the going gets tough, the rich head to the airport. Luxury goods sales, which have been booming in China, began to slow earlier this year. But that doesn't mean that rich Chinese people have stopped spending. They've just stopped spending in China. Late last year, it became apparent that many wealthy Chinese were losing confidence in the domestic market, as they began investing in convertible assets, like foreign currency, rather than in fixed assets, such as real estate. Now they are increasingly looking overseas to invest in high-end property, partly because of domestic restrictions and bargains overseas, but also as a hedge against political and economic uncertainty at home. This dovetails with the revelation in late 2011 that over half of China's millionaires are thinking about skipping the country and setting up permanently abroad. Chinese prosecutors have said that close to 19,000 officials have been caught in the last 12 years while trying to flee overseas with money earned illegally; they use the term "naked official" for one who has squirreled away an illicit fortune in some overseas bolt-hole, has already safely installed his family there, and is now waiting for the opportune moment to jump China's listing ship. China's wealthy and politically powerful are often members of the same family, and if China really does go into recession, a lot of rich people may decide to cut and run. 4. A LONG, HOT SUMMER Electricity consumption usually spikes over the summer, as people turn on their air-conditioners to cope with the seasonal heat. But this year, many Chinese appear to be braving the high temperatures to economize. China's ports are piled high with coal that should be roaring in the country's power plants. Lower manufacturing output is also to blame. Only last year, Beijing talked about amassing an emergency coal stockpile to prevent the stuff from running out. Now it looks as if China has imported more fuel than it needs, as hard-pressed citizens, businesses, and factories cut their electricity consumption in order to reduce their bills. The national price of coal has already dropped 10 percent since late last year. This drop could further dent the global economy, which would in turn cool demand for Chinese exports even more. That's globalization for you: A Chinese person turns off the air-conditioning, and the world economy catches a cold. 5. HOG RATIOS AND "ROCKET EGGS" As China consumes ever larger quantities of meat, the prices of pork and beef have risen, fueled by the relentless demand. This has made inflation a preoccupation of Chinese policymakers. By 2007, China was eating 1.7 million pigs every day; in 2011 the country's National Bureau of Statistics said pork prices had risen 57 percent year on year. But over the last four months, demand for pork has dipped. The resultant oversupply has caused the all-important hog-to-corn price ratio to fall below the point where rearing pigs becomes profitable, and the Chinese government had to step in and buy up pork to stabilize prices. Even as the pork price has dropped, the price of eggs has shot up -- so quickly that shoppers have started to use the term "rocket eggs." Furthermore, Chinese consumers, their confidence shaken not only by the faltering economy but by a long string of food safety scandals, are increasingly opting to grow their own fruit and vegetables so that they a) won't be ripped off, and b) won't be eating cucumbers pumped full of things that no cucumber should ever be subjected to. Vice President Xi Jinping is expected to assume China's presidency in a once-in-a-decade leadership transition this fall. As the cracks appear in his country's economic foundations, you have to wonder whether he still fancies the job.

Chinese econ collapse is inevitable -- failing monetary and fiscal policies.

STRATFOR 2011 (Think Tank, “Monetary Policy Tools Fooling No One in China”, <http://www.stratfor.com/other_voices/20110413-monetary-policy-tools-fooling-no-one-china>)

The central government has embarked on a monetary tightening program to slow the nation’s growth rate and fight inflation, using credit rationing as its main tool. It’s a policy that’s compounding the nation’s inefficient allocation of capital. It’s also contributing to slower growth potential in China at a time when the nation’s inflation rate is surging. Nominal GDP in China has been increasing at a 20 percent rate, and much of that is tied to inflation. Inflation expectations have been rising even as policymakers raise interest rates: The People’s Bank of China in early April raised the interest rate 25 bps. It was the fourth rate hike in the current tightening cycle. But the aggregate increase for interest rates has been small. A 25 bps rate hike hardly makes a dent in what’s actually a negative interest rate for the real economy. Indeed, at this point, China’s monetary policymakers are too far behind the curve. Inflation is entering crisis territory, as consumer prices for many products and services rise at double-digit rates. Signs of panic have appeared along with hoarding which, when it spreads, could trigger a social crisis. Yet something else is happening. By shifting capital to inefficient users against the backdrop of negative real interest rates, China’s economy is being pushed toward stagflation. Meanwhile, the public is afraid that the government wants to inflate away the value of their money. What’s prevented a full-blown crisis so far is a belief that the yuan will appreciate. If not for this assumption, capital flight from China would be rampant. To change course, policy tightening must shift away from credit rationing and toward market mechanisms. Moreover, the interest rate must be lifted out of the negative column: It should be raised at least three percentage points to allay public fears. These changes are needed as soon as possible. No One’s Fool Too many people in China’s officialdom believe in the power of psychology, particularly in its ability to fight inflation. But inflation is not a psychological phenomenon; it’s a monetary phenomenon. Excessive money supply leads to inflation. To contain inflation is to contain money supply at a growth rate in line with production. Even when psychology succeeds by, for example, convincing people that there’s no inflation when in fact there is, the impact of these mind games does not last long. No one can fool all of the people all of the time. Indeed, psychological tricks can backfire. People who suddenly realize they’ve been fooled can stop believing in other things. Hence, they might refuse to believe their eyes if inflation starts to cool. Policymakers would then have to react with monetary tightening that overshoots goals to calm public fears. An unavoidable consequence of interest rate overshooting is a recession, which is certainly not a desirable outcome. Neither will administrative power cure inflation. Even the most powerful government is not more powerful than the market. Yet administrative power worship is pervasive in China, so many think the government can fight inflation by forcing businesses and merchants to hold down prices. There have been recent examples of such price intervention. But forcing businesses to hold down prices is only a temporary fix. Input costs are rising 20 percent per annum for some businesses, and these companies will not survive unless they raise prices. Businesses pressured by the government to hold down prices might have to halt production or find other ways to increase revenues. For example, they might shrink portions or repackage old products, selling them as new. State-owned enterprises can use subsidies and borrowing to slow price increases. For example, bank loans have been covering losses posted by thermal power plant companies, which have been forced to depress prices. Virtually every power company in China is losing money but survives on loans, basically shifting the inflation burden to banks. This tactic has many side effects, including human health damage. Power companies limit costs by burning low-quality coal or switching off smokestack scrubbers, forcing people to breathe harmful coal smoke. True, the administrative approach to power company price control keeps headline inflation rates in check, but is this good policy for the country overall? Administrative control worship is likewise manifest by credit rationing, which has been resurrected with a vengeance. Few private companies can get any credit from banks these days, forcing them to turn to the gray market for financing at interest rates often above 20 percent. Many, if not most, will not survive if these high financing costs continue. Optimistically, most private company borrowers think the current credit situation is temporary. However, if inflation persists and the government’s credit tightening approach remains unchanged, the private sector will see an increasing number of bankruptcies. China’s capital allocation mechanism is likewise working against the private sector, with increasing bias toward state-owned enterprises. Banks have been lending to underperforming SOEs simply because they’re owned by the government. Most funds raised on the Hong Kong and Shanghai stock markets are for SOEs. Local governments have been raising massive amounts of money by auctioning land and taxing property purchases. As a result, government expenditures have risen as a share of GDP. Indeed, government and SOE expenditures may have reached half of GDP. This is by far the highest in the world. And China does not follow the model common in Europe, where sizeable levels of government revenue are redistributed. History shows that government and SOE spending tends toward inefficiency. There’s plenty of evidence of this in China, where image projects have been sprouting across the country like bamboo shoots in spring. Inflation is a byproduct of inefficiency. Money spent on activities with low productivity levels lack products or services to absorb the money, leading to inflation. Credit rationing is making the situation worse. While the public sector wastes money and fuels inflation, efficient small- and medium-sized enterprises are being starved of cash. Stagflation Risk As capital efficiency declines in a climate of persistent negative real interest rates, stagflation emerges. Stagflation eventually leads to currency devaluation, and devaluations in emerging economies in the past led to financial crises. But the forces that favor low interest rates are powerful. For example, China’s local governments are so indebted – with debts now averaging three times revenues, and some extended by 10 times revenues – that they could not possibly survive positive real interest rates. Their survival hopes rest with sales of land at high prices, and higher interest rates would burst the real estate price bubble. State-owned enterprises are in similar shape and thus favor low interest rates. They reported 2 trillion yuan in combined profits last year but were still cash-flow negative. The SOE sector has never been cash-positive, and last year’s negative cash flow was the worst in years. Accounting for profits is always difficult, and it’s doubly so in China with its vast SOE sector. Government companies are so cash-flow negative and so leveraged that one cannot help worrying about financial health issues. Big problems could be impossible to hide if interest rates turn positive. The force is with credit rationing and negative real interest rates, even though this combination of policy tools makes stagflation inevitable. But is stagflation really so bad? Many would love an economic equilibrium that lasts a few years because it would effectively wipe away debt for those unable to repay. Indeed, stagflation benefits debtors. At the same time, however, savers pay a high price. No one expects savers to sit idly by while their savings are wiped away. Thus, stagflation never creates a stable equilibrium but instead breeds social instability. In an emerging economy, serious stagflation always leads to currency devaluation, which always triggers a financial crisis. China has vast foreign exchange reserves and capital control. Devaluation risks are still low, but not zero. China’s money supply is about four times its foreign exchange reserves. And the effective money supply may be much larger. A massive amount of credit has been extended outside the official system. The nation’s vast trust sector, for example, is effectively arbitraging related interest rates, with a risk profile and thin capitalization that pose a risk to financial stability. Changing Speed To control the money supply, China’s policymakers need to move away from credit rationing and focus on interest rates. Each interest rate hike should double to 50 bps at minimum to signal a new approach. In this way, the interest rate should rise three percentage points as soon as possible. To move away from credit rationing, lending rates should be liberalized further. For example, the band for lending rate flexibility around the official rate can be widened. At present, banks charge fees to increase the effective lending rate, but this system is neither transparent nor efficient. Imbalance is no longer an issue just for the macroeconomy, since it’s affecting microeconomic efficiency, which in turn is leading to a macro consequence – inflation. China’s economic difficulties are caused by problems in the system. Unless the root causes are addressed, these difficulties cannot be resolved. At the root of China’s problems is the rising level of inefficient public sector spending. The system is biased toward supporting public sector income growth. And as public sector demand for funding exceeds what the economy can bear, money-printing is inevitable. Tools for shifting money to the public sector are taxes and land sales. Unless these fall, all the talk about economic rebalancing will be no more than talk. So China should cut taxes, as soon as possible, to signal a new approach to economic growth. The top personal income tax rate should be slashed to 25 percent and the value-added tax reduced to 12 percent. Until that happens, China’s growth model will be suppressing the middle class. A successful white collar who has worked 10 years in a first-tier city cannot afford to buy an average piece of property in China. Suppressing middle class growth is not in the country’s interest, since social stability in modern society is linked to a large, content middle class. Many local governments have come out with property price targets that seem to limit price appreciation but ignore what are now unaffordable levels. The system seems to have become incapable of addressing the public’s fundamental concerns. The average price for a square meter of property in a city should be less than two months of average, after-tax wages. China’s prices are already high by international standards, and already take into consideration the high cost of building a city from scratch. Actually, current price levels are two to three times higher than this cost and can only be sustained by speculative demand. No wonder property sales collapsed after local governments started restricting multiple-property owners and non-resident buyers. A turnaround for real interest rates is not only necessary for containing inflation but vital if China is going to shift its growth model to household spending from government spending and speculation. Savers who lose wealth to inflation are unlikely to be strong consumers but, instead, may speculate to recoup losses, trapping the economy in an inflation, speculation cycle. China’s economic difficulties are interlinked and cannot be addressed separately. The root cause is the political economy that gives public spending the leading role in driving economic growth. A fundamental solution must involve limiting the government’s means for raising funds. Containing inflation and controlling bubbles must be viewed in this context, as the current growth model is pushing the economy toward stagflation and currency devaluation risks loom large. China could see a devaluation-triggered financial crisis similar to what the United States has already experienced. The difference, however, is that China’s system is not robust enough to maintain stability during such a crisis. It’s easy to see why fundamental economic reforms are urgently needed.’

#### Doesn’t cause war -- Chinese military depends on the economy -- proves they’ll turn inward.

New York Post 6/1/99 http://www.papillonsartpalace.com/chinaspy.htm

How are we to make China pay for its wanton act of aggression? The obvious way is to kill its application to join the World Trade Organization and to revoke Most Favored Nation status when it comes up for renewal. We learned from Ronald Reagan's successful fight against the Soviet Union that the soft underbelly of a Communist system is its economy. China could not afford to keep the military establishment it has if it could not count on regular, huge trade deficits with the United States. The Chinese Army is as much an economic as a military institution. Weaken Beijing's economy and you weaken its military.

## Econ/Trade

### Aerospace Industry

#### Civil aircraft sales are the biggest internal link to aerospace and they are predicted to grow in the coming years.

**RNCOS 1/31** – specializes in Industry intelligence and creative solutions for contemporary business segments. Our professionals analyze the industry and its various components, with a comprehensive study of the changing market behavior. Our accuracy and data precision proves beneficial in terms of pricing and time management that assist the intending consultants in meeting their objectives in a cost-effective and timely manner (1/31/12, RNCOS, “US Leads Global Aerospace and Aviation Industry” <http://www.avionics-intelligence.com/news/2012/01/1594542084/us-leads-global-aerospace-and-aviation-industry.html>) // CB

According to our research report, "Aerospace Industry Forecast to 2013", global aerospace industry has witnessed an impressive growth over the past few years, with civil aviation segment emerging as the major contributor. Increase in air traffic and considerable increase in military budget have provided the much required impetus to the industry. The US represents the biggest aerospace market and is anticipated to grow at a CAGR of around 3.2% during 2011-2013. The US is the leader of aerospace and aviation industry as it is both the largest producer and marketplace for the industry. As per our findings, civil aircrafts account for a major share in the US aerospace market. Civil aircraft sales were mainly driven by the sales of large commercial jetliners in the past. Moreover, the positive growth expected from the market for large jetliners is likely to boost the civil aerospace market in the coming years. Besides, the report covers the other major aerospace markets including both developed and emerging markets. The countries covered in the developed markets include, the US, Canada, UK, and many others, while the emerging markets are comprised of countries like the Middle East, China, India, and various others. Besides, overall growth in the global aerospace market is mainly driven by aircraft and aircraft part segments. These segments have witnessed a double digit growth during the last decade. Our report also contains information about the various M&A activities in the global aerospace industry. It entails information of the key competitors in the market along with their business details and areas of expertise. The report shows a highly concentrated structure of the market, with the top players dominating the market. It provides segment-wise analysis of the industry along with emerging trends that may shape up with the betterment of economic conditions. The research will facilitate consultants, industry analysts, and vendors to obtain an in-depth knowledge of the current, past, and future performance of the industry. It provides an extensive research on the recent trends of the aerospace industry trends to provide cutting-edge market intelligence.

#### Aerospace sector predicted to rise despite budget cuts due to market for commercial jets.

**Reading 2/29** – strategy and corporate finance professional, runs a corporate development consultancy (2/29/12, Tony Reading, “The Aviation Sector is Soaring” <http://www.fool.co.uk/news/investing/2012/02/29/the-aviation-sector-is-soaring.aspx>) // CB

The market for large commercial jets is booming. That is good news for companies in the aerospace and defence sector, which are otherwise beset by Western government defence cuts. In the atmosphere of general economic gloom, at first sight it's perhaps surprising that airlines should be queuing up to buy large jets. Air travel is strongly correlated with economic growth. But a moment's thought yields the familiar answer. It is, of course, the dynamic and confident economies of Asia and the Middle East driving demand. While we in the West are paying the price of a decade's overspending, these countries are consuming more and investing more. That means they are travelling more, too. China is at the forefront with its four largest domestic airlines, which are protected from foreign competition, expected to buy more than 4,000 jets over the next 20 years. But other Asian economies are seeing markets driven by the emergence of low-cost carriers such as Indonesia's Lion Air, which plans to buy 230 Boeing 737s. Duopoly The duopoly of Airbus and Boeing (NYSE: BA.US) are the primary beneficiaries. At the end of last year they had a combined order book of over 8,000 aircraft, representing eight years of production at current rates. Orders grew by 2,200 in 2011, twice the rate of production. A third of the order book is in Asia, and another 25% in the Middle East. Orders from North American and European airlines are motivated by the greater efficiency of newer aircraft such as Boeing's 787 Dreamliner, which use 25% to 40% less fuel than older models. Even allowing for cancellations it's a very healthy position for the industry, and both the major builders are ramping up production. But there's a limit to how fast and far they can take that, so the visibility of future production is high. In contrast, the regional/business jet market is more subdued, with the biggest manufacturers Canadian Bombardier and Brazilian Embraer both increasing deliveries in 2011 but seeing their order books reduced. The market structure is different, and China, Russia and Japan are in advance stages of developing their own jets. But what is good news for Airbus and Boeing is also good news for UK companies further down the supply chain. Rolls Royce (LSE: RR) has already reported record profits. Senior On Monday, it was the turn of FTSE 250 firm Senior (LSE: SNR) to announce record results and to give out positive signals, with a 22% dividend increase. The company makes a wide range of high-tech components for original equipment manufacturers. Its aerospace division produces air ducts and other pressure-carrying systems used on commercial and military aircraft. The division contributed 60% to 2011 sales, within which large commercial aircraft were another 60%. Boeing is a significant customer, and the entry into service of the Dreamliner will boost sales further, on top of the 26% increase in this market in 2011. Defence made up another 30% of the division's sales, increasing by 10% despite defence cuts, with the company supplying parts for the Sikorsky Black Hawk helicopter and Lockheed Martin air transporter. Last year, Senior acquired the small Lancashire-based aerospace component company Weston, which brings it a manufacturing capability in Asia and exposure to Airbus as a customer. More than 70% of Weston's output is used on Airbus aircraft. Senior's other division, 'Flexonics', makes flexible automotive components, mainly for diesel engines, for both heavy truck and off-road markets, and passenger vehicles. It also serves industrial applications; as a result, the multiple markets served by the company diversify its exposure to any one sector. Profits Overall, Senior saw adjusted profit before tax up 19% in the year, on revenues up 13%. This was the second consecutive year of record operating margins. Adjusted earnings per share were up 21% and mirrored in the dividend increase. For once, the adjusted figures actually painted a more modest picture, as they excluded a large impairment charge taken in 2010. The company generates cash, too. £83m of operating profit produced £96m of cash, which easily covered £54m of interest, tax, dividends and capital expenditure. Consequently, £69m expenditure on acquisitions required only a £29m increase in net debt to £93m. That makes for a net gearing ratio of 34%. The company is well with the covenants on its fixed-rate debt funding, and has headroom for further bolt-on acquisitions. At 196p, the shares are trading on a price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio of 13.5, and yielding 1.9%. But the forward P/E drops to 12.2 and, given the visibility of Senior's earnings from its commercial aerospace business, some weight can be put on that. And, though the yield looks a little sparse, it's covered 3.8 times -- so there is plenty of scope for the dividend to grow. The shares have soared from just 24p in 2009, but with the company's potential to benefit from the boom in large commercial aviation, they still have much further to go.

#### No impact to aerospace collapse -- empirics prove.

**Hill et al** **10** – Edward, Independent Defense & Space Professional, 10 (“Economic Shocks and Regional Economic Resilience” May 10, 2010)

Employment downturns in the Seattle regional economy have occurred around the time of national recession periods. The region experienced shock-induced downturns in 1980-81, 1990, 1993, and 2000-01. It was resilient to the 1993 and 2000-01 shock-induced downturns, but not resilient to the 1980 downturn. (There was little opportunity for resilience to the 1990 downturn because the 1993 downturn occurred so soon thereafter.) Shocks to the region’s major export industries preceded or accompanied the aggregate regional downturns. Wood products (formerly a major regional export industry) suffered employment downturns in 1978-79. Software had such downturns in 1993 and 2000-01, although these downturns appeared as sharp reductions of the industry’s employment growth rate rather than as job losses. (Microsoft, the region’s largest information technology employer, laid off workers for the first time during the Great Recession.) Aerospace experienced downturns in 1980-82, 1990-93, 1998-99, and 2002, and all these downturns were employment declines. However, their impact on the region as a whole probably became less severe over time as Boeing, the region’s largest manufacturer, accounted for a declining (though still substantial) share of the region’s employment . The regional economic development policymakers and practitioners we interviewed perceived the Great Recession as the region’s most severe economic downturn since the early 1970s, although as of the time we conducted our interviews (July 2009) the region’s employment was higher, as a percentage of pre-recession employment, than at the same time after the 2001 recession, and it had not hit the employment trough that it reached after the 1981 recession. After the severe early 1970s recession, policymakers perceived a need to diversify the region’s economy away from its strong reliance on aerospace manufacturing in general and Boeing in particular. Local government and business leaders created the King County Economic Development Council, now called Enterprise Seattle, to recruit new firms to the region. However, diversification of the employment base came about not as a result of any deliberate policy or strategy but because of a historical accident: Bill Gates moved Microsoft to the region in 1979. Other information technology-intensive firms (Starbucks, Amazon, and Costco, as well as suppliers to them and to Microsoft) sprang up subsequently, in part to take advantage of proximity to Microsoft and the large pool if information technology workers that it attracted to the region. (Some local information technology companies were founded by former Microsoft managers or engineers.) As of July 2009, no public or private organization had undertaken or planned any policy or strategy to restructure the regional economy in response to the Great Recession. Our interviewees did not think any such restructuring was necessary. They viewed the regional economy as sufficiently diverse because it is built around two large firms, Boeing and Microsoft, which have steadily introduced new products and around which distinct industry clusters (in aerospace and information technology, respectively) have formed. Our interviewees believed that the region’s eventual recovery from the Great Recession would be a continuation of pre-recession trends, including further growth of the information technology industry and the gradual movement of Boeing away from the region (including the relocation of the firm’s headquarters to Chicago and its opening of a new aircraft production line in South Carolina, its first outside the Seattle area). They also anticipated further growth of the nonprofit sector, which has been fueled largely by funding from current and former Microsoft executives. Hartford Employment shock-induced downturns in the Hartford regional economy occurred around national recession periods in 1980-81 and 2001-02. However, the region experienced a downturn in 1988-90 rather than in 1990-91 as the nation as a whole did. The region was resilient to the 1980-81 and 2001-02 shocks within two years but was not resilient to late 1980s shock. The early 1980s downturn was accompanied by precipitated by shocks to manufacturing industries: fabricated metals, electrical equipment, printing, and aerospace. The late 1980s downturn was preceded and followed by shocks to the insurance industry and accompanied by a downturn in fabricated metal manufacturing (largely aerospace suppliers). The 2001-02 downturn was preceded by shocks in insurance, aerospace, and fabricated metals. Policymakers and practitioners perceived the late 1980s shock-induced downturn as the region’s most severe before the Great Recession, and the employment downturn of that shock was largest of any of the last four recessions, including the Great Recession. A large downturn in the commercial real estate market, in which local insurance companies were heavily invested, precipitated the late 1980s shock to insurance and probably to the region as a whole. In 1993 the Greater Hartford Chamber of Commerce created a regional economic development (business recruitment and retention) agency in response to that shock. After reorganization, this eventually became the Metro Hartford Alliance (MHA), which gradually expanded its mission to include attraction and retention of highly educated workers, regional place-marketing, public policy advocacy, and entrepreneurship assistance. A large number of sometimes competing regional industry-specific nonprofit organizations, some supported by CT’s state cluster initiative, were founded during the 1990s and early 2000s to deal with industry-specific production, technology, workforce, education, and place-marketing issues in manufacturing, insurance, high technology, and medical devices, but these were not founded as responses to industry or regional aggregate shocks and they do not view responding to these shocks as their primary mission. Neither MHA nor these industry-specific organizations deals with the regional economy as a whole. No public or private organization undertook or planned any policy or strategy to restructure the regional economy in response to the late 1980s downturn. However, the economic structure has changed gradually following that downturn. Large aerospace manufacturers have gradually shifted production overseas. Insurance companies have moved more routine clerical work to lower-cost regions while maintaining R&D in the Hartford area. Both insurance and aerospace manufacturing, the region’s dominant export industries, account for smaller shares of employment today than thirty years ago. The regional economy has become smaller but richer; regional average productivity and wages have grown by much more than the national average over the last three decades, while regional employment has never regained its 1988 peak level. Although local (zoning), state, and federal public policies influenced these developments, organized public or non-market private activity did not. The economic development practitioners and public officials we interviewed attributed the lack of such activity to the region’s local government fragmentation and the proliferation of small, often competing private economic development organizations.

#### Lack of experienced workers is an alt cause that the plan can’t solve for.

**SCPR 2/16** – news agency (2/16/12, Shereen Marisol Meraji, “Aerospace manufacturing jobs are here, skilled workers are not” <http://www.scpr.org/programs/madeleine-brand/2012/02/16/22561/aerospace-manufacturing-jobs-are-here-skilled-work>) // CB

Owe Carlsson is sick and tired of hearing that to find manufacturing jobs you should look east, far east. “No, manufacturing is not all in China,” says the exasperated 73 year-old engineer. “The manufacturing base in the L.A. area is phenomenal, but if we do not get fresh blood into our industry, yes, those jobs will disappear.” Carlsson is a Senior Principal Engineer at Alcoa Fastening Systems. The company makes nuts and bolts for airplanes under the umbrella of the multinational aluminum producer, Alcoa. Eighty percent of all the nuts and bolts for airplanes are made right here in Southern California. Survival is not mandatory On a tour of Alcoa Fastening System’s Torrance facility, Carlsson stops to admire a mountain of plastic bins filled with tiny aluminum parts in jewel tones. “When you look out the window of an aircraft and look out onto the wings and you see all those little screws, on the inside is invariably one of these,” he says. Carlsson laments that most of the high-skilled machinists making those turquoise, emerald, and copper colored jewels of the aerospace industry have gray hair and, like him, are long overdue for retirement. “I run into operators, retirement age, they say, ‘Where are the young people, I want to train someone!’" says Carlsson, adding that those workers "are seeing that the next generation is not there, they’re not stepping up.” Carlsson’s office is a Zen-like refuge from the noisy shop floor and visitors are greeted, first, by a black and white framed portrait of Albert Einstein. (Carlsson calls him Uncle Al.) Carlsson’s also a fan of inspirational quotes; one of his favorites is written on his whiteboard. It’s from William Edwards Deming, the American consultant best known for helping revolutionize Japan’s manufacturing sector in the 1950s. It says: “It is not necessary to change, survival is not mandatory.” Carlsson worries that if California doesn't change the way its schools educate future workers, aerospace manufacturing in Southern California will die. “We get so many people knocking on our door, but they have absolutely nothing they can bring to the table," he says. "They don’t have the basics of adding or subtracting. It is catastrophic. Those are things they should have learned in school.” Skills in demand Lucas Pacheco teaches at Hawthorne High's School of Manufacturing and Engineering. The public school is just a couple of miles away from the most powerful aerospace companies in the world. “Northrop Grumman and Boeing and Raytheon are all asking us to make sure that we provide them with a workforce that’s skilled enough to walk in the door and get jobs,” says Pacheco. According to California’s Employment Development Department, the median income for an aerospace engineer is $53 an hour, $19 an hour for skilled machinists. EDD predicted a 12 percent increase in the demand for aerospace engineers between 2008 and 2018. But Pacheco says the prospect of a job sometime in the future isn’t enough to get high school kids psyched about manufacturing. Bubbly sophomore Gesenia Grejeda says she was wooed away from the visual and performing arts academy on campus after watching the manufacturing students race mousetrap cars they designed and built. “I was hooked,” says Grejeda, “and I was like, ‘This is what I want to do!” “I want to be a manufacturer,” says Grejeda’s classmate, David Castro. ”I want to work with machines and design things that we’re going to be using in our lives.” Castro cuts metal tubes on a computerized machine in Hawthorne High’s metal shop, one of the few left in California. He talks about his dream of creating machines that will make life easier for the disabled. Castro says he gets to school at 6 in the morning and leaves around 9 or 10 at night because making parts for student designed projects “is really fun.” School administrators say 85 percent of the teens at Hawthorne High’s Manufacturing and Engineering school are considered at-risk; their families can’t afford college without help, and don't speak English at home. “My mother barely made it through elementary school,” says William Valverde, an alumnus of the program. ”We’re not pushed toward education in the first place, much less are we expected to win the science fair or be a part of the professional Society of Manufacturing Engineers before we’re old enough to vote.” Valverde now studies engineering at Cal State Northridge. He says he never would have considered that path without Lucas Pacheco and the manufacturing academy at Hawthorne. Pilot programs The Society of Manufacturing Engineers, a network of professional manufacturers founded during the Great Depression, also sees the school’s potential. The group recently gave Hawthorne High $16,000 for more equipment and an after-school program. Members of the SME know workers in their industry are graying. So the group is backing high-school programs that encourage teens to study engineering, and funding a reality TV-show pilot called "Edge Factor." The show's trailer features a narrator; in a booming baritone, he intones, “For over 200 years man has been surrounding themselves with machines; they shaped our history and our future.” Now Hawthorne is shaping the future. SpaceX, founded in 2002 by entrepreneur Elon Musk, is a private rocket and satellite company gearing up for a test launch to the space station in the coming months. One thousand of its 1,600 employees work in Hawthorne. “A hunk of metal comes into our factory in Hawthorne and a rocket goes out,” says Kirstin Grantham, the communications director at SpaceX. “On our website there are over 200 jobs posted today, we’re looking for engineers who can help us design this next generation of rockets and spacecraft, we’re looking for technicians who can help us with the assembly process. We want the best and the brightest minds.” Grantham says recruiters are working around the clock to find them and warns other aerospace companies that SpaceX is not above stealing talent. Wouldn't it be nice, if they didn't have to?

### Competitiveness

#### No impact -- competitiveness theory is flawed.

**Krugman 11** – joined The New York Times in 1999 as a columnist on the Op-Ed Page, professor of Economics and International Affairs at Princeton University, became the Ford International Professor of Economics at MIT, one of the founders of the "new trade theory," American Economic Association awarded him the John Bates Clark medal (Paul, “Paul Krugman: Competitiveness deficit not cause of economic collapse,” January 24, 2011, <http://www.daytondailynews.com/opinion/columnists/paul-krugman-competitiveness-deficit-not-cause-of-economic-collapse-1062908.html>) // CB

Meet the new buzzword, same as the old buzzword. In advance of the State of the Union, President Barack Obama has telegraphed his main theme: competitiveness. The president’s Economic Recovery Advisory Board has been renamed the President’s Council on Jobs and Competitiveness. And in his Saturday radio address, the president declared that “We can out-compete any other nation on Earth.” This may be smart politics. Arguably, Obama has enlisted an old cliche on behalf of a good cause, as a way to sell a much-needed increase in public investment to a public thoroughly indoctrinated in the view that government spending is a bad thing. But let’s not kid ourselves: Talking about “competitiveness” as a goal is fundamentally misleading. At best, it’s a misdiagnosis of our problems. At worst, it could lead to policies based on the false idea that what’s good for corporations is good for America. About that misdiagnosis: What sense does it make to view our current woes as stemming from lack of competitiveness? It’s true that we’d have more jobs if we exported more and imported less. But the same is true of Europe and Japan, which also have depressed economies. And we can’t all export more while importing less, unless we can find another planet to sell to. Yes, we could demand that China shrink its trade surplus — but if confronting China is what Obama is proposing, he should say that plainly. Furthermore, while America is running a trade deficit, this deficit is smaller than it was before the Great Recession began. It would help if we could make it smaller still. But ultimately, we’re in a mess because we had a financial crisis, not because American companies have lost their ability to compete with foreign rivals. But isn’t it at least somewhat useful to think of our nation as if it were America Inc., competing in the global marketplace? No. Consider: A corporate leader who increases profits by slashing his work force is considered successful. Well, that’s more or less what has happened in America recently: Employment is way down, but profits are hitting new records. Who, exactly, considers this economic success? Still, you might say that talk of competitiveness helps Obama quiet claims that he’s anti-business. That’s fine, as long as he realizes that the interests of nominally “American” corporations and the interests of the nation, which were never the same, are now less aligned than ever before. Take the case of General Electric, whose chief executive, Jeffrey Immelt, has just been appointed to head that renamed advisory board. I have nothing against either GE or Immelt. But with fewer than half its workers based in the United States and less than half its revenues coming from U.S. operations, GE’s fortunes have very little to do with U.S. prosperity. By the way: Some have praised Immelt’s appointment on the grounds that at least he represents a company that actually makes things, rather than being yet another financial wheeler-dealer. Sorry to burst this bubble, but these days GE derives more revenue from its financial operations than it does from manufacturing — indeed, GE Capital, which received a government guarantee for its debt, was a major beneficiary of the Wall Street bailout. So what does the administration’s embrace of the rhetoric of competitiveness mean for economic policy? The favorable interpretation, as I said, is that it’s simply packaging for an economic strategy that’s centered on public investment, investment that’s actually about creating jobs now while promoting the nation’s longer-term growth. The unfavorable interpretation is that Obama and his advisers really believe that the economy is ailing because they’ve been too tough on business, and that what America needs now is corporate tax cuts and across-the-board deregulation. My guess is that we’re mainly talking about packaging here. And if the president does propose a serious increase in spending on infrastructure and education, I’ll be pleased. But even if he proposes good policies, the fact that Obama feels the need to wrap these policies in bad metaphors is a sad commentary on the state of our discourse. The financial crisis of 2008 was a teachable moment, an object lesson in what can go wrong if you trust a market economy to regulate itself.

#### No correlation between competitiveness and growth.

**Krugman 94** – joined The New York Times in 1999 as a columnist on the Op-Ed Page, professor of Economics and International Affairs at Princeton University, became the Ford International Professor of Economics at MIT, one of the founders of the "new trade theory," American Economic Association awarded him the John Bates Clark medal (Paul, “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession,” April 1994, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/49684/paul-krugman/competitiveness-a-dangerous-obsession>)

In fact, however, trying to define the competitiveness of a nation is much more problematic than defining that of a corporation. The bottom line for a corporation is literally its bottom line: if a corporation cannot afford to pay its workers, suppliers, and bondholders, it will go out of business. So when we say that a corporation is uncompetitive, we mean that its market position is unsustainable -- that unless it improves its performance, it will cease to exist. Countries, on the other hand, do not go out of business. They may be happy or unhappy with their economic performance, but they have no well-defined bottom line. As a result, the concept of national competitiveness is elusive. One might suppose, naively, that the bottom line of a national economy is simply its trade balance, that competitiveness can be measured by the ability of a country to sell more abroad than it buys. But in both theory and practice a trade surplus may be a sign of national weakness, a deficit a sign of strength. For example, Mexico was forced to run huge trade surpluses in the 1980s in order to pay the interest on its foreign debt since international investors refused to lend it any more money; it began to run large trade deficits after 1990 as foreign investors recovered confidence and began to pour in new funds. Would anyone want to describe Mexico as a highly competitive nation during the debt crisis era or describe what has happened since 1990 as a loss in competitiveness? Most writers who worry about the issue at all have therefore tried to define competitiveness as the combination of favorable trade performance and something else. In particular, the most popular definition of competitiveness nowadays runs along the lines of the one given in Council of Economic Advisors Chairman Laura D'Andrea Tyson's Who's Bashing Whom?: competitiveness is "our ability to produce goods and services that meet the test of international competition while our citizens enjoy a standard of living that is both rising and sustainable." This sounds reasonable. If you think about it, however, and test your thoughts against the facts, you will find out that there is much less to this definition than meets the eye. Consider, for a moment, what the definition would mean for an economy that conducted very little international trade, like the United States in the 1950s. For such an economy, the ability to balance its trade is mostly a matter of getting the exchange rate right. But because trade is such a small factor in the economy, the level of the exchange rate is a minor influence on the standard of living. So in an economy with very little international trade, the growth in living standards -- and thus "competitiveness" according to Tyson's definition -- would be determined almost entirely by domestic factors, primarily the rate of productivity growth. That's domestic productivity growth, period -- not productivity growth relative to other countries. In other words, for an economy with very little international trade, "competitiveness" would turn out to be a funny way of saying "productivity" and would have nothing to do with international competition. But surely this changes when trade becomes more important, as indeed it has for all major economies? It certainly could change. Suppose that a country finds that although its productivity is steadily rising, it can succeed in exporting only if it repeatedly devalues its currency, selling its exports ever more cheaply on world markets. Then its standard of living, which depends on its purchasing power over imports as well as domestically produced goods, might actually decline. In the jargon of economists, domestic growth might be outweighed by deteriorating terms of trade. So "competitiveness" could turn out really to be about international competition after all. There is no reason, however, to leave this as a pure speculation; it can easily be checked against the data. Have deteriorating terms of trade in fact been a major drag on the U.S. standard of living? Or has the rate of growth of U.S. real income continued essentially to equal the rate of domestic productivity growth, even though trade is a larger share of income than it used to be? To answer this question, one need only look at the national income accounts data the Commerce Department publishes regularly in the Survey of Current Business. The standard measure of economic growth in the United States is, of course, real gnp -- a measure that divides the value of goods and services produced in the United States by appropriate price indexes to come up with an estimate of real national output. The Commerce Department also, however, publishes something called "command gnp." This is similar to real gnp except that it divides U.S. exports not by the export price index, but by the price index for U.S. imports. That is, exports are valued by what Americans can buy with the money exports bring. Command gnp therefore measures the volume of goods and services the U.S. economy can "command" -- the nation's purchasing power -- rather than the volume it produces.\ And as we have just seen, "competitiveness" means something diFFerent from "productivity" if and only if purchasing power grows significantly more slowly than output. Well, here are the numbers. Over the period 1959-73, a period of vigorous growth in U.S. living standards and few concerns about international competition, real gnp per worker-hour grew 1.85 percent annually, while command gnp per hour grew a bit faster, 1.87 percent. From 1973 to 1990, a period of stagnating living standards, command gnp growth per hour slowed to 0.65 percent. Almost all (91 percent) of that slowdown, however, was explained by a decline in domestic productivity growth: real gnp per hour grew only 0.73 percent. Similar calculations for the European Community and Japan yield similar results. In each case, the growth rate of living standards essentially equals the growth rate of domestic productivity -- not productivity relative to competitors, but simply domestic productivity. Even though world trade is larger than ever before, national living standards are overwhelmingly determined by domestic factors rather than by some competition for world markets. How can this be in our interdependent world? Part of the answer is that the world is not as interdependent as you might think: countries are nothing at all like corporations. Even today, U.S. exports are only 10 percent of the value-added in the economy (which is equal to gnp). That is, the United States is still almost 90 percent an economy that produces goods and services for its own use.

**Competitiveness theories are flawed -- countries don’t engage in economic competition.**

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By contrast, even the largest corporation sells hardly any of its output to its own workers; the "exports" of General Motors -- its sales to people who do not work there -- are virtually all of its sales, which are more than 2.5 times the corporation's value-added. Moreover, countries do not compete with each other the way corporations do. Coke and Pepsi are almost purely rivals: only a negligible fraction of Coca-Cola's sales go to Pepsi workers, only a negligible fraction of the goods Coca-Cola workers buy are Pepsi products. So if Pepsi is successful, it tends to be at Coke's expense. But the major industrial countries, while they sell products that compete with each other, are also each other's main export markets and each other's main suppliers of useful imports. If the European economy does well, it need not be at U.S. expense; indeed, if anything a successful European economy is likely to help the U.S. economy by providing it with larger markets and selling it goods of superior quality at lower prices. International trade, then, is not a zero-sum game. When productivity rises in Japan, the main result is a rise in Japanese real wages; American or European wages are in principle at least as likely to rise as to fall, and in practice seem to be virtually unaffected. It would be possible to belabor the point, but the moral is clear: while competitive problems could arise in principle, as a practical, empirical matter the major nations of the world are not to any significant degree in economic competition with each other. Of course, there is always a rivalry for status and power -- countries that grow faster will see their political rank rise. So it is always interesting to compare countries. But asserting that Japanese growth diminishes U.S. status is very different from saying that it reduces the U.S. standard of living -- and it is the latter that the rhetoric of competitiveness asserts. One can, of course, take the position that words mean what we want them to mean, that all are free, if they wish, to use the term "competitiveness" as a poetic way of saying productivity, without actually implying that international competition has anything to do with it. But few writers on competitiveness would accept this view. They believe that the facts tell a very different story, that we live, as Lester Thurow put it in his best-selling book, Head to Head, in a world of "win-lose" competition between the leading economies. How is this belief possible?

#### Their internal link is just meaningless rhetoric.

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First, competitive images are exciting, and thrills sell tickets. The subtitle of Lester Thurow's huge best-seller, Head to Head, is "The Coming Economic Battle among Japan, Europe, and America"; the jacket proclaims that "the decisive war of the century has begun . . . and America may already have decided to lose." Suppose that the subtitle had described the real situation: "The coming struggle in which each big economy will succeed or fail based on its own efforts, pretty much independently of how well the others do." Would Thurow have sold a tenth as many books? Second, the idea that U.S. economic difficulties hinge crucially on our failures in international competition somewhat paradoxically makes those difficulties seem easier to solve. The productivity of the average American worker is determined by a complex array of factors, most of them unreachable by any likely government policy. So if you accept the reality that our "competitive" problem is really a domestic productivity problem pure and simple, you are unlikely to be optimistic about any dramatic turnaround. But if you can convince yourself that the problem is really one of failures in international competition that -- imports are pushing workers out of high-wage jobs, or subsidized foreign competition is driving the United States out of the high value-added sectors -- then the answers to economic malaise may seem to you to involve simple things like subsidizing high technology and being tough on Japan. Finally, many of the world's leaders have found the competitive metaphor extremely useful as a political device. The rhetoric of competitiveness turns out to provide a good way either to justify hard choices or to avoid them. The example of Delors in Copenhagen shows the usefulness of competitive metaphors as an evasion. Dealors had to say something at the Ec summit; yet to say anything that addressed the real roots of European unemployment would have involved huge political risks. By turning the discussion to essentially irrelevant but plausible-sounding questions of competitiveness, he bought himself some time to come up with a better answer (which to some extent he provided in December's white paper on the European economy -- a paper that still, however, retained "com petitiveness" in its rifle). By contrast, the well-received presentation of Bill Clinton's initial economic program in February 1993 showed the usefulness of competitive rhetoric as a motivation for tough policies. Clinton proposed a set of painful spending cuts and tax increases to reduce the Federal deficit. Why? The real reasons for cutting the deficit are disappointingly undramatic: the deficit siphons off funds that might otherwise have been productively invested, and thereby exerts a steady if small drag on U.S. economic growth. But Clinton was able instead to offer a stirring patriotic appeal, calling on the nation to act now in order to make the economy competitive in the global markets with the implication that dire economic consequences would follow if the United States does not. Many people who know that "competitiveness" is a largely meaningless concept have been willing to indulge competitive rhetoric precisely because they believe they can harness it in the service of good policies. An overblown fear of the Soviet Union was used in the 1950s to justify the building of the interstate highway system and the expansion of math and science education. Cannot the unjustified fears about foreign competition similarly be turned to good, used to justify serious efforts to reduce the budget deficit, rebuild infrastructure, and so on?

### A2 Krugman ’94 Outdated

#### Not outdated -- economic theories still apply.

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But the idea that broader economic performance is about being better than other countries at something or other — that a  country is like a corporation –is just wrong. I [wrote about this at length](http://www.pkarchive.org/global/pop.html) a long time ago, and everything I said then still holds true.\* The hopeful interpretation of Obama’s embrace of the idea that he’s the CEO of America Inc. is that it might help fend off right-wing attacks on government action as a whole, helping him sell the need for public investment of various kinds. On the other hand, as [Robert Reich says](http://robertreich.org/post/2863461038), this could all too easily turn into a validation of the claim that what’s good for corporations is good for America, which is even less true now than it used to be. All in all, it’s kind of sad. And the less said about Jeffrey Immelt’s [vacuous op-ed](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/20/AR2011012007089.html), the better. \*Side note: the usual suspects are going to look at the opening of this piece and say “Ha! Krugman used to think that unemployment benefits cause unemployment! He used to be down on Europe!” So, two points: UI can raise the unemployment rate at which inflation begins to rise — but that’s not our problem now; and over the 17 years since that article was published, a number of European countries have undertaken reforms that substantially improved their job performance.

### Econ Leadership

#### Economic leadership fails -- US isn’t using it effectively, and a litany of domestic failures prevent it from being successful anyway.

#### Suominen, 7-6-12

[Kati, resident fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States in Washington, “America the Absent,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/06/america\_the\_absent]

The release of another weak U.S. jobs report this Friday, July 6 -- which showed the economy adding only 80,000 jobs in June and the unemployment rate holding steady at 8.2 percent -- raises some serious red flags. It's just one of many signs these days that the world economy is once again on the brink of an abyss. Nearly four years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, U.S. growth is flailing, central banks are racing to cut interest rates, and several European nations have plunged back into recession. Instead of powering the 21st-century world economy, export-dependent emerging markets remain hostage to the transatlantic economic morass. We should be out of this by now. The missing ingredient? U.S. leadership. In the 20th century, beginning with the creation of the Bretton Woods system in 1944, America's great contribution was to champion an economic paradigm and set of institutions that promoted open markets and economic stability around the world. The successive Groups of Five, Seven, and Eight, first formed in the early 1970s, helped coordinate macroeconomic policies among the world's leading economies and combat global financial imbalances that burdened U.S. trade politics. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) spread the Washington Consensus across Asia and Latin America, and shepherded economies in transition toward capitalism. Eight multilateral trade rounds brought down barriers to global commerce, culminating in the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. Meanwhile, a wave of bank deregulation and financial liberalization began in the United States and proliferated around the world, making credit more available and affordable while propelling consumption and entrepreneurship the world over. The U.S. dollar, the world's venerable reserve currency, economized global transactions and fueled international trade. Central bank independence spread from Washington to the world and helped usher in the Great Moderation, which has produced a quarter-century of low and steady inflation around the world. Globalization was not wished into being: It was the U.S.-led order that generated prosperity unimaginable only a few decades ago. Since 1980, global GDP has quadrupled, world trade has grown more than sixfold, the stock of foreign direct investment has shot up by 20 times, and portfolio capital flows have surged to almost $200 trillion annually, roughly four times the size of the global economy. Economic reforms and global economic integration helped vibrant emerging markets emerge: The "Asian Tigers" (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) that boomed in the 1980s were joined in the 1990s by the awakening giants of Brazil, China, and India. It was the United States that quarterbacked the play, brokering differences among nations and providing the right mix of global public goods: a universal reserve currency, an open-trade regime, deep financial markets, and vigorous economic growth. Trade liberalization alone paid off handsomely, adding $1 trillion annually to the postwar U.S. economy. Talk about American decline notwithstanding, the economic order created by the United States persists. In fact, at first blush, it appears to have only been reinforced in the past few years. New institutions such as the G-20, a forum for the world's leading economies, and the Financial Stability Board, a watchdog for the international financial system, are but sequels to U.S.-created entities: the Group of Five and the Financial Stability Forum. Investors still view America as a financial safe haven, and the dollar remains the world's lead currency. Open markets have survived, and 1930s-style protectionism has not materialized. The WTO continues to resolve trade disputes and recently welcomed Russia as its 154th member, while the mission and resources of the Bretton Woods twins -- the World Bank and IMF -- have only expanded. No country has pulled out of these institutions; instead, emerging nations such as China and India are demanding greater power at the table. Countries have opted in, not out, of the American-led order, reflecting a reality of global governance: There are no rival orders that can yet match this one's promise of mutual economic gains. Still, while the American order is peerless, it is also imperiled. The deepening European debt crisis, discord over national policies to restore growth, and the all-but-dead Doha Development Round of WTO negotiations speak to the failures of the global economy's existing instruments to manage 21st-century challenges. Instead of coordinating policies, leading countries are trapped in a prisoner's dilemma, elbowing for an edge in world trade and jockeying for power on the world stage. Tensions simmer over issues such as exchange-rate manipulation, capital controls, creeping protectionism, and financial nationalism. Right at the moment when we most need to shore up the troubled global economic order, America -- the architect of this very order -- is failing to lead. Even as the United States remains pivotal to global growth, U.S. corporations -- the engines of the American economy -- are stifled by taxes, regulations, and policy uncertainty. Gaping fiscal deficits in the United States are undermining the dollar, exacerbating trade deficits, and undercutting U.S. economic dynamism and credibility in world affairs, but political posturing has obstructed the country's path to solvency. Earlier this week, the IMF warned that if political deadlock takes America to the so-called fiscal cliff of automatic tax hikes and spending cuts in January 2013, it could have a devastating impact on the U.S. and world economies. No wonder America's image as the global economic superpower is receding around the world. Europe's travails, meanwhile, are reducing U.S. companies' exports and overseas profits, threatening America's recovery. And yet Congress has balked at boosting the IMF's resources to fight the eurozone crisis while the Obama administration has deflected responsibility, framing the crisis as Europe's to manage. It has fallen to countries such as Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and Russia to instead build the firewall that will shield the rest of the world from Europe. The welcome momentum in negotiations between the United States and Pacific Rim countries on the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement does not undo over three years of drift in U.S. trade policy that has jeopardized the very global trading system that the United States built and powered in the postwar era. The only trade deals that the Obama administration has passed -- with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea -- were launched and negotiated by the Bush administration. The world is now facing a triple threat of global economic instability, divisions among top powers, and a global leadership vacuum. This perfect storm could produce a world disorder of mercurial financial markets, widening global imbalances, spreading state capitalism, and beggar-thy-neighbor protectionism -- a scenario with a sorry past and few safe exits. In the late 1940s, a new world order arose because of American strength, vision, and leadership, not because global governance was in vogue. Leadership was never easy: Resistance from allies, protectionist pressures at home, and resource-draining wars all stood in the way. But capitalism spread, trade and financial markets were liberalized, and emerging-market crises were defeated. Global economic integration forged ahead. Today, American leadership is again essential. China prioritizes mercantilism over multilateralism, and emerging nations have yet to fully step up to the plate when it comes to global governance, while Europe and Japan are neither able nor willing to lead. In placing their faith in multilateralism, liberal institutionalists often fail to realize that the world economic order is built on American primacy and power, and Washington's willingness to project it. To lead abroad, the United States must reform at home by imposing ironclad fiscal discipline, cutting taxes and red tape for businesses, and locking in long-term policies -- summoning the private sector to reform schools and rebuild infrastructure, for instance -- that harness the productivity of America's future generations. Abroad, the United States needs to focus on pre-empting instability and integrating the global economy. It should push the IMF to address financial risks before they mushroom into catastrophes, revise the multilateral trade regime to allow for fast deals among a critical mass of members rather than agonizing, decade-long talks requiring the consent of the full membership, and work toward unfettered global financial markets -- all the while deepening access to U.S. goods, services, and investment around the world. A Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement and a transatlantic free trade pact are low-hanging fruits that can jump-start global growth without any new stimulus dollars. The quintessential challenge facing U.S. policymakers is to convince other nations to buy into a rules-based order rather than respond to the siren calls of currency wars and capital controls. For example, with most emerging economies uneasy about Beijing's trade and foreign policies, Washington must incentivize others to take the high ground and strengthen investor protections, enforce intellectual property rights, and adhere to trade rules. With others playing by the rules of the game, a misbehaving China would be turned into a pariah. A stable, integrated, and growing world economy serves our national interests. But such a world is America's to make.

### Resource Wars

#### No resource wars -- scarcity doesn’t cause war.

**Victor 08**­-a professor of law at Stanford Law School and the director of the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development. He is also a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, where he directed a task force on energy security. A frequent writer on natural resources policy(David G., “Smoke and Mirrors”, The National Interest, January 2, 2008, http://nationalinterest.org/article/smoke-and-mirrors-1924)//sjl

MY ARGUMENT is that classic resource wars-hot conflicts driven by a struggle to grab resources-are increasingly rare. Even where resources play a role, they are rarely the root cause of bloodshed. Rather, the root cause usually lies in various failures of governance. That argument-in both its classic form and in its more nuanced incarnation-is hardly a straw man, as Thomas Homer-Dixon asserts. Setting aside hyperbole, the punditry increasingly points to resources as a cause of war. And so do social scientists and policy analysts, even with their more nuanced views. I've triggered this debate because conventional wisdom puts too much emphasis on resources as a cause of conflict. Getting the story right has big implications for social scientists trying to unravel cause-and-effect and often even larger implications for public policy.Michael Klare is right to underscore Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, the only classic resource conflict in recent memory. That episode highlights two of the reasons why classic resource wars are becoming rare-they're expensive and rarely work. (And even in Kuwait's case, many other forces also spurred the invasion. Notably, Iraq felt insecure with its only access to the sea a narrow strip of land sandwiched between Kuwait on one side and its archenemy Iran on the other.) In the end, Saddam lost resources on the order of $100 billion (plus his country and then his head) in his quest for Kuwait's 1.5 million barrels per day of combined oil and gas output. By contrast, Exxon paid $80 billion to get Mobil's 1.7 million barrels per day of oil and gas production-a merger that has held and flourished. As the bulging sovereign wealth funds are discovering, it is easier to get resources through the stock exchange than the gun barrel.

#### Resource wars are highly unlikely and never escalate.

#### Salehyan, ‘8

[Idean, Prof. Pol. Sci. -- North Texas, Journal of Peace Research, “From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet”, 45:3, Sage, DOI: 10.1177/0022343308088812]

A few caveats are in order here. It is important to note, again, that the most severe effects of climate change are likely to be felt in the future, and the future is inherently uncertain.4 While fundamental shifts in the environment are not inconceivable, our best bet for predicting what is to come is to look at what has transpired in the past. Since it is frequently argued that climate change will lead to resource scarcities and exacerbate inequality, it is possible to draw upon past evidence regarding these factors to develop a sense of how conflicts might unfold given changes in the Earth’s atmosphere. Additionally, I do not take issue with the claim that climate change will present considerable challenges for human societies and ecosystems more generally. Humanitarian crises stemming, in part, from climate change have the potential to be severe, and steps must be taken quickly to attenuate such contingencies. Rather, my purpose here is to underscore the point that environmental processes, by themselves, cannot explain why, where, and when fighting will occur; rather, the interaction between environmental and political systems is critical for understanding organized armed violence. First, the deterministic view has poor predictive power as to where and when conflicts will break out. For every potential example of an environmental catastrophe or resource shortfall that leads to violence, there are many more counter-examples in which conflict never occurs. But popular accounts typically do not look at the dogs that do not bark. Darfur is frequently cited as a case where desertification led to food scarcity, water scarcity, and famine, in turn leading to civil war and ethnic cleansing.5 Yet, food scarcity and hunger are problems endemic to many countries – particularly in sub-Saharan Africa – but similar problems elsewhere have not led to large-scale violence. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, food shortages and malnutrition affect more than a third of the population in Malawi, Zambia, the Comoros, North Korea, and Tanzania,6 although none of these countries have experienced fullblown civil war and state failure. Hurricanes, coastal flooding, and droughts – which are all likely to intensify as the climate warms – are frequent occurrences which rarely lead to violence. The Asian Tsunami of 2004, although caused by an oceanic earthquake, led to severe loss of life and property, flooding, population displacement, and resource scarcity, but it did not trigger new wars in Southeast Asia. Large-scale migration has the potential to provoke conflict in receiving areas (see Reuveny, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006), yet most migration flows do not lead to conflict, and, in this regard, social integration and citizenship policies are particularly important (Gleditsch, Nordås & Salehyan, 2007). In short, resource scarcity, natural disasters, and long-term climatic shifts are ubiquitous, while armed conflict is rare; therefore, environmental conditions, by themselves, cannot predict violent outbreaks. Second, even if local skirmishes over access to resources arise, these do not always escalate to open warfare and state collapse. While interpersonal violence is more or less common and may intensify under resource pressures, sustained armed conflict on a massive scale is difficult to conduct. Meier, Bond & Bond (2007) show that, under certain circumstances, environmental conditions have led to cattle raiding among pastoralists in East Africa, but these conflicts rarely escalate to sustained violence. Martin (2005) presents evidence from Ethiopia that, while a large refugee influx and population pressures led to localized conflict over natural resources, effective resource management regimes were able to ameliorate these tensions. Both of these studies emphasize the role of local dispute-resolution regimes and institutions – not just the response of central governments – in preventing resource conflicts from spinning out of control. Martin’s analysis also points to the importance of international organizations, notably the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in implementing effective policies governing refugee camps. Therefore, local hostilities need not escalate to serious armed conflict and can be managed if there is the political will to do so.

**Empirics prove.**

**Salehyan 07**-PHD from UCSD in Political Science, now a professor of Politcal science at the University of North Texas(Idean, “The new myth about climate change”, foreignpolicy.com, August 14, 2007, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2007/08/13/the\_new\_myth\_about\_climate\_change)//sjl

Furthermore, if famine and drought led to the crisis in Darfur, why have scores of environmental catastrophes failed to set off armed conflict elsewhere? For instance, the U.N. World Food Programme warns that 5 million people in Malawi have been experiencing chronic food shortages for several years. But famine-wracked Malawi has yet to experience a major civil war. Similarly, the Asian tsunami in 2004 killed hundreds of thousands of people, generated millions of environmental refugees, and led to severe shortages of shelter, food, clean water, and electricity. Yet the tsunami, one of the most extreme catastrophes in recent history, did not lead to an outbreak of resource wars. Clearly then, there is much more to armed conflict than resource scarcity and natural disasters.

### Resource Wars – Food

#### Famine doesn’t cause war -- it makes people too hungry to fight.

#### Barnett, ‘00

[Jon, Australian Research Council fellow and Senior Lecturer in Development Studies @ Melbourne U. School of Social and Environmental Enquiry, Review of International Studies, “Destabilizing the environment-conflict Thesis”, 26:271-288, Cambridge Journals Online]

Considerable attention has been paid to the links between population, the environment and conflict. The standard argument is that population growth will overextend the natural resources of the immediate environs, leading to deprivation which, it is assumed, will lead to conflict and instability either directly through competition for scarce resources, or indirectly through the generation of ‘environmental refugees’. For example, according to Myers: ‘so great are the stresses generated by too many people making too many demands on their natural-resource stocks and their institutional support systems, that the pressures often create first-rate breeding grounds for conflict’.37 The ways in which population growth leads to environmental degradation are reasonably well known. However, the particular ways in which this leads to conflict are difficult to prove. In the absence of proof there is a negative style of argumentation, and there are blanket assertions and abrogations; for example: ‘the relationship is rarely causative in a direct fashion’, but ‘we may surmise that conflict would not arise so readily, nor would it prove so acute, if the associated factor of population growth were occurring at a more manageable rate’.38 It is possible though, that rather than inducing warfare, overpopulation and famine reduce the capacity of a people to wage war. Indeed, it is less the case that famines in Africa in recent decades have produced ‘first rate breeding grounds for conflict’; the more important, pressing, and avoidable product is widespread malnutrition and large loss of life.

### Trade

#### Trade is resilient.

**Chicago Tribune, ‘8**

[“After Doha,” 8-9, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/chi-0809edit2aug09,0,7859688.story]

Even people involved daily in ongoing international trade aren't reacting much differently. They're buying and selling goods across borders and oceans, dealing with the logistical complications of high oil prices, currency fluctuations, the price of labor, unit cost, quality control and the like. This doesn't mean that a successful completion of the Doha talks wouldn't have mattered. It's a big deal that for the first time in half a century, global trade talks have failed. The Doha talks—seven years in negotiation—would have slashed farm subsidies and further opened markets for manufactured goods and services. But with or without Doha, countries will continue to trade aggressively. The benefits and opportunities are just too great. International trade expanded from 40 percent of the world economy in 1990 to more than 55 percent by 2004, according to the World Bank. The fastest growing countries—among them China, Vietnam, Ireland—were those that expanded their trade. Countries left behind, including much of sub-Saharan Africa, traded the least. Even with the current slowdown in the international economy, the WTO predicts that trade will still grow 4.5 percent this year. (That will be down from 8.5 percent in 2006 and 5.5 percent last year.)

#### Trade doesn’t solve war.

#### Gelpi & Greico, ‘5

[Christopher, Associate Professor of Political Science -- Duke, Joseph, Professor of Political Science -- Duke, “Democracy, Interdependence, and the Sources of the Liberal Peace,” Journal of Peace Research]

As we have already emphasized, increasing levels of trade between an autocratic and democratic country are unlikely to constrain the former from initiating militarized disputes against the latter. As depicted in Figure 1, our analysis indicates that an increase in trade dependence by an autocratic challenger on a democratic target from zero to 5% of the former's GDP would increase the probability of the challenger’s dispute initiation from about 0.31% to 0.29%. Thus, the overall probability of dispute initiation by an autocratic country against a democracy is fairly high (given the rarity of disputes) at 23 nearly .3% per country per year. Moreover, increased trade does little or nothing to alter that risk. Increases in trade dependence also have little effect on the likelihood that one autocracy will initiate a conflict with another. In this instance, the probability of dispute initiation remains constant at 0.33% regardless of the challenger’s level of trade dependence.

### Trade – Protectionism

#### No protectionism and no impact on trade -- multiple international checks.

#### Dadush et al., ‘11

[Uri, senior associate and director in Carnegie’s new International Economics Program, currently focuses on trends in the global economy and the global financial crisis, previously served as the World Bank’s director of international trade and before that as director of economic policy. He also served as the director of the Bank’s world economy group, leading the preparation of the Bank’s flagship reports on the international economy, Shimelse Ali, economist, Carnegie’s International Economics Program, Rachel Esplin Odell, junior fellow in Carnegie’s Asia Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Is Protectionism Dying?”, May, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/is_protectionism_dying.pdf>]

Despite a limited increase in the incidence of protectionist measures during the recent financial and economic crisis, the effects on global trade appear small—the world, remarkably, did not resort to protectionism. In addition to the concerted stimulus measures, financial rescues, and the strengthening of lender-of-last-resort facilities that restricted the duration and depth of the economic downturn, the World Trade Organization’s disciplines, enforceable through its dispute settlement mechanism, no doubt played an important role in staving off trade protection. But this is only one part of the story. The increased resistance to protectionism is the result of a complex, mutually reinforcing set of legal and structural changes in the world economy that have made a return to protection more costly and disruptive and have established new vested interests in open markets. These changes include: • National disciplines: Along with autonomous liberalization and a generally robust rule of law in the largest trading countries—which improve the confidence of importers and exporters—national trade tribunals help prevent protectionism by providing a mechanism whereby individual firms can contest protectionist measures that impact their company. Many national governments have also developed explicit or implicit mechanisms for countering protectionism and ensuring that trade policy reflects the general interest. • Regional and bilateral agreements: In addition to codifying further tariff reductions, regional trade agreements—now covering over half of world trade—contain provisions establishing dispute settlement mechanisms that parties can use to contest violations of the agreement and thereby defend against protectionism. Furthermore, such agreements have often established regular high-level dialogues on trade disputes, treaty implementation, and further liberalization, providing a mechanism for resolving serious violations of the agreement even if its formal juridical mechanisms are not utilized. • “Facts on the ground”: The political resistance to backsliding on liberalization is stronger because trade has become more prevalent and inextricably woven into production and consumption patterns. The change in the political economy of protectionism is manifested in the increased interest of retailers and consumers in imports, the internationalization of production, and the rise of intrafirm trade. Limiting trade in any one sector not only hurts those consumers, retailers, and firms that depend on imports for inputs, but also has repercussions for firms that operate both vertically (within a sector) and horizontally (across sectors) that depend on complex global production chains.

#### Protectionism is not relevant to war -- other factors outweigh.

Hulsman et al., ‘3

[John, PhD, Research fellow in European affairs at the Heritage Foundatiion’s Davis Institute, Joshua Bridwell and Eric Hamilton, “The Myth of Interdependence,” August 20, http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-myth-of-interdependence-2412]

As realization of this phenomenon increases, it is disturbingly common for analysts to develop false conclusions based upon a superficial understanding of globalization. Perhaps the most prevalent and beguiling mirage of all is the notion of a universal "interdependence." Implicit in the arguments of interdependence proponents is the premise that interdependence affects all nations to roughly the same extent --that it acts as a blanket phenomenon, restraining all that are involved to the same degree. Clearly this is not true. Consider this hypothetical. Would Australian foreign policy have been affected if it had strenuously opposed America's efforts in Iraq? Would Canberra have been likely to abrogate the ANZUS treaty because of its people's opposition to the Iraq war? Hardly, as Australia undoubtedly benefits from the American military alliance serving as life insurance in the volatile Asian region. Would it be likely to impose an embargo on the U.S.? Nonsense, as it greatly benefits from trade with America. In fact the opposite is true: it has long been a goal of Australian foreign policy to secure a free trade agreement (FTA) with Washington --Iraq war or no. Would Australia refuse to continue closely sharing intelligence with America? Impossible, as the Bali bombing illustrated that Canberra is a major target of Al-Qaeda, along with the United States. Or would certain Australian diplomats simply snub Americans at cocktail parties? For in the end, that is what "disapproval" with America often amounts to. While interdependence does mean that there is always mutual vulnerability, in the case of the U.S. and Australia (and indeed in every case), this is not the salient feature of the relationship. Rather, Australia's far greater dependence on the U.S. conditions foreign policy decision-making at the highest levels --but not necessarily the other way around. The Wilsonian habit of misunderstanding the nature of interdependence is far from an esoteric error. For despite what many foreign policy practitioners believe, policy outputs flow naturally from first principle intellectual assumptions. By overrating the universal impact of interdependence theory, Wilsonians naturally see the present order as fundamentally multipolar, and devise policies to fit this ‘reality.' Unfortunately, the real world does not correspond to their assessment, thus dooming their policy initiatives to failure. In the turbulence of a changing world order, one particular paradigm has been almost totally neglected. Ironically, we have abandoned realism-the one doctrine that can best navigate our role in the uni-multipolar world we find ourselves in. For, if we hold that the attempt to remake our global history of conflict and chaos into a hopeful future of peaceful order is but an illusion, then we must accept the anarchic nature of our world and attempt to live in it as best we can. Specifically, we must create policies that recognize and place our national interest above all other priorities. This reality is largely reinforced by the current nature of interdependence. The Wilsonian view suggests it binds all states with equivalent strength, while the realist outlook allows that interdependence in the economic arena is very much part and parcel of the modern world, but does not in fact affect all states equally. As illustrated by the U.S.-Australia hypothetical, a power hierarchy characterizes interdependence. Countries that possess the preponderance of power are able to significantly influence the policy outcomes of weaker states (assuming such states do not perceive overriding security/geopolitical concerns). Such will it ever be.

## Europe & Russia

### Europe War

#### Nationalism and instability inevitable, but they won’t cause EU war.

#### Walt, ‘11

[Stephen, Robert and Rene Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School, 8-18, “The coming erosion of the European Union,” <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/18/the_coming_erosion_of_the_european_union>]

I began with the rather obvious point that the highwater mark of Europe's global influence was past, and argued that it would be of declining strategic importance in the future. The logic is simple: After dominating global politics from roughly 1500 to 1900, Europe's relative weight in world affairs has declined sharply ever since. Europe's population is shrinking and aging, and its share of the world economy is shrinking too. For example, in 1900, Europe plus America produced over 50 percent of the world economy and Asia produced less than 20 percent. Today, however, the ten largest economies in Asia have a combined GDP greater than Europe or the United States, and the Asian G10 will have about 50 percent of gross world product by 2050. Europe's current fiscal woes are adding to this problem, and forcing European governments to reduce their already modest military capabilities even more. This isn't necessarily a big problem for Europeans, however, because they don't face any significant conventional military threats. But it does mean that Europe's ability to shape events in other parts of the world will continue to decline. Please note: I am not saying the Europe is becoming completely irrelevant, only that its strategic importance has declined significantly and that this trend will continue. Second, I also argued that the highwater mark of European unity is also behind us. This is a more controversial claim, and it's entirely possible that I'll be proven wrong here. Nonetheless, there are several obvious reasons why the EU is going to have real trouble going forward. The EU emerged in the aftermath of World War II. It was partly intended as a mechanism to bind European states together and prevent another European war, but it was also part of a broader Western European effort to create enough economic capacity to balance the Soviet Union. Europeans were not confident that the United States would remain engaged and committed to their defense (and there were good reasons for these doubts), and they understood that economic integration would be necessary to create an adequate counterweight to Soviet power. As it turned out, the United States did remain committed to Europe, which is why the Europeans never got serious about creating an integrated military capacity. They were willing to give up some sovereignty to Brussels, but not that much. European elites got more ambitious in the 1980s and 1990s, and sought to enhance Europe's role by expanding the size of the EU and by making various institutional reforms, embodied in the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties. This broad effort had some positive results -- in particular, the desire for EU membership encouraged East European candidates to adopt democractic reforms and guarantees for minority rights -- but the effort did not lead to a significant deepening in political integration and is now in serious trouble. Among other things, the Lisbon Treaty sought to give the positions of council president and High Representative for Foreign Affairs greater stature, so that Europe could finally speak with "one voice." Thus far, that effort has been something of a bust. The current incumbents -- Herman von Rompuy of Belgium and Catherine Ashton of Britain -- are not exactly politicians of great prominence or clout, and it is hardly surprising that it is national leaders like Nicolas Sarkozy of France and Angela Merkel of Germany that have played the leading roles in dealing with Europe's current troubles. As has long been the case, national governments remain where the action is. Today, European integration is threatened by 1) the lack of an external enemy, which removes a major incentive for deep cooperation, 2) the unwieldy nature of EU decision-making, where 27 countries of very different sizes and wealth have to try to reach agreement by consensus, 3) the misguided decision to create a common currency, but without creating the political and economic institutions needed to support it, and 4) nationalism, which remains a powerful force throughout Europe and has been gathering steam in recent years. It is possible that these challenges will force the EU member-states to eventually adopt even deeper forms of political integration, as some experts have already advised. One could view the recent Franco-German agreement on coordinating economic policy in this light, except that the steps proposed by Merkel and Sarkozy were extremely modest. I don't think the EU is going to fall apart, but prolonged stagnation and gradual erosion seems likely. Hence my belief that the heyday of European political integration is behind us. Third, I argued that the glory days of transatlantic security cooperation also lie in the past, and we will see less cooperative and intimate security partnership between Europe and America in the future. Why do I think so? One obvious reason is the lack of common external enemy. Historically, that is the only reason why the United States was willing to commit troops to Europe, and it is therefore no surprise that America's military presence in Europe has declined steadily ever since the Soviet Union broke up. Simply put: there is no threat to Europe that the Europeans cannot cope with on their own, and thus little role for Americans to play. In addition, the various imperial adventures that NATO has engaged in since 1992 haven't worked out that well. It was said in the 1990s that NATO had to "go out of area or out of business," which is one reason it started planning for these operations, but most of the missions NATO has taken on since then have been something of a bust. Intervention in the Balkans eventually ended the fighting there, but it took longer and cost more than anyone expected and it's not even clear that it really worked (i.e., if NATO peacekeepers withdrew from Kosovo tomorrow, fighting might start up again quite soon). NATO was divided over the war in Iraq, and ISAF's disjointed effort in Afghanistan just reminds us why Napoleon always said he liked to fight against coalitions. The war in Libya could produce another disappointing result, depending on how it plays out. Transatlantic security cooperation might have received a new lease on life if all these adventures had gone swimmingly; unfortunately, that did not prove to be the case. But this raises the obvious question: If the United States isn't needed to protect Europe and there's little positive that the alliance can accomplish anywhere else, then what's it for? Lastly, transatlantic security cooperation will decline because the United States will be shifting its strategic focus to Asia. The central goal of US grand strategy is to maintain hegemony in the Western hemisphere and to prevent other great powers from achieving hegemony in their regions. For the foreseeable future, the only potential regional hegemon is China. There will probably be an intense security competition there, and the United States will therefore be deepening its security ties with a variety of Asian partners. Europe has little role to play in this competition, however, and little or no incentive to get involved. Over time, Asia will get more and more attention from the U.S. foreign policy establishment, and Europe will get less. This trend will be reinforced by demographic and generational changes on both sides of the Atlantic, as the percentage of Americans with strong ancestral connections to Europe declines and as the generation that waged the Cold War leaves the stage. So in addition to shifting strategic interests, some of the social glue that held Europe and America together is likely to weaken as well. It is important not to overstate this trend -- Europe and America won't become enemies, and I don't think intense security competition is going to break out within Europe anytime soon. Europe and the United States will continue to trade and invest with each other, and we will continue to collaborate on a number of security issues (counter-terrorism, intelligence sharing, counter-proliferation, etc.). But Europe won't be America's "go-to" partner in the decades ahead, at least not the way it once was.

### EU Good

#### EU decline inevitable.

#### Walt, ‘11

[Stephen, Robert and Rene Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School, 8-18, “The coming erosion of the European Union,” <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/18/the_coming_erosion_of_the_european_union>]

Second, I also argued that the highwater mark of European unity is also behind us. This is a more controversial claim, and it's entirely possible that I'll be proven wrong here. Nonetheless, there are several obvious reasons why the EU is going to have real trouble going forward. The EU emerged in the aftermath of World War II. It was partly intended as a mechanism to bind European states together and prevent another European war, but it was also part of a broader Western European effort to create enough economic capacity to balance the Soviet Union. Europeans were not confident that the United States would remain engaged and committed to their defense (and there were good reasons for these doubts), and they understood that economic integration would be necessary to create an adequate counterweight to Soviet power. As it turned out, the United States did remain committed to Europe, which is why the Europeans never got serious about creating an integrated military capacity. They were willing to give up some sovereignty to Brussels, but not that much. European elites got more ambitious in the 1980s and 1990s, and sought to enhance Europe's role by expanding the size of the EU and by making various institutional reforms, embodied in the Maastricht and Lisbon treaties. This broad effort had some positive results -- in particular, the desire for EU membership encouraged East European candidates to adopt democractic reforms and guarantees for minority rights -- but the effort did not lead to a significant deepening in political integration and is now in serious trouble. Among other things, the Lisbon Treaty sought to give the positions of council president and High Representative for Foreign Affairs greater stature, so that Europe could finally speak with "one voice." Thus far, that effort has been something of a bust. The current incumbents -- Herman von Rompuy of Belgium and Catherine Ashton of Britain -- are not exactly politicians of great prominence or clout, and it is hardly surprising that it is national leaders like Nicolas Sarkozy of France and Angela Merkel of Germany that have played the leading roles in dealing with Europe's current troubles. As has long been the case, national governments remain where the action is. Today, European integration is threatened by 1) the lack of an external enemy, which removes a major incentive for deep cooperation, 2) the unwieldy nature of EU decision-making, where 27 countries of very different sizes and wealth have to try to reach agreement by consensus, 3) the misguided decision to create a common currency, but without creating the political and economic institutions needed to support it, and 4) nationalism, which remains a powerful force throughout Europe and has been gathering steam in recent years. It is possible that these challenges will force the EU member-states to eventually adopt even deeper forms of political integration, as some experts have already advised. One could view the recent Franco-German agreement on coordinating economic policy in this light, except that the steps proposed by Merkel and Sarkozy were extremely modest. I don't think the EU is going to fall apart, but prolonged stagnation and gradual erosion seems likely. Hence my belief that the heyday of European political integration is behind us.

#### Decline causes NATO resurgence, checks the impact.

#### Goure, ‘11

[Daniel, Ph.D., Early Warning Blog, Lexington Institute Defense Professionals, 9-23, “Coming EU Collapse Could Re-energize NATO,” http://www.defpro.com/news/details/28104/?SID=50824a11d84c46b49aa469947308327b]

It is ironic that the Euro’s decline and the EU’s possible demise is likely to be a boon for NATO. Absent a strong and expanding EU, NATO will be the sole gravitational force exerting a cohesive influence across the continent. NATO already includes several countries who are not members of the EU; this number will grow significantly if a Euro crisis occurs. Most important, NATO will have to stand guard over Europe during a time that may come to resemble economic and even politically the 1930s. NATO can help stabilize weak European governments under tremendous stress. It also can deter outside powers from seeking to take advantage of Europe's temporary weakness. Finally, NATO provides the best means for leveraging what is likely to be a shrinking stock of trans-Atlantic military capabilities. Despite its contributions to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Libya, it has become fashionable in recent years in some circles to dismiss NATO as a quaint anachronism. It may well turn out that NATO will prove to be the most important US security relationship of the 21st Century.

### Balkans War

#### No Balkans war.

#### Siletsky, ‘11

[Igor, Voice of Russia, 4-26, “Do the Balkans want a War?” http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/04/26/49426351.html]

The Balkans are on the verge of a new war, Western political observers and analysts have been saying. They believe that a precedent for the worsening of the situation was given to the countries of the Former Yugoslavia by the international community, when it sentenced Croatian General Ante Gotovina. For their part, Russian political analysts who see no prerequisites for a new conflict, say that a new outbreak of tensions is beneficial for the West. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY or The Hague Tribunal) delivered a verdict for three Croatian generals on April 15th. All of them were accused of committing crimes against the Serbs during Operation Storm 1995. According to the court ruling, Ante Gotovina was sentenced to 24 years in prison, Mladen Markac – to 18 years, and the third defendant Ivan Cermac – was acquitted. So why has the verdict triggered such stormy emotions not only among the Croats but also in the Western countries. The point is that throughout the history of the existence of The Hague Tribunal the key defendant for the UN court, who was often referred to as “Doctor Evil” was Yugoslavia’s last president Milosevic and of course, his supporters and Serbia itself. There even appeared people in some countries in Europe and in the USA who started saying that the justice of The Hague was one-sided. This postulate needed no proofs for either Russia or the other countries, which were not involved in the “anti-Yugoslav coalition”. However, judging by the facts, those in The Hague have decided to improve their image and to put into life the principle that was declared by the tribunal itself, that is, that “all sides are to blame for the atrocities and that no nation was more responsible than the other”. As a result, the Croatian generals, who were accused of ousting 100,000 peaceful civilians and of murdering hundreds of Serbs, were jailed. As it might seem, justice was obtained. And the fact that the Croats have got angry is simply an expected “side effect”. However, what followed was that the angry “progressive public”- meaning the leading Western media - has undertaken to conduct an investigation of its own. “The Washington Times”, “The Wall Street Journal”, Newsweek, and “The Jerusalem Post”, after studying Storm Operation 1995, came to the conclusion that Ante Gotovina had committed no crimes at all. Moreover, the general is a real Croatian patriot and hero, and that his campaign had not only restored Croatia’s territorial integrity but had also destroyed the dream of the deceased Serb ruler Slobodan Milosevic about “Greater Serbia”. Besides, the Western editions said that by its irresponsible verdicts The Hague Tribunal is stirring up a new war. The first thought that comes to mind after reading all these “journalist investigations” is that the West wants to preserve the status quo in the Balkans, which suits it. In this system Belgrade acts as a “guilty child”, who is still under punishment. And all the other parts of the Former Yugoslavia act as sufferers, whose sufferings are linked on the violent “senior” and who receive small presents and bonuses in consolation. Thus, Kosovo has obtained independence, and Croatia is only one step away from the accession into the European Union (EU). By the way, the Croats themselves are not looking forward to this. However, there’re other reasons as well. Should The Hague Tribunal start conducting an unbiased investigation, many influential persons will be surely hurt. And not only in the Balkans. Suffice it to mention here the information concerning the current Kosovo authorities that was made public by the former ICTY chief prosecutor Carla Del Ponte - that Pristina was involved in the trafficking of human organs. And that not only the Croats also killed the Serbs and not only vice versa. That is why it is necessary to continue studying the latest Balkan crisis, the Head of the Centre For the Study of the Modern Balkan Crisis under the Institute of Slavic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yelena Guskova says: "The new data about the human organ trafficking and about the atrocities, committed by the Croats , offer proof that it is necessary to study the Balkan crisis and that it is necessary to be objective while doing this. Of course, there’re many conflicts in the world. But if we start analyzing how all the other countries developed in the 90s and what occurred to the Balkans and to the post-Balkan space, we’ll undoubtedly arrive at the conclusion that the Serbs, the Croats and the Muslims have already suffered too much. They have no potential to take up arms again. Thus, to say that a new war will break out in the Balkans soon is no good."

### Nagorno-Karabakh

#### Long timeframe.

#### Gorenburg, ‘10

[Dmitry, Harvard University, Executive Director American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 7-11, “Russia benefits from unsettled conflict in Karabakh – analyst,” http://www.news.az/articles/17318]

**Can you predict the further script in the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno Karabakh conflict in terms of the recent events in the region? How long do you think this negotiation process will last?** I don't see a quick resolution, and recent events have not increased my hope that one is coming. I don't think I can put a number on it, but we're certainly talking in terms of several years.

#### Won’t escalate to war.

#### [Stepanian](http://www.azatutyun.am/author/21204.html), ‘10

[Ruzanna, 6-28, “Another Karabakh War Unlikely, Says UK Envoy,” http://www.azatutyun.am/content/article/2085150.html]

The Armenian-Azerbaijani war is unlikely to resume any time soon despite the latest upsurge in ceasefire violations around Nagorno-Karabakh, Britain’s ambassador to Armenia said on Monday. “I wouldn’t want to speculate about the possibility of war in Karabakh,” Charles Lonsdale told a news conference in Yerevan. “Recent incidents raise concern, but I think we are a long way from a resumption of real hostilities.” Lonsdale at the same time that the status quo in the Karabakh conflict may not be sustainable in the long term and that both sides should pursue a peaceful settlement based on mutual compromise.

#### Too many obstacles to overcome and US-Russia animosity prevents it.

#### Gorenburg, ‘10

[Dmitry, Harvard University, Executive Director American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 7-11, “Russia benefits from unsettled conflict in Karabakh – analyst,” <http://www.news.az/articles/17318>]

The reverberations of the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia are still being felt in the region. The unsettled conflict in Karabakh benefits Russia to some extent but is harmful for US interests. US efforts to partially resolve regional tensions by focusing on improving Armenian-Turkish relations have backfired because of on one side, resistance in Armenia to de-emphasizing the recognition of the 1915 events as a genocide, and on the other side, Turkish hesitance to open borders while the Karabakh conflict remains unresolved. Thus it seems that despite recent US efforts to resolve regional conflicts in piecemeal fashion, the only real hope for a solution will come from a global solution that includes the Karabakh conflict, the genocide question, and the border in one settlement. While the current state of Russian-US relations is much improved in comparison to 1-2 years ago, there are still some traces of zero-sum thinking on both sides. To the extent that US-Azerbaijani and US-Turkish relations have been damaged by the stalled effort to improve Armenian-Turkish ties, some Russian leaders will see this as a benefit to Russia and will act to being Azerbaijan closer to Russia.

### NATO

#### NATO fails at everything.

#### Walt, ‘11

[Stephen, Robert and Rene Belfer Professor of International Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School, 8-18, “The coming erosion of the European Union,” <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/08/18/the_coming_erosion_of_the_european_union>]

In addition, the various imperial adventures that NATO has engaged in since 1992 haven't worked out that well. It was said in the 1990s that NATO had to "go out of area or out of business," which is one reason it started planning for these operations, but most of the missions NATO has taken on since then have been something of a bust. Intervention in the Balkans eventually ended the fighting there, but it took longer and cost more than anyone expected and it's not even clear that it really worked (i.e., if NATO peacekeepers withdrew from Kosovo tomorrow, fighting might start up again quite soon). NATO was divided over the war in Iraq, and ISAF's disjointed effort in Afghanistan just reminds us why Napoleon always said he liked to fight against coalitions. The war in Libya could produce another disappointing result, depending on how it plays out. Transatlantic security cooperation might have received a new lease on life if all these adventures had gone swimmingly; unfortunately, that did not prove to be the case. But this raises the obvious question: If the United States isn't needed to protect Europe and there's little positive that the alliance can accomplish anywhere else, then what's it for?

#### No NATO cohesion -- internal disagreements during Libya proves no coherent strategy on anything.

#### Himmelreich, ‘11

[Jörg, lecturer in policy sciences at the Jacobs University in Bremen, 4-25, “An Alliance without a Strategy,” <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,758872,00.html>]

The current mission in Libya is an illustration of greater problems within the NATO alliance -- the member states are no longer able to agree on a common strategy. The alliance has failed in its ability to redefine its mission in a post-Soviet world. NATO lacks ideas and unity, and Germany shares responsibility for this failure. The NATO foreign ministers gathered in Berlin for a summit earlier this month may have worn diplomatic smiles on their faces, but the expressions seemed quite artificial -- and their ostentatious display of unity came off more like a masquerade than reality. The truth is that the alliance is currently experiencing a lack of solidarity on a scale that has been rare in its history. Every country in the alliance appears to be pursuing its own national agenda, with few showing much willingness to compromise with their other partners. To name but a few examples: The German government seemed almost dead-set in its determination to steer down the wrong path to international self-isolation with its abstention in the vote on March 17 on United Nations Resolution 1973, which granted military protection to Libya's civilian population. With its move, Germany frittered away any of the credibility it might have needed to be taken seriously in any further discussion on the military intervention. With state elections taking place just days after the vote, the government appeared to be more concerned with the ballot box at home than issues abroad. In a U-turn on its previous policy on Libya, France -- which has recently re-engaged itself as a NATO partner under President Nicolas Sarkozy -- conducted military air strikes on its own while NATO foreign ministers meeting in Paris were still discussing whether NATO should take over command for the military intervention in Libya from the United States. Previously, France had sought to keep NATO out of Libya for as long as possible, to provide a unique opportunity for Sarkozy to bolster his domestic standing in the run-up to French presidential elections next year. Recently, NATO partner Turkey has begun to see it as self-evident that it should act in a role as mediator between the Arab world and the West. In order to ensure that its role would not be damaged, Ankara prevented the alliance from acting for a decisive number of days. As the NATO alliance leader, the US also decided at rather short notice to demonstrate ambition in the fight against the dictators of the world. With Obama's re-election campaign starting there, Washington's moves also appeared to be motivated by domestic political considerations. Obama is erraneously hoping that the NATO intervention can succeed without US leadership. The US president could lead -- both politically and militarily -- but he doesn't want to. Among the Europeans, it is Sarkozy who would most like to lead the mission, but he is incapable of doing so -- French munitions are already in short supply. And German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle is still insistent that no German soldier should set foot on Libyan soil, but in the next breath he says that Germany will provide military protection to humanitarian transports to Libya. Otherwise, leaders in Berlin are crossing their fingers that the murderous Libyan despot, out of remorse, will voluntarily exit the stage into self-imposed exile. NATO Lacks a Strategy With such deep differences of opinion, it is currently impossible for NATO to develop a common strategy on how to proceed in the face of the present impasse in Libya. With air strikes alone, NATO will be unable to topple Gadhafi, but the current UN mandate doesn't even cover the necessary use of ground troops. Without obtaining arms from abroad, the rebels will also be incapable of gaining the upper hand. And even if they do manage to obtain weapons, it remains an open question whether or not they can prevail. One thing the NATO foreign ministers were able to agree on at their Berlin summit was that Gadhafi's war against his own people -- and, thus, the NATO intervention -- will last longer than originally anticipated. There are deeper reasons behind NATO's inability to agree on a common policy for the Libya intervention. The current problems are tied to profound strategy deficits within the alliance. During the Cold War, the undisputed raison d'etre of the alliance was the US-led joint defense against a Soviet attack on the territory of a NATO member state -- anchored in the famous Article 5 of the NATO charter, which stipulates that an attack on Europe or North America would be considered an attack against all and obligates the other members to come to its aid. Germany, especially, benefitted from the protection offered by Article 5. With the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991, though, NATO lost its enemy and the original reason for its inception. Since then, numerous task forces and innumerable NATO summits have experimented with new strategy proposals. At the same time, though, the international security situation has been in a constant state of flux and has changed in revolutionary ways. NATO had a strong historical -- and praiseworthy -- role to play in the transformation process of the former Warsaw Pact member states, culminating in 2005 with the accession of the Eastern European countries to NATO. But by the time of the Russian-Georgia conflict in 2008, at the very latest, NATO's enlargement euphoria had dissipated. Profound Differences over Future Role Today, the 28 NATO member states have profoundly different opinions about what the alliance's future course should be, a fact that even the new NATO strategy plan adopted at a summit in Riga in November was unable to conceal. It contains little by way of answers to some of the most pressing questions: What role should Russia be given in the efforts to develop a common missile defense to protect Europe from missiles that could be fired from the Middle East? Should NATO act as the global police in every conflict hot spot around the world? Should NATO troops be deployed to secure strategic marine trade lanes and commodity transports in the new era of African pirates? Can cyber attacks trigger an Article 5 collective response from NATO? Opinions among the member states diverge greatly on each of these questions. And the member states are currently unable to agree to a common NATO strategy on any of these issues that is politically palatable for each country. Indeed, NATO today lacks the kind of supreme strategic objective that united all NATO partners up until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. And as long as there is no solidarity or political will among all the member states to establish a substantial new strategy that goes beyond painless closing statements at summits that pay diplomatic lip service but add little in terms of content, NATO's ability to act militarily will remain compromised. And the more it loses its ability to act collectively, the more we will see individual NATO member states seeking out "coalitions of the willing," if those alignments better serve their own strategic interests. The result is the loss of one of NATO's key assets, the integration of the security policies of its 28 member states.

### Russian Aggression

#### Nationalism won’t translate into aggression -- Russia will maintain stability.

**Rifkind 12**- Former foreign secretary of the UK(Malcolm, “Putin's Cold War politics will fail Russia; The new president's lack of friends – and imagination – will cost his country dear”, Daily Telegraph, March 6, 2012)//sjl

Vladimir Putin's victory is, for the West, not entirely disagreeable. Rather, like the curate's egg, it is good in parts. It guarantees that for the next six years Russia will be stable and fairly predictable. It will have, as its president, a leader who is tough and cool. He will conduct a foreign policy with which we are already familiar. It will be nationalist, but not dangerous or irrational on the supreme questions of peace and war. When you are dealing with a state that still has thousands of nuclear warheads, having Putin in the Kremlin should not cause us to lose too much sleep.

Russian expansionism is just alarmism -- no risk of the impact.

Bandow 8 – senior fellow at the Cato Institute (Doug, “Turning China into the Next Big Enemy,” Cato Institute, 3/8/08, <http://original.antiwar.com/doug-bandow/2008/03/07/turning-china-next-big-enemy/>, MMarcus)

In fact, America remains a military colossus. The Bush administration has proposed spending $515 billion next year on the military; more, adjusted for inflation, than at any time since World War II. The U.S. accounts for roughly half of the world’s military outlays. Washington is allied with every major industrialized state except China and Russia. America’s avowed enemies are a pitiful few: Burma, Cuba, Syria, Venezuela, Iran, North Korea. The U.S. government could destroy every one of these states with a flick of the president’s wrist. Russia has become rather contentious of late, but that hardly makes it an enemy. Moreover, the idea that Moscow could rearm, reconquer the nations that once were part of the Soviet Union or communist satellites, overrun Western Europe, and then attack the U.S. – without anyone in America noticing the threat along the way – is, well, a paranoid fantasy more extreme than the usual science fiction plot. The Leninist Humpty-Dumpty has fallen off the wall and even a bunch of former KGB agents aren’t going to be able to put him back together.

**Russias not a threat.**

**Simes 07 –** (Dimitri K. Simes, President of the Nixon Center and Publisher of The National Interest, "Losing War." Foreign Affairs." NOv/DEc. 2007. Lexis)

A variety of other foreign policy disagreements have exacerbated tensions further. It is true that Russia did not support the United States' decision to invade Iraq, but nor did key NATO allies such as France and Germany. Russia has supplied conventional weapons to some nations the United States considers hostile, such as Iran, Syria, and Venezuela, but it does so on a commercial basis and within the limits of international law. The United States may understandably view this as provocative, but many Russians would express similar feelings about U.S. arms transfers to Georgia. And although Russia has not gone as far as the United States and Europe would like when it comes to disciplining Iran and North Korea, Moscow has gradually come to support sanctions against both countries. These numerous disagreements do not mean that Russia is an enemy. After all, Russia has not supported al Qaeda or any other terrorist group at war with the United States and no longer promotes a rival ideology with the goal of world domination. Nor has it invaded or threatened to invade its neighbors. Finally, Russia has opted not to foment separatism in Ukraine, despite the existence there of a large and vocal Russian minority population. Putin and his advisers accept that the United States is the most powerful nation in the world and that provoking it needlessly makes little sense. But they are no longer willing to adjust their behavior to fit U.S. preferences, particularly at the expense of their own interests. [A BLUEPRINT FOR COOPERATION](http://web.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.morris.umn.edu/ehost/detail?vid=19&hid=8&sid=a11398d0-c82a-4a6b-9aed-7ff2fad57aa8%40sessionmgr2" \l "toc#toc" \o "A BLUEPRINT FOR COOPERATION )

#### Russia won’t expand -- demographic problems.

Zeihan 10 – vice president of analysis for STRATFOR. (Peter, “One fight Russia can't afford”, Asia Times Online, June 17, 2010, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/LF17Ag01.html>, Callahan)

But it is no longer the 17th century, and this strategy does not necessarily play to Russia's strengths anymore. The second prong of the strategy - flooding the region with ethnic Russians - is no longer an option because of Russia's demographic profile. The Russian birth rate has been in decline for a century, and in the post-Cold War era, the youngest tranche of the Russian population simply collapsed. The situation transformed from an academic debate about Russia's future to a policy debate about Russia's present. The bust in the birth rate in the 1990s and 2000s has generated the smallest population cohort in Russian history, and in a very few years, those post-Cold War children will themselves be at the age where they will be having children. A small cohort will create an even smaller cohort, and Russia's population problems could well evolve from crushing to irrecoverable. Even if this cohort reproduces at a sub-Saharan African birthrate, even if the indications of high tuberculosis and HIV infections among this population cohort are all wrong, and even if Russia can provide a level of services for this group that it couldn't manage during the height of Soviet power, any demographic bounce would not occur until the 2050s - once the children of this cohort have sufficiently aged to raise their own children. Until 2050, Russia simply has to learn to work with less. A lot less. And this is the best-case scenario for Russia in the next generation. Simply put, Russia does not have the population to sustain the country at its present boundaries. As time grinds on, Russia's capacity for doing so will decrease drastically. Moscow understands all this extremely well, and this is a leading rationale behind current Russian foreign policy: Russia's demographics will never again be as “positive” as they are now, and the Americans are unlikely to be any more distracted than they are now. So Russia is moving quickly and, more important, intelligently. Russia is thus attempting to reach some natural anchor points, eg, some geographic barriers that would limit the state's exposure to outside powers. The Russians hope they will be able to husband their strength from these anchor points. Moscow's long-term strategy consistently has been to trade space for time ahead of the beginning of the Russian twilight; if the Russians can expand to these anchor points, Moscow hopes it can trade less space for more time. Unfortunately for Moscow, there are not many of these anchor points in Russia's neighborhood. One is the Baltic Sea, a fact that terrifies the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Another is the Carpathian Mountains. This necessitates the de facto absorption not only of Ukraine, but also of Moldova, something that makes Romania lose sleep at night. And then there are the Tien Shan Mountains of Central Asia - which brings us to the crisis of the moment. The crisis in Kyrgyzstan The former Soviet Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan is not a particularly nice piece of real estate. While it is in one of those mountainous regions that could be used to anchor Russian power, it is on the far side of the Eurasian steppe from the Russian core, more than 3,000 kilometers (1,800 miles) removed from the Russian heartland. The geography of Kyrgyzstan itself also leaves a great deal to be desired. Kyrgyzstan is an artificial construct created by none other than Stalin, who rearranged internal Soviet borders in the region to maximize the chances of dislocation, dispute and disruption among the indigenous populations in case the Soviet provinces ever gained independence. Stalin drew his lines well: Central Asia's only meaningful population center is the Fergana Valley. Kyrgyzstan obtained the region's foothills and highlands, which provide the region's water; Uzbekistan gained the fertile floor of the valley; and Tajikistan walked away with the only decent access to the valley as a whole. As such, the three states continuously are jockeying for control over the only decent real estate in the region. Arguably, Kyrgyzstan has the least to work with of any of the region's states. Nearly all of its territory is mountainous; what flat patches of land it does have on which to build cities are scattered about. There is, accordingly, no real Kyrgyz core. Consequently, the country suffers from sharp internal differences: Individual clans hold dominion over tiny patches of land separated from each other by rugged tracts of mountains. In nearly all cases, those clans have tighter economic and security relationships with foreigners than they do with each other. A little more than five years ago, Western non-governmental organizations (and undoubtedly a handful of intelligence services) joined forces with some of these regional factions in Kyrgyzstan to overthrow the country's pro-Russian ruling elite in what is known as a "color" revolution in the former Soviet Union. Subsequently, Kyrgyzstan - while not exactly pro-Western - dwelled in a political middle ground the Russians found displeasing. In April, Russia proved that it, too, can throw a color revolution and Kyrgyzstan's government switched yet again. Since then, violence has wracked the southern regions of Jalal-Abad, Batken and Osh - strongholds of the previous government. In recent days, nearly 100,000 Kyrgyz residents have fled to Uzbekistan. The interim government of President Roza Otunbayeva is totally outmatched. It is not so much that her government is in danger of falling - those same mountains that make it nearly impossible for Bishkek to control Osh make it equally difficult for Osh to take over Bishkek - but that the country has de facto split into (at least) two pieces. As such, Otunbayeva - whose government only coalesced due to the Russian intervention - has publicly and directly called on the Russians to provide troops to help hold the country together. This request cuts to the core weakness in the Russian strategy. Despite much degradation in the period after the Soviet dissolution, Russia's intelligence services remain without peer. In fact, now that they have the direct patronage of the Russian prime minister, they have proportionally more resources and influence than ever. They have proved that they can rewire Ukraine's political world to expunge American influence, manipulate events in the Caucasus to whittle away at Turkey's authority, cause riots in the Baltics to unbalance North Atlantic Treaty Organization members, and reverse Kyrgyzstan's color revolution. But they do not have backup. Were this the 19th century, there would already be scads of Russian settlers en route to the Fergana to dilute the control of the locals (although they would certainly be arriving after the Russian army), to construct a local economy dependent on imported labor and linked to the Russian core, and to establish a new ruling elite. (It is worth noting that the resistance of Central Asians to Russian encroachment meant that the Russians never seriously attempted to make the region into a majority-Russian one. Even so, the Russians still introduced their own demographic to help shape the region more to Moscow's liking.) Instead, Russia's relatively few young families are busy holding the demographic line in Russia proper. For the first time in Russian history, there is no surplus Russian population that can be relocated to the provinces. And without that population, the Russian view of the Fergana - to say nothing of Kyrgyzstan - changes dramatically. The region is remote and densely populated, and reaching it requires transiting three countries. And one of these states would have something to say about that. That state is Uzbekistan. The Uzbek Goliath After the Russians and Ukrainians, the Uzbeks are the most populous ethnicity in the former Soviet Union. They are a Turkic people who do not enjoy particularly good relations with anyone. Uzbekistan's ruling Karimov family is roundly hated both at home and abroad; the Central Asian country boasts one of the most repressive governing systems in modern times. Uzbekistan also happens to be quite powerful by Central Asian standards. There are more Uzbeks in Central Asia than there are Kyrgyz, Turkmen, Tajiks and Russians combined. The Uzbek intelligence services are modeled after their Russian counterparts, interspersing agents throughout the Uzbek population to ensure loyalty and to root out dissidents. It is the only country of the five former Soviet states in the region that actually has a military that can engage in military action. It is the only one of the five that has most of its cities in logical proximity and linked with decent infrastructure (even if it is split into the Tashkent region and the Fergana region by Stalinesque cartographic creativity). It is the only one of the five that is both politically stable (if politically brittle) and that has the ability to project power. And it is also the only Central Asian state that is self-sufficient in both food and energy. To top it all off, some 2.5 million ethnic Uzbeks reside in the other four former Soviet Central Asian states, providing Tashkent a wealth of tools for manipulating developments throughout the region. And manipulate it does. In addition to the odd border spat, Uzbekistan intervened decisively in Tajikistan's civil war in the 1990s. Tashkent is not shy about noting that it thinks most Tajik, and especially Kyrgyz, territory should belong to Uzbekistan, particularly the territory of southern Kyrgyzstan, where the current violence is strongest. Uzbekistan views many of the Russian strategies to expunge Western interests from Central Asia as preparation for moves against Uzbekistan, with the Russian-sponsored coup in Kyrgyzstan an excellent case in point. From March through May, Uzbekistan began activating its reserves and reinforcing its Fergana border regions, which heightened the state of fear in Bishkek from shrill to panic mode. Given Uzbek means, motive and opportunity, Moscow is fairly confident that sending Russian peacekeepers to southern Kyrgyzstan would provoke a direct military confrontation with an angry and nervous Uzbekistan. In STRATFOR's view, Russia would win this war, but this victory would come neither easily nor cheaply. The Fergana is a long way from Russia, and the vast bulk of Russia's military is static, not expeditionary like its US counterpart. Uzbek supply lines would be measured in hundreds of meters, Russian lines in thousands of kilometers. Moreover, Uzbekistan could interrupt nearly all Central Asian natural gas that currently flows to Russia without even launching a single attack. (The Turkmen natural gas that Russia's Gazprom normally depends upon travels to Russia via Uzbek territory.) Yet this may be a conflict Russia feels it cannot avoid. The Russians have not forward-garrisoned a military force sufficient to protect Kyrgyzstan, nor can they resettle a population that could transform Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, the Russian relationship with Kyrgyzstan is based neither on military strategy nor on economic rationality. Instead, it is based on the need to preserve a certain level of credibility and fear - credibility that the Russians will protect Kyrgyzstan should push come to shove, and Kyrgyz fear of what Russia will do to it should they not sign on to the Russian sphere of influence. It is a strategy strongly reminiscent of the US Cold War containment doctrine, under which the United States promised to aid any ally, anytime, anywhere if in exchange they would help contain the Soviets. This allowed the Soviet Union to choose the time and place of conflicts, and triggered US involvement in places like Vietnam. Had the United States refused battle, the American alliance structure could have crumbled. Russia now faces a similar dilemma, and just as the United States had no economic desire to be in Vietnam, the Russians really do not much care what happens to Kyrgyzstan - except as it impacts Russian interests elsewhere. But even victory over Uzbekistan would not solve the problem. Smashing the only coherent government in the region would create a security vacuum. Again, the Americans provide a useful corollary: The US "victory" over Saddam Hussein's Iraq and the Taliban's Afghanistan proved that "winning" is the easy part. Occupying the region over the long haul to make sure that the victory is not worse than the status quo antebellum is a decade-to-generational effort that requires a significant expenditure of blood and treasure. Russia desperately needs to devote such resources elsewhere - particularly once the US is no longer so preoccupied in the Middle East. Russia is attempting to finesse a middle ground by talking the Uzbeks down and offering the compromise of non-Russian troops from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Russian-led military organization, as an alternative to Russian forces. This may resolve the immediate crisis, but neither the Uzbeks nor the challenges they pose are going anywhere. And unlike Russia, Uzbekistan boasts very high demographic growth. The bottom line is this: Despite all of Russia's recent gains, Moscow's strategy requires tools that the Russians no longer have. It requires Moscow delving into the subregional politics of places that could well bleed Russia dry - and this is before any power that wishes Russia ill begins exploring what it and the Uzbeks might achieve together.

#### No aggression -- the Russian military is in terrible shape.

Goure 11 – Vice President of the Lexington Institute, a thinktank based in Arlington, Virginia, and an analyst on national security and military issues for NBC. (Daniel, “Russian Military’s Decline Continues”, Lexington Institute, July 12, 2011, <http://www.lexingtoninstitute.org/russian-militarys-decline-continues?a=1&c=1171>, Callahan)

The past 20 years has been a tale of near-continuous decline for the ex-Soviet military. Once it was the largest military force on the planet. Of late it has fallen to a mere shadow of its former self. So low have the fortunes of Russia’s conventional military fallen that it was barely able to defeat Georgia in their short conflict in 2008. The Soviet Union was once known for its massive nuclear arsenal. Now it is barely able to maintain a viable force; most of its systems are obsolescent and aging badly. Even in the absence of new arms control agreements with the United States, Russia would be forced to significantly cut back its nuclear arsenal. According to a senior Russian government official, the situation continues to deteriorate. In a recent interview for a Russian newspaper, reported on by Leon Aron in Foreign Policy, Yuri Solomonov, that country’s chief missile designer, took on his country’s President Dimitry Medvedev. This move is significant for Russian politics, since Medvedev is seeking to extend his tenure against the wishes of current prime minister and former President Vladimir Putin who wants his old job back. Medvedev is associated with a military reform program that was intended to transform the Russian military. But in his critique Solomonov revealed that Russia’s military is heading for the ash heap. According to Solomonov, Russia is now dependent on the West for critical technologies to keep its nuclear forces in operation. The military reform program, which required a massive increase in the production of modern aircraft, ground combat systems and ships, has essentially collapsed because of weaknesses in the Russian defense industrial base. Equally interesting, Solomonov criticizes President Medvedev for his efforts to threaten Europe and the United States over its current plans to deploy a theater missile defense system. The Kremlin leader had suggested that Russia could respond to the deployment of the Aegis Ashore theater missile defense system with countervailing deployments of theater nuclear missiles. Solomonov says that Medvedev is threatening the West with a military deployment that "does not exist, did not exist, and will not exist." In addition, the Russian missile designer pointed out something which Western advocates of limited missile defenses have said for years: the Russian ICBM force could overwhelm such a defense. The Obama Administration’s effort to reset this nation’s strategic relations with Russia is based in large part on the belief that our counterpart in the decades old strategic pas de deux is still a player. In fact, it is clear that Russia continues to decline as a military and economic power even as its politics become more Byzantine. No effort at arms control will be able to mask Russia’s military decline.

#### More ev -- declining population means Russia can’t expand.

Eberstadt 11 – Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute and a Senior Adviser at the National Bureau of Asian Research. (Nicholas, “The Dying Bear”, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136511/nicholas-eberstadt/the-dying-bear?page=show>, Callahan)

December marks the 20th anniversary of the end of the Soviet dictatorship and the beginning of Russia's postcommunist transition. For Russians, the intervening years have been full of elation and promise but also unexpected trouble and disappointment. Perhaps of all the painful developments in Russian society since the Soviet collapse, the most surprising -- and dismaying -- is the country's demographic decline. Over the past two decades, Russia has been caught in the grip of a devastating and highly anomalous peacetime population crisis. The country's population has been shrinking, its mortality levels are nothing short of catastrophic, and its human resources appear to be dangerously eroding. Indeed, the troubles caused by Russia's population trends -- in health, education, family formation, and other spheres -- represent a previously unprecedented phenomenon for an urbanized, literate society not at war. Such demographic problems are far outside the norm for both developed and less developed countries today; what is more, their causes are not entirely understood. There is also little evidence that Russia's political leadership has been able to enact policies that have any long-term hope of correcting this slide. This peacetime population crisis threatens Russia's economic outlook, its ambitions to modernize and develop, and quite possibly its security. In other words, Russia's demographic travails have terrible and outsized implications, both for those inside the country's borders and for those beyond. The humanitarian toll has already been immense, and the continuing economic cost threatens to be huge; no less important, Russia's demographic decline portends ominously for the external behavior of the Kremlin, which will have to confront a far less favorable power balance than it had been banking on.

#### That kills the military.

Eberstadt 11 – Henry Wendt Chair in Political Economy at the American Enterprise Institute and a Senior Adviser at the National Bureau of Asian Research. (Nicholas, “The Dying Bear”, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2011, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136511/nicholas-eberstadt/the-dying-bear?page=show>, Callahan)

Although the Russian government has acknowledged the country's poor demographic trends, it appears to have both grossly underestimated the severity of the crisis and overestimated the ability of current Kremlin policies to counteract whatever negative effects it thinks may be on the horizon. In 2008, just before the onset of the global economic crisis, the Kremlin unfurled an ambitious economic plan known as Russia 2020. It envisions Russia ascending into the ranks of the top five global economies by 2020 and sets as a goal an average annual economic growth rate of 6.6 percent between 2007 and 2020. Even though Russia's per capita output in 2010 was barely higher than it was in 2007, the Kremlin still embraces the Russia 2020 targets as feasible. But attaining those goals would now require an average growth in labor productivity of more than nine Such a tempo of long-term growth in labor productivity was not even reached by China between 1978 and the present day, the greatest period of long-term economic growth ever registered by any country in history. percent per year between 2010 and 2020. Rather than focusing on catapulting the Russian economy into the top echelon of global performers, Russian policymakers would be wise to ask what it would take to prevent the Russian economy from shrinking as a share of total global output in the decades ahead. Between 2005 and 2025, according to U.S. Census Bureau projections, Russia's share of the global working-age population is projected to drop from 2.4 percent to 1.6 percent. This implies that Russia's long-term improvements in labor productivity must average two percent more per year than in the rest of the world. Such prospective accomplishments can hardly be taken for granted given Russia's health and educational problems, not to mention the looming pressures of an aging population. If these accomplishments are not met, Russia's share of world economic output, and the country's global economic influence, will diminish in the years ahead. (This is not to say that Russia will grow poorer, but in a progressively richer, healthier, and more educated world, Russia's human resource constraints may mean that the country should expect a smaller share of the future global economic pie.) Russia's demographic crisis also has implications for its military capabilities and, by extension, for international security. In 2007, former Russian Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin warned that the "reduction in the size of the population and the reduction of population density . . . will create the danger of weakening Russia's political, economic, and military influence in the world." As he recognized, Russia's demographic crisis places inexorable limits on the country's defense potential, especially in terms of military manpower. Maintaining the country's current force structure -- a military of more than a million soldiers, mainly comprising conscripts obliged to serve one-year terms of service -- will not be feasible in the years immediately ahead. Despite plans to transform Russia's armed forces into an all-volunteer service, the Russian military continues to be manned mainly by 18-year-old men. In 1990, slightly more than one million boys were born in Russia; by 1999, however, this number had dropped by 39 percent, to 626,000. Roughly speaking, this means that Russia's pool of prospective recruits is set to fall by almost two-fifths between 2008 and 2017. If Moscow is to prevent this dramatic drop-off in military manpower, it has only two choices: induct fewer qualified conscripts or extend the term of service under the draft beyond the current 12 months. The former is unpalatable because of the need for healthy and educated troops for modern militaries; the latter is politically impossible because of the immense unpopularity of the draft and the penurious wages paid to Russian soldiers.

### Russian Democracy

#### No Russian democracy and the impact is empirically denied.

Kaufmann 12 – Senior fellow for Brookings in the Global Economy and Development program. His areas of expertise include public sector and regulatory reform, development, governance and anti-corruption. Previously, he served as director at the World Bank Institute, leading the work on governance and anti-corruption. (Daniel, ““Putinsanity”: The Reelection of Russia’s President Should Be a Wakeup Call to the World”, Brookings Institute, March 5, 2012, <http://www.brookings.edu/up-front/posts/2012/03/05-putin-kaufmann>, Callahan)

First, Russia’s governance standards have been declining rather markedly for about a decade. This deterioration and substandard governance can be seen in figure 1 for a number of dimensions of governance, as measured by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), and was discussed in a recent blog entry and conference presentation. In particular, consistent with increasing political repression (ostensibly in the name of "stability"), Russia has experienced a marked decline in voice & democratic accountability over the past decade. Figure 1. Russia: Low & Deteriorating Governance, 2002-2010 The current presidential elections can be viewed in the context of a continuing decline in governance. The media and voters had to operate in a less-than-free political environment, where Putin exerted increasing control over the parliament and provinces, and where the emergence of any viable alternative was stymied. In fact, Russia’s governance rates extremely poorly when compared to the rest of the world. In figure 2, the governance “composite”, a simple average of the six dimensions of WGI, are shown. The rough composite index of governance shows that Russia fails to measure up to the governance of countries that have attained relatively high governance standard, including several post-socialist countries (now fully integrated into Europe) and South America. By contrast, the presence of Ukraine— which has also recently experienced a decline in democratic governance[1] — or worse, Pakistan, in Russia’s governance cohort illustrates that there is a group of countries where good governance did not materialize during transition. Figure 2. How does Russia Measure Up on Governance? Second, for quite some time Russia has wrestled with endemic corruption, which has worsened over the past decade, as seen in figure 1 above. High levels of corruption pervade the executive, legislature, judiciary and private sector interactions with the public sector. As seen in figure 3, for every type of bribery a very high proportion of enterprise managers report frequent bribery, comparable with rates in countries like Nigeria and Libya, and sharply contrasting the much lower frequency of bribery in many other countries. Cronyism plays an important role in Russia and those close to Putin in the Kremlin have benefitted handsomely. One particular source of high-level bribery is public procurement since the most firms in Russia have to pay bribes to obtain contracts. Furthermore, various forms of bribery have risen substantially. The extremely high levels of procurement bribery that pervade today result from an increasing trend over the past decade (figure 4). Third, the troubling evolution of governance in Russia over the past decade should be a wakeup call for the world, which at times has been naïve about Russia’s and other transitions. Over two decades ago, the Soviet Union collapsed and a democratic era dawned in Russia and many former Soviet states.

#### Lack of domestic will makes democratization impossible

Mendelson and Gerber 06 – \*Director of the Human Rights and Security Initiative in January 2007 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington DC. She is also a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program. \*\*Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. (Sarah and Theodore, “Soviet Nostalgia: An Impediment to Russian Democratization”, The Washington Quarterly/CSIS, Winter 05/06, Project Muse)

For different reasons, the Kremlin advisers and Western democracy advocates are both off the mark. No dramatic revolution in Russia is likely to come soon from below or outside. Multiple, random sample surveys we have conducted in Russia since 2001 indicate that many Russians are simply too ambivalent about democracy for any revolutionary scenario to be plausible. Support for concepts such as transparency and the rule of law, as well as free and fair elections, are greatly inhibited by the power of historical legacies. Widely held, uncritical views of the past shape Russia’s political and social development today. If left unaddressed, they threaten to drive a deep wedge between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community. To date, Western democracy assistance has overwhelmingly supported the building of institutions associated with democracy, such as political parties, independent media, and nongovernmental groups.2 Donors have devoted relatively little attention to the ideas that underpin such institutions. The survey findings suggest to us that Western assistance should be reoriented to promote basic democratic principles as well as public understanding of how Russia’s recent history has undermined or reinforced these ideas. Today, many Russians show symptoms of collective amnesia about the past, and a majority of young Russians believe Joseph Stalin (1929– 1953) did more good than bad. Although intellectuals in many countries complain that the next generation in their own countries do not receive adequate training in history, in Russia this “absent memory” appears to have political consequences.3 As long as they remain positively inclined toward Stalin, young Russians are unlikely to embrace concepts such as justice and human rights. The failure of robust democratic institutions to develop, coupled with a lack of understanding of the past, has left Russians uneducated about democracy, ambivalent about Stalin, and confused about Russia’s place in the world.

### Russian Econ

#### Russian economy is resilient.

**Heilprin 11** – AP Reporter (John, “Putin says Russia economy recovering, still below pre-global financial crisis level” June 15, 2011 http://www.startribune.com/world/123913759.html)

GENEVA - Russia's economy is recovering, but remains well below the level it was at before the global financial crisis, says Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, addressing a U.N. labor meeting in Geneva on Wednesday. Putin said Russia has "managed to recover two-thirds of our economy, but still we have not reached pre-crisis levels." The Russian economy contracted by almost 8 percent during the recession. He added that the economy — the world's sixth-largest — would reach pre-crisis levels by 2012, eventually rising to become one of the world's top five. Putin also called for "a more fair and balanced economic model," as nations gradually recover from the world financial crisis that hit in 2008. In April, Putin said in his annual address before Russian parliament that the key lesson from the financial crisis was for the country to be self-reliant and strong enough to resist outside pressure. He said Russia's economy grew 4 percent last year. Putin, widely seen as wanting to reclaim his nation's presidency, said on Wednesday that his government is emphasizing social programs such as increasing aid for young mothers, disabled workers and people with health problems as it recovers.

**Russian economy is able to rebound – several reasons**

**Aslund 10** - Senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics (Anders, November 25, 2010 10 “Reasons Why the Russian Economy Will Recover” http://www.piie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=1712)

While the energy curse is well understood, it tends to be over-emphasized. At one time, it was believed that energy-rich countries were guaranteed stable growth; now oil and gas are considered absolute blockages to growth. But neither is quite true. There are 10 main reasons why Russia is likely to turn around within the next couple of years and enter a higher-growth trajectory: The root cause is the profound sense of malaise in the Russian elite. Nothing is better for reform than malaise. Remember how former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze told each other before assuming power: "We cannot go on like this any longer!" Once again, Moscow is reaching this point. Ideas are also crucial, and a new intellectual paradigm has taken hold. Since February 2008, President Dmitry Medvedev has advocated modernization. While this ambitious idea has dominated the public discourse, little has been done. This contrast between word and action is reminiscent of the Soviet Union in 1987, when Gorbachev had preached acceleration and perestroika for two years but accomplished little. That year, he shifted gear to focus on democratization to shake society up. Russia is finally about to accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO) within a year, which would be a game changer. The best available studies predict enormous gains for the country. Economists Jesper Jensen, Thomas Rutherford, and David Tarr estimate in a World Bank study that Russia should gain about 3.3 percent of GDP annually in the medium term and 11 percent of GDP in the long term. The gains would mainly come from increased foreign direct investment and services. International integration and convergence will drive the country's growth for a couple of decades. One of Russia's largest drawbacks and constant drags on growth is its immense corruption, but Russia is simply too rich, well educated, and open to be so corrupt. As the country has failed to extend its road network since 1997, something has to be done. Even former Mayor Yury Luzhkov —the country's "ultimate traffic jam" —has been sacked. Significant progress in the fight against corruption can be made with relatively easy and small steps—for example, public procurement for key infrastructure projects can be significantly cleaned up if a few honest people are appointed at the top. Money is no longer a free utility for the Kremlin. The price of oil has risen above $80 per barrel, but at that level Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin foresees a budget deficit in 2010 of 4.6 percent of GDP, and deficits will continue until 2014. Therefore, the government can no longer simply throw money at problems. It has to actually solve some of them. Energy production has leveled off and is not likely to rise significantly any time soon. Therefore, growth has to come from other sectors. Look at the composition of and trends among leading companies on the RTS or MICEX and you will see how Russia has changed. The energy companies are now the laggards, while the many growth companies are in consumer industries. In particular, Gazprom, the old cancer of the Russian economy, is in a serious structural crisis. Its market value has fallen by two-thirds from its peak in spring 2008. As a high-cost producer, it is losing out to independent producers—notably Novatek—and liquefied natural gas in Europe. Gazprom represents the most pressing case for restructuring. The company has to cut costs by reducing corruption and enhancing efficiency. This means that Gazprom must put an end to its history of being the huge slush fund for Russia's rulers. Russia's greatest resource is its quickly expanding human capital. According to UNESCO statistics, 51 percent of young Russians graduated from higher educational institutions in 2008, placing Russia as the ninth-highest country in the world. Compare this figure with the United States, where only 35.5 percent of the young population completed higher education in 2008. Admittedly, the Russian numbers are swollen by corruption, plagiarism, and often low standards, but even with some deduction, the Russian figures remain impressive. Everywhere you see young, ambitious, well-educated, and hard-working Russians who are determined to succeed. The long absence of any significant reforms has left much low-hanging fruit, such as elementary deregulation. Privatization is becoming inevitable, and it instantly reduces the corruption characteristic of Russian state corporations. Russia's leading businessmen often talk about "the 2012 problem"—that is, their uncertainty about the elite's presidential selection in March 2012, or probably in December 2011, when a presidential candidate has to be nominated. The choice is becoming increasingly clear: Putin symbolizes corruption, energy dependence, and stagnation, while Medvedev presents an image of modernization and reform. These alternatives are becoming as crystal clear as in 1985, when the Soviet elite opted for change.

**Empirically, decline of Russia’s economy doesn’t lead to war**

**Mankoff 10** - specialist in Eurasian/Russian affairs, adjunct fellow for Russia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations

(Jeffrey, March, “Internal and External Impact of Russia's Economic Crisis”)

The crisis will affect Russian foreign policy in other ways as well. The military, which during the boom years became accustomed to yearly funding increases, will have to confront a period of renewed austerity.27 This austerity comes at a bad time: the war with Georgia in August 2008 exposed a number of shortcomings that the infusion of cash during the Putin years had failed to stem. In particular, the Russian armed forces were slow to react and struggled to mount combined operations, even against a much weaker foe. Even though the war was ultimately successful, the military‘s less than impressive showing strengthened the conviction among Russia‘s political leaders that reform had to be accelerated. In this way the war provided momentum for implementing a scheme to downsize and modernize the army that experts had been discussing since the 1990s. In essence, to deal with the kind of threats it confronts in the contemporary world, the Russian military needs to move away from the conscription-based mass army of the 20th century to a smaller, more mobile, and more professional force. Yet because such a fundamental re-conceptualization of the military‘s structure and goals would require significant downsizing, the officer corps has been strongly opposed to the reform. Anatoly Serdyukov, a one-time furniture salesman, was named Minister of Defense by Putin in 2007 largely because of the perceived necessity of having a non-military figure overseeing the reform efforts. With strong backing from both Putin and Medvedev, Serdyukov has been doggedly pursuing his program of transformation. However, lack of funding has imperiled these efforts, because of the need to provide social support (including housing) for laid off officers. Moscow, meanwhile, insists that spending on military procurement will not be affected by the crisis as it seeks to both upgrade the conventional forces in the aftermath of the Georgia conflict and maintain a sufficient strategic deterrence capability— though whether it can actually afford to do so remains uncertain. Meanwhile, the Russian navy is also encountering problems. Difficulties with the new Bulava submarine-launched ballistic missile (which has failed the majority of its operational tests), delays in procuring new ships, and the mounting obsolescence of much of the existing fleet have created major difficulties for the navy. Given the lack of resources and decline of the military-industrial complex since the Soviet days, these developments may be difficult to reverse.28 The struggles of the military and military-industrial complex have given the Kremlin a powerful incentive to avoid the risk of further military conflicts, especially while the fate of the Serdyukov-Medvedev reforms remains uncertain.

## Environment

### Environment

#### The environment is resilient.

Easterbrook, ‘95

[Gregg, Distinguished Fellow, Fullbright Foundation, “A Moment on Earth,” p. 25]

IN THE AFTERMATH OF EVENTS SUCH AS LOVE CANAL OR THE Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. The environmentthat contains themis close to indestructible.The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.

### Biodiversity

#### Biodiversity levels are higher than any time in planetary history -- loss is inevitable, impossible to forestall, and doesn’t cause catastrophe -- it’s a natural part of ecosystem evolution.

**NPR 07** (North Pacific Research, The Myth of Biodiversity, 5/30/2007, northpacificresearch.com/downloads/The\_myth\_of\_biodiversity.doc)//EM

Change is a vital part of the environment. A successful species is one that can adapt to the changing environment, and the most successful species is one that can do that for the longest duration. This brings us back to the cockroach and the shark. This of course dethrones egotistical homosapien-sapiens as god’s finest creation, and raises the cockroach to that exalted position. A fact that is difficult for the vain to accept. If humans are to replace the cockroach, we need to use our most important adaptation (our brain) to prevent our own extinction. Humans like the Kola bear have become over specialized, we require a complex energy consuming social system to exist. If one thing is constant in the universe, it is change. The planet has change significantly over the last 4 billion years and it will continue to change over the next 4 billion years. The current human scheme for survival, stopping change, is a not only wrong, but futile because stopping change is impossible. Geologic history has repeatedly shown that species that become overspecialized are ripe for extinction. A classic example of overspecialization is the Kola bears, which can only eat the leaves from a single eucalyptus tree. But because they are soft and furry, look like a teddy bear and have big brown eyes, humans are artificially keeping them alive. Humans do not have the stomach or the brain for controlling evolution. Evolution is a simple process or it wouldn’t function. Evolution works because it follows the simple law: what works—works, what doesn’t work—goes away. There is no legislation, no regulations, no arbitration, no lawyers, scientists or politicians. Mother Nature has no preference, no prejudices, no emotions and no ulterior motives. Humans have all of those traits. Humans are working against nature when they try to prevent extinctions and freeze biodiversity. Examine the curve in figure one, at no time since the origin of life has biodiversity been constant. If this principal has worked for 550 million years on this planet, and science is supposed to find truth in nature, by what twisted reasoning can fixing biodiversity be considered science? Let alone good for the environment. Environmentalists are now killing species that they arbitrarily term invasive, which are in reality simply better adapted to the current environment. Consider the Barred Owl, a superior species is being killed in the name of biodiversity because the Barred Owl is trying to replace a less environmentally adapted species the Spotted Owl. This is more harmful to the ecosystem because it impedes the normal flow of evolution based on the idea that biodiversity must remain constant. Human scientists have decided to take evolution out of the hands of Mother Nature and give it to the EPA. Now there is a good example of brilliance. We all know what is wrong with lawyers and politicians, but scientists are supposed to be trustworthy. Unfortunately, they are all to often, only people who think they know more than anybody else. Abraham Lincoln said, “Those who know not, and know not that the know not, are fools shun them.” Civilization has fallen into the hands of fools. What is suggested by geologic history is that the world has more biodiversity than it ever had and that it maybe overdue for another major extinction. Unfortunately, today many scientists have too narrow a view. They are highly specialized. They have no time for geologic history. This appears to be a problem of inadequate education not ignorance. What is abundantly clear is that artificially enforcing rigid biodiversity works against the laws of nature, and will cause irreparable damage to the evolution of life on this planet and maybe beyond. The world and the human species may be better served if we stop trying to prevent change, and begin trying to understand change and positioning the human species to that it survives the inevitable change of evolution. If history is to be believed, the planet has 3 times more biodiversity than it had 65 million years ago. Trying to sustain that level is futile and may be dangerous. The next major extinction, change in biodiversity, is as inevitable as climate change. We cannot stop either from occurring, but we can position the human species to survive those changes.

#### **Biodiversity isn’t key to the environment.**

**NPR 07** (North Pacific Research, The Myth of Biodiversity, 5/30/2007, northpacificresearch.com/downloads/The\_myth\_of\_biodiversity.doc)//EM

Biodiversity is a corner stone of the environmental movement. But there is no proof that biodiversity is important to the environment. Something without basis in scientific fact is called a Myth. Lets examine biodiversity through out the history of the earth. The earth has been around for about 4 billion years. Life did not develop until about 500 million years later. Thus for the first 500 million years bio diversity was zero. The planet somehow survived this lack of biodiversity. For the next 3 billion years, the only life on the planet was microbial and not diverse. Thus, the first unexplainable fact is that the earth existed for 3.5 billion years, 87.5% of its existence, without biodiversity. Somewhere around 500 million years ago life began to diversify and multiple celled species appeared. Because these species were partially composed of sold material they left better geologic records, and the number of species and genera could be cataloged and counted. The number of genera on the planet is an indication of the biodiversity of the planet. Figure 1 is a plot of the number of genera on the planet over the last 550 million years. The little black line outside of the left edge of the graph is 10 million years. Notice the left end of this graph. Biodiversity has never been higher than it is today.

**No extinction -- their projections are wrong.**

**Simon 5** – adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute (Julian, BILL CLINTON; TRUTH OR SPECIES?, 8/3/05, http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Articles/SPECIES4.txt)//EM

The recommendations that leading biologists and ecologists base on non-facts are staggering. Wilson and Stanford's Paul Ehrlich actually ask that governments act "to reduce the scale of human activities." More specifically, they want us "to cease `developing' any more relatively undisturbed land" because "every new shopping center built in the California chaparral...every swamp converted into a rice paddy or shrimp farm means less biodiversity." Science magazine applauds those calls for major governmental policy changes. The proposals -- brakes on progress -- are what the movers and shakers of the Rio summit hope to impose on the nations of the world. This is no small potatoes. Yet a fair reading of the available data suggests a rate of extinction not even one-thousandth as great as the one the doomsayers scare us with. The proximate source of all the scary forecasts is a 1979 book, The Sinking Ark, by Norman Myers. Myers gives two statistics: the estimated extinction rate of known species of animals between the years 1600 and 1900 was about one every four years. And the estimated rate from 1900 to the present was about one a year. Myers gives no sources for his two estimates, but let us assume they are valid. Mr. Myers then departs spectacularly from that modest evidence. He goes on to say that some scientists have "hazarded a guess" that the extinction rate "could now have reached" 100 species per year. Next, the pure conjecture about an upper limit of present species extinction is increased and used by Mr. Myers and Mr. Lovejoy as the basis for the "projections" quoted everywhere. Mr. Lovejoy -- after converting what was an estimated upper limit into a present best estimate -- says that government inaction is "likely to lead" to the extinction of between 14 and 20 percent of all species before the year 2000. That comes to about 40,000 species lost per year, or about one million from 1980 to 2000. In brief, this extinction rate, which is a thousand times greater than the present rate, is nothing but pure guesswork. Yet it is widely published and understood as a scientific statement. In articles in the mid-1980s in the well-known New Scientist magazine, in newspapers, in book form, and at conferences, Aaron Wildavsky and I documented the complete absence of evidence for the claim that species extinction is going up rapidly, or even going up at all. No one has disputed our documentation. Nor has anyone adduced any new evidence since then that would demonstrate rapid species extinction. Instead, until recently the biologists who shout up the species extinction scam simply ignored the data that falsify their claims of impending doom. Just recently, in response to the questions that we and others have raised, the "official" World Conservation Union (IUCN) published a book edited by T. C. Whitmore and J. A. Sayer (1992) that inquires into the extent of extinctions. The results of that project must be considered amazing. All the authors continue to be concerned about the rate of extinction. Nevertheless, they agree that the rate of known extinctions has been and continues to be very low. This is a sampling of quotations (with emphasis supplied), first on the subject of the estimated rates: "60 birds and mammals are known to have become extinct between 1900 and 1950"..." forests of the eastern United States were reduced over two centuries to fragments totalling 1 2% of their original extent, and that during this destruction, only three forest birds went extinct"..."IUCN... has amassed large volumes of data from specialists around the world relating to species decline...the number of recorded extinctions for both plants and animals is very small..." Known extinction rates are very low...", and on and on.

#### Technologies solve the impact to bio-d loss.

**Simon 5** – adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute (Julian, BILL CLINTON; TRUTH OR SPECIES?, 8/3/05, http://www.juliansimon.com/writings/Articles/SPECIES4.txt)//EM

We are delighted that this species of truth, which we thought was dead, is stirring into life. Bill Clinton should heed the astonishing reversal in scientific assessment. Three additional observations are worth keeping in mind. First, it is now practicable to put samples of endangered species into "banks" that can preserve their genetic possibilities for future generations. Second, genetic recombination techniques now enable biologists to create new variations of species. Finally, it is not easy to extinguish an important species even when we try, as the experience of fighting smallpox and the Medfly revealed. All these factors reduce the danger of extinctions. I do not suggest that we should ignore possible dangers to species. Species constitute a valuable endowment, and we should guard their survival just as we guard our other physical and social assets. But we should strive for a clear and unbiased view of the gains and losses to help judge how much time and money to spend guarding our biological assets.

**Population growth makes bio-d loss inevitable**

**Science Daily** 7/28/**11** (“Ongoing Global Biodiversity Loss Unstoppable With Protected Areas Alone” <http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/07/110728123059.htm>, PZ)

Continued reliance on a strategy of setting aside land and marine territories as "protected areas" is insufficient to stem global biodiversity loss, according to a comprehensive assessment published July 28 in the journal Marine Ecology Progress Series.

Despite impressively rapid growth of protected land and marine areas worldwide -- today totalling over 100,000 in number and covering 17 million square kilometers of land and 2 million square kilometers of oceans -- biodiversity is in steep decline. Expected scenarios of human population growth and consumption levels indicate that cumulative human demands will impose an unsustainable toll on Earth's ecological resources and services accelerating the rate at which biodiversity is being loss. Current and future human requirements will also exacerbate the challenge of effectively implementing protected areas while suggesting that effective biodiversity conservation requires new approaches that address underlying causes of biodiversity loss -- including the growth of both human population and resource consumption. Says lead author Camilo Mora of University of Hawaii at Manoa: "Biodiversity is humanity's life-support system, delivering everything from food, to clean water and air, to recreation and tourism, to novel chemicals that drive our advanced civilization. Yet there is an increasingly well-documented global trend in biodiversity loss, triggered by a host of human activities." "Ongoing biodiversity loss and its consequences for humanity's welfare are of great concern and have prompted strong calls for expanding the use of protected areas as a remedy," says fellow author Peter F. Sale, Assistant Director of the United Nations University's Canadian-based Institute for Water, Environment and Health. "While many protected areas have helped preserve some species at local scales, promotion of this strategy as a global solution to biodiversity loss, and the advocacy of protection for specific proportions of habitats, have occurred without adequate assessment of their potential effectiveness in achieving the goal." Drs. Mora and Sale warn that long-term failure of the protected areas strategy could erode public and political support for biodiversity conservation and that the disproportionate allocation of available resources and human capital into this strategy precludes the development of more effective approaches. The authors based their study on existing literature and global data on human threats and biodiversity loss. "The global network of protected areas is a major achievement, and the pace at which it has been achieved is impressive," says Dr. Sale. "Protected areas are very useful conservation tools, but unfortunately, the steep continuing rate of biodiversity loss signals the need to reassess our heavy reliance on this strategy." The study says continuing heavy reliance on the protected areas strategy has five key technical and practical limitations: Concludes Dr. Mora: "Given the considerable effort and widespread support for the creation of protected areas over the past 30 years, we were surprised to find so much evidence for their failure to effectively address the global problem of biodiversity loss. Clearly, the biodiversity loss problem has been underestimated and the ability of protected areas to solve this problem overestimated." The authors underline the correlations between growing world population, natural resources consumption and biodiversity loss to suggest that biodiversity loss is unlikely to be stemmed without directly addressing the ecological footprint of humanity. Based upon previous research, the study shows that under current conditions of human comsumption and conservative scenarios of human population growth, the cummulative use of natural resources of humanity will amount to the productivity of up to 27 Earths by 2050. "Protected areas are a valuable tool in the fight to preserve biodiversity. We need them to be well managed, and we need more of them, but they alone cannot solve our biodiversity problems," adds Dr. Mora. "We need to recognize this limitation promptly and to allocate more time and effort to the complicated issue of human overpopulation and consumption." "Our study shows that the international community is faced with a choice between two paths," Dr. Sale says. "One option is to continue a narrow focus on creating more protected areas with little evidence that they curtail biodiversity loss. That path will fail. The other path requires that we get serious about addressing the growth in size and consumption rate of our global population.”

**Squo solves**

**Loki 4/13**/12 - media executive with 15 years experience in the private and non-profit sectors, Reynard is the co-founder of MomenTech (Reynard, “A Venture Capital Solution to for Biodiversity Loss” <http://www.justmeans.com/A-Venture-Capital-Solution-for-Biodiversity-Loss/53352.html>, PZ)

Governments seem to be unable to stem the tide. Could market-based conservation initiatives help? That's what a new biodiversity-focused fund supporting small sustainable businesses in Latin America hopes to do. The Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), a member of the Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDB), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Dutch Development Bank (FMO) and the Nature Conservancy, has launched the next stage of EcoEnterprises Fund II, a venture capital fund that aims to support biodiversity, preserve critical ecosystems and support local poor by directing capital to community-based sustainable businesses. The MIF is one of the biggest investors in microfinance and venture capital funds for small businesses in Latin America and the Caribbean. The fund "will provide expansion capital to small sustainable businesses, so they may generate livelihoods for rural communities and preserve ecosystems for future generations," according to an IDB press release.[4] The first EcoEnterprises fund, a joint-project of the MIF and the Nature Conservancy launched in 2000, invested $6.3 million in 23 Latin American and Carribbean sustainable companies that cover a wide array of eco-friendly products, including organic shrimp, organic spices, FSC-certified furniture, pesticide-free biodynamic flowers and acai palm berry smoothies. Together, these firms have created over 3,500 jobs, benefited almost 300 communities and conservation groups, generated more than $280 million in sales, leveraged $138 million in additional capital and—much to the delight of conservationists and environmentalists—conserved over 860,000 hectares of land (around 3,320 square miles, or about a third of the area of Massachusetts).[5]

### Air Pollution

#### No impact to air pollution.

#### Schwartz & Hayward, ‘7

[Joel, Visiting Fellow – AEI and former Dir. Reason Public Policy Institute’s Air Quality Project and former Ex. Officer of the California Inspection and Maintenance Review Commission which evaluated California’s vehicleemissions inspection program, MA in Planetary Science from Cal. Tech., and Steven, F.K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow – AEI, “Air Quality in America: A Dose of Reality on Air Pollution”, Decenber, <http://www.aei.org/docLib/20080317_AirQuality.pdf>]

Air pollution affects far fewer people, far less often, and with far less severity than is commonly believed. The common wisdom is that a substantial fraction of Americans are suffering serious and permanent harm from air pollution even at recent historically low levels. Yet the actual research, most of it government-funded, tells a different story. California’s Children’s Health Study (CHS), for instance, reported that higher air pollution was associated with a lower risk of developing asthma. The CHS also found that ozone had no effect on children’s lung development, even in areas that exceeded the federal standard more than one hundred days per year. High levels of PM2.5 were associated with a decline in lung function. However, even for children who grew up in areas with PM2.5 at three times the level of the annual standard, the decline was only one to two percent. The CHS children were born in the early 1980s. No American child today experiences anywhere near the PM2.5 levels that were associated with even these tiny lung-function declines. Based on estimates by the California Air Resources Board, perhaps the most aggressive air pollution regulatory agency in the world, eliminating virtually all human-caused ozone in California would reduce total asthmarelated emergency room visits and respiratory hospital admissions by only about 1 and 2 percent, respectively—and this in a state where millions of people live in areas that have by far the highest ozone levels in the nation. We show that even this estimate is inflated, because it is based on a selective reading of the health effects literature that ignores contrary evidence. The most serious claim about air pollution is that it prematurely kills tens of thousands of Americans each year. The claim is based on small statistical correlations between daily pollution levels and daily deaths. But correlation doesn’t necessarily mean causation, as recent embarrassing medical reversals have shown. For example, based on correlation studies, medical experts presumed that hormone-replacement therapy and Vitamin A supplements prevent heart disease, calcium supplements prevent osteoporosis, and a low-fat diet reduces cancer risks. But randomized trials, which eliminate the sources of uncontrollable bias that plague correlation studies, showed that these claims are greatly exaggerated or just plain false. In fact, Vitamin A turned out to increase cardiovascular risk. The air pollution–mortality claim deserves even greater skepticism. First, it is based on the same unreliable correlation methods that have led medical authorities astray in other areas. Second, even though pollution was correlated with higher premature mortality on average, it seemed to protect against death in about one-third of cities. How could pollution kill people in some cities and save them in others? More likely, both results are chance correlations rather than real effects. Third, researchers have been unable to kill animals in laboratory experiments, even when they expose them to air pollution at levels many times greater than ever occur in the United States. This suggests that air pollution at today’s record-low levels doesn’t pose a risk, and current standards are health-protective with plenty of room to spare.

#### Studies linking the effects of air pollution to other issues are awful -- err against their impacts.

#### Koop and Tole, ‘4

[Gary, Prof. Econ. – U. Leicester and Fellow at the Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis and Lise, Lecturer in Env. Social. Sci. – Dept. Econ. U. Leicester, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, “Measuring the health effects of air pollution: to what extent can we really say that people are dying from bad air?” 47(1), January, ScienceDirect]

Estimation of the effects of environmental impacts is a major focus of current theoretical and policy research in environmental economics. Such estimates are used to set regulatory standards for pollution exposure; design appropriate environmental protection and damage mitigation strategies; guide the assessment of environmental impacts; and measure public willingness to pay for environmental amenities. It is a truism that the effectiveness of such strategies depends crucially on the quality of the estimates used to inform them. However, this paper argues that in respect to at least one area of the empirical literature—the estimation of the health impacts of air pollution using daily time series data—existing estimates are questionable and thus have limited relevance for environmental decision-making. By neglecting the issue of model uncertainty—or which models, among the myriad of possible models researchers should choose from to estimate health effects—most studies overstate confidence in their chosen model and underestimate the evidence from other models, thereby greatly enhancing the risk of obtaining uncertain and inaccurate results. This paper discusses the importance of model uncertainty for accurate estimation of the health effects of air pollution and demonstrates its implications in an exercise that models pollution-mortality impacts using a new and comprehensive data set for Toronto, Canada. The main empirical finding of the paper is that standard deviations for air pollution-mortality impacts become very large when model uncertainty is incorporated into the analysis. Indeed they become so large as to question the plausibility of previously measured links between air pollution and mortality. Although applied to the estimation of the effects of air pollution, the general message of this paper—that proper treatment of model uncertainty critically determines the accuracy of the resulting estimates—applies to many studies that seek to estimate environmental effects.

### Amazon Deforestation

#### Alt causes to Amazon collapse -- Brazilian agriculture politics.

**Canning, 4/27** Paul Canning, Writer for Care2, “Brazil Goes Backwards on Amazon Deforestation,” [http://www.care2.com/causes/brazil-goes-backwards-on-amazon-deforestation.html Accessed 6/22/12](http://www.care2.com/causes/brazil-goes-backwards-on-amazon-deforestation.html%20Accesed%206/22/12) BJM

Brazil’s Congress has voted to relax laws which protect the Amazon from deforestation. The new forest code now goes to President Dilma Rousseff, who is being urged to veto the bill or at least some of its clauses. Rousseff opposed the bill, but the country’s powerful farming lobby won over enough MPs to over-rule her and her party. World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Greenpeace called the vote: “O início do fim das florestas — the beginning of the end of the rainforest.” “Brazil has been held hostage to the interests of the agriculture lobby from the outset,” said Paulo Adário of Greenpeace in Brazil. “The agriculture lobby has done everything it could to push through its demands.” WWF says the law grants amnesty to those who have destroyed rainforest and opens the floodgates to further destruction. The amnesty is conditional in that perpetrators must enroll in a government-sponsored conservation program and abide by the rules — but there are no clear guidelines for these programs. Increased enforcement of the Forest Code, which dates back to 1965, has slowed deforestation in recent years, with authorities using satellite images to track clearance. Under that code, landowners must conserve a percentage of their terrain forested, ranging from 20% in some regions to 80% in the Amazon. Jeff Tollefson points out in Nature: “The fear is that weakening the law will reverse this progress and unleash a wave of new deforestation by convincing farmers and ranchers that Brazil doesn’t have the political will to truly enforce the law.” Critics of the law say it will encourage more land clearance because government agencies have proved unable to determine when a plot was deforested. Under the new bill, farmers will be able to cultivate land closer to hilltops and riverbanks, which are especially vulnerable to erosion if trees are chopped down

#### More ev -- Brazil is tearing down the amazon for energy self-sustainability.

**Hennigan 7/23** – Irish Times staff writer stationed in San Paulo (Tom, “Amazon under threat again as Brazil's boom takes high toll”, 7/23/12, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2012/0623/1224318509432.html)

With demand rising for electricity, Brazil is looking to the Amazon it did so much to protect AS WORLD leaders in Rio de Janeiro this week tried to map a sustainable future for the planet, their host Brazil provided a ready-made example of the dilemma they face. In recent years the country has made huge strides in tackling deforestation in the Amazon, the world’s biggest rainforest, 60 per cent of which lies within its borders. Latest figures show the rate at which the jungle is being cleared in Brazil is at its lowest since records began in 1988. It marks a huge advance on 1992, when the country hosted the first Earth Summit. Back then, images of burning rainforest helped mobilise the global environmental movement. Now Brazil’s president, Dilma Rousseff, has hailed the success as “a great example of respect for the environment but also the capacity to combine the protection of nature with a reduction of poverty and economic growth”. But at the same time as Brazil celebrates its successes in the rainforest, it is scrambling to secure future energy sources for an expanding economy, and is increasingly looking to the Amazon to do so. Tens of millions of Brazilians are exiting poverty and joining the consumer market. With an increasingly middle-class lifestyle requiring refrigerators, TVs, computers and mobile phones, demand for electricity is projected to grow by 56 per cent by 2021. To meet this, the government is looking to the same Amazon it has done so much to protect from loggers and ranchers, focusing on the river hydro-power potential. At least 22 hydro-electric plants are scheduled to be built along the river’s tributaries, and engineers say the river’s basin could power many more. Such talk alarms many environmentalists and indigenous rights campaigners who argue that damming the basin will inevitably alter is delicate environmental and social balance. “There is a contradiction in government policy. On one hand it wants to preserve the rainforest but on the other it is exploiting it as a resource,” says Daniel Santos, a researcher with Imazon, a local environmental research institute. Dams already under construction in the Amazon have been hugely controversial. The €11 billion Belo Monte dam on the Xingu, which when finished will be the third biggest in the world, will flood hundreds of square kilometres of rainforest, forcing thousands of forest dwellers to relocate, including several indigenous communities. Many say they will resist efforts to displace them. While locals are removed, thousands of construction workers are brought in to remote jungle regions where forest is cleared for access roads and the transmission lines that will transport the energy to the country’s population centres. A report by Imazon warns that the government is not taking into account the full environmental impact of dams in the Amazon, calculating that 153 million tonnes of carbon will be released by the deforestation they cause. “The government is promoting a model of energy production without having all the data on the environmental impact,” warns Santos. But supporters of hydro-plants defend their benefits. “The country will need this energy so it has to come from somewhere and it is self-evident that hydro is environmentally friendlier than oil or gas fired stations. The fuel is water,” says José Gelázio da Rocha, the engineer who supervised construction of the giant Itaipú dam on the Paraná river. But water is not the only fuel Brazil is seeking to harness in the Amazon. The region is also the focus of a gathering effort to exploit oil and gas reserves, often found in its deepest reaches. Marcio Rocha Mello, head of independent Brazilian oil company HRT, says the region could hold reserves equivalent to Algeria and Libya of over 100 billion barrels of oil. Getting all this energy from deep under the forest floor to consumers thousands of kilometres away risks creating new spots of industrialisation in the heart of the jungle. Environmentalists point to the dismal environmental record of oil companies operating in the Amazon in neighbouring Ecuador.

### Coral Reefs

#### Reefs are resilient and will adapt.

P. **Gosselin** 6/28/**11** - an Associate Degree in Civil Engineering at Vermont Technical College and a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering at the University of Arizona in Tucson (“Threat to Coral Reefs Exaggerated, Says New Study” <http://notrickszone.com/2011/07/28/threat-to-coral-reefs-exaggerated-says-new-study/>, PZ)

Some scientists and media have gotten much attention claiming that the world’s coral reefs could disappear in as little as 20 to 30 years – all because of humans consuming fossil fuels and whatever. Now the Financial Times Germany reports on a study that claims this is all exaggerated. The world’s largest coral reef off the east coast of Australia is not going to disappear as fast as once previously thought, according to a new study. Warnings that the Great Barrier Reef could die off due to climate change over the next 20 to 30 years are exaggerated says Sean Connolly of the James Cook University.” This comes to no surprise for skeptics. How many millions of years and through what ranges of temperature swings have the coral reefs survived so far? Indeed a few tenths of a degree Celsius of change over decades will have no impact on the reefs. And I seriously doubt the reefs are going to do what the models tell them. The James Cook University Press release here says: …some current projections of global-scale collapse of reefs within the next few decades probably overestimate the rapidity and uniformity of the decline.” Again, if the relatively sudden transition from ice age to optimum did not kill them, why would a few tenths of a degree over decades or centuries do it? Wikipedia writes that coral reefs in the Persian Gulf have adapted to temperatures of 13 °C (55 °F) in winter and 38 °C (100 °F) in summer, i.e. 25°C change in 6 months. Like any species on the planet, reefs are always threatened by something. The press release writes: However reefs are naturally highly diverse and resilient, and are likely to respond to the changed conditions in different ways and at varying rates.” The James Cook press release, despite its obvious findings, still tries to convey an aura of alarm (for funding) yet admits that climate change is a natural process that has occurred time and again in the past. Past extinction crises in coral reef ecosystems appear to coincide with episodes of rapid global warming and ocean acidification, they say. This has led some to predict rapid, dramatic, global-scale losses of coral reefs.” The rapid changes they mention here were measured in degrees per decade and century, and not tenths of a degree as is the case with today’s relatively boring rate of change.

**Coral reefs are uniquely resilient -- interconnectivity guarantees recovery.**

**McClanahan et al., ‘2**

[Tim, Wildlife Conservation Society, with Nicholas Polunin [Newcastle University] and Terry Done [Australian Institute of Marine Science]. “Ecological States and the Resilience of Coral Reefs.” http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol6/iss2/art18/]

Coral reefs can be resilient to multiple scales of disturbances (Pandolfi 1996, Connell 1997). One important factor that determines the degree of resilience at a particular place is the scattered patchy distribution of reefs throughout tropical ocean basins (IUCN/UNEP 1988). Individual reefs may be replenished to a greater or lesser extent by recruitment from planktonic larvae derived from other reef sources outside of the disturbed areas (Hughes et al. 1999a). Ocean-wide currents can potentially deliver larvae across hundreds and thousands of kilometers (Roberts 1997), although actual dispersal may be more limited (Cowen et al. 2000). Consequently, the combination of spatial heterogeneity and refugia of reef systems, the temporal heterogeneity of dispersal, and a physically stable but moving transport system of currents ensures the connectivity among reefs that is required for recovery. This is an important aspect of ecological resilience.

### Deforestation

#### Their authors misrepresent data to exaggerate the impacts.

#### SJTG, 2000

[Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography, “BOOK REVIEWS Reframing Deforestation: Global Analysis and Local Realities: Studies in West Africa”, 21:2, 99-103, Wiley Interscience]

The abuse of information to support preconceived notions of high rates of forest loss is a common theme throughout the book, and particularly in the chapters on Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia and Ghana. The FAO (1981) indicated that Côte d’Ivoire had the highest rate of deforestation in the tropics, with the vast majority of forest loss having taken place during the twentieth century. A USAID report published around the same time predicted that Liberia would be denuded of its forest cover within another ten years. It was assumed in both cases that, at the turn of the century, forest more or less extended to its bioclimatic limits, despite good contradictory historical evidence. Subsequent measurements of forest cover are equally suspect. The 1980 figure for Côte d’Ivoire was derived from two estimates made during the 1950s and 1960s. The statistics for Liberia are even more incredible, with one survey in the late 1960s, which was used as a basis for the FAO’s (1981) calculations, actually over-estimating the size of the country (and thus underestimating the percentage of forest cover)! According to Fairhead and Leach, if the full range of information on vegetation and population changes in the region is used judiciously, then deforestation rates are generally around 30 percent of the FAO estimates. The authors conclude that the amount of forest lost in Ghana is perhaps only half of that suggested in most recently published texts. Again part of the discrepancy lies in inaccurate estimates of forest extent. Estimates of forest cover at 1900 have tended to be based on the determination of deforestation rates for the late twentieth century, which are then extrapolated backwards. Two assumptions underpin these estimates. First, population sizes have steadily increased and, second, at the turn of the century, primary forest extended to what may be its climatic limits today. An interrogation of historical texts indicates, however, that neither assumption holds. Depopulation was significant in Ghana during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and probably in much of West Africa, as a result of frequent wars, disease and the activities of slavers. Thus Fairhead and Leach maintain that a substantial amount of the forest that existed around 1900 was not primary but regrowth over abandoned fields and villages. Benin is also frequently cited as a country that since 1900 has experienced an inexorable loss of trees from areas that are climatically able to support forest (FAO 1981, 1993; Sayer 1992). However, this claim turns out to have been based upon extrapolations from changes in the boundaries of a single forest fragment, the choice of which was highly subjective. Furthermore, it seems that Benin’s forest zone was not entirely covered by high forest at the turn of the century; in 1910 the forester Chevalier stated that forest had already disappeared ‘almost completely’. Significantly he noted the presence of isolated trees with long straight boles. Chevalier assumed that this feature indicated an origin in closed forest and thus more extensive forest cover in the relatively recent past. Fairhead and Leach provide a different interpretation, however. They argue that a straight bole is not a morphology that is restricted to a particular habitat (i.e. forest). Moreover, they maintain that, rather than a residual of deforestation, the presence of isolated trees may be due to deliberate planting by farmers, and therefore represent an expansion of forest as defined by the FAO. The final two chapters in this part describe forest histories for Togo and Sierra Leone. Deforestation in these two countries is generally assumed to be largely a pre-twentieth century process, and mainly due to iron working (Togo) and commercial logging (Sierra Leone). However, as the authors stress, although the time-scale may differ from previous chapters, the assumption of deforestation remains. The impact of pre-colonial iron working and logging on forests has largely been based on a particular reading of twentieth century landscapes. In reality, the area of land capable of supporting forest in both countries may have been exaggerated; little forest may have been reported by colonial foresters at the beginning of the twentieth century simply because there was never much there. Furthermore, the amount of charcoal required to feed the smelting process and number of logs removed by commercial operators (and hence extents of forest degraded or destroyed) may have been greatly exaggerated. In the third and concluding part of the book the authors argue that exaggerated and pejorative claims about deforestation also have histories and that these can be traced to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The authors re-emphasise their point that these claims were based partly on assumed relationships between farmers and vegetation. Conveniently, the assumption that agriculture and forests were mutually exclusive presented colonial governments with a sound reason for expropriating forest resources. The authors also maintain that the exaggerations were fueled by genuine fears of the climatic impact of deforestation and by the need to present emerging colonial forestry services with a raison d’être. Moreover these assumptions and power relations appear to have out lived the colonial period; for colonial forestry services read national government forest departments and international conservation agencies. Policy responses to the orthodoxy of deforestation have tended to weaken traditional forms of vegetation (including forest) management and links between farmers and their environment. These outcomes lead to increased poverty and instability in rural areas and thus are powerful forces for deforestation. Two calls are made in the book’s concluding chapter that, if implemented, may break this positive feedback, first, for histories of vegetation change to be treated more critically and with greater objectivity than has generally been the case to date; and second, for alternative discourses to be revealed by the research process, and for these alternatives to be circulated as widely as competing interpretations.

**Alt cause -- Amazon deforestation.**

**Canning, 4/27** Paul Canning, Writer for Care2, “Brazil Goes Backwards on Amazon Deforestation,” [http://www.care2.com/causes/brazil-goes-backwards-on-amazon-deforestation.html Accessed 6/22/12](http://www.care2.com/causes/brazil-goes-backwards-on-amazon-deforestation.html%20Accesed%206/22/12) BJM

Brazil’s Congress has voted to relax laws which protect the Amazon from deforestation. The new forest code now goes to President Dilma Rousseff, who is being urged to veto the bill or at least some of its clauses. Rousseff opposed the bill, but the country’s powerful farming lobby won over enough MPs to over-rule her and her party. World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Greenpeace called the vote: “O início do fim das florestas — the beginning of the end of the rainforest.” “Brazil has been held hostage to the interests of the agriculture lobby from the outset,” said Paulo Adário of Greenpeace in Brazil. “The agriculture lobby has done everything it could to push through its demands.” WWF says the law grants amnesty to those who have destroyed rainforest and opens the floodgates to further destruction. The amnesty is conditional in that perpetrators must enroll in a government-sponsored conservation program and abide by the rules — but there are no clear guidelines for these programs. Increased enforcement of the Forest Code, which dates back to 1965, has slowed deforestation in recent years, with authorities using satellite images to track clearance. Under that code, landowners must conserve a percentage of their terrain forested, ranging from 20% in some regions to 80% in the Amazon. Jeff Tollefson points out in Nature: “The fear is that weakening the law will reverse this progress and unleash a wave of new deforestation by convincing farmers and ranchers that Brazil doesn’t have the political will to truly enforce the law.” Critics of the law say it will encourage more land clearance because government agencies have proved unable to determine when a plot was deforested. Under the new bill, farmers will be able to cultivate land closer to hilltops and riverbanks, which are especially vulnerable to erosion if trees are chopped down

### Natural Disasters

#### Tech solves the impact

**Hamilton 97** – Chairman of IDNDR Scientific and Technical Committee (IDNDR = International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, Early Warming Capabilities for Geopolitical Hazards, 10/97, [http://www.unisdr.org/2006/ppew/whats-ew/pdf/report-on-ew-capabilities-for-geological-hazards.pdf)](http://www.unisdr.org/2006/ppew/whats-ew/pdf/report-on-ew-capabilities-for-geological-hazards.pdf)//EM)

Using currently available methodology, the areas that are prone to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides, and tsunamis can be identified and the degree of the hazard can be assessed. Such hazard assessments provide an adequate basis for promulgating land-use practices to avoid these geological hazards and building practices to withstand their effects. All nations that are threatened by geological hazards should conduct national, regional, and, where appropriate, local hazard assessments. It should be noted that this is one of the three targets of the IDNDR.

### Oceans

#### Oceans are resilient.

#### Dulvy et al., ‘3

[Nicholas, School of Marine Science and Tech. -- U. Newcastle, Yvonne Sadovy, Dept. Ecology and Biodiversity @ U. Hong Kong, and John D. Reynolds, Centre for Ecology, Evolution and Conservation @ School of Bio. Sci. @ U. East Anglia, Fish and Fisheries, “Extinction vulnerability in marine populations”, 4:1, Blackwell-Synergy]

Marine fish populations are more variable and resilient than terrestrial populations Great natural variability in population size is sometimes invoked to argue that IUCN Red List criteria, as one example, are too conservative for marine fishes (Hudson and Mace 1996; Matsuda et al. 1997; Musick 1999; Powles et al. 2000; Hutchings 2001a). For the (1996) IUCN list, a decline of 20% within 10 years or three generations (whichever is longer) triggered a classification of 'vulnerable', while declines of 50 and 80% led to classifications of 'endangered' and 'critically endangered', respectively. These criteria were designed to be applied to all animal and plant taxa, but many marine resource biologists feel that for marine fishes 'one size does not fit all' (see Hutchings 2001a). They argue that percent decline criteria are too conservative compared to the high natural variability of fish populations. Powles et al. (2000) cite the six-fold variation of the Pacific sardine population (Sardinops sagax, Clupeidae) and a nine-fold variation in northern anchovy (Engraulis mordax, Clupeidae) over the past two millennia to suggest that rapid declines and increases of up to 10-fold are relatively common in exploited fish stocks. It should, however, be borne in mind that the variation of exploited populations must be higher than unexploited populations because recruitment fluctuations increasingly drive population fluctuations when there are few adults (Pauly et al. 2002).

#### Alt causes to bio-d decline -- overfishing.

**O’Connell 2** – science and environmental issues writer for many different publications (Sanjida, Down among the low life, 4/17/02, http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2002/apr/18/research.highereducation)

The world's fisheries are now in decline. Deep sea fishing decimates bottom-dwelling creatures. Trawling can reduce the diversity of an area by 50% and it can take centuries for the region to recover. Oil and gas drilling is increasingly taking place in the deep sea which, apart from the risk of blow-outs, is polluting. Drilling brings up fossil water from deep within the Earth's crust; the water is often radioactive and highly salty, toxic to organisms adapted to today's oceans. Another worrying area of exploitation is bioprospecting for minerals. For instance, mining manganese nodules could be carried out by a robotic device that would trawl the surface, churning out sediment that can asphyxiate slow-growing organisms. The minerals themselves are a further problem: a lump of manganese as big as a fist was produced by bacterial excretions and grew at the rate of a millimetre a century for a thousand years. It is hardly a sustainable harvest. Dumping at sea is sanctioned for "off-shore processing of seabed mineral resources", and "wastes derived from normal operations in the ocean", which is practically carte blanche for anyone with an imagination. "To the extent that the decision-makers think about the deep sea at all," says Norse, "they consider it primarily a place to first, hide submarines, secondly extract non-living resources like oil, and living resources such as fish, and thirdly, dispose of wastes. The deep sea is 'out of sight, out of mind'. But because there is a growing indication that the deep sea has high biodiversity and because deep-sea ecological processes play a crucial role in the Earth's biogeochemistry, it behoves humankind to treat the deep sea with uncharacteristic caution."

### Overpopulation

#### Technology mitigates the impact of overpopulation.

**Mulligan, 9** – economics professor at the University of Chicago. (Casey B., “The More the Merrier: Population Growth Promotes Innovation”, 9-23, <http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/the-more-the-merrier-population-growth-promotes-innovation)//>AH

A recent study reiterated the conclusion that population growth ought to be controlled in order to combat global warming, and other world problems. I beg to differ. The authors of studies like these have exaggerated the benefits of population control, because they ignore some of the significant economic benefits of large populations. The director-general of Unicef has been quoted as saying, “Family planning could bring more benefits to more people at less cost than any other single technology now available to the human race.” And one of the benefits of reduced population, it is claimed, is reduced carbon emissions and therefore mitigation of climate change. This statement takes technology for granted, yet technology itself depends on population. Especially important among the sources of technical progress — discoveries — are trial and error, and incentives. Reasonable people can disagree about the relative importance of these two, but both are stimulated by population. The more people on earth, the greater the chance that one of them has an idea of how to improve alternative energies, or to mitigate the climate effects of carbon emissions. It takes only one person to have an idea that can benefit many. Plus, the more people on earth, the larger are the markets for new innovations. Thus, even if the brilliant innovators would be born regardless of population control, their incentives to devote effort toward finding new discoveries and bringing them to the marketplace depend on the size of that marketplace. And it’s clear that incentives matter for innovative activity: That’s why we have a patent system that helps innovators obtain financial rewards for their inventions. Not surprisingly, research has shown that market size stimulates innovative activity, as in the case of pharmaceutical research that is especially intense for conditions that have more victims. It may take a long time for population growth to either give birth to an inventor brilliant enough, or motivate enough incentives, to have an impact on the climate. But that’s not a reason to turn to population control, because it also takes a long time for population control’s impact to be noticeable. Although the calculations are inherently uncertain, the value of the additional innovation stimulated by additional population may be significant. In my academic work I have calculated that the value, to the entire marketplace through this channel, of an additional person may be on the same order of magnitude of the value that person places on his own life. For example, a person who can earn $2 million in his own lifetime may, by his presence in the worldwide marketplace, stimulate innovative activity that is worth a few hundred thousand dollars. The role of technical change has been repeatedly underestimated. For example, someone a century ago who claimed that the earth could have enough food to support nine billion people (population control advocates now think that the earth’s population can easily get there) would have been considered crazy. But with today’s technology it is easy to see how many billions can be fed. Some of the important solutions to climate change will also come from technological progress.

More evidence.

Sommerfeld, 99 - educated @ Stanford University, Knight Journalism Fellowship at MIT, Deputy editor at msnbc.com digital network and TODAY.com, (Julia, “Will technology save us from overpopulation?”, 1999, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3072069/ns/us\_news-only\_on\_msnbc\_com/t/will-technology-save-us-overpopulation/#.T\_cI7cWYEmw)//AH

Oct. 12, 1999 — While environmental groups are citing Tuesday’s 6 billion person milestone to highlight the challenges facing the globe, some economists are cheerfully wishing baby 6 billion a happy birthday. They predict technology will ensure that today’s and tomorrow’s children will have longer, more comfortable and more productive lives than those who came before them. This viewpoint, most vocally expressed by some optimistic economists and members of conservative think-tanks, is based on the idea that humans don’t deplete resources but, through technology, create them. Thus, as the globe’s population grows, resources will become more abundant. “We shouldn’t fear the arrival of more people because they are the bearers of the real resource, human intelligence,” said Sheldon Richman, editor of the libertarian publication “The Freeman.” “Technology is the result of applied human intelligence. And technology helps us push back the carrying capacity of the world. It creates resources. In effect, it makes them infinite.” This line of thinking is anathema to most environmentalists. “Pretending that technology will give the earth an unlimited carrying capacity for humans is very dangerous. It ignores the environmental damage and human health implications of what we already do,” said Peter Gleick, director of the Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment and Security. Scarcity or abundance? Environmentalists say if present population and consumption trends go unchecked, the earth will face a future of overcrowded cities and scarce resources. They picture bumper-to-bumper cars spewing toxins into the atmosphere, wresting the earth’s crust of its last pockets of fossil fuel. They fear more malnutrition and less available fresh water. Economists like Richman, however, predict an abundance - of food, water and fossil fuel (or whatever energy source may replace it). They envision desalination plants making seawater potable, a “Gene Revolution” eradicating food shortages and nuclear science making energy too cheap to meter. That argument, for many, is counterintuitive. How can more people using more resources result in a net gain of resources? Basically, their argument goes as follows: More people and more consumption cause problems in the short run, such as pollution or resource shortages. But short-term scarcity raises prices and pollution causes public agitation and this attracts entrepreneurs who will come up with technological solutions and develop better ways to do things. And in the long run, these developments will leave us better off than if the problems hadn’t arisen at all. In other words, it’s always darkest before the dawn. The environmentalist view, it might be said, is more along the lines of it’s always darkest before it goes black. They see present shortages as harbingers of future resource dearth. Julian Simon, the late University of Maryland professor and original “optimistic economist,” based his argument on historical evidence that resources have become cheaper and more abundant over time with increases in population. The standard of living has risen across the world as its population has grown, and there’s no reason to think this trend suddenly will reverse itself, he argued. Six billion and counting While world population is still rising fast, no one argues it will hit the astronomical numbers like the 15 billion predicted 20 years ago. The United Nations now believes that population will likely peak at 8.9 billion in the middle of the next century. But some environmentalists say even this modified figure could spell disaster. They say we aren’t doing that well providing for the 6 billion people we already have. The “optimistic” economists envision another future. About water shortages, they cite water reclamation, efficiency technologies and desalination. Of increased agricultural demands, they believe higher-yielding seeds will continue to be developed. And when asked about pollution, they note that new, non-polluting energy sources are in the works and fuel efficiency has already drastically improved in recent years. More traditional environmentalists respond that such technologies are too expensive. They argue that desalination plants may be feasible in places like Tampa, Fla., but are simply not affordable in places like India, which is facing a devastating water shortage. “Technology is a tool,” says Alex Marshall of the United Nations Population Fund. “But first it has to be available, and to a large extent it isn’t available in Third World countries.” But economists say that as technologies get more advanced and shortages more apparent, new technologies will become more cost-efficient and within the reach of Third World nations. “As soon as a resource becomes truly scarce, it becomes economical to try to replace it,” said Jerry Taylor, director of natural resource studies at the Cato Institute. “Fusion, fission, wind power, solar power and fuel cells are all alternative energy sources that aren’t economic yet because we aren’t experiencing a shortage of fossil fuels. There has to be economic incentive. Marketplace actors figure out the cheapest way to give people what they want. And when it becomes cheaper to use solar power or wind power, we will do so.”

#### Overpopulation rhetoric is alarmist nonsense – population is slowing

**Pearce, 9** - international speaker on environmental issues @ Yale and Cambridge, contributor for the WWF, the UN Environment Programme, the Red Cross, UNESCO, the World Bank, the European Environment Agency, and the UK Environment Agency, trustee of the Integrated Water Resources International (Fred, “The overpopulation myth”, 3-8-2010, http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/the-overpopulation-myth/)//AH

The idea that growing human numbers will destroy the planet is nonsense. But over-consumption will Many of today’s most-respected thinkers, from Stephen Hawking to David Attenborough, argue that our efforts to fight climate change and other environmental perils will all fail unless we “do something” about population growth. In the Universe in a Nutshell, Hawking declares that, “in the last 200 years, population growth has become exponential… The world population doubles every forty years.” But this is nonsense. For a start, there is no exponential growth. In fact, population growth is slowing. For more than three decades now, the average number of babies being born to women in most of the world has been in decline. Globally, women today have half as many babies as their mothers did, mostly out of choice. They are doing it for their own good, the good of their families, and, if it helps the planet too, then so much the better. Here are the numbers. Forty years ago, the average woman had between five and six kids. Now she has 2.6. This is getting close to the replacement level which, allowing for girls who don’t make it to adulthood, is around 2.3. As I show in my new book, Peoplequake, half the world already has a fertility rate below the long-term replacement level. That includes all of Europe, much of the Caribbean and the far east from Japan to Vietnam and Thailand, Australia, Canada, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Algeria, Kazakhstan, and Tunisia. It also includes China, where the state decides how many children couples can have. This is brutal and repulsive. But the odd thing is that it may not make much difference any more: Chinese communities around the world have gone the same way without any compulsion—Taiwan, Singapore, and even Hong Kong. When Britain handed Hong Kong back to China in 1997, it had the lowest fertility rate in the world: below one child per woman. So why is this happening? Demographers used to say that women only started having fewer children when they got educated and the economy got rich, as in Europe. But tell that to the women of Bangladesh, one of the world’s poorest nations, where girls are among the least educated in the world, and mostly marry in their mid-teens. They have just three children now, less than half the number their mothers had. India is even lower, at 2.8. Tell that also to the women of Brazil. In this hotbed of Catholicism, women have two children on average—and this is falling. Nothing the priests say can stop it. Women are doing this because, for the first time in history, they can. Better healthcare and sanitation mean that most babies now live to grow up. It is no longer necessary to have five or six children to ensure the next generation—so they don’t. There are holdouts, of course. In parts of rural Africa, women still have five or more children. But even here they are being rational. Women mostly run the farms, and they need the kids to mind the animals and work in the fields. Then there is the middle east, where traditional patriarchy still rules. In remote villages in Yemen, girls as young as 11 are forced into marriage. They still have six babies on average. But even the middle east is changing. Take Iran. In the past 20 years, Iranian women have gone from having eight children to less than two—1.7 in fact—whatever the mullahs say. The big story here is that rich or poor, socialist or capitalist, Muslim or Catholic, secular or devout, with or without tough government birth control policies in place, most countries tell the same tale of a reproductive revolution. That doesn’t mean population growth has ceased. The world’s population is still rising by 70m a year. This is because there is a time lag: the huge numbers of young women born during the earlier baby boom may only have had two children each. That is still a lot of children. But within a generation, the world’s population will almost certainly be stable, and is very likely to be falling by mid-century. In the US they are calling my new book “The Coming Population Crash.” Is this good news for the environment and for the planet’s resources? Clearly, other things being equal, fewer people will do less damage to the planet. But it won’t on its own do a lot to solve the world’s environmental problems, because the second myth about population growth is that it is the driving force behind our wrecking of the planet. In fact, rising consumption today far outstrips the rising headcount as a threat to the planet. And most of the extra consumption has been in rich countries that have long since given up adding substantial numbers to their population, while most of the remaining population growth is in countries with a very small impact on the planet. By almost any measure you choose, a small proportion of the world’s people take the majority of the world’s resources and produce the majority of its pollution. Let’s look at carbon dioxide emissions: the biggest current concern because of climate change. The world’s richest half billion people—that’s about 7 per cent of the global population—are responsible for half of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions. Meanwhile, the poorest 50 per cent of the population are responsible for just 7 per cent of emissions. Virtually all of the extra 2bn or so people expected on this planet in the coming 30 or 40 years will be in this poor half of the world. Stopping that, even if it were possible, would have only a minimal effect on global emissions, or other global threats. Ah, you say, but what about future generations? All those big families in Africa will have yet bigger families. Well, that’s an issue of course. But let’s be clear about the scale of the difference involved. The carbon emissions of one American today are equivalent to those of around four Chinese, 20 Indians, 30 Pakistanis, 40 Nigerians or 250 Ethiopians. A woman in rural Ethiopia can have ten children and, in the unlikely event that those ten children all live to adulthood and have ten children of their own, the entire clan of more than a hundred will still be emitting less carbon dioxide than you or me. It is over-consumption, not over-population that matters. Economists predict the world’s economy will grow by 400 per cent by 2050. If this does indeed happen, less than a tenth of that growth will be due to rising human numbers. True, some of those extra poor people might one day become rich. And if they do—and I hope they do—their impact on the planet will be greater. But it is the height of arrogance for us in the rich world to downplay the importance of our own environmental footprint because future generations of poor people might one day have the temerity to get as rich and destructive as us. How dare we? Some green activists need to take a long hard look at themselves. We all like to think of ourselves as progressives. But Robert Malthus, the man who first warned 200 years ago that population growth would produce demographic armageddon, was in his time a favourite of capitalist mill owners. He opposed Victorian charities because he said they were only making matters worse for the poor, encouraging them to breed. He said the workhouses were too lenient. Progressives of the day hated him. Charles Dickens attacked him in several books: when Oliver Twist asked for more gruel in the workhouse, for instance, that was a satire on a newly introduced get-tough law on workhouses, known popularly as Malthus’s Law. In Hard Times, the headmaster obsessed with facts, Thomas Gradgrind, had a son called Malthus. In A Christmas Carol, Ebenezer Scrooge was also widely seen at the time as a caricature of Malthus. Malthus, it should be remembered, spent many years teaching British colonial administrators before they went out to run the empire. They adopted his ideas that famine and disease were the result of overbreeding, so the victims should be allowed to die. It was Malthusian thinking that led to the huge and unnecessary death toll in the Irish potato famine. We must not follow the lure of Malthus, and blame the world’s poor for the environmental damaged caused overwhelmingly by us: the rich. The truth is that the population bomb is being defused round the world. But the consumption bomb is still primed and ever more dangerous.

#### Overpopulation doesn’t lead to economic downturn – technology solves

**Williams, 8** - Professor of Economics at George Mason University, and was chairman George Mason’s Economics dept., (Walter “Government poses biggest threat to our prosperity” Spartanburg Herald-Journal, July 2,2008, GoogleNews)//AH

Contrary to the myths about how overpopulation causes poverty, poor health, unemployment, malnutrition and overcrowding, human beings are the most valuable resource — and the more of them the better. There is absolutely no relationship between high populations and economic despair. For example, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire, has a meager population density of 22 people per square kilometer, while Hong Kong has a massive population density of 6,571 people per square kilometer. Hong Kong is 300 times more crowded than the Congo. If there were any merit to the population control crowd's hysteria. Hong Kong would be in abject poverty while the Congo nourishes. Yet Hong Kong's annual per capita income is $28,000 — while the Congo's is $309, making it the world's poorest country. What are the chances for the United States to become overpopulated? How many more people could we handle? I don't have an answer, but here are a couple of facts that suggests we have a ways to go before we have to worry about overpopulation: All urban areas, any community of At least 3 percent of the United States' 2.3 billon-acre land mass. The world's population is 6.7 billion. That means if the entire world's population were put into the United States, each person would have about a third of an acre. Neither the United States nor the world is running out of space. Letting them off the hook Population controllers have a Malthusian vision of the world and see population growth as outpacing the means for people to care for themselves. Mankind's ingenuity has proven the Malthusiuns dead wrong. As a result of mankind's ingenuity, we can grow increasingly larger quantities of food on less and less land. The energy used, per dollar of GDP, has been in steep decline, again getting more with less, and that applies to most other inputs we use for goods and services. The greatest threat to mankind's prosperity is government. A recent example Zimbabwe's increasingmisery. Like our country, Zimbabwe had a flourishing agriculture sector, so much so that it was called the breadbasket of southern Africa. Today its people are on the brink of starvation as a result of its government. It's the same story in many countries — government interference with mankind's natural tendency to engage in wealth-producing activities, blaming poverty on overpopulation not only lets governments off the hook; it encourages the enactment of harmful policies.

#### Overpopulation is over-hyped – food supply and space will support life

**Harren, 11** - Writer @ Lifenews (Mia, “Overpopulation is a Myth: Plenty of Food and Space Exists” 5-29-11, http://www.lifenews.com/2011/05/29/overpopulation-is-a-myth-plenty-of-food-and-space-exists/?pr=1)//AH

Proclamations of overpopulation have circulated for decades. Are they true? First off, what is meant by the word “overpopulation”? It has nothing to do with the amount of people but rather to the resources and the capacity of the environment to sustain human activities. To be overpopulated, a nation must have insufficient food, resources and living space. With the world population at around 6.8 billion last year, food and living space are hardly a concern. In 1990, it was estimated that the world could feed up to 35 billion people. Most sources estimate that the global population will level out at around 9.2 billion in 2050, and then start to decline. Indian economist Raj Krishna estimates that India alone is capable of increasing crop yields to the point of providing the entire world’s food supply. Lack of food is not the problem but rather the need for more efficient distribution. Another supposed problem is living space. In 2003, the entire population of the world could fit inside the state of Arkansas. The world may seem crowded, but it’s because humans cluster together for trade and companionship, not for lack of room. Even so, there are those who insist that we will continue to breed exponentially, causing a population explosion. Paul Ehrlich first introduced this idea in 1968 with his book, “The Population Bomb.” It succeeded in scaring the masses, just as Thomas Malthus did, but these theories suffer under the impression that humans are the only thing fluctuating. “Population rose six-fold in the next 200 years. But this is an increase, not an explosion, because it has been accompanied, and in large part made possible, by a productivity explosion, a resource explosion, a food explosion, an information explosion, a communications explosion, a science explosion, and a medical explosion,” wrote community development specialist Abid Ullah Jan in an article published in 2003 called “Overpopulation: Myths, Facts, and Politics.” Poverty, too, is not the effect of overpopulation, but rather the aftermath of poor leadership. In Ethiopia, government officials are blamed for causing poverty by confiscating food and exporting it to buy arms. In Africa, economic problems are seen as a result of excessive government spending, taxes on farmers, inflation, trade restrictions and too much government ownership. Depopulation is more likely to cause economic distress than these other factors.

#### Technology and economic growth solve overpopulation problems

Bailey, 10 - B.A. in philosophy and economics @ University of Virginia, economist for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, (Ronald, “The Eternal Return of Overpopulation”, 10-19-10, <http://reason.com/archives/2010/10/19/the-eternal-return-of-overpopu)//>AH

Overpopulation panic is back. Concerns about a world too full of “filthy human children” motivated eco-terrorist James Lee when he held employees of the Discovery Channel hostage at gunpoint in September. But the deranged Lee is far from alone when it comes to worrying about overpopulation. The May-June cover of the progressive magazine Mother Jones asked, “Who’s to Blame for the Population Crisis?” British journalist Matthew Parris wrote an op-ed in September in the London Times asserting, “If you want to save the planet, stop breeding.” Parris further coyly suggested that we study “China’s example, for lessons good and bad.” But on World Population Day in July, British journalist Fred Pearce argued that “population is not the problem.” Pearce’s relatively sanguine article at the environmentalist website Grist provoked Robert Walker, former head of the anti-gun group Handgun Control and now executive vice-president of the Population Institute, to respond at the same site with an article titled “Of course population is still a problem.” Walker asks Pearce what he evidently thinks are deep questions: “Looking ahead, Fred, will these countries [with anticipated population growth in Africa and Asia] be able to feed themselves? Will they have enough safe drinking water? Will their lands be deforested or their rivers polluted? Will their maternal mortality rates and infant mortality rates remain unacceptably high? Will they be caught in a demographic poverty trap? Will they become failed states? If you have good answers to these questions, please let me know.” Let’s take a stab at providing good answers to Walker’s questions. Will the world be able to feed itself in 2050? As it happens, the journal Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B (Biological Sciences) devoted its September 27 issue to analyzing the issue of global food security through 2050. One of the specially commissioned research articles projects that world population will reach around 9 billion by 2050 and that in the second half of the 21st century, “population stabilization and the onset of a decline are likely.” This should allay Ryerson’s concern that the world’s resources are not infinite and therefore “cannot support an infinite population of humans.” So okay, infinite human population growth isn’t likely, but can the Earth adequately feed 9 billion people by 2050? Well, yes, suggest two other of the Royal Society articles. A review of the relevant scientific literature led by Keith Jaggard from Rothamsted Research looks at the effects of climate change, CO2 increases, ozone pollution, higher average temperatures, and other factors on future crop production. Jaggard and his colleagues conclude [PDF], “So long as plant breeding efforts are not hampered and modern agricultural technology continues to be available to farmers, it should be possible to produce yield increases that are large enough to meet some of the predictions of world food needs, even without having to devote more land to arable agriculture.” Applying modern agricultural technologies more widely would go a long way toward boosting yields. For example, University of Minnesota biologist Ronald Phillips points out that India produces 31 bushels of corn per acre now which is at the same point U.S. yields were in the 1930s. Similarly, South Africa produces 40 bushels (U.S. 1940s yields); Brazil 58 bushels (U.S. 1950s yields); China 85 bushels (U.S. 1960s yields). Today’s modern biotech hybrids regularly produce more than 160 bushels of corn per acre in the Midwest. For what it’s worth, the corporate agriculture giant Monsanto is aiming to double yields on corn, soybeans, and cotton by 2030. Whether or not specific countries will be able to feed themselves has less to do with their population growth than it does with whether they adopt policies that retard their economic growth. Another article looking at the role of agricultural research and development finds that crop yields have been recently increasing at about 1 percent per year. In that article researchers estimate that spending an additional $5 to $10 billion per year would increase food output by 70 percent over the next 40 years. Note that world population is expected to increase by about 33 percent over that period. What about safe drinking water? Water is more problematic. The researchers commissioned by the Royal Society run a model that projects that competition for water to meet environmental flow requirements (EFRs) and municipal and industrial demand will “cause an 18 percent reduction if the availability of water worldwide for agriculture by 2050.” Interestingly, the amount of freshwater withdrawn for municipal and industrial use was 4.3 percent in 2000 and is estimated to increase to 5.9 percent by 2050. So the main competition for agricultural water is maintaining flows for environmental reasons. Since water is now often unpriced and subsidized, it gets used very inefficiently. As water becomes scarcer farmers and other users will have incentives to adopt water sparing techniques, such as drip irrigation. In addition, researchers are close to developing drought tolerant crops. The study also notes that water stressed regions will be able to “import water” in the form of food produced in areas with abundant water. With regard to deforestation and polluted rivers, the answer is probably yes for many of the poorest countries. However, speeding up economic growth and technological improvements will dramatically lower the risks of these undesirable outcomes. As noted above, enough food to feed 9 billion can be grown on land currently devoted to agriculture. With regard to water pollution, it is one of the first environmental problems that poor countries begin to clean up as they grow wealthier. A recent study found that in every country where average annual per capita income exceeds $4,600 forests are stable or increasing [PDF]. In addition, technological progress offers the possibility that humanity will increasingly reduce its future demands on nature by a process of dematerialization [PDF], that is, obtaining more value while using less material. Maternal mortality rates have fallen substantially—from 422 per 100,000 live births to 251 per 100,000 live births—over the past 30 years, according to a study published in The Lancet this past April. Sadly, the study noted, “More than 50% of all maternal deaths were in only six countries in 2008 (India, Nigeria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo).” Oddly, some activists opposed the publication of The Lancet article, fearing that the good news would stifle their fundraising. The world’s infant mortality rate has never been lower. Most countries, even very poor countries, continue to experience declines in infant mortality. Walker’s last two questions about poverty traps and failed states are related, but not in a way that supports his implied points. As Wheaton College economist Seth Norton explains, "Fertility rate is highest for those countries that have little economic freedom and little respect for the rule of law.” He adds, "The relationship is a powerful one. Fertility rates are more than twice as high in countries with low levels of economic freedom and the rule of law compared to countries with high levels of those measures." Fertility rates are high in failed states like Somalia, Chad, Sudan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Yemen, because of the lack of rule of law which inexorably generates poverty. Norton persuasively argues that such places are so chaotic that it’s like living in giant open access commons. In those cases people often reason that more children means more hands for grabbing unowned and unprotected resources for the family. Such anarchic places would be particularly ill-suited to implementing the kind of population control policies Walker favors. According to research published by the Royal Society, it looks as though the world will be able to feed 9 billion people by 2050, perhaps even allowing some farmland to revert to nature. Water is a problem, but economic and technological solutions show promise in ameliorating it. But more importantly, Walker and other overpopulationists get the causality backwards. Poverty is the cause and high fertility is the symptom. Poverty traps and failed states which result in high maternal death rates, starvation, pollution, and deforestation are not created by population, but by bad policies. Working to spread economic freedom and political liberty is a lot harder than self-righteously blaming poor people for breeding too much. But it's the only real option.

#### No impact to overpopulation– multiple warrants

Bailey, 9 - B.A. in philosophy and economics @ University of Virginia, economist for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, (Ronald, “Our Uncrowded Planeted”, 10-1-09, <http://www.american.com/archive/2009/september/our-uncrowded-planet>)//AH

Imminent doom has been declared again. But don’t worry, neo-Malthusian predictions of overpopulation are wrong. Every so often, the overpopulation meme erupts into public discourse and imminent doom is declared again. A particularly overwrought example of the overpopulation meme and its alleged problems appeared recently in the Wall Street Journal’s MarketWatch in a piece by regular financial columnist Paul B. Farrell. Farrell asserts that overpopulation is “the biggest time-bomb for Obama, America, capitalism, the world.” Bigger than global warming, poverty, or peak oil. Overpopulation will end capitalism and maybe even destroy modern civilization. As evidence, Farrell cites what he calls neo-Malthusian biologist Jared Diamond's 12-factor equation of population doom. It turns out that Farrell is wrong or misleading about the environmental and human effects of all 12 factors he cites. Let’s take them one by one. 1. Overpopulation multiplier: Looking at the most recent United Nations’ population projections, it is likely that world population will peak somewhere between 8 and 9 billion near the middle of this century (current population is about 6.8 billion) and then begin declining back toward 6 billion by 2100. In addition, if lower fertility rates are the goal, promoting economic freedom is the way to achieve it. In 2002, Seth Norton, a business economics professor at Wheaton College in Illinois, published a remarkably interesting study on the inverse relationship between economic freedom and fertility. Norton found that the fertility rate in countries that ranked low on economic freedom averaged 4.27 children per woman while countries with high economic freedom rankings had an average fertility rate of 1.82 children per woman. Crop yields have been increasing at a rate of about 2 percent year for 100 years and now population is growing at 1 percent per year. 2. Population Impact multiplier: Farrell mirrors Diamond's concern that the world's poor want to become rich. This means that they aim to consume more. Can the Earth sustain increased consumption? Yes, economic efficiency is dematerializing the economy and thus will spare more land and other resources for nature. As Jesse Ausubel, director of the human environment program at Rockefeller University, and colleagues have shown, although the average global consumer enjoyed 45 percent more affluence in 2006 than in 1980, each consumed only 22 percent more crops and 13 percent more energy. See below for more information on positive trends in agriculture, water usage, and forest growth. 3. Food: Farrell says we are running out. It is true that far too many people are on the verge of starvation and the recent economic crisis has pushed even more in that direction. But Farrell and Diamond overlook the fact that crop yields have been increasing at a rate of about 2 percent per year for 100 years and now population is growing at 1 percent per year. Agronomist Paul Waggoner argued in his a 1996 article, "How Much Land Can Ten Billion People Spare for Nature?," published in the journal Daedalus, that "if during the next sixty to seventy years the world farmer reaches the average yield of today’s U.S. corn grower, the 10 billion will need only half of today’s cropland while they eat today’s American calories." If Waggoner is right—and all signs are that he is—the future will be populated by fat people who will have plenty of wilderness in which to frolic. 4. Water: There is no doubt that a lot of fresh water is being wasted. However, we know how to solve that problem—create property rights and free markets for water. For example, water use per capita in the United States has been declining for two decades. Farrell and Diamond propagate the stale water wars meme. Transboundary water cooperation rather than conflict is the norm. "The simple explanation is that water is simply too important to fight over," notes Aaron Wolf, the Oregon State University professor who heads up the Program in Water Conflict Management. Wolf observes that history records that the last water war occurred 4500 years ago between Lagash and Umma over irrigation rights in what is now Iraq. Farrell claims that forests are being destroyed at an accelerating rate. He is wrong. Forest regrowth is the actual trend in many places. 5. Farmland: First note that vast increases in agricultural productivity over the past half century spared an area about the size of South America from being plowed up to produce food for the current population. In a 2000 Science article, soil scientist Pierre Crosson and colleagues noted, "studies of the onfarm productivity effects based on 1982 N[ational] R[esource] I[nventory] cropland erosion indicated that if those rates continue for 100 years, crop yields (output per hectare) would be reduced only 2 to 4 percent. These results indicate that the productivity effects of soil erosion are not significant enough to justify increased federal outlays to reduce the erosion, but not all agree." In any case, soil erosion is a problem that is being addressed by modern high-tech no-till agriculture. 6. Forests: Farrell claims that forests are being destroyed at an accelerating rate. He is wrong. Forest regrowth is the actual trend in many places. A 2006 article on forest trends in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences found "Among 50 nations with extensive forests reported in the Food and Agriculture Organization’s comprehensive Global Forest Resources Assessment 2005, no nation where annual per capita gross domestic product exceeded $4,600 had a negative rate of growing stock change." In fact, leaving aside Brazil and Indonesia, globally the forests of the world increased by about 2 percent since 1990. And there is further good news—a quarter to a third of the tropical forests that have been cut down are now regenerating. 7. Toxic chemicals: Farrell writes, "Consider the deadly impact of insecticides, pesticides, herbicides, detergents, plastics ... the list is endless." When one actually considers the impact on synthetic chemicals on people, it turns out that the more man-made chemicals, the higher do human life expectancies rise. Contrary to activist claims, trace amounts of synthetic chemicals are not producing a cancer epidemic. In fact, cancer incidence rates in the U.S. have been falling for nearly a decade. 8. Energy resources, oil, natural gas, and coal: Farrell is just incoherent here. He hints at "peak oil," and supplies may become tight, but that would largely be a result of political factors, not the depletion of reserves. As for coal and natural gas supplies, no one is suggesting their imminent depletion. 9. Solar energy: Farrell does not here mean photovoltaic power, but rather the Earth's "photosynthetic capacity,” that is, the ability of plants to turn sunlight into food, fuel, and other useful products. Apparently, he thinks that humanity is using too much of it. To the extent this is a problem, biotech advances are already addressing it by researching ways to boost crop productivity by transforming plants from less efficient C3 photosynthesizers to the more efficient C4 pathway. The world's poor want to become rich. This means that they aim to consume more. Can the Earth sustain increased consumption? Yes. 10. Ozone layer: Farrell seems unaware of the fact that this problem has already largely been dealt with. To the extent this was a problem, the Montreal Protocol in 1987 that banned the refrigerants that were depleting the ozone layer has fixed it. This month, NASA reported a slightly positive trend of ozone increase of almost 1 percent per decade in the total ozone from the past 14 years. 11. Diversity: Biodiversity trends are notoriously difficult to predict. In 1979, Oxford University biologist Norman Myers suggested in his book The Sinking Ark that 40,000 species per year were going extinct and that 1 million species would be gone by the year 2000. Myers suggested that the world could "lose one-quarter of all species by the year 2000." At a 1979 symposium at Brigham Young University, Thomas Lovejoy, former president of The H. John Heinz III Center for Science, Economics, and the Environment announced that he had made "an estimate of extinctions that will take place between now and the end of the century. Attempting to be conservative wherever possible, I still came up with a reduction of global diversity between one-seventh and one-fifth." Lovejoy drew up the first projections of global extinction rates for the “Global 2000 Report to the President” in 1980. If Lovejoy had been right, between 15 and 20 percent of all species alive in 1980 would be extinct right now. No one believes that extinctions of this magnitude have occurred over the last three decades. What happens to humanity if many species do go extinct? In a 2003 Science article called "Prospects for Biodiversity,” Martin Jenkins, who works for the United Nations Environment Programme-World Conservation Monitoring Center, pointed out that even if the dire projections of extinction rates being made by conservation advocates are correct, they "will not, in themselves, threaten the survival of humans as a species." The Science article notes, "In truth, ecologists and conservationists have struggled to demonstrate the increased material benefits to humans of 'intact' wild systems over largely anthropogenic ones [like farms] … Where increased benefits of natural systems have been shown, they are usually marginal and local." 12. Alien species: Farrell claims, "transferring species to lands where they're not native can have unintended and catastrophic effects." Mostly not. Biologist Mark Davis chalks up most opposition to "alien" species to prejudice and muddy thinking, adding in the current issue of the New Scientist that "you may be surprised to learn that only a few per cent of introduced species are harmful. Most are relatively benign." As I pointed out nine years ago, the preference for native over non-native species is essentially a religious one. It has no warrant in biology. While there certainly are environmental problems, current trends do not portend a looming population apocalypse. Instead, the 21st century will be more likely remembered as the century of ecological restoration.

### Ozone

#### Your studies are wrong – pollution levels are manageable and they don’t wreck the ozone.

**Artz 11** – reporter for the Heartland Institute (Kenneth, Nation’s Air Quality Continues to Improve, 6/13/11, http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2011/06/13/nations-air-quality-continues-improve)

Air quality is improving almost everywhere in the United States, according to the American Lung Association’s (ALA) “State of the Air” report for 2011, which covers the years 2007 through 2009. Ozone, Soot Levels Improve According to the report, ozone levels registered the strongest improvement. All metro areas in the 25 cities most polluted by ozone showed improvement over last year’s report. Particulates also registered impressive reductions. All but two of the 25 cities most affected by particle pollution (sometimes called soot) improved over last year’s report. The State of the Air 2011 report examines ozone and particulate pollution at official monitoring sites across the United States in 2007, 2008, and 2009. The report uses the most current quality-assured nationwide data available for these analyses. EPA Seeks to Frighten Joel Schwartz, a Senior Consultant with Blue Sky Consulting Group of Sacramento, California, said the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and environmental activist groups nevertheless continue to frighten people into believing national air quality is worsening. “The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has made the claim that air pollution at current levels kills tens of thousands of Americans every year. EPA makes a wild claim like that because, first, they believe it, but secondly because they must keep up the perception that there’s a serious problem that must be solved. If there wasn’t a serious problem, then EPA wouldn’t be able to justify the enormous budget and resources the organization commands,” said Schwartz. “Of course, the EPA’s story is all wrong. We have cleaner air now than 1970 when the Clean Air Act was established. In fact, the air in 1970 was cleaner than it was in the 1930s,” Schwartz observed. “Obviously, at high enough levels air pollution can kill people. But the evidence shows that the air we breathe today is nowhere near that level, nor has it been for a very long time. In fact, the air is getting cleaner,” said Schwartz Moving the Goal Posts Physician John Dunn, a policy advisor for the American Council on Science and Health, said EPA and environmental activist groups are able to list large numbers of metropolitan areas as out of compliance with federal standards only because the federal government keeps moving the goal posts. The compliance goals, moreover, have little or no correlation with human health. “The EPA has continually and repeatedly reduced the air quality standard for the purpose of adding more areas [as failing to reach] the air quality standards,” said Dunn. “The air in the United States has been safe for a long, long time. But EPA and environmental activist groups want the air to be pristine and free of small particles. Cleaner air than what we currently breathe doesn’t mean that it is safer air. In fact, you can’t have pristine air unless you live in a small bubble with air conditioning and air filters,” Dunn explained. James Enstrom, an epidemiologist at the University Of California Los Angeles School of Public Health, agreed. “The reason cities and counties go up and down on the ALA’s list is because, basically, EPA keeps lowering the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) which apply to outdoor air throughout the country,” Enstrom said. “It’s based on an over-interpretation of the health effects of criteria pollutants associated with ozone and smog. That means it’s difficult for these counties to comply even though the effects [of ozone and smog levels] are very weak.” Phantom Health Impacts The air quality in the United States is already safe, and it won’t be any safer if the EPA continues increasing regulations to make it cleaner, said Steve Milloy, an environmental and public health policy consultant and the publisher of JunkScience.com. “The goal of regulatory agencies like the EPA is to create more regulators. Regulators naturally like to regulate. The environmental movement is using the environment like a shield so that everyone will be so ginned up with fear that we’ll pass their agenda which harms the economy and costs billions and billions of dollars and can’t be justified,” Milloy explained. “EPA uses straw man arguments to scare the public into action through accepting their agenda. I dare any regulator to show me the person who is adversely affected by air quality today. It just doesn’t happen,” said Milloy, who holds a masters degree in health sciences and biostatistics.

## Heg/Military

### Heg – Inevitable

#### Zero chance of hegemonic collapse -- the US is too far ahead economically and militarily.

**Kagan 12** – senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution (Robert, “Not Fade Away”, The New Republic, p. International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity, 1/11/12, http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/99521/america-world-power-declinism?passthru=ZDkyNzQzZTk3YWY3YzE0OWM5MGRiZmIwNGQwNDBiZmI)

Less than a decade ago, most observers spoke not of America’s decline but of its enduring primacy. In 2002, the historian Paul Kennedy, who in the late 1980s had written a much-discussed book on “the rise and fall of the great powers,” America included, declared that never in history had there been such a great “disparity of power” as between the United States and the rest of the world. Ikenberry agreed that “no other great power” had held “such formidable advantages in military, economic, technological, cultural, or political capabilities.... The preeminence of American power” was “unprecedented.” In 2004, the pundit Fareed Zakaria described the United States as enjoying a “comprehensive uni-polarity” unlike anything seen since Rome. But a mere four years later Zakaria was writing about the “post-American world” and “the rise of the rest,” and Kennedy was discoursing again upon the inevitability of American decline. Did the fundamentals of America’s relative power shift so dramatically in just a few short years? The answer is no. Let’s start with the basic indicators. In economic terms, and even despite the current years of recession and slow growth, America’s position in the world has not changed. Its share of the world’s GDP has held remarkably steady, not only over the past decade but over the past four decades. In 1969, the United States produced roughly a quarter of the world’s economic output. Today it still produces roughly a quarter, and it remains not only the largest but also the richest economy in the world. People are rightly mesmerized by the rise of China, India, and other Asian nations whose share of the global economy has been climbing steadily, but this has so far come almost entirely at the expense of Europe and Japan, which have had a declining share of the global economy. Optimists about China’s development predict that it will overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world sometime in the next two decades. This could mean that the United States will face an increasing challenge to its economic position in the future. But the sheer size of an economy is not by itself a good measure of overall power within the international system. If it were, then early nineteenth-century China, with what was then the world’s largest economy, would have been the predominant power instead of the prostrate victim of smaller European nations. Even if China does reach this pinnacle again—and Chinese leaders face significant obstacles to sustaining the country’s growth indefinitely—it will still remain far behind both the United States and Europe in terms of per capita GDP. Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-century China learned and Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, “military strength underpins hegemony.” Here the United States remains unmatched. It is far and away the most powerful nation the world has ever known, and there has been no decline in America’s relative military capacity—at least not yet. Americans currently spend less than $600 billion a year on defense, more than the rest of the other great powers combined. (This figure does not include the deployment in Iraq, which is ending, or the combat forces in Afghanistan, which are likely to diminish steadily over the next couple of years.) They do so, moreover, while consuming a little less than 4 percent of GDP annually—a higher percentage than the other great powers, but in historical terms lower than the 10 percent of GDP that the United States spent on defense in the mid-1950s and the 7 percent it spent in the late 1980s. The superior expenditures underestimate America’s actual superiority in military capability. American land and air forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and are the most experienced in actual combat. They would defeat any competitor in a head-to-head battle. American naval power remains predominant in every region of the world. By these military and economic measures, at least, the United States today is not remotely like Britain circa 1900, when that empire’s relative decline began to become apparent. It is more like Britain circa 1870, when the empire was at the height of its power. It is possible to imagine a time when this might no longer be the case, but that moment has not yet arrived.

#### Trends prove that hegemony is inevitable.

**Drezner 1/22** – professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (Daniel W., “[An open letter to the Mitt Romney on American foreign policy leadership](http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/07/02/an_open_letter_to_the_mitt_romney_on_leadership),” January 22, 2012, Foreign Policy,

<http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/22/predictions_about_the_death_of_american_hegemony_may_have_been_greatly_exaggerated>) // CB

So, America is doomed, right?  To be honest, this sounds like a lot of pious baloney.  As [Michael Beckley points out](http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21649/chinas_century_why_americas_edge_will_endure.html?breadcrumb=%2Fproject%2F58%2Fquarterly_journal%3Fparent_id%3D46" \t "_blank) in a new article in International Security, "The United States is not in decline; in fact, it is now wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991."  The whole article is worth a read, and a good cautionary tale on the dangers of overestimating the ease of national catch-up: The widespread misperception that China is catching up to the United States stems from a number of analytical flaws, the most common of which is the tendency to draw conclusions about the U.S.-China power balance from data that compare China only to its former self. For example, many studies note that the growth rates of China’s per capita income, value added in high technology industries, and military spending exceed those of the United States and then conclude that China is catching up. This focus on growth rates, however, obscures China’s decline relative to the United States in all of these categories. China’s growth rates are high because its starting point was low. China is rising, but it is not catching up. What about the future?  One could point to the last few months of modestly encouraging economic data, but that's ephemeral.  Rather, there are three macrotrends that are worth observing now before (I suspect) they come up in the State of the Union:  1)  The United States is successfully deleveraging.  As [the McKinsey Global Institute notes](http://www.mckinsey.com/Insights/MGI/Research/Financial_Markets/Uneven_progress_on_the_path_to_growth" \t "_blank), the United States is actually doing a relatively good job of slimming down total debt -- i.e., consumer, investor and public debt combined.  Sure, public debt has exploded, but as MGI points out, that really is the proper way of doing things after a financial bubble: The deleveraging processes in Sweden and Finland in the 1990s offer relevant lessons today. Both endured credit bubbles and collapses, followed by recession, debt reduction, and eventually a return to robust economic growth. Their experiences and other historical examples show two distinct phases of deleveraging. In the first phase, lasting several years, households, corporations, and financial institutions reduce debt significantly. While this happens, economic growth is negative or minimal and government debt rises. In the second phase of deleveraging, GDP growth rebounds and then government debt is gradually reduced over many years.... As of January 2012, the United States is most closely following the Nordic path towards deleveraging. Debt in the financial sector has fallen back to levels last seen in 2000, before the credit bubble, and the ratio of corporate debt relative to GDP has also fallen. US households have made more progress in debt reduction than other countries, and may have roughly two more years before returning to sustainable levels of debt.  Indeed, the deleveraging is impressive enough for even [Paul Krugman to start sounding optimistic](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/23/opinion/krugman-is-our-economy-healing.html?_r=1" \t "_blank):  the economy is depressed, in large part, because of the housing bust, which immediately suggests the possibility of a virtuous circle: an improving economy leads to a surge in home purchases, which leads to more construction, which strengthens the economy further, and so on. And if you squint hard at recent data, it looks as if something like that may be starting: home sales are up, unemployment claims are down, and builders’ confidence is rising. Furthermore, the chances for a virtuous circle have been rising, because we’ve made significant progress on the debt front. 2) Manufacturing is on the mend.  Another positive trend, contra the Harvard Business School and the GOP presidential candidates, is in manufacturing.  Some analysts have [already predicted a revival](http://www.bcg.com/media/PressReleaseDetails.aspx?id=tcm:12-75973" \t "_blank) in that sector, and now the data appears to be backing up that prediction.   The [Financial Times' Ed Crooks notes](http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ac827a4c-4118-11e1-b521-00144feab49a.html" \l "axzz1jkaMlPGZ" \t "_blank): Plenty of economists and business leaders believe that US manufacturing is entering an upturn that is not just a bounce-back after the recession, but a sign of a longer-term structural improvement. Manufacturing employment has grown faster in the US since the recession than in any other leading developed economy, according to official figures. Productivity growth, subdued wages, the steady decline in the dollar since 2002 and rapid pay inflation in emerging economies have combined to make the US a more attractive location. “Over the past decade, the US has had some huge gains in productivity, and we have seen unit labour costs actually falling,” says Chad Moutray, chief economist at the National Association of Manufacturers. “A lot of our members tell us that it sometimes is cheaper to produce in the US, especially because labour costs are lower.” Now, whether this boom in manufacturing will lead to a corresponding boom in manufacturing employment is [much more debatable](http://blogs.cfr.org/renewing-america/2012/01/20/why-manufacturing-will-not-lead-a-jobs-recovery/" \t "_blank).  Still, as [The Atlantic's Adam Davidson concludes](http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/01/making-it-in-america/8844/" \t "_blank):  "the still-unfolding story of manufacturing’s transformation is, in many respects, that of our economic age. It’s a story with much good news for the nation as a whole. But it’s also one that is decidedly less inclusive than the story of the 20th century." 3) A predicted decline in energy insecurity.  British Petroleum has issued their [Energy Outlook for 2030](http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle800.do?categoryId=9037134&contentId=7068677" \t "_blank).  The Guardian's [Richard Wachman provides a useful summary](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jan/18/shale-oil-gas-us-energy-self-sufficient" \t "_blank): Growth in shale oil and gas supplies will make the US virtually self-sufficient in energy by 2030, according to a BP report published on Wednesday. In a development with enormous geopolitical implications, the country's dependence on oil imports from potentially volatile countries in the Middle East and elsewhere would disappear, BP said, although Britain and western Europe would still need Gulf supplies. [BP's latest energy outlook](http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/STAGING/global_assets/downloads/O/2012_2030_energy_outlook_booklet.pdf" \t "_blank) forecasts a growth in unconventional energy sources, "including US shale oil and gas, Canadian oil sands and Brazilian deepwater, plus a gradual decline in demand, that would see [North America] become almost totally energy self-sufficient" in two decades. BP's chief executive, Bob Dudley, said: "Our report challenges some long-held beliefs. Significant changes in US supply-and-demand prospects, for example, highlight the likelihood that import dependence in what is today's largest energy importer will decline substantially." The report said the volume of oil imports in the US would fall below 1990s levels, largely due to rising domestic shale oil production and ethanol replacing crude. The US would also become a net exporter of natural gas.

#### US hegemony is inevitable -- their authors rely on faulty indicators.

**Brooks and Wohlforth 09** – Associate Professors of Government at Dartmouth College (Steven G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “Reshaping the World Order,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2009, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64652/stephen-g-brooks-and-william-c-wohlforth/reshaping-the-world-order>)  
Only a few years ago, pundits were absorbed in debates about American “empire.” Now, the conventional wisdom is that the world is rapidly approaching the end of the unipolar system with the United States as the sole superpower. A dispassionate look at the facts shows that this view understates U.S. power as much as recent talk of empire exaggerated it. That the United States weighs more on the traditional scales of world power than has any other state in modern history is as true now as it was when the commentator Charles Krauthammer proclaimed the advent of a “unipolar moment” in these pages nearly two decades ago. The United States continues to account for about half the world’s defense spending and one-quarter of its economic output. Some of the reasons for bearishness concern public policy problems that can be ﬁxed (expensive health care in the United States, for example), whereas many of the reasons for bullishness are more fundamental (such as the greater demographic challenges faced by the United States’ potential rivals). So why has opinion shifted so quickly from visions of empire to gloomy declinism? One reason is that the United States’ successes at the turn of the century led to irrational exuberance, thereby setting unreasonably high standards for measuring the superpower’s performance. From 1999 to 2003, seemingly easy U.S. victories in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq led some to conclude that the United States could do what no great power in history had managed before: effortlessly defeat its adversaries. It was only a matter of time before such pie-in-the-sky benchmarks proved unattainable. Subsequent difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq dashed illusions of omnipotence, but these upsets hardly displaced the United States as the world’s leading state, and there is no reason to believe that the militaries of its putative rivals would have performed any better. The United States did not cease to be a superpower when its policies in Cuba and Vietnam failed in the 1960s; bipolarity lived on for three decades. Likewise, the United States remains the sole superpower today. Another key reason for the multipolar mania is “the rise of the rest.” Impressed by the rapid economic growth of China and India, many write as if multipolarity has already returned. But such pronouncements mistake current trajectories for ﬁnal outcomes—a common strategic error with deep psychological roots. The greatest concern in the Cold War, for example, came not from the Soviet Union’s actually attaining parity with the United States but from the expectation that it would do so in the future. Veterans of that era recall how the launch of Sputnik in 1957 fed the perception that Soviet power was growing rapidly, leading some policymakers and analysts to start acting as if the Soviet Union were already as powerful as the United States. A state that is rising should not be confused with one that has risen, just as a state that is declining should not be written off as having already declined. China is generally seen as the country best positioned to emerge as a superpower challenger to the United States. Yet depending on how one measures gdp, China’s economy is between 20 percent and 43 percent the size of the United States’. More dramatic is the difference in gdp per capita, for which all measures show China’s as being less than 10 percent of the United States’. Absent a 1930s-style depression that spares potential U.S. rivals, the United States will not be replaced as the sole superpower for a very long time. Real multipolarity—an international system of three or more evenly matched powers—is nowhere on the horizon. Relative power between states shifts slowly. This tendency to conﬂate trends with outcomes is often driven by the examination in isolation of certain components of state power. If the habit during the Cold War was to focus on military power, the recent trend has been to single out economic output. No declinist tract is complete without a passage noting that although the United States may remain a military superpower, economic multipolarity is, or soon will be, the order of the day. Much as highlighting the Soviet Union’s military power meant overlooking the country’s economic and technological feet of clay, examining only economic output means putting on blinders. In 1991, Japan’s economy was two-thirds the size of the United States’, which, according to the current popular metric, would mean that with the Soviet Union’s demise, the world shifted from bipolarity to, well, bipolarity. Such a partial assessment of power will produce no more accurate an analysis today. Nor will giving in to apprehension about the growing importance of non-state actors. The National Intelligence Council’s report Global Trends 2025 grabbed headlines by forecasting the coming multipolarity, anticipating a power shift as much to non-state actors as to fast-growing countries. But non-state actors are nothing new—compare the scale and scope of today’s pirates off the Somali coast with those of their eighteenth-century predecessors or the political power of today’s multinational corporations with that of such behemoths as the British East India Company—and projections of their rise may well be as much hype as reﬂections of reality. And even if the power of non-state actors is rising, this should only increase the incentives for interstate cooperation; non-state threats do not affect just the United States. Most non-state actors’ behavior, moreover, still revolves around inﬂuencing the decisions of states. Nongovernmental organizations typically focus on trying to get states to change their policies, and the same is true of most terrorists. When it comes to making, managing, and remaking international institutions, states remain the most important actors—and the United States is the most important of them. No other country will match the United States’ combination of wealth, size, technological capacity, and productivity in the foreseeable future. The world is and will long remain a 1 + x world, with one superpower and x number of major powers. A shift from 1 + 3 to 1 + 4 or 5 or 6 would have many important consequences, but it would not change the fact that the United States will long be in a far stronger position to lead the world than any other state.

#### Declinists are wrong and fall prey to psychological traps.

**Nye 10** – December University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard (Joseph, “THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POWER: DOMINANCE AND DECLINE IN PERSPECTIVE,” December 2010, Foreign affairs, <http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic1038752.files/Facilitation%20Articles/Fac_20120305_1.pdf>)  
Despite such differences, Americans are prone to cycles of belief in their own decline. The Founding Fathers worried about comparisons to the Roman republic. Charles Dickens observed a century and a half ago, "If its individual citizens, to a man, are to be believed, [the United States] always is depressed, and always is stagnated, and always is at an alarming crisis, and never was otherwise." In the last half century, belief in American decline rose after the Soviet Union launched Sputnik in 1957, after President Richard Nixon's economic adjustments and the oil shocks in the 1970s, and after the closing of rust-belt industries and the budget deficits in the Reagan era. Ten years later, Americans believed that the United States was the sole superpower, and now polls show that many believe in decline again. Pundits lament the inability of Washington to control states such as Afghanistan or Iran, but they allow the golden glow of the past to color their appraisals. The United States' power is not what it used to be, but it also never really was as great as assumed. After World War II, the United States had nuclear weapons and an overwhelming preponderance of economic power but nonetheless was unable to prevent the "loss" of China, to roll back communism in Eastern Europe, to overcome stalemate in the Korean War, to stop the "loss" of North Vietnam, or to dislodge the Castro regime in Cuba. Power measured in resources rarely equals power measured in preferred outcomes, and cycles of belief in decline reveal more about psychology than they do about real shifts in power resources. Unfortunately, mistaken beliefs in decline-at home and abroad-can lead to dangerous mistakes in policy.

#### Primacy won’t ever collapse.

**Friedman 09** – American political scientist, author, founder, chief intelligence officer, financial overseer, and CEO of the private intelligence corporation Stratfor, authored several books (George, “The Next 100 Years” p 13-31]  
We are now in an America-centric age. To understand this age, we must understand the United States, not only because it is so powerful but because its culture will permeate the world and deﬁne it. Just as French culture and British culture were deﬁnitive during their times of power, so American culture, as young and barbaric as it is, will deﬁne the way the world thinks and lives. So studying the twenty- ﬁrst century means studying the United States. If there were only one argument I could make about the twenty- ﬁrst century, it would be that the European Age has ended and that the North American Age has begun, and that North America will be dominated by the United States for the next hundred years. The events of the twenty- ﬁrst century will pivot around the United States. That doesn’t guarantee that the United States is necessarily a just or moral regime. It certainly does not mean that America has yet developed a mature civilization. It does mean that in many ways the history of the United States will be the history of the twenty- ﬁrst century. The Dawn of the American Age There is a deep- seated belief in America that the United States is approaching the eve of its destruction. Read letters to the editor, peruse the Web, and listen to public discourse. Disastrous wars, uncontrolled deﬁcits, high gasoline prices, shootings at universities, corruption in business and government, and an endless litany of other shortcomings—all of them quite real—create a sense that the American dream has been shattered and that America is past its prime. If that doesn’t convince you, listen to Europeans. They will assure you that America’s best day is behind it. The odd thing is that all of this foreboding was present during the presidency of Richard Nixon, together with many of the same issues. There is a continual fear that American power and prosperity are illusory, and that disaster is just around the corner. The sense transcends ideology. Environmentalists and Christian conservatives are both delivering the same message. Unless we repent of our ways, we will pay the price—and it may be too late already. It’s interesting to note that the nation that believes in its manifest destiny has not only a sense of impending disaster but a nagging feeling that the country simply isn’t what it used to be. We have a deep sense of nostalgia for the 1950s as a “simpler” time. This is quite a strange belief. With the Korean War and McCarthy at one end, Little Rock in the middle, and Sputnik and Berlin at the other end, and the very real threat of nuclear war throughout, the 1950s was actually a time of intense anxiety and foreboding. A widely read book published in the 1950s was entitled The Age of Anxiety. In the 1950s, they looked back nostalgically at an earlier America, just as we look back nostalgically at the 1950s. American culture is the manic combination of exultant hubris and profound gloom. The net result is a sense of conﬁdence constantly undermined by the fear that we may be drowned by melting ice caps caused by global warming or smitten dead by a wrathful God for gay marriage, both outcomes being our personal responsibility. American mood swings make it hard to develop a real sense of the United States at the beginning of the twenty- ﬁrst century. But the fact is that the United States is stunningly powerful. It may be that it is heading for a catastrophe, but it is hard to see one when you look at the basic facts. Let’s consider some illuminating ﬁgures. Americans constitute about 4 percent of the world’s population but produce about 26 percent of all goods and services. In 2007 U.S. gross domestic product was about $14 trillion, compared to the world’s GDP of $54 trillion—about 26 percent of the world’s economic activity takes place in the United States. The next largest economy in the world is Japan’s, with a GDP of about $4.4 trillion—about a third the size of ours. The American economy is so huge that it is larger than the economies of the next four countries combined: Japan, Germany, China, and the United Kingdom. Many people point at the declining auto and steel industries, which a generation ago were the mainstays of the American economy, as examples of a current deindustrialization of the United States. Certainly, a lot of industry has moved overseas. That has left the United States with industrial production of only $2.8 trillion (in 2006): the largest in the world, more than twice the size of the next largest industrial power, Japan, and larger than Japan’s and China’s industries combined. There is talk of oil shortages, which certainly seem to exist and will undoubtedly increase. However, it is important to realize that the United States produced 8.3 million barrels of oil every day in 2006. Compare that with 9.7 million for Russia and 10.7 million for Saudi Arabia. U.S. oil production is 85 percent that of Saudi Arabia. The United States produces more oil than Iran, Kuwait, or the United Arab Emirates. Imports of oil into the country are vast, but given its industrial production, that’s understandable. Comparing natural gas production in 2006, Russia was in ﬁrst place with 22.4 trillion cubic feet and the United States was second with 18.7 trillion cubic feet. U.S. natural gas production is greater than that of the next ﬁve producers combined. In other words, although there is great concern that the United States is wholly dependent on foreign energy, it is actually one of the world’s largest energy producers. Given the vast size of the American economy, it is interesting to note that the United States is still under-populated by global standards. Measured in inhabitants per square kilometer, the world’s average population density is 49. Japan’s is 338, Germany’s is 230, and America’s is only 31. If we exclude Alaska, which is largely uninhabitable, U.S. population density rises to 34. Compared to Japan or Germany, or the rest of Europe, the United States is hugely under-populated. Even when we simply compare population in proportion to arable land—land that is suitable for agriculture—America has ﬁve times as much land per person as Asia, almost twice as much as Europe, and three times as much as the global average. An economy consists of land, labor, and capital. In the case of the United States, these numbers show that the nation can still grow—it has plenty of room to increase all three. There are many answers to the question of why the U.S. economy is so powerful, but the simplest answer is military power. The United States completely dominates a continent that is invulnerable to invasion and occupation and in which its military overwhelms those of its neighbors. Virtually every other industrial power in the world has experienced devastating warfare in the twentieth century. The United States waged war, but America it­ self never experienced it. Military power and geographical reality created an economic reality. Other countries have lost time recovering from wars. The United States has not. It has actually grown because of them. Consider this simple fact that I’ll be returning to many times. The United States Navy controls all of the oceans of the world. Whether it’s a junk in the South China Sea, a dhow off the African coast, a tanker in the Persian Gulf, or a cabin cruiser in the Caribbean, every ship in the world moves under the eyes of American satellites in space and its movement is guaranteed—or denied—at will by the U.S. Navy. The combined naval force of the rest of the world doesn’t come close to equaling that of the U.S. Navy. This has never happened before in human history, even with Britain. There have been regionally dominant navies, but never one that was globally and overwhelmingly dominant. This has meant that the United States could invade other countries—but never be invaded. It has meant that in the ﬁnal analysis the United States controls international trade. It has be­ come the foundation of American security and American wealth. Control of the seas emerged after World War II, solidiﬁed during the ﬁnal phase of the European Age, and is now the ﬂip side of American economic power, the basis of its military power. Whatever passing problems exist for the United States, the most important factor in world affairs is the tremendous imbalance of economic, military, and political power. Any attempt to forecast the twenty- ﬁrst century that does not begin with the recognition of the extraordinary nature of American power is out of touch with reality. But I am making a broader, more unexpected claim, too: the United States is only at the beginning of its power. The twenty ﬁrst century will be the American century.

### Heg – Decline Inevitable

#### US hegemonic collapse is inevitable and the US now has diminishing influence.

**Layne 4/26** – Associate Professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University and Research Fellow with the Center on Peace and Liberty at The Independent Institute (Christopher, “The End of Pax Americana: How Western Decline Became Inevitable,” April 26, 2012, The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/04/the-end-of-pax-americana-how-western-decline-became-inevitable/256388/2/>) // CB

When great powers begin to experience erosion in their global standing, their leaders inevitably strike a pose of denial. At the dawn of the twentieth century, as British leaders dimly discerned such an erosion in their country's global dominance, the great diplomat Lord Salisbury issued a gloomy rumiation that captured at once both the inevitability of decline and the denial of it. "Whatever happens will be for the worse," he declared. "Therefore it is our interest that as little should happen as possible." Of course, one element of decline was the country's diminishing ability to influence how much or how little actually happened. We are seeing a similar phenomenon today in America, where the topic of decline stirs discomfort in national leaders. In September 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proclaimed a "new American Moment" that would "lay the foundations for lasting American leadership for decades to come." A year and a half later, President Obama declared in his State of the Union speech: "Anyone who tells you that America is in decline . . . doesn't know what they're talking about." A position paper from Republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney stated flatly that he "rejects the philosophy of decline in all of its variants." And former U.S. ambassador to China and one-time GOP presidential candidate Jon Huntsman pronounced decline to be simply "un-American." Such protestations, however, cannot forestall real-world developments that collectively are challenging the post-1945 international order, often called Pax Americana, in which the United States employed its overwhelming power to shape and direct global events. That era of American dominance is drawing to a close as the country's relative power declines, along with its ability to manage global economics and security. This does not mean the United States will go the way of Great Britain during the first half of the twentieth century. As Harvard's Stephen Walt wrote in this magazine last year, it is more accurate to say the "American Era" is nearing its end. For now, and for some time to come, the United States will remain primus inter pares--the strongest of the major world powers--though it is uncertain whether it can maintain that position over the next twenty years. Regardless, America's power and influence over the international political system will diminish markedly from what it was at the apogee of Pax Americana. That was the Old Order, forged through the momentous events of World War I, the Great Depression and World War II. Now that Old Order of nearly seven decades' duration is fading from the scene. It is natural that U.S. leaders would want to deny it--or feel they must finesse it when talking to the American people. But the real questions for America and its leaders are: What will replace the Old Order? How can Washington protect its interests in the new global era? And how much international disruption will attend the transition from the old to the new? The signs of the emerging new world order are many. First, there is China's astonishingly rapid rise to great-power status, both militarily and economically. In the economic realm, the International Monetary Fund forecasts that China's share of world GDP (15 percent) will draw nearly even with the U.S. share (18 percent) by 2014. (The U.S. share at the end of World War II was nearly 50 percent.) This is particularly startling given that China's share of world GDP was only 2 percent in 1980 and 6 percent as recently as 1995. Moreover, China is on course to overtake the United States as the world's largest economy (measured by market exchange rate) sometime this decade. And, as argued by economists like Arvind Subramanian, measured by purchasing-power parity, China's GDP may already be greater than that of the United States. Until the late 1960s, the United States was the world's dominant manufacturing power. Today, it has become essentially a rentier economy, while China is the world's leading manufacturing nation. A study recently reported in the Financial Times indicates that 58 percent of total income in America now comes from dividends and interest payments. Since the Cold War's end, America's military superiority has functioned as an entry barrier designed to prevent emerging powers from challenging the United States where its interests are paramount. But the country's ability to maintain this barrier faces resistance at both ends. First, the deepening financial crisis will compel retrenchment, and the United States will be increasingly less able to invest in its military. Second, as ascending powers such as China become wealthier, their military expenditures will expand. The Economist recently projected that China's defense spending will equal that of the United States by 2025. Thus, over the next decade or so a feedback loop will be at work, whereby internal constraints on U.S. global activity will help fuel a shift in the distribution of power, and this in turn will magnify the effects of America's fiscal and strategic overstretch. With interests throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe and the Caucasus--not to mention the role of guarding the world's sea-lanes and protecting U.S. citizens from Islamist terrorists--a strategically overextended United States inevitably will need to retrench. Further, there is a critical linkage between a great power's military and economic standing, on the one hand, and its prestige, soft power and agenda-setting capacity, on the other. As the hard-power foundations of Pax Americana erode, so too will the U.S. capacity to shape the international order through influence, example and largesse. This is particularly true of America in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent Great Recession. At the zenith of its military and economic power after World War II, the United States possessed the material capacity to furnish the international system with abundant financial assistance designed to maintain economic and political stability. Now, this capacity is much diminished. All of this will unleash growing challenges to the Old Order from ambitious regional powers such as China, Brazil, India, Russia, Turkey and Indonesia. Given America's relative loss of standing, emerging powers will feel increasingly emboldened to test and probe the current order with an eye toward reshaping the international system in ways that reflect their own interests, norms and values. This is particularly true of China, which has emerged from its "century of humiliation" at the hands of the West to finally achieve great-power status. It is a leap to think that Beijing will now embrace a role as "responsible stakeholder" in an international order built by the United States and designed to privilege American interests, norms and values.

#### Decline is inevitable and there’s no impact to it.

**Kennedy 10 –** professor of history and director of international security studies at Yale University (Paul, “Back to Normalcy: Is America really in decline?” 12/30/2010, The New Republic, Vol. 241, Issue 20 <http://www.tnr.com/article/magazine/79753/normalcy-american-decline-decadence>)

America’s military strengths are, by contrast, still remarkable; at least this one leg of the stool is sturdy. But how sturdy? Well, almost half of the world’s current defense expenditures come from the United States, so it is not surprising that it possesses a gigantic aircraft carrier Navy, a substantial Army and Marine Corps that can be deployed all over the globe, an ultra high-tech Air Force, and logistical and intelligence-gathering facilities that have no equal. This is the strongest leg of the three. But it is not going unchallenged, and in several regards. The first is in the rise of irregular or “asymmetrical” warfare by non-state actors. Anyone who has seen the recent award-winning movie [The Hurt Locker](http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0887912/), about the U.S. Army’s uncomfortable and bloody experiences in Iraq, will know what this means. It means that the narrow streets of Fallujah, or, even more, the high passes of the Helmand mountains, equalize the struggle; high-tech doesn’t quite work against a suicide bomber or a cunningly placed road mine. General Patton’s style of warfare just doesn’t succeed when you are no longer running your tanks through Lorraine but creeping, damaged and wincing, through the Khyber Pass. Sophisticated drones are, actually, stupid. They help avoid making the commitment to winning on the ground, and they will eventually lose. Secondly, there is the emergence, along the historical pattern of the rise and fall of the great powers, of new challenger nations that are pushing into America’s post-1945 geopolitical space. Putin’s Russia is [clawing back its historic zones of control](http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/magazine/77397/russian-aggression-the-velvet-surrender-vladimir-putin-vaclav-klaus-czech-republic) and, frankly, there seems little that Washington can do if Belarus or a kicking-and-screaming Latvia is reabsorbed by the Kremlin. India is intent on making the term “Indian Ocean” not just a geographic expression; in ten or 20 years’ time, if its plans are fulfilled, it will be in control. Which is rather comforting, because it will thwart China’s purposeful though clumsy efforts to acquire much-needed African mineral supplies. But China, in its turn, and through its very new and sophisticated weapons systems (disruptive electronic warfare, silent submarines, sea-skimming missiles), may soon possess the capacity to push the U.S. Navy away from China’s shores. Like it or not, America is going to be squeezed out of Asia. Overall, and provided the gradual reduction of America’s extensive footprint across Asia can occur through mutual agreements and uninterrupted economic links, that may not be a bad thing. Few, if any, Asian governments want the United States to pull out now, or abruptly, but most assume it will cease to be such a prominent player in the decades to come. Why not start that discussion now, or begin a rethink? American hopes of reshaping Asia sometimes look curiously like former British hopes of reshaping the Middle East. Don’t go there. Finally, and most serious of all, there is America’s dangerous and growing reliance upon other governments to fund its own national deficits. Military strength cannot rest upon pillars of sand; it cannot be reliant, not forever, upon foreign lenders. The president, in his increasingly lonely White House, and the increasingly ineffective Congress, seem unable to get a harsh but decent fiscal package together. And now, the Tea Party nutcases are demanding a tax-cut-and-spend policy that would make the famous Mad Hatter’s tea party itself look rather rational. This is not a way to run a country, and especially not the American nation that, despite its flaws, is the world’s mainstay. This is worrying for its neighbors, its many friends and allies; it is worrying for even those states, like India and Brazil, that are going to assume a larger role in world affairs in the years to come. We should all be careful to wish away a reasonably benign American hegemony; we might regret its going. But the ebb and tides of history will take away that hegemony, as surely as autumn replaces the high summer months with fruit rather than flower. America’s global position is at present strong, serious, and very large. But it is still, frankly, abnormal. It will come down a ratchet or two more. It will return from being an oversized world power to being a big nation, but one which needs to be listened to, and one which, for the next stretch, is the only country that can supply powerful heft to places in trouble. It will still be really important, but less so than it was. That isn’t a bad thing. It will be more normal.

**Hegemony is in terminal decline -- rising powers.**

**Bacevich 11 –** professor of IR at Boston University (Andrew J, “Shaping a new world order,” August 17, 2011, LA times, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-bacevich-multipolar-world-20110817,0,6442079.story)

Chief among the problems facing the United States today is this: too many obligations piled high without the wherewithal to meet them. Among those obligations are the varied and sundry commitments implied by the phrase "American global leadership." If ever there were an opportune moment for reassessing the assumptions embedded in that phrase, it's now. pixelWith too few Americans taking notice, history has entered a new era. The "unipolar moment" created by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has passed. To refer to the United States today as the world's "sole superpower" makes about as much sense as General Motors bragging that it's the world's No.1 car company: Nostalgia ill-befits an enterprise beset with competitors breathing down its neck. Similarly, to call Barack Obama the "most powerful man in the world" is akin to curtsying before Elizabeth II as "Queen of Great Britain, Ireland and British Dominions beyond the Seas": Although a nice title, it confers little by way of actual authority. A new global order is rapidly emerging. In that order, the United States will no doubt remain a very important player. Yet alongside the U.S. will be several others: China preeminently among them, but with Russia, India, Turkey, Japan, South Korea and Brazil also demanding to be reckoned with. (Whether Europe, currently wallowing in disarray, can muster the will and wallet to play in this company qualifies as an unknown.) Nothing Washington can do will prevent this geopolitical transformation. Politicians may insist that the United States still stands apart — always and forever a "triple-A nation" — but their declarations will have as much effect as King Canute ordering the waves to stop. Indeed, to indulge further in the fiction of American omnipotence — persisting in our penchant for fighting distant wars of dubious purpose, for example — will accelerate the process, with relative decline becoming absolute decline. For Americans, husbanding power rather than squandering it is the order of the day.

**US power projection is on the decline -- offshore balancing is likely.**

**Walt 11** – Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University (Stephen M., “What I told the Navy this year,” Foreign Policy, June 10, 2011, <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/06/10/what_i_told_the_navy_this_year>) // CB

Over the next forty years, this position of primacy was challenged on several occasions but never seriously threatened. The United States lost the Vietnam War but its Asian alliances held firm, and China eventually moved closer to us in the 1970s. The Shah of Iran fell, but the United States simply created the Rapid Deployment Force and maintained a balance of power in the Gulf. Israel grew ever-stronger and more secure, and Egypt eventually realigned towards us too. And then the Soviet Union collapsed, which allowed the United States to bring the Warsaw Pact into NATO and spread market-based systems throughout the former communist world. This situation was highly unusual, to say the least. It is rare that any single power-let alone one with only 5 percent of the world's population -- is able to create and maintain a particular political and security order in almost every corner of the world. It was never going to last forever, of course, and three key trends are now combining to bring that era of dominance to an end. The first trend is the rise of China, which discarded the communist system that had constrained its considerable potential and has now experienced three decades of explosive growth. China's military power is growing steadily, and as I and [other realists](http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0056.pdf" \t "_blank) have [noted](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/04/25/chinas_new_strategy), this trend will almost certainly lead to serious security competition in Asia, as China seeks to limit the U.S. role and as Washington strives to maintain it. The second trend is the self-inflicted damage to the U.S. economy, a consequence of the Bush administration's profligacy and the financial crisis of 2007. The United States faces a mountain of debt, the near-certainty of persistent federal deficits, and a dysfunctional political system that cannot seem to make hard choices. This situation does not mean the United States is about to fall from the ranks of the great powers, but the contrast with earlier periods -- and especially the immediate aftermath of World War II -- is stunning. Just look at our tepid response to the Arab spring and compare that with the [Marshall Plan,](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/30/foreign_policy_on_the_cheap) and you get some idea of our diminished clout. The third trend is the emergence of several influential regional powers, who have managed to reform their own economies, gain greater confidence and independence, and (in some cases) throw off their previous deference to Washington.  States such as Turkey, India, and Brazil are not about to become true global powers, but each has become more influential in its own neighborhood, is able to chart its own foreign policy course, and won't be inclined to defer to Washington's wishes. This is especially true for those states -- most notably Turkey – where the U.S. image is now [decidedly negative](http://pewglobal.org/2011/05/17/arab-spring-fails-to-improve-us-image/" \t "_blank).  China's rise may eventually give many states diplomatic options, further complicating America's ability to run a Washington-centered world order. Make no mistake: these developments do not mean the United States is facing terminal decline, or about to drop out of the major power category.  As I told the [2009 Strategy Forum](http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/06/18/what_i_told_the_navy), unlike Europe or Japan, the U.S. population is still increasing and America's long-term power potential remains high. The U.S. economy is still the world's most diverse and technologically sophisticated, and our military power will remain formidable even if defense budget faces significant cuts (as it should). The United States is not about to decline the same way that Britain did after World War II; in fact, it is almost certain to be the world's single most powerful state for some time to come. What is ending, however, is the "American Era": that unusual period of primacy where the United States could orchestrate lead a political/economic/security order almost everywhere. We didn't control the world, but we cast a long shadow virtually everywhere and we could usually make most things go our way. What does this mean going forward? It means the United States is going to have set priorities, and write off some areas or regions where its vital interests are not engaged or where those interests are not threatened. In particular, the United States should focus on preserving a balance of power in the key industrial areas of Europe and Asia and in the oil-rich Persian Gulf, while maintaining its position as the only great power in the Western hemisphere. We will need to get our allies to do more, however, and as the Libyan intervention shows, the only way to do that is to do rather less ourselves). But we will have to forego the costly moral crusades that neoconservatives and liberal interventionists love to drag us into, and that also means staying out of the costly business of "nation-building" (which we are not very good at anyway). In short, the United States will have to return to the strategy of ["offshore balancing"](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offshore_balancing" \t "_blank)that it followed for most of its history. In practice, this means drawing down our military presence in Europe (which is stable and democratic and faces no threats it can't handle itself), getting out of Iraq and Afghanistan and moving our forces there back offshore and over-the-horizon, and shifting more of our strategic attention to Asia, where China's rise is creating a number of new and potentially valuable partners. This is decidedly not an "isolationist" strategy, insofar as the United States would remain diplomatically engaged around the globe and militarily committed in several key regions. But we would be much less inclined to intervention on other states' internal affairs. As you might expect, the audience at the War College seemed to like this analysis, because the Navy is central to making a strategy like this work. Offshore balance requires command of the sea, so that the United States can project power when and where it has to. Naval forces are also a useful way to signal commitment, but without creating the friction and resentment that large, on-shore deployments create. And though naval forces are not cheap, an approach that shifts more of the burden to others and doesn't try to remake societies that we don't understand is going to be more affordable both now and in the future.

### Heg – Not Solve War

No relationship between US capabilities and peace. **Fettweis 10** – Professor of national security affairs at U.S. Naval War College (Christopher J., “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Informaworld, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82)   
One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilizing power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defense hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

**There is zero evidence to suggest hegemony solves conflict.**

**Montiero 12 –** Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University (Nuno, “Unrest Assured”, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 Winter 11/12, <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Unrest_Assured.pdf>)

In contrast, the question of unipolar peacefulness has received virtually no attention. Although the past decade has witnessed a resurgence of security studies, with much scholarship on such conflict-generating issues as terrorism, preventive war, military occupation, insurgency, and nuclear proliferation, no one has systematically connected any of them to unipolarity. This silence is unjustified. The first two decades of the unipolar era have been anything but peaceful. U.S. forces have been deployed in four interstate wars: Kuwait in 1991, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan from 2001 to the present, and Iraq between 2003 and 2010. 22 In all, the United States has been at war for thirteen of the twenty-two years since the end of the Cold War. 23 Put another way, the first two decades of unipolarity, which make up less than 10 percent of U.S. history, account for more than 25 percent of the nation’s total time at war. 24 And yet, the theoretical consensus continues to be that unipolarity encourages peace. Why? To date, scholars do not have a theory of how unipolar systems operate. 25 The debate on whether, when, and how unipolarity will end (i.e., the debate on durability) has all but monopolized our attention.

Heg doesn’t solve war. **Preble 10** – director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute (Christopher, “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?” August 2010, <http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/>)  
Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, [questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory](http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539021" \t "_blank) from the very beginning. [A number](http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2009-Fall/full-Sapolsky-etal-Fall-2009.html" \t "_blank) [continue](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63010/richard-k-betts/a-disciplined-defense" \t "_blank) [to do so](http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=331" \t "_blank) today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

#### Primacy does not prevent a global nuclear exchange or create regional stability.

**Hachigan and Sutphen 08** – Senior Fellow at American Progress and Deputy White House Chief of Staff (Nina and Monica, “The Next American Century”, Stanford Center for International Security, p. 168-9)

In practice, the strategy of primacy failed to deliver. While the fact of being the world’s only superpower has substantial benefits, a national security strategy based on suing and ratiaing primacy has not made America more secure. America’s military might has not been the answer to terrorism, disease, climate change, or proliferation. Iraq, Iran, and North Korea have become more dangerous in the last seven years, not less. Worse than being ineffective with transnational threats and smaller powers, a strategy of maintaining primacy is counterproductive when it comes to pivotal powers. If America makes primacy the main goal of its national security strategy, then why shouldn’t the pivotal powers do the same? A goal of primacy signals that sheer strength is most critical to security. American cannot trumpet its desire to dominate the world military and then question why China is modernizing its military.

#### Their authors confuse correlation and causation.

**Legro 11** - professor of politics and Randolph P. Compton Professor in the Miller Center at the University of Virginia (Jeffrey W, “Sell unipolarity? The future of an overvalued concept in International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarit”)

Such a view, however, is problematic. What seems increasingly clear is that the role of polarity has been overstated or misunderstood or both. This is the unavoidable conclusion that emerges from the penetrating chapters in this volume that probe America’s current dominant status (unipolarity) with the question “does the distribution of capabilities matter for patterns of international politics?”3 Despite the explicit claim that “unipolarity does have a profound impact on international politics”4 what is surprising is how ambiguous and relatively limited that influence is across the chapters. The causal impact of unipolarity has been overvalued for three fundamental reasons. The first is that the effects of unipolarity are often not measured relative to the influence of other causes that explain the same outcome. When the weight of other factors is considered, polarity seems to pale in comparison. Second, rather than being a structure that molds states, polarity often seems to be the product of state choice. Polarity may be more outcome than cause. Finally, while international structure does exist, it is constituted as much by ideational content as by material capabilities. Again polarity loses ground in significance.

#### Statistical studies prove.

**Fettweis 11 –** Department of Political Science, Tulane University (Christopher J., “Free Riding or Restraint? Examining European Grand Strategy,” 9/26/11, Comparative Strategy, 30:316–332)

It is perhaps worth noting that there is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level of U.S. activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in 1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible “peace dividend” endangered both national and global security. “No serious analyst of American military capabilities,” argued Kristol and Kagan, “doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America’s responsibilities to itself and to world peace.”52 On the other hand, if the pacific trends were not based upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S. actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period, instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However, even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends, then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the alternative for a moment and suppose that there is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined. Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on. Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S. spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue that their expectations had been fulfilled. If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think otherwise base their view on faith alone.

#### Plus, the US can’t make credible threats -- too many red lines violated.

**Rubin 11 –** resident scholar at AEI (Michael, “New Middle East: Quo Vadis?” February 08, 2011? American Enterprise Institute, <http://www.aei.org/speech/100204>)

As American policymaker maneuver in the new Middle East they must also be wary that they operate with diminished credibility. Both Presidents Bush and Obama drew and violated redlines linking Iranian behavior with specific actions on more than two dozen occasions. This creates a dangerous environment of overconfidence among American adversaries who increasingly believe that the United States is a paper tiger. While many people say wars in the Middle East are caused by oil, and trendy academics say water shortages cause conflict, the reality is that overconfidence causes most wars. In the aftermath of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, Hezbollah's secretary-general Hasan Nasrallah declared that if he had known how Israel was going to reach, he would never have launched his initial operation. Because he did not understand Israel's redlines, he sparked a war. The fact that Iran does not fully understand what America's real redlines are mean that we may find ourselves reacting to their violation in a way that will spark a war that neither side expects.

### Ag Leadership

**US agriculture exports are at an all-time high**

**HPJ 11** – High Plains Midwest Journal, cites a secretary of agriculture (High Plains Midwest Journal, “U.S. farm exports reach all-time high” June 2011, <http://www.hpj.com/archives/2011/jun11/jun27/0512AgExportsSetRecordsr.cfm>) // CB

Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack made the following statement on data released showing that U.S. farm exports reached an all-time high of $75 billion during the first half of fiscal year 2011: "Today's trade data demonstrate that, once again, America's farmers and ranchers are helping lead the way to recovery from the worst economic recession in decades. The gains in U.S. agricultural exports are particularly encouraging news for those who live in rural America or earn a living in farming, ranching and agriculture-related industries, because exports are creating jobs here at home. Farm exports alone will support more than one million jobs in America this year. Strong U.S. farm exports will be a key contributor to building an economy that continues to grow, innovate and out-compete the rest of the world. "At $75 billion, U.S. agricultural exports for FY 2011 are 27 percent higher than the same period in last year. This puts us on track to reach the current USDA export forecast of $135.5 billion by the end of the year. "As expected, China is our top export market. With $15.1 billion in farm exports, China accounted for nearly 20 percent of all U.S. agricultural exports. Canada is our second-largest market. "Both the value and volume of exports rose in the first half of the year, with the volume of bulk shipments up 5 percent from last year. Wheat and cotton volumes were especially robust, with increases of 64 percent 44 percent, respectively. "March was the highest-grossing month for U.S. agricultural exports ever. During that month alone, U.S. farmers and ranchers exported $13.3 billion worth of U.S. agricultural goods. That's $407 million more than the previous record set in November 2010. "Congress can help U.S. farmers and ranchers sustain their record growth by moving expeditiously to pass the South Korea, Colombia and Panama trade agreements. When fully implemented, those three agreements have potential to add more than $2 billion per year to our exports and support job creation here at home. Gains like these will help farmers and ranchers continue to contribute to President Obama's National Export Initiative goal of doubling all U.S. exports by 2014."

**China is becoming a larger agriculture exporter**

**USDA 11** – United States Department of Agriculture (USDA, “Chinese Agricultural Exports Provide Growing Competition,” 2/3/11, <http://www.fas.usda.gov/info/WebStories/China_Export_020311.asp>) // CB

With China becoming the second largest U.S. market in fiscal year 2010, China’s emergence as a major agricultural importer is well-known.  While China is a large net food importer, it is also becoming a formidable competitor in the export market with shipments nearly tripling over the past 10 years and market share increasing.  While some of China’s exports are bound for the United States, others directly compete with U.S. products in foreign markets.  Exports of consumer-oriented high-value products (HVPs) have shown particular growth, especially to nearby markets in Japan and Southeast Asia.  Although China faces production constraints and booming domestic consumption, future exports, particularly of high value products, have room for expansion. Chinese agricultural exports began to surge after 1999, with shipments increasing in value from $10.3 billion in 1999 to an estimated $28 billion in 2010.  This $18 billion increase is impressive, but as global agricultural trade was also on the rise over this period, perhaps more important was the increase in market share.  Chinese exports accounted for 4.5 percent of global agricultural trade in 1999, but climbed to 5 percent in 2009.  Meanwhile, over the same period, U.S. export share fell from 22 percent to 18 percent.  Although other exporters, particularly Brazil and Argentina, played a larger role in the fall of U.S. share, the growth of Chinese exports likely contributed to the drop, particularly in certain markets for consumer-oriented HVPs.

Multiple alt causes the aff can’t solve

Journal of Commerce, 12 ("Agriculture Trade a 'Risky Business'", April 16, Proquest) // NK

Analysts and economists at the U.S. Department of Agriculture are full of good news about sales prospects for U.S. farm goods. But high up in every glowing estimate is a reminder that agriculture markets are subject to whims and market changes at a moment's notice. Livestock, dairy and poultry exports are expected to reach record levels again in 2012, the USDA said in its latest export forecast report. There are issues, however, that could cloud that sunny forecast, such as the ongoing sanitary and phytosanitary trade issue, changes in overseas handling of mad cow restrictions, and the Chinese demand for dairy and pork products. Any export item is subject to economic realities, trade wars and sudden shifts in supply or demand. But with food and farm items, that list grows to include freezing weather, floods, recalls based on contamination, disease in animal populations, not to mention plant disease or viruses. Last July, New Zealand kiwifruit growers were riding high. In the 2011 shipping season, they filled 63 chartered reefer vessels as well as 7,000 reefer containers with more than 110 million trays of kiwifruit. During one frenetic day in June, Zespri delivered 160 refrigerated containers, containing 832,000 trays of kiwis, to the Port of Tauranga for export in a 12-hour period. At that time, the industry thought 2012 would be even better. Zespri Chairman John Loughlin told shareholders kiwifruit sales in China were up 27 percent and that sales there could grow from 10 million trays annually to 90 million, by increasing consumption per person to just 8.8 ounces each year. The market optimism is gone, at least for the next few years, as New Zealand kiwi growers discovered a vine disease known as PSA in major growing areas that has spread much more quickly than anticipated. As the first shipment of kiwifruit in 2012 left the Port of Tauranga in early April, Zespri had lowered its sales forecast to 95 million trays and sent a group of Maori business and cultural representatives to Japan, its largest market. In addition to a singing group and gifts of Maori carvings, the delegation will take to its top Japanese clients "a subtle message to stick with us" even though the PSA bacterial disease had infected orchards in New Zealand, according to reports in New Zealand newspapers. The industry has identified a new kiwifruit variety it hopes will be resistant to PSA. In the meantime, kiwifruit producers across the Southern Hemisphere hope to increase their exports and gain market share in key markets in Asia and Europe. Mad cow disease, swine flu, hoof and mouth disease and the avian flu have impacted markets in the U.S. and around the globe with trade implications lasting years. But sometimes, a foodborne illness crops up that can disrupt a market overnight though product recalls. Several years ago, every leaf of spinach on grocery store shelves and in restaurants was recalled in the U.S. It took weeks before the tainted product was traced back to a farm in Central California. In the meantime, the entire industry took a financial hit; a number of small farms and packing houses went out of business, even though they had handled none of the tainted product. Chiquita, which had acquired a domestic bagged salad business the year before the spinach outbreak, was forced to sell its famed Great White Fleet of refrigerated vessels because of the financial losses incurred from the spinach recall period. No spinach grown or marketed by Chiquita was ever linked to the outbreak. On its Web side, the Food and Drug Administration lists 20 food product recalls in the 30 days prior to April 5 this year. The most common reason for a recall is an undeclared ingredient that could cause an allergic reaction, but instances of salmonella and listeria monocytogenes are also listed. Weather can also have an unexpected effect, both on the supply and demand side. In 2011, freezing weather in Florida reduced the state's citrus harvest by millions of boxes and reduced U.S. exports of oranges, grapefruit and lemons. But last year, U.S. exporters of beef, pork and vegetables saw increased demand following the earthquake, tsunami and resulting radiation scare in Japan. Key production areas in Japan for the commodities were affected by the extreme climatic situation, and demand for imported food grew.

**US agriculture exports are higher than ever**

**Western Farm Press 11** – (Western Farm Press, “Agriculture exports to remain strong in 2012,” Western Farm Press, September 2, 2011, <http://westernfarmpress.com/government/agriculture-exports-remain-strong-2012>) // CB

Agriculture exports in fiscal year 2012 are expected to match 2011 at $137 billion, according to the Outlook for U.S. Agricultural Trade report released by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Economic Research Service. The forecast for agriculture imports is $105 billion - 11 percent higher than 2011, resulting in an agricultural trade surplus of $32 billion, the third-highest ever. The value of U.S. rice exports in fiscal 2012 is forecast at $2.1 billion, slightly lower than FY 2011 because of the decrease in production, however, higher long-grain prices will help offset the decrease, the report says. Rice export volume is forecast to decline 500,000 MT to 3.5 million because of the smaller domestic long-grain crop and competition from medium-grain exporters Australia and Egypt. "Our farmers are the best in the world at finding consumers far from home," USDA Secretary Tom Vilsack said in a statement yesterday after the release of the Farm Income and Agriculture Outlook reports. "Today, a new forecast of U.S. agricultural exports confirmed that 'Grown in America' products remain in high regard and high demand in the rest of the world."

## Middle East

### Middle East War

#### **It’s all hyperbole – no one would risk extinction**

Ferguson 06 – Professor of History at Harvard University, Senior Research Fellow of Jesus College, Oxford, and Senior Fellow of the Hoover Institution, Stanford. (Niall, “WWIII? No, but still deadly and dangerous”, LA Times, July 24, 2006, <http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jul/24/opinion/oe-ferguson24>, Callahan)

Could today's quarrel between Israelis and Hezbollah over Lebanon produce World War III? That's what Republican Newt Gingrich, the former speaker of the House, called it last week, echoing earlier fighting talk by Dan Gillerman, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations. Such language can -- for now, at least -- safely be dismissed as hyperbole. This crisis is not going to trigger another world war. Indeed, I do not expect it to produce even another Middle East war worthy of comparison with those of June 1967 or October 1973. In 1967, Israel fought four of its Arab neighbors -- Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. In 1973, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. Such combinations are very hard to imagine today. Nor does it seem likely that Syria and Iran will escalate their involvement in the crisis beyond continuing their support for Hezbollah. Neither is in a position to risk a full-scale military confrontation with Israel, given the risk that this might precipitate an American military reaction. Crucially, Washington's consistent support for Israel is not matched by any great power support for Israel's neighbors. During the Cold War, by contrast, the risk was that a Middle East war could spill over into a superpower conflict. Henry Kissinger, secretary of State in the twilight of the Nixon presidency, first heard the news of an Arab-Israeli war at 6:15 a.m. on Oct. 6, 1973. Half an hour later, he was on the phone to the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin. Two weeks later, Kissinger flew to Moscow to meet the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev. The stakes were high indeed. At one point during the 1973 crisis, as Brezhnev vainly tried to resist Kissinger's efforts to squeeze him out of the diplomatic loop, the White House issued DEFCON 3, putting American strategic nuclear forces on high alert. It is hard to imagine anything like that today. In any case, this war may soon be over. Most wars Israel has fought have been short, lasting a matter of days or weeks (six days in '67, three weeks in '73). Some Israeli sources say this one could be finished in a matter of days. That, at any rate, is clearly the assumption being made in Washington. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has been in no hurry to get to the scene (she is due to arrive in Israel today). Nor has she scheduled any visits to Arab capitals. Compare this leisurely response to the frenetic shuttle diplomacy of the Kissinger era. While striving to secure a settlement between Israel and Syria, Rice's predecessor traveled 24,230 miles in just 34 days. And yet there are other forms that an escalation of the Middle East conflict could conceivably take. A war between states may not be in the cards, much less a superpower conflict. What we must fear, however, is a spate of civil wars -- to be precise, ethnic conflicts -- across the region.’

#### Empirics go neg – leaders default toward regime preservation

Cook 07 – CFR senior fellow for MidEast Studies. BA in international studies from Vassar College, an MA in international relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and both an MA and PhD in political science from the University of Pennsylvania (Steven, Ray Takeyh, CFR fellow, and Suzanne Maloney, Brookings fellow, 6 /28, Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast, http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php?id=6383265)

Underlying this anxiety was a scenario in which Iraq's sectarian and ethnic violence spills over into neighboring countries, producing conflicts between the major Arab states and Iran as well as Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government. These wars then destabilize the entire region well beyond the current conflict zone, involving heavyweights like Egypt. This is scary stuff indeed, but with the exception of the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds, the scenario is far from an accurate reflection of the way Middle Eastern leaders view the situation in Iraq and calculate their interests there. It is abundantly clear that major outside powers like Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey are heavily involved in Iraq. These countries have so much at stake in the future of Iraq that it is natural they would seek to influence political developments in the country. Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

#### No superpower draw-in.

**Dyer, ‘2**

[Gwynne, Ph.D. in Military and Middle Eastern History from the University of London and former professor at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and Oxford University Queen’s Quarterly, “The coming war”, December, Questia]

All of this indicates an extremely dangerous situation, with many variables that are impossible to assess fully. But there is one comforting reality here: this will not become World War III. Not long ago, wars in the Middle East always went to the brink very quickly, with the Americans and Soviets deeply involved on opposite sides, bristling their nuclear weapons at one another. And for quite some time we lived on the brink of oblivion. But that is over. World War III has been cancelled, and I don't think we could pump it up again no matter how hard we tried. The connections that once tied Middle Eastern confrontations to a global confrontation involving tens of thousands of nuclear weapons have all been undone. The East-West Cold War is finished. The truly dangerous powers in the world today are the industrialized countries in general. We are the ones with the resources and the technology to churn out weapons of mass destruction like sausages. But the good news is: we are out of the business.

### Middle East Water Wars

#### Water cooperation now solves

Pandya et al 12 – \*Amit, former director the Regional Voices program at the Stimson Center. \*\*David Michel, Senior Associate Director of the Environmental Security Program at the Stimson Center, \*\*\*Syed Hasnain, consultant at the Environmental Security Program at the Stimson Center, and \*\*\*\*Russell Sticklor, research associate. (“Water Challenges and Cooperative Response in the Middle East and North Africa,” Stimson Center, June 11, 2012, <http://www.stimson.org/summaries/water-challenges-and-cooperative-response-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa/>, Callahan)

To date, international and domestic responses to water-scarcity issues have largely focused on bolstering supply rather than reducing demand via measures that encourage or mandate greater water conservation. Augmenting supply allows governments to at least partially circumvent various political and ethnic tensions that often accompany water access. Focusing on conservation and greater water-use efficiency, meanwhile, has a much higher potential to trigger grievances, particularly among politically influential actors in the agricultural sector who may have become accustomed to unrestricted surface water and groundwater pumping for irrigation. In Oman, Yemen, and elsewhere, IWRM-because of its more balanced consideration of both supply and demand dynamics-has gained steam in recent years. Policymakers are increasingly viewing the approach as not only a better way to manage water, but also as a more effective means to spur cooperation between riparian states. IWRM is based on the philosophy that all uses of water are interdependent, and that water exists both as a social and economic good. For instance, agricultural runoff can pollute aquifers and rivers, leading to poor-quality drinking water and environmental degradation. Conversely, limiting agricultural water withdrawals for ecological reasons-such as sustaining fisheries-can result in disappointing crop yields. These issues have security ramifications when they create or add to intrastate or interstate instability. Another potential approach to achieving greater water conservation calls for a more significant role to be played by the private sector. The public water-management sectors in many MENA countries suffer from poor management and/or inadequate investment in the water sector. Private participation in the sector now seems inevitable, and could represent an important means of improving performance in water management and public sanitation, and achieving significant gains in productivity and efficiency. Every government in the region, in conjunction with its advisors and investors, could choose the public-private mix that is best tailored to local needs, capacities, and circumstances. One particular challenge is that MENA governments would have to demonstrate the political will to raise water tariffs to cover costs and develop the regulatory arrangements that would give private sector firms confidence that they can generate a fair rate of return on their investments. Even relatively low-risk contracts, such as leases or contracts to provide management services, would require governments to establish their credibility as good partners of the private sector. While many governments are currently contemplating reforms that would make private participation in water and sewerage possible, only a few countries in the MENA region have succeeded to date in actually achieving private sector participation.

#### Water scarcity causes cooperation – their causality is wrong

The Local 11 – Swedish newspaper in English, cites a joint study by the Swedish and Swiss governments. (“Water shortages to force Middle East cooperation”, The Local, February 11, 2011, <http://www.thelocal.se/31974/20110211/>, Callahan)

"We have a regional cooperative strategy that the Swedish government has adopted. The decision was made during the last cooperation strategy period in August 2010. From 2006 to 2010, one of the major sectors to work with in the Middle East and North Africa was transboundary water management," she explained. Sida is supporting initiatives that will eventually lead to effective management of transboundary water issues in the region, according to Rask. Current strategies involve exploring more sustainable uses of water resources while taking into account climate change. Sida's efforts concentrate on two subregions, the Jordan and the Tigris, and it is also involved in the Nile River. According to Rask, the total budget of the water study was about 4 million kronor, ($615,000), of which Sida financed half. At the launch of the report in Geneva on Thursday, Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rez called for closer cooperation between Turkey, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the Palestinians and Israel on managing increasingly scarce water resources, arguing that water could also be used to forge a "blue peace." "The report comes to an alarming conclusion; five of the seven countries are experiencing a structural shortage and debit of most of the big rivers has declined by 50 to 90 percent between 1960," she told journalists. "In the future the main geopolitical resource in the Middle East will be water more than oil," she added, warning that it was closely tied to peace efforts. However, the report also acknowledged the difference between the countries, with upstream Turkey in a position to "influence prospects of peace" despite the collapse of 1980s plan to pipe water to Israel and Gulf states. Downstream territories such as Israel, Jordan and Palestinian territories were in the worst position, with mounting clean water deficits of up to 500 to 700 million cubic metres each. The report also argued that technical solutions such as desalination or wastewater recycling in Israel would ultimately have limited scope. "Purely unilateral solutions will mainly work for a decade or so but Israel will have to look for external sources and regional cooperation beyond 2020 to ensure its water security," it said. Swiss diplomats said they had already started to lobby the seven governments for a joint water cooperation council expanding on an nascent Turkish, Iraqi, Jordanian and Syrian effort, as well as other steps, even if they admitted that it would be challenging.

### Israeli-Iran Strikes

#### Israel won’t strike Iran -- political backlash, and strategic concerns.

Menon 3-15 – professor of international relations (Rajan Menon, “Why Israel Won’t Rush into War with Iran”, March 15, 2012, <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rajan-menon/israel-wont-rush-to-war_b_1346263.html>)//MG

But applying Netanyahu's standard would entail waging preventive war, which is altogether different from a preemptive one. The Israeli government would be claiming the right to attack based not an evident and compelling threat from Iran but on its assessment that Iran might acquire the wherewithal to harm Israel at some undefined juncture. That's an extremely permissive justification, one that few countries, even those well disposed toward Israel, will endorse, not least because Israel itself has nuclear weapons and thus a deterrent. While it's hard to imagine a U.S. president reproaching Israel, Netanyahu shouldn't bet that Obama would order American forces to join in. As for the reaction elsewhere, it will range from tepid support (at best) to condemnation, with the latter being the predominant one. The Arab Spring has increased Israel's isolation in its neighborhood, and bombing Iran will make matters far worse. It's said that several Sunni Arab states fear the prospect of an Iran wielding nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf sheikdoms are most often mentioned, but so is Egypt. But no matter what the leaders of these countries might think, or communicate subtly to Washington or Tel Aviv, none will stand up and approve an Israeli attack for fear of a backlash from "the street," particularly after the mass protests of the Arab Spring. Nor will Israel find support elsewhere in the Muslim world. Take Turkey, for instance. Ankara believes that a nuclear-armed Iran would make the Middle East an even more dangerous place. The Turks nevertheless insist that the evidence on Tehran's intentions remains inconclusive; that Iran is, in any event, not close to manufacturing a bomb; and that diplomacy, not sanctions, let alone force, is the best solution. Then there's Israeli public opinion. If you've assumed that Netanyahu's bellicosity has deep support among Israelis, you are not alone. Yet the reality is different. A recent poll shows that only 19 percent of Israelis support an attack without American support and that only 43 percent favor proceeding without it. Only 28 percent expect America to join an Israel strike, 39 percent anticipate only political support, while a third believes that Washington would stay neutral or even punish Israel**.** The vast majority does not think that an attack would delay an Iranian nuclear weapons program for more than five years, and a third opines that it will either accelerate it or make no difference. Similarly, prominent Israelis (including two former heads of the Mossad, Ephraim Halevy and Meir Dagan, and a former Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak) have declared that an attack on Iran is unnecessary to safeguard Israel and would indeed be counterproductive. Now, Netanyahu could ignore polls and pundits, but, like all politicians in democracies, he cares for votes and cannot dismiss the electoral consequences of a decision, the ripple effects of which leave Israelis more vulnerable. The operational obstacles that Israel will confront in executing a successful attack -- whatever that means -- have received much attention: the distance Israeli jets will have to fly (1,861 miles to and fro); the need to refuel them en route, using aerial tankers; the size of the strike force that will be needed to overcome Iran's substantial air defense network; and Iran's dispersal of its nuclear facilities, some of which are deep underground and reinforced so as to protect them against even America's most powerful bunker-busting bomb, the 30,000 lb. GBU-57 A/B "Massive Ordnance Penetrator," which Israel lacks. While these are important, the bigger problem is strategic rather than operational. An Israeli strike would likely guarantee that Iran makes a determined and explicit bid to build nuclear weapons because its leaders will conclude that Israel would never have struck if Iran had them. That assessment will have wide support in Iran, even among those who dislike the current regime. It would be strategically obtuse to attack Iran knowing this, and there's no reason to assume that Netanyahu doesn't know it. Moreover, Israel leaders have been sending continual warnings intended to sway Iran's leaders (insisting, nevertheless, that they are irrational and hence immune to nuclear deterrence) -- an odd thing to do if Netanyahu is counting on maximizing surprise and effectiveness. An Israeli attack on Iran will have consequences that are multiple, prolonged, and pernicious. But it's hardly a foregone conclusion that it will occur; indeed, it's less likely than generally assumed

### Iran Aggression

#### No Iran threat -- deteriorating military, diplomatic isolation, and inflation -- their ev is alarmism.

#### Cohen, 7-3-12

[Michael, Senior Fellow -- American Security Project, “This Week In Threat-Mongering - The Iran Version,” http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2012/07/this-week-in-threat-mongering-the-iran-version.html]

Case in point: this little nugget from Nicholas Burns -- a former under secretary of state for political affairs at State Department, U.S. ambassador to NATO and State Department spokesman. Burns is a pretty bright guy and highly respected. Still in a discussion with Jeff Goldberg, Burns was asked who the United States' number-one adversary in the world is, Burns's reply: "Iran." Goldberg responded, "No doubt in your mind?" Burns said, "None." Whew, now that is a relief! If Burns is correct that Iran is America's number one adversary in the world then truly the United States has little to worry about. Iran is a second rate military power, lacks an active nuclear program, is deeply isolated in the Middle East, has a poorly performing economy and has few allies or friends. In short, Iran is the hottest of hot messes. Let's consider for example, Iran's military. Clearly is Iran is America's number one adversary it must mean they have a fearsome and dangerous armed forces . . . well, not exactly. This according to Tony Cordesman: Iran is sometimes described as the “Hegemon of the Gulf,” but it is a comparatively weak conventional military power with limited modernization since the Iran–Iraq War. It depends heavily on weapons acquired by the shah. Most key equipment in its army, navy and air force are obsolete or relatively low quality imports. Iran now makes some weapons, but production rates are limited and Tehran often exaggerates about its weapons designs. Its forces are not organized or trained to project significant power across the Gulf. Its land forces are not structured to project power deep into a neighboring state like Iraq or to deal with U.S. air-to-ground capabilities. Scary! Here's more from IISS on Iran's military capabilities. What about Iran's economy? Indeed, it's deeply ironic that at the same time Burns was sternly warning the gathered hoi polloi in Aspen about the threat from Iran comes this news from the New York Times: Bedeviled by government mismanagement of the economy and international sanctions over its nuclear program, Iran is in the grip of spiraling inflation, which threatens to worsen with the imposition on Sunday of new international measures aimed at cutting Iran’s oil exports, its main source of income. With the local currency, the rial, having lost 50 percent of its value in the last year against other currencies, prices are rising fast — officially by 25 percent annually, but even more than that, economists say. Distorted by inflation, Iran’s economy increasingly centers on speculation. In this evolving casino, the winners seize opportunities to make quick money on currency plays, while the losers watch their wealth and savings evaporate almost overnight. At first glance Tehran, the political and economical engine of Iran, is the thriving metropolis it has long been, where in 2011 Porsche sold more cars than anywhere else in the Middle East. City parks are immaculately maintained, and streetlights are rarely broken. Supermarkets and stores brim with imported products, and homeless people are a rare sight on its streets. But Iran’s diminishing ability to sell oil under sanctions, falling foreign currency reserves and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s erratic economic policies have combined to create an atmosphere in which citizens, banks, businesses and state institutions have started fending for themselves. What's most interesting about Iran's economic woes is that it's only partially due to sanctions - the other factor is Iran's economic mismanagement. So we're dealing with a country that has a weak military, few capabilities for projecting power, a political leadership that is driving its economy into the ground and growing diplomatic isolation. Again, if this is America's number one adversary . . . things are looking pretty good.

#### No Iran threat -- no military capability or influence.

Walt, ‘11

[Stephen, Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, 12-7, “The 'silent war' with Iran,” http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/12/07/the\_silent\_war\_with\_iran]

I certainly agree that what the United States is doing is better than launching an all-out attack, but I question this approach on three grounds. First, as I've already argued elsewhere, our preoccupation with Iran vastly overstates its capabilities and the actual threat it poses to U.S. interests. Iran is a minor military power at present, and it has no meaningful power projection capabilities. It has been pursuing some sort of nuclear capability for decades without getting there, which makes one wonder whether Iran intends to ever cross the nuclear weapons threshold. Even if it did, it could not use a bomb against us or against Israel without triggering its own destruction, and there is no sign that Iran's leadership is suicidal. Quite the contrary, in fact: the clerics seem more concerned with staying alive and staying in power than anything else. Iran's "revolutionary" ideology is old and tired and inspires no one. The "Arab Spring" has underscored Iran's irrelevance as a political force, Iran's Syrian ally is under siege and may yet fall, and the ongoing U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will remove a key source of Iranian-Iraqi solidarity and encourage Arab-Persian differences to reemerge once again. Iran is a problem but a relatively minor one, and it is a sign of our collective strategic myopia that U.S. leaders either cannot figure this out or cannot say so openly.

#### No Iran impact -- regional influence, proxies and prolif are overblown threats.

Moran, ‘11

[Michael, Slate, 12-22, “Arab Spring, One Year On: Winners and Losers (Part II),” http://www.slate.com/blogs/the\_reckoning/2011/12/22/arab\_spring\_one\_year\_on\_winners\_and\_losers\_part\_ii\_.html]

Iran: Did you notice how, at various points during the Arab Spring, Iran released a statement intended to approvingly note that one of its enemies – Mubarak, the Saudis, the Jordanians – were facing domestic discontent? And then, as soon as it became apparent in each case what the discontent was about, Iran shut the fuck up. Allah be praised! If there is any major state-level loser in the events of the past year, it is Iran. Working away at their nuclear dreams, increasingly isolated as a result on international markets and diplomatic forums, they now have been displaced as the favorites of the average person in the Arab world by the Turks – a NATO nation – and have watched as secular revolutions topple dictatorships and (so far) elect parliaments pledged to tolerance. Of course, nuclear armed losers are no laughing matter – even the late lil’ Kim had to be taken seriously. But the emergence of nonviolence as a credible movement in the region, the revitalization of the Arab League, and most of all, the injection of public opinion as a factor in the future of the region, all argue against new theocracies modeled on the Iranian one. Iran’s one great lever at this point is its ability to threaten instability through its proxies (Hezbollah, al Sadr in Iraq) or it’s yet to be completed nuclear capability. My guess is none of the three will turn out to be the trump cards some believe they are.

#### No Iran aggression or adventurism -- multiple factors constrain.

**Wehrey et al 09 –** Senior Analyst at RAND and David E. Thaler, Nora Bensahel, Kim Cragin Jerrold D. Green, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Nadia Oweidat, Jennifer Li (Frederic, “Dangerous but Not Omnipotent,” 2009, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG781.sum.pdf,> accessed 1-11-12)

To accurately gauge the strategic challenges from Iran over a ten- to fifteen-year horizon, this study sought to assess the motivations of the Islamic Republic, not just its capabilities. This approach, although difficult given the complexities of the Iranian system, is critical in identifying potential sources of caution and pragmatism in Iran’s policy formulation. Our exploration of Iranian strategic thinking revealed that ideology and bravado frequently mask a preference for opportunism and realpolitik—the qualities that define “normal” state behavior. Similarly, when we canvassed Iran’s power projection options, we identified not only the extent of the threats posed by each but also their limitations and liabilities. In each case, we found significant barriers and buffers to Iran’s strategic reach rooted in both the regional geopolitics it is trying to influence and in its limited conventional military capacity, diplomatic isolation, and past strategic missteps. Similarly, tensions between the regime and Iranian society—segments of which have grown disenchanted with the Republic’s revolutionary ideals— can also act as a constraint on Iranian external behavior. This leads to our conclusion that analogies to the Cold War are mistaken: The Islamic Republic does not seek territorial aggrandizement or even, despite its rhetoric, the forcible imposition of its revolutionary ideology onto neighboring states. Instead, it feeds off existing grievances with the status quo, particularly in the Arab world. Traditional containment options may actually create further opportunities for Tehran to exploit, thereby amplifying the very influence the United States is trying to mitigate. A more useful strategy, therefore, is one that exploits existing checks on Iran’s power and influence. These include the gap between its aspiration for asymmetric warfare capabilities and the reality of its rather limited conventional forces, disagreements between Iran and its militant “proxies,” and the potential for sharp criticism from Arab public opinion, which it has long sought to exploit. In addition, we recommend a new U.S. approach to Iran that integrates elements of engagement and containment while de-escalating unilateral U.S. pressure on Tehran and applying increased multilateral pressure against its nuclear ambitions. The analyses that informed these conclusions also yielded the following insights for U.S. planners and strategists concerning Iran’s strategic culture, conventional military, ties to Islamist groups, and ability to influence Arab public opinion.

#### No Iran adventurism -- threat of US retaliation and no popularity in the region.

**Walt** **10 –** Professor of IR at Harvard (Stephen M, Foreign Policy, “How not to contain Iran,” 3/5/10, <http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/03/05/how_not_to_contain_iran>)

Third, they overstate Iran's capacity to subvert or blackmail its neighbors. Iran's capacity to export its version of Islamic fundamentalism has declined steadily since the 1979 revolution (and it wasn't very great back then), and the regime is a far less attractive model today than it was under the more charismatic Ayatollah Khomeini. The brutal crackdown following the elections last summer has undoubtedly tarnished Tehran's appeal even more. Lindsay and Takeyh acknowledge this point as well in the long version of their article, but they fail to draw the obvious conclusion: if Iran cannot subvert its neighbors, then the danger it poses is modest and their article didn't need to be written.

Furthermore, a nuclear Iran could not blackmail its neighbors (or compel them to expel U.S. forces), because it could not carry out a nuclear threat without facing devastating U.S. or Israeli retaliation. The mighty Soviet Union could not blackmail any US allies during in the Cold War; indeed, it wasn't even able to blackmail weak and neutral countries. American leaders have found it equally difficult to translate our vast nuclear arsenal into meaningful political leverage. Yet Lindsay and Takeyh imply that Iran could perform this miracle today, even though it is far weaker. They never explain why or how, however; it's just another [convenient bogeyman](http://www.thenational.ae/article/20081121/REVIEW/846523295/1008" \t "_blank).

### Iran Aggression – Strait of Hormuz

#### No Strait of Hormuz impact – it’s just rhetoric and alt causes now should’ve triggered

**UPI 12** – United Press International (“EU ban on Iranian oil hikes Strait of Hormuz tensions,” 1/5/12, <http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2012/01/05/EU-ban-on-Iranian-oil-hikes-Strait-of-Hormuz-tensions/UPI-79861325784664/>)

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates, Jan. 5 (UPI) – Europe's move toward banning Iranian oil imports, vital to Iran's besieged economy, has sharpened tensions in the Persian Gulf, where Tehran has threatened to block the strategic [Strait of Hormuz](http://www.upi.com/topic/Strait-of-Hormuz/) if new sanctions are imposed. Oil prices rose sharply to an eight-month high of around $113 per barrel following the European Union's agreement in principle Wednesday to impose the ban. France's Societe Generale warned that prices could hit $125 a barrel in the coming days amid market concerns over the unfolding crisis and escalating Iranian threats against U.S. forces in the region. A shutdown of the 112-mile strait, the only way in and out of the gulf, would cut off around one-fifth of the global oil supply and, some analysts say, would skyrocket prices as high as $250 a barrel. On New Year's Eve, U.S. President [Barack Obama](http://www.upi.com/topic/Barack_Obama/) signed into law unilateral sanctions targeting Iran's central bank to make it harder for Tehran to sell its oil. The bank handles Iran's oil transactions and funnels more than 90 percent of hard currency into the local market. The United States has already banned imports of Iranian crude. A similar step by Europe would have serious repercussions for an economy already starting to flake. Iran's oil sales earn it some $70 billion a year, 80 percent of its annual foreign revenue income. Western action has hit Iran's currency hard. The trial fell more than 11 percent in a week, slumping to an all-time low of 17,000 to the U.S. dollar. A year ago the rate was 10,500 to the dollar. This has intensified the economic pressure on Iran from four rounds of increasingly harsh sanctions imposed since the [United Nations](http://www.upi.com/topic/United%20Nations/) cracked down in June 2010 over Iran's nuclear program. France is pressing the European Union to join the ban. Iran sells large amounts of crude to China, India, South Korea and Japan but Italy, Greece and Spain are also big buyers. EU officials say European opposition to the proposed ban is eroding, with Greece, already crippled by the global recession, lifting its objections Monday. French Foreign Minister [Alain Juppe](http://www.upi.com/topic/Alain_Juppe/) says EU foreign ministers are expected to announce harsher sanctions on Iran's energy and banking sectors, possibly involving a ban on Iranian oil imports, at their next meeting Jan. 30. That could involve some 600,000 barrels per day in Iranian exports and would likely mean that Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil producer, would have to step in to maintain the global supply and prevent a potentially dangerous price surge. The impact of a European import ban is difficult to calculate as Tehran could simply boost sales to the energy-hungry Asian market, where it has a key ally in China – although these would be hit by closing Hormuz. Beijing has been keen to secure increased Iranian oil supplies and, along with Russia, has blocked efforts in the U.N. Security Council to impose an international ban on Iranian exports. The Saudis have 2 million bpd in spare production capacity. But covering a severe slump in Iran's exports, along with cuts by Libya, [Syria](http://www.upi.com/topic/Conflict-in-Syria/) and Yemen amid the political turmoil convulsing the Arab world, Riyadh would be left with little to spare to cover further disruptions. Escalating Iranian threats to close Hormuz over the last few days are widely seen as saber-rattling by Tehran as its economic crisis deepens. These include the high-profile testing of new anti-ship missiles during large-scale naval maneuvers in the region. But if these were intended to frighten the Europeans from extending sanctions, they didn't seem to have much effect. Indeed, there was a sign Tehran's political leadership, as opposed to the military, was looking for a way out of the confrontation. The government of President [Mahmoud Ahmadinejad](http://www.upi.com/topic/Mahmoud_Ahmadinejad/) signaled Saturday it was ready to resume international talks on its contentious nuclear program.

#### Iran won’t close the straits

**Singh 12 –** managing director of The Washington Institute and a former senior director for Middle East affairs at the National Security Council (Michael, "The real Iranian threat in the Gulf," 1/3/12, Foreign Policy shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/01/03/the\_real\_iranian\_threat\_in\_the\_gulf)

Iran's bellicose rhetoric and Gulf war games in recent days have given rise to the question of whether Tehran could close the Strait of Hormuz. As many analysts have observed, the answer is no -- not for a meaningful period of time. Less frequently addressed, however, is whether Iran would even try. The answer to that question is also "no" -- even the attempt would have devastating strategic consequences for Iran. The presumable target of an Iranian effort to close the Strait would be the United States. However, while we would of course be affected by any resulting rise in global oil prices, the U.S. gets little of our petroleum from the Gulf. The U.S. imports only about 49 percent of the petroleum we consume, and over half of those imports come from the Western Hemisphere. Less than 25 percent of U.S. imports came from all the Gulf countries combined in October 2011 -- far less than is available in the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve, were Gulf supplies to be interrupted.   China, on the other hand, would find its oil supplies significantly threatened by an Iranian move against the Strait. China's most significant oil supplier is Saudi Arabia. China also happens, however, to be Iran's primary oil customer and perhaps its most important ally: Beijing provides Iran with its most sophisticated weaponry and with diplomatic cover at the United Nations. Thus a move to close the Strait would backfire strategically by harming the interests of -- and likely alienating -- Iran's most important patron and cutting off Iran's own economic lifeline, while doing little to imperil U.S. supplies of crude. It is perhaps no coincidence, then, that China quickly dispatched Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun to Tehran in the wake of Iran's bellicose statements. In typically opaque fashion, the Chinese Foreign Ministry said only that "China hopes that peace and stability can be maintained in the Strait;" this is essentially diplo-speak for "Cool it." Even if Iran ignored these considerations and proceeded with an effort to close the Strait, the U.S. and others would move to keep it open, and would be unlikely to stop there. As Iran has crept closer to a nuclear weapons capability, the possibility of military action against Iran has also become more imminent. President Obama has been reluctant to threaten Iran militarily, and any U.S. president would think long and hard before engaging in another armed conflict in the Middle East.  An effort by Iran to shut down the oil trade in the Gulf, however, would make such a decision straightforward. The U.S. would react with force, and once engaged in hostilities with Iran, would likely take the opportunity to target Iran's nuclear facilities and other military targets. It is difficult to envision any scenario beginning with an Iranian effort to close the Strait of Hormuz that does not end in a serious strategic setback for the Iranian regime.

### Iran Prolif

#### Nukes won’t cause Iranian aggression -- prefer our ev.

#### Pillar, ‘11

[Paul, Strategic Studies Institute, National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia, has served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including chief of analytic units covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia, 12-22, “Worst-Casing and Best-Casing Iran,” http://nationalinterest.org/blog/paul-pillar/worst-casing-best-casing-iran-6307]

Kroenig's article, like other war-promoting pieces, never provides any analysis to support the oft-repeated notion, which Kroenig himself repeats, that possession of nuclear weapons would somehow lead to Iran behaving more aggressively in its region even if it never actually fired the weapons. Walt notes that nuclear weapons simply don't work that way. I have examined this particular question with regard to Iran . Rather than analysis, the notion of greater Iranian aggressiveness is supported by nothing more than a vague sense that somehow those nukes ought to make such a difference. Kroenig imparts a patina of Cold War respectability to some of his assertions by stating that Iran and Israel lack many of the “safeguards” that kept the United States and the USSR out of a nuclear exchange. But actually his piece ignores the rich and extensive body of strategy and doctrine developed during the Cold War that explains things like escalation dominance and that underlies Walt's correct observation about what nuclear weapons can and cannot do. Herman Kahn, the Cold War's foremost guru of escalation, would be rolling over in his sizable grave if he could see what passes for analysis in Kroenig's piece.

#### The impact is super easy to contain and it won’t be that bad.

#### Barnett, ‘11

[Thomas, World Politics Review, 11-14, “The New Rules: How to Stop Worrying and Live with the Iranian Bomb,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10652/the-new-rules-how-to-stop-worrying-and-live-with-the-iranian-bomb]

The International Atomic Energy Agency’s latest report on Iran’s nuclear program surprised no one, even as it created the usual flurry of op-eds championing preventative “next steps.” As I’ve been saying for the past half-decade, there are none. Once the U.S. went into both Iraq and Afghanistan, the question went from being, “How do we prevent Iran from getting the Bomb?” to “How do we handle Iran’s Bomb?” That shift represents neither defeatism nor appeasement. Rather, it reflects a realistic analysis of America’s strategic options. With that in mind, here are 20 reasons why Iran’s successful pursuit of the Bomb is not the system-changing event so many analysts are keen to portray. 1. Iran’s efforts are not irrational. America invaded Iran’s western and eastern neighbors in quick succession, while putting Iran on notice that it, too, was on the list of George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil.” Decades of history tell Tehran: Get the Bomb, and the U.S. will never invade. Iran’s logic here is unassailable. 2. The world’s rising powers are not on board with the West. Brazil and Turkey made their diplomatic play last spring, and the West vilified them in response. Russia has already dismissed more sanctions as a clear “instrument of regime change.” China and India, along with Russia, have their own energy interests in Iran. In sum, Tehran’s workaround options are considerable. 3. More Western sanctions will have no impact. See above. Also, though the economic costs to date have been substantial, Tehran is willing to endure any amount of economic pain to ensure regime survival. The Arab Spring and the dangers it poses to the mullahs’ rule only sharpen this instinct. 4. Iran will not accept any deal that doesn’t include maintaining at least the pathway to the Bomb. The Bomb not only ensures regime survival, it is Tehran’s ticket to the great powers’ club. Without it, Iran is simply a failed revolution, a moribund economy and a sullen, checked-out society. With it, Iran is a focus of global attention and remains in the race for regional leadership. 5. Iran’s Bomb will offer the regime no significant new regional influence. Iran is already losing the Arab Spring -- and Iraq -- to Turkey and will likely lose influence to a revived Cairo as well. Iran’s Bomb is a desperate pan-Islamism card vis-à-vis Israel that will only engender a vigorous anti-Shiite response from the Saudis. 6. The strategic balance of power in the region will not dissolve. Iran’s Bomb means closing the door on a U.S. invasion, but nothing else. Iran’s limited proxy wars are neither enhanced nor inhibited by possessing the Bomb, as America will stand by both Israel and the Saudis. 7. America’s regional military presence will not be threatened. The U.S. military has a long and well-established record of serving as a tripwire presence in regional hotspots. That won’t change with Iran’s Bomb. If anything, Tehran’s achievement will reverse America’s growing fixation on building up its military in Asia vis-à-vis China. 8. The terror threat is overblown. Persian Iran isn’t pursuing the Bomb to put it in the hands of extremist Arab nonstate actors. Even Israel is a red herring for the Bomb’s ultimate purposes, which are clearly anti-U.S. and anti-Saudi. 9. The right historical analogy is not late-1930s Europe, but South Asia once both Pakistan and India got their Bomb. Israel is no Czechoslovakia. Rather, it is armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons and can wipe Iran off the map far more feasibly than vice versa. Yes, the early stages of a mutually assured destruction dyad between Israel and Iran would be scary, but the world has managed this scenario before -- with a perfect record to date. 10. The MAD situation between Israel and Iran is manageable. Israel owns a state-of-the-art multilayered missile defense system, which means it can survive a direct exchange far better than Iran ever could. It also means Israel could retaliate with confidence in any suitcase bomb scenario. 11. An Israeli attack will not work. It will slow down Iran’s pursuit of the Bomb, but as the -- presumably -- joint Israeli-U.S. Stuxnet cyberattack on Iran showed, Tehran can simply respond by ramping up its effort all the more. 12. A U.S. attack is not feasible any time soon. President Barack Obama doesn’t want to be a one-term president that badly, nor is he willing to tarnish his Nobel Peace Prize that decisively. More importantly, attacking Iran would torpedo Obama’s entire effort to get out of Iraq and Afghanistan with some sense of honor. 13. Iran has already achieved a crude but effective asymmetrical deterrence capability. There is no derailing the Bomb pursuit without regime change, and the U.S. is simply unwilling to take on that massive effort. The quick-and-dirty route is to nuke Iran’s facilities, sending the double signal of “No nukes for you!” and “See what we’re capable of?” But once you start talking about using nukes to destroy nukes, you realize that Iran has already achieved a sloppy deterrence. 14. A pre-emptive war works primarily to Iran’s advantage. The political infighting in Tehran is at an all-time high. Meanwhile, the Arab Spring is going badly for Iran. Thus an attack by either Israel or the U.S. would be a godsend to the decaying theocratic regime, changing those narratives and unifying the country. 15. We can easily arm Iran’s rivals. America has been selling arms like crazy throughout the region for a while now, and nothing will keep Washington from further enhancing the defensive -- and offensive -- capabilities of Iran’s many enemies. 16. The danger of wider proliferation is overblown. Yes, Riyadh and possibly Ankara will follow suit, but arguing that anti-Western regimes the world over will now seek a nuclear deterrent is fanciful. After all these years of freaking out about nuclear proliferation, we’re still talking about just the two remaining “Axis of Evil” members. To date, North Korea’s achievement has triggered no such regional nuclear race in East Asia. Iran’s effort likely will in the Middle East, but that is still a unique dynamic with limited legs. 17. The follow-on regional proliferation can be played to our advantage. Nothing clarifies the strategic mind like nukes. Once the Saudis join in, the world’s great powers will force a regional strategic dialogue. When that happens, Israel’s diplomatic existence will finally be recognized across the region. 18. The soft-kill option has worked before. In 1972, America gave the Soviets a signed piece of paper that declared them a legitimate nuclear power. Deprived of its own version of the “great Satan,” the USSR collapsed from within -- in the space of a generation. The Iranian mullahs’ self-destruction will come far faster.

### US-Iran Strikes

#### US attacks on Iran won’t happen.

Barnett, ‘11

[Thomas, “The New Rules: How to Stop Worrying and Live with the Iranian Bomb,” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/10652/the-new-rules-how-to-stop-worrying-and-live-with-the-iranian-bomb]

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Deprived of its own version of the “great Satan,” the USSR collapsed from within -- in the space of a generation. The Iranian mullahs’ self-destruction will come far faster. 19. We’ve got better fish to fry right now regionally. All focus should be on toppling Iran’s prime regional proxy, Syria, and bolstering the nascent governments in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. 20. The global economy is more important. No one can afford $200-a-barrel oil. Alarmist pundits -- and GOP candidates -- who still feel like turning Iran’s Bomb into America’s latest diplomatic obsession would do well to recall the 2008 U.S. presidential election: Obama was elected in large part to avoid such reckless calculations.

#### The IRGC will prevent war from escalating.

#### Taheri, ‘7

[Amir, Iranian dissident and former editor of Kayhan, Iran's main daily newspaper, Gulf News, 6-13, [http://angryarab.blogspot.com/2007/06/they-were-supposed-to-impose-israeli.html](http://angryarab.blogspot.com/2007/06/they-were-supposed-to-impose-israeli.html" \t "_blank)]

 In Persian mythology, no warrior worth his salt would enter battle before a good dose of rajaz. Put simply, rajaz is translated as boasting. However, the term covers a broader range of meanings.   The hero steps into the battlefield, draws his sword, swirls several times and then stops to address the adversary who has likewise taken position. He might recite a qasida (ode) recalling the martial deeds of his ancestors. Or, he might declaim a satirical sonnet mocking the enemy. In the modern military lexicon, rajaz could be regarded as psychological warfare.   Against that background, recent statements by several key figures in the Khomeinist leadership could be seen as rajaz. These are people who appear to have bought into President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's theory that a limited war against the United States is inevitable and that, once it is fought, the Americans will run away, leaving Tehran to set the agenda for the Middle East and, perhaps, even beyond.   What is odd, however, is that Iran's top brass apparently do not share Ahmadinejad's belief that a duel with the US would be short and sweet, let alone that it would end with Tehran's victory.   The only senior IRCG commander to partially echo Ahmadinejad's rajaz, is Brigadier Mohammad Baqer Zulqadr, the Deputy Interior Minister for Security and the bete-noire of liberals in Tehran.   Why should IRGC commanders be anxious to distance themselves from Ahmadinejad? After all, the radical president, himself a former IRCG member, was their handpicked candidate in the presidential election of 200  Ahmadinejad's political rivals, including Hashemi Rafsanjani, claim that the IRCG filled the ballot boxes to ensure its candidate's victory.   Rafsanjani also claims that the IRGC engineered Ahmadinejad's victory to strengthen its hold on Iran's state-dominated economy. IRGC's commanders now account for a good part of Iran's entrepreneurial elite.   Some analysts believe that the IRGC has replaced the Shiite clergy as the wealthiest stratum of Iranian society.   Mohammad Khatami, the mullah who preceded Ahmadinejad as president, had prepared a massive privatisation programme aimed at transferring state-owned assets worth $18 billion to private companies controlled by mullahs and their partners in the bazaars.   The idea was to limit the IRGC's economic clout and restore the balance of economic power in favour of the clergy and the traditional merchant classes.   Ahmadinejad has redesigned the privatisation scheme to enable the IRCG to secure a major share. The IRGC is grateful for the favour but not to the point of endorsing Ahmadinejad's strategy of provoking war with the US.   The IRGC commanders prefer a strategy of low intensity operations and proxy wars against the US and its regional allies, notably Israel.   Low intensity operations and proxy wars sap the morale of the enemy without giving them a pretext for using their superior military might against the Islamic Republic. There is no guarantee that a full-scale war would not transmute into regime-change.   Specific cause   The IRGC has a more specific cause for concern. It knows that in case of a major war it would be the principal target of US attacks. The destruction of the IRGC could leave the mullahrchy defenceless and vulnerable to a power grab by the regular army in alliance with the political opponents of Khomeinism.   Iran might become another Iraq, as far as the US is concerned. But Ahmadinejad and his IRGC backers could end up where Saddam Hussain and his Baathist cohorts did.   We are faced with a paradox. The IRGC is behind almost all of the mischief that the Islamic Republic has done in the region in the past 25 years.   Right now, however, it is the key opponent of a full-scale war with the US. The question is whether the IRGC could act in time, perhaps by forcing Ahmadinejad's ouster, to prevent what it regards as the worst-case scenario for the regime.

### Peace Process

#### Successful conflict resolution is impossible.

#### Mutter, ‘11

[Paul, graduate student at the Arthur L. Carter Journalism Institute at NYU and a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus, 5-24, “By Targeting Palestinian Civilians Israel Only Strengthens Influence of Islamist Ideologues,” http://www.fpif.org/blog/by\_targeting\_palestinian\_civilians\_israel\_only\_strengthens\_influence\_of\_islamist\_ideologues]

Hardliners, whether Israeli or Palestinian, do not desire a settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that ends in a negotiated peace like the one that U.S. President Barack Obama suggested in his speech of May 20, 2011, calling for a negotiated two-state solution based on Israel’s pre-Six Day War borders. These radicalized actors want an all-or-nothing end that justifies their ideological certainties. It has to end that way for them. Human rights groups, Israeli and Palestinian, are just as much an enemy to Palestinian hardliners and Israeli hardliners. Palestinian extremists pursue a “strategy of tension” by targeting Israeli civilians, hiding behind Palestinian civilians (knowing that massive retaliation will follow) and assassinating Palestinian moderates. They hope to provoke a radicalization of the conflict on the Palestinian AND Israeli sides by framing the debate as a “clash of civilizations” or an “existential threat” conflict. On the Israeli side, the IDF pursues the "Dahiya Doctrine," which amounts to the collective punishment of civilians "to make the fear we sow among them greater.” In practice, it necessitates the targeting of civilian infrastructure in a military operation to break the people’s “will” to support their (that is, “the enemy’s”) political leadership. Or as tsarist General Mikhail “Bloody Eyes” Skobelev put it when summarizing his campaign strategy for subjugating Central Asian tribes, “the harder you hit them, the longer they stay quiet.” The Dahiya Doctrine, as an extreme form of collective punishment, has its genesis in the US occupation of the Philippines. Applied more selectively, it is the practice of executing (or jailing) X number of civilian hostages based on the number of one's soldiers killed or wounded by the enemy (recall how the capture of a single Israeli soldier was used as a plank in the political foment in Israel to launch Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2008). Such a practice has been more recently employed by the Axis Powers and the USSR in WWII, the USSR in Afghanistan, Israel in Gaza (Operation Cast Lead) and the Pakistani Army in its border conflicts. On the scale that the Israelis have practiced it, the Germans, Americans and British practiced it in WWII through city destruction (i.e., flattening whole cities deliberately to break the population's will to fight). It has never worked, though. Such a strategy strengthened the civilian support for their political leadership, as was the case during WWII when German “terror bombing” and Allied “area bombing” failed to break support among the British, German and Japanese populations for continuing the war. If anything, it intensified their resistance by amplifying their suffering. Today, Israel inadvertently strengthens Islamist ideologues through the practice of the Dahiya Doctrine, just as extremist Palestinian groups and Israeli settlers knowingly attempt to set the tone for the conflict ("clash of civilizations," "existential threat") by attacking one another and luring their rivals into massive retaliation operations like Operation Cast Lead or the al-Asqa Martyr's Brigade's operations against civilian targets and use of child suicide bombers in the al-Asqa Intifada. They are all quite happy that the violence is setting the tone for the debate and drowning out negotiated political settlements. That is why hardliners such as these are railing against any two-state solution: they do not want it, and cannot accept it because then their reason for existence, their capacity to hold onto power (because it is ultimately about power), is called into question. It also goes a long way towards explaining inter-Palestinian violence, which has taken the lives of thousands of those committed to peace, such as Juliano Mer-Khamis and Vitorrio Arrigoni. People like Juliano and Vitorrio are dangerous to peace – even more dangerous than the President of the United States or Israeli moderates – in the eyes of those who oppose a negotiated settlement. For these extremists who pursue violence, it must end with one people, on one land – no compromise, no coexistence. And land is, more so than religion, at the heart of this conflict. Machiavelli, although writing nearly five centuries ago, adequately characterized the nature of the current state of the conflict, writing in The Prince: But when it is necessary for him to proceed against the life of someone, he must do it on proper justification and for manifest cause, but above all things he must keep his hands off the property of others, because men more quickly forget the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony. Both sides have intentionally caused deaths of civilians to spread fear and wreck vengeance. And in doing so, such belligerents simply hope to use the pain from those losses to advance their preferred solution: a world where the other side ceases to exist, or whose existence provides justification for retaining control over a people through a cycle of attack and retaliation.

### Saudi Prolif

#### No Saudi prolif.

**Lippman, ‘11**

[Thomas, senior adjunct scholar at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, 8-5, “Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear Policy,” http://www.susris.com/2011/08/05/saudi-arabia%E2%80%99s-nuclear-policy-lippman/]

It is widely believed among policymakers and strategic analysts in Washington and in many Middle Eastern capitals that if Iran acquires nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia will feel compelled to do the same — a belief that was reinforced when King Abdullah, in a WikiLeaks cable, was reported to have told American officials this outcome would be inevitable. In some ways this belief makes sense because Saudi Arabia is as vulnerable as it is rich, and it has long felt threatened by the revolutionary ascendancy of Iran, its Shi‘ite rival across the Gulf. Publication in late 2007 of portions of a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate reporting that Iran had abandoned a program to weaponize nuclear devices in 2003 did not put an end to the speculation about a Saudi Arabian response; the NIE made clear that Iran was continuing its effort to master the uranium enrichment process, and could resume a weapons program on short notice. It is highly unlikely, however, that Saudi Arabia would wish to acquire its own nuclear arsenal or that it is capable of doing so. King Abdullah’s comments should not be taken as a dispositive statement of considered policy. There are compelling reasons why Saudi Arabia would not undertake an effort to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, even in the unlikely event that Iran achieves a stockpile and uses this arsenal to threaten the Kingdom. Money is not an issue — if destitute North Korea can develop nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia surely has the resources to pursue such a program. With oil prices above $90 a barrel, Riyadh is flush with cash. But the acquisition or development of nuclear weapons would be provocative, destabilizing, controversial and extremely difficult for Saudi Arabia, and ultimately would be more likely to weaken the kingdom than strengthen it. The kingdom has committed itself to an industrialization and economic development program that depends on open access to global markets and materials; becoming a nuclear outlaw would be fatal to those plans. Pursuing nuclear weapons would be a flagrant violation of Saudi Arabia’s commitments under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and would surely cause a serious breach with the United States. Saudi Arabia lacks the industrial and technological base to develop such weapons on its own. An attempt to acquire nuclear weapons by purchasing them, perhaps from Pakistan, would launch Saudi Arabia on a dangerously inflammatory trajectory that could destabilize the entire region, which Saudi Arabia’s leaders know would not be in their country’s best interests. The Saudis always prefer stability to turmoil. Their often-stated official position is that the entire Middle East should become an internationally supervised region free of all weapons of mass destruction.

### Syria – CBWs

#### No impact to Syrian CBWs -- no reliable data they have them, and if they do, they’ll do minimal damage.

Nerguizian, ‘11

[Aram, visiting fellow with the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS, 12-13, “INSTABILITY IN SYRIA: Assessing the Risks of Military Intervention,” http://csis.org/files/publication/111213\_SyriaMilitaryIntervention.pdf]

Many experts believe Syria has chemical warheads for its Scuds, and other rockets and missiles. Some experts believe these include cluster bomb warheads with both chemical and conventional munitions. No unclassified data exist on the lethality of such warheads, but states of the former Soviet Union are known to have transferred some data on such designs, and Syria is believed to have mustard gas, and a range of nerve agents, including persistent nerve gas. In 2001, Jane’s reported that Syria test-launched a “Scud-B” carrying a simulated chemical warhead, adding that Syria was believed to have large stockpiles of mustard, Sarin and VX agents as options for arming its SSMs. 12 Another report went on to add that of all the agents in its biological and chemical warfare (BCW) arsenal, Sarin nerve gas is the most common; Syria was reported to be producing the agent in the mid-1980s. 13 It is unclear, however, whether Syria has advanced beyond unitary or relatively simple cluster warhead designs and delivery systems. It is equally unclear that Syria has the capability to test chemical weapons warheads, and redefine any design to produce high levels of reliability and lethality for a given weight of agent. The operational lethality of a chemical missile warhead might well be a small fraction of its theoretical lethality, and the weight of agent would have to be much smaller than in a bomb of similar weight and far harder to disperse even if the system functioned perfectly. As a result, they could be little more than “terror” weapons, and far more effective as a threat than in actual use. All of the countries in the Levant, except Lebanon, have the technology base to manufacture first and second-generation biological weapons, but no reliable data exist to prove they are doing so. There are some indicators that Syria and Iran have at least explored the production of both chemical and biological weapons, and it is possible Syria could have biological designs. The lethality of any such warheads, however, would be extremely uncertain without extensive operational testing against live targets, and would present far more problems in producing an effective and reliable weapons system than line source delivery from low flying aircraft or cruise missiles. While some expert disagree, there also does not seem to be any reliable way to simulate the real world operational lethality of biological weapons and much of the effectiveness data in the open literature grossly exaggerates probable real world capability. In practice, such warhead might fail to have any effect. It should also be noted that while most threat analysis focuses on missiles, Syrian aircraft can almost certainly deliver chemical bombs, including cluster weapons. It is unclear that Syria has high payload unmanned combat aerial vehicles, but these might also deliver chemical weapons, and an aircraft or UCAV that slowly dispersed a stable biological agent would be far more effective than any probable missile warhead. Moreover, dry storable biological agents can be used in covert attacks. The use of such weapons does not seem likely, and would provokes a level of retaliation that would almost certainly destroy the Syrian regime, but it is important to look beyond missile warfare in assessing potential chemical and biological threats.

#### Consensus -- Syrias having too much trouble developing bioweapons.

GlobalSecurity.org, ‘11

[“Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD),” 7-24, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/syria/bw.htm]

Syria has a robust biotechnology infrastructure and is likely It is highly probable that Syria also is developing an offensive BW capability. Nearly all assessments of this program point to Syria having difficulty producing biological weapons without significant outside assistance both in expertise and material. A facility near Cerin is the only reported facility suspected as being used for the development of biological agents. Syria has signatory of the Biological Warfare Convention but has not ratified it.

## Relations

### US-China Relations

**Relations are resilient**

**ChannelNewsAsia.com 10**-(“US, China change tone but disputes lie ahead”, ChannelNewsAsia.com, March 31, 2010, <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_world/view/1046978/1/.html)//sjl>

China on Monday praised the "positive attitude" of President Barack Obama after he voiced support for a greater relationship with the rising Asian power in receiving its new ambassador. More concretely, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and her deputy, James Steinberg, said China was recognizing a threat from a nuclear Iran, hinting that Beijing was coming closer to Western nations' position. The calls for cooperation come despite two angry Chinese protests since the beginning of the year after Obama approved an arms package to Beijing's rival Taiwan and met with Tibet's exiled spiritual leader the Dalai Lama. "This was a nice symbolic movement on which the two countries could agree to change the tenor," said Nina Hachigian, a China expert at the Center for American Progress, a left-leaning think-tank.

**No impact – relations are inevitable and conflicts won’t escalate**

**Medeiros 2006** – RAND researcher, Strategic Hedging, Washington quarterly, vol 29 no 1, winter

The United States and China are shadowboxing each other for influence and status in the Asia Pacific. Rhetorically pulling punches but operationally throwing jabs, both are using diplomacy and military cooperation to jockey for position as the regional security order evolves. Driven by China's ascending role in Asian security and economic affairs and the U.S. desire to maintain its position of regional preponderance, policymakers in each nation are hedging their security bets about the uncertain intentions, implicitly competitive strategies, and potentially coercive policies of the other. To hedge, the United States and China are pursuing policies that, on one hand, stress engagement and integration mechanisms and, on the other, emphasize realist-style balancing in the form of external security cooperation with Asian states and national military modernization programs. Neither country is openly talking about such hedging strategies per se, especially the security balancing, but both are pursuing them with mission and dedication. U.S. and Chinese leaders regularly recite the bilateral mantra about possessing a "cooperative, constructive, and candid" relationship, even as policymakers and analysts in each nation remain deeply concerned about the other's real strategic intentions. Such balance-of-power dynamics certainly do not drive each and every U.S. or Chinese policy action in Asia, but mutual hedging is fast becoming a core and perhaps even defining dynamic between the United States and China in the Asia-Pacific region. The logic of this mutual hedging is understandable, as it allows Washington and Beijing each to maintain its extensive and mutually beneficial economic ties with each other and with the rest of Asia while addressing uncertainty and growing security concerns about the other. Hedging also helps prevent a geopolitical rivalry from becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, another mutual core interest. In this sense, the U.S. and Chinese choice of hedging strategies could arguably be a manifestation of security dilemma dynamics at work in a globalized world characterized by deep economic interdependence and the need for multilateral security cooperation. Yet, such hedging is fraught with complications and dangers that could precipitate a shift toward rivalry and regional instability. It is a delicate balancing act that, to be effective and sustainable, requires careful management of accumulating stresses in U.S.-China relations, of regional reactions to U.S. and Chinese hedging policies, and of the domestic politics in each country. The prospect of armed conflict over Taiwan's status exacerbates these challenges.

**Relations resilient – international issues irrelevant to alliance**

**Bader 12 –** (Jeffrey A., John C. Whitehead Senior Fellow in International Diplomacy, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center, “China and the United States: Nixon's Legacy after 40 Years,” Brookings, 2-23, http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2012/0223\_china\_nixon\_bader.aspx)

The element in the relationship that is unrecognizable from the time of Nixon’s trip, of course, is the economic. The U.S. business community has been the anchor of U.S.-China relations for the last 30 years, as we have built up an annual trade relationship of over $500 billion, with huge U.S. investments in China and growing Chinese investment here. The business community, however, is now divided in the face of Chinese competition, some conducted in ways in conflict with Western norms. Pressure inside the United States for strong action against Chinese economic practices has been building. In the years ahead economic frictions may prove a greater challenge to a smooth relationship than the international security issues that have been the historic core of U.S.-China relations.

**US-China relations resilient – common interests**

**English News 6/26** – news agency (edited by Mu Xuequan, “China, U.S. to forge new military relations,” 6/26/12, English News, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2012-06/26/c_123334081.htm>) // CB

BEIJING, June 26 (Xinhua) -- Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie met here on Tuesday with Samuel Locklear, head of the U.S. Pacific Command, vowing to forge a new type of military ties. China-United States relations have kept moving forward in the past 40 years despite ups and downs, said Liang, noting that the main reason has been the broad common interests shared by the two sides. Healthy, stable development of China-United States relations is not only in the interests of the two countries, but also conducive to the peace, stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and the world, he added. China and the United States both have important domestic political agendas this year and have to concentrate on economic recovery, development and reform, so it is a common need of both sides to maintain the steady development of bilateral ties, according to the defense minister. Chinese President Hu Jintao raised a four-point proposal on forging a new model of relations between the two world powers during his meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama in Mexico last week, which has pointed out the direction for bilateral relations, he noted. Liang called on the two armed forces to establish a rapport based on equality, mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, which is corresponding to the new model of bilateral relations. He also reviewed his meeting with U.S. Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta in May, noting that China is ready to work with the United States to beef up high-level military exchanges, deepen cooperation in non-traditional security, and develop bilateral military ties. He also elaborated on China's stance on the U.S. side's adjustment of its Asia-Pacific strategy as well as reconnaissance activities by U.S. warships and planes close to China. Locklear affirmed the importance of China-United States relations as well as bilateral military relations. Although there remain differences between the two sides on some issues, they have common interests in broader areas, he pointed out. In order to safeguard the common interests of the two sides and build a safe international environment, he called on the two armed forces to further enhance dialogue, communication and cooperation.

#### US-China relations are in trouble -- regional security disputes are inevitable.

**Seth 12-**Australian writer and academic(S P, “Is US-China collision inevitable?”, Global Research, February 6, 2012, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=29117)//sjl>

US-China relations have never been easy. They are likely to become even more complicated after the recent announcement of a US defence review that prioritises the Asia-Pacific region. Even though the review seeks to make sizeable cuts of about $500 billion in the US’s defence budget over the next 10 years, it would not be at the cost of its engagement with the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, as President Obama told reporters, “We will be strengthening our presence in the Asia-Pacific...” Washington’s decision to make the Asia-Pacific a priority strategic area was presaged during Obama’s recent visit to Australia. He hit out at China on a wide range of issues, while announcing an enhanced US role, including the use of Australian bases/facilities for an effective military presence. He urged China to act like a “grown up” and play by the rules. Elaborating on this in an address to the Australian parliament, he said, “We need growth that is fair, where every nation plays by the rules; where workers’ rights are respected and our businesses can compete on a level playing field; where the intellectual property and new technologies that fuel innovation are protected; and where currencies are market-driven, so no nation has an unfair advantage.” This catalogue of US economic grievances against China has been the subject of intermittent discussions between the two countries without any satisfactory results. On the question of human rights and freedoms in China, Obama said, “Prosperity without freedom is just another form of poverty.” The US is upping the ante in its relations with China, with Asia-Pacific centre-stage. It does not accept China’s sovereignty claims in the South China Sea and its island chains. This has caused naval incidents with Vietnam, the Philippines, and with Japan in the East China Sea, and a close naval skirmish or two with the US. As part of a new resolve to play a more assertive role, the US has reinforced and strengthened its strategic ties with Vietnam, the Philippines, India, Australia and Japan. In announcing cuts to the defence budget over the next decade, President Obama seemed keen to dispel the notion that this would make the US a lesser military power. He said, “The world must know — the US is going to maintain our military superiority with armed forces that are agile, flexible and ready for the full range of contingencies and threats.” The US’s continued military superiority has a catch though, which is that the US will be adjusting its long-standing doctrine of being able to wage two wars simultaneously. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta maintains that the US military would still be able to confront more than one threat at a time by being more flexible and adaptable than in the past. Be that as it may, the increased focus on Asia-Pacific has upset China. Its hope of making the region into its own strategic backyard, with the US distracted in the Middle East and its economy in the doldrums, might not be that easy with the new US strategic doctrine prioritising Asia-Pacific. Not surprisingly, the Chinese media has not reacted kindly to it. According to the Chinese news agency Xinhua, “...the US should abstain from flexing its muscles, as this will not help solve regional disputes.” It added, “If the US indiscreetly applies militarism in the region, it will be like a bull in a china shop [literally and figuratively], and endanger peace instead of enhancing regional stability.” The Global Times called on the Chinese government to develop more long-range strike weapons to deter the US Navy. Australia, the US’s closet regional ally, fears that China’s rising economic and military power has the potential of destabilising the region. Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd hopes though (as he told the Asia Society in New York) that there was “nothing inevitable” about a future war between the US and China, emphasising the need to craft a regional architecture that recognised the coexistence of both countries, and the acceptance of US alliances in the region. He also saw hope (as a counterpoint to China) in the “collective economic might of Japan, India, Korea, Indonesia and Australia,” which means that, hopefully, China’s perceived threat might be balanced and contained with the US’s enhanced commitment to the region, and the rising clout of a cluster of regional countries. There are any number of issues that could become a flashpoint for future conflict, like Taiwan, Korea, the South China Sea and its islands, the maritime dispute with Japan and so on. With China determined to uphold its ‘core’ national interests, and the US and others equally committed to, for instance, freedom of navigation through the South China Sea, it only needs a spark to ignite a prairie fire.

#### But, cooperation is inevitable on key issues -- compromises prove.

**Shambaugh 11-**David Shambaugh is professor of Political Science & International Affairs and director of the China Policy Program at George Washington University, and a nonresident senior fellow in the Foreign Policy Program and Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies (CNAPS) at the Brookings Institution(David, “Stabilizing Unstable U.S.-China Relations? Prospects for the Hu Jintao Visit”, Brookings Institute, January 2011, http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/01/us-china-shambaugh)//sjl

To be fair, there were some signs of stasis and even improvement on some issues during the year. This is particularly true over the past month, when U.S. officials in the White House, State Department, Commerce Department, and Pentagon all report that their Chinese interlocutors have been “on their best behavior” in the run-up to the Hu visit, so as to create a positive atmosphere. Consider these examples. In November Presidents Hu and Obama themselves met on the sidelines of the G-20 Summit in Seoul, noting the “globally significant ties” between the two countries and their joint efforts to facilitate global economic recovery. In December, after almost a year of suspended exchanges by the Chinese military, the Defense Consultation Talks (DCT) were held and an official invitation was extended to Secretary of Defense Gates to visit Beijing on January 9-12. Also in December, the 21st session of the U.S.-China Joint Commission on Commerce & Trade (JCCT) took place in Washington and achieved progress on a range of previously contentious issues. The U.S. attained significant promises (but not binding commitments) from the Chinese side concerning: relaxation of discriminatory government procurement provisions in its “indigenous innovation” policies; intellectual property protection (a chronic problem for years); revision of heavy machinery and industrial equipment guidelines so as not to favor domestic producers; “smart grid” standards and 3G technologies; and possibly reopening China’s market to U.S. beef imports. All in all, Secretary of Commerce Gary Locke proclaimed himself “very, very pleased” with the outcome of the JCCT session. North Korea has also been a very contentious issue on the U.S.-China agenda. Washington has grown increasingly impatient with Beijing for its failure to “discipline” and “rein in” Pyongyang from its belligerent, destabilizing, and dangerous behavior over recent months (to say nothing of its multi-year nuclear weapons program and recent discovery of a new uranium enrichment facility this autumn). Tensions began to reach a head in late November and early December with the North Korean shelling of a South Korean island, which was followed by joint U.S.-Republic of Korea deterrent military exercises (Seoul also carried out its own unilateral exercises). The outbreak of inadvertent war did not seem outside the realm of possibility—keeping military intelligence officials on alert around the clock in recent weeks. After repeated calls by high-ranking U.S. officials for Beijing to control Pyongyang, by mid-December senior Obama administration officials were praising Beijing for restraining Pyongyang from further escalation (although it remains completely unclear what, if anything, Beijing did to this end). Progress on climate change was also made recently at Cancun, with differences being narrowed on carbon emissions verification and funding for developing countries’ energy programs.

### US-EU Relations

#### Alt causes to relations --

a. heg -- creates mistrust and prevents disputes from being resolved.

Layne 03 – Visiting fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute in Washington and author of "Casualties of War". (Christopher, “Supremacy Is America's Weakness”, The Financial Times, August 13, 2003, <http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/supremacy-is-americas-weakness>, Callahan)

Major combat operations in Iraq ended in April but the transatlantic rupture between the US and "old" Europe triggered by the war has not healed. This is because American hegemony remains the cause of the rift. The struggle for supremacy has been a feature of US-European relations since America emerged as a great power in the late 19th century. During the 20th century, the US fought two large wars in Europe to stop a hegemonic Germany from threatening America's backyard. After the second world war, America's strategic ambitions - based primarily on economic self-interest, not cold-war ideology - led it to establish its own hegemony over western Europe. There is a well-known quip that Nato was created to keep the Russians out, the Germans down and the Americans in. It is more accurate to say that America's commitment to the Atlantic alliance is about staying on top - and keeping the Europeans apart. Postwar US policymakers did not forget why the US went to war in 1917 and 1941. When they helped rebuild western Europe after 1945 - and promoted economic and political integration - they also recognised the risk of creating the geopolitical equivalent of Frankenstein's monster. The last thing Washington wanted was to encourage the emergence of a new, independent pole of power that could become a potential rival to the US. As Dean Acheson, then secretary of state, said, Americans wanted to preclude western Europe from "becoming (a) third force or opposing force". US support for European integration has always been conditional on its taking place within the framework of a US-dominated Atlantic community. Rhetoric notwithstanding, the US has never wanted a western Europe of equal power because such a Europe could exercise its autonomy in ways that clashed with Washington's interests. Unsurprisingly, Washington has tried to hamper the EU's moves towards political unity and strategic self-sufficiency. Washington is trying to derail the EU's plans to create, through the European Security and Defence Policy, military capabilities outside Nato's aegis. It has encouraged the expansion of Nato and the EU in the hope that the new members from central and eastern Europe will keep in check Franco-German aspirations for a counterweight to American power. More generally, the Bush administration is playing a game of divide and rule to undermine the EU's sense of common purpose.

#### b. Divergent China policies ensure clashes.

Gill and Niblett 05 – Gill holds the Freeman chair in China Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. Niblett is director of the center's Europe Program. (Bates and Robin, “Diverging paths hurt U.S. and Europe”, CSIS, September 6, 2005, <http://csis.org/print/5999>, Callahan)

Washington Divergent U.S. and EU approaches toward China's dramatic political and economic rise carry the danger of misunderstandings not only across the Atlantic, but also with China, and could have negative economic and security consequences in the near and long terms. A resurgence in American China-bashing over the past six months reflects a combination of concerns: competition with China's economy, China's accelerating military modernization, and Beijing's expanding diplomatic and economic presence around the world. These factors foster a rare bipartisan consensus on Capitol Hill, one that the White House has been wary to challenge. In contrast, on Monday, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao of China and members of his government welcomed Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain and other European Union leaders to the eighth EU-China summit in Beijing. This summit marked another important step in the solidifying strategic relationship between Europe and China. The EU has already become China's leading trade partner, and China is the second largest destination in the world for EU exports. But these statistics obscure the scope and depth of the EU-China dialogue. The summit in Beijing last week bolsters an ever deepening set of EU-China relations that includes work on a new and wide-ranging Framework Agreement to further formalize political relations; strengthened scientific and technology cooperation; collaboration on labor, tourism and migration issues; and a specific effort aimed at climate change and energy supply security. EU-China cooperation on space is already far along, as China is a major partner in the development and deployment of the Galileo navigation system. U.S. policy makers are only now waking up to these developments. Instead, over the past year, U.S. attention on the EU-China relationship has focused almost exclusively on preventing EU governments from lifting their 1989 arms embargo against China. Greater scrutiny of European trade with China in high-technology, defense-related and dual-use items is certainly warranted, and U.S. concerns have forcefully supported those in Europe who have advocated a more measured approach to military-technical relations with China. Moreover, with the shelving earlier this summer of EU plans to lift the embargo, EU officials and their U.S. counterparts have belatedly established a formal EU-U.S. dialogue on Asia and China. 1 But U.S. interest in engaging substantively with Europe on China-related issues is halfhearted at best. The administration appears primarily intent on educating Europeans about the security risks that China poses to Asia, a region across which the United States extends important security guarantees and maintains significant numbers of deployed forces. It seems far less interested in discussing the objectives, merits, successes and failures of recent U.S. and European approaches. For their part, Europeans are equally wary about consulting with the United States on their policies toward China. This has been evident in the economic sphere, where Europeans have balked at suggestions that they jointly tackle the Chinese government's frequent failure to protect the intellectual property of Western investors and exporters into China. This ambivalence extends also to the political level, where many Europeans believe that the United States' confrontational attitude toward China will create a self-fulfilling prophecy of Chinese militarism. Overall, Europeans are still sore over the trashing they received from Congress and the White House during the arms embargo uproar earlier this year. But such distrustful standoffishness by both sides serves the interests of neither. Separately, neither U.S. critical detachment nor European engagement efforts have been successful in inducing positive steps from China in critical areas, like ratifying the UN Convention on Civil and Political Rights, halting the passage of the antisecession law aimed at Taiwan, or pursuing less mercantilist trade and technology policies. Instead, Chinese leaders continue to take advantage of divergent U.S. and EU approaches toward China, deftly playing one side off the other. Both the United States and European nations have a shared strategic interest to integrate China beneficially into the international trading and security system, and bring about the kind of domestic social and economic development in China which will make it a more stable, open, and prosperous partner. The absence of a strong trans-Atlantic dialogue regarding China threatens not only rifts in U.S.-EU relations, it also enables Beijing to persist with policies that run counter to U.S., EU and even Chinese long-term interests. U.S. and European leaders need to put as much effort into understanding their respective policies toward China as they are putting into their bilateral discussions with China.

### US-India Relations

#### Iran disputes are a huge alt cause -- spills over to all areas of cooperation.

Fontaine 12 – Fontaine has been a staff member for the NSC and a foreign policy advisor to Senator John McCain and now represents at CNAS. (Richard, “The Coming U.S.-India Train Wreck”, The Diplomat, January 26 , 2012, <http://thediplomat.com/2012/01/26/the-coming-u-s-india-train-wreck/>, Callahan)

Still, the new U.S.-led sanctions push may put Washington and New Delhi on opposite sides of this critical issue. Asked about America’s new sanctions, Indian Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai said this past week: “We have accepted sanctions which are made by the United Nations. Other sanctions do not apply to individual countries. We don’t accept that position.” Indeed, he went further, noting that an Indian delegation would travel to Iran to “work out a mechanism for uninterrupted purchase of oil from Iran.” And India and Iran have reportedly agreed to settle some of their oil trade in rupees to avoid restrictions on dollar-denominated trade. Thus far, Washington and New Delhi have chosen to emphasize the areas of agreement – the IAEA votes, their shared opposition to an Iranian nuclear weapon – and downplay the disagreement on how to achieve that objective. But with the issue heating up in Washington and other world capitals, and with the new U.S. sanctions poised to go into effect, there’s the danger of a real impasse. Members of the U.S. Congress will be dismayed if India appears to stand outside a concerted international effort to press Iran at a critical inflection point. Members of the Indian parliament, for their part, will not particularly appreciate being publicly goaded to get tough on Iran. The collateral damage could be the U.S.-India relationship. A falling out over Iran could infect other elements of the budding strategic partnership, and make everything else – from trade to defense cooperation to diplomatic coordination – more difficult. The United States and India should urgently seek ways to bridge their differences over Iran. A genuine partnership on this issue might see India using its unique role to carry messages to the Iranian leadership and provide insights about Iranian behavior to the American side, while the United States works with New Delhi to pressure Iran on a variety of fronts. For the sake of preventing a nuclear-armed Iran and for the solidity of the U.S.-Indian relationship, the two nations’ respective leaders should engage on Iran, and soon.

### US-Russia Relations

**Relations resilient – economics**

**Miznin** – Director of studies at the independent Moscow-based Institute of Strategic Assessments, is currently a Leading Research Fellow with the Center of International Security at the Russian Academy of Sciences’ Institute of World Economy and International Relations – **08** Victor, Russia’s Nuclear Renaissance, Spring, www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2008/14/mizin.php

Luckily, the next cold war is not quite upon us. Moscow does not have the necessary clout to control its half of the world. Some nationalistic impulses aside, neither does it now have an ideology fundamentally antagonistic to the capitalist West. The segment of the Russian strategic arsenal still targeting the United States and NATO has dwindled considerably over the past decade-and-a-half, and will be further reduced in the years ahead, either as a result of bilateral agreement or through the simple attrition of hardware. And politically, Russia’s elites depend too much on established relations with the West, where their monies are secured and where their families reside or vacation, to sever their links with American and its allies. Forging a new nuclear relationship This, then, is the current state of the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship, in which dialogue may be continuous but is mired in mistrust, suspicion and mutual recriminations. Both countries remain locked in their Cold War military postures, and mutual assured destruction (MAD) continues to be an underlying premise of Moscow-Washington ties.

**Shared interests encourage cooperation.**

**Weitz 05** – PhD Harvard University and Senior Fellow and Director of Program Management at Hudson Institute (Richard, “Revitalising US Russian Security Cooperation: Practical Measures”)

Russia and the United States are the most important countries for many vital security issues. They possess the world's largest nuclear weapons arsenals, are involved in the principal regional conflicts, and have lead roles in opposing international terrorism and weapons proliferation. Despite persistent differences on many questions, mutual interests consistently drive Russians and Americans to work together to overcome these impediments. This Adelphi Paper argues that opportunities for further improving security cooperation between Russia and the United States exist but are limited. Near-term results in the areas of formal arms control or ballistic missile defences are unlikely. The two governments should focus on improving and expanding their joint threat-reduction and non-proliferation programmes, enhancing their military-to-military dialogue regarding Central Asia and defence industrial cooperation, and deepening their anti-terrorist cooperation, both bilaterally and through NATO. Using more market incentives, expanding reciprocity and equal treatment, and limiting the adverse repercussions from disputes over Iran would facilitate progress. Russia and the United States will not soon become close allies, but they should be able to achieve better security ties given that, on many issues, their shared interests outweigh those that divide them. The Russian and American defence communities have substantially improved their bilateral cooperation since the Soviet Union's demise. In April 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice told a Russian radio audience: 'I believe that our military-to-military cooperation is perhaps the best that it has ever been'.1 The Russian and US militaries have conducted major joint operations, most prominently in the former Yugoslavia, and the two governments have discussed possible combined anti-terrorist operations in third countries. Their non-proliferation experts increasingly collaborate on threat-reduction projects outside Russia.

**No impact to relations and Putin collapses them**

**Fly 11 –** Foreign Policy initiative executive director (Jamie, “Time to Abandon ‘Reset’?” 10/10/11, <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/279602/time-abandon-reset-jamie-m-fly>)

Putin’s return should serve as a wakeup call for President Obama and his advisers. The “reset” policy profoundly misreads not only why U.S.-Russia relations chilled in the first place, but also what is truly required to improve them. The problem was not U.S. rhetoric or actions, but the nature of the Russian regime. U.S.-Russian relations will not be on a firm footing until Moscow changes its strategic outlook and the Russian people are truly free to choose their own leaders. Rather than coddle the Kremlin, the Obama administration should embrace the strategic goal of helping Russia move toward a truly representative democracy. Unfortunately, the administration’s focus on questionable efforts to obtain Russian acquiescence on certain issues — such as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, limited cooperation on Iran, and the Northern Distribution Network into Afghanistan — has prevented administration officials from speaking frankly and repeatedly about the true nature of the Russian regime. Instead, administration officials tried to argue that the iPad-toting, tweeting President Medvedev represented a more moderate face of the new Russia, and that administration priorities with Russia were aimed at bolstering Medvedev vis-à-vis Putin. In November 2010, Vice President Biden outlined the administration’s thinking, telling journalists: “I do believe that there is a play here.” Biden added: “Medvedev has rested everything on this notion of a reset. Who knows what Putin would do? My guess is he would not have gone there [in terms of committing to the reset], but maybe.” The administration’s investment in Medvedev came even as opposition parties were harassed and blocked from competing in elections, peaceful protesters jailed, journalists beaten and killed, and routine legal norms repeatedly violated under Medvedev’s leadership. Russia’s rhetoric and threatening actions toward its neighbors also changed little under Medvedev, and the U.S. “reset” had the unfortunate affect of implying to U.S. allies in the region that Washington was all too willing to overlook their interests in the pursuit of cooperation with Moscow. Moving forward, the Obama administration should recognize that there are few areas in which genuine U.S.-Russian cooperation is both possible and mutually advantageous. Combating the spread of nuclear weapons may seem like such an area, but experience has shown that Russia has little desire to deal seriously with proliferators like Iran and North Korea. Indeed, Russia has repeatedly rebuffed and watered down Obama’s attempt to address Iran’s, Syria’s, and North Korea’s nuclear misbehavior in the U.N. Security Council. Russia has also blocked U.S. and European efforts to condemn the brutal crackdown underway in Syria by the regime of Bashar al-Assad, and dragged its feet as the Security Council debated the emerging crisis in Libya earlier this year. The United States will continue to need Russia’s permission to fly over its territory to supply NATO forces in Afghanistan via the Northern Distribution Network — even more so as U.S.-Pakistani ties deteriorate — but this alone is not a reason to gloss over Russia’s record. The Obama administration should instead take this opportunity to advance a democracy-centered approach to Moscow. The United States must make clear that Russia’s authoritarianism is unacceptable. Every beating and killing of a journalist, every mass arrest at an opposition rally, every rigged election, and every thuggish public statement made by a member of the regime must be roundly and repeatedly condemned by the U.S. government at the highest levels. Recent legislative sanctions sponsored by Sen. Ben Cardin (D., Md.) in response to the murder of Russian tax lawyer Sergei Magnitsky are a worthy and notable example of this approach. In addition, the United States should use Russia’s interest in accession to the World Trade Organization to raise the profile of these human-rights concerns. The administration must also do more to assist our ally Georgia, including through weapons sales, which have not occurred since Russia’s 2008 invasion. With the return of Vladimir Putin, U.S.-Russian relations are headed for even more turbulent times. Unfortunately, the White House seems oblivious to that reality. In response to Putin’s announcement, Biden’s November 2010 caution was thrown to the wind as White House spokesman Tommy Vietor declared: “While we have had a very strong working relationship with President Medvedev, it’s worth noting that Vladimir Putin was prime minister through the reset. . . . We will continue to build on the progress of the reset whoever serves as the next president of Russia.”

#### Relations don’t solve global problems.

**Ostapenko, ‘9**

[Trend News, “Normalization in U.S.-Russian relations not to change political situation in world: analyst at French studies institute,” 7-8, http://en.trend.az/news/important/opinion/1501081.html]

Normalization of relations between the United States and Russia will not assume a global significance and will not change the situation in the world, since today Russia does not play the role it played formerly, Dominic Moisi, analyst on Russian-American relations, said. "There is a country that is essential for the future of the world, it is not Russia, but it is China," Moisi, founder and senior advisor at the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI), told Trend News in a telephone conversation from Paris Speaking of the growing role of China, Moisi said that the Chinese are soon going to be the number two economy in the world. Russian economy can not compete. As another important aspect of the increasing weight of China in the world, Moisi considers the absence of problems with the aging of population, unlike European countries, including Russia.

#### Relations are shot -- long-term trends.

**Dr. Charap 10-**afellow in the National Security and International Policy Program at the Center for American Progress holds a doctorate in political science and an M.Phil. in Russian and East European studies from the University of Oxford, where he was a Marshall Scholar. He received his B.A. from Amherst College. **.** (Samuel, “The Transformation of US-Russia Relations”, Current History, proquest)//sjl

Although the bilateral relationship today is vastly improved compared to its post-August 2008 doldrums, major differences remain. Three problems have been particularly acute over the past year. First, the two countries take conflicting approaches to major international security issues, ranging from the future of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture to missile defense. Regarding the former, Moscow continues to push an agenda - embodied in Medvedev's proposal for a new European security treaty and his government's plans for reform of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe - meant both to boost its voice in decision making and to diminish the authority of the institutions it holds in disfavor and the salience of those norms it finds objectionable. This agenda is often diametrically opposed to Washington's. The second problem has to do with the "values gap" - the contrast between the ideals that define politics in the United States and Russia's controls on participation in public life and continued limitations on personal freedom. While the gap has been reduced as an irritant because of the Obama administration's change in tone, it has not disappeared. Indeed, some would point to recent violent breakups of peaceful demonstrations and arrests of human rights activists and argue that the gap has widened, though there is more political contestation in Russia now than there has been in several years. US officials, meanwhile, continue to make statements about human rights violations in Russia; and US financial assistance to local nongovernmental organizations and the new peer-topeer NGO engagement doubtless irk the Kremlin. Traditionally, a third major obstacle to a closer relationship has been the conflict between Russia's insistence that the former Soviet region constitutes its "sphere of privileged interests," as President Medvedev has described it, and Washington's equally adamant stance that the countries of the region should be free to make their own foreign policy choices. However, with the exception of Georgia, US-Russia competition in the region has diminished significantly. Changes in international energy markets have largely ended the so-called pipeline war in Central Asia, which saw Russia and the West pushing competing plans to get hydrocarbons from the Caspian to Europe. With a democratically elected president in Kiev who actively seeks closer ties with Moscow, Ukraine has largely ceased to be a locus of geopolitical tug-of-war. On other issues in the former Soviet region, such as ArmeniaTurkey reconciliation or the process of conflict resolution in Nagorno-Karabakh, Moscow has actually played a constructive role. Similarly, in the aftermath of the ouster of Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek Bakiyev, the United States and Russia worked together - first, to ensure his safe escape into exile, and then to coordinate a response to the humanitarian crisis in Kyrgyzstan. Even so, two years later, it is clear that the issues stirred up by the Russia-Georgia war will themselves constitute a roadblock for US-Russia relations for years to come. The United States considers Russia to be in violation of the ceasefire agreement that ended the war, which, at least in the Western reading, calls for all forces to return to prewar positions and levels, and for the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) to have access to the region to verify compliance. Instead, Moscow is bolstering its military presence in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, after having signed basing and border protection agreements with the de facto governments in Tskhinvali and Sukhumi. Russia claims that the cease-fire was signed before the emergence of what it (along with Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Nauru) considers two new independent states and therefore no longer applies. Moscow is not willing to allow the EUMM access to South Ossetia, nor has it pushed Tskhinvali to participate in early-warning conflict prevention mechanisms. As a result, an already tense situation on the ground is only made more volatile. Russia continues to pressure states such as Belarus to recognize the two breakaway Georgian provinces and, together with representatives of the two regions, has monopolized Geneva-based multiparty conflict talks with a demand for a non-use-of-force agreement that appears to be a backdoor route to discussion of the regions' status. Meanwhile, Russia continues to meddle in Georgia's domestic politics, to treat its democratically elected government as if it were the leadership of a rogue state, and regularly to question the propriety of any US-Georgia bilateral engagement, particularly in the defense sphere. For US-Russia relations, these issues are in themselves bad enough. The very real possibility of a second conflict and the utter absence of positive momentum suggest that they will remain a problem for years to come. In short, the 2008 war in Georgia planted a ticking time bomb under the bilateral relationship, notwithstanding the dramatic improvement in ties under Presidents Obama and Medvedev. ASSAILING OBAMA The war's indirect impact on the bilateral relationship is likely to be equally if not more damaging in the long term. For much of the post-cold war era, debates within the United States about relations with Moscow were largely confined within the Washington Beltway. The relationship, like the vast majority of foreign policy issues, simply did not capture the public imagination in the way that the economy did - or, for that matter, the US relationship with the Soviet Union. Russia episodically came up in electoral politics, but more as an afterthought than a central theme. Even within the Beltway, pundits' and experts' opinions regarding strategy toward Russia might have varied, but the dividing lines rarely corresponded with partisan splits or broader debates about the direction of US foreign policy. In late 2002, a task force report (prepared by Sarah Mendelson for the Century and Stanley Foundations) on the domestic politics of America's Russia policy concluded that "Aside from a few issues, there has been relatively little policy debate among even those experts who follow events in Russia on a full-time basis. To a great extent the US government has had an extremely free hand in setting the basic contours and details of policy toward Russia. . . . Regardless of the policy, whatever the issue, from promoting democracy to stopping nuclear proliferation, the American public rarely has been engaged." For almost six more years, this analysis would hold true. But the events of August 2008 changed all that. When war broke out, then-candidate Obama had already experienced a rough primary battle that featured a television ad questioning his readiness as commander in chief to handle a late-night crisis. The future president's team was acutely sensitive to allegations of inexperience and naivete in foreign policy, especially given the statesman stature that his opponent, Senator John McCain, had gained because of a decorated military career and his years in the Senate. On Russia, Obama emphasized cooperation in securing loose nuclear materials. This contrasted with McCain's approach, which, following his 2007 call to remove Russia from the Group of Eight, bordered on a neo-containment strategy. And while Obama, as chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's subcommittee on Europe, had cosponsored a resolution applauding NATO's decision at the Bucharest Summit to eventually include Georgia and Ukraine as members of the alliance, McCain's credentials as a long-standing "friend of Georgia" were unmatched. Against this background, the August war was bound to take on greater significance in the 2008 campaign than it otherwise might have. Sensitivities were compounded by a flap over a statement Obama released when hostilities first broke out, which included the following: "I strongly condemn the outbreak of violence in Georgia, and urge an immediate end to armed conflict. Now is the time for Georgia and Russia to show restraint, and to avoid an escalation to full-scale war." Even though Obama's words echoed those of the Bush White House at the time, they proved a lightning rod. Critics quickly drew distinctions between Obama's statement and McCain's, which focused exclusively on the need for Russia to curtail its actions. The Obama camp protested that its first reaction was a reflection of the information available at the time, and that later statements did in fact focus more on Moscow, but by that point Russia policy had entered the partisan political realm. During the three presidential debates that fall, Russia was probably the foreign policy topic mentioned most often after the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. For McCain, the accusation that Obama's initial statement had demonstrated a combination of naïveté, inexperience, and poor judgment, all of which should make Americans think twice about choosing him as commander in chief, became a trope in speeches. As McCain put it during the second presidential debate, "Senator Obama was wrong about Iraq and the surge. He was wrong about Russia when they committed aggression against Georgia. And in his short career, he does not understand our national security challenges." This message seemed to resonate: In a poll conducted after the war in Georgia, 55 percent of likely voters named McCain as best qualified to deal with Russia, compared to 27 percent for Obama. The Russia issue soon became conflated with a broader narrative about Obama's (and his party's) approach to foreign policy generally. At the Republican national convention, former New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani denounced Obama's reaction to the Russia-Georgia war as an example of a proclivity to blur what should be clear distinctions: "Obama's first instinct was to create a moral equivalency, suggesting that both sides were equally responsible, the same moral equivalency that he's displayed in discussing the Palestinian Authority and the state of Israel." This sort of accusation has continued to this day: that Obama is a foreign policy realist who cares little for principles or friends and is content to work with enemies because he does not see them as such. Certainly this line of attack on Democrats is not new, but the insertion of Russia into the discussion was an innovation - one that required demonizing the country. During the second debate, journalist Tom Brokaw posed a question this way: "This requires only a yes or a no. Ronald Reagan famously said that the Soviet Union was the evil empire. Do you think that Russia under Vladimir Putin is an evil empire?" Obama answered that Moscow had "engaged in an evil behavior" but cautioned that "it is important that we understand they're not the old Soviet Union." Neither he nor any national political figure could hope to survive if he fully rejected the premise of the question: the equation of Russia with the Soviet Union. More than two years after the August 2008 war, the political intensity surrounding US-Russia relations shows no signs of abating. The McCain view of Russia as an evil dictatorship irrevocably committed to undercutting US interests and reestablishing complete regional hegemony - once considered somewhat extreme within the Republican foreign policy establishment - is now the party line. Further, the accusation that the Obama administration has in the course of improving US-Russia relations somehow downgraded US ties with both new NATO allies in Central Europe and non-NATO partners in the region (in particular Ukraine and Georgia) has dogged the reset of relations from the beginning, despite the lack of factual evidence to support the claim. Critics even deny the improvement in US-Russia relations, or argue that it has not produced any gains for American national security. As McCain himself put it in a recent opinion article in The Washington Post, "The administration has appeared more eager to placate an autocratic Russia than to support a friendly Georgian democracy living under the long shadow of its aggressive neighbor. It has lavished Medvedev with long phone calls and frequent meetings, with only modest foreign policy gains to show for it." In the phrase of one Czech politician, a phrase that echoed Giuliani's convention speech and resonated in Washington, Obama's foreign policy is "enemycentric." That is, he either fails to understand that Russia is an "enemy" or he simply prefers doing business with "enemies." In short, the politicization of Russia policy that followed the August war has transformed one of the administration's relatively few clear-cut foreign policy successes into something of a political liability. It has also begun to have an impact on the relationship itself, with the New START treaty facing an uphill battle for approval in the Senate. One senator has referred to Russia as the Soviet Union several times in the course of committee hearings on the treaty, while the former Massachusetts governor and presidential candidate Mitt Romney has dubbed the accord as "Obama's worst foreign policy mistake." MEDVEDEV'S MIXED BAG The US-Russia relationship has, within Russia too, undergone a process of politicization since the Georgia war. The vast majority of the Russian public, including many of Putin's harshest critics, strongly favored the Kremlin's actions in August 2008 - with the decision to recognize the two breakaway republics representing a partial exception. But the August war, because it plunged US-Russia relations to their lowest point since the end of the cold war, paradoxically gave Medvedev the opportunity, through rebuilding those relations, to generate political capital at home.

#### Putin won’t compromise or cooperate.

**Rifkind 12**- Former foreign secretary of the UK(Malcolm, “Putin's Cold War politics will fail Russia; The new president's lack of friends – and imagination – will cost his country dear”, Daily Telegraph, March 6, 2012[)//sjl](http://dl2af5jf3e.search.serialssolutions.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info%3Aofi%2Fenc%3AUTF-8&rfr_id=info:sid/summon.serialssolutions.com&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Putin%27s+Cold+War+politics+will+fail+Russia&rft.jtitle=The+Daily+Telegraph&rft.au=MALCOLM+RIFKIND&rft.date=2012-03-06&rft.spage=20&rft.externalDBID=DAIT&rft.externalDocID=2602384461)//sjl)

What of Russia's foreign policy in Putin's third term? It is difficult to see any serious convergence with the West on either Syria or Iran. From any logical point of view, its current obstructionism at the UN is leading Russia down a cul de sac and doing untold damage to Moscow's relations with the Arab world. Although the Assad regime has been a close ally for years, Moscow knows as well as the rest of the world that its days are numbered. Instead of pressing the case for a peaceful change in Damascus, Russia has blocked pressure and has antagonised many Arab countries, among whom its reputation is lower than for many years. Likewise, on any logical basis, Russia should be as alarmed as the West about an Iran with nuclear weapons. Iran is near to its southern borders and Russia has a smouldering insurgency in nearby Muslim Chechnya. The more there is nuclear proliferation, the greater the likelihood of fissile material getting into the hands of Islamic terrorists. Putin's main problem is that he is a Russian nationalist with little imagination. These are qualities eminently suitable for the KGB officer he once was, but of little value in international relations. He appears to see foreign policy as a zero sum game and that whatever might be desired by the United States should be resisted by Russia if his country is to be respected by the world as a serious power.

#### Alt causes to relations -- Syria, missile defense, Magnitsky.

Asian News Monitor 6-19-(Thai News Service Group, “Russia/United States: Russia-US relations face difficult times – view”, Asian News Monitor, June 19, 2012, proquest)//sjl

The chairman of the Russian State Duma's committee for international affairs, Alexei Pushkov, believes Russian-US relations are facing a rather difficult period because of Syria and U.S. missile defense plans in Europe. The expected reset in relations between the two countries has hung, he said at a news conference for foreign and Russian reporters at the Russian Embassy in London on Thursday. The deployment of U.S. missile shield elements in Europe mars bilateral relations, the head of the Duma committee stressed. According to him, this creates a crisis of trust in relations. Russia regards these moves by Washington in Europe as its bid to change strategic parity in its favor, Pushkov said. The Magnitsky case also adds to tensions in bilateral relations, he said.

#### More ev -- missile defense is a huge alt cause.

**Jane’s Intelligence Weekly 12-**(Jane intelligence weekly, “Russia threatens pre-emptive action as missile defence impasse continues”, *Jane intelligence group 4.19,* May 9, 2012, proquest)//sjl

Russia on 4 May once again stated that it would consider pre-emptive action against the planned NATO European missile defence shield, as talks on the issue remain deadlocked. The statement was made by Russian chief of the general staff Nikolai Makarov at a three-day conference on the issue of missile defence held in Moscow. During the conference, Russian minister of defence Anatoly Serdyukov also stated that talks with the US regarding the European missile defence system were at a "dead end". The Russian government has remained vehemently opposed to the planned missile defence shield, stating that it could degrade Russia's strategic deterrent when fully operational. US and NATO officials have attempted to play down these fears, when NATO's deputy secretary general Alexander Vershbow said on 4 May: "The NATO missile defence will be capable of intercepting only a small number of relatively unsophisticated ballistic missiles." They have also stated that the system is only designed to intercept missiles launched from countries such as Iran. Some attempts have been made to find a workable solution, with Russia suggesting the formation of a joint missile defence system covering both Russia and Europe. However, this has been rejected by NATO, who will only consider some information sharing. It stated: "At this stage of our relationship, NATO is not going to outsource its security to Russia or give Russia a veto over the defence of NATO territory." In response, Moscow has repeatedly stated that it will withhold the right of pre-emptive action against the missile defence system should it pose a threat to Russia's strategic deterrence, including the deployment of short-range Iskander ballistic missiles to the European exclave of Kaliningrad. FORECAST The Moscow conference on missile defence comes ahead of the 20 May NATO summit in the US city of Chicago. Such summits have often been the scene of high-level talks between the leaders of NATO members and Russia under the auspices of the NATO-Russia council. However, it has been confirmed that no such meeting will be held in Chicago, highlighting the depth of the impasse. The reiteration of the Russian concerns about the shield is likely designed to serve as a message to the NATO summit, where further decisions about the development of the European defences may be made. Although Russia's position remains belligerent, talk of pre-emptive action is essentially symbolic rather then illustrative of any heightened risk of conflict over the short term. Nevertheless, the issue is likely to continue undermining Russia's relations with the US and NATO, with the stalemate likely to continue at least until the possible re-election of US president Barack Obama in November.

### A2 Relations Solve Warming

#### Russia’s not a helpful partner in fighting climate change.

**Maron 10**-(Dina Fine Maron (Climatewire Journalist), “When the Smoke Clears in Russia, Will Climate Policy Change?”, New York Times, August 13, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/08/11/11climatewire-when-the-smoke-clears-in-russia-will-climate-18501.html)//sjl>

Still, it will likely take more than the fires to spark a more aggressive emission reduction commitment from Russia, Kokorin said. "I don't expect it will change their international climate talk stance this year because their negotiations are very pragmatic and economic-based," he said. Russian officials have taken the stance in earlier climate talks that committing to curb larger amounts of emissions could hamper the country's economic growth and that does not appear to be changing. At international climate talks last winter in Copenhagen, Denmark, the country proposed committing to a 15 to 25 percent reduction in emissions by 2020 based on 1990 levels. The environmental community widely viewed that number as inadequate. During the most recent round of climate talks in Bonn, Germany, the wildfires were already ablaze, and it did not change how Russia approached the talks, according to Jake Schmidt, international climate policy director for the Natural Resources Defense Council. The representative his organization had at the talks saw no change in the Russian negotiators' position, he said. While an isolated natural event cannot be ascribed to climate change, the current Russian heat wave and floods in Pakistan and China are all consistent with climate change predictions, according to Jeff Knight, climate variability scientist at the U.K. Met Office Hadley Centre. Medvedev has taken steps in the last year to shine light on climate policy for his country, rolling out a "climate doctrine" for his country's approach to the issue and urging the Russian government to back the doctrine with new laws and regulations. Thus far, however, his words have not translated into action, said Charap. That may be because the public interest in moving on this issue has not been there, he said. "Hopefully, there will be an increase in public awareness now," he said. After much of the Soviet Union's military-heavy industry collapsed in the late 1990s, the country's emissions dropped far below the baseline level established by the Kyoto Protocol, allowing Russia to stockpile billions of dollars' worth of emissions allowances without actively greening its industry. Is a little warming still good? Since then, Russian climate policy has traditionally been shoved to the back burner while public pressure to act remained low and climate skepticism remained high. Just last November, Russia's state-owned Channel 1 aired a documentary challenging the human link to climate change, titled "The History of Deception: Global Warming," according to Charap. The country's climate stance has also reflected the belief that a little global warming could be a good thing. A 2007 Russian U.N. Development Programme report, for example, suggested the benefits of Russia warming 2 or 3 degrees Celsius might include "higher agricultural yields, lower winter human mortality ... lower heating requirements, and a potential boost to tourism" (ClimateWire, June 23, 2009).

#### More ev -- the government and public are opposed to solutions.

**Liss 07-** (Artyom Liss,“Global warming leaves Russians cold”, BBC, September 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7011055.stm)//sjl>

More than 50% of Russians asked about global warming say they haven't heard much about it, according to a BBC World Service poll of 22,000 people in 21 countries. The Russian media focus on what seem to be more pressing problems. There are burning social issues, there's uncertainty about the security, there's a falling-out with the West, and, crucially, it is a very cold country. A meteorologist in Arkhangelsk, in the north of Russia, once told me: "I know global warming is a problem, but I would welcome a bit of warmth up here. Then I could grow my own tomatoes." We spoke as we stood on ice in the middle of the frozen Dvina river. The temperature was approaching -25C. Melting permafrost This meteorologist is by no means the only person in Russia to think this way. His view virtually mirrors the state's official position. "We are not panicking. Global warming is not as catastrophic for us as it might be for some other countries," Rinat Gizatullin, a spokesman for the Natural Resources Ministry, says. "If anything, we'll be even better off: as the climate warms, more of Russia's territory will be freed up for agriculture and industry." Alexey Kokorin of WWF in Russia says Russians who are aware of global warming tend to live in some of the worst affected areas, such as Siberia, with its melting permafrost, or the Caucasus, with its regular heatwaves. The real problem, Mr Kokorin says, is not that people don't know what's going on, it is that they have some of the "weirdest ideas about what causes global warming, and they don't feel the need to change things". Quota sale The government says it is trying to educate people. But, so far, most of the steps that have been taken have been aimed at businesses, not at ordinary Russians.

### US-Saudi Relations

#### Tons of factors sustain cooperation.

#### Gause, ‘11

[Gregory III, Professor of Political Science, University of Vermont, “Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East,” Council Special Report No. 63, December 2011]

The United States’ relationship with Saudi Arabia has been one of the cornerstones of U.S. policy in the Middle East for decades. Despite their substantial differences in history, culture, and governance, the two countries have generally agreed on important political and economic issues and have often relied on each other to secure mutual aims. The 1990-91 Gulf War is perhaps the most obvious example, but their ongoing cooperation on maintaining regional stability, moderating the global oil market, and pursuing terrorists should not be downplayed.

#### Relations are resilient.

#### Gause, ‘11

[Gregory III, Professor of Political Science, University of Vermont, “Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East,” Council Special Report No. 63, December 2011]

U.S. analysts tend to not only exaggerate both Saudi domestic fragility and Saudi regional power but also exaggerate the level of tensions in the Saudi-U.S. relationship whenever differences between the two countries emerge. A Saudi watcher at an important Washington think tank declared recently that “U.S.-Saudi relations are in crisis.”47 A former high-ranking official on Middle East policy in the Clinton administration contended that the Saudis now see the Obama administration as a threat to their domestic security.48 The Los Angeles Times spoke of the “rivalry that has erupted across the Middle East this year between Saudi Arabia and the United States, longtime allies that have been put on a collision course” by the Arab upheavals.49 Without question, Washington and Riyadh have been at cross-purposes on some recent issues, most notably Mubarak’s fall and the Saudi intervention in Bahrain. But talk of crisis and collision course is misleading. If the Saudi-U.S. relationship could withstand the real crises of the past—the oil embargo of 1973–74, the fallout of the 9/11 attacks—then the current differences are hardly enough to sever the tie. That is certainly what the Saudis say.50 Actions by Washington and Riyadh support the view that, despite tensions, there is no crisis in the relationship. Plans are proceeding for the United States to sell Saudi Arabia $60 billion in arms over the coming years. U.S. advisers are helping the Saudi Interior Ministry build a 35,000-man “special facilities security force” to protect Saudi oil installations.51 Intelligence cooperation on counterterrorism continues at the highest levels. Washington and Riyadh have coordinated the efforts to manage a transition of power in Yemen. Both countries continue to see Iranian regional ambitions as a serious threat to their interests.

#### Tension inevitable, doesn’t disrupt the relationship.

#### Carnegie, ‘11

[Marina Ottaway, Christopher Boucek, Marwan Muasher, Abdulaziz Sager, Mustapha Alani, Gregory Gause, Char Freeman, Christian Koch, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9-12, “Ten Years After 9/11: Managing U.S.-Saudi Relations,” http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm]

The relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia has been important to both countries for decades with mutual dependence on oil and security. Relations have periodically been subject to tensions, notably after the September 11 attacks as a majority of the hijackers were Saudi citizens. More recently, tensions have risen due to the divergent reactions of Washington and Riyadh to the Arab Spring.

## Terrorism

### Terrorism – General

#### Best statistical analysis proves -- the risk of terrorism is super low.

#### Zenko, 6-6-12uah

[Micah, Fellow in the Center for Preventive Action at the [Council on Foreign Relations](http://www.cfr.org/?cid=oth_partner_site-atlantic-primer_on_airpower-071811%20), and author of Between Threats and War: U.S. Discrete Military Operations in the Post-Cold War World, “Americans Are as Likely to Be Killed by Their Own Furniture as by Terrorism,” http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/06/americans-are-as-likely-to-be-killed-by-their-own-furniture-as-by-terrorism/258156/]

Today, the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) released its 2011 Report on Terrorism. The report offers the U.S. government's best statistical analysis of terrorism trends through its Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS), which compiles and vets open-source information about terrorism--defined by U.S. law as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents." Although I invite you to read the entire thirty-one page report, there are a few points worth highlighting that notably contrast with the conventional narrative of the terrorist threat: "The total number of worldwide attacks in 2011, however, dropped by almost 12 percent from 2010 and nearly 29 percent from 2007." (9) "Attacks by AQ and its affiliates increased by 8 percent from 2010 to 2011. A significant increase in attacks by al-Shabaab, from 401 in 2010 to 544 in 2011, offset a sharp decline in attacks by al-Qa'ida in Iraq (AQI) and a smaller decline in attacks by al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)." (11) "In cases where the religious affiliation of terrorism casualties could be determined, Muslims suffered between 82 and 97 percent of terrorism-related fatalities over the past five years." (14) Of 978 terrorism-related kidnapping last year, only three hostages were private U.S. citizens, or .003 percent. A private citizen is defined as 'any U.S. citizen not acting in an official capacity on behalf of the U.S. government.' (13, 17) Of the 13,288 people killed by terrorist attacks last year, seventeen were private U.S. citizens, or .001 percent. (17) According to the report, the number of U.S. citizens who died in terrorist attacks increased by two between 2010 and 2011; overall, a comparable number of Americans are crushed to death by their televisions or furniture each year. This is not to diminish the real--albeit shrinking--threat of terrorism, or to minimize the loss and suffering of the 13,000 killed and over 45,000 injured around the world. For Americans, however, it should emphasize that an irrational fear of terrorism is both unwarranted and a poor basis for public policy decisions.

#### **Terrorists can’t acquire or use WMDs.**

Friedman 8 – PhD in political science, affiliate of the Social Securities Program at MIT, research fellow for defense and security studies at the CATO Institute (Benjamin H. Friedman, “The Terrible ‘Ifs’”, The Cato Institute, and winter 2008, http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv30n4/v30n4-1.pdf)//MG

TERRORISM The greatest current threat to U.S. security is from terrorism. Yet terrorists kill less Americans than peanuts in most years. Even in 2001, terrorists killed less than one-10th as many Americans as the flu. The minority of the jihadist movement actively trying to kill Americans has shown no sign of a presence in the United States, as the FBI has grudgingly admitted. (Contrary to what you usually hear, absence of evidence is evidence of absence, but not proof.) The jihadists’ perverse ideology makes them unpopular in their own lands — except perhaps when American military occupations give credence to the jihadist propaganda that America is at war with Islam. The possibility that terrorists will soon manufacture nuclear or biological weapons and kill us in droves is remote. The difficulty of making nuclear and biological weapons is generally understated. (Chemical weapons, often discussed inthe same breath as biological and nuclear weapons, are not much more deadly than conventional munitions and therefore their proliferation to terrorists should not be a special concern.) Weaponizing biological agents is a mean feat for most nations and probably beyond the capability of today’s terrorist groups. Nuclear weapons are our greatest worry and we probably should invest more to secure them and their components. However, given their size, the tight security that protects them, and the general need for activation codes to use them, the odds of terrorists stealing such a weapon and using it are close to zero. The most prudent worry is that terrorists might acquire fissile material and employ engineers competent enough to build a homemade nuclear weapon that could be smuggled into the United States. But this scenario requires a number of risky steps: a nuclear terrorist must find a source for fissile materials and other components, buy those materials, smuggle them across borders, design and assemble the weapon, and then deliver it to its target, which will likely be another location, probably across borders. Each of those steps is possible, but the existence of multiple failure points drives down the odds of overall success, especially for a loose-knit group, as Ohio State political scientist John Mueller writes. (See “A False Sense of Insecurity,” Fall 2004.)

#### No impact and terrorists can’t get weapons.

Linzer 4 – Washington Post staff writer (Dafna Linzer, “Nuclear Capabilities May Elude Terrorists, Experts Say”, Washington Post, December 29, 2009, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32285-2004Dec28.html)//MG>

Without sophisticated laboratories, expensive technology and years of scientific experience, al Qaeda has two primary options for getting a bomb, experts say, both of which rely on theft -- either of an existing weapon or one of its key ingredients, plutonium or highly enriched uranium. Nuclear scientists tend to believe the most plausible route for terrorists would be to build a crude device using stolen uranium from the former Soviet Union. Counterterrorism officials think bin Laden would prefer to buy a ready-made weapon stolen in Russia or Pakistan, and to obtain inside help in detonating it. Last month, Michael Scheuer, who ran the CIA's bin Laden unit, first disclosed in an interview on CBS's "60 Minutes" that bin Laden's nuclear efforts had been blessed by the Saudi cleric in May 2003, a statement other sources later corroborated. As early as 1998, bin Laden had publicly labeled acquisition of nuclear or chemical weapons a "religious duty," and U.S. officials had reports around that time that al Qaeda leaders were discussing attacks they likened to the one on Hiroshima. A week after his CBS appearance, Scheuer said at breakfast with reporters in Washington that he believed al Qaeda would probably seek to buy a nuclear device from Russian gangsters, rather than build its own. There were as many as a dozen types of nuclear weapons in the hands of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, but Russian officials have said that several kinds have since been destroyed and that the country has secured the remainder of its arsenal. The nature and scope of nuclear caches are among the most tightly held national security secrets in Russia and Pakistan. It is unclear how quickly either country could detect a theft, but experts said it would be very difficult for terrorists to figure out on their own how to work a Russian or Pakistani bomb. Newer Russian weapons, for example, are equipped with heat- and time-sensitive locking systems, known as permissive action links, that experts say would be extremely difficult to defeat without help from insiders. "You'd have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions before the weapon would allow itself to be armed, for the fuses to fall into place and then for it to allow itself to be fired," said Charles D. Ferguson, science and technology fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. "You don't get it off the shelf, enter a code and have it go off." About This Series The three articles beginning today are the culmination of a year-long effort to examine the challenges the United States faces more than three years after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Previous articles have ranged from the threat posed by conventional truck bombs to the difficulty of tracking terrorist fundraising. The articles starting today take a detailed look at terrorists' ability to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, biological and chemical. While the dangers certainly are real, there is considerable disagreement among security experts about the probabilities for "catastrophic terrorism." In the case of nuclear and biological weapons, the subjects of articles today and tomorrow, there are technical and scientific hurdles that have proved daunting, even for nations with sizable budgets and state-of-the-art facilities. Chemical weapons, which will be explored in an article Friday, would be somewhat easier to devise or obtain, but also far less likely to yield huge numbers of casualties. A radiological device would have similar limitations for terrorists. Each type of weapon presents special challenges for the groups seeking to acquire it, but experts warn that the odds for a successful attack could rise significantly in the future as determined foes intersect with advancing technology. The strategy would require help from facility guards, employees with knowledge of the security and arming features of the weapons, not to mention access to a launching system. Older Russian nuclear weapons have simpler protection mechanisms and could be easier to obtain on the black market. But nuclear experts said even the simplest device has some security features that would have to be defeated before it could be used. "There is a whole generation of weapons designed for artillery shells, manufactured in the 1950s, that aren't going to have sophisticated locking devices," said Laura Holgate, who ran nonproliferation programs at the Pentagon and the Energy Department from 1995 to 2001. "But it is a tougher task to take a weapon created by a country, even the 1950s version, a tougher job for a group of even highly qualified Chechen terrorists to make it go boom." Transporting a weapon out of Russia would provide another formidable obstacle for terrorists. Most of the ready-made bombs that could be stolen would be those made with plutonium, which emits far higher levels of radiation and is therefore more easily detected by passive sensors at ports than is highly enriched uranium, or HEU.

### A2 Retaliation

#### Public anxiety prevents retaliation.

#### Huddy et al., ‘5

[Leonie Huddy, Professor of political science -- Stony Brook University, Stanley Feldman, Professor of political science @ Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY), Charles Taber (Professor of political science @ Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY) & Gallya Lahav (Professor of political science @ Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY), “Threat, Anxiety, and Support of Antiterrorism Policies,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 49, No. 3, July 2005, Pp. 593–608]

The findings from this study lend further insight into the future trajectory of support for antiterrorism measures in the United States when we consider the potential effects of anxiety. Security threats in this and other studies increase support for military action (Jentleson 1992; Jentleson and Britton 1998;Herrmann,Tetlock, and Visser 1999). But anxious respondents were less supportive of belligerent military action against terrorists, suggesting an important source of opposition to military intervention. In the aftermath of 9/11, several factors were consistently related to heightened levels of anxiety and related psychological reactions, including living close to the attack sites (Galea et al. 2002; Piotrkowski and Brannen 2002; Silver et al. 2002), and knowing someone who was hurt or killed in the attacks (in this study). It is difficult to say what might happen if the United States were attacked again in the near future. Based on our results, it is plausible that a future threat or actual attack directed at a different geographic region would broaden the number of individuals directly affected by terrorism and concomitantly raise levels of anxiety. This could, in turn, lower support for overseas military action. In contrast, in the absence of any additional attacks levels of anxiety are likely to decline slowly over time (we observed a slow decline in this study), weakening opposition to future overseas military action. Since our conclusions are based on analysis of reactions to a single event in a country that has rarely felt the effects of foreign terrorism, we should consider whether they can be generalized to reactions to other terrorist incidents or to reactions under conditions of sustained terrorist action. Our answer is a tentative yes, although there is no conclusive evidence on this point as yet. Some of our findings corroborate evidence from Israel, a country that has prolonged experience with terrorism. For example, Israeli researchers find that perceived risk leads to increased vilification of a threatening group and support for belligerent action (Arian 1989; Bar-Tal and Labin 2001). There is also evidence that Israelis experienced fear during the Gulf War, especially in Tel Aviv where scud missiles were aimed (Arian and Gordon 1993). What is missing, however, is any evidence that anxiety tends to undercut support for belligerent antiterrorism measures under conditions of sustained threat. For the most part, Israeli research has not examined the distinct political effects of anxiety. In conclusion, the findings from this study provide significant new evidence on the political effects of terrorism and psychological reactions to external threat more generally. Many terrorism researchers have speculated that acts of terrorist violence can arouse fear and anxiety in a targeted population, which lead to alienation and social and political dislocation.8 We have clear evidence that the September 11 attacks did induce anxiety in a sizeable minority of Americans. And these emotions were strongly associated with symptoms of depression, appeared to inhibit learning about world events, and weakened support foroverseas military action. This contrasted, however, with Americans’ dominant reaction, which was a heightened concern about future terrorist attacks in the United States that galvanized support for government antiterrorist policy. In this sense, the 9/11 terrorists failed to arouse sufficient levels of anxiety to counteract Americans’ basic desire to strike back in order to increase future national security, even if such action increased the shortterm risk of terrorism at home. Possible future acts of terrorism, or a different enemy, however, could change the fine balance between a public attuned to future risks and one dominated by anxiety.

### Bioterrorism

#### Bioterror is extremely unlikely.

#### Leitenberg, ‘6

[Milton, Senior research scholar at the University of Maryland, Trained as a Scientist and Moved into the Field of Arms Control in 1966, First American Recruited to Work at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Affiliated with the Swedish Institute of International Affairs and the Center for International Studies Peace Program at Cornell University, Senior Fellow at CISSM, http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0217-27.htm]

So what substantiates the alarm and the massive federal spending on bioterrorism? There are two main sources of bioterrorism threats: first, from countries developing bioweapons, and second, from terrorist groups that might buy, steal or manufacture them. The first threat is declining. U.S. intelligence estimates say the number of countries that conduct offensive bioweapons programs has fallen in the last 15 years from 13 to nine, as South Africa, Libya, Iraq and Cuba were dropped. There is no publicly available evidence that even the most hostile of the nine remaining countries — Syria and Iran — are ramping up their programs. And, despite the fear that a hostile nation could help terrorists get biological weapons, no country has ever done so — even nations known to have trained terrorists. It's more difficult to assess the risk of terrorists using bioweapons, especially because the perpetrators of the anthrax mailings have not been identified. If the perpetrators did not have access to assistance, materials or knowledge derived from the U.S. biodefense program, but had developed such sophistication independently, that would change our view of what a terrorist group might be capable of. So far, however, the history of terrorist experimentation with bioweapons has shown that killing large numbers of people isn't as easy as we've been led to believe. Followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh succeeded in culturing and distributing salmonella in Oregon in 1984, sickening 751 people. Aum Shinrikyo failed in its attempts to obtain, produce and disperse anthrax and botulinum toxin between 1990 and 1994. Al Qaeda tried to develop bioweapons from 1997 until the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, but declassified documents found by U.S. forces outside Kandahar indicate the group never obtained the necessary pathogens. At a conference in Tokyo this week, bioterrorism experts called for new programs to counter the possibility that terrorists could genetically engineer new pathogens. Yet three of the leading scientists in the field have said there is no likelihood at this time that a terrorist group could perform such a feat. The real problem is that a decade of widely broadcast discussion of what it takes to produce a bioweapon has provided terrorists with at least a rough roadmap. Until now, no terrorist group has had professionals with the skills to exploit the information — but the publicity may make it easier in the future. There is no military or strategic justification for imputing to real-world terrorist groups capabilities that they do not possess. Yet no risk analysis was conducted before the $33 billion was spent. Some scientists and politicians privately acknowledge that the threat of bioterror attacks is exaggerated, but they argue that spending on bioterrorism prevention and response would be inadequate without it. But the persistent hype is not benign. It is almost certainly the single major factor in provoking interest in bioweapons among terrorist groups. Bin Laden's deputy, the Egyptian doctor Ayman Zawahiri, wrote on a captured floppy disk that "we only became aware of (bioweapons) when the enemy drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing concerns that they can be produced simply with easily available materials." We are creating our worst nightmare.

### Cyberterrorism

#### No risk of cyberterrorism.

#### Green, ‘2

[Joshua, Editor, Washington Monthly, “The Myth of Cyberterrorism”, November, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0211.green.html]

When ordinary people imagine cyberterrorism, they tend to think along Hollywood plot lines, doomsday scenarios in which terrorists hijack nuclear weapons, airliners, or military computers from halfway around the world. Given the colorful history of federal boondoggles--billion-dollar weapons systems that misfire, $600 toilet seats--that's an understandable concern. But, with few exceptions, it's not one that applies to preparedness for a cyberattack. "The government is miles ahead of the private sector when it comes to cybersecurity," says Michael Cheek, director of intelligence for iDefense, a Virginia-based computer security company with government and private-sector clients. "Particularly the most sensitive military systems." Serious effort and plain good fortune have combined to bring this about. Take nuclear weapons. The biggest fallacy about their vulnerability, promoted in action thrillers like WarGames, is that they're designed for remote operation. "[The movie] is premised on the assumption that there's a modem bank hanging on the side of the computer that controls the missiles," says Martin Libicki, a defense analyst at the RAND Corporation. "I assure you, there isn't." Rather, nuclear weapons and other sensitive military systems enjoy the most basic form of Internet security: they're "air-gapped," meaning that they're not physically connected to the Internet and are therefore inaccessible to outside hackers. (Nuclear weapons also contain "permissive action links," mechanisms to prevent weapons from being armed without inputting codes carried by the president.) A retired military official was somewhat indignant at the mere suggestion: "As a general principle, we've been looking at this thing for 20 years. What cave have you been living in if you haven't considered this [threat]?" When it comes to cyberthreats, the Defense Department has been particularly vigilant to protect key systems by isolating them from the Net and even from the Pentagon's internal network. All new software must be submitted to the National Security Agency for security testing. "Terrorists could not gain control of our spacecraft, nuclear weapons, or any other type of high-consequence asset," says Air Force Chief Information Officer John Gilligan. For more than a year, Pentagon CIO John Stenbit has enforced a moratorium on new wireless networks, which are often easy to hack into, as well as common wireless devices such as PDAs, BlackBerrys, and even wireless or infrared copiers and faxes.

#### Minimal impact to cyberterrorism and it’s empirically denied.

#### Friedman, ‘5

[Ben, Doctoral Candidate Pol. Sci. -- MIT, “Think Again: Homeland Security”, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\_id=3079&page=2]

“Terrorists Will Soon Mount a Crippling Cyberattack” Nonsense. Cyberattacks are costly and annoying, but they are not a threat to U.S. national security. Here, some historical perspective is useful. Alarmists warn that cyberterrorists could cripple American industry. Yet, even during World War II, the Allied bombing campaign against Germany failed to halt industrial production. Modern economies are much more resilient. A 2002 Center for Strategic and International Studies report, for instance, notes that just because the U.S. national infrastructure uses vulnerable communications networks does not mean that the infrastructure itself is vulnerable to attack. The U.S. power grid is run by some 3,000 providers that rely on diverse information technology systems. Terrorists would have to attack a large swath of these providers to have a significant effect. That’s a difficult task. Hackers, unlike summer heat waves and thunderstorms, have never caused a blackout. The U.S. water system is similarly robust, as is the U.S. air traffic control system. Although dams and air traffic control rely on communications networks, hacking into these networks is not the same as flooding a valley or crashing a plane. Viruses and denial–of–service attacks are everyday occurrences, but they are not deadly. Most attacks pass unnoticed. Because terrorists aim to kill and frighten, they are unlikely to find these sorts of attacks appealing. Even if they do, they will merely join a crowd of existing teenagers and malcontents who already make cyberattacks a major business expense. The annual costs of viruses alone reportedly exceed $10 billion in the United States. A 2003 Federal Trade Commission report put the annual cost of identity theft, much of which occurs online, at more than $50 billion. Cybersecurity gurus have far more to worry about from traditional hackers than from terrorists.

#### Their ev is alarmism.

#### Green, ‘2

[Joshua, Editor, Washington Monthly, “The Myth of Cyberterrorism”, November, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0211.green.html]

It's no surprise, then, that cyberterrorism now ranks alongside other weapons of mass destruction in the public consciousness. Americans have had a latent fear of catastrophic computer attack ever since a teenage Matthew Broderick hacked into the Pentagon's nuclear weapons system and nearly launched World War III in the 1983 movie WarGames. Judging by official alarums and newspaper headlines, such scenarios are all the more likely in today's wired world. There's just one problem: There is no such thing as cyberterrorism--no instance of anyone ever having been killed by a terrorist (or anyone else) using a computer. Nor is there compelling evidence that al Qaeda or any other terrorist organization has resorted to computers for any sort of serious destructive activity. What's more, outside of a Tom Clancy novel, computer security specialists believe it is virtually impossible to use the Internet to inflict death on a large scale, and many scoff at the notion that terrorists would bother trying. "I don't lie awake at night worrying about cyberattacks ruining my life," says Dorothy Denning, a computer science professor at Georgetown University and one of the country's foremost cybersecurity experts. "Not only does [cyberterrorism] not rank alongside chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons, but it is not anywhere near as serious as other potential physical threats like car bombs or suicide bombers." Which is not to say that cybersecurity isn't a serious problem--it's just not one that involves terrorists. Interviews with terrorism and computer security experts, and current and former government and military officials, yielded near unanimous agreement that the real danger is from the criminals and other hackers who did $15 billion in damage to the global economy last year using viruses, worms, and other readily available tools. That figure is sure to balloon if more isn't done to protect vulnerable computer systems, the vast majority of which are in the private sector. Yet when it comes to imposing the tough measures on business necessary to protect against the real cyberthreats, the Bush administration has balked.

### A2 Cyberterror Kills Infrastructure

#### resilient -- cyberattacks won’t wreck tech infrastructure.

Lawson, ‘11

[Sean, Phd in Science and Technology Studies -- Department of Communication at the University of Utah, Associate National Security Analyst with DynCorp Systems & Solutions, WORKING PAPER BEYOND CYBER-DOOM: Cyberattack Scenarios and the Evidence of History January 2011 No. 11-01 Mercatus Center George Mason University]

History & Sociology of Infrastructure Failure Even today, planning for disasters and future military conflicts alike, including planning for future conflicts in cyberspace, often relies upon hypothetical scenarios that begin with the same assumptions about infrastructural and societal fragility found in early 20th-century theories of strategic bombardment. Some have criticized what they see as a reliance in many cases upon hypothetical scenarios over empirical data (Glenn, 2005; Dynes, 2006; Graham & Thrift, 2007: 9–10; Ranum, 2009; Stiennon, 2009). But, there exists a body of historical and sociological data upon which we can draw, which casts serious doubt upon the assumptions underlying cyberdoom scenarios. Work by scholars in various fields of research, including the history of technology, military history, and disaster sociology has shown that both infrastructures and societies are more resilient than often assumed by policy makers. WWII Strategic Bombing Interwar assumptions about the fragility of interdependent industrial societies and their vulnerability to aerial attack proved to be inaccurate. Both the technological infrastructures and social systems of modern cities proved to be more resilient than military planners had assumed. Historian Joseph Konvitz (1990) has noted that “More cities were destroyed during World War II than in any other conflict in history. Yet the cities didn’t die.” Some critical infrastructure systems like power grids even seem to have improved during the war. Historian David Nye (2010: 48) reports that the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy all “increased electricity generation.” In fact, most wartime blackouts were self-inflicted and in most cases did not fool the enemy or prevent the dropping of bombs (Nye, 2010: 65). Similarly, social systems proved more resilient than predicted. The postwar U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, as well as U.K. studies of the reaction of British citizens to German bombing, all concluded that though aerial bombardment led to almost unspeakable levels of pain and destruction, “antisocial and looting behaviors . . . [were] not a serious problem in and after massive air bombings” (Quarantelli, 2008: 882) and that “little chaos occurred” (Clarke, 2002: 22). Even in extreme cases, such as the the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, social systems proved remarkably resilient. A pioneering researcher in the field of disaster sociology describes that within minutes [of the Hiroshima blast] survivors engaged in search and rescue, helped one another in whatever ways they could, and withdrew in controlled flight from burning areas. Within a day, apart from the planning undertaken by the government and military organizations that partly survived, other groups partially restored electric power to some areas, a steel company with 20 percent of workers attending began operations again, employees of the 12 banks in Hiroshima assembled in the Hiroshima branch in the city and began making payments, and trolley lines leading into the city were completely cleared with partial traffic restored the following day (Quarantelli, 2008: 899). Even in the most extreme cases of aerial attack, people neither panicked, nor were they paralyzed. Strategic bombardment alone was not able to exploit infrastructure vulnerability and fragility to destroy the will to resist of those that were targeted from the air (Freedman, 2005: 168; Nye, 2010: 43; Clodfelter, 2010). In the aftermath of the war, it became clear that theories about the possible effects of aerial attack had suffered from a number of flaws, including a technological determinist mindset, a lack of empirical evidence, and even willfully ignoring evidence that should have called into question assumptions about the interdependence and fragility of both technological and social systems. In the first case, Konvitz (1990) has argued that “The strategists’ fundamental error all along had been [giving] technology too much credit, and responsibility, for making cities work—and [giving] people too little.” In his study of U.S. bombardment of Germany, Clodfelter (2010) concluded that the will of a nation is determined by multiple factors, both social and technical, and that it therefore takes more than targeting any one technological system or social group to break an enemy’s will to resist. Similarly, Konvitz (1990) concluded that, “Immense levels of physical destruction simply did not lead to proportional or greater levels of social and economic disorganization.” Next, theories of strategic bombardment either suffered from a lack of supporting evidence or even ignored contradictory evidence. Lawrence Freedman (2005: 168) has lamented that interwar theories of strategic bombardment were implemented despite the fact that they lacked specifics about how results would be achieved or empirical evidence about whether those results were achievable at all. Military planners were not able to point to real-world examples of the kind of social or technological collapse that they claimed would result from aerial attack. But they were not deterred by this lack of empirical evidence. Instead, they maintained that “The fact that infrastructure systems had not failed . . . is no proof that they are not susceptible to failure” and instead “emphasized how air raids could exploit the same kind of collapse that might come in peace” (Emphasis added. Konvitz, 1990). Airpower theorists were not even deterred by seemingly contradictory evidence. Instead, such evidence was either ignored or explained away. For example, during the 1930s, New York City suffered a series of blackouts that demonstrated that the social disruption caused by the sudden lack of power was not severe. In response, airpower theorists argued that the results would have been different had the blackouts been the result of intentional attack (Konvitz, 1990). But the airpower theorists missed the mark in that prediction too. Instead of leading to panic or paralysis, intentional aerial bombardment of civilians “angered them and increased their resolution” (Nye, 2010: 43; Freedman, 2005: 170). The social reaction to strategic bombardment is just one example of how efforts both to carry out, but also to defend against, such attacks often led to results that were the opposite of what was predicted or intended. One study of the mental-health effects among victims of strategic bombing found that excessive precautionary measures taken in an attempt to prevent the panic and paralysis predicted by theorists did more to “weaken society’s natural bonds and, in turn, create anxious and avoidant [sic] behavior” than did the actually bombing (Jones et al., 2006: 57). Similarly, in cases of intentional, self-inflicted blackouts, fear of what might happen to society were the power grid to fail led to a self-inflicted lack of power that not only did not have the desired military effect but may also have been an example of excessive, counterproductive precaution (Nye, 2010: 65).

#### Empirically proven.

Lawson, ‘11

[Sean, Phd in Science and Technology Studies -- Department of Communication at the University of Utah, Associate National Security Analyst with DynCorp Systems & Solutions, WORKING PAPER BEYOND CYBER-DOOM: Cyberattack Scenarios and the Evidence of History January 2011 No. 11-01 Mercatus Center George Mason University]

The empirical evidence provided to us from historians and sociologists about the impacts of infrastructure disruption, both intentional and accidental, as well as peoples’ collective response to disasters of various types, calls into question the kinds of projections one finds in the cyber-doom scenarios. If the mass destruction of entire cities from the air via conventional and atomic weapons generally failed to deliver the panic, paralysis, technological and social collapse, and loss of will that was intended, it seems unlikely that cyberattack would be able to achieve these results. It also seems unlikely that a “cyber-9/11” or a “cyber-Katrina” would result in the loss of life and physical destruction seen in the real 9/11 and Katrina. And if the real 9/11 and Katrina did not result in social or economic collapse, nor to a degradation of military readiness or national will, then it seems unlikely that their “cyber” analogues would achieve these results.

### Nuclear Terrorism

#### **No impact -- the risk of a successful attack is highly improbable.**

Mueller 7 – PhD in political science from UCLA, professor of political science at Ohio State University (John Mueller, “Reactions and Overreactions to Terrorism: The Atomic Obsession”, American Political Science Association, July 24, 2007, http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSA2007.PDF)//MG

In the case of nuclear terrorism, an approach that seems to have some appeal is to begin by assessing the barriers that must be surmounted by a terrorist group in order to carry out the task of producing and then successfully detonating an improvised nuclear device-- one that would be, as Allison notes, "large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient" (2004, 97). Table 1 presents some 25 of these, and there are surely many more. If one assumes that the terrorists have in each instance a fighting chance of 50 percent of surmounting each of these obstacles--and for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are far, far worse than that--the chances a group could successfully pull off the mission come out to be very considerably worse than one in 33 million, a result they might just find a bit uninspiring, even dispiriting.

### A2 Build Nukes

#### Terrorists can’t build a nuclear device -- too many obstacles.

Mueller 7 – PhD in political science from UCLA, professor of political science at Ohio State University (John Mueller, “Reactions and Overreactions to Terrorism: The Atomic Obsession”, American Political Science Association, July 24, 2007, http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSA2007.PDF)//MG

It is essential to note, however, that making a bomb is an extraordinarily difficult task. As the Gilmore Commission, a special advisory panel to the President and Congress, stresses, building a nuclear device capable of producing mass destruction presents "Herculean challenges." The process requires obtaining enough fissile material, designing a weapon "that will bring that mass together in a tiny fraction of a second, before the heat from early fission blows the material apart," and figuring out some way to deliver the thing. And it emphasizes that these merely constitute "the minimum requirements." If each is not fully met, the result is not simply a less powerful weapon, but one that can't produce any significant nuclear yield at all or can't be delivered (Gilmore 1999, 31, emphasis in the original). Similarly a set of counterterrorism and nuclear experts interviewed in 2004 by Dafna Linzer for the Washington Post pointed to the enormous technical and logistical obstacles confronting would-be nuclear terrorists, and to the fact that neither al Qaeda nor any other group has come close to demonstrating the means to overcome them. Allison nonetheless opines that a dedicated terrorist group could get around all the problems in time and eventually steal, produce, or procure a "crude" bomb or device, one that he however acknowledges would be "large, cumbersome, unsafe, unreliable, unpredictable, and inefficient" (2004, 97). In his recent book, Atomic Bazaar: The Rise of the Nuclear Poor, William Langewiesche spends a great deal of time and effort assessing the process by means of which a terrorist group could come up with a bomb. Unlike Allison, he concludes that it "remains very, very unlikely. It's a possibility, but unlikely." Also: The best information is that no one has gotten anywhere near this. I mean, if you look carefully and practically at this process, you see that it is an enormous undertaking full of risks for the would-be terrorists. And so far there is no public case, at least known, of any appreciable amount of weapons-grade HEU [highly enriched uranium] disappearing. And that's the first step. If you don't have that, you don't have anything.

More ev -- the process is too complicated.

Mueller 7 – PhD in political science from UCLA, professor of political science at Ohio State University (John Mueller, “Reactions and Overreactions to Terrorism: The Atomic Obsession”, American Political Science Association, July 24, 2007, http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSA2007.PDF)//MG

Building a bomb of one's own - Since they are unlikely to be able to buy or steal a useable bomb and since they are further unlikely to have one handed off to them by an established nuclear state, terrorists would need to manufacture the device themselves. Because of the dangers and difficulties of transporting and working with plutonium, a dedicated terrorist group, it is generally agreed, would choose to try to use highly enriched uranium (Keller 2002; Linzer 2004; Allison 2004, 96-97; Goldstein 2004, 131-32; Wirz and Egger 2005, 500; Langewiesche 2007, 21-23). 6 The goal would be to get as much of this stuff as necessary (more than 100 pounds is required to reach critical mass) and then fashion it into an explosive. 7 Most likely this would not be a bomb that can be dropped or hurled, but rather an "improvised nuclear device" (IND) that would be set off at the target by a suicidal detonation crew. The process is a daunting one, and it requires that a whole cascade of events click perfectly and in sequence. To begin with, stateless groups are simply incapable of manufacturing the required fissile material for a bomb since the process requires an enormous industrial process (Allison 2004; Langewiesche 2007, 20; Perry et al. 2007). Moreover, they are unlikely to be supplied with the material by a state for the same reasons a state is unlikely to give them a workable bomb. Thus, they would need to steal or illicitly purchase this crucial material.

### A2 Loose Nukes

#### No risk of loose nukes.

Mueller 7 – PhD in political science from UCLA, professor of political science at Ohio State University (John Mueller, “Reactions and Overreactions to Terrorism: The Atomic Obsession”, American Political Science Association, July 24, 2007, http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSA2007.PDF)//MG

Stealing or buying a bomb: loose nukes. There has been a lot of worry about "loose nukes," particularly in post-Communist Russia--weapons, "suitcase bombs" in particular, that can be stolen or bought illicitly. However, when asked, Russian nuclear officials and experts on the Russian nuclear programs "adamantly deny that al Qaeda or any other terrorist group could have bought Soviet-made suitcase nukes." They further point out that the bombs, all built before 1991, are difficult to maintain and have a lifespan of one to three years after which they become "radioactive scrap metal" (Badken 2004). Similarly, a careful assessment of the concern conducted by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has concluded that it is unlikely that any of these devices have actually been lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be very low or even non-existent b7ecause they require continual maintenance (2002, 4, 12; see also Langewiesche 2007, 19). It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory since it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups, particularly, of course, Chechen ones with whom it has been waging an vicious on-and-off war for over a decade. Officials there insist that all weapons have either been destroyed or are secured, and the experts polled by Linzer (2004) point out that "it would be very difficult for terrorists to figure out on their own how to work a Russian or Pakistan bomb" even if they did obtain one because even the simplest of these "has some security features that would have to be defeated before it could be used" (see also Langewiesche 2007, 19; Wirz and Egger 2005, 502). One of the experts, Charles Ferguson, stresses “You'd have to run it through a specific sequence of events, including changes in temperature, pressure and environmental conditions before the weapon would allow itself to be armed, for the fuses to fall into place and then for it to allow itself to be fired. You don't get off the shelf, enter a code and have it go off. Moreover, continues Linzer, most bombs that could conceivably be stolen use plutonium which emits a great deal of radiation that could relatively easily be detected by passive sensors at ports and other points of transmission. The government of Pakistan, which has been repeatedly threatened by al Qaeda, has a similar very strong interest in controlling its nuclear weapons and material. It is conceivable that stolen bombs, even if no longer viable as weapons, would be useful for the fissile material that could be harvested from them. However, Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland's Spiez Laboratory, point out that even if a weapon is not completely destroyed when it is opened, its fissile material yield would not be adequate for a primitive design, and therefore several weapons would have to be stolen and then opened successfully (2005, 502).

### A2 States Give Nukes

#### States won’t assist -- too many risks, empirical proof.

Mueller 7 – PhD in political science from UCLA, professor of political science at Ohio State University (John Mueller, “Reactions and Overreactions to Terrorism: The Atomic Obsession”, American Political Science Association, July 24, 2007, http://psweb.sbs.ohio-state.edu/faculty/jmueller/APSA2007.PDF)//MG

Assistance by a state A favorite fantasy of imaginative alarmists envisions that a newly nuclear country will palm off a bomb or two to friendly terrorists for delivery abroad. As Langewiesche stresses, however, this is highly improbable because there would be too much risk, even for a country led by extremists, that the ultimate source of the weapon would be discovered (2007, 20). Moreover, there is a very considerable danger the bomb and its donor would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve (including on the donor itself). It is also worth noting that, although nuclear weapons have been around now for well over half a century, no state has ever given another state--even a close ally, much less a terrorist group--a nuclear weapon (or chemical, biological, or radiological one either, for that matter) that the recipient could use independently. For example, during the Cold War, North Korea tried to acquire nuclear weapons from its close ally, China, and was firmly refused (Oberdorfer 2005; see also Pillar 2003, xxi). There could be some danger from private (or semi-private) profiteers, like the network established by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. However, its activities were rather easily penetrated by intelligence agencies (the CIA, it is very likely, had agents within the network), and the operation was abruptly closed down in 2004 (Langewiesche 2007, 169-72). In addition, al Qaeda--the chief demon group--is unlikely to be trusted by just about anyone. As Peter Bergen (2007, 19) has pointed out, the terrorist group's explicit enemies list includes not only Christians and Jews, but all Middle Eastern regimes; Muslims who don't share its views; most Western countries; the governments of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Russia; most news organizations; the United Nations; and international NGOs. Most of the time it didn't get along all that well even with its host in Afghanistan, the Taliban government (Burke 2003, 150, 164-65; Wright 2006, 230-1, 287-88; Cullison 2004).

### Al Qaeda

Al-Qaeda isn’t a threat -- too fractured.

Blair 4/28 – writer for the National Post (David Blair, “’Headless’ Al-Qaeda Weak: Expert”, National Post, April 28, 2012, <http://www.nationalpost.com/related/topics/Headless+Qaeda+weak+expert/6535479/story.html)//MG>

LONDON - Long before U.S. special forces launched the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, his terrorist movement had been gravely weakened by the loss of key figures. The death of al-Qaeda's founder on May 2 last year accelerated its decline into what one official called a "headless" network. The fact that bin Laden met his end in Pakistan also showed how a region once considered al-Qaeda's heartland has become its graveyard. Most of those who planned the attacks on September 11 have succumbed to the most intense counter-terrorism campaign in history, with regular missile strikes by U.S. Predator drones taking the heaviest toll. Ayman al-Zawahiri, bin Laden's official successor, is one of the few surviving members of his original circle. Exactly how many members of "core al-Qaeda" have been eliminated is kept secret, but Tobias Feakin, the director of national security at the Royal United Services Institute in London, estimated that 80% had been killed or captured. Bin Laden's demise has made al-Qaeda "a lot more rudderless," added Mr. Feakin. "It's difficult to see how they're going to recover from this. The old guard have been killed off or arrested and you don't see anyone stepping into that space." Today, al-Qaeda is best understood as a brand name attaching to an array of fragmented groups. Command and control by a hierarchical leadership has become virtually impossible.

#### Al-Qaedas weak -- internal divisions, lack of leadership.

CBS News 11- cites National Security Analyst Juan Zarate (“Expert: Al-Qaeda ‘weaker than we thought’”, CBS News, June 9, 2011, <http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500202_162-20070262.html)//MG>

CBS News National Security Analyst Juan Zarate said on "The Early Show" the trove of information has revealed al Qaeda is "weaker than we had perhaps thought." According to two U.S. officials who spoke to the press on the condition of anonymity, the CIA-led team of data analysts, cyber experts and translators is "95 percent done" decrypting and translating the material collected from a journal, computers, hard drives and thumb drives. Those officials say they expect the job to be finished by the middle of the month. As for what the U.S. has learned, Zarate said counter-terrorism efforts have been stepped up, and there are "internal divisions we can play on" going forward. According to U.S. officials cited in an Associated Press report, the information at the political compound showed a type of office politics, with various members of the hierarchy weighing in and sometimes back-stabbing each other in attempts to vie for the bin Laden's attention and work the system. Sources: CIA "95% done" reading bin Laden files And now, with their leader gone, Zarate told co-anchor Erica Hill, "American officials want to break the back of al Qaeda leadership at a moment where they're very weak." In fact, Zarate said, a recent video of al Qaeda's longtime No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahri, may be an indication of that weakness. In the message, al-Zawahri does not profess to be the new leader of the movement. Zarate called the absence of a takeover "quite significant." "The fact that Ayman al-Zawahri has not been named the new leader of al Qaeda suggests that there are internal divisions within al Qaeda leadership and movement," Zarate explained. "Zawahri is not necessarily well-liked, not charismatic. Bin Laden was the founder, the glue of this movement. And the fact that you haven't seen a new leader emerge really does suggest that there are internal fissures and friction within the al Qaeda leadership." However, it's not only the lack of what Zawahri says, but what he does say that indicates a fragility of the al Qaeda effort in the world. The terrorist organization's No. 2 eulogizes bin Laden and promises a reprisal for his death. However, while Zawahri says America should still be terrified, Zarate said he's also using the video message to try and "buck up" remaining followers. "He is ... trying to build up the morale of the al Qaeda faithful," Zarate said. "The loss of bin Laden was a huge blow to the movement."

#### That prevents a successful attack.

Friedman 8 – PhD in political science, affiliate of the Social Securities Program at MIT, research fellow for defense and security studies at the CATO Institute (Benjamin H. Friedman, “The Terrible ‘Ifs’”, The Cato Institute, and winter 2008, <http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv30n4/v30n4-1.pdf)//MG>

Large-scale terrorism requires not only hatred but also organization. Only hierarchical organizations reliably store knowledge and distribute it via training and divide labor to achieve complex goals. Harassed by vigilant intelligence agencies, al-Qaeda is today less an organization than a movement of like-minded individuals who are at best loosely linked and distributed among decentralized organizations and fellow-travelers. Al-Qaeda and its allies have managed only a series of conventional bombings abroad since September 11. They appear too disorganized to launch further complex attacks on that scale, let alone the apocalyptic nightmares that we have been told to expect. Because the potential cost of terrorists’ acquiring nuclear or biological weapons is so high, we should work hard to prevent the remote possibility. But we must consider that remoteness when we evaluate our nonproliferation policies.